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Israel: Extrajudicial Sanctions 

Against Husbands Noncompliant 

with Rabbinical Divorce Rulings

May 2017
This report is provided for reference purposes only. 

It does not constitute legal advice and does not represent the official 

opinion of the United States Government. The information provided 

reflects research undertaken as of the date of writing. 

It has not been updated.
The Law Library of Congress 1

Israel: Extrajudicial Sanctions Against Husbands 

Noncompliant with Rabbinical Divorce Rulings 

Ruth Levush 

Senior Foreign Law Specialist

SUMMARY In a five-to-two decision, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected petitions by two Jewish 

husbands against rulings by rabbinical courts subjecting them to the application of twelfthcentury social religious sanctions not expressly authorized under Israeli law. The 

sanctions were designed to pressure husbands to comply with divorce judgements issued 

against them by rabbinical courts. The Supreme Court accepted the petitions only with 

regard to one specific sanction that was held to conflict with current principles of 

Israeli law. 

I. Introduction 

On February 28, 2017, an extended bench of Israel’s Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of 

Justice, recognized the authority of rabbinical courts to apply twelfth-century social religious 

sanctions not expressly authorized under Israeli law.1

 The sanctions were originally instituted by

Rabbi Yaakov Ben Meir Tam2(“Rabeinu Tam’s Distancing Rules,” hereinafter RTDR), as a way

to pressure Jewish husbands, when ordered by a rabbinical court to divorce, to deliver their 

wives a get (Jewish bill of divorce).3

The authority of rabbinical courts to adjudicate matters of marriage and divorce of Jews, citizens,

and residents of Israel, in accordance with Jewish law, is based on the Rabbinical Courts 

Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953.4 While rabbinical courts may decide that

based on the evidence before them the parties must divorce, they do not have the power to 

dissolve a marriage. To constitute a divorce under Jewish law, the consensual transfer of a get

from the husband to the wife and her consensual receipt of it must take place. Special rules 

govern the text of the get and the evidence necessary to prove its validity.5

1

 HCJ 5185/13 Anonymous and Gez v. Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem (2017), http://elyon1.court.gov.il 

/files/13/850/051/t36/13051850.t36.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4BQ9-FJAF. 

2

 Rabbi Yaakov Ben Meir Tam was born in France around the year 1100 and was a leading scholar. See e.g. 

Solomon Schechter & Max Schloessinger, Jacob Ben Meir Tam (known also as Rabbenu Tam), JEWISH 

ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/8436-jacob-ben-meir-tam#anchor7 (last visited Apr. 

20, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/D5PS-WCFL. 

3

 JACOB BEN MEIR TAM ET AL., SEFER HAYASHAR LE RABEINU TAM, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS PART 42 (1898), 

electronic copy available at https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015070382794 (last visited Apr. 25, 2017), archived 

at https://perma.cc/G7T6-VAXD.

4 Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce), 5713-1953, §§ 1–2, SEFER HAHUKIM [SH] No. 134 p. 165, 

as amended. Up-to-date text of this law and all legislation in this report is available at the Nevo Legal Database at 

www.nevo.co.il (by subscription, in Hebrew), archived at https://perma.cc/N9LF-MWEU. 

5

 For additional information, see e.g. Jewish Divorce 101, CHABAD.ORG http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo 

/aid/557906/jewish/Divorce-Basics.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/8JE4-XBGQ.
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While the wife’s refusal to receive a get generally prevents the husband from remarrying,6 the

consequences of the husband’s refusal to give her a get are much harsher. In accordance with 

Jewish law, a child born to a married woman not from her husband is considered a mamzer (a 

bastard) and is prohibited from marrying another Jew.7

The inability of a wife to obtain her get because of her husband’s disappearance, incapacity,8 or

his refusal to give her a get makes her aguna (a chained woman), as she is unable to remarry and 

establish a new family.9 While releasing agunot (plural of aguna) from the chains of their illfated marriages is considered a mitzva (a religious commandment) in the Jewish community, it is 

recognized that much caution is required to prevent remarriage while the first marriage is still 

valid. An annulment of the first marriage is rare and is often questionable.10

As the delivery and acceptance of a get must be consensual, caution must also be used to prevent 

the pressure exerted on the husband from nullifying the get based on coercion. The twelfthcentury RTDR were designed to address the concern that physical pressure or harm might force 

the husband to give the get against his will. Instead, Rabeinu Tam’s suggestion was to distance 

the husband from community life by encouraging the community to, for example, sever contact 

with him, avoid business dealings with him, or refrain from hosting, feeding, or visiting him 

when he was sick.11

Scholars explained that the proposal by Rabeinu Tam to distance the husband from the 

community constituted a passive measure of nonaction rather than coercion. The distancing was 

