NUREG/CR-1682

SAND80-1957

RV

ELECTRICAL INSULATORS IN A REACTOR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT

Otmar M. Stuetzer

Date Published: January 1981

Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185

operated by

Sandia Corporation

for the

U. S. Department of Energy

Prepared for

Plant Instrumentation, Control, and Power Systems Branch

Office of Water Reactor Safety Research

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555

Under Interagency Agreement DOE 40-550-75

NRC FIN No. A-1051-0

I

3
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The project was initiated and guided by R. Feit of the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission. J. E. Gover supervised the work and provided

enthusiastic support. L. L. Bonzon provided essential information and

advice, and a critical reading of the manuscript.

0. Milton and R. T. Johnson, Jr. of the Sandia Electronic Materials

group furnished helpful data. Thanks are also due to G. L. Cessak

(surface cleaning procedures), D. M. O'Keefe (contaminant solutions), and

R. J. Baughmann (general chemistry). R. A. Damerow, M. Murphy, and

P. Yarrington, as well as J. Mock from the EG&G office at Three Mile

Island, provided essential input. F. T. Stixrud designed modifications to

the steam test chambers and assisted with instrumentation. R. Gagliardo

of Burns and Roe shared his kqowledge of TMI-2 with us.

J. L. Johnson designed and built the experimental arrangements,

performed most of the experiments, and developed the control and

evaluation computer program; his acute observations and his dedicated

cooperation have made an essential contribution to the work.

Thanks are due to J. Castle for his critical reading of the

manuscript.

4
ABSTRACT

Wire connections in a reactor containment generally are made by means

of many hundreds of insulating blocks ("terminal blocks") which'are

protected by metal boxes. A broad investigation was conducted to

determine what effect the heat, steam, and contamination resulting

from a nuclear reactor accident would have on-these terminal blocks.

A comprehensive experimental program was performed at temperatures,

pressures, and time constants characteristic of the Three Mile Island

accident. A model was developed which predicts, within an error

factor of 2, the probability of an electrical breakdown for a wide

range of temperatures, contamination, and protective measures.

"Normally dirty" terminals in a tightly closed protective box with a

6 mm "weephole" in a 480 V circuit had about one chance in 100 of

suffering complete breakdown at Three Mile Island.* If flow retarders

or "breathers" narrowed the effective size of the weephole, breakdown

was less likely by about a factor of 3. For a large scale steam

breakout with a temperature of 170°C, however, the breakdown

probability for an unprotected terminal would be about 30% at the

same voltage.

Terminal blocks are probably the weakest links in a reactor's

electrical system, and concern about their presence in safety-related

circuits is fully justified. Some remedial measures and some

improvements for future installations are proposed.

5
CONTENTS

Page

I. Introduction and Summary 9

A. Purpose and Program 9

B. Low-Voltage Surface Breakdown 10

C. Experimental Facilities 11

D. Experiments 11

E. Evaluation 13

F. Conclusions and.Recommendations 15

II. Low-Voltage Surface Breakdown 18

A. Introduction 18

B. General Mechanism 18

C. Rough Classification of Regimes 20

D. Surface Resistivity 21

E. Voltage Dependence 25

F. Current Dependence 28

G. Surface Power Density 29

H. Conclusions 30

III. Experimental Facilities 32

A. Preliminary System 32

B. Improved System 32

C. Electrical Circuits 36

IV. Experiments 38

A. Low Temperature Measurements 38

B. Forced Breakdowns 41

C. Final Experiments 41

D. Contamination 43

V. Evaluation and Results 47

A. The Model 47

B. Breakdown Current 48

C. Average Leakage Current 48

D. Breakdown Probability 51

6
CONTENTS (cont)

Page

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 55

A. Discussion of Results 55

B. Application of the Model 56

C. Shortcomings of the Model 56

D. Recommendations 58

References 60

APPENDIX A -- Radiolysis and Surface Conductivity 63

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1 Surface Resistance Ratio vs Temperature Change 23

2 Equivalent Circuit for Low-Voltage Breakdown 26

3 Variation in Breakdown Discharge Inception and

Flashover Voltages With Surface Resistance 27

4 Discharge Inception Voltage vs Surface Layer Bulk

Resistivity 27

5 Time to Breakdown vs Current for Various

Electrode Spacings 29

6 Experimental Setup 1 33

7 Chamber Layout 34

8 Steam Chamber Interior 34

9- ZWM Terminal Block in Enclosure Box 35

10 Terminal Block Models Used at Three Mile Island Unit Two 35

11 Basic Measurement Circuit 36

12 Block Diagram of Advanced Measuring System 37

13 Leakage Current vs Time Showing Breakdown 39

14 Steam, Voltage, and Temperature Cycles With

Representative Leakage Current 42

15 Computer Printout of Leakage Currents of Four

Parallel Terminals, One with Delayed Voltage 43

16 Leakage Current Distribution 50

7
CONTENTS (cont)

Page

17 Impurity Ranking 50

18 Average Probability of Breakdown vs Inverse Temperature 54

TABLES

Table

1 Low-Voltage Breakdown 21

2 Quantities of Contaminants Entering Hydrogen

Recombiner System 45

3 Breakdown Statistics for Terminal Blocks 52

4 Commercial Breakdown Data 53

8
ELECTRICAL INSULATORS IN A REACTOR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT

I. Introduction and Summary

A. Purpose and Program

Electrical insulators, mostly in the form of connection boards or

"terminal blocks", can be exposed to a severe environment during an

accident involving steam breakout in the containment of a reactor. The

insulators will then permit increased leakage currents, present a noisy

shunt to the circuit, and may suffer temporary or permanent electrical

breakdown. The number of terminals in a reactor containment may be very

large; at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2), about 2700 terminals remain

after 620 were replaced by splices. The purpose of the present work is a

broad investigation of insulator deterioration under accident conditions

to provide data for circuit analysis and to propose improvements in

present and future installations.

In a comprehensive experimental program, more than 600 terminals were

exposed for an average of five hours to heat, steam, varying power cycles,

contamination, different protective arrangements, etc. The conditions

were selected to imitate the Three Mile Island accident (i.e., temperatures below 90 0 C, blocks made of phenolics, and the contaminants most

often boric acid and the standard containment spray). Direct impingement

of steam on the terminal blocks was avoided. In many experiments the

terminals were protected by enclosures, into which a pressure equilibrating drainage hole or "weephole" was cut. In combination with commercial

tests under higher temperatures and with room temperature data from

literature, our measurements permit a broad statistical description of

insulator behavior over a wide range of accident conditions.

9
Our experiments do not take radiation into account; for TMI-2 conditions the influence of radiation on insulator breakdown appears to be

negligible. Purely mechanical failures of terminals (sliding link breaks;

mechanical cracks due to excessive tightening and/or thermal expansion)

are not included in our considerations. These aggravate the situation and

would of course enter into circuit reliability statistics.

B. Low-Voltage Surface Breakdown

It is essential for the interpretation of our data to develop an understanding of the underlying phenomenon: low-voltage surface breakdown

(also called "tracking"). This degradation mechanism is very complex.

Leakage or breakdown depends on a large number of parameters, such as

material, voltage, temperature, measuring time (or rather voltage exposure

time), humidity, and most importantly, contamination. Some of these parameters, as discussed in more detail in Section II, are of minor influence

and most are quite well measurable and reproducible, but the dominant

influence, contamination, does not fit in these categories. The great

variety of contaminants possible in a reactor containment is discussed

later. There are unexpected complications: the breakdown voltage not

only has a minimum value but may have a maximum as well. Worst, of all,

the observations are time and history dependent. It is not surprising,.

then, that our measurements show large fluctuations in leakage currents

and our results have considerable error bars.

Section II is basically a literature survey of the state-of-theknowledge about tracking at room temperature. With about fifty directly

or indirectly quoted authors, there is no single result without at least

one dissenting voice. Only "general consensus" exists. Secaion ii

includes comments about how our results fit this general picture.

An important simplification is achieved by introducing the surface

resistivity, ps(n), to classify and estimate the deterioration-breakdown

process. For high surface resistances (109P), breakdown requires high

voltages (10 4V) and takes-weeks at room temperature. For low surface

10
resistances (10 2 g2), a few hundred volts will cause a breakdown in fractions of a second. Severe changes in ps occur quite readily: a change in

humidity from 50-100%, or an increase in temperature by only 7*C, or a

thumbprint on the surface, may each decrease the surface resistivity by a

factor 103 or more.

Surface resistivity and surface breakdown are only weakly dependent on

the insulator material. Phenomena observed and breakdown statistics

derived for phenolics will therefore also apply well to other insulators.

C. Experimental Facilities

Two experimental arrangements were used; they are described in Section

III. In principle, they resembled the well known facilities utilized for

loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) testing under IEEE qualification test

standards. They were, however, as far as steam exposure is concerned,

much simpler; simulating TMI-2 accident conditions, the system could work

at atmospheric pressure, at lower temperature (8600) than the IEEE

Standards (1770C), and at slow (20 min.) temperature rise times.

For the first experiments, steam was generated in or injected into a

large plastic box; contamination was added by a hot air operated nebulizer. The much improved second system used the steam exposure facilities

of the Sandia environmental test group; impurities were added directly to

the steam supply.

The data handling system used was quite powerful: 14 channels (12 for

terminals, 2 for calibration resistors) could either be continuously read

(singly) or sampled in one-minute steps. Additional channels recorded

temperatures and dewpoint depression. Computer printouts and plots over

three decades of leakage current (.1 to 100 mA) were obtained.

D. Experiments

As low-voltage breakdown for protected and relatively clean insulators

is (fortunately) a rare event, a large number of experiments had to be

performed to obtain a meaningful statistical description. All experiments

11
were done under as high humidity as obtainable inside the chamber but outside the protective circuit boxes. The three kinds of phenolic blocks

present in Three Mile Island Unit 2 were exposed. Voltage, temperature,

and contamination were varied; the leakage currents to ground were measured over time spans from 4 to 6 hours. Three series of experiments were

performed with the two sets of apparatus described above.

