J-S71032-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

U.S. ROF III LEGAL TITLE TRUST 2015-

1, BY U.S. BANK NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, AS LEGAL TITLE 

TRUSTEE,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SUSAN LAIRD & GENE STRIKWERDA,

Appellants No. 1812 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order April 22, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No.: 2014-29951

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2018

Appellants, Susan Laird and Gene Strikwerda, appeal, pro se, from the 

trial court’s April 22, 2016 order granting the motion for summary judgment 

of Appellee, U.S. ROF III, Legal Title Trust 2015-1, by U.S. Bank National 

Association as legal title trustee in this mortgage foreclosure action. We 

affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S71032-17

- 2 -

In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history of this case.1 (See Trial Court Opinion, 4/07/17, 

at 1-5). Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.

On appeal, Appellants raise the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of 

[Appellee?]

(Appellants’ Brief, at 6).

We briefly note our standards of review.

Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment 

is plenary. We apply the same standard as the trial court, 

reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there 

exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to 

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved 

against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment 

be entered.

Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly 

implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of his cause of 

action. Thus, a record that supports summary judgment will 

either (1) show the material facts are undisputed or (2) contain 

insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of 

action or defense and, therefore, there is no issue to be submitted 

to the fact-finder. Upon appellate review, we are not bound by 

the trial court’s conclusions of law, but may reach our own 

conclusions. The appellate court may disturb the trial court’s 

order only upon an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

____________________________________________

1 On May 24, 2016, the trial court ordered Appellants to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On 

June 13, 2016, Appellants filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement. See id. On 

April 7, 2017, the court filed an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
J-S71032-17

- 3 -

Dibish v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., 134 A.3d 1079, 1084-85 (Pa. Super. 

2016), appeal denied, 141 A.3d 481 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, 

[t]he holder of a mortgage has the right, upon default, to 

bring a foreclosure action. The holder of a mortgage is entitled to 

summary judgment if the mortgagor admits that the mortgage is 

in default, the mortgagor has failed to pay on the obligation, and 

the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount. 

Bank of America, N.A. v. Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 464-65 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

appeal denied, 112 A.3d 648 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted). 

After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, the applicable 

law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that there 

is no merit to the issues Appellants have raised on appeal. The trial court 

opinion properly disposes of the questions presented.2 (See Trial Ct. Op., at 

7-12) (finding that: (1) Appellee is the real party in interest with standing to 

foreclose; (2) Appellants failed to rebut any of Appellee’s substantive 

allegations; (3) Appellants’ general denials did not identify any issues of 

factual dispute; and (4) Appellants’ claim that Appellee wrongly filed two 

____________________________________________

2 To the extent it can be determined from Appellants’ brief, which is all but 

unintelligible, Appellants appear to argue that the affidavit filed by Appellee in 

support of its motion for summary judgment was inadmissible hearsay. (See 

Appellants’ Brief, at 7-8). The trial court did not address this issue in its 

opinion because Appellants did not raise it in their Rule 1925(b) statement. 

(See Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 6/13/16, at 1). Thus, 

Appellants waived this issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); see also 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998), superseded by rule 

on other grounds as stated in Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 431 

(Pa. Super. 2009).
J-S71032-17

- 4 -

different true and correct copies of the note was both waived and unsupported 

by record). Accordingly, we affirm based on the trial court’s opinion.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/16/18
201 ticRALOIN94641P1r11123AP11 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL ACTION - LAW 

U.S. ROF III LEGAL TITLE TRUST 2015-1 : BY U.S. BANK, N.A., AS LEGAL TITLE 

TRUSTEE 

Plaintiff v. SUSAN LAIRD Aff(JA SUSAN L. LAIRD 

AND STRIKWERDA 

Defendants 

OPINION 

Branca, J. April 7, 2017 

1. INTRODUCTION 

Susan Laird afkla Susan L. Laird and Gene Strikwerda (collectively, "Defendants") 

appeal pro set from this Court's Order, dated April 22, 2016, granting Plaintiff, U.S. ROF III 

Legal Title Trust 2015-1, by U.S. Bank National Association, as Legal Title Trustee's Motion for 

Summary Judgment and entering judgment, in rem, in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants 

in the amount of $334,811.49, plus interest and applicable costs. For the reasons that follow, 

Defendants' appeal is without merit and the Court's Order, dated April 22, 2016, should be 

AFFIRMED. 

