UNITED STATES ARMr IN WORLD WAR II 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

NORTHWEST AFRICA: SEIZING 

THE INITIATIVE IN THE WEST 

by 

George F. Howe 

CENT~'R OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STAlES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D. c., 1993 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 57-60021 

First Printed 1957-CMH Pub 6-1-1 

For sale bv the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Covernment Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor 

Advisory Committee 

(As of 15 March 1957) 

Elmer Ellis 

University of Missouri 

Samuel Flagg Bemis 

Yale University 

Gordon A. Craig 

Princeton University 

Oron]. Hale 

University of Virginia 

W. Stull Holt 

University of Washington 

Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Newman 

U.S. Continental Army Command 

Brig. Gen. Edgar C. Doleman 

Army War College 

Brig. Gen. William F. Train 

Command and General Staff College 

Maj. Gen. Robert P. Hollis 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

Col. Vincent]. Esposito 

United States Military Academy 

T. Harry Williams 

Louisiana State University 

Office of the Chief of Military History 

Maj. Gen. Richard W. Stephens, Chief 

Chief Historian 

Deputy Chief of Military History 

Chief, War Histories Division 

Chief, Editorial and Publication Division 

Editor in Chief 

Chief, Cartographic Branch 

Chief, Photographic Branch 

III 

Kent Roberts Greenfield 

Col. Ridgway P. Smith, Jr. 

Col. Seneca W. Foote 

Lt. Col. E. E. Steck 

Joseph R. Friedman 

Elliot Dunay 

Margaret E. Tackley 

· . . to Those Who Served 

Foreword 

The history of initial actions in a war contains lessons of special value for 

the professional soldier and for all students of military problems. Northwest 

Africa abounds in such lessons, for it covers the first massive commitments of 

American forces in World War II. The continent of Africa became a gigantic 

testing ground of tactics, weapons, and training evolved through years of peace. 

The invasion stretched American resources to the limit. Simultaneously the 

country was trying to maintain a line of communications to Australia, to conduct 

a campaign at Guadalcanal, to support China in the war against Japan, to arm 

and supply Russia's hard-pressed armies on the Eastern Front, to overcome the 

U-boat menace in the Atlantic, to fulfill lend-lease commitments, and to accumulate the means to penetrate the heart of the German and Japanese homelands. 

The Anglo-American allies could carry out the occupation of Northwest Africa 

only by making sacrifices all along the line. 

Two campaigns occurred there: Operation TORCH which swiftly liberated 

French North Africa from Vichy French control, followed by a longer Allied 

effort to destroy all the military forces of the Axis powers in Africa. The latter 

concentrated in Tunisia, where the front at one time extended more than 375 

miles, and fighting progressed from scattered meeting engagements to the final 

concentric thrust of AmericaQ, British, and French ground and air forces against 

two German and Italian armies massed in the vicinity of Bizerte and Tunis. 

The planning, preparation, and conduct of the Allied operations in Northwest Africa tested and strengthened the Anglo-American alliance. Under General Dwight D. Eisenhower a novel form of command evolved which proved 

superior to adversities and capable of overwhelming the enemy. 

Washington, D. C. 

19 December 1956 

VB 

RICHARD W. STEPHENS 

Maj. Gen., U.S.A. 

Chief of Military History 
The Author 

The author, a graduate of the University of Vermont, received the Ph. D. 

degree in History from Harvard University in 1930. He was a member of the 

faculty of the University of Cincinnati from 1926 to 1945. In 1932-33 he studied 

and traveled in England, France, and the Mediterranean area as a Fellow of 

the Social Science Research Council. 

In 1945 he became a staff member of the Historical Branch, G-2, War 

Department. Until 1952 he was writing the present volume as a member of 

the Mediterranean Theater Section, Office of the Chief of Military History. 

He then became Defense Historian, Department of the Interior. He is now Historian with the Department of Defense. Dr. Howe is the author of a biography 

of Chester Alan Arthur, of a General History of the United States Since 1865, 

and of The Battle History of the First Armored Division. 

viii 
Preface 

Certain considerations which attracted the author to the subject of this 

volume also governed its original plan. Campaigning in Northwest Africa was, 

for the U.S. Army, a school of coalition warfare and a graduate school of Axis 

tactics. Operation TORCH, with its political overtones, was the first great expeditionary assault in the West and by far the largest in history at that time. 

The historical evidence, even if oppre&<;ively bulky, was rich in variety. Captured 

documents and German officers provided the means of recovering "the enemy 

side," at least sufficiently to clarify most tactical situations of any consequence. 

Other materials made it possible to construct a history of the operations by the 

U.S. Army in context, that is, with due regard for the activities of the other 

Military Services and of the British and French allies. 

During the five years from 1947 to 1952, significant changes in concept 

caused the original plan to be modified. It became apparent that, if full use were 

made of Axis materials coming to the Office of the Chief of Military History, 

the functioning of the Axis at all levels of command as a military coalition could 

be portrayed more effectively in this setting than in any likely alternative. The 

plan was therefore adjusted to make this narrative a history of two opposing 

coalitions by tracing the parallel strategic and tactical decisions from the heads 

of governments along the chains of command to execution in combat zones. 

During this process it was kept in mind that interest in the record of the U.S. 

Army must not be submerged by all that is implied in the phrase, in World 

War II. 

That Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West is a product of 

co-operation, collaboration, and co-ordination is apparent from the notes. Co-operation took the form chiefly of making records available and of providing authentic 

recollections which illuminated the documents. Critics of a first draft in 1951 gave 

the author invaluable guide lines for a second stage of preparation. It then received the principal attention of collaborators-editing, cartography, pictorial illustration, and further application of evidence on the enemy side. These processes 

terminated in the latter part of 1956. 

The author would enjoy acknowledging by name his sense of debt to the 

many persons who co-operated, collaborated, and even co-ordinated in such a 

way as to make this book better than he alone could have made it. Among the 

co-operators, Forrest Pogue, Marcel Vigneras, Alice Miller, and Clyde Hillyer 

ix 
Christian were particularly helpful, and assistance came in two instances which 

call for special mention. The author cherishes the recollection of sitting at the 

desk and in the chair of the President of Columbia University for many hours 

examining the manuscript diary of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, a 

privilege which he owed to General Eisenhower and Kevin McCann. He holds 

in the greatest respect the scrupulous effort of Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, while 

he was Chief of Military History, to avoid influencing in any way the book's 

description of General \Vard's part in the events in Northwest Africa. 

Among the collaborators, the author's indebtedness is greatest to the Chief 

Historian of the Army, Kent Roberts Greenfield; his contribution was far above 

and beyond the call of anything but his own broad concept of duty. The book 

benefited from the help of colleagues of the Mediterranean Theater Section 

of the Army's Office of Military History, Howard McGaw Smyth and Sidney 

T. Mathews, of Mrs. Jeanne Smith Cahill as research assistant, and David Jaffe 

as principal editor. During research, special aid came from (then) Maj. John 

C. Hatlem, USAF, an incomparable photographer of battle terrain, and Wsevolod 

Aglaimoff, the most analytical and discerning of cartographers. Subsequently, 

the book has prospered from the attentions of Maj. James F. Holly, cartographer, 

and Margaret Tackley, Chief of the Photographic Branch. 

Two other collaborators invite the author's special acknowledgment, Detmar 

Finke and Charles von Luttichau. Their work in establishing full and precise 

detail, particularly with reference to the enemy side, was performed with a 

cheerful thoroughness which could hardly be exaggerated. 

Certain persons who have lived vicariously with the fluctuations of this 

prolonged project with extraordinary forbearance are also hereby thanked. 

Washington, D. C. 

8 November 1956 

x 

GEORGE F. HOWE 
Contents 

PART ONE 

Preparations 

Chapter Page 

I. THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF WAR, 1940-1942 . 3 

The Mediterranean as an Axis Theater. . . . . . . . . . . 4 

The Allied Decision To Occupy French North Ajrica. . . . . . 10 

The President Commits the United States to Operation TORCH. 13 

II. STRATEGIC PLANNING. 15 

Beginnings oj the Allied Force . 15 

General Eisenhower's Directive . 16 

The Objective . . . . 16 

Political Considerations. 22 

Strategic Decisions . . 25 

III. TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS. 32 

Organizing the Chain oj Command oj the Allied Force. 32 

Directivesjor Joint Aceion by the U.S. Army and Navy. 37 

Western Task Force Planning. . 39 

Center Task Force Planning. . . 46 

Planningjor Operations at Algiers. 50 

Political Preparations . 54 

Civil Affairs Planning. . . . . 57 

IV. COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 60 

Training jor the Assault. . . . . 60 

Plans jor Logistical Support. . . . . . . 63 

Departure oj the Western Task Force. . . . 67 

Departure Rf the Center and Eastern Task Forces. 70 

Axis Situation in the Mediterranean on the Eve oj the Attack. 72 

Finding a French Leader. . . 77 

The Climax oj the Preparations. . . . . . . . . . . . 84 

Xl 
PART TWO 

The Amphibious Phase on the Atlantic Coast 

Clwpter Page 

V. THE FRENCH DECIDE TO FIGHT. . . . . . . . . 89 

VI. TAKING SAFI . . . . . . 97 

The Objective and Its Difenses . 97 

The Plan f.!! Attack . 102 

Debarkation Begins. . . . . 102 

The Battle Opens. . . . . . 104 

Completing the Seizure of Safi . 107 

Air Action at Safi. . . . . . 109 

Stopping Freneh Reinforcement From Marrakech . 111 

The Armored Force Starts Toward Casablanea. . 114 

VII. FEDALA TO CASABLANCA. 116 

The Landings Begin. . . . . . 123 

Clearing Cap de Fedala. . . . . 127 

The Capture of the Batterie du Pont Blondin. 129 

Other D-Day Landings at Fedala . 130 

The French Reaction Ashore. . 131 

Naval Action on D Day. . . . 133 

Unloading at Fedala on D Day. 134 

The Advance on 9 November. . 137 

French Countermeasures in M orocco, 9~ 70 November. 141 

The Attack Near the Coast on 70 November. . . . 142 

Pushing to thP Southeastern Edge oj Casablanea, 70 November. 144 

VIII. MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 147 

The Plan qf Attack. . . . . . . 150 

The Enem.JI Is Alerted. . . . . . 153 

The 2d BL T Attacks in the Center. 155 

The 1st BLT Attacks on the South Wing. 157 

The 3d BL T's Attack on the North riling. 158 

Summary f.!! D Day. . . . . . . 159 

The Second Day's Operations. . . . 161 

ThP l'light Attacks, 9-10 November. . 163 

Closing on the Airdrome, 10 NovembfT . 165 

Taking the Kasba 167 

The Final Phase. . . 168 

Xll 
Chapter 

IX. THE END OF HOSTILITIES IN MOROCCO 

Armistice. . . . . . . 

Enemy Submarines Attack. . . . . . . . 

Political Conditions . . . . . . . . . . 

The Western Task Force After the Surrender 

PART THREE 

The Amphibious Operations in the Mediterranean 

Page 

171 

171 

174 

176 

179 

X. THE LAST PRELIMINARIES. . 185 

The Conva.)!.\' Elude the Enemy. . . . 185 

Giraud's Associates in Oran and Algiers. 188 

Giraud at Gibraltar. . . . . . . . 190 

XI. THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN . 192 

The Arrival of the Center Task Force Off Oran . 192 

The Landings at Mersa bou Zedjar. . . . . . . . . . .. 195 

The Landings at Les Andalouse, (r Beach). . . . . . . .. 199 

The Direct Assault on Oran Harbor (Operation RESERVIST) . 202 

Naval A.ir Support for the Landings. . 204 

The Landings Along the Golfe d' Arzew . 205 

Combat Team 18 on D Day. . . . . 207 

Combat Team 16 an D Day. . . . . 208 

Task Force RED Takes Tafaraoui Airfield. 209 

The Airborne Troops qf the Center Task Force. 212 

The Situation as D Day Ends. . . . . . . 213 

XII. THE SEIZURE OF ORAN. . . . . . . 215 

The French Counterattack on the Eastern Flank. 215 

French ArmoTfd Counterattack Near Tafaraolli. 217 

Afisserrhin Is ~ypassed ~y the GREEN Flying Column, 9-10 November . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 

St. Cloud Is Final~y Bypassed. . . . . . . 220 

The Approach to Oran From the East and South. 220 

The Final Attack on Oran, 10 ]I/ovember . 223 

Aftermath of Victory. .. .... 225 

Xlll 
Chap tel Page 

XIII. THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 22{) 

The Plan oj Attack . . 229 

Arrival at the Beaches . . . . . . . . 234 

The Western Landings. . . . . . . . 235 

The Capture oj Lambiridi and oj Elida Airdrome 238 

Operation TERMINAL 241 

The Eastern Landings . . 244 

Negotiations in Algiers. . 249 

Hostilities Cease in Algiers 250 

XIV. THE AXIS REACTION AND THE FRENCH DECISION. 253 

Axis Efforts To Gain French Co-operation 254 

Axis Military Planning 260 

Clark-Darlan Negotiations . . 262 

The North Ajrican Agreement . 269 

French West Ajrica Co-operates 271 

French Organizationjor J\lilitary Co-operation. 272 

PART FOUR 

The End of Operation Torch 

XV. TAKING POSITIONS FOR THE DRIVE ON TUNIS. 277 

Advance Into Tunisia . . . . . . 277 

The Terrain if Tunisia . . . . . 280 

Allied Spearheads Engage the Enem)! 283 

Nehring Takes Command in Tunis . 286 

The First Battle at Medjez el Bab, 79--20.Vovemher 287 

The Enemy Attempts To Extend the Bridgehead 288 

Preparations jor the First Allied Attack 291 

Enemy Strength 294 

Allied Plan of Attark . . . . . . . 295 

XVI. THE ATTACK TOWARD TUNIS. . . . 299 

The Two .Yorthern Columns Attack, 25.Vovemher 299 

The Southern Attack Begins. 302 

The Rattle jar Djedei·da . 305 

XIV 
Chapter 

XVII. STALEMATE BEFORE TCNIS 

The AXIs Counterattack Begins. . . 

The Second Day . . . . . . . . 

The Climax ~r the Counterattack, 3 December 

December Decisions on Axis Strateg)l. . . . 

The Action at DJebel el Guessa, 6 Decemher . 

The Allies Fall Back to a New Line 

The Plansfol the Final Attack. . 

The Engagement at Longs/oft Hill . 

PART FIVE 

Concentration of Forces in Tunisia 

XVIII. THE NEW SITCATION: ALLIED REACTION. 

Central Tunisia: The Terrain. . . . . 

Operation SA TIN and Related Probl!ms . 

The New Chain of Allied Command. 

Giraud Replaces Dar/an . . 

French Factionalism Persists. 

Rearming the French. . . . 

XIX. THE NEW SITUATION: AXIS REACTION 

Revision of Axis Plans. . . . 

The Axis Logistical Problem 

Axis Reorganization in January 

The Axis Forces--Strength and DispoJltion 

XX. SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 

Fighting To Keep the Initiative 

The Enemy's Attack, 78-28 January 

Changes in Allzed Held Command 

The Enemy's JVext Moves 

II Corps Plans. . . . . . . . 

The Enemy Attacks Fald Pass. . 

The Allied Attack on Maknassy Begins 

The Enem,.J1 Retains Fald Pass. . . 

Operations Southwest of Pont-du-Fahs 

II Corps Attack on Maknassy Ends 

II Corps Goes on the Defensive. 

xv 

Page 

311 

312 

315 

318 

321 

326 

329 

335 

338 

347 

347 

349 

354 

355 

359 

361 

363 

363 

365 

368 

370 

373 

373 

376 

383 

386 

386 

388 

392 

393 

394 

395 

398 
Chapter 

XXI. THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 

Allied Expectations . . . . . 

Page 

401 

401 

402 

405 

407 

410 

416 

419 

Allied Dispositions, 73 February . . . . . . 

The Enemy's Intentions . . . . . . . . . 

Axis Plans for Taking Sidi Bou Zid and Gafsa 

The Battle if Sidi Bou Zid, 74 Februa,-y. . . 

Allied Preparations for Counterattack . . . . 

The Countrrattack at Sidi Bou Zid, 75 February 

XXII. THE ENEMY DRIVES BACK THE ALLIED SOUTHERN 

FLANK. . . . . . . . . . . 423 

The Decision To Fall Back to the West 423 

The Axis Attark Pauses . . . . 424 

The Axis Forces Squander a Day. . . 426 

The Allied Line Swings Back . . . . 427 

The Attack on Sbei"tla Begins, 76 February 430 

yVithdrawal to Sbiba~Loss of Feriana and Thelepte 436 

XXIII. ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS. 438 

The Axis Decision of 78 February 438 

The Allied Line in the South 442 

The Terrain at Kasserine Pass 444 

The De}ense of K asserine Pass, 79 February 447 

The 21st Panzer Division Is Stopped at Sbiba, 79 Februa,-y 452 

The Loss of Kasserine Pass, 20 February. . 453 

Allied D~fenses in the Rear of Kasserine Pass . . . . . . 457 

XXIV. THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK. 459 

The Enemy Is Held on the Tebessa Road. 460 

Thala Narrow(y Escapes Capture 464 

The Enemy Retires Through Kasserine Pass 469 

The Jlfew Army Groups . . . . . 475 

Balance Sheet ~f the February Battles . . . 477 

XVl 
PART SIX 

Shift to Northern Tunisia 

Chapter Page 

XXV. THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR DECISIVE ACTION 485 

Reorganizing the Allied Command 485 

Ground .Forces Reorganize 489 

The New Allied Air Command 492 

Allied Preparations in the Communications Zone 495 

Preparations by the French. . . . . . . . . 499 

XXVI. THE ENEMY STRIVES TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE. 501 

A Major Effort in the North Is Planned 501 

The Attack on the Northern Flank . . . 504 

The Attack via Sidi llsir. . . . . . . 505 

The Enerrsv Fails, South cif the Medjerda . 507 

The Outcome oj the 26 Februar.y Offensive. 508 

New Instructions jor Army Group Africa 509 

Axis Logistical Preparations. 512 

The Battle cif Medenine 514 

Rommel Leaves Tunisia . . 519 

XXVII. FRO~vl MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 521 

The Approach oj the British Eighth Arm)'. 521 

The AJ areth Position. . . . . . . . . 522 

Rommel's Analysis cif the M areth Position. 524 

The Gap Leading to El Hamma . . . . 525 

Plans jar Operation PUGILIST GALLOP 526 

Difense Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . 527 

The Battle on the Coastal Plain . . . . . 530 

The Shift to Operation SUPERCHARGE II 533 

The Enerrsv Falls Back to the Chou Position. 537 

The Enemy Is Driven to Northeastern Tunisia. 539 

XXVIII. GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR (17-25 MARCH) 543 

18 Arm)' Group's Plan for II Corps . 543 

The Corps Plan: Operation TYO P 545 

The Occupation cif Gajsa. . . 547 

The Seizure of Station de Sened. . 548 

The Advance Be)'ond lvfaknassy . 550 

18 Army Group Revises II Corps lvfission, 22 March 552 

Enemy D~fense of Maknassy Pass, 23-25 March . . 554 

The 1st Infantry Division Holds thr Enem,y Near El Guellar 557 

Reinforced American Infantry Versus German Armor, 23 ,\1 arch 560 

XVll 
Chapter Page 

XXIX. II CORPS OPERATIONS BEYO~D EL GUETTAR. 564 

18 Armp Group Again Revises the Plan for 11 Corps. . 564 

Two Divisions East of El Guettar, 28-29 March. . . 565 

The Armored Attack Toward Gabes, 30 March-l April 569 

Tactical Air Support 0/11 Corps. 573 

Il Corps Is Held, 2-6 April. . . 574 

The Enemy Pulls Out, 68 April. 576 

XXX. ATTACKS AT FONDOUK EL AOUAREB AND PURSUIT ONTO THE PLAIl" . . . . . . . 578 

The Second Attack at Fondouk el Aouareb Falters . 582 

British 6th Armoured Division Breaks Out at Fondouk 1'1 AOllareb . 589 

The Enem)J Slips Past K airouan . . . . . . . . . . . .. 590 

PART SEVEN 

Allied Drive to Victory 

XXXI. PREPARATIONS . . . . . . . . 

The Terrain of the EnemJ" s Bridgehl'ad 

The Allied Plan of Attack . . . 

The Enemp's Plans and Regrouping . 

Allied Regrouping . . . . . . . 

XXXII. THE ATTACK BEGINS ..... 

11 Corps Plans. . . . . . . . . . 

Preparations for the Attack in the ].forth 

Attack in the North Begins . . 

11 Corps .Southern Attack Begins . . . 

XXXIII. THE ADVANCE TO MATEUR 

Hi1l609 ......... . 

The Attack Opens . . . . . . . 

First Failure and Broadened Plans . 

Succesiful General Attack, 30 April-I Ma)J . 

Approaching" The AJ ousetrap" . . . . . 

The Enemy Is Forced To Withdraw, 1-3 May 

The Fall of Mateur, 3 May ..... . 

XVlIl 

595 

595 

598 

601 

604 

609 

613 

614 

618 

620 

628 

628 

631 

632 

635 

638 

639 

641 
Chapter 

XXXIV. THE END IN TUNISIA 

Plans To Take Tunis. . . 

The Liberation of Tunis . . 

Bizerte Falls to the U.S. II Corps 

[T.S. II Corps Pushes Beyond M ateur 

Total Surrender in the North 

The Fighting Ends in the Scuth 

Allied Reorganization . . 

XXXV. FRUITS OF VICTORY 

Appendix 

French Unification . . . . 

Some" LfSsons Lwrned" by the Army 

Some " Lessons Learned" by the Enemy. 

Allied Leadership. . 

Strategic Consequencps . . . . . . . 

A. ALLIED TROOP AND SUPPLY SHIPMENTS 

B. AXIS TROOP AND SUPPLY SHIPMENTS 

NOTE ON SOURCES 

GLOSSARY 

CODE NAMES 

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 

INDEX 

Tables 

JVo. 

1. Personnel and Vehicles Assigned to Force "X" (BLACKSTONE), as of 

Page 

644 

644 

649 

651 

654 

659 

662 

665 

669 

669 

671 

673 

674 

675 

679 

682 

684 

688 

693 

695 

699 

22 October 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 101 

2. Personnel and Vehicles Assigned to Force "Y" (BRUSHWOOD), as of 

22 October 1942 . . . . . . . . .. ......... 122 

3. Personnel and Vehicles Assigned to Force "Z" (GOALPOST), as of 

22 October 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 151 

4. Battle Casualties Sustained by the Allied Forces in the Algerian-French 

Moroccan Cilmpaign, 8-11 November 1942. . . . . . . . . . .. 173 

XIX 
No. Page 

5. Battle Casualties Sustained by the Allied Forces in the Tunisian Campaign, 

12 November 1942-13 May 1943 ........... 675 

6. Strength and Supplies of Allied Assault Forees in the Invasion of North 

Africa, 8 November 1942 . . . . . . . .. 679 

7. Strength of Allied Forces Landed in North Africa as of 1 December 1942. 679 

8. Strength of U.S. Army in North Africa, November 1942-April 1943.. 680 

9. German Supply Shipments Received in North Africa, November 1942-

May 1943 . 682 

10. German Losses in Sea Transport to North Africa, November 1942-May 

1943. . .. ....... . . . . . . 683 

11. Axis Troops Transported to North Africa, November 1942-May 1943. 683 

Charts 

1. AFHQ Organization, 1 November 1942 . . . . . . .. .... 34 

2. Allied Command Relationships in the Mediterranean, March 1943 . 486 

Maps 

1. Lines of Communication in French North Africa 18 

2. Advance from Safi, 9-11 November 1942 112 

3. Landings at Algiers, 8 November 1942 232 

4. First Actions in Tunisia, 16-23 November 1942. 285 

5. First Allied Drive on Tunis, 25--30 November 1942 297 

6. Situation in Northern Tunisa, 16 December 1942. 334 

7. Battle for Longstop Hill, 22-26 December 1942. . 340 

8. Battle for the Eastern Dorsal Passes, 18-25 January 1943 375 

9. Faid-Maknassy Actions, 30 January-3 February 1943 389 

10. The Dorsal Positions in Central Tunisia, 13-18 February 1943 404 

11. Battle of Sidi Bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943 . 408 

12. Engagement at Sbe'itla, 16-17 February 1943. . 429 

13. Situation in Tunisia, 26 Fehruary 1943 . . 491 

14. German Offensive in Northern Tunisia, 26 Fehruary-15 March 1943. 503 

15. Battle of Medenine, 6 March 1943 . . 515 

16. Actions Near El Guettar, 28 March-1 April 1943 566 

17. First Attack on Fondouk, 27 March 1943 . 579 

18. Battle for Fondouk Gap, 8-9 April 1943. 584 

19. Attacks on Axis Bridgehead, 19 April-l May 1943 596 

20. II Corps Routes, April 1943 605 

21. Victory in Tunisia, 3-13 May 1943. 646 

xx 
Maps I-XII are in accompanying map envelope 

I. Safi Landing Area 

II. The Capture of Casablanca, Operations 8-11 November 1942 

III. Taking Port-Lyautey, 8-10 November 1942 

IV. Seizure of Oran, 8-10 November 1942 

V. Tunisian Battleground 

VI. Tebourba Engagement 

VII. German Attack on Medjez el Bab, 6-10 December 1942 

VIII. Battles at Kasserine Pass and Sbiba Gap, 19-22 February 1943 

IX. Mareth and Chott Positions, 16 March-6 April 1943 

X. Operations of II Corps in Southern Tunisia, 16-23 March 1943 

XI. II Corps Operations in Northern Tunisia, 23 April-3 May 1943 

XII. Battle for Hill 609 (Djebel Tahent), 27 April-l May 1943 

III ustrations 

U. S. Rangers Training in Scotland . . . . . . . . 

Maj. Gen. George S. Patton,jr., Aboard the USS Augusta 

Gibraltar. . . . . . . . . . 

En Route to North Africa. 

Landing Craft Circling Near a Troop Transport 

Safi Harbor. . . 

La Railleuse, Pointe De La Tour 

Fire Control Tower . . 

Navy Fighter Planes from the USS Santee. 

Seatrain Lakehurst. 

Cap De Fedala . 

Casablanca 

Transports of the Center Attack Group 

Beach Red 3, Fedala. 

The Wadi Nefifikh and Beach Blue 2. 

Light Tank M5 Near Fedala 

Assembly Area, Afternoon of D Plus 1 

Entrance to the Port of Fedala. 

Port-Lyautey. Airdrome . 

Path of the Raider Detachment Aboard the Dallas 

Aircraft Carrier Chenango. 

Arriving at Fedala to Negotiate an Armistice 

Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at Gibraltar. 

Oran 

XXi 

Page 

64 

69 

85 

91 

94 

98,99 

100 

104 

110 

113 

117 

120 

123 

126 

127 

129 

138 

140 

148 

166 

168 

172 

175 

194 
X White Beach on the Bay of ~lersa Bou Zedjar 

Y Beaches, Lcs Andalouses 

Y White Beach, Les Andalouses 

Troops and Equipment Coming Ashore, Z White Beach 

The ":Maracaibo" HI\1S lWi.IOIl • 

French Prisoners . . . 

Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall 

Algiers . 

C. S. Troops Landing Near Surcouf 

Maj. Gen. Charles S. Ryder . . . . 

General Eisenhower with Adm. Jean FralH;ois Darlan 

Allied Leaders in Algiers 

Sbe'itla 

Crew of a General Grant Tank 

German Mark IV Medium Tank 

Djedei:da 

German Mark VI Tiger Tank . 

The German 88-mm. Flak Guns 

El Bathan 

Casablanca Conference 

German SIEBEL Ferry 

Lt. Gen. K. A. N. Anderson 

37-mm. Antitank Gun (M3Al) and Crew 

Faid Pass 

Sidi Bou Zid 

Spahis Withdrawing from the Sidi Bou Zid Area 

Field Marshal Rommel 

Terrain at Kasserine Pass 

105-mm. Howitzer of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion 

General Grant Medium Tank M3 

Men of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion 

Maj. Gen. Orlando VVard 

Maj. Gen. Terry Allen 

Crew of Half-Track 

The Railroad Station at Kasserine Villa£\e 

Marching Through Kasserine Pass 

German Medium Tank Mark IV 

Lt. Gen. George S. Patton,.Ir. . 

Unloading P38 Fighter Planes 

Field fvfarshal Albert Kesselring 

Sherman Tank with "Scorpion" Attachment 

Railroad Station at Maknassy 

Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinctt . 

XXII 

Page 

197 

200 

201 

207 

209 

211 

226 

242 

245 

251 

266 

267 

290 

292 

301 

304 

307 

313 

319 

360 

367 

383 

410 

414 

415 

416 

439 

444 

448 

450 

454 

468 

469 

471 

472 

473 

480 

488 

497 

502 

532 

551 

554 
Infantrymen Near EI Guettar . 

U. S. Armor Near EI Guettar 

Loading a 155-mm. Howitzer. 

Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy. 

Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon 

Djebel Ain EI Rhorab 

Maj. Gen. Omar:'>;. Bradley 

Djcfna Area 

Pack Animal Bringing Supplies 

Hill 609 

Hill Complex in Sidi Nsir Area 

Hill 609 Area. 

Troops Moving to a Nevv Position Near Hill 609 

Mateur . 

1 st Armored Division Tank . 

Gen. Alphonse Juin . 

Bizerte 

Troops of 60th Infantry 

Tanks and Infantrymen in Bizerte 

Gen. J uergen Von Arnim 

Aerial View of Enemy Prisoners Near Mateur 

Allied Leaders in Tunis, May 1943. 

Po.t;e 

559 

561 

563 

568 

575 

580 

606 

615 

621 

629 

630 

631 

633 

639 

643 

651 

652 

654 

655 

664 

666 

670 

The illustrations on pages 197 and 245 are from the Imperial War Museum, 

London; the illustration on page 383 is from Service Cinema des Armel's; the one on 

page 502 is a captured German photograph. All other illustrations are from the 

files of the Department of Defense. 

XXIll 
The U.S. Army Center of Military History 

The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as required by 

the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including historical properties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also maintains liaison with public 

and private agencies and individuals to stimulate interest and study in the field 

of military history. The Center is located at 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, 

D.G 20005-3402. 

XXIV 
PART ONE 

PREPARATIONS 

CHAPTER I 

The Mediterranean Theater of War, 

1940-1942 

American soldiers began striding through 

the surf to the beaches of Northwest Africa 

before dawn on 8 November 1942. They 

were the first of more than one million 

Americans to see service in the Mediterranean area during World War II-men of 

the II Army Corps in Tunisia, the Seventh 

Army in Sicily, the Fifth Army in Italy from 

Salerno to the Alps, and an elaborate theater organization. 1 The stream of American 

military strength which was to pour into that 

part of the world during the next two and 

one half years would include the Twelfth, 

Ninth, and Fifteenth Air Forces; the U.S. 

Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters; 

the Eighth Fleet; and a considerable 

American contribution to Allied Force 

Headquarters.2 

1 At the time of the attack, French North Africa 

was within the boundaries of the European Theater 

of Operations, U.S. Army. On 4 February 1943, a 

separate North African Theater of Operations, 

U.S. Army, was established. On I November 1944, 

this area (with modified boundaries) was renamed 

the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. 

Army. 

, (1) Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., 

The Army Air Forces in World War 11, Vol. n, 

Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, August 1942 

10 December 1943 (Chicago, 1949). (2) Samuel 

Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11, Vol. II, Operations in 

North African Waters, October 1942-June 1943 

(Boston, 1950). (3) History of Allied Force Headquarters, August 1942-December 1942, Pt. I, pp. 

3-4, 18,23-26. DRB AGO. 

These first Americans to arrive in Northwest Africa were part of an Allied expeditionary force which linked ground, sea, 

and air units from both the United States 

and the British Commonwealth. They were 

participants in the first large-scale offensive 

in which the Allies engaged as partners in a 

common enterprise, an operation which 

transformed the Mediterranean from a British to an Allied theater of war. Occupying 

French North Africa was actually to be the 

first of a considerable series of undertakings 

adopted, planned, mounted, and executed 

under the authority of the Anglo-American 

Combined Chiefs of Staff.3 Succeeding operations in the Mediterranean area proved 

far more extensive than intended. One undertaking was to lead to the next, each based 

upon reasons deemed compelling at the 

3 The Combined Chiefs of Staff was an agency 

created in response to decisions reached at the 

ARCADIA Conference of American and British leaders in Washington in January 1942. The agency's 

headquarters was in Washington, where the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff met with the British Joint Staff 

Mission (representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff Committee), but a large number of its sessions 

took place at special conferences attended by the 

Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Combined Chiefs 

of Staff acquired a structure of subordinate planners and a secretariat. (I) See WD, Press Release, 

6 Feb 42, printed in New York Times, February 7, 

1942. (2) See also Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. 

Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 

1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953). 
4 

time, until at the end of hostilities Allied 

forces dominated the Mediterranean Sea 

and controlled most of its coastal region. 

After liberating French North Africa and 

dearing the enemy from the Italian colonies, 

the Allies sought to bring the entire French 

empire effectively into the war against the 

Axis powers. They reopened the Mediterranean route to the Middle East. They 

went on from Africa to liberate Sicily, 

Sardinia, and Corsica. They caused Mussolini to topple from power, and they 

brought his successors to abject surrender. 

They drew more and more German military 

resources into a stubborn defense of the Italian peninsula, and helped the Yugoslavs to 

pin down within their spirited country 

thousands of Axis troops. Eventually, the 

Allies delivered a solid blow from southern 

France against the German forces which 

were opposing the Allied drive from the 

beaches of Normandy! They made Marseilles available for Allied use and they occupied northern Italy and Greece. In Italy 

they forced the first unconditional surrender 

by a large German force in Europe. The 

events following the invasion of French 

North Africa thus made of the Mediterranean a major theater in World War II's titanic struggle. The momentous first step 

though not timorous, was hesitant, and 

somewhat reluctant; like the first step of a 

child it was more a response to an urge for 

action than a decision to reach some specific 

destination. The responsibility for this beginning rested more with the civilian than 

with the professional military leaders of the 

two countries. Whether the decision was 

wise or not, the critical factors affecting suc-

• Report of Operations: The Seventh United 

Stat~s Army in Franc(l and Germany, 1944-1945 

(Hl"ldelberg, 1946), Vol. I. ' 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

cess, like those inviting the attempt, were 

largely political rather than military. 

The Mediterranean as an Axis Theater 

Axis involvement in the Mediterranean 

theater of war likewise mounted from small 

beginnings and after periodic inventories of 

the general military situation. Since the 

German Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, had precipitated the war much earlier than the Duce 

Benito Mu~lini, had agreed to be ready,; 

Italy remamed a nonbelligerent until June 

1940, and participated then very briefly 

in the attacks which led to French surrender. 

The Mediterranean escaped major hostilities during this period of Italian preparations. Italian forces were assembled in 

eastern Cyrenaica for an eventual attack 

on Egypt in conjunction with an attack 

from the south to be launched from Ethiopia, while British forces were gathered to 

defend Egypt. But actual conflict was 

deferred. 

After France's capitulation in June 1940, 

and after the British Government refused 

to make peace by negotiation, Hitler reluctantly concluded that the war must be carried to British soi1.6 His project for invading 

• Instrucs by Mussolini, 4 May 39, for the Italian 

Foreign Minister Count Galeano Ciano, to be used 

at the next meeting with Ribbentrop; Explanatory 

Note, 21 Aug 39, regarding Italian attitude. Both 

in Ciano Papers, Rose Garden Collection. 

• MS #C-059a, Operation SEA LION Das Unternehmen SEELOEW E un der verschaer!te Lultkrieg gegen England bis zum 30. Oktober 1940 

(Helmuth Greiner). This manuscript is one of a 

series written after the war from the contemporary 

drafts which Greiner had made for the war diary 

of the Oberkommando de, Wehrmacht, Wehrmachtluehrungsstab, that is, the Armed Forces 

Operations Staff of Hitler's Armed Forces High 

Command (hereafter referred to as 0 KW / W FSt). 

Grl"in('r kept this diary from 1939 to 1943. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF WAR, 1940-42 5 

the United Kingdom was frustrated at an 

early stage by the failure of Reichsmarschall 

Hermann Goering's Luftwaffe to eliminate 

the Royal Air Force and by the irreconcilable discrepancies between what the German Army required and what the German 

Navy could furnish for transport and escort 

shipping. He repeatedly postponed a decision to attack across the English Channel 

and eventually abandoned the idea. 7 If he 

could not strike his enemy at home, he proposed instead to inflict a vital injury by 

seizing Gibraltar in co-operation with Spain 

and Italy and by supporting the Italians in 

their drive toward Egypt and the Suez 

Canal.s He tried, mainly in this connection, 

to construct an anti-British alliance of Germany, Italy, France, and Spain, thus gaining for the Axis the French fleet along with 

French and Spanish strategic areas. His efforts failed. 

Marshal Henri Petain engaged in an endless, elastic contest with the Nazis to hold 

fast to all things that were French. His government, ever under threat of military occupation of all of France at the Fuehrer's signal, served Hitler's purpose by preventing 

the creation in the French colonies of an 

independent anti-Nazi French government.9 

7 Ibid. 

• Ibid. 

• ( 1) Confs, 6 and 26 Sep 40, Office of Naval 

Intelligence, Fuehrer Conferences on matters dealing with the German Navy (hereafter cited as ONI, 

Fuehrer Conference), 1940, Vol. II. ONI, 

Fuehrer Conferences, is a selection of translated 

documents from German naval archives. (2) 

Hitler's Dirs, 12 Nov and 10 Dec 40, WFSt/ Abt 

L (I), Nr. 33356/40 and OKW /WFSt/ Abt L, Nr. 

33400/40, Office of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer 

and other Top-Level Directives 0/ the German 

Armed Forces (hereafter cited as ONI, Fuehrer 

Directives), 1939-1941. This is a selection of translated documents from German military and naval 

archives. (3) Hitler's Dir, 29 May 42, OKW / 

WFSt/Op Nr. 55896/42, ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 

1942-1945. 

Whatever concessions beyond the armistice 

agreements Petain might make at Nazi insistence and in return for the release of German-held French prisoners, for example, the 

old Marshal would never commit French 

forces to fight beside the Germans.10 The 

French Navy, bitter as it was toward the 

British, would have scuttled its warships 

before allowing them to be used to advance 

Hitler's aspirations.ll France, therefore, was 

not available for an alliance against the 

British and was left in control of its Northwest African colonies under pledge to defend them against attack from whatever 

side.12 

Francisco Franco set such an exorbitant 

territorial price upon a partnership with 

Germany as to make impossible an alliance 

which included Spain and France, and 

he engaged in such elaborate and effective 

procrastination as to render any genuine 

military contribution to the seizure of Gibraltar a matter for Nazi despair. When 

Hitler went to meet the Caudillo at Hendaye, France, on 29 October 1940, the 

Spanish dictator subjected him to the unusual experience of being a listener for 

hours. Rather than undergo such pain 

again, Hitler told Mussolini he would prefer to have several teeth pulled.13 

I. Msg, SS Col Dr Knochen to Reichsfuehrer SS, 

from Paris, 14 Nov 42, transmitting report of J. 

Fessati of conversations in Vichy w / Adm Platon. 

(Himmler Files, Footlocker 51, No. 10.) 

11 (I) William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble 

(New York, 1947) pp. 375, 390. (2) Albert Kammerer, La Passion de la FloUe Franraise (Paris, 

1951), pp. 268-300, 310. (3) Winston S. Churchill, 

Their Finest Hour (Boston, 1949), pp. 217, 229, 

231,236. 

,. Ltr, Dar1an to Churchill, 4 Dec 42, printed in 

transl in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 239-40. 

J3 (1) MS # C-065h, Das Unternehmen FELIX 

(Greiner). Operation FELIX was the planned 

German attack on Gibraltar. (2) State Dept Press 

Release 150, 4 Mar 46. (3) Herbert Feis, The 
6 

The fact that a new alliance of the four 

governments could not be attained became 

evident at a time when even the existing 

arrangement between Germany and Italy 

was somewhat strained. Although the two 

dictators had a friendly personal relationship, the Italians intended to wage a separate and parallel war in the Mediterranean. 

Hitler had always accepted the principle 

that the Mediterranean was an area of 

paramount Italian interest just as, farther 

north, German interests were exclusive.14 

He received in the autumn of 1940 clear 

indication that the Italians wished to proceed independently. Initially the Italians 

refused a German offer of an armored unit 

for use in the planned Italian campaign 

from Libya against Egypt. It was only after 

the campaign, begun on 12 September 

under the command of Maresciallo d'Italia 

Rudolfo Graziani, had bogged down that 

the Italians reluctantly accepted the German offer. On 28 October, moreover, although knowing Hitler's opposition, and 

therefore dissembling their intentions, the 

Italians attacked Greece from Albania. 15 

Hitler's disgust at the opening of this new 

front in the Balkans by the Italians led him 

to withdraw temporarily his offer of German armored support for the Italian forces 

in Libya. This decision was confirmed during the Innsbruck conference of 4 and 5 

Spanish Story (New York, 1949). (4) Ltr, Hitler 

to Mussolini, 31 Dec 40, sent after recovery to CG 

US Fifth Army by Col T. J. Wells, 15 Jul 45. Copy 

in transl in OCMH. (5) Hitler's Dir, 12 Nov 40, 

WFStjAbt L(l), Nr. 33356/40, ONI, Fuehrer 

Directives, 1939-1941. 

"Obersalzberg Conference, 13 Aug 39, German 

notes of the conference between Hitler and Ciano, 

Doc TC-77, in the records of the United States 

Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 

Record Group 238, National Archives (hereafter 

cited as USC, Rg 238). 

1:' MS # C-065e, Die Unterstuetzung Italiens im 

Herbst und Winter 1940-41 (Greiner). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

November between Generalfeldmarschall 

Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Armed Forces 

High Command (Oberkommando der 

Wehrmacht-OKW) and Maresciallo d' 

I talia Pietro Badoglio, the Chief of the 

Supreme General Staff (Stato Maggiore 

Generale). When both these adventures became engulfed in failure, the Italians on 19 

December abandoned their reluctance to 

accept German reinforcements which Hitler, despite his irritation with Italian behavior, had again offered to supply for 

reasons of high military policy.HI 

Hitler was already planning a Blitzkrieg 

against Russia to be executed during the 

summer of 1941. 17 For that attack his 

Balkan flank had to be secure. He believed 

that the free use of the Mediterranean route 

by the British was equivalent to a large extra 

tonnage of transport shipping and the release of naval warships for other operations, 

an advantage to his major enemy which 

might make a complete Axis victory unattainable.ls He also wished to prevent the 

detrimental effect upon Italian morale and 

the severe loss of prestige for the Axis which 

would result from the loss of Libya and the 

related possibility of a separate Italian 

peace. III 

One large aviation unit (X. Fliegerkorps) received orders to shift to southern 

Italy in December 1940 and a small armored force began crossing from Naples to 

Tripoli in February, There it was to be 

combined with Italian mobile units under 

the command of Generalleutnant Erwin 

1. Ibid, 

11 D/A Pamphlet 20-261a, 1'he German Campaign in Russia-Planning and Operations (/940-

42) (Washington, 1955). 

"MS # C-065f, Rommel's erster Feldzug in 

Afrika, 1941 (Greiner), 

" ( I) MS # C-065 (Greiner), (2) Conf, 8-9 

Jan 41, ONI, Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, Vol. 1. 
Rommel in an aggressive rather than a static 

defense. Rommel was subordinated to the 

Italian Commander in Chief Libya (Commandante del Comando Superiore Forze 

Armate Libia), Generale d’Armata Italo 

Gariboldi, who replaced Graziani in early 

February 1941. Rommel’s command, the 

German Africa Corps (Deutsches Afrika 

Korps), shortly reinforced by the addition 

of an armored division, received general directives from Hitler only after Mussolini 

had approved them, for the German forces 

were considered as agents of Italian military 

policy within the Axis partnership.20

The German Africa Corps prepared for 

its eastward thrust toward Egypt while 

other German troops extended their hold 

over the Balkans and prepared to subjugate 

Greece. Some of the limited British forces 

in northern Africa were diverted to Greece 

to aid its defenders, but not enough to prevent the Peloponnesus from being swiftly 

overrun in April 1941, while almost simultaneously Rommel’s force swept across 

Libya with surprising speed to the Egyptian 

border. Only the port of Tobruk remained 

in British possession in the rear of the Axis 

units, where it was a continual threat to 

their long line of supply. The British Eighth 

Army, which was formed during the next 

few months of 1941, was not ready for another offensive to the westward before November, but Rommel also was obliged to 

pause. If these Axis thrusts in the Balkans 

and northern Africa were, on the one hand, 

followed by the dramatically successful air20 Hitler’s Order, 10 Dec 40, and Dir, 11 Jan 41 

OKW/WFSt/Abt L, Nr. 33400/40 and OKW/ 

WFSt/Abt L, Nr. 44018/41; Orders signed by 

Keitel, 13 Jan and 3 Apr 41, OKW/WFSt/Abt L, 

Nr. 00 94/41; Order signed by Col Walter Warlimont, deputy chief of OKW/WFSt, 19 Feb 41, 

OKW/WFSt/Abt L (I Op), Nr. 44189/41. All 

in ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1939–1941. 

borne assault on Crete in May, they were, 

on the other hand, somewhat offset shortly 

afterward by the British and GaullistFrench seizure of Syria and by the British 

military occupation of Iraq. Turkey remained resolutely neutral.21 

All Axis operations in 1941 were overshadowed by the German invasion of the 

Soviet Union in June. The requirements 

and preparations for this colossal effort precluded any extensive German commitments 

in the Mediterranean. Franco’s delays 

dragged out negotiations over German seizure of Gibraltar beyond the time when anything could be done about it without 

detriment to the impending attack against 

Russia.22 Throughout most of the year, 

therefore, the principal feature of the war 

in the Mediterranean was the battle over 

supply lines. German aval units were 

drawn into this struggle, like the ground 

troops, in a role at least nominally subordinate to the Italian Supreme Command.23 

German aviation harassed British shipping. 

German submarines joined Italian naval 

units in policing the waters of the Sicilian 

straits. The occupation of Crete, costly as it 

was, improved the Axis position greatly in 

21 (1) D/A Pamphlet 20–260, The German Campaign in the Balkans (Spring 1941) (Washington, 

1953). (2) Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), pp. 95–110, 196–304, 321– 

32. 

22 MS # C–065h (Greiner). 

23 (1) The Italian Supreme General Staff was reorganized in June 1941. Its powers were greatly 

increased and it became the most important organ 

of command. Thereafter it was known as the Comando Supremo (Supreme Command). See Howard McGaw Smyth, “The Command of the Italian 

Armed Forces in World War II,” Military Affairs, 

XV, No. 1 (Spring, 1951), 38. (2) Hitler’s Order, 

29 Oct 41, WFSt/Abt L (I Op), Nr. 441794/41, 

in ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1939–1941. (3) ViceAdm. Eberhard Weichold (German Admiral, 

Rome), The War at Sea in the Mediterranean. 

U.S. Navy Press Release 26 Feb 47. 
8 

the violent effort to strangle the connection 

between Malta and the eastern Mediterranean. The British island of Malta, between 

the Sicilian straits and Crete, was a base for 

aircraft, destroyers, and submarines which 

severely curtailed the flow of supplies and 

reinforcements from Italy to Tripoli. The 

fortunes of Rommel's command seemed 

almost directly proportional to Axis success 

in neutralizing Malta.24 

If the Soviet Union had succumbed to the 

gigantic attack which began in June 1941, 

Hitler would presumably have undertaken 

in November an elaborate attack upon the 

Near East and have forced Spain to allow an 

attack against Gibraltar. Concentric drives 

by Rommel through Egypt, by a second 

force from Bulgaria through Turkey, and, 

if necessary, by a third element from Transcaucasia through Iran were also contemplated. 25 Success in these operations would 

have broken the British hold on the Middle 

East. But when, despite the heightened German need for petroleum from the Middle 

East for operations in 1942, the attack 

against the Russians fell short of success, the 

program scheduled for November was necessarily delayed. The British began a counteroffensive in northern Africa at that point 

which relieved the garrison cut off in Tobruk 

and drove Rommel's forces back on EI 

Agheila. This advantage was abruptly canceled in January 1942, when Rommel made 

a second advance to the east which regained 

much of the lost ground.26 His command 

,. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 62, 570-72, 

575-77. 

'" Draft Dir, II Jun 41, OKW/WFSt/Abt l. 

(I Op), Nr. 44886/41, in aNI, Fuehrer Directives, 

1939-194l. 

2. (I) Erwin Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass (Heidenheim/Brenz, 1950), pp. 94-99. (2) Winston S. 

Churchill, Th1e Hinge of Fate (Boston, 1950), pp. 

20-35. (3) MS # T-3-PI, Mitteimeerkrieg (Gencralfddmarschall Albert Kesselring), Pt. I. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

was renamed Panzerarmee Afrika, and received reinforcements and additional equipment to resume the attack against the British 

Eighth Army. From the EI Gazala Line he 

was expected to gain Tobruk and the coast 

directly east of it.27 

Rommel's success and the capture of 

Malta were interdependent, a fact which 

produced a decision to undertake seizure 

of the island. Heavy air attacks would be 

made upon it in April 1942 to cover the 

shipment to Tripoli, Bengasi, and Derna of 

the means required for the first phase of 

Rommel's offensive. After he had seized 

Tobruk and pushed to Marsa Matriih, thus 

holding the area from which Malta might 

be helped by British land-based airplanes, 

he was to pause while mixed German and 

Italian forces, partly airborne and partly 

seaborne, gained possession of the island. 

Supplies to Rommel could thereafter go forward from Italy to the African ports in sufficient volume and his offensive would be 

resumed. While these plans were maturing, 

more German forces reached the Mediterranean basin. 28 

"A panzer group headquarters (Panzergruppe 

Afrika) was created for Rommel in August 1941 

with command over the German Africa Corps, 

Italian XXX Corps, and some small miscellaneous 

units. Rommel was promoted to General der Panzertruppen I July 1941 and to Generaloberst on 1 

February 1942. (I) OKW, Kriegstagebuch (hereafter cited as OKW, KTB), I.IV.-3/'VI.42, Entries 21, 30 Apr, and I, 7 May 42. Great Britain, 

Exhibit 227, USC, Rg 238. This document appears 

to be the only one of those comprising the text of 

the OKW war diary that was not destroyed. The 

OKW war diary, prepared by Hitler's Plenipotentiary for Military History, Oberst Walter Scherff, 

was to be the basis for a history of the war 

as seen from the highest German level. (2) Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, pp. 111-26. (3) MS # T3-PI (Kesselring), Pt. I. 

2M (I) Order signed by Keitel, 4 May 42, WFSt/ 

Abt Op Nr. 5579/42, ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 

1942-1945. The planned operation for Malta was 

Operation HERKULES, and the one for Libya was 
THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF WAR, 1940--42 9 

The German X. Fliegerkorps was replaced, beginning late in 1941, by the S econd Air Force (Luftflotte 2) over which 

Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring exercised command as Commander in Chief 

South (Oberbefehlshaber Sued) from a 

new headquarters at Frascati, near Rome. 

Kesselring, subordinated to the Duce, was 

expected to employ his aviation in conformity with directives issued or approved 

by Mussolini, and to have a relationship as 

air commander to the Italian Supreme 

Command similar to that of Rommel as 

ground commander to the Italian Commander in Chief in Libya. Kesselring as 

senior German officer also assisted Generalleutnant Enno von Rintelen, Commanding 

General, Headquarters, German General at 

the Headquarters of the Italian Armed 

Forces (Deutscher General bei dem Hauptquartier der italienischen WehrmachtGerman General, Rome) in conveying German views to the Italians. If the action of 

the Italian Supreme Command was influenced by a spirit of deference to German 

military enlightenment, the Italians nonetheless insisted that the Germans at all times 

adhere strictly to the form of Italian control, 

and Hitler supported this arrangement.2

" 

Operation THESEUS. (2) Ugo Conte Cavallero, 

Comando Supremo, Diario 1940-43 de Capo di 

S. M. C. (Rome, 1949), p. 251 (30 Apr 42). (3) 

MS # T-3-PI (Kesselring), Pt. I. 

, ... The term Commander in Chief South will b .. 

used in this volume to rder to the pprson holding 

thp title Oberbefehlshaber Sued, whilp the abbreviat('d form OB SO UTH will rpfer to his hpadquarters. 

Second Air Force consisted of II. Fliegerkorps at 

Mpssina and X. Fliegerkorps at Athpns. (I) Ord('r 

sign('d by K('itPI, 29 Oct 41, WFSt/Abt L (lOp), 

Nr. 441794/41, ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1939-

19,J.1. (2) MS # T-3-PI (K"ssplring), PI. I. (3) 

AAF Air Hist Gp Rpts 578-79, German Air Forc .. 

in th(' M .. diterranpan. AAF Archivps .i 12-430 C 

(9961,4). 

Axis operations in 1942 began with 

marked successes and brought the coalition 

to the zenith of its fortunes in World War II. 

Rommel's late May attack went much more 

rapidly than had been expected and succeeded in taking Tobruk in June almost immediately instead of being delayed by the 

kind of stubborn defense which had kept 

that port from the Germans in early 1941. 

British losses of men and materiel were 

great, but the loss of T obruk's port was 

equally serious.30 Rommel believed he could 

continue to Cairo before meeting effective 

resistance. At that juncture, Hitler was lured 

into a serious blunder. He had been unable 

to quiet his misgivings over the projected 

seizure of Malta, for he felt that the assault 

was inadequately planned and subsequent 

support perilously undependable. He therefore proposed to Mussolini that Operation 

HERKULES, the seizure of Malta, be postponed in favor of a continued drive into 

Egypt, and Mussolini, despite the demurrer 

of some of his military advisers, consented. 31 

A new line of supply to Rommel was to run 

via Crete to Tobruk. Malta was allowed to 

recover. In July 1942, Rommel's army got 

as far inside Egypt as the El 'Alamein position, some sixty miles southwest of Alexandria, before being held up by lack of supplies 

and the opposition of the British Eighth 

Army.32 On the Eastern Front, the German 

3" Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 413-20. 

'1 (I) OKW, KTB, \'. 1.IV-3/.VI.42, 20 and 21 

May, 22, 23, and 24 Jun 42. (2) Hitler's Ltr, 23 

Jun 42, in transl is quotpd in Cavall('ro, Comando 

Supremo, p. 277, and a comdrs' conf in the field, 

25 Jun 42, is r('cord .. d on pp. 278-81. (3) MS # 

T-3-PI (Kpssplring), PI. I, also d('scribps comdrs' 

ronf of 25 Jun 42. 

" ( I) As soon as Rommd's army crossed thp 

Libyan-Egyptian border th(' command of this forcp 

was switched from the Italian Commandc-r in Chipf 

Libya, to thp Comando Supremo. Rommd was 

promotpd to G('nt'ra\ft'ldmarscliall on 22 June 1942, 
10 

attacks on the southern sector pressed 

speedily toward the Don River, heading 

beyond it toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus. 33 Such was the situation in the Mediterranean when the Allies faced the question 

where to attack in 1942. 

The Allied Decision To Occupy 

French North Africa 

The Allies were drawn to the Mediterranean by the fact that the British Eighth 

Army was arrayed against Panzer Army 

Africa near Egypt and by the military potentialities of the French colonies in northwestern Africa either as friend or foe. These 

potentialities had been considered well before the United States became a belligerent. 

American military planners studied the requirements of operations designed to prevent enemy use of air or naval bases on the 

Atlantic African coast as far south as 

Dakar. 34 At the end of 1940, when the 

British had defeated Graziani's army, they 

held six divisions in readiness to join the 

French in defending Morocco, Algeria, and 

Tunisia in case Petain agreed to resume the 

war against the Axis. After that opportunity 

failed to materialize, the British planned in 

October 1941, in case of a success against 

Rommel in Cyrenaica, to capture Tripoli 

and, subsequently, to support French North 

Africa in a renewal of hostilities. Prime 

Minister Winston S. Churchill brought to 

the ARCADIA Conference in Washington in 

December, shortly after the attack on Pearl 

MS # T-3, Der Feldzug in Nordafrika 1941-43 

(General der Panzertruppen Walther Nehring, et 

al.), Pt. II, Ch. VI. (2) Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, 

pp. 179-88. 

:J.1 Edgar McInnis, The War: Third Year (Toronto, 1942),pp. 261-71. 

"Joint Plan [BLACK] for the Occupation of 

Dakar, 10 Aug 41. (See draft papers in BLACK and 

BARRISTER Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.) 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Harbor, his own strategic analysis for 1942 

and 1943 containing strong arguments for 

giving the liberation of French North Africa 

the highest priority in the Atlantic area. 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt showed 

marked interest in the project. ,,, 

The guiding principle of Allied strategy 

in 1942 in the Atlantic and European areas 

was to close and tighten the ring around 

Germany, while achieving readiness for an 

invasion to destroy her military power. 

Anglo-American leaders hoped that by 1943 

the way would be clear for an Allied return 

to the Continent, either across the Mediterranean, or via the Aegean and the Balkans, 

or by landings in western Europe.'" A 

friendly occupation in 1942 of French 

North Africa was recognized to be "of the 

first strategical importance in the Atlantic 

area," and plans to achieve this were in 

preparation for several weeks following the 

conference. 37 

Influences attracting the Allies toward 

the Mediterranean, strong as they were in 

January 1942, were for a time counterbalanced by other factors of greater 

strength.:" The competing claims upon 

Allied resources were numerous and very 

powerful. The line of communications 

through the Hawaiian Islands to Australia 

05( 1) Churchill's memo, dated 16 December 

1942, and the President's first response as reported 

by the Prime Minister to the British War Cabinet 

and Chiefs of Staff on 23 December 1942, are 

printed in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 646-

51, 664-65. (2) Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt 

and Hopkins: An Intimate Histor), (New York, 

1948), pp. 460-66. 

'" Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 459. 

37 Memo ABC 4/6, JCS and COS for President 

and Prime Minister, 13 Jan 42, sub: Mvmts and 

projects in Atlantic Theater-first half 1942. OPD 

Exec 8. (2) Directive for creation of Task Force 

GVM:>;AST was approved in the Office of the Chief 

of Staff, Army, on 19 February 1942. 

'" Matloff and SneJ1, Strategic Planning lor Coalition War/are, analyzes these factors. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF WAR, 1940-42 11 

had to be maintained, and in the face of 

continued Japanese successes in their drive 

southward, various points along the line had 

to be reinforced. China could not be abandoned while it absorbed so large a number 

of Japanese troops and persevered in the 

war which it had waged since 1931. Russia 

was engaging by far the largest proportion 

of the German strength for the second year, 

and required the shipment of munitions over 

long and expensive routes. Iceland and the 

British Isles were to receive American garrison forces in order to release British units 

for service elsewhere. The Battle of the Atlantic ran in favor of the German U-boats, 

which achieved appalling successes close to 

the eastern coast of the United States. 3

!' 

The Americas had to be defended. A large 

portion of the munitions and men prepared 

for combat in the United States had to be 

devoted to the expansion program of all th~ 

armed services. Lack of shipping precluded 

any operation in French North Africa until 

still more pressing demands elsewhere were 

met. 

Before the shipping situation eased, the 

Allies in April revised the program outlined 

at the ARCADIA Conference, adopting as the 

new major objective the concentration of 

forces in the British Isles for a cross-Channel 

attack in 1943 against the heart of Germany 

through France and the Low Countries. 

Frequent Commando raids against the 

French coast would be made during the 

period of preparations; the heavy bombers 

of the U. S. Eighth Air Force being organized in the United Kingdom were to supplement those of the Royal Air Force in strikin!!," German industrial targets with increasing severity; but the main effort of the 

,. Samuel Eliot Morison, Histor), 01 United States 

Naval Operations in World War II, I, The Battle 

01 the Atlantic (Boston, 1950), 125-57. 

American forces in the Atlantic area in 1942 

would be to transfer units and materiel from 

the United States to the United Kingdom, 

there to complete training for the ultimate 

assault during the following year. 40 Measured by the reasoning underlying these 

plans, an expedition to French North Africa 

would be a diversionary undertaking, inevitably weakening the projected main effort. 

Militating against the program of concentration which the Allies adopted in April 

were several strong influences. The main 

attack in 1943 could not succeed unless the 

Soviet Union were still engaging on the 

Eastern Front much of the German 

strength. The ability and the determination 

of the Russians to maintain resistance to the 

Axis forces might not survive the German 

offensive of 1942. A preliminary attack 

across the English Channel in 1942 H to 

gain a continental bridgehead for subsequent expansion in 1943 was contemplated 

by the Allies as a means of aiding the Russians without forfeiting the ability to make 

the main attack on schedule. If the Germans 

should fall suddenly into internal political 

convulsion, the same plan could be used to 

grasp that advantageous opportunity. But 

the measure of relief for the hard-pressed 

Russians would be determined by the size of 

the German forces diverted to western 

France from the Eastern Front to oppose the 

.0 (1) This build-up for a cross-Channel attack 

was known as Operation BOLERO. (2) Adoption of 

the new plans leading to the main assault, Operation Rou I'DUP, is described in Sherwood, Roosevelt 

and Hopkins, pp. 518-34. (3) See also Matloff 

and Snell, Strategic Planning lor Coalition Wellare; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

(Washington, 1951). (4) Churchill, The Hinge 01 

Fate, pp. 314-24, prints pertinent documents. (5) 

Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active 

Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948), pp. 

418ff., citing Stimson's diary. 

.. Operation SLEDGEHAMMER. 
12 

Anglo-American landings, so that genuine 

assistance to Russia was tantamount to inviting defeat. The forces available would 

be preponderantly British. The British were 

unwilling to make a sacrifice attack for such 

a purpose. In view of the President's encouragement to Molotov in May 1942 to 

expect a "second front" before too long,~2 

some Anglo-American offensive in 1942 

seemed imperative in order to sustain Russian faith in the western Allies. The President was determined that American units 

go into combat against the Germans before 

the end of the year, presumably for the 

effect such a situation would have on American morale. 43 The Prime Minister was 

ready for an Anglo-American operation in 

Norway in conjunction with the Russians, 

and eager for an invasion of northwestern 

Africa, but on 8 July notified the President 

that the British saw no possibility of making 

a preliminary attack in 1942 to gain a 

beachhead across the Channe1.44 

The British decision against Operation 

SLEDGEHAMMER was based not only on the 

undue risk of defeat in such an undertaking, 

but also on doubt whether there were 

enough resources, particularly the craft and 

crews required for the amphibious phase of 

the attack.4

:' It may also have found some 

"Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 563, 

prints a contemporary record of the Molotov-Roosevelt conversations of 30 May 1942 with the communique issued II June after Molotov's return to 

the Soviet Union. 

., His instructions to Hopkins, Marshall, and 

King, dated 16 July 42, said: "It is of the highest 

importance that U.S. ground troops be brought 

into action against the enemy in 1942." Par 3 (e), 

printed in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 

603. (2) See also Stimson and Bundy, On Active 

Service, pp. 425-26. 

.. Msg printed in Churchill, The Hinge 0/ Fate, 

pp. 434-35. 

'" (I) Landing craft reaching the United King· 

dom in September were but 10 percent of what in 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

support in the Prime Minister's detennination, as he has written in his memoirs,46 to 

bring about an Allied occupation of French 

North Africa and perhaps of Norway. 

After the British refusal to proceed with 

Operation SLEDGEHAMMER was received, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplated adherence to the principle of concentration of 

force against a major adversary by switching the main American effort to that in the 

Pacific against Japan: 1 

The President rejected this proposal, particularly because no large-scale beginnings 

could be made there before 1943, but also 

because of his conviction that Allied strategy 

was sound and should not be abandoned.4

" 

He did, however, make a final effort to reconcile the British authorities to the course of 

action urged upon him by his own military 

advisers. On 18 July he sent Mr. Harry 

Hopkins, George C. Marshall, and Admiral 

Ernest J. King to London with instructions 

to make certain that every means would be 

considered for a small-scale attack on the 

Continent in 1942. If convinced that such 

an operation could not be mounted with any 

reasonable chance of "diverting German air 

forces from the annihilation of Russia," they 

were to proceed with the consideration of 

other projects involving combat with German ground forces in 1942, either in North 

Africa or the Middle East. It was understood that preparations for ROUNDUP (a 

April had been deemed necessary for Operation 

SLEDGEHAMMER. JCS, Special Monograph on Am· 

phibious Warfare, Ch. II, pp. 60-72. (2) Mark W. 

Clark, Calculated Risk (New York, 1950), p. 34. 

.. Churchill, The Hinge of Fale, p. 441. 

"Memo, Marshall and King for President, 10 

Jul 42. OPD 381 Gen, Case 73. 

"Memo, Col John R. Deane, for King, 12 Ju142, 

quoting msg from President to Marshall and King 

phoned from Hyde Park, N. Y.: Memo, Marshall 

and King for President, 12 Jul 42. Copit's in OPD 

381 G!'n. Case 73. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF WAR, 1940-42 13 

full-scale continental attack) in 1943 were 

to continue without interruption.~9 

The President Commits the United States 

to Operation TORCH 

The Allied military chiefs in London 

failed to reconcile their disagreement over 

the feasibility of SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942, 

a fact which was then reported to the 

President. 50 

The operation could not be undertaken 

without agreement and was therefore abandoned,51 except that, mainly for appearance's sake, planning operations and some 

preparations were continued. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had been 

unable to agree and had divided along national lines. Here then was a critical test of 

the Anglo-American capacity to function as 

a military coalition. Mr. Churchill and Mr. 

Roosevelt broke the deadlock. The President, as Mr. Churchill had discovered, was 

more favorably inclined toward an opera-

•• (I) Memo, Marshall for WD Msg Ctr, 16 Jul 

42, sub: Opns this year to be sent to Gen Eisenhower only. OPD Exec 5. (2) Memo, President for 

Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 16 Jul 42, sub: 

Instrucs for London Conf, printed in Sherwood, 

Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 603-05 . 

.. ( 1) Min, Combined Staff Conf at 10 Downing 

St., 20 Jul 42; Rev Min, Combined Staff Conf 

London, 22 Jul 42. OPD ABC 381 BOLERO Sec 2. 

(2) The Americans had arrived a t their posi tion 

in discussions first by those in London, then by conferences of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

London group, 18-19 July, and phrased it in a 

memo of 21 July prepared by Lt. Gen. Dwight D. 

Eisenhower and others for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

CinC AF Diary, 18-21 Jul 42. (Sec Note on 

Sources. ) 

" Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 610-11. 

Cables from British intelligence agents were shown 

to Hopkins at the Prime Minister's request and indicated that a group of highly placed French officers and most French nationals in North Africa 

would welcome and aid an American, but not a 

British, expedition. 

tion in Northwest Africa than his military 

advisers, especially General Marshall. The 

President on 23 July sent supplementary 

instructions to the American members of the 

Combined Chiefs directing them to arrive 

at an agreement on some operation to be 

launched in 1942, and listing possibilities 

among which the occupation of French 

North Africa was given the top priority.52 

Bound by these instructions, the American 

chiefs agreed that using American forces in 

Northwest Africa was preferable to sending them to the Middle East. Thereupon, 

on 25 July, the Combined Chiefs reached 

a compromise. The U. S. members agreed 

to accept Operation TORCH on condition 

that a final decision by the Combined Chiefs 

be postponed.53 

According to this agreement, planning 

would start at once in London, but final 

decision to mount the invasion would be 

reserved until 15 September. If it then 

appeared likely that the Russians could 

actively resist German military power in the 

spring of 1943, the ROUNDUP operation 

would retain its priority over any other undertaking. If the Russians, on 15 September, seemed about to collapse, the invasion 

of North Africa would be mounted in time 

for landings before I December. 5

< Some of 

the heavy bomber groups and other air units 

previously destined for action in 1942-1943 

over Europe would be shifted to North 

" Msg, President to Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 

23 Ju142. WDCSA 381 Sec 1. 

'" Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, pp. 273-86. 

"This agreement was in conformity with Memo 

[No.4], CG ETOUSA for Marshall, 23 Ju142, sub: 

Survey of strategic situation, in CinC AF Diary, 

23 and 27 Jul 42. This memo, prepared for use 

after the earlier American position had been rejected, took a skeptical view of the Russian capacity 

to fight through 1943 unaided. 
14 

Africa, and others, to the Pacific where they 

were greatly needed. 

On 25 July the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

named the prospective operation TORCH 

and agreed to a system of command to be 

in effect in one phase during the planning, 

and in another, "after the decision to 

mount." 55 But the President disregarded 

the conditional nature of the Combined 

Chiefs' decision, and on the same day informed Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, 

Admiral William D. Leahy, Lt. Gen. Henry 

H. Arnold, and Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, when they met him at the White 

House, that he had already committed the 

United States unconditionally to the North 

African operation.:ifl After General Marshall 

and Admiral King returned from London, 

the former apparently still believing that 

the final decision to mount the North African invasion was to be reached on 15 September, the President repeated "very definitely" to a special conference of representa-

"" CCS 33d Mtg, 25 Jul 42. 

,~ (1) Msg, McNamey to Marshall, WD to CG 

ETOUSA, 25 Jul 42, CM-OUT 7303. CM-IN and 

CM-OUT numbcrs used in the footnotes of this 

volume refer to numbers appearing on copies of 

those messages in General Marshall's In and Out 

Logs, filed in the Staff Communications Office, 

Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. (2) The 

President so acted on the advice of Hopkins who 

cabl<>d from London without the knowledge of 

General Marshall and Admiral King. Sherwood, 

Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White 

House "that he, as Commander-in-Chief, 

had made the decision that TORCH should be 

undertaken at the earliest possible date, He 

considered that this operation was now our 

principal objective, and the assembling of 

means to carry it out should take precedence 

over other operations. . . ." 57 

President Roosevelt's action amounted to 

a modification of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff's recommendation so drastic as to be 

almost a rejection. He did not then realize, 

as he came to appreciate later, that a campaign to seize French North Africa would 

preclude an attack across the English Channel toward the heart of Germany in 1943, 

and that he had made a choice in favor of 

the strategy of encirclement rather than that 

of a direct and central thrust. But he could 

indeed have pointed out that the decision 

to penetrate the Mediterranean conformed 

to the grand strategy formulated in January 

at the ARCADIA Conference if not to the 

modification of April. The Allies would 

be closing the ring around Germany, tightening it, and achieving readiness for an 

invasion to destroy her military power. 

", (1) CCS 34th Mtg, 30 Jul 42. (2) Memo, 

Gen Smith for JCS, I Aug 42, sub: Notes of conf 

at White House at 8: 30 P.M., 30 Jul 42. OPD 

381 (7-2+-+2) Sec .j.-B. (3) JCS 27th Mtg, 

4 Aug 42. 
CHAPTER II 

Strategic 

Beginnings of the Allied Force 

A period of uncertainty followed President Roosevelt's decision that Operation 

TORCH should immediately be made a paramount undertaking to be launched at the 

earliest possible moment. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff were not convinced of the finality 

of this decision until 30 July. Although 

they informed the British Chiefs of Staff of 

it the next day, an official communication to 

the Prime Minister was delayed for a week 

during Joint Chiefs' studies to ascertain the 

actual earliest possible date for the attack. 

Choice of a commander in chief was therefore retarded. The agreement reached by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff in London on 

25 July had provided for one American 

supreme commander over both ROUNDUP 

and TORCH, pending the decision to mount 

the latter, and for an American to be supreme commander of TORCH but a temporary vacancy to prevail in the supreme 

command of ROUNDUP, after such a decisIon. 

The British proposal that General Marshall be named supreme commander and 

that Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower be 

his deputy was never discussed with General 

Marshall by the President. Instead, the 

President approved the designation of General Eisenhower to be Allied supreme commander of TORCH. That he would do so was 

indicated on 31 July, but official action 

awaited an exchange of messages with the 

Planning 

Prime Minister on 6 August. Both leaders 

then also agreed that the invasion should 

occur as early in October as might prove 

feasible, rather than on 30 October, as estimated by the military planners. 

A directive from the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff to General Eisenhower was not approved until 13 August, almost three weeks 

after the decision to launch the invasion. 

Meanwhile, General Eisenhower assumed 

the leadership on a provisional basis in 

formulating an outline plan acceptable to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. But the 

organization of a staff, selection of major 

commanders, elaboration of operational 

plans and orders, arrangements for specialized training, and provision of materiel and 

transportation went forward rapidly only 

after the uncertainty surrounding the supreme command had been terminated.1 

'( I) Cbl, McNarney to Marshall, 25 Jul 42, 

CM-OUT 7303. (2) CCS 33d (with Annex) and 

34th Mtgs, 25 and 30 Jul 42. (3) Memo, Gen 

Smith for JCS, I Aug 42, sub: Notes of conf at 

White House at 8: 30 P.M .• 30 July 1942; Ms~, 

JSM to COS, 31 Jul 42, JSM 329. OPD 381 (7-

25-42) Sec 4-B. (4) Churchill, The Hinge 0/ Fate, 

pp. 449-51, 526, contains messages exch~nged between the Prime Minister and the President and 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill on the- subject of 

command over Operation TORCH. (5) JCS 28th 

Mtg II Aug 42, Item 13; JCS 36th Mtg, 13 Aug 

42 Item 5. (6) CCS 103/1. This is the 13 August 

1942 Directive for the Commander in Chief, Allied 

Expeditionary Force. (7) Cbl, Marshall to Eisenhower 14 August 42, CM-OUT 4312. (8) Capt. 

Harry' C. Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower (New York, 1946), pp. 32 (25 Jul 42), 36-

39 (31 JuI42). 
16 

General Eisenhower's Directive 

A strategic (or outline) plan for Operation TORCH was in preparation for six weeks 

before Allied agreement was reached on 5 

September. Once again, the President and 

the Prime Minister had to intervene to resolve a wide divergence in the views of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

General Eisenhower's directive of 13 

August described his mission as gaining, in 

conjunction with Allied Forces in the Middle East, complete control of northern 

Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. 

The first stage would be to establish firm, 

mutually supported lodgments in the OranAlgiers-Tunis area on the north coast, and 

in the Casablanca area on the northwest 

coast, in order to have readily available 

good bases for continued and intensified air, 

ground, and sea operations. A second stage 

was to extend control over the entire area 

of French MOtocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, 

and in case of hostile action by the Spanish, 

over Spanish Morocco also. The Allies 

would thus create conditions favorable for 

further offensive operations through Libya 

against the rear of the Axis forces in the 

Western Desert. The ultimate objective 

would be "complete annihilation of Axis 

forces now opposing the British forces in the 

Western Desert and intensification of air 

and sea operations against the Axis on the 

European Continent." , 

The Objective 

Northwest Africa's three major political 

divisions-Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia-were all under European control." 

"CCS 103/1,27 Aug 42. sub: Opn TORCH. 

" Topographical and other geographical information on which this section is based will b(' found in 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Most of the region was within the empire of 

France, but Morocco was divided into three 

separate sections of which only one was 

French. It was much the largest. About 5 

percent of Morocco was dominated by 

Spain. The third section, a very small zone 

adjacent to the port of Tangier, was legally 

under international guardianship, but since 

June 1940 was in the military possession of 

Spain. Between Morocco and Tunisia lay 

Algeria. It was the most nearly French. Its 

maritime border section comprised three of 

the departments of the Third French Republic sending representatives to the prewar 

legislative assemblies in Paris. Native or 

naturalized French citizens formed over 10 

percent of its population. A Governor General and a French military administration 

governed directly its southern provinces. 

Morocco and Tunisia were nominally 

ruled by the absolute authority, civil and 

religious, of native rulers, the Sultan of 

Morocco and the Bey of Tunis. Actually, in 

the capital of each, the French maintained 

a Resident General who conducted all foreign relations and supervised, by means 01 

a French staff, the civil administration by 

native officials. 

The population of the three colonies 

totaled approximately 16,700,000, of which 

all but 1,500,000 were either Berber or 

Arabic Moslems. Only 175,000 of the 

6,500,000 inhabitants of French Morocco 

were French by birth or naturalization; a 

th(' following: Report on Tangier, Spanish and 

French Morocco, C. B. 4096 E; Report on Algeria, 

C. B. 4096 L, Pt I; and Report on Tunisia, C. B. 

4091 I (Xl-all of Inter-Service Information 

Series (British l. S('C also: G-2 WD, Surwy of 

Northw('st Africa, 20 Aug 41, 2 \'ols.; OSS African 

S('c, Morocco, rev 6 Oct 42, State Dept R & A 

686, 2 vols.: and Algeria and Tunisia, 26 Aug 42, 

State Dept R & A 687, 2 vols. All rpts in G-2 WD 

Documcnts Library. 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 

mere 110,000 of the 2,700,000 in Tunisia 

could be so classified. Between the Moslems 

and the native Jews, relations were always 

discordant; anti-Semitism was not a Fascist 

importation. In addition to the numbers 

given here in round figures, military personnel and refugees from Europe added an increment of undeterminable size. 

The ring of territories adjacent to the 

desert was kept at all times directly under 

military control, stemming from the headquarters of the Commander in Chief of all 

French Army forces in Nor~h Africa, at Algiers. In November 1942 this officer was 

Gen. Alphonse Juin. In 1940, beginning 

with the arrival of Gen. Maxime Weygand 

as Commissioner-General under Marshal 

Petain, and again in 1942, at the instigation of Adm. Jean Fran~ois Darlan, high 

officers of the Army or Navy replaced civilians in almost all the leading administrative 

positions. The Resident General for Morocco at Rabat was Gen. Auguste Paul 

Nogucs, and for Tunisia at Tunis, Vice 

Adm. Jean-Pierre Esteva. ''''hile the Governor General of Algeria was a civilian, M. 

Yves Chatel, his cabinet was headed by 

Vice Adm. Raymond Fenard. 

The Combined Planning Staff in London 

had to develop an outline plan for TORCH 

which was adapted to a large and complex 

area comprising more than 1,000,000 

square miles (1,074,238). The distances 

were considerable. From Casablanca to 

Tunis, for example, is 1,274 miles by 

motor road and over 1,000 miles by 

airline. Safi, a south Moroccan port, lies 

near the thirty-second parallel, north latitude, corresponding to that of San Diego, 

California, while Algiers, Bizerte, and 

Tunis are near the thirty-seventh parallel, 

the latitude of San Francisco and St. Louis. 

Because of unfavorable geographical con17 

ditions, the population is concentrated in a 

small part of the total area, principally at 

the ports. The coast of Morocco on the Atlantic side is fairly Rat and open, but on the 

Mediterranean side, from a point opposite 

Gibraltar to another about 150 miles to the 

east, the crescent-shaped mass of the lofty 

Er Rif mountains effectively bars access to 

the interior. Thence eastward as far as Tunisia, coastal ranges, occasionally interrupted by plains and narrow river valleys, 

drop sharply into the Mediterranean. In 

Algeria and Tunisia, this belt of rugged terrain forms the northern portion of the Region du Tell (maritime Atlas mountain 

area), a group of parallel bands of mountains and valleys between the sea and the 

region of high plateaus. 

Rising near the ocean in southern Morocco and stretching northeastward for more 

than a thousand miles are the masses and 

high crests of the Atlas Mountains. At one 

point they approach so closely the Er Rif 

mountains of Spanish Morocco that only a 

limited defile, the Taza gap, permits access 

from the plains of French Morocco to the 

Algerian Region du Tell. Northwest of the 

Atlas Mountains, within French Morocco, 

are two main regions. Along the coast is a 

level plain crossed by meandering streams, 

a plain which extends inland most irregularly and lies below Morocco's rugged counterpart of Algeria's high plateaus. This second region is severely eroded, with large 

areas of bare rock, of steep-sided valleys, and 

of thin-soiled hills. The terrain is so difficult 

that for centuries, travelers between northern and southern Morocco have skirted 

along its coastal rim. 

The Atlantic coast of Morocco has few 

capes or headlands and no natural harbors. 

Strong winds and extremely heavy swell and 
18 

A T L A 

o C E A N 

MAP I 

surf prevail. Artificial ports, protected by 

breakwaters and dredged to suitable depths, 

were constructed by the French, especially 

during the regime of Marshal Louis Lyautey 

after World War I. Their location was determined not by coastal features but by the 

nature of the adjacent hinterland. Casablanca surpassed all other ports in area, 

depth, loading facilities, and storage capacity. It handled almost 90 percent of Morocco's prewar traffic and served as the gateway for overseas shipments to all northwestp 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

A 

L 

..... 

ern Africa. Lesser ports were Safi, RabatSale, Mehdia, and Port-Lyautey, the last 

of which was several miles up the shallow 

Sebou river from its mouth at Mehdia. 

None of Morocco's rivers are navigable 

for a substantial distance. The railroad system which linked these ports with the hinterland and with Algeria and Tunisia had as 

its main line a standard-gauge, partly electrified route which ran from Marrakech 

through Casablanca, Rabat-Sale, and PortLyautey to Oujda. One branch ran to Safi, 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 19 

S,ARDI"U, 

r CAN 

o 

LINES OF COMMUNICATION 

IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA 

___ M,u". 1110 &.0 

--- R.ld1.1II0&O. friO . .... . t.. c.auca , ) I NGLC '111 &"« 

- -- R ,loI l IIIO &D. ,..-,IID 4 G&\I",( . S I1\G\- l TIU C.., 

a second to Tangier, and others to interior 

communities. Invading forces of any size 

would need to control the ports of Safi, 

Casablanca, and Port-Lyautey. 

The Algerian coast faces the Mediterranean Sea with many headlands but no deep 

indentations. At the few points at which 

plains or valleys le~d inland from the wide 

bays, artificial port<; have been constructed 

or natural harbors improved. The best unloading facilities and railroad connections, 

the planners recognized, were at Oran, AI-

....... ... ...... 

L 

'-.... 

TRIPOLI 

a y 

o 

"'Oll ~ 

A 

giers, Bougie, Philippeville, and Bone. (Map 

1) The main line of railroad ran eastward 

from Oujda, near the Moroccan boundary, 

through Tlemcen to Oran, thence through 

interior valleys some twenty miles south of 

the coast to Algiers, Set if, and Souk Ahras, 

from which it crossed northern Tunisia 

through Bedja to Bizerte and through Medjez eI Bab to Tunis. Branch lines of onemeter gauge connected lesser ports, such as 

Nemours, Beni Saf, Anew, Mostaganem, 

and Cherchel with the main line. 
20 

In Tunisia almost all the railroads were 

narrow gauge. Such a line followed the coast 

from Tunis southward through Sousse and 

Sfax to Gabes, with branches westward 

from Sousse to Kasserine, from Sfax to 

Gafsa and Tozeur, and from Tunis by a 

great southerly loop to Tebessa and Constantine in Algeria. From this loop ran 

several short branches. Thus all the major 

ports, Bizerte, Tunis, Sousse, and Sfax, were 

linked with the main system from Morocco 

and with communities situated in the valleys 

of central and western Tunisia. For forces 

invading Tunisia overland from the west, 

they furnished meager assistance to any 

large-scale movement. It was clear to the 

planners that the sea approach must be used 

as far as possible and that the limited railroads would require supplementing by 

maximum use of the highways. 

The main highways system consisted of 

one east-west coastal route and one interior 

and roughly parallel route, the two being 

linked by numerous interconnections. Surfaced with bitumen, with the bridges capable of at least twenty-five-ton traffic, these 

roads were used by an active autobus system 

and could support two-way traffic at most 

points. But they did have bottlenecks-oneway bridges, tunnels just large enough for 

one bus, and sharp turns high on the sides of 

precipitous mountain gorges. From Souk 

et Tnine northeast to Djidjelli on the coastal 

route, the road ran in a notch excavated in 

the side of a cliff for nearly thirty miles. 

High passes were subject to snow blockades 

in the winter months. Alternative stream 

crossings, in case of the failure of any highway bridges, involved steep-sided river beds 

which could be forded only in dry summer 

weather, or deep gorges which might best 

be spanned by adapting railroad bridges to 

motor traffic also. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

In addition to these roads of the main 

system, a highway ran from Constantine to 

Tebessa in eastern Algeria, and thence to 

the Tunisian coast at Galles via Gafsa, or at 

Sfax or Sousse via Sbeitla. Much of this 

particular route was newly widened, graded, 

and surfaced as a military road. The secondary roads in general lacked surfacing or 

drainage which would keep them passable 

in wet weather under heavy motor transport; even in dry weather, they were incapable of relieving much of the pressure on 

the main system. Northwest Africa's highways therefore would be adequate only if 

favorable weather prevailed for the very 

heavy traffic to be expected in the drive eastward into Tunisia. But those facilities were 

further limited by the restriction to two 

main routes, and counterbalanced also by 

the great distances involved. From Algiers 

to Tunis the distance was over 540 miles, 

and from Philippeville to Tunis more than 

240 miles. Oran was 270 miles west of 

Algiers, and Casablanca, 458 miles farther 

still. An occupying force seeking to bring 

Tunisia under control by moving overland 

from Algeria and Morocco must bring with 

it an impressive volume of vehicles and be 

well prepared for highway maintenance. 

Of the airdromes in French Morocco five 

were considered to be first class, those at 

Marrakech and Meknes, about seventy to 

eighty miles inland, and at Cazes (near 

Casablanca), Rabat-Sale, and Port-Lyautey on the coast. The field at Port-Lyautey 

was the only installation with concrete runways, but all five were large enough for 

bombers and in dry weather would be usable. The first-class airdromes were accessible by railroad and highway. Five other 

large fields in French Morocco were classed 

as secondary for lack of equipment, inaccessibility by land, or obstructions to ready 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 

approach by air. At most of the ports were 

seaplane anchorages, and at Port-Lyautey 

such a station had once been heavily used by 

the ·French." 

The three primary airdromes in Algeria 

were at La Senia (near Oran), at Maison 

Blanche (near Algiers), and at Les Salines 

(near BOne). Somewhat less usable were 

the inland airfields at Blida (25 miles from 

Algiers) and Setif (about 30 miles from the 

Golfe de Bougie). Secondary fields capable 

of extension and development included 

those at Tafaraoui (16 miles southeast of 

Oran), Constantine, and Tebessa. Seaplane 

stations had been developed at Oran, Arzew, Algiers, and BOne.s 

Tunisia's air facilities included primary 

airdromes at Sidi Ahmed (near Bizerte) 

and EI Aouina (near Tunis), secondary airdromes at Kairouan and Gabes, and seaplane stations at Bizerte. Tunis, and Sousse. 

On the flat coastal plain were many operational fields and landing grounds capable of 

extension and development. 

French forces for the defense of North 

Africa had been restricted by the terms of 

the armistice with Germany in 1940 antI 

were understood in 1942 to include an army 

of 120,000 men. Of these troops, 55,000 

were believed to be in Morocco, 50,000 in 

Algeria, and 15,000 in Tunisia when the 

basic planning began in London.S Twelve 

units of motorized field artillery had been 

allowed but almost no medium and no 

• Description in OSS, African Sec, Morocco, 

19011; and in G-2 WD, Survey of Northwest Africa, 

I, 7311. G-2 WD Documents Library. 

• The analysis of air facilities in Algeria and 

Tunisia is based on OSS African Sec, Algeria and 

Tunisia, 26 Aug 42, Vol. I, Pt. 2. 

'( I) Data from AFHQ Intell Rpts I and 2, II 

and 18 Sep 42. (2) Slightly lower totals, based on 

troops actually present. arf' givf'n in Pif'rre Barjot, 

Le dlbarquement du 8 Novembre 1942 en Afrique 

au Nord (Paris, 1949), pp. 28-30. 

21 

heavy artillery. Mechanized cavalry had at 

its disposal between 120 and 160 obsolete 

tanks and 80 armored cars in Morocco, 

about 110 such tanks and 60 armored cars 

in Algeria, and only 20 armored cars in 

Tunisia. In each of the three colonies, one 

regiment of antiaircraft artillery was dispersed, although at the ports supplementary 

batteries were manned by naval personnel. 

Estimates of French air strength varies, 

but most of it was understood to be concentrated at the Moroccan airdromes. From 

155 to I 70 combat planes could be expected 

at the first contact, and within two hours 

after the alarm, from 166 to 207 additional 

aircraft from stations inland.7 Of these, almost half were thought to be Dewoitine 520 

fighters, superior in maneuverability to carrier-borne Navy fighters. 8 Approximately 

the same number were believed to be twinengine bombers. All French combat planes 

would be manned by able pilots. 

If German planes should also respond to 

an early warning issued from an intercepting submarine or from a long-range air 

patrol a few days before the convoys completed the approach, and should the Germans use Spanish and Spanish Moroccan 

airdromes for their concentrations, their air 

superiority over Morocco could be overwhelming during the attack. The margin 

of that superiority would be limited only 

by the size of the stocks of aviation fuel and 

bombs available to several hundred aircraft. 

7 (I) AAF InteU, Study of Axis Air Capabilities 

in Opposing Allied Landings Against Northwest 

Africa, II Aug 42. OPD TF "A" Reds. (2) Memo, 

Rear Adm Henry Kent Hewitt to CinC US Fleet, 

7 Sep 42, sub: TOllCH Air Requirements. Div of 

Naval Hist. (3) Telgs, USFOR to AGWAR, 7 Sep 

42, eM·IN 2710, and 8 Sep 42, CM·IN 3628. 

• The Dewoitine fighter was a low· wing, all·metal 

monoplane which had a reputed range of 500 miles, 

a speed of 340 miles per hour, and a ceiling 32,500 

feet. 
22 

Political Considerations 

The nature of the Allied objective in 

Northwest Africa prescribed an expedition 

which had to operate initially at widely 

separated points located in three disti~ct 

political units, all subject to the authonty 

of the French government at Vichy. All 

three had to be brought under control either 

by substituting Allied for French authority 

as a result of a victory in arms or by enlisting the French in the war against the Axis 

powers without disturbing their control over 

the restless native populations. To achieve 

control by a victory in arms would manifestly require a large force at the outset and 

then a rapid build-up. 

Plans for French North Africa had to take 

into account political conditions throughout 

the whole French empire. The French people had not been unified by the disaster to 

their nation. Even before the defeat of 1940 

factionalism arising from the revolutionary 

social currents of the times was rife, and 

a proud and patriotic people was tom by 

mutual distrust. These attitudes prevailed in 

defeat. The situation was aggravated after 

defeat by conflicting views over the best 

way to serve French interests while the 

country was partly occupied by an enemy 

still engaged in war against a former ally. 

Differences over these issues engendered bitter hatreds. The Allies in planning for Operation TORCH sought to collaborate with 

friendly segments of the armed forces, of 

the public administration, and of various 

civilian organizations in French North 

Africa. Among the available French leaders 

through whom they might effect this collaboration, Gen. Charles de Gaulle was 

bound to be considered. 

Just before the Germans completed their 

conquest of France, General de Gaulle esNORTHWEST AFRICA 

caped to England, where he laid plans for 

the liberation of his country by organizing 

into a fighting force all Frenchmen willing 

and able to bear arms against the Germans. 

On 18 June 1940 he made a now-famous 

appeal to his countrymen by radio. As hostilities in France were being concluded, and 

while Petain, after the Franco-German ar 

mistice, was setting up a government at 

Vichy in that part of France not occupied by 

the Germans, de Gaulle's group in England 

was also taking form. The General was recognized by the British Government as 

"Chief of all the Free French, wherever they 

may be, who may join you to defend the 

Allied cause" (7 August 1940). The Free 

French, however, considered themselves 

more than a voluntary association opposed 

to the Axis j they assumed that their leaders 

headed the true, legally constituted government of France. The Vichy government 

they denounced as part of the Fascist-revolutionary movement in Europe and without legal foundation. Their own establishment, organized in September 1941 as the 

French National Committee and formally 

recognized by most of the Allied governments, was represented as the continuation 

of the legitimate government of which M. 

Paul Reynaud had been the Premier until 

his resignation. In the United Kingdom, 

the Fighting French, as they thereafter preferred to be termed, were supported by the 

British and, indirectly, through lend-lease 

channels by the United States. At various 

points in the French empire, colonial governors adhering to General de Gaulle made 

local resources available for the Allied effort 

to defeat the Axis powers. 

The U.S. Government established channels of communication with General de 

Gaulle purely as a military leader for the 

discussion of matters having military sig-
STRATEGIC PLANNING 

nificance. Responsibility for the liaison was 

placed upon Admiral Harold Stark,9 chief of 

the United States Naval Mission in the 

United Kingdom. Conversations with General de Gaulle and with members of his organization during the months preceding the 

invasion of French North Africa yielded information of considerable value to the 

Allies.10 

The Vichy government led by Marshal 

Petain was accepted by the United States 

as the successor in fact to Reynaud's government under the Third Republic. Diplomatic 

representation was maintained at Vichy, 

both before and after Pearl Harbor. A 

settled purpose of American diplomacy was 

to maintain pressure upon Petain's government to uphold the terms of the armistice, 

to deny the Axis powers any assistance and 

any privileges not pledged in that document, and to insist that the Axis powers 

confine themselves to only those concessions 

granted as a condition for laying down 

French arms. The objective central to all 

American policy was to prevent Axis use of 

French colonial territories and of the French 

fleet. 11 An important secondary consideration was to obtain through French governmental channels in Vichy all possible information concerning Axis plans and activities. 

The Marshal's government countenanced 

the Economic Accord of March 1941, negotiated by Mr. Robert Murphy, U.S. envoy, 

and General Weygand, Vichy's proconsul 

at Algiers. It arranged for the importation 

into French North Africa of limited quantities of consumption goods for local use. 

• His Army associate was Brig. Gen. Charles L. 

Bolte. 

II See, for example, the record of a c.nnversalion 

of 24 September 1942 in COMNAVEU, U.S.-

French Relations, 1942-1944, App. B, Pt. I, pp. 

45ff. OCMH. 

II Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 542. 

23 

Twelve economic vice-consuls, supervising 

the distribution of such imports to see that 

none passed into Axis possession, reinforced 

the regular consular establishment in providing a staff of propaganda and intelligence agents. With the secret operatives of 

Allied governments, they could participate 

in subversive operations as well as espionage. 

They established valuable ties with resistance organizations. They thus could supply 

data for planning and agents for executing 

the plans. 

Devotion to the Marshal was particularly 

strong in the armed forces of Vichy France 

in both the unoccupied portion of Metropolitan France and in the colonies of French 

West Africa and French North Africa. 

According to the prevailing opinion, de 

Gaulle and his following were engaged in 

dividing and weakening France, undermining its proper leadership, and compromising its ability to contribute effectively to 

its own liberation.12 The anti-Fascist aims 

of the resistance organizations undoubtedly 

attracted recruits but at the expense of 

antagonizing French authoritarians. Yet 

the government of a country at war with the 

Axis was obliged, in calculating how to 

overcome the Axis, to retain every possible 

advantage, to enlist all possible allies. For 

the United Nations, in 1942, to renounce 

the aid obtainable through friendly relations 

with the government at Vichy and to 

espouse the cause of Fighting France alone 

seemed quixotic. To scorn the limited but 

substantial contribution by de Gaulle's 

movement toward eventual victory would 

have been imprudent. In making war, what 

seemed fitting was to make use of what each 

side could contribute and to break with 

12 Such an attitude was, to be sure, the counterpart of the Free (or Fighting) French estimate of 

French groups other than their own. 
24 

Vichy, if at all, only at the last possible 

moment.a 

The British Chiefs of Staff proposed and 

the Americans agreed that the Fighting 

French should not be apprised of the forthcoming operation until it had begun. This 

policy was adopted to avoid leakage of intelligence to the enemy,t4 but it was further 

warranted by the complexion of French 

political opinion in French North Africa.1ft 

There, as elsewhere in the French empire, 

anti-Axis Frenchmen were divided. The 

monarchists were there, for example. Their 

claimant to the throne of France, the Comte 

de Paris, kept a residence in Spanish Morocco. The left wing was there. Both factions 

furnished recruits to a movement to terminate Marshal Petain's fascistic revolution. 

Included in these two groups were some of 

de Gaulle's adherents, but the bulk of the 

French in North Africa were opposed to 

him in 1942. De Gaulle's followers had 

fought with the British against other 

Frenchmen at Dakar and in Syria, and that 

was held against him. If many opposed the 

Fighting French for their actions as renegades and rebels, much the greater number 

did so because of their profound faith in 

Petain. The old Marshal was admired on 

the one hand because of his authoritarian 

reforms and on the other because of his policies toward the Axis, policies which were 

regarded as very shrewd. Petain, they believed, was only yielding to the storm of 

necessity, bending only as far as he was 

" This is the thesis of Langer, Our Vic1ay Gamble. 

"(1) COS (W) 241, 5 Aug 42. (2) Memo, Marshall for Dill, 7 Aug 42, sub: COS (W) 241. 

WDCSA 381 TORCH. (3) Memo, Marshall for 

President, 7 Aug 42, approved by "F. D. R." Copy 

in OPD Exec 5. (4) Msg, WD to USFOR, 8 Aug 

42. OPD Exec 10, Item 36a. 

U Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 

97-98. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

pressed; and he was expected to straighten 

up as the pressure relaxed. His supporters 

were convinced that he, Weygand, and 

Darlan had held the Germans rather closely 

to the armistice terms, that he was able to 

dis.o;;emble his anti-Nazi feelings, and that 

he had France's best interests at heart. In 

the early autumn of 1942 the loyalty of most 

French inhabitants of the colonies in North 

Africa, including the most anti-German 

among them, was toward the government 

at Vichy. 

During the planning for Operation 

SUPER-GYMNAST (one of the early plans for 

the invasion of North Africa) immediately 

after Pearl Harbor, the twelve economic 

vice-consuls in French North Africa were 

reinforced by agents of the American Office 

of Co-ordinator of Information, men who 

were sent to establish confidential relations 

with leaders among the natives and with 

resistance groups among the French. Coordination of secret intelligence and special 

operations by American and British agents 

was achieved through Lt. Col. William A. 

Eddy (Marine Corps), American naval 

attache at Tangier. He kept in steady communication with a British counterpart in 

Gibraltar. 

The initial purpose of the resistance organizations had been to C'ppose occupation 

of French North Africa by Axis forces, particularly by airborne elements. This goal 

was revised during the first four months of 

1942 when an Allied expedition was in prospect. Their new mission was to assist Allied 

landings and, during them, to control proAxis segments of the North African population. Had the operation been undertaken 

in May 1942 the Allies might have found 

there a group of friendly French who were 

numerous, eager, and energetic. When the 

operation was postponed, Allied relations 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 

with these resistance groups and American 

operations under the Economic Accord 

both suffered a relapse. Connections remained, nonetheless, which could be revived after the planning of Allied Force 

Headquarters for TORCH began.16 

In French North Africa, the Allies hoped 

for weak French military resistance to 

TORCH which could be reduced further by 

( 1) the intervention of friendly French resistance groups to sabotage the execution of 

French military defense plans, or (2) the 

enlistment of the French authorities in a 

common endeavor. The wide expanse of 

the area to be brought under control and 

the complex character of its non-European 

population made highly desirable the recruitment of the French North African territories as active allies. 

Strategic Decisions 

Allied strategic planning for TORCH 

began in London on 31 July, when a group 

of British and American officers constituting the Combined Planning Staff first met 

under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Alfred 

M. Gruenther. They prepared an exploratory plan which amounted to a modification 

of what the British planners had already 

sketched. It called for the seizure of two 

large and two small ports within the Mediterranean and a subsequent seizure of Casablanca. Four divisions were to be employed 

in the assault. Later convoys were to bring 

from six to eight more divisions The planners were convinced that insufficient naval 

escort ships for simultaneous landings on 

the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts made 

it necessary to postpone the Casablanca assault to a second phase. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff immediately scrutinized the findto Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 180-225. 

25 

ings of the London planners, for they were 

obliged to find the earliest possible date for 

Operation TORCH consonant with a sound 

concept of the operation. The directive from 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the commander in chief had not yet been formulated, so that the mission was not yet firmly 

defined. On 31 July, planners in Washington expressed serious doubt about abandoning simultaneous assault landings on the 

western coast as well as inside the Mediterranean, but at the same time noted that 

some plan was essential in case unfavorable 

weather forced all landings to be made inside the Mediterranean. In this very first 

exchange of ideas, the four interrelated key 

issues thus arose: (1) the date for D Day; 

( 2) the desirability of making all landings 

inside the Mediterranean; (3) the feasibility 

of making any outside landings on the Atlantic coast of Morocco; and (4) the 

amount of available naval escort, carrierborne aircraft, and fire support.17 

The earlier the operation could begin, 

the more likely that it would achieve some 

degree of surprise and, at the same time, 

benefit from the enemy's involvement with 

operations on the Eastern Front. Mter the 

middle of October, German air units might 

be expected to transfer from the campaign 

in Russia to the Mediterranean basin. Unless the Allies struck in French North Mrica 

by then, the Nazis' pressure on the government of Spain would be stronger, and the 

inclination of the Soviet Union to drop out 

of the war might become greater. If some 

of the President's associates wished the 

operation to begin in time to affect the 

" (I) Msgs, USFOR to AGWAR, 30 Jul 42, 

eM-IN 10559, and 31 Jul 42, CM-IN 10945. (2) 

Msg, AGWAR to USFOR, 31 Jul 42, CM-OUT 

0037. (3) Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk 

(New York, 1950), pp. 43-53, indicates the effects 

of thl' unct"rtainties on the planning operations. 
26 

American Congressional elections in November, he himself seems to have left the 

decision to be controlled by military considerations. But he did not accept the advice 

of General Marshall and Admiral King that 

the earliest practicable date would be 7 November without careful analysis of the reasons offered for it. 18 The governing factor 

in this estimate was the length of time required to convert ocean liners to combat 

loaders (assault transports). For several 

more weeks Allied strategists sought persistently to have an earlier D Day through 

plans which would not require the use of 

these particular ships. 

The operation might have begun earlier 

if the landings near Casablanca could have 

been either entirely dispensed with or postponed to a second phase of the attack, when 

it could be executed with some of the same 

shipping used in the first landings. The 

pressure for such a solution was strong, particularly in an early phase of the planning. 

The preliminary outline of 31 July proposed 

a deferred Casablanca landing, while the 

plan submitted to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff with the date 21 August dropped the 

Casablanca landing altogether. The War 

Department planners insisted on including 

an attack to capture Casablanca, in order 

to insure a line of communications to the 

United States. They also insisted on its 

being simultaneous with the operations inside the Mediterranean, in order to make the 

maximum impression upon the French and 

Spanish authorities by such a show of force. 

In London, particularly among the British 

planners, the hazards to Allied control of 

,. (1) Memos, Marshall and King for President, 

4 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, and 6 Aug 42, sub: TORCH. 

OPO Exec 5. (2) Ltr, Leahy to Marshall, 5 Aug 

42. OPO ABC 381 Sec 4-B, Case 44. (3) Msg, 

AGWAR to USFOR, 6 Aug 42, CM-OUT 1632. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

the Strait of Gibraltar and of Gibraltar itself were deemed less substantial than they 

appeared to be in the thinking at Washington. In London they were aware, moreover, that the landings near Casablanca 

might well be thwarted by the incidence of 

unfavorable weather with high swell and 

tumultuous surf, and that the attempt to 

safeguard the Gibraltar area by such an expedition might thus be frustrated. 19 

The basic problem in this connection was 

to determine where the Axis powers would 

resist the Allied expedition. Would they appropriate airfields in Spain and neutralize 

Gibraltar by air attack? Would the Spanish 

assist them in a ground attack on Gibraltar, 

as Hitler had once expected, and perhaps 

by hostile action from Spanish Morocco as 

well? Or would the Germans and Italians 

focus their resistance in the Sicilian straits 

and northeastern Tunisia? The British concluded that the Spanish would do nothing 

and that the enemy's main opposition would 

come in Tunisia. The Americans were far 

less confident that the Spanish Government 

would actually remain neutral if the Germans wished to use Spanish territory, and 

far less certain that the German Air Force 

would not interfere with the vital activities 

planned at Gibraltar. 2o 

The Allied planners also differed over the 

degree of haste necessary in entering Tunisia. In order to establish Allied military 

control over all North Africa, the Allied 

Force had to gain possession of Tunisia. 

British planners were convinced that if Axis 

to (1) Memo with Ltr, Gen Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 42. WOCSA 381 TORCH. 

(2) Msg, USFOR to AGWAR, 31 Jul 42, CMIN 10945. (3) Msg, USFOR to AGWAR, 25 Aug 

42, CM-IN 9526. 

,. (1) Msg, AGWAR to USFOR, 3 Aug 42, CMOUT 0728: Msg, USFOR to AGWAR, 27 Aug 42, 

CM-IN 10397. (2) CCS 38th Mtg, 28 Aug 42. 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 

occupation of Tunisia were not forestalled 

by elements of the Allied Force in the first 

assault, and with the support of the first 

follow-up convoys, the enemy would become 

too strong to dislodge without a protracted 

struggle. Landings as far to the east as BOne, 

near the border between Algeria and Tunisia, were therefore urged by them despite 

the likelihood of enemy air attacks. The Axis 

line of communication to Tunisia would be 

very short. The Axis rate of build-up could 

be much swifter. Time would be on the 

enemy's side. Against this view, the President and his military advisers believed that 

the enemy could land nothing of consequence in Tunisia except by air for the first 

two weeks.21 

The first product of the Combined Planning Staff after the wholly tentative and 

incomplete sketch of 31 July was a Draft 

Outline Plan (Partial), Operation TORCH, 

of 9 August.22 It prescribed a D Day of 

5 November in order to make possible simultaneous landings both inside and outside 

the Mediterranean, at BOne, Algiers, Oran, 

and Casablanca. Two weeks of critical 

analysis, counterproposals, and revision followed, after which the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff received the full Outline Plan of 21 

August accompanied by General Eisenhower's comments. These comments pointed 

out how tentative were some of the important provisions of the plan. They expressed his judgment that the forces provided by the two Allied governments were 

too small to carry out the mission stated in 

his directive. Landings near Casablanca had 

been abandoned in this plan in favor of 

but three attacks, all within the Mediter-

.. (1) Msgs, USFOR to AGWAR, 25 Aug 42, 

CM·IN 9526, and 27 Aug 42, CM·IN 10397. (2) 

Msg, President to Prime Minister, 30 Aug 42. 

WDCSA 381 TORCH (8-31-42) . 

.. OPD TF "An Reds. 

27 

ranean, at Oran, Algiers, and Bone. D Day 

was set at 15 October, the latest date holding promise of any beneficial consequences 

for the Soviet forces fighting the Eastern 

Front.23 Another main factor affecting 

planning at this point was the grave shortage of naval components available for the 

Allied Force. When Eisenhower met in 

London with U.S. Navy representatives on 

11 August, the Combined Planning Staff 

had not received an allocation of either 

Royal Navy or U.S. Navy units. The Commander in Chief, Allied Force, was then told 

that the difficulties facing the U.S. Navy 

in fulfilling existing missions and in furnishing a task force for the Casablanca attack 

would preclude its participation in any 

naval operations within the Mediterranean. 

At most, the U.S. Navy contemplated enabling one or two battleships from the British Home Fleet at Scapa Flow to see action 

in the Mediterranean with other elements 

of the Royal Navy by temporarily substituting American battleships for them at Scapa 

Flow. Apparently detecting an air of hesitation and of undue independence, Eisenhower emphasized that the U.S. Army and 

Navy were both under the President's explicit orders making TORCH an operation 

of the highest priority, that the British 

armed services were in a parallel position, 

and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

would require that the navies of both countries overcome all obstacles in executing the 

operation.2~ 

Two days later, when a British aircraft 

carrier was sunk in the Mediterranean, the 

British Chiefs of Staff in London, with the 

American naval representatives concurring, 

.. CCS 103 with inds, 25 Aug 42. 

.. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, pp. 

49-51 (11 Aug 42). 
28 

concluded that escort vessels, fire support 

vessels, and aircraft carriers would not be 

available in sufficient strength for two major 

landings on the Mediterranean coast simultaneous with an attack outside on the Atlantic coast. The inescapable choice confronting .the planners lay between canceling 

any assault landings at BOne, or even Algiers, 

on the one hand, and omitting such landings 

near Casablanca, on the other. In the first 

formal complete Outline Plan (dated 21 

August) the decision to seize Casablanca 

from the sea was abandoned, and the plan 

to land at Bone retained. An American task 

force was to sail for Oran from the United 

States, and the largest task force (American 

and British) was to sail for Algiers from the 

United Kingdom. 

Planners also had to take into account 

one other consideration. Intelligence reports 

indicated that British forces would be vigorously resisted by the French. It was therefore deemed advisable to maintain, as far 

as possible, an American character for any 

Allied assault. 

General Eisenhower was so dissatisfied 

with the draft plan that he requested a revised directive reducing his mission to proportions consistent with the resources made 

available to him. His strictures produced 

different responses in London and in Washington.2~ The British Chiefs of Staff abandoned their insistence on an early D Day, 

accepted the simultaneous landings near 

Casablanca which General Eisenhower had 

declared so necessary, and proposed a fifth, 

small-scale landing at Philippeville, between 

Algiers and Bone. These recommendations 

were contingent on the contribution of addi2Il( I) CCS 103, 25 Aug 42, Inc! C, by Eisenhower, Clark, and Handy. (2) See Butcher, My 

Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 68-69. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tional American naval forces.28 The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff contemplated an all-American landing force attack at two points, Casablanca and Oran only. The American 

Chiefs were also prepared to adjust the commander in chief's directive, for the U.S. 

Navy could not meet the expanded requirements of the changes proposed by the British.2T Discussion of the plan had reached an 

impasse, culminating in a long and perhaps 

at times acrimonious session of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 28 August, when 

the President and the Prime Minister intervened.28 

The Prime Minister returned to London 

late on 24 August from a visit to Marshal 

Joseph Stalin in Moscow. He had borne the 

brunt of the Russian dictator's invective 

over the Allied decision to occupy French 

North Africa rather than to open the 

promised "second front" in western France 

in 1942. He had enlisted Stalin's approbation of Operation TORCH by putting it in 

the best possible light. He found in London 

that the planning had swung toward a date 

much later than he deemed wise and a concept of the operation which overtaxed the 

resources thus far made available. In the 

employment of the actual means at hand, 

the Allied planners were in disagreement. 

His discussions with General Eisenhower 

and Maj. Gen. Mark Wayne Clark, and the 

impetus which he was able to give to the 

effort to find additional British naval resources accelerated the process of decision. 

Soon he and the President were engaged in 

• (I) Msg, USFOR to AGWAR, 24 Aug 42, 

CM-IN 9341. (2) Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 46. 

2T (I) Msg, AGWAR to USFOR, 24 Aug 42, 

CM-OUT 7500. (2) Msg, USFOR to AGWAR, 25 

Aug 42, CM-IN 9554. (3) Msg, AGWAR to 

USFOR, 25 Aug 42, CM-OUT 7858. (4) Msg, 

USFOR to AGWAR, 29 Aug 42, CM-IN 11,128. 

.. CCS 38th Mtg, 28 Aug 42, Item 6. 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 

a daily exchange of cables which moved 

swiftly toward an Allied agreement. Mr. 

Churchill agreed that the British would accede to an American wish for an all-American assault, with British forces arriving 

after French acquiescence had been obtained, but at the same time he tried to 

make such a solution of the impasse among 

professional military chiefs unnecessary. 211 

On 4 September, the U.S. Navy reported 

the naval units which it could furnish.so 

At the same time, the President and Prime 

Minister were reaching an agreement upon 

three landing forces, mainly American, with 

a reduction of some 5,000 men each in those 

proposed for Casablanca and for Oran, thus 

providing the American dement for the 

force to be landed near Algiers. Each would 

have an American commander. No landings would be made east of Algiers until 

it had capitulated, after which British troops 

would be carried to eastern Algerian ports 

and continue into Tunisia. The troops 

would be carried to the inside landings in 

British shipping, except for American vessels already in the United Kingdom and 

those in which one regimental combat team 

would be sent from the United States to 

Algiers via the United Kingdom. The outside landing would be made from an American convoy. The Royal Navy would furnish escort and support within the Mediterranean, as the U.S. Navy representatives 

had thought necessary since early August, 

while the outside landings would be escorted and protected by American war-

... ( I) Msg, President to Prime Minister, 30 Aug 

42; Msgs, Prime Minister to President, I Sep 42, 

2 Sep 42, and 4 Sep 42: OPD Exec 5, Item 2. (2) 

Msgs, USFOR to AGWAR, 3 Sep 42, CM·IN 1002, 

3 Sep 42, CM-IN 1083, and 3 Sep 42, CM-IN 

1094. 

.. Msg, AGW AR to USFOR, 4 Sep 42, CM-OUT 

1673. 

29 

ships.St One major point remained to be 

determined-the date of D Day. The Combined Chiefs of Staff finally gave responsibility for that choice to the Commander in 

Chief, Allied Force.52 

The culminating Anglo-American executive agreement was formulated in a provisional outline plan at once, and eventually 

submitted on 20 September for official action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.as 

Some fundamental questions remained to 

be settled, but the decisions of 5 September 

enabled the agencies of the two governments to proceed with operational and logistical planning and preparations on a firm 

basis after six weeks of delay and shifting 

uncertainty. 

The concept of the operation and a general allocation of ground, sea, and air elements to the expeditionary force were now 

determined. The planned pattern of the assault cut down to the narrowest of margins 

the possibility of occupying Tunisia within 

a brief period of Allied superiority over the 

Axis forces likdy to be sent there. If the initial attempt should fail, the operation would 

be protracted in proportion to the strength 

which the Axis powers chose to commit. 

Under the most favorable circumstances, 

advance forces would be established in 

northern Tunisia by mid-December, with 

a moderate number of aircraft operating 

against Axis supply lines into Tripoli and 

against Tripoli itself. These forces might 

consolidate the occupation of central and 

southern Tunisia as far as Gabes by the middle of January 1943. A corps of two British 

., (I) Msg, AGWAR to USFOR, 4 Sep 42, CMOUT 1529. (2) Msg, USFOR to AGWAR, 6 Sep 

42, CM·IN 2306. 

.. CCS 103/3, 26 Sep 42, sub: Outline Plan 

Opn TORCH . 

.. Copy in OCMH. 
30 

divisions could then be ready to move into 

Tripolitania at the beginning of March. 

The British Eighth Anny, attacking westward, might by the most hopeful estimate 

arrive at Tripoli in mid-January. Military 

control of northern Africa from the Atlantic 

to the Red Sea would by such a schedule be 

achieved at the earliest by March, and 

might take considerably longer, with a corresponding drain on Allied military resources.34 

Strategic decisions which remained for 

detennination until near the end of the 

planning period included those governing 

relations with the French. The initial contacts between anned forces defending 

French North Africa and those of the Allies 

were bound to produce problems of a most 

delicate character. What would Allied 

policy be toward French airplanes or submarines met at sea? How should French 

merchant ships be treated? Should French 

warships be fired upon before they opened 

hostilities? If the Allied convoys were too 

passive, damaging blows might be struck 

before they could hit back; but if they acted 

aggressively, they might promote a battle 

which neither side desired. 

The directive covering the treatment of 

the French anned forces during initial contact was drafted finaUyon 5 October.36 No 

"(1) AFHQ G-3 Outline Plan C (Provisional) 

for Opn TORCH, 5 Sep 42. Copy in OPD ABC 381 

(7-2>42), Sec 4-Aj (2) CCS 103/3, 26 Sep 42, 

sub: Outline Plan Opn TORCH. 

-( 1) CCS 103/6,4 Oct 42, replacing CCS 103/5 

on the same subject, was approved by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff' and the President and forwarded to 

the British Chiefs of Staff' in London and the Prime 

Minister, 5 October 1942, to be transmitted by 

them to General Eisenhower if they approved. (2) 

Msg, AGW AR to USFOR, 5 Oct 42, CM-OUT 

1578. (3) Previous discussions appear in: (a) Msg, 

AGWAR to USFOR, 27 Sep 42, CM-OUT 9160. 

(b) CCS 41st Mtg, 28 Sep 42, Item 3 and Annex. 

(c) CCS 42d Mtg,2 Oct 42, Supp Notes. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

offensive action was to be taken against 

them by the Allies unless in reply to definitely hostile action. French warships, therefore, were to be allowed to pass undeterred 

through the Strait of Gibraltar and even 

north of the thirty-sixth parallel, north latitude, and to move past Allied convoys without interruption if they kept clear after 

being so warned. Should they fail to keep 

clear, they were then to be destroyed but 

Allied ships were to avoid, as far as possible, 

firing the first shot. Unescorted submarines 

outside territorial waters and darkened ships 

which withheld identification would be 

treated as hostile. French airplanes would 

be treated as hostile when approaching Allied ships or Gibraltar prior to the landings. 

Once the landings began, airplanes, merchant ships, and naval vessels which were 

preparing to get under way, or which disregarded orders from an Allied commander; any ship which attempted to scutde itself, or which failed to identify itself 

properly if encountered at night; and any 

shore battery or other defensive installation 

or moored vessel on which activity indicated 

hostile intentions-aU were at once to be 

treated as hostile. No action against French 

air bases would be taken before the assault, 

but Gibraltar would be defended against air 

attack at all times. 

Once it was deemed necessary to engage 

in offensive action in a certain area. the action was to be opened with maximum intensity and pressed with the utmost vigor 

until aU active resistance was terminated. 

Commanders were empowered to interpret 

the hostile action of one unit in an area as 

an indication of similar intent on the part of 

all other units in that area if attendant circumstances seemed to justify such an interpretation. When the resistance ceased, offensive action was also to be suspended until 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 

its resumption clearly became necessary. 

Unnecessary damage to ships and harbor installations was to be avoided by every possible precaution. 

A rather detailed set of rules covering the 

treatment of Vichy French merchant shipping was drafted at Allied Force Headquarters, but later these were rejected by the 

Joint Chiefs as unnecessarily restrictive upon 

the commander in chief; the accepted principles of international law were to be followed by him, and need not be spelled out.36 

The ultimate status of the French colonies 

and of the government at Vichy was a question of high policy for decision by the President and the Prime Minister. Were the 

Allies going to bring into existence an independent French government in French 

North Africa, rivaling that of Vichy, or were 

they even to promote the disruption of the 

government at Vichy? The President, when 

faced with this issue, finally asserted that he 

had no policy to acknowledge other than 

that of defeating the Axis powers and of 

preserving French administration in the 

French colonies. The propaganda plans 

were adjusted to bring them into full conformity with this policy, submitted to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the resulting 

directive was issued by Allied Force Headquarters as its General Order 4.31 

• ( I) JCS 39th Mtg, 27 Oct 42, Item 9. The 

paper circulated on this subject was CCS 103/12. 

(2) Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 24 Oct 42, NAF 21. 

"'(I) Memo, Col W. J. Donovan for WD, 8 Sep 

42, sub: Psychological Warfare for North Africa, 

listed in Msg, AGWAR to USFOR, 24 Sep 42, 

CM-OUT 08287. (2) Memo, Brig Gen A. M. 

Gruenther for Brig Gen John R. Deane, 15 Oct 

42, sub: Revised Psychological Warfare Plan, with 

31 

The occupation of French North Africa 

was, in accordance with the strategic decisions reached during the planning phase, 

to be executed by forces of both the United 

States and Great Britain, and directed by 

an Allied commander in chief aided by a 

combined staff of both nationalities. The 

three major objectives of the assault landings were Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca, 

each to be taken by a force under an American ground commander. The Eastern Assault Force attacking Algiers would contain 

British and American troops, landing from 

British and American transports, protected 

by British naval elements, and supported by 

British air units, initially carrier-borne and 

later land-based. The Center Task Force 

attacking Oran was to consist of American 

ground troops, conveyed and supported by 

the Royal Navy, and aided by British 

carrier-borne and American land-based aviation. The Western Task Force attacking 

Casablanca was to be American in all three 

components. Allied leaders hoped that the 

French forces in North Africa would at first 

either welcome the invasion or at most 

furnish but nominal resistance, and that in 

the end they would join the Allies in military operations for the liberation of France. 

The Allies would therefore approach French 

North Africa prepared to fight but preferring an amicable association in anns. 

attached: Joint Amer-British Plan for Psych Warfare for France and the Fr Empire (rev) and Draft 

Outline Working Plan (rev). OPD Exec 5, Vol. 

III (1942 Mise). (3) Memo, Gruenther for Deane, 

19 Oct 42. OPD 381 -TORCH. (4) JCS 139, approved 4 Nov 42. (5) Telgs: AGWAR to USFOR, 

13 Oct 42. CM-OUT 04062; USFOR to AGWAR, 

II Oct 42, CM-IN 04484. 
CHAPTER III 

Tactical Plans and Political Preparations 

At the same time that major strategy decisions were being made, command organization, tactical planning, and preparation 

for political activity were also going forward 

at lower military levels. For the planning to 

proceed with the greatest efficiency, directives to the various task force commanders 

should first have been fonnulated. Then, as 

indicated by subsequent World War II experience, from three to five months would 

have been required to complete tactical 

plans and mount the expedition. The Anny 

commanders would have selected the 

beaches to fit schemes of inland maneuver, 

subject to their suitability for naval operations, and once that major problem was 

solved, correlated joint decisions would have 

established: the time of landing (H Hour) , 

detailed requirements, assignment of assault 

shipping, plans for general naval bombardment, and specific organization by tasks, including the furnishing of naval gunfire, air 

support, transportation, supply, medical 

service, administration, and communications. 1 In planning for Operation TORCH, 

there was no time for this orderly sequence. 

