AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

2035 Air Dominance Requirements for

State-On-State Conflict

PETER M. BILODEAU

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 60

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

October 2012
2

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

The Maxwell Papers are available electronically at the Air 

University Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil.
3

2035 Air Dominance Requirements for

State-On-State Conflict

Lt Col Peter M. Bilodeau, USAF

The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the 

offensive.

—Carl von Clausewitz

In 2035 some states’ integrated air defense systems will be able to 

find, fix, track, target, and engage our current air dominance aircraft. US 

operations in this environment may prove costly and threaten heavy 

aircraft losses. Worse, decisive air operations, the hallmark of US 

military strategy for nearly 60 years, may not be possible in hyperdefended airspace.1 As one commentator put it, “the US is confronted 

with a strategic choice: to risk loss of military access to areas vital to its 

national security or to explore options for preserving access.”2

Unlike the 1970’s stealth revolution, there is no “silver bullet” 

technological solution to the 2035 air dominance problem. The United 

States is unlikely to achieve unimpeded access using radio frequency, 

infrared, and electro-optical cloaking technologies alone.3 Therefore, the 

United States needs to reevaluate its overall air dominance strategy to 

ensure it can gain initial access in this new, hyper-defended airspace to 

enable follow-on, high tempo US operations. Prevailing in this future 

environment requires holistic approaches using concepts of operations 

that integrate varied capabilities, capacities, and tactics to create a US 

advantage. The challenge (and the risk) lies in choosing among several 
4

available alternatives at a time when budgets are tight, the threat is still 

developing, and consensus is lacking on the best way to proceed.

To make these choices, senior policy makers need a framework and 

approach to evaluate the developing environment and assist in making 

investment choices. This paper’s purpose is to develop such a framework 

through a five-part analysis. The first part provides a review of US 

technical challenges from potential enemy states. Future strategic, 

operational, and tactical challenges set the stage in this segment of the 

analysis. The second section examines competing air defense network 

models, breaking down how the United States might engage an opposing 

network to gain access. The next part defines a three-tiered approach 

(operations view, systems view, and acquisition view) to analyze 

alternative strategies against future adversary networks. Using this 

approach, the fourth section then examines three concepts of operations 

the United States may employ to gain access into hyper-defended enemy 

states. With these four steps completed, the final analysis outlines 

investment options and recommendations for technical opportunities to 

properly posture air dominance assets for 2035 decisive combat 

operations. The analysis begins by exploring the future strategic 

challenges the United States faces in 2035.
5

2035 Challenges

Strategic Challenge: Reaching the Battlespace

Since World War I, the United States has not been challenged in 

deploying its air dominance platforms to forward bases to execute 

combat operations.4 This could change as modern states begin to level 

the formerly US-dominated, technological playing field. States use

various collaboration methods through a global, web-enhanced platform 

to rapidly increase their technological capabilities.5 One example is 

China’s recent stealth fighter development. The J-20 appears to rival the 

F-22 in size, range, weapons load, and air defense capabilities. Although 

the J-20’s status (prototype or technology demonstrator) is unknown, 

this aircraft could enter production in 8–10 years.6 As a result, the 

United States must modify its widely held assumptions that “time is on 

our side, we have unfettered forward access with unhampered logistics 

and we can achieve air/sea superiority quickly.”7

Regarding geophysical factors, China possesses strategic depth 

and layered interior defense lines which complicates reaching this 

potential battlespace. These defense systems include the DF-21D long 

range ballistic missile which has the capability to disrupt and/or deny 

US forward airbases and aircraft carrier capabilities.8

The South China Sea is divided into the first and second island 

chain (fig. 1). The DF-21D, if fully operational, could reach all current 

forward bases in the region except perhaps Guam. Therefore, the United 
6

States must consider all current forward bases vulnerable to attack and 

powerless to enable decisive combat operations.

Figure 1. China's geophysical factors (Reprinted from Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments [CSBA], 

http://www.csbaonline.com/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100518.Slid

es_AirSea_Batt/R.20100518.Slides_AirSea_Batt.pdf).

In the absence of US theater missile defense capabilities and 

hardened sheltering at US forward bases, the United States is forced to 

operate from longer distances. Increased distances, such as missions 

from Guam, will drive increased sortie durations thus resulting in 

reduced available sorties over a given period of time. A nominal daily 

sortie rate for a 500 nautical mile (nm) combat radius is 3.94 sorties per 

aircraft per day. If the combat radius increases to 2250nm, the rate 

drops to 1.79 sorties per aircraft per day.9 Therefore, US strategic 
7

planners must balance available long range air dominance platforms, 

their sortie requirements, and the time necessary to achieve combat 

objectives.

Summing up the strategic challenge, the increased threat to 

forward bases coupled with geophysical factors, reduces US air power 

projection capability. This challenges our traditional approach with its 

heavy reliance of forward basing and produces new requirements for 

increased range and improved survivability of all air-dominance 

platforms. Except the B-2 stealth bomber, air-dominance platforms may 

be unable to reach the battlespace without significant tanker support. 

This strategic “stiff arm” drives a requirement for more platforms due to 

fewer available sorties, amplifies air refueling requirements, and 

ultimately, slows the traditional tempo of US air operations.10

Operational Challenge: Penetrating the Battlespace

This leads 

to the next hurdle: getting these limited number of air dominance 

platforms into the battlespace.