1. In preliminary measurements the temperature rose to about 430

(110*F) in about 20 minutes. Leakage currents and fluctuations increased

with increasing humidity and temperature (as expected). Breakdowns

occurred during this phase. When the temperature stabilized, the leakage

currents as well as the noise dropped, often by one decade; this constitutes a healing phenomenon. A.C. voltages of 480V, 240V, and 120V were

applied. Turning the voltage on after the humidity had risen increased

current and noise noticeably well above those situations where the voltage

had been applied before the experiment was started. Over two hundred

terminals were measured; seven total breakdowns were observed; six of

these were coincident.

2. Forced breakdown was studied by applying contaminants in solutions

with an eye dropper. If the insulator was noticeably hotter than the

contaminant, the contaminant droplet was simply blown off, clearly helped

by the applied electric field, and no breakdown could be obtained. Otherwise, strong contaminants (such as the standard containment spray solution) produced breakdowns within seconds, as expected.

We were surprised to observe that broken-down terminals tend to

regenerate when exposure to humidity and voltage ceases. Of 50 terminals

broken down to a few ohms, 33 returned to 10 MQ or more (measured with 4.5

volt ohmmeter) after drying for a few days with no voltages applied.

3. In a final experimental series, the Three Mile Island accident was

closely imitated: the temperature rise was generated by injected steam

and approached 86°C (186°F) in about 30 minutes. Contaminants were injected with the steam for the first 30 minutes of the first steam cycle. To

incorporate the experiences of the preliminary tests, the terminals were

12
exposed to three steam cycles and five voltage cycles during five-hour

experiments. Impurities were added at concentrations believed to have

existed at Three Mile Island or taken from a general contamination listing. Readings for up to 12 terminals during each experiment were recorded

every minute (some fast fluctuations were missed thereby). Three hundred

and nineteen terminals were exposed to full cycle programs, and 108 additional ones to partial or altered programs. In part of the experiments, a

protective enclosure with 6 mm weepholes was provided for the blocks.

Twenty-three breakdowns were obtained, almost all at the beginning of the

first or second voltage application. Average leakage resistances, mostly

taken at 480V, varied from 5 MO for a well protected clean terminal to 200

kQ for a dirty, unprotected terminal. Instantaneous values were

occasionally lower by a factor 10 and, thus, possibly inadmissible for

certain circuits.

The experiments, by definition, had to be made in a corrosive environment. Insulation failure (or contact failure) in the wiring system therefore could not be completely avoided. Close to 100 experiments had to be

challenged and are not included in above experiment numbers.

The details of the experiments are described in Section IV.

E. Evaluation

Our measurements were used to develop a model which a) correlates the

data with those obtained by other investigators, and b) permits breakdown

and leakage resistance predictions for other temperatures, voltages, and

conditions. The model, more extensively described in Section V, is based

on an observation in the literature that low voltage breakdown (at room

temperature) is essentially current dependent. We extend this fact to all

temperatures, calculate an activation energy of approximately .31 eV for

breakdown current, and find a reasonable fit (+50%) to the available

observations. For illustration we quote a few estimates for TMI-2 conditions and terminals operated at 480 volts A.C.

13
The probability of an unprotected terminal (open or no box) breaking

down under severe contamination (spray, no direct hit) is approximately

7%. In a protective box with a 6 mm weephole, the breakdown probability

would be approximately .9% with average contamination (dust and dirt) and

approximately .5% with low contamination.

For reactor accidents where temperatures approach 163%C (325*F), the

breakdown probabilities corresponding to the above situations would have

been approximately 30%, 14%, and 9%, respectively.

At room temperature and 100% humidity, our model, perhaps no longer

well justified, predicts breakdown probabilities of well below 10-3 .

(From the literature we know that it may take weeks to obtain a breakdown

under these conditions.)

The model correlates breakdown probability with the average leakage

current and therefore permits an estimate of terminal behavior if the

applied voltage is lower (or higher). For medium and high contamination,

we observe that the currents are ohmic, i.e., proportional to the voltage.

A 120 volt circuit therefore has about one-fourth of the breakdown probability of a 480 volt circuit. For clean terminals this is, however, not

applicable; the probability will be less (possibly much less) than onefourth. Average leakage current also are predicted by the model; fluctuations (noise) are essentially proportional to them.

The evaluation also provides a considerable number of general observations which help understand, and thereby eventually may help mitigate,

insulator deterioration:

1. The leakage currents through various terminals on the same block

tend to be proportional: if one current rises due to some environmental

influence, most of the others do also.

2. The above phenomenon expresses itself most vividly in multiple

breakdowns, which are by no means rare. Breakdown of one terminal tends

to cause a hot, partially ionized vapor cloud around its neighbors. This

14
is of considerable practical importance; a single dirty terminal may foul

several neighbors.

3. If there is no power applied to a terminal, no leakage current

will flow, the surface will not be current-heated, and thicker water

layers will build up in high humidities. Sudden application of a voltage

now finds lower surface resistivity; a higher current flows, and the

breakdown probability is enhanced.

4. The corollary to this phenomenon is that long term application of

power tends to dry out water layers, which decreases leakage currents and

breakdown probabilities. This is always observed for highly contaminated

insulators. For a very clean surface, however, the leakage current tends

to increase with time: gradual tracking as described in Section II outpaces the drying process.

5. Insulators constituting or mounted on heat sinks (e.g., the containment wall) are most endangered; water vapor adsorption is enhanced

there because of the lower temperature.

Comments on additional observations of interest will be included in

Section VI.

F. Conclusions and Recommendations

We have investigated the behavior of contaminated insulators in a hot,

humid environment. Our experimental results apply most directly to Three

Mile Island type accidents but can be extrapolated to higher and lower

temperatures; for accidents with irradiation in excess of 108 rads, the

figures may have to be revised. A dominant influence of contamination is

evident in all cases.

One of the main conclusions is that in a typical small steam breakout

accident insulators do not cause problems if they are clean and protected

by a tight box having (at worst) a small weephole. This holds up to the

time the highly conductive containment spray is turned on. After spray

15
application, high voltage (480V) control circuits which are cycled will be

the first to show deterioration and breakdown. Terminals in boxes mounted

on the (heat sink) containment wall will show leakage currents, noise, and

an approximately 1% breakdown rate. When flow retarding breathers are

used, the breakdowns occur less often. However, if a box lid is left

open, or if a contact is very severely precontaminated, a considerable

failure probability exists immediately at steam breakout time. The consequences of the deterioration depend, of course, on the circuit and may

require detailed circuit analysis to assess. We recommend such analyses

for at least some representative devices (e.g., pressurizer heaters) and

instruments (noise-susceptible pressure gauges).

The above scenario changes severely for a large-scale steam breakout

with high temperatures. For the design basis LOCA, about 14% of the protected terminals are expected to break down within the first 10 minutes.

Therefore, terminals in boxes with weepholes should be avoided in new

reactors in all circuits that could ever be of use during and after accidents. For existing reactors, the protection of terminal blocks should be

improved. We recommend first cleaning (high pressure steam) and then

tightening and sealing of boxes, decreasing or eliminating weepholes, or

adding a weephole thermal closing device. It is also highly advisable to

protect the terminal blocks from dust during construction. (We are not

proposing hermetic sealing of all conduits and boxes because retardation

of steam arrival is all that is needed; flow retarders in weepholes are

therefore quite effective.)

Our investigations find no clear difference in behavior for different

terminal block models. If there were one, the wide statistical spread of

data would veil it. However, we are not stating that there are no differences between blocks. From the general physics of breakdown, blocks that

can accumulate humidity and dirt in a screw cavity just between the connection point and the electrical ground certainly cannot be recommended. It

may pay to consider a redesign that minimizes dirt accumulation on likely

breakdown paths. This redesign could also improve the terminal separators

for prevention of multiple breakdown. Mounting instructions should

specify gloves or a post-installation cleaning requirement.

16
The considerable statistical data spread makes conclusions from low

number experiments suspect.

Containments seem to harbor large amounts (kilogram quantities) of contaminants (acetone, carbon tetrachloride, detergents) which do not appear

to have a reason for being present. A look at how these could be eliminated should be taken. Also, smoke from wire insulation is certainly

dangerous; circuit overloads therefore have to be avoided.

Hydrogen is a molecular gas which at the temperatures in question has

a very low degree of dissociation. Its adsorption should not materially

affect deterioration. Unfortunately, our experiments showed three

breakdowns under about one-half volume percent of H2 in the steam chamber,

a number barely justified by statistics. If hydrogen actually enhances

breakdown, this would predict a strong influence by hydrogen breakouts on

the electrical system. The phenomenon should be investigated further.

Finally, we would like to comment on the observed healing of tracks

which are drying with the voltage off; satisfactory low-voltage impedance

measurements after an accident do not guarantee that the circuit in

question was operative during the accident.

Terminal blocks are apparently the weakest link of the electrical

system inside a reactor containment building. The concern for their use

in safety-related (OE) circuits is absolutely justified. While details

could be only ascertained by a circuit analysis, pre-accident replacement

of the blocks in safety-related circuits at Three Mile Island doubtlessly

prevented some circuit breakdowns and therefore made the accident less

severe.

17
II. Low-Voltage Surface Breakdown

A. Introduction

The important deterioration phenomenon for a terminal block is

electrical damage to its surface in the presence of high humidity and

contamination, possibly aggravated by high radiation doses. This is

called surface breakdown.

This section discusses the state of knowledge of the applicable

physics of low-voltage (<3000 volt) surface breakdown. The general information in this field is extensive1' 2 but often highly contradictory. We

will emphasize materials of interest (phenolics) and conditions occurring

in the reactor accident environment.

