SANDIA REPORT

SAND2012-10041

Unlimited Release

Printed October 2012

India and China: Assessing the Need to 

Strengthen Bilateral Confidence Building 

Measures 

Monika Chansoria

Visiting Research Scholar

Cooperative Monitoring Center

Prepared by

Sandia National Laboratories

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SAND2012-10041

Unlimited Release

Printed October 2012

India and China: 

Assessing the Need to Strengthen Bilateral CBMs 

Monika Chansoria

Visiting Research Scholar

Cooperative Monitoring Center

Sandia National Laboratories

P.O. Box 5800

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185-MS1373

Abstract

India and China display a peculiar case of “constrained cooperation” 50 years after their border 

war, with convergence of economic interests tending to overlook strategic differences. While 

China acknowledges sharing an interest in a peaceful and stable South Asia, it perceives 

strengthened Indo-US ties as an attempt to enlist New Delhi as a counterweight to China or as part 

of a containment strategy against it. 

The Chinese realists are subdivided into “offensive”/“defensive” and “hard”/“soft” camps; each 

believes that the state has to build its own strength. The hard-power realists argue for strengthening 

national power–particularly the military and economic dimensions, while soft-power realism 

emphasizes diplomacy and cultural power. The “offensive realists” argue that China should use its 

newly built military, economic, and diplomatic influence to coerce others toward the ends China 

desires. A range of CBMs between India and China that could reduce frictions and establish 

common ground are discussed.
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CONTENTS

1. Introduction................................................................................................................................ 7

1.1 China’s posture towards India ............................................................................................. 7

1.2 Institutional Framework of Bilateral Cooperation: An Economic Convergence of 

Interests..................................................................................................................................... 8

1.3 Building upon the Commonality of Countering Terror Networks in the Region ............... 9

2. The Trajectory of CBMs in the Indo-Chinese Context............................................................. 13

2.1 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual 

Control in the India-China Border Areas, September 7, 1993................................................ 13

2.2 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of 

actual Control in the China-India Border Areas, November 29, 1996 ................................... 14

2.3 Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the 

India-China Bound Question, April 11, 2005......................................................................... 15

3. Evaluationg the Chinese Approach to CBMs........................................................................... 17

3.1 Indo-China Bilateral CBMs: The Way Forward........................................................... 18

3.2 Need for Nuclear Dialogue and CBMs......................................................................... 19

4. India’s Nuclear Policy............................................................................................................... 21

4.1 India’s Search for an Operational Nuclear Triad.............................................................. 21

5. China’s Nuclear Doctrine and Posture...................................................................................... 23

5.1 Insights into how Chinese Military Strategists and Security Analysis Perceive the Role of 

Nuclear Weapons in the Country’s Defense Posture and the Continued Relevance of its NoFirst-Use Policy ...................................................................................................................... 23

6. Proposal for Establishing a Nuclear CBM Dialogue between India and China ....................... 27

7. References................................................................................................................................ 29

Distribution ................................................................................................................................... 33
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1. INTRODUCTION 

India and China embody two great civilizations, depicting fascinating historical legacies, cultures 

and prospects. With their population jointly representing 36 per cent of that of the world (China at 

1.33 billion and India at 1.15 billion), the two countries together have a significant impact on the 

world’s economy. The India-China equation makes for a classic case of the realist vs. idealist 

debate, which acknowledges that while conceding India’s rise as a regional power, China appears at 

unease while envisioning a multi-polar Asia. The challenges posed to the bilateral equation 

between India and China primarily stem out of an existential security dilemma at work, wherein 

each side appears to be suspicious of the motives of the other and this trust deficit often tends to 

threaten bilateral ties.

This paper analyses recent trends in the areas of India’s convergence with China, as well as New 

Delhi’s strategic divergences with Beijing, as both vie for a greater strategic space and influence in 

Asia, and subsequently underscores the need to strengthen and establish newer confidencebuilding measures (CBMs).1 Entering the 50th year since the Indo-China border war in 1962, the 

present regional and bilateral conditions and equations are far off from being congenial. India and 

China display a peculiar case of “constrained cooperation” with economic convergence of interests 

tending to artificially overlook prevailing strategic differences. The fact of the matter remains that 

these very divergences, of which the territorial and boundary dispute is foremost, hold the potential 

of upstaging ties between the two countries at any given point. The Sino-Indian boundary dispute 

does not simply restrict to the definition of a boundary that could be marked on a map. It also 

takes on board vast tracts of disputed territorial frontiers, thereby adding to the operational 

challenges in attempting to revive a barren process that has been in flaccid motion for more than a 

quarter of a century now. Thus arises a burning need to put in place, certain specific bilateral 

CBMs between India and China with a faith that if sincere attempts are made to address 

divergences on key security issues, then there could be hope to reduce frictions and establish 

common ground.

1.1 China’s posture towards India

China’s posture towards India in the recent past has been to focus only on the economics of the 

relationship whilst choosing to ignore the contentious strategic aspects. These include the 

interminable territorial dispute and the strategic conflicts over China’s growing role in South Asia. 

There appears to be a consensus among the more conservative and nationalist elements in China 

to toughen Beijing’s policies and selectively make its presence felt.2 Alastair Ian Johnston has 

argued that China has historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard realpolitik strategic culture 

across different time periods and that tends to persist in the current context. Chinese decisionmakers seem to have internalized this strategic culture.3 Notwithstanding that the India-China 

relationship had shed much of the baggage of the past few decades, arising out of bitterness of the 

interminable border dispute, efforts to promote political dialogue and economic cooperation seem 

to be becoming stagnant, with many other issues complicating the relationship. The political 

dialogue has failed to yield any forward movement on the border dispute and in addition, China’s 

ongoing campaign for military modernisation and its consequent impact on regional players 

including India, both, at the diplomatic and military level, only tends to underscore an urgent need 
8

to promote bilateral CBMs between the two countries in various fields, most importantly, in the 

military arena and the nuclear realm.

China acknowledges that it shares an interest in a peaceful and stable South Asia. Nevertheless, 

strengthened Indo-US ties are widely perceived in Beijing as an attempt by Washington to enlist 

New Delhi as a potential counterweight to China or as part of a containment strategy against it.4

Beijing’s concerns stem from steps undertaken by successive US administrations to “preserve a 

balance of power.”5 Moreover, according to Zhao Gancheng, Director of South Asia Studies at the 

Shanghai Institute for International Studies:

A strategically more autonomous South Asia would ... lead to less reliance of South Asia on 

foreign forces ... From the angle of long-term interests ... China should adopt a dialectic 

approach and follow a long term South Asia policy ... As the construction of a new South 

Asian regional order progresses, it would be necessary for China to play a permanent role 

in establishing equilibrium and stability in South Asia.6

The form of such an increased Chinese role is still being debated in Beijing. The Chinese realists 

are subdivided into “offensive” and “defensive” as well as “hard” and “soft” camps, each strand 

believes that the state has to build its own strength. The hard-power realists argue for strengthening 

comprehensive national power (zonghe guoli) – particularly the military and economic dimensions, 

while soft-power realism emphasizes diplomacy and cultural power.7 The “offensive realists” argue 

that China should use its newly built military, economic, and diplomatic influence to essentially 

coerce others toward the ends China desires.8

1.2 Institutional Framework of Bilateral Cooperation: An Economic 

Convergence of Interests.