States with advanced defense networks could develop traditional 

and nontraditional means to detect and engage US air dominance 

platforms entering their battlespace. States possessing traditional, 

monostatic air defense networks, like Iran, may obtain more advanced 

air defense systems (i.e., Russian SA-20s) to significantly improve their 

air defense capabilities.11 These systems with engagement ranges 

exceeding 100nm and advanced radar processing technology put current 
8

US aircraft at risk. Advanced states may pursue more advanced means, 

such as bistatic radars, to improve their capabilities. Bistatic radar is the 

term used “to describe the orientation of the radar system in which the 

transmitting and receiving antennas are physically separated (fig. 2).12

Figure 2. Bistatic radar operation (Reprinted from John Franklin, 

“Passive Bistatic Radar,” www.cse.unt.edu/~rakl/john-proposal.ppt 

[accessed 3 January 2011]).

Therefore, US stealth platforms may find they are unexpectedly 

vulnerable in this new battlespace.

Bistatic radars do not have to be military acquisition and target 

tracking radars. Transmitters, or illuminators of opportunity, can take 

the form of television, radio, or mobile phone antennas and can be 

modified into a bistatic configuration. These “passive coherent locations . 
9

. . coupled with sensitive receivers could track stealth aircraft.”13

As software and processing technology continue to improve, 

bistatic radar systems could quickly render current stealth technology 

obsolete. Current stealth aircraft shape and design help minimize 

detection from traditional, monostatic configurations.

If these 

radar configurations come to fruition, US tactical planners would have 

difficulties distinguishing traditional military radar systems from civilian 

systems. This would, in turn, make targeting problematic.

14 However, bistatic 

configurations with advanced signal processing capability could “exploit 

radio signals already plentiful in the atmosphere rather than generating 

its own target beams.”15

Summing up the operational challenge, traditional monostatic 

surface-to-air missiles and more advanced bistatic radars could prevent 

US air dominance platforms from penetrating the battlespace. Increased 

computer signal processing is required to reach this level of access 

denial. Difficulties in targeting threat transmitters and passive receivers 

further complicate the problem. US planners may need cross-domain 

alternatives for air dominance platforms to aid in their survival. This 

leads to the next hurdle in future air dominance: completing mission 

objectives in hyper-defended airspace.

In response, the United States may need to use 

cyber attack against signals processing centers to support air dominance 

platforms.
10

Tactical Challenge: Employing in the Battlespace

Given the developments in directed energy technologies, hyperdefended battlespaces challenge not only aircraft survivability, but also 

weapon survivability. Laser weapons provide an affordable point defense 

against aircraft and their weapons.16

In future hyper-defended airspace, surface-to-air missile systems 

will function to kill delivery platforms while point-defense lasers will 

serve to target inbound weapons (and aircraft if they stray within 

range).

This is why the entire enemy kill 

chain, not just the parts, must be analyzed against US capabilities. If air 

dominance platforms launch weapons that never survive to the target, 

then the capabilities to reach and penetrate the battlespace become 

negated.

17 The United States has successfully demonstrated a megawattclass, chemical oxygen iodine laser.18 Current assessments reveal a 100 

kilowatt chemical laser has enough power to destroy an aircraft and 

cruise missiles at long ranges (fig 3).19 Laser beam quality continues to 

improve and will be the primary driver for future directed energy system 

successes.20 Therefore, planners should expect advanced states to obtain 

lasers with speed of light targeting capabilities to destroy US platforms 

and weapons.21
11

Figure 3. Laser power requirements to affect targets (Adapted from

Richard J. Dunn, “Operational Implications of Laser Weapons,” Northrop 

Grumman Analysis Center,

http://www.northropgrumman.com/analysiscenter/paper/assets/Opera

tional_Implications_of_La.pdf, 7 [accessed 20 November 2010]).

Widespread laser introduction could drive increased weapons 

requirements to ensure target destruction. Today, air dominance 

platforms may only require one or two weapons to achieve a desired 

destruction level. However, a hyper-defended battlespace (with point 

defense laser systems) may require dozens of weapons to ensure one or 

two arrive at the target. As a result, US planners may have to modify 

employment strategies to meet this requirement for mission success.

Summarizing the tactical challenge, directed energy weapons may 

defeat US air dominance platforms and weapons while employing in 

hyper-defended battlespace. This would change US acceptable risk level 
12

calculations. Therefore, the United States may need to dedicate 

significant resources toward developing laser countermeasures for air 

dominance platforms and weapons. Put simply, “to leverage this 

emerging laser capability, we need operational concepts to guide our 

investment of laser technology.”22

Understanding Air Defense Networks

However, before rushing into planning 

operational concepts verses one specific threat, US planners must first 

understand the overall enemy air defense network and the proper 

approach to defeat it.

Whether an air defense network is a traditional, monostatic 

network or an advanced bistatic network, its relative capability depends 

on both sides’ assessment of the network’s strengths and vulnerabilities. 

The result is technological and operational competition where the 

defender seeks technologies to shore up and mitigate the vulnerabilities 

of his network (capabilities to enhance), while the aggressor seeks to 

exploit these same vulnerabilities in order to defeat it (capabilities to 

defeat). Various command and control assets, platforms, sensors, and 

weapons comprise these networks. Network capabilities can be thought 

of in terms of the dynamic targeting steps in Air Force doctrine.23 These 

capabilities are to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess opposing 

forces. An antiaccess/area denial state tries to enhance their network 

while opposing air dominance forces seek to defeat this same network.
13

Figure 4 compares network capabilities with certain technologies 

the defender uses to enhance his network and the aggressor uses to 

defeat. On the right (red-colored column), states developing air defense 

networks want to destroy, disrupt, and deny enemy forces attempting to 

gain access. Passive and bistatic radars enhance the capabilities to find, 

fix, and track air dominance platforms. Advanced missile systems (SA-20 

and DF-21D) enhance targeting capabilities out to distances which 

enhance overall area denial objectives. On the left (blue-colored column), 

states attempting to achieve air dominance must focus on defeating, 

delaying, or denying the network capabilities to gain access.