The pressure after the first decision in 

July to have tactical plans ready for the 

earliest possible D Day made impossible any 

waiting for directives or fundamental decisions concerning the general outline plan. 

Tactical and logistical planning began 

1 U.S. Navy Dept CNO, Amphibious Warfare Instruction (USF 6), 1946, pp. 3-21. 

almost at once. Efforts to keep abreast of 

the shifting concept of the operation prior 

to 5 September produced a dizzying confusion which was accentuated by the dispersal of the planning staffs at several points 

on either side of the Atlantic.· 

Organizing the Chain of Command 

of the Allied Force 

General Eisenhower's command was officially designated by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff to be that of Commander in Chief, 

Allied Expeditionary Force. For security 

reasons, he altered the title to Commander 

in Chief, Allied Force. The original plan 

to have a deputy commander in chief from 

the British Anny was dropped on British 

initiative in favor of an American, one able 

to retain the American character of the expedition in case General Eisenhower was 

prevented from exercising his command by 

disability. General Clark (U.S.) was then 

appointed Deputy Commander in Chief, 

Allied Force, and took charge of the details 

of planning.3 Headquarters was established 

• (I) Clark, Calculat,d Risk, p. 48. (2) Butcher, 

My Tlar" Y ,ars Witla Eis,nlaow,r, pp. 56ft'., utilizing Clark's daily reporu as Deputy CinC AF to the 

CinC AF. 

I (I) Ltr, Gen Clark to author, 12 Apr 49, cites 

entry in his diary of II August 1942 for confirmation of his appointment. (2) Clark, Calculat,d Risk, 

p.42. (3) The abbreviations (U.S.) for American 

and (Br.) for British will be used to indicate 

nationality. 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 33 

at Norfolk House on St. James's Square, 

London, somewhat apart from General 

Eisenhower's offices as Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S. 

Army (ETOUSA). There the staff was 

gradually assembled, the American personnel being diverted in large measure from 

other assignments which had brought them 

to the United Kingdom. British personnel 

was obtained through the War Office from 

headquarters, offices, and units at home. 

Official activation did not occur until 12 

September, when in General Order I, the 

command announced its own birth, gave itself a birth certificate, and officially took 

the name of Allied Force Headquarters 

(AFHQ). It was then one month old.· 

The staff was organized on the principle 

of balanced national participation. Divisions 

and procedures were typical of the U.S. 

Army rather than of the British Army. Operating sections of the general and special 

staffs were integrated; that is, they were 

manned by nationals of both countries in 

equal numbers but without duplications of 

function. If the chief of a section was of one 

nationality, the deputy chief was of the 

other, and their subordinates were each 

matched by "opposite numbers." Administrative and supply sections, on the other 

hand, were normally divided into separate 

segments concerned with the forces of each 

nationality, because of differences in organization, procedure, and channels of communication. General Eisenhower procured 

the assignment as chief of staff of Brig. Gen. 

Walter Bedell Smith (U.S.) upon his release from the secretariat of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in W ashington. ~ The two 

• History of Allied Force Headquarten. Pt. I, 

August 1942-December 1942, pp. 3-4, 18, 23-26. 

DRBAGO. 

S General Smith reported on 15 September 1942, 

relieving General Clark. Hist of AFHQ. Pt. I, p. 18. 

deputy chiefs of staff were Brig. Gen. Alfred 

M. Gruenther (U.S.) and Brig. J. F. M. 

Whiteley (Br.). A British chief administrative officer, Maj. Gen. Humfrey Gale, was 

included in the organization. The heads of 

the G-l and G-4 Sections reported through 

him. The G-2, G-3, and other sections reported to the Chief of Staff directly. 6 

AFHQ deviated from the principle of balanced national personnel only in cases where 

specialized knowledge of organization, technique, and procedure was the overriding 

consideration.? 

The Allies faced a complex problem of 

command structure in trying, as General 

Eisenhower desired, to fuse into one integrated force the ground, sea, and air elements of the two national military establishments. The principle of unity of command required that the task force attacking 

each major area should operate under a 

single commander and that the entire Allied 

Expeditionary Force under the supreme 

commander should avoid subdivisions along 

either national or service lines which seriously impaired the tactical flexibility. Normal national susceptibilities made desirable 

the retention of American or of British elements in the largest feasible units under their 

own commanders, and efficient performance made such action mandatory. 

Completing a chain of command for 

Operation TORCH took several weeks. In 

the end, the American Commander in 

Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, exercised direct command over the commanding 

generals of the task forces, indirect command through a British Naval Commander 

in Chief, Expeditionary Force, over the 

senior naval commanders of both nationalities, and direct command over land-based 

• See Chart I, p. 34. 

• See Histof AFHQ. Pt.I,pp.13-14. 
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TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 35 

aviation through British and American air 

force commanders. The task forces, after 

being reinforced by increments from later 

convoys to the captured ports, were expected to extend their control ashore and 

to be consolidated into an American Fifth 

Army and a British First Army. The naval 

task forces would eventually disperse, but 

subsequent naval operations by other units 

were to be under the control of the supreme 

commander through his naval commander 

in chief.8 

The initial selection of task force commanders was made in the expectation that 

there would be but two, one American and 

one British, Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, 

Jr. (U.S.) and Gen. Sir Harold R. L. G. 

Alexander (Br.). In quick sequence, the 

British found it necessary to substitute Lt. 

Gen. Sir Bernard Montgomery (Br.) for 

General Alexander, and then Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. N. Anderson (Br.) for General 

Montgomery, in order to transfer them to 

missions of higher priority.1I 

When the plans prescribed a third task 

force, to be drawn from American reI (1) CCS 75/3. (2) CCS 45th Mtg, 23 Oct 42. 

(3) Msgs: USFOR to AGWAR, 16 Aug 42, CM· 

IN 6000, and 7 Sep 42. CM·IN 2710; AGWAR 

to USFOR, 9 Sep 42, CM·OUT 3034. 

• (1) Msg, AGWAR to USFOR, 31 Jul42, CM· 

OUT 9255. (2) Butcher, My Three Years With 

Eisenhower, pp. 43, 45-46. (3) Fifty-six years old, 

General Patton had been a cavalryman prominent 

in the newer Armored force since his World War I 

service in France. At the time of his summons to 

Washington at the end of July 1942, he was commanding the I Armored Corps at the Desert Train· 

ing Center in California, with corps maneuvers 

imminent. (4) General Anderson had entered the 

British Army in 1911. After serving through World 

War I, he rose to command the lIth Infantry 

Brigade in 1930 and the 3d Division in 1940 in 

France. He had also been the commander of British 

troops in Palestine in 1930-1932. When he assumed command of the Eastern Task Force he was 

in his fifty-fint year. 

sources, the U.S. II Army Corps, which was 

then in the United Kingdom preparing for 

the cross-Channel invasion of France, was 

given the new assignment. General Clark, 

who had commanded the II Corps in England since June, eventually forfeited the 

command of this task force because he recognized that his responsibilities as Deputy 

Commander in Chief, Allied Force, were 

incompatible with those of the task force 

commander. III General Marshall selected 

Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall (U.S.) to 

command the Center Task Force.ll 

The Eastern Task Force which General 

Anderson was to command was not expected to participate as such in the amphibious phase of the assault on Algiers. It was 

to be preceded by a smaller force, with as 

high a proportion of American troops as 

possible, under an American commanding 

general, and known as the Eastern Assault 

Force. Its actual commander was Maj. Gen. 

Charles W. Ryder (U.S.), since June the 

Commanding General, 34th U. S. Infantry 

Division, which was in training in the 

United Kingdom, presumably for the projected invasion of Continental France.12 

I. Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 Oct 42. 

WDCSA 381 TORCH . 

II General Fredendall, fifty-eight years old, with 

much experience in Army training, had succeeded 

Maj. Gen. Joseph Stilwell (U.S.) as the prospective 

commander of an American force in Operation 

GYMNAST, had worked at plans until that project 

was dropped, and had previously commanded the 

II Corps. General Marshall proposed him for task 

force commander, if needed, on 24 August 1942 

(CM-OUT 7500). General Eisenhower requested 

him on 1 October 1942 (CM-IN 0 176). Fredendall 

arrived in London on 9 October 1942. 

11 General Ryder was fifty years old, with a record 

of distinguished service in France in World War I, 

occupation duty in Germany, four years in China, 

and previous assignment as Chief of Staff, VI Corps. 

during 1941 maneuvers. 
36 

These four troop commanders--Patton, 

Fredendall, Ryder, and Anderson-were 

directly subordinated to General Eisenhower. His control over British ground 

forces was defined in directives from the 

British War Office to General Anderson and 

to a few other British Army officers: 

The First Anny has been placed under the 

Supreme Command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Dwight 

D. Eisenhower, United States Anny. In the 

exercise of his command, the national forces 

at his disposal will be used towards the benefit 

of the United Nations and in pursuit of the 

common object. You will carry out any 

orders issued by him. 

In the unlikely event of your receiving an 

order which, in your view, will give rise to a 

grave and exceptional situation, you have the 

right to appeal to the War Office, provided 

that by so doing an opportunity is not lost, nor 

any part of the Allied Force endangered. 

You will, however, first infonn the Allied 

Commander-in-Chief that you intend so to 

appeal, and you will give him your reasons.13 

A naval task force was to land each of the 

three attacking forces at its objective and 

support it with naval gunfire and aviation. 

For the Western Naval Task Force Rear 

Adm. Henry Kent Hewitt (U .S.) was designated as commander. He was at that time 

the Commander, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, with headquarters at Ocean 

Beach, Virginia, charged with planning, 

.. (1) Rev Draft Dir, COS to Anderson, 21 Oct 

42. These paragraphs appeared unchanged in the 

actual directive sent to General Anderson, 23 October 1942. Identical paragraphs were contained 

in the COS directives to Lt. Gen. Mason MacFarlane (Br.) at Gibraltar and Lt. Gen. Frederick Morgan (Br.), Commanding General, Northern Task 

Force. Ltr, Director Mil Opns to Eisenhower, 28 

Oct 42. See Hist of AFHQ, Pt. I, p. 10, IOn. (2) 

The relation of national to Allied commander was 

thus made more subordinate than in 1918 after an 

initial proposal that it remain the same. CinC AF 

Diary,9 Oct 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

training, and conducting amphibious operations.H He remained in that capacity pending the departure of his naval task force 

from the United States. The other two naval 

task forces (Center and Eastern) were 

drawn almost complet~ly from the resources 

of the Royal Navy. The Center was under 

command of Commodore Thomas H. Troubridge (Br.) and the Eastern under Rear 

Adm. Sir H. M. Burrough (Br.).Is General 

Eisenhower exercised command over the 

naval portion of the Allied Force through 

Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham 

(Br.),.Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force, subject to the limitation 

that control over the Western Naval Task 

Force and subsequent convoys from the 

United States was retained by the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, until they 

arrived at a "chop point" on the fortieth 

meridian, west longitude. Admiral Cunningham became responsible for sea security and amphibious operations to the 

supreme commander, but for other wholly 

British naval operations in either the western 

.. Morison, U.S. Naval Operations, II, 21-23. 

10( I) TSDjHist Sec Admiralty Naval Staff, 

Battle Summary 38, Operation "Torch," Invadon 

of North Africa, November 1942 to February 1943, 

B. R. 1736 (31),1948 (cited hereafter as Br. 

Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch"). Copy in OCMH. 

(2) Admiral Burrough, whose service in World 

War I included the Battle of Jutland, had already 

seen some bitter fighting in World War II off the 

Norwegian coast, on the hazardous Murmansk run, 

and in an August dash through the gantlet to 

Malta which persevered against extremely heavy 

Axis opposition. Commodore Troubridge had participated in Royal Navy operations in Norwegian 

waters in 1940 and in the expedition which seized 

Madagascar from the Vichy French in May 1942, 

an operation which had benefited materially from 

the success of a special raiding party of Royal 

Marines taken by destroyer directly into the port 

of Diego-Suarez. See Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 

pp.233-34. 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 37 

Mediterranean or the north Atlantic he reported directly to the British Admiralty.18 

The land-based aviation in the Allied 

Force was first organized in two portions 

corresponding to the initial arrangement 

of task forces and to the prospective consolidation into British First and American 

Fifth Armies. The Eastern Air Command 

consisted of Royal Air Force units under the 

command of Air Marshal Sir William L. 

Welsh (Br.). A Western Air Command 

from the U.S. Army Air Forces (a new 

Twelfth Air Force) was put under Brig. 

Gen. James H. Doolittle (U.S.). Each was 

to report directly to General Eisenhower. 

The decision to employ a third task force 

necessitated a division of the Western Air 

Command, that portion assigned to the 

Center Task Force to be commanded during 

the assault by General Doolittle's operations 

officer, Col. Lauris Norstad (U.S.), and 

that with the Western Task Force under 

command of Brig. Gen. John K. Cannon 

(U .S. ), each responsible directly to his task 

force commanding general. General Doolittle was expected to command the Twelfth 

Air Force from Gibraltar during the first 

phase of Operation TORCH. In the subsequent phase, its mission would be determined by contingencies for each of which 

it had to be prepared. It might have to 

support Allied operations against Spanish 

Morocco or Spain, and it might have to 

support ground operations in Tunisia before 

subjecting Italy and Rommel's supply lines 

in Africa to bombing attack. The Eastern 

Air Command was expected to work with 

,. NCXF (Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham), Report of Proceedings, Operation TORCH, 

31 Mar 43, with incls. AFHQ Micro Job 8, Reels 

16A-17A. 

General Anderson in winning the race with 

the enemy for Tunisia.17 

Directives for Joint Action 

by the U.S. Army and Navy 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, successor after 

February 1942 to the Army-Navy Joint 

Board, directed such joint operations as 

those of the Western Task Force and Western Naval Task Force. Late in the planning, it validated arrangements already 

made, and formulated others, in a Joint 

Army-Navy Plan for Participation in Operation TORCH to which the short title, 

ROOFTREE, was given.18 American military 

and naval support of Operation TORCH was 

itemized as follows: 

(1) A Joint Expeditionary Force, including the Western Task Force and naval supporting units to seize and occupy the Atlantic 

coast of French Morocco; 

(2) U.S. forces required in conjunction 

with British forces to seize and occupy the 

Mediterranean coast of French North Africa; 

(3) Additional Army forces as required to 

complete the occupation of Northwest Africa; 

( 4) Naval local defense forces and sea 

frontier forces for the Atlantic coast of French 

Morocco and naval personnel for naval base 

maintenance and harbor control in the sector 

of the Center Task Force (Oran area) ; 

(5) Logistic support for all United States 

forces. 

Army forces placed under command of the 

Allied commander in chief were to be assigned directly by the War Department; and 

naval forces, by the Commander in Chief, 

U.S. Fleet. The latter was to provide and to 

control the naval forces necessary for supporting Operation TORCH in the western 

Atlantic and for protecting the follow-up 

"Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 

53-55. 

11 JCS 127/1, 13 Oct 42. 
38 

convoys between the United States and the 

North African theater. As soon as U.S. 

naval units completed their tasks they were 

to be released by the Commander in Chief, 

Allied Force. 

The directive provided most clearly for 

command as follows: 

(a) The Commander in Chief! Allied 

Force will command all forces asSigned to 

Ope~tion TORCH, under the principle of 

unity of command. 

(b) The Western Naval Task Force w~ll 

pass to the command of the ~ommander. 10 

Chief Allied Force, upon crossmg the mendian of 400 West Longitude. This command 

may be exercised either directly by the Commander in Chief or through the Naval Commander, Allied Force. (Prior to that time 

these forces will remain under the command 

of the Commander in Chief, United States 

Atlantic Fleet, who will arrange their movements so that they will meet the schedule of 

the Commander in Chief, Allied Force.) 

( c) Command relations of Subordina~e 

Task Forces are initially set up as given 10 

sub-paragraphs (d), (e), (f), and (g). They 

are subject to change as found necessary by 

the Commander in Chief, Allied Force. 

( d) The command of those units of the 

Western Task Force which are embarked in 

the Western Naval Task Force, will vest in 

the Commander, Western Naval Task Force, 

until such time as the Commanding General, 

Western Task Force, has established his headquarters on shore and states he is ready to 

assume command. 

( e) When the Commanding General, 

Western Task Force, assumes command on 

shore, the naval forces designated to give further support to the occupation of FRENCH 

MOROCCO will pass to his control, acting 

through the Commander, Western Naval 

Task Force. 

(f) Following the assault operations and 

when and as released by Commander in Chief, 

Allied Force, the United States naval forces 

assigned thereto will revert to the command 

of the Commander in Chief, United States 

Atlantic Fleet. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

(g) The United States naval forces assigned for the operation of ports and for naval 

local and sea frontier defenses-Sea Frontier 

Forces Western Task Force, and the Naval 

Opera~ing Base, Center Task Force:-will be 

under the command of the respective commanding generals of those task forces, under 

the principle of unity of command. 

(h) The Commander in Chief, United 

States Atlantic Fleet, will exercise command 

over all forces employed for the cover and 

ocean escort in the ATLANTIC of follow-up 

convoys between the UNITED STATES and 

NORTH AFRICA. 

Planning responsibilities were likewise 

classified as follows: 

(a) The Commander in. Chief, AI.Ii«:d 

Force, will designate the tactical and logIStic 

plans to be prepared by the task force 

commanders. 

(b) The Comma~der in Chie~, Atlantic 

Fleet, will be responsible for planmng for the 

organization of United States Naval Task 

Forces to be assigned to the Commander in 

Chief Allied Force, for the operations of the 

Atlantic Fleet (less the elements assigned to 

Commander in Chief, Allied Force) in support of Operation TORCH, and for subsequent covering operations and convoy 

escorts in support thereof. 

(c) The Army will be responsible for planning for the logistic support and requirements 

of the Army Forces assigned to Operation 

TORCH. 

(d) The Commander in Chief, United 

States Atlantic Fleet, will be responsible for 

planning for the logistic support and requirements of the United States Naval Forces 

assigned to Operation TORCH. 

Transportation responsibilities were specified for both services. The Navy would furnish available troop transports, both combat 

unit loaded and organizational unit loaded, 

and converted cargo vessels, landing boats, 

tank lighters, and gear for unloading on 

beaches. It would also arrange for tankers 

to carry bulk petroleum products. The Anny 

was to arrange for all other shipping which 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 39 

its forces required, to provide gear for unloading at docks, and to allot such shipping 

space in later convoys for the requirements 

of continuing naval support in the theater, 

as might later be agreed. VesseJs carrying 

Army troops, equipment, and supplies were 

to be loaded by the Army at ports designated 

by the Army, while sailing and routing of 

convoys would be controlled by the Navy in 

conformity with the convoy schedule issued 

by the Allied Commander in Chief. The 

Navy was responsible for unloading over 

beaches and the Army for unloading at 

docks. 

Many of these decisions which were so 

carefully organized and formulated in Plan 

ROOFTREE in October had been made earlier by the Chiefs of Staff and by an ArmyNavy TORCH Committee during the course 

of the planning and preparations. 19 The 

committee was an instrument for co-ordinating the planning within the two departments in conformity with decisions reached 

by the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, 

or by the Army and Navy task force commanders. The provisions for control of the 

Joint Expeditionary Force in accordance 

with the principle of unity of command, including arrangement for eventual transfer 

of command from Admiral Hewitt to General Patton, were finally set forth as an annex to the Navy's orders of 7 October 1942 

from Admiral King to Admiral Royal E. 

Ingersoll, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. On 10 October, Admiral Ingersoll transmitted them to Admiral Hewitt, 

as prospective commander of Task Force 

34, Atlantic Fleet (the Navy's numerical 

designation for the Western Naval Task 

.. Partial records of its meetings are in CNO, 

TORCH Planning Minutes. Oiv of Naval Hist, Env 

96, Box 7, Job 4622. 

Force).2O Issuance of this annex did not 

receive a formal concurrence by the War 

Department but its substance was considered sound, and its incorporation in Plan 

ROOFTREE followed almost at once. If General Eisenhower had had changes to urge, 

Patton would also have proposed revisions 

to make more precise the time for the shift 

of command from Hewitt to himself, and 

clearly authorizing him to release Navy 

forces in the event that communications 

between him and General Eisenhower 

should fail. 21 

In most of the joint amphibious exercises 

preceding World War II, the principle of 

unity of command in amphibious operations 

had not yet supplanted that of mutual cooperation. The doctrine on amphibious operations officially accepted in Joint Action of 

the Army and Navy was silent on this vital 

matter. Operation TORCH was to provide 

an important test of a moot feature of amphibious operations, the transfer of command during the critical establishment of 

the beachhead. 

Western Task Force Planning 

On 30 July, immediately after General 

Marshall returned to Washington from the 

decisive conferences in London, General 

Patton was summoned to the War Department to take charge of organizing the Western Task Force and of planning for its operations.22 He spent a few days in conferences 

while Col. Hobart R. Gay, his chief of staff, 

.. Copies in OPO Exec 5, Item 2, Tabs 13, 14. 

11 (1) Msg, AGW AR to USFOR, 9 Oct 42, CMOUT 02981. (2) Eisenhower applied the same 

principle as that of the annex in Oir, CinC AF 

to Comdr WTF, 13 Oct 42. Copy in Col Gay Opnl 

Misc 1942 file, Kansas City Rcds Ctr . 

a Transcript of phone conY, Gen Hull with Patton, 1045,30 Jul 42. OPO Exec 8, Bk. 6. 
40 

and other officers summoned from the I 

Armored Corps, established a headquarters 

in the Munitions Building and devised a 

preliminary plan to capture Casablanca.28 

Patton met there for the first time his prospective associate commander, Admiral 

Hewitt.2' With Col. Kent C. Lambert, who 

was to be his operations officer, he flew to 

England for participation in the planning 

at AFHQ. 2~ The effort to arrive at a satisfactory strategic plan had not succeeded 

when on 20 August he returned to Washington. He carried with him a directive to 

prepare an attack against Oran instead of 

Casablanca,28 in conformity with a provisional outline plan then being submitted to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff by General 

Eisenhower. That directive was promptly 

superseded by another from the War Department,27 but not until the executive 

agreement of 5 September was the objective 

of the Western Task Force firmly established. 

The Western Task Force's mission was to 

secure the port at Casablanca and adjacent 

airfields and, in conjunction with the Center Task Force at Oran, to establish and 

maintain communications between Casablanca and Oran. (See Map 1.) It was 

also to build up land and air striking forces 

.. (1) Intervs with Col Gay and Col Halley 

Grey Maddox, 11 Feb 48. (2) Sgt Sidney L. Meller, The Desert Training Center and Calif.-Ariz. 

Maneuver Area, Hist Sec, AGF, Study 15 (1946), 

pp. 31, 103, citing records of phone convs, 7 Aug, 

20 Aug, and I Sep 42. Camp Haan, Desert Training Center 319.1(2). (3) Memo, Patton for 

ACofS OPD, 3 Aug 42, sub: Notes on WTFTORCH Opn. OPD Exec 5, Item 3, Tab 14 . 

.. Interv with Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt 

(Ret.), 23 Jan 51. .. Interv with Col Maddox, II Feb 48. 

.. Dir, Clark to Patton, 19 Aug 42. OPD TF "A" 

Reds. ., Dir, Brig Gen St. Clair Streett to CG WTF, 

24 AUl[ 42. OPD Exec 8, Bk. 6. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

capable of securing Spanish Morocco, if 

that action should become necessary. 

French ground forces in Morocco were estimated to number from 55,000 to 60,000 

troops, stationed along the border of Spanish Morocco, near the coast, and at inland 

stations such as Marrakech, Meknes, and 

Fes. French naval forces manned coastal 

defense guns and at Casablanca, as well as 

farther south at Dakar, had naval bases in 

which some powerful warships were 

moored. The partly completed Jean Bart, 

with radar and a battery of four powerful 

15-inch guns, lay beside a dock in Casablanca Harbor. The damaged battleship 

Richelieu was based at Dakar. Each warship had a wide cruising range and sufficient power to be a serious threat to anyoffshore naval expedition. Several French 

submarines also lurked in Casablanca Harbor and might emerge for strikes against an 

invader. The French first-line aircraft in 

Morocco were estimated in September as 

13 reconnaissance, 74 fighter, and 81 longrange bomber planes, based for the most 

part at Marrakech, Casablanca-Cazes, and 

Rabat-Sale.28 

The great port and city of Casablanca 

was so strongly defended that direct frontal 

assault would have been extremely costly. 

The objective had to be attacked from the 

rear by forces landing near enough to reach 

it before the defenders could organize effective resistance. If the attacking forces 

used medium or heavy tanks in an overland 

approach to Casablanca, they would need a 

port, since landing craft for armored vehicles of those weights were not then available. Also, if they counted on land-based 

..( I) For anticipated coastal defenses near the 

landing points, see pp. 100-101, 118-19, 154 below. (2) WTF Rpt, Analysis of Military, Civil and 

Economic Facilities, Sep 42. OPD TF "A" Reds. 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 41 

aircraft to support the attack, they had to 

have an airfield that could be captured 

quickly. 

In trying to find a suitable port for the 

Western Task Force's medium tanks, the 

planners had few from which to choose. 

The Moroccan coast is exposed, with the 

only good harbors protected by jetties. All 

the ports near Casablanca are small, shallow, and inadequate. Safi, the most likely 

possibility of three ports along the coastal 

roads to the southwest, is 140 miles from 

Casablanca. The other two, Agadir and 

Mogador, are more than 200 miles away. 

Rabat, capital of French Morocco, is 53 

miles northeast of Casablanca, and PortLyautey 25 miles farther by road. Both 

Rabat and Port-Lyautey were under consideration for some time before the latter 

was chosen. The small fishing and petroleum 

storage port at Fedala, on the wide Baie de 

Fedala, is only 18 miles overland from Casablanca, and seemed suited to serve the main 

infantry attack but not to receive the heavier 

armored vehicles. The beaches on the Baie 

de F edala could accommodate the bulk of 

the invading force. Most of the coast line 

elsewhere is flanked by bluffs so near the 

shore that the beaches are shallow and the 

exits difficult. East of the Baie de Fedala, a 

broad shelf with only a few low sand hills extends inland for less than a mile before rising 

by rounded slopes to a plateau some two 

hundred feet above sea level. At this point, 

between two rivers, a considerable force 

might come ashore on a wide front and have 

room to maneuver while the small port was 

used to expedite the landing of heavy equipment. The medium tanks, however, would 

have to be landed far to the south at Safi. 

The most accessible of the good airfields 

were on the edges of Casablanca and Rabat, 

but the former was too well defended and 

the latter was therefore initially preferred, 

although it necessitated an operation with 

certain doubtful features. 

Rabat, the habitual site of the Sultan's 

palace, also served as the headquarters of 

the French Resident General. There too 

was the post of the commanding general 

of Moroccan troops. A battle for its capture 

might have brought injury to the Sultan 

with serious repercussions among the Moslem population throughout the Mediterranean. Its shallow port was below standard. 

It was likely to be defended more strongly 

than the harbor and airdrome just north 

of Rabat, at Mehdia-Port-Lyautey. The 

airfield at Port-Lyautey had concrete runways; the adjacent Sebou river had been 

developed as a seaplane base; the mouth 

of the river was flanked by excellent 

beaches; and any possible resistance to inland advance seemed likely to yield quickly 

to combined operations by parachute troops, 

saboteurs, carrier-borne aviation, and an 

amphibious landing force. 29 

The original sketch of a plan which General Patton took to AFHQ contemplated 

landings at Agadir, Mogador, and Safi, supplemented by airborne infantry and fighter 

aircraft flown from the United Kingdom 

via Gibraltar. The main weight of the attack would have been delivered well south 

of Casablanca. This conception was changed 

early in September. The whole attack was 

shifted northward, with the main effort to 

be at Fedala and the tanks to be landed 

in the port of Safi. The airfield at Rabat-

-( I) Memo, Truscott for Clark, 12 Sep 42, 

sub: Comments on WTF Tentative Plan (Outline 

Plan). AFHQ AG 370.3-21, Micro Job 24, Reel 

79D. (2) Ltr, Patton to CinC Joint Opns, 24 Sep 

42. AFHQ G-3 Ops 77/5, Micro Job lOA, Reel 

23C. 
42 

Sale was to be the objective of a third 

force.so 

General Patton was eventually induced 

to approve the substitution of Mehdia-PortLyautey for Rabat as the third objective of 

the Western Task Force. He assigned the 

command of the sub-task force (GoALPOST) which would make that attack to 

Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., who 

had been in the United Kingdom at Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's Combined 

Operations Headquarters.31 General Truscott returned to the United States on 19 

September to organize and prepare for his 

part of the operation. The armored elements 

to land at Safi were included in a second 

sub-task force (BLACKSTONE) placed under 

command of Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, 

Commanding General, 2d U.S. Armored 

Division.32 The main attack at Fedala (by 

Sub-Task Force BRUSHWOOD) was to be 

under the command of Maj. Gen. Jonathan 

W. Anderson, who at that time was Commanding General, Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, under Admiral Hewitt, and had 

been long identified with Army troop train-

.. Ltr, Patton to Eisenhower, 10 Sep 42. Copy 

in OPD Exec 2, Item 9. 

11 Truscott, who was then forty-seven yean old, 

had entered the Army in 1917 as a cavalry officer, 

was one of the Army's well-known polo players, and 

had experience with the 13th Armored Regiment 

and as plans and training officer of IX Corps at 

Fort Lewis, Washington, before going to the European Theater. He was to rise to command successively the VI Corps, Fifth Army, and Third Army. 

.. Harmon, then forty-eight yean old, graduated 

from the U.S. Military Academy in 1917, was 

commissioned in the Cavalry, served in France in 

1918, studied or taught in various schools in the 

next decade, and graduated from the Army War 

College in 1934. He was to rise to command the 

XXII Corps in 1945 and to organize and command 

the U.S. Constabulary in Germany in 1946 before 

retiring to become president of Norwich University 

in 1950. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ing for amphibious operations. 33 Maj. Gen. 

Geoffrey Keyes was designated as Deputy 

Commanding General, Western Task 

Force.S. 

The major elements of the Western Task 

Force were transferred to General Patton's 

command from that· of the Commanding 

Generals, Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply, at the end of 10 September. 

These units were the 3d and the 9th Infantry Divisions (less the 39th Infantry Combat Team, which was sent to the Eastern 

Assault Force at Algiers), the 2d Armored 

Division, the 70th and 756th Tank Battalions, the 603d, 609th, and 702d Tank 

Destroyer Battalions, the 71st and 72d Signal Companies, and the 36th Combat Engineer Regiment. The 3d Infantry Division 

was an early Army unit to be trained for 

amphibious operations while the 9th Infantry Division had already been partly trained, 

as had Combat Command B, 2d Armored 

Division. By 24 September, after prolonged 

uncertainty about the available troop trans-

.. Andenon, then fifty-two, graduated from the 

U.S. Naval Academy in 1911, was commissioned in 

Field Artillery in 1912, and rose to the grade of 

lieutenant colonel in France during World War I. 

After graduating from the Army War College in 

1930, he remained as an instructor and later taught 

for four years at West Point, and attended the 

Naval War College. He was assigned to the War 

Plans Division before going to the 3d Infantry Division and was later to command successively the 

X, III, and XXXVI Corps and the Field Artillery 

Replacement Training Center at Fort Sill. 

.. General Keyes, then fifty-four, graduated from 

the U.S. Military Academy in 1913, saw service 

with the Penhing Expedition and elsewhere as a 

cavalry officer, attended the tcole Superieure de 

Guerre in Paris, 1931-1933, and the Army War 

College, 1936-1937, before commanding a mechanized cavalry unit at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He 

had become Commanding General, 9th Armored 

Division, before becoming Patton's deputy commander, and was later to command II Corps in 

Italy and an Army in Germany during the occupation. 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 43 

port, General Patton had assigned his units 

to the three sub-task forces in the form 

which would remain effective, in most respects, in the operation.3~ The Navy had 

readily agreed to furnish destroyer-transports to convey into Safi harbor before daylight two special landing teams of infantry 

for the immediate seizure of key positions 

in the port, and to forestall sabotage. The 

Army Air Forces had assigned the XII 

Ground-Air Support Command 36 under 

General Cannon to the Western Task Force 

and planned to send its ground personnel 

from the United States to meet the flight 

personnel at the captured airfields.37 

Naval planning depended upon a settled 

scheme of maneuver by the landing force, a 

plan in conformity with which the combat 

loading, naval support, and naval air arrangements could be prepared. If the 

beaches which were best suited to the inland deployment of the troops were feasible 

for landing operations, the naval planning 

could proceed without delay. But when 

dou bts arose concerning the character of 

any beach, more information had to be obtained. Photographic reconnaissance by 

British aircraft during the planning period 

.. ( 1 ) Memo, ACofS OPD for CG's AGF and 

SOS, 2 Sep 42, sub: Prep of units for overseas 

service; Memo, ACofS OPD for CG's AGF, SOS, 

and TF "A," 3 Sep 42, issued 5 Sep 42, sub: Creation of TF. OPD 370.5 TF. (2) Ltn, Patton to 

CinC AF, 24 Sep 42, and to CG's Sub-Task Forces 

and ASC, 10 Oct 42. AFHQ G-3 Ops 77/5, 

Micro Job lOA, Reel 23C. 

• On 1 October 1942 the XII Ground-Air Support Command was redesignated the XII Air Support Command. 

11 General Cannon, then fifty, entered the Army 

in 1917 from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 

trained as a pilot in 1921, served in the Hawaiian 

Islands and Argentina, graduated from Command 

and General Staff College in 1937, and was Commanding General, I Interceptor Command, in 1942. 

He was later to command the Twelfth Air Force, 

1943-1945. 

clarified some doubts.38 At least one beach, 

south of Safi, had to be studied from an 

American submarine. Alternate plans were 

therefore prepared to use that beach or another, depending upon the report. 

Landing operations were subject to two 

hazards affecting the operation of all boats 

on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. The long 

fetch across the Atlantic makes a high surf 

and swell normal on that shore and, by November, limits the days when boats can possibly be navigated to perhaps one in five. 

The tide would be ebbing on 8 November 

during the early morning hours of darkness, so that, even with smooth water, landing craft would have to be speedily unloaded and retracted to avoid becoming 

stranded or even broached. To escape the 

latter difficulty, Admiral Hewitt recommended, somewhat to General Patton's dismay, that the operation be deferred one 

week. The proposal was discussed at higher 

Navy levels, rejected, partly because the 

moonlight on the later date would make 

surprise less likely, partly because of the 

narrowing likelihood of good weather, but 

mainly because delay would be generally 

inadvisable.39 

The availability of troops and cargo 

transports was sufficiently uncertain to delay 

firm decisions. Interrelated with the transport problem was that of the troop list, 

which was subject to a stream of minor 

modifications up to the time of departure. 

A tentative troop list of 6 September was 

made the basis for a provisional assignment 

to transports with an estimated capacity of 

.. AAF Director of Intell Service, Photo Intell 

Rpt 99, 28 Sep 42, Defenses of Atlantic Coastal 

Cities in Northwest Africa. AAF Archives. 

.. Memo, Rear Adm Charles M. Cooke, Jr., for 

King, 29 Sep 42. Div of Naval Hist, Cominch 35, 

AC/S F-l. 
44 

2,679 officers and 42,090 enlisted men. tO 

Some of these transports were still being 

converted from passenger liners to combat 

loaders, and would become available barely 

in time to load and depart with inexperienced crews. 

The seatrain New Jersey solved the problem of medium tank transport, but one other 

special transportation problem remained 

unanswered until a few days before the Joint 

Expeditionary Force was scheduled to sail. 

That question was how to deliver aviation 

gasoline speedily to the Port-Lyautey airdrome for the land-based planes. These 

American aircraft were either to be flown 

from Gibraltar or, as actually developed 

later, to land after being catapulted from an 

auxiliary aircraft carrier at sea. The answer 

appeared to be to run a shallow-draft cargo 

vessel up the Sebou river to the docks near 

the airfield. Search for such a ship was successful; the Contessa, a fruit carrier normally plying between the Caribbean and the 

United Kingdom, was chartered, although 

it could not be brought to the port of embarkation until the day the convoy was 

finally loaded. t1 

Admiral Hewitt received an official letter 

of instruction dated 10 October 1942 designating him as commander of the Western 

Naval Task Force (Task Force 34, U.S. Atlantic Fleet) and indicating the ships which 

would be transferred to his command.42 To 

expedite necessary action by subordinate 

commanders, his operations plans had al-

.. The Western Task Force was eventually cut 

down to 33,843 men, including personnel of the 

XII Ground-Air Support Command . 

.. (I) Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, 

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 

II ( Washington, 1957 ) . ( 2 ) Maj. William R. 

Wheeler, ed., The Road 10 Victor" (Newport 

News, Va., 1946), Vol. I, Ch. VIII. 

.. See n.20. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ready been issued the day before. The Western Naval Task Force, besides its Southern, 

Center, and Northern Attack Groups, was 

to contain a covering group and an air 

group. Standard operations annexes were 

included. But two major matters which had 

been under discussion ever since a conference of American and British naval officers 

in Washington on 16 September remained 

to be firmed Up.t3 What would be done if the 

weather made the scheduled landings impossible? How should French forces be 

treated in case they resisted? 

Alternative plans were necessary in case 

bad weather prevented the troops from 

being landed near Casablanca. The ships 

would soon have to refuel. Submarine attack would become much more likely during any prolonged waiting offshore. Of four 

possible alternatives, serious faults could be 

found with all; those most favored provided 

for landings inside the Mediterranean between Oran and Spanish Morocco, or in 

Spanish Morocco and southern Spain if the 

Spanish Government opposed the Allied operations. General Patton, after the subject 

had been thoroughly reviewed, concluded 

that the only tenable plan was "a direct 

naval attack on the moles at Casablanca 

and Port Lyautey .... We should plan 

either to conquer or be destroyed at Casablanca," he wrote. 44 He was so concerned 

lest the naval task force commander, during 

a failure of communications with General 

Eisenhower's command post at Gibraltar, 

insist on diverting the convoy from the primary objective that he sought a secret authorization from the Allied commander in 

chief to require the admiral to bombard 

.. Mins are in CNO, TORCH Planning Minutes. 

Div of Naval Hist, Env 96, Box 7, Job 4622. 

.. Memo, Patton (or Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, 

21 Sep 42. OPD Exec 5 . 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 45 

Casablanca. The request was met with the 

advice that no bombardment should occur 

without reference to General Eisenhower, 

but in the unlikely event of a complete failure of signal communications, he should use 

his own discretion . .a To destroy Casablanca 

would have been entirely contrary to Allied 

policy, for the harbor was scheduled to serve 

as a major Allied base, and any destruction 

would have had an adverse effect upon 

rdations with the French. Such an interference with the command relations prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in Plan 

ROOFTREE) could have had many regrettable consequences. But in view of the confidence which devdoped between General 

Patton and Admiral Hewitt during the approach voyage, and Admiral Hewitt's own 

determination to wait offshore until forced 

to leave, it is doubtful that such an authorization would have been used even if it had 

been issued.46 The existence of approved 

outline plans for alternative operations was 

not known to Admiral Hewitt's planning 

staff or to General Patton's sub-task force 

commanders until the eve of departure, a 

fact which made hard work at drafting operations plans necessary during the voyage. 

How should French forces be treated in 

case of resistance? The previously mentioned directive of 5 October to the Allied 

Force laid down three general principles: 

(1) the French must be permitted to take 

the first hostile action, (2) a hostile act by 

an isolated unit should not necessarily be 

interpreted as indication that all units in 

that area had hostile intent, and (3) once 

resistance in any particular area ceased, 

Allied forces should abandon hostilities unless the French resumed their opposition. 

.. Msg, USFOR to AGWAR, 13 Oct 42, CM·IN 

05483. 

.. Interv with Hewitt, 23 Jan 51. 

The difficulty of this position was manifest. 

General Patton denounced the idea that his 

forces should wait for the French to fire. 

I t would be tantamount, he said, to giving 

an opponent the draw in a gunfight. Many 

believed that the risks to naval units from 

enemy aircraft and coastal batteries were 

disproportionately high. But the entire force 

ought not to be precipitated into general 

attack by purdy local resistance. Western 

Naval Task Force plans, as revised during 

the approach voyage, recognized the unmistakable directive to let the French start 

any fighting and instituted two signals-

"Batter Up" and "Play Ball"-to govern 

American response. 

Anyone about to return French fire 

could signal "Batter Up," while the task 

force and task group commanders would 

have discretionary authority to signal "Play 

Ball." The former indicated a local encounter; the latter, general American offensive action. One was a report; the other, 

an order. 

General Patton interpreted the policy to 

his subordinate commanders as making 

necessary attempts to capture alive any foreign troops who did not resist but at the 

same time to avoid all unnecessary risk. "We 

must do our best to avoid combat," he said, 

"but not to the extent of endangering the 

lives of our troops." Enemy batteries or 

machine gun nests were, if merely trained 

on American troops, to be attacked unless 

the crews indicated a desire to parley. Use 

of antiaircraft weapons against the planes 

of the Western Air Command would be the 

signal for attack either on airfields or troop 

columns!7 

" (I) Information supplied by Rear Adm Ed • 

ward A. Mitchell, then Operations and Senior 

Plans Officer, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. 

OCMH. (2) Memo, Patton for Sub·Task Force and 
46 

General Patton's Outline Plan for the 

Western Task Force was ready for distribution on 16 October 1942.48 It provided for 

simultaneous landings on beaches in the 

vicinity of Safi, Fedala, and Mehdia (west 

of Port-Lyautey). Subsequently, the F edala 

force was to attack Casablanca from the 

east, reinforced by armored elements of the 

Safi force. Other elements of that force 

would prevent the enemy garrison at Marrakech from reinforcing the defenders at 

Casablanca. The Mehdia force was expected first to seize the airport at PortLyautey in time for its use as a base for aircraft not later than noon on D Day, and 

next to capture and occupy the airport at 

Sale, while protecting the northern flank of 

the entire operation. Five regimental combat teams, three armored landing teams 

totaling nine companies of tanks, and a reserve consisting of one battalion of combat 

engineers, one company of military police, 

and an antiaircraft battalion made up the 

three sub-task forces. They were to be carried in twenty-two combat-loaded transports, six cargo transports, and one seatrain. 

The outline air plans for the Western Air 

Command provided for 160 short-range 

fighters, 13 fighter-observation aircraft, and 

15 light bombers to be operating in the 

Casablanca area by D plus 6, beginning on 

D plus 2 and growing by daily flights from 

Gibraltar. When the French Air Force in 

Western Morocco ceased to be a threat, 80 

of the fighters were to be shifted to the Oran 

area.·· 

AAF Comdrs, 19 Oct 42, sub: Policy toward 

French. Col Gay Opnl Mise 1942 file, Kansas City 

Reds Ctr. 

.. Outline Plan TORCH, 8 Oct 42, Annex 6, 16 

Oct 42. OPD 381 TORCH . 

.. Outline Plan TORCH, 8 Oct 42, Annex 10 to 

Annex 1 (Air Outline Plan), 20 Sep 42. OPD 381 

TORCH. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Protection and regulation of coastal shipping after the occupation became a responsibility undertaken by the British for the 

Mediterranean and by the Americans for 

the Atlantic coast of French Morocco. The 

Sea Frontier Forces, Western Task Force, 

commanded by Rear Adm. John Leslie 

Han, Jr., were established for the latter task, 

with a planned strength of two seaplane 

patrol wings, over forty patrol craft, mine 

sweepers, tugs, and salvage vessels, and approximately 5,600 officers and men. Admiral Hall's command was to maintain 

antisubmarine patrols, control harbors, operate base facilities at Port-Lyautey, Fedala, Casablanca, and Safi, and assist in 

local defense at each of them.60 

Center Task Force Planning 

The plans for taking Oran were devised 

in London in co-ordination with AFHQ by a 

planning group of the U.S. II Corps in September and early October. The group began with planning materials originally assembled for General Patton, but which were 

transferred to them when Casablanca finally and firmly supplanted Oran as the objective of the W estern Task Force. The top 

planners included Cols. Arthur Nevins, Edwin B. Howard, Claude B. Ferenbaugh, and 

Clarence L. Adcock, and Lt. Col. Francis 

A. Markoe. Co-ordinated with their work 

was that of General Doolittle and Colonel 

Norstad for air, of British naval planners 

for convoy and ship-to-shore landing operations, Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin for 

supply, and of the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions for their respective combat teams and other commands. Early in 

September, offices at Norfolk House were 

.. Sea Frontier Forces WTF, Opn Plan A-42, 16 

Oct 42, with annexes. Copy in OCMH. 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 47 

occupied by Maj. Gen. Terry Allen, commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division and his chief of staff, Col. Norman D. 

Cota; Brig. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, commanding general of Combat Command B, 

1st Armored Division; and later by Col. 

Paul McD. Robinett, commanding officer 

of a segment of Combat Command B which 

was destined to operate for a time as a separate task force. The commanding general 

of I I Corps, General Clark; the operations 

officer of AFHQ, Brig. Gen. Lyman L. 

Lemnitzer; and the chief of staff of II 

Corps, Brig. Gen. Lowell Rooks, supervised 

the planning and made the high level decisions.31 General Fredendall, who was 

named late in the preparatory phase to command the Center Task Force, joined the 

planning group on 10 October, a few days 

before the final stage of ship loadings and 

landing rehearsals. 52 

Oran had a population in 1942 of over 

200,000 with an eighteenth-century tradition of political subordination to Spain, followed by about a century of French rule. 

The site is on the southern shore of a wide 

bight between Cap Falcon on the west and 

Pointe de I' Aiguille on the east. ( See Map 

IV.)* Two other headlands projecting into 

-Maps numbered in Roman are placed in inverse 

order inside the back cover . 

• , General Rooks, then forty-nine, entered the 

Army in 1917, served as an infantry officer in 

France, studied and taught at The Infantry School 

and the Command and General Staff College, and 

graduated from the Army War College in 1937. 

He became Chief of Staff, II Corps, in June 1942 

after service at General Headquarters and Army 

Ground Forces. Later, he became G-3, AFHQ; 

Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ; Commanding General, 90th Infantry Division; and Deputy G-3, 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force . 

.. II Corps CTF, Roster of Officers, Warrant 

Officers, and Enlisted Men. DRB AGO 202-10.6. 

General Larkin of Services of Supply, ETOUSA, 

was prospective Commanding Officer, Mediterranean Base Section, at Oran. 

the bight subdivide it into three bays, and 

Oran is on the center bay, between Mers el 

Kebir and Pointe Canastel. The small secondary port of Arzew, about twenty miles 

east of Oran, nestles in the western shore of 

the Golfe d' Arzew, on the eastern side of 

a wide and hilly promontory. Topographical features furnish Oran natural protection of great strength. Looming above Mers 

el Kebir and Oran on the western side of 

the center bay are the crests of Djebel Santon and Djebel Murdjadjo.33 These crests 

rise from a high and rugged hill mass sheltering the communities at its base and restricting access to Oran from the west to 

well-defined and narrow channels. Steeply 

sloping bluffs rim the southern and eastern 

shore of Oran's bay. Inland six to twelve 

miles from the coast, the plain bears a broad 

ribbon of shallow, marshy depressions and 

saline lakes, or sebkras. The largest of these 

sebkras is southwest of Oran, where it covers 

an area more than twenty-five miles long 

and from four to six miles wide, becoming 

wider and muddier after rainfall has 

drained into it from the closely adjacent 

hill mass west of Oran, but whitening and 

contracting during the drier summer season. Just north of the Sebkra d'Oran's western end lies the village of Lourmel, which 

in 1942 had a small airstrip. In a corresponding position north of the salt lake's 

eastern end is La Senia, which had a more 

fully developed Army airfield. Several much 

smaller lakes and marshes lie inland from 

the Golfe d'Arzew, and eastward from 

Oran. Between them and the coastal hills is 

an area of fiat, cultivated vineyards crossed 

by highways and branch roads. Masonry 

buildings and walls are characteristic of 

both the villages and scattered farms. 

.. The word "djebel" is the customary French 

North African term for high hill or mountain. 
48 

The defenses of Oran included forty-five 

fortified coastal guns of considerable 

strength; and of Anew, six more. 5

' The 

most important were those on Djebel Santon, west of Mers el Kebir; on Djebel 

Murdjadjo, west of Oran; on Pointe Canastel, northeast of Oran; and on Cap Carbon, 

at the western edge of the Golfe d'Arzew. 

Fort du Santon had four 7.6-inch guns 

and a heavy concentration of antiaircraft 

artillery. 

The Oran Division, estimated at 16,700, 

was stationed partly in barracks near the 

port and the main approaches to the city 

from southwest, south, and east, and partiy 

at inland stations within one day's march. 

The Army airfield at La Senia, about six 

miles south-southeast of Oran, and a Navy 

airfield at Tafaraoui, twelve miles southeast, 

as well as a naval seaplane base at Anew, 

twenty-two miles northeast of Oran, were 

part of the defense system. About one hundred combat aircraft were normally based 

there. Landing strips at Lourmel, Fleurus, 

Oggaz, and St. Denis-du-Sig supplemented 

the airfields. At the western extremity of the 

harbor of Oran, and at the naval base of 

Mers el Kebir, several French naval vessels 

were usually moored. 

The Center Task Force plan for seizing 

Oran prescribed a double envelopment by 

forces landing simultaneously at three major beaches and one minor beach, all in bays 

outside of the bight. sS Total strength consisted of about 37,100 Americans and 3,600 

British, including Royal Navy personnel in 

the landing craft. These forces were to push 

inland to seize airdromes and block approaches, and to drive along the coast to 

capture shore batteries. To gain and hold 

air superiority, the Center Task Force 

.. See p. 193 below. 

.. CTF FO 1,4 Oct 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

planned to use four elements: (1) an airborne force from the United Kingdom was 

scheduled to drop before daylight south of 

Oran, near La Senia and Tafaraoui airfields; (2) armored columns were to drive 

directly from their beachheads to the same 

airfields and to the subsidiary airstrip at 

Lourmel, southwest of Oran, in support of 

the paratroopers, and to aid in defending 

the fields against counterattack; (3) from 

first light until darkness, dive bombers and 

fighters from three aircraft carriers were to 

neutralize the French airfields and clear the 

air of hostile aircraft; (4) as soon as an 

airfield had been secured, land-based planes 

of the Twelfth Air Force were to be flown 

in from Gibraltar. 

While French air power at Oran was 

thus being eliminated, American ground 

elements were to secure the southwestern 

and southeastern flanks, to seize control of 

the high ground west of the city and of 

the port and village of Anew, east of the 

city, and, by encircling the objective in conjunction with naval units off the coast, to 

isolate its garrison. The westernmost landing was to occur at Mersa bou Zedjar (X 

Beach) in a narrow bay about twenty-eight 

miles airline from Oran. In the bay of Les 

Andalouses, seventeen miles farther east, 

was Y Beach. From Cap Carbon and along 

the southwestern sector of the Golfe d' Anew 

as far as St. Leu, about twenty-two miles 

airline easterly from Oran, lay Z Beach, to 

be used by the bulk of the attacking force. 

Light armored columns were to be 

brought to X and Z Beaches on modified 

Lake Maracaibo oil tankers, forerunners of 

the famous Landing Ship, Tank (LST). 

Through openings in the bows, the tanks 

could move over ponton bridges to shallow 

water, cross the beaches, shed their waterproofing equipment, and press inland. More 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 49 

than half of the armor of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, in the Center Task Force, including all the medium 

(M3) tanks of the 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, were aboard transports 

for discharge at a dock in Arzew harbor. 

These medium tanks were barely too large 

to clear the openings into the Maracaibos. 

At Les Andalouses, one regimental landing team (Combat Team 26) was scheduled 

to come ashore and drive eastward to seize 

the fortified coastal batteries on Djebel Santon and Murdjadjo and engage French defenders along the roads over the hill mass 

west of Oran. Southeast of Cap Carbon, 

four companies of the 1st Ranger Battalion 

were to land near the 4.l-inch battery of 

Fort du Nord, to capture it, and to occupy 

the high ground commanding the town and 

harbor of Arzew, while two companies 

seized the other battery near the harbor 

level. From Arzew to St. Leu, in addition 

to the armored column, two regimental 

landing teams (Combat Team 18 and Combat Team 16) and other ground troops 

were expected to land, to capture Arzew 

and its port, to occupy flank-protecting positions, and to close in on Oran from the 

east and southeast. In so doing, they would 

gain control of a small airstrip at Oggaz 

and traverse an area containing several 

villages. 

The British Admiralty was to furnish the 

units of the Center Naval Task Force (with 

minor exceptions) to convey the troops and 

their materiel, using American troops of the 

1st Engineer Special Brigade as hatch crews 

on ten of twenty-three troop transports and 

as operating crews for some of the landing 

craft.36 

.. ( 1) Brig Gen Henry C. Wolfe, Lessons from 

Operation TORCH, 30 Dec 42. (2) Brig. Gen. William F. Heavey, Down Ramp (Washington, 1947), 

p. 30. 

The Center Naval Task Force was 

planned to consist of 61 escort and 9 combat-transport ships, and 34 merchant vessels. 

Commodore Troubridge would command 

it from the special headquarters ship, Largs. 

The battleship Rodney and the fleet aircraft carrier Furious were the 2 capital ships 

assigned to this force, with 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 2 cruisers, an antiaircraft 

cruiser, an antiaircraft ship, 13 destroyers, 

26 lesser vessels, 10 motor launches, and 2 

submarines to engage in protective tasks. 

Commodore Troubridge's force was subdivided into ships carrying assault personnel 

and landing craft for initial landings at the 

four beaches, groups of motor transport and 

tank landing ships expected to discharge 

before daylight, and vehicle and personnel 

carriers scheduled to begin debarkation at 

the Golfe d'Arzew after daylight.51 

The shift of command from Commodore 

Troubridge to General Fredendall was to 

occur as soon as the latter felt that he could 

control the situation ashore. His troops were 

to pass to his control as soon as they reached 

the beaches." 

Operation RESERVIST, a direct assault on 

Oran Harbor by two small shiploads of 

American troops and naval personnel under 

Royal Navy Command, with the mission of 

forestalling sabotage in the port, was appended to the Center Task Force plans late 

in the period of preparations. The port of 

Oran was vital to the program of logistical 

support. Serious risks to prevent its being 

wrecked by scuttled ships and demolished 

facilities were deemed justifiable. That the 

bold entry into a defended harbor by two 

light vessels with a few hundred men as 

passengers was deeply hazardous, if not 

.. Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch." 

III CinC AF Diary, 5 Oct 42. 
50 

foolhardy, was well recognized. Strong 

objections were overruled. ~9 

Although the British assumed the responsibility of protecting and controlling 

coastal shipping along the Mediterranean 

shores, following the occupation of French 

North Africa, Oran was to be an Americanoperated supply base. Rear Adm. Andrew 

C. Bennett (U.S.) as Commander, Advance Group, Amphibious Force, Atlantic 

Fleet in the United Kingdom, was ordered 

to organize an advance U.S. naval base 

unit including a harbor patrol and detachment to operate one major and three minor 

ports in the Oran area.eo He assembled at 

Base Two, Rosneath, Scotland, for departure as part of the Center Task Force, a 

total complement of 82 U.S. Navy, 3 U.S. 

Marine Corps, and 9 U.S. Army officers, 

520 U.S. Navy, 30 U.S. Marine Corps, and 

209 U.S. Army enlisted men. The Army 

personnel was taken from elements of the 

I st Engineer Amphibian Brigade, which 

had been placed under his command upon 

its arrival in the United Kingdom. Admiral 

Bennett was to be responsible to General 

Fredendall. 

At Oran, land-based aviation from Gibraltar would begin with one group of fighters arriving by D plus 2, and reach a total 

of 160 short-range fighters, 13 observationbomber aircraft, and 13 medium bombers 

within a week. These aircraft were to be 

supplemented by another 80 fighters as soon 

.. On record most emphatically was Admiral Bennett (U.S.) at whose training station at Rosneath, 

Scotland, the RESERVIST Force got ready for the 

operation. See NCXF, Report of Proceedings, Operation TORCH, 31 Mar 43, Incl 6 (Miscellaneous 

Reports of Proceedings), Rpt of Commander U.S. 

Naval bases, Oran Area, Incl B. 

• Com inch Secret Despatch 1645, 22 Sep 42, 

cited in Rpt, Adm Bennett to CinC US Fleet, 30 

Nov 42. Div of Naval Hist, File AI6-3. It was to 

be Task Group 26.8, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

as conditions nearer Casablanca allowed 

them to be flown from that area. Almost 

daily increments would build up a total 

American air strength in North Africa of 

400 long-range and 240 short-range fighters, 228 medium bombers, observationbombers, and photographic reconnaissance 

planes. Of these 1,244 aircraft, 282 were 

to be reserves for wastage. The planes would 

be flown by seventy-one squadrons in nineteen groups, and used for fighter defense, 

Army co-operation, tactical and strategic 

bombing, long-range reconnaissance, and 

airborne operations. General Doolittle's 

headquarters was at first to be at Gibraltar, 

then shift to Oran.61 

Planning tor Operations at Algiers 

In planning for the operations at Algiers, 

Allied capacity for co-operation was subjected to a substantial test at the outset. 

Planning began before the executive agreement of 5 September with the assumption 

that the operations would fall to a British 

force to be led by Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. N. 

Anderson (Br.) as Commanding General, 

British First Army. Almost a month of work 

by First Army planners on the project preceded the decision on 5 September that 

during the assault all three landing forces 

should be under American command. Two 

American regimental combat teams were to 

participate in the assault on Algiers and were 

to try to make the American character of 

the force as conspicuous to the French as 

possible; but part of the assault elements 

and all of the reinforcements afloat, two 

thirds of the total, were to be British. General Ryder left his headquarters in Northern 

Ireland as Commanding General, 34th U.S. 

.. Outline Plan TORCH, 8 Oct 42, Annex la to 

Annex 1,20 Sep 42. OPD 381 TORCH. 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 51 

Infantry Division, to report on 5 September 

at Norfolk House as Commanding General, 

Eastern Assault Force. General Anderson's 

plans for the drive into Tunisia had to be 

adapted to the capabilities and requirements of an Allied task force serving at first 

under another commander. After Algiers 

had capitulated, Anderson was to relieve 

Ryder and, as Commanding General, Eastern Task Force, to control the critical operations to seize Tunisia. The shift of command 

at Algiers was clarified in a conference of 

Generals Clark, Anderson, and Ryder on 

8 September.·2 

Further to preserve the attack's American 

character, which British intelligence reports had declared to be prudent, General 

Ryder was authorized to name Brig. Gen. 

Ray E. Porter (U.S.) as Deputy Commander, Eastern Assault Force." His two American regimental combat teams were the 

168th from his own division, recently put 

under the command of Col. John W. 0'-

Daniel, and the 39th (from the 9th Division), under Col. Benjamin F. Caffey, Jr. 

The 39th, embarking in the same transports 

it expected to use in the assault, was shipped 

from the U oited States in time to reach the 

United Kingdom on 7-8 October." All 

other troops were necessarily furnished from 

British First Army. 

The military problem at Algiers had certain resemblances to that at Oran.8

& The 

city is on the western shore of the bay of 

Algiers, which extends for about twelve 

miles between Pointe Pescade on a broad 

headland at the west and Cap Matifou, a 

sharper promontory at the east. (See Map 

• CinC AF Diary, 5 Sep, 9 Sept and 14 Sep 42. 

• CinC AF Diary, 17 Sep 42 . .. 39th InE Hist, 1942. 

• Terrain and defenses as shown in EAF FO 1, 

G-2 Annex. 

3. ) The bay is somewhat deeper than 

Oran's, but is sheltered by western heights 

which, although lower, correspond to 

Djebel Murdjadjo and Djebel Santon, west 

of Oran. The suburbs of La Bouzarea and 

Lambiridi (formerly known as El Biar) 

occupy the western heights at Algiers. Industrial towns and resort villages line the 

southern shore of the bay east of Algiers. 

The headland, cape, and heights along the 

coast furnish sites for coastal defense batteries, with positions and ranges covering 

the bay's entire rim. From the crest of the 

ridges west of the city, the land slopes gradually westward until it reaches a section of 

the coast between the small communities of 

Castiglione and Guyotville. The sixteen 

miles of coast between them trends northeast and southwest and, at Cap Sidi Ferruch, is divided into two unequal portions. 

A jutting promontory at Cap Sidi Ferruch, 

four miles west of Guyotville, separates two 

bays on either side of it. Here in 1830 an 

expedition of about 37,000 men had once 

landed as the first step in the French conquest of Algiers, then under a Moslem ruler. 

A modem fort at Cap Sidi Ferruch was 

intended to prevent history from repeating 

itself. 

Beyond Cap Matifou and the small village of Jean-Bart at its base, the coast is low 

and unprotected for many miles past Ain 

Taya village to the east-southeast. Directly 

south of the bay is Maison Came, about 

eight miles from Algiers. It is a commercial 

town of perhaps 30,000 through which run 

the main highway and railroad connections 

with the great port. Hussein Dey, an industrial suburb almost as large as Maison 

Carree is halfway between the two, and 

Birmandreis, a smaller residential suburb, is 

less than five miles directly south of Algiers. 

South and southwest of the bay of Algiers 
52 

is a ribbon of undulating plain, one of the 

most fertile sections of Algiers, extending to 

the foothills of the Atlas Tellien. Of the 

streams which drain northward from the 

mountains to the coast, two cross this region 

to enter the bay of Algiers and two others 

skirt the outer edges of the headlands bounding the bay. At Hussein Dey, Maison 

Blanche, and Blida in November 1942 were 

airfields which an occupying force must 

bring under control. 

The coastal defense batteries near Algiers, 

twelve or thirteen in number, were known 

to be strongest at Pointe Pescade and Cap 

Matifou and very effectively placed for 

resistance to landings at Cap Sidi Ferruch 

or near the port at Algiers. The Batterie 

du Lazaret near Cap Matifou had a range 

of more than fourteen miles. Weaker batteries, as well as antiaircraft guns, were sited 

along the bay, on the heights of the city, 

and near the airfields. No naval force comparable to that at Casablanca was likely to 

be found in Algiers harbor, but a few smaller 

ships could be anticipated. 

French combat aircraft in Algeria were 

estimated to consist of 2 reconnaissance 

planes, 39 bombers, and 52 fighters, supplemented by 20 transport planes. German 

bombers from Sardinia could also be expected to intervene, although the distance 

from their bases would deprive them of 

fighter escort and leave them without 

enough fuel for prolonged operations near 

Algiers. Ground troops in Algeria included 

the Algiers Division of about 16,000 and 

the Constantine Division of 13,000, plus 

the 7th Legion of Guards, 1,500, and an 

antiaircraft regiment numbering 3,000. An 

armored force which could muster 6 medium and 60 light tanks, some armored cars, 

and an uncertain amount of motorized 75-

mm. artillery had to be taken into considNORTHWEST AFRICA 

eration. The main resistance to an approach 

to Algiers from the east could be expected 

from a garrison of 1,200 at Maison Carree 

and from the armored unit, seven miles 

southeast of the objective. Coastal defense 

exercises against surprise night attack were 

held late in September.66 

The Eastern Assault Force's plan of attack prescribed three simultaneous landings 

by major elements, two of them to be west 

of Algiers and the third, east of Cap Matifou near the village of Ain Taya.67 Each 

landing was to be in the strength of one 

regimental combat team, that by British 

troops to be made by the 11 th Infantry 

Brigade Group of the British 78th Division. 

The two American units were to drive inland and to converge, thus sealing off Algiers from reinforcements, while the third 

sub-task force protected the western flank 

and held itself in readiness for commitment 

either against the city or in securing the airfield at Blida. The 168th Combat Team 

was to seize coastal defenses west of Algiers, 

aided by a Commando unit, and press into 

the city through the suburban heights while 

the 39th Combat Team was capturing other 

coastal defenses near Cap Matifou, occupying airfields and the powerful Radio 

Alger (THA) station,68 and closing on the 

city from the east. A floating reserve available for landing on the afternoon of D Day, 

either to assist in the attack on Algiers or to 

capture Blida airfield and protect the south 

flank, would be furnished by the British 

36th Infantry Brigade Group. One squadron of the British 56th Reconnaissance Regiment was also scheduled for landing with 

• MIg, Dyer to Marshall, 26 Sep 42, eM-IN 

11647. 

.. Outline Plan TORCH, 8 Oct 42. Annex 3, 11 

Oct 42. OPD 381 TORCH. 

.. At Les Eucalyptus. 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 53 

the 11 th Infantry Brigade Group and for 

subsequent availability in force reserve. 

Operation TERMINAL, a direct assault on 

Algiers harbor by a special force combining 

British naval with American Army elements, was inserted in the plans in much the 

same general form and manner as Operation RESERVIST at Oran harbor. Be 

After General Anderson relieved General 

Ryder on orders from the Allied commander 

in chief, Ryder's command would be transformed. His American units would be redesignated the 34th Infantry Division and 

come under General Anderson's command 

as the Algiers garrison. His British units 

would revert to the British 78th Division. 

These plans for the Eastern Assault 

Force were completed with persistent concern for the subsequent mission of the Eastern Task Force. General Anderson was responsible for establishing a base in Algiers 

and then, speedily occupying eastern Algeria and Tunisia. He had urged without 

success that assault landings be made on 

D Day at Philippeville and BOne. He sought 

to accomplish some of the same objectives 

while conforming to the decisions of 5 September by planning to assemble a seaborne 

assault force from the British units released 

by General Ryder, and sending it to take 

the airdrome at Djidjelli and the port of 

Bougie, escorted by naval units from the 

Eastern Naval Task Force which could be 

spared from Algiers. He had hoped to have 

at sea for early arrival and debarkation at 

• Outline Plan TORCH, 8 Oct 42, Annex 30, 13 

Oct 42. OPD 381 TORCH. (2) Provisional Convoy 

Programme with AFHQ Troop List 2 (Order of 

Battle), 3 Oct 42. 1942 TORCH Plans UK Col Gay 

file, Kansas City Reds Ctr. This list allowed for 

116,000 reinforcements to the Eastern Task Force 

while 58,000 were brought to the Center Task 

Force up to D plus 33. 

easterly ports most of the troops and matc~riel with which he expected to penetrate 

Tunisia. Transport on the scale required to 

meet his proposals could not be supplied, 

although the rate of build-up for the Eastern 

Task Force was greatly to exceed that at 

Oran.10 

The capture and employment of the eastern ports-Bougie, Philippeville, and 

Bone-required air defense by fighter planes 

from adjacent landing grounds if the losses 

to enemy bombing attack were to be kept 

within bearable limits. A British parachute 

force using American transport aircraft 

would be in Allied Force reserve and probably be available, as also would be whatever American parachute forces in the Center Task Force were not expended in taking 

Oran. But whatever commitments of these 

elements were made to gain control of airfields along the coast would naturally delay 

airborne attacks at Bizerte and Tunis. 

Air support was to be furnished to General Anderson's forces by the Eastern Air 

Command under Air Marshal Welsh, perhaps reinforced by units from the U.S. 

Twelfth Air Force. The prospects were well 

below General Anderson's desires, for the 

45,000 British and 10,000 American troops 

that he would have in the Algiers area by 

12 November would be supported by at 

most five squadrons of fighters, one light 

bomber squadron, one Army Co-operation 

squadron, one photographic reconnaissance 

squadron, and a general long-range reconnaissance squadron for co-operation with 

the Royal Navy. Service and maintenance 

units might by 12 November be able to 

operate at Maison Blanche airfield or even 

at Blida. The air build-up was expected to 

,. CinC AF Diary, 14 Sep, 15 Sep, 17 Sep, and 

13 Oct 42. 
54 

enlarge this force as rapidly as possible during the remainder of November, but, at the 

time when the Eastern Task Force might be 

reaching its objective in Tunisia and under 

the strongest enemy resistance, the Eastern 

Air Command would still be much too weak 

for the needs of full-scale offensive action 

with the troops. Fighter planes were to be 

shipped in crates to Gibraltar and assembled 

at the airdrome there. Ground units were 

to be brought by sea in order that air transports might be available to the paratroop 

units to the fullest possible extent.71 

The Eastern Air Command was intended 

to reach, in seven weeks, a total of 454 aircraft, in twenty-five and one-third squadrons, more than half of which would be 

short-range fighters, 43 would be general 

reconnaissance planes, and less than 100 

would be bombers of all types.72 Eastern 

Air Command headquarters was to be in 

Algiers. 

Plans for the Eastern Task Force were 

made in alternative forms since French resistance or French acceptance of the advance might so gravely affect the rate of 

eastward movement. If the French resisted, 

a methodical overland advance was expected to yield the capture of BOne in about 

three weeks. If the French either passively 

or actively aided the march, the Eastern 

Task Force would push boldly along the 

coast, with parachute drops at BOne, 

Bizerte, and Tunis on successive days, commencing on D plus 3.78 

n Outline Plan TORCH, 8 Oct 42, Annex Ie to 

Annex 2 of Annex I (Air Outline Plan TORCH), 

20 Sep 42. OPO 381 TORCH • 

.. Outline Plan TORCH, 8 Oct 42, Annex 14 to 

Annex I, 20 Sep 42. OPO 381 TORCH. 

.. Outline Plan TORCH, 8 Oct 42, Annex 4, 28 

Oct 42. OPO 381 TORCH. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Political Preparations 

Tactical plans for the occupation of each 

of the major objectives were founded on 

the knowledge that the size and equipment 

of all French military forces had been severely restricted by Axis limitations, and in 

the hope that actual resistance might be 

minimized by political activity. Indeed, an 

underlying objective of the whole operation 

was to promote conditions which would 

bring the French back into the war on the 

side of the Allies. To effect a purely nominal 

resistance to the landings, followed by ass0-

ciation in arms against the Axis powers, was 

the purpose both of Allied representatives 

in French North Africa and of pro-Allied 

Frenchmen (in the armed services, civil administration, or private life) who were enrolled in secret organizations. The Allied 

agents worked in French North Africa under 

instructions from AFHQ. 

A special staff section at AFHQ was 

created in August to furnish political information to General Eisenhower and to draft 

plans applicable to political aspects of the 

undertaking. Many of these problems had 

been anticipated by the British. The chief 

of this Political Affairs Section, Mr. W. H. 

B. Mack (Br.), was transferred to that position from the British Foreign Office. His 

first instructions were actually signed by 

Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State 

for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Mack's administrative task with reference to Operation TORCH 

was to co-ordinate five agencies, four British and one American: the Special Operations Executive, Political Warfare Executive, Secret Intelligence Service, Ministry 

of Information, and Office of the Coordinator of Information (later, the Office of 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 55 

Strategic Services). 74 A draft plan for political warfare was submitted to General 

Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff, Allied 

Force. 76 It sketched elaborate preparations 

for propaganda, for the terms of possible 

armistices between each of the task forces 

and the local French commanders, for the 

conduct of civil affairs following the termination of hostilities, and for the ultimate 

status of the French colonies and of the government at Vichy. This tentative plan was 

considered in trying to arrive at an outline plan for the entire operation which 

would be likely to succeed. 

Mr. Robert Murphy served in North 

Africa as the chief diplomatic representative 

of the United States before the decision in 

July 1942 to send an Allied expedition there. 

It was well understood by General Marshall 

that the President would assume personal 

direction of political activities, but it was 

expected also that he would so manage 

them that General Eisenhower, as the Allied 

commander in chief, was kept fully aware 

of all details and in immediate control. 

General Eisenhower believed that "su~ 

versive activities, propaganda, and political 

warfare had to be carefully and completely 

co-ordinated with military plans if they were 

to avoid being not only inappropriate but 

also a positive menace." In furtherance of 

this aim Murphy was designated to become 

a member of his staff, to take up the position 

when the Allied Force arrived in French 

TO (1) Dir, Eden to Mack, 15 Aug 42; Ltr, Mack 

to Eden, 19 Aug 42. Copies in OPD ABC 381 

TORCH, Sec 1. (2) Msg 1381, London to AGWAR, 

21 Aug 42, CM-IN 8420. ETOUSA Outgoing 

Cables, Kansas City Rcds Ctr. (3) Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42. AFHQ 330, 31-5. 

.. Ltr, Eisenhower to Clark, 16 Aug 42; Ltrs, 

Mack to Gruenther, 20 Aug and 23 Aug 42; Memo, 

Political Warfare Executive Policy in the Light of 

TORCH. AFHQ AG 336-97, Micro Job 24, Reel 

78D. 

North Africa. Before that time, he acted less 

as a staff than as a line officer in his leadership of the political negotiations and preparations from Casablanca to Algiers.76 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned control 

over all the American agencies concerned 

with undercover preparation for TORCH in 

North Africa and Spain to the Allied commander in chief. The British agencies were 

brought into co-ordination with the American by putting them all under the supervision of G-3 at AFHQ. Colonel Eddy 

(U.S. Marine Corps) directed them from 

Tangier and Col. Brien Clarke (Br.), acting 

as his deputy, directed them from Gibraltar. 

Murphy was empowered to control the 

schedule and order any necessary modifications of secret operations, and even to direct 

them in Algeria and Tunisia should that 

become expedient. 77 

Murphy flew to Washington from Algiers 

early in September for conferences with the 

President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

officials of the Department of State. He 

presented his own estimates of the prospective operation's political aspects and reported that a reputable military group in 

Algiers recommended Allied association 

with Gen. Henri Giraud as a French leader. 

He then learned from the President that a 

final decision to occupy French North 

Africa had actually been reached. 78 

Murphy then went to London bringing 

a draft directive from the President for General Eisenhower to review, and voluminous 

data for the Allied military leadership 

"Telg, London to AGWAR, 7 Aug 42, CM-IN 

2389 (paraphrase). 

.. (1) Telgs, London to AGWAR, 7 Sep 42, 

CM-IN 3151, 22 Sep 42, CM-IN 9484, 26 Sep 42, 

CM-IN 11538, and 16 Oct 42, CM-IN 6797. (2) 

Hist of AFHQ, Pt. I, pp. 84-86. (3) Langer, Our 

Vichy Gamble, pp. 307-16. 

II Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 311, prints 

Murphy's Memorandum. 
56 

to consider. Disguised as "Lt. Col. McGowan," and traveling by air without revealing his identity to fellow passengers, he 

then spent almost twenty-four hours at General Eisenhower's rural cottage near London. His grasp of matters of military 

significance and his evident judgment and 

discretion gained General Eisenhower's "utmost confidence:' He satisfied both American and British members of Eisenhower's 

group that their plans were well founded 

and that he could serve them without breaking the tight barriers of security. The topics 

under discussion ranged widely. Murphy 

learned that the size of the projected expedition would closely approximate that 

which the French in North Africa had estimated would be necessary. He indicated the 

civilian and military co-operation which 

could be expected. The conference reviewed 

the problem of how long an interval should 

elapse between notification of the friendly 

French and actual Allied landings, the risk 

of losing surprise being balanced against 

the necessity for enough time secretly to 

mobilize the fifth columnists. 

The draft directive from the President to 

Murphy under which he was to return to 

Algiers as the President's personal representative authorized him to give at least a 

twenty-four-hour notice to reliable friends 

and to identify for them the approximate 

landing beaches. Although more than a 

twenty-four-hour notice would be needed, 

he was persuaded by General Eisenhower 

that no French leader should be notified 

until D Day was imminent. On the theme 

of the supreme command over inter-Allied 

forces in French North Africa, a post which, 

Murphy reported, General Giraud's adherents in Africa clearly expected him to hold, 

General Eisenhower foreshadowed the position he later took in direct discussion with 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

General Giraud-the French forces must 

first be rearmed by the Allies and in condition to defend Northwest Africa successfully 

before the Allies could consider pennitting 

them to exercise supreme command there. 

French forces could remain under French 

command, but would have to co-operate 

fully with an Allied supreme commander.TII 

The President's draft directive to Murphy specified that no change in the civil 

administration of each of the three territories of French North Africa was contemplated. The Allied leaders intended to leave 

the non-co-operating French there to the 

mercies of the friendly French, while preventing acts of private vengeance. Although 

de Gaulle might be bypassed in Operation 

TORCH, he would have an essential role in 

connection with the cross-Channel attack, 

and the Allied commander in chief expressed strong interest in including de 

Gaulle in planning for that operation as 

soon as possible.80 

These conferences with Murphy in 

Washington, Hyde Park (New York), and 

London consolidated the broad planning 

for activities involving the friendly French. 

The precise secret operations ashore which 

were to facilitate the landings were determined in separate conferences in London 

and Washington until instructions from the 

Commander in Chief, Allied Force, to Colonel Eddy were issued on 14 October.at The 

"Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

p.108. 

.. Min, Discussion with Mr. Murphy. AFHQ AG 

336-97, Micro Reel 78D, Job 24. The minutes were 

kept by Col. Julius Holmes. 

.. (1) Ltr, Gen Lemnitzer to Commodore Douglas-Pennant et al., 8 Sep 42. AFHQ Micro Job 24, 

Reel 136D. (2) Memo, ACofS G-3 AFHQ for 

CofS's of ETF, EAF, CTF, and WTF, 24 Sep 42, 

sub: SOE/OSS. Copy in 1942 TORCH Plans UK 

Col Gay file, Kansas City Reds Ctr. (3) Secret 

Opn. Instrucs to Col Eddy, 14 Oct 42. AFHQ 

Micro Job 24, Reel 81D. 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 57 

instructions provided alternative programs 

of sabotage and subversive action near the 

main objectives of each of the task forces, 

one program in case of resistance by the 

French armed forces and a second in case 

of their acquiescence. These programs involved either destructive sabotage or close 

control over communications and transportation, neutralization of coast defenses, immobilization of ships and submarines in 

port, sending up signal fl'ares and supplying 

guides for the Allies, and other such activity. 

Careful attention was given to the preparation of written material in furtherance of 

political and propaganda aims. These documents included a set of formal communications, prepared partly in London and partly 

in Washington, from the President to the 

rulers and chiefs of government of Portugal, 

Spain, Vichy France, Morocco, Algeria, 

and Tunisia. Proclamations were formulated, both in French and in Arabic, to be 

issued in the name of the President or of the 

commander in chief. Propaganda leaflets 

were prepared to be dropped from airplanes. Radio technicians and broadcasting 

teams were brought to the United Kingdom 

from the United States to accompany the 

Center Task Force. Other field units were 

organized to produce and distribute leaflets 

and to work with local newspapers.82 

Civil Affairs Planning 

Most of the political preparations thus 

far described were concerned with minimizing armed resistance to the occupying 

forces and with obtaining active co-opera-

.. (1) Msgs: USFOR' to AGWAR, 6 Nov 42, 

CM-IN 2625; AGWAR to USFOR, 15 Oct 42, 

CM-OUT 04949; USFOR to AGWAR, 13 Oct 42, 

CM-IN 05515. (2) Msg, Murphy to Hull (or Eisenhower, 30 Oct 42. Copy in WDCSA 381 Torch 

Sec 2. 

tion from the French in driving the Axis 

from northern Africa. But other arrangements looked to the maintenance of security 

in the rear areas after the Allies were established ashore, when French North Mrica 

would become a base for further operations. 

The Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ under 

Mr. H. Freeman Matthews (U.S.) formulated the requisite plans to prepare for such 

responsibilities. 

The Allies had no political course in mind 

other than to win campaigns in the field 

while allowing the French to work out their 

own internal problems, unhampered and 

unaided. This policy was avowed by the 

President and set forth as approved military doctrine.83 They allowed for two contrasting contingencies. A friendly reception 

from the French would warrant one set of 

arrangements; strong opposition, followed 

by conditions which necessitated stringent 

military control, would justify another. The 

planners therefore prepared armistice terms 

for use by the task force commanders to 

fit either situation, and also devised two 

alternative series of proclamations and ordinances.Sf The fundamental purpose was 

to avoid any interference with the population except what was inescapable and necessary to assist military operations. The basic 

method would be to supervise the operation 

of existing civil agencies by the French. The 

past political sympathies of officeholders 

were to be treated as of small significance 

compared with their ability to discharge the 

technical duties of their respective positions. 

Foreign exchange transactions and the 

use of bank accounts were to be subject to 

.. Albert K. Weinberg and Harry L. Coles, Jr., 

Soldiers Become Governors, a volume in preparation (or the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II. 

.. (1) CCS 103/9, 16 Oct 42. (2) CCS 44th 

Mtg, Supp Notes. 
58 

licenses which a task force commander 

might grant or withhold. Taxes were to be 

collected in the normal ways, but those formerly devoted to the national government 

were to be applied to meet any expenses 

of military government. 

Large expenditures would be made by the 

invading forces within French North Africa 

for labor and rentals, as well as for the payment of the troops. Damage claims by individual proprietors could be expected. The 

currency to be used by the Allied Force was 

the subject of careful study and discussion. It 

was not possible to obtain in advance adequate amounts of the local currencies of the 

three French colonies without forfeiting surprise. Insufficient amounts were therefore to 

be supplemented by special invasion currencies, American and British, to be used prior 

to a negotiated agreement with the local government and bank of issue at rates of exchange somewhat more favorable to the 

franc than in the free market in October 

1942. These provisional rates were 75 francs 

to the dollar, 300 francs to the pound 

sterling.811 

Agreements reached after the invasion 

could provide for the use in specific areas of 

local franc currencies issued against dollar 

credits in the United States. Local currencies 

were to be obtained from local banks, being 

printed if necessary in the United States and 

furnished to those banks for issue. The rates 

of exchange would be fixed in the agreements. 86 Finance officers were commissioned 

IIMlg 1498, USFOR to AGWAR, 25 Aug 42, 

CM-IN 9685; MIg 2417, USFOR taAGWAR, 19 

Sep 42; MIg R-1576, AGWAR to USFOR, 5 Oct 

42, CM-OUT 1597; Msg R-2395, AGWAR to 

USFOR, 24 Oct 42, CM-OUT 8579. ETOUSA 

Outgoing and Incoming Cables, Kansas City Reds 

Ctr. 

II MIg R-1735, AGWAR to USFOR, 9 Oct 42, 

CM-OUT 02966. ETOUSA Incoming Cable~, 

Kansas City Reds Ctr. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

directly from civilian positions which 

equipped them for their military roles. The 

Treasury, War, and State Departments cooperated in preparing for the currency 

problems.87 

Control over importation of civilian necessities such as cotton goods, tea, and sugar, 

in great demand by the Arabs, and coal, 

gasoline, kerosene, candles, and soap, items 

wanted mainly by other groups, was recognized as an instrument of political influence. 

It was deemed prudent to relate the distribution of consumers' goods to employment 

in the service of the Allies, making it possible for the natives to convert their labor 

at the ports and along the lines of supply 

into possession of scarce and highly desired 

commodities. 88 

Plans applicable to civil affairs were completed in time for issue in AFHQ General 

Orders on 11, 12, and 21 October.89 Arrangements were also made for the inclusion 

in each task force of a civilian deputy civil 

administrator, a military assistant civil administrator, and a section of some seven 

additional specialists. At AFHQ, the Political Affairs Section under Mr. Mack and the 

Civil Affairs Section under Mr. Matthews 

were combined into one section to be headed 

by the latter until Robert Murphy could 

assume his position as chief civil administrator and political adviser of the commander in chief. The Propaganda Operations subsection and the Psychological 

Analysis and Planning subsection, headed 

by members of the Office of War Information and Office of Strategic Services respectively, were to be supervised by Col. Julius 

.. MIg R-18H, AGWAR to USFOR, 12 Oct 42, 

CM-OUT 03901. ETOUSA Incoming Cablel, 

Kansas City Reds Ctr. 

.. ]CS 136. Copy in OPD 381 (7-25-42) Sec 3. 

.. AFHQ GO's 4 (11 Oct 42), 5 (12 Oct 42), 

and 8 (21 Oct 42). 
TACTICAL PLANS AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS 59 

Holmes in G-l, while the special operations 

sections of the Office of Strategic Services 

(U .S.) and the Special Operation Executive (Br.) Section would remain under G-3 

for co-ordination with other activities.to 

• Msg R-I901, WD to CG ETOUSA, 13 Oct 

42, CM-OUT 04257; Msg 3633. London to 

AGWAR. 15 Oct 42. CM·IN 6797. ETOUSA 

Thus in most respects, the strategic decisions, tactical plans, and political preparations took form early in October, with 

the interval before the prospective departure 

of the assault convoys narrowing to a matter 

of days. 

Incoming and Outgoing Cables, Kansas City Reds 

Ctt. 
CHAPTER IV 

Completing the Preparations 

The pace of preparations for Operation 

TORCH accelerated in October, when decisions already made at higher levels had 

their greatest effect on those engaged in 

training troops, loading convoys, and arranging for reinforcement and subsequent 

logistical support. A dramatic change was 

impending in the Mediterranean theater of 

war. The carefully prepared offensive of the 

British Eighth Army in Egypt was scheduled 

to begin on 23 October in the hope that a 

victory over Field Marshal Rommel's forces 

would be clearly won a few days before the 

Allied landings in French North Africa. 

While the convoys were putting out to sea, 

decisive negotiations linked the Allied Force 

with elements of the French armed forces 

there. These matters were the major aspects 

of the last period of planning, preparation, 

and overseas approach to the objective. 

Training for the A.ssault 

Although under his Army directive all 

training of the Western Task Force was 

General Patton's responsibility as its commander, his units were actually to be trained 

in the methods of amphibious warfare while 

assigned to the Amphibious Force, Atlantic 

Fleet. Rear Adm. Henry Kent Hewitt assumed command of that new agency on 28 

April, about six weeks after its activation 

under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. He had an Army section in his force 

headquarters, an Army as well as a Navy 

chief of staff, and parallel staff sections under each, organized in conformity with 

Army practice. He was eventually to have 

warships, transports, and troops in a forward echelon for overseas operations, while 

a rear echelon gave logistical support and 

continued training and intelligence activities 

whenever the forward echelon was at sea. 

A training center which took form during 

the summer and autumn of 1942 in the Norfolk area included schools for commanders 

and staffs, and for the various specialists 

that had been found indispensable to successful amphibious operations. There, under 

instructors from both the Army and Navy, 

men were trained to serve as transport 

quartermasters, as members of shore fire 

control parties, as members of shore and 

beach parties, as boat wave commanders, 

boat operating crews, or amphibious scouts 

or raiders. 1 

The complex requirements of successful 

landings on hostile shores h~d for several 

years been studied in a series of exercises 

employing elements of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Army. Joint training 

forces, uniting the 1st Infantry Division 

with the 1st Marine Division on the Atlantic 

coast and the 3d Infantry Division with the 

2d Marine Division on the Pacific coast, 

1 Intervs with Adm Hewitt, 23 Jan 51, and Adm 

Mitchell, 13 May 50. (2) Info from Hewitt File, 

OPD TF "A" Reds. (3) Memo, Comdr Amph 

Force Atlantic Fleet for CinC US Fleet, 21 Oct 42, 

sub: Program for amph tng. Copy in OPD Exec 

10, Item 67b. 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

provided in 1941 some advanced training 

for units of two Army divisions which were 

later to participate in Operation TORCH. 

An elaborate full-scale exercise at New 

River, North Carolina, with air and naval 

support had been planned for December 

1941. The U-boat menace caused it to be 

abruptly transferred to the southern shores 

of Chesapeake Bay, where the many deficiencies revealed by the exercise made ap· 

parent the necessity of improved and amplified training. The 9th Infantry Division 

began amphibious training early in 1942, 

taking the place formerly held by the lst 

Infantry Division, which soon afterward 

moved to the United Kingdom.' 

One of the weaknesses shown in various 

exercises in 1941 was the inability of the 

shore and beach parties to unload landing 

craft swiftly; as long as these boats were 

unable to retract through the surf for a 

return trip to a transport, they blocked access to the beach for subsequent boat waves. 

The Navy tentatively assigned responsibility 

for unloading to elements of the landing 

force rather than to teams formed from 

ships' personnel, for the latter were needed 

for duties afloat. The Marine Corps inserted a Pioneer Battalion in its divisions to 

unload boats, and the Army seems to have 

accepted the responsibility in principle, but 

to have delayed making sufficient provision 

in its shore parties for actual performance 

of the task. S 

Throughout the summer and autumn of 

1942 the troops of the Western Task Force 

completed unit training. The 3d Infantry 

Division remained on the west coast until 

'See Capt Marshall O. Becker, The Amphibious 

Training Center, Hist Sec AGF Study 22, 1946, 

pp. 1-17. 

, JCS, Special Monograph on Amphibious Warfare, p. 86. 

61 

just before the final phase, while the 9th 

Infantry and 2d Armored Division's elements, with supporting units, trained at 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and elsewhere 

on the east coast. Amphibious training was 

to reach its climax in a rehearsal in Chesapeake Bay from the very transports, partly 

loaded, on which the landing teams would 

be conveyed to Morocco. The 3d Infantry 

Division arrived at Camp Pickett, Virginia, 

in mid-September, a few days before this 

rehearsal began.' 

The troops received insufficient training 

in air-ground co-operation, for the U.S. 

Army Air Forces, in the midst of a Herculean effort to expand swiftly, could not 

spare enough aircraft and personnel for ef· 

fective training with ground troops. Moreover, the Air Forces differed from the 

Ground Forces in their conception of proper 

battlefield support and were disposed to 

concentrate heavily on strategic bombing. G 

Sub-task force commanders prepared 

schemes of maneuver for forces limited by 

the maximum transport which could be alloted to them, assigning tasks to elements 

of their commands in a manner which will 

be described later.8 Training exercises simulated the actual conditions likely to be met 

ashore. The program of training in the fall 

of 1942 was hampered by incessant withdrawal of men for assignment to officer candidate schools or to cadres of new Army 

units. Successive replacements filled out the 

units with men whose training was necessarily very uneven. The period of planning 

• Donald G. Taggart, ed., History of the Third 

Infantry Division in World War 11 (Washington, 

1947). pp. 7-8. 

• Col. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Army Ground 

Forces and the Jlir-Ground Battle Team, Induding 

Organic Light Jlt·iation, AGF Hist Sec, Study 35, 

1948, pp. 20-21. 

• See below, Chapters VI-VIII. 
62 

and preparations came to a close in the 

latter part of October in an atmosphere 

of unrelieved improvisation and haste, an 

unavoidable consequence of the determination to undertake an operation which 

stretched resources to the limit. 

The Center and Eastern Task Forces 

were trained and rehearsed in ship-to-shore 

landings at various points in the United 

Kingdom. The 39th Regimental Combat 

Team (RCT) was shipped, partly trained, 

from the United States to reach the United 

Kingdom on 7-8 October. It had received 

a considerable amount of battalion and a 

little regimental ship-to-shore training. Its 

transports were combat loaded, carried 

sixty days' supplies and ten units of fire for 

all weapons, T and vehicles which, unfortunately, had to be waterproofed and restowed after reaching the United Kingdom 

in order to be in the correct tactical order 

for a night landing. Mter the voyage the 

troops spent a few days ashore getting reconditioned and then participated in a rehearsal exercise starting on 17 October from 

Tail of the Bank, River Clyde.' 

The 168th RCT, from the 34th Infantry 

Division, had come overseas with normal 

equipment and maintenance, but depended 

upon stocks in the United Kingdom for signal, engineer, ordnance, and quartermaster 

supplies and for ammunition. 

The 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade 

(Col. Henry C. Wolfe, commanding) arrived in the Glasgow area on 17 August 

1942 after a headlong embarkation on very 

short notice, and a voyage of eleven days. 

The unit was expected, at the time of its 

1 The unit of fire (U/F) is a standardized quantity of ammunition for each weapon in service, 

varying for each type of weapon and, during World 

War II, in each theater of operation. 

• (1) 39th Inf Hilt, 1942. (2) AFHQ Memo 1. 

5 Oct 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

departure, to complete training with the 

1st Infantry Division in the United Kingdom and to provide the additional specialized units necessary for the Division's 

assault landing operations. While it was at 

sea, a revised Army-Navy agreement concerning landing craft crews and amphibious 

training went into effect. The brigade was 

broken up soon after its arrival. The advance headquarters of the U.S. Navy, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, was then 

being established at Rosneath, under Admiral Bennett. Colonel Wolfe was assigned 

to the admiral's staff and made responsible 

for shore party training.1I 

Not far from Rosneath, at Inverary, was 

the Combined Operations Training Center 

(British), at the time greatly hampered by 

the lack of adequate boat maintenance facilities. The 56lst Boat Maintenance Company, fully and freshly provided with the 

requisite equipment, salvaged over 100 

landing craft at Inverary. At Toward, the 

beaches were better for practice exercises 

than those at Rosneath or Inverary, but the 

camp site was unsatisfactory. At all three 

places deepwater anchorages permitted the 

instruction of troops in combat loading and 

disembarkation from ships to small boats. 

A fourth site, at Gales, some forty-five miles 

southwest of Glasgow near Irvine, was better in all respects save its exposure to southwest winds, which on occasion forced the 

suspension of all small-boat operations. But 

at the rocky beaches of the four training 

sites, the small boats had to approach the 

shore with caution to avoid broaching, instead of moving rapidly as if under fire.1o 

• Heavey, Down Ramp, Ch. III. 

11 Memo, Brig Gen Daniel Noce for Clark, 26 

Sep 42, sub: Obsn at amph tng ctrs in Scotland. 

AFHQ AG 350.07-15, Micro Job 24, Reel 79D. 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

The training schedule in the United 

Kingdom for the Center Task Force assault 

units was arranged on 25 August 1942, at a 

meeting between General Clark (U.S. ) , 

General Anderson (Br.), Commodore John 

Hughes-Hallett (Br.), and Maj. Gen. J. C. 

Haydon (Br.). It was settled that from 31 

August to 12 September, one RCT of the 

34th Division and a detachment from an 

RCT of the 1st Division would train at 

Inverary, to be followed by an RCT of the 

1st Division from 14 to 26 September. The 

next two weeks were allotted to ship loadings. From 8 to 18 October, rehearsals and 

the topping off of ships would occur. At 

Rosneath and Toward facilities would then 

be available also for boat training of a second RCT from the 1st Division, but no ships 

could be provided. From 22 September to 

5 October, the craft used during training 

were to be put in condition for the operation 

itself. 11 

The 16th RCT held landing exercises at 

Inverchaolain Peninsula (near Dunoon) 

during the night of 27-28 September, while 

the 26th RCT engaged in a second such 

practice operation at Inverary about twentyfour hours later. The 18th RCT and 168th 

RCT had left these stations about a week 

earlier, and were completing their training 

in new areas at that time.12 Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, trained in 

Northern Ireland while the other amphibious assault elements were in Scotland, and 

while much of the staff were engaged in 

planning and preparations in London. 

11 (1) Ltn, Adm Mountbatten to Gen Clark, 

Gen Andenon, and Vice Adm Bertram H. Ramsay, 

25 Aug 42. AFHQ Micro Job 24, Reel 1360. (2) 

Msg, Clark to Andenon, 22 Sep 42. AFHQ Micro 

Job 24, Reel 790. 

12 Ltr, Col S. E. Biddle to Gen Clark, 23 Sep 42. 

AFHQ Micro Job 24, Reel 1360. This outlines 

Clark's itinerary for an inspection trip. 

63 

The British First Army was activated on 

6 July 1942 around the elements of an expeditionary force which had been training 

in western Scotland for several months. It 

consisted, at its inception, of 5 Corps (4th 

and 78th Divisions), 6th Armoured Division, and 22d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. 

During the first week of August, the requirements for staging and executing a largescale amphibious landing against opposition 

had been tested by the British First Army in 

Exercise DRYS HOD. The tests indicated that 

the 78th Division, from which troops for the 

Eastern Assault Force were to be drawn, 

like the boat crews of the British transports, 

was then capable of only the sort of weakly 

resisted operation anticipated near Algiers. 

The 11 th and 36th Brigade Groups and two 

Commando units (partly manned by volunteers from the U.S. 34th Infantry Division) were scheduled to engage in the 

amphibious assault. 

Training for the amphibious operations 

in French North Africa, and in some respects for the subsequent phase of TORCH, 

fell short of what was desired and perhaps 

below the requirements of victory over a 

well-armed and determined foe. Whatever 

misgivings those preparing the expeditionary forces in the United States and the 

United Kingdom may have felt, they were 

attempting to do the best thing possible 

within the limitations imposed by inexperience, uncertainty, and shortness of time, 

rather than trying to tum out a force completely ready. 

Plans for Logistical Support 

The logistical planning for Operation 

TORCH was designed to support an American troop basis of seven divisions, with two 

more in reserve, and a tenth perhaps avail-
U. S. RANGERS TRAINING IN SCOTLAND. Tqp left, men are crossing the rope 

bridge over exploding mines. 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

able if the military situation elsewhere permitted, plus a British "war estab1ishment" 

of four divisions, with part of an airborne 

and a whole small Royal Marine division in 

force reserve.18 Two British divisions which 

were at first included in the schedule for 

Operation TORCH were retained for the defense of the British Isles, but subject to employment in a special Northern Task Force 

(Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan, commanding) to gain full control of the southern 

shores at the Strait of Gibraltar if Spain became hostile to the Allies.14 The initial and 

early following convoys were expected to 

bring to Northwest Africa within one month 

a total of over 200,000 American ground 

troops, including the ground echelons of 

Army Air Forces units, and a somewhat 

smaller total of British troops.u (Appendix A) Large increments were to be 

brought during the next four months. 

In view of the Allied character of the expeditionary force, a clear division of supply 

responsibility was sought. IS The supplies for 

the force in the Algiers area, whether British or American, were to be transported 

from the United Kingdom in British shipping. Those items normally issued to United 

States but not to British forces were to be 

transferred in the United Kingdom by ServJJ Msgs: USFOR to AGWAR, IS Sep 42, CM-IN 

7S17; AGWAR to USFOR, 4 Oct 42, CM-OUT 

1424, and 5 Oct 42, CM-OUT 1602. 

10 Ltr, CinC AF to Gen Ismay, II Oct 42. AFHQ 

AG 3S1.95, Micro Job 24, Reel SID. 

,. Actual totals in round figures: U.S. troops 

from the United States, 65,600 and from the United 

Kingdom, 105,000; British troops from the United 

Kingdom, 144,000. Control Div US Trans Corps, 

Monthly Progress Rpt, 31 May 43. OCT HB. 

If General Eisenhower requested an over-all directive from Combined Chiefs in a telegram (CMIN 3664), 9 October 1942. As prepared by the 

Combined Staff Plannen, the directive was CCSjIO, 

19 October 1942. 

65 

ices of Supply (SOS), ETOUSA, for delivery by the British First Army to American 

elements of the Eastern Task Force and of 

AFHQ. Necessary supplies not normally issued to Amencan personnel would be provided by the British.17 Materiel from the 

United States required by American forces 

in the Oran and Algiers areas in the early 

phase of the operation was estimated at 

260,000 ship tons by D plus 5,84,000 more 

by D plus 26, and on the latter date also, 

11,000 tons of petrol, oil, and lubricants by 

tankers. IS 

Some items to fill out shortages went by 

the "first available shipping from the New 

York Port of Embarkation to the United 

Kingdom, but supplies in other categories 

crossed in more than twenty-five complete 

and balanced shiploads to the United Kingdom, to be convoyed to North Africa without being unioaded.18 

The levels of supply in North Africa proposed by AFHQ were fourteen days' for the 

total force on D plus 30, thirty days' for the 

total force on D plus 60, and forty-five days' 

for the total force on D plus 90 and thereafter, with ammunition reserves held at 

IT This arrangement meant that Class I (rations), 

Class III (petrol, oil, and lubricants), and most of 

Class IV (heavy engineering materials) were to 

be of British issue; the rest of Class IV, Class II 

(clothing, weapons, vehicles), and Class V (ammunition of all kinds) would be American supplies. 

Memo, Col George A. Lincoln for CofS SOS 

ETOUSA, 7 Nov 42, sub: Sum of supply problem 

for TORCH. Kansas City Reds Ctr, Env 27, x14567. 

.. Memo, Col Carter B. Magruder for Brig Gen 

John E. Hun, IS Sep 42, sub: Shipments from US 

for Eastern Force; Memo, Magruder for Brig Gen 

LeRoy Lutes, IS Sep 42, same sub; Memo, Hun for 

Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, 20 Sep 42, sub: 

Mvmt of supplies for spec opn. OPD Exec 5, Bk. 3. 

.. Memo, Lutes for ACofS OPD (Attn: Gen 

Hull), 15 Sep 42, sub: Mvmt of supplies for spec 

opns. Copy in OPD Exec 5, Bk. 3. 
66 

twelve units of fire. 20 A supplementary reserve in the United Kingdom on which to 

draw was proposed in the event of shipping 

losses in the convoys from the United States 

or of other emergencies, to consist of sixty 

days' supplies and three units of fire. 21 To 

reach quickly a moderate reserve level in 

North Africa of forty-five days' supplies 

would, it was discovered, require a shift to 

the Center and Eastern Task Forces of some 

sixteen cargoes previously planned for the 

Western Task Force. It would also compel 

either a limitation of the Western Task 

Force to a total strength of 100,000 men on 

D plus 90, or, if more men were transported, then a reduction in the tonnage for 

transporting organizational and maintenance equipment to one-half of the normal 

allowances.22 

Command decisions made by General 

Clark on 28 September in Washington, in 

a conference with General Patton, Brig. 

Gen. Arthur R. Wilson, and Brig. Gen. 

LeRoy Lutes, fixed the level of supplies for 

the Western Task Force at forty-five days 

and ten units of fire, and cut the organic 

equipment to 50 percent of the normal ship 

tonnage required. The Western Task Force 

was to be short of equipment, particularly 

of vehicles, and of service troops for at least 

three months in order to meet even more 

pressing requirements. The supply convoys 

might reduce this interval only by being enlarged to more than forty-five ships, once 

North African port facilities permitted. 

Each task force was to organize its own 

.. The unit of fire in the Western Task Force is 

given in WTF Memo 44, 18 Dec 42. AFHQ G-3 

Ops 77/1, Micro Job lOA, Reel 23C. 

nTelg, USFOR to AGWAR, 27 Oct 42, CMIN 11595. 

II Memo, Brig Gen LeRoy Lutes for Gen Clark, 

28 Sep 42, sub: Maint of US troops in CTF and 

ETF. OPD Exec 5, Item 2/J. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

service of supply, including base sections to 

become operative in the ports as soon after 

the assault as proved feasible. After the 5 

September decision, General Wilson was 

named to commancl SOS, Western Task 

Force, and eventually, the Atlantic Base 

Section at Casablanca. Brig. Gen. Thomas 

B. Larkin of SOS, ETOUSA, was to take 

command of SOS, Center Task Force, and 

later, the Mediterranean Base Section at 

Oran. It was expected that these two bases 

would soon come directly under AFHQ, 

and that after the merger of the two task 

forces the two SOS headquarters would be 

reorganized. In the United States, General 

Patton planned to leave behind a rear echelon of the Provisional Corps Headquarters, 

Task Force "A," commanded by Maj. Gen. 

Manton S. Eddy, to supervise the shipment 

of troops in accordance with the plans 

for reinforcements and replacements devised before the Western Task Force 

departed.23 

Late in the period of planning and preparation, the SOS, War Department, after 

operating under a series of specific agreements between General Eisenhower's headquarters and agencies in the War Department concerning supply, requested from 

AFHQ a "complete plan." 24 A draft of 

such a plan, furnished on 27 October 1942, 

remained the subject of discussion for several more weeks.23 

The task forces could not establish adequate inventory controls and requisitioning 

II General Eddy, Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, had had his division split up, Combat Team 39 going to General Ryder's Eastern Assault Force, Combat Team 47 to General Harmon's 

Force BLACKSTONE, and Combat Team 60 to General Truscott', Force GoALPOST. 

.. Telg, AGWAR to USFOR, 18 Oct 42, CMOUT 5858 . 

.. Telg, USFOR to AGWAR, 27 Oct 42, CMIN 11595. 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

procedures until the base sections should become operative. For the first two months, 

automatic supply of Class II, IV, and V 

items was planned in conformity with estimates reached by the chiefs of services or 

the SOS, War Department. Limited requisition was then to begin. The ports of embarkation, under the standard program for 

the supply of overseas departments, theaters, and bases adopted by the SOS, War 

Department, were established as the agencies for controlling the outward flow of 

supplies. 

Almost one month after the Operation 

TORCH began, on 4 December, the approved 

supply plan for TORCH, was announced.:16 

The Western Task Force was to be supplied directly from the United States on 

requisitions sent to the New York Port of 

Embarkation, copies of which would be 

sent to ETOUSA via AFHQ. The Center 

Task Force was to be supplied directly from 

the New York Port of Embarkation, except 

for supplementary cargoes at the rate of 

some five ships per month which would 

go via the United Kingdom, but its requisitions would be routed through AFHQ and 

SOS, ETOUSA, to the Overseas Supply 

Division, New York Port of Embarkation. 

A ninety days' level of reserve supplies in 

North Africa was accepted as a goal. The 

level in the United Kingdom was set at 

thirty days of Class I and Class II, and of 

grease and oil in cans and drums, and two 

units of fire, but no reserve of Class IV supplies in general. Requisitions might be submitted for a reserve of particular items.27 

In these terms the supply plan was settled 

without permitting. the overseas theater 

.. Memo, CinC AF for TAG, 4 Dec 43, sub: 

Supply plan for US forces in TOIlCH. 

*' This exposition i. adapted from others officially 

prepared for use at AFHQ shortly before D Day. 

67 

organization either to control directly the 

maintenance of all American contingents 

of the Allied Force or to operate on too 

slender a margin of security. Yet the painful pressure of logistical requirements was 

apparent in the long period allowed for 

build-up. Faced with choices between men 

and materiel, and in tum between various 

kinds of materiel, the planners arrived at 

compromises and adjustments determined 

by their expectations concerning the nature 

of the forthcoming operation.-

Departu.re of the Western Task Force 

Except for the seatrain New Jersey, which 

took on the 39th Combat Team at the New 

York Port of Embarkation, all combatloaded ships from the United States departed from the Hampton Roads Port of 

Embarkation. An admirable plan provided 

for loading the transports there in two 

flights, the second taking on cargo and 

troops while the first went up the Chesapeake on its rehearsal of ship-to-shore debarkation, each troop unit on the transport 

which would convey it to the hostile shore. 

The second group would then have its rehearsal while the first ships were being 

.. For logistical planning, see: (1) History of the 

Planning Division, ASF, 1,87. OCMH. (2) Telgs, 

USFOR to AGWAR: 3 Sep 42, CM.IN 2030; , 

Sep, CM·IN 2710; 8 Sep, CM.IN 3628; 13 Sep, 

CM-IN 5609; 13 Sep, CM-IN 5696; 19 Sep, CMIN 8511; 22 Sep, CM-IN 10047; 23 Sep, CM-IN 

10100; 29 Sep, CM-IN 13002; 1 Oct, CM·IN 0070 ; 

5 Oct, CM·IN 2511; 13 Oct, CM-IN 6411; 22 Oct, 

CM·IN 10052; and 27 Oct, CM·IN 11595. Telgs, 

AGWAR to USFOR: 17 Sep 42, CM-OUT 5915; 

17 Sep, CM·OUT 6033; 20 Sep, CM-OUT 6961; 

22 Sep, CM·OUT 7558; 26 Sep, CM·OUT 8823; 

26 Sep, CM-OUT 8824; 29 Sep. CM·OUT 9579; 

6 Oct, CM-OUT 1763; 10 Oct, CM·OUT 4510; 

18 Oct, CM·OUT 5858; 21 Oct, CM·OUT 6877; 

29 Oct, CM·OUT 9871; and 6 Nov, CM·OUT 

1882. These messages are representative rather than 

complete. 
68 

topped off. This plan could only be approximated, for the Hamptons Roads Port of 

Embarkation was not yet the experienced 

organization which it later became, nor had 

it then the benefit of a completed staging 

area or of a holding and reconsignment 

point system to facilitate the orderliness of 

such a large and complex loading operation. 

Adjustments and improvisations had to be 

continuous. The transport Harry C. Lee, 

for example, came back from the landing 

rehearsal with engine trouble which could 

not be repaired in time for its departure with 

the assault convoy. What had previously 

taken several days to load for combat requirements had therefore to be taken out 

and laboriously restowed in the Calvert. 

Despite fresh paint and the change of crews, 

the task was completed in thirty-five hours 

and the ship joined the main convoy at 

sea. The Contessa provided an agitated postscript, for she appeared at Norfolk as the 

convoy was about to sail and in a leaking 

condition which required that she be drydocked. Many of her crew left town while 

repairs expected to take several days were 

begun. Extraordinary measures got the C ontessa afloat, loaded her with gasoline and 

ammunition, and filled out her crew in time 

to sail without escort toward Mehdia-PortLyautey. Despite these and other deviations 

from the loading program, the Western 

Naval Task Force was ready for departure 

on 23-24 October 1942." 

Admiral Hewitt's command consisted of 

five major divisions: the Covering Group 

(Task Group 34.1), the Air Group (Task 

Group 34.2), and the Southern, Center, 

and Northern Attack Groups (Task Groups 

• Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strat.gy: 1940-1943, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

(Washington, 1956). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

10, 9, and 8). Rear Adm. Robert C. Giffen's Covering Group of seven warships and 

a tanker was intended to furnish a protective barrier between the Center Attack 

Group off Fedala and the French naval 

units based at Casablanca. The Air Group, 

commanded by Rear Adm. Ernest D. McWhorter, consisted of the fleet carrier 

Ranger, the escort carriers Santee, Suwannee, and Sangamon, and a screen of one 

light cruiser and nine destroyers. 

Each of the three attack groups comprised a division of transports, a group of 

warships for fire support, one of the auxiliary aircraft carriers, destroyer screens for 

the transport, fire support, and carrier units, 

and one or more mine sweepers, mine layers, 

tankers, beacon submarines (which had 

been sent ahead), and service ships. The 

Center Attack Group was approximately 

twice the strength of either the Southern or 

Northern Attack Group. The cruiser Augusta served as one of the fire support vessels of Center Attack Group and as the task 

force headquarters ship. The fire support 

section of the Center Attack Group was to 

be in position to assist the Covering Group 

in containing the French naval threat from 

Casablanca against the transports off F edala 

as well as to aid the landing force near 

Fedala. This arrangement subjected the 

Augusta to three somewhat incompatible 

demands upon her batteries and communications facilities. 

The entire task force of more than 100 

ships was too large to be sent from anyone 

port in the United States without attracting 

undesired attention. It therefore assembled 

at sea after a series of departures at various 

times and places, seemingly for different destinations. First to leave were four reconnoitering submarines which were to assist 

the attacking groups in finding their exact 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON, 

JR., ABOARD THE USS AUGUSTA, 

the task force headquarters ship. Part of the 

convoy is barely visible in the background. 

destinations, and a fifth which was sent to 

keep watch over the. port of Dakar. These 

submarines had been at sea several days 

when the first section of the transports and 

warships emerged from Hampton Roads on 

the afternoon of 23 October. The Air Group 

69 

was then ostensibly engaged in maneuvers 

in Bennuda waters. The troopships and 

their protectors headed in that direction. 

Next morning, the second half of the troop 

transports with screening warships, including the cruiser A ugusta with Admiral Hewitt 

and General Patton aboard, left Hampton 

Roads and took a northeasterly course as 

though bound for the United Kingdom. 

From Casco Bay, Maine, the Covering 

Group sortied in time to take its place at 

the front of the fonnation on 27 October, 

while the transports and warships, which 

had left Hampton Roads in two sections, 

were reuniting. On 28 October, the Air 

Group fell in behind the others. The convoy 

was then complete with two minor exceptions. The seaplane tender Barnegat joined 

the fonnation on 6 November after a voyage from Iceland. The C ontessa overtook 

the Southern Attack Group on 7 November 

and continued under escort by the destroyer 

Cowie to its proper position off Mehdia 

among the ships of the Northern Attack 

Group. 

The task force continued in fonnation 

from 28 October to 7 November, refueling 

en route, maintaining radio silence, and 

avoiding as much as possible all contacts 

with other ships. One Portuguese and one 

Spanish vessel were encountered and 

boarded but then allowed to continue. Detection by the enemy seems to have been 

prevented. From 4 to 6 November, the 

weather deteriorated severely, thus confinning radioed weather forecasts of adverse conditions at the time and place set for 

the landings.10 Offsetting these forecasts 

was the more hopeful interpretation of Ad-

• (1) Mlgl, AGWAR to USFOR, 6 Nov 42, 

CM·OUT 881, and 7 Nov 42, CM·OUT 1220. 

(2) Ltr, Patton to Manhall, 6 Nov 42. Copy in 

OPD Exec 8, Bk. 7, Tab 5. 
70 

miral Hewitt's weather officer that the fast· 

moving storm would have the effect of tern· 

porarily abating the high swell and surf at 

the landing points, perhaps long enough to 

establish firm beachheads, or to negotiate a 

surrender by the French. Instead of keeping 

this force together to cruise well out to sea 

until the general forecasts indicated feasible 

landing conditions, Admiral Hewitt decided 

to accept the risk of dividing it according to 

plan and to proceed to the three coastal 

objectives without delay.at 

At daybreak on 7 November, the Southern Attack Group commanded by Rear 

Adm. Lyal A. Davidson split from the main 

formation and headed toward Safi. During 

the afternoon, the Northern Attack Group 

under command of Rear Adm. Monroe 

Kelly also diverged to take a course toward 

Mehdia. The other three groups, separating 

slightly, approached the Fedala-Casa· 

blanca area, remaining until dark as far 

offshore as possible while still permitting the 

transports to reach the debarkation area at 

midnight. 

For the troops, the entire three weeks at 

sea had been a combination of activity and 

discomfort, for they were jammed into 

every available place on the transports, were 

fed in seemingly endless lines, and suffered 

seasickness, particularly during the days of 

rough weather. Yet they were brought up 

on deck for periods of exercise and engaged 

in detailed study or received general instruction on matters hitherto not touched 

upon in training. 

... (1) Intervs with Capt Leo S. Bachmann 

(USN), 16 Jan 51, and Adm Hewitt, 23 Jan 51. 

The weather officer of the Western Task Force was 

Lt. Comdr. R. C. Steere. Admiral Hewitt did not 

intend, as is implied in Morison, U.s. NtWiJl Op11(1.-

tions, II, 50, to direct the Western Naval Task 

Force toward the Strait of Gibraltar. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

On the approach voyage, there was much 

to be done in every echelon. General instruction was given to all officers and enlisted men regarding the customs of the 

Moroccan inhabitants. "The local population will respect strong, quiet men who live 

up to their promises,'" said a circular issued 

to the men. "Do not boast nor brag, and 

keep any agreement you make." A directive 

from General Patton to the officers admonished them that "there is not the least doubt 

but that we are better in aU respects than 

our enemies, but to win, the men must 

KNOW this. It must be their absolute 

belief. WE MUST HAVE A SUPERIOR· 

ITY COMPLEX!" 82 

Departure of the Center and Eastern 

Task Forces 

The assault ships loading in the United 

Kingdom near Liverpool and Glasgow received their troop units late in September 

after most of the cargo had been stowed. 

The movement of troops to ports of embarkation was organized and controlled by the 

appropriate branch of the War Office, aided 

by members of the U.S. Transportation 

Corps. In spite of tendencies to be overly 

secretive or to reject orders received from a 

British agency, American ground and air 

units followed the complex schedule. 

Equipment, supplies, vehicles, and troops 

poured into the ports according to a carefully prepared program and, once aboard 

ship, were taken to the Firth of Clyde.sa 

D( 1) Sub-Task Force BLACKSTONE FO I, IntelJ 

Annex 1, App. 1; Dir, CG TF "AU to CG's, 3d Inf 

Div, 9th Inf Div, 2d Armd Div, and all attached 

Unit Comdrs of TF "A," 18 Sep 42. WDCSA 381 

TORCH (9-18-42). (2) General Patton completed 

a perusal of the K01an during the voyage. Patton's 

Diary, 30 Oct 42. (See Nate on Sources.) 

11(1) Memo, Maj Gen N. G. Holmes for CG 

ETOUSA, sub: Deck loads. AFHQ AG 381 TORCH 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

On 17 October, the entire expedition, 

both Center Task Force and Eastern Assault Force, began to assemble there. The 

assault transports proceeded north to the 

vicinity of Loch Linnhe to hold a final rehearsal just before daylight, 19 October, 

then returned to the Clyde next day. Except for command post exercises ashore by 

a small portion of the men, all waited 

aboard until time to depart. Then the great 

troop convoy sailed for Africa.3• 

The first convoy, a group of 46 cargo 

vessels with 18 escorting warships, had already left port on 22 October on a schedule 

which would permit it to be overtaken by 

the second. U The troop convoy, 39 vessels 

with 12 escorting warships, comprised the 

combat-loaded transports of the Eastern 

Assault Force and Center Task Force. Commanding the consolidated armada was Rear 

Adm. Sir Harold Burrough (Br.), in the 

specially designed command ship Bulala. 

With him were Generals Ryder (U.S.) and 

Evelegh (Br.), and Air Commodore G. M. 

Lawson (Br.) .88 

Second in command of the convoy was 

Commodore Thomas H. Troubridge (Br.) 

in another headquarters ship, the Largs. 

File 2~, Tab 12, Env 27, Kansas City Rcds Ctr. 

(2) Interv with Col Donald S. McConnaughy in 

Paris, II May 45. Colonel McConnaughy was 

Chief of Operations, Office of the Chief of Transportation, and Special Liaison Officer, British War 

Office, at the time TORCH was being mounted in 

the United Kingdom. Hist Rcds ETOUSA. (3) 

Heavey, Down Ramp, pp. 21-30. 

.. Heavey, Down Ramp, pp. 21, 30. 

.. Principal sources for these approach voyages 

are: Incl I (Rpt of The Naval Commander, Center Task Force) and Incl 2 (Rpt of The Naval 

Commander, Eastern Task Force), in NCXF, Report of Proceedings, Operation TORCH. AFHQ 

Micro Job 8, Reels 16A-17A. 

.. General Anderson, Commanding General, 

Eastern Task Force, was at Gibraltar with General 

Eisenhower. 

71 

With him were Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall (U.S. ) , Col. Lauris N orstad (Assistant Commander, U.S. Twelfth Air 

Force),37 and Mr. Leland L. Rounds, who 

had recently been brought out from Oran, 

where he was an American Vice-Consul, to 

furnish liaison with friendly French elements ashore and to provide political intelligence to General F redendall. 38 The escorts 

and most of the transports were British vessels, but the 39th Regimental Combat Team 

continued to Algiers in the combat-loaded 

transports which had brought it across the 

North Atlantic.39 Some Polish and Dutch 

ships were included. 

The men and materiel from the United 

Kingdom reached North Africa by voyages 

organized in an extremely complicated 

pattern. One problem of safe transit was 

solved by sending in advance as far as 

Gibraltar a number of slow colliers, tankers, 

tugs, and other auxiliary craft, as well as the 

three Maracaibo tankers which had been 

converted into tank landing ships. For the 

major convoys of troops and materiel, the 

Strait of Gibraltar was in effect a bottleneck. 

Transit into the Mediterranean during the 

darkness of two successive nights was scheduled for all except one small group of ships, 

which would enter in daylight. Before nearing the strait, both the slow convoy which 

had left the Clyde on 22 October and the 

fast convoy which departed on 26 October 

were to separate into sections destined for 

Algiers and Oran. Preceded by a screen of 

warships (Force H, Royal Navy), the 

Algiers sections of the slow and fast convoys 

were to enter the Mediterranean Sea during 

... Brig Gen James H. Doolittle, Commanding 

General, Twelfth Air Force, was with General 

Eisenhower at Gibraltar . 

.. Interv with Mr. Rounds, 21 Oct 48. 

.. L"dstown, Samuel Chase, Thomas Stone, and 

Almaack. 
72 

the night of 5-6 November. During daylight, 6 November, the Oran section of the 

slow convoy was to follow, and in darkness, 

6-7 November, the Oran section of the fast 

convoy was at last to pass through the narrow waterway. Inside the Mediterranean, 

the separate sections were to consolidate in 

the Eastern and Center Naval Task Forces, 

the process being somewhat further complicated by the successive refueling of some 

ships in Gibraltar harbor, and by later supply from tankers at an advanced position in 

the Mediterranean. Two additional convoys 

from the United Kingdom were to be well 

along the way to the Algiers and Oran areas 

by the time the assaulting forces arrived off 

the landing beaches. 

Moving such a large armada in accordance with this pattern required a masterly 

organization which might have suffered 

from its unavoidable complexities as well as 

from enemy attack. Actually, the plan was 

executed with extraordinary success. Between the Clyde and Gibraltar, no submarine sighted the ships although they 

passed through an area near which more 

than a score of Axis submarines were believed to be operating. One submarine, 

which was sighted at a distance of twentyfive miles from the convoy by a naval air 

patrol, was kept submerged long enough to 

permit the ships to pass unreported. On 

4 November, the Algiers and Oran sections 

of the convoys separated without the benefit of protective, long-range, antisubmarine 

air patrols. The seaplanes equipped for such 

missions had all become inoperable and the 

weather conditions at Gibraltar prevented 

land-based craft from undertaking the task. 