Surface breakdown results from formation of carbonized paths (tracking), accompanied sometimes at very low voltages by material removal

(erosion). Unfortunately, the general aim of published investigations is

different from that of this study. Previous researchers wanted to find a

good and economical insulator material for such humid and contaminated

environments as exist along power lines. Data on insulation deterioration

versus time, which is important to us, are hard to find. High temperature

and particularly radiation influence are not generally considered.

On the other hand, the nuclear utilities have exposed terminal blocks

to a severe environment, e.g., a full LOCA simulation. What was determined, however, was only severe breakdown with "leakage" currents exceeding 1 or 10 amperes. These were go/no-go experiments. We can use the

results as pegpoints, however.

To be able to combine the two pools of information, we have to

understand the basic phenomena occurring during low-voltage breakdown.

B. General Mechanism

Surface tracking is the result of surface leakage currents. In a

humid environment, moisture forms an electrolyte together with ionizeable

18
contaminants or creates continuity between "sooty" particles. (Contaminants generally absorb moisture and ensure surface wetting and the

formation of continupus surface films.) At higher humidities, the surface

film becomes thicker, the conductance higher, and the tracking mechanism

develops as follows.

The surface current heats and starts to evaporate the moisture film.

Eventually electrical continuity will be destroyed at one location. A

"dry band" forms; it is perpendicular to the current flow and very narrow

(about 0.1 mm). Here the electric field exceeds the breakdown stress of

the air, and mild surface arcing ("scintillation") ensues. The discharge,

which is not visible but is audible with proper amplification, slowly

heats, burns, and carbonizes the surface, creating a low resistivity

region. Then a neighboring band forms, and carbon deposits grow and

finally join to form a low-resistance circuit. Arcing becomes stronger

toward the end of this process, as the series resistance of the surface

layer gradually lessens. Finally (power supply permitting), very high

currents may flow and hot (ard loud) arcs may develop.

Sometimes, the chemistry of insulator and contaminant permitting, new

chemicals are formed by the tiny arcs; this may lead to material removal

called "erosion." It occurs mostly at very low voltages and very high

contamination. (We have regularly observed it under these conditions.)

At high current (amperes), the discharges will be clearly visible. They

should not be confused, however, with "dry arc" breakdown, which happens

on essentially uncontaminated surfaces at very high field strengths, in

very short times, and is more destructive than tracking.

Tracking has been the subject of studies for more than half a century.

The older results are well summarized by Whitehead (1950).l In the past

two decades the understanding of the phenomenon has been much improved by

the introduction of the dry band concept described above, and by the application of controlled contamination. The newer developments were analyzed

by Fava 2 in 1977. Many contradictory views still exist; we shall see that

this is due to the large number of parameters entering an experiment,

which prevents two experiments from being identical.

19
In the evaluation of the literature data, a complication is introduced

by the fact that the authors use a wide variety of geometries for their

investigations (concentric electrodes, flat plates, point contacts, and

even a double cylindrical spiral). We have attempted to correct for geometry variations where possible; the data quoted are therefore sometimes not

the values of the original publication.

C. Rough Classification of Regimes

Because of the large variations existing in the parameters (e.g.,

breakdown voltage, breakdown time, contamination, etc.) it is helpful to

look at a rough classification of the parameter values characteristic of a

breakdown situation.

The literature survey discloses that the breakdown phenomena and

quantities correlate relatively well with the surface resistivity ps

(ohms) of the insulator and with the power density Ps (W/cm 2 ) deposited in

the surface, although the correlations are not proportional. For our

purposes, the values of ps and Ps are taken at the beginning of. the

experiment; during deterioration, ps will decrease strongly and Ps will

increase.

In Table 1 we use ps as the main parameter. The values in the Table

represent orders of magnitude data only. We establish three regimes:

(1) a reasonably clean surface with a high surface resistivity (regime a),

(2) a highly contaminated insulator with a surface resistivity of a few

hundred ohms (regime c), and the third regime, which may originate in

regime a and terminate in regime c (regime b). For regime a, several

thousand volts mtust be applied to initiate breakdown, and the development

of a track may require weeks. For regime c, a few hundred volts may cause

breakdown in a fraction of a second.

20
Table 1

Low-Voltage Breakdown

(Modified from Ref. j4)

Regime

Surface Resistivity Ps

Breakdown Mechanism

Breakdown Initiation Voltage

Breakdown Initiation Current

Surface Power Density Ps

Time to Breakdown

Breakdown Products

a 9 b c

10 10 102 Ohm

Corona Tracking Arc

(Tracking) (Erosion)

104 103 102 Volt

10-5 10-3 10-1 Amp

10-3 10 102 W/cm2

Weeks

Ionization

Polar

Compounds

Hours

Carbon

Seconds

Carbon,

Fused

Filler

We will now discuss low-voltage breakdown in some detail. The immense

variability of observations is correlated with the variability of surface

resistivity, which we therefore use as our main descriptive parameter.

D. Surface Resistivity

Surface resistivity ps is defined as the resistance of a square part

of the surface measured between opposite sides. It is measured in ohms.

The concept of surface resistivity is.a useful and well understood one

for thin metallic layers. For surface electrolyte layers it suffers from

a substantial paradox. Since the number of adsorbed layers on a surface

versus humidity is known, we can calculate theoretically the surface

conductivity from the carrier density and the respective mobility.

However, it is found (McIlhagger and Salthouse,3 quoting Chirkov) that the

calculated values are smaller by a factor of 104 to 10 5 than the

theoretical values. The favored explanation absolves the mobility and

assumes that the dissociation of impurities is orders of magnitude lower

on a surface than in bulk. (The phenomenon is gratifying, as we certainly

prefer a high surface resistivity, which decreases the probability of

21
breakdown. It complicates our theoretical considerations, however, as

will be seen in Section V.)

We shall now discuss the various effects which determine or influence

surface resistivity on terminal blocks. (Surprisingly, the material of

the insulator has a very low and unknown influence on ps.)

1. Humidity -- Possibly related to the above paradox is the very

strong variation of surface resistivity with humidity. Yaeger and Morgan 4

found that while the electrolyte thickness increases by a factor of 10 to

100 for a change in relative humidity from 40% to 100% the surface resistance decreases by factors from 103 to 10 4 . Similar changes are found by

many other authors quoted in Ref. 3. The data are not uncontradicted,

however. Chaikin,5 cycling the humidity from 53% to 97% over a nylonfilled phenolic insulator, finds only a factor of 3, not 103 (See Figure 9

of Ref. 5). The discrepancies probably have to do with the various surface cleaning processes used, if any. Chaikin also made his measurements

at voltages which are quite high for a surface resistance determination,

namely 480 Volts. The high variability of surface resistivity with

humidity is of minor concern to us: humidities of 98 to 100% are reached

almost immediately during a steam breakout.

At constant humidity, the surface resistivity changes (mostly

increases) with time. For organic materials (e.g., methyl methacrylate),

Williams and Herman 6 find (See their Figure 7) a small decrease in ps with

no potential applied, and an increase by a factor 10 with 135 volts dc

applied (dry bands may be forming). We find the same phenomenon at higher

temperatures (Section III).

2. Temperature -- To make things more complicated, surface resistivity also depends strongly on surface temperature, which is difficult to

measure in certain situations. Salthouse 7 (Figure 1) finds that for a

temperature change of only 7*C the surface resistivity changes by 3 orders

of magnitude. Surprisingly, the ratio is independent of humidity, i.e.,

independent of the surface layer thickness.

22
1000

ILLJ

U, W

z

1W0 cI- -D Z

I- W

M) 2 10 RELATIVE

• rn 75%

0 Ii. zA 65%

I1 I I I I I

0 1 2 3 4 5

INCREASE IN SURFACE TEMPERATURE

ABOVE AMBIENT 0C

Figure 1. Surface Resistance Ratio vs Temperature Change

(From Ref. 7)

3. Contamination -- The influence of contamination is difficult to

determine. While it is quite simple to measure average surface resistivity by measuring resistance with a low voltage and taking the geometry

into account, it is another matter to reproduce surface contamination.

Many investigators circumvent the problem by immersing the electrodes into

an electrolyte and correlating to the bulk resistivity p (ohm-cm) rather

than to the surface resistivity p5 (ohm). The "inclined plane liquid

contamination test" (Mathes and McGowan 8 ) .is based on this approach. The

results are quite reproducible, but somewhat challengeable. (There are

three widely used outdoor insulator test methods; they do not correlate

well 9 but are generally useful to develop improved materials and surface

treatments. )

23
To achieve reproducibility for establishing statistics, we would

have to reproduce contamination. This is difficult. A touch with a

finger reduces the surface resistivity of "clean" amber by 80 percent.10

Williams and Herman6 found that natural perspiration (deposited on the

insulator by pressing it against a human body) decreased surface resistivity by factors of 10 to 107. The authors also found that "handled"

insulators all had about the same ps independent of material, while

"clean" insulators showed a wide diversity in performance. But what is

clean? Recipes and methods for surface cleaning are legion, but none of

them is guaranteed to lead to reproducible conditions.

Chaikin5 investigated phenolic paper-based circuit boards. He

measured surface resistance at 35 locations of a fingerprint-contaminated

panel. At 97% relative humidity, surface resistivity varied from.place-toplace by a factor of 4000 over the 4 x 6 inch panel. Strangely, Chaikin

found applying three kinds of resin-alcohol solder fluxes did not degrade

the phenolic panels. (Even stranger, solder fluxes seemed to protect the

phenolic insulation from the otherwise-degrading influence of collected

dust.) Of great interest for reactor accident situations are Chaikin's

observations of the influence of a sodium chloride aerosol: 5 alcoholcleaned phenolic panels were not affected, steel wool cleaned samples were

slightly deteriorated, and melamine insulators showed "severe degradation."

If there is any silver in the electrode material, phenolic insulators exhibit extensive silver migration at voltages of the order of 500 V and high

humidities. 6 At prolonged exposure to high humidities and elevated temperatures, fungi are prone to impair surface conductivity on phenolics. 1 1

4. Times and Frequencies -- There is some a2reement that the time

required for a surface to reach equilibrium with the humidity of the

surroundings is of the order of an hour. 3 Chaikin, 5 however, finds the

relevant time interval to be of the order of minutes (see Figure 7 of this

reference). In a steam breakout, diffusion is rapid due to the higher

temperatures; a pseudo-equilibrium therefore should be established fast,

e.g., in minutes.

24
There is a hysteresis effect found by E. Schroedinger, quoted by

Mcllhagger:3 the values of surface resistivity found for rising humidity

are higher than those for decreasing humidity.

Surface resistivity also depends on the measuring frequency. The only

data available (Yaeger and Morgan4 ) were obtained for a pyrex glass surface. From 1 to 100 kHz the surface resistivity decreased by a factor of

3 at 50% relative humidity and by a factor of 220 for 96% humidity. The

surface layer capacitance remained essentially constant. The phenomenon

is unexpected (a bulk electrolyte does not behave that way) and unexplained. Polarization may be one of the underlying causes. The observation of

course has a bearing on breakdown initiated by sharply rising voltage

pulses.

After the above simplified discussion of our basic parameter ps, we

shall proceed to investigate the influence of the various circuit

parameters on breakdown.

E. Voltage Dependence

Figure 2 is a circuit schematic which is useful in describing the

current flow1 2 caused by a gradually increasing voltage V across a moist

surface. Resistor R1 may be very large (108 ohms), R2 is of megohm size,

and R3 represents the internal impedance of the voltage source.

First a minute current of the order of 10- 9 A and linear with voltage

will flow through the only available path, RI, the resistance of the

approximately uniform surface layer. At somewhat higher voltages R1

becomes nonlinear, dry bands form, and R1 increases. At a certain voltage

Vi (which depends on time, as we remember from Table 1), microdischarges

bridge the dry band. Resistor R2 in series with a low impedance discharge

path, as indicated in Figure 2, forms and controls current flow. Further

increases in voltage or increases in time lead to breakdown across all or

part of the insulator. A low impedance arc is formed. The current is now

determined by R3 , the impedance of the outside circuit. The description

is compatible with Table 1; it introduces the existence of an initiation

voltage Vi.

25
I

Figure 2. Equivalent Circuit for Low-Voltage Breakdown

Salthouse 1 2 succeeded in making reproducible measurements of the breakdown behavior for a special insulator (Eastman Chromagram Sheet) using

cobalt chloride as an electrolyte and a concentric electrode arrangement.

In Figure 3 the inception voltage Vi is plotted versus measured surface

resistance; the associated surface resistivity ps is about 1/3 of the

plotted parameter. The graph, slightly extrapolated, makes it appear

plausible that breakdown starts at around 500 V for a surface resistivity

of 103 ohms; this is compatible with the behavior of contaminated phenolic

insulators. An increase, of the voltage at constant ps is seen to lead to

what Salthouse calls a "flashover;" here it means a visible spark across

the dry band, not an arc between the electrodes. The behavior depicted by

Figure 3 is generally found, although variations exist. In Figure 4 (from

Mathes and McGowan 8 ) the surface resistivity variation was obtained by

using an ammonrium chloride solution of varying concentration. The

ordinate is therefore calibrated in the bulk resistivity (0-cm) pertaining

to this solution. We see that the initiation voltage is different for

different substrates (phenolic gives the worst results). The authors have

also indicated that at the very low end of the tracking regime, erosion,

(i.e., mass removal from the surface) occurs. At the high voltage end the

electrolyte simply blows off, and no damage is observed in the time frame

in which the data were taken (1 hour). This potential no-damage situation

is a strongly complicating factor for damage prediction statistics.

26
5

0,3

0

4

3

2

I

0

103 104 Jos 106

Surface Resistance (f2)

Variation in Breakdown Discharge Inception and

Flashover Voltages With Surface Resistance

Figure 3.

Percent NH 4 Cl by Weight

10 5 1 0.55 0o Q05 o425

I I I I i i )lTap Water

V110 1

t 7.5

5.0

43

cc

2.5

1.5

1.0

0.75

0.5

0 0.25

Electrolyte Resistivity (ohm-cm)

Figure 4. Discharge Inception Voltage vs Surface Layer Bulk Resistivity

27
It is appropriate at this time to comment on the use of a voltage

rather than a field as the descriptive parameter for a breakdown situation. The primary breakdown parameter is the field across the dry band.

This is determined by the voltage applied and the width of the dry band,

not by the dimensions of the arrangement. This dry band width seems to be

rather uniform, between 0.1 and 0.3 mm. Therefore, the voltage is a

better parameter than the field between the electrodes. This is generally

accepted. Wilkins and Billings,13 e.g., find only minor variations in the

initiation current (see below) with electrode spacing. Mathes and

McGowan,8 however, state that "in a number of cases" the initial voltage

Vi is strictly proportional to the electrode spacing (see Figure 9 of

this ref). An explanation may be related to the fact that in reference 13

the experiment time is measured in seconds, while in reference 8 it is

measured in hours.

F. Current Dependence

Since the onset of breakdown is voltage dependent, one would expect a

corresponding dependence on linear current density (measured in A/cm).

Experimentally, however, a dependence on current (proper) is found.

Wilkins and Billings13 determined the onset of breakdown for paper/

laminate phenolic at IB = 1.25 mA. The authors find very little variation

of this value with electrode spacing. They determine IB by measuring the

current, at which the time to breakdown decreases hyperbolically (Figure

5).

Comparing materials, it turns out that the value of IB for phenolics

is not near the bottom of the list, while the breakdown initiation voltage

Vi is.

28
I --- I I

30 Effects variation of electrode spacing

for phenolic/paper laminate

A 1/16 in. spacing 1B = 1.0 mA

0 1/8 in. spacing IB = 1.1 mA

o 1/4 in. spacing IB = 1.5 mA

S20 0

0

100

10

100

A-*A0

04 8

I (mA)

Figure 5. Time to Breakdown vs Current for Various

Electrode Spacings

G. Surface Power Density

It is generally agreed that the destructive mechanism (i.e., tracking

and erosion) is linked to thermal events. In fact, Wilkins and Billings13

measured the surface temperature at the breakdown location and found good

correlation with the decomposition temperature of the insulator. It is

therefore not surprising that the surface power density Ps (W/cm 2 ) is a

good measure for breakdown initiation. For phenolic with a surface

resistivity of 3 x 104 ohms, the breakdown deposition s approximately 4

W/cm2 ; for a surface resistivity of 102 ohms, the values are around 10

W/cm2 according to Mandelcorn.14 This is not completely in agreement

with average figures quoted in Table 1; in the light of the considerable

spread of all measurements the results seem reasonable, however.

29
As Ps is not easy to measure directly, additional details about its

influence and its variations are omitted.

H. Conclusions

We have sketched important aspects of a very complex phenomenon,

surface breakdown at low voltages. The complexity is not unexpected.

Breakdown depends on six controllable independent parameters (base material, geometry, voltage, temperature, measuring time, and power supply

impedance) and on at least two more difficult to control independent parameters (humidity and contamination); there certainly are others, such as

surface cleaning methods, air ionization degree, etc. If we select only

two values for each parameter we have 256 different combinations. Therefore, the truth cannot be simple and easy to arrive at.

Nevertheless, considerable understanding of both the phenomena and of

the importance of the various parameters has been developed. For us, the

following points seem to be important.

If several thousand volts are applied, an even slightly contaminated

surface will suffer damage; it may take weeks, however. If only a few

hundred volts are available, surface breakdown can occur in seconds under

conditions of very severe contamination and high humidity. An essential

problem for the Three Mile Island reactor accident case is therefore the

determination of the accumulated contamination at accident time. Protective enclosures, weepholes sizes, and the presence or absence of flow

retarders affect this accumulation.

The survey also predicts that considerable scatter of data has to be

expected in an experimental determination of leakage resistance. This

makes experimentation arduous and costly and the statistics of breakdown

harder to establish.

30
Finally, from the discussed data it becomes evident that humidity and

contamination alone are sufficient to explain observed terminal block

breakdown during qualification measurements; it is felt that radiation

exposure plays a minor role for the reliability of phenolic terminal

boards. We shall return to this point in Section V.

31
III. Experimental Facilities

It was decided to simulate-only temperature, pressure, and temperature rise time up to the TMI-2 accident environment. With a pressure of 1

atmosphere and temperatures less than 86°C (186°F), very simple experimental arrangements could be used, e.g., access to the insulators to be exposed could be obtained simply by opening a lid and sealing of pipes and

cables was not a problem. In principle, of course, the arrangements resembled the more powerful facilities15 '1 6 which are designed to reach

conditions existing during a large scale steam breakout.

A. Preliminary System

In a preliminary arrangement (Figure 6), low pressure steam was generated in a pyrex bottle and injected into a large plastic chamber. The

chamber was instrumented with a hygrometer and a number of thermocouples;

it accommodated one or two terminal blocks, each with 3 to 12 terminals.

A heating element in the chamber controlled the temperature. Contaminants

were added by dripping appropriate solutions through the steam jet, by

dispersion of the solutions by means of a hot air-driven vaporizer, and,

for a number of special experiments, by dripping the solution onto the

block from an eye-dropper.

While the arrangement was necessary for the acquisition of experience

and of preliminary data, it did not permit obtaining simultaneously the

temperatures and relative humidities required for a TMI-2 accident simulation.

B. Improved System

A much improved second system used the steam exposure facility of the

Sandia environmental test group. The exposure chamber had a volume of

about .9 mi3

; temperature and humidity could be controlled. Impurities

were added directly to the steam supply by means of a venturi nozzle. The

facility was programmed to automatically apply steam cycles which reached

a peak temperature of 86%C (186°F) in about 25 minutes; this simulated

Three Mile Island accident conditions.17

32
Figure 6. Experimental Setup 1. (Plastic environment box with

Hygrometer right front, steam bottle to its left side,

power supply left front, switching and measuring

arrangements center rear).

