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THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR REVIVAL AND U.S.

NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 17, 2011

Serial No. 112–7

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs (former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency and head of its Department of Safeguards) .......................................... 10

The Honorable William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, senior fellow, 

Hoover Institution ................................................................................................ 16

Mr. Henry Sokolski, executive director, Nonproliferation Policy Education 

Center .................................................................................................................... 21

Mr. Gene Aloise, director, Natural Resources and Environment Team, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 40

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

Mr. Olli Heinonen: Prepared statement ................................................................ 12

The Honorable William J. Perry: Prepared statement ......................................... 18

Mr. Henry Sokolski: Prepared statement .............................................................. 23

Mr. Gene Aloise: Prepared statement .................................................................... 42

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 72

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 73

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Gus Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida: 

Responses from Mr. Olli Heinonen ..................................................................... 75

Responses from Mr. Henry Sokolski ................................................................... 77

Responses from Mr. Gene Aloise ........................................................................ 79

(1)

THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR REVIVAL AND U.S. 

NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:48 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and my good friend, the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, 

I will recognize Mr. Royce and Mr. Sherman, the chairman and 

ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, for 3 minutes each for their statements. We will 

then hear from our witnesses. 

I would ask that you please limit your prepared statements to 5 

minutes each before we move to the questions and answers with 

members under the 5-minute rule. 

Without objection, your prepared statements will be made part 

of the record, and members may have 5 legislative days to insert 

statements and questions for the record subject to the limitations 

of length in the rules. 

And I will excuse ourselves. Mr. Berman and I very soon will 

have to go to the floor to debate a resolution that is in our committee. So you will excuse us when we leave and not take it personally, I hope. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

The tragedy in Japan continues to dominate the news. The scale 

of the devastation and suffering is unimaginable. Even though we 

watch in safety from the other side of the planet, I believe I speak 

for all of our committee members in saying that our hearts and our 

thoughts and our prayers are with the people of Japan during this 

terrible crisis, especially those who have lost loved ones and those 

whose lives have been unexpectedly upended and filled with despair. 

The ongoing situation is of direct relevance to today’s hearing. 

Many are already predicting that the global nuclear revival now 

under way will be stopped in its tracks by the images of exploding 

nuclear reactors, terrified refugees, and the prospect of huge areas 

rendered uninhabitable. These events have already begun to influence the debate over nuclear energy in the United States and in 

Europe. 

2

However, China and other countries—especially in the Middle 

East—are unlikely to be deterred from their nuclear ambitions, and 

it is in these countries that are pursuing nuclear power for political 

aims, many for destructive goals, that the risk of proliferation is 

the greatest. Rogue nations attempting to build a nuclear weapons 

program need a nuclear energy program to use as cover. 

We can be certain that the crisis in Japan will not persuade the 

Iranian regime to abandon its nuclear weapons program, nor 

should we expect North Korea to dismantle its recently revealed 

uranium enrichment program due to concerns that an accident 

could devastate the nearby population. 

But the nuclear menace we face is broader than simply that of 

traditional nuclear weapons. The crisis in Japan is a dramatic demonstration of the real-world threat resulting from nuclear material 

over which we have lost control. 

A radiological bomb that uses conventional explosives to disperse 

radioactive materials is a far more achievable goal for al Qaeda 

and other terrorist organizations than a nuclear device. We know 

that these groups are actively seeking these materials and have 

also targeted nuclear installations for destruction in the hope of 

spreading nuclear devastation. So the prospect of a sudden and 

widespread nuclear contamination in faraway Japan should remind 

us that we face an even greater threat from our self-proclaimed enemies who are even now planning to unleash it in the centers of 

our cities. 

The crisis in Japan also shows us that even a country at the 

highest level of development with massive resources and legions of 

technicians, scientists, and officials may be unable to prevent a catastrophe. Therefore, spreading nuclear facilities to unstable regimes throughout the Middle East and the Third World, which 

often have only limited resources and expertise, is laying the 

groundwork for potential disaster and a vast expansion of proliferation opportunities. Russia and France are the most irresponsible in 

this regard, with their most senior officials acting as salesmen for 

their state-owned nuclear cooperations. But we are not innocent 

ourselves. At a minimum, we should be not be contributing to the 

program with politically driven nuclear cooperation agreements. 

The Atomic Energy Act, which governs these agreements, was 

written in an era when safe, clean nuclear energy was the hope of 

the future and proliferation concerns were minimal. Over the 

years, tougher provisions have been written into the Act, but the 

situation remains far from satisfactory. 

A key problem is that Congress has little influence largely because these agreements automatically go into effect unless those 

seeking to stop them can secure veto-proof majorities in both 

Houses, a high hurdle indeed. But when writing the law Congress 

never intended for our long-term national security interests to be 

made subordinate to short-term political concerns. So Congress 

must act to fix this problem, especially by requiring that nuclear 

cooperation agreements receive an affirmative vote before going 

into effect. 

I plan to introduce legislation to give Congress that power and 

also to strengthen the nonproliferation provisions in all future nuclear cooperation agreements. Several other Members on both sides 

3

of the aisle are considering similar legislation, and I hope to work 

with them to craft a bipartisan bill that can be passed by this committee quickly, and hopefully unanimously. 

The crisis in Japan has also graphically demonstrated that the 

nuclear threat we face is far more than just simply an accident at 

electricity plants. We have enemies, non-state actors and rogue regimes, who are working to bring about an even greater disaster 

here, not as an act of God but, instead, of conscious design. Our 

laws and our policies must address this threat before it is too late. 

I am now pleased to recognize my friend, the ranking member, 

Mr. Berman, for his opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

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Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Before I start my opening statement, I would like simply to 

apologize in the same sense that the chairman just did. We have 

a resolution on the floor that invokes the War Powers Act provisions. We will have to manage it. I cannot think of a hearing we 

will be holding that I more wanted to be present at for its entire 

time, but there are people other than us who scheduled these 

things, and we are stuck with living with the consequences of their 

scheduling. 

Madam Chairman, thank you very much for holding this hearing. For several years it has been an article of faith that the world 

is experiencing a nuclear renaissance or revival, a post-Chernobyl 

era in which civilian nuclear power is increasingly seen as a solution to energy challenges around the globe. That faith collided with 

a hard reality in Japan this week, and the frightening events in 

that country which are still unfolding today will undoubtedly force 

a rethinking both here and abroad about the expansion of civil nuclear power as well as a fundamental reexamination of the dangers 

that nuclear reactors must be able to withstand. 

The nuclear revival may ultimately be little more than a nuclear 

blip. However, for the time being, many countries, including the 

United States, are interested in nuclear power, in part due to its 


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attractiveness as a carbon-neutral energy source. Given that over 

50 new reactors are under construction worldwide, it is critical that 

we take steps to deal with the potential nonproliferation consequences of this expansion. 

More reactors require more nuclear fuel, which requires more capacity to enrich uranium. More reactors produce more nuclear 

waste, which means more opportunities to extract plutonium 

through reprocessing. Both mean more potential material for nuclear bombs. Therein lies the danger. 

The nuclear revival has a double meaning, a revival of civil nuclear energy and, as a consequence of more enrichment and reprocessing, the possible resurrection of the nightmare once voiced by 

President Kennedy, a world populated with dozens of nucleararmed countries. And to that nightmare we can add one he didn’t 

foresee, the age of the nuclear terrorist. 