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

The instant dispute arises from a Mortgage (the "Mortgage") securing the real property 

(the "Property") located at 3126 Shirlene Road, East Norriton, Pennsylvania, executed and 

delivered by Defendants to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as 

nominee for Franklin American Mortgage Company ("Franklin") on January 23, 2009, and 

NO. 14-29951 

1812 EDA 2016 

1111 IIRritinilt 1111 

2014-29951-0030 4/7/2017 4:07 PM # 11232729 

Opinion 

Rcpt= 23105573 Fee:SO.00 

Mark LCN'y - NIontCo Prothonotary 

While the Court is cognizant of Defendants' pro se status on appeal, Defendants are bound and obligated to 

comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. See Jones v. Rudenstein, 585 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 1991) (Citing Farretta v. _California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46 (1975)). 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 2 

recorded on February 9, 2009.2 The Mortgage secured Defendants' obligations under the 

Promissory Note (the "Note"),dated January 23, 2009, and given to Franklin in consideration of 

a loan to Defendants in the amount of $260,855.00, with interest thereon at 5.000%, payable in 

equal monthly installments of $1,400.33 commencing on March 1, 2009.3 In relevant portion, 

the Note provides: 

"Borrower" means each person signing at the end of this Note, and the person's 

successors and assigns. 

"Lender" means Franklin America Mortgage Company and its successors and 

assigns. 

Borrower's promise to pay is secured by a Mortgage, . . . that is dated the same 

date as this Note and called the "Security Instrument." The Security Instrument 

protects the Lender from losses which might result if Borrower defaults under this 

Note. . .[4] 

In relevant portion, the Mortgage states: 

Borrower owes Lender the principal sum of . . ($260,855.00.) This debt is 

evidenced by Borrower's note dated the same date as this Security Instrument 

(Note) . . .. This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (a) the repayment of the 

debt evidences by the Note, with interest, . . ; (c) the performance of Borrower's 

covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and the Note. 

For this purpose, Borrower does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS 

(solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and to the 

successors and assigns of MERS the following described property .... .[5] 

The covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind and benefit 

the successors andassigns of Lender and Borrower . .[6] 

Thereafter, on August 1, 2011, Defendants defaulted on the Note and Mortgage by failing to 

make the previously agreed upon monthly payments. On January 16, 2013, though not required 

2 [Compl. at Ex. A (the "Mortgage") (Montgomery County Record of Deeds, Instrument # 2009010231, Book 

12533 at Page 368, (11/10/14)]. 3 [Compl. at Ex. B (the "Note"), (11/10/14)]. 

4 [Compl. at Ex. B (the "Note"), at ¶ 1, 3, (11/10/14)]. 

5 [Compl. at Ex. A (the "Mortgage") (Montgomery County Record of Deeds, Instrument # 2009010231, Book 

12533 at Page 368, (11/10/14)]. 6 Compl. at Ex. A (the "Mortgage") (Montgomery County Record of Deeds, Instrument # 2009010231, Book 12533 

at Page 368, at lj 12, (11/10/14)]. 

2 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 3 

because Defendants' period default exceeded 24 months, Plaintiff, nonetheless, sent Notices of 

Intention to Foreclose to each Defendant at the Property via certified and regular mail.7 

On August 22, 2012, the Mortgage was assigned by MERS as nominee for Franklin to 

Bank of America, N.A., which assignment ("First Assignment") was duly recorded in the Office 

of the Recorder of Deeds of Montgomery County on August 24, 2012.8 On April 2, 2014, Bank 

of America, N.A. assigned the Mortgage to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 

which assignment ("Second Assignment") was duly recorded in the Office of the Recorder of 

Deeds of Montgomery County on May 29, 2014.9 On June 6, 2014, the Secretary of Housing 

and Urban Development assigned the Mortgage to U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee 

for SROF-2013-S3 REMIC Trust I ("U.S. Bank"), which assignment ("Third Assignment") was 

duly recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Montgomery County on June 18, 2014.10 

On November 10, 2014, U.S. Bank instituted the instant mortgage foreclosure action 

against Defendants. On December15, 2014, Defendants filed Preliminary Objections pro se, 

asserting that U.S. Bank was not the real party in interest and therefore, lacked standing to 

foreclose. (Defendants inexplicably attached to their Preliminary Objections more than 250 

pages of exhibits.) U.S. Bank filed its Reply on January 2, 2015, and by Order dated February 

25, 2015, this Court overruled Defendants' Preliminary Objections. In the meantime, on January 

13, 2015, U.S. Bank assigned the Mortgage to SROF 2013-S3 REO I LLC, which assignment 

7 [Comp'. at 1112, Ex. C ("Notice of Intention"), (I 1/10/14)]; See 35 P.S. 5 P.S. § I680.402c. 