Figure 4. Air defense network breakdown (Created by the author).

Air Defense Network Breakdown

GENERAL TECHNOLOGY to 

DEFEAT

NETWORK CAPABILITIES SPECIFIC TECHNOLOGY to

ENHANCE

Stealth/Space/Cyber FIND Passive/Bi-Static Radars

Stealth/Space/Cyber/ 

Electronic Warfare

FIX Passive/Bistatic Radars

Stealth/Electronic Warfare/ 

Hypersonic 

TRACK Passive/Bistatic Radars

Stealth/Electronic Warfare/

Hypersonic

TARGET SA-20: Surface-to-Air

DF-21D: Surface-to-Surface

Stealth/Deception(Decoys)/ 

Electronic Warfare/ 

Hypersonic 

ENGAGE SA-20/DF-21D/Directed 

Energy (Lasers)

N/A to this Discussion ASSESS N/A to this Discussion
14

Combinations of stealth, space, cyber, and intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies are needed to avoid 

detection. In addition, operational techniques such as decoy, deception, 

swarming, and saturation enhance the ability of air dominance platforms 

to avoid being tracked and targeted. As a result, the network must be 

deconstructed and analyzed sufficiently to determine which red 

capabilities must be countered and how to accomplish it.

Summing up, advanced air defense networks and robust 

technological enhancements will challenge future air dominance 

objectives. US planners must dissect enemy networks to understand

their capabilities and their associated enabling technologies. They must 

determine whether to leverage existing cross-domain capabilities or 

develop new requirements to invest in future technologies. The challenge 

is where to begin. Strategists need a simple methodology to aid in 

problem solving and determine appropriate requirements to guide followon decisions.

Problem Solving Approach: A Requirements Model 

US planners need a model that reviews air dominance 

requirements to the appropriate level of detail. Currently, the US Air 

Force utilizes a capability-based construct, but it is too general in 

nature.24 Planners could greatly benefit from an integrated operational 

systems and acquisition/logistical requirements model. A detailed, 

multitiered construct would ensure planners thoroughly analyzed 
15

capabilities (with associated limitations) to avoid premature investment 

choices.

Figure 5 outlines specific requirements in a three-tiered approach 

to develop capabilities to meet future air dominance effects. Defeating the 

critical nodes of an enemy network hinges on ensuring all tiers are 

considered in one’s requirement decisions. The first tier is operations 

requirements, the second is the individual systems requirements, and 

the third is acquisition and logistics requirements. An important 

consideration to note is each tier’s specific requirements apply to all 

previous tier requirements. Failure to thoroughly plan in one tier could 

result in an incorrect or incomplete requirement.

Figure 5. Air dominance effects requirement model (Created by the 

author).
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Tier 1, operations requirements, consists of the basic tools used to 

achieve air dominance effects. Command and control (C2), networks, and

ISR will continue to be the brains behind operations. The processing, 

exploitation, and dissemination of battlespace data may not always be 

pushed to operators in traditional methods. Platforms may be required to 

penetrate a hyper-defended battlespace or employ from standoff ranges. 

Sensors could reside on-board and off-board platforms to assist in 

penetration and precision targeting. Kinetic and nonkinetic weapons can 

achieve air dominance effects. Finally, the proper training through 

development of tactics, techniques, and procedures ensures operators 

are technically proficient to accomplish air dominance missions.

Tier 2, system requirements, consists of the specific parts for each 

operations requirement. Power source, material, propulsion, guidance, 

range, speed, accuracy, and timing may be similar or different when 

applied to each operations requirement. The power source must have a 

sufficient duration to accomplish the mission. The material should deny, 

delay, or minimize enemy detection. Propulsion needs to be powerful and 

efficient enough to meet specific mission requirements. Guidance ideally 

needs to be self-reliant and jam proof to ensure precise navigation. Range 

and speed will vary from platform to platform, but must be sufficient to 

reach and penetrate the battlespace. Accuracy is the primary driver to 

achieve desired weapons effects and ensure sortie and threat exposure 

are minimized during decisive combat operations. Finally, timing is 
17

essential in achieving synergistic effects while countering hyper-defended 

battlespace.25

Tier 3, acquisition and logistic requirements, are the determining 

factors when finalizing decisions for tier 1 and tier 2 requirements. 

Affordability, balanced with reliability, will be the primary constraint in 

future defense acquisition budgets. This drives the design for networks, 

platforms, sensors, and weapons. Reusability will depend on platform 

and sensor numbers and specific use. Survivability not only includes the 

platform reaching its launch point but also the weapon reaching its 

target. Adaptability must consider potential multirole usages against 

specific enemy network capabilities. Finally, transportability must be 

considered to ensure logistical requirements are attainable and 

sustainable before even commencing operations. In summary, using this 

requirements model after analyzing enemy air defense networks will aid 

in developing operational concepts.

Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

Concept of Operations Development

There are several definitions of a CONOPS, but for purposes of this 

paper, CONOPS integrates required employment capabilities with tactics 

and required external support to achieve the commander’s objectives.26

Accordingly, 2035 air dominance CONOPS should center on destroying, 

disabling, disrupting, or denying some or all aspects of the enemies’ 

network “kill chain.” Network assessment and requirements models help 
18

determine the capabilities required to achieve the desired effect. Tactics 

maximize capability success and minimize exposure to the network 

threats. Embedded and/or detached support requirements assist in 

attacking the enemy network long enough to achieve mission objectives.