Last week, I watched a very important documentary, ‘‘The Nuclear Tipping Point,’’ which I recommend to my colleagues and everyone during this hearing today. In this film, four of our most respected statesmen on national security—William Perry, who is 

with us today; George Schultz; Sam Nunn; and Henry Kissinger—

discuss the terrifying prospect of terrorists obtaining nuclear material for a nuclear weapon or, as the chairman mentioned, for use 

in a radiological bomb. 

As the film points out, the knowledge required to make a crude 

nuclear weapon has proliferated over the last 10 or 15 years. The 

material to fuel a nuclear explosive is spread all over the world, 

and it is clear that terrorist groups like al Qaeda are seeking this 

material and wish to make weapons. 

It has been estimated there are 1,600 tons of highly enriched 

uranium and 500 tons of separated plutonium in stocks worldwide. 

Most of these materials are in the U.S., Russia, China, U.K., 

France, and Japan. However, about seven tons of highly enriched 

uranium—enough for some 300 nuclear weapons—reside in other 

countries. 

The Obama administration has made securing these stockpiles of 

nuclear materials a top priority. At last year’s unprecedented Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. got agreement from over 40 heads 

of state for our 4-year effort to secure nuclear material worldwide. 

So far, that has resulted in the removal of 120 kilograms of enriched uranium from other countries and agreements to remove 

220 more. 

Another high priority should be negotiating a new agreement 

with Russia to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons. These small 

but powerful weapons, of which Russia has thousands, are undoubtedly on the wish list of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. 

In addition to securing nuclear materials and loose nukes, the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime must be strengthened—and here 

I stand with the chairman—to better address the enrichment of 

uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel. So far, efforts to limit 

the spread of these technologies have met with limited success. 

With Iran’s and North Korea’s development of these technologies, 

aided in large part by the A.Q. Khan network, they have become 

even more difficult to control. That is why the recent U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is so important. 

7

The UAE, on its own, decided to foreswear enrichment and reprocessing. When the U.S. asked them if they would formalize that 

in a legally binding commitment within the cooperation agreement, 

they readily agreed. And this applies not only to nuclear fuel and 

equipment provided by the United States but by any country. 

A State Department spokesman has since called this the gold 

standard for nuclear cooperation agreements, and I agree. The U.S. 

should seek its equivalent for every new nuclear cooperation agreement that it negotiates in the future. We should consider making 

this and a number of other items a statutory requirement in the 

Atomic Energy Act, along with the requirement that every country 

must adopt an Additional Protocol for safeguards to ensure that 

the IAEA has all the necessary authority to investigate any and all 

proliferation concerns. 

Finally, the administration will use all its influence to convince 

the other nuclear supplier states to adopt the same nonproliferation and security conditions in their agreements that we observe in 

ours, especially when those same suppliers are seeking nuclear 

business in the United States. 

And if I could just parenthetically add in my remaining time, 

yesterday we had a hearing on the whole issue of aid levels and 

the deficit, and there were a lot of differences between our parties 

on some of these issues. On the issue which the chairman talked 

about moving ahead on and the whole question of our approach to 

this tremendously important subject on proliferation, I believe the 

opportunity for close and bipartisan work exists, and I look forward 

to working with the chairman and the other members of the committee to move ahead on this issue. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I do look 

forward to that as well. 

Mr. Sherman, the ranking member of the pertinent subcommittee, is recognized for his opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I want to echo your comments and those of others about our concern for our friends and allies in Japan. We hope Japanese authorities get the upper hand and resolve this crisis. The people of Japan 

are in our prayers. We should do whatever we can to help the people of northern Japan, especially to help contain the reactor problem. 

It is too early for a verdict on how this is going to affect nuclear 

power expansion. No doubt many countries will be reluctant, at 

least for a while, to move forward. But, given global warming, 

given the cost of energy, I suspect that within a few years countries 

will go forward with nuclear power. 

I commend the chairwoman for holding these hearings. We held 

hearings in the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee and the full committee last year on this very topic. We 

need to reform the Atomic Energy Act, and I commend the chairwoman for her decision to introduce legislation to do just that. I 

look forward to working with all of our colleagues here on this committee in that effort. 

The Atomic Energy Act should provide that, unless a nuclear cooperation agreement includes four particular provisions, it will reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:28 May 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031711\65302 HFA PsN: SHIRL
8

quire congressional approval by an act of Congress. The chairwoman explained how illusory Congress’ involvement is under the 

present system, and this will give an incentive to our negotiators 

and to the other side to have these four provisions in the agreement. 

First, the other states should adopt the Additional Protocol. Second, the other states should agree to forego the supposed right to 

enrich and reprocess. Third, the partner countries should agree to 

control access to facilities in such a way that personnel from Iran, 

North Korea, Syria, and, depending upon developments in the next 

few weeks, Libya, are not invited to the facilities. And, finally, the 

partner nation should provide for a liability scheme that allows private companies, such as U.S. companies, to participate in the development of nuclear power. 

What is the point of us going forward with an agreement if the 

only companies that can participate—and we are seeing this problem in India—are those who can claim sovereign immunity, such 

as those from Russia, France, and perhaps in the future China? 

We are told that the UAE agreement is the gold standard. It contains only the first two of those provisions, so I would call it the 

‘‘bronze standard.’’ Let’s say that, unless an agreement meets the 

gold standard, it requires an act of Congress to put into effect. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Sherman; 

and now the chairman of the Nonproliferation Subcommittee, Mr. 

Royce, is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

I think all of us feel and want to convey that our thoughts are 

with the Japanese people. We all understand that our ally has had 

to endure an earthquake, a tsunami and now a nuclear crisis. That 

crisis is growing, and certainly we have some lessons to learn. 

As members of this committee, a top task of this committee, 

something we should all be mindful of, is that one of our responsibilities is to help ensure that nuclear material is out of the hands 

of terrorists and also out of the hands of terrorist states. I think 

the global expansion of nuclear power has greatly complicated that 

task. There are nearly 550 nuclear power reactors under construction or planned or proposed around the world today; and, postJapan, we will see how many of these on the drawing board survive 

in the coming months and the coming years. But, with rising populations and rising energy costs, nuclear power will remain attractive for many of these countries. 

Some of the countries that are looking at nuclear energy include 

Belarus and Kazakhstan and Vietnam. The technical and 

infrastructural sophistication of these countries pales in comparison to Japan. How able would they respond? How capable are they 

going to be to respond to disaster? The seemingly poor performance 

of the IAEA in response to Japan’s crisis is what heightens our concerns. 

Of course, the central problem is that it can be a sprint from a 

civilian to a military nuclear program, certainly not a marathon. It 

is the enrichment and reprocessing aspects of the fuel cycle that 

puts nuclear weapons within reach. This is the key bomb-making 

technology. 

9

Notwithstanding its reported troubles, Iran continues to increase 

its supply of enriched uranium; and, last fall, North Korea unveiled 

a uranium enrichment plant, the sophistication of which took many 

of us by surprise. Experts estimate that these centrifuges are four 

times as powerful as those spinning at Natanz. And another piece 

of information, other North Korean sites are likely. 

To handle concerns about enrichment and reprocessing, the U.S. 

Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the UAE included a commitment to forego those sensitive technologies and ratify the Additional Protocol. But other countries, including Jordan and Vietnam, 

are balking at accepting these conditions. 

The administration will soon have to decide whether it wants to 

advance the nonproliferation ball or not. And, Madam Chair, as 

you have argued, Congress should reclaim powers it surrendered to 

the executive branch long ago in a different era. We need to act so 

Congress positively, not passively, approves nuclear cooperation 

agreements. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Amen. Thank you so much. 