The combined GDP of South Asia (with India as the most substantial contributor) and China 

touches (US) $4 trillion. With its annual trade volume with India reaching nearly $70 billion, 

China’s short-term India policy seems to focus exclusively on the economic aspect. In improving 

economic cooperation with the countries of South Asia, Beijing has taken the following measures: 

increase Chinese FDI (foreign direct investment); transfer technology; remove non-tariff barriers; 

and technical assistance to increase trade bases of production in agricultural and manufacturing 

sectors. Asian economies, including that of China, have been buffeted by the global financial 

crunch. Aiming to reach an 8 per cent growth through stimulus packages and boosting domestic 

consumption, Beijing realises the crucial importance of South Asian countries in general, and that 

of New Delhi in particular, vis-à-vis its own economic growth.9 During Premier Wen Jiabao’s South 

Asia visit in December 2010, this understanding was reflected in Assistant Foreign Minister Hu 

Zhengyue’s statement that China was interested in strengthening “high level contacts to enhance 

strategic mutual trust and expand bilateral trade”. Proponents of the economic convergences 

between New Delhi and Beijing need to note that India (the world’s second fastest-growing 

economy) is largely exporting primary commodities to China and importing finished products. For 

example, China is known to have mineral deposits two-and-a-half times that of India, however it 

continues to import iron ore from India. The dumping of Chinese goods is also adversely affecting 

India’s local manufacturing industry. China maintains non-trade barriers and other mechanisms 

that keep out higher-value Indian exports, such as information technology and pharmaceutical 

products; it exports to India double what it imports in value; it continues to blithely undercut 
9

Indian manufacturing despite a record number of anti-dumping cases against it by India in the 

World Trade Organization; and its FDI in India is minuscule ($52 million in the past decade).10

There are several institutional mechanisms for India’s economic and commercial engagement with 

China. India-China Joint Economic Group on Economic Relations and Trade, Science and 

Technology (JEG) is a ministerial-level dialogue mechanism established in 1988 during the visit of 

former Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, to China. Besides, a Joint Study Group (JSG) was set 

up after former Indian Prime Minister AB Vajpayee’s visit to China in June 2003 with an aim to 

examine the potential complementarities between the two countries in expanded trade and 

economic cooperation. As per its recommendation, a Joint Task Force (JTF) was set up to study 

the feasibility of an India-China Regional Trading Arrangement and the JTF Report was 

completed in October 2007. Moreover, there are Joint Working Groups on Trade, Agriculture 

and Energy. In December 2010, during Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, it was 

agreed upon to set up the India-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED) with the first SED 

taking place in Beijing on September 26, 2011.

1.3 Building upon the Commonality of Countering Terror Networks in 

the Region

China and India have both been advocates of continued strengthening of multilateral 

counterterrorism cooperation within the UN framework. A memorandum of understanding 

(MoU) signed between Beijing and New Delhi in May 2006 stipulated that they would hold joint 

military exercises and join forces in counterterrorism operations. Military ties between the Indian 

and Chinese armed forces have been building since December 2007, when the first joint 

counterterrorism exercise “Hand-in-Hand” was held at Kunming, China. One Company each 

from the Indian Army & the PLA participated in the exercise which was based on the theme of 

“Counter Terrorism”. Lt Gen Susheel Gupta, Deputy Chief of India’s Army Staff and Lt Gen Ma 

Xiaotian, Deputy CGS, Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA), were the observers from each 

respective side.

After the terror attack in Mumbai in November 2008, a joint military combat exercise was 

conducted from December 6-14, 2008, in Belgaum, Karnataka (in southern India), which featured 

joint tactical manoeuvres and drills, with a 137-strong Army contingent from the 1st Company of 

the Infantry Battalion of the PLA’s Chengdu Military Area Command, and troops from the 8 

Maratha Light Infantry Battalion of the Indian Army. The exercise focused on joint tactical 

manoeuvres and drills, interoperability training and joint command post procedures, and 

culminated in a simulated joint counterterrorism operational exercise. The larger aim of this 

initiative was to be able to evolve a collaborative security mechanism among Asian powers to tackle 

transnational terrorism.11 Others, however, believe that counter-terrorism collaboration between 

the two nations’ land forces are less than optimal. According to B. Raman: 

Operational cooperation in counter-terrorism and counter-piracy between the navies of the 

two countries is of far greater relevance as compared to cooperation between Indian and 

Chinese armies, since no India-based terrorist group is operating in Chinese territory and 

vice versa. On the contrary, Chinese territory and nationals have been subjected to attacks 
10

not only by the Uighurs, but also by indigenous Pakistan-based Jihadi terrorist 

organisations.12

Given that India has experienced the scourge of terror groups in Kashmir and beyond, and China 

in Xinjiang province, the two could consider proposals including forging closer collaboration in 

intelligence sharing and counter-terror exercises. India has shared with China evidence about the 

involvement of Pakistan-based elements,13 seeking its influence to persuade Islamabad to bring the 

perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attack to justice. India’s present National Security Advisor and 

former Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon had in fact, provided details of the attack to 

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei, who was sent to India as a special envoy to defuse 

tensions between India and Pakistan. Initially, the Chinese state-controlled media had simply 

echoed Islamabad’s position on the issue and subsequently the Chinese government chose to 

refuse in condemning its ally, Pakistan.14

During the course of the first counterterrorism dialogue since November 2008, held in Beijing in 

July 2011, China maintained its position of objecting in the UN to proscribing Maulana Masood 

Azhar of the terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammed and two Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives, Azam Cheema 

and Abdul Rehman Makki, under the al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions list. On the face of it, the 

dialogue was interpreted as a step in moving forward towards enhancing bilateral cooperation; 

however, there was no substantive development, with Chinese officials insisting that the 

information provided by the Indian delegation was “still insufficient”—which makes for a technical 

requirement under the relevant UN resolutions. Besides, details of Chinese arms worth $2 million 

from TCL, a subsidiary of the Chinese arms producer China Xinshidai, provided by Anthony 

Shimray of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN {IM}), were also rejected by the 

Chinese delegation on the ground that they could not act upon a “confessional statement” –

regardless of whether it had been admitted in a court of law.15

Significantly, in August 2011, hinting at a change of stance, China obliquely pointed at Pakistan for 

the deadly attacks in Xinjiang. According to a statement published in the Global Times by Pan 

Zhiping, Director, Institute of Central Asia at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, “Located 

in the southern part of Xinjiang, Hotan is close to the border with Pakistan ... Due to their affinity 

in religion and language, some Uyghur residents there are at risk of being influenced by terrorist 

groups such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement.” This brings to focus China’s prime concern 

vis-à-vis maintaining internal security and crackdown against separatism and extremism in its 

Muslim-majority and far-western Xinjiang province. The Taliban militancy, Islamic terrorist 

organisations and remnants of the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, pose a serious challenge to Xinjiang’s 

stability—often dubbed as China’s “bridgehead” to the West. Xinjiang shares a 5,743 km boundary 

with eight countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan 

and India. China realises that the threat of militant and terrorist groups operating in the Central 

Asian Republics will impact upon the future stability in the restive Xinjiang province. In this 

reference, Beijing wants to make certain that no Islamic separatist group in Xinjiang (whose 

western tip touches the Afghan border) receives any benefit or support from radical/terror groups, 

post the US-led withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.