8 [Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. C ("First Assignment") (Montgomery County Record of Deeds, Instrument 

#2012083941, Book 13388, at Page 01194), (2/26/16)]. 9 [Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. D ("Second Assignment") (Montgomery County Record of Deeds, Instrument 

N2014032724, Book 13786, at Page 00926), (2/26/16)]. 10 [Pl.'s Mot. for Summ: J. at Ex. E'("Third Assignment") (Montgomery County Record of Deeds, Instrument 

#2014037727, Book 13794, at Page 02303), (2/26/16)]. 

3 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 4 

("Fourth Assignment") was duly recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Montgomery 

County on February 23, 2015.1 

On March 16, 2015, Defendants filed their Answer and New Matter, affirmatively 

admitting only their names and mailing addresses.I2 But despite Defendants' prevarication, they 

ultimately admitted all remaining allegations of material fact by virtue of their lengthy and 

obtuse general denials. On April 8, 2015, in response to Defendants' alleged affirmative 

defenses, Plaintiff filed a Reply aptly disposing of their New Matter.I3 Thereafter, on November 

4, 2015, SROF 2013-S3 REO I LLC assigned the Mortgage to Plaintiff, which assignment 

("Fifth Assignment") was duly recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Montgomery 

County on November 13, 2015.14 

On February 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting therein 

that it was the holder of the Note and Mortgage.I5 In response, Defendants filed an Answer, 

attaching more than 850 pages of exhibits, and neglected entirely to file the requisite brief in 

support thereof.16 After a review of the record, the undersigned determined no genuine issues of 

material fact existed, Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and accordingly 

granted Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment by Order dated April 22, 2016. 

Notwithstanding this Court's April 22nd entry of judgment and for reasons still unclear, on April 

26, 2016, Defendants filed 'Preliminary Objections In The Nature To Strike Plaintiffs Sur Reply 

11 [Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. F ("Fourth Assignment") (Montgomery County Record of Deeds, Instrument 

#2015011569, Book 13901, at Page 02967), (2/26/16)]; [Pl.'s Praecipe, at Ex, A ("Fourth Assignment") 

(Montgomery County Record of Deeds, Instrument 420150 11569, Book 13901, at Page 02967), (4/8/15)]. 

12 [Defs.' Answ. & New Matter (3/16/15)]. 

13 [Pl.'s Reply (4/8/15)]. 14 [Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. G ("Fifth Assignment") (Montgomery County Record of Deeds, Instrument 

#2015086531, Book 14043, at Page 00199) (2/26/16)]. 

15 [Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., at ¶ 8, (2/26/16)]. 

16 [Defs.' Answ. To Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., (3/28/16)]; see Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(d); see also Montco. R,C.P. 208.3(b) 

(generally permitting entry of judgment where respondent fails to respond). 

4 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 5 

Brief . . . .'17 On May 20, 2016, Defendants timely filed and served upon the undersigned a Notice of Appeal, and on June 13, 2016, Defendants timely filed and served upon the 

undersigned their Statement of Errors Complained Of On Appeal (Pa. R. A. P. "1925(b) 

Statement") which set forth the following: 

1. The learned Judge erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for summary 

judgement. 

The learned Judge erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for summary 

judgement by allowing Plaintiff to file two completely different true and 

correct copies of the note. 

3. The learned Judge erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for summary 

judgement by not dismissing Plaintiff's case due to lack of standing. 

4. The learned Judge erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for summary 

judgement as the court failed to recognize MERS cannot transfer any 

beneficial interest in the note or mortgage. 

III. DISCUSSION 

On appeal Defendants preserved.two issues for review. First, they contend that Plaintiff 

is not the real party in interest and lacks standing to foreclose; and second, they claim that 

Plaintiff improperly filed two different copies of the Note. Defendants' remaining bald and 

undeveloped contentions that the Court erred are waived for vagueness." As discussed 

hereinafter, Defendants' claims are meritless, and the Court's entry of summary judgment in 

favor of Plaintiff was appropriate. 

