AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

Defending the Homeland

The Case for Integrating National Guard Intelligence 

Personnel into the State Fusion Centers

BRENT W. GUGLIELMINO

Lieutenant Colonel

Air National Guard of the United States

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 67

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

October 2012
2

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

The Maxwell Papers are available electronically at the Air 

University Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil.
3

Defending the Homeland: The Case for Integrating 

National Guard Intelligence Personnel into the State 

Fusion Centers

Lt Col Brent W. Guglielmino

Air National Guard of the United States (ANGUS)

It's clear that collectively, many in the homeland security 

business have lost sight of key intelligence lessons from 9/11. 

Because of their actions, we may well be destined to 

helplessly watch the unfolding of another 9/11-style incident, 

all the time knowing that the next post-disaster commission 

will rediscover the same core intelligence mistakes and 

suicidal bureaucratic processes/resistance.

—Maj Gen Todd Bunting, ANGUS

Kansas Adjutant General

In the fall of 2009, five al-Qaeda operatives were arrested by federal 

authorities while in the final stages of separate operational plans to 

conduct attacks within the United States.1 Clearly, law enforcement was 

aware of their activities. Others within the US intelligence community 

were aware of the identity of some of the individuals and their 

relationships with al-Qaeda but had no knowledge of the specific plots 

that were underway.2 Alarmingly, the adjutants general (TAG) of the 

states where the plots unfolded were unaware of these activities until the 

individuals were arrested and the stories hit the press.3 This is 

significant because the National Guard plays a key role in the American

homeland security (HLS) enterprise, principally in response to a 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) event. 

Yet, they typically lack sufficient access to potentially vital information 
4

that is available via other channels until after it hits the press or has 

become operationally irrelevant.

These events highlight a major flaw in the current information and 

intelligence sharing paradigm, particularly as it pertains to the National 

Guard. What if these men hadn’t been arrested? What if they had 

successfully executed their attacks? The Guard would have been one of 

the last to know despite being one of the principle first responders to a 

potential terrorist event. How many lives would have been lost in the 

name of maintaining the stovepipes and firewalls between the intelligence 

and law enforcement worlds? More importantly, how can this flaw be 

corrected?

The National Guard lacks a fundamental understanding of the role 

of intelligence as a result of the historical security paradigm within the 

United States. This paradigm created a culture so averse to domestic 

intelligence operations and so deferential to the civil liberties and

personal freedoms of Americans that in some instances, it imperils them. 

An oft-asked question since 9/11 is, how many civil liberties are 

Americans willing to forgo in order to secure their freedoms? For most 

Americans, the obvious answer to that question, as the flurry of post9/11 legislation and vast changes to America’s HLS landscape clearly 

shows, is more than what they currently are.

Through nearly its entire history, the Guard has been a domestic 

force with a mission that could best be described as a strategic reserve 
5

primarily operating within the borders of the United States. The 

longstanding sensitivities of the American public regarding domestic 

intelligence operations and the Guard’s citizen-soldier history, 

understandably, led the Guard to minimize its intelligence footprint as 

much as possible.

In 2004 the 9/11 Commission recommended several changes to 

the dominant information sharing and homeland security paradigm in its 

final report to Congress. It identified 41 recommendations to help prevent

another terrorist attack on the United States; of those 41, six pertain 

specifically to information sharing—more than any other single topic.4

Since 9/11, a number of significant foundational documents and key 

organizations have stood up in the United States to enable the fusion of 

information and intelligence urged by the 9/11 Commission. John 

Rollins of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) emphasizes the 

relative weight assigned to these intelligence and information fusion 

concepts noting, “All major post 9/11 government reorganizations, 

legislation, and programs have emphasized the importance of intelligence 

in preventing, mitigating, and responding to future terrorist attacks.”5

Concurrently, operational adaptations have occurred with 

significant implications for the military, law enforcement, and the 

overarching HLS paradigm. One of the key developments involves the role 

of the National Guard, specifically the creation of the National Guard

Joint Staff, represented in the states by the Joint Force Headquarters 
6

(JFHQ). The JFHQs are the National Guards’ operational coordinating 

entity and, consequently, would be responsible for coordinating any 

Guard response to a terrorist event. Unfortunately, the intelligence 

officer, or J2, is not a high priority in most JFHQs and in many cases is 

not even a full-time position. In other instances, the J2 is not a trained 

and certified intelligence officer. Despite the many reforms since 9/11, 

the Guard intelligence enterprise remains alarmingly detached from the 

rest of the HLS community, jeopardizing its ability to achieve sufficient 

situational awareness and adequately posture Guard HLS assets to 

respond to a potential terrorist act within the United States.

