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27–163PDF 2017

IRAN BALLISTIC MISSILES AND INTERNATIONAL

SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT ACT; AND

TAIWAN TRAVEL ACT

MARKUP

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H.R. 1698 and H.R. 535

OCTOBER 12, 2017

Serial No. 115–71

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHE H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

MARKUP ON 

H.R. 1698, To expand sanctions against Iran with respect to the ballistic 

missile program of Iran, and for other purposes ............................................... 2

Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1698 offered by the 

Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs .............. 22

Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 

1698 offered by: 

The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Ohio ................................................................................ 42

The Honorable Ron DeSantis, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Florida ............................................................................ 45

The Honorable Bradley S. Schneider, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Illinois ................................................................... 46

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of California ....................................................................... 47

The Honorable Brad Sherman .............................................................. 49

The Honorable Lee M. Zeldin, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New York ....................................................................... 53

H.R. 535, To encourage visits between the United States and Taiwan at 

all levels, and for other purpose ......................................................................... 54

APPENDIX 

Markup notice .......................................................................................................... 76

Markup minutes ...................................................................................................... 77

Markup summary .................................................................................................... 79

(1)

IRAN BALLISTIC MISSILES AND 

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT 

ACT; AND TAIWAN TRAVEL ACT 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. The committee will come to order. 

Pursuant to notice, we meet today to mark up two bipartisan 

measures. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements or extraneous materials on today’s business. 

As members were notified yesterday, we intend to consider today’s measures en bloc and so without objection the following items 

previously provided to members and also in your packets will be 

considered en bloc and are considered as read: H.R. 1698, the Iran 

Ballistic Missiles and Sanctions Enforcement Act, including the 

Royce Amendment 36 in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1698, 

Chabot Amendment Number 3, DeSantis Amendment Number 57, 

Schneider Amendment Number 2, Sherman Amendment Number 

30, Sherman Amendment Number 31, Zeldin Amendment Number 

32; and H.R. 535, the Taiwan Travel Act as introduced. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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lli'im CONGRESS 

hl'l' 8BSSIOJ\ H. R. 1698 

To ""'1Jaml smwtions against Iran with resped, to the ballisti<· missile progTam 

of Iran, and Cor other purposes. 

II\ THE HOUSE OP HEPRESE)JTATlVES 

MARCH 23, 2017 

}Ir RoYCE of California (for himself. Mr. EKGEL, }Ir. JliicCAB.THY, and Jliir. 

I IOYKR) introchJCccl the follovv~ng bilL whirh was referred to the Committee on Foreign },ffairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financ·ial Services, the Judiciary, ·ways and Means, and Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 

in each case for consideration of surl1 prov~sions as fall \\~thin the jurisdi<•tiqn of the <·ouunittee FoneernPd 

A BILL 

To e11.11and smwtions against Iran with respeet to the hHllistie 

missile program of Iran, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represcnta2 fives ofthe Unded States of/hnerica Z:n 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the "Iran Ballistic Missiles 

5 and International Sanetione; Enfon,ernent Aef'. 
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2 

1 SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOV2 ERNM:ENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BAL3 LISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, 

4 AND TECHNOLOGIES. 

5 (a) 1<'1!\DINGS.-Congress fiuds the following: 

6 (1) United .\fations Security Council Resolution 

7 22:11 (2015)-

8 (A) calls upon Iran "not to undertake any 

9 activity related to ballistic missiles desig11ed to 

10 be capable of delivering mwlear weapons, in11 eluding launches using such ballistic missile 

12 technology": and 

13 (B) calls upon member states to "take the 

14 necessary measures to prevent, except as de15 cided otherwise by the UN Security Couneil in 

16 advanee on a case-by-case basis, the supply, 

17 ~mle, or transfer of arms or related materiel 

18 from Iran". 

19 (2) The United States maintains bilateral sanc20 tions against Iran for its efforts to manufacture, ae21 quire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use 

22 ballistic missiles or ballistie missile laund1 tedl23 nology. and its acquisition of destabilizing t.n)es and 

24 amounts of conventional weapons. 

25 (3) According to the 2016 Worldwide Threat 

26 Assessment, the United States intelligence eommu-
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nity judg-es "that Tehran >vould ehom.;e hallisti(~ mis2 siles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear 

3 weapons, if it builds them. Iran's hallisti(~ missiles 

4 are inherently eapable of delivering l wea pous of 

5 mass destruetionl, and Tehran already has the larg6 est iuveutory of ballistic. missiles in the Middle East. 

7 Iran's progress on space launch vehicles-along vv:ith 

8 its desire to deter the T~nited States and its allies9 provides Tehran '''ith the means and motivation to 

10 develop longer-range missiles, ineluding TCDYfs.". 

11 ( 4) Sinec the passage of U nitcd 1\ ations Secu12 rity Council 22:31, Iran has conducted numerous 

13 tests of hallistie missiles designeil to be eapable of 

14 delivering nuclear weapons, and has aequired desta15 hilizing t)1les of eonventional weapons. 

16 ( 5) lnm has pursued the ability to indigenously 

17 produce ballistic missile and cruise missile goods, 

18 scrv1ces. aud technologies. 

19 (b) 8TATEMEKT OF POLICY.-It is the policy of the 

20 United States to prevent Iran from undertaking any activ--

21 ity related to ballistie missiles designed to be eapable of 

22 delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such 

23 ballistic missile technology. 

24 (e) REPORT ON SUPPIN CflAJN OF IRA_'J'S BALLISTIC 

25 lVfTSSTHjj PRocm.AM.-
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4 

(1) IN cmNERAL.-Not later than 90 days after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 

3 shall submit to the appropriate eongressional eorn4 mittees a report that contains the following: 

5 (A) An analysis of the foreig11 and domes6 tic supply chain in Iran that direetly or indi7 rectly significantly facilitates, supports. or oth8 envise aids the GowTnment of Iran's ballistic 

9 missile program. 

l 0 (B) A description of the geographic. dis11 tribution of the foreign and domestic supply 

12 chain described in subparagraph (A). 

13 (C) An asses~-nnent of the Government of 

14 Iran's ability to indigenously manufac-ture or 

15 otherv>ise prodm·.e the goods, seni(~es, or tedl16 nology neeessary to support its ballistic missile 

17 program. 

18 (D) An identifieation of foreign persons 

19 that have. based on credible information, di20 rectly or indirectly facilitated or supported the 

21 development of the Government of Iran's bal22 listie missile program, including the foreign and 

23 domestic supply chaiu described in subpara24 graph (A). 
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5 

(2) FcmM.-The report required under para2 graph ( 1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 

3 hut may <~ontain a dassifie!l annex. 

4 (d) l.KVESTIGATIONS.-Sectiou ( 4)(e) of the lnm 

5 Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public TJaw 1 04-172; 50 U.S.C. 

6 1701 note) is amended by inserting "or 5(b)" after "sec7 tion 5(a)'' each place it appears. 

8 (e) SANCTIONABLE ACTIViTIES \VITH RESPECT TO 

9 \VEAPONS OF }TASS DESTRUCTION.-Paragraph (1) of 

10 section 5(h) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public 

11 Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amendcd12 ( 1) in the heading, by striking "E:.'(PORTS, 

13 THA_c,SFERS, ,~'ID TKlliSSHIP:.\IENTS" and inserting 

14 "\VEAPONS OF JYL~SS DESTHUCTION; BALLISTIC MIS15 BILES; CONVE~TIONAL \\'EArONS"; 

16 (2) by striking "l:<Jxcept as" and inserting the 

17 following: 

18 "(A) WEAPONS 01'' lvL~SS DES'l'fWC'l'lON.-

19 Exeept as"; 

20 (3) by striking "(A) on or after the date of the 

21 enaetment of the Iran Threat Reduetion and S,yr:ia 

22 Human Rights Aet of 2012'' and inserting the fol23 lowing: 
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2 

3 

() 

"(i) on or after the date of the enadment of the Iran Ballistic Missiles and 

International Sanetions Enforeement Aet"; 

4 ('±) striking "and" at the end of subpara5 graph (A)(i) so redesig11atedl; 

6 ( 5) by striking " (B) knevv" and inserting the 

7 following: 

8 "(ii) knew": 

9 ( 6) by striking " ( i) the eA.'J)ort" and inserting 

l 0 the following: 

11 "(l) the export"; 

12 (7) by striking "would likely" and inserting 

13 "may"; 

14 ( 8) by striking " ( ii) the eA.l)Ort" and inserting 

15 the following: 

16 "(ll) the export"; 

17 (9) by striking "(I) acquire'' and inserting the 

18 follovviHg: 

19 "(aa) acquire"; 

20 (1 0) by striking ": or'' at the end of subpara21 graph (A)(ii)(II)(aa) (as so redesignated); 

22 ( 11) by inserting after subparagraph 

23 (A)(ii)(II)(aa) (as so redesignated) the following: 
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"(bh) ae<plire or develop hal2 listie missiles or ballistic missile 

3 l;mneh teehnologie14; or"; 

4 (12) by striking "(ll) acquire" and inserting 

5 the following: 

6 "(cc) acquire"; 

7 (1:3) by striking the period at the end of sub8 paragraph (A)(ii)(II) ( ee) 1-\0 rede14ignated) aml 

9 insetting "; and": and 

10 (14) by adding at the end of subparagTaph (A) 

11 the following: 

12 "(iii) knovv~ngly e:q)orts or transfers, 

13 or permits or othenvi14e f;wilitates the 

14 transshipment or re-e:xl)ort of, any goods, 

15 serviees, te(~hnology, or other items to Iran 

16 that materially contributes to the ability of 

17 Iran to18 "(l) acqwre or develop ballistic 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

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missiles or ballistic missile launch 

technologies; or 

"(II) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and t:n)es of advanced coHvcutional wcapous (as such 

term is defined in paragraphs (1) and 

(2) of sectio11 1 G08 of the Iran-Iraq 
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Arms Kon-Proliferation Ad of 

2 1992).". 

3 (f) S&~CTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO 

4 BALLISTIC lVliSSlLES.-Paragraph (1) of section 5(b) of 

5 the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 1 04-172; 50 

6 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended by subsection (c), is fur7 ther amended by adding at the end the follovving: 

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"(B) ADDITIONAL K'i.LLISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, ~~~D TECH~OLOGY.-

''(i) ADDTTTON;\T, AUTTTORTTY.-The 

President shall impose the sanctions described m paragraph (8), (10), or (12) of 

seetion 6(a), as the ease may he, 1vith respect to-

"(I) an ageney or instrumentality 

of the Government of Iran if the 

agency or instrumentality, on or after 

the date of the enaetmcut of this subparagraph, seeks to develop, procure, 

or acquire goods, senices, or technology that materially contributes to 

efforts by the Government of Iran 

with respect to ballistic missile-related 

goods, services, and technologies as 

described in clause (iii); 
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"(II) a foreign per,.;on or an 

agency or instrumentality of a foreign 

state if the person or agen(~y or instrumentality knowingly, on or after 

the date of the enactment of this 

parag-raph, provides material support 

to the Government of Iran that materially r'ontribute,.; to efforts by the 

Government of Iran with respect to 

ballistic missile-related goods, senices, 

and techuolo~ties as described m 

clause (iii); and 

"(III) a foreign per,.;on that the 

President determines lmovv'ingly engages in a signifi(~ant tran,.;e:wtion or 

transaetions with, or provides sig-nificant financial services for, a foreign 

person or an agency or iustrumentality of a foreign state described m 

subclause (T) or (IT) >'Vith respect to 

ballistic missile-related goods, services, 

and technologies as described m 

clause (iii). 

"(ii) DETERMIKATION ON BALI,ISTIC 
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"(I) IN C+ENERAL.-Not later 

than :30 days after the date on which 

the Pre~idt~nt reeeives eredible informaticm that the Government of Iran 

has conducted a test of a ballistic missile, the President shall submit to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

Honse of Repre~entative~ and the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of 

the Senate a determination of whether 

or not the test of such missile fails to 

eomply with, \~olates, or is in defianee 

of United ::-iation~ Se(mrity Couneil 

Resolution 22:31 (2015). 

