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92–407 PDF 2004

IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL SUPPLY

REDUCTION STRATEGY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 17, 2003

Serial No. 108–115

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS BELL, Texas

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

PETER SIRH, Staff Director

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Deputy Staff Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHILIP M. SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

CHRIS BELL, Texas

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. MARC WHEAT, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

JOHN R. STANTON, Professional Staff Member

NICOLE GARRETT, Clerk

JULIAN A. HAYWOOD, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on September 17, 2003 ..................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Crane, Dr. Barry, Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug Control Policy ........................................................................... 10

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Crane, Dr. Barry, Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug Control Policy:

Information concerning drug use ............................................................. 29

Information concerning U.S.-Dutch Bilateral Law Enforcement Meeting ........................................................................................................... 41

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 13

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana, prepared statement of ............................................................... 4

(1)

IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL SUPPLY

REDUCTION STRATEGY

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND

HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room

2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Carter, Cummings,

Ruppersberger, and Norton.

Staff present: J. Marc Wheat, staff director and chief counsel;

John Stanton, congressional fellow; Nicole Garrett, clerk; and Tony

Haywood, minority counsel.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Good morning. Because of our focus in the subcommittee this

year on the reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control

Policy and the President’s treatment initiative, this is a continuation of hearings in the 108th Congress on drug supply and interdiction matters. The abuse of illegal narcotics and its silent everyday impact on health, safety, families, and stability in every community across the country continues to be one of the most pressing

issues facing the United States.

Tom Davis, the distinguished chairman of the full committee,

and I, with the full support of the subcommittee ranking member,

Mr. Cummings, have introduced legislation reauthorizing ONDCP

and its programs for 5 years. The bill makes some significant revisions to current law that will enhance the effectiveness and accountability of the National Drug Control Strategy and its programs, streamline and simplify the process for its development,

and provide increased flexibility to the ONDCP Director to respond

to changing circumstances. The bill is a forceful and bipartisan recommitment to our diverse national efforts to control drug abuse

and to renew our support for a strong ONDCP to plan and coordinate the President’s strategy to measurably reduce drug use by

American youth and to control drug abuse and its consequences.

The bill is a true bipartisan effort and represents the outcome of

ongoing consultation and discussions with the minority.

The bill contains the complete text of the Dawson Family Community Protection Act that was introduced by the ranking member

of this subcommittee, Mr. Cummings, to address witness and community protection initiatives in the wake of the tragic death of the

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Dawson family in Baltimore at the hands of violent drug dealers.

The bill reported from committee also contains a number of items

requested by Mr. Waxman, the distinguished ranking member of

the full committee, many of which reflect a clear bipartisan agreement that the medical campaign should not be used for political

purposes.

As I often point out, around 20,000 Americans die each year of

drug-related causes, more than any single terrorist act to date. It

is vitally important that we maintain vigorous efforts to control the

sources of supply of narcotics and to interdict them prior to entering the United States. While we have recently begun to see the real

and tangible successes in some of our source country programs,

most notably Plan Colombia, the Federal Government continues to

face significant challenges on two fronts: supply reduction strategies and programs, and, second, the interdiction strategies and programs. The challenges are both caused by policy and political

issues and by resource constraints. Our witness today has some of

the most significant responsibilities for strategic matters relating

to narcotics supply reduction and interdiction, and I appreciate the

opportunity to have Dr. Crane enlighten us on the status of these

critical programs.

First, I would like to review the strategies used in Plan Colombia. Chairman Tom Davis of the full committee and I returned

from a visit to Colombia just after this Nation’s birthday this summer, which was the third committee delegation this year. We are

beginning to see real and tangible successes, and the Speaker of

the House and both of us very much appreciate the continued support of President Uribe and Vice President Santos, with whom we

have had the opportunity to spend a significant amount of time.

We also obtained a renewed sense of the many steep challenges Colombia and our source country programs continue to have. We met

with soldiers who had lost limbs and eyes to the increasing terrorist attacks of the FARC. We met with widows who were grateful

for the opportunity to learn skills toward earning a modest living

by baking or sewing, supported by the Agency for International Development. I would like Dr. Crane to address what else we should

be doing from a policy or strategic perspective to capitalize on the

momentum in Colombia.

Other serious issues must be considered relating to Plan Colombia. We Americans continue to be held hostage by the FARC. The

Attorney General of the United States has indicted members of

both the FARC and the AUC for using drug proceeds to support

their terrorist acts. Colombian heroin is being increasingly prevalent on the East Coast of the United States. As our programs succeed in Colombia, we now face increased attacks on spray planes

and the spillover of the drug traffic, violence, and terrorism to

other nations of the Andean region. We must also continue to consider the failure of European nations to step up and provide sorely

needed assistance to build communities and institutions at this

crucial time. These countries pledged to provide assistance at the

very beginning and have yet to contribute, or have only contributed

very minor amounts.

The second significant issue is the question of allocation of national resources to drug interdiction missions. Many of our most

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significant interdiction assets used in this hemisphere were moved

into the new Department of Homeland Security in March, namely,

the U.S. Coast Guard cutters and aircraft, and the Immigration

and Customs Enforcement aircraft and go-fast boats. The subcommittee staff received briefings this summer at the Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West and the U.S. Southern Command that suggest that the redirection of national resources from

drug control missions to homeland security and combat missions

have had a dire negative impact on drug interdiction. I also understand the Department of Defense wants to realign its Joint Interagency Task Forces with a closure and relocation of JIATF-West

and the creation of a JIATF-North. I am very curious how the Office of National Drug Control Policy advocates and solicits cooperation from the contributing departments in meeting the national

strategy.

Finally, I would like to hear about the strategic and policy responses to rapidly emerging new threats such as the flood of Ecstasy into the United States and the resumption of large-scale heroin production in Afghanistan. A member of my staff has just returned from Turkey and Uzbekistan, where he gathered information about production trends, transshipment routes, and precursor

chemicals. The Drug Enforcement Administration has a limited

number of personnel in the region, working closely with Department of State personnel and host nation personnel. Their efforts

are noteworthy but minuscule in comparison to the size of the

problem. I look forward to your testimony on this particularly dire

narcotics supply issue.

Clearly, our plate this morning is very full, so I welcome our witness, Dr. Barry Crane, Deputy Director of the Office of National

Drug Control Policy. But first I would yield to Mr. Cummings for

any opening statement he may have.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

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Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Illegal drugs contribute to an estimated 50,000 deaths in the

United States each year. Nineteen thousand of those deaths are a

direct result of illegal drug use. According to the 2001 National

Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 16 million Americans use an illegal drug on at least a monthly basis, including 6.1 million who

needed treatment. Only 17 percent of those needing treatment received it. In Baltimore City alone there are some 50,000 plus people addicted to drugs. Nationwide, it is estimated that each year

110,000 individuals who seek treatment are unable to obtain it. A

high percentage of all crime in the United States is drug related,

and most of the prisoners sitting in U.S. prisons, jails, and detention facilities are there because of illegal drug activity.