This paper first addresses the current homeland security 

landscape as it pertains to the National Guard, detailing the role the 

Guard has been directed to play and the legal landscape undergirding 

what the National Guard can and cannot do in terms of HLS operations. 

Second, it proposes a potential solution to the problem of better 

connecting the National Guard into the larger HLS community by

integrating National Guard intelligence personnel into the existing state 

fusion center (SFC) enterprise. Finally, an assessment of the objectives, 

advantages, and second-order effects of this action is included.

Research Process

This paper uses standard archival research citing a broad array of 

publically available sources. Additionally, a number of personal e-mail 

interviews were conducted by the author with various state adjutants 
7

general and members of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) staff. Efforts

were made to contact individual JFHQ-State J2s, but most were 

unavailable or unable to respond within the timelines provided. The 

author relies heavily on personal experiences while serving as chief of 

current intelligence within the NGB Joint Staff as well as serving as the 

principal intelligence analyst for the chief of the NGB from 2008 to 2010.

The Role of the National Guard

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended that the 

National Guard plays a prominent role in the CBRNE consequence

management and response plans of US Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM). In coordination with the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the 

plan calls for the Guard to develop 10 new units known as homeland 

response forces (HRF). The HRFs would join an already robust lineup of 

57 National Guard combat support teams (CST) and 17 CBRNE 

enhanced response force packages (CERFP) to increase the existing 

Department of Defense (DOD) CBRNE consequence management 

enterprise from 18,000 personnel to approximately 24,000 by the end of 

fiscal year 2010.6

This tremendous growth in the Guard’s homeland role, 

approximately 33 percent in terms of CBRNE response force structure, is 

a reflection of the words of former secretary of Homeland Security Tom 

Ridge who stated that the military’s role in HLS would be significant and 
8

would be “played predominantly by the National Guard.”7 Moreover, in 

2008 the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, in their final 

report to the Congress and the secretary of defense on National Guard 

transformation, recommended that “Congress should mandate that the 

National Guard and Reserves have the lead role in and form the backbone

of DOD operations in the homeland.”8

While no formal tasking has appeared, the National Guard Joint 

Staff is already heavily invested in, and tasked to be, an integral player in 

the United States’ HLS paradigm. Moreover, recent emphasis by DOD on 

the total force as a result of the global economic crisis likely translates 

into an extended period of fiscal austerity for regular DOD assets leading

to more substantive efforts to integrate reserve component and regular 

forces. This will result in even more prominent roles for the National 

Guard in certain missions.

While a legal mandate for this has 

not yet materialized, momentum in the HLS community in recent years 

emphasizes increased Guard involvement in HLS operations.

The Need for Situational Awareness

USNORTHCOM commander, Adm James Winnefeld Jr., recently 

called the National Guard “NORTHCOM’s indispensible partner” stating 

that “the Guard is the key connective tissue, the tie between the first 

responders in the states and the federal team.”9 NORTHCOM depends

more than ever on the Guard to provide effective, local, on-scene 

leadership in response to domestic disasters, as well as in monitoring US
9

borders, and in HLS operations in general. From an operational 

perspective, Guard forces tasked with key response and force protection 

missions in the homeland must be as knowledgeable of their operating 

environment as possible. They must share a common, well-developed 

picture of the domestic threat environment with their HLS partners and 

establish a capability in the two regimes that monitor, report on, and 

predict the likely future of the threat environment: law enforcement and 

intelligence. This was the intent undergirding the concept of SFCs.