In mid afternoon, the Oran portion of the 

fast convoy steamed to the west while its 

destroyer screen made several aggressive attacks on submarines detected by warning 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

apparatus. No results were observed, but the 

transports remained unscathed. After an 

interval of twenty-one and a half hours, the 

Oran-bound ships reversed course and approached the strait after nightfall, 6 November. Thirty hours remained before the 

assault landings would begin. 

Axis Situation in the Mediterranean 

on the Eve of the Attack 

The convoys were approaching an area 

in which serious changes had occurred since 

the Allied decision in July to undertake an 

operation against French North Africa. At 

that time, it will be remembered, the British 

Eighth Army had been driven far into 

Egypt and had taken its stand on what was 

known as the EI 'Alamein line. The British 

and the Axis forces had then withstood each 

other's probing attacks and had prepared 

for a return to the offensive. Rommel organized a single strong defensive position 

with considerable depth from which he intended to attack as soon as possible. The 

Axis leaders had calculated that the relative 

situation of the two adversaries would be 

best for the Panzer Army Africa late in August, for thereafter the British ability, in 

spite of lengthy supply lines, to deliver reinforcements and materiel in great quantities 

would enable the Eighth Army to acquire an 

ever-increasing margin of superiority in 

numbers, weapons, and battlefield resupply.·o The Prime Minister devoted close 

personal attention to the situation and revised the command by installing Gen. Sir 

Harold R. L. G. Alexander as Commander 

in Chief, Middle East, and Lt. Gen. Sir 

.. (1) MS # T-3 (Nehring, et al.), Pt. II, Ch. 

III. (2) Rommel, Krieg ob. Hass, pp. 199-210. 

(3) MS # ~75. Endgtl.ltig. Stelltlngnallm. IU 

d.r Gesell;ellt. d.s F.ldzug.s in Nordafrik4, 1941-

1943 (Keaaelring). 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

Bernard L. Montgomery as Commanding 

General, Eighth Army.4! Preparations 

were made by these leaders to execute 

exactly the tactics which the enemy would 

have preferred to adopt himself, that is, to 

await an offensive, meet it in prepared defensive positions, and, after getting everything in readiness, counterattack.42 

One major change in the Mediterranean 

theater had taken place with the revival of 

Malta as a base for British attacks against 

the Axis line of sea communications to Tripoli. The use of aircraft carriers from Gibraltar to ferry planes within flying distance of 

Malta enabled the Royal Air Force to resume powerful attacks from Malta airfields 

on Axis shipping. Submarines from Malta 

also claimed many a victim. The enemy resorted to coastal traffic from Tripoli eastward to Bengasi and Derna in small, shallow-draft vessels. Hitler recognized in midSeptember that Malta must again be 

neutralized. The Luftwaffe's resources were 

unequal to this added demand, while German and Italian troops that had once been 

designated to seize the island (the canceled 

Operation H ERK U LES) were committed 

in Libya, a move which left insufficient 

ground forces. Among the Italian military 

leaders, daily review of the situation in the 

Mediterranean brought them back to the 

same themes, "Malta e nafta" (Malta and 

fuel) .48 

.. Churchill, Th, Hing, of Fat" pp. 457-71. 

.. ( I) Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, EI Alam,in to th, Rio Sangro (London and 

New York, 1948), pp. 1-12. (2) MS # T-3-PI 

(Kesselring), Pt. I. (3) MS # T-3 (Nehring, 

,t al.), Pt. II, Ch. III. 

.. (I) Churchill, Th, Hing, of Fat" pp. 50~6. 

(2) MS # T-3-PI (Kesselring), Pt. I. (3) Hitler's 

Order, 14 Sep 42, OKW/WFSt/Op Nr. 003142/ 

42, ONI, Fu,hrer Dir,ctiv,s, 1942-1945. (4) Cavallero, Coman do Supr,mo, pp. 347,348. (5) ViceAdm. Eberhard Weichold, Th, War at S,a in th, 

M,dit,rran,an, Pt. I, pp. 18-23. 

73 

That Hitler recognized the danger of an 

attack by the Allies in 1942 was shown in 

certain defensive measures which he ordered that summer. Several armored divisions were withdrawn to western France 

from the Eastern Front; this step deprived his commanders of the means of 

exploiting the initial successes on the southern section of that front." Hitler acknowledged his concern when Grossadmiral Erich 

Raeder in August warned that the Allies 

might be preparing to enter French North 

Africa with the connivance of the French 

and thus to inflict a very serious blow to the 

Axis coalition.45 He became alarmed lest the 

Allied reinforcements in the Middle East 

presage the seizure of Crete rather than an 

attack against Rommel's strong defensive 

position, and he ordered that that island's 

garrison be increased to repel seaborne and 

airborne attacks. To insure that the complicated process of resisting an amphibious 

attack should be conducted with unity of 

command, he charged Kesselring, directly 

under himself, with the defense of all the 

coasts in the Mediterranean and Aegean 

Seas which were held by German troops, 

excepting those in Rommel's sector." 

The threat of an Allied invasion in the 

western Mediterranean was met in conformity with German, rather than with 

Italian, views of appropriate action despite 

.. General der Artillerie Walter Warlimont, 

(Deputy Chief, OKW/WFSt) "A Summary of the 

German Campaigns, 1939-Sep 43," p. 12 (SAIC/ 

FIR/ll, dated 24 Jul 45). 

.. Conf, 26 Aug 42, ONI, Fu,hr,r Conf,r,nces, 

1942. 

.. (I) Hitler's Orders, 14 Sep and 13 Oct 42, 

OKW /WFSt/Op Nr. 003142/42 and OKW / 

WFSt/Op Nr. 551743/42, ONl, Fu,hr,r Directiv,s, 1942-1945. (2) MS # C-{)65a, Aufzei.chnungen u,b,r d, Lag,vortra,g, und B,spr,chung,n im 

Fu,hr,rhauptquarti,r vom 12. August bis zum 17. 

Ma,rz 1943 (Greiner), 8 and 15 Sep 42. 
74 

the fiction that the Mediterranean was 

Mussolini's theater of war. Gennan policy 

from 1940 to 1942 was to refrain from moving into unoccupied France in order to prevent creation of a French government in 

North Africa opposed to the Axis powers. 

Comando Supremo professed in October to 

have much less concern with plans and 

preparations for seizing unoccupied France 

than with countermeasures against Allied 

invasion of French North Africa and West 

Africa. Moreover, Rommel's line of supply 

could, Comando Supremo believed, be 

much improved if the Axis made full use of 

Tunisia's ports and airfields rather than 

limiting itself as it had thus far in 1942. 

Two Italian divisions were held in reserve in western Tripolitania at points from 

which they could speedily enter Tunisia. 

Both of the Axis partners recognized that 

an incursion into Tunisia would arouse 

French hostility. The Germans, presumably, 

did not desire a repetition of the Greek 

fiasco of 1940 and in spite of the Italian attitude decided to continue to adhere to the 

policy of friendly relations with the Vichy 

government. The Germans believed that 

any other course might precipitate a French 

attachment to the Anglo-American Allies. 

Axis policy therefore remained, in response 

to German insistence, that of waiting in 

readiness to send forces into Tunisia in the 

role of friendly protectors acceptable to the 

French government at Vichy. Rommel 

would have to get along without the Tunisian ports.47 

•• (1) Mig, G,rman G,n,ral, Rom" Nr. 5186/42 

to OKH/Op Abt, 10 Oct 42, in OKH/G,nStdH/ 

Op Abt, File S IV-Ch,/sach,n, F,indb,urt,ilung 

u. ,ig,n, Absicht,n T,il 11 (hereafter cited as 

OKH/Op Abt S IV-Ch,/sach,n, T,il 11). (2) 

Mig, OKW/WFSt Nr. 551768/42 to G,rman 

G,n,ral, Rom" and others, 17 Oct 42 in D,utsch, 

WaDen Stillstandkommission (German Armistice 

Commission-DWStK), Ch,/sachen, 1941-1943. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

In mid-October neither Italian nor German intelligence deemed an Allied invasion of the Mediterranean area to be imminent. No operation was expected until 

spring. The place where the attack would 

then come was a matter of disagreement. 

When indications of an earlier Allied operation were noted at Gibraltar, the Italians 

still considered an attack on French Morocco most likely. If unopposed by Axis 

forces, the Allies would reach Bizerte in 

about one month and, from that point, were 

expected to hit the Italian mainland, an 

operation which it was feared would have 

a disastrous effect on the Egyptian campaign and the whole Italian war effort!8 

The Germans were inclined to expect an 

attack to seize Dakar and thereafter, if the 

Mediterranean area were invaded at all, 

most of them thought the Allies would bypass French North Africa to close on Rommel's rear area or to gain a bridgehead on 

the other side of the Mediterranean. Actually, both Axis partners were much surprised when the attacking force did in fact 

appear in the Strait of Gibraltar!9 

The last opportunity for the Axis forces to 

attack the British Eighth Army on anything like equal terms came at the end of 

The headquarters of the G,rman Armistice Commission was in Wiesbaden, Germany. (3) Msg, 

DWStK, Gruppe W,hrmaeht (Arm,d Forces Section-Gr We) DWStK/Gr W,/Ia Nr. 6/42 to 

OKW /Che/ WFSt, 18 Oct 42, in DWStK, Ch,/-

sach,n, 1941-1943 . 

.. (1) Views of Generale di Brigata Cesare Am~, 

chief of the Italian S. 1. M. (Italian Arm)' Intellig,nce), quoted in Msg, DWStK/Gr We Nr. 6/42 

to OKW /Che/ WFSt, 18 Oct 42, in DWStK Che/-

sach,n, 1941-1943. (2) Adm. Franco Maugeri (ed. 

by Victor Rosen), From the Ashes 0/ Disgrace 

(New York, 1948), p. 86. Its author was in 1942 

head of S. 1. S. (I talian Naval Intelligence). 

'"Mig, OKW/WFSt Nr. 551768/42 to German 

General, Rome, and others, 17 Oct 42, in DWStK, 

Che/sach,n, 1941-1943. 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

August. Reserves of fuel and other supplies 

had been accumulated so slowly that no 

attack could be undertaken before that date, 

and, even then, the most careful estimates 

indicated that the operation would require 

400 to 500 cubic meters more of gasoline 

than was on hand. Kesselring, upon learning that this deficiency alone stood in the 

path of an attack, undertook to furnish the 

required amount from Luftwaffe reserves. 

Thus on 30-31 August, depending upon 

tankers at sea for fuel which would be 

needed to continue operations in case of 

an initial success, the Panzer Army Africa 

moved to an attack. The battle of 'Alam el 

Haifa followed. 

The battle was won by the Eighth Anny 

not only because of the scanty resources 

with which the offensive was begun but also 

because the British had correctly foreseen 

the plan of attack and had adopted appropriate countermeasures. To open the gaps in 

the mine fields through which the Axis 

armor was expected to pass by moonlight in 

order to make an early morning assault 

against Montgomery's deep southern flank 

proved much more difficult than the Germans had anticipated. The deep soft sand 

into which many Axis vehicles were lured 

slowed progress and used up fuel. Sandstorms which deterred the Allied air units 

from maximum effectiveness during the first 

day ceased to give that protection after 

nightfall. Parachute flares by night and 

clear weather by day thereafter enabled 

bombers to inflict severe injury on Rommel's forces, supplementing the heavy artillery fire which fell on his units concentrated in the mine-field passages. The attack 

lost momentum as it neared the main British 

lines on 'Alam el Haifa ridge, ahout 15 miles 

southeast of El 'Alamein, and was broken 

75 

off in failure on 3-5 September. Axis troops 

were forced to reoccupy their former defensive positions. They maintained contact, 

but no resumption of the attack could be 

foreseen. Axis losses in this battle were recorded as 570 killed, 1,800 wounded, and 

570 prisoners of the Allies, as well as 50 

tanks, 400 trucks, 15 field pieces, and 35 

antitank guns.60 

The British Eighth Army spent the next 

seven weeks reinforcing its units and replenishing stocks, arriving at an ample margin 

of superiority not only in troops but in tanks, 

guns, aviation, and mobility. Its morale was 

excellent. The plan of battle was well calculated to overcome the enemy's capabilities and meet his disposition of forces. The 

attack began on 23 October with a thundering artillery preparation such as the Western 

Desert had never before experienced.61 

Panzer Army Africa had remained in defensive positions near El 'Alamein to receive 

the British attack. It might have fallen back 

nearer Tobruk, developing successive positions into which to retire. It might have stationed the major elements in intermediate 

positions behind a forward screen which 

simulated a major defense, and have 

counterattacked when the attacking forces 

had been somewhat disorganized by the 

initial operations. But it did neither. Rommel himself departed to take a rest leave on 

the Continent, turning over command to his 

deputy, General der Panzertruppen Georg 

Stumme. General der Panzertruppen Walther Nehring, commander of the German 

Africa Corps, had been wounded in the bat-

.. (I) Rommel, Kri.g ohn. Hass, pp. 199-223. 

(2) MS # T-3-Pl (Kesselring), Pt. I. (3) Montgomery, El Alam.in to th. Rio Sangro, pp. 5-10. 

.. Montgomery, El Alam.in to th. Rio Sangro, 

pp. 18-19. 
76 

tle just concluded, and left Africa to convalesce near Berlin.52 

Allied planners chose 23 October as D 

Day to launch the attack of the British 

Eighth Anny in deference to tactical requirements, not to any timetable of highlevel strategy. The victory was won barely 

in time for its impact to be felt by men faced 

with crucial decisions concerning the Mediterranean. On 2 November, after ten days 

of severe combat had worn both annies 

down, Rommel, who had been recalled from 

leave and arrived in Africa on 25 October, 

warned the Axis leadership to expect a 

serious disaster. His forces were exhausted, 

quite unable to withstand the annored 

thrusts which the enemy might be expected 

to deliver within twenty-four hours. Orderly 

withdrawal by his nonmotorized Italian and 

Gennan units would not be possible. In 

this situation "the gradual annihilation of 

this Anny must be expected . . ." were his 

concluding words." A little later he reported the German Africa Corps down to 

twenty-four tanks and gave indications of 

drastic losses, both Italian and Gennan. 

Hitler replied that no other course could 

be considered except stubborn resistance. 

"The troops," he declared, "can be led only 

to victory or to death." M Mussolini's orders 

through Comando Supremo were to hold 

the front in Egypt at any price. The situa-

.. Panzer Army Africa was renamed G,rmanItalian Panzer Army (Deutsch.ltalienische Panzerarm,,) on 25 October 1942. 

(1) Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, pp. 199-223. (2) 

MS # 0-086, Die 1. Phase der Kaempfe in Tunesien bis zur Uebernahme des Belehls durch dOl 

neugebildete Oberkommando der 5. Panzerarm" 

am 9.Xll.1942 (Nehring). (3) MS # T-3-Pl 

(Kesselring), Pt. I. 

.. Mag, Rommel German.ltalian Panz" Army 

Nr. 132/42 to OKH/Op Abt, 2 Nov 42, in OKH/ 

Op Abt, File S IV-Chelsach,n, T,illl. 

.. Rommel, Kri,g ohne Hass, p. 268. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tion on the battlefield deteriorated further on 

3 November as these impossible orders were 

being drafted so far away, and when Kesselring arrived next day by air from Crete to 

consult with Rommel he was soon persuaded 

that the commander must have discretionary authority to condutt his battle as the circumstances might dictate. He joined that 

noon in such a request, which later was conceded by Hitler and Mussolini. It was too 

late to save thousands of men. Some Italian 

units had been forced to withdraw even 

earlier to avoid being cut off, and Rommel 

intended that all his mobile elements should 

pull back fighting to the next feasible line 

of defense. The rest would be left behind. 

Comando Supremo sent reinforcements 

toward the Salum-Halfaya area, farther 

west, while Rommel's anny was either 

driven from the battlefield or captured. The 

prevailing confusion left the extent of his 

defeat for later computation.55 

The Allies could look back a few months 

later to the Battle of EI 'Alamein and recognize that the tide in the Mediterranean had 

then turned definitely. This victory was the 

first of a long series of almost uninterrupted 

triumphs over Axis forces which ended in 

the Po River valley. In a sense it was the 

Gettysburg of the African campaign. The 

fact that Rommel flew back from Gennany 

to assume the command of his anny shortly 

after General Stumme died in action, while 

executing Rommel's plans, 56 is a circumstance which pennitted later analysis of the 

battle as an encounter between two of the 

ablest field commanders of the war, and 

.. (1) Ibid., pp. 268--75. (2) Exchange of orders and messages, B,I,hl, des O. K. W. und M,ldung,n an O. K. W. vom 3.-5.XI.42, photostat 

copies under covering Ltr SS-Oberfuehrer AlfredIngemar Berndt to Rommel, 3 May 43, in File 

CRS, Red Gp 1048, EAP-2 I-X-l 4/60 . 

.. Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, p. 247 . 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

which will no doubt encourage its study 

for years to come. 

The battle of El 'Alamein yielded certain 

results distinctly beneficial to the Allies. 

Axis military prestige suffered most opportunely. Collapse of the Axis advance toward 

the Nile subjected the German-Italian partnership to the undermining influence of 

mutual recrimination. Rommel's position as 

an Axis field commander suffered an eclipse, 

partial among Germans and total among 

Italians. The latter henceforth distrusted 

Rommel. Some Germans blamed him for 

disregarding obvious logistical restrictions. 

Hitler concluded that Rommel needed a 

rest but postponed replacing him. When the 

Allies arrived off the African coast, the 

opposing coalition was already beginning to 

weaken. 

That the Allied system of command 

would function as well during operations as 

for planning remained to be seen, but it 

was already apparent that the Axis command structure was defective in both areas. 

No unified Axis Mediterranean theater 

existed. Major operational decisions were 

ostensibly made either by Mussolini himself, or in his name by the Comando Supremo; but actually they were made in 

collaboration with the Germans, whose 

counsel often took the form of completely 

drawn up orders which the Italians passed 

on to their troops intact. Each of the German armed services had a headquarters in 

Rome. That of the German Air Force's OB 

SUED was under the senior German officer 

in the Mediterranean area, Field Marshal 

Kesselring. He outranked but had not yet 

superseded the German General, Rome, 

Enno von Rintelen, as a channel for conveying German views to the Italian high 

command. This confusing situation was 

made even more difficult as a result of the 

77 

fact that Kesselring held the mission of 

facilitating by sea and air, partly by command and partly by co-ordination, German 

and Italian support of operations in Africa 

and the Balkans and defense of the coasts. 

Rommel's operations were not subject to 

Kesselring's control. Rommel looked to 

others, not to Kesselring, for supplies. Although this tangle was eventually simplified, the Allied coalition in the Mediterranean began with a system of command 

superior to that of the Axis and was, in fact, 

to retain that superiority to the war's end. 

Finding a French Leader 

All other measures taken by the Allies to 

minimize resistance by the French were subordinate to an understanding with a suitable 

French leader, one who could rally the 

armed forces of French North Africa in renewed war against the Axis powers. Such 

a man must be a personage, a man holding 

a position of unmistakable patriotism and 

endowed with such superlative qualities of 

leadership that he could persuade loyal officers of the French armed forces to seize 

the opportunity to liberate France. All 

French officers were bound to Marshal Petain by oaths which they would have to violate, an action which could be expected only 

in disciplined response to orders from their 

immediate superiors. Thus the actual problem was to find a new leader to whom the 

higher command in French North Africa 

would adhere, and in support of whom it 

would issue appropriate orders to the lower 

echelons. 

Could such a leader be found in the existing structure of Vichy's military establishment? Admiral Darlan, next in succession to 

Marshal Petain, and commander in chief 

of all the armed forces of his government, 
78 

had confided to the U.S. Ambassador, Admiral Leahy, late in 1941 that he might be 

ready to dissociate himself from the policy 

of collaboration and lead his countrymen to 

the side of the Allies if he were supported by 

sufficient American aircraft, tanks, and effective troops. 17 His conduct left doubts 

whether he was motivated more by ambition 

or by patriotism. If he were apprised of Allied intentions, would he assist or would he 

betray the project? 

Gen. Alphonse Juin, senior military 

officer in French North Africa and commander in chief of the French Anny there, 

had been released from prison by the 

Germans after Weygand's recall from Algiers late in 1941, but was no collaborationist. He was under orders to defend the 

French territories against invasion by any 

forces whatsoever, and he included in his 

preparations elaborate plans to resist an attack into Tunisia and eastern Algeria which 

could only come from the Axis countries. lIS 

He intended to execute his orders, even 

against the Germans, and believed that he 

would be supported in such action by Admiral Darlan, if not by all at Vichy.DB The 

Allies could not have chosen an associate 

better able to assist them but more unwilling 

to take the initiative in defiance of his instructions from above. 

Gen. Auguste Paul Nogues, Resident 

IT (1) William D. Leahy, 1 Was There (New 

York, 1950), pp. 469-72. (2) Rads, Murphy to 

Dept of State, 20 Oct 42, and 5 Nov 42. Copies in 

OPD 336 Sec 2, Case 22. 

II Commandant-en-Chef franc;ais, civil et milltaire, Etat-major, 3" Bureau, Rapport des operations en Tunisie (hereafter cited as Giraud Hq, 

Rapport des operations, p. 12. (See Note on 

Sources.) 

II ( 1 ) This he told Murphy through Major 

Dorange on 20 October 1942. Copy of this report 

in OPD 336 Sec 2, Case 22. (2) Interv, Marcel 

Vigneras with Gen Juin, 5 Dec 48. (3) Ltr, Murphy 

to author, 31 Jan 50. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

General of Morocco, had shown marked 

zeal in 1940 in organizing and preparing 

for eventual resumption by the French 

Army of hostilities against the Axis powers, 

especially by concealing from the armistice 

commissioners both troops and materiel in 

excess of the permitted amounts. But by 

1942 he seemed to Mr. Murphy to have 

become dispirited by the long delay. His 

intentions as late as 6 October 1942 were to 

resist any Allied invasion not strong enough 

to repel probable countermeasures by the 

Axis forces, and it cOllld be doubted, despite 

his antagonism toward the Germans and 

their cordial distrust of him, that he would 

assume the burden of breaking with Marshal Petain's authority.GO 

Lt. Gen. Louis-Marie Koeltz, commanding the 19th Region Militaire in Algiers, or 

Maj. Gen. Georges Barre, commanding the 

Tunis Division, each the principal troop 

commander in his territory, and Vice Adm. 

Raymond Fenard, Secretary-General of 

French North Africa, or Vice Adm. JeanPierre Esteva, Resident General of Tunisia, 

each a protege of Admiral Darlan high in 

the civil administration of French North 

African territories, had considerable prestige 

but could not be expected to lead a break 

with the government at Vichy. 

.. ( 1) Interv, Marcel Vigneras with Gen A. Guillaume, 23 Nov 48; Ltr, Robert D. Murphy to 

author, 31 Jan 50; Ltr, Gen Noguo to author, 28 

Jan and 23 Mar 50, containing notes on American 

landings in North Africa. (2) OKH/GenStdH/ 

Fremde Heere West, Heereskontrollinspektion 

(Bollrges) , V.O. Fremde Heere West Hr. 97/42, 

13 Feb 42, Penonality Appraisal Sketches of Leading French Generals in Northwest Africa, in File 

CRS, Rcd Gp 1027, OKH/H2/187, Sec Kriegs-

.taatssekretariat. (3) Msg, DWStK/Gr We Hr. 

365/42 to OKW /WFSt, 27 Oct 42, Rpt on Conf 

Chief DWStK (Morocco) with Adm Darlan on 

24 Oct 42, in File OKW /WFSt Sonderakte 

Vorgaenge Frankreich. 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

Although a leader taken from Marshal 

Petain's military establishment might well 

provide the greatest immediate advantages 

to the Allies, those benefits could be gained 

only at severe risk. The political consequences would be bad wherever, outside 

French North Africa, the Vichy government was believed to be wholly collaborationist and was an object of distrust or 

hatred. But equally important from the 

strictly military point of view, the vital element of surprise would have to be forfeited 

as far as the French were concerned and, 

perhaps, the Axis enemies as well. Axis 

countermeasures during the approach, the 

landings, and the advance into Tunisia 

might be prepared in time to inflict severe 

injuries. Had the Allies been able to take 

into their confidence the right Vichy French 

leaders,s1 the inner core of the resistance 

organization in the French anned forces 

might have arranged for only a nominal 

show of opposition intended to delay Axis 

retaliation, but the betrayal of such a confidence would have brought disaster. The 

risk seemed too great. 

Could the Allies find an eminent person 

outside the Vichy establishment able to assume French civil and military leadership 

in French North Africa, some high-ranking 

officer who would accept a role of dissidence 

for reasons of higher patriotism? They 

would have to take their chances on his 

ability to win over the higher military commanders in French North Africa. Such a 

candidate appeared in the person of General 

Giraud. 

Giraud, then in his early sixties, had 

., The political consequences would have been 

serious in view of the contamination of all by the 

collaborationist record of 10 many, and the undiscriminating condemnation of Vichy by the 

Gaullists. 

79 

achieved considerable distinction in a military career which involved many years of 

service in Morocco; combat, capture, and 

escape in both World Wars; instruction for 

three years at L'Ecole Superieure de Guerre 

in Paris, membership on Le Conseil Superieure de la Guerre, and four-star rank 

as commander of the French Seventh Anny 

in 1940. His escape from the Koenigstein 

prison in Saxony through Switzerland to 

unoccupied France in April 1942 had attracted wide attention. He had undertaken 

to support Marshal Petain's authority and 

had been pennitted to retire into southern 

France, near Lyon. There he wrote a long 

analysis of the causes of France's downfall 

in 1940 and planned for a day when Frenchmen might again fight for their freedom.82 

Mr. Robert Murphy returned to Algiers 

from his visits to London and New York in 

September with instructions to establish 

communications between Giraud and Eisenhower. He had just reached Algiers when 

he was approached by a representative of 

Admiral Darlan, who revealed that Darlan 

was being rapidly driven toward a choice 

between far closer collaboration with the 

Gennans and coming over to the side of the 

United States, bringing with him the French 

fleet. To adopt the latter alternative, he required guarantees of ample American aid 

to offset French deficiencies in military 

equipment. Here was a situation which required not only a choice by Darlan but another choice, more pressing than he realized, by the Allies. Murphy recommended 

that his government attempt to bring about 

a co-operative relationship between Giraud 

and Darlan.83 

• (I) G. Ward Price, Giraud and the African 

Scene (New York, 1944), pp. 1-63. (2) Henri 

Giraud, M es evasions (Paris, 1946), passim. • Msg, Murpby to OPD for Eisenhower, 16 Oct 

42. In OPD 336 Sec 2, Case 22. 
80 

Although General Giraud's residence in 

southern France was kept under surveillance, he had established communication 

with French patriots in Algiers and through 

them with others in the major centers of 

French North Africa, as well as with demobilized officers in France, and looked 

ahead with eagerness to the spring of 1943 

when he hoped, with American aid, to bring 

about a successful return to arms in unoccupied France. His plans and communications were necessarily subject to the utmost 

secrecy. His principal representative in Algiers was Maj. Gen. Charles E. Mast, commander of the Algiers Division since September 1942. In Casablanca, the commander of the Casablanca Division, Maj. 

Gen. Emile Bethouart, veteran of Narvik, 

was also an adherent of Giraud. Other officers of the French Army and various 

civilians were prepared to uphold Giraud 

in overthrowing the authority of the government at Vichy if necessary in order to resume the war against the Axis powers. He 

had channels of communication with the 

Allied leaders through his friends in Algiers 

and through the U.S. Military Attache at 

Bern, Switzerland,1I4 and perhaps for a short 

time through the American embassy at 

Vichy. While Giraud's willingness to cooperate with the Allies was being ascertained, Mast assured Murphy that Giraud 

would prefer to act apart from Darlan and 

that Giraud could alone rally the French 

Army in North Africa, gain the adherence 

of the French Navy there, and make it possible for the Allies to "gain entry practically 

without firing a shot." 65 Mast was confident that the time had arrived not only 

.. Phone cony with Miss Constance Harvey 

(fonner U.S. Vice·Consul at Lyons) 27 Jul 51. 

.. Msg, Murphy to OPD for Eisenhower, 16 Oct 

42, eM·OUT 5218. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

to reach an agreement with Giraud but to 

discuss specific military plans in staff 

talks; therefore he proposed via Murphy a 

rendezvous near Cherchel, about ninety 

miles west of Algiers, on the night of 21 

October. Five days' notice was very short 

indeed. 

Murphy's reports produced intense concern and lively activity in London and 

Washington. Generals Eisenhower and 

Clark, the Prime Minister, and the British 

Chiefs of Staff concluded that Giraud should 

be recognized as "our principal collaborator 

on the French side" and as Governor General of all French North Africa, responsible 

for civil and military affairs, and as such 

should receive Allied support and protection. 

At the same time, they approved General 

Eisenhower's further proposal that Giraud 

be requested to negotiate with Darlan and 

to accept him in a military role which would 

be mutually agreeable. In effect, they agreed 

that one friendly French leader would be 

good but that two would be better, especially when one controlled the French fleet 

at Toulon. General Eisenhower then had in 

mind the early activation of the American 

Fifth Army under General Clark and the 

elevation of the French commander in chid 

to succeed Clark as deputy commander in 

chief.66 The British Chiefs of Staff, however, believed that no civil and military governor general could properly also serve as 

the Allied deputy commander in chief, so 

that the latter position would be available 

only to Darlan. All agreed that, because of 

insufficient ships, escorts, and ports, it would 

be impracticable to meet Giraud's wish for 

simultaneous assistance to the French Army 

in southern France during the invasion of 

French North Africa. As Giraud was think-

.. Msg, London to AGWAR, 17 Oct 42, CM·IN 

7296. 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

ing of an invasion in the spring, and could 

not yet be infonned of the actual Allied 

plans, the most that could be told him at 

this juncture was that the aid he desired 

would be hastened by an easy occupation 

of northwestern Africa.6T 

Preparations in London to send a delegation for the projected staff talks at 

Cherchel on 21 October went forward while 

in Washington the draft instructions concerning association with Giraud and Darlan 

were under consideration. 

The men selected for the hazardous mission were: General Clark, Brig. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer (head of the AFHQ G-3 

Section) , Col. Archelaus L. Hamblen 

(AFHQ G-4), Capt. Jerauld Wright, USN 

(AFHQ liaison officer with the U.S. Navy), 

and Col. Julius Holmes (of AFHQ G-l), 

who had been supervising a civil affairs 

section and who was able to act as interpreter. Clark's instructions, which were 

drafted after the President's views on this 

critical matter were reported, covered various aspects of the projected relationship. 

Darlan must not be mentioned; to propose 

him as a future French commander in chief 

might well disrupt the negotiations. Clark 

was to declare that selection of a French 

commander for French forces was "a matter 

to be handled by the French themselves." 

This principle would be joined with the 

parallel guarantee that the Americans would 

not interfere with French civil government. 

To dispel any fears of a future British hold 

on French colonial territory, Clark was also 

to emphasize the American control of the 

operation. Finally, Clark was authorized to 

indicate to the French that only under such 

conditions as General Eisenhower had envisaged in his talks with Murphy near 

" Mag, London to AGWAR, 17 Oct 42, CM-IN 

7368. 

81 

London would a French commander in 

chief over all North Africa eventually be 

accepted; in the interim, the Americans 

would equip and supply French troops 

engaged in fighting the Axis powers. 68 

The meeting near Cherchellater became 

one of the better-known exploits of the war. 

While the Allied commander in chief went 

to Scotland on a scheduled inspection of 

final amphibious rehearsals by some of his 

assault units, General Clark's group started 

by air and submarine for a point on the 

African coast fifteen miles west of Cherchel. 

The submarine voyage from Gibraltar to 

the vicinity of the rendezous was completed 

too late to land before daylight of 21 October, so the party remained submerged most 

of the day. Those waiting at the villa, discouraged by their fruitless vigil, drove back 

at dawn to Algiers, expecting to make a 

second try two nights later. A radio sent 

from the submarine to Gibraltar and relayed 

to Algiers over the Office of Strategic Services secret radio chain, brought Mr. Murphy, Vice-Consul Ridgeway B. Knight, and 

some of the French back to the scene at 

midnight, 21-22 October, while General 

Mast and his staff appeared shortly before 

0500. The meeting was held in a seaside 

villa loaned by a sympathetic owner. 

An initial special conference brought together Generals Clark, Lemnitzer, and 

Mast, Lt. Col. Louis G. M. Jousse, and 

Mr. Murphy. General Mast was told that 

the Allies had decided to send to North 

Africa a large American force, supported in 

the air and on the sea by British units. He 

in tum advised the Americans to prepare for 

the swiftest possible movement into Tunisia 

to counterbalance the Axis capacity to begin 

sending in troops by air within thirty-six 

• Msg, WD to ETOUSA, 17 Oct 42, CM-OUT 

5682. 
82 

hours of the first American landings. He 

also urged the necessity of retaining the 

bridgehead in southern France by simultaneous aid to French forces waiting there. 

The discussion shifted to the role to be 

played by General Giraud. It was agreed, 

first, that he should receive directly from 

the Allies a letter setting forth their intentions and, second, that if Giraud consented 

to come to North Africa he should be 

brought out by an American submarine. A 

draft letter was prepared, subject to approval by General Eisenhower, which proposed: first, the restoration of France to its 

1939 boundaries; second, acceptance of 

France as an ally; and third, assumption of 

the supreme command in North Africa by 

the French "at the appropriate time" following the landings, the establishment of 

bases, and the rearming of French troops.ell 

In a general conference among all the officers, much precise intelligence was furnished by the French and the fact was emphasized that the Blida airdrome at Algiers 

and the garrison and airdrome at Bone were 

controlled by adherents of General Giraud. 

After barely eluding French police by 

hiding in an empty wine cellar while the 

villa was searched, and after braving high 

surf and rough seas to return in frail landing 

craft to the submarine, the party set out for 

Gibraltar, and from there radioed to Lon-

• ( 1) Before approving the letter to General 

Giraud, General Eisenhower felt compelled to 

clarify the conditions for transferring command to 

the French; these conditions called for delay, and 

even at the time of transfer provided that the 

American commander would continue controlling 

French North Africa as a base for operations 

against the Axis. Only defense would be "turned 

over to French command." (2) General Mast estimated the French forces which could be rearmed 

as: eight infantry and two armored divisions, plus 

separate tank, artillery and service units-all ready 

within one month. Msg, London to AGWAR, 29 

Oct 42, CM-IN 12,809. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

don a report of its achievement.To On 25 

October in two B-17's, they reached England. The Western Task Force had by then 

already commenced its voyage to the landing beaches. The other task forces were 

about to sail. Additional intelligence was 

radioed to Hewitt and Patton on the A ugusta and turned to account also in Eastern 

Task Force plans. The participants scattered 

to their respective tasks, the French still unaware that the operation was so near, and 

that part of the expeditionary forces were 

actually on the way. 

The terms of association with Giraud remained to be established. His general position, as he wrote to a fellow countryman, 

was: "We don't want the Americans to 

free us; we want them to help us free ourselves, which is not quite the same." 11 Preliminary negotiations elicited a provisional 

draft embodying his views of the Allied proposals, but official proffer of support by the 

Allies awaited adjustments concerning the 

matter of command that would meet Gen10 ( 1) Accounts of this submarine trip by several 

of the participants have been published. The narrative above is based primarily on the unpublished 

official report by General Clark to General Eisenhower, dated 30 October 1942, augmented by 

Clark's memoir, Calcul,ll,tl Risk, pp. 67-89. (2) 

See also Ridgeway B. Knight, "General Clark's Secret Mission to Algeria on October 21, 1942," 

Am"ican For,ign S"vice Journal, XX (March, 

1943), 122-23. (3) Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes, 

"Eisenhower's African Gamble," Collier'S, CXVII 

(January 12, 1946), 14-15,33-34. (4) Les Cahiers 

Franfais Information (published by Direction de 

la documentations), No. 47 (August 1943), p. 10. 

(5) Frederick C. Painton, "Secret Mission to North 

Africa," Readers' Digest, XLII (May, 1943). (6) 

Msg 4057, London to AGWAR, 25 Oct 42, CM-IN 

10601. ETOUSA Outgoing Cables, Kansas City 

Rcds Ctr. This is a relay to Stimson and Marshall 

of Clark's message to Eisenhower. (7) Barjot, 

u dibarquement du 8 Novtlmbre tin Afriqutl du 

Nord, pp. 81-93. 

"Ltr, Giraud to Gen Robert Odic (Ret.), 15 

Oct 42. Copy in Smith Papers. 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 

eral Eisenhower's views/2 At some point in 

his negotiations with the Allies, if not 

through Mr. Murphy, he listed four conditions governing his acceptance, of which 

one was that he should be commander in 

chief of Allied troops on French soil whereever French troops were fighting. On a 

memorandum naming the conditions, which 

has survived in his handwriting, is written 

in the lower left comer, "0. K. Roosevelt." 73 The authenticity of this document 

cannot be established, but Giraud's expectations that this condition would be met 

came as a great surprise to the Allied Commander in chief later, for the negotiations 

conducted through Murphy in Algiers with 

Giraud in southern France had remained 

inconclusive on the matter of command." 

Giraud had made clear on 27 October 

that he believed the American command 

over the landings should be transformed 

.. (1) Rad, Murphy to ACofS OPD, 26 Oct 42. 

Copy in OPD Exec 3, Item 2a. (2) Algiers Despatch 

76 with incls, Murphy to Secy of State, 22 Mar 43. 

State Dept Archives. This tile includes all Mr. 

Murphy's correspondence with General Giraud on 

the subject of command. (3) Ltr, Murphy to author, 31 Jan 50. (4) Henri Giraud, Un seul but: 

la victoire (Paris, 1950), pp. 348-52. (5) Langer, 

Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 331-34. 

T. (I) Giraud, Un seul but: la victoire, p. 335. 

(2) Albert Kammerer, Du dlbarquement Africain 

au meurtre de Darlan (Paris, 1949), pp. 112-14. 

.. Search in the records of the President at the 

White House and Hyde Park, New York, of the 

Department of State, and the U.S. Anny, and inquiries to Mr. Murphy, Miss Constance Harvey 

(then U.S. Vice-Consul at Lyons), Admiral William 

D. Leahy (then Ambassador at Vichy), Mr. Douglas MacArthur III, and Mr. S. Pinkney Tuck 

(then on the embassy staff at Vichy) have failed 

to elicit a trace of any communication between 

Giraud and President Roosevelt which could have 

received the President's written "O.K." A photostatic copy of the document in Giraud's own 

papers shows it to be a copy of a telegram in his 

own handwriting rather than the original, if such 

there be. 

83 

after some forty-eight hours into an interAllied command ashore, and that in French 

North Africa he should be the Allied commander in chief. Murphy stated the three 

central features of Allied policy: (1) France 

would be fully restored to her prewar 

boundaries and sovereign independence; 

(2) purely French national matters would 

be left for determination by the French 

without American interference; ( 3) "the 

government of the United States regards 

the French nation as an ally and will deal 

with it as such." As to the inter-Allied command, he suggested that the transfer of 

command from American to French hands 

might follow the rearmament of French 

forces in French North Africa with American materiel, but left the decision to be 

reached directly between Eisenhower and 

Giraud. 

These proposals, officially presented in 

informal letters dated 2 November, were in 

Giraud's possession when he was summoned 

to leave his retreat and thus catapulted into 

the situation to which the proposals applied. 

He had a hard choice, for a decision to cooperate with the Americans required him 

to advance the date for rallying the French 

several months; it also meant that simultaneous military action in southern France, 

which he considered vital to effective liberation of all France, must be abandoned. 

He decided to co-operate, but if he answered 

the letters of 2 November, his reply was not 

received before he himself appeared to state 

his views. Thus a friendly French military 

leader was found by the Allies at the very 

last minute, and in circumstances certain to 

produce much subsequent difficulty.75 

11 (I) Interv, Marcel Vigneras with Gen 

Giraud, 10 Nov 48. (2) Giraud, Un seul but: la 

victoire, pp. 16-22. (3) CinC AF Diary, 7-8 No\' 

42. 
84 

The Climax of the Preparations 

The first transports bound for Algiers 

entered the Mediterranean on the night of 

5-6 November and, fully visible, slipped 

silently past Gibraltar, from which the operation was to be directed. 76 Deep within the 

Rock, in damp and limited quarters excavated during the previous year, General 

Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, Allied 

Force, and his principal staff, who flew from 

the United Kingdom to Gibraltar on 5 and 

6 November in B-17's, set up an advanced 

command post. With General Eisenhower 

were his deputy commander in chief, General Clark (U.S.), his naval commander in 

chief, Admiral Cunningham (Br.), his air 

officer, Air Commodore A. P. Sanders 

(Br. ), the commanders of the two major 

air elements, General Doolittle (U.S.), and 

Air Marshal Welsh (Br.), the commanding 

general of the force which would push eastward from Algeria into Tunisia, General 

Anderson (Br.), and others. General Eisenhower was nominally in command of Gibraltar's fortress. 

Material which British and Canadian 

tunnelers had excavated from the Rock had 

been used to extend the landing strip on 

Gibraltar's airfield into the Bay of Algec;iras. 

Aircraft which in recent weeks had been 

brought in crates and assembled now stood 

wing to wing cramming the field. Gibraltar's 

harbor gave temporary refuge to oilers, tugs, 

refueling warships, and other varied craft. 

Such unusual activity did not pass unobserved by the Axis agents on Spanish soil 

adjacent to airfield and harbor. But where 

It (I) For the planned schedule from D minus 

8 to D plus 33, see: Memo, Gen Lemnitzer for Gen 

and Spec Staff Secs AFHQ, 31 Oct 42, sub: Program of events and control of opns from AFHQ 

Adv Hq. (2) CinC AF Diary, 5 Nov 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

and in what strength the Allies were preparing to strike, and just when the operation would begin, they could only surmise. 

In the Rock, also, was the signal communications center for the imminent operation. The advanced headquarters was linked 

with London and Washington, with Tangier and a secret American radio network 

in French North Africa, and with the vessels of the great naval task forces and their 

protecting groups. Once the ships could 

terminate their radio silence, a cascade of 

messages would be added to the stream already inundating the center of Gibraltar. 

Important developments were taking 

place elsewhere. En route to Gibraltar from 

southern France, in a British submarine 

which had been put temporarily under 

American command, and which was out of 

communication with Gibraltar for over 

twenty-four hours because of a defective 

radio transmitter, was General Giraud.7T In 

Algiers, General Mast's organization was 

sending warnings to Oran and Casablanca 

and preparing for its own local operations. 

Mr. Robert Murphy was reporting a conference with General J uin to which he had 

been invited earlier that day.78 The French 

commander in chief had discussed the possibility of Allied aid against the threatening 

Axis initiative in Tunisia. He had warned 

Murphy that a recent visit to French North 

and West Africa by Admiral Darlan had 

TT Reports of the submarine journey, Operation 

MINERVA, appear in the following sources: (I) Br. 

Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," App. B3. (2) Memo, 

Capt Jerauld Wright, for Comdr USN Forces in 

Europe, 7 Dec 42, sub: Rpt on Opn MINERVA. 

AFHQ AG 370.2-53, Micro Job 24, Reel 79D. 

The three companions of General Giraud were 

Capt. Andre Beaufre, Lt. de vaisseau Hubert Vi ret, 

and Aspirant Bernard Giraud, the general's son. 

'" Msg, Murphy to Secy of State Cordell Hull for 

WD, 5 Nov 42. Copy in OPD 336 Sec 2, Case 22. 
COMPLETING THE PREPARATIONS 85 

GIBRALTAR, looking toward the Bay oj Algeciras. 

brought about no change in the standing defense instructions: if the Allies should invade 

before the Axis forces did, Juin would be 

compelled to order that they be opposed; if 

the Allies would only wait, they could be 

welcomed and assisted. 

The Allies' leadership had just been somewhat flustered by the sudden insistence of 

General Mast's group, through Murphy, 

that the Allied landings be postponed for 

three weeks to permit them to make adequate preparations. The proposal had been 

rejected as wholly impracticable.79 Now 

General Juin's counsel of delay also had to 

be ignored. The assaulting force was 

mounted and moving on an inexorable, predetermined course. The months of planning 

and preparing were almost at an end. 

" (1) Msg 749, Algiers to Gen Handy for Adm 

Leahy, 31 Oct 42. Copy in WDCSA 381 TORCH 

(11-1-42) Sec II. (2) Msg 4373, London to 

AGWAR, 1 Nov 42. ETOUSA Outgoing Cables, 

Kansas City Reds Ctr. (3) Memo, Marshall for 

Leahy and King; Memo, President for JCS, 2 Nov 

42; Msg, Fidd Marshal Dill to COS, 2 Nov 42, 

JSM 455. Copies in WDCSA 381 TORCH Sec 2. 

PART TWO 

THE AMPHIBIOUS PHASE ON THE 

ATLANTIC COAST 

CHAPTER V 

The French Decide To Fight 

Operation TORCH had two major phases. 

The first, amphibious landings, included 

widely separated operations on the Atlantic 

coast of Morocco and on the Mediterranean shores of western and central Algeria. 

The second phase was an overland advance 

through eastern Algeria into Tunisia, supplemented by the consolidation of each of 

the three task forces near Casablanca, Oran, 

and Algiers, and by the increase of air 

strength at the newly acquired French airdromes. The amphibious phase was to be 

conducted against such resistance as the 

French might choose to offer in spite of extraordinary efforts by the Allies to avert it. 

The second phase would begin while the 

French deliberated over joining the Allies 

in active opposition to the Axis powers or 

remaining passively neutral. 

The amphibious landings were all to begin in the predawn hours of 8 November; 

the hostilities which ensued, as will later appear, were concluded successively in Algiers, 

Oran, and Casablanca: Although D Day 

was the same for aD, H Hour was a matter 

of discretion with each task force commander, for with more than 700 airline miles 

intervening between Casablanca and AI1 In this part of the narrative, and in the section 

which follows, the geographical pattern of Allied 

advance from west to east has been allowed to 

prevail over a strictly chronological pattern, with 

an account of first the operations of the Western, 

then of the Center, and lastly of the Eastern landing forces. 

giers, the conditions of tide, moonlight, 

wind, and sunrise at these widely separated beaches would vary. The commanders were free to delay after 0100 in order 

to grasp favorable conditions, rather than 

under compulsion to meet a precise over-all 

schedule regardless of the immediate situation. The Eastern and Center Naval Task 

Forces adopted 0100, Greenwich time; the 

Western Task Force planned for 0400.2 

The landing forces expected to be put 

ashore by American methods off Morocco 

and by British methods off Algeria. The 

Western Naval Task Force intended, within 

the limits imposed by its incomplete and 

hurried training for such an undertaking, 

to anchor the troop transports in a designated area several miles offshore and to release the landing craft which had been 

swinging from their davits. These boats 

would then assemble alongside certain ships 

to take aboard the troops, temporarily organized into boat teams. Once loaded, the 

boats would circle until time to assemble in 

waves at a line of departure between two 

control vessels. From that line they would 

proceed in formation and on schedule toward shore, escorted by guiding vessels 

equipped with radar and other navigational 

aids. No preliminary bombardment was to 

I (1) Outline Plan, TORCH, 8 Oct 42, par. 4. 

OPO 381 TORCH. (2) WTF Final Rpt, Operations 

TORCH, Vol. II. ORB AGO. (3) CTF FO 1,4 Oct 

42, par. 2; EAF FO I, 4 Oct 42. 
90 

soften resistance at the beachhead, but fire 

support ships would take stations from 

which to shell targets ashore as required. 

The waves of landing craft would go in at 

intervals which allowed each wave to unload and retract from the beach in time to 

make room for the wave behind it. The 

first troops to land were to capture the beach 

and prepare it to receive succeeding waves. 

Later arrivals would reconnoiter inland, 

expand the beachhead, and penetrate the 

interior to reach special objectives. After 

being unloaded and withdrawn from the 

beaches, the landing craft were to be guided 

back for later loads according to a schedule 

which would bring them alongside various 

transports rather than only to their own 

parent ships. After daylight the transports 

could be brought in closer or taken out 

farther to sea, depending on the progress of 

operations ashore and the enemy's ability 

to retaliate. 

The fast convoy approaching the Strait 

of Gibraltar from the United Kingdom had 

been practically unobserved, the only warning being an unconfinned report on 2 November from the Gennan submarine U -514 

of seven large ships, probably transports, 

moving eastward toward the Mediterranean.lI The Western Naval Task Force, as 

already noted, crossed the Atlantic without 

being detected by either French or Axis 

reconnaissance. The main indication to the 

enemy that the Allies were preparing a landing on the Atlantic coast was the extraordinary accumulation of ships and aircraft at 

Gibraltar in October and nearly November, 

a process interpreted to mean that an attack 

might be imminent at Dakar as well as in-

• S,ekriegsleitung/l.Abt (hereafter referred to as 

SKL/l.Abt) KTB, Teil A, 1.-30.XI.42, 8 Nov 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

side the Mediterranean.' The convoys which 

were observed passing into the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar and 

which were kept under enemy air observation at fairly frequent intervals on 6 and 

7 November attracted much attention, but 

Admiral Hewitt's convoy succeeded in keeping out of sight until after nightfall. It then 

sped to the three major areas from which 

its attack on French Morocco was to be 

launched. Thus, off Safi, Fedala, and 

Mehdia, the three naval attack groups 

carrying the sub-task forces under General 

Patton's command were taking their positions as D Day arrived. 

French military forces in the Casablanca 

defense sector had been allowed to relax the 

state of readiness during the evening of 7 

November, but the events of the early morning were to bring about a general alert 

throughout French Morocco. These warnings seem to have been instigated not by 

receipt of reports from Algiers or Oran, or 

by the recorded broadcast to the French 

people from the President transmitted from 

London, but rather by the efforts of the 

pro-Allied French in Casablanca to forestall resistance to the landings. For these 

men had been actively at work to help bring 

about a peaceful occupation of western 

Morocco. $ The few Americans engaged for 

well over a year in preparing for such events 

awaited the arrival of the Western Task 

Force with mounting excitement. They 

heard the British Broadcasting Corpora-

• Msg, OKW /WFSt Nr. 551768/42 to German 

General, Rome, and others, 17 Oct 42 in DWStK, 

Chefsachen, 1941-1943. 

• ( 1) Rpt, Maj Deuve to CG Marrakech Div 

and Safi-Mogador Sector, 14 Nov 42, sub: Opns 

for 8-9 Nov 42. Copy in transl in WTF Final Rpt, 

G-2 Annex, Item 12. (2) Morison, U.S. Nallal 

Operations, II, 68-71. 
THE FRENCH DECIDE TO FIGHT 91 

EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA, 26 October 1942. 

tion's warning signal, "Robert arrive," 

shortly after sundown on 7 November. The 

U.S. Consul General, H. Earle Russell, was 

informed by one of his staff that landings 

were being made in Algeria and would begin on the west Moroccan coast at 0500, 

local time (0400, Greenwich time), on 8 

November. President Roosevelt's notes to 

the Sultan of Morocco and to the Resident 

General, which were to be delivered in Rabat, more than fifty miles away, were entrusted to two vice-consuls with directions 

to present them as soon as the landings were 

in progress.e A secret radio station ("Lincoin") was in operation on the roof of a 

building not far from the port with an al-

• Rpt, Russell to Secy of State, 12 Nov 42, sub: 

Occupation of Casablanca by Amer troops. Copy 

in OCMH. 

ternative apparatus at another point in case 

of emergency, and with storage batteries at 

hand to use when the city's electric power 

should be cut off. Waiting in a small shelter 

near his instruments was the French operator ( " Ajax" ). A messenger linked the operator with the consulate, where Vice-Consul W. Stafford Reid encoded and. decoded 

messages. All radio contact with the approaching force was channeled by specific 

orders through Gibraltar. Unwillingness of 

the operator at Gibraltar to adopt the procedures which the operator at Casablanca 

deemed necessary in the light of experience, 

rendered contact imperfect, particularly at 

night. 7 

7 Jnl and Rpt, Ajax to Reid, 22 Nov 42. In private possession. 
92 

All arrangements for sabotage, seizure of 

key points, and capture of leading Vichyites 

and German Control Commissioners in Morocco, which had been so long in preparation by French civilian groups organized by 

Vice-Consul David W. King, were set aside 

by an order from Mr. Robert Murphy in 

Algiers, scarcely three days earlier. This 

step transferred complete control to General Bethouart, commanding general of the 

Casablanca Division. King issued instructions on 7 November for a forty-eight-hour 

practice alert which would place his civilian 

groups in position to act when they discovered that the invasion was actually taking 

place, but even these orders failed to reach 

Port-Lyautey until much too late. General 

Bethouart, acting for the organization 

headed by General Mast and others in Algiers, was expected to prevent resistance by 

the French forces ashore and to expedite an 

association in arms with the Allies against 

the Axis powers. He planned to seize temporary control at Rabat by a military coup, 

then to order the garrisons along the coast 

to remain in their barracks while the landings were executed, and to hold potential 

reinforcements at their interior stations.8 

French military plans for defending Morocco were elaborate and well established. 

They had been brought up to date by a 

series of directives from Gen. Georges Lascroux, Commander in Chief of Moroccan 

Troops, dated 19 August 1942,9 The western coast from Spanish Morocco to Rio de 

Oro was divided by these plans into four 

• (1) Interv with King, 24 Feb 48. (2) TORCH 

Anthology, Africa, Rpt 10,207 (rpt by King). CIA 

OSS Archives. (3) Gen. £mile B~thauart, The 

Occurrences of 8 November in Morocco. Copy in 

OCMH. 

• Journal of Actions of the High Command of 

Moroccan Troops, 8-11 Nov 42. Copy in transl in 

WTF Final Rpt, G-2 Annex, Item 11. The journal 

identifies the directives as 773jOP3. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

sectors, of which all but the most southerly 

were within the objective attacked by the 

Western Task Force. These three sectors, 

from north to south, were headed respectively by the Commanding General, Meknes 

Division (Maj. Gen. Andre Dody) ; the vice 

admiral commanding Moroccan Naval 

Forces (Vice Adm. Fran~ois Michelier); 

and the Commanding General, Marrakech 

(Maj. Gen. Henri Martin). Garrisonsand 

auxiliary troops, which were normally stationed at various points within each area, 

were to be concentrated as needed in order 

to reinforce the defenders of the ports. Defense in depth for approximately fifty miles 

along routes to the interior was also planned. 

Three sections of mobile reserves were 

available inland under the control of the 

theater commander (the Resident General), one group to assemble near Khemisset, a second, near Settat, and the third, a 

light armored brigade, in the BoulhautMarchand area. On the north, protection 

of the frontier between the French and 

Spanish protectorates was furnished mainly 

by garrisons controlled from Oujda and 

Guercif. Auxiliary native troops from the 

interior would be used either on the northern front or, eventually, on the western coast 

if that proved necessary. 

Although the plans were primarily designed for the repulse of enemy forces pressing toward the interior from the west or 

north, they were also arranged with a view 

to defending firmly the Moroccan capital, 

Rabat, by a particularly large proportion 

of the available strength. 

The Center Attack Group was just arriving off Fedala as General Bethouart sped 

past that town en route to Rabat to take 

there the first critical overt steps in his projected military coup. At 0200, he sent a 

letter to General Nogues in which he ex-
THE FRENCH DECIDE TO FIGHT 

plained that General Giraud, aided by 

American troops, was taking command in 

all French North Africa and had designated 

General Bethouart both to take command 

in Morocco over all Army troops and to 

assist an American expedition about to land 

there. General Nogues was also apprised of 

the fact that orders were being issued to all 

Moroccan garrisons and airdromes not to 

oppose the landings. He was asked either 

to issue confirming orders or, if he preferred, 

to absent himself until he could simply accept a fait accompli.1o 

While this letter, with accompanying 

documents, was being delivered at the Residency, General Bethouart proceeded to the 

command post of the Moroccan Army headquarters. He was protected there by a battalion of Colonial Moroccan Infantry, recruited chiefly from young men who had 

escaped from France hoping to resume the 

war against the Axis, soldiers to whom the 

current mission was congenial. General Lascroux, whose post General Bethouart was 

assuming, was sent to Meknes under nominal duress. General Lahoulle, commanding 

French air forces in Morocco, agreed not to 

resist the landing if the ground forces also 

refrained. When he tried by telephone to 

persuade Admiral Michelier to adopt the 

same policy, and was induced instead to 

reverse his own stand, he too was placed 

under arrest. Orders to keep all planes 

grounded were issued to the air bases.l1 

,. General Nogu~s furnished an account to his 

staff of the events of 8-11 November 1942 which 

appears in WTF Final Rpt, 0-2 Annex, Item II, 

23 Dec 42. In replies to queries by the author, 

dated 28 January 1950 and 23 January 1951, General Nogu~s described Bchhouart's documents concerning Giraud and American action as unauthenticated by signature and of doubtful reliability. 

II General Bethouan has written a detailed and 

trustworthy account of his actions: The Occurrences 

of 8 November in Morocco, cited above, n. 8. 

93 

In Casablanca, at the Admiralty, General 

Bethouart's chief of staff, Lt. Col. Eugene 

Molle, handed to Admiral Michelier a letter from General Bethouart similar in character to that sent to General Nogues. The 

recently arrived admiral, commander of all 

French naval units in Morocco and commander in chief of the Casablanca defense 

sector, was urged to join the elements under 

General Giraud in receiving the Americans 

without resistance as a preliminary to joint 

action against the Axis.12 The American 

consular staff in Casablanca had had ample 

grounds for believing that the upper grades 

in the French naval establishment there 

were pro-Axis. For the American task force 

to occupy Casablanca and subsidiary ports 

unmolested, the French naval commander 

would have to issue orders of unmistakable 

force and clarity. 

The situation placed Admiral Michelier 

under the necessity of making a critical 

choice. His responsibilities were large. The 

standing orders for defense charged him, as 

Naval Commander in Chief in Morocco, 

with defense against an enemy afloat, and, 

as the immediate commander of the Casablanca defense sector, with the employment 

of sea, air, and ground forces against landing parties. Only when the success of an invading force required commitment of the 

general reserves would the command over 

defensive operations pass from Admiral 

Michelier to General Nogues as Commander of the Moroccan Theater of Operations. The unity of command over all armed 

elements was thus arranged in a sector extending inland for fifty miles in order to 

prevent a transfer of leadership at the 

critical point of an attack when an enemy 

.. Bethouart, The Occurrences of 8 November in 

Morocco. 
94 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

LANDING CRAFT CIRCLING NEAR A TROOP TRANSPORT until time to 

assemble in waves for the run to shore, 8 November 1942. 

began establishing his foothold ashore. Permanent, detailed instructions for all echelons 

had been issued, instructions to be enforced 

automatically in case of attack, whoever the 

aggressor might be. The mechanism of defense could be stopped only by very positive 

intervention. When the Admiral received 

~thouart's message, he scouted the possibility that the Americans could land a force 

during the night capable of holding any of 

the ports under his protection. The weather, 

the surf, and the failure of his coastal air or 

submarine patrols to detect the Western 

Naval Task Force within cruising distance 

of the shore before darkness--all seemed to 

warrant disbelief. He therefore decided that 

General B&houart was the victim of a hoax, 

and assured General Nogues and others by 

telephone at intervals during the night that 

no large force was offshore.lI 

.. Ltr, Nogu~ to author, 28 Jan 50, notes on 

American landings in Morocco. 

Admiral Michelier directed the assistant 

commander of the Casablanca Division, 

Brig. Gen. Raymond Desr~, to cancel General ~thouart's orders holding the unit immobilized and, instead, to place its components where the standing orders prescribed. 

By 0300, the Americans in the consulate observed truckloads of soldiers, a stream of 

little "Citroens," and many motorcycles 

and bicycles hastening through the city 

toward the port and coastal batteries. 1. 

The choice before General Nogues, when 

he received General ~thouart's letter and 

found the Residency surrounded by insubordinate forces, depended directly upon the 

nature of the impending attack. He might 

have been placed in command of Moroccan 

defensive operations by direction of General 

" (I) ~thouart, The Occurrences of 8 November in Morocco. (2) w. StafFord Reid, Torchlight 

before Dawn. Unpublished memoin in private pol-

_ion. 
mE FRENCH DECIDE TO FIGHT 

Juin, who was his superior in such matters, 

and who was at the time, along with Admiral Darlan, under arrest in Algiers. He 

might have assumed the command on his 

own initiative had he recognized that the 

magnitude of the American forces about to 

land required the commitment of reserves 

from the interior stations. He could not have 

countermanded Admiral Michelier's orders 

to the crews of the coastal batteries and the 

units of the Casablanca Division along the 

coast without being "dissident." The most 

which could have been expected by those 

who knew him, in view of his determination to keep French Morocco from German 

military occupation and of his professional 

concern with the discipline of the French 

Army, was a course leading to token resistance.15 Casualties might have been held 

to a minimum while at least an appearance 

of defense was being created. French failure 

to resist an American attack by forces manifestly weak and insufficient to control French 

Morocco, or any Commando raid of the 

hit-and-run variety, could not fail to cause 

Axis reprisals. Whether General Nogues assumed control with a view to confining 

French resistance to "token" proportions 

or allowed the Casablanca defense sector to 

resist manfully under Admiral Michelier's 

direction would depend directly on the size 

of the American invading expedition. 

With these considerations in mind, and 

before replying to General Bethouart's letter, General Nogues began a cautious appraisal of the situation and ordered a general alert. Ie The naval authorities denied 

the presence of large forces offshore. The 

11 Ltr, Nogu~s to author, 28 Jan 50. 

II (I) Ibid., Ltr, Nogu~s to author, 23 Jan 51. 

(2) ~thouart, The Occurrences of 8 November in 

Morocco. (3) Langer, O"r Vichy Gambl., pp. 112-

251. 

95 

landings did not begin at the time announced by General Bethouart, nor did any 

American force arrive at Rabat. By telephone General Nogues communicated with 

the commanders of the Meknes and Marrakech military sectors and ascertained that 

they remained subordinate to his authority 

rather than accepting the leadership of General Bethouart, as the latter had claimed. 

President Roosevelt's note to General 

Nogues was delivered considerably later 

than the plans called for, and was laid aside 

unrecognized for a later perusal. Any doubts 

concerning its authenticity might have been 

dispelled if the President's radio broadcast 

had been heard by the Resident General, 

but by the time the document was read the 

size and strength of the landings were apparent. 

General Nogues finally replied to General 

Bethouart by telephone after planes had 

strafed the antiaircraft batteries at Rabat 

and the airdromes at Casablanca, Sale, and 

Port-Lyautey, after ground troops had 

seized Safi and Fedala, and after naval gunfire had silenced the principal batteries near 

both ports. He then knew that fighting was 

also occurring at Oran and Algiers and that 

General Giraud had not been generally accepted as the leader in North Africa. He 

ordered General Bethouart to dismiss the 

protective battalion of Moroccan Colonials 

at once. To avoid bloodshed within the 

army, Bethouart and his principal associates sent away the guard and went to the 

Residency. There they were kept in custody 

until evening and then sent to Meknes to 

stand trial for treason.17 

17 Ltrs, Gen Nogu& to author, 28 Jan 50 and 23 

Jan 51; Rpt, Consul Gen Russell to Seey of State, 

12 Nov 42, sub: Occupation of Casablanca by 

Amer troops Bethouart, The Occurrences of 8 

November in Morocco. 
96 

In Casablanca just after 0630, leaflets 

containing General Eisenhower's proclamation showered down over the city. An hour 

later, a cordon of guards ringed the U.S. 

Consulate; in the park across the street an 

antiaircraft battery was set up; and the air 

battle against Cazes airfield opened. Col. 

William H. Wilbur, a member of Patton's 

staff, had the mission of persuading the 

commanders in the city to co-operate with 

the Americans. But by 0800 as he arrived 

at the Admiralty after a trip in a small car 

that bore a huge flag of truce, the big guns 

on EI Hank, on the Jean Bart, and on other 

ships in the harbor had opened fire against 

Admiral Hewitt's Covering Group. Shells 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

from the Massachusetts, the Wichita, and 

the Tuscaloosa began to fall in the harbor in 

reply. Soon the port area was blanketed 

with smoke which rolled in over the city.Is 

Hostilities had come to Morocco in a manner perhaps determined at Vichy but certainly attributable to the resolute French 

admiral at Casablanca and accepted by the 

Resident General at Rabat. The latter assumed command later in the morning and 

announced that a state of siege prevailed 

throughout French Morocco.le 

11 Reid, Torchlight before Dawn. Unpublished 

memoirs in private possession. 

11 Journal of Actions of the High Command of 

Moroccan Troops, 8-11 Nov. 42. Copy in transl in 

WTF Final Report, G-2 Annex, Item 11. 
CHAPTER VI 

Taking Safi 

The capture of Safi, where the medium 

tanks of the Western Task Force were to 

be landed, opened the attack in Morocco. 

At about 0600, 7 November, the Southern 

Attack Group carrying the Safi landing force 

split from the main convoy of the Western 

Naval Task Force and headed toward its 

objective.1 In midafternoon, while the remainder of the convoy zigzagged, the transport Lyon dropped astern with the destroyer-transports Bernadou and Cole and 

in about two hours transferred to them by 

means of landing craft the bulk of companies K and L, 47th Infantry. These men, 

especially trained, were to be the first to 

land.2 

Half an hour before midnight, the transports and warships began to enter their assigned areas about eight miles offshore, and 

S Led by the old battleship New York and the 

light cruiser Philadelphia, it included the escort 

aircraft carrier Santee, eight destroyen, four transports, one cargo ship, the seatrain, two old modified 

destroyer-transports, an oil tanker, one mine layer, 

two mine sweepen, and a tug. 

• The documentary records of the amphibious 

and land operations in taking Safi are assembled 

in the following: (1) CTG 34.10 War Diary and 

Action Rpt, Operation TORCH: Assault on Safi, 

French Morocco, 8 Nov 42. This includes reports 

of the Philadelphia, Mervine, Knight, Beatty, Merrimack, Harris, Lyon, Lakehurst, and Calvert. (2) 

WTF Final Rpt, Operations TORCH, with annexes. 

DRB AGO. Of especial value is Annex I, Final Rpt 

Opns BLACKSTONE. This section is based primarily on those records. (3) See also Maj James 

Y. Adams, AGF Obsr's Rpt, 7 Jan 43. Copy in 

AGF 319.1 (For. Obs), Binder I, Tab 8. 

soon the column came to a stop. (The 

Santee remained about sixty miles from the 

coast, guarded by two destroyers, during 

the next four days.) Safi's lights were visible 

on the horizon as preparations for the landings began at once. Troops were alerted. 

Boats were lowered. Debarkation nets went 

over the sides. The landing craft were 

loaded. But in the black darkness, the complicated process of debarkation advanced 

less rapidly than had been contemplated in 

the plan of attack and made improvisation 

necessary. 

The Objective and Its Defenses 

To the men who were about to land, Safi 

remained until daylight as they had seen 

it pictured on maps and photographs, or 

described in field orders and operations 

plans. They knew it to be a small town 

(about 25,000) near an artificial harbor 

which had been used in recent years principally for the export of phosphates. (Map 

1) The harbor was a triangular area of 

protected water sheltered on the east by the 

shore, on the west by a long jetty extending northwesterly from the shore for a distance of almost a mile, and on the north 

by a mole (phosphate pier) which projected 

westward about 300 yards at right angles to 

the shore. The gap between the tip of the 

mole and the jetty was the harbor entrance, 

an opening about 500 feet in width. Within 
98 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

REO BEACH BLUE BEACH GREEN BEACH SAFI 

SAFI HARBOR (looking east), JO November 1942. The ships, left to n'ght, aTe USS Dix, 

Calvert, Harris, Lyon, and Housatonic. 

this harbor triangle were several mooring 

places for ships with drafts of as much as 

thirty feet, and in the southernmost angle, 

the Petite Darse as it was called, were slips 

for shallower draft fishing boats. The merchandise quay at the northeastern comer 

provided berths for at least three large vessels. Electric cranes were available there 

for loading operations. The wharves had 

access to covered sheds and to space for considerable open storage, and were connected 

by spur tracks to a railroad leading to the 

interior. Near this comer, also, was a 100-

foot lighthouse tower. 

South of the artificial harbor and the new 

buildings in its vicinity was the old fishing 

town of Safi, which extended along the 

coastal shelf and at a break in the bluffs up 

the easier slopes to a rolling tableland. The 

native city was nearest the sea at a point 

where a small stream entered it. Not far 

from the cliftlike waterfront was the tower 

of an old Portuguese fort of masonry in the 

crenelated style of the late Middle Ages. 

On the hillside 750 yards to the east was the 

Army barracks, and about 2,200 yards 

farther inland, an emergency landing field 

for aircraft. 

Safi's beaches were few and, for the most 

part, lay at the base of high, steep, and 

rocky bluffs which allowed no exit for vehicles. Within the harbor, however, near 

the Petite Darse was a short stretch of soft 

sand, rising rather rapidly to the coastal 

shelf, which was designated as GREEN 

Beach. Just outside the harbor, extending 

northward from the mole for almost 500 

yards was a longer strip of sand called BLUE 
TAKING SAFI 99 

SAFI HARBOR (looking west), afternoon of D Day. Photograph taken from the tableland 

above harbor mouth. 

Beach. A third patch of sand ran for a 

somewhat shorter distance along the base of 

the cliffs northwest of BLUE Beach; it was 

called RED Beach. Approaches to RED and 

BLUE Beaches were exposed to the surf. 

Passage inland from them was possible for 

vehicles only from the southernmost portion 

of BLUE Beach. The last of the beaches at 

which landings might have been made was 

eight miles south of the harbor, at Jorf e1 

Houdi, below rugged but not insurmountable bluffs and near a road. It was labeled 

YELLOW Beach and considered during the 

planning as a possible point of landing from 

which to march on Safi from the south. Its 

approaches were to be reconnoitered by 

submarine in time to be reported to the subtask force commander during the first hours 

after arriving off Safi. Should the report be 

favorable, the 2d Battalion Landing Team, 

47th Infantry, would be sent there while 

other units were striking farther north. 

At Safi the invaders expected to find a 

garrison of over 1,000 men. The force 

actually there was smaller than that, consisting of one battalion of infantry, one 

armored battalion equipped with fifteen 

obsolete light tanks and five armored cars, 

and two batteries of artillery, one with four 

75-mm. howitzers and the other four 155-

mm. mobile guns. There were coastal guns 

on Pointe de la Tour and on the tableland 

above the harbor mouth. Air support could 

be summoned from inland airdromes and 

ground reinforcements from Marrakech, at 

least ninety-four miles away, and possibly 

from other points. In fact, road and railway 

connections with Marrakech alone might, 
100 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

LA RAILLEUSE, POINTE DE LA TOUR. Three of the four /30-mm. guns infixed 

circular emplacements are visible. 

if undisturbed, bring to the Safi area within 

ten hours about 1,400 cavalry, 2,000 infantry, two battalions of horse-drawn guns, 

and, in even less time, thirty tanks and ten 

armored cars.8 

The warnings which spread across French 

Morocco reached Safi shortly after 0320 

(local time). The commanding officer at 

Safi, Major Deuve, started promptly for his 

command post, a small group of buildings on 

the rolling tableland just above the port 

known as the Front de Mer. While the invading force was organizing for landings, he 

confirmed the readiness of his slender defenses to resist what might come to Safi. An 

I WTF G-2 Rpt, 12 Sep 42. 

actual total of some 450 officers and men 

manned the following: 

( I) At the Front de Mer, two exposed 

75-mm. guns operated by naval crews and 

defended with automatic arms from surrounding rifle pits. 

(2) On the Pointe de la Tour, a headland less than a mile above RED Beach, a 

coastal battery known as La Railleuse which 

consisted of two operable and two inoperable 130-mm. guns in fixed circular emplacements, with a modem range finder and 

fire control apparatus. The guns had a reputed range of 19,000 yards. They were 

themselves protected by four .50-caliber 

antiaircraft machine guns and barbed wire 

barriers. They were manned by naval crews 

and defended by part of the l04th (Coastal 
TAKING SAFI 

TABLE I-PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES ASSIGNED TO FORCE "X" (BLACKSTONE), 

AS OF 22 OCTOBER 1942 

reuonnel 

101 

Unit Vehicl .. 

Tot.1 Ollke ... EnliOlOd 

TOT AL ______________________________ ___________ ____ 6,428 327 6,101 779 

9th Infantry Division 

ht BLT, 47th Infantry • ___ ___ ____________________________ 1,422 51 1,371 127 

2d BLT, 47th Infantry & ___________ _ ___ __ __ _______________ 1,423 SI 1,372 132 

Headquarters, 47th Infantry __ __________ ______ __ ____ __ _____ 339 39 300 44 

Other 47th Infantry Troops ___ __ __ ___ __ _______ ____________ 966 39 927 79 

Armored Landing Team 

2d Battalion (reinforced), 67th Armored Regimen!. __ ______ __ 889 39 850 150 

Headquarters, Combat Command B, 2d Armored Division ____ 34 10 24 7 

Armored Team on Seatrain 

3d Battalion (reinforced), 67th Armored Regiment ____ ______ _ 255 16 239 189 

Armored Team Combat Support Troops _ ------------------ 744 H 710 to 

Other Force "X" Personnel 

Detachment of 

Air Force Air Support Party _____________________________ 11 2 9 2 

1st Armored Signal Battalion ______ ___ ___ ____ ________ ____ 27 I 26 S 

122d Signal Company (Radio Intelli ence) _____ ___ ____ __ __ 26 I 25 4 

142d Signal Company __________________________________ 92 .. 88 18 

163d Signal Company (Photographic) __ __ _________________ 6 1 5 I 

239th Signal Company (Operational) __ ___ ________________ 27 1 26 5 

66th Engineer Company (Topographic) ___________________ 5 0 5 0 

56th Medical Battalion __ ___________________ ______ ______ 71 2 69 0 

Headquarters, 2d Armored Division __ ______ _____ __ ___ __ ____ 45 13 32 6 

Interpreters. ________ ____________________ _______ ___ _____ _ 24 16 8 0 

Prisoner Interrogation Teams __ ______ __ ____________________ 20 5 15 0 

Civil Government PersonneL ______________________________ 2 2 0 0 

• locludi ns 4.h Platoon. R.ttery A. « 3d "",.t Artillery (AA) Battalion_ 

• Including 51h Plaloon, Bouery A. « 3d Co •• 1 Artillery (AA) Batt. lion. 

So~,ct: Ann .. A (Troop Lin) to Momo. Tf "A" 10 AeolS orD. 22 o.t H _ Ordor of BOltl. TF "A" 1942. St_ Loui. Redo. 

Defense) Company of the 2d Moroccan Infantry Regiment, most of whom remained 

on the alert in a neighboring village. 

shore, a mobile battery of three tractordrawn 155-mm. guns in a well-camouftaged 

position. 

(3) In a prepared position on high 

ground south of the town, next to the town's 

European cemetery, ,a battery of four 75-

mm. pieces operated by the 2d Regiment of 

the Foreign Legion. 

( 4-) Approximately two miles south of 

the town and a half mile inland from the 

( 5) Beside the Public Garden, a platoon 

of light tanks. 

The 5th Company of the 2d Moroccan 

Infantry Regiment quickly sent forward a 

picket platoon and moved to positions from 

which to resist landings in and about the 

harbor. 
102 

The Plan of Attack 

The Safi landing force (designated SubTask Force BLACKSTONE) • numbered 327 

officers and 6,101 enlisted men, commanded 

by Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, Commanding General, 2d Armored Division. 

The force was organized into two battalion 

landing teams (BLT's) for amphibious assault, with part of one infantry battalion in 

reserve; one armored landing team for early 

commitment with one medium tank battalion in reserve; a small medical unit, several specialized signal detachments, interpreters and interrogators of prisoners of 

war; and miscellaneous other detachments. 

The light tanks attached to the two 

BL T's came from Company B, 70th Tank 

Battalion (Separate). The Armored Landing Team consisted of elements of the 2d and 

3d Battalions, 67th Armored Regiment 

(thirty-six light and fifty-four medium 

tanks), supported by two batteries of selfpropelled 105-mm. howitzers, a provisional 

bridge company, signal and supply detachments-all from the 2d Armored Division. 

The sub-task force commander took his staff 

and headquarters from that division, as did 

Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, who controlled 

the Armored Landing Team through Headquarters, Combat Command B, and a detachment from Headquarters, 67th Armored Regiment. 

The main purpose in taking Safi was to 

get the medium tanks ashore to use as 

needed. The forthcoming operation was expected to fall into four major phases. First 

the port must be brought under control by 

seizing the docks and preventing sabotage, 

and by clearing the enemy from a deep 

beachhead around it. Next, the armored elements on the transport Titania and the me-

• See Table 1. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

dium tanks on the seatrain Lakehurst had 

to be brought ashore and assembled for combat. Third, the line of communication had 

to be made secure for a northward advance. 

Lastly, the armored force, in particular, had 

to hasten overland toward Casablanca using 

bridges over the Oum er Rbia river which 

must be secured as early as possible. To 

control the port and establish the beachhead, artillery batteries had to be neutralized and captured, machine gun positions 

cleared, the garrison subdued, and the arrival of French ground reinforcements or 

delivery of a serious air attack prevented by 

defended roadblocks and by supporting air 

cover. 

After reconnaissance, the assault was 

scheduled to open with surprise landings 

in the harbor itself from the Bernadou and 

the Cole. Following the latter from the line 

of departure, 3,500 yards offshore, at intervals of not more than 50 feet so as to keep 

each other in sight, were to Come a wave of 

five light tanks for GREEN Beach and three 

successive waves of infantry intended for 

Beaches BLUE, RED, and GREEN respectively. The trip in was to take from thirteen 

to sixteen minutes. Three more assault waves 

were to wait at the line of departure, the 

first two to be sent in by the control vessel 

at proper intervals and the last to remain in 

floating reserve until summoned from shore. 

First light was expected at 0536 and sunrise at 0700. The time for starting the run 

to shore was therefore set for 0330. 

Debarkation Begins 

Debarkation from the transports waiting 

off Safi proved more difficult than had been 

anticipated. Matters were complicated by 

the fact that, even before the men began 

shifting from the transports to landing craft, 
TAKING SAFI 

events did not go according to plan. After 

darkness had fallen on 7 November, the 

U.S. submarine Barb took station some two 

and one-half miles from Pointe de la Tour 

and disembarked a detachment of Anny 

scouts from the 47th Infantry to row in a 

rubber boat to the end of the long jetty, 

there to mark the harbor entrance by infrared signals in order to help the Bernadou 

and the Cole. In complete darkness, they 

entered the harbor before they discovered 

their exact whereabouts and were obliged 

to take shelter from the fire of sentries. The 

submarine, however, started continuous 

infrared signaling from its station. 

While landing craft were being loaded 

alongside the transports, a scout boat from 

the transport Harm commanded by Ensign 

John J. Bell, started in at 0200 carrying 

orders to the special landing groups on the 

Bernadou and Cole to execute the attack 

plan, and with instructions to obtain from 

the submarine a written report of its reconnaissance of YELLOW Beach. The submarine's signals could not be seen. II Ensign Bell 

therefore reported to the commanders of 

the Bernadou and the Cole that he would 

himself take a position off the tip of the jetty 

to assist their approach. He neared the harbor at minimum speed, cutting his motor 

every fifteen minutes and listening as he 

• The submarine remained until firing by friendly 

ships forced it to submerge, and then, shortly after 

0600, started for a patrol station southwest of 

Mogador, out of the attack zone and in the path of 

any French naval reinforcements from Dakar. Its 

beach reconnaissance had been completed so near 

the time of attack as to be of minor value. Its 

assistance to navigation .by the Ber"adou and Cole 

was superseded by that furnished from the scout 

boat carrying Ensign Bell. (I) Barb Action Rpt, 

25 Nov 42. SS220jA16, Ser 026C. (2) TF 34 Opn 

Plan 4-42, Annex A, Special Instruction for Safi 

Submarine. Copy in Col Gay Opnl Misc 1942 file, 

Kansas City Rcds Ctr. (3) Rpt of 1st Lt Willard 

G. Duckworth, 17 Nov 42, in 47th Inf AAR. 

103 

drifted. At 0410, as he neared the spot from 

which to guide the incoming Bernadou, he 

saw the lights at the end of the jetty go out, 

and from the general direction of Pointe de 

la Tour, barely descried the destroyer-transport nearing the harbor mouth. Its infrared 

light was visible. Ensign Bell turned on his 

own. 

The 1st Battalion Landing Team (BL T) , 

47th Infantry (Maj. Frederick C. Feil), disembarked from the Harris while the harbor 

entrance was being marked and the two 

destroyer-transports were getting into position to enter the port. The H arril twentyeight landing craft were lowered by 0035 

hours, while twenty-one more boats from 

the Lyon and the Calvert, were on the way. 

Those from the Lyon had difficulty finding 

the Hams and were late. Unloading operations in the darkness fell behind the appointed schedule, necessitating a delay of 

thirty minutes in the entire program. The 

vehicles and guns of the first wave of artillery had been loaded in three holds on the 

fourth deck of the Harris; to extract them, 

heavy vehicles had to be shifted and nine 

hatches had to be opened. The troops, moreover, weighed down with sixty-pound packs 

and weapons, crawled deliberately down 

the debarkation nets.8 

The limited training and experience of 

the Western Naval Task Force showed at 

this juncture. Getting the assigned landing 

craft to ship's side and lowering tanks, vehicles, ammunition, and equipment in the 

heavy swell proved unexpectedly difficult. 

Only four out of five tank lighters for the 

first wave and only the first three personnel 

waves were loaded from the Harris and sent 

to the rendezvous area off its port bow in 

time for the delayed H Hour. The other 

• Harris Action Rpt, 16 Nov 42. 
104 

FIRE CONTROL TOWER of the 

/30-mm. ballery on Pointe de la Tour. A 

shell plowed the furrow in the foreground 

and then ricocheted through the observation 

slot. 

two waves straggled. The wave of tanks and 

the three waves of troops started in, nonetheless, from the line of departure at 0400. 

They were escorted by the destroyers M ervine and Beatty. 

The Battle Opens 

The Beatty was expected to furnish fire 

support from an area south of the lanes of 

approach. It crossed behind the Bernadou 

to reach its position. In the darkness, the 

Beatty was mistaken by those on the Cole for 

the Bernadou itself. As the Bernadou neared 

the harbor mouth, the signal "VH" was 

flashed from the shore. It replied at once 

with the same signal. Nothing followed from 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

the shore for about fifteen minutes. Then, 

as the ship passed the north end of the jetty 

to enter the harbor mouth, the defenders of 

Safi suddenly poured fire in that direction 

from the 75-mm. battery at the Front de 

Mer, from machine guns emplaced along 

the bluffs and the high ground east of the 

port, and from rifles on the wharves and 

jetty. From its hidden position south of 

Safi, even the 155-mm. battery opened up, 

and the 130-mm. battery on Pointe de la 

Tour also began to bombard the transport 

area. The Bernadou's gunners replied with 

steady efficiency while the ship continued 

on her way. A flare with American flag attached was released above the harbor in the 

hope of moderating the hostile reception; 

for a brief period it assisted the French gun 

pointers but had no other effect. 

At 0428, when French gun flashes were 

observed by those on the Mervine, her commander gave the code signal for meeting 

such resistance, "Batter Up!" Her gunners, 

who had kept their weapons trained on the 

lights near the coast as the vessel escorted 

the landing craft toward the shore, responded almost instantly to firing orders 

with accurate and effective salvos. Only a 

minute or two later, the Beatty's 5-inch 

shells also began to strike the area from 

which French artillery and machine gun 

fire was coming. At 0438, Admiral Davidson signaled "Play Ball." The New York 

then took under fire the big guns on Pointe 

de la Tour, smashing the fire control tower 

with the second salvo of its 14-inch shells. 

At the same time, the Philadelphia shelled 

the supposed site of the battery to the south. 

For about ten minutes, fire was heavy, but 

it diminished as the Bernadou drew near 

shore within the port. 
TAKING SAFI 

Bearing Company K, 47th Infantry 

(Capt. Gordon H. Sympson), that old vessel pressed through the opening tempest of 

both hostile and friendly fire to the narrowing angle of the harbor near its southern 

limits. Boats at anchor barred quick access 

to the wharves; so the Bernadou made for 

a small mole between GREEN Beach and the 

Petite Darse, ran gently upon its rocks, flung 

over a landing net, and, at approximately 

0445, disembarked the first American 

troops to land in French Morocco. The first 

men clambered down the net a few feet and 

hastened along the mole to the positions 

which they had been trained to take. Others 

were much more deliberate. 

When the Cole observed the Beatty en 

route to her fire support position in the 

darkness and mistook her for the Bernadou, 

she turned southward to follow. Soon Ensign Bell in the scout boat saw her on a 

course certain to pile her against the jetty. 

By flashlight and then by voice radio, he 

signaled barely in time to stop her thirty 

yards short of a crash. Also by radio, he 

guided the Cole back on a curving course 

into the harbor. 

The tank lighters by this time had cut 

ahead of her and, although one fell out temporarily with motor trouble, three continued 

into the harbor to GREEN Beach, arriving 

there some twenty minutes after the Bernadou. The 47th Infantry Reconnaissance 

Platoon rode with the tanks in these lighters, 

and, on reaching shore, one section hastened 

through Company K to the post office to 

take over the telephone and telegraph central station and to cut communications with 

the rest of Morocco. They captured some 

French troops moving toward the port, 

seized an antitank gun, and disarmed civil 

105 

police." The Cole itself ran through a renewed outburst of machine gun and small 

arms fire but swung along the merchandise 

quay. Company L, 47th Infantry (Capt. 

Thomson Wilson), debarked and swarmed 

through the dock area, from which the defenders fled, while one American detachment overcame a machine gun crew to take 

poaession of the petroleum storage tanks 

about 350 yards east of the harbor. At daylight, the harbor, railroad station, post office, and highways entering the city from 

the south were held by men of the special 

landing groups. The enemy had taken cover 

in buildings and other places of vantage on 

the heights east and north of the port, from 

which sporadic fire was received well into 

the afternoon. 

The first three waves of the Major Fell's 

1st Battalion Landing Team, 47th Infantry, each with more than 200 men 

in a group of six landing craft personnel, ramp (LCPR's), landed before daylight on RED, BLUE, and GREEN Beaches. 

The plan to remain close enough for visual 

contact broke down during the run to shore. 

Each wave depended on navigation by compass and on the assistance of Ensign Bell's 

flashlight signals to save itself from fumbling around the harbor entrance until first 

light. The three waves reached land between 0500 and 0530, largely where they 

had expected to, and got themselves and 

their equipment up the beaches against 

minor resistance from higher ground. Company B and a platoon of Company A, 47th 

Infantry, pushed inland from Beach RED, 

but others advanced from Beaches BLUE 

and GREEN only after about an hour's delay. The fourth and fifth waves, held up 

'Rpt of 2d Sec Rcn Plat. 8 Nov 42, in 47th Inf 

AAR. This section was commanded by 1st Lt. J. W. 

Calton, who had had Commando training. 
106 

by various difficulties in debarkation, did 

not go ashore before daylight.' 

Daylight revealed to the defenders at the 

coastal defense guns on Pointe de la Tour 

the exact location, within easy range, of the 

transports and the destroyer Mervine. They 

resumed the firing which had been suspended about two hours previously, concentrating on the Mervine while the transports hastily moved farther from the shore. 

The destroyer, replying with its own guns 

as best it could, by energetic evasion also got 

out of range, but not until it had been 

straddled several times and its steering gear 

injured by a near miss astern. The fourth 

wave of the 1st BLT, 47th Infantry, started 

in for BLUE Beach just as the firing began 

and, passing unscathed under the shellfire, 

arrived about 0745. The fifth wave was 

withheld while the Harris moved out to sea, 

and did not land until about 0905. Meanwhile, Ensign Bell's scout boat hurried away 

from its vulnerable position near the harbor 

entrance and was sent to assist the landings 

at YELLOW Beach. 

The attempt to send the 2d BLT (Maj. 

Louis Gershenow) to YELLOW Beach had 

been thwarted until after daylight. The 

transport Dorothea L. Dix, crowded with 

approximately 1,450 officers and enlisted 

men, 5 light tanks, and nearly 1,500 tons 

of vehicles and other cargo, made hard work 

• (I) The first wave consisted of 212 men, a few 

more than in the second and third, distn'buted 

among the following units: Company A, 47th Infantry; 15th Engineers; and 163d Signal Company 

( Photo). The first wave also contained the following specialists: communications sergeant with 

SCR-536; shore party beach markers; two light 

machine gun squads; two 60-mm. mortar squads; 

four aid men; and two litter bearers. (2) USS 

Harris Action Rpt, 16 Nov 42. (3) 47th 10£ Hist, 

I Aug 40--31 Dec 42. (4) Adams, AGF ObIT's Rpt, 

7 Ian 43. Copy in AGF 319.1 (For. Obs), Binder 

I, Tab 8. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

of debarkation. Lowering and loading of 

landing craft in the heavy swell fell considerably behind the schedule. Its scout boat, 

away in time to take station oft' YELLOW 

Beach at 0355, waited there for the destroyer Knight to escort the waves of landing craft, but the Knight was not ready until after 0500. The destroyer began the eightmile movement from the transport area with 

only five imperfectly organized waves of the 

ten needed to carry the whole landing team. 

En route, these five lost contact with the 

destroyer and returned to the transport area; 

here they circled about, and did not start 

for YELLOW Beach again until 0800, when 

La Railleuse had ceased firing. 

The abortive first effort of the 2d BL T 

to reach YELLOW Beach during the last hour 

of darkness had hardly begun when one of 

the most disturbing episodes of the Safi 

landing occurred. A truck being lowered by 

the Dix into an LeV (landing craft, vehicle) was swung heavily against the side 

by the ship's motion. An extra gasoline can 

on the truck was crushed, spraying gasoline 

into the motor of the craft below. There it 

exploded, igniting the boat, the truck, and 

the ship's side. Flames flared up brilliantly, 

silhouetting other vessels in the transport 

area. On other ships and among troops at 

the beaches or in landing craft, the belief 

prevailed that the Dix had been torpedoed. 

This impression was strengthened by exploding ammunition in the burning LCV, 

which gave the semblance of combat until 

the craft sank, the noise subsided, and the 

flaming truck was dropped overboard. 

The harbor, the port facilities, and the 

southern part of Safi were brought under 

American control by the special landing 

groups and part of the 47th Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon in less time than it 

took the 1st BLT to take its objective-the 
TAKING SAFI 

high ground northeast and north of the 

harbor. The first three waves of the 1st 

BLT, as already noted, reachd RED, BLUE, 

and GREEN Beaches against minor resistance, and in darkness. They organized the 

beaches and prepared to advance inland to 

the Front de Mer, Pointe de la Tour, and 

other centers of French resistance. As the 

light improved, fire from machine guns and 

concealed riflemen increased. Company C, 

which landed at 0630, had expected the 

support of light tanks from GREEN Beach, 

but these vehicles were delayed for several 

hours. Only three tank lighters, it will be 

remembered, reached GREEN Beach together, shortly after the Bernadou had arrived there. A fourth lighter straggled in 

much later after repairing an engine failure 

which had forced it to drop out of the wave 

formation. A fifth made the trip from the 

Harris to the beach alone. Once ashore, all 

the tanks were immobilized by drowned 

motors, faulty batteries, or by the steep, soft 

sand. It was after 0800 before they were 

ready for action. By that time, naval gun 

fire had silenced the coastal defense guns, 

and most of the high ground adjacent to the 

port was in American possession, although 

enemy riflemen remained concealed on the 

bluff or in buildings overlooking the harbor. 

The infantry, after bogging down under fire, 

were rallied by Col. Edwin H. Randle and 

moved inland without the tanks to their objectives along the beachhead line. Company 

D passed through them after landing at 

BLUE Beach at 0705. 

Completing the Seizure of Saft 

Deepening the beachhead and clearing a 

channel for the seatrain Lakehurst from the 

transport area to the harbor were the next 

operations to be attempted. To assist in the 

107 

first operation, the remainder of the 3d 

BLT, 47th Infantry (Maj. John B. Evans), 

was ordered ashore from the Lyon to reinforce the special harbor landing groups as 

soon as landing craft became available. Disembarkation began at 0755 and the first 

wave started in at 0903, but the unit was 

not all ashore and reorganized until about 

noon. 

The 2d BL T began its second attempt to 

reach YELLOW Beach from the Dix just before 0800 and at noon most of the unit was 

ashore and ready to move upon Safi along 

the coastal roads. Part of the 2d Battalion 

was eventually sent directly into the port, 

where it rejoined those who had by then 

marched north from YELLOW Beach after 

setting up roadblocks and blowing up the 

railroad en route. The Armored Landing 

Team, whose light tanks and other vehicles 

were on the Titania, while most of its personnel was on the Calvert, was ordered at 

about 0900 to start sending tanks to the 

beach in lighters. Within an hour, one 

platoon had cleared GREEN Beach and was 

bound to Pointe de la Tour to investigate 

the situation there. In midmorning, General 

Gaffey, with one more platoon of five tanks, 

hastened from BLUE Beach to reinforce an 

infantry team in quelling renewed resistance 

at the old Portuguese fort. Thereafter, all 

tanks were unloaded within the harbor from 

ship to quay. 

Before either the 3d BL T from GREEN 

Beach or the 2d BL T from YELLOW Beach 

had extended its control over the site of 

the 155-mm. mobile battery two miles south 

of Safi, that battery renewed its firing in 

one final bombardment of Safi harbor. The 

Philadelphia's supporting fire at the opening 

of the battle seemed at the time to have 

silenced it, but as the Armored Landing 

Team began to debark from the Titania, 
108 

shells believed to come from these large guns 

made it necessary to neutralize them at 

once. General Harmon, at 1025, got a call 

through to the cruiser Philadelphia requesting fire on the battery's supposed position. 

Ten minutes later, while an observation 

plane helped locate the camouflaged target, 

the cruiser began dropping salvos of 6-inch 

shells which finally found their mark. To 

complete the destruction of the battery, 

bombers worked over it until a direct hit 

on one gun was seen. Later investigation indicated that the French had themselves 

rendered the weapons unusable. Mter the 

French shelling ceased, unloading of the 

tanks was resumed at noon, and when the 

channel had been swept early in the afternoon, both the seatrain Lakehurst and the 

Titania moved to dockside moorings. The 

Calvert and Lyon anchored just outside the 

harbor. 

American possession of the main defensive batteries and of the harbor was disputed by harassing small arms fire long after 

it became imperative, under orders from 

General Patton, to expedite the unloading. 

American troops were engaged, for at least 

an hour after the seatrain docked, in a fire 

fight in the vicinity of GREEN Beach and 

along the waterfront streets against a few 

riflemen concealed in buildings and on the 

hillsides. Unloading kept stopping as men 

took cover from whining bullets. 

The main center of resistance until midafternoon on D Day was the walled French 

Army barracks area, between the port and 

the newer part of the town, southeast of the 

medina. Company K, leaving one platoon at 

the roadblock on the highway to Mogador, 

was ordered back at about 0730 to engage 

the occupants of the barracks, but at the 

southern limit of the area was pinned down 

by machine gun and rifle fire. When I ComNORTHWEST AFRICA 

pany approached from the northeast, it too 

was held up. The defenders then tried to 

counterattack with three light tanks only 

to have two of them knocked out of service 

by antitank rifle grenades, while the driver 

of a third was stunned in colliding with a 

wall. The tanks were seized and their guns 

were turned against the barracks. Early in 

the afternoon, a section of M Company's 

81-mm. mortars, commanded by Capt. 

James D. Johnston, began dropping high 

explosive shells around the area for two 

hours while the garrison still held out. In 

the meantime, Battery A, 84th Field Artillery, got its truck-drawn 75-mm. pieces emplaced above BLUE Beach in a position 

which commanded both the barracks area 

and the main thoroughfare to Marrakech. 

The guns were not employed against the 

barracks for fear of harming friendly troops, 

but the area was surrendered anyway at 

about 1530, 8 November. About that time, 

General Harmon landed and soon had tank 

and motorized patrols clearing out the 

snipers who were harassing the troops unloading supplies in the port. The day's operations, during which Companies C and 

L in the port area took the most punishment, were almost completed. Safi had been 

taken. 

Almost from the first, civilian natives became a problem to the attacking troops. 

They gathered in awed crowds to observe 

the naval shelling; they were disdainfully 

unafraid of small arms fire. A soldier would 

snake his way painfully through rocks and 

rubble to set up a light machine gun, raise 

his head cautiously to aim, and find a dozen 

natives clustered solemnly around him. 

Street intersections were crowded with natives turning their heads like a tennis gallery 

in trying to watch the exchange of fire. The 

wounded were poked and jabbered at. An 
TAKING SAFI 

unfolded map quickly attracted an excited 

group. During the afternoon, the natives 

thronged the beaches, unloading landing 

craft for the price of a cigarette, a can of 

food, a piece of cloth, plus whatever they 

could steal. Pilferage they attempted with 

tireless energy. Two days later tons of ammunition and rations were to be found 

loaded on native fishing ve!Sels. The theft 

of weapons was far less frequent. Both civilian and military French officials joined in 

urging preventive measures to deal with the 

native propensity for sniping.' 

Control over the deepening bridgehead 

eventually gave security to the unloading 

operations from all serious danger except a 

retaliatory air strike. The air cover which 

the Santee could offer was extremely weak, 

for its complement had been hurried into 

combat while still greatly lacking in experience and training. Admiral Davidson preferred to depend upon the seaplanes of the 

New York and the Philadelphia. Since the 

French air units at Marrakech were reported 

to be friendly, plans to strike the airfield at 

dawn on D Day had been canceled, and air 

action was limited to reconnaissance. 

French aviation remained quiet until midafternoon. Then, at about 1540, and again 

a little later, a two-engined bomber circled 

low enough over the harbor to draw anti. 

aircraft fire from the batteries ashore and 

from the seatrain. It seemed likely that, before daylight returned next day, Safi would 

be under French air attack. 

When darkness fell on Safi, the beachhead extended about 5,000 yards from the 

port. All the roads leading into the town 

were blocked. Traffic entered the city only 

after all persons had been searched for 

• Adams, AGF Obu's Rpt, 7 Jan 43. Copy in 

AGF 319.1 (For. Oha), Binder I, Tab 8. 

109 

weapons; no one was allowed to leave. The 

streets were patrolled. Prisoners of war, 

eventually to number about 300, were accumulating in a newly organized e,l1c1osure. 

Known Axis collaborationists were in custody. At the piers and near the end of the 

jetty, the transport crews were putting 

ashore the tanks, vehicles, and supplies of 

Combat Command B, 2d Armored Division. 

To guard against possible counterattacks, 

the tanks from the Titania, the Harris, and 

the Lyon were either concentrated at an assembly area on Horseshoe Hill, about three 

miles northeast of the harbor, or sent on reconnaissance toward Marrakech. Casualties 

had been light, only three dead and twentyfive wounded having been evacuated to the 

Hams by the medical beach party. One 

man had drowned while going over the 

side from the Lyon. 

A.ir A.ction at Saft 

On D Day no threat of a French counterattack from Marrakech was noted, but 

French air reconnaissance and strafing in 

the latter part of the afternoon, at the probable cost of one plane, indicated that 

stronger resistance might be forthcoming. 

It could, as an early morning warning 

stated, take the form of a heavy bombing 

raid on the shipping and stores concentrated 

in the port; or it might take the form of 

an overland attack by armored troops. In 

any event, the Americans would be wInerable to the air but reasonably strong on 

the ground. Their objective remained that 

of getting the armor ashore and on its 

way north to help effect the capture of 

Casablanca, not to use it in an attack on 

Marrakech. 

The morning of 9 November brought 

the expected French air strike. At dawn, 
110 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

NAVY FIGHTER PLANES FROM THE USS SANTEE on the small airfield at Safi· 

just as planes from the Santee were beginning antisubmarine patrol, and with the 

coast itself shrouded in thick fog, what 

sounded like a considerable formation of 

enemy planes passed over the town and 

harbor. Only one determined bomber, unable to discern the target through the fog, 

swept under the ceiling for a low-level run 

over the seatrain with its load of medium 

tanks. It struck instead one of the small 

warehouses near the ship, a building which 

had been used as an ammunition dump. 

The structure was soon ablaze and ammunition began to explode. The resulting damage, casualties, and delay in unloading, 

though considerable for a single bomb, were 

minor for a whole raid. The plane itself 

was caught by antiaircraft fire and crashed 

on RED Beach. The rest of the French formation did not return. 

Less than an hour later, an American carrier-based plane reconnoitered the Marrakech airdrome and was fired upon. The task 

force commander reluctantly concluded that 

the airfield must be neutralized before his 

armored column could leave the area for 

Casablanca. In the latter part of the afternoon, therefore, a formation of twelve 

planes from the Santee delivered the first 

attack, destroying eight or more widely dispersed aircraft on the ground and setting 

fire to the hangar.!. Eventually, some forty 

French planes of all types were destroyed 

on the Marrakech field.10 

While approaching the Marrakech targets, and again on their return, the formation also attacked more than forty trucks 

.. Rpt, Capt Roland Getz to WTF, 28 Nov 42, 

in 47th Inf AAR. 
TAKING SAFI 

carrying French reinforcements toward Safi, 

strafing and dispersing them. This air strike 

opened the last phase of the battle. With 

gasoline running too low for the return to 

the Santee, the planes had to land on the 

small airfield at Safi, which had been enclosed within the beachhead. But as the 

planes ran downgrade on its irregular runway, six hit soft spots and nosed over. 

During the morning, Admiral Davidson 

and General Harmon recommended to Admiral Hewitt and General Patton that some 

of the Army P-40's on the carrier Chenango 

be based temporarily at Safi. The planes 

could use gasoline and ground crews furnished by General Harmon's force, with 

maintenance personnel and equipment from 

the cruiser Philadelphia. Drums of aviation 

gasoline and lubricating oil were taken to 

the airfield from the Titania, and four antiaircraft guns were set up there and manned 

by Army units. Although the P-40's were 

not sent, the little field was dotted by nightfall with the unfortunate planes from the 

Santee. To get five which were still operational back in the air on 10 November, a 

portion of the adjacent highway was prepared for use as an air strip. A bulldozer 

began to level the trees on either side and, 

although delayed during the night by a 

sniper, completed the task next morning. 

By then the wind had unfortunately shifted, 

sweeping across the highway. Only two out 

of five attempts at take-off were successful. 

The remaining planes were therefore left 

for salvage. 

Unloading of cargo at Safi was completed 

as rapidly as possible, but with such insufficient provision for setting up inland dumps 

that the docks and beaches became congested. The transports, moored at the 

wharves or anchored off the end of the jetty, 

continued unloading throughout the first 

III 

night after the landings. They were screened 

against submarines and air attack by a close 

semicircle of seven supporting warships 

while the cruiser, the escort carrier, and 

their respective destroyer screens moved out 

to sea. The Titania's landing craft were released to the Calvert as the former's cargo 

was swung by booms down to the phosphate 

pier. To unload, the Calvert first used BLUE 

and GREEN Beaches, then slips of the Petite 

Darse, and finally a berth vacated by the 

Titania on the evening of 11 November. 

The Lyon came in on the evening of the 

12th. A large naval working party, after 

making room on the docks, emptied the 

Lyon in time for her departure at 1600, 13 

November. The Harris and the Dix were 

similarly cleared for return to Norfolk at 

that time. 11 

Stopping French Reinforcement From 

Marrakech 

The considerable French garrison at 

Marrakech, the center of the Safi-Mogador 

defense sector, was commanded by General 

Martin, from whom General Bethouart had 

expected to receive assistance. General Martin's intention to aid the Americans was 

revised upon his receipt of orders which he 

would not disobey but which he executed 

with what seemed like less than maximum 

power or alacrity. 13 

11 ( 1) Emptying the Harris required 368 boatloads, and was completed on the afternoon of 11 

November (D plus 3). The Lak,laurst suffered a 

jammed derrick and thus got all the medium tanks 

ashore only after being at the pier about fortyeight hours. Ltr, Patton to Marshall, 15 Nov 42. 

Copy in OPD Exec 8, Bk. 7, Tab 5. (2) Patton 

Diary, 11 Nov 42. D (1) Bethouart, The Occurrences of 8 November 

in Morocco. OCMH. (2) Ltr, Nogu~s to author, 

28 Jan 50, notes on Amer landings in Morocco. 
112 

o 

I 

o 

ADVANCE FROM SAFI 

9 -11 November 1942 

_ BLACKSTONE ... s or OOVANCE 

x 

.0 

EN'CiA(;EM£Nf WITH FRENCH 

TROOPS r~O\l MARRAKECH 

£ levOl/ons In m~/ers 

2? 3,0 4,0 MlIL.ES 

"0 20 3:0 4 '0 5'0 .c ILOU[T[AS 

MAP2 

Reinforcements for the Safi garrison were 

first sighted on the highway from Marrakech at 1350 hours, 9 November. One 

section in fourteen trucks had almast 

reached the Bou Guedra crossroads, fifteen 

miles east of Safi, before being strafed by the 

planes from the Santee. (Map 2) Planes 

from the Santee dispersed a second and 

larger group of perhaps forty trucks at about 

1600, ten miles east of Bou Guedra. Near 

Chemaia, forty miles southeast of Safi, a 

third section consisting not only of trucks 

but also of horse-drawn vehicles and foot 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

7" :r,.mp/~ 

soldiers was observed and attacked about an 

hour later. 11 While these air attacks were 

delaying the French advance, the 1st Armored Landing Team's tanks and artillery 

II This column was later identified as consisting 

of: the 11 th Separate Squadron of the African 

Chuseun; lit Battalion (seven 75·mm. guns). 

Moroccan Colonial Artillery; 2d Battalion (two 

companies only). 2d Regiment of Foreign Legion 

Infantry; and Stair. Regimental Company. and 1st 

Battalion of the 2d Moroccan Tirailleun Regiment. 

all under the command of Colonel Paris. Journal 

of Action. of the High Command of Moroccan 

Troops. 8-11 Nov 42. Copy in WTF Final Rpt. 

G-2 Annex, Item 11. 
TAKING SAFI 113 

SEA TRAIN LA KEHU RST at Safi afler discharging her cargo !if medium tanks. A damaged 

Navy scout observation plane is taken aboard. 

which had already come ashore were dispatched under command of Lt. Col. W. M. 

Stokes to intercept the column. First contact 

was reported at 1700, one and a half miles 

east of Bou Guedra. Colonel Stokes's force 

eliminated a French machine gun outpost 

there, took the bridge, and continued the 

advance until sunset. Mines along the road 

knocked out one American tank. The 

Americans bivouacked that night east of Bou 

Guedra and prepared for a morning battle. 

The French occupied defensive artillery positions commanding the passes in the foothills farther east, and waited. 

When contact was resumed next morning, over three hundred 105-mm. shells 

were fired on the French artillery in the hills. 

The French replied for a time, revealing 

enough strength to promise a substantial engagement before progress toward Marrakech could be resumed. A determined attack with all elements of the armored force 

could have defeated the French only at some 

cost in casualties and delays. General Harmon's orders specified that he should undertake operations against the Marrakech 

garrison only to guarantee security to the 

beachhead at Safi and to his line of communications to the north. The principal need 

for his medium tanks was against the city 

of Casablanca, 140 miles away. General 

Harmon himself surveyed the situation at 
114 

Bou Guedra while the last tanks were being 

swung to the pier from the seatrain, and 

learned from the interrogation of prisoners 

that the French column had been deprived 

of its mobility by the previous day's air and 

ground action. He concluded that the 47th 

Combat Team, with its light tanks of Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, could contain 

the enemy and protect the unloading operations at Safi while the armored column disengaged after dark and started for Casablanca via Mazagan. Late that afternoon, 

when the medium tanks were all ashore, he 

issued orders for the night march. It might 

still be possible to contribute to the capture 

of Casablanca.14 

The Armored Force Starts Toward 

Casablanca 

At 0900, 10 November, Combat Command B, 2d Armored Division, began its 

march north from the vicinity of Bou 

Guedra over the road leading to Mazagan. 

Along the coast, the Philadelphia, Cowie, 

and Knight started for Mazagan about 

1930 to furnish fire support for the armored 

column there. The Bernadou and Cole, 

laden with men, ammunition, and supplies, 

each escorting six landing craft which carried gasoline in cans, departed that same 

evening to bring supplementary fuel and 

ammunition for the armored vehicles. The 

forces by land and sea made steady, uneventful progress beneath a starlit sky. 

The armored column halted at 0430, II 

November, three miles south of Mazagan, 

where the garrison was understood to be 

friendly and weak. Actually, it had been de-

.. (I) WTF Final Rpt, G-2 Annex, Item 5, p. 5. 

(2) The final report of the 47th Infantry's losses 

was: 7 kiUed in action; 41 wounded in action; 2 

missing in action. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

pleted by sending reinforcements to Casablanca. The bridge across the steep-sided 

Oum er Rbia river valley was intact and apparently not defended, but the principal 

crossing at Azemmour, twelve miles northeast of Mazagan, was believed to be strongly guarded by artillery, including antitank 

guns, and by infantry. The first step was to 

secure Mazagan and the next to cross the 

river at Azemmour, with a minimum of 

delay. 

A reconnaissance force entered Mazagan 

without challenge about 0600, thus suggesting that capture of the town would be easy. 

The armored force south of Mazagan 

therefore divided, the medium tank battalion and one artillery battery going directly to seize the Azemmour bridge while 

the light tanks and another battery entered 

Mazagan. About 0730, the Azemmour 

bridge was found to be undefended. At the 

same time, planes from the cruiser Philadelphia and from the carrier Santee began 

to drone over Mazagan while tanks rumbled 

along its streets. Quickly and without a 

fight, the garrison made a formal surrender. 

Port and town were secured, but imperfect 

communication between General Harmon 

and Admiral Davidson left the latter for a 

time in some suspense. At 0850, a radio 

warning-"Stop bombing over Mazagan. 

No fight if no bombs" -indicated that his 

naval fire support would not be required. 

About an hour later, General Harmon's report of the earlier French surrender at 0745 

was received by those on the Philadelphia. 

The surrender of Mazagan, indeed, was 

made at the same time that Casablanca itself ceased all resistance to the American 

forces by which it was being encircled. Admiral Hewitt's instruction to withhold the 

bombardment of Casablanca was overheard 
TAKING SAFI 

on the Philadelphia at 0710. Dispatches 

were sent from that cruiser to General Harmon by seaplane somewhat later, and Combat Command B, 2d Armored Division, was 

assembling southwest of Azemmour when 

the need to hurry northward to Casablanca 

came to an end. 

Rather abruptly, then, Sub-Task Force 

BLACKSTONE'S principal mission terminated 

without the final stage of commitment to 

battle in the vicinity of Casablanca. When 

General Nogues signified the readiness of 

Casablanca to cease resistance, the American armored force was not poised at the 

edge of the great city. It was more than 

fifty miles away, in the vicinity of Azemmour and Mazagan. Most of the tanks had 

115 

not yet crossed the river. General Harmon's 

force had prevented the reinforcement of 

Casablanca, and of Safi itself, from Marrakech. While its armored elements had been 

moving to the position which they reached 

by sunrise on 11 November (D plus 3), the 

larger force at Fedala (Sub-Task Force 

BRUSHWOOD), with the Center Attack 

Group of the Western Naval Task Force, 

had been engaged in operations controlled 

by the fact that they were in much closer 

proximity to the ultimate objective. And 

farther north, the airfield at Port-Lyautey 

had come into American possession. From 

the operations of the Safi force, the story 

turns therefore to the battles nearer Casablanca during the same period. 
CHAPTER VII 

Fedala to Casablanca 

The main amphibious attack for the capture of Casablanca was to be delivered at 

Fedala.1 There Force BRUSHWOOD; consisting of the 3d Infantry Division, reinforced mainly by an armored landing team 

from the 67th Armored Regiment, 2d 

Armored Division, was to establish itself on 

shore, seize the small port, and swing southwestward to capture Casablanca. While it 

was advancing to positions in the outskirts 

of that city, Combat Command B, 2d 

Armored Division, would be making its way 

to the southern side from its landings at 

Safi. Planes of the XII Air Support Command, using the Port-Lyautey airdrome 

soon after D Day, would supplement naval 

air support from the carrier Ranger and the 

escort carrier Suwannee. Off Casablanca, 

the warships of the Covering Group would 

protect the naval task force from French 

naval units based in Casablanca or Dakar. 

The Augusta, Brooklyn, and others would 

1 Basic sources (or this chapter are: (1) WTF 

Final Rpt, Operations TORCH, with annexes. ORB 

AGO. See particularly Annex 2 (Sub-Task Force 

BRUSHWOOD Opns Rpt), 8 Dec 42, with incls. See 

also Annexes 7,8,9, and 11, as well as 0-2 (Annex 

5), Item 11, which contains a copy o( Journal of 

Actions of the High Command of Moroccan Troops, 

8-11 Nov 42. (2) 3d Div FO 1, 17 Oct 42, with 

annexes, 10-17 Oct 42. (3) Bn AAR'., especially 

those of 7th, 15th, 30th, 47th, and 60th Inf. (4) 

Action Rpts of CTG 34.1, CTG 34.9, and of Lllonard Wood, /oslIph T. Dickman, Thomas /II"rlon, 

and CharlllS Carroll. (5) Col Harry McK. Roper, 

Obsr's Rpt, 22 Dec 42. ORB AGO. 

• See pp. 121-22 below. 

furnish fire support to troops ashore. But 

successful landings at Fedala were to be the 

first phase. 

The town of F edala is on a shallow bay 

which lies between two rivers and between 

the rugged projection of Cap de Fedala at 

the southwest and the bold headland of 

Cherqui, three miles to the northeast. ( Map 

II) The small harbor is at the western end 

of the bay. Its protected waters are enclosed 

by an 800-foot breakwater on the inner side 

of the cape and another, extending twice 

as far and at right angles to it, from the 

southern shore of the bay. Through an opening about 100 yards wide between the tips 

of these jetties, a dredged channel enters the 

port. An almost continuous crescent of 

sandy beach extends from the longer breakwater to the Cherqui headland. At a few 

points this broad strand is divided by rocky 

outcrops and, at the base of Cherqui, by the 

mouth of the Nefifikh river. That stream 

enters the bay from a deep ravine or wadi 

extending almost directly south for well over 

a mile. The Mellah river on the other hand, 

the mouth of which is outside the bay at the 

base of Cap de F edala, approaches the coast 

by a meandering course through marshes 

and tidal flats. From the sand dunes along 

the coast between these rivers, a level shelf 

extends inland for from half to three 

quarters of a mile before the land rises very 

gradually to less than 200 feet above sea 

level. A secondary coastal road and the 

railway between Casablanca and the north 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 117 

CAP DE FEDALA with its petroleum storage tanks and lighthouse tower. 

run along the base of this easy slope. The 

main highway between Casablanca and 

Rabat lies one mile or more farther inland. 

The railroad skirts the town except for a 

short branch extending to the harbor. 

Before World War II Fedala was a community of about 16,000 which combined 

the functions of a small fishing port, a major 

petroleum storage and distributing point, 

and a popular pleasure resort. Its hotel, race 

track, casino, golf course, broad, palm-lined 

streets and formal gardens, its parks and 

bathing beach, were among the attractions 

for vacationists. Several sets of petroleum 

storage tanks, a small harbor, and the fishing port within it, met the chief requirements of commerce. On Cap de Fedala a 

lighthouse tower guided pilots past several 

hazards in adjacent waters. 

Within five miles of Fedala on either side, 

ten possible sandy landing beaches were designated. Four were deemed appropriate for 

major use by battalion landing teams and 

two for auxiliary use by smaller units on 

special missions. All the main landings were 

directed to sections of shore in the Baie de 

Fedala identified as Beaches RED 2, RED 3, 

BLUE, and BLUE 2. RED beach lay directly 

under the guns on Cap de Fedala and was 

faced by a ten-foot seawall. It was reserved 

for follow-up landings when the whole region should be under American control. 

Smaller units could land at Beach YELLOW, 

near the mouth of the MeUah river, and on 

Beach BLUE 3, in the Mansouria inlet about 

three miles northeast of the Cherqui headland. Except for Beach BLUE 2, which was 

on the shore of a cove at the Nefifikh river's 

mouth, all four of the better beaches led by 

an easy gradient through sand dunes to flat 

land above. All four beaches were dangerously exposed to the high surf which surged 

in on an average of four days out of five 

in November. Even more unprotected were 
118 

the shores directly northeast of Cherqui and 

southwest of Cap de Fedala. 

The advance from the Baie de Fedala to 

Casablanca was to be made over an area 

extending along the coast some sixteen 

miles. The initial beachhead was to extend 

about five miles inland between the eastern 

bank of the Nefifikh river and the western 

edge of the Me1lah river. Thereafter, during 

D Day the prescribed objective line would 

be reached by advancing southwesterly for 

another four miles beyond the Mellah. 

The most dangerous feature of the amphibious attack at F edala was the ability 

of coastal defense guns there to enfilade the 

beaches. Two batteries were in menacing 

positions on Cap de Fedala. From the tip, 

two 75-mm. guns with a range of 9,000 

yards could fire on any of the beaches on 

which major landings were planned. Near 

the base of the cape, four 100-mm. guns 

comprised the Batterie de Fedala, or Batterie du Port, and could fire directed salvos 

within a range of 15,400 yards. The most 

powerful battery was on the Cherqui headland. It was known as the Batterie du Pont 

Blondin and consisted of four 138.6-mm. 

(5.4-inch) guns capable of firing on targets 

20,000 yards distant. Near these guns were 

searchlights, antiaircraft machine guns, and 

rifle and machine gun pits-all on ground 

well organized for defense. A fourth battery 

was reported to consist of "three or four 

large-caliber guns" at a point about two 

miles northeast of the Batterie du Pont 

Blondin and 1,600 yards southwest of Mansouria inlet. 

Antiaircraft batteries had been identified 

southwest of Fedala near the golf course, 

on the golf course itself, and farther up the 

MeUah river on its western bank, south of 

the railroad. Two antiaircraft or dual purpose guns, as large as lO5-mm. in caliber, 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

and others, 75-mm. or perhaps 90-mm., 

with searchlights and smaU antiaircraft machine guns were indicated at these sites. 

If Fedala's coastal batteries were the 

greatest hazard to the landing force, the 

proximity of the French naval units in Casablanca harbor furnished another threat. 

The Jean Bart's big IS-inch rifles could 

reach the Fedala area, several submarines 

might slip out to inflict grave damage on 

the transports or escort vessels, and other 

French warships would no doubt be ready 

to grasp an opportunity to interfere with 

American naval support of the forces ashore. 

Fedala's garrison was estimated at not 

quite 2,500 men, consisting of a battalion 

plus one company of infantry, two mechanized troops of Spahis, an antiaircraft artillery battery, and other arti11ery units. The 

field artillery had an undetermined number 

of 75-mm. guns and sixteen 13.2-mm. machine guns. Reinforcements could be expected from Rabat, only forty-three miles 

to the northeast; up to five battalions of 

cavalry, two armored battalions, and several 

battalions of infantry might come from as 

far away as Meknes. 

Casablanca's defenders were estimated at 

five battalions of infantry (4,325 men)-

colonial, Moroccan, and Senegalese; at 

least two troops of cavalry (300 men), of 

which one would be mechanized; two battalions of artillery and one of antiaircraft 

( 1,600-1,700 men); naval ground units 

operating the coastal defense guns, and a 

strong assemblage of warships at the Casablanca naval base. From the Rabat-Sale 

and Cazes airdromes, according to best reports, the French Air Force could throw 

fifty fighters and thirty bombers into the 

battle. Reinforcements were expected from 

Mazagan, Kasba Tadla, and Mediouna. 

Thus the attack on Casablanca from Fedala 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

might require seizure of the beachhead from 

somewhat less than 2,500 defenders; defense of Fedala from counterattack and advance southwestward along the coast would 

have to be made against perhaps 6,500 

others. 

In moving to invest Casablanca, some 

American units would push inland to encircle the city and cut its approaches from 

the southeast and south. The terrain to be 

covered in this scheme of maneuver was not 

difficult. The flat sheH along the coast was 

not quite one mile in depth, rising gradually to a tableland eroded into low, gently 

contoured hills and ridges. Small vineyards 

and clumps of woods were widely dispersed 

among numerous small farms. Footpaths 

and mule tracks crossed the hills in many 

directions. One stream bed, that of the Hasser river, wound southwesterly from the Mellah between banks neither high nor precipitous. 