"(II) REPORT.-

lN GENERA.L.-lf the 

President determines pursuant to 

subclause (l) that the test of a 

ballistic missile fails to eomply 

with, \~olates, or is in defiance of 

United ::-lations Seeurity Council 

Resolution 22:31 (2015), the 

President shall trausmit to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

the House of Representatives and 
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the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 

that-

"(A._i~) identifies each 

Iranian person that the 

President determines is responsible for ordering, controlling, or othervvise dired,-

ing the missile test described 

in subclause (T); 

"(BB) detennines 

whether the persons de-

~wrilw!l m suh-item (AA) 

have been designated for 

their adivities in support of 

lnm's ballistic missile program, and if not, so designated, the reasons therefor; and 

"(CC) describes the 

steps the President is taking 

to respond to the ballistic 

missile test described in subclause (I). 
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"(bh) Fomu.-The report 

required by item (aa) shall be 

submitted in undassified form, 

but may contain a classified 

annex. 

"(iii) Et't'ORTS BY THE GOVElU\NlK~\1' 

OF IR~'.J" \\'ITH RESPECT TO Billii,ISTIC 

JVIISSILE-BEh~TED C+OODS, SERVICES, AND 

TECHNOLOGIES DESCiciBED.-For purposes of subclauses (I) and (II) of clause 

(i), efforts by the Govenunent of Iran with 

respeet to ballistic missile-related goods, 

serviees, and teehnolog-ies des(~ribe!l in this 

subseetion are efforts by the Government 

of Iran to nmnufe:wture, ae<plire, possess. 

develop, transport, transfer, test or usc 

ballistic missiles or associated goods, servwcs, or technology by the <Jovennneut of 

Iran in violation of section :3 of Annex B 

of r11ited Kations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), including efforts by the 

Government of Iran to manufacture, acqmre, possess, develop, trausp01t, transfer, 

purchase-
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"(I) goods, servwes, or tedlnologv listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment 

and Technology Anuex of October 8, 

2015, and subsequent rev-isions that 

have been acquired outside of the Procurement \Vorking Group; or 

"(II) goods, serviees, or tedlnology not described in the matter 

preeeding subclause (T) or subelause 

(1) but which nevertheless the President determines would be, if such 

goods, servi('.es, or tedmology vvere 

United States goods, serviees, or teehnology, prohihited for e:-qlOrt to Iran 

because of their poteutial to make a 

material contribution to the development of ballistic missile systems or 

ballistic missile launeh teelmologies. 

"(iv) PmlCTR.RJVmNT vVOR.h!~Ci cmorP 

DEFI~ED.-In clause (iii)(I), the term 

'proeurement vvorking group means the 

Procurement \Vorkiug Group of the Joint 

Commission established under ~bmex IV of 

the applicable provisions in Annex A of 
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3 

14 

1~nited Kations Se(mrit.y Coun(~il Resolution 2231 (2015).". 

8At,CTIOKABLE ACTIV1TIE8 WITH RESPECT TO 

4 COKVEN'l'lONAL WBAPONS.-Paragraph (1) of section 

5 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public TJa:w 104-

6 172; 50 U .S.C. 1701 note), as amended by subsections 

7 (e) and (f), is further amended by adding at the end the 

8 follmving: 

9 "(C) CO~VENTIONAL YVEAPONS.-The 

l 0 President shall impose the sanctions described 

11 in paragraph (8) or (12) of section G(a), as the 

12 case may be, vvith respect to a foreign person 

13 or an ageney or instrumentality of a foreign 

14 state if the President determines that the per15 son or ageney or instrumentality knmvingly, on 

16 or after the date of the enactment of this para17 graph, imports, exports, or re-ex1)orts to, into, 

18 or from Iran, whether directly or indirectly, any 

19 signifieant arms or related materiel prohibited 

20 under Annex D of rnited Nations Seeurity 

21 Council Resolution 22;31 (2015 ).". 

22 (h) EXCEPTIO~ ~'li'-.TD DEFIKITIONS.-Paragraph (1) 

23 of section 5 (b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public 

24 Law 104-172: 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended by suh-
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sedions (e), (f), and (g), 1s further amended hy adding 

2 at the end the follmving: 

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"(D) EXC:E:PTIO;.J.-The President may not 

impose sanctions under subparagraph (B) or 

(C) w"ith respect to a foreign person or a rnited 

States persou if the President determines that 

the person has exercised clue diligence in establishing and enforeing offieial poli<~ies, pro(~edures, and controls to ensure that the person 

does not sell, supply, or transfer to or from 

Iran materials the sale, supply, or transfer of 

\vhich would subject a person to the imposition 

of sanetions under snhparagn1ph (B) or (C), as 

the ease may be, or conduct or facilitate a finaneial transa(·tion for sud1 a sale, supply, or 

transfer. 

"(E) DEFIKITION8.-In subparagraphs 

(B) and of this paragraph: 

" ( i) AGENCY OR INSTRUlVIENTALTTY.-The term 'agency or instrumentality' has the meaning given such term in 

section 1603(b) of title 28, United States 

Code. 

"(ii) FOREIGN STATE.-The term 

'foreign state' has the meaning given such 
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term in se<~tion 1600(a) of title 2R, rnited 

States Code. 

"(iii) (i()\7ERNMEKT OF IR~~.-The 

term 'Government of Iran' has the meaning given such term in section 561.404 of 

title 31, Code of J:i'ederal Hegulatious, as 

such section was in effect on .January 1, 

2016. 

"(iv) SIGNIFIC~'JT TRANSACTIO~ OR 

TRANS;\CTTO~S; STUKTFTC1\NT FINANCIAL 

11 SERVICES.-The tenns 'significant traus12 action or transactions' and 'sig11ificant fi13 naneial serviees' shall he determine!l, for 

14 purposes of sections 101 and 102, in ac15 (•ordam~e with sedion 561.404 of title :11, 

16 Code of 11'edcral Regulations, as such scc17 tion 5G1.404 was in effect on .January 1, 

18 2016.". 

19 (i) SAl'\CTIOKS DESCRIBED.-Section 6(a) of the Iran 

20 Sanctions Act of 199G (Public TJaw 1 04-172; 50 U.S.C. 

21 1701 note) is amended22 ( 1) by striking paragraph ( 10) and inserting 

23 the followin~t: 

24 "(10) INADMISSIBILITY TO UNITED STATES.-

25 The President may direct the Secretary of State to 
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deny a visa to, aml the Seeretary of Homdaml Seeu2 rity to exclude from the rnited States and. if the in3 di;;idual has been issued a ~visa or other doenmenta4 ticm, revoke, in aceorclauce with section 221(i) of the 

5 Immigration and Kationality A('t (8 U.S.C. 1201 (i)) 

6 of the visa or other doeumcntatiou any alicu that7 "(A) is designated pursuant to subpara8 graph (B) or (C) of seetion 5(h)(l): or 

9 "(B) the President determines is a corl 0 porate officer or principal of, or a shareholder 

11 with a controlling interest in, a sanctioned per12 son.''; 

13 (2) hy redesignating paragTaph (12) as para14 graph ( 1:3 ); and 

15 (:1) by inserting after paragraph (11) the fol16 lowiug: 

17 "(12) EXPORT SA_t'\CTIO:'-J.-In the case of an 

18 agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, no item 

19 on the United States Munitions List or Commerce 

20 Munitions I Jist may he e;q)orted to that foreign state 

21 for a period of two years.''. 

22 (j) Rur.E OF CONSTRUCTION.-The sanctions that 

23 arc required to be imposed under this section aud the 

24 amendments made by this section are in addition to other 
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lR 

similar or related sanetiom; that are requirea to he un2 posed under any other provision of law. 

3 SEC. 3. REPORT ON SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES. 

4 (a) IN OJ:<JNJ!]J:Llli.-1\ot later than 120 da,ys after the 

5 date of the enartment of this Art, and every 90 days there6 after, the President shall submit to the appropriate eon7 gressional committees a report that contains the follovving 

8 information: 

9 (1) ~\ny credible information regarding Iran's 

10 attempts to develop, procure, or acquire goods, serv11 ices, or tcchnolog,y with respect to which sanctions 

12 may be imposed pursuant to subparagraphs (B) and 

13 (C) of seetion f5(b)(1) of the Iran Smwtions Aet of 

14 1996 (Publie Law 10'1-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), 

15 as added by sed,ion 8 of this Ad,. 

16 (2) Any credible iuformatiou regarding Iran's 

17 aequisition or attempted aequisition of signifieant 

18 arms and related material in violation of paragraph 

19 5 of Annex B of United Kations Seeurity Council 

20 Resolution 2231 (201 

21 ( 3) Any eredible information regarcling Iran's 

22 eJq)ort or attempted e:zq)ort of signifieant arms and 

23 related material in violation of paragraph 5 of 

24 Annex B of United Nations Security Council R.esolu25 tion 2231 (2015). 
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Hl 

( 4) Any approval gnmted hy the Unitea Na2 tions Security Council for the export of significant 

3 arms and related material identified umler para4 graph 5 of Annex B of C uited J\ aticms Security 

5 Council Resolution 22:31 (2015). 

6 (b) PORLVL-'l'he report required by subscctiou 

7 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 

8 a dassifiell annex. 

9 SEC. 4. REGULATORY AUTHORITY. 

10 (a) TK GENF:RAJJ.-The President shall, not later 

11 than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

12 promulgate reg11lations as neeessary for the implementa13 tion of this Aet and the amendments made by this Aet. 

14 (b) KOTIFICATION TO CO~CrRESS.-Not less than 10 

15 !lays before the promulgation of reg1:Uations under snh16 seetion (a), the President shall notit:v the appropriate eon17 gressional committees of the proposed regulations and the 

18 provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this 

19 Act that the regulations are implementing. 

20 SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS. 

21 In this Act: 

22 ( 1) APPROPRIATE CO~GRESSIONAL COJVDIIT23 'l'EES.-The term "appropriate cougressioual com24 mittees" means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
21


27163b-20.eps

20 

the House of Representatives aml the Committee on 

2 Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

3 (2) CREDIBLE INFORJYL~TION.-The term "ered4 ible information" has the meaning g-iven such term 

5 in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1 996 

6 (Public Law 104-172; 50 L.S.C. 1701 note). 

7 (:3) GUVERl'<IVIEKT OF IR<L'f.-The term "Gov8 ernment of Iran" has the meaning given sneh term 

9 in section 561.404 of title :31, Code of Federal Regl 0 ulations, as SU('h section was in effect on ,J a11uary 1, 

11 2016. 

'\__) 
22


27163c-1.eps

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 

TO H.R. 1698 

OFFERED BY MR. ROYCE OF CALIFORNIA 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 

follovving: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Ad may be (~ited as the "Tra11 Ballistie Missiles 

3 and International Sanctions Enforcement Act:'. 

4 SEC. 2. SANCTIONS RELATING TO EFFORTS BY THE GOV5 ERNMENT OF IRAN WITH RESPECT TO BAL6 LISTIC MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERVICES, 

7 AND TECHNOLOGIES. 

8 (a) FINDI~Gs.-Congn~ss finds the following: 

9 (1) United Nations Security Council Resolution 

10 22::n (2015)-

11 (A) calls upon Iran "not to undertake any 

12 activity related to ballistic missiles designed to 

13 be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, in14 eluding launches using such ballistic missile 

15 technology':; and 

16 (B) requires member states to "take the 

1 7 necessary measures to prevent, except as de18 cided otherwise by the UN Security Council in 
23


27163c-2.eps

2 

1 advance on a ease-by-case basis, the supply, 

2 tiale, or trantifer of armti or related materiel 

3 from Iran''. 

4 (2) The United States maintains hilateral san(~-

5 tions against Iran for its efforts to manufacture, ac6 quire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use 

7 ballistic missiles or ballistic missile launch tech8 nology, and its acquisition of destabili~ing types and 

9 amounts of conventional weapons. 

10 (3) According to the 2016 \Vorldwide Threat 

11 ~Assessment, the United States intelligence commu12 nity judges "that Tehran would choose ballistic mis13 silcs as its preferred method of delivering nuclear 

14 weapons, if it builds them. Iran's ballistic missiles 

15 arc inherently capable of delivering [weapons of 

16 mass destruction], and Tehran already has the larg17 est inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. 

18 Iran's progress on space launch vehicles-along vvith 

19 its desire to deter the U11itcd States and its allics20 provides Tehran with the means and motivation to 

21 develop longer-range missileti, induding ICBMti.". 

22 ( 4) Since the passage of United Nations Seeu23 rity Coum•il 2231, Tra11 has eomluc~ted numerous 

24 tests of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of 
24


27163c-3.eps

1 delivering nuclear weapons, and has acquired desta2 hilizing t}1let; of eonventional weapons. 

3 ( 5) Iran has pursued the ability to indigenously 

4 pro(hwe hallit;ti(~ missile and eruise missile goods, 

5 services, and technologies. 