6

 Under rare situations, husbands may get approval to remarry without a lawful divorce. See Rabbi Gedalia 

Schwarts, Heter Meah Rabbanim, JOFA, https://www.jofa.org/sites/default/files/uploaded_files/10002_u/00241.pdf

(last visited Mar. 31, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/NX93-J97E . 

7 A mamzer is not merely a child born out of wedlock. Jewish law does not recognize illegitimacy of children. The 

implications of birth to a wedded woman not from her husband only apply to marriage of her offspring: “Except 

with regard to marriage the personal status of a mamzer does not prejudice him in any way. His rights of inheritance 

are equal to those of any other heir.” See Mamzer, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ 

mamzer (last visited Mar. 29, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/W4AU-4SRZ. 

8

See HCJ 9261/16 Anonymous v. the Great Rabbinical Court of Appeals in Jerusalem (2017), TAKDIN LEGAL 

DATABASE, www.takdin.co.il (by subscription, in Hebrew), archived at https://perma.cc/YJ4S-EVYQ; see also Ruth 

Levush, Israel: Supreme Court Prohibits Third Party Appeal over Legitimacy of Divorce, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR

(Apr. 28, 2017) , http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-supreme-court-prohibits-third-party-appealover-legitimacy-of-divorce/, archived at https://perma.cc/C2A4-EU8D; and Telem Yahav & Kobin Nachshoni, 

‘Haaguna from Safed’ Will Be Able to Re-marry: “The Happiest Day in My Life”, YNET, 

http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4942752,00.html, archived at https://perma.cc/8MNU-66EB. 

9

 Encyclopedia Judaica: Agunah, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/agunah (last 

visited Mar. 29, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/N87B-M927. 

10 See, e.g., Nathan Guttman, Is 'Chained' Wife Tamar Epstein's Remarriage Kosher—Even Without Orthodox 

Divorce?, THE FORWARD (Dec. 2, 2015), http://forward.com/news/national/325878/chained-wife-tamar-epsteindivorce-kosher/, archived at https://perma.cc/K5XY-D5YY. 

11 Distancing of Rabeinu Tam, MENACHEM ELON, THE STATUS OF THE WOMAN, LAW AND ADJUDICATION,

TRADITION AND TRANSITION, THE VALUES OF A JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC STATE 348–49 (2005). 
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directed towards the community rather than the husband, and would therefore not nullify a get as 

one delivered without free consent.12

The following is a summary of the February 2017 Israeli Supreme Court’s decision authorizing 

rabbinical courts to utilize the RTDR to assist agunot in receiving their get. The decision centers 

on whether the RTDR, which are not explicitly authorized under Israeli law and are not 

enforceable by state authorities, can be recommended by rabbinical courts as a way to influence 

Jewish husbands to comply with divorce decisions.

II. Facts

The Supreme Court’s decision was rendered by a five-to-two opinion in response to two joined 

petitions presenting similar legal questions. The petitioners in both cases were Jewish husbands 

who fled Israel after having been ordered by different rabbinical courts in Israel to divorce their 

wives. One petitioner fled to the US and the other to Belgium, where he was arrested pending 

extradition proceedings. The relevant regional rabbinical courts issued various injunctions 

against both husbands in accordance with their authority under Israeli law. These included an 

order to Israeli consulates in the US not to provide assistance to the first petitioner, and an order 

requiring the second petitioner to deposit his passport at the local rabbinical court. The second 

petitioner, however, managed to leave Israel without surrendering his passport, possibly by using 

a fraudulent identity.13

Addressing the refusal of the husbands to comply with the requirement to divorce their wives, 

both rabbinical courts included in their decisions references to religious sanctions originating 

from the RTDR. Regarding the first petitioner, the court determined that “it would be a mitzvah

to assist the wife” to obtain a get.