Figures 7 and 8 show the interior of the steam chamber. The Erlenmeyer flask contains the contaminants dissolved in distilled water or tap

water. The venturi nozzle on top, through which the steam enters, can be

partly bypassed to regulate the rate of impurity dispersion. The protective box which contains the block (or blocks) shows a 6 mm weephole on the

side. The box could be. closed quite tightly with a lid. Figure 9 shows a

terminal block (States Co. Model ZWM) and the associated cabling inside

the protective box. The three terminal block modules used at TMI-2 are

pictured in Figure 10; they all have metallic ground plates.

33
CHAMBER

TO

INSTRUMENTS

TB: TERMINAL BLOCK

TC = THERMOCOUPLE

Figure 7. Chamber Layout (From ref. 18)

Figure 8. Steam Chamber Interior

34
Figure 9. ZWM Terminal Block in Enclosure Box

(Lid Removed; Weephole on Side)

Figure 10. Terminal Block Models Used at Three Mile Island Unit Two.

Left to right: GE CR2960; GE CR151; States Co. ZWM 25006

35
C. Electrical Circuits

The electrical circuits used are straightforward. The basic principle

is shown in Figure 11. The various terminals, with the ground plate at

high voltage, are connected to an ac voltage source. Dropping resistors

are switched sequentially to a voltmeter to permit measurement of the

leakage currents.

Figure 11. Basic Measurement.Circuit

The circuits of Figure 11 eventually developed into an automated computer controlled system1 8 which permitted programmed sampling of leakage

currents and calibration resistors on 14 channels combined with automatic

voltage cycling for groups of blocks, and automatic steam cycling with

selectable cycle times. Figure 12 shows a schematic1 8 of the essential

components of the system. Channel sampling time could be varied from 40

seconds upward. The data were stored on tape for evaluation.

The electrical noise in the system was high (due to its physical location) and ranged from 20 to 30 pA. Since the leakage currents of interest

were between .1 and 100 mA, the noise was acceptable, however.

36
~1

-J

120

Figure 12. Block Diagram of Advanced Measuring System

37
IV. Experiments

Experiments were performed by exposing terminal blocks in the apparatus described above to various temperatures and humidities, and to a large

variety of added contaminants. We shall first describe three groups of

experiments and their gross results, and then add a discussion of the contamination procedures.

A. Low Temperature Measurements

The first series of experiments was performed using the equipment

described in Section III A. Terminal blocks were exposed to humidities

and/or temperatures as high as the arrangement would permit; contamination

was added more or less at random. Voltages were varied from 120 to 480

volts ac.

It became evident very quickly that leakage currents fluctuate strongly, and breakdown occurs mostly on those terminals which draw the highest

current. This is compatible with room temperature behavior. An unexpected observation was that currents through various terminals on the same

block tended to be proportional; if one current increased, most of the

currents through the neighboring terminals increased by the same percentage.

A short time sample measurement is shown in Figure 13. It was made at

about 35%C (95°F) at a relative humidity rising from 70% to 90%. At time

zero a 1000 ppm (parts per million) spray of room temperature boric acid

was administered through the steam jet; as described above, the spray did

not directly hit the blocks. The blocks had been handled before. One

minute afterward, 480 volts was applied. The leakage current I (which

without spray had been below 20 1A) rose rapidly to about 400 p.A and then

tapered off. The measurement was repeated with the spray preheated to

about 150°F before being injected. Naturally, the effects.were noticeably

enhanced: the block was now cooler with respect to the steam-spray, and

surface adsorption was faster. The terminal with the lowest resistance.

broke down after 3-1/2 minutes. The resulting ion and hot fluid cloud

38
doubled the leakage currents through the other terminals for a minute.

The current traces are clearly parallel, i.e., the currents are proportional.

0.1

Figure 13. Leakage Current vs Time Showing Breakdown. (Block #2, Temp

= 95 0 F, Rel. Humidity 70-95%, V = 480 volts)

Not shown in Figure 13 are occasional very short current spikes

(originated by dry band breakdown) of often less than .1 sec duration.

These represent noise. The noise appeared to be 1/f type extending to

30 Hz.

Attempts to reproduce the measurements shown in Figure 13 in detail

failed completely. Except for the one total breakdown, the main features

39
(rapid rise, then decay; warm electrolyte more effective than cold one)

were always observed, but the details were different. The instantaneous

currents were about a factor 2 higher or lower; the average currents, however, stayed within +30%. In light of the discussion in Section II, this

is not surprising. The chemical mix was probably not exactly the same;

the spray droplet size and distribution, as well as the air currents in

the chamber, were certainly somewhat different; the handling history of

the new blocks was unknown; and local temperature and humidity values were

not exactly reproducible. The connecting wire harness was reused, and

represented a changing source or sink for contaminants.

After about 40 preliminary experiments, many more systematic tests

were conducted using the equipment of Figure 6. Each test lasted from

five to seven hours. The initial rise of current and fluctuations again

was observed; with time (after equilibrium was established), it was

followed by a current and noise drop of about an order of magnitude.

When the voltage was interrupted and reapplied, a strong current surge

occurred. Breakdowns occurred during high current phases. The same

observations were repeated in the final experimental series (described

below).

From the observations, the following physical picture emerges: with

rising relative humidity and steam warmer than the insulator, surface

adsorption is rapid and strong. With equilibrium, the leakage current can

start drying the surface; that is, a "healing" process begins.

In 38 long runs, more than 200 terminals were exposed. The ac voltage

applied was usually 480 volts. Leakage current varied between 10 iA at

steam admission to 4 mA prior to breakdown. Seven complete breakdowns

were observed, six of them within a few seconds; multiple breakdowns are

predicted by our physical model. The secondary current peaks shown in

Figure 13 and discussed above are an indication of increased breakdown

probability.

40
B. Forced Breakdowns

A series of additional experiments was designed to obtain preliminary

information about the influence of specific contaminants (discussed in

detail below) and to study broken-down insulators. Some 50 terminals were

forced to break down by dripping contaminant solutions on their surface at

various temperatures with voltages applied.

One initially surprising observation (which is, however, quite compatible with the physical picture sketched above) was the following: if the

surface was noticeably hotter than the contaminant, the latter was simply

blown off, in part by evaporation and in part by electrical forces. For

suitably oriented surfaces, the Leidenfrost phenomenon (vibrating and

migrating droplets) was seen. If the surface was cooler than the contaminant and slightly dirty or dusty, however, immediate breakdown occurred

for conductive contaminants such as "containment spray."

All the broken-down insulators exhibited clearly visible carbon

tracks, and some showed erosion. Unexpectedly, however, most of the

tracks were not permanently conductive if voltage was removed and the

blocks were dried. Of 50 forcibly broken-down blocks, 33 exhibited more

than 10 MQ resistance when measured with a standard 4.5 volt ohmmeter.

Eight of the 33 terminals stayed above 10 MQ at 200 volts. Much the same

observations were made with regularly broken-down blocks, i.e., those

exposed to our temperature-humidity cycle.

The findings have a bearing on postaccident circuit measurements such

as those performed at Three Mile Island: circuit impedance may now be

high, while a breakdown occurred during the accident.

C. Final Experiments

Based on the experience gained, an automated exposure program was

established in the heavily instrumented facilities described in Section

III B. To simulate the several steam breakouts at TMI-2, three sequential

steam cycles, with 1-hour and 1/2-hour intermissions, were applied. Superimposed on these were voltage cycles such as would have occurred in

41
control circuits. The interlacing of the cycles is shown in Figure 14.

The first voltage application was provided for some terminals (I) a few

minutes before steam turn-on, for other terminals (II) 20 minutes after

steam application. Steam admission was automatically controlled such that

the maximum chamber temperature (measured at three locations) was 86*C

(186 0 F). The resulting temperature cycles also are shown in Figure 14.

The quantity AT indicated in the figure is the wet bulb/dry bulb temperature difference; the curve means that 100% relative humidity was reached

in about 5 minutes in the experimentation chamber (but not inside a protective enclosure). The typical (smoothed) leakage current is shown on the

bottom of the figure; the drying-out phenomenon is clearly recognizable.

The dashed trace (II) indicates the enhancement of the leakage current due

to delayed voltage application.

C

-lOmA

-1.0

-. 1

-. 01--

0 60 120 180 240

t - (minutes)

Figure 14. Steam, Voltage, and Temperature

Representative Leakage Current

Cycles With

Figure 15 shows a computer generated graph of the first 100 minutes of

a leakage current measurement for 4 terminals; the terminal indicated by

42
curve 5 had delayed voltage application. In this particular measurement

the fluctuations were lower than usual, which makes the graph easier to

read.

Data corresponding to those in Figure 15 were taken for 4-1/2 hours on

319 terminals; partial data were taken on 108 additional terminals.

Voltage was usually 480 volts; occasionally it was 240 volts. On an

average, each terminal was exposed to four sudden voltage applications.

Twenty-three breakdowns were obtained, almost all of .them within minutes

of the beginning of the first and second voltage/steam cycle. Twenty-two

of the breakdowns were for unprotected blocks with contamination applied.

z

0

Oi

I. ISTEAM ON 4 STEAM OFF

480 VOLTS

CONT: DUST

0

0

0j

0

In 4

.(U

t.-

42-

q:

Uj 0

CC wrZi _Z

0 0

0

0.)

In ~. . . . .

.......... ...........

C.)

0

U,

U)

C

U,

C

Co

U)

9

U)

0

CC.

U)

04i6

0)

Cl)

i6

00 0

co

Z) (b

0

CO

U)

9

U) 9

CO

-P.- TIME

Figure 15. Computer Printout of Leakage Currents of Four

Parallel Terminals, One With Delayed Voltage

D. Contamination

With the steam, voltage, and temperature cycles fixed, the main parameter to be selected is the contamination.

43
The working fluid of the reactor is thin (approximately 1000 ppM)

boric acid; in a steam flash it will be dispersed over the containment.