6 (b) STATEME~T OF POLIC'Y.-It is the policy of the 

7 United States to prevent Iran from undertaking any activ8 ity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of 

9 delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such 

10 ballistic missile technology. 

11 (c) HEPORT 0~ SUPPLY CHAlK OF lRA_~'S lL~LISTIC 

12 :YliSSILE PHOGR~'liVl.-

13 (1) I~ GENERAL.-Not later than 180 days 

14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

15 President shall submit to the appropriate congrcs16 sional committees a report that contains the fol17 lowing: 

18 (A) An analysis of the foreign and domes19 tic supply chain in Iran tl1at directly or indi20 rectly significantly facilitates, supports, or oth21 ervvise ai(ls the C+overnment of Iran's ballistic: 

22 missile program. 

23 (B) A deseription of the geogntphie dis24 tribution of the foreign and domestic supply 

25 ehai11 desc•ribed in subparagn1.ph (A). 
25


27163c-4.eps

4 

1 (C) An assessment of the Government of 

2 Iran'ti ability to indigen<nltily manufaeture or 

3 otherwise produce the goods, services, or tech4 nology neeeHHary to Hupport itH halliHti(~ rniHHile 

5 program. 

6 (D) An identification of foreign persons 

7 that have, based on credible information, di8 rectly or indirectly facilitated or supported the 

9 development of the Government of Iran's ball 0 listie missile program, including the foreign and 

11 domestic supply chain described in subpara12 graph (A). 

13 (2) 11'0RM.-'l'he report required under para14 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 

15 but may contai11 a classified a1111ex. 

16 (d) SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES vVITH RESPECT TO 

17 WEAPONS OF ::\1ASS DRSTRUCTTO~.-Paragraph ( 1) of 

18 section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 199G (Public 

19 I mw 1 04-172; 50 C.S.C. 1701 11ote) is amended20 (1) in the heading, by striking "EXPORTS, 

21 TRANSFERS, AND TRANSSHIPMENTS" and inHerting 

22 "vVBAPONS OF MASS DJ<JS'l'RUC'l'ION; BALLlS'l'lC lVllS23 STT,RS; CONVRNTTOKAT, \VRAPONS"; 

24 (2) by striking ''Except as" and inserting the 

25 follovving: 
26


27163c-5.eps

5 

1 "(A) .WEAPONS OF l\TASS DESTRCCTION.-

2 Exeept aR''; 

3 (:3) by striking "(A) on or after the date of the 

4 emwtment of the Iran Threat Redudion and S,yria 

5 Human Rights Act of 2012" and inserting the fol6 lowing: 

7 "(i)(I) on or after the date of the en8 actment of the Iran Ballistic :Yiissiles and 

9 International Sanctions Enforcement Act"; 

10 ( 4) by striking "(B) knew" and inserting the 

11 

12 

follovving: 

13 (5) by striking "(i) the e:A'J)Ort" and inserting 

14 the follovving: 

15 "(aa) the export"; 

16 ( 6) by striking "would likely'' and inserting 

17 "may"; 

18 (7) by striking "(ii) the export" and inserting 

19 

20 

the follovving: 

"(bb) the export"; 

21 (fl) by Htriking "(I) a<~<plire'' aml i1merting the 

22 follovving: 

23 "(AA) ae(1uire"; 

24 (9) by striking "; or" at the end of subpara25 graph (A)(ii)(TT)(bb)(AA) (as so redesigmtted); 
27


27163c-6.eps

6 

1 (10) by inserting after subparagTaph 

2 (A)(ii)(II)(hb)(.AA) (as so redesignated) the fol3 lowing: 

4 "(BB) a(~qmre or develop 

5 ballistic missiles or ballistic mis6 sile launch technologies; or"; 

7 ( 11) by striking "(II) acquire" and inserting 

8 the following: 

9 "(CC) acquire"; 

10 (12) by striking the period at the end of sub11 paragraph (A)(ii)(ll)(bb)(CC) (as so redesig11ated) 

12 and inserting "; or"; and 

13 ( 1:3) by adding at the end of subparagraph (A) 

14 the follovving: 

15 "(ii) k11ovvingly eA.l)Orts or trm1sfers, 

16 or permits or othenvise facilitates the 

17 transshipment or re-eA.l)Ort of, goods, serv18 ices, technology, or other items to Iran 

19 that materially supports Iran's efforts to20 "(I) acquire or develop ballistic 

21 missiles or ballisti(~ missile laun(~h 

22 technologies; or 

23 "(IT) ac•quire or develop desta24 bilizing numbers and types of ad25 vanc•ed c~cmventicmal weapm1s (as sud1 
28


27163c-7.eps

7 

1 term is defined in paragraphs ( 1) and 

2 (2) of t->edion 160R of the Iran-Iraq 

3 Arms :\!"on-Proliferation Act of 

4 1002).". 

5 (e) SAKCTIONM3LE ACTIVITIES \VITH RESPECT TO 

6 B~'lLLISTIC MISSILES.-Paragraph (1) of section 5(b) of 

7 the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 

8 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended by subsection (e), is fur9 ther amended by adding at the end the follovving: 

10 "(B) '"WDITIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE-RE11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

LATED GOODS, SERVICES, ~iliD TECHNOLOGY.-

"(i) ADDI'l'lOl'\lw AU'l'HORI'l'Y.-The 

President shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (8), (10), or (12) of 

section G(a), as the case may be, with respect to-

"(T) m1 agency or instrumentality 

of the Government of Iran if the 

President determines that tl1e agency 

or instrumentality, on or after the 

date of the enaetment of thit-> t->ubparagraph, knowingly seeks to develop, 

proc•ure, or aequire goods, serviees, or 

technology that materially supports 

efforts by the (}overnrnent of Iran 
29


27163c-8.eps

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

8 

vvith respect to ballistic missile-related 

goods, serviees, aml tedmologies as 

described in clause (iii); 

"(II) a foreig11 person or an 

agency or instrumentality of a foreign 

state if the President determines that 

the person or agency or instrumentality knowingly, ou or after the elate 

of the enactment of this paragraph, 

provides significant material support 

to the Government of Iran that supports efforts by the Government of 

Iran with respect to ballistic missilerelated goods, services, and techllologies as deseribed in elause (iii); 

and 

"(ITT) a foreign person that the 

President determines knovvingly engages i11 a significant transaetion or 

transactions w~th, or provides signifi-

(~ant finaneial servH~es for, a foreign 

person or an agency or instrumentality of a foreig11 state desc~ribed m 

subclause (I) or (II) vv~th respeet to 

ballistie missile-related goods, servic•es, 
30


27163c-9.eps

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

9 

and technologies as described m 

dam;e (iii). 

"(ii) DETERl\IIKATION ~iliD REPORT 

OK BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTS.-

''(!) IN GENERAL.-1\ot later 

than 30 days after the date on which 

the President determines that the 

Government of Iran has conducted a 

test of a ballistic missile that fails to 

comply with, violates, or is in defiance 

of United ::-.J ations Security Council 

Resolution 2231 (2015), the President 

shall submit to the Committee on l11oreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

Foreign Relations of the Senate a report that ide11tifies each senior official 

of the Government of Iran that the 

President determines is responsible 

for ordering, controlling, or otherwise 

direeting the mitiHile test 

"(II) FORlVL-The report required by subelause (I) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

c~ontain a elassified annex. 
31


27163c-10.eps

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

10 

"(iii) EFFOitTS BY TilE GUVEitNMENT 

OF IRAK WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC 

:MISSILE-RELATED GOODS, SERv'TCES, AND 

TECHNOLOGIES DESCRIBED.-

''(!) IN GENERAL.-For purposes 

of subclauses (I), (II), and (III) of 

clause (i), and except as provided m 

subclause (II) of this clause, efforts 

by the (}ovcrnmcnt of Iran vvith respect to ballistic missile-related goods, 

services, and technologies described in 

tllis subsection are efforts by the Government of Iran to manufacture, acqmre, possess, develop, transport, 

transfer, test or usc ballistic missiles 

or associated goods, services, or techllology by the Ctovcrnmc11t of Iran, ineluding efforts by the Government of 

I ran to mm1ufacturc, acquire, possess, 

develop, transport, transfer, pur-

(~hatie-

"(aa) goods, services, or 

teehnology listed on the Missile 

Technology Control Regime 

Equipment and Teehnology 
32


27163c-11.eps

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

11 

Annex of October 8, 2015, and 

tiuht·wquent revitiimm that have 

been acquired outside of the Pro-

(mrernent vVorking Group or not 

otherwise approved by the U In ted 

Nations Security Council; or 

'' (bb) goods, services, or 

technology not described in the 

matter preceding item (aa) or 

item ( aa) but which nevertheless 

the President determines would 

be, if such goods, services, or 

technology were United States 

goods, services, or technology, 

prohibited for eA.rport to Iran because of their potential to materially support the development of 

ballistic missile systems or ballistic missile launcl1 technologies. 

"(II) ExCBP'l'lON.-Subclause (I) 

tihall not apply with reNpeet to effortN 

by the Government of Iran vvith respeet to ballistie rnissile-related goods, 

services, and technologies that have 

been approved under paragnt.ph 4 of 
33


27163c-12.eps

1 

2 

3 

4 

12 

Annex B of l~ nited Nations Security 

Couneil Retiolution 22:i1 (2015). 

"(iv) PROCURElVIEKT WORKING GROUP 

DEFINED.-ln daut:;e (iii)(!), the term 

5 'procurement working group' means the 

6 Procurement ~Working Group of the Joint 

7 Commission established under Annex IV of 

8 the applicable provisions in Annex A of 

9 United l\ ations Security Council Rcsolu10 tion 2231 (2015).". 

11 (f) SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WITH HESPECT TO 

12 CONVE~'l'lOKlw WI£"\1-'0KS.-Paragraph (1) of section 

13 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 199G (Public Law 104-

14 172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended by subsections 

15 (c) and (f), is further amended by adding at the end the 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

follovving: 

"(C) CONVRNTTO~AL VlRAPONS.-Thc 

President shall impose the sanctions described 

in paragrapl1 (8) or (12) of section G(a), as the 

case may be, ~with respect to a foreign person 

or an agen(T or intitrumentality of a foreign 

state if the President determines that the person or ageney or instrn mentality knowingly, on 

or after the date of the enactment of this paragTaph, imports, exports, or re-exports to, into, 
34


27163c-13.eps

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

13 

or from Iran, whether directly or indirectly, any 

tiignifieant armti or related materiel prohibited 

under paragraph ( 5) or ( 6) of Annex D of 

United K ationR 8eeurity Comu:il Retiolution 

2231 (2015).". 

6 (g) EXCEPTION AND DEFINITIONS.-Paragraph (1) 

7 of section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public 

8 Law 104--172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended by sub9 sections (c), (f), and (g), is further amended by adding 

10 at the end the following: 

11 "(D) EXCEPTION.-'l'hc President may not 

12 impose sanctions under subparagraph (B) or 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

(C) v1rith respect to a foreign person or a United 

States person if the President determines that 

the person has exercised due diligence i11 establishing and enforcing official policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that the person 

does not sell, supply, or transfer to or from 

Iran materials the sale, supply, or transfer of 

which would subject a person to the imposition 

of tianetionti under tiubparagTa.ph (B) or (C), at; 

the case may be, or conduct or facilitate a finaneial tra11saeticm for sueh a sale, supply, or 

transfer. 
35


27163c-14.eps

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

14 

"(E) DEFINITIONS.-ln subparagraphs 

(B) and (C) of thit-> paragTaph: 

"(i) AGE~CY OR INSTRUJ\IE~-

TALITY.-The term 'ageney or int->trumentality' has the meaning given such term in 

section 1603(b) of title 28, United States 

Code. 

"(ii) FOREIGN STATE.-The term 

'foreign state' has the meaning given such 

term in section 1603(a) of title 28, United 

States Code. 

"(iii) GOVJ<JRNMJ<JN'l' OF lRAN.-The 

term 'Government of Iran' has the meaning given such term in section 560.304 of 

title :31, Code of Federal Regulations, as 

such section was in effect on January 1, 

20Hi. 

"(iv) SIGNIFICANT THANSAC'l'IOK OH 

'l'RANSAC'I'TONS; STG~TFTCAN'l' FTNANCTATJ 

SJ<JIWICES.-The terms 'sig11ificant transw~tion or trant->aetiont->' and 't->igTufi(~ant financial services' shall be determined in aceordanee ~with sed.ion 5()1.404 of title 31, 

Code of Federal Regulations, as such see-
36


27163c-15.eps

15 

1 tion 561.404 was in effect on January 1, 

2 2016.". 