And thank you to the excellent set of panelists that we have here 

before us this morning. 

Our first witness is Olli Heinonen. He is the former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and 

head of its Department of Safeguards. He is currently a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at 

the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. 

In addition to his many years of responsibility at the IAEA regarding the nuclear program of Iran, the A.Q. Khan nuclear black 

market network, and other nonproliferation challenges, Mr. 

Heinonen lived and worked in Japan for many years and has direct 

experience with the crippled reactors now in the news. 

We thank you for appearing before us today. We look forward to 

your expert testimony. 

Next we have William Perry, who is well-known to all of us. 

From 1994 to 1997, Mr. Perry served as the Secretary of Defense 

in the Clinton administration. Currently, he is the Michael and 

Barbara Berberian professor emeritus at Stanford University. He is 

a senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford and serves as co-director of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Initiative and the Preventative Defense Project. 

Mr. Perry, we are all aware of your long and distinguished record 

of public service, and we are fortunate to have you here with us 

today. 

Also appearing before us today is Henry Sokolski, who is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. 

He currently serves as an adjunct professor at the Institute of 

World Politics in Washington, DC, and was a member of the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism. He previously served as 

Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Department of Defense. 

Mr. Sokolski has been a valuable resource for this committee for 

many years, and we are pleased to have him with us again today. 

Finally, we welcome Gene Aloise. Mr. Aloise is the Director of 

the National Resources and Environment Team at the Government 

10

Accountability Office, where he is GAO’s recognized expert in international nuclear nonproliferation and safety issues. Mr. Aloise is 

the lead author of the GAO’s March, 2009, report on the extensive 

nuclear assistance being provided to Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba 

by the IAEA Technical Cooperation Program. Our committee, as 

well as the rest of Congress, turns routinely to GAO for its expert 

investigation and analysis; and we thank you, Mr. Aloise, for taking the time to appear before us today. 

As I have stated, your written remarks will be made a part of 

the official record, and we would appreciate if you would summarize your testimony to 5 minutes. 

We will begin with Mr. Heinonen. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. OLLI HEINONEN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND HEAD OF 

ITS DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS) 

Mr. HEINONEN. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Berman, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to 

discuss the nuclear challenges posed by Iran, North Korea, and 

Syria. 

During those three decades which I served in the IAEA, global 

nuclear dangers have only become greater and more complex, while 

the policies to manage these threats have remained stagnant. 

The international community must pay greater attention to future cases of noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation 

Treaty and other nonproliferation obligations, cases which, if not 

resolved in a timely manner, will erode the credibility of the whole 

verification system. We also need to be better prepared to deal with 

states that acquire nuclear technology as a member of the treaty 

and then may withdraw to pursue a military nuclear program. 

The cases of Iran, North Korea, and Syria highlight the fact that 

the international community has allowed too much stalling and obfuscation in resolving safeguards compliance issues and broader 

nuclear concerns. In my written statement I focus on those cases, 

so I won’t here, but I will go straight to the recommendations 

which I have in my mind. 

So what can be done? There are actually several policy options 

which we could consider. 

First, whenever special arrangements are negotiated—whether it 

is an agreed framework, whether it is P5 plus 1 agreements with 

Iran, negotiators must draw red lines with clearly stated consequences when those lines are crossed. 

In addition, it should be made clear that punitive actions would 

be reversed when proliferators abide by the rules. 

Then there are a lot of proposals to make IAEA reporting more 

transparent, safeguards implementation report. Tackle the problem 

cases in the beginning, then it is much easier to solve them. 

Similarly, the IAEA should perhaps brief the United Nations Security Council in a frequent manner; and the IAEA has also to take 

care of its own Technical Cooperation Program. Every state who receives this report could be reviewed to ensure that the support will 

be provided only to states in good standing with their obligations, 

11

and those supports will be provided exclusively for the peaceful use 

of atomic energy. 

Additional protocols should be universalized. There are still close 

to 20 countries which have substantial nuclear programs without 

an Additional Protocol. We must work at making the Additional 

Protocol a precondition for future nuclear supply arrangements. In 

addition, we need to keep in mind that the IAEA should use vigorously all legal instruments in its use, including the provision for 

special inspections. 

With regard to the black market and covert trade networks, the 

IAEA is currently maintaining an Illicit Trafficking Database. This 

should be extended to include not only successful cases but the attempts to acquire nuclear materials and radioisotopes, and perhaps 

even to extend it to cover single-use items, dual-use items, et 

cetera. The IAEA should also have a mandate to investigate those 

cases, not just report only. And, most importantly, the IAEA has 

to have adequate financial and human resources to take care of 

these tasks. 

Those are just a snapshot of the recommendations which I make. 

Some of these challenges are technical in nature, others deal with 

resources and funding, and others are a question of political will. 

Whatever the scenario, we cannot be complacent about our concerns over the potential spread of nuclear weapon technologies and 

capabilities. 

It is also important to see nuclear safety, security, and safeguards—Triple S, as we call them—as an integral system to ensure 

that nuclear energy is used safely, securely, and peacefully, in particular in the states which are just embarking on their nuclear programs. 

Along with my colleagues, my past years at the IAEA have been 

dedicated to putting in place a strong and workable international 

safeguards system that was achievable, but the job is far from 

being done. Ultimately, the choice of pursuing nuclear power under 

a predicted nuclear renaissance cannot be a choice that results in 

endangering and unraveling efforts aimed at strengthening global 

nuclear governance. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heinonen follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE [presiding]. Secretary Perry. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PERRY, 

FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SENIOR FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION 

Mr. PERRY. I want to start off by commending this committee for 

taking on such a vitally important issue. 

The potential danger of nuclear power has been dramatically illustrated in Japan. Indeed, my heart goes out to my Japanese 

friends. I believe that the problem with reactors in Japan is going 

to get much worse before the situation finally is under control. 

Additionally, I have a concern about North Korea. Besides the 

uranium enrichment program already mentioned in North Korea, 

the North Koreans have taken to building their own light water reactor. One can only imagine the safety issues there are going to be 

with this homemade design they are pursuing. 

An even greater danger, however, is if nuclear weapons fall into 

the hands of a terror organization. This is a serious threat to the 

country for which the traditional forms of deterrence are simply not 

applicable. Preventing nuclear terrorism is closely tied to stopping 

the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the proliferation of fissile 

material, and recent developments in North Korea and Iran suggest that we may be at a tipping point in nuclear proliferation. 

While the programs that maintain our deterrence are national, 

the programs that prevent proliferation and safeguard weapons 


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and fissile material are both national and international. Indeed, it 

is clear we cannot meet the goal of reducing the proliferation threat 

without substantial international cooperation. We cannot go it 

alone on this crucial issue. The nations whose cooperation is most 

critical are at risk of nuclear proliferation as much as we, so we 

should be able to get that cooperation. 

The international programs that are most effective in containing 

and rolling back proliferation can sometimes be in conflict with national programs designed to maintain deterrence. Therefore, a strategic posture for the United States that meets both of these security requirements will necessarily have to strike a balance that 

supports both of these needs. 

The need to strike such a balance has been recognized at least 

since the end of the Cold War. President Clinton’s policy on nuclear 

posture spoke of the need to lead but hedge. That policy called for 

the United States to lead in the reduction of nuclear arms, to lead 

in programs that prevent proliferation, but hedge against adverse 

political developments. 