These facts paint an ugly picture of the impact of drugs on the

American society, but they do not begin to describe the tragic harm

done to individuals, families, and communities by drugs. Reducing

the supply of illegal drugs available to the U.S. market is one of

the three basic priorities that underpin the President’s strategy for

reducing the impact of drugs on America. The other two components are prevention and treatment. Today we will hear from Deputy Director for Demand Reduction in the White House, Office of

National Drug Control Policy concerning the progress of the United

States with regard to supply reduction efforts today.

Nearly all of the cocaine consumed in the United States originates in the Andean region nations of South America, with an estimated 90 percent originating in or passing through Colombia. Colombia is now also the most significant source country for heroin

consumed in the United States. Since 2000, when we launched

Plan Colombia with $1.3 billion, well over $2 billion has been invested in supply reduction efforts in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

Today’s hearing provides an opportunity to discuss some very important issues concerning the direction, the implementation, and

the impact of our drug supply reduction strategy, and the extent

to which our international investment has produced meaningful domestic returns. As much as anyone else, I want to see our international efforts succeed. The success must be measured in terms of

domestic impact, on the price and the availability of drugs on the

U.S. streets, and I have yet to see that impact. What I do continue

to see is the devastating impact of addiction, and the question remains: What is the best way to attack this problem?

I am mindful of the well publicized Rand Corp. study that found

that treatment is seven times more cost-effective than domestic

drug enforcement in reducing cocaine use and 15 times more costeffective in reducing the social costs of crime and lost productivity.

Although the Rand study is not without its detractors, I am also

mind of the Baltimore Drug and Alcohol Treatment Outcome

Study, which found a direct correlation between increased exposure

to treatment and significant reductions in criminal and other

unhealthy and antisocial behaviors and outcomes. In Baltimore we

have seen immediate positive returns on our investment and treatment. We are still waiting for Plan Colombia to deliver results at

home.

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Determining how best to allocate limited drug control resources

is an enormous challenge that we have to confront. For that I

thank you, Dr. Crane, for your appearance here today, and I look

forward to hearing your testimony.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you. I ask unanimous consent that all

Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and

questions for the hearing record, and any answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be included in the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and other

materials referred to by Members and the witness may be included

in the hearing record, and that all Members be permitted to revise

and extend their remarks.

Without objection, so ordered.

Dr. Crane, would you please stand so I can administer the oath?

As you know, it is our standard practice in this committee to do

that.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Let the record show that the witness clearly answered in the affirmative.

Now welcome to our committee the Office of National Drug Control Policy witness, Dr. Barry Crane, Deputy Directory for Supply

Reduction. And you are recognized. We will give you more than 5

minutes. We will put your whole statement in the record, so you

can do some summary, because I think it will go even more than

probably even 10. But if you can give us an overview, as I know

you have presented to us in the written, and then we will ask some

questions and details.

STATEMENT OF DR. BARRY CRANE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR

SUPPLY REDUCTION, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL

POLICY

Mr. CRANE. Thank you Chairman Souder and Ranking Member

Cummings. There are other distinguished Members I know that

will expect questions for the record.

It is really a pleasure to appear before you to discuss the implementation of the international supply reduction elements of our

National Drug Control Strategy. On behalf of Director Walters of

the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and all of the members

of ONDCP, I would like to thank both of you for your continuing

support for our national struggle against illegal drugs. We are particularly thankful for your active support of the international supply reduction efforts in Colombia, including visits by many committee members.

I am pleased to report that significant progress has been made

in these efforts and in our implementation of disrupting the market

priority of the national drug control strategy. A more important development is that eradication in Colombia now substantially exceeds coca replanting efforts, thanks to President Uribe’s aggressive aerial spraying campaign. In the western hemisphere we are

trying to eradicate everything we can find. As a result, coca cultivation has decreased by 75 percent between September 2002 and

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early 2003, particularly in the Putumayo region, which was once

the epicenter of coca cultivation, and overall coca cultivation of production in Colombia dropped 15 percent in 2002. Brave Colombian

officials are also aggressively, with U.S. support, weakening criminal and terrorist organizations throughout. We have an organizational attack that broke down the Valencia Trujillo organization

earlier this year. We are beginning financial attack operations

aimed at the money laundering systems involving the black market

peso exchange, and with President Uribe’s help extradited many

members, including a member of the FARC, who was drug trafficking.

In addition, opium poppy cultivation fell by 25 percent in Colombia between 2001 and 2002, and Colombia and the United States

are targeting the remaining heroin production by spraying all the

opium we can find. We are using a new system to try to use informants to find it for reconaissance flights. We have fortified the

interdiction of the heroin by employing airport x-ray machines, and

we are in the process of rapidly expanding DEA’s heroin task force

members inside of Colombia.

Substantial progress is also being made in Mexico, the second

really important country. Since President Fox assumed office in December 2000, much of the Federal policy and judiciary has been reformed, and over 6,000 drug traffickers have been arrested, including the head of the famous Arellano Felix Organization, and many

other large leaders of the major drug trafficking organizations.

Mexico’s eradication programs against marijuana and opium poppy

have been effective as well, and we are ahead of schedule this year,

compared to last year.

The Fox administration has also been unafraid to go after corrupt officials in the government and military, as evidenced by sentencing general officers for aiding the drug trade in 2002, and in

October 2002 arresting 24 individuals charged with leaking information on drug control activities of the Army, Federal police, and

attorney general. Major challenges remain with the extradition of

major traffickers to the United States from Mexico.

In Canada we are concerned with the following. It is a primary

source of the precursor chemicals for methamphetamine,

pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, and its production of marijuana,

especially the high potency type along the northern border. The

United States will continue to work aggressively with Canadian

law enforcement agencies on organizational attack and border

interdiction to disrupt both marijuana and methamphetamine markets.

In Afghanistan, the opium and heroin trade threatened U.S. interests by undermining the Afghan Transitional Authority headed

by President Karzi, thwarting development of illicit economies, and

providing financial support to terrorist organizations. The United

States has been strongly supporting multi-level efforts led by the

United Kingdom to disrupt these illegal drug markets in Afghanistan, and the President’s acceleration initiative will include substantial new resources to do that.

In Europe we are concerned with the Netherlands status as the

primary source of MDMA, or Ecstasy, consumed in the United

States. The Dutch Government must increase its efforts to curtail

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MDMA trafficking. We are also working on bilateral initiatives to

support this goal.

In conclusion, it is notable that progress has been made to this

point for disrupting the market, and efforts have been largely

achieved concurrently and synergistically with the Nation’s war on

terrorism. There have been significant realignment of agencies, resources, and personnel over the last 2 years. For example, interdiction operators continue removing large amounts of cocaine and heroin despite asset limitations, and this is due primarily to much improved intelligence. Our efforts in Colombia are achieving success

due to the bravery of President Uribe and his administration. They

are committing an unprecedented amount of resources to the

counter-drug trade and are following through with unprecedented

actions to find and eradicate all of the coca and opium poppy we

can find in Colombia. In Mexico, the courage and commitment of

President Fox and his administration are producing reformed

counter-drug institutions and reinvigorated organizational attack

initiatives, and renewed resistance against the drug trades

throughout Mexico.

Success in these areas will make a real difference in the availability of drugs in the United States. We will continue to fund

these strategies that are working to keep the pressure up on our

front, and we look forward to Congress’ continued cooperation and

steadfast support.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crane follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you for your testimony. And the first round

of questioning here, what I want to focus on a little bit, and first

let me say one of the important things that we need to do in this

committee on the floor is show that when there are successes, that

we talk about those successes, because those who would end our

anti-narcotics policies, or greatly reduce them, love to talk about

the failures. In Colombia we have actually made some progress,

and it is important that we talk about that progress; and in Mexico, compared to when I first came into office in 1995, where we

were not getting much cooperation, we are at least getting more cooperation from Mexico.

That said, we are kind of disappointed with how much reduction

we have had in the United States, and in continuing to try to figure out what we need to do, we have a series of questions related

to that. Let me first start with some questions, because while we

have broad oversight authority, our direct responsibility is with

ONDCP. And in choosing to focus on this agency and have an agency that was, in particular, trying to coordinate what was a highly

scattered anti-narcotics policy, the thought was that while you

might not have line authority over other agencies, you could have

an impact on that. So while it is helpful to know progress that we

have and get status reports as we get from the different agencies,

I have some very particular questions for you in your role in

counter-narcotics efforts, and that is could you give a little bit some

direct examples, not just in general, but some direct examples of

how your role works with the State Department, the Department

of Defense, and other agencies in trying to steer them in the

counter-narcotics interdiction efforts? In other words, not just talking to us or the media, but what do you do in your job to foster

coordination between the agencies and to say, look, Department of

Defense, which is one of the examples right now, you are backing

off of some of your narcotics efforts; you need to step that up.

Mr. CRANE. Thank you for that question. Essentially my job is

to do the policy, but let me describe just in brief how that works.

The President has pretty well lined out exactly what he wants

done, and we have decision directives to do that. We have implementation guidelines and we run routine meetings to resolve these

issues. To date there have been many issues that we have resolved.

When we can’t resolve them, we basically escalate them up the policy chain for decisions at a higher level. To date we have gone

through almost all of the President’s decision criteria that he wanted on the thing. We have reasonably good cooperation from the different agencies. In fact, we have gotten good cooperation and we

have been able to solve many of the problems, like command and

control, and get that settled. We are now pretty much in a final

phase of wrapping that up in the next few months and giving a report back to the President of how well we have executed these directives. So that is basically, with respect to how we organize the

U.S. Government.

You also realize that I have a secondary role, an important role,

which is to take that message to important allies and put a lot of

pressure on them to work better with us. We have gotten the Air

Bridges restarted in Colombia, we have the counter-narcotics CD

brigade engaged in combat a lot more effectively, we have gotten

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more efficient operations against the fishing trawler East Pack.

Many examples I think have been successful.

Mr. SOUDER. Have you expressed concerns to the Department of

Defense about JIATF and how they are going to coordinate that,

and their public statements that they are going to downgrade some

of their narcotics efforts?

Mr. CRANE. What we have done is solved that problem, as far as

I can tell. We are going to realign it much more efficiently in the

command and control, and I think that is done. I am not sure it

has been officially announced, but that has been completed. We

have agreement among all the combatant commanders and so on

how to do this, so as that comes out we will certainly inform the

committee. But that is, as far as I can see, well under control, and

we will report back to the President we have gotten that done.

Mr. SOUDER. And in the Department of Homeland Security, one

of our concerns is reorganization of the border, because many of

these narcotics agencies are organizations that dealt with immigration and narcotics, so all of a sudden, under Homeland Security,

have a slightly different mission. And the question is, for example,

my understanding in the Coast Guard is that any time there is an

orange alert, they are pulled back into port and they are no longer

there for interdiction efforts. Are you involved in those kind of

questions, and have you expressed concerns to the Department of

Homeland Security about their reduction in their narcotics mission?

Mr. CRANE. Absolutely, sir. We have been able to work closely

with them. As far as I can tell, and I looked at this over a 10-year

period, even though we account for these, performance has actually

gotten better over this time; the seizures have gone up. If you go

back to 1993, we have about maybe a third of the hardware, but

much more efficiently used. So I think the taxpayer is getting a lot

better use for the dollar. The primary reason for this is a lot better

coordinated intelligence among the agencies.

But the second thing we recognized, some of the threats, for example, the go-fast boats were particularly difficult. What has been

deployed is specialized apprehension units with the new MA–68

helicopters. Those are designed specifically to go after that. So as

far as I can see, the interdiction effort has proceeded pretty well,

even in spite of the orange alerts, and the Government has done

a good job, we have an executive branch causing substantial damage.

The most notable success I think last year was we interdicted

sufficient number of the large fishing trawlers in the Eastern Pacific, so that is pretty well diminished as a threat. We are still, of

course, facing the go-fast threat, and we are still working on that.

Mr. SOUDER. So in a direct answer to the question, you have expressed concerns to Department of Homeland Security about that,

or you are satisfied with what they are doing and you let them do

their own thing on that?

Mr. CRANE. Well, both. What we try to do is organize it so that

we don’t have such a big impact. In the first orange alert, of course,

more was impacted, but now a lot of the deep water cutters don’t

necessarily go back to port. But the important thing is that this is

taken into account every time, to balance that in a proper way. So

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while there is a concern, I haven’t noticed a difference in performance. And the way I look at it as a policy grower, I don’t want to

get into every little detail of each department, but what I do want

to do is hold them accountable for doing the best they can.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you think part of your role is to say, for example, we are catching on a small percentage of go-fast boats. I think

the specific what we learned, our staff, in the direct briefing is that

out of 396 cocaine-laden go-fast shipments estimated by our Government, we caught 59; they average 1,500 kilos of cocaine. That

means while we seize 88.5, 594 made it through. So do you then

go to these agencies and say, look, this is unacceptable, we are supposed to be reducing this. What can we do? You need these kind

of things; we need to make budget requests for these kind of

things. Not all this has to be, I understand, in the same administration, this is an awkward question, but what we need to know

out of ONDCP, because you are the primary anti-narcotics advocates, are you going to these agencies and pushing to say, look,

part of your job is to say, look, this is the area that I am supposed

to be watching; we are not improving our efforts fast enough here.