On the left side of figure 6, air dominance capabilities and tactics 

are listed in the first column. The second column identifies the applicable 

enemy network capability. The last two columns link support level and 

requirements to highlight CONOPS component interrelationships. Of 

note, utilizing stealth capability with stealth tactics would require the 

lowest support because these platforms operate autonomously with onboard weapons, sensors, and countermeasures. However, this is 

predicated on cloaking technologies reaching maturation by 2035. 

Conversely, using saturation capabilities through multiplatform 

packaging would require a high level of support in C2 and target data 

dissemination.
19

Figure 6. Capability, tactics, and support interrelationships for 

CONOPS design (Created by the author).

Based on the interrelationships in figure 6, three possible CONOPS 

stand out as candidate solutions to the antiaccess/area denial challenge. 

The first is standoff which minimizes human exposure to threats, while 

maximizing long range weapons effects. The second is penetrating strike 

which depends upon a highly-capable, manned stealth platform gaining 

access to deliver precision weapons. The third is swarm/saturation 

which utilizes stealth, legacy manned, and unmanned platforms to 

overwhelm hyper-defended battlespace with both penetration and long 

range weapons. In each CONOPS, success requires balancing human 

and asset exposure while using proper capabilities to attack the enemy’s 

network.

CONOPS

(Capability + Tactics + Support)

AIR DOMINANCE 

CAPABILITY

ENEMY 

NETWORK 

CAPABILITY

SUPPORT

LEVEL

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

Stealth Find/Fix LOW None

Speed (Hypersonic) Engage LOW Platform/Weapon Capability

Altitude Engage LOW Platform/Weapon Capability

Command/Control F2T2E MED Secure Network

Space/Cyber Find/Fix HIGH Secure Network

AIR DOMINANCE 

TACTIC

ENEMY 

NETWORK 

CAPABILITY

SUPPORT

LEVEL

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

Stealth Find/Fix LOW None

Decoy/Deception Target/Engage MED C2/Large Numbers

Swarm/Saturation Track/Target HIGH C2/Large Numbers

Multi-Axis Track/Target HIGH C2/Electronic Warfare

Packaging Track/Target HIGH C2/Electronic Warfare

CONOPS

(Capability + Tactics + Support)

AIR DOMINANCE 

CAPABILITY

ENEMY 

NETWORK 

CAPABILITY

PORT

VEL

PPORT REQUIREMENTS

Stealth Find/Fix OW None

Speed (Hypersonic) Engage OW orm/Weapon Capability

Altitude Engage OW orm/Weapon Capability

Command/Control F2T2E Secure Network

Space/Cyber Find/Fix Secure Network

AIR DOMINANCE 

TACTIC

ENEMY 

NETWORK 

CAPABILITY

PORT

VEL

PPORT REQUIREMENTS

Decoy/Deception arget/Engage C2/Large Numbers

Swarm/Saturation Track/Target C2/Large Numbers

2/Electronic Warfare

2/Electronic Warfare
20

CONOPS 1: Standoff

Standoff entails multi-domain coordination to acquire targeting 

data to feed standoff platforms for weapons employment. This minimizes 

threat exposure, but is heavily dependent on space/cyberspace to find, 

fix, and track enemy targets. As depicted in figure 7, the carrier strike 

group remains outside DF-21D range (1,500nm) while multiple launch 

platforms stay outside nominal enemy fighter range (500nm).27

Figure 7: Standoff CONOPS: China example (Adapted from Mark A. 

Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, "Air Sea Battle: A

point of Departure," CSBA, [2010]: 22). The original image was modified 

to help describe the standoff CONOPS.

F-22s 

assist with escort, provided an air bridge is maintained. Therefore, 

standoff’s cornerstone concept is using off-board sensors to cue multiple 

weapons against fixed target arrays.
21

At the operations requirement tier, the US command network 

needs to be forward based, preferably onboard the carrier strike group. 

Space access, bandwidth capability, and cyber security to receive 

satellite intelligence and disseminate to weapons platforms are major 

requirements. Weapons platforms, like the B-2, B-52, and B-1, could be 

augmented by arsenal planes to meet the high apportionment targeting 

requirements.28

From the systems requirement tier, the weapon’s power source, 

material, guidance, range, speed, and accuracy are all important 

planning considerations. These need to enable fly-out ranges of several 

hundred miles. The material needs to possess stealth qualities, have 

electronic warfare attributes, or receive cyber attack support to decrease, 

delay, or deny detection during fly-out. Guidance and accuracy must 

ensure the weapon can navigate and hit within distances to achieve 

desired effects. Overall, weapon systems requirements are the highest 

priority in this CONOPS.

Ideally, hypersonic weapons would increase enemy 

targeting difficulties while ensuring high weapon survival rates.

In the acquisition requirement tier, weapon reliability and 

survivability are the drivers. Anti-jam, inertially-aided weapons with selfterminal guidance (like cold atom technology) could solve this 

challenge.29 In addition, weapons should be shielded from 

electromagnetic pulses and direct energy weapons. Therefore, 

affordability needs to be balanced with the overall weapon capability. In 
22

summary, standoff succeeds with unimpeded space/cyberspace access 

and networked command/intelligence support along with weapons able 

to survive to their intended targets.

CONOPS 2: Penetrating strike

Penetrating strike entails using air dominance platforms to enter 

antiaccess/area denial battlespace and employ self-targeted weapons. 