3 (h) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.-Section 6(a) of the 

4 Iran Sanetiom; A<~t of 1006 (Puhli<~ Law 104-172; 50 

5 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended6 ( 1) by striking paragraph ( 10) and inserting 

7 the follovving: 

8 "(10) IKADJVIISSIBILITY TO UKITED STATES.-

9 "(A) l~ GENERAL.-The President may di1 0 rect the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, 

11 and the Secretmy of Homeland Security to ex12 elude from the United States and, if the indi13 vidual has been issued a •.risa or other docu14 mentation, revoke, in accordance vvith section 

15 221 (i) of the Tmmigratim1 and Nationality Act 

16 (8 L".S.C. 1201(i)) of the visa or other docu17 mentation any alien that18 "(i) is desig11ated pursuant to sub19 paragTapll (K) or (C) of section 5(b)(l ); or 

20 "(ii) the President determines is a 

21 eorporate offi<:er or prineipal of, or a 

22 shareholder with a controlling interest in, a 

23 saneticmed person. 

24 

25 

"(B) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY vV1TII 

UNTTRD NATIONS HBJADQUARTRRS AGR.RR-
37


27163c-16.eps

16 

1 ME~T.-Sanetions under subparagraph (A) 

2 tihall not apply to an alien if admitting the alien 

3 into the United States is necessary to permit 

4 the United Statet; to (~omply vvith the AgTee5 ment regarding the Headquarters of the United 

6 K ations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 

7 1947, and entered into force November 21, 

8 1947, between the United ::\1" ations and the 

9 United States, or other applicable international 

10 obligations."; 

11 (2) by redesignating paragraph (12) as para12 graph (13); and 

13 (3) by inserting after paragraph (11) the fol14 lowing: 

15 "(12) EA.t>ORT SAKCTTON.-Tn the ease of an 

16 agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, no item 

17 011 the United States Munitions List or Commerce 

18 Munitions List may be exported to that foreign state 

19 for a period of two years.". 

20 (i) RULE OP CONS'l'lWC'l'lON.-The sanctions that 

21 are required to be impot;ed under thiH t;edion and the 

22 amendments made by this section are in addition to other 

23 similar or related sanetitms that are required to be irn24 posed under any other provision of law. 
38


27163c-17.eps

17 

1 (j) IlviPLEl\IENTATIOK.-The President may exercise 

2 all authoritieR provided under RedionR 20:1 and 205 of the 

3 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 

4 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to <~arry out any amendmentR 

5 made by this section. 

6 (k) EFFECTIVE DATE.-

7 (1) I~ GENERAL.-The amendments made by 

8 this section shall9 (A) take effect on the date of the enact1 0 ment of this Act; and 

11 (B) apply with respect to an activity de12 scribed in subsection (b) of section 5 of the 

13 Iran Sanctions Act of Hl9G, as amended by this 

14 section, that is commenced on or after such 

15 date of enactment. 

16 (2) APPLICM3ILITY TO ONGOING ACTIVITIES RE17 TJATTNG TO CRRTATK ACTTVTTmS.-A person that, 

18 before the date of the enactment of this Act, com19 menced an activity described in section 5(h) of the 

20 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as in effect on the day 

21 before Hueh date of ena<~tment, aml <~<mtinueti the 1W22 tivity on or after such date of enactment, shall be 

23 subjec•t to the pruvisions of the Iran Saneticms Ad 

24 of 1996, as amended by this Act. 
39


27163c-18.eps

18 

SEC. 3. REPORT ON SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES. 

2 (a) IK GR~RRAh-Not later thm1 180 days after the 

3 date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 

4 thereafter for a period not to exceed three years, the Presi5 dent shall submit to the appropriate congressional com6 mittees a report that contains the following information: 

7 (1) Any credible information regarding Iran's 

8 attempts to develop, procure, or acquire goods, serv9 ices, or technology ~with respect to which sanctions 

10 may be imposed pursuant to subparagraphs (B) tmd 

11 (C) of section 5(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 

12 1996 (Public Tm.w 1 04-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), 

13 as added by section 2 of tllis Act. 

14 (2) '"'lily (~redihle information regarding Iran't; 

15 acquisition or attempted acquisition of significant 

16 armH and related material in violation of paragTaph 

17 5 of Annex I3 of l~nited Nations Security Council 

18 ReHolution 22:il (2015). 

19 ( :3) Any credible information regarding Iran's 

20 export or attempted export of significant anns and 

21 related material in violation of paragraph 6 of 

22 Annex B of United Nations Security Couuc~il Resolu23 tion 22:31 (2015). 

24 (4) Any approval granted by the rnited Na25 tions Security Council for the e:A'J)Ort of significant 

26 arms and related material identified under para-
40


27163c-19.eps

19 

1 graphs 5 or 6 of Annex B of United K ations Secu2 rity Couneil Re~mlution 22:n (2015). 

3 (b) FORJVI.-The report required by subsection (a) 

4 Rhall he Huhmitted in unelaHRified form, hut may eontain 

5 a classified annex. 

6 SEC. 4. REGULATORY AUTHORITY. 

7 (a) IN GEJ\~RAL.-The President shall, not later 

8 than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

9 promulgate regulations as necessary for the implementa1 0 tion of this Act and the amendments made by this Act. 

11 (b) NOTIFICATION TO CO~GRESS.-Not less than 10 

12 days before the promulgation of regulations under sub13 section (a), the President shall notifY the appropriate con14 gressional committees of the proposed regulations and the 

15 provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this 

16 Act that the reg·ulations are implementing. 

17 SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS. 

18 In this Act: 

19 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAl, COMMTT20 TJ:<JJ:<JS.-The term "appropriate congressional com21 mitteeR'' meanH the Committee on Foreign '"~ffairH of 

22 the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

23 Foreig11 Relatiom; of the Senate. 

24 (2) CrtEDIDLE nFOitlVIATION.-The term "cred25 ible information'' has the meaning given sueh terrn 
41


27163c-20.eps

20 

1 m section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 19 9 6 

2 (Puhlie Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701note). 

3 (:3) GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.-The term "Gov4 ernment of Iran'' hat-> the meaning given t->U(~h term 

5 in section 560.:304 of title :31, Code of Federal Reg6 ulations, as such section was in effect on January 1, 

7 2016. 
42


27163d-1.eps

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE 

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1698 

OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO 

At the appropriate place, insert the following: 

SEC. . DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPOSI2 TION OF SANCTIONS FOR THE SALE OR 

3 TRANSFER OF DESTABILIZING TYPES AND 

4 AMOUNTS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TO 

5 THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. 

6 (a) NOTIFICATIO~ OF SALES ~WD TI\ANSFEES.-Not 

7 later than 90 dayti after the date on whieh the President 

8 receives credible information that destabilizing numbers 

9 aml t:nles of (:onventiona1 weaponti have heen tiold or 

10 transferred to Iran, the President shall notify the appro11 priate eongTetisional (~onunitteeti of the tiale or trantifer. 

12 (b) DETERMINATIONS \VITH RESPECT TO SANC13 TIO~S.-

14 (1) I~ GENERAL.-Not later than 120 days 

15 after the date on which the President notifies the 

16 appropriate congressional committees of a sale or 

17 transfer under subsection (a), the President shall18 (A) determine whether such sale or trans19 fer meets the requirements to impose sanctions 
43


27163d-2.eps

2 

1 under each prov1s10n of law specified m sub2 tiedion ( <~); and 

3 (D)(i) if the determination is that the sale 

4 or trantifer is suhjed. to any tiueh sanetions, the 

5 President shall6 (I) make a determination whether to 

7 impose or waive such sanctions vvith re8 spect to such sale or transfer; and 

9 (II) submit that determination to the 

10 appropriate congressional committees; or 

11 (ii) if the determination is that the sale or 

12 transfer is not subject to any such sanctions, 

13 the President shall submit to the appropriate 

14 congressional committees a detailed report on 

15 the determination m1d the specific reasons for 

16 the determination. 

17 (2) Fomvr.-The determination m paragraph 

18 ( 1) shall be provided in an unclassified form, and 

19 may cm1tain a classified annex. 

20 (c) PHOVISIONS OP LAW SPJ:<JCH'll:<JD.-The provisions 

21 of law tipe<~ified in thiti ~mhse<:tion are the following: 

22 (1) Section 5(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 

23 199() (50 U.S.C. 1701 11ote). 

24 (2) The Iran-Iraq Arms ::\!"on-Proliferation Act 

25 of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note). 
44


27163d-3.eps

1 (:3) The Iran, Korth Korea, and Syria Non2 proliferation Ad (50 U.S.C. 1701 note). 

3 (d) DEFniTIOKS.-In this section: 

4 (1) DESTABILIZIKG ~UMBERS AND Tl:'PES OF 

5 COJ\v'ENTIONAL INEArOKS.-The term "destabilizing 

6 numbers and types of advanced conventional weap7 ons''-

8 (A) has the meaning given the terms "ad9 vanced conventional weapons" and "cruise mis10 sile" as defined in paragraphs (1) and (2), re11 spectivcly, of section Hi08 of the Iran-Iraq 

12 Arms :\!"on-Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 

13 1701 note); and 

14 (B) includes the S-300 and S-400 missile 

15 defe11se systems and air superiority fighters. 

16 (2) APPROPRL~TE CONGRESSIONliL COMMIT17 TRRS.-The term "appropriate congressional com18 mittees" means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

19 the House of Representatives m1d the Committee on 

20 Foreig11 Relations of the Senate. 
45


27163e.eps

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE 

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1698 

OFFERED BY MR. DESANTIS OF FLORIDA 

Page 17, after line 5, insert the following: 

(k) lMPUjJl\fR~'I'A'I'TOK PLAN.-Not later than ()() 

2 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Presi3 dent shall transmit to the appropriate eongressicmal eorn4 mittees a plan to implementS (1) paragTaph (1) of section 5(b) of the Iran 

6 Sanctions Act of 199() (Public Law 104-172; 50 

7 r.S.C. 1701 note), as amen<led by this seetion; and 

8 (2) section 104 of the Countering America's 

9 Adversaries Through Sanetions AJ~t (Puhlie Law 

10 115-44). 

Page 17, line fi, strike "(k)'' and insert "(l)". 

[g] 
46


27163f.eps

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE 

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1698 

OFFERED BY MR. SCHNEIDER OF ILLINOIS 

At the of section 3 (a), add the following: 

(5) A11y eredible information regarding viola2 tions of travel restrictions described in paragraph 6 

3 of Annex B of United 1\'atiom; Seeurity Couneil Res4 olution 2231 (2015). 

5 (6) Any approval grtmted by the l~nited Na6 tions Security Council for exemptions to the travel 

7 restri<~tions deseribed in paragraph 6 of Annex B of 

8 Lnited Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 

9 (2015). 
47


27163g-1.eps

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE 

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1698 

OFFERED BY MR. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA 

Page 9, line 21, strike "test" and insert the following: ''test. The report should include available information on the ballistic missile or the generic class of ballistic missile or space rocket that was launched: the trajeetory, duration, range, and altitude of the missile flight; 

the duration, range, and altitude of the flight of each 

stage of the missile; the location of the launch point and 

impact point; the payload; and other technical information that is available.". 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

Page 12, after line 10, inse1i the following: 

"(v) ADDITIONAl, RRPORT ON RATr 

LlS'l'lC lVllSSlLE 'l'ES'l'S.-

"(I) IN GRNRRAh-I\ot later 

than January 31 of each calendar 

year, the President should submit to 

the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Foreign Relations of 

the Senate a report that spec~ifies the 
48


27163g-2.eps

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

2 

number and genenc class of ballistic 

miRsiles and spaee roeketR launehed 

by Iran during the preceding calendar 

year and the (lateR of ea(~h missile 

launch and the type of missile 

launched on each relevant date. The 

report should include definitions used 

for classifying the generic classes of 

missiles. 