Mr. CRANE. Well, let me discuss that a little bit. I knew there

was a great concern about that, and the best I could discover is our

performance against these targets and the ones that we don’t necessarily get each year, I can’t find a substantial difference looking

at this. Now, I realize these are ones that were actionable that you

could actually get. It is my understanding, when I went back and

looked at it, there are always hand-offs and there are always some

missed, and when I went back over time, we are actually doing,

percentage-wise, of the ones we actually get the intelligence on and

get, better than we did, say, 10 years ago, and that has been steadily improving.

In 2000, when we looked at this question, we recognized that

they are quite difficult to detect, so we went to this disrupt the

market strategy and primarily emphasized arresting them. So

what we recognized was probably not possible or difficult to capture or seize enough of the go-fast, but what we do is we went to

these specialized apprehension resources, where we could arrest all

the crews, and the objective was to deter their operation, actually

make them quit. We have had some successes in some theaters of

those operations, example, the fishing vessel. The go-fast threat in

the Western Caribbean in 1999, for example, we were able to

mount enough resources and intelligence so they diverted that operation. So as far as I could tell, and I went back and looked at

this pretty careful, and talked to Admiral Sirois specifically about

this, that our performance is still about that level.

Now, a lot of this my guess is we couldn’t get many of these, we

weren’t able to execute against them, so we have to have ability to

attack, but what we did was to overcome our deficiency in how

hard these are to detect and changed our strategy, which is basically try to arrest all these people so that the ones we would get

would make them quit. So this is the current strategy we adopted

in 2000. So this is the best, as I recall, and that is the one we are

trying to go. We would like to have them quit their operation, or

substantially diminish that. So seizures aren’t the total answer

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here; we also look at arrests and how many of that we get. So as

far as I can tell, sir, they have been doing very well on this.

Now, the go-fast are our remaining problem, we have not been

able to get enough of them to stop that threat everywhere, and that

is what we are focusing on right now with these specialized assets.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Dr. Crane, I think it is a reasonable conclusion

that your efforts, or at least two goals of all of these efforts that

you talk about with regard to supply reduction is to reduce the cost

of drugs on the streets in the United States and to reduce the supply. Is that accurate?

Mr. CRANE. Yes, sir, those are my responsibilities.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK.

Mr. CRANE. The supply and keep it from the street, yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. I think you meant to say raise the price on the

street.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, that is what I meant. Thank you.

Now, are we doing that? Are we having that effect?

Mr. CRANE. If you look at over the last 5 years, and if you look

at, for example, cocaine, in the last 5 years, if you look at the price

per pure gram of cocaine from DEA data, yes, we did raise the

price somewhat. Now, one of the unusual things about the drug

market is the way the drug traffickers adapt to interdiction or supply reduction is they lower the purity of the drug. So when they

do that we get a benefit, because we get less people dying from

overdoses. But the other thing is the way they adapt is they lower

the purity of the drug, so what tends to happen is if you don’t adjust for this purity, you get sort of a constant price, and the way

that I believe that supply reduction will ruin the drug business is

it will ruin the quality of the drug to the point where people won’t

buy it. It will not raise it to the price, for example, it was in 1980

because there many of the components of the price came from extremely high prices in Colombia and Peru in those days, and we

won’t see that again. So what we have seen is a decline in the quality of the drug, for example, cocaine.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, you just said something that I found very

interesting. You said that one of your hopes would be that at some

point the purity would be so reduced that people would stop buying

it. Is that what you just said? Because we are talking about addicts.

Mr. CRANE. There are two kinds of users, the non-addicted user

and the user. So in the addicts, yes, it would reduce the quality of

the drug. That is one of the things we have observed, especially

since 1995.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But what I am saying to you is if you have an

addict who needs these drugs and would kill their mother to get

the drugs, just because the purity is reduced, and I may be wrong

about this, it doesn’t seem like it would necessarily cause them to

stop purchasing the drug. They would either try to find another

source, which may be, if it is in the same area geographically, it

may be the same purity, or they will probably use more. I mean,

is that a reasonable conclusion?

Mr. CRANE. I don’t believe so over the long run. We know a lot

more about cocaine than some of the other drugs. You know, we

28

had a lot more of a cocaine problem in the western United States

than we do today, and we have a lot less of a cocaine problem in

the western United States than we do today. So there has been a

trend away from this over time. So if you ruin the quality of the

drugs, and effectively raise the price, make it quite costly for the

drug traffickers, you will in fact, over time, reduce the potential of

use of this. We have seen this in parts of the United States.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do we have data or reports that show that?

Mr. CRANE. I believe so.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would you mind getting that to the committee,

please? I would love to see that.

[The information referred to follows:]

29

30

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me ask you something with regard to eradication, with regard to these peasant farmers. Are we giving them

alternatives? Because that seems to be a major source of income for

those who have so little. And I guess they are willing to take the

risk, but what are we doing to give them alternatives?

Mr. CRANE. Well, we have a balanced program which provides alternatives in many areas. One of the programs of President Uribe

is to put basically wards in some of these areas, to rebuild the forest in some of the drug-decimated areas in Southern Colombia. But

in some areas you just don’t replace their agriculture; in some

areas you give them different kinds of jobs. So we have a broad

range of programs to try to make their life better to support these

efforts through the agency of international development.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Examples? I am just curious. I mean, you have

people who are probably making a fairly decent living, and people

get used to that living growing these plants, and then we come

along and, believe me, I have no pity for those who produce products of death, but we come along and we destroy that way of life,

and I am just wondering what kind of jobs and to what extent do

we get them? I mean, I am just curious. You said that we have a

balanced approach, so give me some examples of what we are

doing.

Mr. CRANE. Well, the one example I gave in the areas that used

to be forest in the Putumayo where they were growing, many of the

people moved in there to profit off the drug industry from other

areas. Now, many of those people have left because the drugs

aren’t there. We haven’t had any big catastrophe in this area to

date. Second, President Uribe has established some programs to reestablish some of these forests, and we have been supporting those

programs. In addition, we have been trying to put in more development in the towns themselves, more of the kinds of things where

you could have a legitimate economy. One of the great tragedies in

any of these areas is the drug economy drives out all the legitimate

ones, and it takes some time to re-establish. So it takes some time,

but we have to do that. The drug economy is not one which anyone

would want to operate under, I mean, it is ruled by violence and

fear, and it creates really a pretty terrible situation for the person.