Threat exposure is high so strike platforms need advanced technologies 

to aid in defending against enemy defense networks. As depicted in figure 

8, F-22s escort refueling platforms that remain outside nominal enemy 

fighter range (500 miles). B-2s or next generation bombers penetrate the 

battlespace for strike missions. Therefore, penetrating strike’s 

cornerstone concept is self-targeting against fixed, mobile, and hardened 

arrays.

From the command network operations requirement tier, space 

and cyber attacks support strike platforms, but these platforms must 

survive/counter autonomous threats. Strike platforms require significant 

technological upgrades to counter bistatic radars and advanced surfaceto-air missiles. Sensors and weapons need to counter laser defenses long 

enough to successfully guide weapons to their targets. Limited platform 

numbers equals lower available sorties which increases the time required 

to complete decisive combat operations. Overall, these low density, high 

demand strike platforms can be single points of failure without proper 

design capabilities.
23

Figure 8. Penetrating strike CONOPS: China example (Adapted from 

Mark Gunzinger, “Sustaining America’s Strategic Advantage in LongRange Strike” [Washington, DC: CSBA, 14 September 2010], 32). Original 

image was modified to clarify the penetrating strike CONOPS.

The systems requirement tier hinges on technological advances 

that must outpace air defense network capabilities. Platform materials 

need to maximize cloaking capabilities in the radio frequency, infrared 

and electro-optical spectrums. Metamaterials could provide this 

capability.30

The acquisition requirement tier presents challenges for strike 

platform capabilities. Affordability is the major constraint since strike 

platforms, sensors, and weapons must be reliable, survivable, and 

Weapon propulsion, range, and speed are not as critical as 

in the standoff CONOPS since platforms deliver them close to the target. 

However, guidance and accuracy weapons must counter jamming and 

possess the same characteristics as weapons in the standoff CONOPS.
24

adaptable against air defense networks. Also, emerging technologies, like 

metamaterials, need to reach acceptable maturation levels by 2035. If 

platforms cannot reach weapons release and weapons can’t survive to 

the target, the acceptable risk level is exceeded prior to mission 

execution. In summary, penetrating strike succeeds with highly 

advanced strike platforms which exceed air defense network capabilities 

(barring any serious time constraints).

CONOPS 3: Swarm and Saturation

Swarm and saturation combines manned stealth platforms, 

high/low tech unmanned air systems, and legacy strike platforms to 

overwhelm air defense networks. Some platforms penetrate and employ 

onboard weapons/decoys while others launch standoff weapons/decoys 

to achieve desired effects. Threat exposure is medium, based on each

platform’s usage and penetrating depth. F-22s escort refueling and 

legacy platforms remain outside nominal enemy fighter range (500 miles) 

and launch standoff weapons (fig. 9). Unmanned air systems 

penetrate/saturate air defenses while deploying swarming assets 

(decoys/weapons). Finally, B-2s or next generation bombers penetrate 

the battlespace to execute strike missions. Therefore, swarm and 

saturation’s cornerstone concept is to overwhelm defense networks with 

the full spectrum of assets against fixed, mobile, and hardened target 

arrays.
25

Figure 9. Swarm and saturation CONOPS: China example (Adapted 

from Gunzinger, “Sustaining America’s Strategic Advantage,” 68). The 

original image was modified to clarify the penetrating strike CONOPS.

The operations requirement tier has both high and low tech 

considerations. The command network requirement for legacy platforms 

and unmanned air systems is similar to the standoff CONOPS. B-1s and 

B-52s would require targeting data while other penetrating assets may 

self target. Swarming platforms like micro air vehicles or saturation 

platforms like the X-47 could perform self-targeting functions.31

Therefore, these sensors and weapons could be reusable or disposable 

depending on use. Overall, operations require large inventories of 

existing legacy systems and advanced technologies all synchronized 

through a secure command network.
26

The systems requirement tier is complex due to varied technology 

levels in the operations tier. A resilient command network with cyber 

defense is crucial to asset synchronization. B-2s and penetrating 

unmanned air systems have similar material requirements as the 

penetrating strike CONOPS. While stealth strike systems may require 

upgrades, legacy platforms would use existing capabilities. So, the 

number and type of assets will drive the overall level and cost of 

technology upgrade.

The acquisition requirement tier includes considerations from the 

standoff and penetrating strike CONOPS. Reusable swarming and 

saturation assets will require costly upgrades for survival verses 

disposable platforms. Thus, affordability will drive force structure. 

Reliability and survivability only pertains to reusable assets which makes 

this feasible. In summary, swarm and saturation succeeds when 

advanced technologies and legacy systems overwhelm an air defense 

network long enough for lethal strikes to erode its capability.

In review of the CONOPS, all three are potential solutions to the 

antiaccess/area denial challenge. All have unique attributes regarding 

capabilities, tactics, and support and all share similar technological 

development challenges to enable their success. Figure 10 compares 

critical CONOPS components (optimized target type, threat exposure, 

strike/support assets, and dominant future technologies) for each 
27

CONOPS. The final step is to prioritize desired capabilities and 

associated requirements to determine which technologies to pursue.

Figure 10. CONOPS comparison (Created by the author).

Recommendations/Investment Options

“To remain the world’s most capable Air Force, we must 

correctly anticipate emerging science and technology 

advances that have the greatest military potential.”