The approach to Casablanca along either 

the main highway or the railway from Rabat led through the eastern suburb of Ain 

Seba1, about three miles from the harbor, 

and past an industrial section south of 

Roches Noires. At Ain Sebaa, a peripheral 

road, the Route de Grande Ceinture, 

branched southwestward from the main 

highway and circled Casablanca at a distance of from three to four miles from the 

port. On the level ground and easy slopes 

between this road and the thickly settled 

portion of the city, the parks, cemeteries, 

and newer residential areas which fringed 

the city were to be found. On the western 

side of the city about three miles from the 

harbor were the racecourse, hotel, and suburban estates of Anfa, the scene of President Roosevelt's overseas conference with 

Prime Minister Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff two months later. 

119 

Casablanca lies at a bulge on the six miles 

of coast between two headlands, Table 

d'Oukacha on the east and El Hank on the 

west. The artificial harbor was east of the 

bulge. Its area and depth, the tugs and 

barges there, the power-driven cranes, railway sidings, and covered storage-all made 

it a maritime prize in 1942. 

Casablanca's coastal defenses were 

strong. On Pointe El Hank were two batteries, one consisting of four 194-mm. (7.6-

inch) and the other offour 138.6-mm. (5.4-

inch) guns, each equipped with range finder 

apparatus and searchlights and protected by 

concrete emplacements and by organized 

defensive positions. On Table d'Oukacha, a 

battery of four l00-mm. guns was similarly 

equipped. In the harbor at the end of a long 

jetty were two 75-mm. coast defense guns. 

The port was protected by a six-and-onehalf-foot concrete wall from one breakwater 

to the other and bristled with antiaircraft 

batteries and machine guns in protected 

emplacements along jetties. 

The antiaircraft defenses included batteries of 75-mm. guns on El Hank, in the 

harbor, on the goH course at Anfa, and in 

Ain Sebaa. Southwest of the city was the 

Cazes airfield, from which defending planes 

might rise to protect the port and city. The 

Covering Group of the Western Naval Task 

Force was to wait for the French to open 

hostilities. The American plan of attack contemplated only counterbattery fire against 

the French coastal guns and no overland 

assault against them except from F edala 

and Safi. 

Such then were the objective and the defenses. Now to tum to the actual FedalaCasablanca operation. The joint ArmyNavy expeditionary force making the amphibious attack at F edala consisted of the 

Center Attack Group of the Western Naval 
CASABLANCA, the main objective on the Atlantic coast of Morocco . Note lighthouse on 

Pointe eL Hank, center f oreground, top. 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

Task Force carrying Sub-Task Force 

BRUSHWOOD. The fire support vessels were 

the cruisers .Augusta and Brooklyn and the 

destroyers Wilkes, Swanson, Ludlow, and 

Murphy. Air support was furnished from 

the carrier Ranger and the escort carrier 

Suwannee, protected by one cruiser and 

five destroyers. Troop and cargo transports 

numbered fifteen, screened by a squadron 

of six destroyers. Also on hand were the 

tanker Winooski and five mine craft. The 

Center Attack Group, with 17,700 naval 

personnel, was commanded from the transport Leonard Wood by Capt. R. R. M. 

Emmett (USN). 

Force BRUSHWOOD-the 3d Infantry 

Division, reinforced chiefly by an armored 

landing team from the lst Battalion, 67th 

Armored Regiment (Maj. Richard E. Nelson) -was organized into three regimental 

landing groups (RLG's). These were based 

on the 7th (Col. Robert C. Macon), the 

15th (Col. Thomas H. Monroe), and the 

30th (Col. Arthur H. Rogers) Infantry 

Regiments. Each regimental landing group 

consisted of three battalion landing teams 

comprising in the main a battalion of infantry, a platoon of combat engineers, one 

or more platoons of self-propelled antiaircraft guns, shore fire control and air support 

parties, medical, signal, service, and other 

detachments, and in the case of two RLG's 

(7th and 30th), a company of shore party 

engineers and a platoon of light tanks. RLG 

15 was to land later at the same beaches as 

the other two. Supporting arms were drawn 

from the 9th, 10th, 39th, and 41st Field 

Artillery Battalions, the 10th Combat Engineer Battalion, 36th Engineer Regiment 

(shore party), 443rd Coast Artillery (AA) 

Battalion (SP), and the 756th Tank Battalion. The Armored Landing Team included elements of the 41st Armored In121 

fantry Regiment, 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 17th Armored Engineer Battalion, and 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, 

all from the 2d Armored Division. Force 

BRUSHWOOD was commanded by Maj. Gen. 

Jonathan W. Anderson, as already noted; 

the assistant division commander was Brig. 

Gen. William W. Eagles; Brig. Gen. William A. Campbell was division artillery 

commander; and Col. Walter E. Lauer was 

the chief of staff. With all detachments included, the force totaled approximately 

19,500 officers, enlisted men, and civilians.3 

The general scheme of maneuver by 

Force BRUSHWOOD was for BLT 1-7 (Lt. 

Col. Roy E. Moore) -or 1 st Battalion 

Landing Team of the 7th Regimental 

Landing Group--to occupy the town and 

cape, BLT 2-7 (Lt. Col. Rafael L. Salzmann) to control the bridges over the Mellah river and to clear a regimental zone 

south and west of the town, BL T 1-30 (Lt. 

Col. Fred W. Sladen, Jr.) to push four 

miles southward to a long ridge well beyond 

the main Casablanca-Rabat highway, and 

BLT 2-30 (Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard) to 

occupy the Cherqui headland, the bridges 

over the Nefifikh river, and a defense line 

on the eastern bank of that stream against 

possible reinforcements from the direction 

of Rabat. The third battalion of each of 

these RLG's minus its Company L, would 

be in floating regimental reserve, and the 

entire 15th RLG would be in Force BaUSHWOOD reserve, prepared to land two hours 

after the assault battalions. The 15th RLG 

• The Army troop list of 22 October 1942 shows 

a total of 19,364 men and 1,732 vehicles (see 

Table 2). The Leonard Wood's Action Report, 30 

November 1942, tabulates the troops and vehicles 

per ship with a total of 19,870 men and 1,701 

vehicles. Morison, U.s . Naval Operations, 11, 37, 

55, sets the total at 18,783 and on p. 158 adopts 

the total of 19,870. 
122 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

TABLE 2-PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES ASSIGNED TO FORCE "Y" (BRUSHWOOD), 

AS OF 22 OCTOBER 1942 

Personnol 

Unit Vehide. 

Total Officers Enlioted 

"rotal ________________________ __ ____________________ _ 19, 364 1,087 18, 277 

3d Infantry Division 

1st RLG (reinfor~ed), 7th Infantry G ______ _ _____ _ ____ __ ___ _ 5,245 224 5,021 

2d RLG (reinfor~ed) , 30th Infantry b _ _ __ _ __ __ _ _ _ ____ ___ ___ _ 5,245 224 5,021 15 th I nfan try ________ ___________________ ____ _________ ___ _ 3,838 178 3, 660 

Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Signal Company, 3d 

InIantry Division ___ __________ ____ ___ ______ ___________ _ 499 56 443 

Headquarters, Task For~e "An _____ ______________ ___ _______ _ 317 93 224 

Armored Landing Team 

1&t Battalion (reinforced), 67th Armored Regiment c _ ___ _ ___ _ 875 38 837 

Other Force "Y" Personnel 

Detachments, XII Air Support COmmand ___ ____________ ___ _ 1,485 166 1,319 

436th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion ___ ___________________ _ 532 32 500 

443d Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion (one and a half platoons 

only) - ------------------- -- --------------------------- 53 2 51 

2d Battalion, 20th Engineer Regiment d ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ _ __ _ 007 17 590 

204th Military Police COmpany __ ____ ____________________ _ _ 113 4 109 

36th Engi.neer Regiment (less detachments) ________________ _ 116 12 104 

Detachment of 

66th Engineer Company ('Topographic) ___ __ ___ __ ____ ____ _ 6 1 5 

lst Armored Signal Battalion ____ ________________ __ ____ _ _ 162 5 157 

122d Signal Company (Radio Intelligence) --- ------------- 26 1 25 

163d Signal Company (Photographic) ___ _________________ _ 12 2 10 

239th Signal Company (Operationa!) ____ __________ ______ _ 47 1 46 

829th Signal Service Battalion __ ____ ____ ___ ___________ __ _ 90 3 87 

1st Broadcasting Station Openuion DetachmenL _______ __ __ _ 30 11 19 

Counterintelligence Group ________________________ ________ _ 37 7 30 

Prisoner Interrogation Group _______ _____ ______ __ _______ __ _ 25 6 19 

Civil Government PersonneL __ _____ _____________________ _ _ 4 4 0 

• Indudin. Battery A Oe .. 4th Platoon). 443d Coast Aro1lery (M) Battalion. and lit Battalion. 36,b Engineer Regiment. 

• Indudin. Battery B (Ie .. lot Platoon), «3d Co .. t Artillery (AA) Battalion, and 3d Battalion. 36th Engineer Regiment. 

• IlIdudinS Batttry C (2d and ~th l:'Iotoon. ), 443d Coa .. Artillery (AA) BaTulion. 

• With he.dquarten det.ohment and Service Company attached. 

Sow,,,: Anne. A (Troop Lilt) to Memo, TF "A" to ACoIS OPD, 22 Oct 4-2. Order o( Bittle TF "An 194.2. St. Louio Redo. 

I, 732 

443 

443 

341 

61 

54 

148 

91 

79 

13 

10 

o 

4 

o 

19 

4 

2 

5 

10 

5 

o 

o 

o 

was to assemble ashore in the 7th RLG's 

zone and to advance southwestward at the 

left of the 7th RLG while the 30th RLG 

secured the rear and furnished a reserve battalion. The two L Companies and the 3d 

Reconnaissance Troop had their special missions following landings at the extreme 

flanks. The 2d Battalion, 20th Engineers 

(Combat), which was in Western Task 

Force reserve with a company of the 204th 

Military Police Battalion, and the Armored 

Landing Team, 67th Armored Regiment, 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 123 

TRANSPORTS OF THE CENTER ATTACK GROUP near the beaches cif Fedala. 

were expected to land on call at least three 

hours after the first wave, the former initially to relieve BL T 1-7 in F edala and 

the latter to join RLG's 7 and 15 in the 

drive on Casablanca. Once the port was in 

American hands, it was to be used first for 

unloading armored vehicles and heavy 

equipment, and then for other materiel. 

The Landings Begin 

Running through intermittent rain 

squalls, the Center Attack Group arrived 

off Fedala shortly before midnight, 7-8 November 1942. Soon afterward the lights of 

Casablanca and Fedala were suddenly extinguished. The transports were organized 

into four columns, with the Leonard Wood 

(BLT 1-7), Thomas Jefferson (BLT 2-7), 

Charles Carroll (BLT 1-30), and Joseph 

T. Dickman (BLT. 2-30) in the column 

nearest the shore. Discovery as the convoy 

neared its destination that an unexpected 

current had carried it a few miles from the 

desired position resulted in a series of emergency turns during which the transport 

formation became badly deranged. Radar 

revealed that some transports were at least 

10,000 yards from their designated place. 

The vessels therefore had to continue movement in the darkness, aided by a control 

vessel, in order to re-establish their planned 

formation within a transport area six to 

eight miles offshore. 

When Captain Emmett described the 

naval situation to General Anderson at 

0130, the four assault BLT's were on transports near their assigned positions, and it 

seemed likely that the men could disembark in time for the 0400 H Hour. Other 

ships might or might not be able to participate as expected. An attempt was therefore 

begun to carry out the basic plan. Three 

scout boats went in to find and mark the 

beaches. Three quarters of an hour later, 

reports of the lagging rate at which vehicles 

and heavy equipment from the Leonard 

Wood were being unloaded, and of the slowness with which landing craft were assembling from each transport at the rendezvous 
124 

points, made it apparent that a half hour's 

delay was essential. Orders were issued to 

the transports to use their own landing craft 

to disembark as large a proportion of the 

assault BL T's as possible without waiting 

for the arrival of the boats from other transports in outer positions. Even with this imptovisation the men, weighted by heavy, 

cumbersome packs, clambered down the 

sides of the ships at too slow a pace to fill up 

the bobbing craft for the 0430 H Hour. 

Another postponement of fifteen minutes 

was authorized. 

The 3d Division's command had concluded from its training experiences that in 

order to insure integrity of units upon landing and to expedite their reorganization 

ashore to prevent defeat in detail, all assault 

and reserve BL T's ought to be assembled 

afloat in landing craft before the start toward the landing beach, and all should be 

put ashore as fast as possible. At Fedala, 

each assault battalion had its own landing 

schedule adapted to the particular characteristics of its beach and its mission. Each 

of the four BL T's required groups of from 

forty-three to forty-five personnel landing 

craft and from five to nine tank lighters, for 

landings extending over periods of from one 

to three hours. The fact that none of the 

transports carried more than thirty-four 

landing craft necessitated the temporary use 

of boats and crews from other transports. 

All these details had been most carefully 

combined in an elaborate boat employment 

plan designed to put the required assault 

units ashore before daylight and to land 

supporting elements there with great rapidity during the morning. 

At about 0400 the four control destroyers, the Wilkes, Swanson, Ludlow, and 

Murphy, each conducting the landing craft 

for which it was responsible, moved to a line 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

of departure, 4,000 yards from the beach 

designated for its battalion landing team. 

BL T 1-7 was to land on Beach RED 2; 

BLT 2-7, on Beach RED 3; BLT 1-30, on 

Beach BLUE; and BL T 2-30, on Beach 

BLUE 2. But all the boat waves were not 

then ready! In fact, the landings at. Fedala 

began at the outset to depart from the plan 

and continued to be only an approximation 

of what had been worked out as the best 

means of getting necessary forces ashore. 

Silencing the coastal batteries, a mission 

of paramount importance, was the first assignment of the forces being sent ashore. 

BL T 2-30 (Colonel Bernard) was expected 

to capture the Batterie du Pont Blondin, 

just east of the Nefifikh river, assisted by 

Company L, 30th Infantry. BLT 1-7 (Colonel Moore) was charged with taking the 

town of F edala and continuing on to the 

cape to seize the two batteries there. The 3d 

Reconnaissance Troop (Capt. Robert W. 

Crandall), landing on Beach YELLOW, was 

to destroy the antiaircraft installations in 

the vicinity of the golf course and then, after 

crossing the Mel1ah, to attack the positions 

on Cap de Fedala from the southwest, on 

the western side of Moore's unit. 

Next most pressing objective was the control of the highway and railway bridges over 

the Mellah before they could be destroyed, 

or Ilsed by French troops for retreat or re-

• Only four out of seven waves from the Wood, 

five out of eight from the leBerson, five and onehalf out of fifteen from the CaTToll, and four out of 

five from the Dickman, which were bound for 

Beach BLUE 2, reported. From the fourth wave, 

three of the six boats had failed to appear at starting time, but two of them, including the boat with 

the commanding officer of BLT 2-30, went in independently. Their navigation was such that they 

ended up thousands of yards to the northeast of 

Beach BLUE 2, well apart from the battalion's attack. Two entire waves from the Carroll of three 

or four boats each missed the rendezvous with the 

Ludlow and went toward Beach BLUE unescorted. 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

inforcement. BLT 2-7 (Colonel Salzmann) 

was to seize these bridges from the east while 

another unit, Company L, 7th Infantry, 

landed on Beach YELLOW an hour after the 

3d .Reconnaissance Troop and supported 

Salzmann's unit from the western bank of 

the stream. 

The first waves of Force BRUSHWOOD 

actually started toward the beaches from the 

line of departure at about 0445. The men, 

in herringbone twill fatigue unifonns and 

with U.S. flag ann bands, were heavily 

laden. They could see near shore the lights 

of the scout boats blinking energetically but 

could observe no sign of action on land. The 

run to shore took from fifteen to twenty 

minutes. A warning from Casablanca had 

been sent to Fedala as it had to Safi, but, 

if received, it had not told the French defenders how or from whom to expect an 

attack, and some French troops remained in 

barracks. When the motors of the landing 

craft were first heard and reported, searchlights on Cap de Fedala and Cherqui shot 

skyward in quest of airplanes, and because 

vertical searchlight beams had been specified in General Eisenhower's broadcast as a 

sign of nonresistance, they brought a brief 

but mistaken moment of hope. Almost at 

once the lights came down to play over the 

sea approaches and on the incoming boatloads of troops. Machine gun fire from support boats which were escorting the landing craft on the last stage of the run caused 

the lights to darken abruptly. The first men 

leaped ashore during this episode. Loss of 

craft during the first landings greatly added 

to the delay and confusion caused by the 

complicated boat employment plan. The lift 

available for later trips from ship to shore 

was sharply reduced by such losses. Faulty 

navigation, attributable to either compass 

deviations, inexperienced crews, or other 

125 

causes, brought boatloads of troops to shore 

sometimes miles from the designated points, 

and onto rocky obstructions or reefs rather 

than at sandy beaches. The consequences 

were serious even when the boats were able 

to retract from these landings, with such 

major ill effects as the scattering of troop 

units, the loss of control over the ensuing 

deployment, and the separation of weapons 

and equipment from units expecting to operate with them. But the boats too often could 

not retract and met destruction under circumstances which drowned some of their 

passengers and left the survivors cut and 

battered and deprived of weapons or radio 

sets needed in the assault. 

First to land at about 0500 were elements 

of BLT 1-7 from the Leonard Wood. The 

thirty-one boats carrying the first four waves 

of the battalion toward Beach RED 2 ended 

up partly on that beach, partly on Beach 

RED 3, and partly on the rocky shore which 

lay between them. The surf swept many 

boats out of control, throwing them against 

rocks with such destructive force that they 

either capsized or were smashed. A total of 

twenty-one boats were lost. Heavily laden 

troops could not swim, and drowned. From 

the Thomas Jefferson, whose beach-marking scout boat was out of position, the 

landing craft bringing BLT 2-7 to Beach 

RED 3 went instead to Beach BLUE 2 at the 

mouth of the Nefifikh and two or three miles 

farther northeast along the coast to tiny 

beaches or rocky reefs. The landings began 

about one hour after those of the 1st BLT. 

The commanding officer of BL T 2-30 

(Colonel Bernard) and his headquarters 

were also carried over three miles east of 

the battalion, which landed as planned on 

Beach BLUE 2. The Jefferson lost 16 of her 

33 landing craft, while 6 mare were damaged on their first trip to shore. Of 25 land-
126 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

BEACH RED 3, FEDALA, at 1100, 8 November. Landing crafl with high ramps is 

an LCM. 

ing craft from the Carroll heading for BLUE 

Beach with units of BL T 1-30, 18 were 

wrecked on the first landing, 5 more on the 

second, and only 2 continued in service. 

Despite these losses, searchlight illumination 

of the beach, and machine gun fire, all three 

rifle companies were ashore by 0600. The 

Dickman's boat crews made the best record, 

losing only 2 out of 27 craft on Beach BLUE 

2 in the initial landing of BLT 2-30, and 

getting the others back to the transport 

promptly for a second trip to shore. 

The landings began during ebb tide. 

Boats which were not quickly unloaded became stranded. Following waves came in at 

intervals scheduled so close that not only 

could they not be warned away from obstacles, but they also prevented retracting 

operations by their predecessors. Lighters 

with vehicles aboard were sometimes held 

at the water's edge because the motors 

would not start so that the vehicles had to 

be pulled ashore rather than being swiftly 

driven off under their own power. Most 

common of the situations delaying retraction was the failure of the troops in the inadequate Army shore parties to unload 

materiel. Unassisted boat crews were too 

slow. When naval beach party personnel 

helped, they were thus diverted from salvage 

operations or from marking hydrographic 

obstacles off the beaches. Landing craft 

which had not been withdrawn were hit and 

wrecked by the high surf on the later flood 

tide. For these and other reasons, the Center 

Naval Task Group suffered the loss of a 

very high proportion of its landing craft. 

The damaging effect of such heavy losses on 

the build-up of troops and supplies ashore 

was felt throughout the operation. This mis-
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 127 

THE WADI NEFIFIKH AND BEACH BLUE 2. Note landing craft on beach. 

fortune was one of the factors which made 

swift investment of Casablanca impossible. a 

Clearing Cap de Fedala 

Less than forty-five minutes of darkness 

remained after the first landings before the 

coastal guns would have targets visible in 

the dim first light. Elements of Colonel 

Moore's 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, assembled at the inland edge of Beach RED 

2 without opposition and hastened toward 

Fedala. One company of the 6th Senegalese Infantry Regiment, the only infantry 

unit in the garrison, was quickly surprised 

and captured. Ten German Annistice Commissioners fled from their headquarters at 

• Memo, Adm Hewitt for Gen Handy, 5 Feb 43, 

sub: Amph tng. FE 25/A16--3, Ser 0059, Kansas 

City Reds Ctr. 

the Miramar Hotel just before a platoon 

entered the building, but they were caught 

in automobiles before they got out of town. 

By 0600 Fedala itself was under American 

control. 

The guns of Cap de Fedala opened fire 

on the ships offshore at about the same 

time as did the Batterie du Pont Blondin, 

that is, a few minutes after 0600. Naval 

counterbattery fire against these guns on 

the cape was hampered from the first by 

the proximity of petroleum tanks which the 

invaders wished to leave undamaged. Fire 

from one of the destroyers which quickly replied to French shelling did strike one of 

the tanks and set it afire. The flagship Augusta succeeded in silencing the Cap de 

Fedala batteries only temporarily by less 

than a quarter hour's bombardment from 

her 8-inch guns. 
128 

At irregular intervals during the morning, one or more of the 100-mm. guns of 

the Batterie du Port resumed fire, especially 

against the beaches near the Cherqui headland across the bay, where the 30th RLG 

was landing. These actions drew counterbattery fire from some of the destroyers 

which caused the French to suspend firing 

for a while. Some American shells which 

passed only a short distance over the guns 

or storage tanks on the cape carried into 

the port or the town, where they struck the 

Hotel Miramar and also menaced friendly 

troops. 

The first detachment of Force BRUSHWOOD headquarters landed at Beach RED 

2 before 0800 under command of General 

Eagles. From a grove near that beach, this 

forward section established radio communications with General Anderson aboard the 

Leonard Wood. General Eagles sent staff 

observers to ascertain the progress of 

Moore's and Bernard's BLT's at the cape 

and headland. When the remainder of the 

forward echelon landed with General Anderson and Beach BLUE at 0945, French 

artillery fire struck near them but inflicted 

no casualties. 

Moore's battalion turned in the meantime 

from occupying Fedala to carrying out two 

separate but related actions-an attack on 

the heavy antiaircraft batteries near the 

race track southwest of the town, and an 

attack along the cape to capture the 100-

mm. guns of the Batterie du Port, a 75-mm. 

battery, a fire control station, and some emplaced antiaircraft machine guns. The 

heavy antiaircraft battery was scheduled for 

seizure by a surprise assault in darkness by 

the 3d Reconnaissance Troop after a landing from rubber assault boats at Beach YELLOW. Wearing special black uniforms, this 

unit waited while a series of mishaps delayed 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

its landing so long that the attempt either 

had to begin in daylight on a well-defended 

beach or had to be abandoned. The unit 

returned to the transport Tasker H. Bliss 

without attempting an operation so different from that for which it was prepared. 

The antiaircraft battery thus was able to 

pin down elements of Company C, 7th Infantry, by direct fire when they tried to approach Cap de Fedala from the town. 

Although a bazooka succeeded in temporarily silencing this battery, it was not 

actually surrendered to Moore's force until 

about 1100. 

American naval gunfire on the cape also 

deterred the attacking troops. Colonel 

Moore's urgent requests to terminate the 

bombardment, relayed to the Leonard 

Wood as early as 0845, were repeated. But 

the simultaneous predicament of Colonel 

Rogers' 30th RLG, which was under intermittent fire from the French guns on the 

cape, caused Rogers to urge that the naval 

gunfire be continued until those guns were 

completely neutralized. His recommendations were approved, so that Moore's attack 

along the cape was retarded until about 

1140. At that juncture, the unsuccessful attempt to neutralize the guns was superseded by an effort to seize them by means of 

a tank-infantry assault, supported by field 

artillery. 

Company A, 7th Infantry, supported by 

four light tanks of Company A, 756th Tank 

Battalion, which were directed by Colonel 

Wilbur from an exposed position on one of 

the tanks, obtained the surrender of the fire 

control station and main 100-mm. battery 

with twenty-two prisoners at about noon.6 

• For this exploit, and his earlier mission to Casablanca through the French lines, Colonel Wilbur 

was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. 

See The Medal 01 Honor 01 the United States Army 

(Washington, 1948), pp. 232-33. 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 129 

LIGHT TANK M5 NEAR FEDALA on D-Day morning. A U.S.flag is painted on the 

lank, and men from the 7th Infantry Regiment are wearing U.S. flag arm bands. 

The highly effective 75-mm. guns and machine guns in concrete emplacements on the 

tip of the cape held out until 1500. They 

surrendered after being subjected to mortar 

fire from Fedala and shells from two 75-mm. 

pack howitzers inland from Beach RED 2. 

Lifting of this fire brought to an end the 

bombardment which had begun with the 

naval gunfire in the morning. 

The Capture of the Batterie du Pont 

Blondin 

At the eastern end of the bay the Batterie 

du Pont Blondin was captured by elements 

of two BL T's as a consequence of admirable 

initiative and a thorough grasp of the whole 

plan by company commanders and platoon 

leaders. The objective had been assigned to 

Colonel Bernard's BL T 2-30, but the battalion commander was carried almost three 

miles from the beach (BLUE 2) where the 

main portion of his BL T had come ashore. 

Nevertheless BL T 2-30's heavy weapons 

company got its mortars into position ashore 

and, with elements of the rifle companies, 

prepared to assault the battery from the 

west. At the same time, quite independently, 

Colonel Salzmann, who had also been put 

ashore at the wrong point, attacked the objective from the east with one section of mortars and four rifle platoons. These units had 

landed on the reefs and small beaches northeast of Cherqui instead of on Beach RED 3 

and could not well proceed on their own assigned mission. But while the troops were 
130 

organizing the attack the Batterie du Pont 

Blondin, like the guns on Cap de Fedala, 

took advantage of the first streaks of daylight to begin firing on the beaches, the approaches, and the control vessels near the 

shore. By 0610 the four destroyers and the 

coastal guns were exchanging shells; Captain Emmett was about to signal "Play 

Ball"; and in preparation for that order, 

which came shortly thereafter, the ships 

were hastening to their fire support areas. 

The cruiser Brooklyn came in with a rush 

from an outer patrolling position, sent up a 

spotting plane, and at 0622 fired her first 

salvo of 6-inch shells. The transports suspended debarkation and unloading and hurried farther out to sea. Three of the control 

destroyers, the Wilkes, Swanson, and Ludlow, continued into fire support areas while 

the Murphy, still only about 5,000 yards 

from the headland, drew heavy fire which 

first straddled and then struck her, forcing 

her to withdraw.7 

Like the Philadelphia's bombardment of 

the Batterie de la Railleuse at Safi, the 

Brooklyn soon struck the fire control apparatus within the fortifications on Cherqui 

and rendered it useless. Another shell hit 

one of the gun emplacements, putting a gun 

out of action, igniting the powder bags, and 

causing many casualties. The ground troops, 

who had almost surrounded the battery, organized while waiting for the bombardment 

from the sea to lift and added Bl-mm. 

mortar shells to the projectiles from the 

Brooklyn. At the first opportunity they 

pushed in from several sides. Capt. M. E. 

Porter, commander of Company H, 30th 

Infantry, received the surrender at approximately 0730, with Colonel Salzmann acting 

as interpreter. Not long afterward Colonel 

, (1) 30th Inf Hist, 1 Apr 43. (2) CTG 34.9 

Rpt, 30 Nov 42, with incls. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Bernard, commanding BL T 2-30, reached 

the position, put a rifle company in charge, 

and sent the other elements to join the rest 

of the BL T in seizing the crossings over the 

Nefifikh river and in setting up defenses 

against counterattacks from the northeast. 

The elements of Colonel Salzmann's BL T 

2-7 which had joined in taking the battery 

crossed the Pont Blondin to an assembly 

area near Beach RED 3. Here they were 

joined by the remainder of their BL T and 

moved along the coastal road to the western 

bank of the Mellah river, a march of about 

seven miles, which they completed during 

the latter part of the afternoon. 8 

Other D-Day Landings at Fedala 

While Moore's BLT 1-7 was occupying 

Fedala and the cape, on the right (west) 

flank of the beachhead, and while Bernard's 

BLT 2-30 and part of Salzmann's BLT 2-7 

were investing the Cherqui headland and 

seizing the Nefifikh bridges at the left (east), 

Siaden's BLT 1-30 landed its three rifle 

companies in a series of small waves on 

Beach BLUE. The craft had run through 

intermittent searchlight illumination and 

machine gunning without casualties or serious damage but, as already noted, had sustained severe losses in the surf. The BLT 

organized just above the beach as daylight 

began and pressed southward toward the 

higher ground which it was to hold. A train 

for Rabat was intercepted about one mile 

west of the Nefifikh river bridge and 

searched. French Army, Navy, and Air 

Force personnel, about seventy-five in all, 

were removed and held as prisoners. The 

train was immobilized. Despite occasional 

artillery fire and strafing air attacks, Sla-

• WTF Final Rpt, Annex 2, 8 Dec 42. 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

den's battalion reached its objective without 

a fight, and by 1600, had consolidated 

positions for defense according to the 

tactical plan. 

The four assault BL T's had thus successfully accomplished their first missions, but 

the two L Companies scheduled to land on 

the western and eastern flanks were frustrated by delays that prevented them from 

landing before daylight. They went ashore 

during the morning on beaches not related 

to their original planned missions and 

marched to join their respective regiments. 

BLT 3-7 (Lt. Col. Ashton H. Manhart) 

(less Company L) began landing at about 

0930 on Beach RED 3, an operation which 

continued for a considerable period because 

of the shortage in serviceable landing craft. 

It then went into an assembly area southeast of Fedala near the 7th RLG command 

post. 

BL T 3-30 (Maj. Charles E. Johnson) 

(including Company L) started arriving at 

Beach BLUE 2 (as well as on the rocks and 

reefs to the northeast of Cherqui) about 

0900. It suffered some casualties from artillery fire and from strafing airplanes as it 

moved inland to an area west of the Nefifikh 

during the remainder of the morning. 

The rifle companies of BLT 1-15 (Maj. 

Arthur W. Gardner), served by only a small 

number of boats, began to land at 1430, 

and were scattered on several beaches. They 

were sent to hold the bridge over the Mellah 

on the main Rabat-Casablanca highway, 

while the remainder of the RLG was ordered to get ashore as rapidly as possible. 

Just prior to darkness Major Gardner's 

BL T arrived east of the bridge, made contact with the 7th RLG on its right, sent 

outposts to organize a defensive bridgehead 

on the western bank, and prepared its night 

position. Company D and its heavy weapons 

131 

arrived in the assembly area after dark. 

The BL T had reached its D-Day objective 

without encountering French forces. 

General Patton first prepared to leave the 

Augusta for the Fedala beachhead at 0800 

on D Day with part of his staff. Their effects were loaded in a landing craft, swinging from davits. Before it could be lowered, 

the cruiser became engaged in firing missions and maneuvers which precluded his 

departure. For over three hours, he was an 

involuntary observer of the ship's skillful 

participation in a sea battle to tum back 

French warships emerging from the port 

of Casablanca. For a few minutes the ship 

also engaged in antiaircraft activity in an 

effort to defend the transports off Fedala 

against attack by French bombers. The first 

muzzle blast of the Augusta's rear turret 

blew the waiting landing craft to pieces, but 

the general could take satisfaction in the 

fact that only a minute or two earlier, his 

distinctive brace of pistols with the white 

stocks had been taken out and brought to 

him. He reached Fedala, therefore, at 1320 

when the firing on Cap de Fedala was still 

in progress, although light resistance elsewhere in the beachhead had ended.9 

The French Reaction Ashore 

French resistance to the American landings began, as indicated in a previous chapter, in the belief by those in command that 

the operation was a minor attack and that 

General Bethouart had been misled concerning its nature. The standing orders for 

defense which had been prepared under di-

• Patton Diary, 8 Nov. 42. The Augusta's action 

illustrated how its overlapping missions interfered 

with the most efficient control of operations ashore 

and offshore. A separate command ship was available for the next great amphibious assault in the 

Mediterranean, the attack on Sicily. 
132 

rectives from the Commander in Chief of 

French Forces in North Africa, General 

Juin, were put into effect by Admiral 

Michelier in the Casablanca zone for which 

he was responsible, by General Martin at 

Marrakech, and by General Dody at 

Meknes. Admiral Michelier's naval forces 

were alerted for action. General Lahoulle 

reluctantly sent his air units into action. 

General Lascroux, after being tricked into 

entering protective custody in Meknes, was 

permitted to return to his headquarters in 

Rabat, from which he could control the 

Army's defensive operations. The Residency 

there was divested of the cordon which had 

surrounded it, and General Bethouart and 

his leading associates submitted to arrest. 

General Nogues, after a night of hectic 

activity, slept during the latter part of the 

morning, and rose to confront a situation 

not yet very clearly defined. The invaders 

were coming ashore at several points, but so 

lacking in strength, apparently, that the 

weak defenders were able to hold them except at F edala. Michelier had repudiated 

the opportunity to arrange a cease fire when 

Colonel Wilbur visited his headquarters 

early in the forenoon. 

As soon as General Patton landed at 

Fedala, the French commandant there was 

brought to him by General Anderson. The 

commandant urged that envoys be sent to 

Casablanca to demand surrender, since the 

French Army did not wish to fight the 

Americans. 

Colonel Gay thereupon rode from Fedala 

under a flag of truce to the admiralty in Casablanca to try again, as Colonel Wilbur had 

tried earlier, to persuade the French to stop 

hostilities. The French Army leaders were 

eager to have the fighting stopped, and some 

of them even suggested a course for the 

Americans to adopt if a surrender of the city 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

had to be gained by force, but the commander, Admiral Michelier again declined 

even to receive the American emissary.10 

The suddenness of the American invasion 

of Morocco had disrupted the French 

Army's plans for defense. It became impossible to concentrate all the major units designated for the three mobile reserve groups 

and, in fact, wholly impossible to establish 

the light armored brigade. From almost the 

first hostilities, portions of the other two reserve groups were engaged on the flanks of 

the defending elements. The American 

beachhead at Fedala cut off an important 

portion of the central sector of defense, that 

from the Nefifikh river to Port-Lyautey, 

from direct control through Casablanca. 

During D-Day afternoon, therefore, General 

Lascroux in Rabat by oral orders assigned 

command of all French land forces operating in the coastal zone north of the Nefifikh 

river as far as Port-Lyautey to Gen. Roger 

Leyer, commander of the Moroccan Cavalry. Special steps in both organization and 

reinforcement were taken for the defense of 

Rabat from attacks developing either from 

Fedala or Port-Lyautey. Troops within the 

Petitjean section of the general reserve under Gen. Maurice Mathenet started toward 

Port-Lyautey, and troops from the Khemisset section, toward an assembly area near 

Les Chenes (east of Sale) , where they would 

be at the disposal of General Leyer. 

Late on D Day General Mathenet was 

ordered by telephone from Rabat to proceed to Port-Lyautey and to assume command of all forces there. General Leyer's 

mission was thus reduced to defending the 

coastal zone adjacent to Rabat, including 

the route to Meknes from the capital. 

.. (1) Interv with Maj Gen Hobart S. Gay, 11 

Oct 48. (2) Patton Diary, 9 Nov 42. 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

American penetration south of Port-Lyautey which was in fact intended to prevent 

reinforcement of Port-Lyautey by units 

from Rabat was taken as a threat to the 

latter. French forces north of Rabat were 

therefore augmented by shifting troops from 

south of that city. 

Naval Action on D Day 

Although the battle for the Fedala-Casablanca area opened when the French on 

Cherqui and Cap de Fedala fired on the 

landing forces of the Center Attack Group, 

the Covering and Air Groups off Casablanca were drawn into combat less than 

an hour later, at daybreak. The M assachusetts, the Wichita, and the Tuscaloosa 

catapulted nine seaplanes and steamed 

along the coast at a range of some 20,000 

yards from Casablanca harbor. The Ranger 

and the Suwannee, ten miles farther out, 

began to launch their planes into a light 

westerly wind during the last minutes of 

darkness. Daybreak found six spotting 

planes of the Covering Group ready shoufd 

bombardment of Casablanca be ordered. 

Circling at a height of 10,000 feet above 

the port a squadron of eighteen dive 

bomber:s from the Ranger prepared to attack any French submarines which tried to 

leave, or to blast antiaircraft batteries which 

opened fire. One squadron of fighters from 

the big carrier was in position to attack 

the airdromes at Rabat and another to hit 

Cazes airfield adjacent to Casablanca. The 

Suwannee's planes protected the vessels off 

Fedala from air or submarine attack. 

A few minutes bdore 0700 the air and 

surface naval combat at Casablanca began 

almost simultaneously. Antiaircraft guns in 

the harbor opened against one of the observation planes; French fighters started driv133 

ing other spotting planes out to sea; two 

French submarines began to leave the port; 

and a few minutes later the great guns of 

the lean Bart and the Batterie El Hank fired 

at the cruisers of the Covering Group. The 

American warships replied without delay. 

In less than twenty minutes the lean Bart's 

main battery was silenced by damage heavy 

enough, it later developed, to keep it out 

of action for about two days. Other salvos 

fell on the submarine pens in the harbor 

and on the coastal defense batteries on 

Table d'Oukacha and El Hank with less 

success than against the lean Bart. Crews 

of the coastal guns may have been driven 

from their stations temporarily, but the 

guns themselves remained serviceable in the 

absence of direct hits. Firing from them 

ceased until the American vessels had been 

lured within closer range and their attention diverted to other targets. 

The air units, which were poised to strike 

as soon as hostile French intentions became 

clear, attacked their targets without further 

hesitation. Their strafing and bombing runs 

over airfields, and their successful dogfights 

with French airplanes aloft, won air superiority as far north as Port-Lyautey. They 

freed the observation planes for spotting, 

participated in the effort to destroy French 

naval units at Casablanca, and kept a constant watch for submarines. The French 

Air Force was reduced quickly to irregular 

strafing flights by low-flying individual 

planes over the F edala beachhead and to 

preparations for bombing attacks on Safi 

and Fedala, to be made at first light on 9 

November. 

At Fedala, not only the coastal guns but 

French warships had to be overcome by the 

Center Attack Group. The transport area 

was only twelve nautical miles from the 

Casablanca naval base. When the Covering 
134 

Group began exchanging shells with the 

Jean Bart and the coastal guns on El Hank, 

the ships began evasive movements offshore 

which eventually took them well to the west. 

The French had an opportunity to send 

their warships from Casablanca hurrying 

northward along the coast to attack the 

F edala transports. 

At 0827 seven destroyers which had made 

their way out of port behind a smoke screen, 

undeterred by attacks from the Ranger's 

planes, opened fire on the American vessels 

nearest to them, the Ludlow and the Wilkes, 

and on some landing craft bringing company L, 7th Infantry, to YELLOW Beach. 

They hit the Ludlow and forced the Wilkes 

to retire toward the cruisers A ugusta and 

Brooklyn. Then for about half an hour they 

sought in vain to penetrate the protection 

afforded to the American transports by 

those cruisers and by the destroyers Wilkes 

and Swanson. When the ships of the Covering Group returned to take up the battle/t 

the French vessels retired to Casablanca, one 

of them smoking badly. 

At 0935 three of the French destroyers 

tried the same maneuver again while the 

Covering Group was engaged against other 

ships in another sector. Again the Augusta, 

Brooklyn, Wilkes, and Swanson, aided this 

time by the Bristol, intercepted and frustrated the effort, but not without some 

minor hits and many close calls, especially 

from torpedoes. The French cruiser Primauguet left Casablanca to support the 

smaller vessels at about 1015, drawing the 

Covering Group within range of the coast 

defense batteries. The action was prolonged 

until after 1100, when three of the attacking 

ships came within five miles of the transports before being driven off. Salvos from 

11 The Massachusetts opened fire at a range of 

19,400 yards at 0918. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

El Hank's guns, torpedoes from French submarines, and strafing and bombing runs 

against French ships by American carrierbased planes contributed to the complexity 

of the morning's naval battle. 

One of the French ships, the "destroyerleader" Milan, beached off Roches Noires 

and burned furiously. Others limped back 

to port about noon for safety. The cruiser 

Primauguet, badly hit, anchored just outside 

the entry in the partial shelter of a jetty. 

To eliminate the vessel, the Ranger's planes 

assailed her in a series of attacks early in the 

afternoon. They started uncontrollable fires, 

drove her men overboard, and forced her to 

try to beach. A destroyer near her had the 

same experience. Both ships smouldered all 

night, while from the Primauguet's magazine ammunition explosions could be heard 

for another day.12 

Naval combat off Casablanca during the 

remainder of 8 November eliminated almost 

all threat by French surface ships to the performance of the transports' mission. Providential escape from scores of straddling 

salvos continued to assist the Covering 

Group, while alert seamanship prevented 

well-aimed French torpedoes from finding 

their marks. Naval bombardment had 

failed, however, to silence for long the 

coastal batteries of El Hank which were still 

operating at nightfall. 

Unloading at F edala on D Day 

To unload the 15,000 long tons of cargo 

from the transports strained available facilities beyond capacity, although the task was 

attempted with persistence and resourceful11 ( I) Account by observer on roof overlooking 

Casablanca harbor. In private possession. (2) Jnl 

and Rpt, Ajax to Reid, 22 Nov 42. In private possession. (3) Morison, U.S. Naval Operations, II, 

Ch. IV. 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

ness. The transports' crews were of unequal 

efficiency. 13 

The Anny shore parties included so large 

a proportion of specialists or combat engineers who turned to other duties during the 

operation that Navy working parties, which 

were organized from ships' crews and sent 

ashore to handle cargo, in several instances 

outnumbered Anny elements.14 The same 

policy that deferred service troops to later 

convoys in order to increase the number of 

combat troops for the assault had also given 

priority to combat vehicles over other types, 

so that automotive transport was trimmed 

down severely. The shortage was felt at once 

in moving materiel inland to dumps. Loss 

of landing craft drastically reduced total 

capacity. While the exact number of the 

boats either temporarily or pennanently out 

of service is not certain, an inspection during 

the morning of 10 November showed 162 

stranded along the bay and 23 others reported farther east. 15 Of these at least 16 

were tank lighters. 

The unloading process was slowed down 

not only by lack of carrying capacity-but 

also by emergency requests for materiel 

which had been lost in the first attempt to 

land. The resulting interference with the 

,. Two were characterized as "smart, experienced, 

well-trained" ; five of them, as "fairly well-trained"; 

three, as "well-converted but totally inexperienced 

in amphibious operations"; and the remaining five, 

as "partially and hastily converted, totally inexperienced in amphibious operations." CTG 34.9 Action 

Rpt, 30 Nov 42, App. I, Incl C, Ser 003052. 

.. Leonard Wood, Thomas JlI6l1rson, Charilis 

Carroll, Josllph T. Dickman, Joseph Hewes, and 

Edward Rutledge had joint shore and beach parties 

consisting of 170 Army and 46 Navy personnel. 

The William P. Biddle ~ad a shore party of 45 plus 

a signal detachment, and a party of 28. Ibid. 

I> The lowf'~t figure seems to be an expenditure of 

40 percent of all cralt during the whole operation, 

137 boats out of 347 used. Morison, U.S. Naval 

Operations, II, 79n. 

135 

orderly removal from ships' holds of materiel which had been combat loaded was 

responsible for retarding the process. 

Engineer officers were held on their transports until long after the time when, by reconnaissance of beaches and docks, they 

could most effectively have organized the 

engineers' operations there. To each shore 

party engineer company, two bulldozers and 

four amphibian tractors (L VT's) were allotted. With the fonner, exits were cleared 

through sand dunes and other obstructions, 

and vehicles were towed across terrain too 

soft for traction. When unloading shifted 

from the beaches to the port, most of the 

bulldozers were diverted to towing supplies 

to dumps, rather than aiding in boat salvage 

operations. Amphibian tractors proved helpful in getting stranded craft afloat but suffered too often from mechanical failures.'" 

The planners of Sub-Task Force BRUSHWOOD estimated Fedala's port capacity at 

800 tons per day, since along the quays at 

the northern edge of the harbor there was 

space for only two ships. Except for one anchorage, the remainder of the harbor was 

too shallow for cargo transports. If calm seas 

should enable other transport vessels to moor 

near the harbor entrance and send their 

cargoes in on small craft, perhaps 1,000 tons 

per day could be unloaded. Railroad sidings 

and approaches for trucks were so restricted 

that, even with additional cranes, it would 

not be possible to transfer materiel from 

t. (I) WTF Final Rpt, Annex 8, App. I, p. 1. (2) 

Joseph T. Dickman War Diary, Nov 42, Account 

of Harry A. Storts. (3) The great value of amphibian tractors for landings in the shallow water over 

coral reefs in the Central Pacific was to be demonstrated in such operations as the capture of the Gilbert and the Marshall Islands about a year later. 

See Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, The 

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955). 
136 

lighters to vehicles fast enough to meet the 

situation. The stuff would simply pile up. 

Warehouse facilities, moreover, were very 

small. 

The materiel brought ashore along the 

bay during the first morning of the operation was handled under intermittent shelling from Cap de Fedala and recurrent 

strafing runs by French planes. Small dumps 

for ammunition, water, rations, and gasoline were established, but stocks accumulated very slowly. In midafternoon, after 

Cap de Fedala had been occupied, the port 

was surveyed by the sub-task force supply 

officer and shore party commander and discovered to be usable at once. The harbor 

master and two pilots were sent under guard 

to the Leonard Wood to confer with Captain Emmett concerning the use of the port. 

The beachmaster, Comdr. J. W. Jamison 

USN), reconnoitering on foot, found the 

rising surf pounding most severely on the 

eastern section of the bay. He attempted to 

consolidate all beach landings at the most 

sheltered point during the later part of the 

afternoon. The absence of lateral communications between the beaches frustrated his 

attempt. But the transports could move 

closer in, thus shortening the ship-to-shore 

round trips and expediting the arrival of 

units and materiel needed to balance and 

strengthen the attacking force approaching 

Casablanca. At 1700 although some 39 percent of all troops (including 90 percent of 

the four assault battalions and of BL T 3-7 ) 

went ashore, only 16 percent of the vehicles 

and merely 1.1 percent of the supplies had 

been landed. The lack of vehicular transport precluded any systematic resupply of 

the forward elements. Equally restricting, 

some pieces of the light artillery batteries, 

some of the self-propelled 105's, and the 

heavy equipment of the cannon companies 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

had not been landed. While the troops and 

trucks at the beaches prepared to labor during the night to get materiel inland and 

under cover in anticipation of a dawn attack from the air, General Anderson concluded that the advance of ground troops 

had to be restrained until a better balance 

had been achieved. 

He directed RLG's 7 and 15 to stop at a 

line about two miles west of the Mellah 

river, a limit almost three miles short of the 

original D-Day objective. RLG 30 was ordered to continue organizing positions from 

which to protect the Fedala area after the 

other two regiments (reinforced) resumed 

the advance toward Casablanca at 0700 

next day. A preliminary outline plan of attack on the final objective was given to the 

regimental commanders. During the remainder of D Day, while elements of Colonel Monroe's 15th RLG kept arriving at 

various beaches, the battalions of Colonel 

Macon's 7th RLG took up positions preparatory to the next day's attack southwestward. Losses reported for the day had 

been moderate, 20 killed and 128 wounded, 

of which the 7th Infantry lost 9 killed and 

38 wounded; the 15th Infantry, 3 killed 

and 13 wounded; the 30th Infantry, 8 

killed and 23 wounded; and other units, 

the remainder.lT 

After General Patton had inspected the 

town and port of Fedala, he authorized a 

military police unit there, in the rear of 

Force BRUSHWOOD, composed of both 

American and French elements, and with 

a French officer acting as assistant provost 

marshal. Patton remained for the night at 

the Hotel Miramar, from which some of 

the German control commissioners had fled 

in the morning, in order to keep close track 

"WTF Final Rpt, Annex 2, p. 18. 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

of Force BRUSHWOOD'S operations at this 

critical stage. The report from General Harmon's attack at Safi was reassuring. News 

from Mehdia-Port-Lyautey was not so 

good. But the most pressing problem appeared to be that of speeding up the inflow 

of materiel from the transports off Fedala 

so that General Anderson's force could expedite its advance on Casablanca. 

The Advance on 9 November 

The first day's operations to secure the 

beachhead were followed on D plus 1 by an 

attempt to move into positions for a coordinated attack on Casablanca to be made 

on the third day ashore. The beachhead was 

protected against a threatened counterattack while the advance toward the outskirts 

of Casablanca proceeded, unsupported by 

land-based air, without the Armored Landing Team, and seriously hampered by 

logistical difficulties. 

General Patton, up before daylight on 

9 November, went almost at once to check 

the situation at the beach. He considered 

it "a mess," with leadership negligent. He 

personally ordered a launch sent out to 

intercept the boats and to direct them into 

the port instead of letting them ride to the 

beach through the towering surf. The Army 

shore parties seemed to him neither energetic nor resourceful in moving the materiel 

already on the beach. In a state of exasperated frustration over the slackness which he 

observed and over some cases of fright during a French air attack about 0800, he 

remained on the beach until after noon. He 

then returned to the Augusta to see Admiral 

Hewitt and sent his deputy commander, 

Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, and most of the 

staff ashore. 18 Advanced Headquarters, 

11 Patton Diary, 9 Nov 42. 

137 

Western Task Force, was set up in the Hotel 

Miramar, and command responsibility for 

Operation TORCH in Morocco passed by 

mutual understanding from Admiral Hewitt to General Patton when he returned to 

shore later that afternoon. Command over 

operations ashore had been exercised by the 

general from the very beginning and was to 

be exercised by Admiral Hewitt over naval 

operations henceforth, in conformity with 

the provisions of their directives.19 

Communication between the Western 

Task Force and the Allied command post at 

Gibraltar remained meager. Radio contact 

with Gibraltar was established on 9 November (by Company C, 829th Signal Service 

Battalion), but traffic was at first badly 

confused by a hostile station which posed to 

each of the authentic stations as the other 

and, when an effective authenticator system 

was improvised, interfered effectively by 

jamming. Communications with Oran were 

established on 10 November,20 and some 

use was made of a new radio station set up 

at Fedala by the Office of Strategic Services 

and Special Operations Executive which 

was operated by a British team in touch 

with Gibraltar.21 

Force BRUSHWOOD headquarters ashore 

shifted to the Fedala schoolhouse in time 

to open there at 0900, 9 November. The 

.. (1) Patton Diary, 9 Nov 42. (2) Intervs with 

Adm Hewitt, 23 Jan 51, and Capt L. A. Bachman 

(USN), 16 Jan 51. (3) Morison, U.S. Naval 

Operations, II, 158, is in error concerning the circumstances. Control from the Augusta over the 

separate operations at Safi and Port-Lyautey had 

been severely restricted by the inadequacy of communications facilities on the Augusta for the unexpected volume of Army traffic . 

.. WTF Final Rpt, Annex 9, p. 3. SCR-188 and 

SCR-199 sets were used. 

II (1) OSS Rpt, TORCH and the SOE Signals 

Stations at Gibraltar. CIA OSS Archives. (2) Msg, 

London to AGWAR, 21 Oct 42, CM-IN 09055. 

(3) Ltr, Frederick P. Culbert to author, 12 Feb 48. 
138 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ASSEMBLY AREA, AFTERNOON OF D PLUS 1. Men arefrom the 3d Infantry 

Division. 

239th Signal Operation Company manned 

the French telephone switchboard in Fedala 

and provided commercial circuits to the 

units approaching Casablanca. No other 

wire communications were available, for no 

field wire or related equipment had yet been 

landed.22 

At 0700 General Anderson's force began 

the second day's advance on a four-battalion front. The 7th Infantry's zone was 

on the right (north) and the 15th Infantry's 

zone on the left. From north to south the 

four BLT's were BLT's 3-7 (Maj. Eugene 

H. Cloud), 2-7 (Salzmann), 2-15 (Maj. 

William H. Billings), and 1-15 (Gardner). 

.. WTF Final Rpt, Annex 9, p. 3 (Col Elton 

F. Hammond, Signal Officer, WTF). 

BLT 1-7 (Moore), which had been relieved in F edala at 0600 by the 2d Battalion, 

20th Combat Engineers, moved up behind 

BL T 2-7 as regimental reserve. BL T 3-15 

was in a similar role behind BLT 2-15. The 

perimeter of the enlarged bridgehead was 

held on the southeast by BL T 1-30 and on 

the east and northeast by BL T 2-30 and the 

reinforced 41st Field Artillery Battalion. 

BL T 3-30, with one platoon of the 443d 

Coast Artillery (AA) attached, prepared to 

move westward from a point near Beach 

RED 3 during the morning to a new assembly area nearer the front. To aid the 

main attack in the 7th Infantry's zone, 

Companies A and C, 756th Tank Battalion, 

were also attached. Colonel Macon's (7th) 

and Colonel Monroe's (15th) regimental 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

command posts were moved up to points 

about a mile east of the line of departure. 23 

The Ranger had aboard three cub observation airplanes for General Campbell's 

Force BRUSHWOOD artillery, which were to 

be sent ashore when the three battalions of 

field artillery, each reinforced by an extra 

battery of self-propelled lOS's, had enough 

weapons ashore, and when a suitable landing field became available. In mid afternoon 

of 9 November, when the troops were approaching Casablanca, these aircraft were 

launched from the carrier's deck with instructions to land at the F edala race track. 

Their route brought them too near the Center Attack Group so that they became the 

target of heavy fire from the Brooklyn and 

from some of the transports. Escaping 

miraculously from their peril, they crossed 

the beach under determined fire from 

friendly antiaircraft batteries. One aircraft 

was shot down with serious injuries to its 

pilot; the others landed safely but received 

no fire control missions prior to the French 

capitulation. 24 

The movement toward Casablanca by 

RLG's 7 and 15, and by BLT 3-30 

(BRUSHWOOD reserve), with one platoon 

of the 443d Coast Artillery (AA) attached, 

was lightly resisted, with occasional strafing 

by low-flying French aircraft. BL T 2-30 

held the front along the steep-sided Nefifikh 

river on the northeastern edge of the beachhead against mounting threats of a counterattack by mobile armored forces from the 

'" Each of the nineteen antiaircraft platoons 

operated four half-tracked multiple gun motor carriers, mounting one 37-mm. automatic gun and 

two .50-caliber fixed machine guns. The 5th Platoon, Battery D, had only two of these (WTF Final 

Rpt, Annex 7, p. 3). The mUltiple gun motor 

carrien were credited with shooting down nine 

planes in three areas, four of them at Fedala 

(WTF Final Rpt, Annex 11, p. 3). 

I. WTF Final Rpt, Annex 7, p. 6. 

139 

directions of Rabat or Boulhaut. A French 

reconnaissance patrol along the RabatCasablanca highway was driven off during 

the morning, and early in the afternoon an 

armored force of some thirty vehicles at 

the intersection of that highway with the 

Fedala-Boulhaut road was dispersed by a 

naval air attack. 25 Defensive measures at 

the critical crossing of the Nefifikh included 

mining the approaches and the bridges, 

while artillery surveyed and checked concentrations, and planes patrolled the approaching roads. But the defenders of Rabat 

actually shifted their major strength on 9 

November northward toward Port-Lyautey 

instead of getting ready for a counterblow 

toward F edala. 

Although the defenders of Casablanca 

failed to come out in force on 9 November 

to meet the invaders approaching from 

Fedala, the advance was stopped as completely as if by a pitched battle. For General 

Anderson again had to halt the progress of 

his assault battalions until they had enough 

supporting weapons, transportation, and 

communications equipment. The 7th RLG 

was fairly well off except for radios for the 

supporting 10th Field Artillery Battalionequipment which had been lost or damaged 

in landing. The 15th RLG, on the other 

hand, lacked the weapons of its Cannon 

Company, the self-propelled lOS's of Battery 

B, 9th Field Artillery Battalion, the selfpropelled 37-mm. antiaircraft guns of the 

443d Coast Artillery (AA), and all the 

transportation of the 39th Field Artillery 

Battalion. A jeep was all that had been available to haul one battery of field artillery. 

Five more of the little quarter-ton vehicles 

were the total transport of the 15th RLG as 

., The vehicles were from the scout car troop, 

1st Squadron, 1st Regiment, African Chasseurs, according to WTF Final Rpt, G-2 Annex, Item 11. 
140 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ENTRANCE TO THE PORT OF FEDALA. Landing craft are from the close-in 

transport area. 

late as 1800 hours. To stop the advance for 

long, it was believed, might result in forfeiting an early French capitulation which 

an immediate strong show of force was likely to produce. Advance was resumed, therefore, at midnight, 9-10 November, with 

transportation furnished to RLG 15 by 

RLG 30 for moving the 39th Field Artillery 

Battalion and for resupply of ammunition. 

Unloading improved for various reasons 

on 9 November. Four docks and two paved, 

inclined slips in Fedala port were found to 

be usable. The slips served as excellent 

places for disembarking vehicles from 

ramped lighters. The dock normally used by 

trawlers in the southeastern corner of the 

port became the center of greatest activity. 

A railway ran along the full length of this 

dock, and the contents of the boats could be 

transferred directly into freight cars that 

were found there. 

At 1100 the transports moved inshore 

again, and the Arcturus was piloted into the 

harbor and moored at the tankers' dock. By 

1430, vehicles of the 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, were being swung ashore. 

At the same time a captured French trawler 

began taking ashore about 200 men per trip 

from the Thurston, supplementing the unending activity of the few landing craft 

and their exhausted crews. On the trawlers' 

dock, a station was organized for evacuating casualties to the transports. Medical personnel from the beach parties concentrated 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

there. From the Army's collecting station 

in the Casino, about 400 yards away, they 

carried the wounded by litter to the dock 

for removal to the sick bays of the ships off 

shore. 

The pace of unloading, which surf conditions had slowed down severely for eighteen hours," was quickened that afternoon. 

At 1700 the convoy had discharged 55 percent of the personnel, 31 percent of the vehicles, and 3.3 percent of the supplies which 

it had brought from the United States. Accelerated operations were in prospect for 

the next twenty-four hours as a result of 

salvaging landing craft, the close-in anchorage of the transports, the extra port facilities, and improving sea conditions. 

Transport of every sort was being requisitioned and put into service to clear beaches 

and docks. On the trawlers' quay, ammunition of many kinds, gasoline in five-gallon 

cans, TNT demolition charges, bangalore 

torpedoes, and other inflammable materiel 

were piling up. A well-placed bomb could 

be disastrous. Men and vehicles worked 

without stint to segregate and disperse the 

fuel and ammunition, although hampered 

by continued uncertainty as to the location 

of the different dumps. Their labors not only 

improved the security of the port but made 

possible a renewed attack on Casablanca. 

French Countermeasures in Morocco, 

9-10 November 

To contain the Americans at the coast 

after their occupation of Safi, Port-Lyautey, 

Fedala, and possibly Casablanca, General 

Nogues (charged by Admiral Darlan at 

1735, 8 November, ~nd by Vichy next day 

with control of operations in western Algeria 

as well as Morocco) on 10 November prescribed a defense along certain inland routes 

141 

rather than along a north-south front. 26 

Small reserve groups of French troops assembled on 9-10 November at Petitjean 

and Khemisset from Fes and Taza, and 

others went to Marrakech from the Agadir 

sector. Orders from General Lascroux's 

headquarters placed General Dody, commanding general of the Meknes Division, in 

charge of defending the inland route to 

Meknes from Port-Lyautey and, in co-operation with the Fes Division, the route via 

Petitjean to Fes, while General Leyer had 

the mission of blocking the route from 

Rabat to Meknes.27 

General N ogues moved his command post 

to Fes on 9 November, and General Lascroux later moved part of his headquarters 

there but remained himself at a command 

post in Khemisset. The German Armistice 

Commissioners had been kept informed of 

developments by General Nogues through 

liaison officers after the attack began but 

had been denied permission to keep a representative at his headquarters. They followed 

him inland, and concluded that his course 

of action, although somewhat inconsistent, 

was primarily intended to discourage German intervention. He flatly opposed the 

arrival of German aircraft to support the 

defense of Morocco. He promised the commissioners that they might leave by air if, as 

conditions then indicated, the Americans 

gained control from the French. Later, when 

the Germans violated the armistice by invading southern France, he did allow the 

commissioners to leave.28 

• General Directive 106-CMC, according to 

WTF Final Rpt, G-2 Annex, Item 11. IT GO 30/3, ibid. 

II (1) Extract of Rpt, Bericht ueber die Vorgaenge in Franzoesisch-Marroko und Nordafrika vom 

B.-II.XI.1942, DWStK, Kontrollinspektion Afrika 

la, Nr. 150/42, 15 Nov 42, in Chef OKW, Sonderakte Vorgaenge Frankreich. (2) Ltrs, Nogu~s to 

author, 28 Jan 50 and 23 Jan 51. 
142 

The resources of the French Anny in 

northern Morocco were assembled and deployed for resistance either to an American 

drive to the northeast or to an attack from 

Spanish Morocco against the northern 

frontier. 

The Attack Near the Coast on 10 November 

The 7th RLG started forward again at 

midnight, 9-10 November, under increased 

shelling from fidd guns in the outskirts of 

Casablanca, still carrying heavy loads of 

ammunition and weapons, and very weary. 

Nearest the beach, the reinforced Company 

L, 7th Infantry, proceeded without interruption, pushing back small French units. 

The remainder of BL T 3-7, straddling the 

coastal road about 1,500 yards inland, 

reached the suburbs of Casablanca not long 

after daybreak but was stopped there by 

French artillery and by small arms which 

swept the open terrain in front of them. 

The fighting on 10 November was the 

hottest experienced by Force BRUSHWOOD. 

After two halts for supporting arms to be 

brought forward, the troops resumed their 

movement at midnight to get into position 

for the co-ordinated action scheduled to 

start at 0700. RLG 7 headed for a line of 

departure running generally south-southwest from a point on the coast just east of 

Table d'Oukacha to the Camp de la Jonquiere, and thence southwestward generally 

following the Route de Grande Ceinture 

that skirts Casablanca. RLG 15 was to move 

southwestward to heights on either side 

of the Casablanca-Marrakech road. The 

French had organized their defense in a 

perimeter extending from Table d'Oukacha, 

including Roches Noires, Camp de la Jonquiere, then following the Route de Grande 

Ceinture to a point about three miles south 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

of the harbor, and from there in a northwesterly loop at El Hank. They had 

strengthened their defenses by an artillery 

concentration against attacks from the east 

and south and reinforced their lines with 

survivors of French warships previously 

sunk. Outer positions- were located at Ain 

Sebaa and at the Tit Mellil crossroads. 

Finally, they had arranged for naval gunfire support of their troops nearest the coast 

whenever an opportunity to slip lighter 

naval vessels out of Casablanca harbor 

presented itself. The 7th RLG, with its 

designated line of departure for the 0700 

attack actually in the rear of the forward 

French positions, was advancing into a 

sector that would be warmly defended. 

The 15th RLG's route of approach led 

through the outpost defenses of Tit Mdlil, 

which the French had had time to prepare 

and which were not to be readily taken; it 

also passed through an area under artillery 

fire from some of the Casablanca batteries. 29 

On the north, closest the shore, platoons 

from Companies I and K of RLG 7 in their 

advance north of the coastal road captured 

a 90-mm. antiaircraft battery about 1,200 

yards southeast of Table d'Oukacha during 

the morning, but the rest of the battalion 

was immobilized and for some hours out of 

communication with the regimental command post. 

Colonel Salzmann's BLT 2-7 moved 

along the Rabat-Casablanca highway as far 

as the railroad underpass at the edge of Ain 

Sebaa, and from that point continued along 

a branch road on the southern side of the 

railroad embankment. In column of companies, the battalion arrived about half an 

hour before daylight near its designated por-

.. ( 1) See overlays in WTF Final Rpt, Annex 2, 

Inels 6 and 7. (2) Morison, U.S. Naval Operations, 

II, 162. 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

tion of the line of departure for the attack 

which was to begin at 0700, 10 November. 

Small arms and artillery fire on the area then 

stopped the advance. The BLT deployed on 

either side of the road in some confusion. 

Two company commanders were casualties, 

some platoons failed to receive orders, and 

the battalion was split into three parts. Salzmann led the bulk of the unit under fire to 

the south flank in order to reach higher 

ground. Several platoons from the three rifle 

companies and most of the Headquarters 

Company remained behind. Part of the 

Headquarters Company and the battalion 

executive officer first took cover wherever 

they could find it in nearby buildings and 

then, when enemy fire let up, pulled back 

to the eastern outskirts of run Sebaa. Eventually they organized a line of defense for 

the 10th Field Artillery Battalion, 1,200 

yards back of the railroad underpass. Others 

also straggled back and were put in this 

line, but the forward elements of the battalion, consisting of two platoons of Company E and one platoon from Company G, 

stood their ground in contact with the enemy. They captured one field piece and 

drove the crews from two others, and even 

tried to envelop the northern flank of the 

French line. This attempt was frustrated by 

the lack of cover. The platoon of Company 

G which tried it was driven to the shelter of 

the railroad embankment by artillery and 

naval gunfire, and during the early afternoon it joined the defensive line organized 

earlier by the battalion executive officer. 

The 10th Field Artillery Battalion, with 

Battery A, 9th Field Artillery Battalion, attached, outdistanced the infantry advance 

between midnight and dawn to reach positions previously reconnoitered in Ain Sebaa. 

The artillerymen got ready for the 0700 attack, but then, almost as soon as their guns 

143 

opened fire, they came under heavy counterbattery fire from 75-mm. and 90-mm. 

guns, the latter only 800 yards distant on 

the north flank. Machine gun fire and hand 

grenade attacks by enemy infantry harried 

the gun crews and caused ten casualties, 

among them Lt. Col. Kermit LeV. Davis, 

the battalion commanding officer. Between 

0930 and 1100, the battalion, lacking infantry protection, dropped hastily back to 

new positions more than 1,000 yards to the 

east. It resumed firing about an hour before 

noon and continued throughout the afternoon, protected by the fragment of BLT 2-7 

described above and under direct orders 

from regimental headquarters, after direct 

communications with it were restored at 

noon.30 

For a short time late in the morning the 

l00-mm. guns and heavy machine guns of 

two French corvettes supported the French 

defensive line near the coast by enfilading 

fire on BLT 2-7. Moving slowly only a short 

distance offshore in the vicinity of Table 

d'Oukacha, they kept firing until an attack 

by the Augusta and four destroyers drove 

them back into Casablanca harbor. The episode lured the A ugusta within range of the 

guns of the Jean Bart, which had been repaired after being reported wholly out of 

action. Unexpected fire subjected the American flagship to a series of very close straddles. The shelling from the corvettes at first 

had been misinterpreted by the troops as 

from American ships, and contributed to the 

decision by some of the retreating units to 

shift position to the east. 

At 1045 Colonel Moore's BLT 1-7 began 

moving into the line on regimental order. 

It was directed to advance with tank and 

.. (1) Ltr, Patton to Marshall, 15 Nov 42. Copy 

in OPD Exec 8, Bk. 7, Tab 5. (2) Interv with Lt 

Gen Geoffrey Keyes, 15 Feb 50. 
144 

artillery support through the zone of Colonel Salzmann's battalion to take the French 

military barracks at Camp de la Jonquiere 

on the outskirts of Casablanca. The BL T 

made good progress under persistent artillery fire until, at 1700, it was barely 400 

yards east of its objective and about one 

and one-half miles in advance of BLT 2-7. 

There it stopped for the night. French prisoners reported that they had received 

orders to fall back; an armistice was 

imminent. 

Pushing to the Southeastern Edge 

0/ Casablanca, 10 November 

Late on 9 November in the zone of Colonel Monroe's 15th RLG reconnaissance 

patrols discovered an organized French 

position of uncertain strength in a village 

near Tit Mellil. The night march past this 

position to a line of departure for the 0700 

attack was therefore postponed until the 

French position could be cleared by a daylight attack. Supporting artillery fire was requested. One battery of the 39th Field 

Artillery Battalion using a jeep and a French 

civilian truck came forward to assist the 

attack at dawn. BLT 1-15 and BLT 2-15 

then met heavy rifle and machine gun fire 

coming from the waiting defenders who 

occupied several concrete buildings and 

who appeared to be strongly organized in 

some depth. Neither the Cannon Company 

nor the Antitank Company of RLG 15 had 

yet been landed from the transports, but 

some 37 -mm. antitank guns were used to 

good purpose as assault guns, while the 

heavy machine guns and 81-mm. mortars 

of all three battalions were also employed 

effectively. Following an earlier admonition from General Patton, to "grab the 

enemy by the nose and kick him in the 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

pants," the regiment enveloped the village from both flanks under covering artillery fire. The French retired to the south 

and west, and were pushed back from the 

ridge of Er Refifida (135) * by heavy machine gun and 37-mm. high explosive fire. 

But it was 1700 instead of 0700 hours when 

the regiment arrived at the line, astride the 

Casablanca-Marrakech highway and south 

of BLT 1-7, from which to attack the main 

objective. 

RLG's 7 and 15 had reached the edge of 

Casablanca late on 10 November at a cost 

of 27 killed and 72 wounded in the 7th 

Infantry, 2 killed and 6 wounded in the 10th 

Field Artillery Battalion, and 11 wounded 

in the 15th Infantry. Losses in other unit'l 

raised the Force BRUSHWOOD total for the 

day to 36 killed and 113 wounded,il chiefly 

because of French artillery and machine 

guns. The day's operations had been as 

costly as those on D Day. The interloping 

enemy aircraft of previous days had dwindled to very few indeed, while the support 

by land-based aircraft from Port-Lyautey 

was still withheld because of delay in capturing the airfield there. If the reports from 

Port-Lyautey were not too hopeful, the 

situation between Fedala and Casablanca 

had improved in two important respects. 

The supply situation no longer restrained 

the advance, for the famine at the port of 

Fedala had been transformed into a glut by 

unloading at a rate far in excess of the 

capacity of the men and available transportation to clear the docks. A substantial number of trucks and the use of the railroad had 

made possible the stocking of forward 

dumps. And even ahead of the trucks, the 

.Figures in parentheses refer to elevation in 

meters. 

It WTF Final Rpt, Annex 2, p. 18. 
FEDALA TO CASABLANCA 

Armored Landing Team 1-67 (Major Nelson) had been put ashore from the Arcturus 

and assembled five and a half miles southwest of Fedala, except for one platoon of 

light tanks of A Company sent forward to 

the southern flank of the 15th Infantry in 

the area of the Tit Mellil. 

General Patton could get little information from either General Truscott or General Harmon, but, urged by General Eisenhower to catch up with the operations at 

Algiers and Oran,32 where fighting had 

already ceased, he determined to proceed 

without the support of P--40's from the XII 

Air Support Command or the medium tanks 

of Combat Command B, 2d Armored Division, from Safi. The French forces in 

Casablanca were believed to outnumber 

available ground troops, but naval air and 

naval gunfire could be counted on to offset 

that advantage. Arrangements for a co-ordinated attack to open with bombardment at 

0700 and ground assault at 0730, 11 November, were made during the afternoon 

and evening. While these plans were maturing, reports were received that General Harmon's medium tanks were moving northward from Safi and that the airfield at PortLyautey had been taken in time to receive 

some of the Chenango's P--40'S.1I General 

Truscott, who had been asking for reinforcements in the morning, was already 

planning to send a small armored force 

southward to get the airfield at Rabat on 11 

Novet:nber. 34 

From four of the transports between 2030 

on 10 November and dawn on 11 November, the personnel and heavy guns of two 

artillery batteries, the personnel and equipII CinC AF Diary, 10 Nov 42. 

so Patton Diary, 10 Nov 42. 

.. Interv with Brig Gen Harry H. Semmes 

(O.R.C.), 7 Mar 50. 

145 

ment of the 3d Signal Company, and the 

signal and medical equipment of some 

armored units were landed under urgent 

request. These units were to strengthen 

RLG 30 to meet an anticipated morning 

attack against the Fedala beachhead from 

the northeast. 

General Anderson notified his assault 

units of the attack orders in prospect for the 

next morning in time for reconnaissance before darkness. Ground advance was to begin 

at 0730, following preliminary bombardment in which warships, carrier-based 

planes, and field artillery would join. EI 

Hank, the water front, and the semicircle of 

field and antiaircraft guns in the southeastern sector of Casablanca, were the designated targets. RLG 7 on the north, RLG 15 

on the east, supported respectively by the 

10th and 39th Field Artillery Battalions 

(reinforced), and the tanks of the 1 st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, in RLG 

IS's sector, were to attack toward the harbor along converging lines. Movements during the night placed the various components 

of Sub-Task Force BRUSHWOOD in position 

for the morning's attack. 

Facing the attacking force, the French 

ground elements, exclusive of the personnel 

at the coastal defense batteries which were 

still in operation, amounted to more than 

3,600 infantry, about 90 guns, and miscellaneous provisional naval units of undetermined strength. A troop of some 400 

Moroccan Spahis was stationed southwest 

of the city and south of the Route de Grande 

Ceinture within striking distance of RLG 

IS's left flank and likely to engage the tanks 

of the 2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment. The measures necessary to overcome 

such defenses with the means available 

seemed certain to cause drastic destruction 

within the city and its harbor, and to do 
146 

irreparable damage to any prospect of cooperation between Americans and French 

in defeating the Axis. Would the French 

resistance persist? Could Nogues be persuaded to order the cessation of hostilities, 

and if he did, would his orders be obeyed? 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

He had finally recognized that the Western 

Task Force was formidable-no raiding 

party-and that even at Mehdia-PortLyautey, where the French opposition had 

been most successful, the triumph of the 

invaders was in sight. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Mehdia to Port-Lyautey 

The basic task of Force GoALPOST in executing its mission was to gain possession of 

an airfield for the use of P-40's (brought on 

the carrier Chenango) and other planes of 

the XII Air Support Command (to be Hown 

from Gibraltar).1 The airfield was to be 

available by nightfall of D Day for support 

thereafter of the main American attack on 

Casablanca. Although the northern force 

might well accomplish other missions, capture of the airport near Port-Lyautey was 

primary and overriding. The operations 

from Mehdia to Port-Lyautey were more 

complex than those of either of the other 

two landing forces. (Map III) 

The Sebou river meandels in wide loops 

as it near the Atlantic coast at Mehdia. Parallel protective moles jut into the sea at its 

mouth. Nine miles upstream around a great 

northerly loop, although only five miles airline to the eastward, is Port-Lyautey, on the 

southern bank of the river. The area within 

the inverted U made by this loop contains, 

in its southern portion, the prominent northern nose of a ridge which extends southwestward, roughly parallel to the seacoast. 

In the Hat northeastern part of the area is 

the Port-Lyautey airdrome, its concrete runI The chief sources for the operations at MehdiaPort-Lyautey are: (1) WTF Final Rpt, Operations 

TORCH, Annex 3 (Opns of Sub-Task Force GOALPOST), and G-2 Annex, Item 11 (Journal of Actions of the High Command of Moroccan Troops, 

8-11 Nov 42). DRB AGO. (2) TG 34.8 Action 

Rpt. (3) Maj Carl E. Bledsoe, AGF Obsr's Rpt, 

27 Jan 43. AGF 319.1 (For. Obs), Tab 17. 

ways and hangars lying on low Hats next to 

the river. It is dominated by the high ground 

to the southwest and, across the river, directly to the north, by bluffs rising about 100 

feet above the water. 

It was not feasible for ships to bypass the 

defenses at the river's mouth and navigate 

upstream to the vicinity of the airfield before debarking the troops who were to occupy it. A sandbar at the entrance limited 

access, even during the highest November 

tides, to vessels of not more than nineteen 

feet draft. About one mile from the mouth, 

a barrier across the channel prevented 

farther navigation except with the concur· 

renee of guards. Machine guns and artillery 

were sited to sweep the river adjacent to 

the barrier. On the shoulder of a mesa south 

of the stream, the walled Kasba (fortress) 

in particular dominated the channel. Ships 

attempting to proceed past these defenses 

in daylight would be at too severe a disadvantage, while at night their chances of 

escaping the misfortune of running aground 

were slight. 

If troops started inland from the ocean 

shore south of the Sebou river, their advance would be impeded by a narrow lagoon 

almost four miles in length, fringed by scrub 

pine woods and steep ridges, which paralleled the coast east of the dunes. Movement of vehicles would have to be funneled 

through a gap of less than one mile between 

the lagoon's marshy northern end and the 

southern bank of the river. This gap, more-
148 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

PORT-LYAUTEY AIRDROME, within the "U" made by the wide loop of the Sebou 

nVeT. 

over, narrowed abruptly to a terrace less 

than 200 yards wide between the river and 

a cliff. Troops drawn into this gap would be 

faced by the strongest concentration of fixed 

defenses in the area to be attacked. Among 

them, indeed, were the principal coastal defense guns, which would have to be neutralized or captured before the transports could 

operate in daylight from positions near the 

beaches. These batteries were believed to 

consist of one four-gun and an adjacent 

two-gun group, each of 138.6-mm. caliber, 

heavily protected by machine guns, antiaircraft weapons, and a system of trenches 

linking the area with the Kasba fortress. 

The older battery of four guns was understood to be mounted without the protection 

characteristic of newer emplacements, but 

all had a range of up to 18,000 meters and 

a traverse which enabled them to cover sea 

and beach approaches to the Sehou from 

any likely angle. 

Another gap at the southern end of the 

long lagoon permitted access to the interior 

where a coastal road turned inland. This 

defile through the coastal ridges was not 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

more than 200 yards wide and was a position of easy defense against any force approaching Mehdia. The bluffs extending 

south of this narrow gap for over four miles 

contained a few exits for roads or trails. 

Through these draws and across the inland 

ridges, infantry units could at least approach 

the airfield from the southwest, passing between Mehdia on the west and Port-Lyautey 

on the east. 

The airfield could be attacked also by 

a force which landed north of the river 

mouth. These troops would have to advance 

for at least 1,500 yards through high sand 

dunes, over steep shale slopes and ridges, to 

reach a secondary road along the river's 

northern bank. Part of such a force could 

occupy the bluffs directly north of the airdrome and the remainder could move down 

a tongue of land within the river's second 

loop to the east. The airport could thus 

be denied to the enemy, but in order to 

make it available to the Americans, the high 

ground southwest of it would also have to 

be held. Supplies, moreover, would have to 

be brought upstream. Control of the river 

from its mouth to Port-Lyautey required 

landings south of the river and inland advance by the few routes permitted by the 

difficult natural barriers paralleling the 

coast. 

General Truscott and his staff recognized 

the possibility of making the assault in either 

of two general ways. All landings could be 

made to the south away from effective opposition; the attacking force, including a 

considerable number of guns and tanks, 

could assemble there and advance northward to the airdrome and the port under 

cover of naval bombardment. Such a 

method involved two great risks: slowness 

in reaching the objective, and interruption 

by bad weather in landing tanks and guns 

149 

after the assault infantry was ashore, thus 

preventing the force from moving northward in good order. It was rejected, therefore, in favor of a landing plan which would 

make maximum use of a short period when 

the surf was moderate, and which seemed 

to combine the advantages of speed, surprise, and flexibility. Landings were to be 

made at several places as close as possible 

to the objective and, during the inland advance, success was to be exploited wherever 

it might be achieved. Numerical superiority 

over the defenders would not be guaranteed 

at every point, nor could sufficient reinforcements be committed from one side 

of the river to the other if needed to turn 

the tide of battle. The separated units would 

have to operate with a high degree of initiative and efficiency. The risk that the attack 

might get out of control was great. But the 

prospects of speedy success and of insurance 

against swiftly deteriorating weather were 

deemed controlling. 

Port-Lyautey and the Port-Lyautey airdrome would be defended on D Day, the 

planners concluded, by one infantry regiment (3,080 men) with supporting artillery. These troops could be reinforced, late 

on D Day, by 1,200 mechanized cavalry and 

elements of a tank battalion (forty-five 

tanks) from Rabat. During the night, about 

half an additional tank battalion could 

reach the area from Meknes. Finally, within five days, two regiments (about 6,200 

men) could march to Port-Lyautey from 

Rabat and Meknes. These troops, while not 

as well equipped as the Americans, would 

include a substantial proportion of seasoned 

veterans. To meet the contingencies of D 

Day, the assaulting units would require 

antitank weapons and tanks, some of them 

landing south of the Sebou river to confront 
150 

French armored units approaching from 

Rabat. Limited by the capacities of available transports, and the necessity of conveying ground troops of the XII Air Support Command, the northern landing force 

would consist of only one regimental combat 

team, the 60th Regiment (reinforced), and 

an armored group, the 3d Armored Landing Team of the 2d Armored Division. Persistent hopes of having an airborne force 

dropped near the airfield were denied. 

The Plan 01 Attack 

Force GOALPOST was conveyed to the vicinity of Mehdia by the Northern Attack 

Group of the Western Naval Task Force. 

Its 525 officers and warrant officers and 

8,554 enlisted men 2 (of whom 124 officers 

and 1,757 enlisted men were ground troops 

of t?e XII Air Support Command), with 

65 lIght tanks and 881 vehicles, were loaded 

in eight transports. Tpey were protected by 

the battleship Texas, the light cruiser Savannah, the escort carrier Sangamon, and nine 

destroyers. Two mine sweepers, an oiler, 

and a seaplane tender were part of the 

group, and the S.S. Contessa, the special 

cargo transport, pursued the others across 

the Atlantic in time to join them off Mehdia 

on D Day. The Chenango, on which the 

Army's seventy-six P--40's were carried, was 

pr~pared to catapult them for emergency 

stnkes followed by landings in the open 

countryside, should such drastic action be 

required. 

To insure at least a skeleton staff arriving 

at the destination, General Truscott had 

divided his staff, placing half abroad the 

USS Allen and half aboard the USS 

Clymer. Assignment was as follows: 

2 See Table 3. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

USS Allen 

Section Rank and Name 

Commanding GeneraL_ Maj. Gen. Lucian K. 

Truscott, Jr. 

Chief of Staff _________ Col. Don E. Carleton 

G-I ________________ Lt. Col. Oliver T. Sanborn, Jr. 

Assistant G-L _______ Maj. Theodore J. Conway 

G-3 ________________ Lt. Col. Van H. Bond 

G~ ________________ Lt. Col. Donald M. Libby 

A.1f Officer ___________ Col. Demas T. Craw 

Signal Officer ________ Capt. John C. Liggett 

Surgeon_____________ Maj. Ralph R. Camardella 

USS Clymer 

2d in Command _____ _ 

Assistant Chief of Staff_ 

G-2 _______________ _ 

Assistant G-3 _______ _ 

Assistant G-4 _______ _ 

Assistant Air Officer __ _ 

Engineer Officer _____ _ 

Col. Frederick J. de 

Rohan 

Lt. Col. William R. 

McCleod 

Maj. Pierpont M. 

Hamilton 

Maj. Carl E. Bledsoe 

Capt. William S. 

McKowsky 

Lt. Col. Charles A. 

Piddock 

Lt. Col. Frederic A. 

Henney 

The Staff of the 60th Combat Team was 

also billeted on the Clymer. 3 

The plan of attack provided for five 

simultaneous landings, two at beaches north 

of the Sebou's mouth and three at beaches 

so~th of it. Selection of these particular 

pomts for the landings was determined less 

by hydrographic conditions than by directness of access to separate inland objectives, 

for the shore offered similar opportunities 

at ~any points. About one mile up the river, 

adjacent to Mehdia, was a sixth beach 

planned for a later landing, while a seventh 

was indicated almost nine miles from tht> 

river's mouth, directly east of the PortLyautey airdrome. The initial assault landings, however, were to be made through the 

pounding surf characteristic of the Atlantic 

• Bledsoe, AGF Obsr's Rpt, 27 Jan 43. AGF 319.1 

(For. Obs), Tab 17. 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

TABLE 3-PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES ASSIGNED TO FORCE "Z" (GOALPOST), 

AS OF 22 OCTOBER 1942 

Personnel 

151 

Unit Veblcle. 

"fotal ______ ______________________ ___________________ 

9th Infantry Division 

1st BLT 60th Infantry G _________________________ __ _______ 

2d BLT, 60th Infantry b ______________________________ __ __ 

3d BLT, 60th Infantry < __________________________________ 

Other 60th Infantry Troops d _______ _______________________ 

Annored Landing Team 

1st Battalion (reinforced) , 66th Armored Regiment' ________ 

Othcr Force "Z" Personnel 

Detachments, XI[ Air Support COmmand ___________________ 

692d- 697th Coast Artillery (AA) Batteries _____ • _________ ___ 

Detachment of 

66th Engineer Company (Topographic) ________________ ___ 

ist Armored Signal Battalion ____________________________ 

9th Signal Company ____ ____________________ ________ __ __ 

122d Signal Company (Radio Jntelligence) ________ __ ______ 

163d Signal COmp'lny (Photographic) _____________________ 

239th Signal Company (Operational) ____ _________________ 

56th Medical Battalion __ • ___ ____________ - ___ --- ___ - ___ _ 

2d Broadcasting Station Operation DetachmenL _____ ________ 

Counterintelligence Group __________ __________ __ _____ __ - __ _ 

Prisoner In terroga tion Grou p ________ ______________________ 

Civil Government PcrsonneL ______________________________ 

Force Headquarters _______________________ - ______________ 

Submarine Markers __ _ ___________________________________ 

Harbor Obstruction Experts ____ __________ _____ ____________ 

Naval Personnel. _________________________ _______________ 

• Including lat Platoon. Battery D. ,"3d COUl Anillery (AA) B.n.lion. 

• rncludin~ 3d Ph.oon. Battery D, 443d eo,,, Artillery (AA) Battalion. 

, Indudlng 4th Plaloon, B.ttery D. 443d CaUl Artillery (AA) B.ttalion. 

J [ncludin lot Ba\t.alion, 540th Engineer Regiment, 

To", I Office .. 

9,079 525 

1,345 61 

1,268 54 

1,461 57 

1.3 18 77 

919 40 

1,936 139 

448 30 

5 0 

3 0 

68 2 

26 1 

6 I 

35 I 

36 I 

30 11 

16 1 

21 6 

4 4-

46 10 

30 6 

40 20 

18 3 

• Including lor Platoon, Battery B, and lot Platoon, Batter)" C. «3d eo .. , Anillery (AA) B. ttolio,., 

Enlisted 

8,554 

1,284 

1,214 

1,404 

1.241 

879 

1, 797 

418 

5 

3 

66 

25 

5 

34 

35 

19 

15 

15 

0 

36 

24 

20 

15 

So.,a: Ann ... A (Troop LUl) to Memo, TF "A" to ACofS OPD, 22 Oct 42. Order of Baltic Tt- "A" 1942. St. Looi. Rcd$. 

881 

118 

117 

l18 

224 

163 

103 

0 

0 

I 

10 

4 

1 

4 

0 

5 

0 

0 

0 

IO 

0 

0 

0 

shore of Africa. Two battalion landing 

teams were to use beaches south of the river, 

a third was to land in two sections on beaches 

north of the river, and the armored group 

was to come ashore south of the river at daylight, using whichever beach was then considered most available. The planners hoped 

that the inside beach (BROWN) on the 

river's bank near Mehdia would quickly be 

made accessible to the tank lighters. 

The most northerly landing was to be 

made by about one third of the 3d Battalion 

Landing Team, 60th Regimental Combat 

Team (approximately 550 men), on Beach 
152 

RED, situated four and a half miles north 

of the river's mouth. This detachment was 

expected to hasten to the bluffs north of the 

Port-Lyautey airfield before daylight. From 

that point, it was to neutralize the field, 

reconnoiter to the north and east about five 

miles, and send a detail to block or gain 

possession of the bridge over the Sebou near 

Port-Lyautey. Eventually the detachment 

would cross the river in rubber boats 

brought from the beach and participate in 

a co-ordinated attack on the airfield planned 

for 1100. 

While this operation proceeded, the larger 

section of the 3d BL T would land at Beach 

RED 2, less than 1,000 yards north of the 

river's mouth. In two hours' time, this force 

was to occupy positions on the northern 

bank of the Sebou opposite Mehdia from 

which to furnish supporting artillery and 

mortar fire for the attack on the Kasba. It 

was then on order to continue along the 

northern bank to join the other part of the 

3d BL T in the river crossing operation and 

the attack on the airfield. 

The most critical mission was that of the 

2d BL T, 60th Regimental Combat Team, 

whose 1,268 men would land on GREEN 

Beach, just south of the river's mouth and 

about one mile from Beach RED 2. Picked 

units equivalent to two rifle companies 

would attempt to capture the coastal defenses at Mehdia before daylight, that is, 

before 0600. If the first effort to seize the 

batteries by bayonet assault should fail, 

naval and air bombardment was to be delivered on call by General Truscott after 

0615, followed by a second ground assault. 

The 2d BL T was to establish its beachhead 

at Mehdia and continue over the ridges to 

the hill southwest of the airfield for participation in the co-ordinated attack at 1100. 

With the 2d BL T was to be a joint demoliNORTHWEST AFRICA 

tion party of Army engineers and Navy 

personnel, whose objective would be to find 

and remove the barrier across the Sebou. 

The channel was thus to be opened for 

movement upstream by the destroyer-transport, Dallas, carrying a special raider detachment of seventy-five men to a landing 

at Beach BROWN 2 near the airport, and 

on the way supporting the advance of the 

2d BL T with gunfire on targets of opportunity. 

In somewhat the same manner that the 

3d BL T utilized Bp.aches RED and RED 2 

north of the river, the 1st BLT was to land 

simultaneously on two beaches, BLUE and 

YELLOW, from four to five miles south of 

the Sebou's mouth. One rifle company was 

to touch down originally at each beach, and 

when the defenses and terrain features had 

been tested the remainder of the BL T would 

follow to that beach which could be most 

readily occupied. The mission of the 1 st 

BL T required rapid overland march to 

block the western exits of Port-Lyautey and 

to participate at 1100 in the attack on the 

airdrome. At the same time, detachments 

were to reconnoiter five miles to the south 

and southeast and to protect the southwest 

flank of the sub-task force. Beyond a line 

which limited this reconnaissance, the supporting air elements would both observe 

and try to halt French troop movements 

from Rabat-Sale. 

The preferred plan of attack of MehdiaPort-Lyautey was thus to begin with landings at five points along ten miles of Atlantic shore line. They would begin at an 

H Hour set at 0400 in order to have two 

hours of darkness for establishing beachheads and capturing by storm coastal defenses and key positions. Then, while four 

separate groups advanced overland and a 

fifth progressed by ship up the Sebou, par-
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

leys would be sought with the French commander at Port-Lyautey. If the response 

proved unfriendly, the airfield was to be 

taken by a co-ordinated attack from three 

or four sides, from the air, and with the 

aid of naval gunfire whenever called. Naval 

aircraft from the Sangamon would assist 

the morning advance and the attack on the 

airdrome scheduled for 1100 hours. The armored landing team would also land during the day to protect and support the operations, particularly in the area southwest 

and south of Port-Lyautey. Before nightfall, 

if all went well, the airport would be in 

American hands, either by French consent 

or by capture, and, on D plus 1, it could be 

used by the Chenango's P-40's and by 

bombers to be flown in from Gibraltar. 

The Enemy Is Alerted 

The Northern Attack Group arrived off 

Mehdia just before midnight, 7-8 November. The lights ashore were shining brightly, 

and the shore was dearly visible from the 

transport area, between 15,000 and 16,000 

yards out. While the Texas and Savannah 

took stations to the north and south, the 

transports sought designated stations in 

which to begin disembarkation of the assault troops. They began ship-to-shore operations almost an hour later than the time 

of arrival, which had been set at 2300, 7 

November. The 1st, 2d, and 3d BLT's were 

on the transports Henry T. AUen, George 

Clymer, and Susan B. Anthony, respectively. The 3d Armored Landing Team was on 

the John Penn, with thirty-seven of its light 

tanks on the Electra. Personnel of the XII 

Air Support Command were on the Florence Nightingale, the Anne Arundel, and 

the Algorab. 

The transports lost formation during the 

153 

last stage of the approach and never regained it. Since landing craft from five of 

the ships were first to carry troops from the 

other three for one or more round trips, 

much confused searching by boat crews ensued with corresponding delay in forming 

waves for the actual landings. General Truscott was ferried from transport to transport 

and agreed to the necessity of postponing 

H Hour from 0400 to 0430. All the craft 

which could be dispatched for landings on 

the revised schedule were then sent in, the 

others being formed in improvised waves 

for the follow-up. 

Several small French steamers were 

allowed to pass along the coast through the 

convoy not long after it came to anchor, 

and observers on the transport Henry T. 

AUen saw one of these steamers, the Lorraine, signal by blinker: "Be warned. Alert 

on shore for 5 A. M." President Roosevelt's 

and General Eisenhower's messages had 

been broadcast from London much earlier, 

and in the Mediterranean the landings were 

well advanced before those at Mehdia commenced. Surprise seemed out of the question. Even if the convoy were not visible to 

watchers ashore, the noise of the winches, 

the booms, and the motors of landing craft 

moving among the larger ships should have 

been audible. It remained to be discovered 

how (in the absence of fire control radar of 

later date) darkness might affect the relative strength of attack or defense. Arrangements to sabotage the coastal guns and oth~r 

defenses had miscarried in consequence of 

the shift in leadership at Casablanca shortly 

before the arrival of the expedition:' When 

General Truscott held a conference with his 

staff on the Allen at 0430, it not only seemed 

certain that surprise had been lost, but also, 

• Interv with David W. King, 24 Feb 48. See 

also Ch. IV above. 
154 

that the attack would be too late for the 

bayonet assault in darkness, which he would 

have preferred. Preparation for a daylight 

attack by heavy naval bombardment was 

precluded by Allied policy. The commanding general might have adopted an alternate plan prepared for daylight operations, 

but the possibilities of success by foUowing 

the main plan on a delayed schedule seemed 

equally good. He therefore made the critical decision to persevere along the lines 

originally laid down. I 

The defenses at Mehdia were lightly garrisoned. No machine guns and artillery 

swept the beaches from pillboxes or other 

emplacements at its upper edge. Naval 

crews operated two 5-inch guns in protected positions on the tableland above 

Mehdia village and in the vicinity of the 

Kasba. Not more than seventy men occupied the fort when the attack started. Two 

75-mm. guns were mounted on flat cars on 

the railroad running beside the river at the 

base of the bluff on which the Kasba lay. 

A second battery of four 75's was brought 

forward after the attack began to a position 

on the high ground along the road from 

Mehdia to Port-Lyautey. A battery of four 

155-mm. rifles (Grandes Puissances Fil-

[oux) was emplaced on a hill west of PortLyautey and southwest of the airport. The 

airport was defended by a single antiaircraft 

battery. The infantry consisted of the 1st 

Regiment of Moroccan Infantry and the 

8th Tabor (battalion) of native Goums. 

One group of nine 25-mm. guns withdrawn 

from other infantry regiments and one battalion of engineers completed the defensive 

force. Reinforcements were sent to occupy 

the entrenchments and machine gun posi-

• Bledsoe, AGF Obsr'. Rpt, 27 Jan 43. AGF 

319.1 (For. Obs), Tab 17. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tions which covered approaches to the 

coastal guns and the fort and to occupy defensive positions on the ridges east of the 

lagoon. The guns were manned and ready 

for action as soon as targets could be discerned. The boom across the river, somewhat upstream from' the Kasba, was 

guarded by machine gunners, riflemen, and 

artillery. Warning orders brought fighters 

and twin-engined bombers into the air for 

attacks at dawn. The Americans were to 

receive no friendly welcome. 

The hostilities soon to begin not only ran 

counter to the hopes of the Americans, but 

persisted despite a courageous mission intended to bring them to an early conclusion. 

Plans had been adjusted while Force GoALPOST was crossing the Atlantic Ocean to 

include Col. Demas F. Craw in Maj. Pierpont M. Hamilton's mission to go by jeep 

from an early beach landing near Mehdia to 

Port-Lyautey to consult the French commander (Col. Charles Petit). The emissaries were to give him a letter similar in purport to the President's broadcast. At first 

light on 8 November, they went ashore as 

the fire of coastal batteries and warships and 

strafing French airplanes began. French 

troops near the Kasba directed them toward 

Port-Lyautey, but as they neared the town 

under a flag of truce, a French machine 

gunner at a road-fork outpost without warning stopped them with a burst of point-blank 

fire which killed Colonel Craw. Major 

Hamilton was then conducted to the headquarters of Colonel Petit, where his reception, though amicable, led to no conclusive 

reply. He was detained in protective custody, 

was eventually permitted to telephone Gen. 

Maurice Mathenet at Meknes, and was encouraged to expect ultimately a favorable 

response. The pervading atmosphere at the 

French headquarters in Port-Lyautey was 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

one of sympathy toward the Allied cause 

and distaste for the current fighting. 6 What 

was lacking was an authorization from Colonel Petit's superior to stop fighting. Pending 

receipt of such authorization, the French at 

Port-Lyautey continued to fight until they 

were defeated, but with diminishing zeal. 

The 2d BLT Attacks in the Center 

In spite of delays and confusion in debarkation, the 2d BLT's first three waves 

started toward GREEN Beach in time to land 

before 0600. The way in was marked by 

various beacon lights, one on a scout boat 

stationed 700 yards out from the river 

mouth, and others on the beaches themselves. No resistance was received from shore 

until the first wave had touched down, possibly as early as 0540. But almost simultaneously with the arrival of this wave at 

the beach, a searchlight illuminated the 

scout boat, a red rocket soared from the 

southern jetty, and coastal guns fired toward 

the scout boat and toward the destroyers a 

little farther out. A few salvos from the destroyer Eberle darkened the searchlight and 

temporarily silenced the guns, but before 

the landings were far advanced two French 

airplanes passed up and down the beach 

strafing boats and personnel, and causing 

some casualties. The first boat teams (containing sections of the heavy weapons company with parts of rifle companies) hastened 

up the beach to cover, where with later arrivals they organized for the assault. At the 

same time, the attempt of the special demolition party to cut the river barrier was frus-

• (I) Ltr, Brig Gen Pierpont M. Hamilton 

(USAF) to author, 31 Jan 50. (2) See also the 

citations for awards of the Congressional Medal 

of Honor to Major Hamilton and poithumously to 

Colonel Craw in Th, Medal 0/ Honor 0/ the United 

States Arm)" p. 232. 

155 

trated by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. 

The party left without achieving its mission. 

Admiral Kelly signaled "Batter Up" for 

local offensive fire at 0615, and ordered the 

Eberle to reply to the French shelling of the 

landing craft approaching GREEN Beach. 

At 0710, orders to "Play Ball," the signal 

for general naval attack by the whole task 

force, were received from Admiral Hewitt. 

The frustrating provisions of the TORCH 

Plan limited naval bombardment, except 

when needed by troops ashore, to replies to 

French fire on offshore targets. In the absence of calls from General Truscott's troops 

ashore through the shore fire control parties 

which were assigned to each BLT, naval fire 

support therefore continued to be withheld. 

The assault troops of the 2d BLT, 60th 

Regimental Combat Team, formed on 

either side of the coastal road where it bent 

northeasterly through a band of scrub pine 

woods between the lagoon and the shore. 

The highway skirted the marshy northern 

extremities of the lagoon and the ends of 

two parallel ridges on either side of that 

water. The western ridge, covered with 

thick brush, was fairly steep and reached a 

height of 75 feet, but the slope just east of 

the lagoon rose abrupdy more than 200 feet 

to a plateau on which were the principal 

objectives of the assault. A lighthouse stood 

on its western shoulder. A thousand yards 

farther to the northeast was the fortified 

Kasba, and near the fort, the coastal battery. 

About half a mile east of the Kasba, on the 

gradual downward slope, was a small collection of dwellings which the attackers 

called the "native village." The coastal highway, after passing through Mehdia and running for more than 2,000 yards along the 

river, rose to join a second road, converging 

from the high ridge, about 1,000 yards 

northeast of the native village. It continued 
156 

eastward about three miles farther to PortLyautey. The mission of the 2d BL T was first 

to make its way directly eastward from the 

beach for approximately one mile to the 

high ridge and next, turning north, to gain 

control of the batteries, of other prepared 

defenses, and of the Kasba itself. Then it 

was to reorganize and push northeasterly 

across the Mehdia-Port-Lyautey highway 

and out to the high ground just southwest 

of the airdrome. 

After reorganizing, the BL T advanced 

toward the ridge for 600 yards or more without interruption, but upon emerging from 

the brush it suddenly had to reckon with 

naval shells that screamed overhead and 

crumped against the ridge a few hundred 

yards away. The warships, under orders to 

reply at once to coastal guns firing to seaward, had opened up without advance notice to troops ashore, although with regard 

for their possible presence in the target area. 

The 2d BL T was thus moving beneath counterbattery fire against the guns near the 

Kasba, which had attempted to hit the transports and supporting ships offshore, rather 

than naval gunfire requested by the shore 

fire control party. The troops, inexperienced 

in the actual effects of such fire and apparently uncertain of its control, melted back 

into cover in considerable disorder and 

waited for it to stop. 

Maj. John H. Dilley, the 2d Battalion 

commander, left his naval gunfire liaison 

officer at the beach and with his artillery 

officer went toward the forward line. In the 

vicinity of the lighthouse they could see a 

few French sailors but no other defenders. 

Naval bombardment, moreover, ceased. 

The BL T once more reorganized, again 

pushed toward the high ridge, and, after a 

fire fight, gained possession before 0900 of 

the area near the lighthouse and of trenches 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

leading toward the Kasba. It was now ready 

to attack the batteries and the fort when 

naval gunfire again began to fall in the same 

area, this time causing a hasty retreat. A 

green flare, the signal to cease fire, was sent 

up, but although the flare was seen by the 

naval gunfire liaison officer at the beach and 

reported by radio to the fire support ship, 

the USS Roe, respite was brief. Other naval 

vessels did not receive the order and more 

shells fell, thwarting the attack for the second time. Although the rate of exchange 

between the coastal guns and the warships 

approximated two French shells for thirty 

American, the latter did not effect complete 

neutralization of the batteries. Furthermore, 

the naval gunfire held up the infantry attack 

at a time when Kasba's defenders were fewest, and thus inadvertently helped prolong 

the whole operation. Accordingly, after the 

attack was thus suspended, Colonel de 

Rohan, Commanding Officer, 60th Regimental Combat Team, appeared at the 

lighthouse and gave orders for its resumption. These orders were misunderstood by 

Major Dilley as requiring that his battalion 

bypass the Kasba and push on to the northeast. In spite of much straggling and confusion, of poor contact with the rear echelon 

of the battalion command post, and in spite 

of the fact that one company had to be left 

in trenches near the Kasba, the remainder 

of the 2d BL T continued eastward into the 

native village. There, shortly after 1230, 

the badly shaken unit came under counterattack. Troops from Port-Lyautey had 

moved up to stop them. A small force of 

French infantry approached the village from 

the east and from the highway north of it, 

supported by 75's firing from near the road. 

Although the shore fire control party had a 

telephone line to the front by that time, and 

had succeeded in bringing naval gunfire and 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

air bombardment on the French artillery, 

they did not stop the French from receiving 

reinforcements of several more truckloads 

of the 1st Regiment of Moroccan Infantry, 

in addition to two towed guns, at about 

1400, and three old-style French tanks at 

1530. The men of the 2d BL T, already 

much reduced by casualties and considerable straggling, and lacking artillery support 

until late in the afternoon, fell back in 

groupS.7 The French took a substantial 

number of prisoners from a detachment 

covering the withdrawal. Even after two of 

the tanks were knocked out by grenades and 

the third withdrew, the BL T troops kept 

pulling back piecemeal, taking up positions 

along the ridge near the lighthouse, particularly in the cover south of it.8 There 

they were at nightfall. The French counteroffensive threatened to continue during the 

night, and perhaps in greater strength. The 

situation near Mehdia was precarious. 

The 1st BLT Attacks on the South Wing 

Navigational errors brought most of the 

1 st Battalion Landing Team, 60th Regimental Combat Team (Maj. Percy DeW. 

McCarley, Jr.), to shore from the Henry T. 

Allen about 2,800 yards north of BLUE 

Beach instead of on BLUE and YELLOW 

'Battery B, 60th Field Artillery, landed about 

0700, hauled its guns across the beach to cover 

while under shellfire, and eventually got into a 

position described as "about 1000 yards inland" 

to fire on coastal defense guns and defensive works 

outside the Kasba rather than against the counterattacking enemy. 1st Bn 60th FA AAR, 8-11 Nov 

42. 

• The lighthouse was held by 2d Lt. S. W. 

Sprindis, 60th Infantry antitank officer, by firing a 

bazooka from different positions along a wall to 

give the attacking force the impression of an entire 

battery of 75's. For this exploit General Patton 

gave him a battlefield promotion. Patton Diary, 

19 Nov 42. 

157 

Beaches, and its second wave landed ahead 

of the first. Fortunately, the BLT was able 

to reorganize without enemy interference. 

After touching down at 0535, its units assembled, made a three-mile detour around 

the southern end of the lagoon, and sent detachments to establish roadblocks at each 

of the road junctions for six miles to the 

south. About five hours after the landings 

began, it started northeastward along the 

high ground. Battery A, 60th Field Artillery, 

set up its 75-mm. pack howitzers in a valley 

southeast of the lagoon and prepared to 

support the advance. 

Three detachments of Company A defended the roadblocks against enemy probing attacks, at first using machine guns, 

mortars, and bazookas, and later in the day, 

37-mm. antitank guns from the Headquarters Company and the Regimental Antitank 

Company. 

The main body of McCarley's BL T, leaving Company A in reserve and moving 

slowly toward Port-Lyautey, first met organized resistance about noon on the high 

ground almost due east of its landing place. 

There, well-concealed French machine guns 

pinned the column down on a ridge until 

late in the afternoon. Shelling by Battery A, 

60th Field Artillery Battalion, finally broke 

up the French resistance just before nightfall. While the BL T was preparing to continue the advance next morning, it was visited by General Truscott, who ordered 

Major McCarley to establish contact at once 

with Major Dilley's BLT to the north and, 

at first light, to resume the attack toward 

the airfield. Responsibility for protecting the 

southern flank of the beachhead was transferred to Lt. Col. Harry H. Semmes, CO, 

3d Armored Landing Team of the 66th 

Armored Regiment. 
158 

French motorcycle, armored car, and 

tank units of increasing strength-the advance elements of a substantial column from 

Rabat-tested the outposts on the southern 

flank on D Day and drove them back by 

evening. These blocking actions, however, 

including use of a bazooka which was mistaken by the enemy for heavy artillery, had 

delayed the northward march of the main 

French force long enough to permit the 

Americans to assemble a very small armored 

detachment during the night with which to 

meet the French in that area on D plus I. 

The 3d BLT's Attack on the North Wing 

The 3d Battalion Landing Team, 60th 

Infantry (under command of Lt. Col. John 

J. Toft'ey, Jr.), experienced perhaps the 

greateSt difficulties of any unit off Mehdia 

in getting ashore on D Day. Its transport, 

the Susan B. Anthony, first had to transfer 

a raider detachment to the Dallas for the 

move up the Sebou river. Next, the landing 

craft had to be organized into waves near 

the control ship, Osprey, which was to guide 

them to Beaches RED and RED 2. Since none 

of the vessels was in its prearranged position, 

operations in the darkness became fumbling 

and uncertain. Debarkation from the transport was also slowed by other difficulties, 

and the whole process fell far behind schedule. It was at least 0500 before the first three 

assault waves for each beach were in formation near the Osprey. The flotilla then went 

north for a few miles along the coast and 

at approximately 0600 turned right and 

headed eastward to the mist-covered shore. 

Since the boats had been brought far north 

of the Sebou and daylight had already arrived, Colonel Toffey, on his own responsibility, decided to follow the alternate plan 

for a consolidated landing by his entire unit 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

on RED Beach only. As the turn to the beach 

was in progress, two French planes swept 

low over the boats, strafing and bombing, 

and causing the loss of two landing craft 

but without casualties among their occupants. 

The first landings occurred about 0630, 

along a one-mile front well to the northeast 

of RED Beach. No fire was received from 

the desolate shore. The boat teams hurried 

up the sandy slopes seeking cover from attack by more strafing planes. Machine gun 

squads of the 692d Coast Artillery (AA) 

and of Company M, 60th Infantry, among 

units in the first waves, swiftly set up their 

weapons and brought down two of the 

planes in offshore crashes. Four companies 

(I, K, M, and Headquarters Company) 

with their medical detachments, rather 

than stopping to reorganize, continued as 

boat teams until they had struggled up the 

steep escarpment east of the sand dunes to 

high ground, about 165 feet above the sea. 

Two hours after the first landings, they had 

completed the climb, carrying their equipment, and were ready to advance to the 

bluffs north of the airdrome. 

Checking maps, the 3d BL T discovered 

that it had not been brought to RED Beach, 

but instead to a point five miles farther 

north. What lay ahead therefore was an 

arduous cross-country march of approximately five miles with the necessity of handcarrying everything over ridges and through 

scrub growth. The BL T met no resistance 

and was in position (but without supporting 

artillery) on Hill 58 by noon. The naval 

gunfire control party set up radios on the 

bluff above the beach and on Hill 74, about 

1,000 yards north-northeast of Hill 58, and 

strung telephone wire across the intervening 

area. Thus it could soon adjust fire for the 

Savannah on a French 155-mm. gun battery 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

observed to be in action southwest of the 

airfield. Western Morocco's largest ammunition dump, a collection of detached beehive structures on the eastern slope of the 

same ridge, was also bombarded by the 

main 14-inch battery of the Texas at a range 

of 12,000 yards. Reconnaissance parties 

found no enemy troops or installations to 

the northeast but ascertained that the PortLyautey bridge over the Sebou was mined 

and strongly defended. At the beach all 

available personnel labored to open exits 

through the dunes and up the escarpment, 

while along the route to Hill 58 others constructed a road. By 2230, the guns of Battery C, 60th Field Artillery Battalion, had 

been dragged to emplacements on Hill 74. 

Later, the rubber boats were sent forward 

from the beach in half-tracks. The first day's 

operations left Colonel Toffey's BL T with 

much to do before it could attack the airfield. 

Summary of D Day 

The attack at Mehdia-Port-Lyautey departed from the basic plan at the outset and 

never returned to it. In the hope of adhering to the original arrangements, the landing 

schedule was, as already indicated, delayed 

a half hour, but this proved insufficient. The 

delay was actually protracted for almost one 

and a half hours. Next, the arrangement for 

simultaneous landings at five coastal points 

was modified drastically. The 3d BLT, seeing that its operations ashore were beginning 

in daylight, shifted to the alternate plan; 

its two separate landings were consolidated 

into one for RED Beach, well north of the 

Sebou river's mouth: The larger section of 

the 3d BL T was to have supported the 2d 

BL T's advance against Mehdia and the 

Kasba by parallel movement on the opposite 

side of the river but actually did not do so. 

159 

And further to complicate the situation, the 

3d BL T was put ashore at a point some five 

miles north of RED Beach, greatly lengthening the amount of rough terrain over which 

it had to struggle to reach the bluffs north 

of the airdrome. 

Major McCarley's 1st BLT was brought 

to shore 2,800 yards north of BLUE Beach 

instead of at BLUE and YELLOW Beaches. 

The resulting situation not only interfered 

with the landings of Major Dilley's 2d BLT 

on GREEN Beach, but also necessitated a 

slow detour around the southern end of the 

coastal lagoon before the 1st BL T could 

reach the high ground east of it and start 

toward the airdrome. The 2d BL T began its 

landings only twenty minutes before dawn, 

and its inland advance by daylight met with 

stronger resistance than its schedule allowed 

for. The 75-mm. battery attached to each 

BL T had been of but little use, either because of delays in emplacement and in establishing fire control, or because of doubts as 

to the location of forward troops. The naval 

gunfire which had served well on the southern flank and farther inland toward PortLyautey had not been well co-ordinated in 

the zone of attack near the coastal guns and 

the Kasba, although elsewhere it had been 

of the greatest value. 

The delay and confusion attributable to 

departures from the plan were increased by 

French air strafing of the beaches at dawn, 

French bombardment of the transport area, 

and defective communications between ship 

and shore after 0700, when the transports 

withdrew to a point fifteen miles out to sea. 

At 1100 on 0 Day, instead of being able to 

launch a co-ordinated attack on the PortLyautey airdrome, the main elements of 

Sub-Task Force GoALPOST were still striving 

to gain firm footholds and were under imperfect control. The French had not been 
160 

dislodged from the vitally important Kasba. 

The barrier to navigation of the river remained in place. The French still controlled 

the south bank of the river and the nose of 

the ridge southwest of the airport. Enemy 

reinforcements from Port-Lyautey had 

strengthened the resistance to Dilley's BL T 

in the Kasba area and had held McCarley's 

BL T well south of positions which it was to 

have occupied before 1100. The 3d BL T 

was most nearly in position, for its leading 

elements were digging in on the bluffs and 

ridges north of the airfield, waiting for 

artillery and rubber boats to arrive from the 

distant landing point, while other detachments were reconnoitering to the northeast 

and east. 

The situation of General Truscott's whole 

force at nightfall, 8 November, was insecure 

and even precarious. He himself had come 

ashore in the early afternoon after a morning during which, because of inadequate 

communications, he could gain little exact 

information and could exercise insufficient 

control. There he found his battalion and 

company commanders in similar difficulties 

with their subordinate units. In a half-track 

carrying a radio,9 he ranged over the beachhead attempting to meet the most immediate problems and to improve co-ordination. 

As the afternoon gave way to darkness, the 

unsatisfactory conditions at the beaches 

were deteriorating still further. Far fewer 

heavy weapons had been landed than were 

required for defense against prospective 

enemy action. The tank lighters had been 

too few, and when failure to capture the 

coastal guns forced the transports to move 

out of range of possible shelling, the round 

trip between ship and shore had been lengthened to more than thirty miles. The rare 

• SCR-193. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

calm prevailing during most of the day disappeared with winds which sprang up at 

sunset. By night, the surf was rising and 

before daylight wave crests reached fifteen 

feet in height. Boats had more and more difficulty in landing and retracting. Stranded 

crews and misplaced troops roved along the 

beaches, contributing to the serious confusion. Inland, the enemy threatened to 

make strong counterattacks, either during 

the night or at daylight. 

General Truscott had by then committed all of his slender reserve. Company L 

(less detachments), 60th Infantry, was sent 

forward late in the afternoon to reinforce 

Major Dilley's 2d BL T. During the night, 

all available men were taken from the shore 

party at Beach GREEN, organized into 

provisional units, and put in defense of 

the ridge line east of the beach. Colonel 

Semmes's seven light tanks were held in outpost positions along the beach until well after 

midnight, when they left to reach positions 

on the south wing of the beachhead before 

dawn. Since naval gunfire from the Savannah, under its own air spotting, had proved 

effective on D Day, it was again requested, 

this time for support of the tanks at first 

light. The French column from Rabat 

which had driven the outposts of Company 

A (reinforced), 60th Infantry, back toward 

the beachhead during the afternoon was 

expected to attack in force at dawn.tO A Provisional Assault Group consisting of three 

rifle and two heavy weapons platoons was 

organized from shore party personnel, 

,. The units of this column were later identified 

as the staff, scout car troop, and two squadrons of 

light Renault tanks, of the 1st Regiment, African 

Chasseurs, lOme motorcycle troops of the Moroccan 

Guard, and truck-borne infantry believed to be the 

2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Moroccan Tirailleurs. 

The tanks had 37-mm. guns, light armor, and twoman crews. 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

placed under the command of Capt. A. O. 

Chittenden, Coast Artillery Corps, and sent 

to reinforce the 1st BL T east of the lagoon. 

The Second Day's Operations 

During the night, while General Mathenet carried out the orders from General Lascroux's headquarters to shift from Meknes 

to Port-Lyautey as part of a revised scheme 

of French defensive operations, more reinforcements went toward Port-Lyautey from 

Fes and Meknes, though heavily attacked 

by planes after daylight.ll Some reached the 

Kasba area, where a dawn counterattack 

in strength threatened to drive Major Dilley's force back to the beach itself. But the 

impending counterattack on the southern 

flank by an armored French column and 

two battalions of infantry was General Truscott's principal concern. If the French 

armor broke through the small defending 

force, it could disrupt the entire attack. 

The 1st BLT, 60th Regimental Combat 

Team, could be struck in the rear and scattered, and BLUE Beach might then be 

wrested from its occupants. 

The swell and surf were running too high 

to unload additional tanks or heavy weapons 

during the night. General Truscott, obliged 

to use available armor to repel the counterattack, had to deny to Major McCarley's 

BL T the armored support with which it 

might have succeeded in getting to the airfield that day. He sent Colonel Semmes with 

his seven light tanks to take up positions 

blocking the Rabat-Port-Lyautey highway 

before dawn. The tanks had to be controlled 

1! The reinforcements were: Staff, Regimental 

Company, and 3d Battalion, Foreign Legion; Staff 

and 1st Battalion, 7th Regiment of Moroccan Tirailleurs; 6th Motorcycle Troop, Moroccan Guard; 2d 

Battalion, 64th Regiment of African Artillery (2 

batteries) . 

161 

without radio, for this equipment had been 

put out of order by the long period of disuse while en route by sea. Furthermore, the 

tankmen had had no opportunity to reset 

the sights on their 37-mm. guns before contact with the French. Semmes's tanks took 

positions astride the highway southeast of 

the lagoon as the first gray light of a cold 

morning appeared. What followed was the 

first tank engagement in Morocco.12 

As Colonel Semmes's light tanks moved 

toward the main highway shortly after 0600, 

they first drove off with heavy casualties a 

company of French infantry in positions in 

the woods and near a farm across the road. 

About half an hour later, some fourteen to 

eighteen Renault tanks (armed with 37-

mm. guns) and approximately two battalions of infantry came into view. approaching along the road from Rabat. The 

American tanks thereupon withdrew behind a slight rise which offered some protection and opened fire on the column. 

Frontal armor on Semmes's seven tanks was 

too heavy for the answering French fire to 

pierce. Though most of the American firing 

was also rendered ineffective by the unadjusted sights of the tanks' major weapons, 

it destroyed four French tanks, inflicted severe losses among the French infantry, and 

stopped the thrust into Force GoALPOST'S 

southern flank. While the French were held 

back, gunfire from the Savannah was directed by her spotting planes on the enemy's 

tank assembly area in a little woods near the 

highway and on other French targets. This 

accurate fire forced the French to break off 

the attack and to withdraw temporarily. 

.. (1) Interv, 9 Mar 50, with Brig Gen Harry 

H. Semmes (O.R.C.), who in 1949 had revisited 

the scene of this fight. (2) Lt. Gen. L. K. Truscott, 

Jr. (USA, Ret.), Command Missions (New York, 

1954),114-16. 
162 

General Truscott attached ten or more 

light tanks of Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, and one section of antitank guns 

from the 60th Regimental Cannon Company to Colonel Semmes's force in time to 

help repulse a second French attack at about 

0900. Throughout the day, the battle continued on a diminishing scale under a brilliant sky. By the latter part of the afternoon, 

the threat to the southern flank of the beachhead had so moderated that Company C, 

70th Tank Battalion, was released to Major 

McCarley's force in the hope that he could 

thereby push through to the airfield before 

nightfall. During the night, nine more tanks 

and the reconnaissance platoon came ashore 

in time to reinforce the 3d Armored Landing Team for the third day's operations.13 

The tank engagement on the southern 

flank had just begun on 9 November when 

the 1st BLT, 60th Regimental Combat 

Team, reinforced by Captain Chittenden's 

Provisional Assault Group and supported by 

Battery A, 60th Field Artillery Battalion, 

resumed its advance toward the airfield, 

some seven miles away. The axis of advance 

ran diagonally over a series of partly wooded 

ridges. The first resistance came about 1030 

in the form of light and ineffective fire from 

an unexpected direction-the areas of the 

lighthouse and the Kasba which had supposedly passed under control of the 2d BL T, 

60th Regimental Combat Team. No other 

French opposition seriously impeded the 

progress of Major McCarley's force until 

it arrived at the crest of Mhignat Touama 

(52) about 1500. By that time, the French 

had deployed along the highway to the 

northeast and on a wooded height to the 

.. (1) Memo, Lt Col Charles F. Smith for ACofS 

:>PD, 15 Dec 42, sub: Obsn on WTF. AGF 319.1 

ORB AGO. (2) AAR, 3d Armd Landing Team, 

B-ll Nov 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

east, and using mortar and heavy machine 

gun fire soon pinned down the leading 

American elements. While supporting 

American artillery, naval gunfire, and tanks 

were being brought into action, the French, 

including some cavalry, organized on the 

east flank for a counterattack. The 105-mm. 

howitzers of Battery A, 60th Field Artillery 

Battalion, stopped the flanking fire from the 

east. This feat, together with the timely 

arrival of ten light tanks of Company C, 

70th Tank Battalion, forestalled the threatened counterattack. Highly effective naval 

gunfire on the highway area and bombing 

by seaplane of French machine gun positions ahead of the Ist BL T appeared to be 

clearing the way for a tank-infantry advance 

before dark. The BL T therefore organized 

to resume its push toward the airfield as 

soon as the naval gunfire should be lifted. 