So these programs take time, but they are underway.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me just go back to one other question. When

you measure your success, when you and the people that work with

you get together and the thing that gets your adrenaline pumping

and you just get excited and want to just jump up and down, what

is that? What is that? How do you measure success?

Mr. CRANE. Well, let me give just an example, a concrete example. With the support of this committee and many of the Members

here, we have put a pretty big program to try to get things going

right in Colombia. That is about to pay, I believe, a pretty good

sized dividend. The way the drug market will be ruined there, it

won’t just be ruined a little bit at a time; there should be a large

change in the drug market, once you get to some critical level.

Now, I believe we achieved that beginning about Christmastime,

that is, where we could take out the drug industry at a rate faster

than they could reconstitute it. There will be some point, we hope,

where there will be a big change in the system. Now, this is where

31

there will be a lot of benefits to America and the rest of the world.

So our goal is not simply to make little changes, but to try and ruin

the whole business. That is why this disrupt the market strategy

was developed.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You spoke earlier in your testimony about how

the government has now been able to find these people I guess in

the police force and wherever who are divulging information.

Mr. CRANE. Right.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did you mention that?

Mr. CRANE. I mentioned Mexico. Let me talk a little bit about

Mexico, because we have seen some dramatic things there. The

commitment of President Fox, with our Government, too, has been

one in which they begin reforming really the police, take the corruption out of there. There have been some remarkable changes.

The most visible evidence of this is the arrest of a lot of the big

cartel leaders in Mexico. And the really serious efforts by the Government of Mexico to gain control of the border cities, to get them

back under control of the Federal Government, and to clean up a

lot of the corruption. Just last year, I mean, they have completely

revamped their Federal police, their drug police, they are reorganizing them, and I don’t want to mention names, but there are

certain individuals there that really get the job done, and they

have been putting them in charge. This is very important to the

United States, and so we are putting maximum effort on that, because we would like to see, during the current administration, that

we get as much out of that we can and consolidate all of those

gains. So there has been a lot of progress in Mexico, remarkably

so.

Mr. CUMMINGS. The chairman said, when he first started, that

we ought to be talking about successes, and I agree with that, I

mean, because what is happening is that a lot of people know we

are spending a lot of money, and the American people want to

know that we are getting results and we are spending their money

effectively and efficiently. And so, you know, the victories are very

important to us too, because when those victories are not presented, and if the Congress doesn’t know that we have those victories, it doesn’t help you at all, because what happens is that they

begin to say, well, you know, since we have all these priorities, let

us shift money from one place to another and not let it go there,

but let it go somewhere else.

Mr. CRANE. I would be happy to comment on that, because I

would like to put it in a longer strategic perspective. Let me just

start when we started this, really about 10 years ago, in the early

1990’s, or even earlier than that. Bolivia was the primary source

of cocaine originally. We put programs in there; we have done a lot

to that. They were mainly air trafficking to Colombia; that pretty

well stopped. The second big success is we got into Peru. And you

can think of this as sort of a campaign, where we eliminated each

of these countries and now we are focused on the final piece of this,

Colombia, which is difficult. Peru had much more cultivation than

it does today. Those things succeeded. In the early 1980’s, for example, over 1,000 airplanes carried drugs and landed in the United

States. Today very few do that. So the air transportation threat has

diminished remarkably.

32

Now we are in the sort of final phase here, where we have, because of the committee and the Congress is working, we have sufficient assets to cause a lot more damage. We now have them in

place in Colombia where they can do some good. But you had to

get to the sort of critical number, and we are now at that level. So

the hope is we can do a lot of damage, for example, to cocaine and

also heroin in the Andes. That is our goal. With the synergistic effects of President Uribe trying to establish authority over all the

municipalities, I think he is planning to have by the end of the

year a government in every one of the municipalities in Colombia,

we will now be able to put some legal forces and try to stop these

drug businesses. So we are looking at a very positive situation, and

we need to make sure that we carry through to the final.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.

Mr. SOUDER. It has been the consistent approach of this committee that it isn’t just about interdiction or eradication or enforcement or treatment or prevention, but that if we couldn’t get control

of some of the cheapness and the purity that was coming in, we

were just overwhelmed at the State level and local level. But one

of the things that we are focusing on in this 2-year cycle is trying

to do a complete analysis of the treatment problems in the United

States. We are trying to get the ONDCP through, which is our primary efforts of national ad campaign, as well as the HIDTAs with

local law enforcement, as well as giving technology to local police

forces, which are things that are on the ground in the communities.

And, in fact, if we look at the Colombia effort, even if we succeed

in a major hit on that, it is going to give us about a 2 or 3-year

window in the United States to make some progress, or it will just

go right back again, because that is that fungible in a relationship.

And if Members haven’t noticed, one of the things we don’t have

this morning is a clock. We just moved back into our offices Monday night and Tuesday, and didn’t have the little lights. So if it

gets too long, I will tap, but we are in no particular rush here with

one witness.

Congressman Carter.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I thank you for not tapping me.

Mr. SOUDER. I know better.

Mr. CARTER. Dr. Crane, I apologize for coming in late. I have a

history of being a trial judge for a long time in Texas, and I live

on I–35, which is, by most estimates, the No. 1 pipeline from Mexico to the East Coast and the Midwest. We estimate that we stop

about 1 in 20 mules moving from Mexico to the north, and we are

pretty aggressive on this stretch of I–35. It sounds like the same

numbers are probably approaching what you are dealing with when

you are dealing with shipping. Would that be a fair estimate?

Mr. CRANE. I think, to be fair, one has to look at the whole thing.

We get a substantial amount inside of South America; we seize it,

besides this eradication. We interdict on the Caribbean Sea; we go

after airplanes, ships. I think we get a lot. If you take a look, I

could go through it, but we could look at the U.N. data; we probably get, when you integrate it all, probably more than half of it.

But, again, you know, these numbers are always questionable. But

cocaine actually is one of the areas we probably seize a substantial

33

amount. But we can certainly get you the exact numbers for that,

particularly integrated over the whole thing.

Mr. CARTER. You know, what we are dealing with is a wide variety and assortment of drugs that move up and down Interstate 35.

Mr. CRANE. Right.