The containment spray19 on the other hand is a quite caustic solution of

boric acid, sodium thiosulfate, and sodium hydroxide. Hydrogen is added

to the reactor fluid in small quantities; a massive outbreak due to a

metal-water reaction occurred during the TMI-2 accident. Table 2 lists

additional contaminants 2 0 which could enter the hydrogen recombiner; at

least the same amount of impurities must at some time be present in the

containment. In fact, the "conventional substances" at the bottom of the

list seem to be present even without an accident. There is a strong

suspicion that copious amounts of construction dirt and dust also can be

found in the protective boxes.

Considering the general difficulities of making breakdown measurements, a very large number of experiments would be necessary to investigate the effects of contaminants systematically, especially if cooperative

effects were to be considered. We limited the scope of our investigations

to the following:

1. Boric acid solutions and containment spray solutions of actual

concentration were dispersed directly by the methods described in Section

III. In programmed experiments the dispersal occurred during the first

30 min.

2. For some of the chemicals of Table 2, the quantities listed were

reduced by the volume ratio of the test chamber to the containment (3 x

10-5) and dispersed as described.

3. Laboratory dust, admittedly not a clearly defined agent, was collected in.corners and sprinkled by hand on the blocks. Dust was generally

applied before the contaminant(s) under investigation.

4. Often contaminants were added in sequence; no clear collective

effects were detected.

44
Table 2

Quantities of Contaminants Entering Hydrogen Recombiner System

Post-LOCA Contaminants That the Hydrogen Recombiner System

Could be Exposed to:

Fission Product Inventory

Fission

Products

Bromine

Iodine

Cesium

Rubidium

Tellurium

Ruthenium

Technetium

Molybdenium

Strontium

Barium

Quantity

Entering

System

(gm)

24

352 (CH3 1)

96.2

15.2

14.6

12.4

5.08

18.8

8.81

8.22

Fission

Products

Antimony

Samarium

Promethium

Yttrium

Praseodymium

Neodymium

Tin

Chromium

Iron

Nickel

Quantity

Entering

System

(gm)

0.0549

3.08

2.75

3.40

6.49

22.0

1.82

0.159

0.254

0.086

Potential Conventional Air Contaminants

Amount Assumed

Initially Airborne

Conventional Substances (gm)

Misc. Oils

Lubricating Oil

Acetone

Carbon Tetrachloride

Greases

Wire Insulation (Smoke)

Paint

Carbon Monoxide

Detergents

Tobacco Smoke

Acetylene

3000

3000

2930

6000

3300

4540

5000

4540

3600

454

454

45
It is believed that a reasonable simulation of the actual, but in

detail unknown, situation was achieved. Hydrogen experiments could not be

made at the high concentrations experienced during the TMI-2 accident

because the facility did not permit this.

It was observed that compared to pure steam, the addition of even

minor amounts (micrograms per cubic meter) of some chemicals led to

observable increases in leakage current. A systematic compilation of all

results is given in the next section.

46
V. Evaluation and Results

As already indicated, eventhe large number of measurements made is

not sufficient to establish systematic statistics of breakdown versus all

the parameters of interest. It would require about 50,000 tests, each

several hours long, in order to: (1) vary the major and measurable parameters, such as voltage, temperature, humidity, geometry, chemical contaminants, and protective arrangement, and (2) perform enough experiments in

each category to average out such unknown quantities as precontamination,

history and detailed distribution of contamination, thickness distribution

of adsorbed water layer, neighbor influence, steam flow patterns, air

ionization, etc. Therefore, we will usethe observations together with

physical arguments to establish a simple "average breakdown model" which

will correlate with our data. The model will be useful for making preictions, albeit with sizeable error bars.

A. The Model

It has been observed that low-voltage breakdowns are essentially

current dependent,13 at least at room temperature (Section II F). The

information in Table 1 points, in the same direction: breakdown depends on

surface conductivity (l/Ps), and, for similar geometries, current is

proportional to this quantity. There is a maximum current IB for each

configuration, which determines the irreversible onset of breakdown. For

the various phenolics, IB is between 1.1 and 1.5 mA at room temperature 1 3

(Figure 5).

We now define an average leakage current IAV' i.e., time averaged and

experiment averaged for each essential parameter combination, and expect

that the ratio TAV/IB is a measure of the breakdown probability of an

average terminal. The model can then be carried through semianalytically.

47
B. Breakdown Current

A difficulty seems to be introduced by the fact that the breakdown

initiation current ("breakdown current") IB is a function of temperature.

This complication turns out to be a blessing in disguise as it forces us

to establish a temperature dependent model suitable for interpolation and

extrapolation.

We have shown in Section II that at room temperature the surface

resistivity is about 105 times higher than it would be for an ohmic conduction process. Since the mobility is absolved3 , we have to make the

carrier density responsible, i.e., dissociation. Over the relatively

small (300 K to 470 K) temperature range which concerns us, dissociation

will be subject to an exponential activation process. We can define a

temperature independent activation energyAE and describe conductivity,

and therefore current variations, by

IB = IBO exp(-AE/kT) (1)

where k is Boltzmann's constant. Since IB/IBO at room temperature is

10-5, we can calculate &E simply; we find that &E =.31 eV, a reasonable

value in the light of our knowledge of semiconductor band gaps. Current

IB is plotted in Figure 16 over an inverse temperature scale for which Eq

(1) gives a straight line. From the literature, we have IB = 1.3 mA at

room temperature. At 343 K (110 0 F), the curve predicts IB = 5 mA, and at

386 K-(1860 F), we expect IB = 20 mA. These values are very close to our

experimental observations. For 463 K (325°F), our theory predicts 95 mA

breakdown current, which is certainly not out of line with observations by

Franklin institute 2 1 . Equation (1) and our value ofAE can be considered

justified.

C. Average Leakage Current

The average leakage current IAV' to be defined below, is not expected

to -- and does not -- follow an equation similar to Eq (1). The average

currents, as do the instantaneous currents, depend on the local balance

between water being adsorbed from the environment and water being

48
evaporated, mostly due to current heating. The arriving water molecules

are transported (barring direct impingement) by diffusion, and diffusion

is strongly temperature dependent. This means that a temperature

dependent factor has to be added to Eq (1). Everything else being equal,

the leakage current will be relatively lower at lower temperatures than

the slope of E4 (1) predicts. A glance at Figure 16, where experimental

average leakage currents are plotted versus l/T, shows that this is the

case. Figure 16 is discussed more fully later; it is established with the

data shown in Figure 17. The average leakage currents plotted in Figure

17 are experiment averages for blocks. First the algebraic average of the

current Iv was determined for each of the eight to twelve terminals

exposed together, i.e.,

t

1 I(t)dt ; (2a)

0

the determination was made by computer integration or by graphical

integration. Then the results for all terminals on the block were

averaged by

n

I (n = 8 to 12) . (2b)

n1

49
Figure 16

Leakage Current Distribution

1.0F

Figure 17

Impurity Ranking

480 VOLTS

100% HUMIDITY

860 C

-- X -IMETHYL-

< - IIODIDE

E " + -c

S- -Br

Z -- X AV

W w --- a: X -- 11-1H2

0 ®CLEANED

LU u

00 Z

:) I- z < , - z

Lj 0 zi 0 0U

0 - w U I Sz -J x S0 z z I- 0 I M 

< J U)UI ZII -JL , ii 0 D .>

> 0 r a < 0 ' < 0

- SINGLE RUN 12 TERMINAL AVERAGE I

X EXPERIMENT AVERAGE IAV

+ AVERAGE OF AVERAGES 'AV

(UNPROTECTED BLOCKS)

0.1

50
The terminals contributing to I were all exposed to an "identical"

environment and had comparable histories. Values of 1 are plotted in

Figure 17 for different (prime) contaminants, arranged in such a way that

the more effective chemicals progress to the right. Also entered in

Figure 17 are (as crossmarks) the group averages IAV of all blocks exposed

(mainly) to the same contaminant. Since the plot is logarithmic, the

geometric average was selected, namely

IAV ( 1 *in)1/n j2. ; (3)

linear averaging would not have altered the results materially. A final

geometric group average 'AV' formed from the IAV values, characterizes all

experiments made at the same voltage, temperature, and diffusion condition

(i.e., protected or non-protected blocks). The values in Figure 17 are

for 480 volt energization, for TMI-2 temperature, and for unprotected

blocks. Similar compilations were made for other experimental conditions.

All values are plotted in Figure 16 below our curve for the breakdown

current. Figure 16, which ir more fully discussed in Section VI, contains

one of the main results of our study, the average leakage currents and

their approximate spread with contamination.

D. Breakdown Probability

From T AV and IB we now define an average breakdown probability

P K IAV (4)

AV IB

The physical meaning Of PAV is the probability of complete breakdown for a

terminal with average (or with unknown) contamination. K is an adjustable

parameter used to improve compatibility with experimental results; it

should be near unity. We find, however, that optimum agreement with

experimental data is achieved for K = 1.4. We will use this value in Eq

(4), fully aware that resulting agreements with experiments will seem

unrealistically precise.

51
We now use Eq (4) to calculate three probability values for each mea-.

surement group and enter them as triangles into Figure 18, which is a plot

of probability of complete breakdown versus inverse temperature. The

three values are PAV' corresponding to IAV in Figure 16, the probability

pertaining to the optimum conditions (marked "clean block"), and the

probability pertaining to the worst case ("highest contamination").

These semitheoretical values have to be correlated with direct experimental data. In Table 3 our measured data, which were acquired with the

methods described in Section IV, are listed, together with values from

commercial sources at high temperatures (163%C or 325°F) and a room

temperature estimate.

Table 3

Breakdown Statistics for Terminal Blocks

(480 Volts, 100% rel. Humidity, 5 hours exposure)

Temperature

163%C = 325*F

(Commercial

Tests)

86 0 C = 186 0 F

(Three Mile

Island 2)

43 0 C = 110°F

(Laboratory)

Number of Experiments

Protected* 28

Open 20

Overall 48

Protected* 112

Open 315

Overall 427

Protected* 42

Open 170

Overall 212

Breakdowns

4

6

10

1

22

23

0

2(+4 multiples)

2

Probability

.14

.30

.21

.009

.07

.054

<10-3

.012

.009

_i0-5 Room Temp.

