NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, 

v.

DAMON ELI RICHARDSON, Petitioner. 

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0179 PRPC 

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2018-133539-001 

The Honorable Ronda R. Fisk, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

APPEARANCES

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Krista Wood

Counsel for Respondent 

Damon Eli Richardson, Douglas

Petitioner

FILED 2-9-2023
STATE v. RICHARDSON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma, Judge Cynthia J. Bailey, and Vice 

Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the following decision.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Damon Richardson petitions for review from the dismissal of 

his petition for post-conviction relief filed under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure (Rule) 33. We have considered the petition for review and, for 

the reasons stated, grant review and deny relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In July 2018, the State charged Richardson with eleven sex 

crimes involving minors and one count of misconduct involving weapons, 

alleged to have been committed in Maricopa County on various dates (and 

date ranges) in 2013 to 2016. After a settlement conference, Richardson pled

guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (a class 2 felony and a 

Dangerous Crime Against Children) and two counts of attempted sexual 

exploitation of a minor (class 3 felonies and Dangerous Crimes Against 

Children). The superior court imposed a consequence consistent with the 

plea agreement: 17 years’ imprisonment (the presumptive sentence) for the 

sexual exploitation of a minor conviction, to be followed by lifetime 

probation for the attempt convictions. 

¶3 Richardson timely filed for post-conviction relief, and the 

superior court appointed counsel to represent him. After counsel found no 

colorable claim, Richardson petitioned for relief in propria persona. The 

superior court summarily dismissed Richardson’s claims, and he timely 

sought review. This court has jurisdiction under article VI, section 9, of the 

Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. § 13-4239.C and Rule 32.16.

ANALYSIS

¶4 Richardson argues the superior court should have granted 

post-conviction relief under Rules 33.1(a) and 33.1(c) based on the following 

claims: (1) his arrest was unlawful; (2) the complaint filed against him was 

untimely; (3) he was unlawfully held without bond; (4) he did not receive a 

preliminary hearing; (5) the State withheld exculpatory evidence; (6) the 
STATE v. RICHARDSON

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3

settlement judge coerced his plea; (7) the State vindictively prosecuted him

and coerced his plea; (8) his plea was not supported by an adequate factual 

basis; (9) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by not obtaining 

exculpatory evidence and by not objecting to the State and the superior 

court’s conduct in coercing his plea; (10) the same judge unlawfully 

participated in both settlement negotiations and sentencing; (11) he was 

sentenced on multiple charges; (12) his sentence was unlawfully enhanced;

and (13) the superior court erroneously denied his motion to compel

production of exculpatory evidence. Richardson also argues the superior 

court should have granted his motion for a change of judge for postconviction relief.

¶5 We review the superior court’s denial of post-conviction relief 

for an abuse of discretion, “which occurs if the court makes an error of law 

or fails to adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” 

State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407, ¶ 6 (2021). We review the court’s

determinations of law de novo. Id.

¶6 Before accepting a guilty plea, the superior court must 

undertake a colloquy with the defendant and find the defendant entered

the plea voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. State v. Rose, 231 Ariz. 

500, 505, ¶ 13 (2013). To that end, the superior court must ensure the 

defendant understands the charges, the sentencing range and conditions, 

and the constitutional rights the defendant waives by pleading guilty. Id.; 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.2(a). The superior court also must confirm the 

defendant wishes to relinquish those constitutional rights and the “plea is 

voluntary and not the result of force, threats or promises.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

17.3(a). A plea is involuntary if the defendant lacks information essential to 

his decision. State v. Stefanovich, 232 Ariz. 154, 157, ¶ 12 (App. 2013). The 

record shows, and Richardson does not dispute, the superior court fulfilled 

its obligations under Rules 17.2(a) and 17.3(a).

¶7 By pleading guilty, a defendant relinquishes his right to 

challenge “all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, except those that relate to the validity of 

[the] plea.” State v. Banda, 232 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 12 (App. 2013). In other 

words, a pleading defendant waives actual and potential non-jurisdictional

“claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights” occurring before 

the plea unless a deprivation relates to the validity of the plea itself. Tollett 

v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).

