AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

Logistics Aloft

JOEL D. JACKSON

Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 71

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

October 2012
2

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

The Maxwell Papers are available electronically at the Air 

University Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil.
3

Logistics Aloft

Col Joel D. Jackson, USAF

Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, Department 

of Defense (DOD) investment in remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) has 

exploded almost 700 percent to just under $4 billion per year in 2009.1

This expansion was primarily caused by the successful application of 

RPAs in their role as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

platforms, but also as ISR/strike platforms because these particular 

mission sets fit the capabilities of RPAs. Going forward with these 

successes, the DOD should assess potential future RPA missions by first 

determining what particular characteristics of the ISR and ISR/strike 

missions made them successful as RPA missions and then determining

what other missions fit these same characteristics. Emergency and 

mission-critical, time-sensitive (MCTS) intratheater logistical resupply

are missions which fit these characteristics of being advantageous to 

persistent, efficient, modular systems integrated into a pervasive battle 

space. Work is currently underway developing RPAs to accomplish these

missions, but these current applications do not focus on these specific 

characteristics. Instead a RPA designed specifically as a logistical delivery 

platform with modular ISR/strike capabilities and long endurance 

should be developed to fill these missions.
4

Intratheater Resupply in Central Command

Intratheater resupply is conducted within a single geographic 

theater. This type of resupply, often called “the last tactical mile,”

generally goes from forward supply bases out to the troops in the field. 

The amount of supplies required for a deployed Army or Marine unit

throughout a theater are well defined. The Marine Corps, for example, 

states a requirement of 20,000 pounds of supplies per day per company

for Afghanistan. Similarly, the Army states a requirement of 7,280 

pounds per day per platoon or 170 pounds per day per person.2 This

resupply, however, may be broken down into classes and categories. The 

classes of supplies are groups such as food and water (Class I), fuels

(Class III), ammunition (Class V), and repair parts (Class IX). Class I

consists of 53 percent of the daily requirement and Class V adds another 

6 percent.3

Simply put, emergency resupply is the delivery of supplies which, if 

not immediately received, will cause catastrophic consequences for a 

unit.

Resupply can also be broken into three categories: 

emergency, MCTS, and routine.

4 MCTS resupply, on the other hand, is the delivery of those 

supplies needed on short notice or outside the normal resupply system.5

What exactly is considered MCTS varies from commander to commander, 

but in general, it is any commodity needed to maintain operational 

effectiveness. This definition is broad enough that it can include anything 

from a 2,000 pound generator to 100 pounds of ammunition, but in 
5

Afghanistan, food and water were added to the MCTS priority list with 

class I, III (small quantities), V, and IX being the most common classes 

flown as MCTS.6 Implied with MCTS resupply is the requirement to be 

delivered in a timely manner. The generally accepted length of time for 

the MCTS supply system is 24 hours from request to delivery compared 

with 72 hours for supplies considered routine.7 Routine intratheater 

supply has traditionally been accomplished by ground delivery with 

emergency and MCTS supply accomplished by fixed-wing aircraft to 

forward airstrips, but both of these methods have proven to be 

incompatible with the ongoing operations in Afghanistan.8

The truck, the cheapest method of delivery, met resistance in Iraq 

with the proliferation of improvised explosion devices (IED). Since 2003,

the goal of theater commanders has been to mitigate this threat by 

decreasing truck convoys and increasing the movement of supplies by 

air.9 In Afghanistan, the IED problem has been exacerbated by poor 

transportation infrastructure. While 84 percent of roads in Iraq are 

paved, only 29 percent of roads are paved in Afghanistan.10

Unfortunately, the other common delivery method, using air assets

to locations with landing strips, is also not practical in Afghanistan. 