Taking the joint military exercises further, it was stated by Colonel Guo Hongtao, Staff Officer of 

the Asian Affairs Bureau, Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence, when he told a 

visiting team of Indian journalists that “China is considering India’s proposal for more joint 
11

military exercises and it is at the stage of working level discussions.” Guo said that the working level 

discussions will ultimately decide on when the exercise could be held while asserting that both 

countries should make “substantive effort to expand bilateral cooperation...” Gou also accepted 

that during the joint counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism war games held in Belgaum in 2008, 

officers of the PLA obtained new combat training experience of “cleaning up of the battlefield”. 

The Indian journalists were visiting China on the invitation of the state-run All China Journalists’ 

Association as part of the China-India Year of Friendship and Cooperation declared by the two 

countries.16 Establishing a Joint Working Group on counter-terrorism could be a positive CBM 

that would prove to be a useful mechanism for exchange of information, intelligence sharing, antiterrorism training programmes and for strengthening institutional links between crime prevention 

agencies in the two countries. Proposals for this could include the following:

 Exchange of information and assessments on the international and regional terrorist situation

 Strengthening of bilateral intelligence and investigative cooperation

 Enhance military-to-military cooperation on counterterrorism

 Working together on multilateral initiatives on terrorism, including on the implementation of 

UNSC Resolution 1373

 Initiation of dialogue and cooperation in homeland/internal security, terrorist financing, 

forensic science and transportation security

 Undertaking concrete steps to detect and counter the activities of individual terrorists and 

terrorist organisations of concern to the two countries
12
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2. THE TRAJECTORY OF CBMS IN THE INDO-CHINESE CONTEXT

In the Sino-Indian context, Confidence Building Measures, including the Sino-Indian Panchsheel 

Agreement of 1954, had been part of India’s nation-building process during the early years of their 

independence and were later consolidated under the Sino-Indian CBMs agreements of 1993 and 

1996 (discussed in detail subsequently in the course of the paper).17 The Sino-Indian interactions 

between 1988 and 1996 are considered very significant since they extended onto undertaking 

CBMs in the military field.18 Today, both China and India get ready to face the formidable 

challenge of defining and demarcating their border—therefore making CBMs as the embodiment 

for future Sino-Indian rapprochement. The bilateral defence interaction has been on the anvil with 

peace and tranquility being maintained by and large, along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the 

border areas. A Chinese military delegation aimed at fostering CBMs between the defence forces 

of the two countries made a visit to India in December 1993 and the visit was reciprocated by 

Indian Army Chief General BC Joshi’s visit to China in July 1994. More than a decade later, in 

May 2006 the first ever MoU on Defence Exchanges between the Armed Forces of India and 

China was signed. The formalisation of this MoU tends to deepen and institutionalize defence 

cooperation between India and China.

 

Nevertheless, considerable work remains. China continues to be in physical occupation of large 

areas of land India claims as its territory, starting with the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh, 

approximately 38,000 sq km, since the mid-1950s. In addition, India maintains that Pakistan has 

illegally ceded to China, in 1963, 5180 sq km of Indian Territory in the Shaksgam Valley of 

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), north of the Siachen Glacier, under a bilateral boundary 

agreement. Additionally, China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian 

Territory in Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls ‘Southern Tibet’. China’s stated position is that 

reunification of Chinese territories is a sacred duty of the People’s Liberation Army. China shares 

a 22,000 km land border with fourteen adjacent states. It has resolved territorial disputes with 

twelve of them, but still needs to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute with India. While 

recognizing the McMahon Line as its boundary with Myanmar, China refuses to do so with India 

and Bhutan.19 Despite the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement signed by the two countries 

in 1993 and the agreement on confidence-building measures in the military field signed in 1996, 

border guards of the PLA have intruded repeatedly into Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh and have 

even objected to Indian road construction efforts in these areas in the past few years. These 

periodic intrusions/transgressions have been widely reported and debated in the Indian press and 

have been discussed at length in the Indian Parliament as well.

2.1 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the 

Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, September 7, 

199320

This agreement was hailed as the first major conventional CBM between Beijing and New Delhi. It 

reiterated the principles of “Panchsheel” and asserted that the Five Principles including mutual 

respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 

other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence should be revived to 

form the basis of inter-state relations between India and China. The agreement averred that the 

India-China boundary question should be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations. 
14

Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. Pending an ultimate 

solution to the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect and 

observe the line of actual control between the two sides. No activities of either side shall overstep 

the line of actual control. In case personnel of one side cross the line of actual control, upon being 

cautioned by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side of the line of actual 

control. When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the line 

of actual control where “they have different views as to its alignment.” Article II asserted that each 

side will keep its military forces in the areas along the line of actual control to a minimum level 

compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries. The two 

sides agree to reduce their military forces along the line of actual control in conformity with the 

requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings to be mutually agreed. The 

agreement underscored that both sides shall work out “through consultations effective confidence 

building measures in the areas along the line of actual control”. Neither side will undertake 

specified levels of military exercises in mutually identified zones. Each side shall give the other 

prior notification of military exercises of specified levels near the line of actual control permitted 

under this agreement.

Significantly, Article V stated that the two sides agreed to take adequate measures to ensure that air 

intrusions across the line of actual control do not take place and shall undertake mutual 

consultations should intrusions occur. Additionally, it was also agreed upon that both sides shall 

also consult on possible restrictions on air exercises in areas to be mutually agreed near the line of 

actual control. Article VII agreed upon holding consultations on the “form, method, scale and 

content of effective verification measures” and supervision required for the reduction of military 

forces along the line of actual control. Lastly, it was also decided under Article VIII that each side 

of the India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary question shall appoint diplomatic and 

military experts to formulate implementation measures. The experts shall advise the Joint 

Working Group on the resolution of differences between the two sides on the alignment of the 

line of actual control and address issues relating to redeployment with a view to reduction of 

military forces in the areas along the line of actual control.