The Rise of the State Fusion Centers

SFCs are state owned and operated facilities housing law 

enforcement and intelligence specialists from across a broad spectrum of 

local, state, and federal government in one common facility. Intended to 

be the first line of defense against homeland terror threats, they ensure

effective fusion of law enforcement and intelligence information at all 

levels of government. At present there are 72 SFCs within the United 

States, each with unique capabilities and manning and each with a 

slightly different perspective of their mandate.10

In August 2006, recognizing a disparity of capabilities, policies,

and procedures across the SFC enterprise, the Department of Justice 

and DHS collaborated in developing a set of fusion center guidelines “to 

assist in the establishment and operation of centers.”11 The guidelines 

did not correct the substantial differences from one center to the next, 

and there remains no standard requirement for what a fusion center 
10

should look like or do. According to John Rollins of CRS, “Although many 

of the centers initially had purely counterterrorism goals, they have 

increasingly gravitated toward an all-crimes and even broader allhazards approach.”12 This ongoing variation between centers perpetuates 

the stove-piped architecture the 9/11 Commission hoped to avoid. The 

commission implied that to effectively achieve fusion of intelligence and 

law enforcement information, it is necessary to have representation from 

all principle stakeholders working side by side on a daily basis. However, 

according to a 2008 CRS report, “While many of the centers have 

prevention of attacks as a high priority, little ‘true fusion,’ or analysis of 

disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, and proactive 

collection of intelligence against those gaps which could contribute to 

prevention is occurring.”13

The Legal Landscape and Intelligence Oversight Policy

Historically, there has been significant opposition within the 

military to conducting intelligence operations within the United States, 

despite the provisions afforded under intelligence oversight (IO) policy. 

Within the Guard, leadership tended to defer to the judicial guidance of 

their respective staff judge advocates general (JAG), often suggesting that 

the Guard should not be involved in domestic intelligence activity in any 

way—the ultimate stovepipe. This extremely conservative approach has 

been the prevailing mentality over the years and has protected TAGs

from potential legal difficulties stemming from possible IO policy 
11

breaches or civil liberties violations. Conversely, it undermined IO policy,

eliminated intelligence as a situational awareness tool, and destroyed

fusion initiatives in the SFCs. To be clear, provided it is properly 

followed, there is no directive or legal impediment in current IO policy 

preventing integration of National Guard intelligence personnel into the 

SFCs.14 According to the NGB JAG, there is no legal reason why DOD 

intelligence personnel, including Guardsmen operating in Title 10 or Title 

32 status, who follow IO rules regarding retention and methods and have 

a legal mission to do so, cannot conduct intelligence activities pertaining 

to foreign intelligence threats within the United States.15 DOD Regulation 

5240.1-R, Intelligence Oversight Policy, procedure 12 states, “DOD 

intelligence components are authorized to cooperate with law 

enforcement authorities for the purpose of investigating or preventing 

clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, international 

narcotics activities, or international terrorist activities.”16

IO policy is governed by Executive Order (EO) 12333, United States 

Intelligence Activities, and supplemented by DOD Regulation 5240.1-R

and the various service-specific IO regulations and instructions. In a very 

broad sense, EO 12333 outlines the legal boundaries for the intelligence 

community. It states that foreign intelligence operations fall under the 

purview of the intelligence community; whereas, domestic intelligence 

operations are the purview of the law enforcement community—

specifically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, DOD 
12

5240.1-R provides more guidance on the proper execution of EO 12333 

and offers specificity on circumstances and procedures under which it is 

acceptable for US military intelligence personnel to engage in intelligence 

activities within the United States against US persons (USPERS).

Guard intelligence personnel are required to comply with all federal 

IO rules without exception. However, before one can understand how IO 

policy affects the National Guard, there are a number of issues that must 

be understood regarding the duty status of Guardsmen, the concept of 

“intelligence activities,” and the latitude that IO policy actually provides, 

enabling intelligence personnel to do their jobs legally in a domestic 

environment.

Title 10 vs. Title 32, State vs. Federal

Guardsmen operate under one of three provisions of the US Code:

Title 10 status (T10), Title 32 status (T32), or state active duty (SAD)

status. The distinction between these statuses is significant with a 

tremendous impact on what Guard intelligence personnel can and 

cannot legally do. T10 and T32 are federal statuses, and each carries 

certain permissions and restrictions. While in T10 status, individuals are 

activated by the federal government to serve on active duty and must 

operate under the same restrictions as their regular Army or Air Force 

brethren. T32 Guardsmen are also mobilized into federal service but 

specifically for the purposes of conducting training in support of their 

T10 mission. T10 and T32 personnel are allowed to conduct intelligence 
13

activities within the United States and to access federal intelligence 

databases and computer systems as long as they have been given a legal 

mission and they operate within the confines of IO policy.