—Gen Norton Schwartz

USAF Chief of Staff

CONOPS 1 (standoff) requires investment in space, cyberspace,

and advanced long range weapons. The command network needs space 

situational awareness and intelligence data transmitted over secure 

CONOPS Comparision

CRITICAL CONOPS 

COMPONENTS

Standoff

CONOPS

Penetrating Strike

CONOPS

Swarm and 

Saturation 

CONOPS

Optimized Target Type Fixed Fixed/ Mobile/ 

Hardened

Fixed/Mobile/ 

Hardened

Threat Exposure Low High Med-High

Current Strike Assets B-2,B-1, B-52 B-2 B-2

Escort/Support Assets F-22/Tankers None/Tankers F-22/Tankers

Dominant Future 

Technologies

Space/Cyber

Arsenal Plane

Hypersonics

Cold Atom

Metamaterials

Next Gen Stealth

Electronic Warfare

Space/Cyber

UCAS (X-47)

Micro Air Vehicles
28

communication lines to standoff platforms. Improvements in defensive 

counterspace and cyber network defense is the first priority. Then cyber 

attack and offensive counterspace can provide direct support for long 

range weapons against enemy air defense networks. Disrupting bistatic 

radar command/control and laser cueing greatly assists standoff 

weapons. Even if cyber attack and offensive counterspace drive defense 

systems into autonomous modes, the weapons still need to make it to the 

target.

The United States can continue long range missile development 

like the joint air-to-surface standoff missile (JASSM) extended range. It 

should have initial operational capability in 2012; the United States

contracted 2,500 weapons at a cost of 7.7 billion.32

The future cruise missile should be a hypersonic weapon. If 

hypersonic weapons are fully operational in 2035, enemy air defense 

systems will have extreme targeting difficulties. The United States would 

“overcome the constraints of distance, time and defense that already 

limit conventional aerospace power projection.”

This weapon is under 

spiral development from the original JASSM so production costs should 

be minimized. This system along with air launched cruise missiles and

tomahawk land attack missiles could be modified with stealth 

technologies, or an entirely new system could be developed.

33 Of note, in May 2010 

the United States successfully completed the first flight test of the X-51A 

“Waverider.”34 This air breathing scram jet was launched at 50,000 feet 
29

mean sea level and reached a speed of about Mach 4.8. This validated its 

potential future application as a weapons platform. Therefore, hypersonic 

weapons would provide suppression of enemy air defenses and 

destruction of enemy air defenses. Overall, standoff provides a medium 

to high cost investment depending on modifications to existing 

technologies or development of new advanced systems.

CONOPS 2 (penetrating strike) requires extensive upgrades to the 

B-2 stealth platform or the development of a next generation stealth 

strike platform. Similar space and cyber attack upgrades from the 

standoff CONOPs would assist in network attack. Investments must 

focus on material and electronic warfare upgrades to protect the B-2 

deep inside an air defense network. B-2 electronic attack upgrades could 

be internal or other airborne electronic attack platforms (“Phantom Ray” 

or RQ-170) could support the B-2.35

Metamaterials are being developed to potentially provide advanced 

stealth capabilities. Rodger M. Walser first described metamaterials as 

“macroscopic composites having a manmade, three-dimensional, periodic 

cellular architecture.”

Overall, electronic warfare is a far 

less challenge than material upgrades.

36 The layman’s definition is building artificial 

materials in order to control electromagnetic signals. Metamaterials in 

the 3–30 gigahertz (GHz) range appear to have reached “analytical and 

experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept.”37

Of note, only certain frequencies at precise angles can produce “invisible” 
30

effects when tracked by a radar scope. Therefore, in 2035 these barriers 

most likely will be overcome, but the United States needs to ensure it 

reaches operational capacity first.

Metamaterial technological barriers exist in two critical spectrums. 

Currently, metamaterials in the infrared spectrum (300 GHz to 300 

terahertz [THz]) and the electrical optical spectrum (>300 THz < 3 

petahertz) are not seeing advances. “Difficulty exists in generating 

magnetic interactions in the optimum regime to provide cloaking 

effects.”38

CONOPS 3 (swarm and saturation) requires investment in 

low/high tech unmanned air systems to serve as weapons platforms, 

sensors, and decoys inside enemy air defenses. In addition, similar 

standoff weapons investments are required for use on legacy platforms 

outside the air defenses. Since saturation is one outright method to 

exhaust an adversary’s initial weapons volley, investments in B-2 

upgrades depends on the micro air vehicles and UCAS X-47 ability to 

degrade an air defense network.

As a result, it is uncertain whether these metamaterials will 

reach maturation. Overall penetrating strike is a high cost investment 

since technology development is in initial stages for both B-2 upgrades 

and a potential next generation stealth platform.

Micro air vehicles are two feet in length or less, capable of 

operating below rooftop level in an urban environment.39 Along with the 

UCAS X-47, these swarming assets would operate covertly to collect, 
31

interrupt, and disable enemy networks. Large numbers of these two 

disposable and nondisposable systems are required to execute this 

CONOPS. Additionally, disposable miniature air-launched decoys, 

improved tactical air-launched decoys and legacy drones will aide in 

saturation.40

Figure 11 outlines the various investment options associated with 

each CONOPS. It breaks down air defense network capabilities and the 

technologies needed to counter each of those capabilities. Relative costs 

serve as an initial comparative snapshot and varies depending on rate of 

future technology development. In addition, type and number of assets 

will vary depending on the specific hyper-defended battlespace 

composition.

Existing QF-4 and QF-15 drones could shield 

nondisposable manned and unmanned air dominance platforms for a 

very low cost. Overall, swarm and saturation is a low–medium cost 

investment depending on asset type and numbers utilized.
32

Figure 11. Investment options (Created by the author).