While this method is achievable to some locations, the general lack of 

landing strips where the units need the supplies has resulted in the 

These two 

factors contributed to the desire to move as little resupply over land as 

possible.
6

inability to deliver a large amount of goods by traditional airlift 

methods.11 Furthermore, the Army terminated the use of its C-23 

Sherpas in Afghanistan. Historically the Army used these aircraft to 

move small, MCTS cargo to forward troop locations, but the Sherpa lacks 

the performance capabilities to operate in the high altitudes required in 

Afghanistan.12

The increased use of airdrop and rotary-wing assets to support 

resupply has resulted in some new challenges. First, the current 

inventory of rotary-wing aircraft has been stretched too thin. The primary 

mission of the CH-47 is to aid the air assault of dismounted combat

forces,

This inability to employ fixed-wing assets using traditional 

airlift methods has dramatically increased the use of airdrop delivery and 

rotary-wing aircraft to meet resupply requirements.

13 but by using them as resupply tools, the Army and the Special 

Forces Command do not have enough aircraft to perform their primary

missions. In addition, the long flights associated with the vast distances 

between supply bases, outposts, and available fuel bases in Afghanistan 

add “substantial wear and tear”14 to the CH-47s and UH-60s used to 

perform resupply missions. This adversely affects the aircrafts’

maintainability rates, further decreasing their availability for any 

mission. To alleviate some of this shortfall in helicopter availability, the 

Army increased their CH-47 fleet by 11 percent in 2005.15 Furthermore, 

in April 2010 the deputy assistant defense secretary for special 

operations and combating terrorism announced the fiscal year 2011 
7

budget would include money for the special operations community to 

procure eight MH-47Gs from the Army, purchase 16 new MH-60Ms, and 

buy five additional CV-22 aircraft—all specifically for use by special 

forces.16

While the initial purchase cost of the CH-47 and UH-60 can be 

significantly less than the C-130J or C-27J (the C-27J is in procurement 

to replace the C-23), the operating costs of the UH-60 is approximately 

equal to a small fixed wing aircraft such as the C-23, C-130J, or C-27J. 

Furthermore, CH-47 operating costs are four to five times that of these 

fixed-wing aircraft.

Purchasing new rotary-wing aircraft obviously increases

availability, but even if there are enough rotary-wing assets to go around, 

using them for logistical operations is simply inefficient.