At that juncture, two accidents spoiled 

the prospects. The BL T's front was not 

marked by identification panels during this 

pause, and a Navy plane dropped two 

bombs among the troops. Artillery fire from 

an unidentified source also fell in the area. 

The disorganization which ensued delayed 

the preparations until darkness was too near 

to warrant starting prolonged tank-infantry 

operations. The tankers prepared to lie up 

until morning while the infantry attacked 

alone. 

Farther north, Major Dilley's 2d BLT, 

stopped late on D Day by a French counterattack east of the lagoon, was expected to 

reorganize during the night and to resume 

the advance against the Kasba. Company 

L (less detachments), 60th Infantry, which 

had reinforced the unit late on D Day, remained for the second day's operation. 

Morning arrived before all the scrambled 

units had been sorted out, and with morning the French attacked again. They had 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

substantially reinforced the Kasba area during the night. Some French troops pushed 

along the shelf on the southern side of the 

river as far as Mehdia at the northern end 

of the beach, overwhelming American outposts on the ridge. Fire from American positions near the lighthouse drove the French 

from Mehdia temporarily, but they brought 

up some 7S-mm. guns and mortars, in turn 

forcing the Americans to abandon the lighthouse area, after holding it for more than 

twenty-four hours. Artillery fire from the 

ISS-mm. battery southwest of the airport 

pinned them down for the first part of that 

afternoon (9 November). The rest of the 

day passed in a sort of deadlock, with the 

2d BL T unable to arrange a successful coordinated attack despite the availability of 

artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. 

Thus the second day ended with the Kasba 

still in French possession. U 

North of the airfield on the morning of 

9 November, the 10S-mm. howitzers of Battery C, 60th Field Artillery, were in position. 

They caused at least a temporary evacuation of the airdrome barracks and engaged 

in a counterbattery duel with French guns 

on the hills southwest of the field. In the 

early afternoon, rubber boats and assault 

guns arrived from RED Beach. Orders were 

issued for two related night operations. 

Companies K and M, 60th Infantry, 

began an approach march at 1630 down 

the tongue of river flatlands toward the 

western end of the Port-Lyautey bridge, 

some three miles away. After dark, Company I crossed the river from the northern 

bank in the rubber boats, intending to 

create at least a diversion on the airfield 

which might aid the force attempting to 

seize the bridge. On signal, one heavy con-

" 2d Bn, 60th Inf, AAR, 8-11 Nov 42. 

163 

centration of artillery was to be fired into 

the area near the bridge. Then the structure 

was to be rushed with a sudden assault. 

Company I's venture on the airfield was to 

be assisted by neutralizing salvos from the 

Kearny on enemy troops in the hills southwest of the airfield. 

The Night Attacks, 9-10 November 

The two night operations by Colonel 

Toffey's BLT were only partly successful. 

Company I crossed the river in the rubber 

boats but lost its bearings near the airfield 

and eventually dug in on the southern river 

bank near the point of crossing, where it 

awaited daylight. Companies K and M 

drove the French defenders from the western end of the Port-Lyautey bridge but were 

in turn repulsed by artillery fire. A machine 

gun platoon was left in position to block enemy use of the bridge while the rest of the 

detachment returned, with its casualties, to 

HillS8. 

These night operations in the vicinity of 

the airdrome had their counterpart in the 

attempts of Major McCarley's BL T to 

move in from the southwest. Companies B, 

C, and D selected a route of approach before 

dark and started at 2300 from the Mhignat 

Touama in column of companies. The sky 

was deeply overcast and visibility was poor. 

The column, instead of continuing according to plan past Port-Lyautey, between a 

low white prison structure on the right and 

the high ground on the left, and on an axis 

approximately paralleling an old railroad 

embankment, swung unintentionally to the 

east toward Port-Lyautey. At 01 00, the 

leading elements ran into a machine gun 

outpost. The force split into three parts, 

with further splintering ensuing as the men 

sought to evade the hostile fire. 
164 

The major part of the 1st BLT, 60th Regimental Combat Team, resumed its progress 

toward the airport until, at 0430, the men 

arrived at a blacked-out building which they 

believed to be the barracks. The structure 

was stealthily surrounded. Machine guns 

were placed to control all exit roads and 

paths. The occupants were then called upon 

to surrender. They surrendered at once, 

about seventy-five in all, after setting down 

their cups and wine glasses, for the building 

proved to be not a barracks but a cafe. Patrols took about 100 more prisoners in the 

vicinity. 

The French saw no reason to pursue energetically a battle which they expected soon 

to terminate. When Colonel Petit, with a 

staff officer of the 1 st Regiment of Moroccan 

Tirailleurs, was capured a little later, he 

ordered that whole unit to cease firing. The 

two officers were, at their own suggestion, 

paroled in the custody of Major Hamilton 

but at their own headquarters in Port-Lyautey. Since he was being detained there, they 

returned to him and thus created a novel 

situation not quite covered by the rules of 

war.13 As the morning advanced, the 7th 

Regiment of Moroccan Tirailleurs was also 

ordered to quit. The major portion of the 

1 st BL T then organized positions controlling 

the highways leading toward Mehdia and 

Rabat and waited for the cessation of some 

naval gunfire which temporarily barred 

their further progress to the airfield. 

Major McCarley and part of Company 

B had moved from the point of dispersion 

through the darkness and rain, by error, 

all the way to the south edge of PortLyautey. At daylight they found the French 

troops there quite willing to avoid hostilities, but as they went to rejoin the rest of 

10 Ltr, Gen Hamilton to author, 31 Jan 50. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

their unit they were stopped and captured 

by a more belligerent Foreign Legion infantry battalion. 

The third part of the 1st BLT that had 

been separated during the night from the 

original column, consisting of a company 

commander and fifty-five enlisted men, returned from the French outpost to the original line of departure for the night's march. 

At daylight, these men started again toward 

the airport, supported by tanks of Company C, 70th Tank Battalion. The advance 

persisted in spite of opposition, the tanks 

accounting for four French antitank guns 

and twenty-eight machine guns, and the 

whole force reaching the western edge of 

the airdrome at 1045 or a little later. 

Pressure to gain the airfield was extremely 

urgent. At the end of operations on D plus 

2, not only was it still in French hands but 

the barrier boom across the Sebou had not 

even been removed. The night of 9-10 November was stormy and starless and the sea 

rough. Nevertheless, about 2130 a joint 

demolition party set out to cut the barrier. 

The boat made its way from the transport 

Clymer to the river, and failing to find Colonel Henney, Commanding Officer, 15th 

Engineers (C), at an expected rendezvous, 

the group proceeded with its task under Lt. 

M. K. Starkweather (USNR). The cable 

was cut, and one man, lowered into the 

water, confirmed that nothing else remained. The smaller signal wire then broke 

and the boom parted. As guards ashore 

opened heavy fire, the boat hurried away 

in the darkness with eight minor casualties. 

The men returned to the Clymer at 0430. 

They believed that they had opened the way 

for the raider detachment on the Dallas, although an extremely exacting bit of navigation remained if the passage to the airdrome was to be successful. 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

Closing on the Airdrome, 10 November 

Daylight on 10 November, the third day 

of the attack, found the scattered 1st BLT 

with one part about 3,000 yards south of 

the airPort, holding over 200 prisoners and 

determined to press on, and another part 

determined to advance over the high 

ground southwest of the airport with a group 

of light tanks. It found the 2d BL T under 

urgent orders to take the Kasba, and 

strengthened by two self-propelled 105-mm. 

assault guns. The 3d BL T at daybreak had 

put one rifle company in position to attack 

the airport from the north, supported by 

artillery. At the mouth of the river, the 

Dallas was about to attempt to force its way 

through the newly breached barrier and 

past the Kasba in order to carry the 

raider detachment to the airfield. Colonel 

Semmes's armored landing team, with fifteen or sixteen light tanks and supporting 

guns and infantry, stood firmly across the 

path of whatever strength might be sent 

from Rabat to reinforce the Port-Lyautey 

defenders. A request to Western Task Force 

for reinforcements had been refused; after 

the 2d Battalion, 20th Combat Engineers, 

had been committed at Fedala on D Day, 

there were no more to send.16 Offshore, the 

Texas, the Savannah, the Eberle, Roe, and 

Kearny cruised slowly into positions from 

which to furnish fire support, and, well out 

of sight of land, the Sangamon's planes 

awaited an adequate wind for take-offs from 

the slow, converted tanker. Early air missions had to be refused, but by 0900 planes 

could be dispatched on reconnaissance as 

far as Meknes and Rabat, while others rose 

to circle on air alert, ready to respond when 

bombing missions were called for. 

I. Patton Diary, 10 Nov 42. 

165 

The destroyer-transport Dallas, carrying 

the raider detachment, at 0530 began working her way into the mouth of the Sebou 

against an ebb tide in very rough water, 

guided by a local river pilot whom the Office 

of Strategic Services had spirited out of 

Morocco with just such a mission as this in 

prospect. The vessel reached the boom in 

the gray light of dawn only to discover that 

the buoys were anchored, with the result 

that the boom had not swung all the way 

open and would have to be rammed. As the 

muddy bottom sucked at her hull, and shells 

from the Kasba began to smack the water 

near her, the ship steamed up to the boom, 

knifed through it, and continued up the 

river. She had survived the worst danger at 

the outset, but shells still narrowly missed 

her as long as she was visible from a tall 

building in Port-Lyautey.17 Heavy machine 

gun fire which raked her decks from the hil1s 

near the airfield had to be stopped by her 

own counterfire, while the Kearny neutralized one 75-mm. battery by prearranged fire. 

The persistent immunity of the ship and her 

passengers was little short of miraculous. 

At the sharp tum in the river, where the 

men of Company I had been dug in for 

several hours, they could hear the sounds of 

gunfire along the river to the west and, at 

0720, could see the masts of the Dallas 

above the low river bank. A few minutes 

later, the ship was picking its way past the 

scuttled French vessel, St. Amiel, and starting southward. Two American seaplanes 

covered these last movements. At 0737, the 

Dallas stopped, stranded in shallow water 

but near the seaplane base on the eastern 

border of the airdrome. Artillery fire from 

about 4,000 yards to the east, beyond the 

IT Interv, 19 Jun 51, with Capt R. J. Brodie 

(USN), her commanding officer at the time of this 

exploit. 
PATH @}F THE RAIBER IDET ACHMENT AB@ARID THE lYALLAS. Jetties 

an.d mouth of the Sebou, top. The Kasba flS seen from the deck of the IDallas, middle lift; right, 

the scuttled French freighter in the river. Bottom, E!lallas off Port-Lyautey flirdrome. 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

bridge, suddenly opened up, only to be 

silenced with extraordinary speed and efficiency by the vessel's 3-inch guns and by 

bombing from a seaplane. The raider detachment quickly debarked in rubber boats. 

Attacking toward the west while I Company 

moved in from the north, the Americans 

cleared the enemy from the field and held 

possession by 0800. Soon the aircraft carrier 

Chenango was preparing to catapult its 

P--40's for flight to the airfield. 

Colonel Toffey, with the forward observer of Battery C, 60th Field Artillery, 

and a party from Company I, reconnoitered 

the Port-Lyautey bridge. Observing enemy 

batteries along the Rabat-Tangier highway 

northeast of Port-Lyautey, they called fire 

from Battery C and from the Texas, Eberle, 

and Kearny on the targets. Dive bombers 

also participated in silencing these guns before they could deliver interdictory fire on 

the airdrome, once the airfield was in American use. By noon, although the French 

blew out three spans of the bridge, patrols 

with tanks had brought the city of PortLvautey and the high ground southwest of 

the airport under American control. The 

P--40's from the Chenango began landing 

on the shell-pocked field and its slippery 

runways about 1030. 

Taking the Kasba 

On 10 November, shortly before the attack on the airdrome, the 2d BLT, reinforced by self-propelled assault guns, moved 

out at first light from a line of departure 

south of the lighthouse against positions organized by the French from its vicinity to 

that of the Kasba .. The attack seemed to 

gather strength as it proceeded, and by 0930 

had cleared all resistance from entrenchments and machine gun nests outside the 

167 

walls of the Kasba. Colonel de Rohan himself took charge of the assaults against the 

gates of the fort. Two 105's fired at point 

blank range, but without success. A provisional assault company of 125 engineer 

troops, consisting of detachments from three 

companies of the 540th Engineers (Combat), from the 15th Engineers (Combat), 

and from the 87lst Aviation Engineers, operating under Capt. Verle McBride, a company commander of the 540th Engineers 

(Combat), reinforced the 2d BL T in these 

attempts. IS Twice during the final stage of 

approach, attacks were thwarted by intense 

machine gun and rifle fire from within the 

fort. At this juncture, General Truscott 

transmitted a call by de Rohan to the carrier-based naval bombers to deliver a supporting strike. Lt. D. C. Dressendorfer 

(USN), the naval air liaison officer, by 

radio guided a flight of dive bombers to the 

Kasba, where smoke shells marked the particular target. Within four minutes of the 

request, the flight began to peel off one at 

a time to drop bombs in the vicinity of the 

gates. The assaulting troops waited between 

100 and 200 yards from the target, recovered from the shock before the French, and 

rushed the fort while the smoke and dust 

were still thick. Surrender by about 250 

troops followed quickly. The back of French 

defense at Mehdia-Port-Lyautey was clearly broken, for the coastal guns near the 

Kasba had been silenced earlier by bombardments from artillery, by naval gunfire, 

and by naval air; the 155-mm. battery and 

other French artillery near the airport had 

already been neutralized by naval gunfire. 

What remained was to secure the area 

against counterattacks, sniping, and saba-

.. WTF Final Rpt, Operations TORCH, Annex 

8,p.2. 
168 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

AIRCRAFT CARRIER CHENANGO with P-40 pursuit planes on deck, November 1942. 

tage and thus to guarantee the effective use 

of the airfield and seaplane base. 

After the surrender of the Kasba, Major 

Dilley reorganized his BL T for the last 

phase of its advance to the nose of the ridge, 

looming above the airfield. On General 

Truscott's orders, an improvised reserve 

force of headquarters and shore party troops 

was brought up from GREEN Beach to protect the BL T's south flank. A French force 

had been observed there in the woods about 

two miles southeast of the fort, presumably 

after infiltrating behind McCarley's scattered command. On an 800-yard front, with 

a self-propelled 105-mm. gun on the left 

wing and a single tank behind Company F 

on the right, the 2d BL T moved through 

the native village, which it had held temporarily on D Day, and continued toward the 

main highway leading to Port-Lyautey. The 

artillery and naval gunfire liaison parties 

were in close touch with the forward situation and able to respond quickly to called 

fire. By 1430 a hill about 1,500 yards nOltheast of Mhignat Touama was wrested from 

French defenders by employing both the 

105-mm. assault gun and the tank. The 

BLT, under renewed orders, completed the 

last mile of the advance to the nose. About 

150 prisoners were taken during the afternoon. All resistance near the airport had 

ended by 1730. 

The Final Phase 

While the airfield was being cleared on 

10 November, French reinforcements approached Port-Lyautey over the highway in 

a truck column from the direction of 

Meknes. Deep supporting naval fire against 

it was delivered on call by the main battery 

of the Texas. Between 0842 and 1131,214 

rounds of 14-inch high explosive shells 

struck intermittently at a range of 17,000 

yards. The column halted, then reversed, 

and eventually dispersed in complete disorganization, its damaged trucks left beside 

the highway, which was cratered by at least 

five direct hits. 

On the southern flank, near the coast 

French armored forces from the direction 01 

Rabat made several attempts to counterat· 
MEHDIA TO PORT-LYAUTEY 

tack successfully through the area of the 

preceding day's failure, each thrust being 

stopped by American annor and then driven 

back with losses by naval gunfire and air 

bombing. 

Unloading the transports had been badly 

hampered by the delay in obtaining access 

to the lower Sebou river and BROWN Beach. 

When the surf on GREEN and BLUE Beaches 

mounted during D plus 1, landing craft 

either foundered and broke apart at the 

beach or, once safely in, found retraction 

impossible. The urgent need for medical 

supplies, water, and ammunition, and for 

tanks, could not be met in spite of several 

attempts. The toll in damaged boats 

mounted sharply until all ship-to-shore 

movement was suspended. Salvage efforts 

proved fruitless until midday of 10 November. When unloading resumed, only a very 

small number of craft were found to be 

serviceable. 

As soon on 10 November as the Kasba 

had been captured and BROWN Beach inside 

the jetties became accessible, the transports 

moved near the mouth of the river. Almost 

at once they were ordered back out to sea 

to escape a submarine which the Roe had 

detected at 1045. Some three hours later the 

ships returned to anchorage, and unloading 

then proceeded faster than the shore parties 

could handle it. Only 1,500 to 2,000 yards 

offshore, they were protected by a tight antisubmarine screen as well as by daylight air 

antisubmarine patrols. One crew of a landing craft, mechanized (LCM), from the 

Florence Nightingale made over fifty-one 

round trips. 

The resulting congestion at BROWN Beach 

was relieved to some extent by sending 

cargoes up the river as far as the airport 

or even to Port-Lyautey. The Osprey and 

Raven were diverted from use as mine 

169 

sweepers to serve as freight lighters. Captured French vessels were also pressed into 

service. The Contessa, which had been 

escorted to Mehdia by the destroyer USS 

Cowie after it overtook the Southern Attack 

Force on 7 November, started up the Sebou 

river at 1620 on 10 November. She ran 

aground soon after passing the Kasba and 

had to wait until high tide early next morning for enough depth to complete the passage. The seaplane tender Barnegat made 

the trip up the river on 11 November with 

the supply and maintenance requirements 

of the Navy's Patrol Squadron 73. The 

eleven long-range reconnaissance aircraft of 

this unit began arriving from the United 

Kingdom two days later. 

French resistance in Mehdia and PortLyautey had dwindled by evening of 10 November to sniping, a practice which the 

French later attributed to the theft of firearms by Arabs from unguarded American 

stocks. Dislocated groups and individual 

soldiers filtered back through Port-Lyautey 

all day. At 2230, 10 November, General 

Mathenet telephoned to the Army headquarters there and, in conversation with 

Major Hamilton, expressed the wish to meet 

General Truscott to discuss the cessation of 

hostilities. With Col. Leon LeBeau, deputy 

commander, Port-Lyautey, and a French 

bugler repeatedly blowing the cease-fire call, 

Major Hamilton went in his jeep to a point 

on the airfield where troops and tanks of 

Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, had assembled. Over the radio in a tank on the 

airfield, he was able to talk with Colonel 

Semmes at the southern edge of the beachhead. The latter took his tank along the 

beach to General Truscott's command post, 

and the two officers then found a place at 

which radio contact with Hamilton could 
170 

be renewed.18 While thus arranging for a 

meeting near the gates of the Kasba 

at 0800, Major Hamilton also communicated through Navy channels. A blinker on 

the airfield signaled to the Dallas, anchored 

off the airport: (Paraphrase) 

General Mathenet has received instructions 

approved by Marshal Pctain to terminate resistance at once. He requests an interview 

with you as soon as possible at the time and 

place which you designate. 

From the Dallas this message was conveyed 

via Admiral Kelly.20 The prolonged and 

complicated battle of Mehdia-Port-Lyautey 

thus came to an end at 0400, 11 November 

1942. 

The formal meeting at the Kasba at 0800 

was a brightly colored pageant of varied 

French and colonial uniforms, Arab costumes, and flags. General Mathenet agreed 

that the French troops in his sector should 

remain in barracks with the Americans in 

possession of what they had won, while ultimate terms were reached at higher levels. 

General Mathenet's readiness to yield the 

Sale airport without further delay made unnecessary a planned march along the coastal 

II Interva with Gen Hamilton, 30 Nov 49, and 

Gen Semmes, 9 Mar 50; Ltr, Hamilton to author, 

31 Jan 50. • Emissaries came through the lines from Rabat 

after the arrangement was concluded. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

road to Rabat-Sale to seize the airport 

there, the force to be aided by the fire support of the Texas and the Savannah and 

some of the destroyers. Late that night Admiral Hewitt signaled to the Northern Attack Force that hostilities had ceased in 

French Morocco. "Be especially vigilant 

against Axis submarines," he warned. 

Salvage of the damaged landing craft 

and scuttled French vessels followed, as did 

the unloading of the transports, inspection 

of the French defenses, and analysis of the 

performance of American weapons. On 14 

November the naval elements prepared to 

leave early next day, either for Casablanca 

or Safi,1I1 and thence for Hampton Roads. 

Battle damage to the airfield was repaired 

and all possible steps taken to produce a 

state of readiness for advance to the northeast to establish contact with General Fredendall's Center Task Force. 

At a cost of seventy-nine killed the capture of Port-Lyautey by Force GoALPOST 

had won for the Allies a vital airdrome, a 

seaplane base from which to engage in the 

critical battle of the Atlantic against Axis 

submarines, and a focal point of transportation routes through northeastern Morocco 

to Algeria and Tunisia. 

.. The Ant/aony and the Algorab, escorted by the 

K.arny and the Park.r, went to Safi tint. 
CHAPTER IX 

The End of Hostilities in Morocco 

Armistice 

Late on the afternoon of 10 November 

General Nogues was indirectly apprised at 

Fes that Admiral Darlan had issued orders 

in the name of Marshal Petain to stop the 

useless fighting. While awaiting confirmation, he telephoned to General Lascrowe: and 

advised him of this turn of events. At 1810, 

the latter accordingly radioed orders to 

Marrakech and Casablanca to refrain from 

active hostilities pending the negotiation of 

an armistice. About an hour later the exact 

text of Admiral Darlan's orders was telephoned from Oujda to General Nogues, 

and transmitted by him to Generals Lascrowe: and Lahoulle and to Admiral Michelier. They were instructed to arrange for a 

meeting of General Nogues with the American commander next day.l 

At about 0200 on 11 November, a French 

car, heralded by the blowing of a bugle, its 

lights on, and white flags flying, appeared 

at an outpost of Company G, 30th Infantry, 

northeast of F edala, carrying two French 

officers and two enlisted men from Rabat. 

This group was conducted to the regimental 

command post and thence to task force 

headquarters at the Hotel Miramar in Fedala, bearing orders from General Lascroux 

to General Desre, that the Casablanca Divi1 WTF Final Rpt, Operations TORCH, G-2 Annex, Item 10 (Rpt of Gen Nogu~ to His Staff) and 

Item 11 (Journal of Actions of the High Command 

of Moroccan Troops, 8-11 Nov 42). ORB AGO. 

sion cease firing. Colonel Gay, as General 

Patton desired, authorized the four Frenchmen to continue through American lines to 

Casablanca, but warned them that they 

must return quickly with an agreement to 

negotiate an armistice if the city were to 

escape the drastic consequences of the coordinated attack scheduled for daybreak. 

Otherwise, the attack would not be postponed. Admiral Hewitt was at once informed that an agreement to suspend all 

hostilities was imminent and would be made 

known to him as soon as possible.' The 

French reply, an agreement to terminate 

hostilities at once and to arrange terms at 

an afternoon conference in Fedala, was received at Headquarters, Western Task 

Force, only a few minutes before the attack was scheduled to begin. The ships were 

taking up firing positions, planes assembling, 

and field artillery batteries alerted for the 

preparation fire when the cease-fire orders 

were flashed. The orders, however, did not 

reach every American unit in time, and for 

a few minutes gunfire opened from tanks 

and from the 39th Field Artillery Battalion 

south of Casablanca, only to be suppressed 

by the commander when the failure of the 

air bombardment to take place indicated a 

change in plans. 

I (1) Interv with Brig Gen Hobart R. Gay, 1 

Feb 48. (2) Patton Diary, 11 Nov 42. (3) Taggart, 

Histor, 0/ th. Third 1n/antr, Division in World 

War II, p. 30. (4) Ltr, Nogu~ to author, 23 Jan 

51, notes on Amer landings. 
172 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ARRIVING AT FEDALA TO NEGOTIATE AN ARMISTICE, 1400, 11 

November 1942. Gen. Augustt Paul Nogues (ltfl) is mtt by Col. Hobart R. Gay. Gen. Augustt 

Lahoullt, Commander of French Air Forcts in Morocco, is on tht right. Gen. Gtorgts Lascroux, 

Commander in Chiif of Moroccan troops, carritS a briif cast. 

The defenders of Casablanca, represented by Admiral Ronarc'h and General 

Desre, surrendered to General Anderson 

shortly before noon at the headquarters of 

the Casablanca Division. American troops 

were to occupy the key positions in the area 

while the French troops remained in barracks but retained their anns. General Anderson himself shifted his Headquarters, 

Sub-Task Force BRUSHWOOD, from the 

Villa Coigny in Fedala to the Villa Mas in 

one of Casablanca's suburbs. At Safi, parallel action took place early next day. 

At General Patton's urgent request, conveyed by an advance party which included 

General Eagles and Col. Harry McK. 

Roper, Admiral Miche1ier went from Casablanca to F edala to participate in armistice 

negotiations at General Patton's headquarters in the Hotel Miramar. The presence 

of Miche1ier, the naval commander in chief, 

led Admiral Hewitt to come ashore to join 
THE END OF HOSTILITIES IN MOROCCO 173 

TABLE 4--BATrLE CASUALTIES SUSTAINED BY THE ALLIED FORCES IN THE ALGERIANFRENCH MOROCCAN CAMPAIGN: 8-11 NOVEMBER 1942 

Orrlniution TOlal Kill.d Wounded Miuing 

TotaL ~ ~ ~ ~ _ ~. . _ ~ ~ _ •• ~ _ . . ____ ~ _ . ... ___ . __ ....• _ . ___ ~ I, 469 530 887 S2 

u. S. For~es . .... ___ .. . __ . . . . . __ .. _. _____ __ . . . __ _ . . __ _ . • 1,4Of 526 837 41 

lit Infantry Divi5ion _. _. __ __ . . ~. __ .. . ~ ...... . ~ .. ... _ .. . ~.. . 313 85 221 7 

3rd Infantry Divj ion .~ . . .. _. ~~ . _ .. _ .~. ~ __ . . _ . __ . ___ .. . ... _ 293 76 208 9 

9th Infantry Divi5ion . .• ~ . . _ . . ... _ .. ____ ___ .. ____ . . . .. __ . _. . 225 80 144 I 

34th Infantry Division •. _. _. __ . . . . . .. . . .... . . _ . . . . _ . .. __ . . . . 78 30 47 I 

ht Armored Divi.ion. ___ .. __ .. ______ __ •. __ __ ___ _____ . _ .___ _ 305 J91 105 9 

2nd Armored Division .• ______ . _. _ .. ___ . __ ~'" ~ __ . ••••. 9 4 5 0 

Army and Corps Troops ... . ____ • ______ • __ ~ •. __ •• ~ ___ . _ •• __ . 114 19 90 5 

Twelfth Air For('e. _. __ __ _ •••..• __ ~~ __ . ___ ______ . __ .. . ___ _ . 67 41 17 9 

Briti.h For~es 6 • • •• _ . _ . .. .. _______ _ __ • • _ • ••• _. _ • _ _ •• •• _ 65 4 SO 11 

• Thae preliminary data (April 1915) diK •• IOm."hat from final Report of Bittle Cuualtiet of World Wa. II (TAG. June 1953). 

Th. final r.port. loul;",449 tillod in IcdoD. 720 wounded. Ind 85 caPlured Or mi •• ing. bowev.r. dOH nol .how dillribulion by divi.ion. 

• PalO ore for Briti.1I Command", durin. 8-17 Novomber 1942. Doeo not includ. _,ble "lIuallia .ufl'orod by tb. Brili,h finl Army 

in unoppoood Ilndinl' in A1 ... na. SOIIrrw U. S. d"au are from Batde Ca.ualti .. ollh. Anny (preliminary). I April 1915. prepared by M.chin. Recorda Bronch. AGO. 

Brili,b dill were .uppliod by the Brili,b Cabinet Oftice. ffiOlOfical 5«lion. 

the conference. With the arrival of General 

Nogues from Rabat, about 1400, it was 

soon possible to begin formal negotiations. 

At this session, the French leaders would 

discover to what extent the military opposition of the past three days had forfeited the 

sort of partnership offered them at the beginning. Their resistance had cost the U.S. 

Army and Navy 337 killed, 637 wounded, 

122 missing, and 71 captured. 3 French 

losses had been much heavier. 

The scene which ensued remained indelibly impressed on the memories of those 

present. It was World War I Armistice Day. 

o (1) WTF Final Rp', Annex 4 (G-l Annex), 

7 Jan 43, (2) Memo with inels, Bureau of Personnel USN for Chief Hiu Div Spec Staff U.S. Army, 

31 Mar 50, sub: Naval casualties during North 

African occupation 8 Nov 42-9 Jul 43. OCMH. 

Later reports give higher figures. (Table 4) 

A guard of honor had been established. 

With great dignity General Patton received 

the French commanders, complimented 

them on the effectiveness of their forces, and 

had read to them the draft armistice terms 

which had been approved before the operation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff! Of 

the two prepared sets of terms, one was 

clearly irrelevant, for it presupposed only a 

token French resistance. The other was also 

inappropriate, for it envisaged prolonged 

fighting resulting in the destruction of 

French military power. No draft terms took 

adequate cognizance of the Allied dependence on continued French capacity to control the Sultan's native subjects, or of the 

French legal position as the Sultan's pro-

• Copy in Civil Affairs-Col Gay 1942 file, Kansas City Reds Ctr. 
174 

tector. The harsh arrangements which 

otherwise might have been imposed were 

therefore dismissed as inapplicable. Instead, an informal understanding was 

adopted, a gentleman's agreement that the 

Americans should occupy areas required for 

security and for future operations, that prisoners should be exchanged, that the French 

should be confined to barracks but not disarmed, and that without General Eisenhower's approval no punishment should be 

inflicted on anyone for having assisted the 

Americans. Lasting terms were left for determination in Algiers, where negotiations 

were in progress, as will be narrated later. 

When this generous arrangement had 

been concluded, the anxieties of the French 

were revived by General Patton's insistance 

that one more requirement must be met, and 

were then suddenly relieved by his explanation of its nature. For he proposed a toastto the liberation of France by the joint defeat of the common enemy.s 

At Gibraltar, meanwhile, the fragmentary character of the reports from the Western Task Force which filtered through the 

overburdened communications system to 

the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, had 

become increasingly disturbing with the passage of each day. On 10 November, General 

Eisenhower informed General Patton in a 

personal communication that Algiers had 

been won for two days, Oran's defenses were 

rapidly crumbling, and the only "tough 

nut" was in Patton's hands. "Crack it open 

quickly and ask for what you want," the 

message said. Next day a British plane, sent 

to gain information, was shot down. On 12 

November, Rear Adm. Bernhard H. Bieri 

• (1) Interva with Gen Gay, 1 Feb 48, Gen Keyes, 

15 Feb 50, and GeD Jean Piatte (French), 10 Jan 

50. (2) Morison, U.s. Naval Op.,aliofU, n, 

164-05. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

and a small Army staff went to Casablanca 

by fast mine sweeper ( H.M.S. Welshman) 

to check with Admiral Hewitt and General 

Patton, and to transmit instructions. By that 

time, the military situation in Morocco was 

no longer in doubt. 

Enemy Submarines Attack 

Hostilities between the French and the 

Americans in the Casablanca area ceased 

only two days before the expected arrival 

of a second convoy of four personnel and 

twenty cargo transports and escorting warships. When the fighting stopped, the transports off Fedala were pushing cargo into 

that small port at a rate which would require at least a week for completion. This 

slow rate of unloading heightened the risk 

of using the offshore anchorage in the F edala 

roadstead. Neither the destroyer screen nor 

the new mine field furnished complete security against expected Axis submarines.8 

The situation subjected Admiral Hewitt 

to an exceedingly difficult decision. If the 

transports were moved to Casablanca, they 

could finish unloading in reasonable security 

and the materiel would be concentrated 

there instead of being set ashore in two 

places. But the harbor would first have to be 

cleared of idle ships. This task would delay 

unloading and force the second convoy to 

cruise off the coast instead of coming directly 

into port, holding the troops at sea that 

• On 8 November 1942 fifteen German submarines 

were ordered to stations from Safi to Fedala, and 

two days later, Group Schlaglol, consisting of 

eight submarines, was in action off Casablanca. 

The enemy's undersea line was extended to the 

Strait of Gibraltar and reinforced by 12-13 November. (1) SKL/l.Abt, KTB, Teil A, 1.-30.XI.42, 

8 Nov 42. (2) SKL/l.Abt, Beilage .tum KTB, Teil 

B-IY, Ergaen.tungen .tur Ubootslage vom 1'x.42 

bis 31.XII.42. 
THE END OF HOSTILITIES IN MOROCCO 175 

LT. GEN. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER AT GIBRALTAR holds a press conference 

with U.S. and British correspondents, 10 November 1942. 

much longer. To leave the transports at anchor off Fedala would be to rely heavily on 

the tide of good fortune which had supported American naval activities thus far, 

but it would expedite the entire operation. 

Admiral Hewitt decided to keep the vessels 

off F edala. All Army personnel except 180 

casualties in sick bays were sent ashore on 11 

November. The fifteen ships, including some 

which had just begun to discharge cargothe Joseph Hewes, the Edward Rutledge, 

the Hugh L. Scott, and the Tasker H. Blisscontinued unloading under such protection 

as a diligent screening group could furnish. 

Axis submarines came indeed. U-J73 

struck the Hewes and the tanker Winooski 

with torpedoes from the west, early in the 

evening of 11 November, and before leaving 

hit the destroyer Hambleton. During the 

next morning several submarines of Group 

Schlagtot attacked the Ranger well out at 

sea and forced her to engage in violent evasive movement to escape torpedoes which 

swept close by her. On the afternoon of 12 

November the U-J30 approached from the 

northwest in 100 feet of water, slipped between the transports at Fedala and the 

shore, avoided the mine field, and, taking 

careful aim during a calm sunset, sent six 

torpedoes in quick succession into the Scott, 
176 

the Rutledge, and the Bliss/ Fires raced 

through the vessels, each of which sank during the night. Hundreds of surviving sailors 

were taken into Fedala and two days later 

brought to Casablanca by train. The other 

ships of the Center Attack Group fonned 

into column and steamed out to more open 

waters. Five of the transports went next day 

into Casablanca where they completed unloading before 15 November and took 

aboard the survivors from the sunken ships.8 

Except for treatment at a shore party dressing station, over 100 casualties had to wait 

until they were on transports for thorough 

medical attention.9 Seven more ships of the 

Fedala group with five from Mehdia docked 

at Casablanca on 15 November and began 

discharging cargo around the clock. The 

ships had to be ready to start back to the 

United States on 17 November. 

The second convoy hovered off the Moroccan coast. On 17 November, the bulk 

of the Western Naval Task Force left the 

harbor, assembled behind a newly laid protective mine field, and departed; on 18 

November, this convoy was able to come in. 

Mountainous piles of half-sorted supplies 

and ammunition on Casablanca's docks 

were being eroded steadily by the strenuous 

efforts of Anny units and native labor gangs. 

Operations of the U.S. Anny in this part 

of Northwest Africa were already entering 

the next phase. 

T (1) Supplies lost on the torpedoed ships were: 

Hewes, 93 percent; Rutl,dge, 97 percent; Scott, 67 

percent; Bliss, 64 percent. A considerable loss of 

vehicles on the Rutledge and Bliss also occurred. 

CTG 34.9 Action Rpt, Incl D. (2) Extract from 

War Diary of U-130, 11 Jun 41-13 Mar 43,12 Nov 

42, Incl D to COMNAVEU Rpt (I.D. No. 251776). 

• The transports were the Leonard Wood, Thomas 

,efferson, Charles Carroll, Thurston, and Elizabeth 

C. Stanton. 

• CTG 34.9 Action Rpt, Inc1 E. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Political Conditions 

The Americans intended that the general 

character of the new relationship between 

them and the French in Morocco should 

follow the fonnula of "forgive and forget." 

The American flag would henceforth fly but 

the French flag would not be lowered. 

American forces would occupy key positions, 

but the French otherwise would not be dispossessed. Military facilities previously defended would now be at the disposal of the 

Americans. All flights from Moroccan airfields would be under American control. 

For the victorious visitors, this fonnula was 

easier to follow than it was for the French, 

whose memories of the recent events rankled. At the higher levels of command, the 

changes seemed to be made with no great 

difficulty. Admiral Michelier soon held a 

position of confidence and esteem among 

the American commanders. General Nogues 

qualified as an invaluable agent. But to the 

officer corps of the three anned services, 

particularly the higher grades of the Navy, 

as well as to pro-Axis civilian sympathizers, 

the situation was galling. 

Circumstances surrounding the imprisonment of General Bethouart illustrated the 

prevailing attitudes. General Bethouart and 

his associates accepted the leadership of 

General Giraud in bringing about an active 

partnership between the French forces in 

North Africa and the Allies four days before General Nogues, Admiral Michelier, 

and their immediate subordinates adopted 

the same course under the leadership of 

Admiral Darlan. Darlan professed to have 

the authorization of Marshal Petain,t° but 

he also accepted General Giraud as his principal military commander in North Africa. 

,0 See pp. 262-65. 
THE END OF HOSTILITIES IN MOROCCO 177 

Bethouart should have occupied a like position of trust and honor in Morocco. Indeed, 

had all these men been politicians, Bethouart and his associates could have made 

incontestable claims to major rewards 

for being the first to act. But they were 

military men in an Army zealous to maintain its integrity, and Bethouart's group had 

clearly broken the bonds of military discipline, even though acting under the highest 

sense of patriotic duty. They had been 

"dissident." In French military hands they 

were actually in danger of paying with their 

lives for anticipating the orders which their 

superiors were to issue four days later, after 

Darlan had taken the responsibility on his 

shoulders. General Nogues, who had believed Admiral Michelier rather than General Bethouart on the night of 7-8 November, initiated measures to bring Bethouart to 

trial, but General Patton insisted that uno 

action whatsoever would be taken against 

him except upon final approval by General 

Eisenhower." 11 As soon as Bethouart's 

plight was made known through American 

channels to General Giraud and thence to 

General Eisenhower, the Allied commander 

in chief interceded on 15 November to request the immediate release not only of 

General Bethouart but of "any others now 

in prison for the same kind of reason." On 

17 November, Bethouart and Col. Pierre 

Magnan, commander of the troops which 

had shielded him at Rabat on the night of 

the unsuccessful coup, were released and 

taken to Algiers by American airplane. 12 

"Memo, CG WTF for CinC AF, 14 Nov 42, sub: 

Case of Bethouart and his adherents. AFHQ AG 

336-62, Micro Job 24, Reel 78D. 

.. (1) Memo, Gen Gruenther (or Clark, 15 Nov 

42; Memo, Patton (or Eisenhower, 15 Nov 42, sub: 

Co-operation o( French authorities; Ltr, Eisenhower 

to Nogu~s, 15 Nov 42. AFHQ AG 336, Micro Job 

24, Red 78D. (2) Gen Emile Bethouart, The 

General Patton sought to prevent or to 

mitigate the punishment of all who were 

held in French custody for pro-Allied conduct before the surrender, and eventually 

to procure their release. Screening those 

who merited release as purely political prisoners from others was a process bound to 

take time, since it would be necessary to 

depend upon the counsel of reliable men 

who knew French Moroccan politics. With 

the invasion, an entirely new group of 

Americans was substituted for those who 

had previously served the interests of the 

United States in Morocco. Although Mr. 

Frederic P. Culbert was selected from the 

Office of Strategic Services representatives 

among the consular staff to be General Patton's deputy adviser on civil affairs with 

broad authority, the staff as a whole was not 

used effectively to protect the preinvasion 

friends of the Allies.IS 

The Americans discouraged all attempts 

at reprisal during the period of released restraint following the French capitulation. 

Wherever it could be done with effect they 

publicly demonstrated support of exactly the 

same police and military agencies which had 

previously been in control. For an undue 

length of time pro-American French remained in custody, while those hostile to 

the Allies before the landings, followers of 

Pierre Laval, remained in positions of trust 

and power. The Frenchmen of authoritarian 

sympathies, some of them members of fascistic societies like the Service d'Ordre LtOccurrences of November 8 in Morocco. Copy in 

transl in OCMH. (3) Interv with W. Stafford Reid, 

13 Feb 48. (4) Msg, David King to Lt Col William 

A. Eddy for Robert Murphy, 14 Nov 42. CIA OSS 

Archives. 11 (1) Ltr, Patton to Culbert, Nov 42. In private 

possession. (2) TORCH Anthology. CIA OSS 

Archives. 
178 

gionnaire des Anciens Combattants and the 

Parti Populaire Franraise and others in less 

formal associations, seemed prepared even 

to assist an Axis counterinvasion. They 

propagandized against the Allies. Frenchmen of pro-Allied views, whether Giraudist 

or Gaullist, were the object of their surveillance and open hostility. Specific denunciations of these anti-American individuals to 

American civilian officials were of little or 

no avail, for their hands were tied by military control. The position which General 

Patton took was that "the anti-DarlanNogues group does not have the personnel 

nor is it in a position to control Morocco if 

given that mission." 14 General Patton's conclusion may be subject to challenge but not 

to disproof, for the surviving evidence is 

partisan and inconclusive. 

A sweeping shift of administration in 

French Morocco would have required the 

retirement of General Nogues from the residency. He had won the hostility of the antiVichy French before the American landings in Morocco. He could not expect it to 

diminish as a result of his conduct during 

the landings and the negotiations in Algiers 

which followed. His ambiguous behavior 

then excited distrust, and he was made to 

bear the major blame for the fighting and 

for the resulting losses. His initial choice was 

founded upon an erroneous military estimate by Admiral Michelier, and upon his 

wish to maintain the integrity of the French 

Army.13 His conduct of the operations was 

in obedience to General J uin's standing 

orders and was intended to avert or delay 

German military intervention. He tried to 

avoid the evil consequences to France of 

" Ltr, Patton to Eisenhower, 19 Nov 42. AFHQ 

Micro Job 24, Reel I 36D. 

'" See pp. 94-95 above. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

an obvious and voluntary defection of 

French Morocco to the Allies in violation 

of France's obligations to the Axis powers 

under the armistice, but he had no opportunity to arrange with the Americans any 

pseudo defense involving little damage to 

either side which might. mislead the enemy. 

He was suspected of maintaining ties with 

Vichy and perhaps thus with the Germans 

even after 15 November. In general, he was 

the victim of the lack of forthrightness which 

characterized his political, as distinguished 

from his military, role. Successful control 

of French Morocco through the intricate 

structure of French supervision and native 

rule required qualifications not readily 

found anywhere and certainly not in the 

Western Task Force. For lack of a substitute, General Nogues was more necessary 

to the Americans than those who protested 

against his retention. General Patton became in effect a defender of General Nogues 

as an indispensable agent who could keep 

the native population in hand while the 

French in Morocco were in general kept 

friendly or neutral.16 

Early in December General Giraud visited 

French Morocco, where General Keyes was 

in command during General Patton's absence on a trip to AFHQ in Algiers and to 

Tunisia. The military leader in the effort of 

French North Africa to gain liberation for 

the mother country was enthusiastically received by the populace. He made it possible 

for French enlisted men who had deserted 

to the Americans during the November 

fighting in Morocco to return to their units 

without punishment. Pro-American officers 

were, he promised, not to be neglected. 

11 Intervs with Reid, 13 Feb 48, and Culbert, 24 

Feb 48. 
THE END OF HOSTILITIES IN MOROCCO 179 

The Western Task Force After the 

Surrender 

The situation facing the Western Task 

Force following the capitulation of the 

French was difficult. Any appearance of 

overwhelming superiority was superficial. 

The French might no longer challenge 

American strength, but, as indicated above, 

it remained to be seen how genuine their 

co-operation would be. Between the French 

and the natives, the imperialist relations of 

the protectorate rested upon the French 

military and the French police. Allied propaganda had encouraged among the Moslem 

and native Jewish population the hope of 

liberation from the French. Between Moslems and Jews endless animosities threatened to boil over unless firmly suppressed. 

In the native situation, therefore, was the 

basis for a dangerous diversion from complete concentration on the major military 

objectives of the Allies. 

The French and the Spanish Governments shared the role of protectors over the 

realm of the Sultan of Morocco. The houndary between the two areas under their respective controls was one which the Spanish 

desired to see much farther south. Should 

the Spanish forces stationed north of the 

boundary succumb to the temptation to 

strike while the French were weakened, 

American forces would almost certainly become embroiled. If the Axis used Spanish 

bases for air or ground attacks upon the supply lines across northern Morocco, the Western Task Force would be required to join in 

countermeasures. Thus the force commanded by General.Patton, barely sufficient 

for the amphibious assault, incompletely 

established on shore, dependent on subsequent increments of men and materiel to 

renew the power of attack, and intruded 

among a population of great political complexity at a distance of 4,000 miles from the 

United States and over 400 miles from 

Oran, felt obliged to move with circumspection, to co-operate rather than to 

command. 

Western Task Force headquarters was 

established temporarily in Casablanca. To 

check on the situation at interior points various inspection trips were made. From the 

47th Infantry regimental headquarters in 

Safi, officer patrols visited Mazagan, Mogador, and Marrakech, while from General 

Truscott's headquarters in Port-Lyautey, 

another party made a trip through the Taza 

gap to Msoun, about 20 miles southeast of 

Taza, stopping at Petitjean, Meknes, and 

Fes, and returning through Rabat-Sale. 

From Casablanca a patrol to Kasba Tadla 

confirmed the reports made from all such 

visits to the military and civilian leaders, 

that the French were well-disposed and 

ready to co-operate. Systematic air reconnaissance extended from 20 miles offshore 

to more than 100 miles inland, between 

Agadir and Guercif. Within this area, 

ground reconnaissance also covered the territory inland to the base of the Atlas Mountains, with a farther extension northeast of 

Fes. 

Areas of special responsibility along the 

coast were assigned. The 47th Infantry 

Regiment remained in Safi to the end of 

November, and a detachment remained 

there even later. Casablanca and Fedala 

were linked under the protection of the 3d 

Division, reinforced, less the 1 st Battalion, 

30th Infantry. That unit, with the 2d Armored Division, was stationed in the vicinity 

of Rabat-Sale. The Mehdia-Port-Lyautey 

area was occupied by the 1 st Provisional 

Brigade ( Cavalry) , General Truscott's 

command. 
180 

During the reorganization and redeployment of the Western Task Force, and other 

preparations for the future, the gigantic task 

of clearing the ports, establishing supply 

points, and unloading the succession of 

troops and cargo convoys was fulfilled.t1 

Native labor and civilian transport were 

utilized, the former thus being able to purchase the cotton cloth, tea, and rice which 

were otherwise unobtainable. Battle damage 

to Casablanca Harbor was repaired as 

rapidly as possible. The sunken ships and 

drydock, the shell-pocked and burned 

wharves, and the damaged cranes and railway sidings were put in order. Defense of 

the harbor there, as well as the ports at 

Safi and F edala, was organized around 105-

mm. howitzers, antiaircraft batteries, and 

smoke generators. Airfields were reconditioned and improved, and protected by 

additional antiaircraft batteries and other 

ground units. The railroad and highway 

routes to the east were surveyed. French 

guards protected the bridges and tunnels. To 

solve the problem of stepping up the capacity of the railroad, it was necessary to 

increase the rolling stock and to import coal 

for use by locomotives east of Fes on the 

portion not electrified. 

Military collaboration with the French 

proceeded steadily. French antiaircraft batteries were not only used to guard the Spanish Moroccan frontier and the routes to the 

east, but were also interspersed among 

American guns for the defense of Casablanca. French Army units were permitted 

to engage in training exercises and were 

taught the use of American weapons and 

"Company C, 263d Quartermaster Battalion, 

worked to clear and operate the port of Safi until 

sent to Oran, en route to Tunisia, on 12 February 

1943. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

eventually of American signal equipment. 

Operation of the coastal defense batteries 

taken from the French Navy-controlled 

units was returned to Admiral Michelier's 

men.18 The French gave ample warning of 

an expected tide of great height on 13 December, so that when· it came, tugs were 

able to recover American ships which had 

broken from their moorings.19 French army 

units began to move eastward into Algeria 

for service along the line of communications 

and eventually for use in Tunisia. 

During the first month following the 

French surrender, the primary concern of 

the Western Task Force shifted from insuring the ability to hold the area and to deter 

aggressive Spanish action to preparing for 

prospective battles elsewhere against Axis 

forces. American air units, after a training 

period, either moved eastward as a group 

or else contributed planes to other units already in combat. Ground units were consolidated, as far as possible. A striking instance 

was the 229-mile march of the 47th Infantry Regiment from Safi to Port-Lyautey 

which began on I December. With elements 

brought over since the assault, the 9th Division would eventually assemble near PortLyautey all its units except the 39th Infantry, which had been part of the Eastern 

Assault Force, and which was to stay in 

eastern Algeria. Armored units of the 2d 

Armored Division were concentrated east 

of Sale. The 3d Division's units were stationed near F edala and Rabat, except for 

the 30th Infantry Regiment, which went to 

Guercif and Oujda to protect an airdrome 

and part of the line of communications 

II Ltr, Patton to Eisenhower, 21 Nov 42. AFHQ 

G-3 Cps 77/3, Micro Job lOA, Reel 230. ,. Ltr, Patton to Eisenhower, 15 Dec 42. AFHQ 

G-3 Cps 77/1 Micro Job lOA, Reel 23C. 
THE END OF HOSTILITIES IN MOROCCO 181 

there. By early December the requirements 

of the Allied drive in Tunisia were reflected 

in the transfer by air to BOne and Blida of 

several antiaircraft batteries, and the prospective movement of others. Several French 

units, including the 7th Moroccan Tirailleurs Regiment, had already started for 

Tunisia. For those remaining in Morocco, 

the program was one of preparation by systematic training and field exercises.20 

.. See WTF G-3 Rpts 24-27, 9-12 Dec 42. 

AFHQ G-3 Ops 77 /4, Micro Job lOA, Reel 23C. 

PART THREE 

THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE 

MEDITERRANEAN 

CHAPTER X 

The Last Preliminaries 

The Convoys Elude the Enemy 

The amphibious operations in the Mediterranean for the capture of Oran and 

Algiers united elements of the U.S. Army, 

the British Army, and the Royal Navy in 

two joint expeditionary forces, supported by 

units of the U.S. Army Air Forces and the 

British Royal Air Force. The amount of 

training was generally below the requirements for success in operations against 

firmly defended shores. Here, as on the 

western coast of Morocco, the Allied Force 

had stretched its capacities to the limit. 

There had been no time even for precise 

forging of the Allied military instrument, 

much less for polishing it. It was rough cast 

in the proper mold and used with that fact 

in mind. The complications of amphibious 

operations were many under the best of circumstances, but by using one country's army 

with another's navy the Allies unavoidably 

increased those complexities. The forthcoming operations in the Mediterranean 

were consequently expected to be unexampled in difficulty as well as in scale. 

Naval forces engaged in the Allied attacks 

entered the Mediterranean in conformity 

with an elaborate pattern which had been 

prepared at the British Admiralty for Operation TORCH.' In the van was the Covering Force (H), containing Vice Admiral 

Sir Neville Syfret's flagship, the Duke of 

, Sep pp. 71-72 above. 

York, and two other battleships, Rodney 

and Renown, the aircraft carriers Victorious and Formidable, three cruisers, and 

seventeen destroyers. The Covering Force 

had the mission of protecting the landing operations from interference by the 

Italian or Vichy French fleets, a task which 

might take it well to the northeast of the 

rest of the convoy. British submarines already in the Mediterranean took patrolling 

stations off Messina, off the northwestern 

corner of Sicily, and off Toulon. Aircraft 

from Gibraltar, Malta, or the United Kingdom began reconnaissance flights over the 

sea between Spain and Sardinia, between 

Sardinia and Sicily, and over southern 

French ports. The first two convoy 

sections, bound for Algiers, went through 

the straits during the night of 5-6 

November, and the third, the slower section 

bound for Oran, passed into the Mediterranean during the afternoon of 6 November. 

Spies reported the naval movements near 

Gibraltar to the Axis powers almost immediately. As early as 4 November, the Germans were aware of a threat but did not 

recognize its import. "In Gibraltar, the Luftwaffe has ascertained up to now the presence of one battleship, two aircraft carriers, 

five cruisers, and 20 destroyers," noted the 

keeper of the OKW /WFSt War Diary; 

"the concentration of such important naval 

forces in the western Mediterranean seems 

to indicate an imminent operation, perhaps 

another convoy to Malta." Marshal Caval-
186 

lero on the same day considered the possibility of an Allied landing on the coast of 

Africa. Before midnight, 5-6 November, he 

was informed that Allied transports were 

actually entering the Mediterranean.2 

The warning, although early, was not 

early enough. The Axis powers had been led 

to expect Allied action on the Atlantic coast 

but did not anticipate an expedition to the 

Mediterranean. This consideration, and the 

necessity to protect the supply lines to their 

troops in Africa and the Balkans, had led 

the Germans and Italians to cluster their 

naval forces in the central and eastern Mediterranean instead of in the western Mediterranean where efforts to intercept Allied 

invasion convoys would be most effective. 

That the events of the next few days might 

well determine Rommel's fate in Africa and 

perhaps the Axis fortunes in the Mediterranean theater of war was well understood. 

Hitler sent a special message to the crews 

of the submarines and the motor torpedo 

boats there: "The existence of the African 

Army depends on the destruction of the 

English convoys. I await a ruthless victorious attack." 3 

Conflicting views and mistaken countermeasures frustrated all efforts during the 

next two days to determine the nature, 

strength, and destination of the Allied expedition. The fragmentary reports from air 

reconnaissance and the absence of reports 

from the submarine screen on which the 

Axis leadership was forced to base its 

deductions late on 6 November left room 

for disagreement. The German Naval High 

Command (Oberkommando de Krief!.s-

, (1) MS # G065a (Greiner), 4 Nov 42. (2) 

SKL/1.Abt, KTB, Teil A, 1.-30XI.42, 6 Nov 42. 

(3) Cavallero, COI1.ando Supremo, p. 4 (6 Nov 42). 

~ (1) SKL/l.Abt, KTB, Teil A, 1.-30.XI.42, 6 

and 7 Nov 42. (2) MS # C-065a (Greiner), 7 

Nov 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

marine-OKM) , which had held the view 

that a convoy for the relief of Malta was the 

most probable explanation of the Allied 

naval movements, now admitted the possibility of Allied landings. The rating of possible targets by the OKM, in their order of 

probability, was: "TripoIi-Bengasi, Sicily, 

Sardinia, the Italian mainland, and in the 

last place French North Africa." Kesselring 

expected the landings, if any, to be made far 

in the west out of the range of the Axis 

fighter-bombers. Hitler on the morning of 

7 November was of the opinion that the 

Allies intended to stage a large-scale landing of four or five divisions at Tripoli or 

Bengasi in order to contribute to the destruction of Rommel's army by attacking 

from the rear, and informed Mussolini of 

this view. The Duce immediately replied 

that he expected the Allies to land on the 

French North African coasts, but Hitler, 

unmoved, continued to hold to his TripoliBengasi theory. The Axis leaders yearned 

for a slaughter of British ships in the Sicilian 

straits in the manner of the attempted 

August convoy to Malta, hoping that such 

a triumph would offset the ill effects of the 

disaster of El 'Alamein. Kesselring was 

therefore ordered to concentrate his air units 

for such an operation, and if opportunity 

for it should not materialize, to be ready to 

harass a probable Allied entry in southern 

France. Early on 7 November the Italian 

Naval High Command (Supermarinrz) accepted the view that the various convoy 

sections were in fact two attacking forces 

bound for the African coast at Tabarka, 

Bougie, and Algiers, but it abandoned this 

view a little later in consequence of remonstrances by the GeTman Naval Command 

Italy (Deutsches lvlarinekommando Italien). However, at the end of the day the 

I talians reverted to their view of the early 
THE LAST PRELIMINARIES 

morning and ordered the available Italian 

submarines shifted accordingly. Late in the 

afternoon OKM reviewed the situation and 

on the basis of the many contradictory reports came to the futile conclusion that it 

must be ready to meet all the possible Allied 

landings. The German submarines south of 

the Balearics were therefore shifted toward 

the French North African coast. 

French forces in the Oran area had 

manned their coastal defenses on the night 

of 6~7 November, when the Algiers convoy 

was off Oran, and after the convoy passed 

the alarm went eastward with it. Plans were 

made on 7 November to mine the coastal 

waters off Tunisia during the following 

night in case the convoy was heading for 

Bizerte.· 

The reaction of the French Government 

could not be predicted by the Axis powers. 

Shortly before his departure by train for 

Munich on the early afternoon of 7 November, for the customary annual celebration of the 1923 Putsch, Hitler ordered 

the units which had been designated for 

occupation of southern France (Operation 

ANTON) to be alerted. The Italians prepared to participate in that operation and 

also to execute long-standing plans for an 

independent seizure of Corsica in case the 

French should make common cause with the 

Allies. o 

The convoy sections of the Allied expedition meanwhile proceeded on their courses, 

planned for them well in advance of the operation, although full responsibility passed 

4 (1) SKL/I.Abt, KTB, Teil A, 1.-30.XI.42, 7 

Nov 42. (2) MS # C-090, Stellungnahme zu 

Berichten deutscher OfJiziere (General der Artillerie 

Walter Warlimont). General Warlimont was deputy 

chief of OKW /WFSt. 

5 (1) MS # C-065a (Greiner), 7 Nov 42. (2) 

Cavallero, Coman do Supremo, pp. 366-74 (4-7 

Nov 42). 

187 

to each naval task force commander when 

his ships reached the meridian running 

through Melilla, in Spanish Morocco. By 

miscalculating Allied destinations, the enemy forfeited his opportunity to strike the 

ships before they reached the landing 

beaches. Only three successful contacts were 

made with the Allied forces on 7 November, 

when 76 German planes were in the air, 

9 German and 26 Italian submarines were 

stationed in the supposed paths of advance, 

and motor torpedo boat squadrons were 

ready for action if the weather permitted. 

An airplane hit the Thomas Stone at dawn, 

when it was almost 150 miles northwest of 

Algiers, bound for the beaches east of that 

city, and broke off its propeller and rudder. 

At sundown a submarine struck H.M.S. 

Panther, in the Covering Force, damaging 

but not sinking the ship. An enemy air strike 

on that force during the afternoon was repulsed. The Allied ships for Algiers passed 

south of the westernmost group of submarines and then swung toward the attack area 

somewhat to the east of another line of submarines intended to intercept them. The 

Oran convoy also stopped short of the submarines in the new positions to which they 

moved on 7 November. 6 

The attack on the Thomas Stone obliged 

her to stop while the convoy continued on 

its course. With the small corvette S pey as 

escort, the helpless transport waited dead in 

the water for arrival of a tug and other escort from Gibraltar. The 2d Battalion, 39th 

Infantry, was aboard and was thus held 

6 (1) SKL/I.Abt, KTB, Teil A, 1.-30.XI.42, 7 

Nov 42. (2) The evidence concerning the attack on 

the Thomas Stone, while not conclusive, indicates 

that it was by a German airplane. A slight discrepancy in the reported positions of the ship and the 

aircraft raises some doubt, but the time of the air 

strike and absence of any reported German submarine attack near that timc and place make attack by airplane seem probable. 
188 

back from participation in the assault. Its 

commanding officer, Maj. Walter M. 

Oakes, calculated that by using the landing 

craft of the transport the bulk of his unit 

might still complete the voyage to Algiers 

in time to join in its capture. He persuaded 

Capt. Olten R. Bennehof (USN) of the 

Thomas Stone to accept the risk of remaining for a few hours after dark without the 

protection of the S pey and with only two of 

his landing craft until the arrivals of the 

destroyers known to be on the way. At dusk, 

Oakes and over 700 men in twenty-four 

boats began a journey of about 150 miles 

with the S pey as escort. The motors of the 

small boats soon proved unequal to the demand. The night became a tedious succession of breakdowns and pauses for repair, interrupted by a brief period of excitement when one of the landing craft was mistaken for a submarine and subjected to fire. 

A rising easterly breeze at daybreak made 

quite apparent that the flotilla could not 

reach its destination that day. Leaving the 

boats, which eventually were scuttled or 

sunk by gunfire, the men crowded aboard 

the corvette and continued to the Algiers 

area, arriving late that evening. About two 

hours after the troops had left it, the 

Thomas Stone was found by two Royal 

Navy destroyers, which undertook towing 

operations. They were joined in this effort 

by a tug in early morning, 8 November, and 

despite great difficulties managed to bring 

the disabled ship into the port of Algiers 

three days later.7 

, (I) Rpt of S pey (Comdr H. G. Boyd-Smith), 

14 Nov 42, and Rpt of Wishart (Comdr H. G. 

Scott), 14 Nov 42, in App. V to Inc! 2 (Rpt of 

The Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force) of 

NCXF. Report of Proceedings, Operation TORCH 

AFHQ Micro Job 8, Reels 16A-17 A. (2) 39th Inf 

Hist, 23 Oct 43. (3) Morison, U.S. Naval Operations, II, 209-12. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Giraud's Associates in Gran and Algiers 

The enemy's efforts to stop the transports 

were matched ashore by the preparations of 

Giraud's followers to aid the landings and 

forestall the needless sacrifice of French 

blood. Mr. Robert Murphy first warned 

General Mast that the attack would come 

soon and then on 4 November that it would 

take place four days later. The immediate 

response was irritation and dismay, for 

Mast, rightly surmising that this fundamental information had been withheld from 

him at the Cherchel staff conference, realized that the shortness of the remaining time 

would force General Giraud into making a 

most difficult choice and would jeopardize 

successful operations by the pro-Allied 

French organizations in Morocco, Oran, 

and Algiers. His insistence upon a delay of 

at least three weeks, which Murphy transmitted sympathetically to General Eisenhower, was firmly rejected in Washington 

and London as out of the question.s What 

remained was to spread the alert to General 

Bethouart, Col. Paul Tostain, the chief of 

staff of the Oran Division, and the large 

Algiers group. 

Just as in French Morocco,9 plans to assist the invasion had been formulated at 

Oran and Algiers. The key figure at Oran 

was Colonel Tostain, who was to be aided 

by a combined military and civilian group. 

Units of the 2d Zouaves Regiment were expcctcd to seize control of the two main mili-

• (I) Algiers Dispatch 749 to Gen Handy for 

Adm Leahy, 31 Oct 42. Copy in WDCSA 381 

TORCH (11-1-42) Sec 2. (2) Msg 4373, London to 

AGWAR, 1 Nov 42. ETOUSA Outgoing Cables, 

Kansas City Rcds Ctr. (3) Memo, Gen Marshall 

for Adms Leahy and King, 2 Nov 42; Memo, President for JCS, 2 Nov 42; Memo, Field Marshal Sir 

John Dill for COS, JSM 455, 2 Nov 42. Copies in 

WDCSA 381 TORCH (11-1-42) Sec 2. 

"Sec pp. 90-92 above. 
THE LAST PRELIMINARIES 

tary installations and to furnish arms for use 

by organized civilian units in seizing communications centers, principal officials, ano 

Axis armistice commissioners. Guides were 

to be furnished to the invading troops. Sabotage of the port would be forestalled by 

civilian teams. Gen. Robert Boissau, commander of the Oran Division, was either to 

be persuaded to countenance an unresisted 

occupation of Oran or held in custody until 

that operation had been completed. 

These plans demanded too much of Tostain, who went to Algiers to consult General 

Mast, Giraud's principal military adherent 

there, and returned to Oran on 6 November 

with the decision that he could not engage 

in insubordination so direct and complete. 

The American vice-consul, Mr. Ridgeway 

Knight, thereupon radioed a warning to 

Gibraltar that the plans for Oran were failing and that the Center Task Force must expect a hostile reception. The civilian teams 

could engage in special tasks, but the arrangements for paralyzing French resistance 

had to be abandoned. 

In Algiers, however, the pro-Allied 

French organization rushed preparations for 

action on the night of 7-8 November. Military participants under General Mast included Colonel Baril at Kolea and Cap Sidi 

Ferruch, Lt. Col. Louis G. M. Jousse, garrison commander in Algiers, Brig. Gen. A. J. 

de Monsabert, commanding the Blida subdivision of the XIX" Region Militaire, and 

Col. Jean Van Haecke, chief of the 

Chantiers de Jeunesse, a youth organization 

with a camp at Blida. Other young Army 

officers were leaders of civilian groups organized to accomplish specific missions. The 

principal civilian leaders were Henri 

d' Astier, Jean Rigault, and Jose Aboulker; 

they had a following of a few hundred men 

who had accepted association for such a day 

189 

as now approached. Plans were based upon 

General Mast's ability to issue orders to units 

of the Algiers Division, and to facilitate 

speedy Allied advance to Algiers and the 

Blida airdrome from the vicinity of Cap 

Sidi Ferruch. Algiers itself was to be neutralized by occupation of the many key 

positions in the great capital, and by having 

civilians masquerade (with the aid of Colonel J ousse) as regular Volontaires de Place 

in the city's system of civilian defense. They 

could expect the connivance of the police. 

Motor vehicles were made ready in secret. 

Firearms, which the Allies had failed to deliver, were limited to a small quantity of old 

rifles to be obtained from the military. The 

Villa des Oliviers, official residence of General J uin, would be surrounded. General 

Koeltz also was to be taken into protective 

custody. If the Allies could manage to take 

over the city within a few hours after landing, assuming that the preparations by General Mast's organization were adequate, 

they could do so almost without firing a shot, 

and could then confront the civil and military leaders with a fait accompli. All could 

then rally to General Giraud. Such was their 

hope. Io 

Eastward from Algiers, along the coast as 

far as Tunis, warnings on 7 November 

brought defensive forces to the alert. The 

pro-Allied French there awaited the appear10 (1) Les Cahiers Fran(ais, No. 47 (August, 

1943), pp. 14 ff., contains a detailed account based 

on a report by M. Jose Aboulker, attested by Colonel Jousse on 24 April 1943. (2) Barjot, Le debarquement du 8 Novembre en Afrique du Nord (Paris, 

1949), pp. 128-34. (3) Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, 

p. 344. (4) Rene Richard and Alain de Serigny, 

L'enigme d'AIger (Paris, 1947), pp. 93-97. Also 

published under the title La bissectrice de la guerre, 

Alger 8 Novembre 1942 (Algiers, 1946). (5) Kammerer, Du debarquement Africain au meurtre de 

Darlan pp. 195-200. 
190 

ance of the invaders before taking overt 

steps. 

Giraud at Gibraltar 

Shortly after 1500, 7 November, General 

Giraud's party arrived at Gibraltar where, 

as already noted, it was anxiously awaited. 

Within an hour, Giraud was in conference 

with General Eisenhower and being briefed 

on the operation to begin a few hours later. 

When apprised in detail of the plans, 

Giraud, as he later declared, was favorably 

impressed by all but four significant features. 

Had the landing forces taken sufficient pains 

to appear to the French as allies rather than 

conquerors? Had sufficient preparations 

been made to gain Tunisia? Could there not 

be some provision for holding a bridgehead 

in southern France? What was the plan for 

his assumption of command? The last matter, which had been deferred in preliminary 

negotiations, became at Gibraltar the subject of prolonged and sometimes heated discussions extending beyond the time when 

the transports had begun to disembark 

troops. 

General Giraud probably believed that he 

already held the President's acceptance of 

his explicit requirement that he be inter. 

allied supreme commander wherever Allied 

troops fought beside French troops on 

French soil. He was convinced that he must 

have the supreme command if he were to 

succeed in rallying the French Army and 

civilian population in North Africa without 

considerable bloodshed. He thought it 

appropriate for an officer of his seniority, 

experience, and special knowledge of French 

North Africa to take precedence over a 

younger American whose extraordinary 

qualifications were then less apparent than 

they later became. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

General Eisenhower knew that the command was not his to bestow. He had no 

pertinent instructions from the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, the source of his authority, 

and no reason to expect in the future any 

instructions granting command over American and British forces to a French officer. 

He found Giraud unwilling to accept any 

responsibility to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, and convinced that he must appear 

before the French as a free national leader, 

not as the appointee of the Allies. At the 

same time, Giraud proposed to lead the 

Allied forces in conformity with his own 

strategic judgments. With resolute persistence, he refused to accept the role which the 

Allies had planned for him, that of commander in chief of French forces only. The 

colloquy ended as the fighting began.ll Thus 

the pro-Allied French in Algiers were 

obliged to proceed without Giraud and in 

ignorance of his whereabouts and status. 

While the conversations of General Eisenhower with General Giraud were still going 

on in the Rock of Gibraltar, the Center and 

Eastern Task Forces were approaching their 

objectives at Oran and Algiers. In advance 

of the approach, five British submarines lay 

off the attack areas of Oran and Algiers surveying by periscope those sectors of the coast 

where the landings were to be made. Each 

submarine had as passengers men who were 

to guide the shoreward movement of landing craft in the assault. One man was to act 

as pilot officer in the leading wave for each 

landing beach, while another in a collapsible 

boat took a position close to shore from 

11 Msg 113, Gibraltar to AGWAR for CCS, 0232, 

8 Nov 42. Copy in Smith Papers. This message reported the conclusion of Generals Eisenhower and 

Clark and Admiral Cunningham that Giraud was 

playing for time to escape responsibility for the 

shedding of French blood, since he must have 

known that his claim was unacceptable. 
THE LAST PRELIMINARIES 

which to mark the beach by light signal for 

the last stage of the approach. After familiarizing themselves with the landmarks as 

best they could through the periscopes by 

day, they used the small craft at night to 

ascertain the inner pilotage conditions. On 

4 November, one team was driven by a 

storm out to sea in the area west of Algiers, 

and was rescued by a trawler which took 

the men into that port. The others waited 

until after darkness on 7 November when 

the submarines took the stations at which 

the convoys were expected to find them.12 

Not long after nightfall on 7 November 

1942, the Oran and Algiers convoys reached 

12 Rpts of KOODOO and INHUMAN Parties in Inc! 

6 (Miscellaneous Reports of Proceedings) of 

NCXF, Report of Proceedings, Operation TORCH. 

AFHQ Micro Job 8, Reels 16A-17 A. 

191 

the points at which sections began diverging to reach the transport and fire support 

areas designated for the various separate 

landings. The aircraft carriers with their 

screens followed to appointed stations 

farther out to sea. North of Algiers, the 

Covering Force stood ready to ward off an 

attack by enemy surface forces and to detach certain heavy units for temporary service with the naval task forces. Already at 

sea in the Atlantic were troop and cargo 

convoys coming from the United Kingdom 

with reinforcements and bringing in particular elements of the Eastern Task Force to 

exploit success at Algiers by invading Tunisia. A few hours earlier than on the Moroccan coast the attack against Algeria would 

begin. 
CHAPTER XI 

The First Day's Operations Against Oran 

The Arrival of the Center Task Force 

Off Oran 

With the fall of darkness on 7 November, 

the Center Naval Task Force turned from 

its course east of Oran and doubled back 

toward the landing areas at which three 

rna jor sections of the ground troops were 

to be set ashore. The lights along the coast 

were still burning shortly before midnight 

as the combat-loaded transports and their 

escorts met beacon submarines north of 

Cap Figalo and Cap Carbon. (Map IV) 

Oran was to be gained by an envelopment 

from three beachheads to be established far 

to the east and west of the city, outside the 

wide bight between Cap Falcon and Pointe 

de l' Aiguille. More than fifty miles lay between the easternmost and westernmost 

landing points. 

The plan of attack prescribed amphibious 

landings by (1) an armored task force 

(GREEN) at Mersa bou Zedjar, (2) one 

regimental combat team (26th) at Les Andalouses, (3) two regimental combat teams 

(18th and 16th), and (4) a second and 

larger armored task force (RED) near 

Arzew.' The eastern landings near Arzew 

were to be facilitated by (5) the 1st Ranger 

Battalion, which was expected to send 

parties clambering up the heights southeast 

of Cap Carbon to take one coastal battery 

and into Arzew Harbor to capture anoth~r. 

1 See Ch. III above. 

(6) A paratroop task force was to be 

brought to La Senia and Tafaraoui airfields, and (7) a small force (RESERVIST) 

was to make a direct assault on Oran harbor 

to prevent destruction of the port facilities 

which were so necessary for later operations. 

The armored task forces were expected to 

thrust inland before daylight to insure the 

early capture of the airfields, particularly 

those at Tafaraoui and La Senia, and to 

close on Oran from the south. The infantry 

units were directed to encircle the city from 

west and east and to block the approach of 

reinforcements from interior stations. To 

accomplish this mission the main body of 

the 1st Infantry Division, landing at Arzew, 

was ordered to gain and hold a division 

beachhead line extending from the heights 

of Djebel Khar, a prominent feature located 

between Pointe Canastel and St. Cloud, 

through Fleurus, then skirting the northern 

end of a salt lake and the road junction 

south of En Nekala, and reaching the Golfe 

d' Arzew just east of La Macta. The 26th 

Infantry was to capture Djebel Santon and 

Djebel Murdjadjo dominating the western 

approach to Oran. 

Naval forces were to furnish gunfire support, to protect the transport areas and landing beaches from seaborne interference, 

and, in the initial phases preceding the capture of airfields, to provide all available air 

support. Two destroyers each were assigned 

for fire support off Mersa bou Zedjar and 

Les Andalouses, and two destroyers and the 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 193 

cruiser Jamaica for the same role at the 

Golfe d' Arzew. The cruiser Aurora took its 

station north of Mers el Kebir, while farther 

out were the battleship Rodney (with 16-

inch guns able to fire over twenty miles) 

and three destroyers. All naval gunfire was 

to be withheld until it became certain that 

surprise had been lost. Counterbattery fire 

was thereafter permissible, but after 1245, 

when Allied troops were expected to have 

occupied most of the beachhead, it was to 

be directed at batteries actually firing and 

at the same time well clear of Allied troops 

and of Arzew, unless specifically ordered by 

Commodore Troubridge. Five British forward observation officers were to move inland with the separate elements of the 

landing force to direct naval gunfire on appropriate targets. Patrolling motor launches 

off Oran and each of the landing zones were 

to furnish an antisubmarine screen. The 

naval air support would come from the carriers Furious, Biter, and Dasher (fifty-seven 

aircraft), between twenty and thirty miles 

offshore, protected by the antiaircraft 

cruiser Delhi and screened by destroyers. 

The defenses of Oran against these forces 

were far from negligible. Sea approaches to 

Oran and Arzew were protected by thirteen 

batteries of coastal guns, some of which 

could be turned against inland targets. The 

heaviest were the four 7.6-inch guns on 

Djebel Santon and the three 9.4-inch guns 

on Pointe Canaste1. 2 Naval gun crews were 

2 Other batteries from west to east were as follows: Cap Falcon, two 75-mm. guns; A,n et Turk 

and Bouisseville, each four 75-mm. guns; Mers el 

Kebir, six 75-mm. guns; area of Ferme Ste. Marie 

and Ferme Combier, about four miles west of the 

harbor, four gO-mm. guns; Fort Lamoune, at the 

base of the breakwater, two gO-mm. guns; Ravin 

Blanc and Gambetta, each four 75-mm. guns (Gambetta also four 120-mm. guns) ; Pointe d'Espagnole, 

last of the eastern harbor defenses, two 75-mm. 

guns; Fort du Nord, at Arzew, four I05-mm. guns; 

estimated to total 4,000, including troops 

who manned antiaircraft weapons adjacent 

to the coastal batteries. The strength of the 

Oran Division (General Boissau) in the 

area was estimated at 10,025, a figure expected to reach almost 18,000 within twenty-four hours and 22,525 by D plus 5 

through reinforcements from inland stations. The Army airfield adjacent to the 

civilian airdrome at La Senia, the Navy airfield at Tafaraoui, and the seaplane base at 

Arzew, were part of the defense system, and 

normally based just under 100 planes. At 

Mers el Kebir and in the western extremity 

of Oran harbor, several French naval vessels were usually moored. 

The assault convoys succeeded in finding 

their beacon submarines in each case at 

about 2130 hours. After releasing motor 

launches to pick up the "leading-in officers" 

from the submarines, the transport groups 

for each beach, preceded by mine sweepers, 

headed for positions near which the first 

formations of landing craft were scheduled 

to assemble. While approaching the coast 

and then while waiting to leave the transport, troops heard the current broadcast of 

the Army-Notre Dame football game, via 

short-wave from New York City, over the 

public address system of at least one ship.3 

The Royal Navy's methods of bringing 

assault troops to the assigned beaches near 

Oran (and Algiers) differed somewhat 

from those used by the U.S. Navy near 

Casablanca. British standing operating procedure required that, as convoys arrived at 

and Fort de la Pointe, at Arzew, two 75-mm. guns. 

CTF FO I, 4 Oct 42 Annex I, App. A. (rev by 

Intell Sum I, 12 Oct 42, and by 33d FA Bn AAR, 

15 Nov 42). 

3 Memo by Sgt Gene J. Elzas, Co K 16th Inf, in 

Eyewitness Accounts of Battles by Camp Ellis Veterans of Foreign Campaigns, European Theater. 

OCMH. 
194 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

DJ SANTD 

Mers el Kebtr 

ORAN, looking northwest. Symbol 0) indicates limit if penetration if H.M.S Walney and 

® of H.M.S Hartland. 

rendezvous points marked by beacon submarines, motor launches should be sent to 

the submarines to take aboard the piloting 

teams for each beach. The submarines then 

proceeded toward a point nearer the shore, 

and released teams in portable boats which 

took positions still closer to the beaches. The 

motor launches meanwhile joined the flotillas of landing craft, assumed guiding stations in the first waves, and moved in with 

the assault. Landing craft crews were not 

expected to exercise the same degree of 

navigational skill as the trained and practiced guides, on whom, in consequence, a 

critical responsibility rested. After successful arrival of the first boat formations, the 

transports were to move in through mineswept channels from first positions about 

five and a half miles offshore, thus shortening the round trips of later ship-to-shore 

movements. 

The simultaneous landings by the several 

elements of the Center Task Force are here 

desc ribed in sequence from west to east, for 

at this stage, the pattern of operations can 

thus be most clearly recognized. Following 

the initial stage of penetration inland, actual 

progress of the attack was determined by the 

points of strongest French resistance, a fact 

which controls the organization of the narrative of that phase of the operation. 4 

4 Rpt, CG CTF to CinC AF, 13 Nov 42, sub: 

Opn TORCH, with attached opns rpts of Parachute 

TF, TF GREEN, TF RED, and CCB 1st Armd Div. 

DRB AGO 95TF1-0.3, 24091 Master. 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 195 

The Landings at Mersa bou Zedjar 

The westernmost beachhead was that of 

armored Task Force GREEN, consisting of 

about one third of Combat Command B, 

1st Armored Division, under command of 

Col. Paul M. Robinett. Task Force GREEN 

was to operate directly under General 

Fredendall until in such proximity to the 

remainder of Combat Command B (Task 

Force RED) that control could be exercised 

effectively by the commander of that unit, 

Brig. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver. Robinett's 

force was organized into assault troops, 

shore party, "flying column," and main 

body. No units were held in reserve before 

the landings. 5 One company of the assault 

troops was designated to land on each of 

X-Ray Beach's two sections to establish the 

beachhead and to signal when the head-

'The total complement of Task Force GREEN 

was 103 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 2,150 enlisted men. Assault troops (Lt. Col. William B. 

Kern commanding) consisted of 1 st Battalion, 6th 

Armored Infantry (less Company B and detachments). Shore party (Capt. Kenneth Kennedy commanding) was Company F, 591st Boat Regimcnt, 

1st Engineer Amphibious Brigade. Flying column 

(Lt. Col. John Todd commanding) included the 

1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (less Companies A and B and a detachment of Headquarters 

Company); Company B, 6th Armored Infantry 

(less two platoons); the 2d Platoon, Company C, 

701st Tank Destroyer Battalion; and the 1st Platoon, Company A, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion (reinforced) . Main body (Col. Robinett 

commanding) was compriscd of Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 13th Armored Regiment 

(less detachments) ; a detachment of the 141st Armored Signal Company; 1st Platoon, Reconnaissance Company, and Companies A and B, 13th 

Armored Regiment; Battery C, 27th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion; Battery D, 106th Separate Coast 

Artillery (AA) Battalion; two platoons of Company B, 6th Armored Infantry; Company C, 701st 

Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one platoon); a 

platoon of Company B, 16th Armored Engineer 

Battalion (less detaehmpnt); and a detachment of 

Company B, 47th Armored Medical Battalion. Info 

from CTF Troop List, 21 Sep 42. 

lands jutting into the bay from the beach 

had been cleared. The shore party-9 officers and 186 enlisted men of Company F, 

591st Engineer Boat Regiment-was to 

operate in two separated sections to reconnoiter beach exits, find assembly areas for 

troop units and vehicles, and determine 

sites for supply dumps. It was ordered to 

construct roadways over the sand with Sommerfeld matting, to unload landing craft, 

to establish a medical aid station, to guide 

and control traffic on the beach, to assist in 

setting up signal communications and in 

defending the beach. While the beachhead 

was being linked by Army radio with Headquarters, Task Force GREEN, and with 

Headquarters, Combat Command B, 1st 

Armored Division, and through the Royal 

Navy's beach signal party with the Senior 

Naval Officer Landings, X Beach (Capt. 

G. R. G. Allen, RN), on the Batory, as well 

as with Commodore Troubridge and General Fredendall on the Largs, the flying 

column and part of the main body were to 

be coming ashore. 

The 1 st Platoon, Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment (1 st Lt. 

Richard H. Van Nostrand), was expected 

to push inland on reconnaissance and security missions, setting up roadblocks near 

the crossing of the Rio Salado on the west 

and at Bou TIelis on the east, and reporting 

the situation at Lourmel. The flying column 

was to move out as soon as it could be reorganized ashore, advancing first on Lourmel 

to secure the landing strip and other facilities there as well as to take over defense of 

the roadblocks and free the reconnaissance 

platoon for advance toward its next objective. It was then to prepare to attack either 

toward Tafaraoui or La Stnia, depending 

on progress of operations farther east. Battery D, 106th Separate Coast Artillery 
196 

(AA) Battalion, was designated to set up 

its machine guns on the beach while waiting for the 40-mm. Bofors to be brought 

ashore. Units of the main body would assemble in assigned areas within the beachhead preparatory to an inland march as 

soon as conditions allowed. 6 

X-Ray Beach's two sections on the bay of 

Mersa bou Zedjar were separated by a 

jutting rocky headland. X WRITE Beach at 

the northeast was adjacent to the village and 

its inner edge was lined with small French 

houses. A second headland at the other end 

of X WHITE formed a sheltered cove with 

a narrow and dangerous entrance but with 

a depth which would permit a close approach to the beach itself. X GREEN Beach 

was more approachable but on a shallow 

bay. Both sections of X Beach extended inland about thirty yards to high dunes, and 

in the case of GREEN Beach, to a single 

exit up a steep slope over deep, soft sand. 

\V RITE Beach permitted access to the village 

at two narrow points between the seaside 

dwellings. Small landing craft were to bring 

light vehicles and personnel from the troop 

transports to WHITE Beach. 

Besides the Batory, the convoy at X Beach 

consisted of the transports Queen Emma, 

Princess Beatrix, Benalbenach, !vI ary Slessor, !vI ark Twain J Walt Whitman, and 

Bachaquero. Twenty light tanks and various 

other vehicles of the Task Force were on the 

Bachaquero, one of three Maracaibos used 

by the Center Task Force. They were, as 

stated earlier, prototypes of the LST's, converted to tank carriers from shallow-draft 

oilers used on Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela.' 

A group of thirty-nine landing craft could be 

assembled for unloading from the other 

vessels. Navigation at night into the cove 

• TF GREEN CCB 1st Armd Div FO 1, Oct 42. 

1 Morison, U.S. Naval Opetations, II, 234. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

was deemed too risky for the Bachaquero, 

which was directed to land at GREEN Beach 

as soon as the beachhead had been secured. 

As the ships drew near to the point for 

initial release of landing craft, their schedule of landings was thrown awry by the 

fortuitous appearance, on a course paralleling the coast, of a small, fully lighted French 

convoy of five vessels bound for Oran under 

the escort of an armed trawler. One of them 

was stopped and boarded, but the others 

sped eastward until they sighted the Allied 

ships off Les Andalouses. They then reversed 

course. Hemmed in by the warships escorting the Batory and her group, these vessels 

ran ashore off Cap Figalo while their escort 

fled. The effect of their interference was to 

hold back the mine sweepers and disrupt 

the schedule of landings on X Beach.s A 

delay which at first threatened to be much 

longer was held to thirty-five minutes at 

WHITE Beach by bringing the transports to 

and lowering the landing craft while still 

more than a mile farther from shore than 

the plans provided. As the troop-filled boats 

assembled for the run to shore, the motor 

launch bringing the guide for the Queen 

Emma's flotilla from the beacon submarine 

did not find that ship in time to lead in the 

assault. The boats started in at midnight 

on a passage bound to take more than an 

hour, from points not only farther out, but 

farther west than had been expected, because of a current for which allowance had 

not been made. During the passage to shore 

the motor of one of these landing boats 

caught fire, spreading to gasoline and fud 

s (1) NCXF, Report of Proceedings, Operation 

TORCH (cited hereafter as NCXF, TORCH Despateh), Ine! 1 (Rpt of The Naval Commander, 

Center Task Force), App. I (Rpt of Capt G. R. G. 

Allen). AFHQ Micro Job 8, Reels l6A-17A. (2) 

The landing tables are in TF GREEN CCB 1st 

Armd Div FO 1, 12 Oct 42, Annex 1. 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 197 

X WHITE BEACH ON THE BAY OF MERSA BOU ZEDJAR. Note barriers to 

exit from heach. 

oil, and although the craft was abandoned 

and sunk, surface oil burned until after daylight. Surprise had been compromised. 

As a consequence of these mishaps, the 

second wave at X GREEN Beach actually 

landed before the first, while on X WHITE 

Beach the scheduled sequence was more 

closely followed." After the beachhead was 

reported secured by the assault troops commanded by Lt. Col. William B. Kern, the 

tank ship Bachaquero, touching bottom at 7 

feet, came to a stop more than 360 feet offshore. 10 The 16th Armored Engineers 

o The first landing at X Beach was reported at 

0136. Msg, Col Robinett to CG CTF, 8 Nov 42, 

Entry 50, in CTF G-3 Jnl. 

10 (1) Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," p. 35. (2) 

Msg, CO 13th Armd Regt to CG CTF, 0401, 8 

Nov 42, Entry 47, in CTF G-3 Jnl. 

worked for three hours to set up a pontoon 

bridge, but this did not quite reach dry 

ground. 11 The shallow bay caused difficulties also for the LCM's bringing in the 

lighter vehicles. They were pushed off the 

bottom by bulldozers but in the process sustained damage to rudders and propellers 

which eventually reduced the serviceable 

lighters from thirteen to three. 

While the armored vehicles waited to use 

the bridge, and while landing craft brought 

in the lighter vehicles, other boats ferried 

personnel from ship to shore. Just as off the 

Moroccan coast, the boats had difficulty 

finding their way in the darkness to the 

proper transports, especially when return11 16th Armd Engr Bn AAR, 3 Sep 43. 
198 

ing several miles from the beaches to the 

ships for second loadings. At the transports, 

some uncertainty was noted among the 

British naval officers in the boats and the 

U.S. Army officers on the decks as to who 

should take things in hand and expedite 

action.'2 

On being put ashore Lieutenant Van 

Nostrand's reconnaissance platoon struggled to get its vehicles over soft sand to firm 

ground, where it organized and at 0603 

started inland up the black top road toward 

Lourme!. Tanks began rolling from the 

Bachaquero to the shallow water at the end 

of the pontoon bridge an hour later, all of 

them coming ashore before 0815.'3 Over 

metal road mat, they cleared the beach to 

firm ground. Headquarters, Task Force 

GREEN, was set up on the headland between 

GREEN and WHITE beaches as the tanks 

came in. The vehicles, guns, and equipment 

arrived in landing craft from the transports 

at a much slower rate. 

The flying column started toward Lourmel at about 0900, shortly after word came 

of a clash between the reconnaissance platoon and a French armored car near the 

village. While Lt. Col. John Todd's force 

approached Lourme!, the spearhead group 

kept the village and airstrip under control 

and, about 1130, set up a roadblock southwest of Er Rahel on the approach from 

Tlemcen. Later in the day, reconnaissance 

was extended along the road to the southwest as far as Ai'n Temouchent. Communications between X Beach and the units 

12 CTF Rpt, Lessons From Operation TORCH, 

29 Dec 42. DRB AGO. 

18 Msgs, SNOL (X) to CG CTF, 8 Nov 42, Entries 91 and 110, in CTF G-3 J nl. The ship pulled 

out at 0815. Other vehicles included six motorcycles, twenty-seven half-tracks. one self-propelled 

37-mm. gun, four 37-mm. towed guns. sixteen quarter-ton trucks, and a signal truck and trailer. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

inland failed as they advanced down the 

southern slope of the hills between them 

and the coast. Radio contact between Headquarters, Combat Command B, at St. Leu 

and the inland elements of the GREEN flying column was also hampered and erratic 

until early on 10 N ovember.14 Back on the 

beaches, meanwhile, the unloading of vehicles and heavy equipment was expedited 

by using sections of ponton bridge as ferries 

from the Benalbenach, and, despite some 

misfortunes, the situation enabled part of 

the main body of Task Force GREEN to 

move during the afternoon through Lourmel toward the next objective.'5 

As previously noted, the force had alternative plans for movement either by the 

road south of the Sebkra d'Oran, in order 

to approach Tafaraoui airfield from the 

west, or along the highway between the 

southern base of Djebel Murdjadjo's rugged 

massif and the northern edge of the Sebkra 

d'Oran, in order to reach La Senia airfield. 

Orders from General Oliver, Commanding 

General, Combat Command B, were at 

noon transmitted through Colonel Robinett 

to Colonel Todd, directing Task Force 

GREEN to use the shorter northern route to 

La Senia. The GREEN column would thus 

operate independently until it had captured 

La Senia airfield either alone or, if need be, 

in conjunction with elements of Task Force 

RED after the latter had secured Tafaraoui. 

Todd's flying column broke through French 

roadblocks at Bou TWis and Bredea during 

the afternoon, and spent the night southwest of Misserrhin. Its radioed reports were 

not received after 1530 by Headquarters, 

Task Force GREEN, which followed from 

H Interv with Brig Gen Paul M. Robinett, 7 

Mar 49. 

15 (I) 13th Armd Regt S-2 Jnl, 8 Nov 42-9 May 

43. (2) 1st Bn 6th Armd Inf Sum Jnl, 8 Nov 42-9 

May 43. (3) CTF G-3 Jnl, 8-11 Nov 42. 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 199 

Lourmel a few hours later, and which 

bivouacked southwest of Bou Tlelis that 

night?G 

The Landings at Les Andalouses (Y Beach) 

On Y Beach near Les Andalouses, the 

26th Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division under Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, 

assistant division commander, and Col. 

Alexander N. Stark, Jr., commanding officer of the 26th Infantry, commenced its 

landing operations in circumstances somewhat similar to those at X Beach. 17 The 

transport group consisted of Glengyle, M anarch of Bermuda, Llangibby Castle, Clan 

M acT aggart, and S alacia, escorted by the 

cruiser H.M.S. Aurora. The Senior Naval 

Officer Landings, Y Beach, was Capt. E. V. 

Lees (RN) on the Glengyle. Forty-fivelanding craft of different types were distributed 

among these ships. While the Aurora engaged the small French convoy which disrupted the scheduled landings at Mersa bou 

Zedjar, and drove it back to the west, the 

transports lowered their boats at 2320 and 

commenced the slow disembarkation of as16 (1) Msgs, CCB to CO 13th Armd Regt, 1135, 

8 Nov 42, and CO 13th Armd Regt to 1st Bn 13th 

Armd Re-gt, 1204, 8 Nov 42, in 13th Armd Regt 

Opns Jnl, Beach Landing at Oran. (2) Intervs with 

Cen Robinett, 7 Mar 49, 24 Jun 49, and 11 Jan 

51, and with Maj Cen Lunsford E. Oliver (Ret.), 

11 Jan 51. (3) Lt. Col. Bogardus S. Cairns, "Employment of Armor in the Invasion of Oran," 

Military Review, XXVIII, No. 6 (September, 

1948), pp. 46-56. 

17 (1) Combat Team 26 included 5,262 officers, 

warrant officers, and enlisted men, the larger elements being the 26th Infantry Regiment, the 33d 

Field Artillery Battalion, Batteries C and D of the 

105th Coast Artillery (AA), and the 2d Battalion 

of the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment. CT 26 

AAR, 21 Nov 42. (2) The report of the Se-nior 

Naval Officer Landings, Y Beach, sets the figures 

at 5,578 men with 395 vehicles. Rpt in App. II 

to Incl I of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. 

sault troops. The ladders thrown down the 

sides of the Monarch of Bermuda had rungs 

two feet apart, so that the heavily loaded 

soldiers, each carrying almost ninety pounds, 

made their way down in darkness at an unexpectedly slow rate. The landing craft with 

the first wave from this transport joined 

those from the Glengyle and started the sixmile run to shore at 2345, led in by Lt. T. E. 

Edwards (RN) in a motor launch. About 

an hour later, the troops could see the flashing signal from the team near shore, but the 

first of the craft from the Monarch of Bermuda did not reach their portion of Y Beach 

until after H Hour (0100), while those 

from the Glengyle made such slow time that 

they did not touch down until 0116. The 

delay in the schedule was not very troublesome because there was no enemy resistance, 

but what did prove thoroughly disrupting 

was the discovery of an unexpected sandbar 

paralleling the shore. It had a clearance of 

from six inches to three and a half feet at 

different points, but what the incoming 

forces did not realize was that the water 

between it and the beach was often as much 

as five feet deep. The first of the small boats 

cleared the bar, but the first three LCM's 

from the Glengyle, arriving in the third boat 

wave, stopped at 0145 and disembarked 

jeeps and guns, which started forward, 

rolled under water, and had to be salvaged 

much later. 

Combat Team 26's second assault wave 

meanwhile came in from the Llangibby 

Castle in eight LCP's, waited for clear 

access to the landing site, and beached on 

Y GREEN at 0138. By 0340, the transports 

had moved into position about 2,000 yards 

offshore and dropped anchor. As early as 

0500, the unit's command post on the 

Glengyle reported that 2,670 men and 33 
200 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Y BEACHES, LES ANDALOUSES 

motor vehicles had landed. 18 An attempt by 

the French warship La Surprise to interfere 

with these landings was prevented by 

H.M.S. Brilliant, which sank her at 0715, 

after an engagement of more than a half 

hour. 

Y (or "Yorker") Beach, on the southwestern part of a wide bay, and near a high 

sheltering promontory and the small village 

of Les Andalouses, was almost midway between Mersa bou Zed jar and Oran. Extending about ten miles to the northeast and east 

from the beach was the Plaine des Andalouses, a level cultivated area between the 

coast and the precipitous slopes of a great 

hill mass. Four villages bordered the plain. 

El Ancor at the southwest and Bou Sfer in 

the south central position nestled close to 

the base of the hills. Les Andalouses at the 

" ( I ) Msg, CT 26 to CG CTF, 8 Nov 32, Entry 

68 in CTF C- 3 Jnl. (2) Rpt of SNOL (Y ), 13 

;\Iov 42, in App. II to Inc! 1 of NCXF, TORCH 

D .. spatch. 

west and Ain et Turk at the northeast were 

each in part a seaside resort for Europeans. 

The beach near Ain et Turk had been used 

at least twice by invaders bent on the conquest of Oran, including Spanish reconquest 

in 1732, but this time it was to be taken 

from the rear. The principal roads accessible 

from Y Beach linked Les Andalouses with 

Bou Tlelis, just north of the Sebkra d'Oran, 

and via a road junction at Bou Sfer with 

Ain et Turk and Mers el Kebir. From the 

latter, at a fork near the western end of the 

valley between Djebel Santon and Djebel 

Murdjadjo, a road branched to Oran over 

the northern slopes of Djebel Murdjadjo 

and the heights west of the city. Thus the 

area, somewhat like that adjacent to Mersa 

bou Zedjar, was a natural pocket hemmed 

in by high hills within which an attacking 

force was vulnerable to energetic counterattack. On the Plaine des Andalouses, such 

a force was subject to ready observation and 

in the last phase of its fifteen-mile advance 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 201 

Y WHITE BEACH, LES ANDALOUSES. Landing craJ! at left is an LeM. 

to Oran, might well come under cross fire 

from Djebel Santon and Djebel Murdjadjo. 

The 2d Battalion, 26th Combat Team, 

reinforced, landed on the west (Y GREEN) 

and the 3d Battalion, reinforced, in the center (Y WHITE), in the assault. The 1st Battalion remained in reserve at the beachhead 

until committed next day. Rifle squads from 

each assault battalion were left to guard the 

flanks of the beachhead while the other units 

proceeded inland. Company G, with an 

antitank platoon attached, took the village 

of EI Ancor and established a system of defenses astride the road leading from it to the 

southwest. When three French armored cars 

approached from the direction of Bou Th~lis 

at about 0800, they were destroyed by accurate 37-mm. antitank and 60-mm. mortar 

fire. The main body of the 2d Battalion 

pressed eastward with the mission of clearing the area of Cap Falcon- Ain et TurkBouisseville. The 3d Battalion left a detachment to occupy Bou Sfer, east of which Battery B, 33d Field Artillery Battalion, set up 

its 75-mm. pack howitzers, and continued 

along the road toward its objective, Ferme 

Combier, some five miles farther to the east. 

Just before reaching it the unit was pinned 

down shortly after 0740 by artillery fire 

from Djebel Santon and close-by Ferme Ste. 

Marie and by small arms and automatic fire 

from Djebel Murdjadjo. There it remained 

for the rest of D Day until it could be reinforced. '9 

The waters off Y Beach were within 

range of the coastal guns of the Fort du 

Santon. At daylight intermittent shelling of 

the transport area began. Shortly before 

0900, the transports there came under more 

accurate fire, and at 0917, the Llangibby 

Castle received the first of several damaging 

hits which obliged her to move farther west 

and out of range. Most of the personnel of 

Combat Team 26 had already gone ashore, 

'" CT 26 AAR, 21 Nov 42. 
202 

but motor vehicles, guns of the 33d Field 

Artillery Battalion, ammunition, and supplies remained to be landed. The Service 

Company was ferried from the Llangibby 

Castle about 0930 and, after reassembling 

from somewhat dispersed landings, reorganized and set about clearing the beach itself 

of supplies. 20 The battery at Fort du Santon 

resumed firing at 1050 and drove the M onarch of Bermuda out of range after one hit. 

From time to time bombardment from 

H.M.S. Rodney silenced it temporarily, but 

could not knock it out. 

T he Direct Assault on Gran Harbor 

(Operation RESERVIST) 

On H.M.S. Largs, reports from the landings on X and Y Beaches, and from those 

on Z Beaches to be described below, confirmed the Center Task Force commanders, 

ground and naval, in the belief that surprise 

had been achieved and that resistance was 

insignificant. The small cutters, H.M.S. 

Hmtland and H.M.S. Wainey/' and two 

attendant motor launches were waiting off 

Oran for orders to enter the harbor with 

their special force to execute Operation 

RESERVIST. The bulk of this force, 17 

officers and 376 enlisted men, had been 

drawn from the 6th Armored Infantry, 1st 

Armored Division, and were under Lt. Col. 

George F. Marshall, commanding officer 

of its 3d Battalion. They had been brought 

to Gibraltar on H.M.S. Leinster on 5 November and remained aboard her in the 

harbor until transferred late the next day 

to the cutters. With the soldiers in the spe20 (1) Br. Battl", Sum 38, Opn "Torch," p. 39. 

(2) CT 26 AAR, 21 Nov 42. (3) Rpt of SNOL 

(Y), 13 Nov 42. in App. II to Incl 1 of NCXF 

TORCH Despatch. 

" Formerly U.S. Coast Guard vessels transff'rred 

to the British more than a year earlier. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

cial force were 4- officers and 22 seamen 

of the U.S. Navy,22 6 U.S. Marines and 52 

Royal Navy officers and ratings, as well as 

the ships' crews. About noon on 7 November, the operation for which they had 

trained in a Northern Ireland harbor was 

explained to them. It was, they then realized, 

a "suicide mission." 

In charge of the operation and mainly 

responsible for its planning was Capt. Frederic T. Peters, RN, a retired officer who had 

volunteered for this undertaking. He rode 

in the H' ainey, which was itself commanded 

by Lt. Comdr. P. C. Meyrick (RN). In 

charge of the H artiand was Lt. Comdr. 

G. P. Billot (RNR). Canoes were carried 

on the Wainey for use by special teams in 

boarding ships to prevent their being scuttled in the harbor entrance or alongside 

the wharves. Captain Peters even contemplated seizing the fortified batteries above 

the harbor, and perhaps receiving the surrender of the city itself.23 

Although an operation to gain and hold 

Oran harbor invited approval, for success 

it had to begin either before H Hour with 

full surprise or much later when the French 

"Numerical strength of the RESERVIST Force 

from: (1) Memo, Maj Gen Orlando Ward fur 

CinC AF, 12 Dec 42, and Gen L. E. Oliver for 

TAG, 19 Nov 42, sub: Authorization of spec fourand battl", streamer. Both in AFHQ AG 

Micro Job 24 Reel 78D. (2) 6th Armd 

Inf AAR, 2 Scp 43. Morison, U.S. Naval 

Operations, II, 225. (4) U.S. Navy participants are listed by name in Report of Commander 

U.S. Naval Bases, Oran Area, which is Inc! 6 

of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. 

" (1) In terv with Harold Leo Disher, 21 Feb 

4-9. Mr. Disher, a War correspondent, made the 

journey with the RESERVIST Force from the Clyde 

to Oran, and was on the bridge of thf' Wainer 

during this operation. (2) See also John A. Parris, 

Jr., et al., Springboard to Berlin (New York, 194-3), 

pp. 93-125, which contains an extensive account 

by Mr. Disher written soon aftf'r the operation. 

(3) Rpt of Lt Corndr Dickey, USNR, in Incl 6 

of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 203 

naval authorities were almost unable to resist and about to destroy what they could no 

longer defend. Operation RESERVIST was 

instead allowed to begin at 0245,8 November, just after the French had been aroused 

by a general alarm which gave them time to 

man their defenses, and at a time when they 

could hardly regard their defeat as imminent. A French naval force controlled the 

port and was expected to resist the Allies 

with all the means at its disposal. Thus the 

forebodings of the special force were 

justified. 

The Walney approached the harbor in 

the shadow of the cliffs rising from the eastern edge of the bay. The Hartland followed 

at a five minutes' interval. The sound of 

sirens in the city could be heard, and all city 

lights were blacked out while the ships were 

still a good distance from shore. The harbor extends eastward along the southern 

limit of the bay from the base of steep hills. 

I t is enclosed on its northern edge by a 

breakwater 3,000 yards long and across the 

eastern end by a smaller jetty extending 

from the Mole du Ravin Blanc with an 

opening about 200 yards wide. Access to 

the port through this aperture was blocked 

by a floating boom past which the Walney 

planned to force its way. Fixed fortified batteries commanded the entrance, the harbor 

itself, and all adjacent waters, while dualpurpose artillery, machine guns, and the 

naval guns of warships in the northwestern 

corner of the long narrow harbor could be 

brought to bear on intruders. Toward this 

potential Vesuvius the Walney and the 

Hartland bent their course, a few minutes 

before 0300, 8 November. 

As the first ship neared the entrance, and 

one of the motor launches sped forward to 

lay a smoke screen, a searchlight's beam shot 

out over the bay. Tracer bullets sprayed out 

considerably ahead of the Walney's bow. 

Then the beam found the vessel, and artillery fire came her way at once. A large 

American flag at her stern, and the reiterated assertion over a loud speaker on the 

Walney that the approaching force was 

friendly, made no impression. A shell soon 

jarred the ship, throwing men to the deck. 

Captain Peters had her turned to the north, 

saw that the Hartland was still following, 

and circled to try for the harbor entrance 

at top speed. In thus persi:-;ting, he disregarded a somewhat equivocal message received during the approach from headquarters on H.M.S. Largs, which reported: "No 

shooting thus far; landings unopposed"; 

and instructed the RESERVIST force: "Don't 

start a fight unless you have to." 24 

On the second approach, shell and machine gun fire ripped into the W alney with 

drastic effect, but she reached the boom, 

broke it, and slipped inside the harbor. 

Abruptly then the French fire shifted to the 

Hartland while the leading vessel slid slowly 

toward the western end of the port in complete darkness and sudden, extraordinary 

silence. Three canoes and their crews were 

launched over the side. Not long after the 

Walney had passed between the Mole du 

Ravin Blanc and a floating drydock moored 

near the northern breakwater, a French 

destroyer was observed approaching head 

on from the west. An attempt was made to 

ram it. The effort failed, and as the two 

ships scraped past each other, the destroyer's 

guns raked the Walney's decks, causing 

many casualties. The intrepid survivors 

continued westward beyond the MOle MilIe rand and then encountered a devastating 

barrage from both sides and from dead 

ahead, of an intensity compared with which 

2t Msg, NC CTF to Walney, 0250, 8 Nov 42, Entry 17, in CTF G-3, Jnl. 
204 

the preliminary fire had been merely an introduction. Fires blazed up. Ammunition 

became ignited. The ship's guns went out 

of action. All but one of the officers on the 

bridge were killed and he was wounded. 

The courageous troops and their commander, Colonel Marshall, kept up small 

arms fire, some until they fell and others 

until they eventually received orders, 

shouted from man to man, to abandon ship. 

The Walney was left a semisubmerged 

wreck not far from the sunken French warships at the western end of the harbor. 

The Hartland also persisted in the attack and was caught by heavy fire just short 

of the smoke screen at the harbor mouth. 

Most of her gun crews and many of the 

troops crouching below decks were wounded 

or killed during this approach. Commander 

Billot was temporarily blinded by a shell 

splinter. The ship failed to find the entrance and struck the jetty south of it. 

The wounded commander had the vessel 

backed off and again sent forward despite the blows already sustained and the 

certain prospect of more ahead. This time 

the Hartland succeeded in the effort to 

enter the port. As she swung round the end 

of the Mole du Ravin Blanc to reach a 

debarkation point near its base, her course 

took her past the French destroyer Typhon 

at its moorings beside the mole. Pointblank 

fire tore through the thin unarmored hull, 

exploded inside, set the ship blazing at several points, and put her wholly out of control. As she drifted, in danger of exploding, 

Commander Billot ordered that she be 

abandoned. One hour after the Hartland 

had come under fire outside the harbor, 

all survivors left the doomed and blazing 

vessel in two motor launches which then 

withdrew seaward. 

Ruthless resistance had completely frusNORTHWEST AFRICA 

trated the daring venture. Of the 17 officers 

and 376 enlisted men of the 6th Armored 

Infantry, 9 officers and 180 enlisted men 

were killed or presumed dead while 5 officers and 152 enlisted men were wounded. 

Only 3 officers and 44 enlisted men landed 

unhurt. 25 U.S. Navy casualties were 5 killed 

and 7 wounded; Royal Navy losses, 113 

killed and 86 wounded.26 All survivors were 

held first as civil, then military, prisoners 

while the battle for Oran proceeded, its ultimate outcome almost unaffected by this 

bloody episode. 

Naval Air Support for the Landings 

At first light, eight Albacore dive bombers from H.M.S. Furious and six Hurricane 

fighter escorts from each of the two auxiliary carriers took off, formed up at 5,000 

feet above H.M.S. Furious, started inland 

at approximately 0600, and climbed to 

8,000 feet.27 They crossed the coast between 

X Beach and Y Beach, continued to a point 

east of Lourmel, and followed the northern 

edge of the Sebkra d'Oran to Valmy. Dropping propaganda leaflets there, they swung 

back over La Senia airfield in broad daylight to be greeted by strong antiaircraft fire 

and enemy fighters. Each Albacore carried 

six 250-pound general-purpose bombs with 

which it accurately struck and wrecked the 

empty hangars on the northwestern side of 

25 (1) Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," pp. 37-

39. (2) See above, n. 22. 

'" ( 1) Rpt of Lt Comdr Dickey, USNR, in Inc! 

6 of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. (2) Info supplied by 

Cabinet Office, London. 

" Air operations from these vessels are recorded 

in Inc! IV (Furious' Reports), Inc! V (Biter's Report), and Inc! VI (Dasher's Report), in App. X 

to Inc! I of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. A liaison 

team of two U.S. Army officers (Lt. Col. S. C. 

Sloane and Maj. John T. Honeycutt) and two radio 

operators had gone aboard the Furious at Gibraltar. 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 205 

the airdrome, inflicting destruction which 

was later to be regretted. In the ensuing 

dogfights, five Dewoitine 520 French fighters were claimed shot down and others damaged. A second attack on La Senia airfield 

and a strike at Tafaraoui airfield were delivered a few minutes later by ten Seafires 

from H.M.S. Furious in low-level strafing 

runs against grounded planes and antiaircraft batteries. Again French fighters contested the action unsuccessfully. In these two 

missions, three British planes were outright 

losses while others of each type were forced 

down at various points ashore as their fuel 

ran out, sometimes after failing quickly to 

find their mother ships. 

Other aircraft took off from the carriers 

to patrol and reconnoiter between the two 

airdromes and Z Beaches as the troops assembled for their inland advances, or to 

investigate the highways as far as Sidi Bel 

Abbes and Mascara for signs of French 

military movement from the interior toward 

Oran. Such French aircraft as were in 

operation near Oran confined their resistance to the defense of the airdrome and left 

the landings at the beaches almost undisturbed. 

The Landings Along the Golfe d' Arzew 

Much the greater proportion of the Center Task Force was scheduled to land along 

the Golfe d'Arzew, either in the vicinity of 

the town of Arzew or over the Z beaches 

extending eastward from it. Naval units in 

this part of the convoy from Gibraltar, not 

including the vessels destined for Operation 

RESERVIST, totaled thirty-four transports 

and more than twenty escorting warships. 

They reached the beacon submarine, five 

and one-half miles from Cap Carbon, beginning at 2130 as the plans prescribed, and 

turned into the Golfe d'Arzew. Although 

the night was dark the beacon light at Arzew 

was clearly visible. 28 

The landing force troops were organized 

as follows: Combat Teams 16 and 18 and 

a Ranger force in two sections, attached to 

the 1 st Infantry Division, all three under 

command of Maj. Gen. Terry Allen, and 

Task Force RED of Combat Command B, 

1st Armored Division, commanded by General Oliver.2\) The Senior Naval Officer 

Landings, Z Beaches, for these eastern landings was Capt. C. D. Graham (RN) with 

headquarters on H.M.S. Reina del Pacifico. 

His first step was to get the Rangers ashore 

in the vicinity of Arzew. 

The Ranger force had four objectives. 

The chief mission was to capture two coastal 

batteries, one of which was emplaced in the 

Fort du Nord above Arzew port on the high 

ground to the north, and the other in Fort de 

la Pointe at the base of the hill at the northeast corner of the harbor. They were also 

to seize part of the town of Arzew adjacent 

to its port, and the heights directly above 

Arzew. To gain these objectives, the 1st 

Ranger Battalion (Lt. Col. William O. 

Darby) split into two detachments. The first, 

consisting of two companies, went in small 

boats from the Royal Scotsman to the protective eastern barrier of the harbor; they 

scrambled onto the quay, overpowered two 

28 Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," pp. 36-37, 

and App. A-7. 

29 "For purpose of coordination and control," the 

Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, inttially commanded all units landing at Z Beach; for 

all other purposes, the Commanding General, Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, retained 

complete responsibility for the tactical employment 

of his command. The Commanding General, 1 st 

Infantry Division, was responsible for expediting as 

rapidly as possible the landing of the armored force 

and retained no control over its elements once they 

had passed through the beachhead. CTF FO 1, 

4 Oct 42, Annex 16. 
206 

sentries in a brief exchange of gunfire, and 

caught the garrison asleep. Soon they held 

Fort de la Pointe and the northern side of 

Arzew. Colonel Darby led four companies 

from the Royal Ulsterman and Ulster 

Monarch up the cliffs from a landing point 

southeast of Cap Carbon and, after proceeding for about one mile, worked up a ravine 

to the rear of the main battery of four 105-

mm. guns at the Fort du Nord. Heavy 

mortars were set up. Three companies approached the barbed wire barrier, and when 

the scouts attempting to cut it drew fire 

the Rangers deployed during a mortar barrage and then rushed the battery enclosure. 

The guns were captured and prepared 

for demolition in case of a counterattack; 

the position was organized for defense; and 

a green signal flare at 0400 made known 

to watchers that the battery was neutralized. 30 Contact was established between the 

two Ranger sections at about the same hour. 

The port was to be controlled and operated at the earliest practicable time by an 

advanced U.S. naval base unit. Parties of 

U.s. and Royal Navy personnel, with a few 

U.S. Marines, filled a landing craft from 

H.M.S. Royal Ulsterman and went to the 

port entrance, waited several minutes for 

the Rangers' signal that their mission at 

Fort de la Pointe had been successful, and 

at about 0200 passed through the unobstructed opening. They continued to the 

inner harbor and, in the darkness, while the 

Rangers could be heard taking Fort de la 

Pointe, boarded and seized control of four 

3. (1) Lt. James J. Altieri, Darby's Rangers (Durham, N. C., 1945), pp. 32-35. (2) Maj Weldon E. 

Laiche, The Or an Operation, 8 November 1942, 

MS. The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., 

1948-49. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

small vessels moored there.s1 Until daylight, 

resistance in Arzew was negligib1e.32 When 

snipers, machine guns, and one small field 

piece opened fire from the perimeter of the 

port and the high ground west of the harbor, 

troops already ashore quickly silenced them. 

Back in the hills, however, a 75-mm. gun 

harassed the landings on Z Beach by spasmodically shelling the ships offshore after 

they had moved in about 0630 to anchor. 

Protective smoke was used to shield the 

ships from the enemy gunners.33 

The three sectors of Z Beach extended 

more than three miles from a point somewhat southeast of Arzew to an eastern limit 

beyond the village of St. Leu. The approaches were generally good, the grades 

easy and the yellow sand fairly firm, but the 

exits were limited to breaks in a low, rocky 

cliff. The two main hazards were exposure 

to wind and surf and vulnerability to artillery fire from the heights above Arzew. As a 

result of minor derangements during the 

initial debarkation and the five-mile approach in formation by landing craft, all 

assault waves could not touch down at the 

three appointed sectors of Z Beach on schedule. Combat Team 18 began landing on the 

western sector, Z GREEN, at 0120; Combat 

" Rpt of Capt Ansel, USN, Port of Arzeu [Arzew], 

30 Nov 42, in Incl 6 of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. 

Capt. Walter Ansel was in command of the Navy 

party. Comdr. H. Archdale (RN) commanded the 

British component. 

.. The assault force was aided by a Foreign Legionnaire, Capt. Edgar Guerard Hamilton, an American whose duty at Fort de la Pointe had almost 

ended, but who was still there when the attack 

began, and was known to be a likely source of help. 

He'is said to have identified himself to captors by 

discovering among them a fellow townsman from 

a small New England community. TORCH Anthology, Vol. I, Ch. 9, p. 9. CIA OSS Archives . 

.. (1) Msg, SNOL (Z) to Largs, 0605, 8 Nov 42, 

Entry 83, in CTF G-3 Jnl. (2) Capt Ansel's Rpt 

cited in n. 31. 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 207 

TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT COMING ASHORE, Z WHITE BEACH near 

St. Leu. 

Team 16, in the center sector, Z WHITE, at 

0100; and Z RED on the east, to be used by 

Task Force RED, Combat Command B, 1st 

Armored Division, was reported ready to 

receive the armored force about 0330.3 4 

Combat Team 18 on D Day 

The 18th Combat Team (Col. Frank U. 

Greer)-7,092 strong-landed on Z Beach 

GREEN from H.M.S. Ettrick, the Tegelberg 

(Dutch), and H.M.S. Reina del Pacifico, 

beginning at 0120. 35 The landing craft formation, though led in by motor launch, 

contained some stragglers which kept arriving at scattered points for more than ten 

minutes, a process which made reorganization more difficult than had been expected. 36 

The 3d Battalion was sent to Arzew to 

occupy the town and relieve the Ranger detachment. The 1 st Battalion was sent directly inland to seize St. Cloud and the high 

ground of Djebel Khar, west of it. From 

0730 to 0840, the 2d Battalion of the 18th 

Infantry, the 32d Field Artillery Battalion 

with two of its guns, and the antitank company came ashore. 37 

The 3d Battalion first met resistance 

about 0400 near the Arzew barracks and 

31 Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," p. 37. (2 ) 1st 

Div AAR, 12 Nov 42. 

35 CT 18 AAR, 19 Nov 42. Strength from M aster 

Landing Schedule, in CTF FO 1, 4 O ct 42, Annex 

3D. Including the period of training in ship-to·shore 

landings and of waiting for final loading, these 

troops had lived on the ships for more than six 

weeks. 

30 (I ) Ibid . (2 ) Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," 

p . 37. 

3T CT 18 AAR, 19 Nov 42. 
208 

naval base southwest of the harbor. The 

barracks was readily seized, with sixty-two 

prisoners taken, but the naval base on the 

south jetty required a concentration from 

60-mm. mortars before it would capitulate. 

Thirteen seaplanes, fueled and loaded with 

torpedoes, were captured ashore intact.38 

By midmorning the entire city had been 

mopped up and only snipers on the outskirts 

remained to be cleared. 

The 1st Battalion encountered French 

opposition for the first time about three 

miles west of Renan where it was attacked 

by five armored cars. All were destroyed or 

immobilized by antitank rifle grenades, and 

the advance continued as far as the village 

of St. Cloud, astride the main road about 

one third of the way from the beach to the 

edge of Oran. St. Cloud lay in the center 

of an open agricultural area, its 3,SOO inhabitants protected by walls and houses of 

masonry and concrete. Although a lone 

American reconnaissance car had passed 

through the village without incident in the 

early morning, the small local guard had 

been roused and reinforced from a barracks 

along the road toward Oran when the 1st 

Battalion, 18th Infantry, approached to 

seize it. 39 The advance guard was met just 

before noon by a heavy volume of rifle and 

machine gun fire from the 16th Tunisian 

Infantry Regiment, and from a battalion of 

the Foreign Legion concealed among the 

houses. The first American attack was 

quickly repulsed by this fire, augmented by 

the 7S-mm. and 1SS-mm. shellfire of a battalion of the 68th African Artillery Regi38 (1) Ibid. (2) Inel 1 (Rpt of the Naval Commander, Center Task Force) of NCXF, TORCH 

Despatch. 

3·lnterv with Lt Col Frederick W. Gibb (then 

CO 3d Bn 16th Inf), 13 Nov 50. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ment along a line northwest of the town. 

The self-propelled 10S-mm. assault guns of 

the Cannon Company, 18th Infantry, were 

sent up from the beach and with the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, reinforced the 1 st 

Battalion in time for a second unsuccessful 

attack from the south at 1S30. Late in the 

afternoon, the 3d Battalion (less Company 

K) arrived from Arzew and assembled on 

the high ground north of St. Cloud preparatory to an attack from that direction. During 

the night, plans were issued for a concerted 

attack to open at 0700, 9 November.40 

Combat Team 16 on D Day 

The 16th Combat Team (Col. Henry B. 

Cheadle), numbering S,608, landed on 

Z WHrrE and Z RED beginning at 0100. 

The 3d Battalion on the west advanced 

against light opposition from isolated farms 

to the vicinity of Fleurus, a few miles south 

southwest of St. Cloud. Fleurus was developed as a block to French road communications. The 1 st Battalion on the east first 

took Damesme and St. Leu by surprise and 

ahead of schedule, and cleared Z RED for 

the later landing of Task Force RED, Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division. It 

then moved eastward through Port-auxPoules and sent a force southeastward to En 

Nekala, occupying each place with one infantry company. At La Macta, some opposition from elements of the 2d Algerian Infantry Regiment was met. The first Americans to enter were ambushed. A co-ordinated attack by Company B and Headquarters Company, 16th Infantry, with a few 

guns, and with H.M.S. Farndale standing 

by for naval gunfire support, opened at 

'0 CT 18 AAR, 19 Nov 42. 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 209 

T HE "MARACAIBO" H.M.S MISOA, a converted shallow-draft oiler used as a tank 

landing ship. At Z Red Beach, light tanks were discharged through doors in the bow over 

bridge sections to the shore. 

1230.41 An hour later they had captured La 

Macta, and by 1400 a defense line east of 

the village, beyond the highway and railroad bridges over the La Macta river, barred 

the French reinforcements which were expected to be sent toward Oran from Mostaganem and Perregaux. Company A, 16th 

Infantry, was placed on the southwest flank. 