The leadership aspect of this policy was demonstrated most vividly by a cooperative program with Russia established under the 

Nunn-Lugar Act that dismantled about 4,000 nuclear weapons in 

Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, a significant contribution to a 

safer world. U.S. leadership has also been demonstrated by three 

treaties: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Moscow Treaty, 

and New START. I believe that the United States must continue 

to support programs that both lead and hedge, that is, programs 

that move in two parallel paths, one path that protects our security 

by maintaining deterrence and the other path which protects our 

security by reducing the danger of nuclear weapons. 

The first path of deterrence is spelled out in the Nuclear Posture 

Review, and I do not plan to discuss that further in this hearing. 

The second path, reducing the danger, does include the following 

components: First, re-energized efforts to reverse the nuclear proliferation in North Korea and prevent the nuclear proliferation in 

Iran. Secondly, negotiate further arms reduction treaties with Russia that make additional reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of 

Russia and the United States. Third, seek an international Fissile 

Material Cutoff Treaty and redouble domestic and international efforts to secure all stocks of fissile material. And, finally, strengthen 

the International Atomic Energy Agency. In particular, work with 

the IAEA to promote universal adoption of the Additional Protocol 

to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

In sum, we should reject the vision of a future world defined by 

a collapse of the nonproliferation regime and work for a world of 

cooperation among the major powers. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perry follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Secretary Perry. 

We are going to hold everyone to 5 minutes here and go right to 

questions. As a matter of fact, I am going to make this suggestion: 

Why don’t you make an opening statement, summarize your written statement in a couple of minutes, and we will come back to 

those points and give you a little more time to embellish on your 

opening points, simply because we are coming to this vote and I 

would like to have a few questions put before we get to it. 

Mr. Sokolski, go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that not only my 

testimony but a two-page note on the policy implications of the accidents in Japan be entered into the record. 

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Your timing, sadly, is all too perfect for this hearing. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, Mr. Sokolski, the timing of your new book is 

all too perfect. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Well, that is due to no planning at all. It is a year 

behind schedule. And that is the—I have to plug it, I guess—NuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:28 May 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031711\65302 HFA PsN: SHIRL

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clear Power’s Global Expansion: Weighing Its Costs and Risks. 

That was not due to planning, I can assure you. 

In any case, sometimes it takes bad news and fearful emotions 

to get us to think. I think we have seen France, China, Germany, 

even India and a number of other countries, freeze their construction plans while they do a safety review. What is a little odd is we 

haven’t yet done that. Instead, our State Department is signing an 

MOU in earthquake-prone Chile to do nuclear cooperation. 

We don’t know where the Jordan and Saudi Arabia agreements 

or the Vietnam agreements are. They quietly went into the rear of 

the freezer with all of the demonstrations, but I don’t think they 

are dead. 

The administration is moving ahead with loan guarantees beyond the $18 billion they already have, even though the head of the 

largest merchant nuclear utility in the world gave a speech last 

week at AEI saying they are not only not necessary, they are 

harmful; and that he doesn’t think they need nuclear power plants 

and will not build them for one to two decades to meet the carbon 

goals. Not only that, a public poll has come out and said the favorite cut, when suggested, from the public’s perspective is loan guarantees. 

In any case, whatever we do, review or not, it is pretty clear that 

comments of the committee are spot-on correct. You do not want 

to sell or cooperate or encourage countries that are really not up 

to snuff to take on building a reactor after the incidents that we 

have had in Japan. Nor after Iran do you want to do anything but 

toughen the nonproliferation conditions on nuclear cooperation, not 

just for the U.S. but for other nuclear suppliers. 

Now the chair, the ranking member, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Royce, 

Mr. Fortenberry, and Senator Akaka have already laid and tabled 

very, very good legislation; and I urge the committee to file that 

into any revision of the Atomic Energy Act. I certainly think the 

idea of forcing votes which focus debate on these agreements is a 

great idea, and I commend Mr. Sherman’s recommendations to the 

committee as well. 

I think, in addition, however, if you are going to be serious about 

getting others to join in, you need to be a bit of a bad cop. I think 

requiring that no U.S. nuclear regulatory license, Federal contract, 

or loan guarantee can be approved for any foreign entity unless the 

President of the United States has first certified that the government of that entity has explicitly endorsed adopting the key nonproliferation provisions of the UAE agreement really needs to be 

put into place. If this committee does this, I believe that the administration will pay close attention; and with any luck much of what 

you do might be co-opted. I think that is the spirit in which you 

should operate. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolski follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sokolski. 

We will come back after the vote for some other comments, for 

you to finish that thought, and to go to Mr. Aloise. And Mr. Aloise, 

we will do that after the vote. 

I would like to go to some questions, and I would like to ask the 

ranking member to open with his questions at this point. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that, because I won’t be able to come back because I will be 

on the floor. 

Mr. Sokolski has started down the path of answering this question that I wanted to ask the panel, but let me get it out there and 

see what he and other members of the panel and he might add. 

The issue of convincing other countries to place nonproliferation 

concerns in the forefront of their political and commercial interests 

in the development and exploitation of civil nuclear energy. Other 

supplier countries like to look the other way. They reason strong 

nonproliferation conditions of the kind we have been talking about 

would fatally undermine their business success. Developing countries are—or give the appearance of being—hypersensitive about 

the West denying them their rights to technology in general to 

keep them less developed and to sensitive technologies like enrichment and reprocessing. 

How do we forge a new consensus among all concerned to minimize the spread of these dangerous technologies that are unfortunately also necessary to supply fuel to nuclear power reactors? I 

would be interested in—again, Mr. Sokolski started to get into this. 

Any other thoughts about——

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Berman, I will make one comment about that. 

We can have a reasonably successful implementation of the goals 

you talk about if we can get the Nuclear Suppliers Group to agree 

on a set of principles. It is not enough for the United States to 

agree on it. We have to have the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 

One silver lining around this Japanese cloud is I think we might 

be able to go back to the NSG—which has been reluctant to make 

such agreements in the past—and try again. I would urge the 

United States to go back to the Nuclear Suppliers Group now, arguing for a very stiff set of standards dealing both with the safety 

issue and with the proliferation issues. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I think what I have suggested dovetails perfectly 

with doing that. I think Dr. Perry is right. It shouldn’t be an either/or. 

Keep in mind the country that is most keenly interested in getting loan guarantees, licenses, and DOE contracts happens to be 

one of the largest suppliers. It is France. However, if you can get 

them to turn around, you automatically get Germany, for a number 

of political reasons. And if you get Germany, you automatically lock 

in Russia. The reason why is the Russians are desperately eager 

to work with Siemens to develop the reactors for domestic and export purposes, and by law they cannot export them without the 

consent and approval of the Germans, and that consent is controlled by law. 

I have got to believe you can get Japan. And South Korea is very 

anxious to look good on nonproliferation, for a variety of reasons 

which this committee knows all too well. One of them is they want 

40

to reprocess or recycle. Second, they have the Nuclear Summit coming in 2012. 

This is a perfect time to work with countries, including the UAE, 

to parade the success. Your timing is good. And I think Mr. Perry 

is absolutely right, you should also parallel work with NSG. I 

wouldn’t do one or the other. I would do both. 

Mr. ROYCE. Any other thoughts? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Thank you. 

As I said in my written statement, I fully agree and support 

what Dr. Perry said. I think the NSG is the easiest and fastest way 

to achieve this goal. 

