This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0299

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Dewaun Lee Timmons-Greenwood, 

Appellant

Filed January 20, 2015

Affirmed

Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court

File No. 69DU-CR-12-4021

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Rebekka L. Stumme, Assistant County 

Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Melvin R. Welch, Welch Law Firm, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Geoffrey R. Saltzstein, Appelman Law Firm, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reyes, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WORKE, Judge

Appellant challenges his aiding-and-abetting-armed-robbery conviction, arguing 

that corroborating evidence was insufficient and that his attorney was ineffective. We 

affirm. 
2

FACTS

Appellant Dewaun Lee Timmons-Greenwood was charged with aiding and 

abetting armed robbery. J.H., who had pleaded guilty to the robbery, testified that in the 

early morning hours of October 14, 2012, he called Timmons-Greenwood and asked for a 

ride home from a party. Timmons-Greenwood asked J.H. if he would like to make some 

money. J.H. replied in the affirmative, and Timmons-Greenwood picked up J.H. and 

J.H.’s friend. 

Timmons-Greenwood handed J.H. a black gun, and suggested that J.H. rob a cab 

driver. Timmons-Greenwood had worked for the cab company and knew where drivers 

kept their money. J.H. and his friend located a cab and directed the driver to C.F.’s 

residence. Timmons-Greenwood followed the cab in his vehicle, and placed several calls 

to J.H. As the driver asked for the fare, J.H. revealed the gun and J.H.’s friend grabbed 

the driver from behind in a choke-hold. The driver struggled free and fled. J.H. ordered 

him to stop and fired a warning shot. The driver stopped and J.H. demanded money, 

which the driver threw onto the ground. J.H. and his friend took the money and ran to 

C.F.’s residence where they met Timmons-Greenwood, who took the gun. The three 

entered C.F.’s residence and divided the money. Later that day, Timmons-Greenwood 

told J.H. that he should hide the gun. J.H. and his friend were arrested a few days after 

the robbery. Around that time, Timmons-Greenwood contacted police and denied any 

involvement in the robbery. 

J.H.’s friend testified that Timmons-Greenwood was not involved in the robbery. 

This conflicted with his testimony given during his plea hearing and his statements to 
3

investigators. J.H.’s friend was shown transcripts of his past testimony, but insisted that 

he could not recall Timmons-Greenwood’s involvement. 

C.F. testified that Timmons-Greenwood, J.H., and J.H.’s friend arrived at her 

residence in the early morning hours of October 14. Later that day, she saw TimmonsGreenwood walk out of a room in her residence carrying a black gun.

L.V., J.H.’s grandmother, testified that she questioned J.H. about the robbery in 

the presence of Timmons-Greenwood. J.H. admitted to the robbery and stated that he 

split the money with Timmons-Greenwood. Timmons-Greenwood reacted strongly to 

this statement, and L.V. cautioned Timmons-Greenwood not to intimidate J.H., as he had 

done on past occasions. J.H. initially told L.V. that he got the gun from friends, but after 

his arrest he admitted that Timmons-Greenwood had given him the gun. 

A.V., L.V.’s husband, testified that shortly after the robbery Timmons-Greenwood 

told him that L.V. had given him permission to store his gun at their residence. A.V. 

stored a black gun for Timmons-Greenwood. After A.V. learned that L.V. had not given 

Timmons-Greenwood permission to store a gun at their residence, A.V. told TimmonsGreenwood to retrieve the gun, which he did. 

Before trial, Timmons-Greenwood attempted to introduce impeachment evidence 

in the form of possible prior convictions against three witnesses. The district court 

directed the prosecutor to make inquiries about these convictions, many of which were

from Illinois. The prosecutor did so, but never received a response. Because there were 

no certificates of conviction, no details regarding the past crimes, and because many of 
4

the possible convictions were decades old, the district court would not allow the past 

crimes to be used as impeachment evidence. 

The jury found Timmons-Greenwood guilty, and this appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

Corroborating evidence

Timmons-Greenwood first argues that the corroborating evidence was insufficient. 

“Whe[n] there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court reviews the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine if the evidence was 

sufficient to permit the jury to reach the verdict it did.” State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 

225 (Minn. 1995). We assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved 

contrary evidence presented. State v. Huss, 506 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1993). 

“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is 

corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission 

of the offense . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2012). “Corroborating evidence must link or 

connect the defendant to the crime. It is not necessary that it establish a prima facie case 

of the defendant’s guilt.” Ford, 539 N.W.2d at 225. 

Corroborating evidence may be secured from the 

defendant’s association with those involved in the crime in 

such a way as to suggest joint participation, as well as from 

the defendant’s opportunity and motive to commit the crime 

and his proximity to the place where the crime was 

committed. The defendant’s entire conduct may be looked to 

for corroborating circumstances. If his connection to the 

crime may be fairly inferred from those circumstances, the 

corroboration is sufficient. 
5

Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Also, corroborating evidence of “possession of an 

instrument . . . probably used to commit the offense” links the defendant to the crime. 

State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 254 (Minn. 2008). 

Timmons-Greenwood argues that because his statements to investigators and the 

testimony of J.H.’s friend conflict with the account of J.H. and the corroborating 

witnesses, his conviction cannot be sustained. He cites State v. Wallert for the 

proposition that when testimony is as consistent with innocence as with guilt, the 

testimony of corroborating witnesses is insufficient. 402 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. App. 

1987), review denied (Minn. May 18, 1987). But Timmons-Greenwood’s reliance is 

misplaced, because in Wallert the corroborating evidence did not point directly to the 

defendant’s guilt. Id. (stating that when evidence is as consistent with innocence as guilt, 

it is insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony). 

Here, corroborating evidence supported J.H.’s testimony and pointed directly to 

Timmons-Greenwood’s guilt. C.F.’s testimony places Timmons-Greenwood in 

proximity to the time and place of the robbery, in association with those who pleaded 

guilty to the robbery, and with the gun used to commit the robbery. L.V.’s testimony 

demonstrates that Timmons-Greenwood had a degree of authority and control over J.H.

and that the two shared the proceeds of the robbery. A.V.’s testimony shows that 

Timmons-Greenwood owned the gun used during the robbery and that TimmonsGreenwood attempted to hide the gun shortly thereafter. This corroborating evidence is 

sufficient to sustain Timmons-Greenwood’s conviction. 
6

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Timmons-Greenwood also argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to 

impeach the state’s witnesses. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims involve a mixed 

question of fact and law, and are reviewed de novo. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 

842 (Minn. 2003). Timmons-Greenwood must show “that counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that a reasonable probability exists 

that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” Id. (quotation 

omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 

(1984)). We need not address both prongs if one is determinative of the claim. Id.

Timmons-Greenwood asserts that his attorney discovered impeachment evidence 

in the form of possible prior convictions, but then failed to properly investigate and see to 

it that the evidence was admitted. After defense counsel moved to admit the 

impeachment evidence, the district court ordered the state to seek further information. 

See Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 2(1) (prosecutor must, at defense counsel’s request, 

assist the defendant in seeking access to information possessed by other governmental 

agencies). Although the state sought information, it received no response. The district 

court stated that such a result is common when seeking information from Illinois. The 

district court then ruled that the evidence could not be admitted because there were no 

certificates of conviction and no known dispositions. Timmons-Greenwood fails to 

mention the district court’s ruling. 
7

Defense counsel was diligent in discovering the potential impeachment evidence, 

seeking further information, and moving the district court to admit the evidence. Abiding 

by the district court’s ruling was reasonable. There is no need to address prejudice.

Affirmed.