17 In fact, when comparing the increased lift capacity 

fixed-wing aircraft have over rotary-wing aircraft, using the cost to 

transport tons per mile over long distances as the comparison metric, the 

CH-47 is 10 times more expensive to operate than the C-27J.18

General Dynamics conducted a study in 2010 quantifying the total 

cost per pound to deliver goods via helicopter and fixed wing aircraft in 

Afghanistan-specific scenarios. Their study included many variables 

including aircraft availability, weather cancellation rates, personnel per 

In 

addition, current Army tactics in Afghanistan dictate that all helicopters 

must always be used in pairs, regardless of the mission. This restriction 

can double the cost per ton-mile because each mission requires the use 

of two aircraft, regardless of the scheduled cargo.
8

aircraft, operating costs, and projected loss rate per aircraft. They 

determined the cost per pound moved was always least for the C-27J,

closely followed by the C-130. A distant third in all scenarios was the 

CH-47 and the most expensive per pound moved was the UH-60.19 Not 

only is the cost of using rotary-wing aircraft for intratheater resupply 

high because it takes valuable assets away from their primary mission, it 

is also an inefficient method of providing resupply over the distances 

required in Afghanistan. Due to these high costs, a 2010 RAND study 

recommended the use of fixed-wing aircraft for longer resupply flights,

specifically advocating fixed-wing aircraft with the use of “JPADs (joint 

precision airdrop system) to deliver emergency supplies to FOBs (forward 

operating bases) and COPs (combat outposts) when the ground situation 

so requires.”20

Because of the high costs associated with using rotary-wing assets

to resupply in Afghanistan, the bulk of the routine resupply has been 

accomplished cheaper by C-130 and C-17 aircraft. Along with direct 

delivery to those locations with landing strips, these aircraft have been 

airdropping almost 1,000 bundles per week at an average weight per 

bundle of 1,700 pounds. Because of their size, these aircraft are able to 

do airdrops in large quantities. For example, a C-17 drops between 25 

and 30 bundles while the C-130 delivers 10 bundles per flight.21 By 

airdropping larger average payloads, these aircraft operate more

efficiently, but there is a serious disadvantage to using large aircraft. 
9

Since they are in high demand to deliver large quantities of equipment, 

personnel, and supplies by air, there is a very structured scheduling 

system based on a 72-hour validation process and formalized priorities. 

This system was developed to make the delivery of goods as efficient as 

possible while maximizing the effectiveness for all users. However, even 

with requests for important movements such as emergency airdrop or 

MCTS, it still takes general officer intervention to validate supplies for

delivery inside the 72-hour validation window.22 Once the goods have 

been validated for delivery, it still takes between six and 24 hours, 

depending on aircraft availability and mission importance, for the 

supplies to be made airworthy and loaded for delivery.23

By contrast the Army’s entire scheduling system for their aircraft is 

developed to respond within 24 hours, enabling small tactically sized 

resupply to fielded troops. In Afghanistan these two scheduling systems 

have resulted in a resupply delivery that can be responsive to the troops 

in the field by delivering emergency or MCTS items within 24 hours of 

request, but at the cost of diverting rotary-wing assets from their primary 

Once airborne, 

the aircraft still must travel the distance from the supply base to the 

troops requesting the supplies. Finally, depending on the priority of the 

supplies, this time critical delivery could preempt the use of a mobility 

asset from servicing multiple users to provide the single important

shipment. While this capability is effective in meeting the war-fighters 

requirement, it is usually an inefficient use of a fixed-wing asset.
10

mission with general officer intervention. The systems can also efficiently 

deliver goods using fixed-wing assets, but with a request validation time 

of up to 72 hours.

These options are not good enough for our fielded troops. In 

August 2007, Combined Joint Special Operations Task ForceAfghanistan (CJSOTF-A) published a memorandum back to US Special 

Operations Command detailing the requirement for better emergency 

resupply. CJSOTF-A outlined the need for a more responsive system to 

resupply troops in contact (TIC) with the enemy with emergency 

ammunition, medical supplies, fuels, and water—primarily classes I, III, 

and V. For this mission, they request a RPA capable of delivering a 

minimum of 1,000 pounds accurately within 150 meters of the TIC in 

“high and hot” environmental conditions, for example, mountainous 

areas and hot temperatures.24

Current RPAs

While CJSOTF-A specifically requested a 

RPA for this mission, it is first important to understand what mission

types lend themselves to this air platform.

Both RAND and General Dynamics conducted studies in 2010 

characterizing the likely mission types for RPAs using the three “Ds”: 

dull, dirty, and dangerous. While the “Ds” are a catchy way to discuss 

the missions advantageous to RPAs, the US Air Force in the 2009 RPA

flight plan explains it better. The flight plan says “UAS are compelling 

where human physiology limits mission execution (e.g. persistence, 
11

speed of reaction, contaminated environment).”25 It then expands on 

this, specifying the attributes RPAs will capitalize on as “persistence, 

connectivity, flexibility, autonomy, and efficiency.”26 It continues, RPAs 

must be integrated with manned and other unmanned systems to 

increase capabilities across the full range of military operations. They 

also must be automated to perhaps lower cost, footprint, and risk. 