Mr. BERMAN. Since they operate by consensus, if we can persuade them—because we had spent a lot of time at the NSG, we 

have in the past, and not achieved some of the things we have 

wanted to get there. 

Mr. PERRY. Had I been testifying here 2 weeks ago, I would have 

been reluctant to make that recommendation because I would not 

believe it could have been achieved. Now I think it is worth going 

back and trying again. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

I think we are going to adjourn. We have got about 4 minutes. 

We are going to stand in recess until the conclusion of this vote, 

at which time we will meet here again. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROYCE. The committee is going to reconvene, and we will go 

to Mr. Aloise for his testimony. You want to summarize for the 

record. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. ALOISE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am 

pleased to be here today to discuss our concerns with IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program and the State Department and IAEA’s 

actions to implement the recommendations from our March 2009 

report. 

As you know, a key mission of IAEA is to promote the peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy. Through its TC program, the agency provides nuclear equipment, training, fellowships, and other services 

to its member states. The U.S. is the largest contributor to the program, and in 2010 contributed over $31 million. 

While the bulk of the TC projects have not involved the transfer 

of sensitive nuclear materials and technology, TC assistance can 

have dual-use implications and has been provided to countries of 

proliferation concern. As we reported in 2009, neither State nor 

IAEA seeks to limit or deny TC assistance to countries that the 

United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism, including Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria; are not party to the NPT, such 

as India, Israel, and Pakistan; and do not have comprehensive safeguard agreements. The former head of the TC program told us that 

all requests for TC assistance are based on technical merits and 

that there were no good countries or bad countries participating in 

the program. 

41

We also reported that IAEA officials told us that the agency did 

not limit TC assistance to Iran and Syria, even though they have 

been found or suspected of violating their safeguards commitments 

and may be engaged in undeclared nuclear activities. 

Our report noted that assessing proliferation concerns with TC 

projects was difficult because of the lack of sufficient and timely information on project proposals. For example, of the over 1,500 

projects that DOE and its national laboratories reviewed between 

1998 and 2006 for proliferation risk, 97 percent of the proposals 

contained only project titles, which is not enough data to assess 

proliferation risk. In addition, DOE and its national laboratories 

did not have enough time to sufficiently review the projects. 

While IAEA’s Safeguards Department reviews TC proposals, and 

ongoing projects, the results of these reviews are confidential and 

not shared with the United States or other governments, so we 

cannot assess the effectiveness of this internal IAEA review. 

From 1998 through 2006, DOE and its national laboratories 

identified 43 of the over 1,500 proposals as having some degree of 

proliferation concern or needing more data to determine such risk. 

IAEA approved 34 of the 43 projects, and it is unclear to us if State 

addressed DOE’s concerns because in all but one case State did not 

document how it responded to these concerns. 

We also reported on shortcomings in State’s monitoring of the TC 

fellowships’ program. Over 1,000 TC program fellows have studied 

nuclear issues at universities and other institutions in the United 

States over a 10-year period. We found that 23 of them were from 

countries that did not sign the NPT and in one case was from a 

U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism, namely Syria. There 

were six fellows from Syria. 

In addition, the IAEA does not track the status, whereabouts, 

and activities of former TC fellows to verify that they are not involved in weapons-related research after they have completed their 

studies. 

Our 2009 report made several recommendations to State to correct these weaknesses in the management of the TC program, and 

some progress has been made in implementing our recommendations. 

It is important to note that State cannot require the IAEA to implement a recommendation, but as the largest financial contributor 

to the agency the U.S. does have leverage in making improvements 

to the program. According to State, the IAEA is now providing information on project proposals earlier in the approval process. 

However, according to DOE, the amount of information about each 

project is still limited and insufficient to assess proliferation risks. 

In addition, State appears to be doing a better job of tracking TC 

projects of proliferation concern and has developed new guidance 

regarding fellowships. 

Importantly, however, State still strongly disagrees with our suggestion to the Congress to consider requiring State to withhold a 

proportionate share of U.S. contributions to the TC fund for assistance to U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism. We continue to 

believe that Congress should seriously consider this matter, because there is precedent for such withholding, and such action 

would follow through a more consistent and cohesive U.S. policy toVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:28 May 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031711\65302 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ward nations that the United States has deemed inherently dangerous. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I would be happy 

to address any questions you or other members may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]


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Mr. ROYCE. We appreciate your testimony, Mr. Aloise. 

I think we will go first to Jean Schmidt for her questions. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sokolski—did I say that right? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Sokolski. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Sokolski. I apologize, sir. We are all Irish today. 

Are you Irish, sir? Well, Schmidt is an Irish name, too. 

Anyway, sir, a key element of U.S. policy related to the expansion of civilian nuclear energy overseas is providing ready access 

to a fuel supply, so that emerging nations, nuclear nations, do not 

have to build their own enrichment capabilities. This policy serves 

a major nonproliferation goal in that enrichment can be used both 

for peaceful purposes and for developing highly enriched uranium 

for weapons. However, in order for the U.S. to maintain a leadership position in this arena, it is necessary for a domestic U.S. enrichment capacity to be available to the world market. Sir, do you 

agree that it is in the policy interests of the United States to maintain a strong domestic enrichment industry? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Let me answer that question by noting that I am 

an avid car buff. I actually do now own one American automobile. 

The rest are Japanese, made in the United States. They are better. 

We are now very strong in enrichment because of URENCO. I 

would say that is okay. In other words, I don’t really think we are 

anything other than supplied well, and there are a lot of other suppliers besides those housed in the United States. 

I wish the supply of fuel was the major lever for nonproliferation 

that it might have been in the 1970s. I suspect, although you can’t 

be against multinational fuel banks, or for that matter almost anything multinational, we have gone a bit too far in arguing everyone 

has an inalienable right to make fuel, which I don’t read in the 

treaty and I have written extensively on, and many others have. 

I think we have overdone it. 

And the economics of making fuel, unfortunately, are not that much worse than boiling water, and these reactors are costing $4 

billion to $10 billion. Making fuel under some circumstances can 

cost a fraction of that. I think we are in trouble for that reason, 

and I think it would be nice to think that we could be cast back 

into the 1960s when we made almost all the fuel and the Russians 

were the only others. Those days are, unfortunately, well behind 

us. 

And I would not be apprehensive about URENCO, which is 

owned by foreigners, but I think they are friends. They are very 

close friends. Mr. Domenici certainly was not upset about it, and 

I think he is a pretty good measure for what is okay when it comes 

to the nuclear industry. So I wouldn’t be apprehensive about that. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. 

Mr. Heinonen, did I say that correctly? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Oh, good. Thank you, sir. 

Recently, Syria announced that on April 1st it will allow IAEA 

inspectors to visit an acid purification plant in the city of Homs. 

One of the byproducts of this plant is yellowcake and uranium concentrate. Commercial satellite photos recently released by the Institute for Science and International Security, however, may prove 

61

that Syria has been working to perfect atomic weapons since before 

Israel’s military strike in 2007. There may also be another two or 

three sites in Syria with nuclear facilities. If Syria chooses to revoke its permission to the IAEA to conduct the April 1st inspection, 

or, should it continue to refuse the IAEA inspection access to its 

other potentially nuclear sites, how should the IAEA respond? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Thank you. 