"(II) FORM.-The report required by subclause (l) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

contain a classified annex.''. 
49


27163h-1.eps

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE 

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1698 

OFFERED BY MR. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA 

Add at the end the following new section: 

SEC. . DETERMINATION ON USE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF 

2 IRAN OF COMMERCIAL PASSENGER AIR3 CRAFT AND RELATED SERVICES FOR ILLICIT 

4 MILITARY OR OTHER ACTIVITIES. 

5 (a) DR'l'RRJVITKA'I'TON.-Not later than 180 days after 

6 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 

7 thereafter for three yean;, the Pretiident shall submit to 

8 the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Fi9 naneial Serviees, and the Permanent Seleet Committee on 

10 Intelligence of the House of Representative and the Com11 mittee on Foreign Relationti, the Committee on Banking, 

12 Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee 

13 on Intelligence of the Senate a determination on use by 

14 the Government of Iran of commercial passenger aircraft 

15 and related services for illicit military or other activities 

16 on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

17 (b) ELEJVIE:-.TTS OF DETERlVIINATIO:-.T.-The deter18 mination required under subsection (a) shall include a de19 scription of the extent to which-
50


27163h-2.eps

2 

1 ( 1) commercial passenger aircraft m Iran are 

2 being utied to trantiport3 (A) arms or related materiel, including de4 fentie artieleti, defentie tiervieet:;, or tedmi(~al data 

5 that are controlled on the United States Muni6 tions List established under section 38 of the 

7 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778); 

8 (B) any item that is, or would be, if lo9 cated in the United States, controlled by E:x'})ort 

10 Control Classification Number 600 series listed 

11 on the Commerce Control List maintained 

12 under Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Ex13 port Administration Hegulations; 

14 (C) items used to facilitate the develop15 ment or production of a chemical or biological 

16 weapon or other weapon of mass destruction 

17 m1d their means of delivery, includi11g ballistic 

18 missiles and cruise missiles; or 

19 (D) any foreign person that facilitates the 

20 transfer of any of the articles described in sub21 paragraphti (A) through (C); 

22 (2) commercial passenger aircraft licensed by 

23 the Offic•e of Foreig11 Assets Control of the Depart24 ment of the Treasury are being used for activities 

25 desc~ribed i11 paragntph ( 1 ); and 
51


27163h-3.eps

1 (:3) foreign governments and persons have fa2 <~ilitated the aetivitieH deH<:rihe<l in paragTaph (1), in3 eluding allovving the use of aiq)orts, services, or 

4 other reHoun~et;. 

5 (e) FORM OF DETERMINATION.-The determination 

6 required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclas7 sified form but may include a classified annex. 

8 (d) DEFI:--riTIOKS.-ln this section: 

9 (1) CO:MMERCL~ PASSEKGER AIRCRAFT.-'l'he 

10 term "commercial passenger aircraft" includes11 (A) an aircraft of United States origin and 

12 that is classified under Export Control Classi13 fieation 1\umber (ECCN) 9A99l on the Com14 meree Control List maintained under Supple15 ment No. 1 to part 77 4 of the ExlXJrt Adminis16 tration Reg·ulations; or 

17 (B) an aircraft not of l~nited States origin 

18 of which United States-controlled content con19 stitutes 1 0 percent or more of the total value of 

20 the aircraft and that is21 (i) elaHHified umler EJ-q)()rt Control 

22 Classification Number (ECCN) 9A99l on 

23 the Comrnerc~e Control TJist rnaintai11ed 

24 under Supplement K o. 1 to part 77 4 of the 

25 Export Administration Regulations; ami 
52


27163h-4.eps

4 

1 (ii) is registered in a jurisdiction other 

2 than the United Statet;. 

3 (2) EXPORT ADJVIINISTRATIO~ REGULATIONS.-

4 The term "Export Adminit;tration Regulationt;" 

5 means subchapter C of chapter ~VII of title 15, Code 

6 of Federal Regulations. 

7 (:3) RELATED SERVICES.-The term "related 

8 services", with respect to a commercial passenger 

9 aircraft, includes1 0 (A) the export, re-export, sale, lease, or 

11 transfer to Iran of spare parts and components; 

12 and 

13 

14 

(B) warranty, maintenance, and repair 

serv1ces. 
53


27163i.eps

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE 

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1698 

OFFERED BY MR. ZELDIN OF NEW YORK 

Page 4, after line 12, insert the following: 

(E) A determination vvith respeet to ea(~h 

foreign person identified under subparagraph 

(D) as to whether the foreig11 pers(m meets the 

criteria for designation under-

(i) paragraph (1) of section 5(b) of 

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public 

Law 104-172; 50 r.S.C. 1701 note), as 

amended by this section; 

(ii) seetion 104 of the Countering 

America's Adversaries Through Sanctions 

Aet (Puhlie Law 115-44); or 

(iii) Executive Order 13382 (2005). 

~ 
54


27163a-1.eps

115TH CONGHESS 

1ST SESSIO:J H.R.535 

To r:neourage visits hetwren ihe !luited States and Taiwan at alllt>veh, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JAl\UAl:\Y ld, 2017 

Mr. CHABOT (for himself, Mr. RoYCE of California, and Mr. SHER.\L'L'I) introduced the following bilL whieh Wa$ referred to the Committee on Fon~ign 

AJl'airs 

A BILL 

To encourage visits between the United States and Taiwan 

at all levels, and for other puqJoses. 

1 Be il enacted by lhe Senate and Hou.se !?[ Represenla2 hves Um:ted States 1:n Congress as.se1n1J'le(i, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Travel Act". 

5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

6 Congress finds the following: 

7 (1) The Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 

8 et seq.), enacted in 1979, has continued for !37 years 

9 to be a cornerstone of relations between the United 
55


27163a-2.eps

2 

1 States and Taiwan and has serYecl as an anchor for 

2 peaee aml t;e(mrity in the \Vestern Pa<~ifie area. 

3 (2) The Taiwan Relations Act declares that 

4 peaee and stability in the vV estern Pcwifie area are 

5 in the political, security, and economic interests of 

6 the United States and are matters of international 

7 concern. 

8 (3) The L"nited States considers any effort to 

9 determine the future of Taiwan by other than pcacc1 0 ful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a 

11 threat to the peace and security of the Western Pa12 cific area and of grave concern to the United States. 

13 (4) Taiwan has succeeded in a momentous tran14 sition to democracy beginning in the late 1980s and 

15 has been a beacon of democracy in Asia, and Tai16 wan's democratic achievements msp1re many coun17 tries am! people in the region. 

18 (5) Visits to a country by United States cabinet 

19 members and other high-ranking officials arc an in20 dicator of the breadth and depth of ties between the 

21 rnited States and sueh eountry. 

22 ( 6) Since the enactment of the Taiwan Rela23 tions Ad, relations between the United States and 

24 Taiwan have suffered from insufficient high-level 

25 c•ornrmmieatitm due to the self-imposed restrieticms 
56


27163a-3.eps

1 that the United States maintains on high-level visits 

2 \vith Taiwan. 

3 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It iH the Hense of Con5 gress that the United States Government should encour6 age visits between officials from the L nited States and 

7 Taiwan at all levels. 

8 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.-It should be the policy 

9 of the United States to10 ( 1) allow offieials at all levels of the United 

ll States (}overnment, including cabinet-level national 

12 security officials, general officers, and other execu13 tive branch officials, to travel to Taiwan to meet 

14 their Taiwanese counteq)arts; 

15 (2) allow high-level officials of Tah,-an to enter 

16 the United States, under conditions which dem17 011strate appropriate respect for the dignity of such 

18 officials, and to meet w-ith officials of the United 

19 States, ineluding offieials from the Department of 

20 State and the Department of Defense and other cab21 inet agen<~ies; and 

22 (3) encourage the Taipei Economic and Cul23 tural R,epresentative Offiee, ami any other im;tru24 mentality established Taiwan, to conduct business 

25 i11 the United States, im~luding aetiv-ities whieh in-
57

Chairman ROYCE. I now recognize myself to speak on today’s 

business. So today we consider H.R. 1698. This is the Iran Ballistic 

Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act. It responds 

to the regime’s continued pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missiles and dangerous conventional weapons. 

As we heard at our hearing yesterday, there is bipartisan agreement that we must continue to respond to the full range of threats 

that Iran poses to our national security and that of our allies and 

partners. 

That means going after Iran’s support for terrorism as we did 

last month by marking up two strong bills targeting Iran’s leading 

terrorist proxy and that is Hezbollah. 

It also means targeting Iran’s development of intercontinental 

ballistic missiles and dangerous conventional weapons and that’s 

what this bill does. 

It requires a comprehensive investigation to identify and designate the companies and the banks and the individuals both inside and outside of Iran which supply the regime’s missile and conventional weapons programs and it sanctions those entities. 

And I should note that we had an excellent hearing on Iran yesterday and our subcommittees have had excellent hearings for 

which I thank them. 

I appreciate members’ concerns regarding the future of the Iran 

deal, on both sides. This isn’t an easy issue. But this bipartisan 

bill, which we have before us today with over 300 co-sponsors, this 

bill is not and should not be a referendum on the nuclear deal. 

I welcome the amendments considered in the en bloc that seek 

to strengthen this bill’s impact on Iran’s missile program. 

I want to add a note of thanks to the members on both sides of 

the aisle who contributed to this bill with their thoughtful amendments—to Mr. Chabot, Mr. DeSantis, Mr. Schneider, Mr. Sherman, 

and Mr. Zeldin. 

As former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter warned, the I in 

ICBM stands for intercontinental, ‘‘which means having the capability from flying from Iran to the United States.’’

There is no question that the U.S. must take strong action now 

to curb Iran’s dangerous pursuit of ballistic missiles. 


27163a-4.eps
58

So moving on to our other measure that we are taking up today, 

I want to thank Representative Steve Chabot for authoring H.R. 

535. This is the Taiwan Travel Act. 

Currently, the State Department enforces self-imposed restrictions on official travel between the United States and Taiwan. This 

bill denounces that practice by encouraging more frequent official 

visits including at the highest levels that will serve to further 

strengthen the critical U.S.-Taiwan partnership. 

This bill builds off legislation we passed out of the committee last 

month, which addressed Taiwan’s exclusion from the World Health 

Assembly. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Eliot Engel, for his remarks. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

markup. 

This has been a busy week, Mr. Chairman, as we all wait to 

learn what the administration plans to do about the Iran deal. 

This morning we have two bipartisan measures before us and 

that is no surprise because this committee is accustomed to working in a bipartisan way. 

We think that foreign policy should be bipartisan and that partisanship should stop at the river’s edge, and that is the way we 

have conducted ourselves during these past 5 years. 

But, apparently, the administration doesn’t agree. We learned 

through reporting that last evening the President’s national security advisor, General McMaster, and Secretary of State Tillerson 

briefed Republican members on the administration’s plans. 

Policy toward Iran is of the highest national importance. We 

must stand together to confront these threats and, frankly, partisan briefings simply do not help. So let’s get this right and stop 

the political games that the administration is playing. 

If reporting is accurate, the administration plans to decertify the 

deal and push for Congress to pass legislation to change parts of 

it. 

I am not quite sure how that would work. Congress has a role 

to play in foreign policy. But we cannot pass a law to unilaterally 

change an international agreement. 

If the administration wants to change the nuclear deal—and I 

would be the first to say there are areas which can be improved 

or strengthened—I want to remind everybody I voted against the 

deal 2 years ago—then the administration needs to work with our 

allies and negotiate. 

We can do this. There is time before areas of the agreement sunset. Let us put our heads together with our friends in London, 

Paris, Berlin, and the EU and see to it that all pathways to a bomb 

are cut off for Iran in perpetuity. But let us do it right. Don’t blow 

up the agreement to save it. We will come out worse in the end. 

If the administration needs certain authorities, that’s where we 

have a job to do. But this talk of decertifying the agreement and 

kicking it to Congress for some sort of magical fix just doesn’t make 

sense. 

I wish I had more clarity on what the White House plans to do 

but the White House apparently feels the Democratic members 

don’t need any kind of briefings. 

59

I am, frankly, irked that many of us are being kept in the dark. 

That said, I am a co-sponsor of the ballistic missile legislation and 

I plan to support it. 

I am ready to work with Chairman Royce to pass more sanctions 

on Iran. But I am more curious why the tough sanctions law the 

President signed in August hasn’t been put to use yet. 

We hear a lot of talk from the White House, but so far the only 

action when it comes to Iran is this plan to decertify the deal. 

I agree with my friend, the chairman. Let us enforce the hell out 

of the sanctions we have. 

So I will support this bill but I have a lot of questions about 

what the administration plans to do in the hours and days ahead 

and, again, I am concerned about legislating on Iran when only a 

few members have the full picture of what’s about to happen. 

Next, I am grateful to Representatives Chabot and Sherman for 

their strong leadership on Taiwan and, in particular, for introducing the Taiwan Travel Act. 