Furthermore, they should have a final outcome of a vehicle with a 

modular system of capabilities and not a particular platform for one 

mission.27

The US Air Force and the rest of the DOD have many small RPAs

used for reconnaissance. The mission of logistical distribution lends itself 

to larger systems in order to fit supplies; therefore this paper will only 

use the DOD’s large ISR platforms for comparison. The DOD has two

primary large ISR platforms and one large strike/ISR platform: the RQ-4, 

the MQ-1, and the MQ-9. The MQ-1 Predator is the work horse of the 

current ISR RPA fleet. As the M denotes in the name, it is a multirole 

aircraft versus the reconnaissance-only RQ-4. The MQ platforms are

In summary, there is a significant niche these missions 

should fill; the more niches each platform can fill, the better. The flight 

plan does not assume RPAs will be developed to replace manned aircraft 

unless there is a compelling reason in either a mission niche capitalizing

on inherent RPA attributes or efficiencies gained by adopting a RPA

system. The success of the current large ISR platforms follows these 

flight plan attributes and fit this niche.
12

primarily low-altitude ISR platforms capable of performing close air 

support (CAS), combat search and rescue (CSAR) support, and precision 

strike all during an ISR mission. The Predator has a max payload of 300 

pounds and can loiter for 22 hours at speeds of up to 135 knots.28 The 

MQ-9 Reaper is a larger platform capable of performing the same roles as 

the Predator, but has an increased payload and speed capability 

compared to the MQ-1. The increased size of the platform expands its

payload to 3,000 pounds but limits endurance to 18 hours at speeds up 

to 200 knots.29 The RQ-4 Global Hawk is the largest of the three RPAs 

with a commensurate increase in both payload and endurance. It is 

purely a high-altitude ISR platform incapable of an attack mission, 

though it is capable of a wide array of ISR tasks. Its size gives it a 3,000-

pound payload as well as an endurance of 28 hours at speeds over 300 

knots.30

As previously noted, the flight plan described assumptions for the 

future use of RPAs. These assumptions included mitigating the 

limitations of human physiology while maximizing flexibility and 

efficiency. Due to their long endurance capabilities, these platforms are 

To determine other missions which may be right for RPAs, it is 

important to understand why these three platforms have been successful 

in their missions. First, these three platforms fit exactly into the niche 

mission and efficiency construct of the US Air Force flight plan. Second,

they have been deployed in an environment void of regulatory or enemy 

constraints.
13

able to persist, or maintain operational status, over the battlespace for 

extended periods of time. They specifically have the characteristic of 

persistence because they are not constrained by the physiologicallybased flight duty times associated with manned aircraft. Since the 

primary mission of these RPAs is ISR, a major criterion for success is 

duration over the survey area. Unlike missions requiring the movement

from point A to point B, these missions simply require persistence over a 

desired area. Finally, the natural evolution of this persistent mission was

adapting munitions to the airframe, resulting in a concurrent attack

capability.

These three RPAs possess other advantages based on the flight 

plan. They have modular systems integrated into the entire battle space 

construct with complementary manned and unmanned vehicles. By the 

word modular, the Air Force implies the ability to mix and match 

payloads to attain desired capabilities. All three RPA platforms offer 

complete flexibility to fill a variety of roles depending upon war-fighter 

requirements. The Air Force also integrates the current RPAs by using

manned, unmanned, and satellite technology when conducting theater 

ISR as well as manned and unmanned strike aircraft. This combination 

of modular assets gives the war fighter complete flexibility of capabilities 

and applications to use depending on the circumstances.

The second aspect to consider in determining why the ISR 

platforms have been successful is cost. While cost is always important 
14

and seems to be listed as a RPA advantage in any study, the flight plan

only assumes the automation of RPAs could potentially reduce costs.31

While none of the current ISR platforms can be considered cheap, they 

either fill a niche mission and are thus fiscally incomparable, or they are 

significantly cheaper than their manned counterpart. The least expensive

platform is the Predator which has a cost of $20 million (in 2009 dollars) 