Mr. CARTER. One of the things that has concerned me in having

to deal with this, when you deal with it in the courthouse, it seems

like, you know, an almost bottomless pit of dealing, from the people

that are users that you get for possession, you put in prison or you

treat them or you do something. It is a huge cost of resources for

this country. And I don’t have any numbers, you might have a

number, but I would estimate that substantially more young Americans are dying from the drug trade in the United States than are

dying in any war that we are fighting anywhere in this world.

Would you say that is a pretty fair estimate?

Mr. CRANE. I would say that is probably a fair estimate.

Mr. CARTER. Because daily hundreds of young people die.

Mr. CANE. Oh, I don’t know about daily hundreds of young people, but I do know that over the year the substantial number of

people die from illegal use of drugs. That is why we take serious

action. If you look at it historically, 10 or 15 years ago, it was a

worse situation than we have today. We have actually made some

reasonable progress. The United States is one of the few countries

the United Nations cited as actually making substantial progress,

so you can see that in their most recent World Drug Report. But

I do realize that at the local level it can seem overwhelming. I can’t

actually comment directly on your district, but what I can say is

that we have to have an integrated campaign from one end to the

other and try to damage it.

Mr. CARTER. Well, I can only operate from my own personal experiences, but if you make it hard enough on people, and if we are

going to call this a war on drugs, if we are at war with people, then

we do whatever it takes to get the job done, and we don’t coddle

the people and we don’t say, you know, you have been a misunderstood child, you know, you have killed our kids and you are ruining

our economy and you are hurting our people, and, therefore, we are

going to punish you, and we are going to severely punish you. We

take that policy in the little county that I am from. We have the

lowest crime rate in the State of Texas.

Now, do you feel that what happens to these people when we

interdict and catch them is harsh enough to keep them out of this

very lucrative trade, or do they just serve their time, 22 months,

and get right back in the trade?

Mr. CRANE. From my perspective, and I will speak about the famous situation in Colombia, the famous quotation of Pablo

Escobar, the leader of one of the big drug cartels in Colombia, that,

you know, a grave in Colombia was better than a jail cell in the

United States basically. So we very seriously harshly treat these

people and incarcerate them for long periods of time. We extradited

record numbers of them in Colombia. So we are doing this, and it

is very serious. And many of the ones we have interviewed in the

jails were surprised at the severity of the sentences.

Mr. CARTER. That is what I wanted to know.

34

Mr. CRANE. We do go after them seriously, and this is a very serious matter for the President in all of our behalf, and there are

very serious penalties. We have been putting a lot of them in jail

for the rest of their lives or for very long periods of time.

Mr. CARTER. Excellent. That is what I wanted to know. Thank

you.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. First thing, Dr. Crane, I agree with your

focus on looking at the whole drug situation as a business. Congressman Carter was a judge; I was a prosecutor specialized in

Title IIIs and a lot of drug work, and if you are getting them in

the pocketbook, that is where it makes a difference, and I hope we

can move forward.

My biggest concern, and it is a concern that you didn’t express

today, but I would like to explore it a little bit more, is the issue

of taking the resources away from our drug interdiction, what we

have done throughout the years and the good results that have

been obtained, and taking the resources away from there and putting them into terrorism. Now, I believe we need to put the resources into terrorism, but we shouldn’t be taking them away from

the drug area.

Now, let me give you some examples. I am on the Intelligence

Committee, and a group of us went to Asia, and one of the areas

that we went to was Thailand. And we went into the upper areas

right at the border next to Burma, and we were briefed. And, you

know, it is always great, you sit here in committee and you hear

different testimony, and not that you are, but some people are very

reluctant to say anything because they are concerned they might

get in trouble or whatever it is. Sometimes that is very frustrating

But when you go to the front line, you see what the real deal is.

And what we got, not in Thailand, but in some other areas, is that

you have some very dedicated front-line DEA agents, and they

don’t have the resources; where they used to have maybe six or

seven, you have one or maybe two. Now, they have become advisors

to the Thai police, military, and things of that nature, but after

hearing what they say and what their issues are, it seems to me

they are almost on top of it.

As you said, we are getting better, we are getting more sophisticated, we are cooperating and developing better relationships and

training other governments to deal with the issue, but it seems to

me that by taking away those resources, it could blow. As an example, Burma, which, as you know, they have a quasi-military that

protects the people that come in through the trails from Burma to

Thailand, and just the day we were there, there was a big gunfight

between the two groups; I think 10 people were killed, and thank

goodness the bad guys, not our side. But, you know, there could be

a real issue if we don’t really re-evaluate and stop saying we are

fine, we are good. We are looking for money everywhere, homeland

security, whatever it is. Whatever the issue is, we have money

issues, and we can see different agencies everywhere, including Department of Defense, trying to deal with the issue of money. So

what I would like to do is really develop a strategy and make sure

we get the facts out there on what we really do need, because what

is going to happen, and it is already happening in Colombia, is that

35

because the terrorists, we have been going after the money and

doing a good job with respect to terrorism, but they are going to

be looking for other sources of money, and it would be a great partnership between terrorists and between the drug organizations,

and you have it right now in Colombia. I believe there are estimates that half the money that is used by terrorists in Colombia

to buy weapons and the resources they need come from the drug

cartels. Is that your opinion?

Mr. CRANE. Oh, absolutely. I think that is true.

Mr RUPPERSBERGER. So more and more this is going to come together. But you still can’t take away from the drug enforcement,

and I am very much concerned about it. We have had many hearings in this committee; I have raised that issue over and over

again, and all we hear is it is great, it is good, and whatever; and

that is the opinion I got here today, and I don’t believe that it is.

And I would really hope that you could at least put the facts. All

we are talking about is getting the facts together and how we

might have to keep putting our resources into the drug arena.

Could you comment on my statement, please?

Mr. CRANE. Absolutely. I visited Burma also. I’m sorry, not

Burma, the northern border of Thailand, and discussed with the

Thais, as well as the Chinese, the problems with drug control.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And, by the way, one other thing while we

were there, it seems like because of the money issue, the drug right

now is methamphetamine, and the reason is because of the margins of profit. They have these factories there and they can make

so much, and they make so much profit based on the profit of heroin at this point.

Mr. CRANE. What I would like to do is put the perspective on the

whole Thailand and the strategic pictures.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I am talking about the whole policy. I just

used Thailand as an example.

Mr. CRANE. Yes. I was going to give that as an example, though,

to say that at the tactical level operators always ask for more assets. The question is how are we doing there in the strategic context. This was one of the largest opium growing areas in the world

when I was over in Asia and lived in Thailand in the 1971 timeframe. When I went back and visited, I was surprised. The northern part of Thailand, for example, has been completely reformed,

alternative crops and everything. It is a very productive area. That

used to be opium country, north of Cheng Mai; now, today, it isn’t.