Conclusion

It is extremely unlikely that the 2035 stealth air dominance aircraft 

will be truly invisible. We will not find Perseus’s helmet from Greek 

mythology. As many unclassified studies have concluded, the current 

limited US stealth inventory is expensive and will progressively lose their 

decreased detection advantage over the next decades.41

Of the three CONOPS, swarm and saturation provides the best 

balance between cost and capability. Nonkinetic and electronic warfare 

If a state-onstate verses a near-peer competitor conflict arises then the United States

can expect to lose some current stealth aircraft in a hyper-defended 

battlespace.

Investment Options

CONOPS To Counter: 

Find

To Counter: 

Fix

To Counter: 

Track

To Counter: 

Target

To Counter: 

Engage

Notes/

Overall 

Cost

Standoff Space/Cyber Space/Cyber Advanced 

Stealth Cruise 

Missiles

Hypersonics

Arsenal Plane

Hypersonics

Arsenal Plane

Relative Cost Med Med High High High MedHigh

Penetration

Strike

Metamaterial

Next Gen Stealth

ElectronicWarfare

Metamaterial

Next Gen Stealth

ElectronicWarfare

Metamaterial

Next Gen Stealth

ElectronicWarfare

Metamaterial

Next Gen Stealth

ElectronicWarfare

Metamaterial

Next Gen Stealth

ElectronicWarfare

Relative Cost High High High High High High

Swarming / 

Saturation

Micro Air 

Vehicles

Micro Air 

Vehicles

UCAS (X-47)

Decoys

Legacy Drones

UCAS (X-47)

Decoys

Legacy Drones

UCAS (X-47)

Decoys

Legacy Drones

If B-2 is 

upgraded 

advanced 

stealth:

Cost=High

Relative Cost Low Low Med Med Med LowMed
33

disruption of an air defense network is a low cost capability. 

Overwhelming numbers of low tech, disposable platforms and weapons

provide the means to exhaust initial enemy weapons volleys. This 

provides high tech platforms with a window of opportunity to penetrate 

and destroy fixed, hardened, and mobile targets. Eventually, enemy air 

defense systems will erode and US air dominance returns to a level we 

are accustomed to fighting during decisive combat operations. Defeating 

an antiaccess/area denial enemy requires this type of synthesized, 

multidomain strategy.

In closing, US planners need a framework like the one presented to 

solve future air dominance challenges in antiaccess/area denial states. It 

begins with understanding potential enemy technical challenges and air 

defense network capabilities. Then a requirements approach model is 

used to develop sound CONOPS. Only after these steps are accomplished 

can proper technologies be identified for investment. It is ultimately 

technology which will enable platforms, sensors, and weapons to succeed 

in future decisive combat operations.

Notes

 

1. Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim 

Thomas, AirSea Battle: Point-of-Departure Operational Concept

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

[CSBA], 18 May 2010), xii. The authors present an in-depth discussion 

surrounding China’s and other state’s rising antiaccess, area denial 
34

 

capabilities and the US failure to modify their forces to counter such 

capabilities.

2. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why Air Sea Battle? (Washington, DC: 

CSBA, 19 February 2010), viii.

3. Arend G. Westra, “Radar vs. Stealth: Passive Radar and the 

Future of U.S. Military Power,” Joint Force Quarterly 55, no. 4 (October 

2009): 139. The author discusses multiple advanced countermeasures to 

current US stealth technology throughout the entire electromagnetic 

spectrum and implications for future air power.

4. Krepinevich, Why Air Sea Battle?, 5. The author argues that 

early US basic power projection capability dates back to the SpanishAmerican War in 1898 and force projection to forward bases during the 

Cold War was never contested by the Soviet Union. Only major combat 

operations are considered in this assertion.

5. Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat (New York: Farrar, 

Straus & Giroux, 2005), 176. The author details 10 world flatteners and 

their convergence which has created this new web-based platform for 

collaboration. This inexpensive and quick collaboration is helping states 

increase their education, research, and war-making capabilities.

6. “Editorial: Remain Watchful of China’s Ascent,” Aviation Week 

and Space Technology, 18 January 2011, 1.
35

 

7. Harry Foster, “Air Power and Anti-Access/Area Denial 

Networks,” (lecture, A2/AD conference, Washington, DC, 28 October 

2010), slide 3.

8. Wendell Minnick, “China Builds First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 

Base,” Defense News, 5 August 2010, 1. The author describes the DF21D having the potential range of 1,500–2000 kilometers which covers 

70 percent of the South China Sea.

9. Foster, “Air Power Anti-Access/Area Denial Networks,” slide 8. 

Assumes missions are flown at 480 knots ground speed to the target 

with a one hour mission delay and three hour turn time upon landing.

10. Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas, AirSea Battle, 24. 

Consequences of losing forward air bases in an antiaccess/area denial 

conflict are outlined to include reduced sortie rates and increased tanker 

demands.

11. David A. Fulghum, “Russia Sells SA-20 to Iran,” Aviation Week 

and Space Technology, 12 December 2008, 1.

12. “Stealth Aircraft Vulnerabilities,” Global Security.org, 7 

November 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/stealthaircraft-vulnerabilities.htm.

13. Robert P. Haffa and James H. Patton, Jr., “Analogues of 

Stealth: Submarines and Aircraft,” Comparative Strategy 10, no. 3 

(July/September 1991), 15. The author discusses that bistatic radars 
36

 

would require large computing power to collect and analyze the multiple 

radar beans received across several antennas.

14. Ibid., 14.

15. Ibid., 15.

16. Richard Dunn, “Operational Implications of Laser Weapons,” in 

Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics/Quantum Electronics and Laser 

Science Conference and Photonic Applications Systems Technologies, OSA 

Technical Digest, CD-ROM, Optical Society of America, 2007, 3.