14 Accordingly, the court clarified, the public should refrain

from “doing him [the husband] good and/or adding him to a minyan,

[15]

 and/or negotiat[ing] with

him and/or bury[ing] him [in a Jewish burial].”

16

The rabbinical court also allowed the full disclosure of the husband’s name and other identifying 

information including a photograph, with a notice that anyone who knew where the husband 

could be found must assist in getting him to deliver a get to his wife. The court noted that any 

person who assisted the husband in prolonging the wife’s status as aguna is considered an 

accomplice. A copy of the decision was delivered to the rabbi of the community where the 

petitioner was residing in the US.17

12 Id.

13 HCJ 5185/13, majority opinion by Justice Elyakim Rubinstein ¶¶ 1–18.

14 Id. ¶ 3.

15 A minyan is a quorum of ten men over the age of thirteen required for traditional Jewish public worship. See

Rabbi Abraham Millgram, Minyan: The Congregational Quorum, MY JEWISH LEARNING, http://www.myjewish 

learning.com/article/minyan-the-congregational-quorum/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017), archived at

https://perma.cc/487E-GC49. 

16 HCJ 5185/13, ¶ 4.

17 Id. 
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With regard to the second petitioner, the rabbinical court expressly held that if he continued to 

refuse to give his wife a get, the husband should be subjected to the RTDR. Accordingly, 

nobody should deal with him in trade or in any financial matter. He should not be hosted, fed, or 

visited when he is sick, and should not be honored at the synagogue in any way, including by 

reading publicly from the Torah18 and publicly reciting the Jewish prayer for the dead, until he

gives a get to his wife. The court further allowed the wife to publish the decision subjecting her 

husband to these sanctions and to provide information about the decision to every synagogue and 

individual so that he would be rejected by everyone in the community.19

III. Subject of the Petitions

The main argument by both petitioners before the Supreme Court was that in the absence of 

explicit authorization in Israeli legislation, the rabbinical courts did not have jurisdiction to 

include the RTDR among the sanctions to be imposed on them.20

In response to the suggestion by a majority of the Justices, the Rabbinical Courts’ Administration 

and the Attorney General, who were also among the respondents, agreed that the RTDR were 

referred to in both rabbinical court decisions only as a recommendation and not as a 

mandatory obligation.21

IV. Majority Decision

A. Justice Elyakim Rubinstein 

Justice Rubinstein wrote the main decision. In his opinion, the lack of equality under Jewish law 

in the ability of husbands as compared with wives to obtain a divorce requires looking for ways 

to assist agunot. He therefore opined that although the RTDR are unenforceable, there is no 

reason why rabbinical courts should not recommend that they be applied.22

Rubinstein noted that Israeli law already provides for the enforcement of rabbinical court rulings 

through the Religious Courts (Forcing Compliance and Hearing Procedures) Law 5716-1956

(hereinafter RC (Forcing Compliance) Law)23 and the Rabbinical Courts (Enforcement of

Divorce Decisions) Law 5755-1995 (hereinafter the RC Law).24

18 See Judaism: The Written Law–Torah, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/thewritten-law-torah (last visited Apr. 26, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/7CTU-SHHX. 

19 HCJ 5185/13, majority opinion by Justice Elyakim Rubinstein ¶ 11. 

20 Id. ¶¶ 5, 13.

21 Id. ¶ 20.

22 Id. ¶ 21.

23 Religious Courts (Forcing Compliance and Hearing Procedures) Law, 5716-1956, SH No. 200 p. 40, as amended. 

24 Rabbinical Courts (Enforcement of Divorce Decisions) Law 5755-1995, SH No. 1507 p. 139, as amended. 
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These laws authorize various measures against noncompliant defendants, including issuing 

injunctions to prevent them from leaving the country, seizing their property, and blocking Israeli 

passports from being issued to them. The RC Law also provides for prohibitions against 

receiving, possessing, and renewing a driving license; being appointed to government positions; 

operating a licensed business; and opening or possessing bank accounts. Additional sanctions 

include imprisonment25 and solitary confinement. The RTDR sanctions, Rubinstein opined,

were more extensive than those authorized under Israeli legislation.26

The rabbinical courts’ recommendation to impose RTDR sanctions, according to Rubinstein, 

reflected a recognition of a woman’s right to dignity, liberty, and family life. This right, he 

opined, is guaranteed under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.27

Rubinstein opined, however, that unlike other RTDR religious sanctions, preventing a 

noncompliant husband from having a Jewish burial contradicts Israeli law.28 In accordance with

section 1 of the Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962, “[e]very person shall be capable of 

having rights and obligations from the completion of his birth until his death.”29 Therefore, for

example, a person’s individual debt (as compared with the estate’s debt) expires upon death. 