So there has been a very big success in that respect. Second, both

the Thais and the Chinese have worked hard and have gone after

actually this outlaw, the Wa State Army and those people, and

there have been substantial reductions in opium. I think this year

we are going to get another 40 percent. Slowly the golden triangle

is being removed from the opium area.

But you are exactly right, methamphetamine is the new problem,

and that is one that we are trying to get grips with. The best we

know, the thing that seems to work against methamphetamine, is

controlling the precursor chemicals, and that is the best we can do

in our understanding. So we have mounted programs, for example,

the Chinese manufacture a lot. The Chinese have given us assurances and so on they would try to help us with this. So the United

36

States can’t do everything everywhere, so we have tried to build

these multi-coalitions to get these other countries to contribute

also. We have to do that, and I think we have had some success.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And it is working. It is working.

Mr. CRANE. Yes. So while I realize the tactical forces at the border, this is an important thing.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But my macro question is the resources

that are being taken away from drugs and going into terrorism,

where in fact we can’t take away from one and give to the other

without having an effect. Eventually, it is going to make a difference.

And I remember testimony, I am not sure, Mr. Chairman, how

we had a group of law enforcement officers from all over the country, and there were statistics that showed that there has been an

increase in certain areas since the lack of resources have come in.

That was about a month ago; I don’t recall the hearing.

Mr. CRANE. I think to be very specific, we really need to fully

fund the DEA. They have picked up a lot more since September 11,

a lot more responsibilities in their international programs, and

fully funding the President’s initiative, that would help. DEA intelligence has been really excellent.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, I understand you are speaking for

your President. I agree.

Mr. CRANE. No, but it is very important that we really push for

that because we have really gotten tremendous bang for the buck

out of those great Americans out there on the front lines.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Getting back to my question, do you feel,

based on your position and what you know, that the resources

being taken away from drug interdiction, which might be going

over to homeland security, or wherever they are going, and that we

really need to really maintain at least our status quo now because

we are doing the job?

Mr. CRANE. I honestly don’t believe that while there might be

some little things on the margins, that the main program is still

succeeding at the level that the homeland security is focused more.

I don’t personally believe, looking at what has happened and the

results, that any of this has affected us that much in our operations, while I always recognize you can do some more. So I have

not seen that, and I have been looking at this for a long time as

an expert in this area.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, I guess time is going to tell, because

we will have to evaluate the performance.

Mr. CRANE. Absolutely.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And the purpose of this committee here is

to try to establish what your needs are and how we can direct, if

we agree with what the policy is, that we can put the resources

back into that.

Mr. SOUDER. I want to ask a few other specific followup questions. What you are hearing from this committee in a bipartisan

way, and I don’t know a delicate way to say this because I am such

a strong supporter of this administration, and I understand that

we are in direct budget pressure and I understand there is tremendous pressure, at least in public comments, to have people inside

the administration agree with each other, but we have to have the

37

people in charge in our policy weighing in aggressively on these

policies and not getting rolled right now in the internal debates, because we can chase various things. We all know I am on the Homeland Security Committee, and I know we have long-term pressures

there, but narcotics and homeland security are so inter-related,

plus we have more known deaths every year from narcotics. And

I just do not believe it is an accurate statement that there hasn’t

been a reduction. Now, we all know why there has been a reduction, but you yourself, just a little bit ago, said that we are doing

almost as well in your, what I believe is a very optimistic, projection of how we are doing with go-fast boats. But the President

didn’t say we are going to do almost as well in narcotics reduction,

he said that ONDCP and Director Walters were going to be accountable for reducing drug use in the United States so much per

year, and almost as well isn’t cutting it. Now, we understand that

a few variables came up, but then we need to say, OK, well, what

do we have to do to meet those targets.

I also thought I just heard you say that you believe that the golden triangle is being removed as a major source. Did that mean

Burma too?

Mr. CRANE. I said opium.

Mr. SOUDER. Heroin.

Mr. CRANE. I think the results are going to show that opium reduction in the golden triangle continues to decline every year. We

believe there will be a major reduction again this year, and this

isn’t the result of the United States in there, this is the result of

a coalition of nations working together to get this to happen.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you believe that Burma, the total golden triangle?

Mr. CRANE. Yes, Burma is going to decline. I think the U.N. reports in this area, the ones I talked to the U.N. staff, we have had

very good relations with them; they do a lot of ground surveys.

Mr. SOUDER. I beg to differ with that statement, and see if you

disagree with this. The U.N. drug control people believe that there

has been a reduction in the golden triangle not because of wonderful efforts there, although Thailand has been aggressive, but because we haven’t controlled Afghanistan, and that there has been

a re-surge of opium in Afghanistan. And the Brits agree with this,

ONDCP is making this case, and that what it has done is Afghan

heroin and other parts are driving the market to the west. In fact,

I believe just yesterday the State Department cited Burma again

for lack of cooperation as one of those nations.

Mr. CRANE. Oh, absolutely.

Mr. SOUDER. Not on human rights, but on narcotics.

Mr. CRANE. Methamphetamine in particular.

Mr. SOUDER. But one of my questions would be what specific recommendations have you made regarding Afghanistan, and do you

know or have you recommended any policies to go after the stockpiles that basically, for various reasons, were not sought, and have

you made recommendations to go after the heroin and opium production in Afghanistan? Because while it may not be going to the

United States as directly, although that is unclear what is hitting

the West Coast, because there heroin is coming from the Asian

side, it certainly is part of the international drug control money

38

laundering parts, that to the degree that Afghan heroin and, for

that matter, anything coming out of Burma or China, the region in

that area, moves to Europe, it means that Colombian heroin moves

to the United States, because it needs a market, and if it doesn’t

have a European market, it floods our market harder. What specific recommendations have you made and what are we doing to try

to reconcile what has been kind of an, because we have other focuses in Afghanistan, increasing problem, and that is that the production seems to be back up and their stockpiles haven’t been hit?

Mr. CRANE. Let me just comment a little bit about that. In Afghanistan we do have a detailed strategy; the United Kingdom is

the lead. We support that. There are other nations we are trying

to bring on board because we need a multilateral thing. The President has put substantially more resources into Afghanistan with

his new acceleration initiatives just announced last week.

Mr. SOUDER. New dollars for drug interdiction?