IO policy is complex, but for the purposes of this paper, there are 

two key elements of note. First, properly authorized intelligence 

personnel engaged in intelligence activities on a USPERS must conduct 

their activities using the least intrusive means.17

Current State of Affairs

Second, intelligence 

personnel have 90 days to determine whether intelligence on a USPERS

they may have collected or used is germane to the mission. If so, they 

may proceed in accordance with their mission; otherwise, they must 

destroy the information and cease any further operations against that 

USPERS. Short of these two considerations, there is no legal impediment 

to Guard intelligence personnel working in an SFC and fusing 

intelligence and law enforcement information.

Interestingly, in 2006 the Guard explored the possibility of 

integrating intelligence personnel into the SFCs but decided not to 

proceed with the initiative. At the time, there was a great deal of debate 

as to the extent to which the Guard should be involved in HLS 

operations. The NGB J2 had even drafted a concept of operations

(CONOP) for integrating National Guard intelligence personnel into the 

SFCs. Col Timothy Keasling, author of the draft, noted:
14

“DHS took immediate offense to the document since they 

were the lead for sharing information with state and local 

officials. They saw this [CONOP] not as help from the Guard 

but as disrupting their rice bowl . . . this after six months of 

discussion within the [DOD working] group [of which DHS 

was a part]. DHS then provided a copy to DOD HD [assistant 

secretary of defense-homeland defense]. HD did not see this 

as a DOD mission, voiced IO concerns, and asked the Guard

to shut down the effort. All guidance [to shut down the 

initiative] was verbal. Just prior, the National Information 

Strategy was released by the White House stating that the 

National Guard did have a role. Additionally, the program 

manager-information sharing environment had recently 

published their plan discussing the National Guard’s role. 

Despite these overarching documents, OSD [Office of the 

Secretary of Defense] ignored the Guard’s role and the senior 

leadership of the Guard had no desire to engage. The 

National Guard’s role in information sharing [subsequently] 

died on the vine.”18

Consequently, in a number of instances since March 2008, JFHQState J2s and their respective TAGs were found to be unaware of key 

intelligence pertaining to homeland threats affecting their respective 

states.19 Moreover, many key Guard personnel either did not have 
15

adequate clearances or lacked regular access to appropriately classified 

facilities and/or equipment.

The issue is not whether the Guard should be involved with the 

details of ongoing terrorism investigations within the United States. 

However, as the designated DOD first responder to CBRNE contingencies 

and a potential source of security and force protection in the region, they 

should be made aware that there are investigations underway and who 

the principals are. To be prepared to respond to or avoid a terrorist 

attack, the Guard needs some basic facts and general situational 

awareness of potential trouble spots. In most cases, the law enforcement 

community is fully aware and often actively engaged in thwarting plans 

of potential terrorists. What happens if they miss one, as in the recent 

case of Mohammed Abdul Mutallab, the Christmas Day bomber who 

attempted to blow up a civilian airliner over the United States? National 

Guard leadership cannot properly posture and/or position assets to deal 

with the potential aftermath of a successful attack without access to 

information on the current operating environment. The fact is, in most 

cases that access is lacking.

Several TAGs share these concerns. When asked whether they felt 

they had sufficient access to intelligence, particularly intelligence 

regarding homeland threats, there was a general sense of agreement 

amongst TAGs.20 General Bunting, TAG of Kansas, responded with an 

emphatic “no.” “This is true in regards to both tactical and strategic 
16

intelligence, fully understanding that intelligence products are never 

absolute. The majority of [intelligence] reports raise your blood pressure 

and stress levels but lack anything actionable, or many times even 

relevant, to the states.”21

Maj Gen William Wofford, the Arkansas TAG, shared the same 

opinion, mentioning that while he did receive intelligence of this sort, it 

was generally not very useful. “The problem is that the intel we receive is 

not always timely and many times has not been analyzed properly to 

show important trends if there are any. If the info is not timely it is as 

bad as not receiving info at all.”22 Conversely, in Maryland the situation 

appears to be much better from the perspective of the Maryland TAG, 

Brig Gen James Adkins. General Adkins relates that Maryland is getting 

very good intelligence support on homeland and state threats, and he 

attributes this success largely to the full-time presence of Maryland Army 

and Air Guard inside the Maryland SFC “that maintain good information 

sharing networks with various Homeland Security officials both at federal 

and state level.”23

Colonel Keasling, former deputy director of the NGB J2 at a time 

when the National Guard was initially considering integrating Guard 

intelligence folks into the fusion centers, has a very clear perspective:

No, I do not [believe the states are receiving adequate 

intelligence of homeland threats]. Too few states have 

qualified J2s and too little communications capability in the 
17

right places. Most of a states’ [intelligence] capabilities rest 

with their organic component intelligence structures, the 

Army or Air Guard respectively, who are generally focused on 

their overseas missions. To make matters worse, some states 

have no organic intelligence structures. Compounding this 

problem, most TAGs lack the will and understanding to 

leverage the intelligence capability they do have.24

Two Distinct Worlds: Intelligence and Law Enforcement

Currently, given the role the Guard has in the HLS and the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency mission areas, the lack of access to 

critical intelligence becomes increasingly problematic for the National 

Guard as well as the rest of the HLS community and the people they are 

tasked to protect. It positions the Guard as the weakest link in the HLS 

chain in terms of situational awareness. That often translates into being 

the weakest link operationally as well.

The Guard has tried to kill two birds with one stone by 

maintaining a footprint inside many of the fusion centers in the form of 

counterdrug intelligence analysts. To be clear, many counterdrug 

intelligence analysts are not intelligence analysts at all. According to the 

NGB’s counterdrug office, at best about half of the counterdrug 

intelligence analysts are actually intelligence qualified personnel.25 Many 

are actually law enforcement personnel having served as a member of a 

provost marshall’s staff or as field investigative officers. Most have not 
18

attended one of the service intelligence schools (Fort Huachuca, Arizona,

for the Army or Goodfellow AFB, Texas, for the Air Force), nor have they 

served as intelligence officers in the field at any time during their careers.

Law enforcement and intelligence represent two separate career 

fields and hence two different skill sets. Fundamentally, law enforcement 

is forensic in nature, looking backward from the point of the crime in an 

effort to determine what happened and prosecute the guilty. Conversely, 

intelligence inherently assumes a predictive, forward-looking posture,

being tasked to provide the current threat picture and assess likely 

future enemy actions. This is not to debate the merits of either. Indeed, 

the 9/11 Commission states both are needed to develop the best possible 

picture of the threat. The 9/11 Commission’s intent behind the SFCs 

was to collocate law enforcement and intelligence personnel. The Guard 

responded by collocating military and civilian law enforcement personnel, 

forgoing the intelligence piece, thus missing the whole point.

A Possible Solution

A possible solution to this problem is to integrate National Guard 

JFHQ-State J2s into the SFCs, affording them regular and systematic 

access to relevant intelligence and law enforcement derived data 

pertaining to potential terrorist threats to the individual states as well as 

the larger homeland in general. Moreover, it affords them the opportunity 

to participate in the interagency analysis that goes on within the HLS 
19

community, bringing more fidelity to the federal threat picture via 

additional inputs from the state and local level.

Such a move could provide not only National Guard leadership but

also leadership across the whole of government, with a substantially 

improved view of the threat landscape and a better opportunity to 

coordinate response options with partners and stakeholders at all 

levels—the stated intent of the 9/11 Commission. This is a solution TAGs 

could enact on their own accord; there is nothing stopping them. The 

Guard must be willing to shift priorities within the JFHQ-State staffs. If 

they ever hope to have the situational awareness necessary to posture 

and/or respond to a terror attack, it is an absolute imperative that the 

Guard appropriately man the JFHQ-J2 positions with trained, qualified,

experienced, full-time intelligence professionals and imbed them inside 

the SFCs.

Impediments to Integration

The Guard has yet to make intelligence a priority. Most of the 

JFHQ-J2s do not have access to top secret intelligence specific to 

homeland threats either due to lack of equipment or lack of adequate 

clearances.26 This is reflected in the fact that only 30 of the 54 JFHQState J2s are full-time personnel.27 Of those 30, it is unknown at the 

national level how many state J2s are actually intelligence qualified. This 

information is likely available at the state level; however, the NGB has 

not conducted a data call to date to determine those numbers. According 
20

to the NGB J2, 22 of the 54 JFHQ-State J2s have access to the 

communications architecture and equipment capable of accessing top 

secret information on a daily basis. Of those 22, three rely on using 

someone else's top secret facilities while the remaining 19 have, or are 

building, their own dedicated JFHQ sensitive compartmented 

information facility.