First of all, I think that this step to allow the IAEA to visit this 

production plant in Syria is a very modest step. It doesn’t solve this 

problem at all, in my view. It is important that the IAEA have full 

access to the destroyed reactor and facilities which might be related to that, and these are the locations which you just mentioned 

in your question. In order to solve this problem and to ensure that 

all nuclear material in Syria is placed under the IAEA safeguards. 

What needs to be done, if Syria doesn’t heed to this IAEA request, 

in my personal view the IAEA would use all the powers which it 

has and then the next logical step is to do a special inspection. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. I yield back my time. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

I am going to go to Mr. Sherman. He is the ranking member of 

the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

First, I want to commend the chairwoman for moving forward 

with legislation. But, let’s face it, the only bills the President is 

going to sign this year are appropriations bills and post offices. Everything else is a statement. If we are going to be able to have Congress play a role in this area we are going to have to take whatever 

bill this committee comes up with and insist that it be made part 

of the appropriations bill. If we are not able to do that, unwilling 

to do that, unwilling to cross party lines in order to demand it, it 

is not going to happen and service on this committee will be educational but otherwise irrelevant. As I said, if it is not in the appropriations bill, it is never going to become law; and the President 

is not going to want us to reinject Congress into the decision-making process. 

One thing I found is, whatever people believe when they are running for President, whatever party they are for, they are against 

Congress actually having any control of anything just as soon as 

they walk into the White House. Whether there is some sort of new 

form of Legionnaire’s Disease inhabiting that building that skews 

one’s view of the division of power and the balance of power, I don’t 

know. 

I want to commend Mr. Sokolski for your comment that our Government has, in effect, given away the store by seeming to acknowledge that Article 4 of the NPT allows countries to enrich and 

get within striking distance of a nuclear weapon all while claiming 

to be in compliance with the NPT. I can understand why the Iranian Foreign Ministry takes that position. If you look at the text, 

your interpretation is just as valid and has the additional advantage of not leading to nuclear weapons in the hands of some of the 

most nefarious governments. 

I raised this question informally with some of your colleagues, so 

I will ask you, why is it that countries are reluctant to agree to a 

62

liability protocol that allows American companies to do business in 

their country when sovereign immunity grants that same liability 

protection automatically to French and Russian companies? And is 

there a way for these companies to simply agree that whatever defenses the relevant French or Russian company would have are 

also available to others building nuclear plants in their country? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I want to make sure I understand the question, 

so I don’t just talk. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It is my understanding nobody wants to build a nuclear plant if they can get sued for $20 trillion unless they have 

a damn good defense. The French company can claim sovereign immunity. I don’t know exactly the French Government’s involvement. The Russian company likewise. The American company goes 

in unless the laws of the host country provide for special liability 

treatment, and even the so-called gold standard agreement we 

reached with the UAE did not provide that. 

As you may have heard, some of my constituents are concerned 

about jobs, and what is the good of all these nuclear agreements 

if American companies are completely shut out of the process? So 

why are host countries reluctant to give our companies the same 

liability protection which they in effect give to the French, the Russians, and someday maybe the Chinese? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Simple. It saves money. The product that they can 

buy from the Koreans, French, and if the Germans help the Russians, is pretty good. It costs less. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I am not asking why they buy the other product. 

I mean, you can lose a bid. Why do they shut us out of the bidding 

by not adopting the liability law? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Well, because they have to spend—it is not just 

something you sign. You have to take money and put it into an account and create a pool of money to implement that CFC law, 

which is really what you are asking them to do. 

Mr. SHERMAN. No, what I am asking is simply to provide by law 

that a lawsuit against General Electric would be treated just the 

same as a lawsuit against a Russian company that happens to be 

government owned. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. You can change the law. If that is the character 

of the question, have at it. 

I think that the problem is just that, though. What we tried to 

do is use an international vehicle, and we created the CFC. I can 

sense the frustration with that because no one wants to sign up to 

it because it requires putting money aside. Effectively, you may 

very well have a point. But you have to understand you are then 

putting the U.S. Government in the position of assuming risk, and 

you are hoping——

Mr. SHERMAN. Again, my question is just a simple one-sentence 

statement in the liability law. I realize you——

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Well, I do think that the recourse—I guess the 

simple one-sentence answer is ‘‘heads up.’’ Our court system would 

take seriously suits in a way that people going to a French or Russian court would be very unlikely to get relief. So the Treasury is 

open for raiding if you do this, I think, if there is an accident. 

To give you an example, the Japanese did channel away the liability, so GE is not subject to suit. 

63

Mr. SHERMAN. I believe my time is expired. 

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Jeff Duncan from South 

Carolina for his questions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I thank the panelists for being here today. 

The issues around the world and Japan are very concerning to 

me, because I have been to Japan and my heart goes out to the 

folks there. We are watching that issue very, very closely. 

And, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have the Nation’s most important site for nonproliferation in my district in South Carolina, 

and that is the Savannah River Site and Savannah River National 

Laboratory. The Savannah River Site handles the most sensitive 

nuclear materials and seeks to ensure that the legacy weapons materials once used in the nuclear weapons that kept our country safe 

are used in the future hopefully for energy production. 

In addition to these legacy materials, the Savannah River Site 

receives spent fuel from the countries that were involved in IAEA’s 

Atoms for Peace programs dating back to the 1950s. This issue is 

of particular importance, as you can see, to my district, and I commend the chairwoman for holding the hearing today. 

But let me be clear, while we are proud of the ongoing missions 

and future missions at the Savannah River Site, especially the role 

that the Site plays in helping the Nation address energy independence, the Site is not—and I repeat not—suitable for long-term storage of legacy weapons materials, nor spent fuel from the Atoms for 

Peace countries. 

As we continue to pursue MOX reprocessing in this country, we 

need to also address the long-term stable and secure storage of 

these materials. I specifically point to Yucca Mountain and the billions of taxpayer dollars that have been spent there and ask this: 

With further and future nonproliferation agreements in place resulting in a future increase in legacy weapons materials, I would 

be interested in hearing your ideas for how these materials should 

be dealt with, specifically storage and the validity of Yucca Mountain. And I will address that to Mr. Sokolski first. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. First, you have got time. Don’t get in a rush to 

get this wrong. I think there is a kind of imperative about solving 

these waste problems which does not parallel the reality of what 

is going on. 

Certainly with the civil fuel it is pretty clear. When environmentalists and utility managers are doing and thinking the same 

thing and storing it on-site in casks, and the National Research 

Council says that is a good, safe way and cheap way to do things, 

you should take yes for an answer. That will do, I was told by 

DOE. But that is only good, they said, for 500 to 1,000 years. I 

said, well, for government work, that is a start. Not bad. Last I 

checked, we haven’t been around that long. So let that happen. 

Don’t get in the way of that. 

Second, with regard to the military things—I think Dr. Perry 

may have ideas as well—I think it is very important, first, to make 

what you have secure, whatever form it is in. Moving stuff around, 

particularly moving stuff around in places like Russia, I don’t 

know, I would be not too quick to do that unless you had to. 

64

With those two rules of thumb, you can get by for quite a while. 

And in government doing a pretty good job in getting by is a pretty 

high standard these days. Generally, we don’t meet that standard. 

So I would shoot for that first. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Are you familiar with the processes that are being 

handled at H Canyon, Savannah River Site? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. A little, yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. It is very concerning to me, Mr. Chairman and the 

panelists here, that we are seeing the Department of Energy reevaluate and I guess divert assets and revenues to environmental 

management, which is an important aspect going on at both Savannah River Site, Hanford, and all across the land. 