Mr. CRANE. Let me go to our problem. Our problem is lack of security in the areas. So we need the police. That is where you put

the money and that is where it should be put. The most important

piece is that we got commitment of the central government to outlaw the opium. That has happened. If you take a look at the current information, that has gotten attention of the farmers; they

have disbursed somewhat. They are not doing what they did years

ago, which is growing it right along the main highway in large

farms. So there has been an impact on the farmers. The opium production has not recovered, according to our official estimates, to

where it was during the Taliban times, and there are reports from

the U.N. where the quality of the drug, or purity, declined in Europe over the last couple of years. So those things give us some

hope, but we are certainly nowhere near where we want to be yet;

we want to eliminate that.

It makes it very difficult, if we don’t get control of the drugs in

Afghanistan, to establish viable, legitimate economies; it prevents

everything. So the first step, of course, is to put a lot more police

in there, in the local governments, but in the end narcotics control

has to be a local effort inside three areas, it can’t be done remotely.

So President Karzi has made the commitment, as far as I can tell;

President Bush is going to give him a lot more resources for the

police, and so as we stabilize that government it is certainly the

intention of not only the United States, but many other countries,

and it is my role to meet with them and get them to put substantial assets in their also. So that is what we are doing right now,

our strategy.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, the problem I have, while that sounds good,

I understand the nature of the terrorist threat, it is not the way

we are approaching it in Colombia. Because their local police

forces, CMP, we are supporting their units in the defense department, but we are also putting planes in for eradication, even

though the villages aren’t necessarily stabilized yet. I mean, there

are areas we are doing eradication, where we are doing interdiction, where we are doing shoot-down policy even if we don’t have

security in those villages yet.

Mr. CRANE. It is true. Coca is a different kind of crop than heroin

poppy.

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Mr. SOUDER. We are doing this on heroin in Colombia as well.

Mr. CRANE. Right. But the big effort clearly is in coca.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, there is agreement here on the Hill some

about whether or not there should be a big effort in both of those.

Mr. CRANE. But I am just saying the magnitude of the coca is

a lot bigger.

Mr. SOUDER. Yes, there is more coca.

Mr. CRANE. Yes. And if you look at poppy, we have actually

changed our whole tactics. But to get back to your question, I

would disagree with one statement. I think President Uribe has

made the commitment to go back to those for the first time in history. So even though that is not a drug control aspect, the fact that

drug control is helping them remove the financing of these real armies. He is going to take back the territory. And so we are doing

that together. So they are going to take back the territory and establish local law.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, I absolutely support that, but we are doing

both. Are we doing both in Afghanistan?

Mr. CRANE. In Afghanistan we are going to have to do both too,

but there it is very likely you are going to be able to spray. If you

look at the way the poppy fields, most of the agriculture in Afghanistan is legitimate, it is just a small fraction that isn’t, even though

it is still a substantial part of the poppy market. But these are very

small plots that the farmers have grown, so you are going to have

to go in there pretty much with people on the ground and manually

get rid of them; you are not going to be able to do this like the big

coca plantations.

Mr. SOUDER. I wanted to ask two other specific questions, then

I will see if anyone else has additional questions.

In your written testimony you mention that the Canadians have

taken steps to improve their precursor chemical laws, but that

‘‘The regulation promulgated earlier this year by the Government

of Canada to restrict the availability of pseudoephedrine and other

precursor chemicals, while a step in the right direction, could be

stronger.’’ What specific recommendations do you have for making

it stronger that we should be pushing for?

Mr. CRANE. I think in Canada we recognize that until they

passed the original law earlier this year, they didn’t really have too

much control. There has to be more severe penalties. Perhaps we

should put precursor control underneath law enforcement. So this

leads to a diversity of who is in charge of it.

Now, I am not saying those people aren’t trying to do their best,

but we need a really concentrated focused effort. Law enforcement

should be looking at diversion like it is in the United States. But

again, our relations with Canada, Canada is a very important

country to the United States; we want them to succeed. I am personally dedicated to working with them and making it succeed; not

just talk about the problems, but what can we do to make it work.

Now, the Canadians have put through also a new drug control

strategy this year. So all of these are positive. I believe it will help

us with this activity.

Mr. SOUDER. The biggest political problem we have in the United

States is this proliferation in the narcotics area of meth labs. While

they may not individually supply as much cocaine or marijuana,

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the number of it and how it is dominating the issue, and the potency of the meth and those precursor chemicals are not only coming heavily from Canada, which is our biggest trading partner, for

example, in Indiana, by far, but we do need to address that and

continue to work with them because this is probably the fastest

growing pressure on us and the biggest danger to our kids because

it can be produced domestically if we get control of some of the

international.

Along the same lines on the Dutch Government, you have in your

written testimony ‘‘Senior officials of the Dutch and U.S. Governments met in the Hague in March 2003 to discuss means of

strengthening cooperation against international crime, narcotics

trafficking’’ and I wanted to know what the status of that was on

Ecstasy, MDMA, and precursor chemicals, because they are the

other big place those things are.

Mr. CRANE. I personally went to the Dutch, and I won’t say what

we said, but we were very firm with them on what needed to be

done. With respect to the Ecstasy, the smuggling is one aspect of

it. The other aspect is production, which is pretty high. So we told

them, look, there are three things you can do to try to stop production. If you look at the current DEA data right now, the STRIDE

data, it suggests that the purity of Ecstasy has declined substantially. And I think if you go back and take a look, hopefully we

have turned the corner on the harmfulness of that drug. But again,

we have law enforcement activities. The Dutch have been cooperating with us on this, and some other things, so we continue to work

with them, put pressure on them. As you know, the Dutch have

been strong supporters of the United States on the war on terror,

and we need to work with them as a strong ally, so we have been

doing that but being firm, and I think we made some progress with

that.

Mr. SOUDER. Are there any specific requests pending with them

that they haven’t implemented on precursor chemical laws or Ecstasy? And it spilled over into Antwerp as well.

Mr. CRANE. Well, there are certainly some detail things that off

the top of my head I couldn’t tell you the specific law enforcement.

Mr. SOUDER. If you could give us some response.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Anything else, Mr. Ruppersberger?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Just trying to get another way to get the

needs. Broad question: What would you consider to be your biggest

challenge in your capacity in dealing with the eradication and

working with the drugs?

Mr. CRANE. That is a very fair question. You know, my biggest

challenge is to get us to work together to cause really big changes.

One of the strange things about these drug markets is they can

automatically sort of adapt to pressures, and there are these sort

of critical points, and when you get passed them you cause these

large changes. So my biggest challenge is to get us to work together

with our allies to get over these critical points and cause large

changes, not small changes.

Mr. SOUDER. With that, we appreciate your coming to our hearing today. We may have some additional written questions, and I

had a couple, for you to get some detailed answers to, particularly

with the Dutch and the Canadians. But we are trying to work with

governments that at least in the law enforcement side want to

work with us.

Mr. CRANE. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to

reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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