In the summer of 2009, the NGB J2 developed a top secret 

intelligence portal addressing a number of National Guard interest areas 

specifically related to the intelligence the chief of the NGB receives during 

intelligence briefings. This was done to help better focus the Guard on 

the threat environment domestically and overseas. The portal required 

the highest levels of security clearance and handling caveats.

Subsequently the NGB J2 notified the state JFHQs of this new source of 

intelligence. Over the course of the past year, only 10 of the 30 full-time 

JFHQ-State J2s accessed the products and information on that portal 

and still fewer did so regularly. In other words, of the 54 total J2 

positions, less than 20 percent had accessed the key intelligence 

available and potentially relevant to them.28

Unfortunately, manpower in the National Guard is a zero-sum 

game. Should leadership decide to increase intelligence manning,

another staff element would suffer. Failing a dramatic change in funding 

or a lifting of the congressional cap on active Guard reservists,29 there is

at present no way around this hurdle. The real question is whether TAGs
21

and NGB leadership are prepared to go before Congress in the aftermath 

of another 9/11 and explain why they still haven’t developed their 

intelligence and information sharing capabilities to the point urged by

the 9/11 Commission. If not, serious work faces the National Guard in 

reprioritizing its manpower to address deficiencies in its intelligence 

capacity and capability.

Operationally, the Guard has been proactive in adapting to the 

post-9/11 world with the creation of HRFs, CSTs and CERFPs as well as 

the JFHQ-State construct, but the necessary changes to develop an 

intelligence infrastructure capable of supporting the new missions and 

force structure have not yet materialized. Many TAGs do not have the 

requisite security clearances to see most of the vital homeland security 

related intelligence that is available and which often affects them.30

Despite overwhelming evidence that the Guard requires access to 

key HLS related intelligence, it is the only organization with a sizeable 

role in HLS lacking the vital intelligence it needs. For a number of 

reasons—some self-inflicted, some bureaucratic, and some technical—

When coupled with the fact that their respective JFHQ-J2s may be 

equally constrained, it becomes extremely problematic to expect TAGs to 

have a suitable level of situational awareness to properly posture and/or 

position their forces for the purpose of either force protection or disaster 

response. In short, they are being asked to make decisions without the 

benefit of much of the key information needed.
22

the National Guard lacks day-to-day access to and is denied the daily 

collaborative analytical exchange on the vast stores of homeland 

security-related information/intelligence currently available within the 

intelligence community (IC).

Conclusions

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States is very 

clear and unambiguous regarding how the United States intends to 

combat terrorism and foster a more secure homeland:

To prevent acts of terrorism on American soil, we must enlist 

all of our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland 

security capabilities. We will continue to integrate and 

leverage state and major urban area fusion centers that have 

the capability to share classified information; establish a 

nationwide framework for reporting suspicious activity; and 

implement an integrated approach to our counterterrorism 

information systems to ensure that the analysts, agents, and 

officers who protect us have access to all relevant intelligence 

throughout the government. We are improving information 

sharing and cooperation by linking networks to facilitate 

Federal, state, and local capabilities to seamlessly exchange 

messages and information, conduct searches, and 

collaborate.31
23

Consistent with all post-9/11 US counterterrorism (CT) policy 

guidance, the NSS advocates sharing all relevant CT information across 

all levels of government. The IC, DOD, and DHS have made tremendous 

strides in moving towards this goal. The development of a robust 

community of SFCs, coupled with ongoing efforts to develop policy that 

supports sharing, is merely the first step. Short of the technological 

hurdles currently impeding a robust and efficient HLS enterprise, the 

next step in meeting the objectives of the 9/11 Commission is to ensure 

that those who are tasked with defending the homeland—the citizen

soldiers of our nation—have appropriate access to the same information 

that is already being shared by other parts of the HLS enterprise.

Part of the solution is for TAGs to seize the initiative and act by 

reprioritizing their manpower and properly resourcing their intelligence 

capabilities. There are no legal constraints; though there may be some 

funding constraints, but ultimately, where there’s a will, there’s a way. 

The Guard is assuming more and more of the DOD’s HLS 

responsibilities, and USNORTHCOM has reached out to them to work 

more closely. Now is the time for National Guard intelligence personnel to

be integrated into SFCs. It will enable a better preventive posture against 

possible terrorist operations in the homeland and, in response to those 

operations, ensure a better coordinated response across the spectrum of 

government by first responders. Additionally, it further minimizes the 
24

traditional stovepipes that have represented the operational norm 

between and within the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

Failing any new policy directives, the issues highlighted in this 

paper will continue to pose a risk to our nation’s defense. The fear is that 

rather than correcting the problem, we will continue to march forward 

with our stovepipes, once again finding ourselves a nation enthralled 

with the televised activities of yet another congressionally mandated 

post-disaster commission. We will once again hear testimony telling how 

we failed to connect the dots and fuse the intelligence. We will hear how 

we lacked the imagination to consider that the enemy might attack us in 

some new way. Perhaps we’ll even see an IC reorganization. At what 

cost? To be sure, integrating Guard intelligence personnel into the SFCs

would have far-reaching implications on not just the National Guard but 

the DOD, DHS, and the entire US HLS paradigm. It remains as one of the 

final pieces of the fusion and integration puzzle and represents the most 

expedient and cost-effective means of achieving the necessary level of 

situational awareness our homeland defenders need.

Notes

1. In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi, a Pakistani national and 

permanent resident of the United States was arrested for attempting to 

build and detonate explosive devices in the New York City subway. The 

attacks were ordered by al-Qaeda regional leader and facilitator Saleh alSomali and orchestrated between Zazi and two associates across state 
25

lines between Colorado and New York. In October 2009 David Coleman 

Headley, a Pakistani-American citizen, and Tawahar Rana, a PakistaniCanadian, were arrested, accused of conspiring with al-Qaeda, the 

Pakistan-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e Tayiba, the Pakistani 

Interservices Intelligence directorate, and a number of former Pakistani 

military officers. Headley reportedly played a prominent role in the 

planning and execution of the 2008 Mumbai attacks killing 168, as well 

as the 2010 bakery attack in Pune, Germany, which killed 15 and 

injured 54. In fact, he was deeply involved with various international 

terrorist cells; Judith Crosson, Rocco Parascandola, Alison Gendar, Jake 

Pearson, Tina Moore, and Larry Mcshane, “Reputed Al Qaeda Terror Cell 

Operative Najibullah Zazi Arrested by FBI,” New York Daily News, 19 

September 2009, 

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2009/09/19/2009-09-

19_zazi_cuffed_after_qaeda_canary_sings_li_secret_code_used_to_inform_

plotters_li.html; Annie Sweeney and Hal Dardick, “Chicago: Front Line in 

War on Terror: Officer Spotted Mumbai Terrorist Running His Children 

through Military Drills in Park,” Chicago Tribune, 11 November 2010, 

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/elections/ct-met-terrorismchicago-police-1114-20101111,0,391867.story; and Antonio Olivo, 

“Chicago Agency a Front for Terror Plot, Probers Allege Federal Officials 

Target Operations of First World Immigration,” Chicago Tribune, 3 
26

January 2010, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-terror-ranaimmigrationjan03,0,6207893.story.

2. Personal knowledge of the author who served as the principal 

briefer to the chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) at the time of the 

activities in question and who regularly corresponded with other 

intelligence agencies on current intelligence issues.

3. TAG is a major general in a given state who commands that 

state’s National Guard forces. In many states, the TAG is tasked with the 

additional responsibilities of being the state emergency manager and/or 

the state director of homeland security. TAGs with these additional 

responsibilities are sometimes referred to as “super TAGs;” and author’s 

personal experience as chief of the NGBs current intelligence division 

and principal intelligence analyst to the CNGB. Between 2008 and June 

2010, I had the opportunity to present either face-to-face briefings or to 

telephonically notify various TAGs on certain specific terrorism issues. In 

almost every case, the TAGs were unaware of the information presented 

to them.

4. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 

Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks upon the United States, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: W. W. Norton & 

Company, 2004), 416–19.
27

5. John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, 

Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress (Washington,

DC: CRS, 18 January 2008), 5.

6. Department of Defense (DOD), “Homeland Response Force Fact 

Sheet,” http://www.defense.gov/news/HRFCERFP.pdf (accessed 15 

October 2010).