But it is concerning to us that they are taking resources from H 

Canyon, which has been up and running for 40 years, processing 

the nuclear material; and with the nonproliferation materials coming to Savannah River Site and the role that H Canyon would play 

in reprocessing that and a lot of other missions that are going on 

there, it is very, very concerning to me and the delegation from 

South Carolina that Secretary Chu and his staff have decided to 

take $100 million away from H Canyon. Because what is going to 

happen there is we are going to lose the valuable human resources 

that would seek employment in other areas, and we will lose those 

from Savannah River Site. 

And so as we move forward, as we talk about the nonproliferation and the legacy weapons materials, that we keep in mind that 

H Canyon plays a vital role in this country and has for 40 years. 

It doesn’t need to be put in warm standby. It needs to be continuing to conduct the missions it was designed for. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Faleomavaega from Guam. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. No, I am from American Samoa, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. American Samoa, I stand corrected. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and thank our 

panel of witnesses for their expertise in also sharing with us the 

issue that we are discussing this morning. 

I have somewhat of a different perspective in terms of how we 

are to address the issue of nuclear technology and the problems 

that we are faced with right now, especially with the situation in 

Japan and the aftermath of the earthquake and the tsunami. I say 

that I take a different perspective because it is almost like a broken record now. We have been talking about nuclear proliferation, 

we talk about regulatory aspects and the importance of the strategic and military interests that we have. The number of nuclear 

weapons that are now in place—and correct me if I am wrong—

that we now currently have the capacity with all the nuclear powers they have in their possession, these nuclear weapons, enough 

to blow this planet 10 times over with its capacity and to say that 

madness that continues in terms of why we continue to have in our 

possession these nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction——

I wanted to ask you gentlemen if you can help me. What country—my understanding is France currently depends—about 80 percent of its energy resources come from nuclear technology. I wanted 

65

to ask in your opinion which country currently has the most advanced technology dealing with nuclear energy? 

It is quite obvious that, what, for the last 30 or 40 years Japan 

has revealed the fact that there is tremendous weakness in the capacity and ability of the Japanese Government to address the dangerous situation that we are now faced with with the four nuclear 

reactors that have dangerously come down to the problems of what 

is happening in the Fukushima nuclear reactor there in Japan. 

But I am curious, gentlemen, in your best judgment, which country currently has the best technology on nuclear technology for its 

use for peaceful purposes, for example, France being one of those 

countries? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I will take a stab. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Please. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I think it is not fair to pick just one. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Your microphone. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I am sorry. 

I think that each country has some comparative strengths, and 

they are different. When it comes to design, the U.S. is pretty good. 

In advanced design, the U.S. advanced design is pretty good. When 

it comes to constructing something quickly and for a reasonable 

firm price, boy, I think the Koreans have a lot to offer. When it 

comes to large plants that are reasonably modern that can be built, 

France has something to offer. It doesn’t come cheap. And if you 

want price, the price leader is Russia. By the way, reliability is a 

different problem. So it depends what you are looking for, and that 

is the reason why there is all these different firms. 

Now, I didn’t mention China because they are not quite in the 

game yet, but they will come into the game because we gave them 

a lot of good reactor technology, and we really did give it to them. 

My guess is once they get into the mode of mastering that you will 

see them on the market, and their price will be low. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Heinonen. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Thank you. 

Well, I have a couple of remarks, though Mr. Sokolski I think 

summarized this pretty well. 

One can look at this from another angle, which is maybe important from the nonproliferation point of view. When we look at the 

risks of nuclear energy, it is not only the enrichment. We need also 

to look at what to do with the spent fuel and how to deal with the 

plutonium contained in the spent fuel with the longer term. 

And, therefore, when we look for solutions we should look to a 

leasing option for the nuclear fuel. So whoever sells you a reactor 

actually leases the fuel for the lifetime of the reactor by providing 

investment services and taking the fuel back and then disposing of 

it. This is the kind of solution we should look for at this point in 

time. As Henry said, I think that might be the widest nuclear fuel 

cycle support that can be provided today both by Russia and, to a 

certain degree, France. Many other countries have a lot of limitations to take back, for example, spent fuel to their own territory. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Secretary Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. I concur with what both the previous witnesses have 

said. 

66

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My time is up. I appreciate it. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. I barely started. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much. 

We are going to go to Mr. Fortenberry from Nebraska. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I begin my questions, let me make an observation. As I 

look out here, we have got a group of young people here, and that 

is good. I am glad you are interested in the question. As I look over 

here, we have a few members of the press. We have a former Secretary of Defense, a high-ranking official, former official in the 

International Atomic Energy Agency nonproliferation experts. A 

few Members. What is at issue here is the future of civilization, but 

I guess no one has the time. 

This is a very, very real problem that has heightened awareness 

in this body, and I assume in other places, but is just not quite a 

priority. Now, maybe with the disasters in Japan, it will become 

more so. But this is not something that we can react to. This is 

something that we have to prevent, nonproliferation of this powerful technology that can be used for good or for devastating harm. 

And so, Mr. Chairman, I think those of us who care deeply about 

this—and I know others do, but it just doesn’t get to be 

prioritized—have an important job to do here in heightening the 

awareness of a need to be focused constantly on how we think 

clearly and strategically as to reduce proliferation in our world or 

to increase nonproliferation objectives in our world. 

With that said, I think if I could summarize as succinctly as possible what you all are talking about, is in effect what we have to 

have, what we are looking for, what is very delicate to achieve for 

the objective of nonproliferation, is a global private-public partnership that effectively is enforced through a shared geopolitical strategy. And that is tricky. That sort of transcends the boundaries of 

treaties. It transcends the boundaries of trade. It sort of becomes 

a hybrid model of enforcement that is based upon good will, based 

upon a willingness to not cheat in terms of business agreements, 

and pressure by governments consistently to achieve the objective 

of nonproliferation. 

Now, the Nuclear Suppliers Group I guess approximates this entity or this kind of concept as much as possible. China is now apparently cheating, so there might be even cracks in what has 

worked to a degree in seeking nonproliferation objectives in a communal worldwide sense. 

So, with that said, let me ask you this. Mr. Sokolski, you had 

said earlier I don’t think there is an inalienable right to make your 

own nuclear fuel. How did this paradigm come about? How can we 

shift and change that? I heard your earlier answer that perhaps it 

is foregone now. It is too late. This is related to the idea of how 

again do we strengthen the capabilities of the other entities that 

are out there. 

And this would be your question Mr.—is it pronounced 

Heinonen? The governor of Nebraska is named Heineman, by the 

way. Is the IAEA capable of achieving the objective of nonproliferation or is it constrained by—just tell me the constraints that are 

there that prevent the ultimate objective, what we are trying to 

achieve. 

67

Mr. SOKOLSKI. In answer to your question, if you are on a bad, 

bad roll, it is very important—I know when you ski if you are making mistakes the first thing you are supposed to do is stop. You 

don’t keep skiing and try to correct yourself. You stop, and then 

you rethink what you are doing. I think with regard to this argument about rights, it is a way of interpreting the treaty. But I 

think, as Mr. Sherman pointed out, it is corrosive to a lot more of 

the provisions of the treaty to interpret it that way than to say, 

Well, whatever it is has to be safe. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So why hasn’t the paradigm shifted? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Well, because we have chosen in this country, as 

well as encouraging other nuclear suppliers to follow our lead, to 

make our mistakes in this regard hereditary. What we have done 

is, well, because we said yes to Japan and yes to South Africa and 

yes to Brazil, we cannot stop and say maybe we need to rethink 

that. Maybe, at a minimum, we need to stop saying out loud, they 

clearly have the right. Maybe we need to start saying, you know, 

it is really not in the treaty. And maybe we have to make sure 

that, at a minimum, whatever activity it is, it is safeguardable and 

beneficial. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. The right depends upon certain conditions. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Right. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Now, in that regard, we put out an agreement 

with the UAE that was supposed to become a gold standard for 

nonproliferation objectives while pursuing civil nuclear technology. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Right. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. There is some problem there in that we don’t 

have other countries who are willing to accept the same standards 

and therefore can outcompete us. 