*6 mm weephole

Some comments are in order here, because the commercial experiments

were made under conditions different from ours. The available data on

these measurements (Franklin Institute, Westinghouse Canada) are listed in

Table 4. Conditions similar to the IEEE specified design accident environment1 9 (large break LOCA) were used. Relative humidity was, like ours,

100%. The pressure was very much higher than ours; this should be of

minor influence, as diffusion is essentially pressure independent. The

52
fast initial temperature rise prescribed by the IEEE encourages breakdown.

The admixture of contaminants was more conservative than ours, however.

Voltages used were sometimes higher (by 40 volts) than 480 volts, but. the

temperatures were often lower (290'F instead of 325°F). The exposure time

was longer than ours, but almost all breakdowns occurred early in the

test. Overall, we are justified in comparing this family of experiments

with ours, considering the +50%/-30% error margin we have applied to all

predictions.

Table 4

Commnercial Breakdown Data

(100% Humidity, 285 0 F-3250 F, 480-600 Volts ac)

Experimenter

Franklin Inst

for N.E.

Utilities

Ref: 22, 23,

24, 25

Franklin Inst

for CYAP

Ref: 26

Westinghouse

Canada

Ref: 27, 28

Not Included

Franklin Inst

for

Weidmueller

Termination,-

Ref: 21

Blocks

Marathon O

Westinghouse e

GE, 25 mm Weephole

.. , GE, Westinghouse, KULKA, Al Box

GE, Westinghouse, KULKA, Steel Box

GE, Westinghouse, KULKA, Steel Box

GE, Westinghouse, KULKA, Steel Box

Culter Hammer (600 Volts)

Penn Union

GE, Al Box, 1 in. weephole

GE, Al Box

in Evaluation

Weidmueller, Tight Box

Melamine - Voltage Lowered

During Experiments to

Avoid Breakdown

Number of Terminals

Protected Unprotected

4

2

2

6

6

6

6

12

2

2

2

Number of

Breakdowns

2

0

3

0'

1

0

4

0

0

0

25 0

Table ,3 also contains a room temperature estimate. At this temperature (where steam is water vapor) the breakdown probability is very low.

From Table 1 we see that 480 volts is probably under the threshold voltage

for breakdown except for the dirtiest surface. Observed breakdowns take

weeks to occur; the breakdown probability PAV is estimated as 10-5 with an

uncertainty factor of 10 on either side of it. For protected terminals,

PAV would be still lower.

53
We finally enter, from Table 3, the experimental breakdown probabilities (PAv) for protected and for unprotected terminals into Figure 18 and

connect the data points by free-form curves. We know that these curves

must have horizontal asymptotes for P = 100% and effective vertical

asymptotes (for P = 10-4 to 10-6) at room temperature. The general shape

of the curves is therefore well determined by two or three real data

points, and certainly so within our wide error limits.

0

0~

w

w

Figure 18. Average Probability of Breakdown vs Inverse Temperature

As stated above, the experimental data (with our adjustment factor K =

1.4) fit the expected value points for average conditions surprisingly

well. Our model appears viable, although it has a number of shortcomings

which are discussed later.

54
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

Figures 17 and 18 and Table 3 contain the main results of our

investigation. Their importance and their limitations are discussed

below.

A. Discussion of Results

For 100% relative humidity and a potential difference of 480 volts,

Figure 18 represents the temperature dependence of the average total-breakdown probability of a phenolic terminal block for two cases. In the first

case (upper curve), the insulator is open to the environment but is not

directly hit by steam or spray. In the second case, the block is protected by an "average" (i.e., not hermetically sealed) enclosure with a 6 mm

(1/4") weephole. If the protection is increased by a 2 mm flow retarder

in the weephole, the applicable curve would be lower by a factor of two or

three. At higher temperatures (left side o.f plot), the curves tend to

approach each other: diffusion through the weephole becomes so fast that

any protection effect decreases. At lower temperatures, breakdown probability becomes negligible even in a humid environment. The curves are

for average (or unknown) contamination. For higher contamination the

curves shift upward, in very severe situations by a factor of two. For

low contamination an equivalent decrease is predicted. Contamination

degrees such as "highest" or "clean block" are not rigorous but, rather,

practical designations.

There are two kinds of data in Figure 18. Firstly, the experimental

points (open dots) suffer from the shortcomings of low number statistics

for situations where breakdowns are rare, i.e., on the right and lower

side of the graph; at 110 0 F, as Table 3 shows, there were only two independent breakdowns after eliminating multiple events, and there was only one

breakdown inside a box under TMI-2 accident conditions. Secondly, the

semitheoretical points (triangles) obtained from correlation with our

model have been determined by multiple averaging from highly fluctuating

data. Considerable error bars are therefore indicated and, for prediction, have to be attached to the curve values: +50%/-30% at the higher

probabilities and a factor of two at the lower end of the curves.

55
B. Application of the Model

The model represented by the curves establishes correlation between

breakdown probability, which is extremely hard to measure, and average

leakage current, which is quite easy to determine. The correlation is

useful in both directions. Commercially, e.g., average leakage currents

.(IAV) have not been published, but the breakdown probabilities have been

measured reasonably well. Therefore, from Eq. (4) and Table 3 we can

estimate the average leakage currents at 325°F, and find 20 mA for an

unprotected terminal and 9 mA for an insulator in a box with a weephole.

The values are entered in Figure 16.

More importantly, the model permits parameter scaling, with certain

precautions. We have found, e.g., that in our measurement leakage current

for high and average contamination were ohmic, i.e., leakage currents are

proportional to voltage, and probability then scales with voltage. At 240

volts we expect half the breakdown probability, and at 120 volt a quarter

of the 480 volt values. For insulators approaching the designation

"clean", this model is not applicable; currents here, and therefore probabilities, decrease much faster than linearly with voltage.

The capability to estimate electrical total breakdown probabilities

and to establish average leakage current is needed for the analysis of

circuit behavior under accident conditions. Fluctuations were observed to

be generally proportional to leakage current, so we have now a means of

estimating maximum instantaneous current (3 to 5 times average) and noise

(1/f noise with average current value, TAV, at 1 Hz and extending to 30

Hz).

C. Shortcomings of the'Model

The work reported, while apparently very broad, has some shortcomings

in addition to its strongly statistical nature.

1. Neither in our nor in the high temperature commercial measurements

were the insulators exposed to radiation during the experiment. The bulk

56
properties of phenolics are not affected by deposition of less than 107

rads. 2 9 Up to this exposure the only concern is for surface effects,

i.e., essentially radiolysis occurring in the surface water layer. The

problem was addressed theoretically, using literature data (see Appendix

A). It was found that for TMI-2 accident conditions, the effect of

radiolysis is negligible on surface conductivity, and therefore on breakdown. For radiation depositions of 108 rads or more, the above findings

may have to be reevaluated.

2. Hydrogen gas is present in molecular form in the reactor fluid.

During an accident, massive outbreaks can occur. But H2 is a very stable

molecule; the dissociation up to 470K is very small. No indication could

be found in the literature that solvated H2 contributes to surface conductivity. Surprisingly, at an addition of about one half volume percent

of H2 , three terminals (previously contaminated with spray or acetone)

broke down, a number not expected from statistics. Unfortunately, a

facility for higher concentration hydrogen experiments was not available.

3. The hydrogen puzzle raises the question of the completeness of our

investigation; not all the chemicals in Table 2 were tried, nor were

collective effects systematically investigated.

4. From the physics of breakdown, one would expect to see response

variations with terminal block design. Blocks with screwholes, e.g., in

which liquid and dirt can accumulate, should break down more often than

clean designs where breakdown paths are only statistically formed. This

effect showed up clearly in our forced breakdown experiment (Section IVB),

but was barely recognizable in steam exposure experiments because it was

veiled by statistics.

5. Mechanical damage to blocks seems to be quite common. Cracks, in

which contaminated water can accumulate, will increase the breakdown

probability.

57
6. Breakdown and deterioration can be very circuit specific: a 50 K

leakage path may completely eliminate one circuit and have no effect

whatsoever on another.

Most of the above phenomena have a tendency to aggravate the terminal

block problem; our evaluation is therefore optimistic. Even so, it points

out that terminal blocks in a containment can cause considerable problems

during an accident or even just with a small steam leak occurring.31°

D. Recommendations

The results of our study indicate that the following recommendations

for reducing or eliminating the danger from terminal block deterioration

are warranted:

1. For existing reactors, steam cleaning of terminal blocks with subsequent alcohol washing is recommended, especially if considerable amounts

of dust are found in the protective box or if an accident has occurred. A

very highly contaminated block, cleaned this way and sealed with RTV, was

regenerated completely and functioned like a new block during a steam

cycle; the measurement is indicated on the right of Figure 17. As a

single very dirty terminal is prone to take its neighbors along in breakdown, cleaning of contamination spots is important.

2. The protective boxes in the containment should be inspected for

loose, open, or missing lids. The boxes should be tightened, and the weepholes should be eliminated, decreased in diameter (e.g., by insertion of

flow retarders), or equipped with some kind of bimetallic closing device

which automatically activates at high temperatures.

3. For new reactors or for. thorough retrofit situations, elimination

of terminal boxes as in safety-related circuits (as already accomplished

at TMI) should be considered for all those circuits which are of

conceivable use during and after an accident.

58
During construction, cleanliness and dust protection should be emphasized--

gloves may have to be used or a postcleaning requirement may have to be

established.

4. Special attention should be given to penetration boxes and instrument boxes on the containment wall; they are connected to a heat sink, and

.the blocks inside will suffer higher water adsorption. High voltage

circuits (480V) and those circuits where the power is cycled are most

endangered.