The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, after coming ashore on the initiative of its commander at 1000, was released from corps reserve 

and sent toward Fleurus on the southern 

flank of the division. 42 

" (1) Msg, Jamaica to NC CTF, 1229, 8 Nov 

42, Entry 213, in CTF G-3 Jnl. (2) Interv with 

Lt Col William A. Cunningham, III (then CO 1st 

Bn 16th Inf), 1 Aug 49. (3) Strength of Combat 

Team 16 from Master Landing List, Annex 3D to 

CTF FO 1,4 Oct 42. 

"(I) CT 16 AAR, 21-24 Nov 42. (2) Spec 

Periodic Rpt, 0200, 9 Nov 42; Msg, SNOL (Z) to 

T ask Force RED Takes T afaraoui Airfield 

The armored task force of 4,772 men, 

under command of General Oliver, which 

had the mission of capturing Tafaraoui and 

La Senia airdromes, was brought to Z Beach 

and Arzew on the transports Durban Castle 

and Derbyshire and the Maracaibos Misoa 

and Tasajera. After Z RED Beach had been 

reported cleared, the Maracaibos beached 

a little before and a little after 0400, put 

out th~ir ponton bridges, and began unloadSenior Officer CTF, 0100, 8 Nov 42 (msg cited 

but not filed ); Msg, Farndale to NC CTF, 1610, 8 

Nov 42, Entry 281. All in CTF G-3 Jnl. (3) Capt 

S. V. Ralph, The Operations of the 2d Battalion, 

16th Infantry, in the Invasion of North Africa, 8 

November-II November 1942, MS. The Infantry 

School, Fort Benning, Ga., 1947-48. This manuscript relates the personal experience of a battalion 

adjutant. 
210 

ing at 0600. They were fully unloaded at 

0759 despite fire from a battery near St. 

Leu. 43 Combat Command B's plans for Task 

Force RED were in outline much like those 

for the smaller Task Force GREEN, described earlier in this chapter. The shore 

party on Z RED Beach consisted of the 2d 

Battalion, 591st Boat Regiment, less Company F (at Mersa bou Zed jar). A reconnaissance force consisting of the Reconnaissance Company (less one platoon in Task 

Force GREEN), 13th Armored Regiment, 

was expected to land first from the Maracaibos, to assemble near the beach, and at 

H plus 3 ~ hours to move inland expeditiously to the village of Ste. Barbe-du-Tlelat, 

a distance of about twenty miles to the 

southwest. That small village was the hub 

of a network of main and secondary roads 

along which the reconnaissance force [Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment (-) ] could disperse to reconnoiter 

the areas near Sidi bel Abbes, Oggaz, St. 

Denis-du-Sig, Perregaux, Tafaraoui, and 

Mascara, and toward La Senia to establish 

.. (1) Msg, CT 18 to CT 18 rear (intercept), 

0704, 8 Nov 42, Entry 90, in CTF G-3 In!. (2) 

Task Force RED, Combat Command B, 1st Armored 

Division, contained: Headquarters, Combat Command B; Reconnaissance Company (less a platoon), Maintenance Company (less a detachment), 

Service Company (less a detachment), a detachment of Headquarters Company, and the 2d Battalion-ali of the 13th Armored Regiment; the 1st 

Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment; the 2d Battalion, 

6th Armored Infantry (+); the 27th Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery C) ; Company B, 701st 

Tank Destroyer Battalion (+); Company B, 16th 

Armored Engineer Battalion (-); a detachment 

of Company E, 16th Annored Engineer Battalion; 

the 106th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion (less Battery D) ; Company B, 47'th Medical Battalion; the 

2d Battalion, 591st Engineer Boat Regiment (less 

Company F); Company B, 1st Armored Support 

Battalion (-); and a detachment of the 141st 

Armored Signal Company. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

contact with Task Force GREEN. A flying 

column (Lt. Col. John K. Waters) consisting of the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored 

Regiment (less Company C), Company E, 

6th Armored Infantry, one heavy platoon 

of Company B, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, one platoon of the 16th Armored 

Engineer Battalion and a reconnaissance 

section, attached, was to assemble near St. 

Leu and advance swiftly along the same 

road to Tafaraoui airfield via Ste. Barbedu-TIelat. If the Paratroop Task Force were 

found already in control, Colonel Waters 

was authorized to transfer to its commander 

the responsibility for protecting the airfield 

and to continue on further missions, including that of covering the assembly near Tafaraoui of the main body of Task Force RED 

and preparing for an advance on the La 

Senia airport and, after that, on Oran. The 

parachute force was to be attached to Colonel Waters' command during joint operations should they be required to seize and 

hold Tafaraoui airfield. The main body of 

Task Force RED would assemble at St. Leu, 

where General Oliver's command post was 

to be established. In addition to some vehicles from the Maracaibos, the main body 

would include others from the Derbyshire 

and Durban Castle and light tanks of Company C, 1st Armored Regiment, which were 

to be unloaded at the Arzew docks. It would 

include Company B, 701st Tank Destroyer 

Battalion (less the heavy platoon with the 

flying column) and all but one battery of 

the 106th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion, 

which was to furnish antiaircraft protection 

both on Z RED Beach and at Tafaraoui 

airfield. 44 

H (1) CCB 1st Armd Div FO 1, 11 Oct 42. (2) 

TF RED CCB 1st Armd Div FO 1 with Intell 

Annex, 11 Oct 42. 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 211 

FRENCH PRISONERS captured by men of Combat Command B, lst Armored Division, 

are /',uarded by MP's on the beach near St. Leu, 8 November 1942. 

The reconnaissance force moved out at 

0820, followed some fifteen minutes later by 

the light flying column.45 Headquarters, 

Combat Command B, was set up in a police 

station in St. Leu while Colonel Waters' 

force hastened through Ste. Barbe-du-llelat 

to Tafaraoui airfield, north of the village 

and more than twenty-five miles inland. 

Brushing aside all resistance, it arrived at 

the airdrome at 1112, and deployed for the 

attack. The airborne troops had not yet arrived. Roads north and northeast of the airdrome were blocked to prevent escapes as 

Company A, 1st Armored Regiment, attacked from the south and Company B, 1st 

Armored Regiment, with the 1 st Platoon of 

,S ( I) TF RED 1st Armd Div AAR, 12 Nov 42. 

(2) 1st Bn 1st Armd Regt, 31 Dec 42. (3) 2d Bn 

6th Armd Inf Hist, II Oct 42-12 May 43. (4) Msg, 

8 Nov 42, Entry 149, in CTF G-3 In!. 

Company E, 6th Armored Infantry, attacked from the east. A vigorous assault by 

the tanks quickly took the airfield, with 

some 300 prisoners, while an ammunition 

train approaching from Oran was seized as 

it neared the field. It was now possible to 

order Task Force GREEN to approach La 

Senia by the more direct route north of the 

Sebkra d'Oran. At 1215, Tafaraoui airfield 

was declared ready to receive Allied planes 

from Gibraltar. La Senia airfield, on the 

other hand, had not yet been captured, and 

the French there sent bombers the few miles 

to Tafaraoui to counterattack. Carrier 

planes, with the loss of one, knocked down 

four French aircraft. When the first two 

squadrons of Twelfth Air Force Spitfires 

from Gibraltar were landed at 1630 at 

Tafaraoui, four French planes, which had 

been mistaken for an expected carrier plane 

escort, jumped them and killed one Ameri-
212 

can pilot before they were themselves destroyed or driven off.46 

The armored advance by Colonel Waters' 

force from Tafaraoui airfield against La 

Senia airdrome was deterred by French air 

attacks, by enemy batteries, and by the 

threat of counterattacks from the south. 

During the night, as part of the main body 

of Task Force RED reinforced the flying 

column, a section prepared to start for La 

Senia at 0600, 9 November.47 

The Airborne Troops of the Center Task 

Force 

Back in England, late on 7 November, as 

the men of the Paratroop Task Force (Col. 

William C. Bentley, Jr.) stood by the transport planes at St. Eval and Predanneck in 

Cornwall on five-minute alert, word arrived 

that the "Peace" Plan would be used.48 

The take-off would be set back. The planes 

did not assemble over the southwest tip of 

England, therefore, until 2200. Rain, fog, 

faulty radio intercommunication, and defective running lights interfered with the 

maintenance of formation. When the airplanes climbed through clouds to 10,000 

feet above sea level to surmount the crests of 

Spain's northern mountains, they became 

.... The two squadrons were from the 31 st Fighter 

Group commanded by Col. John R. Hawkins. They 

had been the first such unit to reach the United 

Kingdom, had been part of the Allied air cover for 

the Dieppe raid on 19 August 1942, and were in 

aircraft which had been assembled at the Gibraltar 

airdrome. The 52d Fighter Group (Col. Richard 

Allison) was ready for the mission but unable to 

take off until after Hawkins' unit cleared the 

airstrip. 

<1(1) 1st Bn 1st Armd Regt AAR, 31 Dec 42. 

(2) TF RED 1st Armd Div AAR, 12 Nov 42. (3) 

Co B 70lst TD Bn AAR, 27 Sep 42-12 Feb 43, 

24 Sep 43. 

48 Instead of parachute drops, aircraft would land 

troops. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

completely dispersed. The beacon signal 

from the ship off Oran, being sent on a frequency other than that expected by the 

transport planes, was never received. The 

widely separated aircraft, unaware that the 

"'Var" Plan had been reinstated while they 

were in flight, were heading toward a 

hostile reception.49 

Six of the air transports wandered far to 

the west of Oran. One landed at Gibraltar; 

two in French Morocco; and three in Spanish Morocco. The parachutists of a seventh 

C-47 were dropped while over another 

point in Spanish Morocco. Sixty-one paratroopers were interned by the Spanish Government. Of the thirty-two planes which 

arrived over Algeria about 0600 at various points along the coast, all were low in 

fuel. The troops were exhausted by the long, 

cramped flight. Southeast of Lourmel, near 

Source Blanche, a group of twelve planes 

on Colonel Bentley's order dropped their 

passengers by parachute. Before long they 

were trudging toward Tafaraoui, which 

they reached the next day.50 One of the C47's continued over Tafaraoui airfield only 

to receive antiaircraft fire and to turn off 

while sending warning by radio that the 

"War" Plan was in effect after all. All but 

four of the C-47's then landed at the western end of the Sebkra d'Oran, beginning at 

49 A warning that General Boissau in Oran had 

been apprised of the imminent Allied arrival, that 

the fifth column plans had broken down, and that a 

state of full alert existed was reported by Offiee of 

Strategic Services radio from Oran to Colonel Eddy 

on 7 November 1942. OSS Rpt, TORCH and the 

SOE Signal Stations at Gibraltar, p. 5. CIA OSS 

Archives. General Eisenhower transmitted this report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a message 

(Review 2) sent at 0232, 8 November 1942. 

00 They were reported by Headquarters, Combat 

Command B, at 1340 to be at Source Blanche and 

Oggaz. Msgs, 8 Nov 42, Entries 230 and 233, in 

CTF G-3 Jnl. 
THE FIRST DAY'S OPERATIONS AGAINST ORAN 213 

about 0830, and there established a defensive position, reinforced later by a platoon 

of light tanks. Meanwhile Colonel Bentley, 

after his plane had dropped the paratroopers, continued over Tafaraoui and La Senia, 

where he observed evidence of hostile forces. 

He was then forced to land on a salt flat 

south of Oran before he could rejoin the 

others. Two other transports settled down 

near his, one still loaded with troops. All 

these Americans were captured and imprisoned by French civilian police. Thus the 

morning passed with the paratroopers scattered and ineffective. 

By afternoon of D Day, with Tafaraoui 

airdrome in Allied hands, Col. Edson D. 

Raff attempted to have the flyable C-47's 

at the western end of the Sebkra d'Oran assembled on the field, but the French continued their resistance. Fighters from La 

Scnia forced down several of the transports 

and inflicted casualties on the crews and 

paratroopers. Artillery in the hills within 

range of Tafaraoui dropped 75-mm. shells 

on the airfield for about an hour, damaging 

some newly arrived C-47's. By nightfall, 

only fourteen of the transports remained operationa1. 51 Of the 556 paratroopers, only 

ahout 300 could be assembled on 15 November at Maison Blanche airfield, near 

Algiers, for the next operations. 

The Situation as D Day Ends 

Commodore Troubridge and General 

Fredendall on the Largs could assess the situation of the Center Task Force twenty-four 

hours after its arrival off Oran as distinctly 

promising despite some setbacks and some 

uncertain prospects. The beach landings had 

51 This account appears in the History of the 51st 

Troop Carrier Wing, pp. 9 If. It is also reprinted in 

Wings at War Series 6: The AAF in Northwest 

Africa, published by AAF, 1945. 

been successful, although the pace had fallen behind expectations. Arzew had been 

captured intact, and its small port was being 

used to the full. Repeated weak challenges 

to the Allied naval blockade off Oran and 

Mers el Kcbir had been repulsed without 

any interference in the landing operations 

and with loss of three small French warships. French aviation had offered negligible opposition. Each of the three major 

beachheads had been established. From the 

beachhead on the western flank, Task Force 

GREEN was firmly established in possession 

of Lourmel airstrip and on its ways to La 

Senia airfield, slated for attack at dawn. 

Combat Team 26, 1st Infantry Division, 

under General Roosevelt had crossed the 

Plaine des Andalouses to occupy the road 

centers at El Ancor, Bou Sfer, and Ain et 

Turk, and was scheduled to attack next the 

coastal battery on Cap Falcon and to push 

through Ferme Combier and past Djebel 

Santon. To the south, Task Force RED had 

occupied Tafaraoui airdrome and was preparing a detachment to push northwestward 

to the La Scnia airfield in the early morning. 

In the beachhead inland from the Golfe 

d' Arzew, General Allen had advanced to 

the prescribed division beachhead line, except in the area of St. Cloud, where the 

French had stopped the 18th Infantry. Already ashore were 10,472 men of the reinforced 1st Infantry Division and 1,026 men 

of General Oliver's Task Force RED, 1st 

Armored Division. Corps troops numbering 

2,522 had been landed, of which the 1st 

Battalion, 19th Engineers (Combat), was 

the one striking force in reserve. Only 340 

vehicles belonging to these units had been 

landed. The increasing roughness of the 

surf, after damaging scores of landing craft, 

forced the suspension of all beach landings, 

before daylight, both along the Golfe d' Ar-
214 

zew and at Les Andalouses. The cove near 

Mersa bou Zedjar remained usable, if considerably hampered by the swel1.52 The 

.. Msg, Principal Mil Landing Officer (Z) to CG 

CTF, 0705, 9 Nov 42, Entry 377, in CTF G-3 In!' 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

direct assault on Oran harbor and the airborne attack on Tafaraoui airdrome had 

each badly miscarried, although the extent 

of the losses remained unknown at Center 

Task Force headquarters. 
CHAPTER XII 

The Seizure of Oran 

The second day's operations promised to 

be more difficult. Resistance such as that 

encountered by Combat Team 18 at St. 

Cloud and Combat Team 26 at Ferme Combier could be expected at other points 

selected by the French defenders. French 

opposition was likely to stiffen with a view 

to delaying the attack until reinforcements 

from the interior could intervene. Enemy 

counterattacks were a possibility, and the 

roads, particularly that from the Foreign 

Legion's center at Sidi bel Abbes, were being 

closely watched for the approach of French 

columns. American ground units were 

widely scattered, with small reserves and 

restricted mobility, and with less armored 

and artillery support than would have been 

the case had unloadings kept to the scheduled volume. On the other hand, American 

land-based aircraft units were prepared to 

reinforce the carrier-borne aviation in order 

to increase the margin of Allied air superiority, and naval gunfire support was ready.l 

The attack planned for 0400, 9 November, toward Oran had to be suspended until St. Cloud was taken. Late on D Day, 

General Allen issued orders for the investment of St. Cloud from all sides. Combat 

Team 16 (less the 1st Battalion) was instructed to bar reinforcement of St. Cloud 

from the Oran side. 2 The 2d Battalion, 16th 

1 Msgs, NC CTF to Comdrs of Aurora, Rodney, 

Jamaica, and Farndale, 1445, 8 Nov 42, Entry 335, 

in CTF G-3 Jnl. 

21st Div (Tourville) FO 2, 2115, 8 Nov 42. 

Infantry, relieved the 3d Battalion in 

Fleurus, and the 3d Battalion then shifted 

to high ground west and northwest of St. 

Cloud, on the road between it and Arcole, 

where it was to interpose between St. Cloud 

and an army barracks as best it could without supporting artillery. The 18th Infantry, 

reinforced by two batteries of the 32d Field 

Artillery and by elements of the 16th Infantry, was to attack St. Cloud, after an 

artillery preparation of fifteen minutes, from 

the north, east, and south. Support by 

Twelfth Air Force Spitfires was at first ordered then canceled until the planned drive 

on Oran." Task Force RED could furnish 

no armored support in view of the missions 

to which it was already committed and the 

incompleteness of its unloading.4 

The French Counterattack 

on the Eastern Flank 

The French counterattacks expected on D 

plus 1 seemed before daylight to be impending at Y Beach,5 and later were reported at 

the eastern flank of Z beachhead and near 

Tafaraoui airfield.s The enemy was reported 

3 Msgs, CG CTF to Col Norstad (Tafaraoui), 

0015 and 0318, 9 Nov 42, in CTF G-3 Jnl. 

• Msgs, CG 1st Div to CG CTF, 2010, 8 Nov 42, 

and reply, 2217, 8 Nov 42, Entries 350 and 326, 

in ibid. 

• Msg, CG CTF to CO CT 26, 0540, 9 Nov 42, 

Entry 367, in ibid. 

• Msgs, CG CTF to CO 531 Engr Shore Regt, 

0945 and 0958, 9 Nov 42, Entries 399 and 406, in 

ibid. 
216 

to have infiltrated along Djebel Murdjadjo 

south of El Ancor for a drive northward 

toward the beachhead of Combat Team 26. 

At the easternmost wing of the Center Task 

Force, reinforcements from the 2d Algerian 

Infantry Regiment at Mostaganem were believed to have strengthened the troops that 

had been driven out by the 1 st Battalion, 

16th Infantry, as it occupied La Macta on 

D-Day afternoon. At daylight, moreover, 

air reconnaissance revealed that light armored and motorized forces were advancing 

in column from Sidi bel Addes toward 

Tafaraoui. 7 Planes strafed and bombed 

these elements and thereafter watched the 

highway for the main column of which, presumably, they were the advance elements. 

The threat which developed on the eastern flank near La Macta was disturbing to 

the whole plan of operations on D plus 1. 

About one battalion of the enemy infantry 

forded the La Macta river south of the highway bridge, crossed a swamp during the 

night, and got into the rear of 1st Battalion, 

16th Infantry. They approached from the 

same direction that a reinforcing company 

of the 1 st Ranger Battalion had been expected, and they attacked northeastward 

toward the coast.8 Center Task Force sent a 

company of the 1st Battalion, 19th Engineers, as reinforcements in response to a first 

report which had been sent back circuitously 

and which had become garbled in transmission. The rest of the engineer regiment 

7 Msg, CG CTF to CG CCB, 0658, 9 Nov 42, 

Entry 372, in ibid. 

, (I) Msg, Maj Russell F. Akers, J r., to CG CTF, 

1055, 9 Nov 42, Entry 489, in CTF G-3 Jnl. (2) 

CTF G-2 Periodic Rpts 4 and 5, 9 Nov 42. (3) 

Msg, Farndale to NC CTF, 0934, 9 Nov 42, Entry 

409, in CTF G-3 Jnl. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

was alerted for possible movement. 9 Before 

they could arrive, naval bombardment was 

also requested by the naval gunfire officer 

with the force at La Macta who described 

the situation as "horrible." With the troops 

entirely surrounded, he expected a "big attack" shortly after noon by greatly superior 

forces. tO The Center Task Force felt compelled to divert forces from other missions 

to quell this threat to Z Beach. 

Signal communications with La Macta 

were almost nil. Reserves were insufficient, 

and lacked transport. By voice radio General Rooks directed the Commanding General, Combat Command B, at St. Leu to 

send to La Macta whatever armored reinforcements could be found, even by recalling 

a column which was en route to Ste. Barbedu-Tlelat to help Colonel Waters' force 

oppose a French armored threat from Sidi 

bel Abbes. Since the column contained two 

medium tanks, the only mediums ashore, it 

promised to provide substantial support to 

the eastern flank of the Center Task Force.ll 

Three Albacore dive bombers, escorted by 

four Seafires, took off from the Furious at 

1241 to silence French artillery reported in 

action at a point east of La Macta. They 

returned at 1441, claiming a successful strike 

at the designated point, but they had observed no clear evidence that the enemy 

battery was there. I2 The troops in the mean-

• (I) Msgs, CG CTF to co 531st Engr Regt, 

0945 and 0958, 9 Nov 42, and to CO 1st Engr 

Amph Brig, 1000, 9 Nov 42, Entries 399, 406, and 

408, in ibid. (2) Interv with Col Cunningham, I 

Aug 49. 

10 Msg, Farndale to NC CTF, 1215, 9 Nov 42, 

Entry 460, in CTF G-3 Jnl. 

11 (I) Msg, CG CTF to CG CCB, 1310, repeated 

1325, 9 Nov 42, Entry 469 in ibid. (2) Interv 

with Gen Oliver, II Jan 51. 

" Furious Air Log and Rpt, 9 Nov 42; Msg, Aircraft to Largs, 1400, 19 Nov 42, Entry 502. CTF 

G-3 Jnl. 
THE SEIZURE OF ORAN 

time were encouraged to hold on. "Help 

coming: tanks, engineers, bombers, Spitfires," they were assured. '3 The cruiser 

H.M.S. Jamaica moved into position during the air attack to join H.M.S. Farndale 

in naval gunfire support when called. The 

situation ashore was saved by the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, which drove the 

French troops away by fire and maneuver. 

The naval bombardment was held in readiness but not required. 14 The first armored 

reinforcements plus Company D, 6th Armored Infantry, were used in a reconnaissance and demonstration to the east and 

southeast. 

The situation at La Macta cleared up 

before arrival of the armored column with 

the medium tanks. The column was accordingly stopped a second time and ordered to 

resume progress toward Tafaraoui airfield 

in time to join Task Force RED for the third 

day's operations. General Oliver's headquarters platoon of light tanks at La Macta 

was replaced by another platoon which remained near La Macta during the night. 

The engineer company was placed in the 

gap between La Macta and En Nekala, the 

marshland through which the morning attack had been launched.'5 Arrangements 

were made to relieve the 1 st Battalion, 16th 

Infantry, after dark with the 1st Battalion, 

19th Combat Engineers, from corps reserve 

and with two batteries of the 7th Field Artillery Battalion. The infantry would thus 

be freed for operations next morning with 

13 Msg, CG CTF to CO 1st Bn 16th Inf, 1347, 

9 Nov 42, Entry 477, in ibid. 

14 Msg, Jamaica to NC CTF, 1353 and 1443, 9 

Nov 42, Entries 497 and 486, in ibid. 

15 (I) Msg, CG CCB to CG CTF, 1730, 9 Nov 

42, Entry 532, in ibid. (2) Interv with Col Cunningham, I Aug 49, and Gcn Oliver, II Jan. 51. 

217 

the remainder of Combat Team 16 as the 

attack closed on Oran from the east.'6 

The enemy threat to the beachhead at 

Les Andalouses which had been reported 

before dawn turned out to be a minor danger which was readily controlled by General Roosevelt's own forces. The American 

attack there, somewhat like that at MehdiaPort-Lyautey during this same morning, was 

imperiled by a shortage of ammunition and 

by the suspension of beach landings. At 

noon, one landing party was brought by 

determined and skillful navigation through 

the heavy swell with ammunition already 

loaded on its own motor transport. Combat 

Team 26 continued its attack subject to 

shelling from Cap Falcon and other batteries, and in the face of resistance from 

about 600 men of the 2d Regiment of 

Zouaves on the heights west of Mers el 

K€bir.17 Combat Team 26 was making very 

slow progress over terrain advantageous for 

defense, against heavier shelling than that 

to which other attacks ashore were being 

subjected. 

French Armored Counterattack Near 

Tafaraoui 

A third French counterattack was 

launched by an armored force upon elements of Combat Command B in the vicinity of St. Lucien, seven miles east of Tafaraoui airfield. The initial effect of this threat 

was to stop the northward movement from 

Tafaraoui by most of the RED flying column 

which had just started its march to La 

S€nia. French artillery fire from the hills 

16 ( I) Msg, CO 19th Engrs to CG CTF, 1105, 

10 Nov 42, Entry 702, in CTF G-3 Jnl. (2) CT 

16 AAR, 21 Nov 42. 

17 (I) Msg, 1st Div to CG CTF, 1440,9 Nov 42, 

Entry 525, in CTF G-3 Jnl. (2) Interv with Col 

Alexander N. Stark, Jr. (Ret.), 18 May 51. 
218 

west of Tafaraoui had already delayed these 

troops at a road junction directly north of 

the airdrome when they received word of 

the approaching French armored force. 

One reinforced tank company continued to 

La Senia despite the artillery fire, but the 

remainder turned back to defend the airfield, for protection of the Twelfth Air Force 

fighter base so recently established at Tafaraoui was essentiaP8 Reinforcements consisting of a platoon of light tanks, another 

of tank destroyers, two medium tanks, an 

antiaircraft artillery battery, and a convoy 

of air force ground troops were reported en 

route at 1015, but the armor was later diverted toward La Macta, as indicated 

above. 11l 

The French armored force assembled in 

the vicinity of St. Lucien while the Americans organized an attack to drive it off. The 

reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Battalion, 

lst Armored Regiment (Lt. William Beckett, commanding), established contact with 

the French between Ste. Barbe-du-Tlelat 

and St. Lucien, while Company B, lst Armored Regiment (Capt. William R. Tuck, 

commanding), and a platoon of tank destroyers moved from Tafaraoui airfield early 

in the afternoon and launched an attack. 

The tank destroyers laid down a base of fire 

from a hill about 800 yards from St. Lucien 

while the tanks advanced with two platoons 

abreast and a third 500 yards behind them. 

The French force was driven from the field 

leaving fourteen ruined E-35 tanks behind. 

Captain Tuck's force, which had lost one 

man, one tank, and one half-track, held 

St. Lucien until relieved that night by Company E, 6th Armored Infantry. Thus 

,. Msgs, CCB to CG CTF, 0832 (recorded 0952), 

9 Nov 42, and 0932,9 Nov 42, Entries 403 and 421, 

in CTF G-3 Jnl. 

to Msg, CG CCB to CG CTF, 1015, 9 Nov 42, 

Entry 428, in ibid. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

French armored intervention had failed to 

regain Tafaraoui airfield, but by catching 

the Americans without reserves, had upset 

the advance on La Senia airfield and Oran 

from the south. 20 

La Senia airfield was not seized until 

1000, 9 November, after many airplanes 

had already flown off, presumably to 

French Morocco. A few remained dispersed 

on the ground or in the hangars. Some of 

the defending troops retired toward Oran. 

The first American elements to reach the 

airfield were a few light tanks and selfpropelled guns under the command of Colonel Todd, a portion of the flying column 

of Task Force GREEN. They reached their 

objective via the highway north of the 

Sebkra d'Oran and around the French barrier at Misserrhin, arriving on the southern 

part of the airdrome soon after sunrise. Resistance by the garrison was nominal. The 

GREEN flying column at first reported taking 60 airplanes and over 300 prisoners, a 

figure eventually reduced to 159 prisoners 

with 61 rifles and 4 machine guns, all captured without losses. 21 If the airfield was 

easily taken, its possession was soon rendered precarious by aggressive artillery 

bombardment from two batteries of French 

,. (l) Msgs, CG CCB to CG CTF, 1040 and 

1110, 9 Nov 42, Entries 437 and 438, in ibid. 

(2) French units from the south converged in the 

St. Lucien area while another column was approaching from Relizane. Reinforcements were sent as far 

as Sidi bel Abbes from Oujda, French Morocco, 

on 9 November. Journal of Actions of the High 

Command of Moroccan Troops, 8-11 Nov 42. Copy 

in transl in WTF Final Rpt, Operations TORCH, 

G-2 Annex, Item 11. DRB AGO. (3) 1st Bn 1st 

Armd Regt and 2d Bn 6th Armd lnf AAR's. (4) 

Info from Ltr, Col John K. Waters to author, 29 

May 51. 

21 (1) Msg, CG CCB to CG CTF, 0959, 9 Nov 

42, Entry 422, in CTF G-3 JnI. (2) CCB 1st Armd 

Div 8-2 Jnl, 9 Nov 42. (3) Ltr, Lt Col Frank F. 

Carr to Gen Robinett, 12 Apr 50. COH in OCMH. 
THE SEIZURE OF ORAN 

75-mm. guns near Valmy which outranged 

the tank guns. The party was pinned down, 

waiting for reinforcements from either Colonel Waters of the RED column or Colonel 

Robinett's GREEN force. Each of them had 

his own pressing problems, but Company A, 

1st Armored Regiment, with a platoon from 

Company E, 6th Armored Infantry, the advance section of Task Force RED, arrived 

by afternoon. When the enemy's 75's at 

Valmy began shelling the airfield heavily, 

a detachment of Colonel Todd's force attacked and drove the crews out of their positions. The detachment did not hold the 

ground but returned to the airfield that 

night, after destroying three enemy guns. 

All French planes left in the hangars were 

destroyed. 

Misserrhin Is Bypassed by the GREEN 

Flying Column 9-10 November 

Task Force GREEN approached La Senia 

in two sections. While Colonel Todd's advance party was pressing along the highway, 

Colonel Robinett had, as noted above, 

strengthened the protection of the western 

flank and started eastward. His command 

grew constantly through the addition of detachments and disabled vehicles left behind 

by Colonel Todd's advance party, and 

through the arrival of a few elements from 

the rear. Signal communications by radio 

with the beachhead and between advancing 

elements of the Center Task Force were 

seriously inadequate and remained so until 

the morning of 10 November. The flying 

column was not heard from for many 

hours. 22 On 9 November, the main body 

of Task Force GREEN expected to reach La 

22 Interv with Gen Robinett, 24 June 49. 

219 

Senia, and if early enough in the day, to 

turn toward Oran itself. 

The defenders of Oran developed one 

of the principal bastions of their outer ring 

at Misserrhin, eight miles from Oran and 

seven miles along a branching road from La 

Senia. There the lofty mass of Djebel Murdjadjo loomed high above the narrow strip 

of level ground adjoining the great salt flats 

of the Sebkra d'Oran. The sebkra was considered impassable by heavy vehicles. The 

highway from the west entered a village of 

stone and concrete structures well adapted 

to defense. Its other features of strength were 

supplemented by a battery of 75's emplaced 

on a bold height and protected by bunkers 

occupied by machine gunners and riflemen. 

Some armored cars were also available. 

Colonel Todd's depleted flying column 

had slipped past Misserrhin after nightfall 

on D Day and had continued early on D + 1 

along the edge of the sebkra to La Senia 

airfield. By the time Colonel Robinett's 

Headquarters, Task Force GREEN, reinforced, arrived at the Misserrhin bottleneck, 

the enemy had strengthened the garrison 

there and was ready for a protracted engagement. Neither a frontal attack down 

the road by tanks at 1030, supported by artillery fire, nor an arduous attempt at noon 

to move to the northern flank succeeded. 

One tank was knocked out on the road, 

thereafter forming a partial roadblock. 

Task Force GREEN'S lack of infantry hampered its operations severely. At 1615, after 

more armor and artillery had come up, 

Colonel Robinett decided that, rather than 

wait to bring up infantry and resume the 

fight for the village, he would continue after 

dark along the sebkra's rim, bringing to 

Todd's advance force on the airfield the reinforcements, ammunition, and gasoline 

which he reported to be greatly needed. 
220 

At dusk, Robinett's column swung to the 

south and began what proved to be a difficult but successful night march to join Todd 

on the airfield. The column was soon by 

error traversing the muddy basin but discovered that it could keep going. Word from 

the beach was brought by Lt. Bremner 

(RN), who then took back a series of 

messages from Colonel Robinett, the most 

important of which was that all possible reinforcements and in particular Colonel 

Kern's infantry should use the same route 

and reach the airfield by daylight. In total 

darkness, the column reached a point south 

of its goal, turned north, found a way onto 

firm ground, and about 0100 joined the 

small force already there. Task Force GREEN 

prepared to attack the Valmy area first and 

then, perhaps in conjunction with Task 

Force RED from Tafaraoui, to advance 

against Oran. Early in the morning, when 

Kern's infantry units arrived, along with a 

company of tanks and with trucks of gasoline and ammunition, Colonel Robinett had 

under his command a composite force. 23 

St. Cloud Is Finally Bypassed 

The attack on St. Cloud by the 18th Infantry, reinforced, which began about 0700, 

9 November, bogged down by noon in the 

face of persistent and heavy French fire 

when the troops were only part way through 

the village.24 Casualties were considerable. 

The regiment then planned to pull the infantry back, reorganize it for a converging at23 (1) CCB 5-3 and 5-2 Jnls, 9-10 Nov 42. 

(2) Interv with Gen Robinett, 24 Jun 49, and 

notes in his possession. 

2< Troops defending 5t. Cloud has been identified 

as the 16th Tunisian Infantry Regiment, the 1st 

Battalion of the Foreign Legion, an armored unit, 

a battalion of 75-mm. guns, and a battery of 155-

mm. guns. CTF G-2 Rpt 2, 2400, 8 Nov 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tack by all three battalions, smash the town 

with massed artillery preparations for half 

an hour, and then send the infantry in once 

more. When General Allen was informed of 

these plans, he visited the regiment's forward command post, checked the situation 

with Colonel Greer, and directed that the 

proposed operation be suspended and that 

there be no further artillery bombardment of 

St. Cloud. With General Fredendall's concurrence, he ordered instead that the village 

be contained with one reinforced battalion; 

the others were to go westward immediately 

after nightfall to participate in an attack 

on Oran. The general situation permitted 

such an action, while the Allied policy of 

holding to a minimum all destruction of 

civilian life and property was much better 

served by bypassing St. Cloud than by pulverizing it. 

The Approach to Gran From the East and 

South 

The situation late on 9 November permitted planning for a final attack on Oran 

next morning. At General Allen's command 

post at Renan, Col. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, 

operations officer of the Center Task Force, 

General Allen, General Oliver, and some of 

their staffs developed such a plan. The 

counterattacks of the French had all been 

repelled. In that process, their only available armored force had been overwhelmed. 

The French had lost all their airfields near 

Oran. French infantry and artillery were 

defending organized islands of resistance at 

St. Cloud, Valmy, and Misserrhin, and 

might similarly offer resistance on the edge 

of Oran. American forces for the attack 

would include five battalions of the 1st Infantry Division from the east, to be supported by most of the 1st Infantry Division's 
THE SEIZURE OF ORAN 

artillery, under Brig. Gen. Clift Andrus, 

and three battalions from the northwest, to 

be supported by the 33d Field Artillery Battalion, and aided by naval gunfire against 

the French coastal batteries impeding General Roosevelt's advance. The tanks, tank 

destroyers, armored infantry, and supporting units of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, were strung out from Arzew 

to Tafaraoui airfield, and then to La Senia 

airfield and Misserrhin; but General Oliver 

could hurry Task Force RED toward La 

Senia, bypassing Valmy, and might establish contact with Task Force GREEN in time 

to bring it into the concerted attack after 

detouring around Misserrhin. From the 

south, then, one or more armored columns 

could be sent into the heart of Oran. Written orders were drafted while the preparations began. 25 

The night marches which the 16th and 

18th Infantry, reinforced, had to make in 

order to arrive at the designated sectors of 

the line of departure had already begun, 

but they required successful and energetic 

action by troops who were nearing exhaustion. After weeks on shipboard, they had 

been on the alert or in motion for fortyeight hours. Exact directions had to be sent 

forward to the leading elements. In the 

case of the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, the 

orders directed that it return to the 16th 

Infantry's zone by shifting southward over 

a lateral route connecting the road between 

Arcole and Oran with that between Fleurus 

and Oran. The 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, 

had already succeeded in slipping past the 

French forces in Arcole without arousing 

more than an outpost near a farm along the 

route, despite the hampering effect of a considerable number of French prisoners. The 

'" (1) Plan is CTF FO 2, 2215, 9 Nov 42. (2) 

1st Inf Div FO 3. 

221 

unit had actually arrived at the city limits 

and was preparing, in the absence of any 

opposition, for missions within Oran when 

an officer from division headquarters arrived with the formal orders directing it 

to shift to the south and there go into regimental reserve. Colonel Cheadle had to folIowan instruction which involved forfeiting 

advantages already in hand. The battalion 

(Maj. Frederick W. Gibb) was compelled 

to pull back and march down a road actually nearer the city than that envisaged in 

the field order. In consequence, the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, soon found itself 

squarely between the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, and a sizable French force just as 

a sharp fire fight broke out. It was pinned 

down as most of the crossfire passed 

overhead. 

The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry (Maj. 

Joseph B. Crawford), had come along the 

Fleurus-Oran road after overcoming slight 

resistance at two points, but in the vicinity 

of St. Eugene it ran against a strongpoint 

manned by the 1st Battalion, 2d Zouaves, 

and the 68th Regiment of African Artillery. 

The fighting at that obstacle persisted for 

several hours before the French were obliged 

to surrender. 2;; While these operations were 

in progress, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, 

was being brought by truck from La Macta 

to join the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, in 

the assault scheduled for 0715 hours, 10 

November. 

The two battalions of the 18th Infantry, 

which had been released from the investment of St. Cloud in order to make parallel 

advances along the coastal road and the 

road through Arcole to reach the northerly 

2. (1) CT 16 AAR, 21 Nov 42. (2) CTF G-2 

Rpt 5, 10 Nov 42. This reports that 308 French 

prisoners of war were taken in a six-hour battle. 

(3) In terv with Col Gibb, 13 Nov 50. 
222 

section of the line of departure, could not 

meet the schedule. The 3d Battalion, 18th 

Infantry, with the 32d Field Artillery Battalion in support, was engaged in capturing 

the coastal battery on Pointe Canastel and 

other French positions in that area throughout the morning. It could not get to Oran 

itself until about 1350, 10 November. The 

2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, which followed 

the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, on the road 

through Arcole hours later, was less fortunate than Lt. Col. Frederick W. Gibb's 

force, for it found the defenders at Arcole 

aroused and stubborn. The French artillery 

included some 155-mm. guns of the 66th 

Regiment of African Artillery in positions 

defended by the 2d Battalion, 2d Zouaves. 

Although the attacking force overcame the 

main resistance in a lively engagement, it 

could not get to the edge of the city before 

1100 hours.'21 

Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, undertook in preparation for the attack to concentrate its two task forces near 

La Senia airfield. The area through which 

these forces expected to attack at daylight 

was level and cultivated, and crossed by 

several almost parallel roads running northnorthwesterly into Oran. A branch railroad embankment crossed these roads between La Senia airfield and La Senia village 

and joined the main line from Ste. Barbedu-TWat through Valmy to Oran. At La 

Senia village, almost three miles south of 

Oran, and at Valmy, about four miles 

farther south-southeast, the French had assembled forces which had to be reckoned 

with. Task Force GREEN, reinforced by infantry and other units from X Beach just 

before daylight, organized for an attack on 

"(\) CT 18 AAR, 19 Nov 42. (2) CTF G-2 

Rpt 5, 10 Nov 42. This reports that about sixty 

French prisoners of war were taken. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Valmy in total darkness and still in ignorance of the Center Task Force's final plan 

of attack. At Tafaraoui airfield Task Force 

RED prepared to start at daybreak in order 

to reach, if not a juncture, at least a position for close parallel action by both parts 

of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, in attacking Oran without stopping 

to seize either Valmy or La Senia villages. 

General Oliver gathered what supplementary elements he could spare from the roadblocks in the area east of Tafaraoui to 

strengthen his attacking force, and at 0604 

resumed radio communication with Colonel 

Robinett, transmitting orders to prepare to 

attack Oran. Robinett had intended to employ Task Force GREEN against the French 

force near Valmy before swinging toward 

Oran, but General Oliver could not approve 

any action which would delay the jump-off 

beyond the 0715 H Hour set in the Center 

Task Force's plan. 28 Accordingly, Robinett 

canceled the operation against the Valmy 

batteries and the plan of operations was reorganized hurriedly, although to meet the 

designated H Hour was out of the question 

even if La Senia village, like Valmy, were 

to be bypassed. 

By daybreak, 10 November, Oran was 

completely enveloped by forces which, although at varying distances from the city's 

limits, were closing in for concentric attack. 

All sides of the city seemed likely to be penetrated before the end of the day. If the defenders could hold out long enough, a relief force might break through the surrounding cordon, but otherwise the city was 

bound to capitulate. The ring of encircling 

American troops had not succeeded in attaining positions for the simultaneous attack 

2S (1) Msg, CCB to CO 13th Armd Rgt, 0708, 

10 Nov 42, in 13th Armd Regt S-3 JnL (2) Interv 

with Gens Oliver and Robinett, 11 Jan 51. 
THE SEIZURE OF ORAN 

at 0715 as planned on the previous evening, 

but they would be ready later in the day. 

The Final Attack on Gran, 10 November 

The Rodney, Jamaica, and Aurora stood 

ready to furnish naval gunfire support, and 

Force H, the Royal Navy's covering force, 

had come near enough during the night to 

furnish, if called for, a dive-bombing attack 

on the battery at Fort du Santon."9 General 

Roosevelt's force was expected to persevere 

in conformity with its original orders until 

improved communications made it possible 

for General Allen to supplement them with 

direct instructions. A Twelfth Air Force 

Spitfire acting as courier dropped a message 

near the command post at Bou Sfer before 

0900 directing General Roosevelt to "shoot 

the works on F. O. No.1 at once." 

Earlier, as elements of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, organized 

for the attack, the French guns near Valmy 

began shelling them and drew counterbattery fire for about half an hour. Many 

French shells exploded near the troops, particularly those in Colonel Robinett's command, but miraculously they caused no casualties. General Oliver's very small advance 

force was less fortunate in this respect, for 

its progress was barred by the steep embankment of the railroad and blocked at two underpasses by heaps of disabled vehicles and 

empty oil drums. While these barriers were 

being cleared away, shells from guns near 

29 Sources for this section are: (1) Msg files of 

CTF G-3 Jnl, 10 Nov 42, and 13th Armd Regt 

S-2 and S-3 Jnls, 10 Nov 42. (2) 1st Bn 6th Armd 

Inf Sum Jnl, 10 Nov 42. (3) 1st Armd Regt, 27th 

Armd FA Bn, 6th Armd Inf, and 16th, 18th, and 

26th CT's AAR's. (4) Spec Rpt by Maj Gen Terry 

Allen (Ret.). OCMH. (5) Intervs with Gens Oliver 

and Robinett, Cols Gibb and Akers, and Lt Col 

Rudolph Barlow. 

223 

Valmy and from heavier coastal guns directed inland struck with destructive effect 

on some of Oliver's vehicles and personnel. 

A few of the Valmy 75's were disposed of 

by fire from Battery C, 27th Armored Field 

Artillery (with Colonel Robinett), while 

some well-concealed gun positions east of 

Valmy were overrun by Company C, 1st 

Armored Regiment (Capt. Rudolph Barlow), on its way up from Tafaraoui. The 

coastal guns were neutralized by naval gunfire. Not until after 0900 were elements of 

Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, almost ready to start into Oran. 

From Task Force GREEN, Colonel Robinett sent a composite column under Colonel Todd to the French Military Headquarters in the Chateau Neuf and to the 

adjacent port. The column consisted of two 

and one-half companies of light tanks, one 

company of armored infantry, a tank destroyer section, and some supporting weapons attached to the tank units. On the high 

ground south of La Senia he held a small 

reserve force. 

A little later, Colonel Waters accompanied the first section of Company B, 1st Armored Regiment (Capt. William R. Tuck), 

into the city along a parallel road less than 

a mile to the east. Clouds of brick-red dust 

rose behind the vehicles as they crossed the 

open plain under scattered fire of largecaliber guns which caused no casualties. No 

sounds of battle could be heard on the La 

Senia airfield once the roadblocks at the 

city's edge had been blasted by gunfire. The 

two columns shortly after 1015 entered a 

city silent except for snipers, the only group 

which remained actively hostile. The public 

buildings were barricaded but not the 

streets. Todd's column went straight to General Boissau's headquarters and to the port 

beyond it. The infantry took measures to 
224 

prevent further destruction of the invaluable port facilities. Colonel Kern went to 

Camp St. Philippe and procured the release 

of its Allied prisoners, totaling about 500. 

Colonel Waters sent one section of Tuck's 

company cruising about the city while with 

another he turned eastward toward the area 

about to be attacked by the 1st Infantry 

Division. Some of his tanks ran out of gasoline and had to be refueled within the city, 

but others demonstrated to General Allen 

that he would not need the artillery preparation and air strafing attacks which had 

been rescheduled for noon. His infantry 

were able to march unopposed to occupy 

those key points of the city which had been 

assigned to them, while Colonel Waters 

gave General Fredendall a ride into Oran 

in his tank. Meanwhile La Senia village surrendered without resistance to a small tank 

detachment from Colonel Robinett's 

reserves. 

General Boissau and a representative of 

Admiral Rioult accepted the terms of a provisional armistice covering French forces, 

including coastal batteries, pending agreement on formal terms of surrender. A ceasefire order was issued at 1215. The French 

tricolor flag was to be flown with the white 

flag of truce. General Fredendall was asked 

to confer upon the terms of surrender. 

At about 1230, Admiral Rioult and General Boissau met General Fredendall, Colonel Ferenbaugh, Maj. Russell F. Akers, Jr., 

and others, including a representative of 

Commodore Troubridge, to negotiate the 

terms of capitulation. It was agreed that the 

French tricolor should continue to fly, with 

the white flag beneath it, that French forces 

should be confined to quarters but retain 

their arms, while American troops were to 

occupy key positions near sea coast defenses, 

and elsewhere within and near the city, and 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

that harbors, airfields, and other facilities 

needed by the Center Task Force should be 

made freely available. General Boissau was 

to retain his command and to police the city 

of Oran. All Allied and French prisoners 

were to be released at once. When Captain 

Peters, commander of the RESERVIST Force, 

had been released, the Commanding General, Center Task Force, and his party withdrew. At 0945 next day, Headquarters, 

Center Task Force, was transferred from 

the Largs to the Grand Hotel in Oran. 

The suddenness with which the armored 

force penetrated Oran, after most of its defenders had been drawn to its outer defenses, 

brought about surrender there before parallel action could be forced on all the French 

military installations and units in the field. 

Combat Team 26, for example, was still 

struggling to get the guns of Fort du Santon 

suppressed by air or naval bombardment, 

and naval shells were still falling there when, 

at 1330, orders were sent out to the Rodney 

to suspend firing and thus permit the surrender of the battery. The armistice found 

the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, in possession of Ain et Turk, the 1st Battalion on the 

heights of Djebel Murdjadjo, from which a 

force of thirsty, hungry, and dispirited 

Zouaves had been driven, and the 3d Battalion, which had been relieved on the 

heights by the 1st Battalion, on its way down 

the road into Oran. At St. Cloud, the 1st 

Battalion, 18th Infantry, reinforced, had 

been ordered to attack the village on the 

morning of 10 November. All its attacks 

were repulsed, and St. Cloud was still in 

French hands, but the defenders were negotiating for a surrender when they received 

General Boissau's orders to cease fire. The 

surrender of St. Cloud yielded some 400 

prisoners and fourteen 75-mm. guns, eight 
THE SEIZURE OF ORAN 

heavy and fifteen light machine guns, four 

37-mm. guns, and four 60-mm. mortars. 

With the end of the fighting at St. Cloud, 

organized resistance in the Oran area ended. 

What remained was enough sniping to keep 

the occupying troops on edge for several 

days. 

Aftermath of Victory 

Although a few isolated French units 

were still shooting at Allied planes, sniping 

at American troops, and defiantly postponing acceptance of defeat on 11 November, 

occupation and organization of the area 

by the Allied forces proceeded speedily. 

The beaches at Mersa bou Zedjar, Les Andalouses, and near St. Leu were abandoned. 

The personnel, and such transports as had 

not already been unloaded and sent back 

via Gibraltar, were shifted from transport 

areas into the ports. Arzew, Mers el K6bir, 

and the outer section of Oran's harbor were 

available without delay. The inner harbor 

of Oran could not be used until after a 

blocking ship had been removed from its 

entrance channel, and it could be fully used 

only after other hulks had been pulled from 

the berths at dockside. During the evening 

of 10 November, two truck convoys brought 

naval parties from Arzew to Oran where 

energetic action brought that port into partial use in a surprisingly short time. Salvage 

was carried out by U.S. Navy elements, 

reinforced by a British vessel and its complement. Antisubmarine protection was furnished with materiel supplied by the Royal 

Navy. French authorities placed all available tugs, salvage equipment lighters, port 

facilities, and local pilots at the disposal of 

Rear Adm. Andrew C. Bennett (USN), 

who, as Commander, U.S. Naval Operating Bases, Oran Area, became responsible 

225 

for the functioning of the ports.so The ports 

of Nemours, west of Oran, and Mostaganem to the east were surveyed but were 

found limited to shallow-draft vessels and 

open to submarine attack. General Fredendall stationed the ground forces under his 

command near the airfields and in control 

of the road net leading to Oran. The outlying French communities were inspected, 

with official visits to the principal military 

and civil authorities. The paratroopers were 

ferried eastward for new missions, and the 

Twelfth Air Force elements labored to organize the fields at Tafaraoui and La S6nia 

for maintenance and efficient control of air 

operations. The first follow-up convoy could 

be expected on 13 November. 

F or the problems of a political nature 

which would confront the Center Task 

Force once hostilities were suspended, General Fredendall had been furnished with a 

political adviser, Mr. Leland L. Rounds. He 

was a civilian who had been in Oran for the 

preceding year and a half, until shortly before the expedition left the United Kingdom, 

as one of the consular representatives of the 

United States. He was also deputy civil administrator under Mr. Robert Murphy of 

General Eisenhower's headquarters. The 

nearness of Oran to Spanish Morocco and 

to the Spanish mainland made necessary, as 

the planners of Operation TORCH had well 

recognized, that the Allied foothold in the 

area be firmly established. The French civil 

administration was controlled by adherents 

of the government at Vichy. For several 

months, the fascistic Service d'Ordre Legionaire and similar organizations had been 

molesting those suspected of anti-Vichy or 

pro-de Gaulle sentiments. A number of Ger30 Rpt, Adm Bennett to CinC US Fleet, 30 Nov 

42, sub: Opns of US naval forces CTF. Div of 

Naval Hist A 16-3. 
MAJ . G EN. LLOYD R. FREDENDALL, center, u.s. Commander if the Center Task 

Force. From lift, officers are Brig. Gen. Luniford E. Oliver, Brig. Gen. Lowell Rooks, General 

FredendalL, Lt. Gen. Mark W . Clark, and Brig. Gen. James H. Doolittle. (Photograph taken 

December 1942.) 
THE SEIZURE OF ORAN 

man and I taIian armistice commissioners 

had been working with a network of proAxis sympathizers in Oran. Mr. Rounds 

and Colonel Bentley, who had been released 

earlier that same day, and a party of four 

enlisted men on 10 November gathered up 

a suitcase full of documents at the villa 

which had been hurriedly vacated by the 

German commissioners and turned them 

over to Col. Edwin B. Howard, G-2, Center 

Task Force. 

Identifying and restraining Axis sympathizers in the Oran area proved unwelcome to General Fredendall. He adopted 

the policy of "very mild arrangements" and 

of permitting civil officials to retain their 

positions undisturbed. The inevitable hostility which existed between such officials 

and the pro-American Frenchmen who had 

risked their lives or personal freedom before 

the landings in order to prevent a useless 

battle encouraged the administrative authorities to make reprisals on them. The relative unconcern of the American military 

leadership made it necessary for the Americans with whom they had co-operated before the invasion to protect these anti-Axis 

French. For both the Frenchmen who had 

taken such risks and those Americans who 

were concerned with their misfortunes after 

the victory, the events of the ensuing weeks 

were deeply disillusioning. The fact that Allied military policy in these matters was 

never put to the test by an Axis counterattack in the vicinity may have been fortunate. 3t 

The seizure of Oran was accomplished in 

less than three days by military means alone. 

Of the three great task forces, the Center 

31 (1) Memo, Maj Thomas G. Young, Jr., for 

Col Howard, 1 Dec 42, sub: Security in Oran area, 

in CTF G-2 Jnl. (2) TORCH Anthology, Vol. I, 

Ch. 9, pp. 9, 12-13. CIA OSS Archives. 

227 

Task Force was the only one which could 

subsequently claim to have won a decision 

wholly by force of arms. Success at Oran 

resulted from a series of circumstances, some 

fortuitous and some the result of imaginative planning or energetic improvisation. 

Well-calculated measures got the convoys 

to their destinations without enemy interference. Surprise got them ashore without 

significant French opposition. Determination got them inland and at their main objective rapidly. As General Fredendall 

radioed to General Eisenhower, they "went 

to town." No arm or service, except perhaps the airborne group, was superflous to 

the victory of the Center Task Force and 

each performed outstanding feats, but none 

was more clearly responsible for the swiftness of the French collapse than the armored 

force. In little more than forty-eight hours 

after being brought offshore, one portion 

of that force had arrived in the heart of 

Oran and another had demonstrated its 

invulnerability to French armor. Casualties 

had been below expectations, and fell most 

severely on the ill-considered Royal Navy 

project for storming Oran harbor by direct 

assault from the two small cutters. About 

half of those engaged were killed and only 

about 10 percent emerged unscathed. They 

were the preponderant portion of the 1st 

Armored Division's losses, of 191 killed, 

105 wounded, and 9 missing, a casualty 

figure in comparison with which the losses 

incurred by Task Forces GREEN and RED 

were negligible. The 1st Infantry Division's 

casualties-85 killed, 221 wounded, and 7 

missing-reflected the hard fighting in 

which the division was engaged at various 

points and the fact that it had faced so 

large a proportion of the enemy. Other 

units, including the Parachute Task Force, 

sustained but minor losses. The enemy's 
228 

casualties were less than those of the attacking force, and considerably less than 

among French units defending Casablanca, 

Port-Lyautey, and Safi.32 

•• Reliable statistics are lacking, but the proportion is indicated roughly in Petain et les Allemands, 

memorandum d' Abetz sur les rapports franco-allemands (Paris, 1948), p. 185. This lists French 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

With Oran in Allied hands, the Center 

Task Force prepared to establish contact 

with the Western Task Force through the 

Taza gap, and with the Eastern Task Force 

in the vicinity of Orleansville . 

killed at Casablanca as 475, at Oran 165, and at 

Algiers, 11. At Casablanca the wounded were even 

more numerous. 
CHAPTER XIII 

The Occupation of Algiers 

Algiers was the most important objective 

of Operation TORCH. The Allied Force was 

directed, it will be remembered, to establish 

lodgments elsewhere in French North Africa 

as a step preliminary to seizing the easternmost protectorate, Tunisia. Algiers was the 

area most closely related to the Tunisian 

phase of the operation. The port, the railroad terminal, the working space for a 

supply base, and the two airfields made the 

city a prize, while the facilities for housing 

and offices made it the likeliest place for 

Allied Force Headquarters when that 

agency could be moved from London. Allied control of the rear area during fighting 

in Tunisia or any subsequent operation in 

the Mediterranean theater would center 

readily in Algiers. It was the capital of Algeria and the seat of government for all 

French North Africa. The French system 

of civil and military administration focused 

there. The presence of the principal figures 

in the government of French North Africa 

would make the city the probable scene of 

the extraordinarily difficult French choice 

between neutrality and resumption of hostilities against the Axis countries. 

Measures for winning Algiers without 

bloodshed or creating rankling resentments 

were well advanced and, if successful, would 

find the French armed forces rallying to the 

leadership of General Giraud and returning to war for the liberation of France, with 

or without the open approbation of the 

government at Vichy. 

Military operations at Algiers were actually to lead to an armistice earlier than at 

Oran or Casablanca, but were to be followed by two days of negotiations during 

which the intentions of Marshal Petain in 

Vichy remained uncertain. Operation 

TORCH at this juncture became more political than military, if the two spheres can be 

differentiated when political negotiations 

are being carried on by military men with 

military purposes in view. The first concern 

here is with the amphibious operations of 8 

November, and after that with the politics. 

For the sake of clarity, the geographical sequence from west to east will be followed in 

relating the history of the landings and initial penetration of the area near Algiers. 1 

The Plan of Attack 

The Eastern Assault Force plan for capturing Algiers did not rely on possible assistance by friendly French elements ashore 

1 The basic sources for this chapter are the following: (1) Inc1 2 (Rpt of The Naval Commander, 

Eastern Task Force, Rear-Admiral H. M. Burrough) of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. (2) EAF FO 

1, 4 Oct 42. (3) 39th Inf Hist, 23 Oct 43. (4) 

168th Inf Hist, 15 Oct-12 Nov 42. (5) 175th FA 

Bn War Diary, 8 Nov 42-2 Mar 43. (6) CinC AF 

Diary. (7) The chief source for the operations of 

British Army and Royal Air Force units has been 

information furnished in response to specific inquiries addressed by the author to the Historical 

Section, Cabinet Office, London, and the Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, London (hereafter 

cited as Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London, 

or Info supplied by Air Ministry, London). 
230 

but was based on an analysis of the terrain 

and the defenses. Of the ground troops at 

Algiers 7,000 were believed to be in the immediate vicinity of the city, 4,500 to be west 

of it in the area of Cherchel~Kolea~BlidaMiliana, and 3,500 east of it near Dellys~ 

Tizi Ouzou~Fort National and Aumale. 

Far to the west near OrIeansville and well to 

the east at Setif were the next potential supporting ground units. The Algiers garrison 

included an armored unit of old-style tanks 

and annored cars. From the Maison 

Blanche and Blida airdromes, fifty-two 

fighters and thirty-nine bombers could contribute to the defense. At the coast were 

twelve or thirteen fortified and protected 

batteries with infrared thennal detectors 

and range-finder stations, predecessors of 

radar apparatus for such purposes. The 

three principal batteries included one in the 

old fort at Cap Sidi Ferruch, one near 

Pointe Pescade at Fort Duperre, and the 

Batterie du Lazaret on Cap Matifou near 

Fort d'Estrees, but others commanded the 

port and bay of Algiers and all sea approaches for miles on both sides of the city. 

The first mission for each major element of 

the landing force was therefore to gain possession of the coastal batteries near the 

beach at which it came ashore. 

The guns of Batterie du Lazaret, of Fort 

Duperre, and on the Jetee du Nord in the 

port, with their direction finders, searchlight installations, and other equipment, 

were to be captured intact and held for 

transfer to Allied coast artillery units. Other 

guns were either to be immobilized by removal of essential parts or to be demolished.2 

Three zones of attack were selected for 

the landings and designated in conformity 

, (I) Dir to CG EAF, 10 Oct 42. AFHQ G·~3 

Ops E/300/1 Mirro Job lOA, Reel SC. (2) Br. 

First Army Opn Instr No.4, IS Oct 42. DRB AGO. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

with British usage as Apples, Beer, and 

Charlie Sectors (instead of Able, Baker, and 

Cast zones). Apples Sector lay west of Algiers between Castiglione and a point about 

five miles southwest of Cap Sidi Ferruch. 

Beer Sector extended from Cap Sidi Ferruch to St. Eugene, a small village near the 

northwestern corner of Algiers bay. Charlie 

Sector was on the eastern side of Cap Matifou off Ain Taya and Surcouf. In picking 

these areas, the Eastern Assault Force had 

had to forego use of the best landing beach 

near Algiers, that on the eastern shore of 

Algiers bay, because it lay within range of 

coastal guns which might escape neutralization until after the initial landing phase. 

(Map 3) 

Two pairs of landing beaches were designated on either side of Cap Sidi Ferruch, 

Apples GREEN and WRITE along the seven 

miles nearest Castiglione, and Beer GREEN 

and WHITE just east of Cap Sidi Ferruch. 

On the rugged shore three miles east of the 

projection of Rass Acrata to a point within 

the bay of Algiers almost a mile southeast 

of Pointe Pescade, four sections of Beer 

RED beach were designated in coves and 

small bays. Landing beaches called Charlie 

GREEN, BLUE, RED 1, and RED 2 were selected in the sector between Jean-Bart and 

the mouth of the Rerhaia river. 

The Apples Sector on the west faced an 

inshore area with a narrow undulating 

coastal shelf rising to a set of parallel 

wooded ridges about three miles from the 

sea. Beyond these ridges lay the most intensively cultivated plain in Algeria, and 

on its far side the foothills of the Atlas Tellian. The village of Castiglione on the southwest of Apples GREEN Beach numbered 

fewer than 4,000 population, about one 

half of them Europeans. On the ridge south 

of Apples WHITE was KoIea, a larger com-
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 

mnnity with a substantial garrison. The 

ridges extended eastward as far as a river 

valley running northward to enter the ocean 

at the eastern end of Apples WHITE. Beyond 

that stream, the complex hill mass which 

protected Algiers on the west widened out. 

The Beer Sector fronted this higher hill 

mass. Beach Beer GREE", on the west extended along the bay from the eastern side 

of Cap Sidi Ferruch headland. Beer WHITE 

was near the center of the shore between 

Cap Sidi F erruch and Rass Acrata point. 

Beer RED had four distinct sections separated by points and bluffs, at Cap Caxine, 

Pointe Pescade, and near St. Eugene. Two 

major overland routes from the Beer Sector 

to Algiers crossed from west to east. The 

first was a coastal road through small beach 

communities and along the cliffs, a distance from Cap Sidi Ferruch to Algiers of 

some sixteen miles. The second and shorter 

route ran through an abandoned Trappist 

agricultural community to the town of 

Cheragas, on a ridge about 600 feet above 

sea level, and thence through the fashionable suburb of Lambiridi (formerly known 

as El Biar) to the steep downward slope of 

the city's western edge. Two secondary 

roads, one leading from Beer \V HlTE to 

Bouzarea and the other from Beer GREE", 

via OuIed Fayet, flanked the short route. 

These routes were accessible over fairly easy 

slopes partly covered with vineyards, but 

Beer RED'S four sections offered only small 

footholds at the base of high steep slopes and 

were chosen because they were near coastal 

batteries on the heights above them. 

The hinterland of the Charlie Sector differed sharply from that west of Algiers. 

Beach Charlie GREEN, near the tiny fishing 

hamlet of Jean-Bart; BLUE, squarely in 

front of Ain Taya village; and RED 1 and 

2, near the beach resort of Surcouf on the 

231 

eastern flank, were all smooth and of a fairly 

easy grade; but Beaches BLUE and GREE'" 

led to a low escarpment with limited exits. 

Once that barrier had been surmounted and 

a ridge had been crossed, the northeastern 

portion of the Plaine de la Mitid ja stretched 

beyond the horizon toward the southwest 

and offered easy access to Algiers from the 

east and south. 

The Eastern Naval Task Force, besides 

assigning escorts to three groups of troop 

and cargo transports, was prepared to furnish antiaircraft protection from a ship especially equipped for such a mission at each 

landing sector, to supply air support from the 

aircraft carrier Argus and the auxiliary carrier Avenger, and to provide naval gunfire 

support on call. A forward observation officer was expected to move inland with each 

landing team, keeping in touch by radio 

with a fire support ship assigned to his sector. If heavier fire than that available from 

a destroyer was needed, it could be requested through combined support control 

(on the headquarters ship Bulala) from one 

of four cruisers, She !field, Bermuda, Scylla, 

and Charybdis. Of the seven forward observation officers one was with the force at 

Apples Sector, four were with those landing 

at Beer Sector, and two with the troops at 

Charlie Sector. In the Case of calls for gunfire from the cruisers, a safety margin of 

2,000 yards between the target and the nearest Allied troops was deemed necessary. 

N a val aircraft were prepared to assist the 

fire support ships in bombarding the coastal 

batteries with the aid of flares, if necessary 

before daylight, and after daylight with 

dive-bombing, spotting, or smoke-laying, as 

requested. An interval of at least thirty 

minutes after a request was made was to be 

expected before bombers could reach a 

given target. Naval aircraft would furnish 
e E E R 

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CHARLIE 

LANDINGS AT ALGIERS 

8 November 19 42 

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234 

tactical reconnaissance and fighter patrols 

until Maison Blanche airdrome had been 

captured and occupied by Royal Air Force 

fighter squadrons of the Eastern Air Command. The land-based planes would thereafter take over air defense of the airfield, the 

port, and the convoys as well as reconnaissance and close support missions. 8 

A rrival at the Beaches 

The Bulolo and the fifteen assault tramports of the Eastern Naval Task Force continued on an easterly course along the thirtyseventh parallel throughout daylight on 7 

November, but at 1800, as darkness was 

falling, turned toward Algiers and soon 

divided into three columns. The transports 

for the eastern landings, with escorts, 

headed for a rendezvous with a beacon submarine northeast of Cap Matifou; the other 

two groups formed a double column and 

continued together to a point northwest of 

Cap Sidi Ferruch. There they separated at 

about 2130 hours, one section seeking rendezvous with its beacon submarine north of 

Cap Sidi Ferruch and the other, north of 

Castiglione. Admiral Burrough and General Ryder, the two commanders, were on 

the headquarters ship Bulolo with the center 

group nearest Cap Sidi Ferruch. 

The slower cargo section of the Algiers 

convoy, after passing through the Strait of 

Gibraltar on 6 November with the troop 

transports, took a shorter route to the attack 

zone, a course running closer to the African 

shore. This slower section was almost due 

north of Cherchel and well to the southwest 

of the swifter troop transports when at dusk 

the latter had turned southward toward 

Algiers. The cargo ships then grouped themselves into three sections, each of which was 

, EAF FO 1 with annexes, 4 Oct 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

destined for one sector, and took easterly 

courses that brought them to their destinations just as the landings were beginning! 

The Eastern force at Apples Sector consisted of three troopships (Karanja, Viceroy 

of India, and M arnix van Suit Aldegonde) , 

five cargo ships (Manchester, Lalande, 

Ocean Wanderer, Ocean Viceroy, and 

Dewdale) , and the antiaircraft vessel Pozarica. The sloops Enchantress and Stork 

and the corvettes Convolvulus and M arigold were assigned as escorts. The destroyer 

Bramham was available for gunfire support. Aboard the assault transports were 

units of the British 11 th Infantry Brigade 

Group, a force totaling 7,230 officers and 

enlisted men. 5 

The 11 th Infantry Brigade Group's initial missions were to seize control of two key 

bridges on the coastal road east of Apples 

WHITE and to establish southern flank protection for the Beer Sector along roads from 

Castiglione through Kolea to Bir Touta. 

North of this road rose the green-clad 

heights at the edge of the broad Mitid ja 

plain. From the vicinity of Bir Touta and 

the quiet elevations of Dovera, a health resort, the force was to be ready to move into 

Algiers, if needed, or southwest about fifteen miles to Blida to support an attack on 

the airdrome there. 

The larger proportion of enemy troops 

and coastal guns lay in Beer Sector, to which 

an Allied force of 10,421 officers and enlisted men was brought on five troopships 

(Keren, Winchester Castle, Otranto, Sobieski, and Awatea) and ten cargo vessels. 

The Palomares was to furnish antiaircraft 

protection. The monitor Roberts and the 

destroyers Blyskavica and Wilton were des-

• Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," Plan 4. 

'Statistics taken from Annex 5 to EAF FO 1, 4 

Oct 42. 
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 

ignated for fire support. Troops of the reinforced 168th Infantry (34th Division Combat Team) were expected to move from 

Beer GREEN to seize Fort de Sidi Ferruch 

and capture its guns and infrared installations, from Beer WHITE to gain control of a 

warning device on the projection of Rass 

Acrata, and from the separate sections 

of Beer RED to capture similar installations 

on Cap Caxine and Point 270, and to occupy the battery at Fort Duperre. While 

some elements were engaged in these missions at the coast, others were to press inland 

through Cheragas to the heights of La Bouzarea, almost 1,500 feet above sea level, and 

thence down into Algiers. Many key points 

in the city and the port were designated for 

swift seizure. 

Group Charlie, the 39th Combat Team 

(9th Division) reinforced, was embarked 

on the assault ships Samuel Chase, Leedstown, Almaack, Dempo and Exceller, the 

first three of which were combat loaders 

and the other two carried a high proportion of vehicles, and the slow ships M acharda and Maron. The antiaircraft ship 

Tynwald and the fire support destroyers 

Cowdray and Zetland were the principal 

escort vessels. The mission of the 39th Combat Team was to capture the airfield at 

Maison Blanche, the towns of Maison Carree and HusseIn Dey, and close Algiers from 

the southeast. 

A reserve group off Apples and Beer Sectors, the 36th Infantry Brigade Group of 

over 7,100 men, remained afloat in eight 

troop and cargo transports subject to call. 

In the Eastern Assault Force total of 

33,376 men were elements of the Royal 

Navy, most of whom served as landing craft 

crews and unloading parties, although some 

performed duties on the beaches. Also included were large numbers of troops to 

235 

organize and defend the beaches, to move 

supplies inland if the action should continue for several days, and to serve as Royal 

Air Force ground troops. It was only natural 

to hope that operations could be transferred 

to the port of Algiers in time to make it 

possible to unload many units and much 

materiel on docks. 

The Western Landings 

The landings of 11 th Infantry Brigade 

Group (Br.) on the Apples Sector near 

Castiglione went smoothly. The lights of 

that town shown brightly, the night was 

clear, the swell was moderate, and disembarkation proceeded with few difficulties. 

From the Karanja, the Viceroy of India, 

and the Dutch transport M arnix van Suit 

Aldegonde, assault troops of the 1st Battalion of the East Surrey Regiment, 5th 

Battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment, and 2d Battalion of the Lancashire 

Fusiliers took their places in landing craft, 

which then formed up for movement to the 

beaches. A moderate breeze from the northeast and a westerly current, both of which 

carried the landing craft several miles from 

,scheduled positions during the assembly, 

failed to hinder the operation. The piloting 

parties from the beacon submarine were 

taken aboard motor launches. The submarine then went to a point two miles offshore and released a marker team in a collapsible boat, which in turn took station 

only 400 yards off Apples GREEN and commenced flashing a navigation signal to the 

incoming waves of landing craft. 

At 2350, they started toward shore. At 

0100, they began arriving at what were 

found to be rough and dangerous beaches, 

but by careful handling disembarked all 
236 

boatloads without mishap.G No resistance 

was offered, and the force readily continued 

on its inland missions. Before daylight, the 

troops secured the bridges and took Castiglione, Kolea, and Zeralda, where they seized 

a radio station. Headquarters of the 11 th 

Infantry Brigade landed at 0230 on Apples 

WHITE. Units of the French Army, encountered at Kolea barracks, declared that they 

had been instructed not to resist. 

The 168th Combat Team (Col. John W. 

O'Daniel) of 4,355 Americans and 1,065 

British, to which part of the 1st Commando 

and all of the 6th Commando (British and 

American) were attached, began landings 

west of Algiers at 0100 under control of 

Capt. R. J. Shaw (RN), senior naval officer landings, on the Keren. Some 900 officers and enlisted men of the Commando 

units left the Otranta and the Awatea for 

various points along the coast from Cap 

Sidi Ferruch to the northwest corner of the 

bay of Algiers. Landing on Beer GREEN, 

five troops of the 1st Commando were expected immediately to capture Fort de Sidi 

Ferruch and secure the defense installations 

there. Using the "scramble" beaches of Beer 

RED, beaches which were to be swiftly 

crossed and not organized for protracted 

use and defense, the 6th Commando (ten 

troops) had orders initially to seize Fort 

Anglais, Fort Independence, the infrared 

stations at Rass Acrata and Cap Caxine, 

and then to take Fort Duperre and an observation station at Point 270. 7 They were 

thus to silence the coastal batteries which 

menaced the waiting ships offshore. At the 

same time, the first infantry units were to 

land, assemble, reorganize, and prepare to 

advance inland. 

o App. IV (Rpt of R.N. Beach and Pilotage 

Party, 8 Dec 42) to Inc! 2 of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. 

'168thCTFO 1, 140ct42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

The men of the 1 st Commando, heading 

for Fort de Sidi Ferruch, landed near their 

objective and hastened before 0300 to take 

possession from the nonresisting garrison. 

Colonel Baril, who had come from KoJea 

for the purpose, formally surrendered the 

fort to Lt. Col. T. H. Trevor (Br.), commander. From the ships, watchers at the 

rail saw the signal that the fort and coastal 

batteries had been taken; the mounting tension was relieved. Thus far, plans seemed to 

be going well.8 

The 6th Commando did not fare so well. 

Many of the landing craft in which its 

troops were to be conveyed from the Awatea 

had to come alongside from other vessels. 

Delays attributable to this arrangement 

were increased during the shoreward movement by the breakdown of landing craft engines and by the unseaworthiness of many 

boats. The first to land were two hours behind schedule; the last, more than five 

hours. Most of the craft sought their designated landing points without the benefit of 

the piloting party. In consequence, it was 

broad daylight, 0815, before Fort Duperre 

was encircled. 9 Not until after an air attack 

by nine Albacores of the Fleet Air Arm, followed by a limited ground assault, was the 

fort surrendered to the 6th Commando during the afternoon. A prospective naval bombardment was then hurriedly canceled. 

Before daylight, the infantry operations 

were also thrown into confusion. The 1st 

, When General Mast was notified that landings 

were imminent, he urged that they be made at Cap 

Sidi Fcrruch and adjoining beaches. Msg RC 35, 

Felix Cole to Secy of State Hull, 4 Nov 42; see also 

Msg, Algiers to Gen Handy, 31 Oct 42. Copies in 

WDCSA 381 TORCH Sec 2. 

'Maj ]. E. H. MacLeod, Account of Operation 

TORCH Compiled From Accounts of Troop Commanders, 6 Commando, on the Operation West of 

Algiers, 7-8 November 1942, 21 Nov 42. Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 

Battalion, 168th Infantry, was scheduled to 

land nearest Cap Sidi Ferruch on Beer 

GREEN, while the 2d Battalion made simultaneous use of Beer WHITE. The assault 

companies were to pass through the dunes 

and continue across gradually rising ground 

through vineyards and scrub-pine woods to 

two battalion assembly areas. They were to 

advance thence along secondary branch 

roads to the main highway between Castiglione and Algiers. Their route would then 

take them past several hamlets and the village of Cheragas to Lambiridi, about ten 

miles from the beaches. They were expected 

to reach the high ground dominating Algiers before sunrise and to be closely followed by a stream of reinforcements for the 

final operations to gain control of the city. 

The French Army barracks and defensive 

positions which lay in the path of advance 

were to be brought under control through 

surprise attacks, and the administrative 

headquarters in old Fort l'Empereur, directly west of Algiers, was to be occupied. 

The routes and schedule of advance thus 

planned were drastically modified almost at 

the outset of the landing operation. For the 

ba~ic procedure designed to guide the landing craft to assigned beaches foundered. The 

same motor launch which was to take 

aboard a pilot for Beer WHITE from the 

beacon submarine first had to embark the 

principal beachmaster from one of the 

transports; when that task had been accomplished, its crew could not find the submarine from which it was to take off the 

pilot. The motor launch eventually went 

toward the beach without him. The submarine waited vainly until it was scheduled 

to move inshore, and then transferred the 

pilot to the nearest available landing craft. 

The pilot was thus able to guide formations 

from the Winchester Castle and the Otranto 

237 

toward Beer GREEN. The motor launch, 

however, led the troops meant for Beer 

WHITE toward what turned out instead to 

be a landfall in the Apples Sector far to the 

west, among troops of the 11 th Infantry 

Brigade Group (Br.). Some of the landing 

craft guided by the pilot toward Beer 

GREEN were carried off course and reached 

the shore between Beer GREEN and Beer 

WHITE. Thus the first waves of the 168th 

Combat Team were forced to improvise as 

soon as they touched the African shore. 

Components of each battalion were scattered along fifteen miles of coast. The scarcity of tank lighters retarded the arrival of 

vehicles, heavy weapons, and equipment. 

From the beginning, machine guns, mortars, 

and boxes of ammunition had to be handcarried along the routes to Algiers by soldiers 

of the heavy weapons units, who found it 

impossible to maintain the rapid pace set by 

the less-encumbered rifle companies. Heavy 

swells, offshore obstacles, soft sand, or difficult beach exits made desirable the early 

closing of Beer GREEN and of all but 200 

yards of Beer WHITE, which as a result became seriously congested.lO Communication 

by radio among units ashore failed because 

of damage to many instruments during the 

landings and because of the insufficient 

range of others. A few bantam cars and 

trucks raced up and down the roads, carrying officers in search of missing parts of 

their commands or shuttling troops and 

weapons toward the front. Civilian transport was requisitioned. Control of the operation was imperfect but sufficient to organize an advance. 

The 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, was 

the most seriously scattered. Somewhat 

10 App. IV (Rpt of R.N. Beach and Pilotage 

Party, 8 Dec 42) to Inel 2 of NCXF, TORCH 

Despatch. 
238 

more than half its strength had arrived at 

Beach Beer GREEN by 0130, but the remainder, including the commanding officer, Lt. 

Col. Edward J. Doyle, was delivered at 

points southwest of Cap Sidi Ferruch on 

the wrong side of that headland, and as far 

southwest as the Apples Beaches. The contingent at Beer GREEN sought the battalion 

assembly area in the vicinity of Sidi Ferruch 

and waited there while Capt. Edward W. 

Bird of Company B rode forward on reconnaissance toward Lambiridi with two British officers. At the French barracks west of 

the town, they aroused the occupants to 

hostile action and hastily withdrew, leaving 

one of the British officers a captive. In the 

absence of both the battalion commander 

and executive officer whose mission it was 

to organize beach defense, command of the 

battalion passed temporarily to Captain 

Bird. As daylight came, about 0830, the 1 st 

Battalion began its march along the southern route, via (La Trappe) Ouled Fayet to 

Lambiridi, with the mission of protecting 

the Combat Team's south flank. 

The Capture of Lambiridi 

and of Blida Airdrome 

Colonel Doyle overtook the column during the early stage of this movement and 

led it aggressively through sporadic resistance as far as the outskirts of Lambiridi. 

From high ground on the western fringe of 

the town, a defending French force fired 

down upon the invaders. The advance 

halted while the 2d Battalion came up on 

the left and a co-ordinated assault was in 

preparation. 

The 2d Battalion Landing Team, commanded by Lt. Col. Dewey H. Baer, was 

separated into numerous scattered parties 

during the landing phase. Nine boatloads 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

from Companies E and F, commanded by 

Maj. Robert R. Moore, Battalion Executive Officer, which had been scheduled to 

land at 01 00 from the Keren at Beach Beer 

WHITE, touched down instead at Beer 

GREEN. They hastened along the highway 

to rejoin the rest of the unit, and advanced 

along the northern route to La Bouzarea, 

catching up with another portion and with 

Colonel Baer during the final stage of their 

approach to Lambiridi. Still other elements 

of the 2d Battalion, which had landed farther afield, came up later in the day. 

Colonel O'Daniel with a party from his 

headquarters did not arrive at Beer WHITE 

until about 0700, after several hours at sea. 

They had first been taken to Apples WHITE 

and then brought back along the coast to 

the correct destination. When the 3d Battalion Landing Team (Lt. Col. Stewart T. 

Vincent) began landing from the Otranto 

shortly after 0730, the rifle companies went 

forward to strengthen the impending attack on Lambiridi, the heavy weapons 

company struggling without transport vehicles to keep up with the riflemen. At noon, 

the regimental command post moved to 

the vicinity of Cheragas, and Colonel 

O'Daniel went on toward Lambiridi to expedite the attack through it against Fort 

l'Empereur. 

Shortly after noon, Baer's 2d Battalion 

on the left (north), Vincent's 3d Battalion 

on the right of the most direct route, and 

Doyle'S 1st Battalion working up from the 

south to the right rear started into Lambiridi. The 2d Battalion had forced back 

some outposts of resisting French troops. 

The 3d Battalion was newly arrived, and 

thus far without hostile encounter. The 1st 

Battalion, after a minor brush with French 

troops in an outlying barracks, was drawn 

to the northeast by the sound of firing. AI-
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 

though some of the regimental mortars were 

available for the attack, there was a disturbing absence of antitank guns. The 3d 

Battalion found Lambiridi's streets at first 

silent and empty. Company K approached 

the square in the center of the town by the 

main street. It was stopped abruptly by a 

French armored car which sent heavy machine gun fire in irregular bursts to drive 

the men to cover. Concealed riflemen then 

took up the fire and prevented resumption 

of the advance. The fighting in Lambiridi 

continued throughout the afternoon, a 

French Red Cross ambulance driving about 

to collect the wounded of both sides. 

Colonel Doyle, Captain Bird, and a detachment of about twenty-five men from 

the 1st Battalion left the others, worked 

around the southern edge of Lambiridi, and 

continued into Algiers. The small party arrived about 1500,8 November, at the Palais 

d'Ete and captured it. After guards had 

been placed at its gate and in its vicinity, the 

intrepid group started on to secure the Police Station, and to capture the German 

consul. Concealed snipers suddenly fired at 

them, killing Colonel Doyle and wounding 

one enlisted man. 

The troops near the center of Lambiridi 

remained pinned down, but flanking parties 

overcame the armored resistance and kept 

on to the vicinity of old Fort l'Empereur. 

Perhaps fifty men of Company F and K 

took up positions northwest of the objective 

while, on the east and south, parts of Companies I and L ranged themselves with 

Browning automatic rifles (BAR's) and 

light machine guns at points of vantage. The 

entrance could be approached only by crossing an open ravine. The attackers felt unequal to the task, and darkness fell as they 

waited for reinforcement and planned for 

action next morning. 

239 

The progress of Colonel Q'Daniel's command toward Algiers had met weak resistance during the morning after initial uncontested success, only because of a change 

in the French chain of command. General 

Mast had ordered the troops of his Algiers 

Division to assist the landings, accepting the 

Allies as friends, and to join them in preparing to resist an Axis attack. A few hours 

later, General Koeltz, Mast's superior, canceled these orders and relieved Mast of his 

command, replacing him with General 

Roubertie. Mast had gone to the vicinity of 

Beer GREEN Beach, where he had seen and 

advised some of the Americans, while Colonel Baril had left Kolea to assume personal 

charge of the peaceful transfer of Fort de 

Sidi Ferruch to the Americans. But General 

Roubertie instructed troops of the Algiers 

Division to disregard all orders emanating 

from Mast and to resist the invasion energetically. Thereupon, French troops in the 

path of O'Daniel's men near La Bouzarea 

and Lambiridi began to contest the advance 

toward Algiers." 

Capturing Blida airdrome was a mission 

which, despite its importance, the Allied 

plan had made an alternative secondary 

task for elements of the 11 th Infantry Brigade Group (Br.), to be accomplished 

either late on D Day or on D plus 1. Maison 

Blanche airfield was to be the base for the 

first land-based aircraft to come from Gibraltar. But Blida airdrome was being held 

by friendly French forces under command 

of General de Monsabert and during the 

early morning hours by a French air commander willing to accept de Monsabert's 

directions. General Giraud was expected to 

land there to assume the role of national 

H( 1) 168th Inf Hist, 15 Oct-12 Nov 42. (2) 

Kammerer, Du dibarquement Africain au meurtre 

de Dar/an, pp. 252-54. 
240 

leadership. The favorable situation might 

well shift before Giraud arrived unless de 

Monsabert should be reinforced by Allied 

troops as early as possible. General Mast 

had therefore gon,e to Beer Sector not only 

to superintend the voluntary surrender of 

Fort de Sidi F erruch but to expedite the 

Allied thrust to Elida airdrome. Motor 

transport requisitioned from Kolea was 

waiting in readiness to transport a substantial detachment over the roads about 

twenty-five miles to the objective. Mast met 

and persuaded Colonel Trevor, commanding the 1st Commando detachment, to undertake the mission despite the fact that it 

necessitated a departure from Combat 

Team 168's plan. Accordingly, about 0415, 

a portion of his Commando force started for 

the airdrome.12 

Other troops also went to Elida. Since the 

11 th Infantry Brigade Group encountered 

no resistance on the west flank, part of it 

was available either for strengthening the 

attack on Algiers or for taking Elida airdrome. A reconnaissance party under Lt. 

Col. L. A. Manly, 2d Battalion, Lancashire 

Fusiliers, was sent to Elida about 0800, and 

was followed between 1100 and 1600 by 

all but one company of the remainder of 

that battalion in requisitioned transport or 

afoot. 

Colonel Trevor's detachment reached the 

airdrome about 0900, but when Trevor entered into negotiation with Colonel Monstrelet, the French air officer commanding, 

he would not agree to uncontested occupation by the Commandos, in view of contrary 

orders from Algiers. Trevor's men were disposed near the main gate to the airdrome, 

which was closed, and waited there for rein12 ( 1) Rpt of Capt Bird, 168th Inf Hist, 15 Oct12 Nov 42, (2) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, 

London, 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

forcements before provoking hostile action. 

In the late afternoon, the 2d Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers (minus one company), 

under Colonel Manly, arrived, and later in 

the day, a portion of 84th Light Antiaircraft Battery (Br.) and four Bofors guns. 

The French garrison remained in possession 

of the field, which though neutralized could 

be used by Allied airplanes only to land and 

remain grounded.'3 

About noon, General Evelegh ordered 

the 5th Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment, and a detachment of the 1 st Battalion 

of East Surrey Regiment, to the southern 

outskirts of Algiers, a movement which they 

accomplished in the course of the afternoon 

and evening. At 1700, the 6th Battalion of 

the Royal West Kent Regiment, which had 

been the floating reserve of the 11 th Infantry 

Brigade, was ordered to disembark at Beer 

W RITE Beach and to move into the area 

near Birmandre"is as relief for the 5th Northamptons. Through rising surf which soon 

afterward precluded beach landings, the 

battalion came ashore and started inland, 

but it was not needed, and re-embarked at 

0700 next morning to go into combat for 

the first time farther east. 

" Planes from the aircraft carrier Argus took up a 

patrol above the airfield at daybreak and saw white 

flags being waved, On authorization from his commander, LL R H, C, Nation (RN) landed at about 

0800, taxied to the hangars, and obtained a written message that Blida airdrome was at the disposal 

of Allied forces for landing purposes, For a time, he 

remained the sole Allied representative on the airfield, When the troops arrived less than an hour 

later, Lieutenant Nation was reported to have flown 

back to the carrier leaving the situation to them, 

(I) BL Admiralty, The War at Sea, III, 376-77. 

(2) BL Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," p, 29, citing 

Fleet Air Arm (H. M, Stationery Office, pp, 117-

18, (3) The author has found no confirmation of 

this episode in contemporary records, but Lieutenant Nation has repeated the account to the Air 

Historical Branch, Air Ministry, London, 
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 

Allied forces landing west of Algiers in the 

Apples and Beer Sectors had thus achieved 

on D Day all their major objectives short of 

the occupation of Algiers itself, although 

proceeding toward that goal at a pace far 

slower than the plans had provided. The 

coastal batteries in these sectors were in 

Allied possession. The road network was 

under Allied control. The airfield at Elida 

was neutralized and served no hostile French 

aircraft for countermeasures such as those 

near Fedala, Port-Lyautey, and Oran on 

this same day. The delayed execution of the 

plans had, however, cost the Eastern Assault 

Force the benefits of the friendly French 

action within Algiers during the early morning hours and possible gains from a direct 

attack on the port by TERMINAL Force. 

Operation TERMINAL 

Algiers port, like Oran's, was attacked 

directly by an antisabotage force in the hope 

of preserving facilities for the very pressing 

requirements of Allied supply.'· On two 

British destroyers, the Broke (Lt. Comdr. 

A. F. C. La yard) and the Malcolm (Comdr. 

A. B. Russell), to which they had transferred on the late afternoon of 7 November 

from the cruiser She !field, the men of this 

special force waited well north of Pointe 

Pescade for orders that would send them to 

the assault. In addition to 74 Royal Naval 

personnel to board and seize ships in Algiers 

11 (I) Operation TERMI!,;AL (Rpt of Capt Fancourt), II Nov 42, in App. V to Inc! 2 of NCXF, 

TORCH Despatch. (2) Morison, U.S. Naval Operations, II, 207-08. (3) Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn 

"Torch," pp. 29-31. (4) Maj Leslie W. Bailey, 

The Operations of the 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, at Algiers, 7 November-IO November 1942, 

MS (hpreafter cited as Bailey, Opns of 3d Bn 135th 

Inf). The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga. 

Bailey was a platoon leader in Company I, 135th 

Infantry. 

241 

Harbor and 3 British Army officers, the 

group included 24 American officers and 

638 enlisted men from the 3d Battalion, 

135th Infantry, U.S. 34th Division.'5 All 

were in American Army uniform and under 

command of Lt. Col. Edwin T. Swenson. 

They had trained briefly for this mission in 

Belfast Harbor and at a nearby camp but 

learned its exact nature only during the final 

stage of the approach voyage from the 

United Kingdom. Commanding the entire 

TERMINAL Force was Capt. H. L. St. J. Fancourt (RN). 

On receipt of orders from Admiral Burrough, the two vessels started at 0140 for 

the bay of Algiers, where the lights of the 

city were visible as they slipped past the 

eastern shore. The harbor extended along 

the western edge of the bay more than one 

and one half miles southward from the Ilot 

de la Marine. A crescent-shaped sea wall, 

bowed toward the shore, protected the center of the harbor, while two jetties projecting from shore beyond the sea wall's extremities left sheltered gaps for access to the 

open bay. Across these two entrances were 

barrier booms. Jutting out from the shore 

into the harbor were eight concrete moles of 

varying lengths and widths which in effect 

subdivided the entire area into four major 

basins. At the far north was the section controlled by the French Navy and protected 

by powerful fixed batteries mounted on the 

Jetee du Nord. Most of the other three sections were devoted to commercial shipping. 

On a flat shelf between the base of the moles 

and the steeply rising slopes of the city were 

" (I) 135th Inf Hist, Sec. IV, 18 Oct 42-15 May 

43, p. I. (2) App. I to Rpt of The Rear Admiral 

Commanding, 10th Cruiser Squadron, in Inc! 6 

(Miscellaneous Reports of Proceedings) of NCXF, 

TORCH Despatch. Captain Fancourt's report (see 

n. 14 (I) above) describes the TERMINAL forces as 

725 U.S. troops and 60 Royal Navy personnel. 
242 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ALGIERS, looking north. (Photograph taken May 1943.) 

paved streets and narrow lanes lined with 

warehouses and other port structures. The 

plan of attack called for the Broke to pierce 

the barrier, enter the southern basin, and 

discharge troops and naval boarding parties 

at the Quai de Dieppe. About fifteen minutes later, the Malcolm was to follow a similar course to the Grand Mole. While a protective cordon was set up barring access by 

road from the south, teams of platoon 

strength were to secure an electric power 

station, a petroleum storage depot, and a 

seaplane base in the southwestern section of 

the harbor, and the port offices, graving 

docks, and adjacent moles farther north. 

The assignment of missions was flexible, allowing for the possibility of failure by either 

ship to complete its approach or even for 

the necessity of withdrawing.

16 

Coastal batteries dominated the bay and 

harbor not only from the Jetee du Nord and 

Hot de la Marine but also from high ground 

adjacent to the port. In a most advantageous position directly south of the port on the 

crest of a knoll about 300 feet high was the 

Batterie des Arcades with three medium 

guns." Machine gun fire could be expected 

]I' Bailey, Opns of 3d Bn 135'th Inf, pp. 12- 13. 

"( 1) Bailey, Opns of 3d Bn 135t~ Inf, p. 11, 

and Map C. (2) Lt Col Ray C. Fountam, U.S. Prov 

Div G- 2 Report, 20 Sep 42. AFHQ G-3 Opns 22 / 7, 

Micro Job lOA, Reel 5C. 
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 

from other points as well as from these batteries. Against such strength, the attacking 

force could not expect to benefit from surprise. The landings on the beaches near 

Algiers would have been in progress more 

than three hours before the TERMINAL 

Force could reach the harbor. Plannners 

deemed it possible that, as an offset against 

the loss of surprise, some of the port's defenders might be drawn off to oppose the 

advance from the beaches. The coastal guns, 

moreover, were understood to be the objective of Commando attacks scheduled to 

be completed before the harbor was approached.'8 Also, it was possible that the 

guns could not be sufficiently depressed to 

strike targets within the harbor itself. Finally, the two ships each flew large American 

flags and hoped thus to encourage merely 

token resistance. 

As the vessels neared their objective, the 

admonition not to fire unless previously fired 

upon ceased to be restraining. The city's 

lights went out. Searchlight beams swept 

out across the bay and soon fell on the intruders. Shelling followed at once, particularly from the Batterie des Arcades. In the 

glare and tumult, both ships twice missed 

the entrance and then circled for a third 

try. At that juncture, just after 0400, the 

Malcolm was badly hit, caught fire on deck, 

and was obliged to withdraw.'9 Casualties 

were ten killed and twenty-five wounded.20 

The Broke persisted until a fourth try 

succeeded in taking her at top speed through 

the barrier "like a knife through butter." 

Full daylight was still far away as she enlR Bailey, Opns of 3d Bn 135th Inf, pp. 11-12. 

19 (1) Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," p. 29. 

(2) 135th Inf Hist, Sec. IV, 18 Oct 42-15 May 43, 

p.2. 

20 H.M.S. Malcolm (Rpt of Comdr Russell) in 

App. V to IncJ 2 of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. 

243 

tered the port. The Broke missed the 

planned point of mooring, either because 

some anchored vessels barred her path or 

because she mistook her objective in the 

darkness, and berthed instead along the 

Mole Louis Billiard.21 Half the TERMINAL 

Force, consisting of Company L, one section 

of Company M, and nine medical troops 

of the 135th Infantry, with some British 

naval personnel, had come safely through 

the heavy bombardment, flattened on the 

deck of the Broke and sheltered somewhat 

by her armored rail. They debarked slowly 

onto the quay at about 0520. 22 

Quickly the various teams scattered on 

their respective missions. Within a short 

time, they took possession of the mole itself, 

the electric power station, and the petroleum 

tank farm, and began slowly extending 

northward to the seaplane base and along 

the street paralleling the shore. Small arms 

and automatic fire fell on open intersections 

but was insufficient to stop the advance. The 

resistance diminished to occasional sniping 

and soon all sounds of battle gave way to a 

silence broken principally by the church 

bells of the city. Naval boarding parties encountered no indications of scuttling or sabotage. At 0800, the attack seemed to have 

succeeded even without the Malcolm and its 

portion of the TERMINAL Force. What remained was to establish contact with the 

American troops approaching the city, perhaps already entering its outskirts. Within 

21 ( 1) Bailey, Opns of 3d Bn 135th Inf, p. 17. (2) 

H.M.S. Broke (Rpt of Comdr Layard) 11 Nov 42, 

in App. V to Incl 2 of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. 

" (1) Bailey, Opns of 3d Bn 135th Inf, pp. 10, 

12·-13. (2) 135th Inf Hist, Sec. IV, 18 Oct 42-15 

May 43, p. 2. 
244 

a few minutes of each other, a delegation 

from the city consisting of two civilians and 

two police officers requested that arrangements be made for the formal surrender of 

Algiers to the Americans, but a French officer warned that the intruders were being 

practically surrounded by French troops of 

wholly hostile intent.23 

Whatever hesitation in defending the port 

the French may have had as a result of differences among themselves during the preceding three hours came to an abrupt end 

about 0800. Artillery fire from the Jetee du 

Nord drove the Broke to another mooring 

and then to a third-one which was better 

protected from the line of fire hut which 

separated the ship's party from the elements 

ashore. 24 While waiting, headed toward the 

entrance for quicker departure, the Broke 

came under fire from an unseen weapon, 

probably a howitzer, which at 0920 made 

several hits or near misses in swift succession. 2

'j A quick withdrawal had become 

essentiaL 

The Broke's siren sounded the recall 

nal and perhaps sixty men near the ship 

hurried aboard. The main part of Colonel 

Swenson's force could not have reached her 

for several minutes, and even then, in their 

commanding officer's judgment, would have 

been subject to greater danger than if they 

remained ashore. Colonel Swenson believed, 

moreover, that his force could hold out until 

the 168th Combat Team arrived. He 

ordered his men to keep their positions. At 

0940, the Broke struggled out into the bay 

partially hidden by smoke. The Zetland 

23 (I) Baiky, Opns of 3d Bn 135th Inf, p. lB. (2) 

Br. Battle Sum 3B, Opn "Torch," p. 30. 

"Captain Fancourt radioed for an air bombing of the menacing battery at 1030 to cover the 

Broke's prospective withdrawal. 

"'Bailey, Opns of 3d Bn l35th Inf, p. lB. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

stopped bombarding the Batterie du Lazaret 

on Cap Matifou to cover the Broke, and 

later took aboard all her passengers, as she 

towed the Broke out to sea. 2G 

While six Albacore dive bombers silenced 

the coastal guns at the northern end of the 

harbor at about 1100, the determined fire 

of the Allied troops temporarily subdued 

the Senegalese companies which hemmed 

them in. But ammunition had already been 

running low when several French light tanks 

and armored cars arrived about 1130 to 

make the Americans' position hopeless. 27 

From the city, no sounds indicated the arrival of the main force, still several miles 

away. About 1230, therefore, Colonel 

Swenson surrendered his group. In their 

jubilation, the port's defenders made no 

effort to sabotage its installations before the 

main body of Allied troops should gain the 

city. The captives were imprisoned for the 

next two days.28 Operation TERMINAL at 

Algiers, like Operation RESERVIST at Oran, 

had been undertaken in defiance of accepted principles of warfare and had failed, 

but the conduct of its participants had been 

gallant and the resistance which overcame 

them happily lacked the ruthlessness shown 

by the defenders at Oran. 

The Eastern Landings 

The assault landings east of Cap Matifou 

were made by the American 39th Combat 

'" The Broke was so badly damaged that in rough 

wl'ath~r next day, she foundered and sank. 

27 135th Inf Hist, Sec. IV, 18 Oct 42-15 May 43, 

p. 3. 

"Losses from TERMINAL Force: British losses 

were 7 killed, 2 died of wounds, and 18 others 

wounded on the Broke; 4 wounded on the M alcalm 

(Br. Battle Sum 3B, Opn "Torch," p. 31 n.). The 3d 

Battalion, l35th Infantry, lost 15 killed and 33 

wounded (Bailey, Opns of 3d Bn l35th Inf, p. 28). 
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 245 

u.s. TROOPS LANDING NEAR SURCOUF, 8 November 1942. 

Team of 5,688 officers and enlisted men, 

reinforced by 312 (198 British, 114 American) from the 1 st Commando, all under the 

command of Col. Benjamin F. Caffey, Jr. 

They were transported by the American 

combat loaders Samuel Chase (the command ship ), Leedstown, Almaack, and Exceller, under escort by three British warships. The senior naval officer, landings was 

Capt. Campbell D. Edgar (USN ). Beach 

parties and signal sections were American, 

augmented by British Army beach signal 

units. More than an hour before midnight, 

the small convoy established communications with the beacon submarine and hove 

to some eight miles offshore. The transports 

had started on this journey from New York 

Port of Embarkation on 25 September only 

a short time after most of them had been 

commissioned. The unfortunate Thomas 

Stone was the best prepared for night amphibious operations. 29 The convoy began its 

actual assault operations, therefore, under 

the handicap of inexperience and insufficient training, and under the additional difficulty of last-minute adjustments arising 

from the loss of the Thomas Stone .30 

In a moderate swell and under a clear sky, 

with lights ashore undimmed and the piloting party waiting to guide the landing craft 

formations to the beaches, the disembarkation into the boats began. The difficulties 

which delayed other combat teams, whether 

in the Western, Center, or Eastern Task 

Forces, in getting assault waves in place to 

start their runs to shore were also experi-

'" Sec pp. 62, 187- 88 above. 

JU( 1) 39th Inf Hist, 23 Oct 42. (2) Morison, U.S. 

Na val Operations, II, 192-93. (3 ) Lt Col William 

T. Evans, The Algie rs Operation, 8 November-II 

November 1942, MS. The Infantry School, Fort 

Benning, Ga . (4) ETF Opn Order 11, 10 Oct 42 . 
246 

enced in the Charlie Sector. But energetic 

action and skillful improvisations overcame 

those difficulties in time to make the initial 

touchdowns at about 0130 at all but one 

point. 

The 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, and 

supporting units were on the Samuel Chase; 

the 3d Battalion and a detachment of the 

1 st Commando (five troops only) were on 

the Leedstown. The Almaack carried the 

Headquarters Company and vehicles, most 

of the drivers of which were on the Exceller 

or scattered on the other ships. The 3d 

Battalion, originally scheduled for the reserve, was now to undertake the mission for 

which the luckless 2d Battalion on the 

Thomas Stone had been preparing up to a 

few hours earlier. 

Of four beaches which had been designated in the sector, three were employed. 

Charlie GREEN extended for about 800 

yards, halfway between the villages of JeanBart and Ai'n Taya. Charlie BLUE, of the 

same length, lay directly in front of Ai'n 

Taya. RED Beach, subdivided into RED 1 

and RED 2, reached from the hamlet of 

Surcouf, east of Ain Taya, to the marshy 

mouth of the Rerhai'a river. The landing 

schedule, adjusted at a conference of commanders on the Samuel Chase to meet prevailing conditions, provided that the 1st 

Battalion Landing Team should go to 

Charlie BLUE, and Commandos and the 3d 

Battalion Landing Team should go to 

Charlie GREEN, and service units and vehicles should use Charlie RED, the only one 

which had easy access to the interior.:lI The 

others were faced by an almost vertical 

bluff with stairs for pedestrians but with no 

good exits for vehicles. 

'" (1) ETF Opn Order 12, p. 2. (2) App. IV 

(Rpt of R.N. Beach and Pilotage Party, 8 Dec 42) 

to Inc! 2 of NCXF, TORCH Despatch. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

As the assault waves were nearing the 

beaches, two ships of the slower convoy with 

materiel for the easternmost landings arrived in the transport area, and, since no 

opposition appeared to be coming from 

ashore, Captain Edgar ordered all his transports to proceed closer to the beaches. About 

0130, they started to positions only 4,000 

yards out. More than an hour later the 

battery on Cap Matifou was roused. Even 

before Captain Edgar had received a report 

from the beachmaster, he heard a broadcast 

from Washington announcing that the landings under his command had been successfully accomplished. '12 

Searchlights on Cap Matifou swept over 

the area, illuminating not only the transports but the British destroyers, C owdray 

and Zet/and. The four big guns of the Batterie du Lazaret directed several shells toward the destroyers, which fired in return, 

dousing the light and forcing the battery 

to suspend fire.'" 

The westernmost landings in the Charlie 

Sector were the last to be made, for the 

Commandos in eleven LCP's, guided by a 

pilot aboard one of these boats, after a late 

start from the vicinity of the Leedstown ran 

into an offshore fog bank, slowed down to 

enable the formation to keep together more 

closely, and completed their run to GREEN 

Beach about two hours behind schedule. 

The first waves of infantry from the Samuel Chase, and the service units from the 

Almaack, bound for BLUE and RED Beaches, 

were expected to leave together at the same 

time as the Commandos. They were to have 

a motor launch and pilot at both outside 

'" SNOL Charlie Action Rpt, 12 Nov 42. AFHQ 

AG 370.2, Micro Job 24, Reel 79D. 

"" (1) Ibid. (2) Morison, U.S. Naval Operations, 

II, 198-99. The time of this engagement with the 

battery is set at about 0230 by Captain Edgar. 
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 

front positions, and to remain together for 

the first six miles until they arrived at an 

offshore obstacle and landmark, the Bordelaise Rock. The last 2,000 yards would find 

the two groups diverging to their respective 

objectives. Unfortunately for the execution 

of this plan, the navigators of the landing 

craft going to RED Beach failed to swing 

southeastward at the rock and continued instead to BLUE Beach.:H A few boats bound 

for GREEN Beach from the Leedstown also 

strayed into the BLUE Beach area. Yet in 

the absence of resistance, it was possible for 

the units to straighten out the situation 

quickly. The 1st Battalion Landing Team 

(Lt. Col. A. H. Rosenfeld) at Aln Taya 

was beginning to reorganize by 0130, and 

the 3d Battalion Landing Team (Maj. Farrar O. Griggs) nearer Jean-Bart was about 

fifteen minutes later in preparing for its inland advance. 35 

The Commando troops under command 

of Maj. K. R. S. Trevor (Br.) moved westward along the coastal road. Detachments 

soon controlled three important objectives: 

Jean-Bart, a signal station and barracks near 

Fort d'Estrees, and the approaches to the 

Batterie du Lazaret. The battery and fort 

declined to surrender or to accept a truce, 

and proved too strong to be taken by assault 

with the means available. A request was 

made, therefore, for heavy supporting naval 

gunfire. 36 

The 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry, was expected to move by the coastal road to Fort 

de l'Eau, Maison Carree, and HusseIn Dey. 

Here it was to seize a small airfield and subseq uently establish contact with the Allied 

forces approaching Algiers from the west, 

" Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," p. 28. 

'" 39th Inf Hist, 23 Oct 43. 

'" Interv with Brig Gen Benjamin F. Caffey, Jr. 

(USA, Ret.), 21 Feb 50. 

247 

with the special detachment which was to 

have stormed Algiers Harbor, and with the 

friendly French who were to have gained 

control of the city.'" A march of approximately six miles brought the 3d Battalion to 

the resort village of Fort de l'Eau, where 

French troops disputed its further westward 

progress. Three French tanks supporting the 

infantry there damaged some American 

trucks, threatened to strike the battalion on 

the flank, and brought the advance toward 

Algiers to a stop.38 

The 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, had the 

vital mission of seizing the Maison Blanche 

airdrome before daylight. Beach conditions 

immobilized the newly landed antitank guns 

and 105-mm. howitzers, but advance elements set off without them. The battalion 

made an expeditious approach march by 

road for most of the ten miles to the airfield. 

arriving at its objective at approximately 

0615."" A few French tanks, against which 

the attacking force had no suitable weapons, 

were encountered as the battalion neared 

the airfield, but after they had fired briefly 

as if in merely token resistance, they withdrew while the American troops occupied 

the airfield. Negotiations for its surrender 

were completed by 0830,'° Fog over the 

airdrome was too thick to permit immediate 

use by Royal Air Force units, but the 43d 

'" EAF FO I. 

'" Rad 1305/8, SNO ETF to Rear Adm Aircraft 

Spare Force I, Flag Officer H, and 10th Cruiser 

Squadron, 8 Nov 42; Rad 1306/8, G-2 EAF to 

AFCP Gibraltar, 8 Nov 42. AFHQ G-3 Ops 22/5, 

Micro Job lOA, Reel 5C. 

"" 39th Inf Hist, 23 Oct 43. 

m (I) Rad 1352, CG EAF to AFCP, 8 Nov 42. 

AFHQ G-3 Ops 22/5, Micro Job lOA Reel 5C. 

(2) Maj George S. Bare, The Algiers Operation, 

8 November-II November 1942, MS, pp. 18-19. 

The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga. This cites 

the personal knowledge of the battalion commanding officer, Colonel Rosenfeld. (3) CT 39 AAR. 
248 

Squadron (eighteen Hurricanes) was reported in at 1035, with two other units then 

summoned arriving during the afternoon. 

The main problem in using the field was to 

obtain fuel and maintenance, but enough 

fuel was found to get some of the aircraft 

aloft over Algiers and Cap Matifou before 

sunset. 41 

Capture of the field proved far less advantageous than had been anticipated, for vehicles, supplies, and ground crews for the 

Royal Air Force squadrons, brought to the 

sector on the cargo ships Dempo, M acharda, 

Maron, and Ocean Rider, had met with ill 

fortune. The high swell and surf through 

which the landings of the assault troops were 

made demanded a proficiency in small-boat 

navigation exceeding that of most of the 

half-trained crews assigned to that duty. 

As the craft piled up on the beaches, or 

swamped offshore, the rate of debarkation 

by later serials slowed down sharply. The 

weather, moreover, deteriorated during the 

day, also helping to prevent aviation supplies sorely required at Maison Blanche from 

being landed. The carrier aircraft continued 

to furnish almost all air support on D Day 

and to defend the port. 42 The defense of the 

airfield was entrusted to Company A, 39th 

Infantry, reinforced by an extra machine 

gun platoon from Company D and by a section of 81-mm. mortars, while the remainder 

11 (1) Rad Blue 260, CG EAF to AFCP Gibraltar, 

8 Nov 42. AFHQ G-3 Ops 22/5, Micro Job lOA, 

Reel 5C. (2) The other two squadrons were the 

81st and 82d Squadrons (Spitfires). Info supplied 

by Air Ministry, London. 

" (1) NC ETF Opn Order 11, 10 Oct 42. (2) 

SNOL Charlie Action Rpt, 12 Nov 42. AFHQ AG 

370.2, Micro Job 24, Reel 79D. (3) Rad, SNO 

ETF to NCXF, 8 Nov 42. AFHQ G-3 Ops 22/5, 

Micro Job lOA, Reel 5C. (4) App. VIII to Rpt of 

Avenger in App. V to Inc! 2 of NCXF, TORCH 

Despatch. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

of the 1 st Battalion occupied an area north 

and northeast of the field. 4:3 

While the approach to the city from the 

east was being held up on Cap Matifou and 

at the village of Fort de l'Eau, and while 

rough water was destroying more and more 

landing craft, slowing down the movement 

of men and supplies from ship to shore to 

a mere trickle, efforts were made to break 

the deadlock at the Batterie du Lazaret. 

The request for naval gunfire in support of 

the Commando troops on Cap Matifou 

brought at 1040 a bombardment from 

H.M.S. Zetland which continued for an 

hour but which proved insufficient to produce surrender. H A combined air and naval 

bombardment was therefore delivered early 

in the afternoon. While the Commandos 

pulled back a second time, the cruiser Bermuda and a flight of Albacore dive bombers 

from the carrier Formidable struck the area 

under attack for more than an hour, commencing about 1430. After 1600, the Commandos, supported by one self-propelled 

105-mm. howitzer, renewed their attack on 

the battery. Some fifty French marines surrendered at 1700. Reinforced by two armored cars, the Commandos went on to attack Fort d'Estrees about half an hour later, 

but without success. At 2000, the attack was 

broken off. The Commandos withdrew to 

the south for the remainder of the night. 45 

Axis bombers arrived at dusk to hinder 

Allied progress toward the seizure of Algiers. One small flight demonstrated without serious effect near Algiers, and another 

achieved a preliminary success on the eastern side of Cap Matifou against the ships 

43 CT 39 AAR. 

H Msg, ::;~O ETF to NCXF, 8 Nov 42. Copy 

printed in Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," p. 97. 

1,,( 1) Interv with Gen Caffey, 21 Feb 50, who 

believes that the fort also surrendered before morning. (2) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 

anchored off Charlie Sector. They severely 

damaged the destroyer Cowdray and immobilized the transport Leedslown with a 

hit astern. After narrow escapes other vessels shifted next morning to the bay of Algiers for unloading in Algiers Harbor. The 

Leedslown was left behind, a setup for return visits on 9 November, when two afternoon attacks forced its abandonment. U.S. 

Navy losses on the ship were eight dead and 

fourteen wounded. Army personnel also suffered casualties while trying, with the assistance of those already on the beach, to reach 

land through surf and undertow. 46 

N e golialions in Algiers 

Algiers came under control of the irregulars of the French resistance at the time the 

landings began and remained so for several 

hours of increasing danger and anxiety. 

About half an hour after midnight, they began putting into execution their longmatured plans. Organized parties occupied 

the major centers from which opposition to 

the landings might otherwise have been directed. They stopped most telephone service 

except over the police system. At the police 

headquarters and outlying stations, they 

gained control, locked up top officials, and 

issued instructions favorable to their purposes. They took possession of the Algiers 

radio station and prepared to broadcast an 

appeal in the name of General Giraud. 

Guides went to the expected points of landing and prepared to expedite the arrival at 

the city itself of enough American troops to 

take over and hold control. Temporarily 

'" (1) Br. Battle Sum 38, Opn "Torch," p. 31. (2) 

Morison, U.S. Naval Operations, II, 212-14. (3) 

Memo with inc1s, Chief Bureau of Personnel USN 

for Chief Hist Div Spec Staff U.S. Army, 31 Mar 

50, sub: Naval casualties during North African 

occupation 8 Nov 42-9 Jul 43. OCMH. (4) Interv 

with Cen Caffey, 21 Feb 50. 

249 

they immobilized the Algiers garrison. Although not all the plans were executed, the 

anti-Vichy organization in the main discharged its part of the operation effectively. 

The pro-Allied French were in control by 

0130; they held the city not only for the 

two hours which they had foreseen but until 

0700, the very latest time believed possible 

in the planning phase. 

At 0700, General Giraud had not arrived. 

An appeal was broadcast by his adherents 

as if from him. At 0700, no American troop 

units had come into Algiers. The insurrectionist patriots began to lose control of the 

centers which they had been holding and 

resorted to various improvised stratagems to 

hinder organized opposition to the slow 

Allied approach. Some sniping occurred 

from upper windows on groups in the 

streets. One officer of great zeal and courage 

was killed. Long before the city was yielded 

to the armed invaders, the tables had been 

turned on General Mast's associates, many 

of whom were locked up and some of whom 

were dead. The Allies eventually received 

control of the city from its regular defenders. 

While the pro-Allied French began their 

part of the operation inside Algiers, Mr. 

Robert Murphy and his colleagues proceeded with theirs. The first waves of troops 

had already started toward the beaches 

when Murphy called on General Juin at his 

official residence in Lambiridi. 47 The convoys which General Juin knew to be crossing 

the Mediterranean were, Mr. Murphy at 

last revealed, about to disembark an overwhelming force at Algiers. They had come, 

he explained, to assist France in achieving 

her liberation, acting on the invitation of 

General Giraud. General J uin, he hoped, 

47 Mr. Murphy's Notes reporting the events of the 

evening appear in Langer, OUT Vichy Gamble, pp. 

345-49. 
250 

would co-operate by issuing all instructions 

necessary to prevent resistance, and join in 

a friendly reception. Only four days earlier, 

General Juin had warned Mr. Murphy that 

he was under orders to resist an attempt by 

any force to seize French North Africa!" 

Now he was asked to recognize that General 

Giraud's leadership might supersede the 

authority which had hitherto controlled 

him. He therefore took the understandable 

position that this American invitation 

should be submitted without delay to the 

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces 

of Vichy France, Admiral Darlan, from 

whom a change of orders might indeed be 

obtained. Such a step was feasible because 

Admiral Darlan was then in Algiers. 

Wherever Darlan might be when the 

American proposal was received, he could 

not escape making a choice, and that it 

should be presented to him in Algiers rather 

than in Vichy was a circumstance advantageous to the Allies. He was there with his 

wife attending his son, Alain, in what was 

believed to be the last stage of a fatal illness. 

That a man occupying Darlan's position 

should remain rather secretly in Algiers 

while Allied forces crossed the Mediterranean to occupy the city was a coincidence 

fraught with such impressive consequences 

that it has been attributed to premeditation 

and prearrangement. The evidence concerning Darlan's knowledge of what was 

impending and his intentions may not be 

conclusive, but it does indicate that he was 

caught by surprise and was exasperated that 

he had not been forewarned. 

About twenty minutes after being notified that Mr. Murphy had an urgent message for him, Darlan was brought to General Juin's villa, where he was apprised of 

"Msg, AGWAR to U5FOR, 5 Nov 42, C1'f-OUT 

1343. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

the situation immediately. After getting over 

his first irritation, he recognized that it was 

up to him to decide whether French North 

Africa should pass into the hands of the 

Allies with or without bloodshed. German 

reprisals elsewhere in North Africa, and in 

France were certain if Vichy were implicated in the Allied occupation. He was reminded by Mr. Murphy that he had previously expressed to Admiral Leahy, the U.S. 

Ambassador in Vichy, his willingness to consider collaboration against the Axis when 

the Allies could come to him with 500,000 

American soldiers, fully equipped, and with 

tanks and planes in quantity. Those forces 

were now approaching. The time for his 

decision had arrived. 

The facts justifying such an irrevocable 

French commitment remained to be ascertained beyond all doubt. Darlan had only 

:Mr. l\'furphy's word; no reports had come 

as yet from French observers. 'While temporizing, the admiral emphasized his obligations to Marshal Petain. At Mr. Murphy's 

suggestion, he drafted a radio message to his 

Chief of State reporting the situation, and 

remained temporarily under house arrest. 

While a reply was being awaited, the cordon 

of pro-Allied guards surrounding General 

Juin's villa was expelled by gardes mobiles. 

Murphy himself became the prisoner there 

while Darl~m and Juin then went to Fort 

l'Empereur to determine a future course. 

J uin set about regaining control where possible. General Koeltz was freed from arrest. 

Passive acceptance of the invaders began to 

give way to moderate resistance as Koeltz 

relieved Mast of his command over the 

Algiers Division. 

Hostilities Cease in Algiers 

In Vichy, just after 0900, 8 November 

Marshall Pctain received the Ameri-
THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS 

can Charge d'Affaires, Mr. S. Pinkney 

Tuck, who brought the President's official 

message. The reply, already prepared, was 

then signed by the Marshal and handed to 

his visitor. The French would resist this 

attack upon the French empire. At the conclusion of the interview, when Mr. Tuck 

rose to leave, Marshal Petain showed the 

greatest amiability and good spirits. 4

" Later 

in the day, the charge d'affaires was informed that diplomatic relations with the 

government of the United States were 

broken. 50 Marshal Petain replied to Admiral 

Darlan's report from Algiers with an authorization to act freely in the Marshal's behalf, reporting what had been done."" While 

Darlan postponed decisive steps, the Eastern 

Assault Force closed in, preparing to surround the city. General Ryder, who left the 

Bulolo about 0900 to join the advance echelon of his headquarters at Beach Beer 

WHITE under Brig. Gen. Ray E. Porter, 

could by 1600 consider that success was impending. His troops held the heights west 

of Algiers, the highways approaching the 

city from west and east, the airfields at 

Blida and Maison Blanche, and the principal coastal batteries from Cap Sidi Ferruch to Ilot de la Marine at Algiers Harbor. 

Naval gunfire on the Batterie du Lazaret 

on Cap Matifou and artillery shelling of 

Fort l'Empereur were certain indications 

of the ultimate destruction of each. British 

Albacore dive bombers had already struck 

the Jetee du Nord, Fort Duperre, and Fort 

d'Estrees. Fort Duperre was ready to capitu-

'" Msg, S. Pinkney Tuck to Secy of State Cordell Hull, 8 Nov 42. Copy in OPD Exec 5, Vol. VI. 

"Phone conv, Tuck and Atherton State Dept, 

11: 30 P.M., 8 Nov 42. Copy in OPD Exec 5, Vol. 

VI. 

'01 The text of Darlan' s message to Petain, and 

Petain's reply, are given in Kammerer, Du debarquement Africain au meurtre de Darlan, pp. 262, 

267. 

251 

MAJ. GEN. CHARLES S. RYDER. 

(Photograph taken in 1948.) 

late. Fort d'Estrees was holding out. The 

city was now well on the way to being surrounded, giving Darlan, J uin, and the other 

French leaders the choice of waiting to be 

captured or marching out with such forces 

as they could extricate. The Eastern Assault 

Force had fallen far behind its schedule and 

was logistically none too firmly established 

ashore, but it was there to stay. Such was 

the situation when, shortly after 1600, General Ryder learned from one of Robert Murphy's staff that General J uin was ready to 

negotiate. Darlan had authorized him to 

arrange a settlement for Algiers but not for 

all French North Africa."" 

The arrangements by which hostilities in 

Algiers came to an end began with a brief 

face-to-face encounter by Generals Ryder 

and Juin. They met in Juin's headquarters 

"" Interv with Gen Ryder, 18 Mar 49. 
252 

in Fort I'Empereur, to which Ryder was 

brought with two other American officers in 

Juin's own automobile after passing through 

the lines in Lambiridi to find the fort. The 

two men at 1840,8 November, concluded a 

simple oral agreement to stop fighting at 

once and to transfer control of the city to 

the Americans at 2000. The French troops 

would return to their barracks, retaining 

their arms and colors. Americans would occupy key points in the city and rely on the 

aid of French police to maintain order. Detailed armistice terms would be the subject 

of discussion at a meeting to be held next 

morning. While these informal arrangements were being put into effect, General 

Ryder returned to the Bulala and reported 

them to Gibraltar, recommending that he 

be permitted to arrange an armistice on the 

basis of the mild terms prepared, during 

the planning, for a case of merely token 

resistance. 

General Juin had been restricted by Darlan's authorization to an agreement covering Algiers only. Elsewhere in Algeria 

French troops were ordered to resist any 

non-French forces which attacked them. 

Ryder wished to extend the pacification 

throughout Algeria, while Murphy, on behalf of General Eisenhower, was trying to 

procure Darlan's order stopping hostilities 

in all French North Africa. A conference 

with the French leaders at the Hotel St. 