" Defendants' Preliminary Objections present just one example of Defendants' repeated misapplication and lack of 

Comprehension of the rules of civil procedure, as demonstrated herein: "The verification attached is signed by Leslie 

J. Rase Esquire. Leslie J. Rase Esquire is not a party to this case. Pa. R.C.P. 1024 requires that parties sign 

verifications. This verification violates the rules and therefore this document must be stricken.... This is not proper 

under civil procedure. Under old time practice this was called a Speaking Demurrer. Speaking Demurrers are not 

aloud [sic]." Additionally, Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that Plaintiff lacked standing, 

which was denied by operation of law. 

18 See Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4). 

5 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 6 

A. Standard of Review 

Summary judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue of 

material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action. Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2(1). The record 

is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the 

presence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Albright v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 696 A.2d 1159, 1165 (Pa. 1997) (citing Pennsylvania State University 

v. County of Centre, 615 A.2d 303,304 (Pa. 1992)). However, "[w]here the non-moving party 

bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in 

order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient 

evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of proof establishes 

the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law." JP Morgan Chase Bank, 

N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1261-62 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). More 

specifically, to preclude entry of judgment, respondents must identify: 

(1) one or more issues of fact arising from evidence in the record controverting 

the evidence cited in support of the motion or from a challenge to the 

credibility of one or more witnesses testifying in support of the motion, or 

(2) evidence in the record establishing the facts essential to the cause of action or 

defense which the motion cites as not having been produced.19 

Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(a)(1),(2). In a mortgage foreclosure action, summary judgment is appropriate 

if the mortgagors "admit that the mortgage is in default, that they have failed to pay interest on 

the obligation, and that the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount." Cunningham v. McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (citing Landau v. W. Pa. Nat'l Bank, 

282 A.2d 335, 340 (Pa. 1971)). Finally, when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the 

appellate court may only disturb the order of the trial court when it is determined that there has 

19 Pa, R.C.P. 1035,3. 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 7 

been an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. Shomo v. Scribe, 686 A.2d 1292, 1294 (Pa. 

1996); Panichelli v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, 669 A.2d 930, 931 (Pa. 1996). 

B. The Court Properly Granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 

On their face, Defendants' pro se pleadings reflect numerous procedural and 

substantive deficits. Their anfractuous responses and allegations are improperly 

predicated on a variety of documents which are either not part of the record, or 

completely irrelevant to the Court's disposition of the instant Motion for Summary 

Judgment.2° For the reasons that follow, the Court's entry of judgment in favor of 

Plaintiff was appropriate. 

i. Plaintiff Is The Real Party In Interest With Standing To Foreclose.21 

Given the prolix nature of Defendants' responses and allegations, including block 

quotations from various irrelevant publications, their defense to.Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 

Judgment, while not entirely clear, appears from their 1925(b) Statement to be that: (1) Plaintiff 

is not the real party in interest and lacks standing to foreclose, and (2) a genuine issue of material 

fact exists as to Plaintiff's possession of the Note.22 Defendants' claims are meritless. 

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff properly alleged it was "the present holder 

of the Mortgage and Note, as well as the mortgagee of record."23 In response, Defendants 

unconvincingly denied Plaintiff's status as holder, stating, "Denied. There is no evidence that the 

2° Defendants repeatedly refer to publications such as, 'Modern Money Mechanics,' as well as the 'Certificate of 

Incorporation of Mortgage Electronic Registrations System, Inc.,' as well as `MERS System of Rules of 

Membership,' Ginnie Mae Guaranteed REMIC Pass -Through Securities Base Offering Circular' MERS 

Residential Marketing Kit,' MERS Procedures Manual, Release 19.0,' and 'MERS Procedural Manual, Release 

1.3.5, I .,20 21 Notwithstanding Defendants' failure to file a brief, this Court will address Defendants' I925(b) Statement. See 

Montco, R.C.P. 208.3(b)(6)(b) (Entry of judgment against respondent for noncompliance is appropriate.) 22 [See Defs.' Preliminary Objections (12/15/14) , Defs.' Answ. & New Matter (3/16/16), Defs.' Answ. to Pl.'s Mot. 

for Summ. J., at ¶ 8, (3/28/16)]. 23 [Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., at ¶ 8, (2/26/16)]. 