for each set of four aircraft, ground control station, and satellite link.32

The Reaper costs $53.5 million (in 2006 dollars) for a set of four 

aircraft,33 while the RQ-4 has the highest per unit cost of between $55 

and $81 million per aircraft.34

What is significant for these RPAs, however, is their cost compared 

to manned systems. While the Predator at $5 million per airframe has no 

comparable manned aircraft, the Reaper could be compared either to the 

legacy strike aircraft, the F-16, or the new strike aircraft, the F-35—both 

of which are considerably more expensive. While the F-16 costs $23 

million in 2006 dollars, only twice as much as the Reaper, it is beginning 

to be phased out the inventory due to its increasing age and 

maintenance costs. The F-16s replacement, the F-35, on the other hand,

is currently estimated to cost approximately $120 million in 2010 

dollars, or almost 10 times more than a Reaper. Finally, while the Global 

Hawk is the most expensive RPA, the cost of its closest manned 

counterpart, the U-2, is still classified. Additionally, RPAs also have less 

expensive operating costs. Northrop Grumman, the manufacturer of the
15

Global Hawk, stated that the costs of operating the Global Hawk is 

quoted as one-third that of the U-2,35

One of the main criteria for the lower acquisition and operating 

costs over their manned equivalent is the extra cost associated with 

building an environment for a human. Aircraft cost is directly 

proportional to weight and aerodynamic shape. Each extra pound built 

into the aircraft requires added lift to get airborne; each reduction in 

aerodynamic shape increases drag that must be overcome driving costs

associated with the design and operation higher. A Stanford University 

study based on a summary by R. S. Shevell breaks out these costs for 

the different components of an airliner. While this is not a direct 

comparison to a fighter or reconnaissance aircraft, it does give a 

significant factor worth considering. This study attributes weight directly 

to both manufacturing and operating costs and then attributes over 28

percent of the weight of an airliner to the climate control system, 

avionics, and navigation systems associated with having human pilots.

with similar lower operating costs 

for the Predator and Reaper as well. Understanding why RPAs are 

cheaper goes beyond just looking at these lower costs, however.

36

As such, any RPA system trying to achieve cost supremacy over a

manned system should be designed purely as an unmanned system from 

the start. Any “optionally manned” RPA drives higher acquisition and 

operating costs.
16

There is more to cost, however, than simply the acquisition and 

hourly operating cost of the platform. Another important aspect of overall 

cost is the cost associated with the personnel required to operate the 

aircraft. There are three important aspects to consider in personnel 

costs—the number of people required to operate and pilot the aircraft,

the cost to train the pilots, and the number of aircraft each crew can 

operate at a time. While the Air Force has not fully decided how all RPA

pilots will be trained, the current plan is to develop pilots by sending 

them to specialized RPA training and not specialized undergraduate pilot 

training (SUPT). This decision is driven by both the long timeline and 

high cost of SUPT. To send one pilot to SUPT costs the Air Force 

$888,900 and takes approximately one year plus follow-on specialized 

aircraft training which often takes six months to a year to complete. RPA 

training costs the Air Force $32,800 per student and takes only 10

months from the beginning of training until they are qualified to fly 

combat missions.37

A second cost advantage to the current RPAs is the number of 

missions each operator can fly concurrently. Due to the generally 

simplistic loiter-type mission these aircraft fly and the automation 

associated with the aircraft’s technology, two pilots are generally used to 

operate three missions and occasionally run four separate missions 

concurrently. These advantages drastically lower both the personnel and 

training costs associated with these ISR RPAs.
17

Finally, ISR RPAs are successful because they operate in a friendly 

regulatory environment as well as an environment free from air-to-air 

enemies. Current airspace regulations by both the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) as well as the international equivalent, the 