Now, you were talking earlier about leverage. If you can get the 

French to go along with certain provisions by, I assume, leveraging 

our loan guarantees for their business in this country to accept 

that gold standard, then the Germans and the Russians potentially 

follow. Did I follow you correctly in that regard? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Yes, roughly. There are other things the French 

want, too. It seems to me that the key advantage of the gold standard is that, in lieu of having an international organization that 

runs and owns everything, you are at least making a clear distinction between what is safe and dangerous. You have got to get everyone to go down that road. Keep in mind in 1945 we actually 

tried to do this. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. How? What are the entities out there that 

can leverage this if you shift the paradigm and actually cause enforcement? Back to my earlier comment——

Mr. ROYCE. If the gentleman would yield, shift the attitude in 

the Department of Energy. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I was going to say charity starts at home. You 

have an opportunity to make it very clear what you think safe and 

dangerous is, that you like the gold standard. And I think this 

point about the Appropriations Committee is, unfortunately, right 

on point that Mr. Sherman made. Go talk amongst yourselves and 

see if anybody knows anybody on the Appropriations Committee. 

Believe you me, if you start moving down this road, you will probably leverage the most important group. They are over in the 

68

White House. And they will go, oh, my God, if they are going to 

do this, we need to preempt them. You might be able to get some 

of this done without necessarily getting the law passed if they 

think you are serious and it looks like you are really going to do 

it. 

Once you do it, the NSG has an opportunity that becomes riper 

because, oh, my God, they are really going to do this. Let’s preempt 

it. 

You have a golden opportunity here, I think, to get the gold 

standard looked at more seriously by more countries. And I think, 

unfortunately, it has taken this accident and the reduced value of 

stocks in nuclear vendors, the lack of credit, the opportunity that 

has been afforded by natural gas not to have to go nuclear immediately. All of this is in your favor. If you don’t act now, I think 

it is a mistake. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. If I could follow up on that observation or that point. 

Right now, we have the leverage. We have the President’s statement in Prague in 2009 that we were going to face this new paradigm in civil nuclear cooperation in which all countries are going 

to be able to enjoy the benefits of nuclear power while avoiding the 

spread of nuclear weapons and technology. 

Well, we have a basis for that—or we had—the UAE agreement. 

If you look at a situation like the one that the administration is 

contemplating for Vietnam, which is what we are talking about 

now, I think what you called that was driving a stake through the 

heart of our efforts to stop the spread of nuclear fuel. I mean, once 

we back off of the position that you had to forego enrichment and 

reprocessing, we really are in a new paradigm. 

And so if we use the leverage we have now to get back to the 

agreements that will at least halt that spread, I don’t think that 

the problem is as dire as my colleague would indicate in terms of 

the situation with the votes in either the House or the Senate. And 

certainly with a two-thirds override the administration would, I 

think, be confronted with the real politics of dealing with this 

issue. And I think it is very important that we deal with it quickly, 

especially when we have the leverage. 

So it is true we might be able to do it through the appropriations 

process, but we could also run legislation into the Senate and talk 

to Mr. Lugar and talk to Mr. Kerry and other members of the Senate. 

I do think—well, I will go to a question to you, Mr. Sokolski; and 

that is, one of the excuses for not following through with the type 

of agreement we had with the UAE vis-a`-vis Vietnam was, well, it 

is a different situation. In the Middle East, you are facing proliferation, but you don’t have that problem in Asia. I think the quote 

was, ‘‘It doesn’t apply to Asia. The concerns about an arms race in 

the Middle East aren’t the same concerns in Asia.’’

Well, I am not sure that that is the right premise. I think about 

North Korea: First plutonium and then uranium enrichment. We 

see the reactions to that in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. I 

think about the transfer from North Korea to Burma that we are 

all concerned about in terms of this capability, of the fact that 

China is looking to sell reactors to Pakistan. Isn’t this just as comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:28 May 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031711\65302 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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bustible an area, potentially, as the Middle East, and shouldn’t we 

apply the same standard? Isn’t this an opportunity right now to leverage that standard? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. It is worse than you even have laid out. Privately, 

Jordanian officials were reported to have said, ‘‘Why in the world 

would we in the Middle East agree to a standard if you are not 

willing to inflict it on Vietnam? Why are we different?’’ So you do—

it is kind of like the house divided speech that Lincoln gave. Now, 

that was a more odious topic, it was slavery and whether or not 

you could divide the good States from the bad States and you 

would have slavery in the South but not the North. And he said, 

‘‘This is not tenable. You will either have the country entirely free 

or entirely enslaved.’’ I think this is just such a proposition, and 

it is clear enough for any other foreign official to figure. It should 

be clear enough for anyone here to figure as well. 

Mr. ROYCE. Then why is that unclear to these spokesmen? Why 

is it unclear to the U.S. Department of Energy? What is the impetus for going off of the gold standard and going onto this slippery 

slope that will get away from us with Vietnam? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I think Dr. Perry can perhaps address this as well 

as anyone. But my own personal experience working in the Pentagon is it is very hard to think about the long run and what might 

be important if what is urgent is just getting people happy who are 

right in front of you and you have a current country that you want 

to please. So it is really the reason why we have—I hate to say it—

division of power and why there is oversight. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Secretary Perry, your observations on this point. 

Mr. PERRY. I would just add to what Mr. Sokolski said that the 

danger in Asia is at least as great as the danger in the Middle 

East. 

Mr. ROYCE. All right. Well, that counters pretty effectively the 

quote. 

Mr. Heinonen, your thoughts. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes, thank you. 

Actually, I agree with what the both witnesses said. And I would 

say that we have also to look forward. And what we are here testing is the credibility of the regime. You cannot have two standards 

in the same regime. And then also I think that it is important to 

think that times may change, and there is also a threat also in 

Asia. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, yes. Thank you, Mr. Heinonen. 

Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. I would just add we have addressed this overall 

problem in light of our nonproliferation work and that is sending 

mixed messages. I think we should be as careful as we can in making sure in all the different realms of nonproliferation that we send 

the same message and that we are serious about it. What is good 

for one nonproliferation regime in one country should be the same 

in another. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Aloise. 

I think this is a critical issue that we are dealing with, and one 

of the things I just want to convey is our appreciation for having 

you witnesses with your expertise join us today and lay out your 

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views. We have your written testimony as well for the record, and 

let me express our deep appreciation to you for being here for this 

hearing today. 

The hearing will now stand adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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[Responses from Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and 

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[Responses from Mr. Henry Sokolski, executive director, Nonproliferation Policy 

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[Responses from Mr. Gene Aloise, director, Natural Resources and Environment 

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[NOTE: Responses from the Honorable William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, senior fellow, Hoover Institution, to Mr. Bilirakis’ questions were not submitted to the committee prior to printing.]

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