5. Circuit overloads leading to insulation burns have to be avoided;

smoke from burning wire insulation enhances breakdown.

6. Terminal blocks should not be mounted in such a way that condensate can collect in screwholes close to a potential breakdown path. Separators with a low melting point should be avoided. It may be advisable to

perform a re-design study to make blocks more breakdown resistant.

7. For accident analysis, it should be kept in mind that broken-down

blocks may heal. Low voltage postaccident tests do not permit conclusions

concerning the behavior of a circuit during the accident.

8. Large amounts of effective contaminants (Table 2) seem to exist in

containments, without clear reason. Consideration should be give to eliminating most of them.

9. The screening tests performed at the behest of the USNRC3 0 are

quite meaningful in general; however, due to the highly statistical nature

of breakdowns, they should not be used for detailed decisions.

10. For a complete assessment of terminal block malfunctioning, a

detailed circuit analysis has to be performed.

59
Re ferences

1. S. Whitehead, Dielectric Breakdown of Solids, Clarendon Press.

Oxford, 1950 (See Chapter "Surface Breakdown").

2. R. A. Fava in "Treatise on Materials Science and Technology", Vol.

10, "Properties of Solid Polymeric Materials", Part B, Edited by M.

Schulz. Academic Press, NY, 1977.

3. D. S. Mcllhagger and E. C. Salthouse, Proc. Inst. El. Eng. 112, p.

1468, 1965.

4. W. A. Yaeger and S. 0. Morgan, J. Phys. Chem. 35, p. 2026, 1931.

5. S. W. Chaikin, IRE Transactions QC-6, p. 57, 1956.

6. T. C. Williams and D. B. Herrmann, IRE Transactions QC-6, p. 11,

1956.

7. E. C. Salthouse, Proc. Inst. El., Eng. 115, p. 1707, 1968.

8. K. N. Mathes and L. J. McGowan, Proc. AIEE 80, Part 3, p. 281, 1961.

9. M. J. Billings, et.al., IEEE Transactions on El. Insulation, E13, p.

33, 1968.

10. E. Liste, Z. Phys. 62, p. 646, 1930.

11. J. S. Dryden and P. T. Wilson, Australian J. Appl. Science 1, p. 97,

1950.

12. E. C. Salthouse, IEEE Conference on Dielectric Materials,

Measurements and Applications, p. 245, July 1970.

13. R. Wilkins and M. J. Billings, Proc. IEEE, 116, p. 1777, 1969.

14. L. Mandelcorn, Proc. AIEE 80, Part 3, P. 481, 1961.

15. See, e.g., Franklin Institute Reports F-C 4033-3, January 1975, and

I-C 4911-1, January 1978.

16. L. L. Bonzon, "LOCA/MLSB Simulation Facility and HIACA", Sandia

Internal Memorandum, 1/23/80.

17. Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, Report NSAC-I, July 1979 (see

Attached Accident History Graphs).

18. J. L. Johnson, "Terminal Block Testing: Hardware Implementation,"

Sandia Labs Internal Memorandum, 6/5/80.

19. IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1 E Equipment for Nuclear Power

Stations, IEEE 323, 1974.

60
20. TMI-2 Final Safety Assessment Report (FSAR) Table 6.2-16, p. 6.2-81.

21. Franklin Institute (for Weidmueller Terminations), Report F-C5205-1,

October 1979.

22. Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, Report F-C4911-I, January

1978.

23. USNRC, Minutes of Meeting on Feb. 1, 1978, Docket No. 50-29, Feb. 3,

1979 (sic).

24. USNRC, Summary of Meeting on Jan. 29, 1978, Docket No. 50-2134, Jan.

30, 1978.

25. General Electric Company, Letter to Metropolitan Edison Co., GP-8-58,

Oct. 10, 1978.

26. USNRC, Summary of Meeting on March 23, 1978, Docket No. 50-213, March

30, 1978.

27. Indiana and Michigan Power Company, Letter to Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, Docket No. 50-316, DPR #74, March 22, 1978.

28. Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit #2, Docket No. 50-316, undated.

29. J. E. Gover, Personal Communication.

30. USNRC Bulletin 78-02, January 30, 1978.

31. See, e.g., USNRC, IE Circular No. 80-15, June 20, 1980.

61-62

APPENDIX A

Radiolysis and Surface Conductivity

During nuclear reactor excursions, insulating surfaces are exposed

both to high humidity and to sizeable doses of radiation. The thin water

layer on the insulator is then partially ionized by radiolysis. Some of

the ions (H+ and OH-) have a relatively high mobility in an electric field

and may generate surface conductivity and thus contribute to electrical

breakdown.

We will discuss the pertinent physical phenomena and provide a general estimate of the resulting conductivity. For the special case of the

TMI-2 accident, numerical figures will be furnished. We assume a pure

water layer without chemical contamination on the insulating surface.

An essential parameter is the thickness 6 of the water skin. It is a

function of relative humidity (Figure Al). For glass as substrate,A-1 6

varies from 17 to 120 monolayers, if the humidity varies from 90% to 97%.

There is indicationA- 2 that for phenolic surfaces approximately the same

values apply. For the TMI-2 situation, the insulators of concern are

mounted in a protective "penetration box" with a weephole. We estimate

that with unplugged weepholes the humidity inside the boxes varies from

60% to 97%. Therefore, the layer thickness varies between 4 and 120 monolayers, i.e., between 32 and 960 x 1078 cm. These figures are of course

not valid if there is direct spray impingement, dripping, or liquid collection in design features such as screwholes.

The complex reactions in irradiated water are analyzed in some detail

by Baker and Limatainen.A-3 Of importance for us are not the copious

molecular products formed, but the ionized radicals, mainly H+ and OH-,

which have the highest mobilities. The authors define a factor GR which

63
describes the number of radicals which "leave the tracks of the ionizing

radiation" for each 100 eV absorbed. In the absence of other data for

assessing electrical phenomena, we shall use the GR values for analyzing

the conductivity increase (or leakage resistance) under radiation.

IL

LO

0-1

LiLi

a:

C,

Li

eU

70-

60

50

40

30

20

10- -- i i

10 20 30 40 50 60 Q 70 80

> RELRTIVE HUMIDITY

90 100

Figure Al. Number of Adsorbed Water Layers vs Relative Humidity

For water moderated reactors the energy deposition is mainly caused

A-4 by y-rays. Depending on reactor design, GR values vary between a low

value of .4 and a maximum of 2.7 radicals per 100 eV. If r rads/sec = r x

6.25 x 1013 eV/sec gr impinge on I ccm (= 1 gr) of water, the number of

ionized carriers formed in this volume is

n = 6.25 x 1011 x GR r/cm 3 sec, (A-1)

according to the above definition of GR*

To calculate the resulting conductivity a-, we need to know the

average lifetime T(sec) and the average mobility ji(cm2 /V sec) of the

64
generated *ionic carriers. The values for both quantities are known to be

strongly dependent on the thickness 6, which for our case is sometimes of

the order of the mean free path of molecular motion. This fact increases

the lifetime T and decreases the mobility p. in a manner which is not well

understood, but as these quantities enter the equation for a- as a product,

we feel we can use bulk values for our estimate. Lifetime T then-may be

taken between 10-3 and 10-1 seconds, and mobility p. between 10-5 and 10-7

cm2 /V sec. We find, therefore,

a- q • nT- p (Q- 1 cm- 1 ) (A-2)

where q is the elementary charge, 1.6 x 10-19 A.sec.

We can now finally calculate the resistance R of a strip on the surface which is a cm long and b cm wide, R = a/bSo-, and find, using Eqs.

(A-l) and (A-2):

R _ 1.6 x 10- 1 2 a (A-3) b6q GR * r T

For terminal blocks in the TMI reactor, a = b and the two quantities

cancel. Of course, the worst (i.e., smallest) leakage resistance is

obtained for the maximum parameter values in the denominator. The maximum

radiation deposition outside the reactor vessel, but inside the containment, observed at TMI was 6000 rads/hour = 1.67 rads/sec.A- 5 Using this

and the other maximum parameter values listed above, we find a leakage

resistance of R = 2 x 1016Q. Hydrolysis alone therefore causes very

little leakage. Even if we modify our figures for 8, GR, r, T, and p. by

one order of magnitude each in the unfavorable direction, R is still = 2 x

10110. At 500 volts or less, the effect therefore is negligible with

respect to the circuit impedances involved. The same conclusion is obtained if we take secondary electrons reflected from bulk collisions into

account,A- 6 which may change the results from Eq. (A-3) by a factor of

500. -Our calculations are of course only valid if linearity and linear

superposition holds. This is highly likely for parameters of the order of

our considerations.

65
References for Appendix A

1. Yaeger and Morgan, J. Phys. Chem. 35, p. 2026, 1931.

2. Mcllhagger and Salthouse, Proc. Inst. El. Eng. 112, p. 1469, 1965.

3. Baker and Linatainen, "Chemical Reactions," in "Technology of Nuclear

Reactor Safety, Vol. 2, p. 470, MIL Press, Cambridge, MA, 1973.

4. Hart, McDonnell and Gordon, "Decomposition of Boric Acid Solutions by

Reactor Radiation," Proceedings of the First U.N. International

Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, 1955, Vol. 7, p.

593.

5. P. Yarrington, Oral Communciation.

6. J. Castle, Oral Communication.

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4445 J. A. Lewin

4445 F. V. Thome

4450 J. A. Reuscher

4500 E. H. Beckner

4700 J. H. Scott

5154 R. J. Baughmann

5800 R. S. Claassen

5810 R. G. Kepler

5811 L. A. Harrah

5811 R. L. Clough

5813 J. G. Curro

5813 K. T. Gillen

5813 E. A. Salazar

5815 R. T. Johnson

8214 P. A. Childers

3141 L. J. Erickson (5)

3151 W. L. Garner (3)

For DOE/TIC (Unlimited Release)

3154-4 J. Hernandez (25)

For NRC distribution to NTIS

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1981: 777-023/513

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