International Civil Aviation Organization, put tight restrictions upon 

RPAs operating in airspace with manned aircraft. In 2006 the FAA issued

a certificate of authorization granting Predators and Reapers access to 

US civilian airspace in order to search for survivors after disasters, but 

this allowance is narrow and currently the exception rather than the 

rule. Until technology solves the dilemma of how RPAs avoid collisions 

with manned aircraft, whether the manned aircraft is equipped with 

traffic collision avoidance systems or not, RPAs will not have access to 

regulated airspace. This restriction drastically limits the missions RPAs 

can train for and fly. Lastly, if the US did not have air supremacy over 

Afghanistan, it would severely limit the success of these RPAs due to 

their lack of defensive systems. While the ISR RPAs have been very 

successful in Afghanistan, it is not for one particular reason but a 

combination of various reasons. To determine other potential missions 

for RPAs, there must be an evaluation of these missions against the same 

factors that capitalize on the current RPAs strengths.
18

Future RPA Mission

To be truly successful, any new RPA should meet a niche mission,

meshing with the inherent advantages of an RPA and be cost effective. In 

stating the current problems with emergency and MCTS supply delivery, 

General Dynamics defined one challenge as needing the flexibility to 

respond to changes in the operational environment. The two factors they 

determined that account for the responsiveness of a logistical system are

the distance-terrain interaction and the planning cycle time leading up to 

mission execution.38

The current assumption in resupply is that people request goods

which are then loaded on a resupply vehicle and taken to the point of 

need. Conceptually, this is akin to waiting until troops in contact request 

air support prior to loading the weapons on the aircraft and then working 

the mission into the planned events. While this logistical planning model 

works fine for low priority, noncritical goods, it does not work well for 

emergency/MCTS requirements. To meet the needs for these critical 

Both these factors are generally predetermined. The 

supply depot location is usually fixed, and the distance required to travel 

is determined by the location of the troops. While the planning cycle can 

be sped up thru general officer involvement in the validation phase or a 

complete process improvement of the planning cycle, it is currently set at 

either 24 or 72 hours. However, if the advantages of RPAs are exploited, 

they can overcome both of these shortcomings.
19

supplies, they need to be available and ready for delivery when requested 

by the user.

Also, in today’s combat environment, a unit may not know in 

advance when it wants goods delivered. What may now seem to be a good 

time to receive supplies may rapidly become a bad time 24 hours later. A 

goal of the logistical system should be to minimize the lead time from

request to delivery of these critical emergency/MCTS requests by 

reducing both the distance-terrain interaction as well as the planning 

cycle while maintaining effectiveness for the receiving unit. In order to 

accomplish this task, an RPA preloaded with approximately 1,000 

pounds of common emergency/MCTS cargo along with modular ISR 

packages could maintain long loiter times over the battlefield, providing 

ISR coverage until called in by units in need of the supplies. The RPA 

could then either use low-cost, low-altitude (LCLA) airdrop or JPADS to 

deliver supplies before returning to its ISR orbit, awaiting relief by the 

next cargo-loaded RPA. As the Air Force is planning on providing 50 ISR 

RPA orbits by 2011,39

While prepositioned logistics cannot account for every type of 

critical delivery requirement, the most common requests can be 

accommodated. Of the top five classes of short notice requests 

determined by the General Dynamics study

the proximity of these orbits to the units in need of 

supply should be close, reducing the time from request to receipt and

providing the goods when and where desired.

40 only Class IX, repair parts, 
20

could be hard to preplan into standing cargo loads. Class I (food and 

water), Class V (ammunition), Class VIII (medical supplies), and Class III 

(petroleum products) could all have prepositioned stocks ready for 

delivery. By taking some of the most common requests out of the current 

delivery system and into this niche delivery capability, it would also 

reduce the drain on the current system.