7 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 8 

Plaintiff is the holder of the Note or Mortgage."24 Contrary to Defendants' assertion, the record 

aptly supports Plaintiff's status as the real party in interest. More specifically, not only did 

Plaintiff painstakingly set forth the factual details underpinning each Mortgage Assignment, but 

it exceeded its evidentiary burden by attaching copies of each Assignment, statements of their 

recordation, and a documentary Affidavit in support of its Motion, all of which supported its 

standing to foreclose, as well as the sums due thereunder.25 

For their part, however, Defendants baldly asserted in their Answer to the Motion for 

Summary Judgment that Plaintiff cannot be the holder of the Mortgage and the Note, because the 

Note was specially endorsed by Franklin to Countrywide Bank, FSB.26 Defendants' response 

addressing the Note's special endorsement is irrelevant to Plaintiff's status as the mortgagee and, 

in any event, not supported by the case law. 

First, as demonstrated by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure, the mortgage holder is 

the party with standing to foreclose. See Pa. R.C.P. 1147(1) (Requiring complainant to allege 

"the parties to and the date of the mortgage, and of any assignments, and a statement of the 

place of record of the mortgage and assignments.") That propositiOn is supported by our 

Pennsylvania jurisprudence, as aptly demonstrated by our Superior Court's recent decision in 

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat, holding that a mortgagee which avers and produces evidence to 

support its status as the holder of the mortgage, by assignment, is the real party in interest." See 

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat, 131 A.3d 65,68-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); see also Wells Fargo 

24 [Defs.' Answ. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., at 118, (3/28/16)]. Additionally, while Defendants did not assert with 

the requisite specificity any other issues on review, their repeated block recitation of portions of publications which 

have no relevance to the instant dispute do not constitute sufficiency, so as to preserve their denials any of Plaintiff's 

remaining allegations. See Pa. R.C.P. 1029. 

25[See Pl.'s Mot. for Summ, J,, at Exs. A ("the Note"), Ex. B ("Mortgage,") Ex. C ("First Assignment"), Ex. D 

("Second Assignment"), Ex. E ("Third Assignment"),Ex. F ("Fourth Assignment,") and Ex. G ("Fifth Assignment"), 

Ex, R ("Affidavit"), (2/26/16)1; See Kirby v. Kirby, 687 A.2d 385, 388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (Documentary 

affidavits, if uncontradicted, may properly support the entry of summary judgment as they fall outside the ambit of 

the Nanty-Glo Rule.) (internal citation omitted). 26 [Defs.' Answ. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J,, at 118, (3/28/16)]. 

8 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 9 

Bank, N.A. v. Lupori, 8 A.3d 919, 922 n. 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). It is well -settled that "[w]here 

an assignment is effective, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes all of his 

rights. See Smith v. Cumberland Group, Ltd., 687 A.2d 1167, 1172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 

Defendants, therefore, not only misrepresented Plaintiff's authority as the mortgagee and 

the evidence of record supporting Plaintiff's status as the holder of the Mortgage and Note, but 

they also failed to muster any evidence of their own to rebut Plaintiff's allegations and/or 

evidence. As delineated by Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(a), Defendants were obligated to set forth: 

(1) one or more issues of fact arising from evidence in the record controverting 

the evidence cited in support of the motion or from a challenge to the 

credibility of one or more witnesses testifying in support of the motion, or 

(2) evidence in the record establishing the facts essential to the cause of action or 

defense which the motion cites as not having been produced.27 

In response to Plaintiff's properly plead allegations and supporting evidence, Defendants 

failed entirely to present any relevant evidence to rebut Plaintiff's claim as the real party 

in interest, and holder of the Mortgage and Note despite the opportunity to conduct 

discovery.28 Defendants' haphazard attachment of hundreds of pages of extraneous 

exhibits, including publications and documents lacking any relevance to the instant 

action, in no way rebutted Plaintiff's substantive evidence.29 As set forth above, to 

preclude entry of judgment a respondent may not rest upon mere general denials, but 

must identify an issue of fact arising from the evidence. See Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3. Given 

Defendants' failure to meet their burden of rebuttal, the Court's entry of judgment in 

favor of Plaintiff, as mortgagee, was appropriate. 

27 Pa. R.C.P. I 035.3(a). 28 Defendants failed to face their Answer to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment with the required cover sheet, 

pursuant to Montco. R.C.P. 205.2(b), wherein they could have expressly requested discovery, and did not otherwise 

seek discovery as to Plaintiff's status as the real party in interest. 29 [See Defs,' Preliminary Objections (12/15/14) , Defs.' Answ. & New Matter (3/16/16), Defs.' Answ. to Pl.'s Mot. 

for Summ. J,, at ¶ 8, (3/28/16)]. 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 10 

This Court is not unmindful of the mortgage industries' propensity to repeatedly re -assign 

mortgages. This practice, though legal, can no doubt be confusing to pro se mortgagees, such as 

Defendants. Nonetheless, Plaintiff, in this case has demonstrated its burden under the Rules by 

expressly pleading each Mortgage assignment chronologically, and attaching to its pleadings the 

referenced assignments; thereby setting forth in as succinct and orderly manner as possible the 

basis for its status as assignee of the Mortgage. As such, the uncontroverted evidence establishes 

that Plaintiff, by virtue of its unrebutted chain of assignments, is the mortgagee with standing to 

foreclose, and Defendants' claim to the contrary is meritless. 

ii. Alleged Two Different Copies of Note. 