2.2 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field 

along the Line of actual Control in the China-India Border Areas, 

November 29, 199621

The second CBM in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border 

Areas, signed in 1996 was primarily aimed at fulfilling the agenda of the first such CBM agreement 

of 1993. Moving more specifically into expanding these CBMs in the sensitive areas in the military 

field, it was specified that “Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side”. The 

agreement crucially affirmed commitment of both sides to the line of actual control while fully 

recognising that both sides had “different perceptions” on certain segments for which the two agree 

“to speed up process of clarification” and start “to exchange maps indicating their respective 

perceptions...as soon as possible” (Article X). According to Article III of the 1996 agreement, all 

future ceilings are expected to be based on "parameters such as the nature of terrain, road 

communications and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/de-induct troops and 

armaments." While clearly categorizing the types of “offensive weapons”, withdrawal of which will 

be given priority, Article IV pronounced the inclusion of combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, 
15

guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, 

surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles. Besides, the two sides also agreed upon 

exchanging data on the “military forces and armaments” that are to be reduced. The agreement 

urged both sides to “avoid holding large scale military exercises involving more than one division 

(15,000 troops) in close proximity to the LOAC” and to inform the other side on “type, level, 

planned duration and areas of exercise” in case it involves more than a brigade (5,000 troops), and 

about de-induction22 “within five days of completion,” and the other side shall be free to seek any 

number of clarifications as it deems necessary.23 According to Article V, the two sides also agreed 

that no combat aircraft which include “fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, military trainer, armed 

helicopter and other armed aircraft” shall be allowed to fly “within ten kilometers” of the LOAC 

“except by prior permission” from the other side. Similarly, Article VI prohibits any use of 

“hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two 

kilometers” of the LOAC unless it is “part of developmental activities” in which case the other side 

shall be informed “through diplomatic channels or by convening a border personnel meeting, 

preferably five days in advance.” With an objective to strengthen exchanges and cooperation 

between their “military personnel and establishments”, Article VII provided that the two sides shall 

expand meetings between their border representatives at designated places and also enhances 

“telecommunication links” between these border points. And finally, as under Article XI the SinoIndian Joint Working Group on Boundary Question starts “mutual consultations” for “detailed 

implementation measures”, once again under Article IX each side shall have “the right to seek 

clarification” regarding the “manner in which the other side is observing the agreement” or on any 

“doubtful situation” in the border region.

2.3 Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for 

the Settlement of the India-China Bound Question, April 11, 2005

By reaffirming the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation 

between India and China, signed on June 23, 2003, and recalling that the two sides had appointed 

Special Representatives to explore the framework of settlement of the India-China boundary 

question, both India and China noted that the two sides are seeking a political settlement of the 

boundary question in the context of their overall and long-term interests. An early settlement of the 

boundary question should be pursued as a strategic objective and that the political parameters and 

guiding principles for a boundary settlement should ensure that the differences on the boundary 

question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations (Article I). 

The two sides will take into account, inter alia, historical evidence, national sentiments, practical 

difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border 

areas (Article V). Perhaps the most crucial clause in this agreement came in the form of Article VII

which stipulated that in the process of reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall 

“safeguard due interests of their settled populations” in the border areas. However, Chinese 

Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi stated in June 2007, “... the mere presence of populated areas in 

Arunachal Pradesh would not affect Chinese claims on the boundary.” This statement was a 

blatant renouncement of the aforementioned Article VII of the “Agreement on Political 

Parameters and Guiding Principles” signed during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in 

April 2005, which categorically stated, “In reaching a border settlement, the two sides shall 

safeguard populations in border areas.” Within the agreed framework of the final boundary 
16

settlement, the delineation of the boundary will be carried out utilising means such as modern 

cartographic and surveying practices and joint surveys (Article VIII). However, pending an ultimate 

settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should strictly respect and observe the line of 

actual control and work together to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas (Article IX).

The Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary issue has been the most noteworthy forum for 

implementing Sino-Indian CBMs by means of holding regular meetings of military commanders 

from both sides at Bumla and Dichu in the eastern sector, Lipulekh near Pithoragarh in the 

middle sector, and Spangur near Chushul in the western sector. These meetings are organised and 

conducted by the military area commanders from the two sides to establish facts on the ground. 

Besides, both commanders have access to each other through a “hotline” link to ensure 

consultations in case of any intrusion and/or emergency.
17

3. EVALUATIONG THE CHINESE APPROACH TO CBMS

Nations that relate to their neighbors in zero-sum terms will use CBMs sparingly, postponing 

resolution of contentious issues until power balances have altered in their favour. In contrast, 

nations that truly wish good-neighborly relations can use CBMs extensively to establish new 

patterns of cooperative security. In recent years, Beijing has publicly endorsed the practice of 

confidence-building measures, with the Chinese government gradually accepting CBMs as an 

important means of safeguarding China’s security and regional peace. China’s CBMs with India to 

improve lines of communication, reduce tensions, and disengage forces along disputed border 

areas are significant, but do not seem to presage final accords, at least in the near-term.

Tracing the evolution of the Chinese approach to CBMs, Xia Liping notes that China’s negative 

attitude toward CBMs changed significantly in the mid-1980s with Beijing’s need to focus on 

economic development. Xia asserts, there is little debate among Chinese scholars on the current 

significance of CBMs. As for CBMs to prevent maritime and resource conflicts, Xia calls for 

incidents at sea-type accords and the installation of hotlines.24 China has experienced a process of 

gradually deepening its understanding of the concept of CBMs beginning with the early 1950s to

the early 1970s, when China did not embrace the concept of CBMs because during this period the 

concept of CBMs had not fully developed. The process of the Conference on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which led to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, presents the most fully 

developed model for CBMs. At first, China had a negative attitude towards the process, thinking it 

was the manifestation of a policy of appeasement taken by Western countries towards the 

hegemony of the Soviet Union.25 Since the mid-1980s, there has been a significant change in 

Chinese thinking and approach toward the idea of CBMs. The main reasons for this change are 

the following:

 With the end of the Cold War, CBMs are emerging as an essential means of preventing 

accidental wars and unintended escalation in strife-ridden regions;

 The importance of economic factors in international relations and economic interdependence 

is increasing among Asian-Pacific countries. This has made states in the region more willing to 

resolve territorial disputes and political problems through peaceful means, including CBMs;

 China has been focusing its efforts on internal economic development, so it is trying its best to 

seek a peaceful international security environment; and

 China’s policy of reform and openness has made much progress, rendering Chinese scholars 

and officials much more open to accepting new concepts from abroad in the field of arms 

control. CBMs have been introduced in China with the idea that CBMs are one of the 

important means of maintaining peace and stability.26

More significantly, during the Second Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 

held on August 1, 1995, Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, outlined some principles of the 

Chinese government policy specifically in reference to CBMs:27

 To establish CBMs so as to improve the Asia-Pacific security environment and to bring stability 

and prosperity in the region to the twenty-first century;
18

 To put good political desire as the first precondition of the establishment of CBMs between 

countries; “without good and common political desire, it is impossible for them to cooperate 

voluntarily”;

 To attach importance on pushing CBMs in its broad sense so as to improve the regional 

security environment as a whole; “it is not enough to establish CBMs only in [the] military 

field, and the establishment of CBMs should include political, economic and social contents”

 To establish CBMs according to both the reality of diversification in the Asia-Pacific region and 

the new features of the international situation, and not to blindly imitate the models of other 

regions and those of the past; and

 To establish some pragmatic and feasible CBMs step by step. Regional security cooperation 

should be developed according to the spirit of doing easier things first, then taking on more 

difficult issues, while seeking common ground and setting differences aside for the time-being.28

Most of these CBMs have been related to border-disputes and some scholars have questioned the 

necessity or even the usefulness of nuclear related CMS. They argue that the areas of dispute are 

too complex already and urge that the nuclear issue should not be thrown into the mix; especially 

since the likelihood of a nuclear exchange is so low. In the event, where there is low/no probability 

of a nuclear exchange, pursuing nuclear CBMs are unlikely to damage confidence-building 

processes between two strategic actors and the case of India and China should fall best under this 

category. Furthermore, periods of low tensions are probably the best times to start new confidence 

building measures.