The duty of a husband to give a get to his wife similarly expires upon his death, after which his 

wife becomes a widow.30

According to Rubinstein, the authority of rabbinical courts to publish their decisions derives 

from their authority under the RC (Forcing Compliance) Law31 to determine whether hearings on

matters under their jurisdiction will be held publicly or behind closed doors. Therefore, he did 

not find any fault in widely publishing the rabbinical courts’ decisions against the petitioners.32

Rubinstein rejected the argument that the publication of the rabbinical courts decisions could be 

likened to social media “shaming.”

33 He opined:

A major part of the problem associated with the phenomenon of “shaming” in social 

media derives from the fact it is often done recklessly, sometimes based on mere rumors 

and may result in unjustly harming an individual’s reputation, often in an irreparable 

25 Imprisonment may be for a period of five years, which may be extended periodically up to ten years. Id. §§ 3, 3A. 

26 HCJ 5185/13, majority opinion by Justice Elyakim Rubinstein ¶ 22.

27 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, SH No. 1391 p. 150; HCJ 5185/13, majority opinion by Justice Elyakim 

Rubinstein, ¶ 36.

28 Id. ¶ 36. 

29 Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962, § 1, SH No. 380 p. 120. 

30 HCJ 5185/13, majority opinion by Justice Elyakim Rubinstein ¶ 38.

31 Religious Courts (Forcing Compliance and Hearing Procedures) Law, 5716-1956, § 1A(a), SH No. 200 p. 40, as 

amended. 

32 Id. ¶ 39.

33 Id. ¶ 43.
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way; It is different when [publication is] done after verification of the facts, as in our 

case, and as a matter of almost last resort.34

Moreover, Rubinstein determined that unlike referenced American cases involving online 

shaming of drunk drivers and prostitution customers by state authorities, the state did not take 

positive actions in shaming individuals in the cases at hand.

35

B. Concurring Opinions 

Agreeing with Justice Rubinstein, Justice Isaac Amit added that the limited effectiveness of the 

RTDR on nonreligious Jews, “who might not fear being excluded from a minyan[36] or [from]

being honored with an aliya[37]

” does not make their application a violation of the principle of

equal treatment under Israeli law.38 In Amit’s view, courts have to find the most effective

relevant measure depending on the particular circumstances of the case before them.39

Both Justice Uri Shoham and Justice Isaac Amit opined that the petitioners lacked clean hands as 

they unlawfully fled Israel.40 Without making a decision regarding the authority of the

rabbinical courts to recommend application of the RTDR, Justice Esther Hayut agreed that the 

petitions must be rejected on the ground of lack of clean hands.41

Concurring that the petitions should be generally rejected, Justice Neal Hendel held that the 

recommended application of the RTDR by the rabbinical courts might harm the rights of the getrefusing husband. The harm that might result, however, does not affect his rights with such force 

that it cannot be based on the rabbinical courts’ general authorities and would therefore require 

express authorization by law.42

Both Justice Hendel and Justice Amit, however, disagreed that the petitions should be denied 

with regard to the RTDR’s recommendation to deprive the petitioners of Jewish burial.43

34 Id. (translated by author). 

35 Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 

36 See explanation, supra note 15. 

37 Being honored with an aliyah means being asked to recite blessings over the Torah. See Ronald L. Eisenberg, 

How to Have an Aliyah, MY JEWISH LEARNING, http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/aliyah/ (last visited Mar. 

31, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/H8TZ-L3HF. 