¶8 The superior court correctly dismissed Richardson’s claims 

relating to his arrest, release status, preliminary hearing, and charging 
STATE v. RICHARDSON

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documents because those claims assert non-jurisdictional issues he waived 

by pleading guilty. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 121 Ariz. 16, 17–18 (1978) 

(challenge to preliminary hearing waived by guilty plea); State v. Martinez, 

102 Ariz. 215, 216 (1967) (claim of unlawful arrest waived by guilty plea);

State v. Reed, 121 Ariz. 547, 549 (App. 1979) (challenge to grand jury 

proceeding waived by guilty plea).

¶9 Though Richardson preserved claims asserting his plea was

involuntary, the superior court reasonably determined he did not establish 

a colorable basis for relief. The State did not force Richardson to make a 

quick decision on the plea offer, and he did not enter a change of plea until 

about two weeks after the settlement conference. 

¶10 At the change-of-plea hearing, during a colloquy with the 

superior court judge, Richardson confirmed he fully understood and 

agreed with the plea agreement, his attorney answered all his questions,

and no one compelled him to plead guilty by force, threat, or promise. 

Richardson’s statements have “legal significance” and “carry a strong 

presumption of verity.” State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521, 525, ¶ 12 (App. 2017) 

(cleaned up). Because Richardson did not show the representations were 

the result of “misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others,”

he failed to rebut that presumption. Id. at 526, ¶ 13 (cleaned up).

¶11 First, the record does not support Richardson’s argument the

superior court coerced his plea at the settlement conference. At the outset, 

the superior court told Richardson its role was not to promote any 

particular outcome but simply to give him information so he could “make

an informed decision” whether to accept the plea offer. The superior court 

then explained the relative strengths and weaknesses of the State’s case 

against Richardson and different sentencing scenarios if he were convicted 

at trial.

¶12 Richardson next argues the State’s conduct at the settlement 

conference effectively coerced his plea and revealed a vindictive 

prosecution. Initially, the State incorrectly asserted it needed only to prove 

“possession” on the sexual exploitation charges. But the State promptly

corrected itself and agreed it also needed to prove Richardson “knowingly” 

possessed the exploitive images. Additionally, the State’s suggestion it 

could add charges based on additional images found on a separate device

if Richardson rejected the plea did not render the plea involuntary. A

prosecutor may lawfully threaten to bring additional charges, supported by 

probable cause, in the interest of persuading the defendant to accept a plea. 

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); State v. Dominguez, 130 Ariz. 
STATE v. RICHARDSON

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498, 499 (App. 1981). Such conduct is a legitimate tactic in plea bargaining

and does not, in itself, constitute unlawful coercion or vindictiveness. See

Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (reasoning that “in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea 

bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as 

the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer” and 

“acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies 

rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional 

sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process”).

¶13 Richardson asserts his attorney provided ineffective 

assistance by not objecting to the misconduct of the prosecutor and the 

superior court during the settlement conference. To establish a colorable 

claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must show counsel’s 

performance was objectively unreasonable and caused prejudice. Bigger, 

251 Ariz. at 407, ¶¶ 7–8. Because neither the court nor the prosecutor 

committed misconduct, his attorney had no reasonable basis to object and

the superior court appropriately dismissed that claim. In his underlying 

petition, Richardson also claimed defense counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by not explaining the elements of the offense and by allowing 

him to plead guilty without adequate proof the statutory elements were 

met. Richardson has abandoned those claims because he did not raise them 

on review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.16(c)(4); State v. Rodriguez, 227 Ariz. 58, 

61, ¶ 12 n.4 (App. 2010).