Georges at 2000 prepared the way for General Clark's negotiations as soon as he 

should arrive; at the same time Admiral 

Darlan consented to the use of Algiers Harbor at first light, 9 November, for sheltering 

the Eastern Naval Task Force.;;:; 

"'(1) Ibid. (2) Kammerer, Du dtibarquemenl 

Africain au meurtre de Darlan, pp. 278, 280. (3) 

Richard and Scrigny, L'enigme d'Alger, Annex IV, 

pp. 266-68. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

General Ryder met the French chiefs 

once more in conference during the next 

afternoon. Although he had not yet received from Allied Force advance headquarters at Gibraltar any reply to his recommendation of the previous afternoon that 

he conclude an armistice on easy terms, he 

decided to offer those terms on his own responsibility. They were accepted provisionally, subject to approval from Marshal 

Petain~an approval which could not be 

promised before one more day. Meanwhile 

the French troops in Algiers were assembled 

in barracks and left in possession of their 

arms. General Ryder's only safeguard for 

his forces was the promise of the French 

leaders that they would not resume hostilities without warning. General Ryder insisted upon supplementing this limitation by 

discreetly gathering up their ammunition 

and placing it under American guards, 

pending a lasting basis of association. At 

this juncture, the situation changed materially. Arrangements concerning Algiers became subordinated to negotiations for a 

general cease-fire order for Oran and Morocco, and for French resistance to the Axis 

forces arriving in Tunisia. On the evening 

of 9 November, Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. N. 

Anderson (Br.) arrived at Blida, went to 

the Bulala, and assumed command of the 

Eastern Task Force for the drive on Tunis. 

At almost the same time General Clark arrived to lead the negotiations with Darlan, 

] uin, and others. General Giraud also appeared at Algiers, with the approbation of 

the Allied high command, to rally French 

patriots who were prepared to resume hostilities against the Axis powers. While fighting continued at Oran and in western Morocco, in Algiers it was in abeyance. 51 

C,' Richard and Serigny, L'enigme d'Alger, Ann('x 

V, pp. 270-76. 
CHAPTER XIV 

The Axis Reaction and the 

French Decision 

The future course of the French forces in 

Northwest Africa was decided during the 

week which followed the Allied arrival. On 

10 November 1942, the immediate needs of 

the Allied command, if it was to win the 

race for Tunisia, were a prompt decision by 

the French to terminate hostilities sti\l prevailing at Oran and in western Morocco, 

and measures to prevent the Axis from gaining a bridgehead in Tunisia. Time was so 

precious that, despite uncertainty whether 

the French would continue to resist, submit 

to invasion, or actively assist the Allies, the 

Eastern Task Force, under General Anderson's command, began its scheduled operation. It started advancing toward Tunisia 

by land, sea, and air, accepting the risks of 

a line of supply which might become highly 

insecure if the negotiations then in progress 

should turn out badly for the Allies. 

The French leaders conferred with Allied representatives at Algiers and with Axis 

representatives in Tunis, at Vichy, and at 

Munich, where Hitler himself saw Pierre 

Laval. At Algiers the Allied negotiators 

sought to persuade the French that the time 

had come to join forces with the Allies in 

order to liberate France in conformity with 

Allied grand strategy. But it was too much 

to expect of the French authorities, given 

the complexities of the situation in which 

they found themselves, that, even if so disposed, they could make an immediate decision in Algiers favorable to the Allied plan 

of action. They could expect retaliatory action by the Axis in continental France which 

would almost certainly include seizure of the 

unoccupied zone. They therefore had to 

make at least a show of discharging France's 

obligation, under the terms of the FrancoGerman armistice of 1940, to defend the 

African territories against Allied invasion. 

For the same reason they had to refer the 

Allied armistice proposals to the Vichy government. Furthermore, since the unity of 

French forces in Africa was essential, and 

since the bulk of these forces was loyal to 

an oath taken to Marshal Petain, the military leaders in Algiers felt compelled to act 

at least nominally, and perhaps actually, 

with Petain's approval. Finally, both they 

and the Allied command were faced with 

the political fact that deeply embedded antipathies and distrusts divided the French, 

complicating the relations between them 

and the non-European inhahitants of 

French North Africa, and strongly influencing the life of all segments of the population. 

The Allies were not prepared to control this 

population except through the French. The 

first task of the Allied command was to effect 

the association of a military and political 
254 

group among the French leaders which 

could take necessary measures with timely 

adroitness. Allied pressure for such a basis of 

Allied-French co-operation mounted with 

each day of negotiation. 

Aside from the threat of Axis retaliation, 

what the French would do was dependent 

not only on what the Allies offered but on 

what the Germans and Italians were prepared to provide. Petain's weak government 

in Vichy had to choose between passive 

neutrality and active collaboration with the 

Axis powers just as the regime in French 

North Africa had to choose between passive neutrality and active association with 

the Allied coalition. Control over Tunisia 

was as vital to the Axis powers as it was to 

the Allies. Hitler and Mussolini were even 

more eager than the Allies to gain the use 

of the French warships in support of the 

Axis cause. What could the Germans do? 

Axis Efforts To Gain French Co-operation 

For a time after the Allied landings, the 

Axis leaders hoped for immediate active collaboration by the Vichy government, a 

relationship which would make available 

the French fleet based at Toulon, the essential ports of Bizerte and Tunis, and landing 

fields for the Luftwaffe perhaps as far west 

as Constantine. German military support, 

primarily air, was immediately offered to 

Vichy and accepted with the stipulation 

that the German planes operate from 

bases in Sicily and Sardinia. Kesselring 

was directed to give aid to the French 

in their fight in North Africa and soon planes 

were made ready to attack the Eastern 

N a\'al Task Force at Algiers, a strike which 

took place on 8 November at dusk. At the 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

same time, the German Navy began preparations to send to Tunisia the 3d as" Boat 

Flotilla based in Sicily.l 

To establish liaison between Darlan and 

the Axis air forces in North Africa, a German officer, identified as a Captain Schuermeyer, started for Algiers by air on the 

afternoon of 8 November. When he landed 

at Setif in eastern Algeria late in the day, he 

found the intelligence from Algiers so unpromising that he went instead to Tunis, 

where he sought out General Barre. Barre 

had been put in command of the Eastern 

Defense Sector by Darlan's order late that 

afternoon. In conformity with the standing 

orders for the defense of Tunis and eastern 

Algeria, he had disposed his troops in six 

groupements and issued orders to obstruct 

the entrance to the ports at Bizerte, Tunis, 

Sousse, and Sfax. 

Ostensibly to make the proffered air support more effective, the Germans during the 

day demanded and received permission 

from Vichy to dispatch two liaison officers 

from Germany to Darlan and Esteva, and 

to send their air reinforcements via unoccupied France. The German demanded with 

increasing insistence the use of airports in 

Tunisia and the Department of Constantine 

as bases. 

Vichy's concessions did not allay Hitler's 

chronic distrust, which the French deepened 

by not accepting at once his offer of an outand-out military alliance against the Allies. 

To determine the French stand, Hitler on 

the morning of 9 November summoned 

Premier Pierre Laval to Munich for a con1 ( 1 ) Kammerer, Du debarquement Africain all 

lIleurtre de Darlan, pp. 286, 101. (2) SKI./l.Abt. 

KTB, Teil A, 1.-30.XI.42, 8 No\' 42. 
THE AXIS REACTION AND THE FRENCH DECISION 255 

ference, and gave a somewhat politer invitation to the Italian allies. 2 

While the Germans were edging their way 

into Tunisia, the Italians were busily preparing to move into Corsica and to share 

in exploiting the concessions wrung from the 

French regarding North Africa. Marshal 

Cavallero initially opposed Italian participation in a Tunisian expedition, but by the 

evening of 8 November Axis preparations 

were in full swing to ship to Tunisia on 10 

November ground troops, primarily Italians, 

supported only by such German specialized 

units as were immediately available in Italy. 

Kesselring also arranged to divert to Tunisia 

three or four of the heavy, newly developed 

88-mm. antiaircraft guns intended for Rommel's army.3 

Early on 9 November the Vichy government informed the Germans that French 

air bases in Tunisia and in the Department 

of Constantine were available to the Luftwaffe. Later in the morning the French 

qualified this concession by insisting that 

only German forces, no Italians, be sent to 

Tunisia. This French condition was reiterated at noon by Admiral Esteva, the Resident General, who reported to Vichy that 

two German liaison officers had arrived in 

Tunisia, accredited by Kesselring to Darlan, 

, (1) Generalkommando XC. Armee Korps, 

Kriegstagebuch I (hereafter cited as XC Corps, 

KTB 1), 16.-30.XI.42, p. 1. (2) Journal de Marche 

du Commandement Superieur des Troupes de 

Tunisic (hereafter cited as CSTT Jnl), 8 Nov 42. 

(See Note on Sources.) (3) KammerC'[, Du debarquement Africain an meurtre de Darlan, pp. 

303-06, 365, 670. (4) Otto Abetz, Das ofJene 

Problem (Cologne, 1951), p. 246. (5) Hugh Gibson, cd., The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943 (New York, 

1946), p. 451. (Hereafter cited as Ciano Diaries.) 

" (1) Cavallero, Coman do Supremo, pp. 370-72, 

376-79. (2) Deutsches Marinekommando Italien, 

[{ riegstagebuch des Befehlshabers (hereinafter cited 

as Marinekdo. Italien, KTB), 1.lS.XI.42, 8 Nov 

42. 

and bearing orders to arrange for the collaboration of German and Italian air units 

with the French defenders of North Africa. 

Esteva protested to Vichy against this collaboration and particularly against the use 

of any Italian forces. Even before this message could be sent the first German planes 

were landing, and until darkness fighters, 

dive bombers, and air transports kept arriving at El Aouina airdrome, near Tunis. They 

brought German paratroopers and Kesselring's headquarters guard to protect the 

landing ground. French troops ringed the 

field and kept the Germans there. But General der Flieger Bruno Loerzer, commanding general of II. Fliegerkorps in Sicily, was 

driven through the cordon on a special 

visit to Admiral Esteva to obtain his guarantee of at least a passive French reception of 

German forces, wherever in Tunisia they 

arrived. 4 

On the same evening, 9 November, Ciano 

arrived in Munich as Mussolini's representative. Hitler received him immediately and 

together they reviewed the situation created 

by the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria. Hitler believed that "the Americans" 

would try to invade Tunisia by land; therefore the Axis must secure an earlier hold 

there. The French, he said, had demanded 

that only German units should be sent into 

Tunisia, a proposal that was tantamount to 

refusing his demands, since Germany lacked 

sufficient materiel or manpower to meet 

, (1) Kammerer, Du debarquement Africain au 

meurte de Darlan, pp. 306, 307, 359 -61. (2) MS 

# D-040, Verhandlung mit dem Stellvertreter von 

General Barre und dem Residenten von Tunis Admiral Esteva (Generaloberst Bruno Loerzer). (3) 

MS # D-067, Die Beauftragung des OB Sued mit 

der zusaetzlichen KampfJuehrung in Nord-Afrika 

nach der alliierten Landunl!, (General der Fliq;('f 

Paul Deichmann). 
256 

these and other needs. Hitler intended to 

discover what Laval had to offer, but he had 

already sent to Tunisia two Stuka groups 

and one fighter group. Soon small German 

ground units would follow. If he could rush 

a few troops into Tunis in this fashion, 

stronger forces could come in later and improve the Axis position. By midnight 10-11 

November, the German concentration on 

the borders of unoccupied France would be 

complete; if the French had failed him, the 

invasion would proceed at once. Ciano reported that the Italian position in these matters was the same as the German; Italian 

forces would be ready to occupy part of 

Southern France and to seize Corsica. Hitler 

remarked that the Axis position in Tunisia 

could be upheld only if a convoy could land 

heavy equipment, including some heavy 

tanks (Tigers) which werc then on their 

way to Italy. ~ 

The Vichy government received with 

some misgivings, no doubt, professions by 

the Germans that their operations in Tunisia 

were designed to help the French to preserve control of their northwest African territories; they could hardly reconcile these explanations with Axis actions. Vichy representatives in vViesbaden were assured by the 

German Armistice Commission on 9 ~o­

\'ember, for example, that the covetous Italians for the time being would not be permitted to establish military forces in Tunisia. 

But the Italian Air Force held fighter units 

in readiness for action there while the Germans were courting Vichy and the Tunisian 

authorities; on the morning of ION ovemAufzeichnung ueber die Unterredung zwischen 

dem Fuehrer und dem Grafen Ciano in Anwesenheit 

des Reichsmarschalls, und des ReichsaussenministeTs im Fuehrerbau in Muenchen am 9. November 

1942 (Memo by Dr. Paul Schmidt). German For-

~ign Ministry Archi\Ts. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ber, thc Italians finally sent a flight of twenty-eight Macchi 202 fighters." 

In a short conference later on the morning 

of 10 November, Ciano informed Hitler 

that the fir~t Italian planes had arrived in 

Tunisia, and he proposed that, in view of 

the latest reports from North Africa, the 

Italians be allowed to occupy Corsica. Hitler agreed to this proposal and M ussolini 

was immediately notified. 

On the afternoon of 10 November Hitler, 

Ciano, and Laval conferred. After Hitler 

and Laval had reviewed the course of 

German-French relations since 1940, Hitler 

posed the question: would France now 

make the ports of Tunis and Bizerte and all 

Tunisian air bases available to the Axis 

powers? If not, collaboration was at an end. 

Hitler demanded a definite answer from 

Laval. Laval nonetheless avoided the issue, 

saying that only Petain could make such a 

decision. When he reminded Hitler that the 

French could not agree to Italian participation in the Axi, occupation of Tunisia, Hitler answered that Germany and Italy were 

allies, and that France would have to accept this fact and allow troop units of both 

nations to enter. 7 Soon after thi.<: fruitless 

conference, orders went out to Axis forces 

to occupy Vichy France on the next morn-

" (1) Kammerer, Du dtfbarquemenl Africain au 

meurtre de Darlan, p. 365. (2) Cavallero, Coman do 

Supremo, pp. 379-83. 

'( 1) Aufzeichnung ueber die Unterredung 

zwischen dem Fuehrer und dem Gra/en Ciano in 

Anwesenheit des Reichsmarschalls, und des Reichsaussenministers im Fuehrebau in Muench1en am 10. 

November 1942 (Memo by Dr. Paul Schmidt). 

German Foreign Ministry Archives. (2) Aufzeichnung lIeber die Unterredung zwischen dem Fuehrer, 

dem Grafen Ciano und Ministerpraesident Laval 

in Anwesenheit des RAM im Fuehrerbau in Muenchen am Nachmittag des 10. November 1942 

(Memo by Dr. Paul Schmidt). German Foreign 

Ministry Archives. 
THE AXIS REACTION AND THE FRENCH DECISION 257 

ing, and a formal directive was issued for the 

occupation of Tunisia.' 

The policy of the Axis in Tunisia, as 

formulated by 11 November, was to bring 

in a strong military force in the ostensible 

role of protector of the French. To give the 

operation as German a character as possible, all Axis forces in Tunisia were to be 

under German control. The German field 

commander in Tunis, Colonel Harlinghausen of the Luftwaffe, soon to be replaced 

by an Army officer, was responsible to the 

Commander in Chief South, who was given 

complete command of the Tunisian bridgehead. Because of the limited forces available, this bridgehead was to be established 

on defensible terrain having the shortest 

practicable line, one as far inland from the 

main supply ports as Axis forces could 

maintain. Friendly relations with the French 

command in Tunisia were to be cultivated. 

The Tunis Division would be disarmed in 

case its sympathies were doubtful, and its 

weapons used by German troops and, if necessary, by recruits from the Italian population of Tunisia. The French fleet was to be 

held at its base in Toulon while Axis submarines and bombing planes struck the Allied landing forces. All available sea and 

air transport was temporarily to be diverted 

from supplying Rommel's army in order to 

rush new Axis units to Tunisia. 9 

Allied retaliation against the privileged 

treatment of the Germans in Tunisia took 

the form of deterrent air strikes from Malta 

against the German aircraft at the airdrome 

near Tunis and the airlift from Sicily. The 

first of these raids was an attack on ION 0-

vember on EI Aouina airdrome of Tunis by 

8 SKLj LAbt, KTB, Teil A. 1.30.X 1.42, 10 and 

11 Nov 42. 

'SKL/1.Abt, KTB, Teil A, 1.-30.XI.42, 10 Nov 

42. 

nine planes of t~e 272d Squadron, Royal 

Air Force, with considerable though temporary effect.l0 

The Germans rendered French acceptance of the fiction of German friendliness 

completely impossible by violating the original armistice terms restricting German military control to northern France. At midnight, 10-11 November, they began to penetrate the previously unoccupied portion of 

metropolitan France in accordance with 

plans brought up to date during the preceding summer.l1 'Vith motorized units in the 

lead, a total of more than ten divisions, two 

of which were armored, swept across southern France without meeting resistance. At 

the same time six Italian divisions marched 

into eastern France. The Vichy government 

was completely submerged by the Axis; it 

merely uttered feeble protests, and countenanced the anti-Axis French action in North 

Africa only by highly secret and rather 

vague communications from Marshal Petain 

to Admiral Darlan. The French Navy remained at the base in Toulon under close 

surveillance, the object of covetous attention 

from both Allied and Axis leaders. 

Even after Axis occupations of the free 

zone and of Corsica, Axis troops and equipment pouring into Tunisia met no French 

resistance. Ground troops arrived daily by 

air and, beginning on 12 November, at fre1" Info supplied by' Air Ministry, London. 

\[ This was Operation ANTON (formerly 

ATTILA). German First Army's plans approved 

by OB West on 15 August 1942 involv('d the employment of formations from both First Army and 

Army Group Felber. Army Group Felber was thl' 

designation used for H eadq1larters XLV Corps for 

dccC'ption purposes. 

" (1) Armeeoberkommando 7, KTB, IX.-Xll.42. 

and Anlagen. (2) Armeeoberkommando 1, KTB. 

IO.VII-31.Xll.42, and Anlagen. (3) Hoeheres 

Kommando XLV (Army Group Felber), Korpsbefehle, 22.III.40--29.lX.42. 
258 

quent intervals by sea. The long and prodigious airlift begun on 9 November was 

to carry a total of 15,273 officers and enlisted men, and 581 tons of supplies by the 

end of the month. 13 The transport vessels 

Catarina Costa and Ciud di Napoli arrived 

at Bizerte on the evening of 12 November 

with 340 men, 17 tanks, 4 guns, 55 trucks, 

40 tons of ammunition, and 101 tons of fuel, 

a small beginning in the prolonged struggle 

to supply the Axis forces in the Tunisian 

bridgehead. By the end of November, 20 

officers, 1,847 enlisted men, 159 tanks and 

armored cars, 127 guns, 1,097 vehicles, and 

12,549 tons of supplies, comprising twentyeight shiploads, were brought over.14 

Axis use of the ports of Tunis and Bizerte 

was made difficult by the actions of General 

Barre and Admiral Louis Derrien, commanding officer of the French naval forces 

in Tunisia and sector commander of all 

French forces in Bizerte. Both of these ports 

were blocked and their full use denied the 

Axis by sinking vessels in the harbor approaches. But these measures did not delay 

the Germans and Italians for long. With 

the aid of special Italian port engineers 

Bizerte was clear for use by 12 November, 

and Tunis by 15 November 1942. Thus the 

entrance to Bizerte was no longer blocked 

when the Italian transports approached. 

General Barre, at this point faced with a 

fait accompli, authorized German use of the 

Sidi Ahmed airfield near Bizerte as well as 

the port, in order to postpone a clash at 

arms. Hi 

l' Panzer-Armeeoberkommando 5 (hereafter cited 

as Fifth Panzer Army), Abt Qu 3-0berquartiermeister Tunis, Taetigkeitsbericht, 15.x I.-31.X II.42. 

14 I bid. 

" (1) CSTT Jnl, 11-13 Nov 42. (2) His own 

explanation is to be found in General Georges Barre, 

Tunisie, 1942-1943 (Paris, 1950), pp. 134-43. (3) 

Marinekdo. Italien, KT B, 1.-15.X 1.42, 9, 11, 13, 

and 15 Nov 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

The position of the Germans in Tunisia 

remained for a time weak and uncertain. 

They found it exceedingly difficult to ascertain what the French in that area would do 

when the Allies and the Axis actually came 

to grips. The French authorities were themselves subject to a series of highly confusing 

instructions. At first they adopted the position of total defense against all adversaries. 

N ext they accepted Axis planes and airborne troops. Then they were instructed 

from Algiers on 10 November, after Admiral Darlan's first armistice agreement, not 

to resist the Anglo-Americans either. The 

next day, following telephoned instructions 

from Algiers, they were ordered to resist any 

Axis ships or landing forces but not airplanes unless they engaged in hostile acts, 

and not to resist any Allied ground, sea, or 

air forces. By midnight, authority of the 

leaders in Algiers was discredited by broadcasts from Vichy, and the policy became 

that of passive neutrality toward all foreign 

forces. Such passivity permitted the Axis 

build-up in Tunisia by air and sea to continue, and made certain that eventually 

French troops would have to retire from the 

area of combat or even to disband, or what 

was far more likely, to adhere to one side or 

the other in the forthcoming engagements.]" 

The movements of General Barre's Tunis 

Division were perplexing to Axis leaders. He 

had first been ordered from Algiers to dispose his troops, as well as others in the Constantine area who went under his command, 

in such a manner as to be able to defend 

Tunisia from all sides. Contrary orders from 

Vichy led him to remain passively neutral 

while the Germans and Italians began arriving. Instructions simply to segregate his 

10 (1) Les Cahiers Franr;ais Information, No. 48 

(September, 1943), p. 23. (2) CSTT Jnl, 8-14 Nov 

42. 
THE AXIS REACTION AND THE FRENCH DECISION 259 

French forc("~ from all Axis troops were in 

turn modified by those from General Juin 

in Algiers to occupy defensive positions west 

of Bizerte and Tunis at specific places in the 

Tunisian hills and the Med jerda river valley. In defiance of Juin's orders, Admiral 

Derrien retained at Bizerte one section of 

the Tunis Division (3,012 men) as well as 

the naval troops under his command to defend the coast and operate the coastal batteries. In the presence of this force, Col. 

Hans Lederer, appointed on 11 November 

as the German Army's commander of the 

Tunisian bridgehead, decided that the small 

force at his command in Bizerte did not 

justify his following the example of Colonel 

Harlinghausen, who seized the key positions 

in Tunis with his troops after the bulk of 

the French forces had withdrawn from the 

city on the night of 13~14 November. Lederer's decision was confirmed by Kesselring, 

who reserved for himself the right to order 

any action against the French in Bizerte. 

Lederer had removed his headquarters 

from Tunis to Bizerte on 13 November, after 

consultations with Harlinghausen and the 

local German naval commander, Captain 

Loycke. The terrain near Bizerte was more 

favorable than that near Tunis for building up an initial bridgehead, and Bizerte 

was, moreover, to be the main supply port 

for overseas shipments arriving in Tunisia 

from Italy.l1 But the withdrawal toward 

17 (1) Division v. Broich, Kriegslagebuch (hereafter cited as Div. Broich, KTB), Nr. 1, Il.XI.-

31.XII.42, 11-14 Nov 42, and Anlagenheft I, 

Anlage 4, Anlagenheft II, Anlage 8. The Axis 

ground forces in Tunisia on 13 ~ ovember were 

divided as follows: Tunis (Colonel Harlinghausen), 

three companies of 1st Tunis Field Battalion, one 

company of paratroopers, one antiaircraft artillery 

company, 14th Company, 104th Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment, advance detachment of the 5th Parachute Regiment of the Hermann Goering Division 

(3 officers and 150 enlisted men) ; Bizerte (Colonel 

Bcdja by General BarnS's headquarters and 

over 9,000 of his combat elements was 

watched by the Germans and Italians with 

concern. Air reconnaissance eventually confirmed what had been suspected, that the 

Tunis Division was facing east as if expecting a clash with the Axis troops, and retiring 

westward toward a junction with Allied 

columns approaching from Algeria."B 

During the second week of the race for 

Tunisia, the pressure on General Barre to 

oppose the Allies became even more insistent. Orders from Vichy to assist the Axis 

powers were not only renewed, but Vice 

Adm. Rene Platon, Secretary of State to 

the Chief of Government (Pierre Laval), 

himself came to Tunisia to see that they 

were received and understood."n 

While Admiral Esteva remained compliant and Admiral Derrien promised to 

continue to resist the Allies, emissaries trying to persuade General Barre found him 

Lederer), the 5th Battery, 190th Artillery Regiment, one company of lsi Tunis Field Battalion, 

and personnel of the 4th Company, I 90th Battalion, 

and personnel of the 4th Company, 190th Panzer 

Battalion, the 4th Battery, 2d Artillery Regiment, 

the 557th Italian Assault Gun Battalion, and 

the I.36th Italian Tank Destroyer Battalion. (2) 

M arinekdo. 1 talien, KT B, 14, 15 Nov 42. (3) Rpt 

by Col Mendel of CSTT, 0510, 14 Nov 42, in 

Journal de Marche de la Division de marche de 

Constantine (journal hereafter cited as DMC Jnl). 

(4) CSTT J nl, 11 Nov 42 (Note furnished to Service Historique by General Barre at a later date). 

" (I) XC Corps, KTB I, 16.-30.xI.42, 16 Nov 

42. (2) Giraud Hq, Rapport des operations en 

Tunisie, pp. 2-5. \0 ( I) Platon arrived at Tunis airdrome at 0900, 

15 November. Rpt, V.O. Tunis (Liaison Officer, 

Tunis), Lage Nord-Afrika (A, Ausl/Abw, B. Nr. 

47351/42 g.IM WEST S) to Chef 1 luer Chef Ami 

Aus/Abw, 16.x1.1942, in OKW/Ag Ausland lIA5, 

Alliierte Landung im Franzoesisch-Nordafrika am 

8. November 1942, Band I. He went to Bizate that 

evening and remain('d two days. (2) Les Cahiers 

Fran~ais Information, No. 48 (September, 1943), 

pp. 23 II. 
260 

elusive. 20 When the Germans complained 

that roadblocks erected by his troops were 

barring the armed reconnaissance parties, 

Barre replied: "I protest energetically 

against the incursion of a German scout car 

foll0~ed by a truck carrying about 20 men, 

coming from Mateur in the direction of 

Beja [Bed ja J. They broke through several 

roadblocks; it is reported that shots were 

exchanged on that account." 21 His troops 

were apparently instructed to fire on Axis 

units which attempted to pass through his 

lines. Such incidents confirmed the belief 

that Barre was in communication with the 

Allies and was waiting until he could operate with them against Axis troopS.22 

Axis Military Planning 

The Axis high command meanwhile continued to formulate strategy. German military intelligence calculated that the Allies 

had in Algeria three or four divisions and 

between fifteen and twenty thousand corps 

and army troops, and that the defection of 

the French forces in Morocco and Algiers 

had relieved the Allies of the necessity of 

defending their bridgeheads there. The Germans expected an early Allied advance on 

'" Esteva told the U.S. consul on 8 Novembn 

1942, upon receiving a letter from President Roose-

\Tlt as the landings began, that he would follow 

Petain's ordns. Tdg, Doolittle to State Dept, 

CM-IN 3690. 

"(I) Diu. Broich, KTB I, 1l.XI.-31.XII.42, 15 

Nov 42. (2) Msg, IV Region Maritime Marine en 

Tunisie to Colonel Lederer, No. 621 EM/SECA, 

15 Nov 42, in Div. Broich, KTB I, 11.xI-31.xII.42. 

Anlagenheft II, Anlage 7. (3) Msg, Lcdner to 

DB SUED, Ia Nr. 6/42, 15 Nov 42, in ibid., Anlage 8. 

"(1) XC Corps, KTB I. 16.-30.X.42. (2) The 

1st Parachute Battalion (Br.) was at Bedja, 16-17 

November, after an airdrop at Souk el Arba during 

the previous aftnnoon, and Blade Force was Coming eastward. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Tunisia, and they feared a thrust to the 

Sousse, Sfax, or Gabcs areas which might 

sever Axis overland ties with the GermanItalian Panzer Army and enclose the Tunisian bridgehead. Kesselring therefore proposed to build up a new front in Tunisia 

immediately, in line with policy previously 

decided upon. For this hc estimated he 

would need three things: a new army approximately as strong as the German-Italian 

Panzer Army, although of a somewhat different composition; as long a period as possible in which the British Eighth Army 

would be engaged by Rommel at a substantial distance from Tunisia; and a secure 

line of transport from Italy. 

To meet Kesselring's requests, the OKW 

sent over a new German ground commander, and ordered to Tunisia three divisions, the 10th Panzer and the Hermann 

Goering Division from France and the new 

334th Infantry Division, then being organized in Germany. To these were added an 

Italian corps headquarters and two Italian 

divisions, which Mussolini had already 

begun to transport to Tunisia. Rommel was 

again exhorted to withdraw as slowly as possible; M ussolini asserted that the fate of the 

Axis forces in Africa depended upon Rommel's ability to delay the British as long as 

possible. A shuffle in command responsibilities was ordered to improve the shipping situation. None of these measures could be 

completely executed because of conflicting 

demands made by the rapidly worsening "ituation on the Eastern Front. 2 : 

"( 1) Rpt, GenStdH / Abt Fremde H eere West. 

Nr. 918/42, 17 Nov 42, in OKH/OP Abt, S IVChefsachen, Teil II. (2) SKL/1.Abt, KTB, Teil A, 

1.-30.xI.42, 14-17 Nov 42. (3) MS # T-3-PII 

(Kesselring), Pt. 2. (4) MS # C-065a (Greiner), 

14-17 Nov 42. (5) Panzer Armee Afrika, Schlachtbericht 23.X.42-15.I.43, Band 1 (hereafter cited 

as Panzer Arm)' Africa, KTB. Band 1), 14 Nov 42. 
THE AXIS REACTIO~ A~D THE FRE~CH DECISIO~ 261 

Even before the Allied landings, Kesselring and the OKW had been planning to 

clarify and simplify the complicated German chain of command in the Mediterranean. A beginning was made in October 

1942, when Kesselring as Commander in 

Chief, South, became responsible for organizing the defense of all German-occupied 

coastal areas in the Mediterranean. This 

mission applied to the Balkans and Crete 

but not to the African areas controlled by 

Rommel's forces. After the invasion, when 

he was saddled with the additional responsibility for the conduct of ground operations 

in Tunisia, Kesselring reorganized his headquarters. He created separate staffs for 0 B 

SUED and Luftfiotte 2 and further, within 

OB SUED, directed that Col. Siegfried 

Westphal, the deputy chief of staff for operations, hold specific responsibility for the 

African theater, while General der Flieger 

Paul Deichmann, the chief of staff, remained responsible for overall theater matters.N 

All the men and materiel which could be 

spared for the Mediterranean from other 

fronts were needed by both Field Marshal 

Rommel's German-Italian Panzer Arm)' 

and the new command in Tunisia. Each 

faced the prospect of conducting a defensive 

campaign against an aggressive foe while 

hampered by shortages of all kinds. Rommel 

sought to protect the interests of his command by installing Generalmajor Alfred 

Gause in Rome as his deputy. To guarantee 

a unified German policy toward the Italian 

High Command, Hitler on 16 November 

ordered the wbordination of General Gause 

(1) MS # C-065a (Greiner), 14 :-lov 42. (2) 

Hitler's Dir, 13 Oct +2 (OKW/WFSt/Op Nr. 

551743/42), ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1942-1945. 

(3) MS # T-3-PII (Kesselring;). (4) MS # D067 (Drichrmnn). 

and General von Rintelen, the German General at Comando Supremo, to Field Marshal Kesselring as Commander in Chief, 

South. Gause, under Kesselring's control, 

was to prepare in southern Italy the army 

units intended for the Tunisian and Tripolitanian theaters and see to their timely arrival at ports of embarkation. No change 

was intended in the subordination of Rommel's army to the Duce through Comando 

Supremo nor in the direct control over General von Rintelen by the Armed Forces High 

Command in "all matters outside the province of the Commander in Chief, South." 2ri 

When the Allied operations in Northwest 

Africa began, General der Panzertruppen 

Walther Nehring, the commander of the 

German Africa Corps (DAK), convalescing near Berlin from wounds he had received in Egypt on 31 August 1942, was ordered back to Rommel's German-Italian 

Panzer Army, to prepare the proposed 

Marsa el Brega position. En route to his 

post, he reached Rome on 12 November, but 

there he was stopped. His orders had been 

canceled; he was sent instead to Tunisia to 

command a new corps to be formed there. 

At Kesselring's headquarters the field marshal told him exactly what was expected: 

the establishment of a bridgehead extending 

to the west at least as far as necessary for 

freedom of maneuver, and if possible as far 

as the Tunisian-Algerian border. Kesselring 

and the OKW considered the present commander inadequate and hoped that Nehring 

would be able to master the situation. Only 

a very few German troops were on the 

ground. A new headquarters was being organized. The mission would require resourceful improvisation by all manner of ex-

"(1) MS # C-065a (Greiner), 14-17 Nov 42. 

(2) Hitler's Order, 16 Nov 42, in OKH/Op Abt. 

S IV, Chej.wchen, Teilll. 
262 

pedients for some weeks to come. Nehring 

after this briefing flew to Tunisia on 14 

November, where he made a personal survey of the situation. He returned to Rome in 

the evening to receive his final instructions 

at OB SUED on the next day.2" 

The initial Axis reaction to the Allied 

landings was a swift determination to challenge the Allies in Tunisia and a rapid improvisation of the means. 27 Like the Allies, 

Germany and especially Italy were mindful 

of the campaign in Libya, but Hitler encouraged Mussolini to look also to the west. 

Operations in Tunisia would be supported, 

he wrote, by some of the best German divisions and some of the heaviest and most effective tanks in existence, for the objective 

of the operations in Tunisia must be an advance to the west which would destroy the 

Allied-French North African positions in the 

Mediterranean. 28 

Clark-Darlan Negotiations 

What the Germans would do had not become wholly apparent to the French either 

in Vichy or Algiers as Darlan's negotiations 

with the Allied deputy commander in chief 

began. \Vhen General Clark, accompanied 

by Robert Murphy and Capt. Royer M. 

""MS # D-086 (Nehring). Nehring, then a 

colonel, had served at the opening of World War II 

as chid of staff of the XIX Army Corps. In 1940 

he commanded the 18th Panzer Division as a brigadier general. He was promo'ted to major general 

and became acting commander of the German 

Africa Corps in February 1942. In July 1942 he 

was confirmed as commanding g,.neral af the Africa 

Corps and at the same time promoted to lieutenant 

general. 

"(1) MS # C-065a (Greiner), 14 Nov 42. (2) 

Compilation, Truppen fuer Tunis, 13 Nov 42, in 

OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, File Tunis, lO.xI.42-

2. V.43. 

2R Ltr, Hitler to Mussolini, 20 Nov 42, in von 

Rohden Collection, # 4376-33. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Dick (RN), met Admiral Darlan and his 

associates on Tuesday morning, 10 November, at the Hotel St. Georges to discuss the 

future relations between the Allies and the 

French in Northwest Africa, each negotiator was under great pressure. General Clark 

was in desperate need of putting an early 

stop to the hostilities between the French 

and the Allies, and of bringing about 

French armed resistance to the Axis forces 

entering Tunisia. He hoped to enlist the 

French fleet on the Allied side. Fighting 

in Algiers had been suspended for more 

than a day, but at 0855, as the conference 

opened, the final Allied attack was about to 

penetrate Oran, while on the Atlantic coast 

of Morocco, the three sub-task forces of 

General Patton's command were at the climax of their interrelated operations, and 

Admiral Hewitt's naval force, having destroyed many fine French warships, was a 

magnet for approaching enemy submarines. 

The commandant of the airdrome at Tunis 

had fled westward bringing word of the 

unresisted arrival there on 9 November of 

a considerable number of Axis aircraft.2~ 

Were Axis forces to gain an easy foothold 

in Tunisia? To prevent it would require 

prompt and decisive countermeasures by 

the French armed forces. Admiral Darlan, 

on the other hand, had made known to the 

Allies that he would negotiate for all French 

North Africa if he could do so without associating with dissident French leaders, such 

as Generals Giraud and Mast,'~o but when 

"" (1) Rad 1938, EQM TF to AFCP, 9 Nov 42. 

AFHQ G-3 Ops 22/5, Micro Job lOA, Reel 5C. 

(2) Tclgs, 9 Nov 42, Nos. 863/Cab and 864/Cab, 

in CSTT Jnl Annex. 

," The original messag", sent via Royal Navy 

radio, partially garbled, was pass~d on to G,.neral 

Eisenhower by Admiral Cunningham late on 0 Novcmbe-r. It was sent at 1658 and received at 1726. 

CinC AF Diary, 9 Nov 42. 
THE AXIS REACTION AND THE FRENCH DECISION 263 

he proposed to Vichy the mild terms of an 

armistice which he believed would be acceptable to the Allies, he was instructed to 

refrain from negotiations without an express 

authorization.31 Further resistance to the 

Allies was obviously useless. But the choice 

between passive neutrality and active assistance to the Allies, including defense of 

Tunisian ports and airfields against the Germans, involved a political rather than a 

military decision. It should be determined 

by governmental authorities and be transmitted in the form of orders to the armed 

services. Co-operation with the Allies, if that 

should be the decision, would then become 

compatible with the oaths of loyalty and the 

professional obligations of the French 

forces. 

General Clark's approach to the issues 

was forthright and compelling: delay until 

the Vichy government came to a decision 

in a cabinet meeting that afternoon was 

completely inadmissible; Admiral Darlan 

must <l.ct at once, issuing a cease-fire order 

for all French North Africa, or be taken 

into custody and held incommunicado; the 

Americans would then arrange matters with 

other French leaders. Shortly before noon, 

Darlan drafted and signed in the Marshal's 

name directives to the chiefs of armed forces 

requiring them to break off all hostilities 

and to observe complete neutrality. The 

orders were reported by radio and also transmitted by courier planes.'" As previously 

"RecQrd Qf Events and DQcuments FrQm the 

Date That Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark Entered NegQtiatiQns With Admiral Jean Fran<;Qis Darlan Until 

Darlan Was Assassinated Qn Christmas Eve, 1942 

(hereafter cited as RecQrd Qf Clark-Darlan NegQtiatiQns), p. 4. DRB AGO. This recoOrd is based Qn the 

verbatim nQtes kt'pt by Qne oOf General Clark's staff . 

. " (I) RecQrd Qf Clark-Darlan NegQtiatioOns, pp. 

9-11. (2) Rad 12572, Clark via NC ETF toO NCXF 

fQr EisenhQwer 10 NQV 42, CinC AF Diary, 10 

NQV 42. 

narrated, Oran had already yielded, and 

Darlan's orders were accepted in Morocco 

by General Nogucs and Admiral Michelier 

and put into effect barely in time to save 

Casablanca from a destructive attack. 

A French decision to join the Allies in 

active resistance to the Germans and Italians 

remained in suspense, while even Darlan's 

cease-fire order was jeopardized by events 

later on 10 November. Petain approved it 

but when Pierre Laval, en route to Munich 

to face Hitler and Count Ciano and their 

military entourage, learned of Darlan's 

action, he persuaded Petain by telephone to 

withdraw his initial approbation and to disavow Darlan's action. Darlan then replied 

to the Marshal, "I annul my order and constitute myself a prisoner." But at Darlan's 

own suggestion, the Allies put him under 

arrest before the orders of annulment could 

be issued. His powers were next transferred 

by Petain's decree to General Nogucs, and 

he declared himself unable to treat further 

with General Clark. It was left to those who 

had received his earlier order to reconcile 

the conflicting instructions with their sense 

of what they were bound in honor to do. 

Night fell on 10 November with the Eastern 

Task Force preparing to steam along the 

coast east of Algiers, where French port 

commanders had instructions from Admiral 

Moreau in Algiers which conflicted sharply 

with those derived from General Juin. The 

former prescribed resistance to the Allies; 

the latter, friendly conduct toward the Allies 

and resistance to Axis forces if they attacked."" 

If 10 November brought a seesaw in the 

general situation in Algiers, the next day 

produced another. Clark sought to get from 

" (1) CSTT Jnl, p. 11, cQntains a CQPy Qf Darlan's Qrdt'r. (2) DMC Jnl, entries at 1755, 1820, 

1900 and 2050, 10 NQV 42. 
264 

the French at least as much resistance to 

Axis occupation of Tunisian ports and airdromes as they had offered to the Allies before Darlan's cease-fire order of the preceding day. He sought in addition full participation by the French in the anti-Axis effort, 

including the issuance of orders by Admiral 

Darlan to Admiral de Laborde at Toulon 

to bring the French fleet over to the Allied 

side. At first Admiral Darlan professed to 

be completely powerless as a result of Marshal Pctain's disavowal of his cease-fire order 

of the previous day. Then he received by a 

~ecret and personal channel of communication with Vichy a message that the disavowal had been made under constraint and 

was contrary to the Marshal's actual 

wishes.'" The Germans and Italians, as already noted, entered unoccupied France 

that night over the Marshal's protests and in 

execution of plans long ready for such a 

situation.'" Darlan thereupon directed General J uin to order the commanders in chief 

of ground and air forces, to resist the Axis 

in Tunisia. In the welter of radio broadcasts 

that day, Marshal Pctain responded to German pressure exerted through Pierre Laval 

by publishing his disavowal of Admiral 

Darlan's armistice and announcing his 

transfer of all authority in North Africa 

from Darlan to General Nogucs. General 

Nogucs in Morocco none the less accepted 

instructions from Darlan to report to Algiers 

on 12 November to confer with the French 

leaders. 

'" ( I) Kammerer, Du dibnrque7lient Africain nu 

meurtre de Dar/nn, pp, 408-11. (2) Haute Cour 

dr Justice, Proces du M arechal Pitain (Paris, 

19-+5), pp, 279-82 (Tcstimony of Capt Edouard 

Archambaud), 300 (Lptter of Juin), (3) Leahy, 

I Was There, p, 339. 

"'Msg, OKW/WFSt (Nr,551929/42) to OKH/ 

GenStdH/Op Abt, 10 )lov 42, in OKH/GenStdH/ 

Op Abt, File Tunis, lO.XI.42-2,V.43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

In view of the Vichy broadcasts, some of 

General Juin's subordinates questioned the 

authenticity of his pro-Allied orders and 

forced their suspension.or, General Clark 

stormed in protest to Admiral Darlan and 

General Juin against what looked like surreptitious cancellation of orders to the Tunisian French forces to resist the Germans. 

His demands led General Juin to procure 

continuation of resistance in Tunisia whereever practicable without waiting for General Nogues' orders.;JT But the situation on 

12 November depended on Admiral Darlan's ability to persuade others to co-operate 

with General Giraud, with whom he was 

prepared to associate himself, and to convince General Nogucs that he should join 

the combination in a secondary role. 

General Giraud, after coming to a satisfactory understanding with General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham at Gibraltar, had arrived in Algiers before 

General Clark. It was agreed that Giraud 

was to be recognized as Commander in 

Chief of French forces and as Governor of 

French North Africa. He undertook to cooperate steadily with the Allied commander 

in chief. He expected, in case of a prolonged 

battle in Tunisia, that a small interallied 

staff would prepare plans for joint consideration and that, on a broad front requiring subordinate military zones, command 

in each zone would be exercised by an officer from the national force providing the 

largest number of troops there. Moreover, 

all orders to French forces would be issued 

'"' In Tunisia, Admiral Darlan and General Juin 

were believed to be prisoners of the Americans. 

Interv, Marcel Vigneras with GC'n Juin, Rabat, 5 

Dec 48. OCMH. 

" Ibid. 

"H (1) Record of Clark-Darlan Negotiations, 

pp. 26-35. (2) Intcrv, Vigneras with Juin, 5 Dec 

48.0CMH. 
THE AXIS REACTION AND THE FRENCH DECISION 265 

by General Giraud. 3!) This relationship was 

a substantial recession from his demand to 

be accepted as Interallied Commander in 

Chief, and to be given active command after 

the landings had been in progress for about 

forty-eight hours. The delay in arriving at 

this undertaking was prejudicial to his 

success, although hardly responsible for his 

failure. For he did fail. 

Darlan's willingness to negotiate with the 

Allies for the suspension of hostilities was 

made known to General Eisenhower while 

Giraud was en route to Algiers from Gibraltar:" The Allies were faced with the prospect of two rival French leaders and were 

discovering that the bulk of the French 

armed forces were determined to follow 

orders in a legitimate chain of command. 

Whoever gained their support must speak 

with the authority of Marshal Petain. 

Giraud appeared as a revolutionist, a dissident, however popular his cause, however 

patriotic his motives. Darlan wore the mantle of the Marshal. He made it fit him, even 

after public disavowal and condemnation 

by the Marshal, by recourse to the Marshal's 

"secret thought." He was following the instructions which Petain was supposed to 

have given him in 1940 in anticipation of 

a situation requiring such a double game 

against the Nazis, and, in so doing, he satisfied the requirements of many men in 

French North Africa who wished to fight 

for France without violating the obligations 

of honor." 

Giraud passed the night of 9-10 N ovember with friends near Algiers and conferred 

'" Gen Mason MacFarlane Notes, 8 Nov 42. Copy 

in Cine AF Diary, Bk. V, pp. A-147-52. 

'" Cine AF Diary, 9 Nov 42. 

41 [Maxim,,] Weygand, Memoirs: Rappe!e au 

'ervice (Paris, 1950), p. 545, sets the date for these 

instructions, of which he then knew nothing, as 

about August 1940. 

with adherents who revealed how completcl y they had miscalculated the actual 

conduct of the French armed forces when 

faced with the test. The appeal in Giraud's 

name over the radio early on 8 November 

had proved to be unavailing. General Mast 

and his associates were in seclusion. General Bethouart and others were under 

arrest. Giraud had lost the initiative. He was 

wholly unable to effect an extension of the 

truce from Algiers to the rest of French 

North Africa, let alone call for a return to 

active hostilities against the Axis, beginning 

in Tunisia, with any expectation of success. 

As a political leader he would depend upon 

Allied military support rather than on 

French approbation. He would be more a 

Maximilian than a Juarez!" 

After almost four days of deliberation, 

General Clark, with Robert Murphy's assistance, brought about on 13 November a 

workable pattern of French organization 

for immediate collaboration with the Allies. Responsibilities were assigned as follows: Darlan, High Commissioner and 

Commander in Chief of Naval Forces; Giraud, Commander in Chief of Ground and 

Air Forces; Juin, Commander of the Eastern Sector; N ogues, Commander of the 

Western Sector and Resident General of 

French Morocco; Chatel, Governor General of Algeria. Active participation by the 

French in liberating Tunisia and then metropolitan France was to begin immediately, 

while detailed terms governing relations 

with the Allied Force were to be formulated 

hy subsequent negotiation. General Eisenhower, during a quick visit with Admiral 

Cunningham from Gibraltar, expressed his 

" (1) Giraud, Un seu/ but: la victoire, pp. 38--40. 

(2) Barjot, Le debarquement du 8 novembre 1942 

en Afrique du Nord, pp. 179-87. 
266 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

GENERAL EISENHOWER WITH ADM. JEAN FRANQOIS DARLAN, 

General Clark, and Mr. Robert Murphy after a meeting in Algiers, 13 November 1943. 

satisfaction!3 Such an understanding as this 

reflected two major factors: first, General 

Nogucs had renounced Petain's assignment 

to him of supreme authority in French 

North Africa and had advised the Marshal 

that it Cihould remain with Darlan; ~;econd, 

General Giraud was accepted by the others 

despite his standing as a dissident officer. 

The agreement was put into force with enthusiasm and with much greater peace of 

mind as a consequence of a message by se-

'" (1) Record of Clark-Darlan Negotiations, pp. 

42-44. (2) CinC AF Diary, 13~15 Nov 42. (:1) 

Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 

190~92. 

cret channel from the Marshal that Darlan's 

leadership had his approval."l 

Among the Allied leaders in London, the 

atmosphere on 12 November was most 

hopeful, with talk by the Prime Minister of 

General Eisenhower's returning from Gibraltar soon for a conference on general 

strategy. The Northern Task Force, which 

had been designated for a counterattack in 

Spanish territory, could be employed elsewhere; arrangements for accumulating 

H Msg, Petain to Nogues, 1400, 13 Nov 42. Copies 

printed in slightly different forms in Kammerer, 

Du debarquement Africain au meurtre de Darlan. 

pp. 484~86, and in Haute Cour de Justice, Proces 

du M arechal Ntain, p. 300. 
THE AXIS REACTION AND THE FRENCH DECISION 267 

ALLIED LEADERS IN ALGIERS. From left, front row: Admiral Dar/an, Adm. Sir 

Andrew Browne Cunningham, General Eisenhower, and Henri Giraud with back turned. 

troops in French North Africa might even be 

curtailed in order to attack new objectives:' 

First reports of the Allied occupation impressed the Fighting French most favorably. 

General de Gaulle appeared to welcome the 

appearance of General Giraud among the 

overt opponents of the government at Vichy. 

His broadcast on the evening of 8 N ovember called on all French patriots to support 

the Allied operations to the full. On ION 0-

vember he proposed to send to North Africa 

a mission which might facilitate the creation of unity between General Giraud's 

group there and his own. The proposal re-

·iO Msg G-253, Smith to Eisenhower, 12 Nov 42. 

Smith Papers. (See Note on Sources.) 

ceived the Prime Minister's endorsement 

and the President's qualified approval. 46 

Receipt in London of news that the Allies 

had accepted association with Admiral DarIan produced an abrupt change in the prevailing optimism. A new face on the whole 

North African project emerged from the 

mists of censorship. Unity among the antiAxis French was obviously impossible if 

Darlan were leading those in North Africa. 

The Free French feared that the Allies 

'" (1) Msg G-234, CofS AF to CinC AF, 11 

Nov 42; Msg G-286, Prime Minister to CinC AF, 

13 Nov 42. Smith Papers. (2) Record of Admiral 

Stark's Conversation With General de Gaulle, 12 

Nov 42, in COMNAVEU, U. S.-French Relations, 

1942-1944, App. B, Pt. II, pp. 12, 57ff. OCMH. 
268 

would perpetuate in French North Africa 

and metropolitan France the very elements 

which had condemned General de Gaulle as 

a traitor. De Gaulle and his following could 

never bring themselves into association with 

such men. The General worked himself up 

to the point of sending an insulting communication which Admiral Stark refused 

to accept, and to the verge of a bitter public announcement from which he was restrained only by Mr. Churchill's attentive 

persua~ion and by the President's declaration that the Allied arrangement with DarIan was merely a "temporary expedient." 

After the understanding of 13 November 

in Algiers between the Allied and French 

military leaders had received the approval 

of the President, Prime Minister, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, and had been revealed 

to the public, the immediate response in the 

United States as well as the United Kingdom was a swiftly rising tempest of protest." 

Learning of this reaction, General Eisenhower sent an eloquent message to General 

Marshall, the crux of which was its opening 

assertion that "existing French sentiment 

in North Africa does not even remotely resemble prior calculations, and it is of utmost 

importance that no precipitate action be 

taken which will upset such equilibrium as 

we have been able to establish." <' General 

Marshall employed this description in outlining the situation to a hurriedly summoned 

conference of press and radio commentators 

on the morning of 15 November. It assisted 

Secretary Stimson in pacifying some associates in the government next day, as well 

as helping dissuade !VIr. \\' endell Willkie 

"Msgs, AGWAR to US FOR, IS Nov 42, CMOCT 4943, and 16 ='Iov 42, CM-OUT 5052. 

" Quoted from paraphrase first published in full 

in Langer, OUT Vichy Gamble, pp. 357-60, and 

later in large part in Sherwood, Roosevelt and 

Hopkins. p. 652. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

from attacking the action in a public broadcast. '" Besides the many "star-gazing idealists" in the United States who resented the 

acceptance of Darlan, bitter critics in the 

United Kingdom also required political 

sedatives.-'" On 17 November Mr. Churchill 

took cognizance of the fact that very deep 

currents of feeling had been stirred. He concluded that the arrangements with Darlan 

must not lead people to think that the Allies 

were ready to make terms with local quislings, especially as he believed that the 

understanding with Darlan could "only be 

a temporary expedient, justifiable solely by 

the stress of battle. "-, 1 The President issued 

a puhlic statement of American policy. He 

declared flatly that "in view of the history 

of the past two years no permanent arrangement should be made with Admiral DarIan." The President also pointed out that 

"no one in our Army has any authority to 

discuss the future Government of France 

and the French Empire," and that "temporary arrangements made with Admiral 

Darlan apply, without exception, to the current local situation only'" He concluded, 

"Reports indicate that the French of North 

Africa are subordinating all political questions to the formation of a common front 

against the common enemy ..• -," 

Darlan complained to General Eisenhower that the Allies e\·idently intended to 

use and then discard him, and that they were 

decreasing his usefulness hy thus weakening 

his influence in French Africa. Yet he ('on-

'" Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service. 

pp. 543-4+. 

'." The quoted phrase is froIl! Sccrctary of the 

;\Ia\'Y Frank Knox. Ltr, Knox to Stark, 18 :-';ov 42, 

copy in COM;\IAVEC, V.S.-French Rt'lations, 

1942 1944, App. B, Pt. II, p. 33. OCMH. 

'.[ Msg, Prime Minister to President, 17 :-';O\' 42, 

printed in Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 632-·33. 

'" Quoted from Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 

pp. 653-54. 
THE AXIS REACTION A.:"JD THE FRE.:"JCH DECISIO.:"J 269 

tinued to negotiate detailed agreements 

governing future relations between the 

French colonies and the armed forces of the 

Allies, arrangements pertaining to civil administration, French shipping, and economic activity, and to enlist the support of 

French West Africa for his program of 

active warfare against the Axis powers:" 

A,vare of these facts Eisenhower in his messages reflected indignation at being drawn 

into a political morass at a time when the 

imminent battles in Tunisia were claiming 

close attention. The \Var Department 

~tood firmly behind him, refusing to concur 

in the Department of State's proposal that 

remedial measures in the French civil administration should be guided by principles 

which would terminate Allied acceptance of 

Admiral Darlan.:·-' 

The North African Agreement 

The first of the detailed arrangements 

between the Allies and the French was that 

embodied after somewhat protracted negotiations in the North African Agreement of 

22 November, known from its signatories as 

the "Clark-Darlan Agreement." Its preamble and twenty-one articles set forth the 

bases for co-operative action in the months 

to follow. Most of the statement of purposes 

was phrased in language taken from letters written, before the landings, by Mr. 

Robert Murphy as the President's personal 

representative in French North Africa to 

Giraud and other friendly French officers. 

'''(1) COMNAVEC, U.S.-Frt'nch Relations, 

19+2-194+, App. B, Pt. II, p. 57ff. OCMH. This 

contains copies of kttns and memoranda. (2) Msg, 

Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 Nov +2, CM-I'\" 13024. 

" (1) Msg, AFCP Gibraltar (Commandeth) to 

AGWAR, 18 r\ov 42 CM-I."i 7911. (2) Msg-, 

EisFnhow('f to Smith, 18 l':ov 42. Smith Papers. 

-" Msg-, AGWAR to CSFOR, 17 .\"0'· 42, eMOCT 5428. 

The terms of many articles were from the 

draft armistice terms approved in advance 

of the operation by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff.'" To avoid the appearance of diplomatic recognition of Darlan's political 

status, the word "protocol" was dropped 

from the title, and General Eisenhower was 

urged to announce it unilaterally as an acceptable understanding with Darlan. The 

general plan provided for the closest possible co-operation in the effort to expel the 

Axis forces from North Africa, liberate 

metropolitan France, and "restore integrally 

the French Empire." The French were to 

control their own forces and resources within the framework of general policies satisfactory to the Allied commander in chief. 

They granted tax immunity and legal extraterritoriality to Allied personnel. The commanding general was authorized to designate as military areas the places he deemed 

to be "of importance or useful to the purposes set forth in the preamble." Administration, public services, and public order 

in these areas would then come under his 

direct control. Allied military forces were 

to have unrestricted use of all telecommunication services, which were to be operated 

and maintained by the French. The fiction 

of a paramount American position in the 

campaign led to frequent reference to the 

Allied commander in chief as the Commanding General, U.S. Army, "with supporting forces." C" 

'" (1) T"xt is CCS 1 30 Jan 43. (2) Also 

on AFHQ Micro Job Reel 136D. 3) The 

armistice !terms arc CCS 16 Oct reproducing Memo, G-3 AFHQ 3 Oct 42. 

',; ( 1) Gf"nf"ral Eisenhower saw less significance 

in the exact phraseology than in the general lines 

of th" understanding which must succeed in galvanizing the Fnnch civilians and armed forces into 

action. (2) CCS 103/ 17, ."iorth African ProtOCOl 

1, 20 Nov 42, (3) CCS 49th Mtg, 20 Nov 42, 

Item 8. 
270 

The North African Agreement was negotiated by Allied military leaders and approved by the President and the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff as a military measure. But 

from the outset, the nature of the Allied relationship to the Darlan administration was 

viewed in different lights by the Allied commander in chief, who was well aware of his 

dependence upon voluntary French aid, and 

by the President, who was inclined to think 

of French North Africa as conquered and 

occupied. 58 

The public unrest over the Allied affiliation with Darlan in North Africa had somewhat abated by 22 November, when the actual detailed agreement with him was signed 

in Algiers. Brig. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, 

chief of staff of AFHQ, reported from London on 24 November that the Prime Minister and Cabinet were giving the arrangement firm support. He then flew to the 

United States partly to help eliminate the 

resentment still prevailing there. Admiral 

Stark also wrote to Secretary of the Navy 

Frank Knox a stalwart defense of the arrangement with Darlan. "I told DeGaulle," 

he said, "that had I been in Eisenhower's 

shoes I would have done exactly as Eisenhower has, and that I believe he [de Gaulle], 

as a soldier, would have done the same 

thing." 59 

Rearmament of French troops with modern arms had been promised successively to 

Mast at Cherchel, Giraud at Gibraltar, and 

oR General Eisenhawer, an the advice of Admiral 

Cunningham and athers at Gibraltar, submitted thr 

agreement to' the Cambined Chiefs af Staff rather 

than act an his awn responsibility. The President's 

view appeared in a canference with the Jaint Chiefs 

af Staff an 7 January 1943. Min in OPD Exec 10, 

Item 45. 

0' (1) Msg, Smith to' Marshall, 24 Nav 42, CMIN 10359. (2) Msgs, Stark to' Knax, 24 Nav 42, 

and Smith to' Eisenhawer, 25 :"lav 42. Capies in 

Smith Papers. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Darlan's group at Algiers. The Combined 

Chiefs of Staff were now ready to make a 

small token shipment as soon as it could be 

conveyed. GO The extent and timing of additional transfers of arms would be dependent upon events and conditions. By 16 Deccmber, AFHQ created a Joint Rearmament Committee,'" which continued in 

service through the next two years, but during the next few months actual delivery of 

arms to the French was cut down by shortages in armament and shipping and by the 

preferential claims of the expanding American Army. 

Following the agreement of 22 November, further negotiations led to accord on 

economic matters and to adherence by 

French West Africa to Darlan's arrangement with the Allied commander in chief. 

On 3 December a "Provisional Arrangement" for the employment of French shipping was signed in Algiers. It confirmed the 

right of the Allies to convert the harbors of 

Oran and Algiers more fully to their own 

military uses, and it enlarged the global pool 

of shipping in the service of Allied operations. H2 The title "Provisional Arrangement," was another concession to the President's view that General Eisenhower's 

authority was that of plenary military command over the whole area and that he 

should enter into no formal agreement or 

contract, but the General felt compclled to 

report that "it is impossible to exaggerate 

the degree to which, in carrying on the fight 

00 (1) Msgs: AGWAR to' USFOR, 11 Nav 42. 

CM-OUT 3689; Cammandeth to' AGW AR, 19 Nay 

42 CM-IN 8049 and CM-IN 8050: AGWAR to' 

USFOR, 21 Nav 42, CM-OUT 6859. (2) CCS 

48th and 49th Mtgs, 13 and 20 Nav 42. 

m AFHQ Staff MemO' 52. 

"' Msg, FREEDaM to' AGWAR 3 Dec 42, CM-IN 

1943. 
THE AXIS REACTION AND THE FRENCH DECISION 271 

in Tunisia, we are dependent upon the good 

will and cooperation of the French." n:< 

French West Africa Co-operates 

Governor General Pierre Boisson of 

French West Africa and Togoland came to 

Algiers directly after the North African 

Agreement was completed and joined with 

Darlan and General Eisenhower in arriving 

at terms of collaboration by his colony with 

the Allies. French West Africa and Togoland were strategically located on the western bulge of Africa in a position important 

for transatlantic and north-south travel both 

by air and by sea. The port of Dakar had 

caused great concern to the Allies, for 

French warships, including the battleship 

Richelieu, harbored there, and airfields and 

coastal air bases in that area could be of 

great value. Boisson had denied use of the 

territory to Fighting French, British, and 

Axis nationals alike. On 8 November, Marshal Petain recognized this loyalty in declaring: "The attack on North Africa has 

taken place. Be ready for all emergencies. 

The Marshal and his government count on 

you." 04 On 22 November, Boisson and the 

military commander, General Jean Barrau, 

broadcast French West Africa's adherence 

to Darlan, professing complete confidence 

that the step was in conformity with Marshal Petain's actual desires.";' 

Because earlier events in the war had 

created strong anti-British feeling in French 

West Africa, Boisson insisted upon nego-

" Ibid. 

M Copy of transl in Msg, Tuck to Secy of State, 

8 Nov 42. WDCSA 381 TORCH Sec. 2. 

c .• Texts of their remarks were transmitted in Msg, 

US Consul Dakar (Fayette J. Flexer) to State Dept, 

26 Nov 42. Copy of transl in WDCSA 384 Africa. 

tiating only with Americans.';'; It was therefore deemed impolitic to insist that Admiral 

Cunningham participate with Eisenhower, 

Boisson, and Darlan in arriving at an understanding. Instead, and with no concealment 

of the fact that British wishes in this matter were indistinguishable from those of the 

American government, General Eisenhower 

concluded an understanding which was 

transmitted in draft on 4 December for approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

With modification to meet the requirements 

of the British and the views of the President, it was announced unilaterally by General Eisenhower on 7 December.'" It was 

parallel in form and content with the North 

African Agreement of 22 November, but 

it had the further explicit provision (2c) 

that no measures would be taken by American, British, or Allied authorities which 

would result in any French troops combating other French troops. The understanding announced on 7 December was 

concluded with the expectation that, after 

Boisson returned to Dakar, he would receive 

a mission directly from the United States, 

headed by Rear Adm. William A. Glassford, Jr. (U.S.), to arrange for the Allied 

use of air, seaplane, and naval bases there. 

The Glassford Mission was well received 

in Dakar. It arranged an understanding in 

conformity with its directive from the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and with due regard to the 

needs of the British services.';' Existing milico Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 236,488-93. 

n; Copy in an appendix to CCS 129, Instructions 

to the "Glassford Mision" to Dakar. The Allies 

would not countenance a proposal to call the Darlan-Boisson group the 'French Imperial Federation." 

'~The instructions from the Joint Chiefs wen' 

embodied in CCS 129. The communications between Boisson and the commission are in CCS 

129/3,8 Jan 43. 
272 

tary facilities became available to the Allies. 

They could thus exercise undivided control of sea communications from the United 

Kingdom to the Cape of Good Hope. Such 

substantial benefits to the Allied war effort 

remained subject to one nagging difficulty, 

that of inducing the Fighting French in 

Equatorial Africa to cease treating Boisson's 

colonies as essentially hostile. An 

French Organization for Military 

Co-operation 

Long before the last stage of negotiations 

to establish the terms of co-operation in 

northwest Africa, the French had organized 

and begun to furnish active military assistance against Axis forces in Tunisia. The military chain of command over ground forces 

under Admiral Darlan's regime placed General Giraud directly under Darlan. Giraud 

was Commander in Chief of Ground and 

Air Forces, responsible for their organization, training, and employment. He was expected to co-ordinate the operations of 

French forces with those of the AngloAmerican allies. In combined Army-Navy 

operations, he was to act through the Commander in Chief of Naval and Naval Air 

Forces in Africa (Admiral Jacques Moreau). His authority over military activities 

in French West Africa was to be exercised 

through the Commander in Chief of Armed 

M (1) Msgs: AGWAR to Commandeth, 24 Oct 

+2, CM-OUT 7682; Commandcth to AGW AR, 24 

Nov 42, CM-IN 10301,25 Nov 42, CM-IN 10902, 

29 Nov 42, CM-IN 13024, and 3 Dec 42, CM-IN 

699; FREEDOM to AG WAR, 7 Dec 42, CM-IN 3279; 

AGWAR to FREEDOM, 9 Dec 42, CM-OUT 3117. 

(2) CCS 51st Mtg, 4 Dec 42. (3) CCS 129. (4) 

The Prime Minister's approval of all General Eisenhower's political dccisions was conveyed on 13 DecC'mber, after his report in a secret Parliamentary 

session. Msg 543, USFOR to FREEDOM, 13 Dec 42. 

ETOUSA Outgoing Cables, Kansas City Reds Ctr. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Forces in that territory (General Barrau). 

His authority over French units in North 

Africa would be exercised through the Commander in Chief of Ground Forces (General J uin ) ,'" 

Giraud looked ahead to creating a detachment of the French Army which would 

not only participate in driving the Axis from 

Tunisia but would go on to help liberate the 

French empire. In the meantime, he ordered full mobilization in French North 

Africa and French West Africa and set 

about making maximum use of the French 

units already available. He prescribed as a 

system of command an arrangement which 

included the reciprocal subordination of 

small French or Anglo-American detachments to large units of another nationality 

in their respective zones of action but which 

depended primarily on orders emanating 

from his headquarters through a French 

chain of command. Co-ordination of French 

operations with those of the Allied Force 

would be insured, he declared, by the proximity of French and Anglo-American command groups and collaboration between 

them in arriving at decisions.71 

On 15 K ovember, Giraud's first directive 

to General Juin prescribed a covering role 

for French troops along a general line from 

Tabarka on the northern coast to Tehessa, 

behind which the Allied Force could concentrate for an attack against Bizerte. Juin, 

giving effect to this directive, divided his 

forces into a Covering Detachment and an 

East Saharan Command. In command of 

the first he put his corps commander, Gen. 

Louis-Marie Koeltz, with headquarters at 

Constantine. Over the latter he retained 

70 Adm of Fleet Darlan, Order 7M, 15 Nov 42, 

"Hq, CinC (Giraud), No. lS/Cab, 18 November 

1942. 
THE AXIS REACTION AND THE FRENCH DECISION 273 

General Delay, whose headquarters was at 

Ouargla, Algeria. 72 

General Koeltz was able to adapt the 

measures already taken under the standing 

orders for the defense of French North 

Africa against attack from the east, to the 

requirements of his new orders. He designated key points along the forward line for 

the Covering Detachment: Tabarka, Souk 

el Arba, Le Kef, Tadjerouine and the nearby Sidi Amor Gap, Djebel Dir (1474) and 

passes east and south of Tebessa. The major 

elements under his command were the 

Tunisian Troops under Gen. Georges Barre 

on the north and the Constantine Division 

under Gen. Joseph Edouard Welvert on the 

southwest. A boundary between their zones 

of action ran along the road from Souk 

Ahras to Le Kef. Before long, he expected 

the Algiers Division (Gen. Agathon Deligne) and the Algerian Light Armored 

Brigade (Col. J. L. Touzet de Vigier) to 

72 (1) Giraud Hq, Rapport des operations, p. 18, 

and Annexes 1 and 2. (2) Giraud, Un seul but: la 

victoire, pp. 46-47. (3) CinC of the French Ground 

Forces of North Africa, Gcn Ordpr 4, IS Nov 42. 

Copy in CSTT Jnl, p. 28. 

come forward and assume sectors along the 

front. 

None of these French units had sufficient 

modern weapons or equipment, including 

transport. All were below strength as a result of the conditions imposed by the armistice with the Axis powers. Cadres were 

ready for eventual expansion and the whole 

army was in need of modernization with 

materiel provided by the Allies in fulfillment of promises made to Giraud and his 

associates during the negotiations before 

the Allied landings.'" 

As pointed out earlier, Allied and Axis 

forces had already clashed in Tunisia long 

before the last stage of the political negotiations. The initial Axis reaction to the 

Allied landings and the ultimate decision 

by the French to take an active part in freeing Tunisia were followed by intensive 

efforts by both sides to gain the upper hand 

at Tunis and Bizerte before the winter rains 

began. The narrative now takes up the operations of the Eastern Task Force as it 

advanced toward Tunis. 

73 See Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

(Washington, 1957). 

PART FOUR 

THE END OF OPERATION TORCH 

CHAPTER XV 

Taking Positions for the Drive on Tunis 

The Allied and Axis powers each rushed 

forces into northern Tunisia at the earliest 

opportunity, assuming grave risks. The first 

air and ground units sent by the Germans 

and Italians landed on Tunisian airfields 

and entered the port of Bizerte in close 

proximity to thousands of French troops 

capable of overwhelming them. Lt. Gen. 

Kenneth A. N. Anderson's task force left 

its base at Algiers hundreds of miles behind 

as its units pressed eastward along the coast 

and overland through a French and Arabic 

population that was puzzled, indifferent, or 

hostile. Operations were carried on while 

the political situation was being explored 

and before a friendly arrangement with the 

French could be assured. 

Assuming maximum French co-operation, Allied strategists had made plans to 

employ parachute troops and Commandos 

for the successive seizure of the airdromes at 

Bone, Bizerte, and Tunis on 11, 12, and 13 

November. Reserves that had not been committed at Algiers would be sent by sea to the 

Golfe de Bougie for the seizure on 12 N 0-

vember of the port of Bougie and the 

neighboring airdrome at Djidjelli, thus obtaining a forward base with fighter protection against the Axis bombers capable of 

striking from Sicilian airfields. 1 But with 

French co-operation still uncertain, the 

1 (1) Outline Plan Opn TORCH, 8 Oct 42, Annex 

4 (ETF Outline Plan), 28 Oct 42, pars. 5, 7. OPD 

381 TORCH. (2) First Army Opn Instruc 4, 15 

Oct 42, App. B. DRB AGO, 

Commandos and parachutists could not 

wisely be sent so far ahead of Allied ground 

troops. Instead, the British 78th Division, 

under the command of Maj. Gen. Vyvyan 

Evelegh, undertook first to occupy Bougie 

and Djidjelli, and next to rush as many 

troops as possible overland via Setif and 

Constantine to a railhead at Souk Ahras in 

Tunisia, while a second air and seaborne 

expedition took Bone. 

Advance Into Tunisia 

The revised plans went into effect on 9 

November. 2 Distances were considerable, 

about 260 airline miles from Algiers to Bone 

and 120 miles more to Bizerte or Tunis. 

The country to be crossed was rugged. The 

long lines of communications would be vulnerable at many points which would have 

to be left unprotected at first. Risky and 

difficult the swift advance might be, but 

speed was fundamental to achieve the main 

purpose of the entire TORCH Operation. 

The Eastern Task Force held in reserve 

afloat off Algiers a force to be landed at 

Bougie as soon as possible after D Day.a 

At 1830, 10 November, a fast convoy left 

Algiers for the objective, almost 100 miles 

2 The chief source for the operations of British 

Army and Royal Air Force units has been information supplied by Cabinet Office and Air Ministry, 

London, 

o Operation PERPETUAL. A brief aecount is given 

in Br. Battle Sum 38, Operation "Torch," p, 43-44. 

Copy in OCMH. 
278 

away on the western shore of the Golfe de 

Bougie. From the airfield at Djidjelli protection could be furnished to an advance assault shipping base at Bougie. Four infantry 

landing ships of the Royal Navy (Karanja, 

Marnix, Awatea, and Cathay), carrying 

the 36th Infantry Brigade Group (Br.), 

and six escorting warships overtook a slower 

group of five cargo vessels and ten warships 

which had started for Bougie at 1600. A 

covering force to the north added greatly to 

the number of units protecting the expedition. The aircraft carrier Argus was scheduled to furnish air cover at Bougie until 

noon, 11 November, when the Eastern Air 

Command would assume the responsibility. 

After the capture of the Djid jelli airstrip 

fighters flown from Maison Blanche airfield 

would use fuel brought by the convoy and 

trucked to the airstrip during the morning. 

The convoy arrived off Cap Carbon at 

0430, 11 November, and proceeded with 

landing operations on the assumption that a 

hostile reception was possible. Troops of the 

6th Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, 

struggling through heavy surf, came ashore 

at a point outside the range of the coastal 

guns. Farther east near Djidjelli, troops who 

were to take control of the airfield from 

friendly French and who were to provide 

fuel and ammunition for Royal Air Force 

planes which were expected during the day 

tried to land from the Awatea. Because the 

surf was too heavy, they had to turn west to 

go ashore at Bougie. There they joined the 

remainder of the expedition in using the 

sheltered bay with the permission of the 

French officer in command. They were 

about forty miles from the Djid jelli airstrip, 

too far to capture it in time to make it available for use if the Royal Air Force planes 

arrived as planned, or to supply fuel. 

The Argus turned to other duties accordNORTHWEST AFRICA 

ing to the schedule, and was itself bombed 

nearer Algiers before the end of the day. 

The land-based fighters of the Eastern Air 

Command, which had been held back until the airstrip was finally captured, arrived 

early on 12 November. Even then they were 

forced to wait until the next night for gasoline to be brought up. In consequence, the 

ships a Bougie were without active defense 

by land- or carrier-based aircraft except for 

brief patrols by planes which had flown 

nearly 200 miles to reach the area in time 

for action on the afternoon of 11 November 

and all day 12 November. The enemy sank 

the auxiliary antiaircraft ship Tynwald, destroyed the transports Karanja, Cathay, and 

Awatea, and damaged the monitor Roberts 

before this operation was completed. Bougie 

and Djid jelli were occupied, and on 12 November a force consisting of the reinforced 

8th Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, was sent to occupy the town and 

airfield at Setif. 

At dawn, 12 November, the destroyertransports Lamberton and Wheatland, with 

the guidance of a friendly local pilot, slipped 

into the port of Bone, 125 miles east of 

Bougie, and put ashore the 6th Commando 

(reinforced). The unit was at the eastern 

limits of Algeria, some 185 miles from 

Bizerte along the coastal highway. Later 

that day, 312 men of the 3d Battalion, 1st 

Parachute Regiment (Br.), were dropped 

from transport planes of the 64th Troop 

Carrier Group (U.S.) on a small airfield 

near Bone. Both arrivals were unopposed" 

This airfield and a second somewhat larger 

field at Duzerville, although about 130 miles 

west of Tunis, served as a forward air base 

for the Eastern Air Command. The port of 

'Memo, Maj Charles Billingslea for CG Airborne Gp, 15 Nov 42, sub: Parachute opns. AFHQ 

AG 370-71, Micro Job 24, Reel 79D. 
TAKING POSITIONS FOR THE DRIVE ON TUNIS 279 

Bone was highly valued by the Allies although within easy bombing range of enemy 

aircraft from Sardinia and Sicily. Its accommodations for docking at least twenty-two 

ships, and its railroad connections with La 

Calle by narrow-gauge track and with Duvivier, on the main Algiers-Tunis line, by 

standard-gauge electric railway, made it a 

potentially significant point of transshipment for the heavy stream of supplies and 

reinforcements to be rushed into Tunisia. 

(Map V) 

The Eastern Task Force, moving overland, first penetrated Tunisia at two different points, and at the same time sent a third 

force to the Algerian border on the southern 

flank. The British 78th Division on 14 

November was ordered to send a mobile task 

force of infantry with supporting armor, 

artillery, and combat engineers to move 

rapidly along the coastal highway from Bone 

to the port of Tabarka or even farther east. 

This overland march would be paralleled 

by two airborne advances next day. The 

British 1st Parachute Battalion (from 

AFHQ reserves) was to be sent from Algiers 

to the railroad center of Souk el Arba. The 

2d Battalion, U.S. 509th Parachute Infantry 

(Col. Edson D. Raff) , which had assembled 

at Maison Blanche after its unfortunate experience at Oran, was to be dropped on the 

southern flank at Youks-Ies-Bains, near 

Tebessa. The three operations would therefore place Allied forces within Tunisia at 

two northern points, each covering a major 

route from Algeria, and at the AlgerianTunisian boundary on the southern flank. 

At each point, plans called for contacts with 

the French in the vicinity, reconnaissance, 

and delaying action against enemy attempts 

to penetrate farther west. 

Youks-Ies-Bains airfield was occupied by 

parachutists of the 2d Battalion, 509th 

Parachute Regiment, who dropped from 

thirty-three C-47 transports on the morning of 15 November in an improvised operation. The airdrop owed its success to a 

friendly French reception. The gasoline 

stocked at the airfield was taken under 

American protection while the French garrison withdrew to a post about five miles 

away. Part of Colonel Raff's force then 

continued to Tebessa. 5 

The airdrop scheduled for Souk el Arba 

on 15 November had to wait one more day 

because of weather conditions. By the night 

of 16 November, Tunisia had been entered 

at two advanced points, Tabarka and Souk 

el Arba, where contact was established with 

General Barre's command at a point one 

and a half miles west of Bedja. Meanwhile 

on the northern axis of advance elements of 

the British 36th Brigade Group had arrived 

at Djebel Abiod. The troops had found the 

French to be helpful and well disposed. 

Behind this first series of eastward movements by sea, ground, and air, the main 

body of 78th Division started its overland 

advance from Algiers on 15 November, 

using motor transport just landed from one 

of the follow-up convoys. The stage was set 

for the first tentative contacts between Allied 

and Axis ground troops. If matters went 

reasonably well, the Eastern Task Force 

would be able to make a general advance 

into Tunisia one week later." 

• Rpt of airborne opns, 15 Feb 43. OPD 381 

Africa (1-27-43) Sec 2, Case 79. 

• A seaborne attack on Sousse mounted in Malta 

(Operation BREASTPLATE) and to be made simultaneously with the attack from the west was not 

attempted because of lack of means to seize the 

port against resistance. (1) Msg, USFOR to 

AGWAR, 18 Nov 42, CM-IN 7911. (2) Msg, 

Eise nhower (in Gibraltar) to Smith (in London), 

1129, 16 Nov 42; Msgs G-406 and G-449, Smith 

to Eisenhower, 16 and 18 Nov 42; Msg NR-862, 

Eisenhower to Gov of Malta, 2236, 18 Nov 42. 

Copies in Smith Papers. 
280 

The Eastern Air Force was overextended 

by the effort to meet all its responsibilities 

during the Eastern Task Force's rapid advance into Tunisia. Convoys at sea as well 

as ports, airfields, and troop movements in 

the forward area~all required air protection. For lack of radar ashore, early warning of enemy air attacks could rarely be 

obtained; therefore daylight fighter patrols 

had to be continuous. Equipment for improving airfields and maintaining aircraft 

came eastward haltingly, so that the air 

effort was carried on within severe limitations. While assembling the Eastern Task 

Force in position to launch his attack, General Anderson called for heavy and persistent Allied bombing of the ports and 

airfields near Bizerte and Tunis to cut down 

the Axis inflow. He also had to have strong 

air protection for the vital port of Bone in 

order to guarantee receipt of all sorts of 

critically needed materiel. Use of air transport to expedite the build-up contributed 

to the burden on the facilities of the airdromes near Algiers, where congestion hampered efficient performance. Finally the 

arrangements to co-ordinate air and ground 

operations were almost frustrated by the 

marked deficiency in signal communications. General Evelegh's Headquarters, 78th 

Division, included a Royal Air Force "tentacle" or Advanced Air Signal Corps (comparable to an American air support party) , 

while, to maintain liaison with General Anderson's task force headquarters, the Royal 

Air Force had provided for a command post 

headed by Air Commodore G. M. Lawson. 

This unit was the nucleus of the future 242d 

Group's staff. Signal communications between these points and the air staff at 

AFHQ and with the forward airdromes 

were not working as late as 23 November, 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

when Air Commodore Lawson found the 

widespread ignorance of organization and 

the need for energetic rectification most disturbing. The Eastern Air Command had 

to overcome not only the enemy's advantages but the drawbacks of its own chaotic 

condition before Allied air power could 

make itself fully effective. 7 

The Terrain of Tunisia 

In moving against northeastern Tunisia, 

the Allies were faced with an area of great 

topographical complexity. Bizerte and 

Tunis are situated in coastal flatlands 

fringed by hills which project to the seacoast from high and irregular mountain 

masses lying to the west. Bizerte's basin is 

relatively small and much of it is submerged 

under the Lac de Bizerte and the marshy 

Garaet Ichkeul. The plain adjacent to Tunis 

is separated from that of Bizerte and is 

bounded on the northwest, west, and south 

by the eastern extremities of high mountain 

ridges. Lower hills rim the Tunis plain at 

the southwest, between the Medjerda and 

Miliane rivers. Through this more favorable 

traversable sector ran the main highway and 

railroad connecting Algeria with Tunis. 

The mountainous region north of the 

Medjerda river and southwest of Bizerte, 

an area about fifty miles long and extending 

inland forty miles from the coast, is separated into five segments by four lesser 

streams: the Sedjenane, Malah, Djoumine, 

and Tine. The irregular masses rising between these rivers are covered with a dense 

scrub in the northern belt from the Sedjenane to the sea. Elsewhere their upper 

portions are rocky and bare, dark gray in 

'Info supplied by Air Hinistry, London. 
TAKING POSITIONS FOR THE DRIVE ON TUNIS 281 

color, speckled with shadows, with a trace 

of green along the brooks nearer the bases. 

Conditions were favorable to defense. Certain rocky heights gave observation over 

a wide expanse. On the rounded shoulders 

of the hills were innumerable excellent sites 

for mortars. Potential tank routes were few 

and readily recognized and mined. Outflanking maneuver over the hills would require extraordinary effort. These characteristics were suspected, perhaps, by the 

approaching Eastern Task Force, but their 

full import was to be learned the hard way. 

The Medjerda valley extends generally 

southwest to northeast about 125 miles 

across Tunisia from headwaters beyond the 

Algerian border to its outlet north of Tunis. 

It consists of several alluvial plains connected by gorges, and the river for most 

of its length has steep-sided banks. After 

heavy rains the clay soil of the fertile plains 

turned into some of the softest mud known 

to soldiers. The countryside between the 

towns was dotted with many French farms 

and estates, on which were buildings of 

white and pink stucco, with somewhat 

fewer villas in classic style. There were also 

many small Arab villages of gray, mudand-straw huts. Between Medjez el Bab 

and Tebourba, the Med jerda ran close to 

the base of lofty hills, with a narrow shelf 

from which a railroad and highway continued across the plain to Tunis. The river 

was bridged at Djedeida (fifteen miles from 

Tuni,,), where the stream turned more 

sharply northward, and at eight other points 

farther upstream at intervals of six to ten 

miles, all within the area in which the Allied 

troops were to concentrate or to engage the 

enemy. 

Between the Medjerda and Miliane 

rivers, a highway from Le Kef reached 

Tunis through Teboursouk, Medjez el Bab, 

and Massicault. Closer to the Miliane, 

roads to Tunis from Pont-du-Fahs ran along 

that stream on either side, and on the southeastern bank near the base of the mountain 

ridge was also a railroad from Le Kef 

through Le Sers, Bou Arada, and Pont-duFahs to Tunis. It was in the hills north of 

the Medjerda and along both sides of that 

valley that the first efforts to reach Tunis 

and Bizerte were to be made. An Allied 

thrust along the Medjerda was vulnerable 

to a southern flank attack delivered from the 

vicinity of the Miliane. Nevertheless, the 

Axis defenders of Tunis feared being pinned 

down while Allied forces pushed to the coast 

well to the south, and thereby cut the line 

from Tunis to Tripoli. The topography of 

central Tunisia gave the defenders more 

security from such a threat than they perhaps realized. 

South of the Miliane the topography is 

dominated by three connected mountain 

chains which form a vast, inverted Y. The 

stem extends northeastward to Cap Bon. 

The fork is found south of Pont-du-F ahs 

in the vicinity of the bold Djebel Fkirine 

(988), a peak rising to more than 3,000 

feet. For over 125 miles one prong (the 

Eastern Dorsal) projects southward to Maknassy, while a still longer extension to the 

southwest (the Grand, or \Vestern, Dorsal) 

reaches beyond F criana. Across the wide 

southern opening of the Y is the east-west 

chain on either side of the oasis at Gafsa. 

Within this great triangular region is an 

intermediate Tunisian plateau, crossed by 

a few streams draining the higher ground 

at the west to the coastal plain at the east. 

The intermediate plateau is subdivided 

by several disconnected and curving ridges 

which are more or less parallel to the Grand 
282 

Dorsal. They are so scattered within the 

area as to create a group of wide valleys and 

basins connected by openings between 

guardian heights. Most of the region receives less than sixteen inches of rainfall 

annually, and the bulk of that within the 

winter months, so that the ground is dry and 

dusty from March to ~ovember, though 

there is enough moisture for forage and 

agriculture at many points. Orchards, grainfields, and cultivated cactus patches supported a surprisingly large number of small 

Arab villages and individual Europeanowned farms. 

The coastal plain lies between the Eastern 

Dorsal and the sea, spreading south of Enfidaville to a width of about seventy miles, 

narrowing north of Gabes to a bottleneck, 

and again broadening between the Matmata mountains and the sea, where the coast 

swings southeasterly to Tripolitania. Shallow lakes and dried-up lake beds are found 

at numerous points on the coastal plain, 

while on similarly level terrain extending 

westward for more than 200 miles from the 

Gabcs gap, salt marshes ( chotts) cover 

about half the surface. Movement north 

and south on the coastal plain is easy but 

the narrow gap at Gabes, the neck between 

Enfidaville and Hammamet farther north, 

and the defile at Hamman Lif near the base 

of Cap Bon peninsula, are dominating 

points of control. 

The southern section of barren, undulating desert changed to tableland in the latitudes of Sfax and Sousse and, near Kairouan, could be used with little preparation 

for airplane landing fields. Water brought 

by streams and aqueducts from the intermediate plateau was necessary for the agriculture and the townspeople of the coastal 

plain. Over this area north and south for 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

about 180 miles ran sections of the rail and 

highway used in November 1942 to connect the Axis Tunisian bridgehead with 

Tripoli. To reach and cut this Axis line of 

communications, the Allies had to establish 

a line of their own reaching southeastward 

over the mountains of eastern Algeria and 

central Tunisia. It required the use of port 

facilities and railroad capacity already being 

stretched to the full to build up the Eastern 

Task Force in the Medjerda valley and 

north of it. The Allied drive on Tunis absorbed almost all available transport and 

focused their resources on northeastern Tunesia, from Pont-du-Fahs northward. 

Because of the rugged topography movement between the interior and the coastal 

plain is restricted to breaks in the mountain 

barriers. The intermediate plateau within 

the flaring arms of the two dorsals can best 

be reached from the coast through passes in 

the Eastern Dorsal at Pichon, Fondouk el 

Aouareb (also known as Fondouk el Okbi), 

Fai'd, and Maknassy, or through a defile 

east of El Guettar and a broader gap at 

Gafsa. Transit through tbe Western Dorsal 

is somewhat easier and best achieved at 

openings near Maktar, Sbiba, Kasserine, 

and Feriana. East-west movement through 

the central mountain complex north of the 

intermediate plateau is most practicable 

along the finger-like extensions of tbe eoastal 

plain which project into tbe hills and extend 

at intermediate altitudes into the higher 

plateau and mountain ridges. The Goubellat plain between tbe Medjerda and Miliane 

rivers, about half way between Medjez el 

Bab and Pont-du-Fahs, is the most important area thus connected with the coastal 

zone. 

In northern Tunisia the road and railroad routes drew attacking forces along cer-
TAKING POSITIONS FOR THE DRIVE ON TUNIS 283 

tain well-defined lines of approach. The 

coastal road from Tabarka to Mateur was 

the first. That road was linked with the 

Medjerda valley routes by a north-south link 

of almost twenty-five miles connecting Djebel Abiod and Bedja. A secondary road from 

Bedja ran northeasterly to Sidi Nsir, roughly 

parallel to a section of the railroad linking 

Bedja with Mateur, and then struck eastward to the Tine river valley where it sent 

one branch northward to Mateur and another branch still farther east to link with 

the Mateur-Choulgui pass-Tebourba road. 

Thus a second element of the attacking force 

could move through Sidi Nsir to the Tine 

valley and then be in position either to cooperate with a coastal road column in attacking Mateur, or to occupy Choulgui pass 

and even join a third attacking element in 

seizing Tebourba. A third group would have 

its choice of the road and railway line along 

the northern bank of the Medjerda river 

to Tebourba or south of it from Medjez el 

Bab through Massicault to Tunis. If it drove 

against Tebourba with its right flank resting 

on the Medjerda, defensive measures would 

be required on the other side of the stream, 

where hills would enable the enemy to 

harass anyone on the northern bank, and 

where the Massicault road would serve for 

a swift thrust against the key communications center of Medjez el Bab. 

Bizerte and Tunis were forty miles apart 

by the direct highway east of Lac de Bizerte 

and about fifty miles by road and railroad 

through Mateur and Djedelda, a route 

which penetrated the fringe of hills between 

Mateur and the Tunis plain some ten miles 

north of Choulgui pass. Possession of Mateur as the hub of radiating roads and railroad lines not only was essential if Bizerte 

was to be taken from the interior, but it 

would also be a great advantage in an attack on Tunis. Possession of Djedelda, less 

than fifteen miles from Tunis, would effectively break the railroad link between Tunis 

and Bizerte and confine the ground link to 

the highway through Protville. Indeed, any 

force which could take and hold Djede1da 

would be strong enough, presumably, to 

seize Tunis itself. 

Allied Spearheads Engage the Enemy 

French troops were located at various 

points between the forces of the approaching Allies and of the Axis. The latter had 

been pushing westward into the hills by a 

series of small encroachments before which 

General Barre's Tunisian units withdrew 

under instructions not to permit a premature 

clash. The withdrawals were accompanied 

by equivocal French answers to invitations 

to join the Axis forces and fight the Allies. 

The Axis accepted each equivocation without an ultimatum as long as Axis forces were 

only a small miscellaneous assortment incapable of enforcing its demands. What 

General Barre began as a temporizing measure he continued after the basic decisions 

by the French in Algiers on 13 November, 

as long as both sides needed to avoid battle. 8 

The French completed their regrouping in 

northern Tunisia on 17 November. 

North of these screening French troops, 

the first Allied ground engagement with the 

Germans occurred the same day. At Djebel 

Abiod, a provisional British unit was then 

guarding the bridge and highway intersection after a march from Tabarka during the 

previous night. While it organized defensive 

positions, a German-Italian armored reconnaissance column approached along the 

'CSTT Jnl, 13-15 Nov 42. 
284 

twisting road from Bizerte and Mateur.D At 

1430, the two forces clashed. (Map 4) 

Heavy British artillery fire halted the enemy's advance. The Germans and Italians 

deployed swiftly and for the next three hours 

replied with accurate mortar and machine 

gun fire and with effective shelling from 

tank guns. At dusk, they retired along the 

road, having lost one man killed, twenty 

wounded, and eight tanks knocked out. Allied losses in personnel were considerable. 

Furthermore, one field gun was destroyed 

and four were damaged, most of the antitank guns were knocked out, and many carriers and other vehicles were destroyed or 

badly damaged. The battle which thus began on 17 November continued at intervals 

during the next two days, with each side receiving reinforcements but neither being 

able to dislodge the other.10 

While these elements of the 36th Brigade 

Group were defending the Djebel Abiod 

road junction, Hartforce, a mobile fighting 

and reconnaissance party of about 150 men, 

carried out a sweeping, independent patrol 

in the hills south of the D jebel Abiodl\hteur highway. At 1900 hours, 20 1\"0-

vember, the force arrived back on the road 

between Djebel Abiod and Bedja. A few 

• The British force cO'nsisted of: Headquarters 

and three cO'mpanies, 6th BattaliO'n, Royal West 

Kent Regiment (6/R WK) ; twO' trO'O'Ps of the 360th 

Battery, 138th Field Regiment, RO'yal Artillery; 

C Squadron, 56th Reconnaissance Regiment, and 

Hartforce, a provisional unit cO'mprising B Com· 

pany, Carrier Platoon, and twO' detachments of the 

mortar platoon, of the 5th Battalion, Northampton· 

shire Regiment. The Axis cO'lumn, under Maj. RudO'If Witzig, commander O'f the 11 th Parachute En· 

f.(ineer Battalion, included about fifteen tanks, two 

cO'mpanies of parachute engineers, Qne battery of 

105-mm. gum, and a few Italian armored cars. 

lO (1) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, Landon. 

(2) Div. Broich, KTB, Nr. 1, Il.XI.-31.XII.42, 

16-20 Nov 42, and Anlagenheft I, Anlage 4; An· 

laf.(enheft II, Anlage 8. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

minor engagements with enemy vehicles and 

patrols had shown that the Germans were 

still confined to the roads. 

A reconnaissance party sent out by the 

Germans from Mateur toward Bedja on 18 

November in three light reconnaissance and 

three heavy armored cars ran into an ambush laid by about one company of the 1st 

Parachute Battalion (Br.) near Sidi Nsir. 

The fight occurred only thirteen miles southwest of Mateur.ll The enemy force was completely destroyed or captured, but the 

British had to leave the captured vehicles 

behind. They were retrieved by another 

German reconnaissance patrol on the 20th. 

Well on the way toward the general area 

of these contacts by this time was Blade 

Force, a provisional formation operating 

under command of the 78th Division as 

the main striking group. Its components 

were drawn from the British 6th Armoured 

Division, and it resembled an American 

armored combat command. 12 Blade Force 

had begun its march from Algiers to Souk 

Ahras late on 15 November, partly by railroad and partly by motor convoy. It biv11 Msg, Div. Broich to XC Corps, 18 Nov 42, in 

Div. Broich, KTB, Nr. 1, 11.XI.-31.XII.42, An· 

lagenheft II, Anlage 8. 

12 Blade Force was commanded by Col. R. A. 

Hull and consisted of: 17/21 Lancers Regiment 

(Qne mO'dern unit formed by the merger of two 

former cavalry units); B SquadrO'n, 1st Derbyshire 

Yeomanry; C Battery, 12th RQyal HO'rse Artillery 

(mechanized) ; A Battery, 72d Antitank Regiment; 

G Troop, 51 st Light Antiaircraft Regiment; one 

troop, 5th Field Squadron, Royal Engineers; B 

CQmpany, 10th Rifle Brigade. On 18 NO'vember, 

additiO'nal units placed under cQmmand were: the 

5th Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment; the 

457th Light Battery, Royal Artillery; the 1st Parachute Battalion; and the American 175th Field 

Artillery Battali~n (twelve 25.pounder guns). On 

24 November, the 1st Battalion, U.S. 1st Armored 

Regiment, after coming east from Oran, joined 

Blade Force at Bedja. InfO' supplied by Cabinet 

Office, London. 
, 

u 

'-~. 

• 

, 

I

) I ., [ I 
286 

ouacked near So uk Ahras during the night 

of 17-18 November, preparing to resume 

its advance next morning to the vicinity of 

Bedja, Medjez el Bab, and Le Kef. A fragment of Blade Force, including the 175th 

Field Artillery Battalion (U.S.), reached 

Medjez el Bab to reinforce the French during the afternoon of 18 November and the 

following night. Fighting would extend 

southward from Djebel Abiod and Sidi Nsir 

to Medjez el Bab in a matter of hours. 

Nehring Takes Command in Tunis 

On 17 November, General Nehring, who 

had arrived the day before, opened his command post as Commanding General, German XC Corps, in theformer U.S. consulate 

in Tunis. No German signal communications had been arranged, and the French 

telephone system was being used despite the 

risk of hostile surveillance. Transportation 

was supplied chiefly by hired French automobiles. No chief of staff was yet on hand. 

No one could tell Nehring exactly which 

units had arrived, where they were, or who 

commanded them. 

General Nehring established two separate bridgeheads, one temporarily under 

Colonel Harlinghausen, the Luftwaffe officer in command at Tunis, and a second under a new commander at Bizerte, Lt. Col. 

Stolz, each directly responsible to Nehring. B 

"Stolz had replaced Col. Hans Lederer at Bizcrte on 16 November and on 18 November was 

himself superseded by Col. Fritz Freiherr von 

Broich. Stolz then took command of the troops at 

Mateur. Colonel Harlinghausen on 18 November 

was relieved by Lt. Col. Koch, commander of the 

5th Parachute Regiment at Tunis, freeing Harlinghausen for his primary air mission. Harlinghausen 

also retained command of the antiaircraft troops 

and the units in Sousse, Sfax, and Gabb. (I) Diu. 

Broich, KTB, Nr. 1, llX1.-31XII.42, 16-18 

Nov 42. (2) XC Corps, KTB I, 16.-30X1.42, 

18Nov42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Nehring ordered expansion of the Bizerte 

bridgehead to the west and reconnaissance 

as far along the coast as Tabarka; in addition, he accepted Admiral Derrien's promise 

to defend Bizerte against Anglo-American 

attack in a sector to be occupied solely by 

French troops. All but one company of German infantry and some German and Italian 

antiaircraft units in Bizerte were thus released for commitment west of the city. On 

the advice of Dr. Rudolph Rahn, the Nazi 

diplomatic agent in Tunis, and in the light 

of his own observations, General Nehring 

continued to expect no more than passive 

neutrality from Esteva, Barre, and even 

Derrien.14 

On 17 November, Nehring and Rahn 

recommended that Esteva be immediately 

relieved of his post as Resident General. He 

had induced them to consider him well disposed to the Axis, but he proved completely 

undecided and incapable of making even 

the simplest decisions in matters of administration and supply. At the same time, they 

recommended prompt execution of Admiral Platon's proposed arrangement for 

sending General Henri F. Dentz to Tunisia 

as a special representative with extensive 

powers from Marshal Petain, a step which 

they believed would contribute to winning 

over General Barre and his Tunis Division 

from passive neutrality (for they had persuaded him to revoke orders to his troops 

to fire on Axis forces) to active colla boration. 15 

The aggressive reconnaissance to the west 

H (I) Div. Broich, KTB, Nr. 1, 1l.x1.-31.XII.42. 

15-18 Nov 42. (2) XC Corps, KTB I, 16.-30X1.42. 

15-18 Nov 42. 

1.; Rad, Ag Ausland Nr. Sp. 47/42 geh. Ausl I 

(A3) O. v. D., 18 Nov 42, to WFSt/Atlas and 

others; Rad, Abw 1M WEST S No. 47564/42g, 17 

Nov 42, to Chef Amt Ausl/Abw. Both in OKW/Ag 

Ausland II A5, Alliierte Landing, in FranzoesischNordafrika am 8 November 1942, Band I. 
TAKING POSITIONS FOR THE DRIVE ON TUNIS 287 

which Nehring directed Colonel Stolz's force 

to undertake was pushed from Mateur 

toward Tabarka on 17 November, resulting 

in the engagement at Djebel Abiod already 

described. 

The First Battle at M ed jez el Bab, 

19-20 November 

Allied concentration of in northern 

Tunisia was observed and in some instances 

attacked by Axis aircraft, from whose reports it became apparent to Nehring that 

the test in the Medjerda valley must soon 

occur. Most pressing was the situation in 

Medjez el Bab, to which Col. Guy Le 

Coulteux de Caumont's group had retired 

on the morning of 17 November, closely 

pursued by about 300 tough German Air 

Force troops of the 3d Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment, under the command of 

Capt. Wilhelm Knoche. The town was at 

the easternmost projection of a French-held 

quadrilateral of which Bedja, Teboursouk, 

and Souk el Arba formed the other points. 

The time for the showdown on Barre's attitude had arrived. By previous arrangement, 

General Barre came to Medjez el Bab from 

Souk el Arba at 0400, 19 November, to 

meet an emissary from Dr. Rahn, who gave 

him an ultimatum from General Nehring: 

French troops must withdraw again to the 

meridian of Tabarka, thus freeing much of 

Tunisia, or hostilities against them would 

begin at 0700. Barre's offer to give his decision at 0700 was recognized at Nehring's 

headquarters as an effort to gain more time 

before openly joining the Allies.11; Yet the 

Germans made one more effort to avoid 

'" (1) Giraud Hq, Rapport des operations, pp. 

6-7. (2) XC Corps. KTB I. 16.30.XI., 18 and 19 

Nov 42. (3) MS # 0-323, Meine Erlebnisse im 

Tunesien~Feldzug, November 1942 bis Januaf 

1943 (Captain Wilh~lm Knoche) 

conflict. Another order, direct from Marshal Petain, was transmitted through Admiral Esteva to General Barre, forbidding 

him to fire against Axis forces. This renewed 

directive was obtained from Vichy after 

three unsuccessful attempts by the Germans 

on 18-19 N ovem ber to persuade the general 

to execute earlier orders of similar purport." 

Axis air reconnaissance over the Medjez el 

Bab area revealed the presence of an Allied 

force-the observer saw a number of vehicles and was challenged by American antiaircraft fire. German ground troops were 

therefore ordered to be ready to make a 

morning attack, in \=o-ordination with dive 

bombers, on the troops defending both the 

town and its important bridge over the 

Medjerda river." 

Small forces were at hand for the first 

battle for Medjez el Bab. Colonel Le Coulteux deferred the actual outbreak of hostilities as long as possible in expectation of 

strong Allied reinforcements. During the 

night of 18-19 November he received from 

Blade Force one American field artillery 

battalion (the 17 5th) in addition to small 

British armored and infantry detachments.1

" 

"Rpt, German Armistice Commission, H'icsbaden, 20.XI.42, 15.00, in OKW /WFSt, Sonderakte, Vorgaenge Frankreich. 

"XC Corps, KTB I, 16.-30.XI., 19 Nov 42. 

'" The 175th Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. 

Joseph E. Kelly) with 175 rounds of 25-pounder 

ammunition for each of its twelve with six 

davs' rations and with some machine 

gu~s mounted on its trucks, was sent east at 0800, 

16 November, with the British 78th Division, expf'eting to support an armored fonT, either British 

or American. Col. R. A. Hull, commanding Blad{' 

Force, sent the battalion, operating under the command of Lt. Col. S. l L. Hill of the 1st Parachute 

Battalion (BL) to reach Medjcz cI Bab by early 

morning, 19 Novembt'T, to assist the French in holding the bridge. Frmch liaison officers guided the 

battalion to Medjez ... 1 Bab, where th(' batt<'ri('s were 

r('ady to fin: before daylight. See 175th FA Bn War 

Diary, 8 :'-Iov 42-1 Mar 43. 
288 

Shortly after 0900, 19 November, the 

Germans broke off all parleys and their attack became merely a question of time. 

About 0915, the battle opened with an exchange of small arms, mortar, and artillery 

fire. Beginning about 1045 the Germans 

were aided by Stukas, the enemy air formations bombing and strafing the battle 

area at two-hour intervals. The defenders 

successfully threw back small-scale infantry 

assaults after two of these air attacks, but 

heavy casualties and reduced ammunition 

stocks threatened to make the town untenable without reinforcements. Reinforcements were not forthcoming, for First 

Army's instructions were to avoid frittering 

away Allied strength and to conserve all 

possible means for the final push eastward 

in a few more days.20 The Germans received 

only three truckloads of Italian reinforcements during the afternoon, but after darkness sent detachments to swim the stream 

and to fight on the northern bank. An attack 

with increasing strength was successfully 

simulated. 21 The Allies fell back from the 

bridge, which they left intact. 

Shortly before midnight the commander 

of the 1st Parachute Battalion, Lt. Col. S. 

]. L. Hill, summoned Colonel Le Coulteux 

to his command post at Oued Zarga and 

informed him that a general withdrawal 

should begin without delay. The troops at 

Medjez el Bab were ordered to take positions on the high ground some three miles 

east of Oued Zarga, a strong natural line 

astride the road to Bedja. The retirement 

was well advanced before daylight, and by 

early afternoon the new line was organized. 

The enemy occupied Medjez el Bab soon 

after it was evacuated, but did not follow 

on 175th FA Bn War Diary, pp. 21-28; Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

"' MS # D-323 (Knoche). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

toward Oued Zarga until more than a day 

had passed. 22 Enemy air, however, did 

bomb Bedja most severely on 20 November, 

inflicting many casualties among both soldiers and civilians. On 22 November, Axis 

ground troops were stopped east of Oued 

Zarga and Slourhia by defense forces. 23 

The Enemy Attempts To Extend the 

Bridgehead 

While the Allies were concentrating near 

Bedja in preparation for their major attack, 

they felt the sting of Axis air strikes and the 

fire power of probing motorized columns. 

The enemy tried to delay the progress of the 

Eastern Task Force by bombing port areas 

and roads near Bone, La Calle, and Tabarka, and the roads radiating from Bedja. 

He used every precious day to the utmost 

in accumulating enough means successfully 

to defend the Tunisia bridgehead. He organized defensive perimeters around Tunis 

and Bizerte, and established blocking positions in depth along the routes which led 

into them. Farther to the west and southwest, Axis reconnaissance forces kept testing 

Allied local strength. 

Although General Nehring's primary mission was to consolidate his hold on the main 

bridgehead, he was also responsible for organizing the protection, as far as Gabes, of 

the long overland line of communications 

from the bridgehead to Tripoli. The importance of this route to the Axis forces could 

hardly be exaggerated. Yet Nehring felt he 

lacked the means to carry out both missions. 

" (1) CSTT Jnl, 19-20 Nov 42. (2) Command 

of the 3d Parachute Battalion at Medjez el Bab 

had passed to a Captain Schirmer, who knew the 

terrain to the west only by map. MS # D-323 

(Knoche) . 

'" CSTT Jnl, 22 Nov 42. 
TAKING POSITIONS FOR THE DRIVE ON TCNIS 289 

He remained apprehensive that while he was 

holding the northeastern tip of Tunisia, the 

Allies might outflank him farther south and 

seize a segment of the coastal corridor. His 

orders to forestall such an operation were 

underscored during persc.Jnal visits to his 

headquarters by Kesselring on 17 and 20 

November, and by Generale di Brigata Antonio Gandin, liaison officer from the Comando Supremo) on 19 November. Mussolini's deep concern that the line of communications to Rommel's army should remain 

unbroken was then stressed.24 

Small German garrisons occupied Sousse, 

Sfax, and Gabes on 1 8 November. On 

20 November, Italian troops from Tripoli 

reached Gabes after an overland march. 

Other Italians coming by railroad from 

Tunis, despite delays by sabotage, reached 

Sfax on 21 November. To impede any Allied thrust toward Gabes or Sfax, demolition teams parachuted at night far to the 

west along the roads between Gafsa and 

Tebessa. Armored reconnaissance patrols, 

followed by small security detachments, entered the intervening area. A German airborne demolition team landed near Gafsa 

on the evening of 20 November while an 

Italian armored and motorized force was 

heading toward Gafsa over the main road 

from Gabes. The garrison in Gafsa, a French 

command and a small detachment of Colonel Raff's 2d Battalion, 509th Parachute 

Regiment, retired to Feriana after being 

alerted by telephone. On 22 November, 

21 (1) XC Corps, KTB I, J6.-30.XI.42, 17-21 

Nov 42. (2) SKL/l. Abt, KTB, Teil A, I.-30.XI. 

42, 18-21 Nov 42. (3) Lageorientierung Nordafrika, OKII/Op Abt, Nr. 24253/42. 18 Nov 42, 

Lageorientierungen vom 5.XI.-31.XII.42. (4) MS 

# D-147, Die 1. Phase deT Kaempfe in Tunesien 

bis zur U ebernahme des Oberbefehls durch das 

neugebildete OberKommando deT 5.Pz ATmee am 

9.XII.1942, Teil II (Nehring). 

somewhat reinforced, it returned to Gafsa, 

drove out the Germans, and continued 

toward Gabes. It encountered the Italian 

motorized column near El Guettar and sent 

it hurrying back to its base of operations. 

Another Allied detachment headed toward 

Sbei'tla to check the penetration there of an 

Axis force from the northeast. 25 

Sbcltla, a community partly ancient and 

partly modern, was very briefly held by the 

enemy. An armored German column on 

21 November cleared the way for an Italian 

security detachment to occupy Kairouan, 

east of the mountains, and next day broke 

through one of the passes and drove a 

weaker French garrison out of Sbei'tIa, But 

after this German force had started back to 

Tunis, via Siliana and Pont-du-Fahs, leaving 

an Italian group in possession of Sbeltla, a 

detachment of Colonel Raff's command 

suddenly struck at midday and turned the 

tables. It expelled the Italians, a stronger 

French force took up the defense of Sbe1t1a, 

and Raff's detachment withdrew to Kasserine and Feriana. 2

£ The enemy made one 

unsuccessful attempt on 24 November to 

regain Sbe'itla but thereafter accepted the 

fact that he lacked the means. These forays 

and others demonstrated that neither adversary was then prepared to undertake any 

sustained offensive action III central 

Tunisia." 

The defensibility of the Axis bridgehead 

in northeastern Tunisia would have been 

2' (1) XC Corps, KTB I, J6.-30.XI.42, 20-23 

Nov 42. 2) AFHQ, G-3 Rpts, 8-30 Nov 42, Rpt 

No. 15, Nov 42. (3) XIX Corps Jnl, 15 Nov 

42-13 May 43, entries 20-23 Nov 42. (4) 7015t TD 

Bn AAR, 24 Scp 43. (5) Col. Edson D. Raff, We 

Jumped to Fight (New York, 1944), pp. 91ff. (6) 

Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

'" Raff, We Jumped to Fight, p. Ill, citing Co B, 

701st TD Bn (Capt Gilbert Ellman). 

" XC Corps, KTB I, J6.-30.XI.42, 19-24 Nov 42. 
290 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

SBEITLA 

greatly enhanced if it could have been expanded far enough inland to provide room 

for maneuver. The Commander in Chief, 

South, urged General Nehring to push westward beyond Med jez el Bab as closely as 

possible to the area of the current Allied 

concentration. Nehring, however, sought 

first to insure that the close-in defenses of 

Bizerte and Tunis were strong. On 21 November, he established two sectors in the 

perimeter around Tunis, assigning responsibility for the southern sector to the Italians 

and for the northern to Colonel Stolz, whose 

command in Mateur was taken over by Col. 

Walther Barenthin. Djedelda was to be a 

key point in the perimeter, and its airfield 

was made ready as a forward base of Axis 

close air support operations. Mateur remained a base for motorized screening patrols extending toward the area held by the 

Allies. On 21 November, one such column 

approached Bedja via Sidi Nsir at the same 

time that the Axis occupants of Medjez el 

Bab were feeling out Allied strength in the 

same general area. The column was stopped 

short by a French defensive force consisting 

of the 2d Battalion, 15th Regiment of Senegalese Infantry, reinforced by one 47-mm. 

gun and one 25-mm. gun. The larger 

weapon knocked out four Italian tanks and 

caused the others to retire, while French 

counterattacks against one flank of the 
TAKING POSITIONS FOR THE DRIVE ON TUNIS 291 

Italian motorized infantry drove off the rest 

of the force. 28 

Southwest of Tunis, Axis security detachments had been established in Zarhouan 

and Pont-du-Fahs as early as 19 November 

and mobile detachments had been active in 

the Tebourba-El Bathan and GoubellatBou Arada areas. On 20 November, while 

enemy elements were overcoming French 

resistance in Med jez el Bab, other elements 

occupied Ksar Tyr. By 23 November, their 

probing in the region south of the Medjerda 

reached the vicinity of El Aroussa. 29 There 

a reconnaissance party from the 5th Parachute Regiment was thrown back by one 

Allied infantry battalion supported by an 

estimated nine to twelve British tanks. 

Stukas struck the Allied troops, but the Axis 

ground units, like those of the Eastern Task 

Force, were then under strict orders not 

to jeopardize their resources in aggressive 

attacks. They had been directed to husband 

their tanks and heavy guns in order to remain capable of defending a line which 

General Nehring would designate later. 

They withdrew. 

By 24 November, the German-Italian 

forces had enlarged the Axis bridgehead as 

much as General Nehring believed they 

could. He thereupon elected to await the 

expected Allied attack before resuming 

counterthrusts toward western Tunisia. 3o 

Preparations for the First Allied Attack 

The Eastern Task Force set 21 or 22 

November as the earliest date for the begin28(1) CSTT JnI, 22 Nov 42. (2) XC Corps, 

KTB I, 16.-30XI.42, 20-22 Nov. 42. 

29 MS # D-086, Die I. Phase der Kaempfe in 

Tunesien bis zur Uebernahme des Befehls durch 

das neugebildete OberKommando der 5.Pz.armee 

am 9.XII.42, Teil I (Nehring). 

:I' XC Corps, KTB I, 16.-30.XI.42, 23-24 Nov 42. 

ning of its general advance. In preparation, 

Allied ground troops took up forward positions on a general line running southward 

from Djebel Abiod through Sidi Nsir, Oued 

Zarga, Testour, and El Aroussa. General 

Anderson on 21 November doubted the 

ability of his available forces to reach Tunis 

against the enemy's supposed strength. After 

visiting the forward area, Anderson returned to his Algiers headquarters to appraise the situation, particularly the significance of reported German moves on his 

southern flank, and to make certain that 

his attack, once it began, would get off to 

a good start. 31 

Although Axis strength and dispositions 

in Tunisia were then imperfectly known at 

Eastern Task Force headquarters, the rapidity of the Axis build-up and the numbers of 

armored vehicles and defensive weapons 

which were believed to be at the enemy's disposal greatly exceeded the estimates of the 

preinvasion planners. In order for the Allies 

to cope with this increased enemy strength, 

a change was necessary in the composition 

of General Anderson's command, which had 

been limited to units of the British First 

Army, supported by squadrons of the Royal 

Air Force. To strengthen his forces, mobile 

American units were also drawn into Tunisia. Artillery, light and medium tanks, 

tank destroyers, armored infantry, and related elements were sent forward from 

Algiers and Oran, while fighter and bomber 

squadrons of the XII Air Support Command were shifted eastward in small numbers. Artillery battalions from the 39th and 

168th Regimental Combat Teams at Algiers 

were the first to arrive. Elements of Combat 

31 (1) Rpt, CG ETF (Jemmapes) to AFHQ, 

(and Br. War Office), 2200, 22 Nov 42. Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (2) Br. First 

Army Opn Instruc 6, 21 Nov 42. DRB AGO. 
292 

Command B, U.S. 1st Armored Division, 

started eastward on 15 November by road 

and railroad with the prospect of piecemeal 

commitment, but General Oliver, its commander, convinced Generals Clark and 

Eisenhower that it should all be employed 

as a balanced armored team even if many 

of its lighter tracked vehicles had to go 700 

miles with the wheeled vehicles by road. 

Some elements rode from Algiers to Bone 

by sea. By 27 November, all units except 

Company C, 13th Armored Regiment, had 

left Oran and been attached to the Eastern 

Task Force, and were coming close to the 

area of combat. In fact, some were already 

there. American tank units were included 

in each of the major elements of the Eastern 

Task Force when the first attack began, 

while headquarters and other elements of 

Combat Command B, U.S. 1st Armored 

Division, were on hand during the final 

phase. 32 

The line of communications to the Eastern 

Task Force remained in a rudimentary state 

of organization. Its headquarters under 

Maj. Gen. J. G. W. Clark (Br.) opened in 

Algiers on 17 November, and moved forward to Setif on 28 November. From a 

junction point at Souk Ahras, the railway 

line ran south to Tebessa, supply base for 

the Tunisian Task Force on the southern 

flank, and eastward to Souk el Arba, the 

railhead for the main offensive. Trains made 

the journey from Algiers to Souk el Arba in 

from four to six days. Nine trains a day 

could be accommodated, with one hauling 

the minimum requirements for civilian supply and two carrying coal to electric generating stations and to locomotive refueling 

points. The remaining six, hauling military 

" ( 1) Intervs with Gens Oliv('r and Robinett, 

11 J an. 51. (2 ) Info supplied by Cabine t Office, 

London. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

CREW OF A GENERAL GRANT 

TANK heating .fieLd rations at Souk eL 

Arba, 23 November 1942. 

supplies, were supplemented by as much 

coastal traffic as possible. Despite the hazards of air attack on ships using the port of 

Bone, and the actual damage to piers and 

cranes, Bone became the point of transshipment of supplies bound for La Calle 

(the base for the forces on the extreme 

northern wing) and of men and materiel 

en route to Souk el Arba via Duvivier and 

Souk Ahras. In an effort to unload ships 

rapidly and send them out to the greater 

safety of open waters, the port commanders 

permitted congestion to develop which 

could be removed only by devoting all available trucks and labor to port clearance . 

Motor transport was everywhere far below 

normal requirements for an assault. Neither 

the 78th Division nor the elements of the 

British 6th Armoured Division, therefore, 

nor the American units which were brought 
TAKING POSITIONS FOR THE DRIVE ON TUNIS 

eastward to reinforce them, had the full 

allowance of organic transportation. \Vhat 

they did have-and this was supplemented 

by requisitioned French civilian vehicles, 

"every kind of scrawny vehicle that 

can run," as General Eisenhower described 

them-was worked to the limit."" 

Motor traffic was hampered by the deterioration of the roads under heavy use 

and by the necessity of one-way movement 

on some bridges and along narrow stretches 

between soft shoulders. The Eastern Task 

Force's road control system was in operation on 13 November. Gasoline consumption ran ahead of estimates, in part because 

requirements of the American reinforcements had not been taken into account. A 

serious shortage was eased by release to the 

Allies of a French reserve stock of aviation 

gasoline. The piling up of materiel in the 

ports had its counterpart at the Souk el 

Arba railhead after that had been open 

four or five days. As the offensive was about 

to begin, carloads of ammunition and other 

essential materiel had accumulated there 

and remained neither unloaded, separated, 

nor organized for issue. Both motor transport and labor were insufficient. The 1st 

Battalion, 39th Infantry, and later, the 3d 

Battalion, 39th Infantry, were drawn from 

Algiers to points along the line of communications and employed not only as guards 

but as service units.s4 

The Allied offensive was prepared during a period of increasing air clashes, and 

'" (1) Ltr, Eisf'nhower to Marshall, 30 Nm' 42. 

WDCSA 384 Africa. (2) Msg, CAO AFHQ to 

QMG AFHQ. Copy in AF Archives, Hist Officf' File 

520.2132. 

" ( 1) 39th Inf Hist, 

Col Frank J. Redding, Jr., Operations of C 

Company, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, 24 November-II December 1942, MS. The Infantry 

School, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1948-49. 

it involved an unexpected commitment of 

Twelfth Air Force units to operations in 

Tunisia. The abbreviated conflict of 8-11 

November left enough surplus stocks of a viation fuel and ammunition at the ports for 

a vigorous air effort. Offsetting that advantage was the shortage of vehicles for transporting these stocks to the airfields, the 

"loss" by ground personnel of servicing 

equipment during transit, and the fact that 

there were few and relatively distant airfields in forward areas. General Anderson's 

close air support was to be furnished from 

the fields at Souk el Arba (80 miles from 

Tunis), Bone (135 miles from Tunis), and 

Youks-les-Bains (155 miles from Tunis). 

While fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons were being brought forward to use 

these fields, the ports from Algiers to Bone 

and the Allied air base at Maison Blanche 

had to be protected from the enemy. On 16 

November B-17F heavy bombers of the U.S. 

97th Bombardment Group began a series 

of raids from Maison Blanche on the Sidi 

Ahmed airfield at Bizerte, the EI Aouina airfield near Tunis, and toward the Elmas airfields near Cagliari in Sardinia. 

German and Italian air units confined 

road movements east of Souk el Arba to the 

hours of darkness and repeatedly bombed 

Bedja, Teboursouk, Souk el Khemis, and 

other forward centers. Enemy bombers 

struck the Algiers harbor and airfields 

heavily on the evenings of 20 and 21 November, compelling the B-l7's to withdraw 

to Tafaraoui near Oran. Thereafter they 

had to make roundtrip flights of 1,200 miles 

to strike Bizerte or Tunis, picking up fighter 

escort for the flight east of Algiers. Night 

fighters, aided by radar and a balloon barrage, were brought in to defend. Algiers. 

Although the Flying Fortresses were forced 
294 

back, other units came fOIWard. At Youksles-Bains, a squadron of the U.S. 14th 

Fighter Group (P-38's) arrived on 21 November to operate on the southern wing in 

support of the Tunisian task force and to 

be available for missions in support of British 78th Division after 27 November. One 

squadron of light bombers (DB-7's) came 

in later. 35 

After the Allied attack began, the Eastern 

Task Force could expect close support from 

the two squadrons (thirty-six aircraft) of 

Royal Air Force Spitfires which were stationed at Souk el Arba, two squadrons of 

Spitfires and one of Hurribombers at Bone 

(Duzerville) airfield, and five squadrons of 

light and medium bombers at Blida airdrome near Algiers or at the intermediate 

airfields at Setif and Canrobert. Reserves of 

fighters and light or medium bombers were 

available at Tafaraoui or Gibraltar. The 

Twelfth Air Force units at Youks-Ies-Bains 

could be diverted to the operation along the 

Medjerda river from missions farther south. 