7. Tom Ridge, director of the Office of Homeland Security (address,

Fletcher Conference, Washington, DC, 14 November 2001), 

http://www.vodium.com/mediapod/ifpa/ (accessed 15 September 

2010).

8. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Transforming 

the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force,

Final Report to the Congress and the Secretary of Defense (Washington,

DC: Government Printing Office, 31 January 2008), 15, emphasis added.

9. SSgt Jim Greenhill, “‘You Can Count on Me,’ NORTHCOM 

Commander Tells National Guard,”

http://www.ang.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123219170.

10. Department of Homeland Security, “State and Local Urban 

Fusion Centers,”

http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm.

11. Ibid., 1.

12. Ibid.

13 Rollins, Fusion Centers, 1.
28

14. Maj Erin McMahon (Office of the NGB Judge Advocate), e-mail 

interview with author, 15 October 2010.

15. Ibid. Key to this discussion was the idea that any form of 

communication (e.g., e-mails, chat room correspondence, etc.) between 

US persons and a terrorist entity would suffice to establish a foreign 

nexus sufficient for intelligence personnel to handle information 

pertaining to the individuals in question. Intelligence personnel would 

still be bound by all other aspects of IO policy including proper mission, 

authorization, handling caveats, etc.

16. Ibid., emphasis added.

17. DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, Intelligence Oversight Policy,

December 1982.

18. Col Timothy Keasling (former deputy director of the NGB Joint 

Intelligence Directorate), e-mail interview with author, 30 September 

2010.

19. The author had over 20 opportunities to brief several state 

TAGs and JFHQ-State J2s, either face-to-face or via other means, while a 

member of the CNGBs current intelligence team. A common response at 

the end of said briefings, with very few exceptions, was stunned disbelief. 

In particular, we presented intelligence regarding three specific terrorist 

threats to the homeland that had been developing for several weeks to 

the TAGs of the affected states. Two of the three threats were ultimately 

foiled and received significant attention in the national media. We had 
29

been briefing this information to the chief of the National Guard for 

weeks, but when we briefed the TAGs of the affected states, they were 

shocked to hear that this was going on in their respective states. 

Additionally, in most cases, it was necessary to arrange for classified 

read-ons for the TAGs and their staffs prior to briefing them so they 

would have authorization to receive the information. No doubt realizing 

the limitations inherent to the National Guard Joint Staff and its limited 

connectivity into the intelligence community, it is a tremendous credit to 

the CNGB that he emphasized we notify the TAGs directly upon receiving 

this type of intelligence.

20. TAGs from Kansas, Arkansas, Alabama, and Maryland, e-mail 

interviews with author, as well as personal phone conversations held in 

the course of regular duties with chiefs of staff with nearly 20 different 

states between 2009 and 2010.

21. Bunting, e-mail interview with author, 29 September 2010.

22. Maj Gen William Wofford (TAG of Arkansas), e-mail interview 

with author, 23 September 2010.

23. Brig Gen James Adkins (TAG of Maryland), e-mail interview 

with author, 12 October 2010.

24. Keasling, e-mail interview with author, 1 October 2010.

25. Capt Mesha Cichon (counterdrug division, NGB [NGB-J32]), email interview with author, 27 October 2010.
30

26. Personal experience in working with many of the JFHQ-State 

J2s while serving as chief of the current intelligence division within the 

NGB-J2.

27. “NGB J2 Contact Roster,” 9 September 2010, 

https://gkoportal.ngb.army.mil/sites/J2/Lists/J2%20State%20Contact

%20List2/AllItems.aspx (accessed 18 October 2010).

28. NGB J2 Top Secret Intelligence Portal Statistics, current as of 

October 2010. 

29. Active Guard Reserve (AGR) refers to a federal military program 

which places Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers and Air 

National Guard and Air Force Reserve Airmen on federal active duty 

status to provide full-time support to National Guard and Reserve 

organizations for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, 

instructing, or training the Reserve components. Soldiers and Airmen in 

such status are commonly referred to as AGRs. There is a 

congressionally mandated cap on the total number of AGRs allowed at 

any given time.

30. Personal experience in working with many of the JFHQ-State 

J2s while serving as chief of the current intelligence division within the 

NGB-J2.

31. Barack H. Obama, II, National Security Strategy of the United 

States (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), emphasis added.