I am a strong supporter of Taiwan. I visited there many times 

including with the chairman, who has been a longstanding champion and highly regarded expert on Taiwan issues. 

Taiwan is a flourishing multi-party democracy of more than 20 

million people with a vibrant free-market economy. It’s a leading 

trade partner of the United States alongside much bigger countries 

like Brazil and India. 

Over the past 60 years, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has undergone dramatic changes and Taiwan’s development into a robust 

and liberal democracy underscores the strong friendship our two 

countries share today. 

The cornerstone of our relationship is the Taiwan Relations Act 

passed by Congress in 1979. It has been instrumental in maintaining peace and security across the Taiwan Straits and in East Asia, 

and serves as the official basis for friendship and cooperation between the United States and Taiwan. Congress has played a major 

role in defining what our bilateral relationship looks like. 

Given the possibility that the new administration may want to 

revisit regulations and guidance toward Taiwan, the Taiwan Travel 

Act is timely. 

This measure puts Congress on record saying the United States 

Government should encourage more regular, substantive, and senior level engagement between American and Taiwanese officials 

and reaffirms that our policy should be to allow such visits to occur 

at all levels of government. 

This is the sort of engagement and support we would like to see 

for our close friends and partners in Taipei. That is why I support 

this measure and encourage all members to do the same. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this markup and 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

Do any other members seek recognition? 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

As we heard yesterday in testimony from General Wald, the Iran 

deal ‘‘places Iran on a trajectory to become as an intractable challenge as North Korea is today and, possibly, worse.’’

60

The general noted that while Pyongyang’s relentless pursuit of 

nuclear weapons has only deepened its isolation and driven it toward bankruptcy, the JCPOA is doing the opposite for Iran. 

It was clear, Mr. Chairman, from the beginning that this deal 

was deeply flawed. You said it. I said it. Many members of this 

committee on both sides of the aisle said it. 

It was clear as well that it was based on a fundamentally misguided premise that Iran’s manifest desire for nuclear weapons 

could be considered separate from its development of a delivery capability for that weapon or from the rest of Iran’s violent campaign 

for regional hegemony. 

It should be self-evident that a nuclear warhead without a delivery vehicle is not going very far very fast. Iran’s ballistic missile 

program is inseparable from its desire to impose nuclear blackmail 

on the United States, Israel, and other regional friends and allies. 

Iran also exports its extremist revolution through the proliferation of conventional weapons to terrorist proxies. The Iranian nuclear deal, as we all know, gave Iran an infusion of an estimated 

$115 billion in unfrozen assets and, as John Kerry said in an interview that was carried by CNN, that we don’t know where that 

money is going and it probably will end up in the terrorists’ hands, 

not to mention other financial inducements like the $1.7 billion in 

small bills. 

As we heard yesterday, this money has helped Iran to extend its 

malign influence to an unprecedented extent across the region in 

Syria, in Iraq, in Lebanon, and in Yemen. 

H.R. 1698, the Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act, enjoys broad bipartisan support and has a 

huge number of co-sponsors—some 320. 

The bill expands sanctions against organizations and individuals 

that facilitate Iran’s ballistic missile program as well as its trade 

in conventional weapons. 

It is critical to our national security and that of our allies in the 

region, especially our good friend and ally, Israel. 

I yield back and I ask unanimous consent that the full statement 

be made a part of the record. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

We now go to Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for bringing these excellent bills up. For 20 years, I have had a commitment to the security of Taiwan and countering the threat of Iran. 

H.R. 535 I think should enjoy the support of everyone here and 

I have studied it as ranking member of the Asia Subcommittee. 

Taiwan has 23 million people. We have $85 billion of two-way 

trade. Any country near that important to us we would have meetings at the highest levels of government. 

This bill expresses a sense of Congress that it should be U.S. policy to encourage government visits at all levels between the United 

States and Taiwan. 

Now, it is true that officials have traveled from Taiwan to the 

United States at various conferences. They participate in the meetings in the United States regarding the environment and global 

anti-terror campaigns. 

61

But when it comes to the senior most Taiwanese national officials, we don’t allow them to come to Washington. Taiwan’s defense 

Foreign Minister and President have come to the United States 

this year but not Washington, DC, and not to meet in formal meetings in U.S. Government buildings. 

There is only one beneficiary of this program and that is myself 

and the 30th Congressional District since it is a matter—since the 

place most visited by senior Taiwanese officials is the Sheraton 

Universal Hotel in my district. As wonderful as those meetings are, 

it would be much better if the meetings were at the State Department and here in the United States Congress. 

Encouraging greater level of high-level visits and dialogue as 

mentioned the bill would ease Taiwan’s international isolation and 

reaffirm the U.S. political and security commitments to Taiwan. 

As to H.R. 1698, the Iran Ballistic Missiles Act, this is an important act to make it plain that Iran’s violations of U.N. Security 

Council resolutions regarding not only ballistic missiles but also 

the transfer of weapons must be responded to, and that is why I 

am pleased to be one of the 320 co-sponsors of this important legislation. 

Thank you for including my two amendments, the first of which 

requires the President to submit periodic reports on the illicit activities of supposedly civilian aircraft controlled by Iran. 

Are they using them to take materiel to Assad, to the Houthis, 

and others? Are they using them to move chemical or biological 

weapons? Are they using them for terrorist acts like they did in 

Bulgaria a decade or two ago? 

This is important because we are called upon to allow the sale 

of U.S. planes—supposedly civilian planes—to Iran. We should 

know what their existing civilian planes are used for. 

Second, it calls for the President to report after each missile test 

the technical details of the test—the trajectory, duration, range. 

I want to point out that some or all of these reports can be classified and some portions, clearly, should be. 

The United States, clearly, provides the same information about 

North Korean missile tests that this bill calls on them to provide 

with regard to Iranian nuclear tests. 

Such information will provide better assessments for the capacity 

of these missiles and help Congress do its job. 

Finally, when it comes to sanctions on Iran, we need the toughest sanctions with the best explanation—tough sanctions so that 

Iran gets the message—the good explanation so that Europe and 

Asia support what we are doing. 

That is why I am pleased that this bill focuses on Iran’s violation 

of U.N. Security Council resolutions dealing with missiles and 

weapons. 

The worst reason we could give is to say we are imposing sanctions to deliberately shred the nuclear deal. If we do that, Europe 

won’t enforce the new sanctions and will not join us in them, and 

Europe will think it’s fine for Iran to stop even pretending to live 

under its commitments under the deal. 

Equally tough sanctions imposed because of what Iran is doing 

in Syria, what they are doing in missiles, what they are doing to 

violate U.N. Security Council resolutions gives us a chance of interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:26 Nov 09, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\101217M\27163 SHIRL
62

national support and leaves in place the benefits that we do get, 

and we do get some benefits from the Iran nuclear deal. 

Finally, I would point out that in this room several of us, including myself, asked Secretary Kerry in 2015 were we allowed under 

the JCPOA to adopt sanctions because of Iran’s support for terrorism, holding our hostages, and supporting Assad. 

And the answer from Secretary Kerry is we are free to adopt additional sanctions as long as they are not a phony excuse for just 

taking the whole pot of the past ones and putting them back. 

So let us impose the sanctions that Iran has earned from its evil 

activities and let’s just make sure they pass the test of not being 

phony. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and again, I’d like to 

thank you and Congressman Eliot Engel for the leadership on this 

issue. 

We have seen this committee on numerous occasions focus on 

what could be one of the gravest threats to the wellbeing of the 

American people that we face today. 

In fact, I would probably put it at the most important. We have 

an unstable regime. We have a group of religious fanatics controlling the Iranian Government and our efforts to prevent the lunacy 

that comes out of that regime from getting into possession of nuclear weapons is vital to the security and wellbeing of the people 

of the United States. 

So I thank both of you for keeping us focused on this issue. Let 

me note that 20 years ago when I was here I remember a similar 

situation when we were facing the possibility that a lunatic in 

North Korea would get their hands on nuclear weapons. 

And we went out of our way. We were assured by the administration that sanctions and incentives like giving cash would do the 

trick, and it didn’t. 

The fact is we have had sanctions on North Korea and they did not work. The fact is we gave North Korea $4 billion to $5 billion, 

and not only did it not work, it probably facilitated their nuclear 

weapons program by giving them some other money that was then 

fungible to channel into the development—long-term development 

of a nuclear weapon. We have unleashed $150 billion into the control of the mullah regime in Iran. These are people who believe that we represent Satan 

to them. 

The United States represents a Satanic force in the world that 

needs to be wiped out. That is what they believe. We have to face 

that reality. 

If we don’t face that reality, we are going to face the same situation that we face in North Korea today. Yeah, wishful thinking. 

That was 20 years ago, and we facilitated North Korea to getting 

into this position. 

Again, sanctions alone will not work. But we should make sure 

that we move forward with all the things that we can do short of 

a military confrontation. 

Sanctions is certainly one of them, and the second part, however, 

I think we have to bite the bullet and realize that in a nuclear age, 

63

we sometimes will have to take actions against governments that 

we would not necessarily want to disturb. We let them sit there. 

We’d have to take actions, and it doesn’t necessarily mean sending 

American troops into action and into military confrontation. 

Instead, which, during the Reagan years—I am very proud to 

have played a role in developing what they called the Reagan Doctrine, which was go out and try to find out who the enemies of your 

enemy are and then help those people to do the fighting for you. 

And in this case, Iran is filled with people who hate the mullah 

regime. They are oppressed by the mullah regime. Persians—young 

Persians marched, in fact, 8 years ago, seeking our help, and we 

rebuked them. And instead, we should be reaching out to these 

young Persians who hate the mullah regime and want to live at 

peace, want to build an economy and not nuclear weapons. Let us 

reach out them. 

Let us reach out to the Baluch, a people who are oppressed in 

Iran. Let us reach out to the Kurds. There are more Kurds in Iran 

than there are in Iraq, for example. There are Azaris that feel they 

are oppressed. They are part of the same Azaris from Azerbaijan. 

We have people that we can work with the vast majority of people in Iran who don’t like the mullah regime. If our goal is to stop 

this mullah regime from obtaining nuclear weapons which would 

threaten and endanger the people of the United States. 

We need to do sanctions but we need to do more than that. But 

I join you today in doing this, this that we can do right now. 

So thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to you and 

the ranking member for bringing these bills before us. 

I want to join in supporting the Taiwan Travel Act, which is an 

important statement of American backing for our friends in Taipei 

and for the values of democracy that Taiwan proudly exudes in 

East Asia. 

The U.S.-Taiwan relationship is an obvious and easy and important relationship to support. I would like to focus my time instead 

on the Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enhancement Act. 

Although we already passed into law the substantive provisions 

included in this bill when we passed CAATSA back in July, I welcome today’s markup as yet another opportunity to discuss the options we reserve for going after Iran’s malign activities and for 

doing it without wasting time outside of the JCPOA. 

It’s been more than 21⁄2 months since we sent the President additional authorities to impose tighter sanctions that would squeeze 

Iran’s support for terrorists like Hezbollah that would hold the 

IRGC accountable for its support to the Assad regime and its efforts to sow discord in the region and to punish Iranian officials responsible for the well-documented human rights abuses against the 

Iranian people. 

Yet, we still have not seen the President or this administration 

act to enforce these new sanctions. Instead, we have been consumed by the certification debate. 

64

I opposed the JCPOA but I also have spent my congressional career pushing the sanctions architecture that brought Iran to the 

negotiating table. 

I know that it was not easy to bring our international partners 

on board and I recognize that in order to continue the pressure to 

pressure Iran, we will need the support of our allies and others on 

the global stage. 

I have already made my feelings clear about certification and the 

implications of unilaterally disengaging from the JCPOA. 

I will just add that whatever speech the President may give 

today or tomorrow, I hope that it includes a comprehensive strategy for combating Iran’s anti-American and anti-Israel posture in 

the region, and I hope that the President commits to use the sanctions tools that we in Congress have given to him. 

Because however we feel about the nuclear deal, we can certainly 

all agree that Iran must be held accountable for its blatant and 

consistent violations of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, 

which forbids Iran from testing or developing ballistic missiles. 

The very fact that it is the IRGC that oversees the missile program, the same organization responsible for supporting Hamas, 

Hezbollah, and Assad should help illuminate why the international 

community rightly is so concerned. 

Iranian aggression and the threat posed by its revolutionary 

leadership has always been a priority in this committee and I 

would like to thank the committee’s leadership for your continued 

vigilance and attention to this issue and for bringing this bill before us today. 