Airlift is inherently expensive and loitering with cargo is not within 

the normal thought process of how to efficiently provide airlift. The 

mixture of ISR/CAS and resupply missions, coupled with the 

effectiveness of the instantly deliverable emergency supplies added to an 

otherwise lightweight efficient RPA, make the costs of loitering with 

additional cargo acceptable. New technologies are emerging to lower the 

weight of aircraft reducing the overall weight increase. For example, the

new advanced composite cargo aircraft is a flying test bed designed to 

investigate less expensive and easier methods to integrate composites 

into aircraft. By integrating these new capabilities with the cost 

efficiencies of training RPA pilots separately from manned aircraft pilots 

and using new technologies allowing up to a 4:1 airframe per pilot ratio, 

the added effectiveness of instantly deliverable emergency or MCTS goods 

will far outweigh the costs. The US Transportation Command recently 

awarded a $450 million dollar, 5-year contract for manned civilian 

rotary-wing lift in Afghanistan.41 While the cargo RPAs would not be able 
21

to fill this entire mission set, it could provide a cheaper and better 

response to the customer for the right mission niche.

Recommendation

Currently, there is only one RPA with similar capabilities to 

partially fill this mission, the Boeing A160, but even it does not possess 

all the required capabilities to truly capitalize on the RPA strengths. The

A160 is an $8.5 million rotary-wing aircraft, specifically designed to be 

an RPA capable of providing all-weather vertical takeoff and landing 

(VTOL) delivery of goods with payloads of about 1,000 pounds and

endurance of approximately 18 hours.42

Some advantages the rotary-wing A160 has over a potential fixedwing cargo RPA are the ability to provide all-weather precision delivery 

using VTOL as well as the ability to bring back people or cargo after 

making a delivery. The General Dynamics study estimates only a 3.4

percent weather delay rate for fixed-wing aircraft providing low-altitude 

air-drop;

Unfortunately, while the A160 

does have a long endurance capability, it is at the expense of cargo 

weight. While maintaining 18 hours of endurance, its cargo capability 

reduces to only 300 pounds, negating the ability for it to load ISR 

modules on board during its loiter time.

43 airdrops using LCLA bundles would meet the needs of half of 

the resupply precision requirements.44 This 50 percent includes the 

delivery of large quantities of fuel and water that are still being delivered 

by ground convoy. So while goods occasionally do need to be delivered 
22

with the precision only a VTOL aircraft can attain, LCLA is able to 

cheaply provide the accuracy required for the vast majority of supplies 

while JPADS has recently improved its accuracy providing pinpoint 

delivery at a higher price if this trade off is desired by the user.

One benefit of the A160 is the ability to hover and not land when 

delivering goods that do not require a landing zone. By capitalizing on 

this capability, however, it negates the ability to carry return goods or 

passengers. So while the A160 meets some of the requirements to 

maximize its strength as a RPA, it is not able to fully capitalize on all of 

the advantages laid out by the flight plan. To truly capitalize on these 

strengths, a fixed-wing aircraft, specifically designed as a RPA with the 

ability to airdrop 1,000 pounds on standard pallets and hold an ISR 

array while having a 24-hour loiter time, should be developed.

Conclusion

There is no doubt ISR RPAs have been successful in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. There can equally be no doubt that troops in Afghanistan 

are in need of an emergency and MCTS resupply system capable of 

delivering goods as soon as possible after they have been requested. 

While it may be a short-term gain to simply design a nonpiloted version 

of a current rotary-wing aircraft or make an evolutionary step forward by 

designing an new rotary-wing RPA for this single mission, unless all the 

tenets of the flight plan are enacted and a fully modular system is 
23

designed capitalizing on the persistent capabilities of the RPA, the DOD

will be failing to fully meet the potential for an intratheater resupply RPA.

Notes

 

1. Brien Alkire, James Kallimani, Peter Wilson, and Louis Moore, 

Applications for Navy Unmanned Aerial Systems (Santa Monica: RAND, 

2010), 1, https://www.rand.org.

2.General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission For 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) (Fairfax, VA, February 2010), 52.

3. Ibid., 51.

4. Ibid., 47.

5. Ibid.

6. Kenneth Horn, Elvira Loredo, Steven Cram, Lewis Jamison, 

Christopher McLaren, William Phillips, and Jeffrey Sullivan, Use of the C27J Fixed-Wing Aircraft for Conducting Army Mission Critical, Time 

Sensitive Missions in Counterinsurgency Operations (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2010), 2, http://www.rand.org; and General Dynamics, Future 

Modular Force Resupply Mission, 36.

7. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review 

Report (Washington DC, January 2009), 38, http://www.deic.mil/cgibin/gettrdoc?ad=ada493403&location=u2&doc=gettrdoc.pdf; and Horn, 

Loredo, Cram, Jamison, McLaren, Phillips, and Sullivan, Use of the C27J, 13.
24

 

8. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 29–

30.

9. Ibid., 23.

10. Ibid., 29.

11. Ibid., 30

12. Horn, Loredo, Cram, Jamison, McLaren, Phillips, and Sullivan, 

Use of the C-27J, 5.

13. Ibid., 7.

14. Ibid.

15. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 33.

16. Megan Scully, Officials Say Special Ops Forces Face Helicopter 

Shortage (CongressDaily, AM, National Journal Group, April 2010), 1.

17. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 72.

18. Horn, Loredo, Cram, Jamison, McLaren, Phillips, and Sullivan, 

Use of the C-27J, 7.

19. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 76.

20. Horn, Loredo, Cram, Jamison, McLaren, Phillips, and Sullivan, 

Use of the C-27J, 8.

21. Col David Almand, Air Mobility Division director, Combined Air 

Operations Center (CAOC), Central Command (CENTCOM), e-mail to the 

author, 16 Oct 2010.
25

 

22. Col Dave Almand, Air Mobility Division director, CAOC, 

CENTCO), Type of Airlift, (Validation Method) and Responsiveness,

PowerPoint slide, Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks, 2010.

23. Ibid., e-mail to the author, 19 January 2011.

24. Col Edward Reeder, Jr., commander, Combined Joint Special 

Operations Command-Afghanistan, to Southern Command, 

memorandum, Combat Mission Needs Statement for emergency resupply 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), 8 August 2007.

25. US Air Force, United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047 (Washington DC, 2009), 14. The Air 

Force uses remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) in lieu of unmanned aircraft 

systems (UAS).

26. Ibid., 15.

27. Ibid.

28. US Air Force, Predator fact sheet, Air Combat Command (ACC), 

http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=122

(accessed 20 July 2010).

29. US Air Force, Reaper fact sheet, ACC, 

http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405, 

(accessed 18 August 2010).

30. US Air Force, Global Hawk fact sheet, ACC, 

http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=13225

(accessed 19 November 2009).
26

 

31. USAF, Flight Plan, 14.

32. US Air Force, Predator fact sheet.

33. US Air Force, Reaper fact sheet.

34. US Air Force, Global Hawk fact sheet.

35. Dave Majumdar, “High Altitude, High Stakes,” C4ASR Journal, 

13 September 2010. Ed Walby, Northrop Grumman director of business 

development for Global Hawk, was quoted in the article.

36. Aerodynamics and Design Group, Stanford University,

Operating Cost study (based on summary by R. S. Shevell), 7.

37. Maj Casey Tidgewell, Headquarters Air Force/A3O-AT, RPA 

career field manager, e-mail to the author, 15 October 2010.

38. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 37.

39. Michael Hoffman, “UAV Pilot Career Field Could Save $1.5B,”

Air Force Times, 2 March 2009, 

http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_uav_audit_0301

09 (accessed 29 November 2010).

40. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 37.

41. “AAR Awarded $450 Million Task Order under New 

USTRANSCOM Contract,” AAR Corporation press release, 

http://www.aarcorp.com/news/aar_transcom_100510.htm (accessed 29 

November 2010).
27

 

42. Boeing, “A160 Hummingbird,” 

http://www.boeing.com/bds/phantom_works/hummingbird.html

(accessed 29 November 2010).

43. General Dynamics, Future Modular Force Resupply Mission, 72.

44. Ibid., 60.