38 HCJ 5185/13 Justice Shoham’s opinion ¶ 9. 

39 Id., Justice Amit opinion ¶ 8. 

40 Id., Justice Amit’s opinion ¶ 1; Justice Shoham’s opinion ¶ 2.

41 Id., Justice Hayut’s opinion ¶¶ 1–7.

42 Id., Justice Hendel’s opinion ¶¶ 7–11.

43 Id., Justice Hendel’s opinion ¶ 14; Justice Amit’s opinion ¶ 17.
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V. Minority Opinions 

A. Justice Yoram Danziger 

Justice Danziger disagreed with the conclusion that because the RTDR were merely extrajudicial 

“recommendations” rather than mandatory requirements, they could be imposed by the 

rabbinical courts. In his opinion, like any other institution that operates by law, the rabbinical 

courts enjoy only those authorities that were determined by legislation.44

As noted in Justice Rubinstein’s opinion, the legislature provided for enforcement authorities of 

the rabbinical courts in the RC Law and in the RC (Forcing Compliance) Law.45 A review of the

explanatory notes for a bill preceding the RC Law, Rubinstein stated, indicates that the drafters 

of the legislation intended to “utilize a halachic [Jewish law] tool” to solve the problem of 

women who are denied a get. The drafters noted that the legislation “coincided with 

implementing the idea of the RTDR.”46

Danziger concluded, therefore, that there was no doubt that the legislature was aware of the 

RTDR and even viewed the RC Law as a civil “translation” of the RTDR. If the legislature 

wished to apply the RTDR themselves, he opined, the legislature could have achieved this goal 

by an express authorization in the RC Law. The legislature’s choice to “translate” the RTDR 

into a limited list of sanctions without making such authorization, Rubinstein determined, 

suggests its intention not to allow an expansion of the enforcement measures specified in the 

RC Law.47

This conclusion is further supported, according to Danziger, by a review of amendments to the 

RC Law since its enactment in 1995, authorizing the addition of specific sanctions against “get

refusers.”48 As the application of the RTDR imposes social sanctions on “get refusers,”

Danziger concluded, their application could not be recommended by the rabbinical courts in the 

absence of explicit authorization by law.49

B. Court President Justice Miriam Naor 

Concurring with Justice Danziger, Justice Naor rejected the distinction adopted by the majority 

between an order and a recommendation. She opined that a recommendation made by a 

rabbinical court based on Jewish law might have normative effect, at least for part of the public, 

especially when included in a court decision. It is not the terminology that determines the nature 

of the rabbinical court decision, but the substance of it. Therefore, Naor disagreed with the 

44 Id., Justice Danziger’s opinion ¶ 1.

45 Id. ¶ 2.

46 Id. ¶ 16.

47 Id. ¶ 16. 

48 Id. ¶ 17.

49 Id.
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majority opinion that the rabbinical courts’ decisions regarding the application of the RTDR 

were merely recommendations without any normative effect.50

Naor expressed concern that if the Supreme Court allowed the rabbinical courts to recommend 

application of the RTDR, over time and with a change of circumstances a rabbinical court might 

add additional sanctions in accordance with its own perceptions. According to Halacha, the 

collective body of Jewish religious laws, the list of sanctions depends on the discretion of the 

rabbinical courts and does not constitute a limited list. Naor disagreed that rabbinical courts 

should be authorized to impose a wide range of sanctions without any defined criteria, stating 

that “[t]his time it concerns a prohibition on feeding or offering drink [to the get refuser] or 

conversing with him, and maybe next time the court might recommend sanctions regarding 

family members or other persons interacting with the get refuser[.]”

51

Naor also questioned the possible implications of the RTDR on violations of other laws. For 

example, if, based on a rabbinical court’s recommendation not to have business dealings with the 

get refuser, a person who has been negotiating or even signed a contract with the get refuser 

reneges on his contractual commitments, does he risk a lawsuit based on breach of contract? 

Without expressing any opinion on the matter, Naor explained that she posed these questions to 

illustrate the wide, even possibly unintended, implications that might arise from authorizing the 

rabbinical courts to recommend sanctions that are not authorized by law.52

VI. Ruling

Based on the majority opinion, the Supreme Court held that the rabbinical courts were authorized 

to recommend application of the RTDR in response to the unlawful behavior of the petitioners 

and their refusal to give their wives a get in violation of the judicial decisions requiring them to 

do so. The husbands’ petitions were therefore rejected, except with regard to voiding the RTDRbased sanction of depriving the petitioners of a Jewish burial upon their death.53

50 Id., Justice Naor’s opinion ¶¶ 4–11. 

51 Id. ¶ 15. 

52 Id. ¶ 16. 

53 Id., summary ¶¶ 1–2.