I appreciate it and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

We now go to Steve Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding 

this markup today—a very important one, I think. 

First, I would like to voice my support for H.R. 535, the Taiwan 

Travel Act, a bill that I introduced along with my friend from 

across the aisle, Brad Sherman from California. Introduced it earlier this year. I want to thank him for his leadership on this issue. 

As a founding member of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, I 

have particular interest in U.S.-Taiwan relations, and I think, as 

many of us do, take our commitment to Taiwan very seriously. 

I would also like to quickly address the restrictions on visits by 

high-ranking Taiwanese officials, something that many of us find 

both insulting and counterproductive. 

I remember a number of years ago about 26 of us, after votes on, 

I believe, it was a Tuesday—Monday or Tuesday evening—flew all 

the way up to New York City to meet with President Chien, who 

was President of Taiwan at the time. Very inconvenient for us to 

have to fly all the way up there and come back here. These are 

self-imposed restrictions that the United States imposed. 

This policy is nonsense and should be changed. The fact that you 

can’t have a President or a Vice President or Foreign Minister or 

the Defense Minister from Taiwan come here from to our capital, 

Washington, is just, I think, crazy. 

Earlier this year, I expressed these concerns again, after having 

said this to previous administrations, to Secretary of State 

65

Tillerson, and pointed out that this self-imposed restriction bars 

Taiwan officials from setting foot in this center—this city, the center of democracy and freedom. 

This policy goes against our own self-interest. It tells China that 

we are willing to yield to them on our foreign policy issues such 

as this one. 

It conveys weakness, I think, to Beijing. China continues to take 

aggressive actions that further its long-running campaign to isolate 

Taiwan and I believe that the United States has a legal and moral 

commitment, as we all know, to defend Taiwan sovereignty in the 

face of this aggression from the PRC. 

The United States should have a direct dialogue with our democratically-elected friend, the leadership in Taiwan, whichever party 

it happens to be, and it’s time to change this outlandish policy and 

outdated policy. 

The Taiwan Travel Act will do this and I would urge my colleagues to support this measure, and I would also like to urge my 

colleagues to support an amendment that we will be offering on 

H.R. 1698. 

It requires the President to notify Congress when there is credible information that Iran may be receiving large quantities of advanced conventional weapons from foreign countries. 

Going further, this amendment would also require the President 

to determine if such a weapons transfer should trigger further 

sanctions. 

Nearly 10 years ago, Russia signed a contract to sell several S300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran. In 2010, Russia suspended the sale, only to renew the deal after the terms of the Iran 

deal was agreed to, and that wasn’t a coincidence, I believe. 

The S-300 missile defense system strengthens Tehran’s military 

capabilities and it complicates our U.S. strategy for eliminating potential Iranian nuclear weapons. 

Now Moscow has delivered multiple S-300 delivery systems to 

Iran. It’s dangerous. Should military action ever be required we 

want to avoid that, obviously, if at all possible, just as we want to 

avoid military action with respect to North Korea, if at all possible. 

But to allow missile systems like these, which could jeopardize 

future American actions, again, if necessary is just wrong. 

Late last month, Iran even displayed this surface-to-air missile 

system to the public—a move that was, clearly, designed to elevate 

tensions to be more aggressive with the United States and with the 

West in general. 

We have to take action, I think, on this and I think this legislation is a step in the right direction. I would encourage folks to support that amendment and support the Taiwan Relations Act, and 

I will yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Bill Keating of Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I would like to thank the chair and the ranking member for 

working together in a bipartisan way once again on these pieces of 

legislation. 

I think it is important. We are giving the Trump administration 

the tools that are necessary to use these sanctions as part of what 

66

I hope will become a comprehensive strategy that is currently lacking. 

I also must comment, because I think we are on the edge of 

something very dangerous if, indeed, the briefing that the Republican members have received about the President’s failure to certify 

the Iran agreement, something he didn’t share with us, is indeed 

true. 

This committee has worked hard to work together. We worked 

hard to try and see what we could do to influence China in the 

short run to intercede in North Korea and to try and work in that 

regard. 

Failing to certify is going to, frankly, cause great damage in trying to get China to move because we won’t show the consistency 

and resolve necessary when we make an agreement to go forward. 

Secondly, I think for all of us who want to make sure that the 

agreement is aggressively enforced, this is going to weaken that effort because it’s going to make the coalition of allies that we assembled to make it possible in the first place less cohesive. 

And without that cohesiveness, we won’t be able to act as strongly and aggressively as we could otherwise to enforce this agreement. 

And my last point, Mr. Chairman, is this. If he goes ahead and 

fails to certify, as yesterday’s testimony indicated to this committee, we will be playing with fire. 

In that 60-day period it is very likely, I believe, that there will 

be some actors that will move for a major incident in the Middle 

East to try and provoke this Congress into acting in a way that will 

blow up that agreement and blow up the coalition that we have 

going forward. 

This period is essential and I hope, should this happen, I hope 

the same feelings, a bipartisan agreement, loyalty to our country, 

putting that first above all else, I hope that stays in force, as we 

go forward for the entire Congress. 

We, as a committee, can demonstrate that should these things 

occur from outside malign actors, that we will stay together. We 

will not be moved and get through this very dangerous period. 

So I want to congratulate this committee on working together 

once again, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Keating. 

We now go to Mr. Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this important markup. 

It is encouraging to see your bipartisan leadership with Ranking 

Member Eliot Engel. 

I am grateful to be a supporter of H.R. 1698, the Iran Ballistic 

Missiles Sanctions Enforcement Act, as well as H.R. 535, the Taiwan Travel Act. 

Sponsored by Chairman Ed Royce, I appreciate being a co-sponsor of H.R. 1698, the Iran Ballistic Missiles and Sanctions Enforcement. 

This bipartisan bill works to expand sanctions on Iran with respect to their ballistic missile program and, ultimately, works to 

keep American families safe. 

67

I am also grateful to support, as a co-sponsor of H.R. 535, the 

Taiwan Travel Act, sponsored by our colleague, Congressman Steve 

Chabot. 

Working to strengthen the relationship between the United 

States and Taiwan by encouraging officials of all levels from both 

countries to visit and meet with each other, and also motivates Taiwanese to promote business in the United States. 

My home state of South Carolina has benefitted with the billiondollar investment by Nan Ya Plastics—Formosa Plastics Group in 

Lake City, South Carolina, which has created hundreds of jobs for 

American families. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. David Cicilline, Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to you, 

Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking member for holding this markup 

today. 

I strongly support the Taiwan Travel Act and our efforts to recognize the important relationship between the United States and 

Taiwan. 

We are here on another issue of tremendous importance-Iran. 

Despite the President’s treatment of the U.S. commitment to the 

Iran nuclear deal with this on again-off again, will he certify-will 

he not certify as though it were a segment in a game show, this 

is not a trivial matter. 

We are talking about nuclear war, about a direct threat to our 

ally, Israel, to the safety of American men and women stationed in 

the Middle East, and, of course, our safety here at home. 

By threatening not to certify that Iran is in compliance with the 

JCPOA, without any evidence that they have violated the terms 

and, in fact, broad agreement that Iran is complying with the 

terms of this—of the JCPOA, including multiple sources that include the President’s own senior officials, the President threatens 

to destroy the agreement that took decades to build. 

He threatens the credibility of the United States of America, he 

threatens our relationship with our allies, and he threatens our 

ability to mobilize support to combat Iran’s many destabilizing activities throughout the region. 

And most importantly, he threatens to put Iran under direct 

path for a nuclear bomb. The Iran deal accomplished its objective 

preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. 

This is not to say that they are not engaged in destabilizing aggressive conduct. Are they funding terrorism? Yes. Are they supporting Hezbollah and Hamas? Yes. Are they continuing to take 

American citizens hostage? Yes. These are all serious issues of vital 

importance that we need to focus on outside the terms of the 

JCPOA. The nuclear deal was never meant to combat the multitude of Iranian factions of international law. 

It was meant to take the nuclear issue off the table so that we, 

as an international community, can focus our energies on tightening the cinch around Iran’s illicit financial activities, against 

their terrorism, and against their egregious human rights abuses 

and other maligned activities both within Iran and elsewhere. 

As Jake Sullivan testified before this committee yesterday, the 

fabricated drama created by President Trump surrounding certifiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:26 Nov 09, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\101217M\27163 SHIRL
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cation only draws attention away from the very issues we need to 

address most. 

So long as we are bickering with our allies and threatening to 

unilaterally pull out of the JCPOA, we give Iran cover for its bad 

behavior. 

If recent news reports are correct, President Trump seems to 

think that he can have his cake and eat it, too. He seems to think 

that he can neglect to certify as required under the Iran Nuclear 

Agreement Review Act and then kick the can to Congress and absolve himself from any leadership role on this critical issue and he 

will create great uncertainty about the U.S. position, this would be 

a grave mistake. 

America must live up to its commitments. There is plenty of 

room to negotiate on the details that fall outside of the JCPOA. 

This is precisely what the JCPOA was intended to do—to give us 

room to focus on the very real and very serious issues of Iranian 

malfeasance. This is exactly what we must do. 

The U.S. must keep its commitment to our allies, maintain our 

compliance with the Iran nuclear deal, and most importantly, as 

our chairman so aptly put it, we must enforce the hell out of it. 

That is Congress’ role and it’s up to ensure that we and our allies 

make clear to Iran that while we maintain enforcement of the 

JCPOA, we will hold them to task for their bad behavior elsewhere. 

And if they violate the terms of the JCPOA we must do everything we can to reimpose sanctions and hold Iran accountable. And 

I sincerely hope that we never get to that point. 

But if we do, I know that I speak for many of my colleagues 

when I say we will be the first in line to hold a hard line and we 

impose sanctions. 

But for President Trump to pull out of the deal simply because 

he doesn’t like it, because he campaigned against it, or because it 

will benefit him politically is the height of irresponsibility. 

I thank the chairman for bringing up legislation now and previously that will hold Iran accountable for its behavior and I urge 

the administration to utilize the tools we are giving them to enforce 

sanctions against Iranian officials in businesses that violate international law. 

I think it’s important to note that as of now the administration 

has yet to impose any new sanctions based on the authorities we 

gave them this summer in H.R. 3364. 

This is inexcusable. I thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for your leadership and yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. Brian Mast of Florida. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. I will keep my remarks brief. 

My thoughts on the JCPOA and the Iran deal are simple and it’s 

that it places about as much deterrence on Iran as putting a millionaire on house arrest while cutting them a check for billions of 

dollars at the same time. 

The fact is that Iran has done their absolute best to kill American service members in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are colonizing 

their way across the Middle East through their proxies, and discounting the fact that an ICBM is not the only way to deliver a 

69

nuclear payload, the reality is it can be dropped off of the belly of 

an aircraft, delivered by a submarine, shipped in a container, or 

placed on the back end of a truck. 

If we allow Iran the ability to deliver any payload to our shores 

by an ICBM, then this is an allowance that has occurred out of 

nothing more than fear and trepidation and weakness. 

These are things that Americans have never been and should 

never be defined by, and we should not start that today. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Mast. 

Any other members? Ms. Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our ranking member. Thank you for these bipartisan bills, which I support both of 

them. 

I say today is a tale of two countries. Taiwan is a great friend, 

a great trading partner, very culturally enriched and, incidentally, 

just elected its first woman President, which I congratulate them 

for. 

Iran, on the other hand, is not a friend. They are the numberone state sponsor of terrorism and I am very pleased to also support this ballistic missile bill. 

With all that said, I am going to try to restrain myself because 

my colleagues have been very, I think, polite—maybe use the word 

dangerous, irresponsible. 

I want to say that, in my opinion, that the failure to certify, at 

this point in time, that Iran is meeting its obligations under the 

JCPOA is a manufactured crisis by the White House. 

It is based upon fake news and it is an action that would be opposed by our allies who went along with the agreement and reportedly opposed by the President’s own national security team. 

Like others up here, originally I opposed the Iran agreement for 

a number of reasons. I won’t get into it today. 

That was then. Now is now, because we have already released 

over $100 billion worth of assets. All reports and agreed upon by 

our international partners is that Iran has been complying with the 

agreement. 

So, to me, it would be totally insane, really, to leave this agreement now. There are issues, I know, we all are concerned about 

and we, obviously, need to continue to enforce the agreement. 

We need to try to stop Iran’s terrorist activities but this is not 

the way to do it—by decertifying the agreement or the compliance 

with the agreement. 