17. Ibid.

18. Dr. William D. Schneider, “Defense Science Task Force on 

Directed Energy Weapons,” (Washington, DC: Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, December 

2007), 6.

19. Dunn, “Operational Implications of Laser Weapons,” 7.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., 10. These laser systems are expected to have the 

following capabilities: multiple target engagement, rapid retargeting, 

exceptional accuracy, low logistical support requirements, and flexibility 

in carriage and employment.

22. Ibid., 4.

23. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.9, Targeting, 8 June 

2006, 49. This Air Force document states on the cover that it 

complements related discussions found in Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, 
37

 

Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002. Additionally, the dynamic 

targeting process is also referred to as the “kill chain.”

24. Dr. Werner J. A. Dahm, Technology Horizons: Vision for Air 

Force Science and Technology during 2010–2030, vol. 1, Washington, DC, 

Office of the US Air Force Chief Scientist, 15 May 2010, 43. The Air Force 

Research Laboratory uses a general construct in its attempts to define a 

future war-fighter’s needs. They use eight focused long term challenges 

as their current guideline; the fourth challenge is persistent responsive 

precision engagement defined as, “maneuver through antiaccess/area 

denied environments to deliver effects rapidly and/or persistently.”

25. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 31. 

“Synergistic Effects” is one of the seven tenets of air and space power. 

Specifically, AFDD 1 describes that its objective is the precise, 

coordinated application of the various elements of air, space, and surface 

power to bring disproportionate pressure on enemy leaders to comply 

with our national will. 

26. The definition of what comprises a concept of operations 

(CONOPS) varies considerably from the strategic level to the tactical level. 

The US Air Force defines its service CONOPS as “the highest Service-level 

concept comprising a commander’s assumptions and intent to achieve 

desired effects through the guided integration of capabilities and tasks 

that solve a problem in an expected mission area.” JP 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, II-24. This publication’s Level 4 
38

 

planning CONOPS described integrated tactical actions with high fidelity. 

For information on Air Force CONOPS, see Air Force Instruction 10-

2801, Air Force Concept of Operations Development, 24 October 2005, 2. 

For information on CONOPS in joint planning see JP 5-0, 1–18.

27. Krepinevich, Why Air Sea Battle?, 19. The author states that 

carrier forces would need to maintain a distance of 1,000–1,600 nm from 

the China coastline to avoid the advanced surface-to-surface threats. 

Airborne platforms would also need to maintain a distance of 500 nm to 

remain outside a Chinese fighter’s nominal unrefueled max range, 

assuming they return to their original mainland air base.

28. Eric Weidanz, email to the author, 6 January 2011, 1. Arsenal 

plane is a Boeing 777 platform converted to a strike platform capable of 

launching standoff missiles such as the JASSM-ER. Each plane is 

estimated to hold 52 missiles and have a combat radius of 4,000 miles.

29. Stefanie Tompkins, “Precision Inertial Navigation Systems,” 

Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, 

http://www.darpa.mil/dso/thrusts/physci/newphys/pins/, 1. Cold 

atom interferometers are being developed to replace the global 

positioning system for navigation. This technology would require no 

external transmissions and would still provide precise navigation 

capability.

30. Bora Ung, “Metamaterials: A Metareview,” Ecole Polytechnique 

of Montreal: http://www.polymtl.ca/phys/doc/art_2_2.pdf, 1. 
39

 

Metamaterials are manmade materials that exhibit unique 

electromagnetic properties that theoretically could be undetectable in the 

radio frequency, infrared, and electro-optical spectrums. This will 

increase stealth platform cloaking capabilities.

31. US Air Force Fact Sheet, “Micro Air Vehicle Integration and 

Application Research Institute,” 

http://www.wpafb.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=17006, 1. 

Micro air vehicles are designed to provide close covert sensing

capabilities to enhance situational awareness and targeting data. Also 

see Gunzinger, “Sustaining America’s Strategic Advantage,” 69. The X-47 

is an unmanned carrier air vehicle with stealth, surveillance, and selftargeting capability.

32. Deagel.com, “AGM-158 JASSM-ER,” 

http://www.deagel.com/Land-Attack-Cruise-Missiles/AGM-158-JASSMER_a001073002.aspx, 1.

33. Richard P. Hallion, “Hypersonic Power Projection,” Mitchell 

Institute for Airpower Studies, 

http://www.afa.org/mitchell/reports/MP6_0610.pdf, 8.

34. US Air Force, “X-51 Waverider makes Historic Hypersonic 

Flight,” Air Force News, 26 May 2010, 

http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123206525.

35. Gunzinger, “Sustaining America’s Strategic Advantage,” 75.
40

 

36. Akhlesh Lakhtakia, “Evolution of Metamaterials,” Department 

of Engineering Science and Mechanics, Pennsylvania State University, 

April 2007, 

www.esm.psu.edu/~axl4/lakhtakia/documents/Lakhtakia_07_7.pdf, 12.

37. James W. Bilbro, “Technology Readiness Levels,” JB 

Consulting International, 

http://www.jbconsultinginternational.com/Pages/TechnologyReadinessL

evels.aspx3.

38. Laura Rea, “Sensors Directorate Applied Metamaterials” 

(lecture, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 20 

September 2010), slide 7.

39. US Air Force Fact Sheet, “Micro Air Vehicle Integration,” 1.

40. Global Security.org, “Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD),” 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/mald.

htm, 1.

41. Westra, “Radar verses Stealth,” 142. The author describes how 

current stealth technology alone will be less effective over the years 

relative to passive radar improvements. The United States cannot simply 

invest in stealth without understanding the rapidly developing counters 

to stealth.