On appeal, Defendants also asserted that the Court erred "by allowing Plaintiff to 

file two completely different true and correct copies of the note."30 The Court is 

perplexed by this assertion. Not only is this allegation unsupported by any submissions 

of Defendants on the record, but this Court's review revealed identical copies of the Note 

attached to Plaintiff's Complaint and Motion for Summary Judgment. Indeed, the copy 

of the Note attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment includes the exact same time - stamp affixed to the copy of the Note filed with the Complaint; thereby confirming that 

Plaintiff attached the same Note copy to both pleadings.31 Moreover, in any event, 

Plaintiff had no obligation under the Rules to attach a copy of the Note; especially in light 

of Defendants' apparent failure to demand production of the same. 

Under Pa. R.C.P. 1147, a complainant seeking to foreclosure must set 

forth the following averments of fact: 

30 [See Defs.' 1925(b) Statement]. 

31 [Compare Pl.'s Compl., at Ex. B ("the Note"), (11/10/14), with P1.'s Mot. for Summ. J,, at Ex. A ("the Note"), 

(2/26/16)]. 

10 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 11 

(1) the parties to and the date of the mortgage, and of any assignments, and a 

statement of the place of record of the mortgage and assignments; 

(2) a description of the land subject to the mortgage; 

(3) the names, addresses and interest of the defendants in the action and that 

the present real owner is unknown if the real owner is not made a party; 

(4) a specific averment of default; 

(5) an itemized statement of the amount due; and 

(6) a demand for judgment for the amount due. 

Pa. R.C.P. 1147. As demonstrated, nowhere in the Pa. R.C.P. 1147 is there a requirement 

to attach a copy of the Note upon which entry of j udgment is sought. Thus, in the first 

instance, Plaintiff's inclusion and attachment of the Note copy was in excess of that 

which is required by Pa. R.C.P. 1147. 

Additionally, Defendants' 1925(b) lacks sufficient detail and specificity to 

identify the filings at issue, and as such, this Court is unable to ascertain to which exhibits 

Defendants refer.32 Therefore, Defendants' claim regarding Plaintiff's filing of two 

different copies of the Note is not only meritless, but is also deemed waived in light of 

defendants' failure to provide the Court with the mandated specificity. 

Finally, as addressed previously, the instant Note has been in arrears since 

Defendants' default in August 1, 2011. Despite copious amounts of paper added to this 

case by Defendants' futile and frivolous attempts to delay the disposition of this matter, 

and abuse our legal system so as to remain in the Property for years without payment; the 

record reflects no genuine issues of material fact to preclude entry of judgment. Thus, in 

light of Defendants' failure to demonstrate the requisite issue of material fact or produce 

32 See Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(11). 
2014-29951-0030 Opinion, Page 12 

any evidence of record to rebut Plaintiff's status as a real party in interest with standing to 

foreclose, the Court's entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants was 

wholly appropriate. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

This Court respectfully requests that its Order, dated April 22, 2016, granting 

Plaintiff, U.S. ROF III Legal Title Trust 2015-1, by U.S. Bank National Association, as 

Legal Title Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment and entering judgment, in rem, in 

favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of $334,811.49, plus interest and 

applicable costs, be AFFIRMED. 

BY THE COURT: 

THOMAS C. BRANCA, 

Copies of the above Opinion 

mailed on 4/ -7 /17 to: 

By First Class Mail: 

Sarah McCaffery, Esquire 

Leslie J. Rase, Esquire 

Susan Laird, Pro Se, 3126 Shirlene Rd., East Norriton, PA. 19403 

Susan L. Laird, Pro Se, 3126 Shirlene Rd., East Norriton, PA. 19403 

Gene Strikwerda, Pro Se, 3126 Shirlene Rd., East Norriton, PA. 19403 

By Interoffice Mail: 

Court Administr tion 

L( Secretary w' 

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