NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 19-2350

_____________

DONTE LAWRENCE,

 Appellant 

v.

SUPERINTENDENT DALLAS SCI; 

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF 

THE COUNTY OF CHESTER; 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

______________

On Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D.Pa. Civil No. 2-17-cv-00871)

District Court Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert

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Argued: May 20, 2021

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Before: McKEE, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 10, 2021)

Thomas A. Dreyer, Esq. [Argued]

30 Running Brook Road

Glen Mills, PA 19342

Nicholas J. Casenta, Jr., Esq. [Argued]

Chester County Office of District Attorney

Suite 4450

201 West Market Street
2

P.O. Box 2746

West Chester, PA 19380

Ronald Eisenberg, Esq.

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

1600 Arch Street

Suite 300

Philadelphia, PA 19103

OPINION*

_______________________

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Donte Lawrence appeals the District Court’s denial of his writ of habeas corpus

petition. He argues that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by 

failing to object to the Commonwealth’s characterization of him as a “cold-blooded 

murderer” during its opening statement. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 

District Court.

1

I.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Lawrence must show that 

trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that 

trial counsel’s errors prejudiced his defense.2

 In determining whether trial counsel’s 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We 

have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2253. Because the District 

Court ruled on the habeas petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, our review of 

its decision is plenary. Dellavecchia v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 819 F.3d 682, 691 (3d 

Cir. 2016).

2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
3

performance was deficient, we must be “highly deferential” and “indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.”3

 Here, trial counsel’s choice to withhold objection is entitled to double 

deference under Strickland v. Washington and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act.

4 Accordingly, counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment.”5 Even if we were to find that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, we 

would then have to determine that the state court’s contrary holding was unreasonable 

under the Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington v. Richter, wherein the Court 

explained that “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 

habeas relief so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision.”6

 

During the Post-Conviction Relief Act hearing, trial counsel explained that he did 

not believe the comment would warrant a mistrial and did not want to further highlight 

the Commonwealth’s characterization of his client.

7 That was certainly a reasonable 

strategy. However, even if we concluded it was an unreasonable dereliction of the 

standard of professionalism owed Lawrence, the double deference that Richter requires 

3 Id. at 689.

4 See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 121-23 (2011). 

5 Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 22 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 6 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

7 App. at 127.
4

would still preclude our holding that the state court’s contrary conclusion was 

unreasonable. 

Nevertheless, before concluding, we emphasize that the fact that we must affirm 

the District Court’s denial of Lawrence’s habeas petition in no way suggests that the 

prosecutor’s opening statement here was appropriate or proper. On the contrary, the 

prosecutor’s opening was the kind of argument that should be reserved for summation,

where such argument is allowed so long as it is based on the trial record. Given the zeal 

of the Commonwealth’s opening statement here, it is apparently necessary for us to 

remind counsel of a fundamental principle of trial advocacy: “[t]he purpose of an opening 

[statement] is to give the broad outlines of the case to enable the jury to comprehend it. It 

is not to poison the jury's mind against the defendant . . . .”8

 Neither the emotion of the 

courtroom nor adversarial zeal should blind attorneys to the fact that “[a]n opening 

statement has a narrow purpose and scope. It is to state what evidence will be presented, 

to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to relate parts of the 

evidence and testimony to the whole; is not an occasion for argument.”9

Nevertheless, a habeas petitioner must establish more than an ill-advised or 

unprofessional opening statement by a prosecutor to establish relief under Strickland. 

For the reasons we have explained, any professional transgression here is simply not 

sufficient to establish that Lawrence is entitled to relief. 

8 United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 470 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Gov’t of 

Virgin Islands v. Turner, 409 F.2d 102, 103 (1968)). 9 Id. at 471 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976) (Burger C.J., 

concurring)). 
5

II.

Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Lawrence’s petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus.