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No. 95-070 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1995 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

KATHLEEN A. KOVASH, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

MYRON J. KOVASH, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin, 

The Honorable Thomas A. Olson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Mark P. Yeshe, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Derik Pomeroy, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana 

K. Amy Pfeifer, Attorney at Law, Department of 

Social and Rehabilitation Services, Helena, Montana 

(Attorney for Child Support Enforcement Division) 

Todd R. Hillier, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana 

(Attorney for Guardian Ad Litem) 

Bruce E. Becker, Attorney at Law, Livingston, 

Montana (Attorney for Jeffrey Kovash) 

Submitted on Briefs: June 20, 1995 

Decided: July 25, 1995 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Appellant Myron Kovash appeals the visitation schedule issued 

sua sponte by the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin 

County. We affirm. 

The sole issue on appeal is: 

Did the District Court err when it issued a visitation 

schedule sua sponte? 

The parties were divorced in 1992. They have four minor 

children. Myron resides in Livingston, Montana, and respondent, 

Kathleen Kovash, resides in Kellogg, Idaho. In the divorce decree, 

Kathleen was granted sole custody. Myron's visitation rights were 

to be terminated if he failed to comply with certain conditions in 

the decree. The first visitation schedule issued by the District 

Court covered the period from August 31, 1992, through July 31, 

1993. In September 1993, the two older children began residing 

with Myron in Montana, while the two younger children stayed with 

Kathleen in Idaho. The subsequent visitation schedules concern the 

two younger children. The second visitation schedule covered the 

period from December 26, 1993, through January 2, 1994. The third 

visitation schedule covered the period from April 1, 1994, through 

August 19, 1994. 

In the fall of 1994, the District Court requested the Guardian 

Ad Litem to submit a recommendation concerning visitation. After 

she submitted her recommended visitation schedule to the District 

Court, it issued an order containing the current visitation 

schedule. The current visitation schedule covers the period of 

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December 16, 1994, through August 26, 1995. Myron bases his appeal 

on this last visitation schedule. 

ISSUE 

Did the District Court err when it issued a visitation 

schedule sua sponte? 

Our standard of review for a district court's decision 

concerning visitation is whether it abused its discretion. In re 

Marriage of Hunt (1994), 264 Mont. 159, 164, 870 P.2d 720, 723, 

(citing In re Marriage of Anderson (1993), 260 Mont. 246, 252, 859 

P.2d 451, 454). 

Myron argues that the District Court violated § 40-4-217(1), 

MCA, when it denied his proposed visitation schedule and issued its 

own without a hearing. 

The proper statute governing a district court's continuing 

jurisdiction over visitation is § 40-6-118, MeA. 

The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke 

a judgment or order: 

(2) with respect to matters listed in 40-6-116(3) 

Relevant portions of § 40-6-116, MCA, state that: 

(1) The judgment or order of the court determining the 

existence or nonexistence of the parent child 

relationship is determinative for all purposes. 

(3) (a) The judgment or order may contain any other 

provision directed against the appropriate party to the 

proceeding concerning the custody and guardianship of the 

child, visitation privileges with the child . . . or any 

other matter in the best interest of the child. 

(Emphasis added.) 

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.. 

In the instant situation, Myron had the hearing required by 

§ 40-4-217, MCA, before his visitation rights were terminated in 

the decree of dissolution. The District Court suspended that 

termination of visitation pursuant to Myron's compliance with 

certain conditions. The District Court has continuing jurisdiction 

to monitor Myron's compliance with those conditions and to grant 

visitation accordingly. The visitation that Myron has enjoyed did 

not change his status. He is still a parent with terminated 

visitation rights. That status has merely been suspended by the 

District Court based on Myron's compliance with the conditions in 

the decree of dissolution. Pursuant to §§ 40-6-118 and -116 (3) (a) , 

MCA, the District Court has continuing jurisdiction to issue 

visitation schedules in conjunction with Myron's compliance with 

those conditions. 

We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 

when it issued the current visitation schedule sua sponte. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as 

precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document 

with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result 

to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company. 

'-.,. -- (i, ( r (', Y i /i'~/-'! I,! ·'-it:l~·/ / 

Justice 

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We concur: 

<-' -' 

) Chief Justice 

Nf~L 

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... .. , , 

Justice James C. Nelson specially concurs. 

I concur in the result of our opinion, but not in its 

rationale. I would hold that the District Court erred ln not 

holding a hearing on modification of the custody order, but would 

also hold that the error was harmless given that the order entered 

by the court substantially complied with the proposed visitation 

requested by Myron and in view of the recommendation of the 

guardian ad litem. 

More importantly, we do not cite any authority for our 

application of §§ 40-6-118 and 40-6-116, MCA, which are part of the 

Uniform Parentage Act, Title 40, Chapter 6, part 1, MCA, to the 

modification of custody issue in this marriage and divorce case. 

In that respect, I note that neither party has argued the 

application of those statutes to this dispute, and I have strong 

reservations about whether either statute is appropriately applied 

here. Under the circumstances, I would not decide this case on the 

basis of those statutes. 

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