3.1 Indo-China Bilateral CBMs: The Way Forward

In a significant movement forward, India has proposed to set up a new Border Personnel 

Meeting (BPM) venue along the Uttarakhand-Himachal Pradesh stretch of the Sino-Indian 

border as a CBM between the two countries. The proposal was put forth by India during the 4th

round of the Annual Defence Dialogue between Beijing and New Delhi in December 2011, in 

which both sides agreed to increase the defense exchanges between the two countries and enrich 

the content of the exchanges. Thus far, meetings at regular intervals are held at three facilities in 

Kibithu in Arunachal Pradesh, Nathu La in Sikkim and Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir. The 

need for such a facility was felt by the Indian side as there was no such venue in the central 

sector of the 3,488 km long Indo-China International Land Border. However, the proposal is 

under consideration by the Chinese side.29

In addition, India and China also etched out a Working Mechanism for Consultation and 

Coordination on India-China Border Affairs on January 17, 2012. According to Dai Bingguo, State 

Councillor of the People’s Republic of China, both India and China should put aside their 

differences and seize “a golden period to grow...” While on the face of it, the optimism helped in 

setting a positive tone to the talks, it did not really translate into any substantial shift in the Chinese 

policy on the issue. The latest mechanism tends to reiterate mere symbolism, submitting no 

tangible progress on ground. It offers a “desire to materialise the spirit” of similar endeavours 

inked previously, including the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of 1993, CBMs in the 

Military Field of 1996, and the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of these CBMs of 

2005, coupled with numerous meetings of the Joint Working Group. Since it only seeks to 

“consult” and “coordinate” border affairs, the efficacy of the latest Working Mechanism as a 
19

plausible means of achieving any sort of breakthrough to the interminable territorial and boundary 

dispute will likely be placed under a critical scanner. Interestingly, Article V of the Working 

Mechanism states that it “will not discuss resolution of the Boundary Question or affect the Special 

Representatives Mechanism”. In the scenario of India intending to negotiate with China on arriving 

at a boundary resolution from a position of equality in the long term, it ought to step up efforts in 

the said direction, particularly seeking delineation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) physically 

on ground and map—which could be the biggest and most tangible CBM between Beijing and New 

Delhi. It needs to be underlined here that since the Indo-China War of 1962, the LAC between 

India and China has not yet been physically demarcated/delineated on ground as well as in the 

military maps. This, in effect, has resulted with both sides drawing their respective perceptions of 

the LAC. The resultant and often reported incidents of border transgressions by the Chinese 

troops are being addressed through established mechanisms including hot lines, flag meetings, 

border personnel meetings and normal diplomatic channels. The latest Working Mechanism aims 

to only facilitate timely communication of information on the border situation, for appropriately 

handling border incidents, thus putting a worrying question mark over the eventual future of 

India’s boundary settlement with the People’s Republic of China. While the classic realist 

perspective on clashing interests and power in an anarchic international system has not entirely 

become redundant, the growing coincidence of interests between the two “emerging powers” in an 

increasingly integrated system has not yet been fully recognised by either side.

3.2 Need for Nuclear Dialogue and CBMs

The vulnerability of modern states to armed conflict with conventional weapons, coupled with the 

possibility of it extending into the nuclear realm, tends to accentuate the contextual and operational 

significance of deterrence. The theory of nuclear deterrence attempts to relate the threatened use 

of force to states' efforts to secure their interests through the strategy that leaves something to 

chance or the strategy of retaliation. CBMs help to untangle the qualms and complexities, serve to

reduce tensions and promote regional security by means such as giving prior notification of military 

exercises, establishing “hotlines”, relocating short-range missiles away from the border, engaging in 

bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines to develop confidence building 

measures both in the conventional and nuclear fields. In addition to the conventional CBMs, 

nuclear CBMs can be described as a tool to achieve greater bilateral stability at the strategic level 

between two nuclear powers. A conceptual requirement of nuclear CBMs should be that 

inadvertent nuclear war can be prevented by improving levels of communication, increasing 

nuclear information exchange, and restricting military operations near international borders.30

The present scenario of “non-negotiation of nuclear CBMs between India and China” only tends 

to add to the security dilemma between Beijing and New Delhi. India and China can try and devise 

mechanisms so as to gauge the extent to which the existential critical differences can be abridged 

and thereafter recognize expansion of common ground. The precarious nuclear balance between 

India and China warrants that nuclear CBMs be established between the two countries, given that 

the presence of nuclear weapons further complicates the debates over a conventional conflict, 

especially owing to the presence of a perplexing nuclear escalation ladder. However, at the same 

time, it also needs to be borne in mind that both India and China would certainly not want to limit 

themselves with any CBM, which would affect the pace of their respective armament/military 

modernisation programmes, in order to assure security. Even though, differentiating 

conventionally armed missiles from that of being nuclear-armed can be hard to achieve, however, 
20

the issue of their respective deployments could be mutually taken up for discussion. Herein, it 

needs to be debated whether nuclear CBMs between India and China can be pursued 

independently of conventional CBMs.

It appears that China is opposed to India’s joining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. For 

instance, Beijing was reluctant to allow the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to open up trade in 

nuclear materials and technology with India in 2008. In so far as the Chinese approach is 

concerned, there is an absence of a realistic approach towards India’s emergence as a nuclear 

weapons power. From an Indian standpoint, there is a complete need for establishing a closer 

dialogue between Beijing and New Delhi on matters nuclear. Beijing and New Delhi have never 

undertaken a dialogue on nuclear issues ever since India tested nuclear weapons in 1998. China 

refuses all such discussions claiming they would undermine the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The blurred security environment is also witness to the fact that China refuses to discuss any 

nuclear CBMs or, nuclear risk-reduction measures (NRRMs) with India. In that sense, it is very 

contentious to proceed forward with a discussion on their respective nuclear weapons programme, 

perhaps a dialogue on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and global nuclear disarmament 

might just prove more fecund. Nevertheless it continues to remain ambiguous whether Beijing 

would be willing to reconsider its position of accepting India as a nuclear-armed power. By virtue 

of explicitly accepting the changes in the policies of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Beijing 

has tacitly recognised India’s position as a country with nuclear weapons. There needs to be an 

exhaustive and in-depth discussion at the Track II level between specialists from the two countries 

and thereafter be raised at the official policymaking levels in each country.

