[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 21-12578

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

D'ANTHONY M. DILLARD, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cr-00232-ECM-SMD-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12578

Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

D’Anthony Dillard appeals his 27-month sentence after 

pleading guilty to escaping from custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 751(a). He argues that the district court erred in applying a fivelevel enhancement for the threatened use of force against a person

during an escape, see U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(1), and that his sentence 

is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary 

to achieve the sentencing purposes identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

Following a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.

I 

Under § 2P1.1(b)(1), a five-level enhancement applies when 

an escape involves the “the use or threat of force against any person.” The application notes explain that if bodily injury results 

from the use or threat of force, an upward variance may be warranted. See § 2P1.1, comment. (n. 4) (emphasis added). 

Factual findings underlying the application of an enhancement are reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Williams, 

527 F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th Cir. 2008). Generally speaking, we defer 

to a district court’s credibility determination “unless it is contrary 

to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face 

that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v.

Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks 

omitted).

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21-12578 Opinion of the Court 3

Here the district court found, after considering evidence presented by both sides, that Mr. Dillard had threatened to use force 

against another person. It credited the testimony of a police officer 

who explained that Mr. Dillard—after being surrounded—shifted 

his car into reverse, looked back, accelerated, and ran into a truck 

occupied by another officer with enough force to “jolt” that officer 

in his seat. We acknowledge that Mr. Dillard presented contrary 

evidence, such as the testimony of Charlandra Washington, but 

that does not make the district court’s credibility assessment clearly 

erroneous. A factual finding is not clearly erroneous when the factfinder chooses between two permissible views of the evidence. See 

United States v. Saingerard, 621 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010). 

On this record, we are not “left with a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Barrington, 

648 F.3d 1178, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011).

II 

 We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). The party challenging a sentence bears the 

burden of demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light 

of the record, the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts. See United States v. 

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). We will reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the 

§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12578

of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United 

States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 

A district court must make an individualized assessment to 

determine an appropriate sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. And 

it must impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary, to comply with the factors and purposes listed in § 

3553(a)(2). These include the need to reflect the seriousness of the 

offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for 

the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the 

defendant’s future criminal conduct. See § 3553(a)(2); United 

States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016). A court 

must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and 

the history and characteristics of the defendant. See § 3553(a)(1). 

Significantly, a district court need not weigh each factor 

equally, but instead may give great weight to one factor over the 

others. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. Absent clear error, 

we will not reweigh the § 3553(a) factors ourselves. See United 

States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, a district court should not focus on one factor “single-mindedly” to the detriment of other factors, and a court’s unjustified reliance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 

(11th Cir. 2006). 

Mr. Dillard’s advisory guideline range was 27-33 months’ 

imprisonment. The district court denied Mr. Dillard’s request for 

a downward variance and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the 

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21-12578 Opinion of the Court 5

guidelines range. The court found that Mr. Dillard’s criminal history category of V was accurate and reflected the seriousness of the 

crimes committed. It also explained that Mr. Dillard had chosen to 

violate the law every day that he had stayed away from the residential re-entry center from which he had absconded. And it said 

that it had considered the arguments of the parties and the § 3553(a) 

factors.

Under the circumstances, including the fact that Mr. Dillard 

had threatened the use of force against one of the police officers, 

we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion. We expect that a sentence within the guideline range will be reasonable, 

see United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009), 

and Mr. Dillard has not convinced us that his bottom-of-the-range 

sentence was unreasonable. 

III 

 We affirm Mr. Dillard’s sentence.

AFFIRMED. 

 

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