You know, the President made a lot of campaign promises that 

some of us disagreed with and, to me, a lot of his actions have been 

destructive—destructive against women, destructive against the 

environment, destructive against immigrants. 

But, to me, this is a new level of potential destruction because 

we are talking about our very existence. And now, to me, using nuclear war as fulfilling a campaign promise. 

So I hope, although I don’t expect, that the President is going to 

back down from his campaign promise. But I do hope and expect 

that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle are going to show 

some restraint and reasonableness because there is too much at 

stake. 

70

And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

We go to Tom Garrett of Virginia. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman, the rhetoric here is disturbing. 

I mean, I think I just heard someone suggest that if the Iranians 

were aggressive with nuclear weapons it was the responsibility of 

President Trump—the destruction that might follow. 

There is—I mean, that’s Vandenberg who said politics should 

stop at the water’s edge. I’d imagine he’d roll over in his proverbial 

grave. 

A couple things have been said. Failure to certify ‘‘won’t show the 

consistency of resolve to move forward.’’

No, I think it would show greater resolve to deter Iran, who has 

been very clear in their rhetoric, from not only producing nuclear 

weapons but also, and quite importantly, delivery mechanisms. 

In 1994, President Clinton stood before the nation to trumpet the 

North Korean nuclear deal, which was followed with billions and 

billions of dollars in aid and assets transferred to North Korea, and 

President Clinton essentially declared that there was an end to the 

nuclear threat from North Korea as a result of that wonderful 

agreement. 

Fast forward 23 years and here we sit. Google it. 

And so another one of my colleagues and friends suggested that 

if we don’t do this that we are kicking the can—or the President 

would decertify that he’ll be kicking the can to Congress. 

I would offer that the only can kicking going on here is of a nation that won’t take the mullahs at their word. I pointed out yesterday that this is a regime that is burned the effigy of every single 

United States President since Jimmy Carter and, indeed, during 

the finalization of the framework for the JCPOA depicted a lynching of our first African-American President. Google it. 

And so they demonstrated repeatedly through act and word a desire to eradicate this nation, the United Kingdom, the Israelis, 

amongst others, from existence. 

We have history as a teacher where we plied the North Koreans 

with billions of dollars and the President of the United States declared the nuclear threat in the region to be gone. 

Fast forward to the current events of today. Now we plied the 

Iranians with the freeing of billions of dollars of assets and literally 

palettes of cash money, and we are told that the JCPOA is somehow sacrosanct and beyond reproach. 

Let me point out, probably for at least the tenth time in this 

committee, that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 from 

2010, prior to the JCPOA, articulated that Iran shall not undertake 

activities to develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear payload. Shall not. 

The JCPOA, this document that we would think was somehow 

the be all, end all that would secure our future forever and if this 

administration questions the policies of the last administration 

might lead to the greatest destruction—that hyperbole needs to 

stop because it is dangerous, candidly, to how we treat each other 

as Americans—it is somehow sacrosanct that JCPOA is worded 

such as Iran is called upon not to undertake ballistic missile testing. 

71

Again, shall not undertake 2010 U.N. Security Council, which 

means the Chinese and the Russians and the world agreed to it—

is called upon not to undertake JCPOA 2015, drafted while they 

are burning our President in effigy and depicting him being hung, 

and there is a hue and cry that somehow pointing out flaws in this 

document, admitting that there might have been mistakes is 

wrong. 

Mr. Sullivan, yesterday, who might have been national security 

advisor, had the result of the last elections been different, said diplomacy requires compromise. 

I wonder if he was quoting Neville Chamberlain circa 1938. Because the Treaty of Versailles called on the Nazis not to develop 

an army greater than 100,000 soldiers, and several million soldiers 

and millions of dead innocent people later we learned that sometimes parties who enter treaties don’t honor them. 

Winston Churchill said appeasement means feeding the crocodile 

and hoping he’ll eat you last. I would hearken back to the statement that we might be kicking the can to Congress by pointing out 

flaws in JCPOA to suggest that the only can-kicking going on now 

is kicking the can of a nuclear threat to our children down the 

road, just like was done by the Clinton administration in the 1990s 

when they declared an end to the threat from that region. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Tom. 

We go to Mr. Brad Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, thank you for introducing H.R. 1968. 

I am a proud co-sponsor of this legislation and a proponent of 

doing everything in our power to curb and put an end to Iran’s malign behavior. 

The Iran Ballistic Missile and International Sanctions Enhancement Act does just that. It would impose sanctions on those who 

support Iran’s ballistic missile program and transfer weapons to 

and from Iran. 

Iran is a bad actor in a volatile region and its agents continue 

to sow instability. That is why I offered an amendment to require 

a report containing information on any credible information regarding violations of the travel restrictions on sanctioned Iranian individuals per U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 and any exemptions that have been approved by the Security Council. 

There are troubling reports that Iran’s commander of the IRGC 

Quds Force, General Qasem Soleimani, has traveled to Russia in 

violation of UNSCR 2231. 

These travel restrictions were put in place for good reason and 

we deserve to know whether in fact violations have occurred. 

I would like to thank the chairman for including my amendment 

in the en bloc package. I would also like to note that while I oppose 

the JCPOA, now that it is in place, I believe we have to aggressively and rigorously enforce it. 

But as we enforce it, it is critically vital to acknowledge that the 

JCPOA, like any agreement, has inherent risks and that this deal 

in particular has serious shortcomings and gaps, including but not 

limited to the sunset provisions. 

72

The urgent responsibility of our Government, in conjunction with 

our partners and our allies, is to develop the comprehensive strategies and commit the necessary resources to work to close the gaps 

and reduce the risks. 

I believe we must clearly and fully articulate, as a matter of national policy, that the United States will never allow Iran to have 

a nuclear weapon and that we will aggressively work to confront 

Iran’s malign activities in the region and around the world. 

I applaud this committee for its work to reduce Iran’s malign activities and prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

Any other members seeking recognition? 

Mr. Espaillat. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is my first year in Congress. Had I been here when this 

agreement would have been reached I probably would have looked 

at it with a great deal of speculation and concern. I felt perhaps 

it was not as strong as it should have been. 

But it is what it is, and today we see how over 402 site visits 

and 25 snap inspections were conducted in the year—in the 12 

months of 2016, almost doubling from 212. We are just slightly 

over 200 visits—inspections were conducted on 213. Also over 

200—on 214 over 350 as well as 215 and, as I said in 2016, 412 

inspections were conducted. 

All leading to what conclusion? And that is that they have been 

in compliance. Yesterday we heard from General Wald, who said 

that he felt almost 99 percent sure that they were cheating on the 

agreement, unsubstantiated allegation that I think is irresponsible 

at the very least. 

And so all important players in this endeavor, particularly the 

inspectors, are saying that they are in compliance of the JCPOA. 

And so whereas the agreement perhaps was not strong enough 

to include other areas of concern for America, Iran’s missile program and other important factors that must be addressed, the experts have told us time and time again not only in the past administration but in this administration that they have been in compliance. 

So the agreement also came about as a result of coalition building with other important allies that we have across the world, and 

we have a certain responsibility toward those allies to ensure that 

they don’t feel in the future when we need them again—let’s say, 

for example, with North Korea—that they will be left out in the 

cold. After they reach an agreement they sacrifice or they were—

they were flexible in conceding certain thing that may have been 

dear and near to them. 

So I think that we should continue to push forward to ensure 

that we hold Iran’s feet to the fire—that some of these issues that 

were left out of the agreement should be dealt with by the same 

international community and the same coalition that we helped 

lead. 

So we cannot advocate our leadership role in that coalition. It is 

important that America continues to be the leader of the world. 

73

So we must continue to strengthen that agreement and discuss 

the particular issues that are very concerning to all of us in the future. 

I join our ranking member, Eliot Engel, in supporting the concept that we got to strengthen this. But at this point, it will be political malpractice, if you may, if we opt out. 

We will feel the concern and scorn, in many cases, of our allies, 

and I think we will put the world in peril. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Espaillat. 

Hearing no further requests for recognition, the question occurs 

on the items considered en bloc. 

All those in favor say aye. 

All those opposed, no. 

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the measures 

considered en bloc are agreed to. 

Without objection, the measures considered en bloc are ordered 

favorably reported as amended. Staff is directed to make any technical and conforming changes, and the chair is authorized to seek 

House consideration under suspension of the rules. 

Yes, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Yes, thank you. 

Just two quick things. I first want to say, I know we all want 

to wish Mr. Connolly a speedy recovery. He had an accident and 

he is being wheelchaired around in a wheelchair and we wish him 

a speedy recovery. 

And the second important thing is happy birthday, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you, Mr. Engel. Appreciate that. 

Well, thank you. 

On that high note, that concludes our business for today. And so 

I want to thank all of the members of this committee and you as 

well, Mr. Engel, for your contributions and assistance with this 

markup. 

The committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:37 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

October 5, 20 17 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN meeting of the Committee on Foreign 

A±Iairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Oftice Building (and available live on 

the Committee website at http://www.ForeignAffairs.house.gov) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

MARKUP OF: 

Thursday, October 12, 2017 

9:30am 

H.R. 535, Taiwan Travel Act; and 

H.R. 1698, Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions 

Enforcement Act 

By Direction of the Chairman 

1i1e Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with 

disabilities. if you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202225-5021 at least four 

business days in advance of the even/, whenever practicable. Questions with regard /o special 

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

l\1I'W'JbS OF l'ULL COMMIT! tE MARKUI' 

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Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Edward R. Royce 

ChecA all ~fthe_following that apply: 

Open Session [Z] 

Executive (closed) Session D Televised [Z] 

Elec!ronically Recorded (!aped) [Z] 

Stenographic Record [2] 

BILLS FOR MARKUP: (Include bill number(s) and title(s) of/e~;is/ation) 

See attached. 

COI\lMITTEF MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See attached. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEI\"ffiERS PRF.SE~T: 

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STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements suhmiltedfor the re(;orJ.) 

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ACTIONS IAKEI\ DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies o(legislation and amendments.) 

See markup summary. 

REC0l{J)J£D VOTES TAKE.N (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote talZv ,,heel listing each memher.) 

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TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

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PRESENT 

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FULL ('OMMFITEE lvfARKUP 

MEMBER l'RESDcT MEMBER 

Edward R. Rovce, CA X Eliot L. Engel, NY 

Christopher H. Smith, NJ X Brad Sherman. CA 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL Gregory W. Meeks. NY 

Dana Rohrabacher, CA X Albia Sires. NJ 

Steve Chabot. OH Gerald E. Connolly. VA 

Joe Wilson, SC X Theodore E. Deutch. FL 

1\!lichael T. McCaul, TX Karen Bass, CA 

Ted Poe. TX X William Keating. MA 

Darrell Issa. CA X David Cicilline, Rl 

Tom Marino. PA Ami Bera. CA 

Jeff Duncan. SC X Lois FrankeL FL 

Mo Brooks. AL Tulsi Gabbard. HI 

Paul Cook. CA X Joaquin Castro, TX 

Scott Perrv. PA X Robin Kelly. IL 

Ron DeSantis. FL X Brendan Boyle. PA 

Mark Meadows, NC Dina Titus, NV 

Ted Yoho. FL Norma Torres. CA 

Adam Kinzinger,IL X Brad Schneider. TL 

Lee Zeldin. NY X Tom Suozzi. NY 

Dan Donovan, NY X Adriano Espaillat. NY 

James F. Sensenbrenner. Jr .. WI X Ted Lieu. CA 

Ann Wagner. MO 

Brian J. Mast. FL 

Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA 

Francis Rooney, FL 

Thomas A. Garrett, Jr.. VA 
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10/12/17 Foreign Affairs Committee Markup Summary 

By unanimous consent, the Chair called up the following measures and amendments, previously 

provided to Members, to be considered en bloc 

1. H.R. 1698 (Royce), Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act; 

a. Royce 36, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1698; 

1) Chabot 3, an amendment to Royce 36; 

2) DeSantis 57, an amendment to Royce 36; 

3) Schneider 2, an amendment to Royce 36; 

4) Sherman 30, an amendment to Royce 36; 

5) Shennan 31, an amendment to Royce 36; 

6) Zeldin 32, an amendment to Royce 36. 

2. H.R. 535 (Chabot), Taiwan Travel Act. 

The measures considered en bloc were agreed to by voice vote. 

By unanimous consent, the measures as amended were ordered favorably reported to the House, 

and the Chairman was authorized to seek House consideration under suspension of the rules. 

The Committee adjourned.