Given that both India and China share similar perspectives on nuclear weapons and both accord a 

fairly limited role in national security strategy to nuclear weapons, with their role restricted to 

retaliation, China and India’s similar approach towards disarmament should be viewed as a 

positive step towards the objective to establishing nuclear CBMs. China has advocated for the 

complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It has been argued by Beijing 

that in order to attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament, the 

international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan with 

different phases, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear 

weapons. China holds that, before the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear 

weapons, all nuclear-armed states should abandon any nuclear deterrence policy based on the firstuse of nuclear weapons, make an unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will they 

use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free 

zones, and negotiate an international legal instrument in this regard. In the meantime, nucleararmed states should negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each 

other.31
21

4. INDIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY

Ever since testing nuclear weapons in 1998, India has made ardent efforts to maintain and stabilise 

its nuclear deterrent and minimise existential nuclear dangers. In the Indian case, the logic and 

role of nuclear weapons as a political instrument confers on them a utility more in terms of

political deterrence rather than limiting it to military deterrence. In this reference, New Delhi's 

nuclear weapons are entirely a political instrument in nature, based on the political necessity of 

exercising the option and the nature of the environment in which it has to pursue national interests. 

India's nuclear doctrine outlines the strategy of "credible minimum deterrence" and also establishes 

that India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike. This declared "no-first-use" doctrine thus 

rules out the first-strike option and seeks to ensure the survivability of the nuclear arsenal for a 

credible second-strike capability. The fact that India's deterrence debate revolves around a 

defensive doctrine, amply visible by a repeated affirmation of the "No-First-Use" principle shall 

only assist in enhancing regional strategic stability, desirable both for the purposes of deterrence 

stability and that of crisis stability.

The long-term effectiveness of a nation's nuclear deterrent is determined not by a quantitative 

comparison or war-fighting capability of the weapons, but by their inherent capacity to retaliate. 

Conventional weapons alone cannot deter a nuclear adversary. A no-first-strike policy must be 

backed by an assured, effective and rapid second-strike capability for ensuring robust deterrence. 

Against this backdrop, a retaliatory second-strike capability that is credible and invulnerable 

becomes imperative for India so as to be able to deter the adversary by surviving the first strike and 

inflicting substantial retaliation thereafter. It would only be apposite to state here that the means of 

delivery assume critical importance since its survivability and effectiveness in reaching the likely 

decision points required in the deterrence paradigm finally defines credibility of a nation's 

deterrence posture. Notwithstanding the delay in India's achieving the desired objective of a fullyoperational nuclear triad, the journey of achieving such a triad can be described as a work in 

progress, which will provide New Delhi with an option of upgrading its present strategic posture of 

"dissuasion" to one of "credible deterrence".

4.1 India’s Search for an Operational Nuclear Triad

Presently, India awaits the third and perhaps, most elusive, underwater leg of its nuclear triad, 

namely, the INS Arihant—an indigenous nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear-tipped 

ballistic missiles (SSBN). Likely to be fully operational and out at sea by early 2013, the “harbouracceptance trials” and the “sea-acceptance trials” of INS Arihant have been slated for this year and 

upon their completion, the SSBN shall be commissioned into the Indian Navy. As the Indian 

Navy stands poised to complete the nation’s nuclear triad, it is expected that the final nuclear 

insurance will come from the seas once the INS Arihant begins undertaking deterrent patrols. 

India’s nuclear doctrine calls for sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces; a 

robust command and control system; effective intelligence and early warning capabilities; 

comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with strategy; and the requisite primary 

and alternate chain of command to employ nuclear forces and weapons. The possession of a 

nuclear triad primarily includes development of three major delivery components, namely strategic 

bombers (carrier-based or land-based, armed with bombs or missiles), land-based missiles and 

SSBNs. India’s force structure is largely based upon its existing military assets including the 
22

Sukhoi-30 MKIs and Mirage-2000s ensuring that India’s limited arsenal can execute a successful 

second strike to cause damage that would be unacceptable to the adversary and therefore influence 

its cost-benefit analysis of undertaking a first strike to begin with. Besides, more recently in April 

2012, the Indian Navy formally inducted the INS Chakra, an 8,140 tonne nuclear-powered AkulaII class attack submarine, armed with the 300 km range ‘Klub-S’ land-attack cruise missiles and 

advanced torpedoes, leased from Russia for a period of 10 years. However, the INS Chakra falls 

short of providing India with its long-awaited third leg of the nuclear weapons triad, since it will not 

be armed with long-range strategic missiles. Nevertheless, the INS Chakra has surely strengthened

India’s underwater combat arm by offering operational flexibility in blue-water operations, and 

additionally presenting the capability to deploy a potent weapons delivery platform at a place of its 

choosing at long distances in stealth. In the meanwhile, India looks towards its second SSBN, 

named the INS Aridhaman, following the induction of the INS Arihant.

Additionally, the successful test-launch of the long-range Agni V missile by India in April 2012 has 

undoubtedly bolstered India’s deterrent, and the Agni V is being considered as the mainstay of 

India’s nuclear delivery vectors. The accuracy of the Agni V missile can only be ascertained with 

frequent validation tests, before it gets fully inducted into the Indian armed forces by 2014-15. In 

that sense, it will be another two years before New Delhi sees the fully integrated and operational 

version of the Agni V missile. A fully functional and cohesive nuclear triad force structure 

composition that includes nuclear-capable long-range aircraft, inter-continental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and SSBNs, with actual weaponisation 

being held back, (i.e., nuclear weapons in a mated format) will be the ultimate platform for India’s 

nuclear triad. That the mere possession of nuclear weapons paves the way for an implicit threat of 

use or actual use, a well propounded “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons is India’s elementary 

commitment and in furtherance to this reference, every possible effort should be made to 

persuade as many nations who are in possession of nuclear weapons, to join an international treaty 

which seeks to ban their first use. Till the time nuclear weapons will be eliminated from the world, 

the related threats shall also remain. The sole permanent solution to this quandary remains a 

global commitment towards achieving universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear 

disarmament which will enhance and grant a sense of permanence to the conceptual as well as 

operational levels of collective security. This is a cause, long espoused by India, and being a 

national security objective, New Delhi should continue its efforts towards seeking to achieve the 

goal of a nuclear weapon-free world.
23

5. CHINA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND POSTURE

Chinese leadership has today achieved broad consensus that the nation’s interests are best served 

by a stable and peaceful international environment.32 China’s commitment to a peaceful rise has 

prompted China to limit its nuclear weapons as much as possible. Running contrary to China’s 

intention to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, however, is China’s national defense imperatives 

that demand that China must develop its nuclear weapons to a certain extent. Chinese decisionmakers are faced with the task of finding the appropriate trade-off between the two competing 

goals. Their response is nuclear modernization. The task facing China’s leadership in terms of 

nuclear policy seems to be rather clear: Maintain the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrence 

capability. The PLA’s Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), responsible for China’s strategic missile 

forces, nuclear and conventional, has gained higher prominence in Chinese defense planning and 

decision-making over the last decade. 