¶14 Richardson also claims the factual basis offered to support his 

plea was inadequate. Besides ensuring a defendant’s guilty plea is 

voluntary, the superior court must also find a factual basis to support the 

plea. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.3(b). The record does not support Richardson’s 

claim. At the change-of-plea hearing, Richardson expressly agreed he 

“knowing[ly]” possessed, and attempted to possess, exploitive images of a 

minor under 15. His admissions satisfied the elements of A.R.S. § 13-3553. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.3(b) (court may find factual basis from a defendant’s 

statements); State v. McVay, 131 Ariz. 369, 374 (1982) (defendant’s 

admissions of intent during plea colloquy provided sufficient evidence of 

malice); see also Rose, 231 Ariz. at 506, ¶ 21 (factual basis is satisfied by 

“strong evidence” of guilt and does not require proof “beyond a reasonable 

doubt”) (citations omitted).

¶15 Richardson raises several claims about purportedly 

exculpatory evidence showing he did not “knowingly” possess the

exploitive images. He asserts text messages between himself and his former 

girlfriend—discussing her packing and sending his belongings—show he

did not knowingly possess the device with the exploitive images.
STATE v. RICHARDSON

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Richardson argues: (1) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963), by withholding the messages; (2) his attorney provided ineffective 

assistance by not obtaining them despite knowing they existed; and (3) the 

superior court erroneously denied his post-plea motion to compel their 

production. Richardson establishes no right to relief.

¶16 First, the superior court reasonably determined Richardson

waived his Brady claim when he pled guilty. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 

61, 62 n.2 (1975) (by removing “the issue of factual guilt from the case,” a 

guilty plea “renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically 

inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt”). Because 

Richardson knew about the messages when he pled guilty, their

nondisclosure could not have made his plea involuntary. See Stefanovich 232

Ariz. at 158, ¶ 15. The court also appropriately dismissed his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to obtain 

the text messages. Richardson does not show his attorney’s possession of 

the messages would have impacted his plea. See State v. Bowers, 192 Ariz. 

419, 425, ¶ 25 (1998) (holding to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must allege “specific 

facts which would allow a court to meaningfully assess why that deficiency 

was material to the plea decision”).

¶17 The superior court also acted within its discretion by denying 

Richardson’s motion to compel production of the text messages. See State v. 

Fields, 196 Ariz. 580, 582, ¶ 4 (App. 1999) (explaining a superior court abuses 

its discretion in a discovery ruling if it misapplies the law or relies on 

irrational grounds). As Richardson described in his affidavit, the text 

messages at most would show he lacked control over some of his 

belongings for a short period before law enforcement discovered the 

exploitive images. The superior court reasonably determined Richardson 

failed to show the messages’ exculpatory value and he, thus, had no

“substantial need” for them. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.6(b)(1). 

¶18 Richardson raises several claims about his sentence. The 

superior court correctly dismissed his double jeopardy claim because the 

record shows he was charged with, and pled guilty to, possessing (or 

attempting to possess) three separate exploitive images. See State v. 

McPherson, 228 Ariz. 557, 560–61, ¶¶ 7–8 (App. 2012) Richardson also 

claims the superior court unlawfully issued enhanced sentences and the 

settlement judge should not have presided over sentencing. Because 

Richardson did not raise those issues as grounds for relief in the superior 

court, we decline to review them. See State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468 

(App. 1980); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.16(c)(2)(B). Conversely, Richardson raised 
STATE v. RICHARDSON

Decision of the Court

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two sentencing issues in his underlying petition which he did not include 

in his petition for review: (1) the sentence was unconstitutionally 

disproportionate; and (2) he was not given the opportunity to review the 

presentence report. Richardson, thus, abandoned those issues. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 33.16(c)(4); Rodriguez, 227 Ariz. at 61, ¶ 12 n.4.

¶19 Finally, we reject Richardson’s contention he was entitled to 

have a different superior court judge rule on his claims for post-conviction 

relief. Rule 33.10(a) requires proceedings for post-conviction relief to be 

assigned, if possible, to the sentencing judge—which is exactly what 

occurred here. A defendant may seek a change of judge in a Rule 33 

proceeding only if the proceeding is assigned to someone other than the 

sentencing judge. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.10(a).

CONCLUSION

¶20 We grant review and deny relief.