Following the principle of building a lean and effective force, the PLA Second Artillery Force

strives to push forward its modernisation and improves its capabilities in rapid reaction, 

penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while steadily 

enhancing its capabilities in strategic deterrence and defensive operations. It continues to develop a 

military training system unique with the strategic missile force, improve the conditions of on-base, 

simulated and networked training, conduct trans-regional maneuvers and training with opposing 

forces in complex electromagnetic environments.33 It has set up laboratories for key disciplines, 

specialties and basic education, and successfully developed systems for automatic missile testing, 

operational and tactical command and control, strategic missile simulation training, and the 

support system for the survival of combatants in operational positions. It has worked to strengthen 

its safety systems, strictly implement safety regulations, and ensure the safety of missile weaponry 

and equipment, operational positions and other key elements. It has continued to maintain good 

safety records in nuclear weapon management. Through the years, the PLASAF has grown into a 

strategic force equipped with both nuclear and conventional missiles.34

5.1 Insights into how Chinese Military Strategists and Security 

Analysis Perceive the Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Country’s 

Defense Posture and the Continued Relevance of its No-First-Use 

Policy

In 1964, Beijing announced that it would adhere to a policy of no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear 

weapons (bu shouxian shiyong) and called for worldwide nuclear disarmament. It has adhered to 

its announced policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and in all circumstances, and 

made the unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will it use or threaten to use 

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. It needs to be 

mentioned that although official Chinese statements continue to ascribe to a no-first-use policy, 

there remains some confusion about the scope of the policy and the conditions surrounding it.

Stating that it will limit its nuclear capabilities to the minimum level required for national security, 

China adopted a minimal deterrent strategy relying on a small number of nuclear weapons to 
24

deliver punitive, counter-value responses to an adversary’s first strike. A majority of Chinese 

analysts profess the no-first-use issue arguing that this position has served Chinese strategic interests 

well since the 1960s giving Beijing the moral high ground and lending credence to its commitment 

to the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. Following the end of the Cold War, China 

holds that if all declared nuclear-weapons states should make a pledge of NFU of nuclear weapons, 

this would be one of the most effective measures to prevent nuclear war and nuclear proliferation 

and would also give impetus to the process of nuclear disarmament. Major General Peng 

Guangqian argued that the first use of nuclear weapons by any country would be unthinkable today 

and advocates that China should not change its existing policy, which emphasizes: the defensive 

nature of China’s nuclear arsenal; China’s doctrine of no-first-use; the limited size of Chinese 

nuclear forces; China’s efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and international nuclear arms 

control; and China’s commitment to the ultimate goals of “total elimination and thorough 

destruction” of nuclear weapons.35

There is another school of thought in China, which views nuclear weapons as essentially a symbolic 

tool whose sole purpose is to advance political and strategic goals, rather than military weapons. 

Discarding a no-first-use would not enhance China’s security, which depends on the credibility of 

its resolve to use maximum conventional force to meet any conventional attack. For instance, Sun 

Xiangli argues that for China, nuclear weapons are political and strategic deterrent weapons. This 

is the fundamental underpinning of Chinese policy that has remained a constant since 1964.36 Li 

Bin at the Tsinghua University, argues that China has adopted a no-first-use policy because its 

nuclear strategy is first and foremost to counter nuclear coercion. Further, any suggestion of first 

use during a conventional conflict is neither morally acceptable nor credible. China’s no-first-use 

policy, can be explained in the backdrop that it would never be credible for China to declare it will 

use nuclear weapons first.37

However, on the flipside, scholars such as Shen Dingli at the Fudan University argue that China’s 

no-first-use policy, is morally appealing and politically useful, but should not be allowed to impose 

undue and precarious constraints on China’s strategic nuclear options, especially at a time when 

China’s nuclear and conventional forces are limited and comparatively unsophisticated compared 

to those of its potential adversary. Shen argues, “If China’s conventional forces are devastated, and 

if Taiwan takes the opportunity to declare de jure independence, it is inconceivable that China 

would allow its nuclear weapons to be destroyed by a precision attack with conventional munitions, 

rather than use them as a true means of deterrence.”38 What Shen is arguing here is not that the nofirst-use doctrine should necessarily be abandoned, but rather that a more serious discussion is 

needed regarding how China can most effectively protect its core national security interests. If nofirst-use continues to serve China’s needs, it should be maintained and upheld; however, if this 

doctrine becomes a moral and philosophical straightjacket that undermines China’s national 

security, then, Shen argues, it should be modified.39

As of now, no-first-use remains in place as official Chinese policy. A serious debate on the future 

of this posture is likely to continue and even intensify in the months and years ahead. For instance, 

PLA officer, Major General Wu Jianguo, has explicitly stated that his country may find nuclear 

weapons useful in local wars.40 In a reference to the West and the Soviet Union, Wu stated:

...Threatened to use nuclear weapons in conventional wars because they believed that with 

nuclear weapons in hand, psychologically they would be able to hold a dominant position 

which would enhance troop morale and frighten the enemy on the one hand, and restrict 
25

the enemy’s use of some conventional means on the other, thus changing the direction of 

the war.41

Wu goes on to argue that if the PRC cannot achieve its objectives through purely psychological 

means, it must “strive to win a victory through actual combat, so as to remove obstacles to its 

political, economic, and diplomatic activities. Militarily, the immense effect of nuclear weaponry is 

that it can serve as a deterrent force and, at the same time, as a means of actual combat.”42 Wu 

rejects the idea that any form of combat, including nuclear warfare, is inherently taboo.

However, final decision-making and implementation of official policy in the nuclear realm 

continue to be the exclusive prerogative of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and military 

leadership at the highest levels. However, the fact that China’s nuclear use policy is being debated 

publicly implies that it has also been the subject of internal discussions and that, while it remains 

unchanged for the moment, the door has been left open to further official examination of the 

policy.
26
27

6. PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING A NUCLEAR CBM DIALOGUE 

BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

Thus far, the existing CBMs have not been able to eliminate the tenacious security dilemma 

present in the India- China context. It becomes even more important to assess and discuss the 

possibility of introducing nuclear CBMs in the India-China context which could potentially include 

the following:

 Jointly advocate the cause of universal nuclear disarmament

 Channelize efforts for an international convention on unconditional no-first-use of nuclear 

weapons and on the non-use and non-threat-of-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 

states and in nuclear-free zones

 Declaration of not using WMD against each other

 Support efforts to establish nuclear-free zones

 Pledge not to use nuclear weapons against one another and more importantly, a de-targeting 

agreement with each other

 Discuss the possibility of land-based nuclear arsenals remaining “de-mated” and “de-alerted” in 

peacetime

 Agreement on technical parameters, pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles

 Make existing hotlines and communication channels available 24x7

 Mutual agreement on reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, 

and notifying each other of any such incident/accident

The realist mode negates the understanding that the economic facet of Sino-Indian ties would 

constitute the key to the success of the future relationship: economic stakes and convergences 

cannot discount the existential strategic divergences, which could become a spoiler in the future 

relationship, as both contend for a larger share of the global economic and strategic pie. Although 

China and India have been converging on the economic front (heavily fashioned to favour China), 

the never-ending border dispute is just one of the many areas of discord between the two. Bilateral 

CBMs play a very critical role in India-China relations, more so, owing to respective perceptions 

vis-à-vis a “security dilemma” that exists between the two countries. For the time being, economic 

convergence of interests between China and India has tended to override the prevailing strategic 

differences and provides a novel connotation to the relations between the two nations. However, 

their bilateral territorial and boundary dispute has the potential to flare into a border conflict, 

leading to alteration of the strategic balance in the region. The recurrent and tiring rounds of talks, 

agreements and discussions without a significant breakthrough or even a possibility of it, seem to 

indicate that the border dispute will eventually become a key impediment in the future course of 

China’s relations with India. On the eve of Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in 2010, the 

Chinese Ambassador to India, Zhang Yan stated, “China-India relations are very fragile and very 

easy to be damaged and very difficult to repair.” This consequently highlights the urgent need to 

further build upon the CBMs between the two countries especially since peaking tensions can 

many a times become a fertile ground for confidence building measures to be adopted mutually.
28
29

7. REFERENCES

1 Monika Chansoria, “India and China: A Case of Constrained Cooperation,” Indian 

Foreign Affairs Journal, vol. 6, no. 3, July-September 2011.

2 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy 

Paper, no. 26, September 2010.

3 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 

Chinese History, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

4 This view was expressed by many Chinese strategic analysts during their discussions 

with this author in Beijing and Shanghai in August-September 2012.

5 Statement by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice where she stated, “... we 

expect that we will be able to keep a balance in this [South Asian] region”, cited in, AG 

Noorani, “Balance of Power in South Asia,” Frontline, April 22, 2005.

6 Zhao Gancheng, “South Asia’s Position in the International Order and Choice before 

China,” South Asian Studies Journal (Chinese), No. 1, May 2010.

7 David Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 

34, no. 1, Winter 2011, p. 12.

8 Ibid.

9 Chansoria, n. 1.

10 Ibid.

11 Cited in a Xinhua News Agency Report, December 14, 2008.

12 B Raman, “Sino-Indian Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism,” International Terrorism 

Monitor, Paper No. 311, November 22, 2007.

13 For more detail, see “ India shares Mumbai terror attack proof with China” the Times of 

India, January 5, 2009

14 This view was echoed by Chinese security experts while discussing counter-terror issues 

with this author. However, it also needs to be stated here that few Chinese analysts did 

acknowledge that terrorist organisations and individuals operating in China’s 

northwestern Xinjiang province has terrorist linkages that could be traced back to 

Pakistan. It was also accepted that the Chinese authorities had in fact, taken up this issue 

with their Pakistani counterparts.

15 Statement cited in a report titled, “India hits China wall in anti-terror talks,” Indian 

Express, September 5, 2011.
30

16 “China Considering More Joint Military Exercises with India,” Indo-Asian News Service 

(IANS) Report, July 2012.

17 For more details see, Zhen Ruixiang, “Shifting Obstacles in Sino-Indian Relations,” 

Pacific Review, vol. 6, no. 1, 1993, p. 66.

18 The 1988 visit by former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988 was a 

breakthrough visit in facilitating a turnaround of relations between India and China. In a 

Joint Communique released during the end of this visit, India, for the first time, dropped 

its earlier policy stance of asking for settlement of the border as a precondition for any 

improvement in relations. For more details on this Communique, see, “India-China Joint 

Press Communique,” Statement on Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Ministry of External 

Affairs, October 1989); also see, Shen-chun Chuan, “Peking’s Relations with India and 

Pakistan,” Issues & Studies, vol. 25, no. 9, September 1989.

19 It would be pertinent to mention here that according to Chinese experts on strategic 

affairs, there is considerable optimism and confidence that China’s boundary dispute with 

Bhutan may be resolved soon. This sentiment was expressed during a personal 

conversation with this author in China in August-September 2012.

20 For the entire text of this CBM Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 

India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, see the Archived 

Documents, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, September 

1993.

21 For the entire text of this CBM Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 

India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, see the Archived 

Documents, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, November 

1996.

22 De-induction of troops primarily refers to moving back of forces from the forward areas 

where they have been deployed back to their permanent peacetime locations, or to 

locations in the rear, thus implying that the forces are no longer actively deployed for 

combat.

23 Ibid.

24 Views expressed by Xia Liping, at the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies cited 

in, “The Evolution of Chinese Views toward CBMs,” in Michael Krepon (ed.), Report 

No. 23, prepared for the Henry L Stimson Center, May 1997.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 For more details, see the statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, speaking 

before the Second Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, August 1, 1995, 

as cited in Renmin Ribao, August 5, 1995.

28 Ibid.
31

29 “India proposes new border facility as CBM with China,” Press Trust of India News 

Report, New Delhi, December 26, 2011.

30 Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), p. 294.

31 For more details see, China’s National Defence in 2010, Information Office of the State

Council, Beijing, March 2011.

32 Nan Li, “PLA Conservative Nationalism,” cited in, Stephen Flanagan and Michael Marti, 

ed., The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition, (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University, 2003).]

33 For more details see, China’s National Defence in 2010, Information Office of the State 

Council, Beijing, March 2011.

34 Ibid.

35 For more details see views of Major General Peng Guangqian, an analyst of nuclear and 

military strategy at the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, cited in, “Shijie heanquan yu 

zhongguo de hezhanlue” [World Nuclear Security and China’s Nuclear Strategy], 

Zhongguo Pinglun [China Review], No. 11 (2005).

36 Sun Xiangli, a nuclear arms control specialist with the Beijing Institute of Applied 

Physics and Computational Mathematics argues in, Guoji Junbei Kongzhi yu Caijun 

Baogao [Yearbook on International Arms Control and Disarmament 2005] (Beijing: 

Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe [World Affairs Press], 2005), pp. 213-220; also see, Jing-dong 

Yuan, “Beyond No-First-Use: Recent Chinese Discussions of Nuclear Strategy,” WMD 

Insights, September 2006, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

37 Views expressed by Li Bin, “Zhongguo hezhanlue bianxi,” Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, 

[World Economics and Politics], No. 8, 2006.

38 For more details see, Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century,” China 

Security, Issue No. 1, Autumn 2005, p. 13.

39 Jing-dong Yuan, n. 34

40 Wu Jianguo, “Nuclear Shadows on High-Tech Warfare,” in Michael Pillsbury, Chinese 

Views of Future Warfare, (Lancer Publishers, 1998), p. 142.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 144.
32
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