Photographic reconnaissance would be negligible. Provision for maintenance would be 

little better. 

The plans for air co-operation on the 

afternoon of 24 November, and for several 

days following, called for bombing the ports 

and airfields at Bizerte and Tunis from all 

quarters by Royal Air Force units, including 

those based at Malta, supplemented by 

others from the XII Bomber Command. 

All air units actually stationed in the forward fields were to be subject to direct calls 

for assistance from Headquarters, Eastern 

Task Force, through Air Marshal Welsh, 

who would transmit requests for American 

. " Craven and Catc, The Army Air Forces, II, 

83-86. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

air missions to Headquarters, Twelfth Air 

Force (General Doolittle) .3" 

Enemy Strength 

The ground forces under General Nehring's command when the Allies' attack began on 25 November totaled about 15,575 

German and 9,000 Italian troops. They 

were organized in separate zones around 

Bizerte and Tunis, and were supplemented 

by a small reserve held in the Tunis area in 

readiness for reconnaissance or counterattack. 

Within the two portions of the bridgehead 

German troops predominated. Italian 

troops were assigned to the Tunis South sector and to many small Axis groups in contact with the Allies at forward points between the northern coastal highway and the 

area of patrolling west of Sfax and Kairouan. Admiral Derrien's French naval 

forces manned the coastal batteries in the 

Bizerte area and one of the batteries defending Tunis. Italian naval units held the 

remainder. The French Army detachment 

which Derrien kept near Bizerte had no 

separate mission, and remained a source of 

anxiety. Nehring on 25 November appointed the commander of the 10th Panzer 

Division, Generalmajor Wolfgang Fischer, 

who had arrived in Tunis the previous day, 

as Military Governor (Militaerbefehlshaber) of Bizerte, and directed him to make 

sure of the loyalty of the French troops. Although Admiral Derrien convinced General 

Fischer of their reliability, Kesselring re-

"' (1) Ibid. (2) Msg, Eisenhower to Smith, 24 

Nov 42; Msgs, Smith to Eisenhower, 24 and 25 

Nov 42; Memo, sub: Location of Allied aircraft 

in theater used by CofS at 25 Nov 42 session of 

COS; Msgs, Eisenhower to Cen Ismay, 30 May 42 . 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 
TAKI[\TG POSITIONS FOR THE DRTVE ON TUNIS 295 

mained skeptical, and ordered Nehring to 

take precautions against French defection. 

The German ground elements consisted 

of two parachute infantry regiments, one 

with two infantry battalions and one with 

one infantry and one antitank battalion; a 

battalion of parachute engineers; an air 

force guard battalion and three Army field 

battalions, originally destined as replacements for Rommel's forces; one tank battalion and part of another; two reconnaissance companies, one with armored cars 

carrying 75-mm. guns; a motorcycle company; one motorized antitank company; 

one field artillery battalion; and about two 

and a half antiaircraft artillery battalions, 

whose armament included twenty of the new 

88-mm. dual-purpose guns. 

Italian elements of Nehring's XC Corps 

had by 25 November come to include three 

regiments of infantry; two assault gun and 

two antitank gun battalions; and various 

service units amounting to about one fifth 

of the total Italian forces ultimately designated for Tunisia (47,000 men, 148 guns, 8 

assault guns, 2,700 tanks and trucks, 1,500 

motorcycles, and 204 prime movers). The 

first of the Italian divisions in Tunisia was 

the Superga Division, commanded by Generale di Division Dante Lorenzelli. Elements of the Italian X XX Corps (Generale 

di Corpo d' Armata Vittorio Sogno) had also 

begun to arrive. 

The Axis ground troops in Tunisia were 

supported by five groups of fighters (one 

Italian), one group of dive bombers, and 

one squadron of short-range reconnaissance 

aircraft. These planes were based on the 

airfields of Bizerte, Tunis, and Djedei:da. 

Bombers used fields in Sicily and Sardinia to 

strike Tunisian targets.:17 

37 (1) Compilation, Truppen fuer Tunis, 13 Nov 

42, and rpt, Die eigenen Verbaende in Tunesien 

The XC Corps front extended from 

northeast of Djebel Abiod to the Mateur 

defense perimeter, along the MateurDjedeida road and railroad to St. Cyprien, 

La Mohammedia, and a road junction five 

miles east-southeast of Hammam Lif, with 

detachments in Sousse, Sfax, and Gabes. 

By shifting some forces southeastward from 

the vicinity of Mateur, and pulling others 

back from advanced positions in Goubellat, 

El Aroussa, and Medjez el Bab, Nehring 

had also organized an inner ring of strongpoints protecting Tunis.'< 

Allied Plan of Attack 

The Allied offensive was intended to drive 

back the enemy forces, to separate those 

near Bizerte from those near Tunis, to capture the latter, and then to hem in the Bizerte bridgehead, hamper its reinforcement, 

and build up the means to force it to capitulate. With the surrender of Bizerte, Operation TORCH would terminate. 

When the Eastern Task Force, alternatively referred to as the British First Army, 

began its attack it consisted only of the 

78th Division with elements of the 6th Armoured Division and miscellaneous other 

units attached, plus a line of communications. The British 5 Corps headquarters arrived in Algiers with the third fast convoy 

on 22 November but did not move up and 

assume its mission until after the first attack had been made. Anderson's army headquarters m Algiers, with a forward 

nach dem Stand vom 27.XI.42, 28 Nov 42. Both in 

OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, File Tunis, JO.XI.42-

2.v.43. (2) XC Corps, KTB I, J6.-30.XI.42, 

15-25 Nov 42. The Superga Division, after participating in the invasion of France in 1940, had 

been retrained in 1942 as an amphibious infantry 

division. 

"" XC Corps, KTB, I, J6.-30.xI.42, 24-26 Nov 

42. 
296 

command post at J emmapes, dealt directly 

with General Evelegh's division headquarters at Rhardimaou and on 22-23 November at Souk el Khemis. Principal subordinate elements of the 78th Division were the 

36th Infantry Brigade, Blade Force, and 

11 th Infantry Brigade, commanded, respectively, by Brig. A. L. Kent-Lemon, Col. 

R. A. Hull, and Brig. E. E. E. Cass. 39 On 

23 November General Anderson directed 

General Evelegh to secure the line MateurTebourba as soon as possible. Next day, the 

78th Division issued a plan of attack setting 

the opening phase for that same night. 40 

General Evelegh's plan was to move his 

forces eastward to the objective line in three 

widely separated columns, two of which 

would converge in the vicinity of Tebourba. 

(M ap 5) These three columns were to consist of the British 36th Infantry Brigade 

Grou p on the left (north), Blade Force in 

the center, and the 11 th Infantry Brigade 

Group on the right, each reinforced by 

American armored and artillery units. To 

seize Medjez el Bab and advance along the 

northwestern bank of the Medjerda river, he 

designated the 11 th Infantry Brigade 

Group, protected at first by detached elements of Blade Force. The main body of 

Blade Force, including the 1st Battalion, 

U.S. 1st Armored Regiment of light tanks, 

was to thread its way through the mountains 

past Sidi Nsir into the valley of the upper 

Tine river and thence via Choui'gui pass in 

the eastern hills onto the plain northwest of 

Tebourba. During this advance it would 

block any hostile blow against the Allied 

northern flank, and might grasp an opportunity to seize Mateur, but it was expected 

"" These brigade groups corresponded in strength 

to an Amnican regiment or regimental combat 

team. 

40 78th Div Opns Instruc 1, 24 Nov 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

to seize the bridges over the Medjerda river 

at El Bathan, south of Tebourba, and at 

Djedei'da, northeast of it. Subsequently, it 

would turn over defense of these bridges to 

the 11 th Infantry Brigade Group. 

Beginning during the night of 24-25 November, the 36th Infantry Brigade Group 

was to proceed eastward from Djebel Abiod 

along the twisting road to Mateur and Bizerte. While it appeared to threaten Mateur, 

its ultimate objective in exploiting successes 

was a section of road from a major road 

junction six miles west-northwest of Mateur 

to the bridge over the Sed jenane river seven 

miles farther north, possession of which 

would block one of the main routes between 

Bizerte and Mateur. Execution of these missions would complete the first phase of the 

Allied attack. 

On the night of 25-26 November, as the 

first step of the next phase, the 11 th Infantry Brigade Group was expected to leave 

one reinforced battalion to hold Tebourba, 

El Bathan, and Djedeida, and to move the 

main body to an assembly area south of 

Mateur. Supported by all available artillery, 

and with Blade Force in 78th Division reserve, the infantry was to attack Mateur on 

26 November. During this phase, the southeastern flank would be protected by a mobile armored force (part British and part 

American) and by French infantry, as a responsibility of General Barre. 

Once the Allies held Tebourba and Mateur, with the important river crossings near 

them, the final attack could be launched 

from the new base line. The plan for those 

operations was withheld for later issuance 

in the light of intervening events. Royal Air 

Force units were to provide tactical air reconnaissance under 78th Division control, 

mainly to observe the movements of Axis 

reserves and, through a control unit with the 
U> 

Z , ~ (- => , .... i i ~ Z · • , O· ; , ; • ; ~ ", -

• • 

-

> . - • ! • "'. • ; . • " ' • ~ , ; O • . , ':: ~ i" "'z .0 ! :J o ... ~ .. ;i ~ "! : 1: ~ · ... ~ .. '" ", :i .... . 

1( 1 • 

U> '0 

'" • .. ;;: -

" ~ 
298 

division, to provide such cover as one fighter 

squadron could furnish for the daylight advance by Blade Force and its concentration 

near Choulgui.41 

This plan had some recognizable weaknesses, attributable partly to postponing selection of the zone of attack in the next 

phase, and partly to disregarding the relationship of the terrain to the utilization of 

armored units. Attached to the 36th Infantry Brigade Group in the mountains was 

a company of medium tanks which it could 

never use. Blade Force lacked infantry and 

was consequently unable to cope with some 

normal tactical situations. If the 36th Infantry Brigade Group had been limited to a 

holding attack, it could have spared some of 

its infantry for employment with Blade 

Force. The mountains which separated 

Blade Force from the 11 th Infantry Brigade 

Group intervened at least as completely as 

would the Medjerda river if Blade Force had 

been sent forward southeast of it while the 

11 th Infantry Brigade used the road along 

the northwestern bank. The main road from 

Medjez el Bab through Furna and Massi41 (I) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

(2) Company E. U.S. 13th Armored Regiment, was 

attached to the 36th Brigade; the I st Battalion, 

U.S. 1st Armored Regiment, was attached to Blade 

Force; and the Reconnaissance and Intelligence 

Platoon and 2d Battalion (less Company E) of the 

13th Armored Regiment, the 175th Field Artillery 

Battalion, and Company C of the 70lst Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the II th Infantry Brigade. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

cault to Tunis, with side roads to various 

river crossings, ran through terrain on which 

armored units could maneuver. A blocking 

detachment near Sidi Nsir might have protected Bedja while releasing forces to make 

the assault on Tunis with the main effort on 

the right (southeast). Finally, the plans forfeited any possibility of surprise; Nehring 

could ascertain the zone of major Allied offensive effort and consolidate his defenses 

accordingly. No plan could have made better use of the inadequate Allied air support 

except, perhaps, to husband rather than 

overextend it. 

Command over French troops was not 

yielded to General Anderson, but was exercised by General J uin as Commander in 

Chief of French Forces on the Tunisian 

Front. A boundary between the area of joint 

operations of the British First Army and 

French Tunisian Troops and the operations 

of the French XIX Corps was specified as 

the line from Montesquieu on the west 

through Tadjerouine and Ksour to Maktar. 

North of it, General Juin was to deal directly with General Barre and to co-ordinate 

French operations with those of General Anderson's force. South of the line, where his 

command would be exercised through General Koeltz of French XIX Corps, co-ordination would be less direct. American troops 

in these operations were to be under British 

or French tactical control. 42 

"CSTT Jnl, 24 Nov 42. 
CHAPTER XVI 

The Attack Toward Tunis 

The Two Northern Columns Attack, 

25 November 

The 36th Infantry Brigade Group was 

not ready for the preliminary attack from 

Djebel Abiod scheduled for the night of 

24~~25 November and, \vhen it started forward the following night, soon discovered 

that the enemy had withdrawn, thus frustrating elaborate plans to pin down and then 

overrun him. The troops continued a cautious but uncontested advance for two more 

days before coming to grips with the enemy 

just west of Djefna. At this rate the 36th 

Brigade Group could not expect, by drawing enemy forces westward to dispute its 

advance, to assist the Allied attack on 

.Mateur from the south and southeast unless 

that attack had also fallen far behind schedule. Contact with the enemy was in fact to 

occur late on 28 November. 

Blade Force's advance began on 25 November with more promising results. The 

column left its assembly area northeast of 

Bcdja at 0700 with more than 100 tanks 

and many other vehicles. By 1300, it had 

reached the road junction south-southwest 

of :Mateur on the Bedja-Sidi Nsir-Tebourba 

route. After driving out or capturing the 

German-Italian detachment in two farms 

near there, part of the force moved closer 

to Mateur while the remainder, which included the 1st Battalion, U.S. 1st Armored 

Regiment (Lt. Col. John K. Waters), continued farther east across the Tine river 

valley. During the latter part of 25 November and on the fonowing day, this unit 

matched its strength ,.,.ith enemy ground 

and air forces in several engagements. 

Colonel Waters' battalion had its Headquarters Company and three other companies of M3 light tanks, an 81-mm. mortar 

platoon, and an assault gun platoon employing three 75-mm. pack howitzers on 

half-tracks, but it had no artillery, infantry, 

or engineers attached, and it had to share 

the support of a handful of British aircraft 

with the rest of General Evelegh's whole 

command. 

The American battalion had been ordered by Col. R. A. Hull, commanding 

Blade Force, to help create a "tank-infested 

area" in the Tine valley southeast of :Mateur 

and to reconnoiter the bridges across the 

~ledjerda river at El Bathan and Djedei'da, 

toward which the 11 th Brigade Group 

would advance as soon at it had occupied 

Medjez el Bab. (See Map VI.) The route 

of reconnaissance led over the hills between 

the Tine river valley and the coastal plain 

via Chouigui pass, a three-mile defile about 

thirty-five miles from Bcdja with a good 

tarmac road and fairly steep grades. In the 

area of the western approach to Choulgui 

pass Colonel \Vaters' battalion, around noon 

of 25 November, met a company of the 

11 th Parachute Engineer Battalion) reinforced by an Italian antitank gun platoon, 

which had been sent from Mateur that same 

morning to augment the detachment at 
300 

Tebourba. The German force turned back 

in the face of the advancing American 

armored battalion and organized a defensive position in a walled French farm about 

two miles from the northwestern entrance 

to the pass. Company A (Maj. Carl Siglin), 

through lack of infantry, failed in its attempt to dislodge the occupants, and Company B (Maj. William R. Tuck) took up 

positions in the pass. During the day further 

British and American efforts to seize the 

farm also failed, until after the garrison 

withdrew to Mateur during the night. 

Company C (Maj. Rudolph Barlow) 

toiled up the road on its reconnaissance 

mission. As it emerged on the Tebourba side 

of Chouigui pass, Barlow's company overran an enemy outpost and destroyed its vehicles. The tanks then continued over the 

level plain in a rapid sortie toward El 

Bathan. Behind the company, enemy aircraft flew over the far side of the hills, where 

they bombed and strafed the rest of the battalion. Company C bypassed the German 

garrison in Tebourba and knocked out the 

enemy security detachment at the El Bathan 

bridge. Then, remaining on the northwest 

side of the Med jerda, it swung through the 

olive orchards which border the stream to 

observe the crossing at Djedeida. 

At this point one of the most bizarre incidents of World War II ensued. The enemy had neglected his own local security, so 

that the American force arrived at a low 

ridge sheltering the newly activated Djedei'da airfield without being detected. Parked 

beside the landing strip was a considerable 

number of Axis planes, perhaps those which 

had earlier attacked the main body of the 

tank battalion near Chouigui pass. As soon 

as the situation was discovered, all seventeen 

tanks swept onto the airfield and precipiNORTHWEST AFRICA 

tated the rarest of battles, that between armored vehicles and grounded aircraft. In 

the resulting melee, twenty or more enemy 

planes were destroyed, while the tanks shot 

up the buildings, supplies, and defending 

troops, and then withdrew in the dusk to 

the west. Losses were two men killed, one 

tank and its crew missing, and several other 

tanks damaged. Word of this exploit and a 

false report received at Nehring's headquarters a little later that evening that Allied 

tanks were within nine miles of Tunis 

caused acute anxiety to assail the German 

commander. 

Actually, Major Barlow's company had 

completed its reconnaissance and returned 

to the battalion in bivouac near Chouigui 

village. Before daylight, Colonel Waters' 

whole command had been brought back 

through Chouigui pass to the Tine river valley to be in Blade Force reserve on 26 November. During the night, Nehring withdrew the Axis troops from Tebourba to 

Djedeida, El Bathan, and St. Cyprien. He 

laid plans to consolidate more of his forces 

for a close-in defense of the Tunis bridgehead. Kesselring, on the other hand, correctly assured him that the Allied approach 

to Tunis would continue to be cautious and 

tentative, justifying the Axis command in 

adopting aggressive methods of defense. 1 

Early on 26 November, Colonel von 

Broich sent a small force consisting of a 

company of the 11th Parachute Engineer 

Battalion, a company of the 3d Tunis Field 

Battalion, and a company of the 190th Pan1 (I) 1st Bn 1st Armd Regt AAR, 31 Dec 42. 

(2) Red of intervs with Col Waters, 29 Dec 42. 

Copy in OPD 381 Africa, Sec 2, Case 71. (3) Inter" 

with Col Rudolph Barlow. (4) MS # T-3-PI, Pt. 

II (Kesselring). (5) XC Corps, KTB I, 16.-

30.XI.42, 25 Nov 42. (6) Diu. Broich, KTB, Nr. 1, 

11.XI.--31.XIl.42, 25 Nov 42. 
THE ATTACK TOWARD TUNIS 301 

GERMAN MARK IV MEDIUM TANK mounting a 75-mm. high-velocity gun. 

zer Battalion from Mateur toward Tebourba. The German force drew near 

Choui'gui pass after Colonel Waters' battalion had taken up its positions there for 

the day. Company C barred the southeastern entrance while the other three companies were on high ground, Company B 

parallel to the road approaching the 

northwestern entrance from the north and 

the others along the road from Sidi Nsir, extending as far west as St. Joseph's Farm 

near the Tine river. The enemy force, approaching from the north, included six 

Mark IV tanks with long 75-mm. highvelocity guns, a type not known to the 

Americans, and three or more Mark Ill's 

with 50-mm. rifles. 

The impending action was the first battle between American and German armor 

in World War II. The Germans continued 

southward past Major Tuck's company, 

concealed in hull defilade on the reverse 

slope of a ridge, to meet the challenge of 

Major Siglin's company. The latter maneuvered to strike the enemy from the southwest, 

after a bold preliminary skirmish by the 

assault gun platoon. While Siglin's men 

claimed the enemy's attention, Tuck's 37-

mm. guns, firing at close range from the east 

flank and rear, knocked out the six Mark 

IV's and one of the Mark Ill's before the 

enemy pulled back to the same walled farm 

he had occupied the previous day. The fight 

cost the Americans six M3's and several casualties, including the life of Major Siglin. 

Truck-borne infantry elements of the enemy 

force, arriving later near the walled farm, 

were driven off or destroyed, and eventually 

the strongpoint itself was abandoned. Two 

squadrons of 17/21 Lancers and some British artillery attempted to cut off the enemy's 

retreat and shared in smashing at least one 

more of his Mark Ill's. One company of 

the 1st British Parachute Battalion occupied 
302 

the vacated positions, which it thereafter 

labeled "Coxen's Farm." 2 

The Southern Attack Begins 

The 11 th Infantry Brigade, reinforced, 

which was to form the southern column of 

the three-pronged drive, meanwhile got off 

to an unpromising start and lagged behind 

schedule in its effort to take the town of 

Medjez el Bab. The defenders there consisted of the 3d Battalion, 5th Parachute 

Regiment (three companies), an Italian 

antitank company, two 88-mm. dual-purpose guns, and tanks of the 190th Panzer 

Battalion. The plan of attack required one 

reinforced infantry battalion to approach 

Medjez el Bab from each side of the river 

while a third element came from the west to 

seize commanding ground but not to 

enter the town until it had capitulated. The 

northern force (the 2d Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers Regiment), as it tried on the 

night of 24-25 November in bright moonlight to cross the bare and level plain toward 

Medjez el Bab, was caught by machine gun 

and mortar fire. The initial burst killed the 

commanding officer, and additional fire 

drove the entire force to cover. 'When artillery began at daylight, it pinned down the 

troops that had reached or crossed the river 

2 (1) SitTep, Div. Bloich to XC Corps, 26 Nov 

+2, in Div. Broich, KTB, Nr. 1. 11.XI.-31.XII.42, 

26 Nov 42, and Anlagenheft II, Anlage 8. (2) 1st 

Bn 1st Armd Regt AAR, 31 Dec 42. (3) Capt Freeland A. Daubin, Jr., The Battle of "Happy Valley," 

MS. The Armored School, Fort Knox, Ky., 1948. 

(4) 1st Armd Div lIist and Jnl, VoL 1. (5) XC 

Corps, KTB I, 16.-30.XI.42 .. 26 Nov 42. (6) Info 

supplied by Cabinet Office, London. This is in certain respects contradictory concerning the relative 

roles of 17/21 Lancers and 1st Battalion, U.S. 1st 

Armof('d Regiment. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

bed. During an attempt to withdraw that 

afternoon under cover of an artillery barrage, a tank-infantry counterattack fr~m the 

town converted the retirement into a disorganized dispersal. Casualties were heavy. 

The second force (the 5th Battalion, 

Northamptonshire Regiment with the U.S. 

175th Field Artillery Battalion attached), 

attacking from the south-southwest, gained 

the heights of Djebel Bou Mouss (250), 

later known as "Grenadier Hill" , bv , midmorning only to lose them soon afterward 

when the enemy counterattacked from -:Vledjez el Bab with tanks. The attack on Medjez 

el Bab had already taken longer than expected and had failed on both wings. 

The Germans, like the Allies six days 

earlier, withdrew from Medjez el Bab during the night of November rather 

than commit more troops to its defense, a 

decision by Nehring which Kesselring later 

condemned. They had severely handled the 

Allied force, and, on the morning of 26 

November, the Luftwaffe took hold where 

the ground troops had left off. During the 

day, Djedeida airfield was reoccupied. 

Enemy planes gained air superiority and 

made movement over the open area near 

Med jez el Bab perilous. The dangers were 

not wholly from enemy aviation. Eleven 

P-38 American fighters drove off some Axis 

planes as the day's operations opened but 

then through error turned to subject an 

Allied column to five low-level strafing runs 

which, within three minutes, had severely 

damaged most of the guns and vehicles of 

Company C, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and had killed five men and wounded 

sixteen. Antiaircraft fire had been withheld. 

By great ingenuity and extraordinary effort, 

all but two of the guns and most of the 
THE ATTACK TOWARD TUNIS 

vehicles were restored to service during the 

next two days.o 

At midday an Allied artillery barrage fel! 

on Medjez el Bab. Tanks of the 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, then led a 

British infantry battalion in an assault. 

Resistance was negligible. The troops found 

the city almost abandoned and one span 

of its important bridge demolished. The 

enemy's withdrawal~along the coastal 

road, south of Mateur, from Chouigui pass, 

and now down the Medjerda from Medjez 

el Bab~seemed to portend a general withdrawal to thicken his screen around Bizerte 

and Tunis. 

Possession of Medjez el Bab was preliminary to a farther advance to Tebourba 

by the southern Allied column. Defenses 

were organized and during the night a 

Bailey bridge span was erected over the gap 

in the broken bridge. A force consisting of 

the 1st Battalion, East Surrey Regiment, 

and a small artillery group advanced northeastward to the edge of Tebourba by midnight 26-27 November. A few hours before 

daylight, 27 November, the village was in 

Allied possession. Headquarters, 11 th Brigade Group, during the day transferred 

defense of Med jez el Bab and the river 

crossings southwest of it to French and 

American units, and sent forward to the 

Tebourba area the 5th Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment, and the 2d Battalion, U.S. 13th Armored Regiment (less 

Company E): 

., (I) Redding, The Operations of C Company, 

70lst Tank D('stroyn Battalion ... , MS. The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., 1948~49. (2) XC 

Corps, KTB I, 16.~30.XI.42, 26~28 :\fov 42. 

4 CSTT Jnl, 27 Nov 42. The 1st Battalion, 4th 

Mixed Regiment of Zouaves and Tirailleurs, and 

one battery of the 3d Battalion, 62d Artillery Regiment, relieved British units at Medjez el Bab during 

303 

Tebourba, a town of less than 4,000 population, was a critical point in either attacking or defending Tunis. In approaching it 

from Med jez el Bab, Allied forces proceeded along the narrow shelf next to the 

Medjerda's northwestern bank and emerged 

through a widening gap between the hills 

and the river onto an open plain. A few 

miles to the east Tebourba's low white 

buildings nestled about a crossroads, surrounded by extensive, geometrically precise 

olive orchards. The river meandered in wide 

loops south of Tebourba and was crossed 

by a substantial bridge at EI Bathan, a suburb somewhat more than a mile to the south. 

Equally distant to the east is the Djebel 

Mai'ana (186), a bare, steep ridge giving 

unexcelled observation over the area for 

several miles in all directions. It commands 

the road to Djedei'da, at the base of its 

northern slope, as well as the railroad to 

Tunis, on the narrow strip between the ridge 

and the river southeast of it. Two lower 

ridges lie about three miles farther east of 

Tebourba, between it and Djedeida. From 

that village, where a stone-arched bridge 

spanned the Medjerda river, the plain, 

studded by a few low hills near the city, 

slopes very gently down to Tunis, some 

twelve miles distant. The river continues 

northeastward between Tunis and Bizerte to 

the sea. North and northwest of Tebourba 

the plain extends to the base of a mountain 

chain projecting between Tunis and Mateur. The road from Tebourba to Mateur 

ran through the small village of Chouigui, 

four miles north of Tebourba, and thence 

via Choui'gui pass, over the low mountains 

between the coastal plan and the Tine river 

valley. 

the afternoon. Batteries of the u.s. 175th Field 

Artillery Battalion were emplaced at Medjez d 

Bab, Siourhia, and Testour. 
304 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ro rCBOIIHBIJ TO MATCIIH 

DJEDEIDA, looking northwest. Note remains of stone-arched bridge, center of photograph. 

This route was used by Blade Force after 

Colonel Hull had received orders from 78th 

Division on 27 November to assemble his 

armor in the Chouigui area the next day. 

When the movement was reported to Nehring it confirmed his expectation that the 

Allied attack was to be concentrated on 

Tunis. The battles in which the two adversaries were soon engaged in and around Tebourba were to determine the success or 

failure of the first race for Tunis. 

Axis forces had been withdrawn from 

Tebourba to the other side of the Medjerda. 

The 1 st Battalion, East Surrey Regiment, 

reinforced, organized a perimeter defense of 

the town early on 27 November; late in the 

morning, one of its patrols toward Djedei:da 

was driven back. Shortly afterward two enemy columns of tanks and infantry assailed 

the northeastern and eastern sectors. One 

enemy tank succeeded in piercing the Allied screen about Tebourba, but it remained 

just a brief period. Around the outskirts, 

however, particularly in the cover of the 

olive groves, the battle persisted until dusk 

and became a series of sharp encounters as 

confused as combat can sometimes become. 

The enemy was pushed slowly eastward and 

at darkness broke off action and retired 

toward Djedeida, taking along a few British 

prisoners and four damaged tanks, but leaving ten others behind. He had hurt the Allied force severely." 

, Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 
THE ATTACK TOWARD TUNIS 

The Battle for Djediida 

The results of the fighting near Tebourba 

on 27 November left each adversary inclined to begin a new stage in his plan of 

operations. Nehring was ready for more 

steps in an aggressive defensive. On 28 November he used troops from both Mateur 

and Djedei'da to seize two of the ridges in 

the mass of low mountains north of Chouigui pass. These two heights dominated a 

network of narrow tracks or dirt roads 

which connected the upper Tine valley with 

the coastal plain north of Djedeida. Sicilybased squadrons began a swiftly rising rate 

of air support. He planned next day to extend Axis control to key road junctions on 

the route between Sidi Nsir and Chouigui 

pass. Evelegh, on the other band, had sent 

reinforced infantry units to those points 

during the night of 27-28 November, to 

assume the defense and release elements of 

Blade Force for the move of that command 

through Choulgui pass to an assembly area 

between Choui'gui and Tebourba. On 28 

November he regrouped for the next phase 

of his attack. 

The original 78th Division plan to hold 

the Mateur-Tebourba base line before beginning the next stage of the offensive was 

now changed. The timetable had been upset 

both by the delay at Medjez el Bab and the 

failure to secure the bridges at El Bathan 

and Djedeida. Efforts to prevent the flow 

of reinforcements through the ports and airfields of Bizerte and Tunis were not succeeding. The enemy seemed to have decided that 

time was on his side, and to await attack 

against his prepared positions. Conditions 

were ripe for concentrating strength to penetrate the Axis defensive perimeter, with the 

Allies using not only Blade Force but also 

the approaching elements and headquarters 

305 

of Combat Command B, U.S. 1 st Armored 

Division (Brig. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, 

Jr.) as soon as they came up from So uk el 

Arba. General Evelegh therefore planned 

to start the attack toward Mateur and that 

toward Tunis in close sequence. 

The attack against DjedeIda would be 

made by the 11 th Infantry Brigade Group. 

When bridge and town were in Allied possession, this force would turn to the northwest and advance on Mateur along the route 

of the main highway and the adjacent railroad between Djedelda and Mateur. It 

would at the same time cover the nothern 

flank of the main attack on Tunis. Blade 

Force would use the captured bridge to 

strike eastward toward Tunis while Combat 

Command B, U.S. 1st Armored Division, 

crossed the river at EI Bathan, swung 

through St. Cyprien, and headed toward 

Tunis from the west-southwest." 

Two special operations were prepared 

which would assist these attacks: (1) the 

British 2cl Parachute Battalion would drop, 

29 November, from American transport aircraft to sabotage an airfield south of Tunis 

at Oudna and to protect the southern flank 

of the advance on Tunis, joining up eventuallv with the armored force near St. 

Cyp;ien; (2) the British 1 st Commando 

(including some U.S. troops) was to make 

an amphibious landing west of Bizerte from 

which it would penetrate to the south and 

connect with the 36th Brigade Group on 

the coastal road. 

In spite of Allied bombing of the ports 

and airfields at Bizerte and Tunis, Axis reinforcements kept arriving. General Nehring's forces now included four gigantic 

Mark VI ("Tiger" ) tanks with 88-mm. 

guns which had been sent to Tunisia for 

test in combat. Like the newest 88-mm. 

• XC Corps, KTB I, 16.·30.X1,42, 28 :-J"ov 42. 
306 

antiaircraft batteries, they were supersecret 

weapons in which Hitler took a considerable 

interest. But more important, possibly, in 

actual defense of the bridgehead were the 

newly arrived staff and annored elements of 

the 10th Panzer Division, commanded by 

General Fischer. Supplementing the 190th 

Panzer Battalion, they were ready to take 

up the challenge of Blade Force before all 

of General Oliver's armored command arrived on the scene. 7 

The operations of 28 November did not 

go well for the Allies, and General Evelegh's 

plans were not realized. On the coastal road, 

the Allied advance guard, 12 carriers and 

2 deployed companies of the 8th Battalion, 

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, were 

enticed into ambush in a defile between two 

hills. (See Map XI.) From the concealment of scrub-covered Djebel Azag (396, 

"Green Hill") and the bare and rocky slopes 

of Djebel Adjred (556, "Bald Hill"), west 

of Djefna, Group Witzig opened dense 20-

mm. machine gun fire on the hapless leading 

elements. This blaze of fire destroyed 10 

carriers, killed 30 men, led to the taking 

of 86 Allied prisoners, and drove the remaining Allied troops back with about 50 

others wounded. An attempt by the enemy 

to envelop the Allied northern flank was 

effectively blocked, but a similar maneuver 

T ( I) The following units of the 10th Panzer 

Diuision had arrived and been unloaded by 29 November: two companies of the 1st Battalion, 7th 

Panzer Regiment, with 32 Panzer Ill's and 2 Panzer IV's; two companies of the 10th Motorcycle 

Battalion; and twq companies of self-propelled 

antitank guns of the 90th Tank Destroyer Battalion. 

(2) XC Corps, KTB I, 16.-30.XI.42, 29 Nov 42. 

(3) Minutes of conference between Hitler and 

Jodi, 1 Dec 42, part of the collection known as 

Minutes of Conferences between Hitler and Members of the German Armed Forces High Command, 

December 1942-March 1945 (hereafter cited as 

Minutes of Hitler Conference). OCMH Files. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

by the British was likewise successfully 

parried. 8 

If this secondary effort failed, the main attack from Tebourba against Djedelda on 28 

November fared no better. Djedelda lay on 

the left bank of the Medjerda river some five 

miles northeast of Tebourba. The main road 

skirted the northern end of Djebel Malana, 

as already noted, and continued over bare 

and generally flat country for three more 

miles to a pair of low ridges beyond which 

lay the airfield and the village. The main 

railroad line closely followed the northwest 

bank of the river. Carefully laid-out olive 

groves and a thin strip of woods along the 

tracks offered some cover there. The 11 th 

Infantry Brigade Group was reinforced during the night and, after reconnaissance from 

Djebel Malana, started an attack on 

Djedelda airfield and village at 1300. With 

the support of medium tanks of the 2d Battalion of the U.S. 13th Armored Regiment 

(Lt. Col. Hyman Bruss), the 5th Battalion 

of the Northamptonshire Regiment made 

the assault. From the neighboring ridge the 

airfield was shelled with considerable damage to newly arrived aircraft, but the attack 

against the village met heavy fire from concealed antitank guns and field artillery. The 

enemy positions were well protected by machine guns and infantry, and supported by 

dive bombers. General Nehring had made 

Djedelda a special defense sector, and it was 

effectively organized and resolutely defended. After losing about five American 

tanks, the attacking force pulled back to re-

• Group Witzig consisted of three companies of 

paratroops and five Italian self-propelled antitank 

guns, reinforced on 30 November by an infantry 

company. 

(1) Sitrep, Diu. Broich to XC Corps, 28 Nov 42, 

and AAR Group Witzig to Diu. Broich, 28 Nov 42, 

in Diu. Broich, KTB, Nr. 1, 11.XI.-31.XII.42, and 

Anlagenheft II, Anlagen 8 and 9. (2) XC Corps, 

KTB I, 16.-30.XI.42, 28 Nov 42. 
THE ATTACK TOWARD TUNIS 307 

GERMAN MARK VI TIGER TANK mounting the 88-mm. /!.un (rear view of tank) . 

organize. The infantry then pushed ahead 

under covering fire but stopped short of the 

village. British troops remained in possession 

of a ridge commanding Djedeida, while the 

wounded were brought out during the night 

by the light of burning tanks, but it was 

clear that to gain the objective stronger Allied forces would be required next day. The 

capture of Mateur, moreover, could not 

well be undertaken until the river crossing at 

Djedeida was controlled by the Allied 

troops.9 

Allied artillery reinforcements came up 

during the night of 28-29 November, including the U.S. 5th Field Artillery Battalion, which had recently arrived in the area 

after leaving Oran on 20 November. Acting 

on orders to place his batteries northeast of 

• (1) Interv with Maj Philip St. G. Cocke, 13 

Jan 50. (2) Rcd of interv with Col. Bruss, 29 Dec 

42. OPD 381 Africa, Sec 2, Case 71. (3) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

Djedeida that night, the battalion commander and several battery commanders 

went forward on reconnaissance. Under the 

misconception that the British held Djedeida, they drove along the road from Tebourba and ran into an ambush which 

robbed the battalion of its principal officers 

before it had even gone into action. After 

reorganizing next morning, the battalion 

occupied positions east of Tebourba in support of the 11 th Infantry Brigade.

10 

The French aided the build-up near Tebourba by assuming, along with elements 

of the U.S. 175th Field Artillery Battalion, 

protection of the Bordj Toum bridge across 

the Medjerda northeast of Medjez e1 Bab, 

and by increasing the French forces at Medjez el Bab, thus relieving the bulk of the 

11 th Infantry Brigade Group for the battle. 

On the night of 28 November, the 1st Bat-

,. 5th FA Bn AAR, 13 Nov 42-18 Jan 43, 6 Mar 

43. 
308 

talion, East Surrey Regiment, organized a 

bridgehead on the southeast side of the river 

at El Bathan." 

The Allied drive toward Tunis reached its 

climax on 29 November. The 11 th Infantry 

Brigade Group renewed its assault on Djedei:da after a half-hour's artillery preparation of high explosive and smoke shells at 

dawn, followed by an attack of the 5th Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment, and a 

dozen American tanks of the 2d Battalion, 

13th Armored Regiment. The enemy leaped 

to his guns when the barrage lightened and 

hit the tanks with antitank and heavy machine gun fire as they came over a ridge and 

rolled down the forward slope. Enemy airplanes were extremely effective. Tanks 

which pulled back to defilade found no cover 

from repeated dive-bombing in the open, 

rolling countryside. Enemy air attacks, more 

intense than those of any previous day, also 

harried the infantry as it broke off the assault. These attacks continued as one portion of the infantry organized a defensive 

line at the ridge while the remainder withdrew to Tebourba. Although the 2d Battalion, Hampshire Regiment, came up after 

dark to relieve the 5th Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment, General Evelegh 

was permitted to suspend the attack before 

daylight, 30 November, pending a marked 

improvement in Allied air strength. 

The approaching reinforcements (the 1st 

11 (I) On 30 November the foJlowing were located in the Medjez ("I Bab area: staff and two battalions .of the 4th Mixed Zouaves and TiraiJleurs 

Regiment; the 3d Battalion, 62d ArtiJlery Regiment; 

a section of motorized engine("rs; a motorized group 

of th" 2d Battalion, 7th Guards Regiment; two 47-

mm. guns of the 62d ArtiJlery Regiment; and five 

American antiaircraft guns. At Bordj Toum the 

company was from the 3d Battalion, 43d Colonial 

Infantry Regiment. See Station List in CSTT Jnl, 

30 Nov 42. (2) 175th FA Bn War Diary, 28-29 

Nov 42. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

British Guards Brigade and Combat Command B, U.S. 1st Armored Division, and 

the British 6th Armoured Division west of 

them) would be helpful, but the most compelling necessity was to end enemy command of the air over the battlefield, such as 

he had enjoyed for the past two days. The 

Eastern Air Command could do little to 

remedy the situation. Its medium and heavy 

bombers kept hitting the airdromes and seaports through which the enemy was receiving his reinforcements, while strikes on the 

airfields inflicted some damage on the 

enemy's air power, but it could not keep 

enough Allied fighter squadrons in the air, 

or base them near enough to the area of 

ground combat. To put an airfield at 

Medjez el Bab into operation by 2 December offered the only serious hope of bettering 

Allied air support of the Eastern Task 

Force.'2 

The northern attack along the coastal 

highway by the 36th Brigade Group spent 

its force on 29-30 November in one last 

courageous effort. Observers could not spot 

the many camouflaged enemy machine gun 

positions on Green Hill north of the road 

even with the aid of low-level air reconnaissance. A night attack on that hill by the 

British 6th Commando (-) and on Bald 

Hill by the 6th Battalion, Royal West Kent 

Regiment (-), put men on the upper 

slopes, only to have them pinned down in 

daylight. By nightfall, 30 November, the 

whole undertaking of the north column was 

stopped. The 36th Brigade Group withdrew 

toward Sedjenane, leaving Group Witzig in 

control.l:l Southeast of Mateur continuing 

" Info supplied by Air Ministry, London. 

13 German casualties were fourteen kiJled, twenty 

wounded, and one missing. ARR, Group Witzig to 

Diu. Broich, 30 Nov and I Dec 42, in Diu. Broich, 

KTB, Nr. 1, 11.xI.-31.XII.42, Anlagenheft II, 

Anlage 9, 29, 30 Nov, 1 Dec 42. 
THE ATTACK TOWARD TUNIS 

the advance from heights north of ChouYgui 

pass, which had been occupied on 28 November, the reinforced battalion of Regiment Barenthin on Nehring's orders occupied the ridge east of Coxen's Farm on 29 

November and consolidated its hold on the 

high ground east of the Tine river.14 Mateur 

thus remained well guarded, both from the 

west and southeast. 

The amphibious landing operation of the 

1 st Commando on the coast west of Bizerte, 

which was to assist the advance of the 36th 

Brigade Group, was executed. Starting from 

Tabarka at 1800 on 30 November, British 

and American troops were put ashore during the early hours of 1 December without 

opposition. They advanced to their designated objectives on the Bizerte-Mateur 

road, denying its use to the enemy for three 

days. Running low on supplies, unable to 

establish radio communications with the 

brigade headquarters, and harassed by the 

Germans, they were finally forced to withdraw to Sedjenane where the last elements 

arrived on 5 December. In this raid the 1st 

Commando suffered 134 casualties, including 74 American.1G 

General Evelegh's recommendation on 29 

November to postpone the attack was not 

approved in time to prevent the parachute 

operation on the southeast flank. At 1450, 

29 November, about 500 men of the 2d 

Parachute Battalion (Br.) floated to earth 

near Depienne, about twenty-five miles 

south of Tunis. They proceeded that night 

to Oudna airfield but found that it was not 

in Axis use. Flight upon flight of Stukas 

and fighters over the troops in Tunisia came 

from other fields. Paratroopers cut the tele-

" (1) Sitrep, Diu. Broich to XC Corps, 29, 30 

Nov 42, in Diu. Broich, KTB, Nr. I, 11.XI.-

31.XII.42, Anlagenheft II, Anlage 8. (2) XC Corps, 

KTB I, 16.-30.XI.42, 28, 29 Nov 42. 

"Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

309 

phone lines and demolished other installations at the empty airfield, and then hid in 

the hills until the following night. When 

they learned by radio that the attack on 

Tunis had been postponed, they made their 

way back to Medjez el Bab as best they 

could, harried by the enemy, hampered by 

the wounded, and widely scattered during 

successive night marches. Losses were 19 

killed, 4 wounded, and 266 missing.16 

Axis parachutists were a threat to the 

highly vulnerable line of communications in 

the rear of the Eastern Task Force. To protect this line French guards were therefore 

mounted at bridges, culverts, and tunnels, 

in response to orders issued on 30 November.17 

Suspension of the Allied attack on Djedei:da early on 30 November and at the 

enemy's Djefna position at the end of the 

day was intended to be temporary. The 

Allied commander in chief, whose command post at Gibraltar had been moved 

to Algiers on 25 November, returned from 

a tour of the front on 30 November and in 

a review of the situation, stated his intentions as follows: 

My immediate aim is to keep pushing hard, 

with a first intention of pinning the enemy 

back in the Fortress of Bizerte and confining 

him so closely that the danger of a breakout 

or a heavy counteroffensive will be minimized. 

Then I expect to put everything we have in 

the way of air and artillery on him and to 

pound him so hard that the way for a final and 

decisive blow can be adequately prepared. 

While that preparation is going on, we can 

clean up the territory to the south. In this 

plan, our greatest concern is to keep the air 

going efficiently on inadequate, isolated 

fields. IS 

,. Ibid. 

11 CSTT Jnl, 30 Nov 42. 

'" Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 Nov 42. Copy 

in OPD 381 Africa, Sec 1, Tab 50. 
310 

Axis forces were affected during these 

critical days by a strong sense of crisis. Allied 

bombing of the airfields at El Aouina and 

Sidi Ahmed, aimed at interrupting the flow 

of enemy reinforcements, was so destructive 

that continual improvisation and strenuous 

labor were required to keep these fields in 

operation. Troops normally engaged in 

other duties were diverted to repairs and fire 

control. As a temporary expedient, incoming plane loads of Axis troops were held 

over for twenty-four hours for such work 

before being shifted to forward areas. The 

decisive shipment of tanks and guns which 

arrived on 27 November was unloaded on 

28-29 November and speeded to forward 

assembly areas and thence to combat. Allied 

armor posed the most serious threat, for air 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

reconnaIssance on 29 November reported 

approximately 135 Allied tanks between 

Djedeida airfield and Sidi Nsir. General 

Nehring was obliged to choose between 

using the few new-type 88-mm. dual-purpose guns at his disposal to defend the airfields from Allied bombers or to protect the 

road to Tunis against Allied tanks. He chose 

the latter alternative. But even while the 

Allied advance was being stopped, primarily by enemy air supremacy, the Axis was 

preparing for an aggressive defense. General Evelegh's decision to pause was almost 

simultaneous with a decision by General 

Nehring to strike back at Tebourba.19 

10 (1) XC Corps, KTB I, J6.-30.XI.42, 28-30 

Nov 42. (2) MS # D-147 (Nehring). 
CHAPTER XVII 

Stalemate Before Tunis 

Field Marshal Kesselring directed General Nehring, commanding the German 

forces defending Tunis, to enlarge the area 

they were holding. During a visit to Tunis 

on 28 November he found much to criticize. 

He believed that Medjez el Bab should have 

been defended rather than abandoned. The 

unloadings of cargo at Bizerte had been 

much too slow, limiting operations against 

the Allies and retarding the schedule of sea 

transport. He found Nehring's attitude too 

cautious and defensive. Since another infantry regiment was soon to arrive, he urged 

that the situation be faced with confident 

determination rather than in a mood of desperation. Finally, he ordered Nehring to regain lost ground up to a line running from 

Tebourba gap to Massicault. Nehring 

placed the operation under command of 

the recently arrived commanding general 

of the 10th Panzer Division, General Wolfgang Fischer, and scheduled it for not later 

than 1 December.' 

The Allied forces were then widely dispersed in the Tebourba area. The most ad1 (I) XC Army Corps, KTB I, l6.~30.xI.42, 28 

Nov 42. (2) MS # D~147 (Nehring). (3) MS 

# T~3~P2 (Kesselring). (4) Rpt, 10. Panzer Division, Ie, Gefechtsbericht ueber Gefecht Tebourba 

vom 1.~4.xIl.42, 3 Jan 43, in 10. Panzer Division, 

Abt. Ie, Anlagen zum Taetigheitsbericht (hen'-

after referred to as 10th Panzer Div, Ie, TB Anlagen), 29.xI.42~15.IIl.43, Anlage 49. (5) General Fischer was relieved as Military Governor of 

Bizerte by Generalmajor Georg Neuffer, commanding general of the 20th Flak Division. 

vanced elements were at the ridge line near 

Djedeida. (Map VI) Two miles west of 

them a company held Djebel Maiana ( 186) 

and made full use of its dominating position 

for observation of the plain below. Close to 

Tebourba village were various units, including the 2d Battalion, U.S. 13th Armored 

Regiment, and the U.S. 5th Field Artillery 

Battalion. Other units were at El Bathan, 

on the southeastern bank of the Medjerda 

river south of Tebourba. The remainder of 

the Allied troops held a triangular area 

whose points, about four miles apart, were 

at Tebourba village (5th Northamptons), 

Chouigui village ( Blade Force less 17/21 

Lancers), and Tebourba gap (Headquarters, 11 th Brigade, 17/21 Lancers, and 

artillery and antitank units l. 

Tebourba gap is a narrow belt of level 

ground between Djebel Lanserine (569) 

and the Medjerda river through which a 

highway and railroad run to Medjez el Bab. 

Along the western edge of the triangle are 

the serried shoulders of Djebel Lanserine, 

rising from the edge of the rolling plain. 

Between Tebourba gap and Tebourba is a 

low ridge, while between Tebourba and 

Chouigui are dips and wadies and a few 

clumps of trees. Since 29 November Blade 

Force had been assembled in the area of 

Chouigui and in a position to protect the 

left (northern) flank of Brig. E. E. Cass's 

11 th Infantry Brigade, at the same barring 

time access to Chouigui pass from the east 
312 

From this assembly area the 17/21 Lancers 

( 17/21 L) had moved early in the morning 

of 1 December to Tebourba gap, leaving 

the 1st Battalion, U.S. 1st Armored Regiment, and other elements of Blade Force 

behind. This was the setting for General 

Fischer's counterattack, which opened a 

little later that morning.2 

The Axis Counterattack Begins 

To carry out his orders Fischer was assigned the forces in the Tunis North sector, 

190th Panzer Battalion, and those elements 

of the 10th Panzer Division that had arrived 

in Tunisia. The Tunis North sector forces 

manned a perimeter, divided into two subsectors-that under Colonel Guensch running from Protville to Djedeida and that 

under Lt. Col. Koch from Djedei"da through 

St. Cyprien to La Mohammedia. Group 

Lueder (elements of 190th Panzer Battalion), which had helped close the gap between Mateur and Djedelda on 28 November by its advance from Sidi Athman, stood 

three miles north of Choulgui pass, and the 

elements of the 10th Panzer Division under 

Captain Hudel were assembling in the area 

around Protville. From the Mateur area 

Fischer recalled on 30 November a small 

tank unit which had been with Group Witzig opposing Brig. A. L. Kent-Lemon's 36th 

Brigade Group. General Fischer expected 

to have at his disposal for his attack approximately forty tanks, mostly Mark Ill's, and 

about fifteen 75-mm. antitank guns and he 

was expecting additional reinforcements 

daily.3 Late on 30 November he took com2 Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

'(I )XC Corps, KTB I, 16.-30.XI.42, 29 Nov 42. 

(2) 10th Panzer Div, Ie, TB Anlagen, 29.xI.42-

15.IlI.43, Anlage 49. (3) Rpt, 10th Panzer Diu, 

WafJenmeldung, 3 Dec 42, in Fifth Panzer Army, 

KTB Anlagen, Id Akten zum KTB I-V, 29.XI.42-

4.IlI.43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

mand of the Tunis North sector from 

Colonel Stolz and issued orders for his 

counterattack from headquarters at Le 

Bardo, on the edge of Tunis. The only radio 

available to his staff }Vas that in Tunis at 

Headquarters, XC Corps. Some of the forces 

to be committed would pass out of radio 

contact at the first hostilities and could be 

reached thereafter only by courier. Accepting this handicap, he assigned and scheduled 

objectives that would take a considerable 

period of time, and prepared to exercise 

direct command at various points on the 

battlefield, trusting otherwise to the discretion of his principal subordinate commanders. 

The operation was to open with a holding 

attack on the southern flank and an armored 

thrust against the northern flank delivered 

at the triangle south of Choulgui village. 

Four separate groups were organized. At 

the outset, three would be in motion while 

the fourth waited in reserve. At the south, 

Group Koch (seven companies of parachute 

infantry, three companies of regular infantry, one German and one Italian antitank company, two field artillery pieces, and 

platoons of engineers and bicyclists) was to 

tie down the Allies by attacking EI Bathan. 

Northwest of Choulgui village, Group 

Lueder (one company of tanks, one field 

artillery battery of three guns, one company 

of dismounted motorcycle troops) was to 

exit from a valley near Hill 258 and attack 

toward the south, while also blocking the 

road through Choulgui pass. Group Hudel 

(two companies of tanks, two companies 

of antitank guns, and a company of dismounted motorcycle troops) was to attack 

from Sidi Athman, eight miles north of 

Djedelda, and destroy the Allied annored 

force at Choulgui, and then, in conjunction 

with Group Lueder, to drive through 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 313 

THE GERMAN 88-MM. FLAK GUNS 

Choulgui and attack T ebourba from the 

west. If the Allies were already falling back 

from the town by the time the amlUI ed 

groups reached the area west of Tebourba, 

the mission of Croups Lueder and H udel 

would be to block the Tebourba gap. 

Ready at Djedelda, a fourth group 

( Group Djedeida ) would pursue the Allies 

if they pulled back during the tank operations north of T ebourba but otherwise 

would await General Fischer's specific order 

to attack. Croup Djedeida included one 

company of parachute infantry, two companies of regular i:ifantry, two antiaircraft 

companies, eighteen 20-mm. guns, a motorcycle engineer platoon, elements of a tank 

destroyer company (three 55 -mm. guns ), 

two Mark III tanks and the two untried 

Tiger tanks which had successfully made the 

overland trip from port to battle front. Several of the new 88-mm. flak guns were diverted from the defense of Bizerte to be 
converted to use as antitank weapons of 

surprising power.4

The German counterattack began at 

0745, 1 December. It had substantial success from the start. Allied troops saw the 

two armored columns converging on Chouïgui, elements of Blade Force in the vicinity 

first observing Group Lueder. Northwest of 

the village, they engaged in a relatively brief 

artillery exchange which cost each side light 

losses. The attacking group in two extended 

V-shaped lines continued south toward 

Chouïgui. The supply and service units of 

Blade Force, screened by 1st Battalion, U.S. 

1st Armored Regiment, and Squadron B, 

1st Derbyshire Yeomanry, fell back east toward Tebourba to avoid being enveloped. 

Then Group Hudel, accompanied by General Fischer, delivered the main blow against 

Chouïgui from the north. Blade Force was 

thus attacked from two directions, and before noon had been largely overrun, its 

headquarters dispersed, and the remainder 

driven back on Tebourba. An attempt to 

assist the armor at Chouïgui by sending 

17/21 Lancers back from Tebourba gap 

to Blade Force’s western flank proved ineffectual. When the Lancers moved out of 

the cover of an olive grove and approached 

their objective across open ground, five of 

their Crusader tanks were knocked out by 

the enemy’s longer-ranged guns, concealed 

in the trees south of Chouigui. The remainder pulled back to a strong position on 

a knoll northwest of Tebourba in support 

of the 11th Brigade Group. When the units 

of Blade Force which had not been destroyed at Chouïgui later withdrew to Tebourba, they were attached to 17/21 

Lancers for further employment. 

4 10th Panzer Div, Ic, TB Anlagen, 29.XI.42- 

15.III.43, Anlage 49. 

The German armor continued southward 

from Chouïgui in a careful pursuit which 

was slowed even further by the delaying action of a British armored car unit, covering 

the somewhat hasty withdrawal into Tebourba gap of Allied trains, artillery, and 

other units. The congestion of vehicles converging there was increased when enemy 

rifle and machine gun fire from Hill 104 

near the southern bank of the river temporarily stopped movement along the northern bank. Allied artillery emplaced on high 

ground at Tebourba gap was weakly protected against possible ground attack with 

close air support, but the afternoon passed 

without execution of such a threat although 

enemy air attacks were frequent. At the 

same time, these batteries continued successfully to slow the southward advance of 

the Germans despite persistent counterbattery and heavy machine gun fire on their 

positions. Groups Lueder and Hudel were 

finally stopped just north of the main road 

between Tebourba gap and Tebourba, although they succeeded in denying use of 

that road to the Allies despite one Allied air 

bombing and persistent Allied artillery fire. 

During the afternoon, the defenders did not 

fall back westward from Tebourba but, reinforced by the arrival of elements of Blade 

Force, held their positions. Under Fischer’s 

plan, German armor was expected to attack 

Tebourba next, but instead it was held 

northwest of the village while Group 

Djedeïda attacked. 

Group Djedeïda attacked early in the 

afternoon against the Allied line at the ridge 

west of Djedeida, marking the climax of Allied progress toward Tunis. General Fischer 

had left Group Hudel, around noon after 

Chouïgui had fallen, to lead Group 

Djedeïda’s attack personally. Its troops were 

inferior in skill and morale, and it lacked 
STALEMATE BEFORE TVNIS 

reserves. The two supporting Tiger tanks 

were helpful, but the stubborn resistance 

offered by the 2d Hampshires (2/H) held 

the attackers far short of their objective. 

During the course of the day the elements 

of Group Koch designated for the attack on 

the German left (south) flank advanced to 

points south and east of El Bathan. 

The Allied situation at nightfall, 1 December, was not good, although the battle 

had not reached a decisive stage. Enemy 

maneuvers had exposed the 11 th Brigade 

Group's northern flank and had reduced the 

zone between Tebourba and Tebourba gap 

to a narrowing strip close to the Medjerda. 

Enemy air attacks upon Allied units moving 

in daylight had increased in tempo. Blade 

Force was divided. Its effectiveness as a tactical unit had been destroyed. The 11 th 

Brigade Group was strung out from Tebourba gap on the west to the vicinity of 

Djedeida on the east and was grouped in 

four principal sections: (1) the 2d Battalion, Hampshire Regiment, at the ridge 

near Djedei'da, with one company of the 

1st Battalion, East Surrey Regiment ( liES), 

on Djebel Maiana west of it, protecting the 

observation post, and miscellaneous units, 

including elements of the 2d Battalion, V.S. 

13th Armored Regiment, near Tebourba; 

(2) a southern force, the 1st Surreys (-), 

holding El Bathan on the southern side of 

the river with two companies supported by 

heavy artillery and antitank guns; (3) a 

western force, chiefly artillery, on the hills 

north of Tebourba gap; and (4) the remnants of Blade Force, mainly the 17/21 

Lancers, harboring south of Tebourba village. 

These Allied troops improved their situation during the night by shifts and reinforcements. Most of the 5th Battalion, 

Northamptonshire Regiment (SINH), after 

315 

blunting the German armored thrust, was 

able to move onto the ridges north of Tebourba gap to protect the hitherto exposed 

artillery positions there, while remnants of 

Blade Force continued to rally in that area. 

Substantial reinforcements from Combat 

Command B, V.S. 1st Armored Division, 

approached from Medjez el Bab and 

brought to Tebourba gap by daylight of 2 

December the light tanks of the 1 st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (less Company C), the mediums of Company E, 13th 

Armored Regiment, which had been recalled from attachment to the 36th Brigade 

Group, the 1 st and 2d Battalions, 6th Armored Infantry, and a battery of four selfpropelled 105-mm. howitzers of the 27th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion. A truck 

convoy loaded with ammunition, gasoline, 

and rations got through to Tebourba where 

replenishment was badly needed. Partially 

offsetting these gains, the southern force defending El Bathan lost the support of the 

V.S. 5th Field Artillery Battalion's I55-mm. 

howitzers by its failure to receive ammunition resupply. Without authorization by the 

commander of the British artillery unit to 

which it was attached, the battalion withdrew during the night rather than uselessly 

expose its weapons. 5 

The Second Day 

General Evelegh had forfeited the initiative but intended, if possible, to relieve 

Blade Force with Combat Command B, 1st 

Armored Division, under command of General Oliver, and to counterattack the 

c, (1) 5th FA Bn AAR, 13 Nov 42-18 Jan 43. 

(2) Info supplied by Cahinet Office, London. (3) 

CCB 1st Armd Div Opns Jnl, 8 Nov 42-11 May 43. 

(4) 10th Panzer Diu, Ie, TB Anlagen, 29.XI.42-

15.III.43, Anlage 49. 
316 

enemy's armored forces northwest of Tebourba while the 11 th Brigade Group held 

its positions. The enemy for his part intended to draw tighter the German ring encircling Tebourba by sending the two armored groups and Group Djedezda against 

it in the morning while Group Koch prevented any withdrawal to the south through 

El Bathan and also reconnoitered against 

the possibility of Allied reinforcements approaching from the southwest. During the 

night, General Fischer sent an armored detachment to gain control of Tebourba gap, 

through which Allied reinforcements were 

correctly reported to be moving northeastward, but his force was driven away toward 

Choulgui. 

The enemy's prospects of early success 

were dimmed by the low quality of his infantry units. The Tunis Replacement Battalions, casual infantry which had been 

brought to XC Corps, were seriously deficient In important respects. General 

Fischer reported to General Nehring of their 

1 December's action: 

... not the slightest interest existed, no 

aggressive spirit, no readiness for action, so 

that I was forced to lead some companies, 

platoons, even squads, and to assign them a 

sector on the battlefield. I consider it my 

duty to point out this critical condition as it is 

impossible to fight successfully with such 

troops. It is also true that their command 

is inadquate. I have warned one captain 

who failed several times to execute his missions that in case of a repetition I would have 

him relieved. I had another officer relieved 

on the spot and demanded that he be courtmartialed because he and his men lurked 

under cover for hours .... G 

G Rpt, 10th Panzer Diu to XC Corps, 2 Dec 42, in 

Fifth Panzer Army, KTB Anlagen, la, Geh. und 

Geh. Kdo. Sachen (Afrika, Tunis) Band 1, 16.Xl.-

42-12.1.43 (hereafter cited as Fifth Panzer Armv, 

KTB, Anlagen, Geh. und Geh. Kdo. Sachen, Band 

1,16.xl.42-12.1.43). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

The enemy nevertheless expanded his first 

day's gains during 2 December. He did not 

occupy much new ground but he further 

weakened the Allies. The 2d Battalion, 

Hampshire Regiment, by bitter fighting at 

the easternmost ridge line, held Group 

Djedezda, except for a penetration along the 

Medjerda river, but at heavy cost. At 

midnight the depleted British force had to 

withdraw about two miles to a new line 

which ran south from Djebel Malana to 

the river, the left (northern) flank being 

protected by A Company, 1st Surreys. The 

southern defending force, two companies of 

the 1st Surreys in El Bathan, for a time supported by a detachment of 17/21 Lancers 

in forays against enemy mortar and machine 

gun emplacements, was worn down by persistent attack from Group Koch. It was 

threatened with partial encirclement after 

enemy machine gunners had infiltrated 

across the river into the olive groves on the 

Tebourba side. Because of the need to reinforce the troops at Tebourba village, Brigadier Cass authorized withdrawal of the 

infantry to positions nearer Tebourba, leaving the bridge at El Bathan covered only by 

antitank guns in exposed forward positions. 

On the plain northwest of Tebourba, 

enemy armor almost completed its attempt 

to encircle the village. Brigadier Cass had 

four separate elements with which to oppose 

the German tanks. One consisted of tanks 

from the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, which had formed a part of Blade 

Force. They had been driven back to the 

cover to Tebourba's olive orchards on the 

previous afternoon, and had later slipped 

northward from Tebourba to a wadi nearer 

Choulgui to escape being trapped. In the 

early morning, after scooting westward to 

the base of the hills and then continuing 

southward toward Tebourba gap, most of 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

them reached the cover of British artillery 

and there rejoined the main Allied force. 

Another element available was the 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (less Company E), which had been defending Tebourba village from close-in positions. It 

was in danger of being cut off at Tebourba 

and out of communication with Colonel 

Bruss, its commander. The newly arrived 

elements of Combat Command B formed a 

third armored element. The British antitank units attached to the 11 th Brigade 

Group formed the fourth and vital part of 

the total Allied strength. 

The situation on the morning of 2 December called for a well co-ordinated employment of these troops in tactics adapted 

to certain advantages held by each side. 

The Germans had pronounced air superiority. Their tanks were individually stronger 

than the American tanks, and some of their 

antitank guns were greatly superior to anything the Allies possessed. The Allies had 

larger numbers of tanks and antitank guns, 

and could also count on well-placed field 

artillery, aided by superb observation. The 

enemy's well-knit armored groups were 

obliged to operate in a limited zone between 

Tebourba and Tebourba gap, where they 

were necessarily exposed much of the time 

to fire from the flanks and, if they turned 

against either area, to fire and counterattack from the rear. Instead of taking advantage of this situation, the Allies frittered 

away some of their armored strength in an 

attempt to pit tanks against tanks without 

even seeking to benefit from greater numbers. Brigadier Cass was unable, moreover, 

to make effective use of all Allied strength 

for lack of radio communications with important elements of his command. General 

Oliver, as commander of Combat Command 

B, U.S. 1st Armored Division, was expected 

317 

to assume command of all armored units 

upon the relief of Blade Force, and at 1150, 

2 December, he sent forward from Medjez 

el Bab Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinett, commander of the 13th Armored Regiment, to 

bring about co-ordination from an advanced command post nearer Tebourba. 

Robinett's party arrived after a sortie of over 

thirty light tanks-made by 1st Battalion, 

13th Armored Regiment, against German 

Mark IV's without benefit of artillery support-had been driven back with heavy 

losses, and as Colonel Bruss was sending 

medium tanks of Company E, 13th Armored Regiment, toward Tebourba with a 

view to reinforcing and extricating the remainder of the 2d Battalion of that regiment, west of the village. This ill-conceived 

attempt subjected the American vehicles to 

antitank fire which destroyed eight of the 

Shermans, cost several lives, and despite 

heroic conduct brought no benefits to the 

Allied side. 7 Cass and Robinett agreed that 

the situation required defensive tactics until 

British and American forces could be 

strengthened and co-ordinated. Another attack by 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, was canceled. 

Neither Group Lueder nor Group Hudel 

could punch its way as far as the river to 

cut off completely the Allies in and near 

Tebourba. The Allied artillery in the olive 

1 (I) 1st Armd Regt AAR, 8 Nov 42-13 May 43; 

CCB 1st Armd Div Opns J nl, 8 Nov 42-11 May 43. 

(2) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (3) 

Interv with Gen Robinett. (4) Robinett correspondence with participants in the battle, 1949-50, 

in his possession. (5) Rcd of interv with Col Bruss, 

29 Dec 42. OPD 381 Africa, Sec 2, Case 71. (6) 

Redding, The Operations of C Company, 70lst 

Tank Destroyer Battalion, 24 November-II December 1942, MS. The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., 1948-49. (7) Scenes of the battle form 

part of a Signal Corps color film (Misc 100 I ), "At 

the Front, North Africa." 
318 

groves west of the town joined the guns on 

high ground above the gap, catching the 

armored units from two directions, holding 

them back and inflicting substantial losses. 

Although the Germans dominated the main 

road between the gap and the village, they 

still left available to the Allies an unimproved track running close to the river's 

bank and screened by trees. 

The fighting of 2 December thus left the 

Germans still holding the initiative, still 

bringing up reinforcements, with much 

more yet to accomplish before the battle 

could be said to be theirs. The successive 

defeats of both British and American armor 

were ominous for the Allies, for they suggested that, even if the battle for Tebourba 

ended with a German withdrawal, Allied 

offensive power would be below requirements for a successful final assault on Tunis. 

At the same time, Axis air activity showed 

no sign of abatement. Under these conditions the next day's battle, even if won by 

the Allies, might determine merely how far 

they could get in their December drive toward Tunis with no likelihood of leading to 

ultimate victory. 

The Climax of the Counterattack, 3 

December 

On 2 December, two companies of the 

10th Panzer Division's 86th Panzer Grenadier Regiment were flown from Italy to 

Tunisia and thence to reinforce Group 

Djediida in the next day's assault. The main 

effort was to be made by this group along 

the railroad, immediately after a heavy 

dive-bombing attack and with the support 

of tanks. Hill 186 was its objective. Group 

Lueder was ordered to stop traffic moving 

westward from Tebourba by pushing all the 

way to the river. Group Rudel, while supNORTHWEST AFRICA 

porting Group Lueder's operation, was required to bar withdrawal from Tebourba to 

the northwest and north. Group Koch, besides strengthening the close-in protection 

of Tunis against a possible attack from the 

southwest, was to bar retreat over the EI 

Bathan bridge and to harass Allied traffic 

through the Tebourba gap by fire from hills 

oppusite it on the southeastern bank of the 

river. 

The third day's fighting brought favorable results to the Axis forces. Quickly the 

two German armored groups, by taking two 

hills west of the town, narrowed the opening 

along the river's northerly side through 

which the Allies to the west might keep in 

communication with those in Tebourba. 

Although El Bathan was mistakenly left 

undefended by Group Koch for part of the 

morning, leaving open a way for possible 

Allied withdrawal from Tebourba, the Allies had pulled back from El Bathan and 

were much too engrossed in resisting the 

seizure of Hill 186 (Djebel Maiana) to 

grasp the opportunity.a 

Group Djede"ida waited until 1000 for a 

scheduled preparatory dive-bombing attack 

and then attacked without it. In a twopronged thrust the Germans struck for 

Djebel Ma'iana. The right group gained the 

northern end of the ridge, secured it, then 

pressed southward until they controlled the 

entire hill. The loss of Hill 186 with its superlative observation post in the end proved 

decisive. Valiant counterattacks launched 

during the afternoon by the 2d Hampshires 

were tantalizingly half-successful. The German left (south) prong of the Djede'ida 

8 (1) JOth Panzer Div, Ie, TBAnlagen, 29.XIA2-

JS.IIIA3, Anlage 49. (2) Rpt 10th Panzer Div to 

XC Corps, 3 Dec 42, in Fifth Panzer Army, KTB, 

Anlagen, Geh. und Geh. Kdo. Sachen, Band J, 

J 6.XIA2-J 2.1.43. 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 319 

EL BA THAN. Portion of Hill 186 can be seen on right beyond the loop in the Medjerda river. 

Cluster of white buildings, left background, is Tebourba. 

group, reinforced by tanks and supported by 

air strikes, broke through the British line 

just north of the river and by 1630 had succeeded in temporarily isolating the 2d 

Hampshires in the orchards east of Tebourba. After a last attempt by the 1st Surreys to regain Hill 186 had failed, and under 

a very heavy dive-bombing attack on Tebourba, the remnants of the 2d Hampshires 

prepared at 1800, together with remnants 

of other units, to evacuate Tebourba village. 

The route of the withdrawal, begun after 

dark, was southward to the track along the 

river bank and thence westward through 

Tebourba gap. The enemy subjected the 

area to heavy artillery and machine gun fire. 

As the column of vehicles thickened, some 

near its head were hit and set on fire; movement stopped, bombardment was intensified, part of the track close to the river gave 

way; progress became impossible, and extrication of the vehicles all but impossible. 

They were therefore abandoned-field guns, 

tractors, and motor transport, along with 

much ammunition. The troops infiltrated 

across the countryside in small groups to 

Tebourba gap. The enemy had fortunately 

been cleared from the hills south of the river 

by Company C, U.S. 6th Armored Infantry, supported by Battery A, 27th Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion, in a sharp, short 

action on the previous morning. The way 

from Tebourba gap up the Medjerda valley 

was thus cleared of harassing fire at this 

critical time. 

At 1100,4 December, attacks from both 

east and west broke swiftly into Tebourba 

and, about an hour later, yielded the town 
320 

to Groups Lueder and Djede'ida. Group 

Koch then advanced northward from El 

Bathan and established contact with the 

other Axis units. The Allies had been 

stopped and turned back. They had withdrawn what they could, but the losses inflicted upon them by General Fischer's 

command in four days were estimated bv 

him to total: 55 tanks, 4 armored cars, 4-

antitank guns, 6 100-mm. guns and 6 

120-mm. guns, 13 smaller guns, 38 machine 

guns, 40 mortars, 300 motor vehicles, 1,000 

to 1, I 00 Allied prisoners, and quantities of 

ammunition of many kinds. It was an unmistakable victory for Fischer and Nehring.1> 

The general situation in Tunisia was reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 

3 December by General Eisenhower as 

follows: 

1. We have gone beyond the sustainable 

limit of air capabilities In supporting ground 

forces in a pell-mell race for Tunisia. Consequently, although our air forces have been 

working at maximum pace without even minimum repair, supply and maintenance facilities, the scale of possible support is insufficient 

to keep down the hostile strafing and divebombing which is so largely responsible for 

breaking up all attempted advances by ground 

forces. 

2. The Air Commanders report that from 

2 days to 1 week more of present scale air 

operation, under existing conditions, will 

leave them near or at complete breakdown, 

yet this scale of air support is not sufficient. 

• (1) 10 Panzer Div, Ie, TB Anlagen, 29.XI.42-

JS./l/.43, Anlage 49. 2) Ltr, Gen Robinett to 

Gen Marshall, 8 Dec Copy in OPD Exec 8, 

Item 7, Tab 30. This letter describes the close coordination of German air and ground operations at 

Tcbourba. (3) The J 1 th Brigade's losses were recorded as 21 guns in battle and 32 during the withdrawal, leaving 21. Casualties reduced its three 

battalions to a total of 660, plus stragglers. Info 

supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (4) Maj. J. M. 

Barton, M.C., "The Hampshire Regiment at Tebourba," The Army Quarterly, XLVIII, No. 1 

(April, 1944),57-63. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

T<; provide reasonable conditions for air operatlOns we must arrange at once for: 

(a) Advanced operating airfields. 

(b) Air maintenance troops well forward. 

(c) Stocks of spare parts and supplies in 

advanced dromes. 

( d) Warning services and Ack Ack. 

To do these things we need a breathing space 

and proper air cover over land and sea routes 

of communication in the rear areas. 

3. We will curtail air operations in forward 

areas to bomber attacks on ports and hostile 

lines of communication with occasional 

fighter attacks against existing airfields. Our 

ground operations will be reduced to consolidating principal gains. . . . All our ground 

forces in Tunisia, except a portion of the 

"Blade" force brought out for refitting, arc in 

contact. No rt'serves are present in that area. 

4. Seven days or even more of delay would 

not be particularly serious in view of tremendous distances we have advanced ahead 

of schedule, provided we could stop Axis 

ground reinforcemt'nt, something that to date 

we havt' not bet'n able to do. Even with some 

opportunity to improve our general supply 

situation east of Algiers, there is a definite 

limit to our rate of build up and the strength 

of forces we ean sustain in Tunisia .... 

5 .... We hope, by reducing the number 

of aircraft in the forward areas during the 

next 5 days, to cut down plane losses . . . 

and build up reserve supplies ... for a 

sustained effort of several days. During the 

same period we will have an opportunity to 

straighten out the t'ongested condition on our 

railway line between Constantine and the forward areas and get supplies moving to the 

proper places. Because of the shortage of 

motor transport, sidings have become crowded 

and supplies immobilized. To move supplies 

will require not only the use of whatever 

troops and trucks the French may be able to 

give us . . . but the use of our own tactical 

vehicles. 

6. Should these calculations and anticipations work out, we will resume the advance as 

soon as possible. The present target date is 

December 9th. The principal objective will 

be the capture of Tunis, to throw the enemy 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

back into the Bizerte stronghold. There we 

will try to confine him closely while bringing 

up additional means for the final kill. 

7. Success of this plan depends also upon 

weather, because if protracted rain should set 

in, every field wc have becomcs unusable except the tiny one at Bone and the one at 

Maison Blanche. Bad weather would, of 

course, also facilitate Axis reinforcement in 

that our bombing opcrations would not be 

effective.'° 

December Decisions on Axis Strategy 

The aggressive defense of Tunis which 

the enemy undertook on 1 December was 

in conformity with the decision reached 

earlier at higher levels of Axis command to 

adhere to an ambitious strategy in northwestern Africa. The Germans abandoned the fiction that they were supporting 

French interests against the depredations 

of the Allies. They sought to seize control 

of the French warships at Toulon, an attempt which on 27 November led to the 

scuttling of these ships in harbor. Hitler 

on 30 November ordered Kesselring to disarm the French forces in Tunisia. On 8 

December General Gause, sent from Rome 

to conduct this operation, obliged Admiral 

Derrien to surrender the elements of his 

command at Bizerte, thus obtaining in good 

order and without resistance all the coastal 

batteries, an arsenal, three torpedo boats, 

nine submarines, two dispatch boats, some 

artillery, and the weapons of 7,000 Senegalese and 3,000 others. The troops were 

eventually removed from Tunisia. The 

Axis command at the same time began 

abortive preparations to recruit an Arab 

10 (1) Paraphrase of msg, CinC AF to CCS 

(Review 23), 3 Dec 42, NAF 110. (2) Msg 1248, 

FREEDOM to USFOR, 5 Dec 42; Msg 291, AGWAR 

to FREEDOM, 5 Dec 42. ETOUSA Outgoing 

Cables, Kansas City Rcds Ctr. The latter reports 

approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

321 

legion in Tunisia and to cultivate leaders 

of the Destourian movement for Arab independence." Admiral Canaris of the 

German Abwehr and the Grand Mufti of 

Jerusalem were scheduled to go to Tunis 

in December to organize sabotage by proAxis Arabs. 

The new measures toward the French 

reflected a modification of the original 

considerations which prompted the Axis occupation of Tunis and Bizcrte. Thc bridgehead in Tunisia and Rommel's position in 

Libya were inextricably related. The decision to occupy Tunisia had bccn made 

whcn Rommel's defeat was new, when his 

army needcd a supplementary line of communications, and whcn warnings of AlliedItalian negotiations in Lisbon cast suspicion 

on Italian detcrmination to continue the war 

on the side of the Axis.'2 On both military 

and political grounds, the creation of the 

bridgehead had then seemed necessary to 

prevent the Axis position in the Mediterranean from deteriorating. The speed and 

vigor with which Axis forces-air, ground, 

and naval-occupied key positions in Tunisia could not be matchcd by equally effective command decisions concerning the 

ultimate exploitation of thcir bridgehead. 

Those decisions depended upon the future 

course of Rommel's army, and what that 

11 (1) MS # C-065a (Greiner), 30 Nov and 

8 Dec 42. (2) Telg, Rahn to OKW/Amt Ausland Abwehr, Nr. 9358/42 geh IIA5, in OKW / Ag 

Ausland IIA5, Alliierte Landung in FranzoesischNordafrika am 8. November 1942, Band II. (3) 

"Les ,evenements de Bizerte, novembre 6-decembre, 

1942," Les Cahiers Fran,ais Information, No. 48 

(September, 1943), pp. 20-23. 

'" (1) Tclg, Ambassador Huene, Lisbon, to Ribbentrop, Nr. 3739, 9 Nov 42, in State Secretary, 

German Foreign Office. File copy in Hist Div, 

Dept of State. (2) Ltr, Stohrcr to Weiszaecker, 

Nr. 5405g, German Embassy Madrid, Secret File. 

Copy in Hist Div, Dept of State. 
322 

course should be was a subject of recurrent 

strategic discussions among the Axis commanders. Beginning while the race for Tunis 

was new, their arguments over Axis strategy 

in Africa extended into January 1943. 

Should Rommel's weakened army retire 

all the way across Libya into Tunisia? Once 

there, should his command be consolidated 

with the other Axis forces in order to resume 

aggressive operations? If an offensive was 

then begun, should it lead farther westward 

in French North Africa or should it head 

eastward once more across Libya to Egypt? 

On the other hand, if aggressive measures 

could be sustained only on a scale unlikely 

to achieve important successes, should not 

all Axis forces which could be salvaged for 

the defense of Sicily and Italy be brought 

back across the Mediterranean? The answers to these questions depended at bottom upon what military resources the Axis 

powers could commit to operations in Africa. If sufficient organized units could be 

found, would it be possible to furnish sufficient logistic support? 

The Axis high command, except for its 

temporary frustration on the eve of Allied 

landings in French North Africa, had a 

fairly reliable concept of what the Allies 

would attempt and of the means at their 

disposal. Its knowledge was not exact but it 

was generally correct. Kesselring's instructions to Nehring, for example, showed that 

he had a good grasp of what General Anderson would probably attempt. Rommel had 

also shown amazing, though fluctuating, 

success in anticipating the tactics of his adversaries in the desert fighting. The major 

problem for the Axis high command was to 

weigh the capabilities of its combat forces 

and its logistics organization. The estimates 

submitted by field commanders and emissaries of OKW caused successive conferNORTHWEST AFRICA 

ences and eventual modifications of Axis 

strategic decisions. Ultimately, each of these 

plans affected the nature of the enemy's effort in Tunisia; Rommel's withdrawal 

across Libya to Tunisia became part of the 

history of Allied operations in Northwest 

Africa. 

On 17 November 1942, on the eve of the 

first small clashes between Allied and Axis 

troops in northern Tunisia, Rommel's much 

depleted German-Italian Panzer Army was 

consolidating after retreating from El 

• Alamein as far as the area of Marsa ei 

Brega, near the southeast corner of the 

Gulf of Sidra. Rommel was then trying 

to induce his superiors to face the facts 

of the military situation which resulted from 

his retreat after failure of the drive into 

Egypt. Those facts led, in his judgment, to 

but one conclusion: his army should start 

retiring by stages without delay at least as 

far as southern Tunisia and perhaps all the 

way to northeastern Tunisia. He was trying 

to prevent orders to stand at the line of 

Marsa el Brega and to hold it, as the phrase 

goes, "at all costs." He therefore submitted 

to the Coman do Supremo a strong argument 

for immediate authorization to pull his 

forces back to Buerat el Hsun, at the western 

edge of the Gulf of Sidra, and ultimate approval of his making a stand in what he 

termed the "Gabes Position." That site was 

a narrows in the coastal plain north of the 

port of Gabes, where passage was blocked 

partly by hills and partly by the steep-sided 

stream bed of the Akarit, with great salt 

marshes (chotts) on the western flank and 

the sea on the other.13 

Rommel's Italian military superiors did 

not accept these proposals. Aside from the 

basic question of whether there was to be a 

"Panzer Army Africa, KTB, 17 Nov 42. 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

retreat at all, two major points were at issue: the timing of Rommel's retreat and the 

area in Tunisia, if he was to fall back that 

far, where his army should make its stand. 

The Italians wanted the maximum amount 

of time in which to increase Axis strength 

in Tunisia and to develop there a fortified, 

unflankable line. They preferred the 

"Mareth Position," south of Gabes, a fortified zone which the French had designed 

and which extended between the Matmata 

hills and the seacoast. Rommel preferred the 

"Chott Position," farther north. He wished 

to be free to move his army back when necessary to escape being outflanked at any position in Libya or to avoid being so deeply 

engaged that extrication of his whole command would not be possible. Contrary to his 

recommendations, Rommel was ordered to 

stand at the Marsa el Brega line while added 

strength was promised to him there, enough 

to guarantee his hold until he was again 

ready for the offensive. 

Rommel's estimate of the reinforcements 

and replacements of materiel needed to execute those orders was very large. His realization that the orders were ill conceived led 

him to make a vain effort on 21 November 

1942 to get them changed. But the Italians 

had gained Hitler's explicit approval and 

had gotten him to direct Rommel, through 

Field Marshal Keitel, that he must hold the 

position at Marsa el Brega. Moreover, the 

Comando Supremo put Rommel under the 

orders of its representative in Libya, Marshal Ettore Bastico.14 

11 (1) Panzer Army Africa, KTB, 17-19 Nov 42. 

(2) Cavallero, Comando Supremo, pp. 387-93. 

(3) Ltr, Mussolini to Hitler, 19 Nov 42, in Ciano 

Papers, Rose Garden Collection, OCMH. (4 ) 

Ltr, Hitler to Mussolini, 20 Nov 42, in von Rohden 

Coll('ction, OCMH, 4376-53. (5) Instrucs, Rommel to General De Stcfanis, 20 Nov 42, in Panzer 

Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 3, Anlage 404/1. 

323 

Hitler assured Mussolini, and indirectly 

informed Rommel, that new German tanks, 

antitank and antiaircraft weapons, and 

supporting air strength would be sent to 

Tripolitania. But actually, Hitler was so 

preoccupied with the Eastern Front, so insistent on treating the Mediterranean as an 

Italian theater of war, and so unwilling to 

accept unpleasant truth about conditions 

and prospects there that his decisions and 

assurances were correspondingly unreliable. 15 

Almost immediately after this decision 

had been reached, the Axis high command 

began to reconsider it, and kept it under 

review for the rest of the month of November. The principal Axis commanders in 

the Mediterranean conferred at Arco dei 

Fileni, Libya, on 24 November 1942 to 

weigh once more the factors affecting Axis 

strategy. Kesselring pointed out that if 

Rommel's army fell back as far as Buerat 

el Hsun, Allied air bases could be constructed so near to Tripoli that their bombers 

would soon terminate its value to the Axis 

as a port. Despite this probability, Kesselring and Cavallero felt compelled to acquiesce in Rommel's judgment that he 

could be outflanked at Marsa el Brega and 

therefore had no real choice but to pull 

back as soon as the British Eighth Army began trying energetically either to pin down 

his front or to envelop his southern flank. 

Kesselring concluded that this maneuver 

would not be long delayed. 18 

(6) Rad, Cavallero to Rommel, 21 Nov 42, ibid., 

Anlage 420. (7) Rad, K('itei to Rommel, 22 Nov 

42. ibid., Anlage 241/1. 

" (1) Bcrghof Conference, 19 Nov 42, in ONI, 

Fuehrer Conference. (2) SKL/I.Abt KTB, Teil 

A, I.-30.X1.42, 20 Nov 42. 

16 (1) Conf notes, Panzer Army Africa, KTB, 

Anlagenband 4, Anlage 434/4. (2) SKL/I.Abt, 

KTB, Teil A, I .-30.x1.42, 27 Nov 42. 
324 

Mussolini became reconciled to an eventualloss of Tripolitania as he contemplated 

the alternative prospect of occupying Tunisia, which had long been an object of 

Italian imperial claims. He believed that, 

in order to retain Tunisia, as much time 

as possible for defensive preparations there 

must be won by delaying tactics in Libya. 

He therefore ordered that Rommel counterattack the leading British elements and 

withdraw only with Bastico's express authorization. Despite those orders, Kesselring 

was willing to consider decreasing Rommel's force in order to use part of it to 

check a possible Allied advance from the 

west against Gabes or even farther, against 

Tripoli. To put an end to the intolerable 

contrast between the mission assigned to 

him and the means provided for its accomplishment, Rommel early on 28 November flew to consult Hitler face to face 

at his headquarters in East Prussia.'7 

Rommel's venture did not go well. Hitler 

gave him no opportunity to pass from his 

proposal of an alternative concept of Axis 

operations to his reasons for objecting to 

the strategy being pursued. At the word 

"withdrawal" he cut him off and insisted 

vehemently that Rommel's orders were in 

conformity with the requirements of Axis 

high strategy and must be carried out. If 

Rommel needed more men and munitions, 

he should have them. Hitler therefore 

quickly arranged for conferences in Rome 

to consider how the system of supply should 

be reformed, and for Reichsmarschall 

Goering, as the Fuehrer's personal repre17 (1) Cavallero, Comando Supremo, pp. 400-

402. (2) Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, pp. 307-13. 

(3) Rad, Bastico to Rommel, 26 Nov 42, in Panzer 

Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 4, Anlage 453. 

(4) Rad, Rommel to Comando Supremo, Bastico, 

and OKW /WFSt, 28 Nov 42, ibid., Anlage 468/1. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

sentative, to go there with Rommel by special train." 

During the train journey, the plan which 

Rommel had not been allowed to present 

for Hitler's consideration, that the Axis 

forces be consolidated in Tunisia to strike 

at the Allies before they could match the 

combined Axis strength, and then drive 

eastward against the British Eighth Army, 

was outlined to Goering. The early union 

of the Axis forces in Tunisia could be 

treated, he was told, for propaganda purposes as a preconceived maneuver responsible for the retreat from EI 'Alamein. Victories in Tunisia would galvanize Italian 

morale as the prospect of a slow bleeding 

to death in the Tripolitanian desert would 

not. The Sicilian straits would remain under Axis control and would thus deny passage to the Allies from the western Mediterranean to the rest of that sea. Kesselring 

came to the train at Rome for a conference 

preceding the first meeting with Mussolini 

and his principal military advisers, and 

neither he nor Goering was wholly favorable to Rommel's proposal. They agreed 

that there was no longer time enough to 

convey to Marsa el Brega sufficient means 

for Rommel to hold there but they decided 

that retirement west of Buerat el Hsun 

should not occur. The final decision, as 

Hitler saw it, would be one for Mussolini 

to make.'9 

"Rpt, Reise des OB ins Fuehrerhauptquartier 

und nach Rom vom 28.XI.42 bis 2.XIl. morgens 

(hereafter cited as Rommel Trip), in Panzer Army 

Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 4, Anlage 494/1. 

10 (1) Rpt, Vortragsnotiz fuer H errn Reichsmarschall von Oberleutnant Berndt ueber die Besprechung am 30.XI.42, 11 :00 Uhr, in Panzer Army 

Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 4, Anlage 494/2. (2) 

Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, pp. 314-15. (3) Rommel Trip. (4) Goering Conference, Rome, in von 

Rohden Collection, OCMH, 4376-44. 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

The Italians, it was soon discovered, were 

now ready to adopt Rommel's earlier plan 

for retirement to the Gabes area. They were 

induced by German arguments to revise 

that position and to accept the plan to hold 

resolutely at Buerat el Hsun, after postponing until the last possible hour withdrawal from Marsa el Brega. Mussolini 

prescribed that Rommel must avoid the 

loss by capture of large numbers of unmotorized Italian troop units, as at El 'Alamein, and that the time for retirement must 

be determined by Marshal Bastico. After 

six days, the Axis leadership had arrived 

again at approximately the same course of 

action as that which the Arco dei Fileni 

conference had approved. The new element 

was the attention now given to the main 

difficulty in carrying out that decision, the 

necessary degree of logistic support. 

Since the one army which Rommel commanded had received inadequate logistical 

support even before El 'Alamein, it could 

hardly be rehabilitated unless the line of 

supply through Tripoli were drastically improved.20 To bring about such a change 

while at the same time trying to win a race 

with the Allies for the possession of Tunisia 

meant that the logistical support of northern Africa would in effect have to be 

revolutionized. 

Goering presided at a meeting on this 

problem on 2 December, directing the discussion in a forceful manner without much 

regard for Italian susceptibilities.21 He suc-

:!() (1) Panzer Army Africa, KTB, 23.X.42-

15.1.43, 27 Oct 42. (2) See also Cavallero, Comando Supremo, pp. 334-35 (23 Sep 42), 355 

(27 Oct 42). 

21 Present were Cavallero, Riccardo, Fougier, 

Gandin, Kesselring, Rommel, Gause, Weichold, 

Pohl, and Reich Commissioner Kaufmann. ( 1 ) 

Cavallero, Comando Supremo, pp. 404-05 (1 Dec 

42). (2) Rommel Trip. 

325 

cessively brought up certain specific measures by which the transport system from 

Italy to Africa could be improved. These 

measures involved vigorous efforts to increase the efficiency of operations and the 

protection from air attacks at the ports. A 

double screen of antisubmarine mines 

could be laid across the Sicilian narrows to 

Tunisia to insure a safe channel resembling 

that which the English had established 

along the coast from the mouth of the 

Thames River to Scotland. Germany could 

supply the mines; Italy must lay them. 

German radar could be installed to help 

protect the convoys. Materiel for Rommel's 

army could be forwarded from Tunis to 

Tripoli on barges and ferries moving along 

the coast under air cover. Italian submarines could take over fuel and ammunition. 

The cargo shipping seized by the Germans in southern French ports which was 

suitable for the supply lines to Africa must 

come into service without further delay attributable to questions of jurisdiction between the new Reich Commissioner for Sea 

Transport, Gauleiter Kaufmann, and the 

principal German Naval Commander, Admiral W eichold. 22 

Goering's effort to improve the system of 

supply, while accepting the fact that control 

over transport would remain Italian, was 

based on belief that the Italians could be 

persuaded or pushed into more efficient use 

of the resources available. He remained in 

Italy long enough to visit Naples and Sicily 

and to report his findings to a second Axis 

conference in Rome on 5 December 1942. 

In the interval, Rommel had returned, early 

'" Ltr, Hitler to Mussolini, 20 Nov 42, in von 

Rohden Collection, OCMH, 4376-53, explained 

that Kaufmann's mission was to regulate the disposition of these French ships and the small-boat 

traffic for Libya, Crete, and the Black Sea. 
326 

on 2 December, to Tripolitania, having discovered that munitions bound for his army 

were being diverted to Tunisia, where Allied 

pressure seemed even more critical. There 

had not been enough supplies for the urgent 

needs of both Axis commands in Africa. 

What reason was there to believe that in the 

future this deficiency could be overcome? 2" 

By 17 December 1942, Rommel had withdrawn his army to the Buerat el Hsun area, 

as authorized. He had observed so insignificant a change in the miserable trickle 

of supplies and munitions coming over the 

shortened line of communications that he 

could not expect to achieve any substantial 

build-up there. At a conference on that day 

with Bastico and others, he therefore renewed the argument in favor of making 

a fighting withdrawal from Tripoli and concentrating in Tunisia for a stroke towards 

Algiers. Holding Buerat el Hsun was becoming impossible and defending Tripoli 

seemed to be pointless. The Axis leadership 

was again obliged to review a strategic decision only a short time after its adoption. 24 

If Rommel's proposal to withdraw his 

army to Tunisia for aggressive operations to 

the west was not accepted on 17 December, 

it was not for lack of intention to strike offensively toward Algeria. To meet the requirements of just such a purpose, Hitler 

had recently sent to Tunisia a new commander, Generaloberst Juergen von Arnim, 

and elevated the headquarters of the Axis 

forces there to that of the Fifth Panzer Army. 

A competent deputy commander, Generalleutnant Heinz Ziegler, was also designated. 

Hitler himself had a conference with each 

(I) Rommel Trip. (2) Cavallero, Comando 

Supremo, pp, 408-09, 

"' (I) Panzer Army Africa, KTB, 17 Dec 42. (2) 

Opns Rpt, Fifth Panzer Army, 0 Qu, Taetigkeilsbericht, Abt Qu 3-0Q Tunis, 15,XI,-31.XII,42. 

(3) Cavallero, Comando Supremo, p. 411. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

of these commanders on the way to their 

new stations at Tunis, at which both arrived 

via Rome on 8 December. The transfer from 

Nehring to von Arnim took place next day.25 

The strategy of the Axis powers was to 

operate as aggressively in Tunisia as the 

means allowed, and their intention in December was to deliver to General von Arnim 

enough forces and logistical support to strike 

out boldly into French North Africa. 

The Action at Djebel el Guessa, 

6 December 

General Eisenhower would not accept as 

final the initial failure to penetrate beyond 

Djedei'da; General Anderson, although far 

from sanguine, continued therefore to plan 

for a renewed offensive against Tunis and 

Mateur. Preparations for such operations 

were to be made while holding a line which 

ran along the eastern edge of Djebe1 Lanserine (569) from Choulgui pass through 

Tebourba gap and across the Medjerda 

river to Djebel el Guessa (145), southwest 

of EI Bathan. The main body of Combat 

Command B, U.S. 1st Armored Division, 

was deployed under General Oliver's command on the southeastern side of the river 

with the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, now released from Blade Force and 

back with its parent unit. Rankled by the recent setbacks at the hands of the German 

armored forces, the Americans hoped now 

to fight as a team in conformity with their 

own doctrine. More British units kept ar-

"' ( I) General von Arnim had been Commanding 

General, XXXIX Panzer Corps, on the Russian 

,Front. MS #C~065a (Greiner), 4 Dec. 42. Both 

von Arnim and Ziegler were promoted on 4 Decembt"r 1942 before leaving for Tunisia. (2) MS # 

C-090 (Warlimont), (3) MS # C-098, Erinnerungen an Tunesien (Generaloberst Juergen von 

Arnim). 
STALEMATE BEFORE TL"NIS 

riving in Tunisia in conformity with preinvasion plans. The 1st Guards Brigade 

(Brig. F. A. V. Copland-Griffith) reached 

Bcdja on 6 December while elements of the 

British 6th Armoured Division (Maj. Gen. 

Sir Charles F. Keightley) began to assemble in the area near Souk el Khemis, Thibar, 

and T eboursouk for eventual employment 

south of the Medjerda. ( See Map V.) 

Blade Force returned to the 6th Armoured 

Division.26 

The French assisted in holding a line 

east of Medjez el Bab and in preparing for 

the renewed attack on Tunis. General J uin 

insisted that Goubellat be held to cover 

Medjez el Bab from the south. To lighten 

the load on General Anderson's troops, he 

gave General Barre responsibility for defending the sector north of Bcdja, bringing 

forward French units from Le Kef and replacing those units by others which General 

Giraud had planned to send to the Tebessa 

area. French troops took up positions on the 

southerly slopes of Djebel el Ang (668), 

north of Medjez el Bab. In central Tunisia, 

where Giraud had directed that an advance 

be made to a line extending northeastward 

from Gafsa to Sbeltla and thence through 

Kesra to Maktar, the French 7th Algerian 

Infantry with a battalion of 75-mm. guns 

and elements of the Tunisian Task Force 

on 3 December seized Fald pass in the Eastern Dorsal. French forces next occupied 

F ondouk el Aouareb on 8 December and 

Pichon on 19.December. Plans were laid to 

advance toward Pont-du-Fahs and Zarhouan, and even to strike at Kairouan. 27 

"" Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

" (1) Fr CinC Ground Forces in North Africa 

Dir 2, 30 Nov 42, copy in CSTT Jnl; CSTT Jnl, 

4-10 Dec 42. (2) Journal de Marche du 19' Corps 

d'Armee (hereafter cited as XIX Corps Jnl), 30 

Nov-19 Dec 42. (3) Journal des marches et op327 

Thus the French threatened the Axis southern flank and prepared to participate in a 

renewed Allied offensive. 

The pressure for troops to protect the 

long line of communications against forays 

by enemy parachutists and other saboteurs 

at the time of the Axis counteroffensive in 

early December was severe. The Allied 

Force command would have preferred to 

use more French troops in such duties in 

order to get the maximum numbers of 

Anglo-Americans, who were better armed, 

into the advanced zone. The entire ten 

companies of the Territorial Division of 

Constantine, plus 300 native customs guards 

(douaniers), and two companies of regulars were used on guard duty at Bone and 

Constantine, and at bridges and tunnels 

along the routes across Algeria. The U.S. 

39th Infantry Regiment was similarly employed. Throughout December French 

commitments in advance sectors ran counter 

to the preferences of the Allied command 

for French guard troops. 28 

If the Allies intended to resume their offensive, so also did the German XC Corps. 

General Nehring found the means, while 

holding at other points, to press beyond 

Tebourba up the Medjerda river valley. 

Part of General Fischer's command was 

shifted to the southeastern side of the river 

to the vicinity of EI Bathan and Massicault. 

erations de la Division de Marche d' Alger, 14 Nov 

42-9 Jun 43 (hereafter cited as DMA Jnl), 1-8 

Dec 42. (4) DMC Jnl, 1-9 Dec 42. 

" (I) Ltr, Col Julius Holmes to Gen Giraud, 5 

Dec 42; (2) Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 6 Dec 42; 

(3) Memo, Col William S. Biddle for ACofS G-3 

AFlIQ, 12 Dec 42, sub: Protection of line of communications; (4) Memo, Gen Rooks to Gen Mast 

for Fr Mil and Air Forces in North Africa, 28 Dec 

42, sub: Troops for line of communications defense; 

(5) Memo, Liaison Sec AFHQ for G-3 AFHQ, 30 

Dec 42, sub: Battalion Oranaisc. AFHQ G-3 Ops 

37/11, Micro Job lOB, Reel 82F, and G-3 Ops 

37/13, Micro Job JOC, Reel 157F. 
328 

(Map VII). The projected attack was to 

strike along both sides of the Medjerda and 

to include a wide swing through Furna to 

approach Medjez el Bab from the southeast. 

But first, Allied troops had to be driven 

from Djebel el Guessa, a cluster of hills and 

ravines which rose abruptly from the flat 

farm land southwest of El Bathan. Its 

heights gave perfect observation over an 

area extending from Tebourba gap to the 

north to the El Bathan-Massicault road to 

the cast and a broad area to the south. Fire 

from its bare northern slopes upon the narrow shelf of Tebourba gap could interdict 

the road there. To clear the Allies from 

Djebel el Guessa, Fischer planned a major 

flanking move through Massicault to the 

northwest and at the same time, a secondary 

push westward from the area south of El 

Bathan. 

The Allied line was held by the 2d Battalion, 6th U.S. Armored Infantry, and the 

8th Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highland Regiment (8/ ASH), at Tebourba gap, 

and the 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, and part of the 27th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion, strung out thinly along 

the crests of Djebel el Guessa. Enemy 

preparations were observed on the afternoon of 5 December. An attack was recognized as imminent. 

After a night in which German flares 

kept the area lighted for observation, the 

attack struck on 6 December at about 0700. 

Two waves of dive bombers softened up the 

American defense; then parachute infantry, 

with machine guns and mortars, began their 

approach to the northern flank. Soon, supported not only by renewed air strikes but 

also by other infantry, reinforced by tanks 

attacking to the west and toward Djebel el 

Guessa's Hill 145, they began to infiltrate 

through the saddles of the ridge line to cut 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

off the troops in the northern section of that 

line. Simultaneously, on the southern flank, 

the enemy committed an armored force, of 

the 7th Panzer Regiment, with some twenty 

tanks and truck-borne infantry, headed for 

Hill 148 and thence to Djebel el Guessa. 

This armored force, after being held up for a 

while, threatened to penetrate between the 

Americans on Djebel el Guessa and their line 

of withdrawal. Its attack caused them to retire hastily with severe losses. Company C, 

6th Armored Infantry, became completely 

disorganized. Battery C, 27th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion, firing in support, drew 

the enemy armored force against its own 

positions. It was forced back into a natural 

cul-de-sac, and although aided by Battery B, 

of the same unit, in the end its five old-style 

half-tracks were destroyed and its survivors 

were captured. But it had won considerable 

time and claimed to have knocked out at 

least eight Mark IV German tanks with its 

105-mm. howitzers. 

To relieve the exposed force at Djebel el 

Guessa General Oliver dispatched Colonel 

Bruss's half-strength 2d Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment (mediums), later sending in the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, from the north side of the river, and 

the light tanks of 1 st Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment (-) from its assembly 

area south of Djebel el Asoud (214). 

Colonel Bruss's force was so late in getting 

started that the battle around Djebel el 

Guessa was almost over. General Oliver still 

hoped to inflict severe damage on the 

enemy's forces, which ceased advancing and 

waited southwest of Djebel el Guessa for the 

counterattack. Bruss divided his battalion 

into two groups, sending E Company, reinforced, along a narrow strip between the 

river and Djebel Bou Aoukaz (226) and D 

Company around the eastern side of that 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

hill mass, while the enemy took cover. When 

the group nearest the river emerged from 

the shelter of the hill, antitank shells swiftly 

knocked out several tanks, stopping the attack; when the other column appeared later, 

it too was repulsed. Colonel Todd's 1st Battalion, meanwhile, made a sortie but arrived 

too late to be of assistance to Bruss's force. 

After this serious setback, the counterattack 

was broken off, but General Fischer's forces 

also pulled back to the northeast without 

attempting to push farther toward Medjez 

el Bab. 29 Instead, elements were sent to support the disarming of General Derrien's 

French forces near Bizerte on 8 December. 

The Allies might have reoccupied Djebel 

el Guessa but did not. The day's battle had 

been damaging to both adversaries and 

especially galling to the Allies. The enemy 

had been able to send a strong battle group 

against part of a force deployed on both 

sides of a river and, after overwhelming the 

exposed forward elements, to meet a counterattack under conditions highly favorable 

to him. These results were probably all the 

more satisfactory to the enemy because of 

American tactical errors. Once again tanks 

had sallied forth to contend with tanks 

rather than attacking with mutually sup-

" (I) Robinett correspondence with participants 

in thc battle, 1949-50, in his possession, contains 

recollections of several participants including: Lt. 

Col. William B. Kern, then commanding officer of 

1st Battalion, 6th Armored Regiment; Maj. Philip 

St. G. Cocke, then commanding officer of Special 

Platoon, 13th Armored Regimcnt; Capt. George 

Simpson, then of 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment; Capt. James P. Mayshark (Ret.), then commanding officer of Company E, 13th Armored Regiment; and Capt. Philip G. Walker, then of Company 

E, 13th Armored Regiment. (2) CCB 1st Armd 

Div Opns Rpt, II Dec 42; 1st Bn 6th Armd Inf 

War Diary. (3) CSTT Jnl, 6 Dec 42, refers to 

Allied air as having saved the Americans. (4) Fifth 

Panzer Army, KTB 11, 1.-31.X11.42, 5 and 6 Dec 

42. 

329 

porting weapons, as the situation had demanded. Again they ran into a curtain of 

antitank fire. But the resulting situation was 

hardly as unfavorable as the interpretation 

placed upon it at British 5 Corps headquarters, which ordered the British 11 th Brigade 

Group to withdraw its remaining elements 

from Tebourba gap along the other side of 

the river to a new line at "Longstop Gap," 

the next conspicuously narrow neck between 

mountains and river southwest of Tebourba 

gap.3t) On the night of 6-7 December, retirement to this position by General Evelegh's troops made pointless an occupation 

of Djebel el Guessa. Combat Command B 

therefore took up new stations at Djebel Bou 

Aoukaz and Djebel el Asoud, a complicated 

hill mass east of the Bordj Toum bridge. 

The Allies were now obliged, in view of 

General Fischer's initial success, to reappraise the situation. a1 

The Allies Fall Back to a New Line 

General Allfrey believed the Allies would 

be incapable of successfully attacking Tunis 

for a considerable period. Rather than 

squander resources to defend territory, he 

believed that economies should be practiced 

and the accumulation of reserves expedited 

by taking safer positions farther west. On 7 

December Allfrey proposed falling back to 

a line extending south from Djebel Abiod 

through Oued Zarga and Testour to Bou 

Arada. This meant abandoning Medjez el 

Bab. Such a step was resisted by General 

Juin in a conference with General Allfrey 

30 The name "Longstop Gap" was derived from 

Longstop Hill, the British designation for Djebel 

cl Ahmera, east of which the Allies were not again 

to pass for a long period. 

31 Info supplif'd by Cabinet Office, London. 
330 

at Barre's headquarters and, when recommended to General Eisenhower by British 

First Army, was also protested by General 

Giraud. 32 The Allied commander in chief 

ordered the defense of a line which ran 

somewhat farther east and which protected 

Medjez el Bab. 

The Commander in Chief, Allied Force, 

was by no means unaware of the risks. "I 

think the best way to describe our operations to date," he wrote at the time, "is that 

they have violated every recognized principle of war, are in conflict with all operational and logistic methods laid down in 

textbooks, and will be condemned in their 

entirety by all Leavenworth and War College classes for the next twenty-five years." 

He accepted the French views and approved defense by General Anderson's force 

of a line which ran east of Medjez el Bab, 

from Tamera on the north through Sidi 

Nsir, Djebel el Ang, Goubellat, and Bou 

Arada. From the new base line, the attack 

was to be resumed when the build-up and 

the weather made it possible. French troops 

of General Barre's command were ordered 

by Giraud to extend the line south of 

Medjez el Bab through Goubellat, Bou 

Arada, and Barrage de l'Oued Kebir, and 

to cover the Medjerda valley, on a line facing south, through Slourhia, Testour, 

Teboursouk, and Le Kef:'" 

In the complex redistribution of forces, 

the 1 st Guards Brigade (-) was to move 

to Medjez el Bab the night of 10-11 De-

"Anderson's letter foreshadowed this proposal. 

Ltr, Anderson to Eisenhower, 5 Dec 42, in CinC 

AF Diary, Bk. IV, pp. A-50ff. 

33 ( 1) Ltr to Gen Handy, 7 Dec 42. Copy in 

OPD Exec 5, Sec 2, Case 51. (2) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948), p. 

123. (3) Telg, Giraud to Juin, 8 Dec 42, in CSTT 

Jnl; for Giraud's and Juin's orders, see CSTT Jnl, 

pp. 71,73. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

cember and hold there. The 11 th Brigade 

and Combat Command B were meanwhile 

to withdraw through Med jez el Bab and by 

0600, 11 December to take up positions 

farther west. General Anderson's advanced 

command post at Ain Seynour, just west 

of Souk Ahras, moved back to Constantine, 

to which Headquarters, British First Army, 

had already moved from Algiers. Preparations were made during two days of persistent rain. But before the Allies could begin their withdrawal, the enemy struck. 

Early on 10 December, the 86th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment, as part of the Fifth 

Panzer Army's effort to expand the bridgehead, started a two-pronged offensive along 

both sides of the river, each prong supported by a company of tanks. The 7th 

Panzer Regiment began a southerly loop 

through Massicault, Furna, and Sidi 

Mediene (later known as "Peter's Corner") 

to attack Medjez el Bab from the southeast. 

This regiment (less its 2d Battalion) was 

reinforced by elements of the 501st Panzer 

Battalion, whose armament included Mark 

VI ("Tiger") tanks, an antitank company, 

and a battery of 100-mm. guns.34 Combat 

Command B, 1st Armored Division, was 

caught at Djebel Bou Aoukaz in an exposed 

position. The closest supporting positions 

were those of British units six to ten miles 

farther to the west. It was in danger of 

being cut off on the southeastern side of the 

" (1) 10th Panzer Diu, Diuisionsbefehl fur den 

AngrifJ am lO.xII., 9 Dec 42, in Fifth Panzer Army, 

KTB, Anlagen, Geh. und Geh. Kdo. Sachen, Band 

1, l6.XI.42-l2.I.43. (2) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB 

II, I.-3I.XII.42, 9 and 12 Dec 42. (3) Combat 

Command B, I st Armored Division, reported 62 

light and 22 medium tanks plus 21 Sherman tanks 

of a detachment of the 2d Battalion, 67th Armored 

Regiment, at the end of 9 December. Msg CP 408, 

CP First Army to AFHQ, 1320, 11 Dec 42. AFHQ 

G-3 Ops 22/5, Micro Job lOA, Reel 5C. 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

river if enemy forces attacking from 

Tebourba gap got control of the Bordj 

Toum bridge at the same time that the 

enveloping sweep of 7th Panzer Regiment 

blocked access to the bridge at Medjez el 

Bab. The American armored unit fought 

throughout the day on rain-soaked ground 

which offered serious hazard to vehicular 

movement except by road. 

An encounter took place at the Allied 

roadblock on the northwest bank near the 

railroad station of Bordj Toum, protected 

by mines laid by the U.S. 16th Combat 

Engineers and by antitank guns. These were 

supported by medium tanks of the 2d Battalion, U.S. 13th Armored Regiment, and 

by IOS-mm. howitzers of Battery B, 27th 

Field Artillery Battalion, firing across the 

river, as well as by Battery A, 17Sth Field 

Artillery Battalion, and the Headquarters 

Platoon, 13th Armored Regiment, on the 

northwest side. The engagement stopped the 

Germans and protected the bridgehead but 

left it under fire and subject to threat of renewed attack at nightfalL On the east bank, 

the second prong of the German attack was 

held back by skillful defense and by soft 

ground, which limited maneuver. But the 

attack by the third enemy column, after 

overrunning elements of the 1st Battalion, 

1st Armored Regiment, reached a roadblock about two miles east of Medjez el Bab. 

Elements of the 4th Mixed Zouaves and 

Tirailleurs Regiment (4 MZI) plus the 3d 

Battalion, French 62d Artillery Regiment, 

and another French battery firing from the 

far side of the Medjerda river held up the 

advanced section of the enemy column 

about t 400, after knocking out four tanks 

and causing other losse.<;. 

Combat Command B tried to intercept 

the main enemy column with a flank attack, 

using elements of the 1 st Battalion, 13th 

331 

Armored Regiment, and of Company C, 

701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. The Germans turned back to meet this threat. The 

American light tanks were outgunned by 

the enemy and mired when they maneuvered off the road; nineteen were lost. The 

tank destroyers claimed ten German 

medium tanks knocked out before being put 

out of action themselves. The enemy had 

successfully run the gantlet until stopped by 

the French roadblock and the American 

counterattack. He then pulled back to Massicault leaving a small blocking detachment 

at Sidi Mediene. He had suffered only 

moderate losses, but at the end of the day, 

both the bridge at Med jez el Bab and that 

at Bordj Toum remained in Allied possession.'15 

At dusk, the plans for Combat Command 

B's withdrawal behind the approved line 

from the southeast side of the Medjerda 

were arranged in a roadside conference west 

of Medjez el Bab by Generals Allfrey, Evelegh, Oliver, and Robinett and by visits to 

other British commanders. British units 

were to cover Combat B's route, including 

the vital Bordj Toum bridge. Two platoons 

of infantry, operating as a patrol, were designated for this mission. 

The withdrawal began after darkness. 

One after another, the units pulled out of 

position on Djebel Bou Aoukaz and Djebel 

el Asoud and fell into column on a lateral 

road leading to Bordj Toum and the sup-

(1) CCB 1st Armd Div AAR, 11 Dec 42. (2) 

Redding, The Operations of C Company, 70lst 

Tank Destroyed Battalion ... , YfS. The Infantry 

School, Fort Benning, Ga., 1948-49. (3) Ltr, Capt 

W. H. Hatcher (Ret.), former CO of Co A 13th 

Armd Regt, to Gen Robinett, 13 Oct 49. In prh'ate 

possession. (4) George F. Howe, The Battle Histor), 

of the lsi Armored Division (Washington, D. C., 

1954), pp. 88-9\. (5) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB II, 

1.31.XII.42, 10 and 11 Dec 42. 
332 

posed roadblock. Tanks, half-tracks, trucks, 

guns, and other vehicles were soon closely 

bunched on a virtual causeway across a 

treacherous sea of mud, and remained so 

as they approached the river. Ahead of 

them, Company D, 13th Armored Regiment (Capt. Philip St. G. Cocke), with 

some infantry, crossed at 1745 to strengthen 

the defense of the bridgehead until the withdrawal was complete. They found no evidence of the covering force and turned toward the railroad station of Bordj Toum 

and the supposed roadblock. A light engagement with a small German force ensued, the 

sounds of which started rumors back at the 

bridge that a German attack was imminent. 

Occasional shells fell near the bridge. The 

rumors spread from the head of the column 

to those in command. They made the position of the withdrawing force seem critical. 

Rather than stop to reconnoiter, Lt. Col. 

John R. McGinness, the officer in command, hurriedly ordered the vehicles to reverse and instead of crossing by the Bordj 

Toum bridge to turn off onto a narrow dirt 

track which ran near the southeastern bank 

of the river through Grich el Oued to Medjez cl Bab. It was a disastrous error of 

judgment. The leading vehicles kept going 

but behind them they left an increasingly 

churned-up ribbon of mud in which most 

of the remainder were completely mired. 

The crews were ordered to abandon them 

and continue into Medjez el Bab on foot. 

Under the circumstances, despite the fact 

that the tanks and half-tracks had already 

been brought close to the point of requiring 

overhaul by hard use and insufficient maintenance, the loss was equivalent to a serious 

defeat at the enemy's hands. 

It was particularly injurious to morale 

as it became a celebrated instance of frusNORTHWEST AFRICA 

trated logistical efiort.:l6 Vehicles could be 

replaced only by stripping some other unit. 

The 1 st Battalion, 18t Armored Regiment, 

relinquished its materiel and some of its 

personnel and went back to the Oran area 

to await a new shipment. The 2d Armored 

Division in Morocco sent 26 mediums by 

rail.'l7 A few of the mired vehicles were later 

extricated by determined crews before the 

enemy closed in. The Germans claimed to 

have destroyed 36 American tanks, 4 armored reconnaissance cars, 2 antitank guns, 

3 armored prime movers, and an undetermined number of guns on 10 December, 

and during a subsequent mop-up of the 

,. (1) The miring, plus em'my action, deprived 

Combat Command B of 18 tanks, 41 guns, 132 

half-tracked and wheeled vehicles, and 19 trailers. 

See AAR's of 1st Bn 1st Armd Regt, 1st and 2d 

Bns 6th Armd InC, 27th Armd FA Bn, and CCB lst 

Armd Div. (2) On 12 Dec('mber the tanks in operation wen' reported as follows: headquarters of 

Combat Command B, 5: headquarters of the 13th 

Armored Regiment, 5: the 1st Battalion of the 1st 

Armored Regiment. 17; the 1st Battalion of the 

13th Armored Regiment, 6; and the 2d Battalion 

of thc 13th Armored Regiment, 16. The 1st Battalion, 6th Armore-d Infantry, had s('nt its vehicles 

back to Grieh el Oued during the afternoon and, 

by doing so, preserv('d 85 percent of them. The 2d 

Battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry, whose commanding officer was in charge of the movem('nt, 

savt'd 10 vehicles. Tt'lg, Liaison Officer First Army 

CP to G-3 AFHQ, 2043, 11 Dt'c 42; Col Richard 

C. Partridge, Rpt on Inspection of ETF Area. 14 

Dec -12, App. C. AFHQ Micro Job lOA, Reel 5C. 

n ( I) 1st Armd Div Hist and Jnl, Vol. 1. (2) 

Memo, AFHQ G-3 for Liaison Sec (Col Biddle), 

15 Dec 42, sub: Reply to Giraud. AFHQ Micro 

Job IOC, Re!'1 157F. (3) From Morocco, a detachment of the U.S. 67th Armored Regiment (Company G and part of Company H, under command 

of Capt. Lac!'y W. Hinky, plus maintenance and 

medical personnel) reached the Bedja area on 10-, 

II December. This detachment of 9 officers and 153 

enlisted m('n was attached to th" British 78th Division and was r<,ady to takt' part in the attack beyond Me-djez cI Bab on 24 De-cember. See History of 

the 67th Armored Regiment (Brunswick, Germany, 

1945), pp. 15-16. 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

battlefield on 11 December, 80 guns, vehicles, and armored personnel carriers.38 

The Allies could not resume their drive 

on Tunis until further preparations for a 

sustained attack had been completed. For 

some ten days after the Allied withdrawal of 

10-11 December, combat was confined to 

patrolling by ground and air, and to bombing raids by each side. The enemy consolidated his position, moved security elements 

into dominating heights along the routes 

northeast of that town, and set up his main 

line of resistance from Bordj Toum to the 

road between Furna and Massicault and 

thence southward to the hills. 3[1 Meanwhile 

the Allies built up supplies at the railhead 

in Souk el Arba, got the railroad between 

Tabarka and Sedjenane into limited service, 

and strengthened antiaircraft defenses. Allied forces, American, British, and French, 

were regrouped for another major thrust 

above the Medjerda river and for support 

to the north and south of it. 

The Allied retirement to the west and the 

continued arrival of Axis reinforcements in 

Tunisia permitted General von Arnim to 

expand the two perimeters protecting Bizerte and Tunis into a general bridgehead. 

His line became a series of interconnected 

" (1) 10th Panzer Diu, Ie, TB, 29.xI.42-1S.III. 

43, 11 Dee 42. (2) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB II, 

1.-31.xII.42, 10 and 11 Dcc 42. (3) Deficiencies 

in Combat Command B's equipment attributable 

to this experience, to preceding engagements, and 

to reduced scales in moving from the United Kingdom to Oran amounted on 13 December, despite 

some replacements, to the following: 50 medium 

tanks, 84 light tanks, 98 M2 half-tracks, 146 M3 

half-tracks, 66 2 y"-ton trucks, 78 y.!-ton trucks, 

72 I-ton trailers, 13 105-mm. self-propelled howitzers, 22 75-mm. towed guns. AFHQ Sitrep 45, 13 

Dec. 42. 

an (1) Fifth Panzer Army, KT B II, 1.-31.XII.42, 

11 and 12 Dec 42. (2) 10th Panzer Diu, Ie, TB 

Anlagen, 29.XI.42-1S.III.43, 12 and 13 Dec 42. 

(3) MS # T-3 (Nehring et al.), Pt. 3a. 

333 

defense outposts which he endeavored to 

consolidate. As of 13 December the northwestern part of his front started on the coast 

about twenty-five miles west of Bizerte, 

crossed the hills to the south as far as the 

Djefna position, then bore southeast to cross 

the Tine river valley; about five miles southwest of Choulgui pass the line surmounted 

Djebel Lanserine and near Bordj Toum 

leapt the Medjerda river. Continuing in a 

southeasterly direction and passing east of 

Ksar Tyr, it continued towards the southeast to Zarhouan and the area of Enfidaville. 

This front was divided into three sectors 

held in turn by Division von Broich from the 

north coast to the area of the Tine river valley, by 10th Panzer Division to a point ten 

miles west of Zarhouan, and by the Superga 

Division in the south and east. The extreme 

southern flank, beginning at a point southwest of Enfidaville, was under command of 

General Giovanni Imperiali of the Italian 

50th Special Brigade. Defense of the coast 

to the north was divided between General 

Neuffer at Bizerte and the German commandant of Tunis.40 

On 15 December the Fifth Panzer Army 

ordered a considerable southward movement to begin next day. The 10th Panzer 

Division's sector was extended to include 

Ksar Tyr and Pont-du-Fahs, the southern 

edge of good "tank country" in northern 

Tunisia. ( Map 6) General von Arnin directed the Superga Division, Italian 50th 

Special Brigade, the 47th Grenadier Regiment, and the 190th Reconnaissance Battalion (directly under Fifth Panzer Army 

headquarters) to occupy stations along the 

.0 Fifth Panzer Army, la, Befehl fuer die Neugliederung der Absehnitte und Befehlsbereiehe, 13 Dec 

42, in 10th Panzer Diu, Anlagenband geh. Kommandosaehen zum Kriegstagebueh 6, 30.1 X.42-

13.II.43. 
• , " • • • 0 J.,ln/o'i/.1 

• 

MAP6 

, ..,. ""u 

'" . ... O .. UI" 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

coast and in the mountain passes of the 

Eastern Dorsal. They were to occupy and 

defend the defiles through the mountain 

chain from Pont-du-Fahs to Maknassy and 

thence to El Guettar and Kebili in southern Tunisia. They were to recover the pass 

near Faid and the other key points at which 

French troops were installed. 

On 16 December the 10th Panzer and 

Superga Divisions advanced their main line 

of resistance while the 190th Reconnaissance Battalion completed its mission as 

ordered!l 

Allied aviation, whose overstrained condition had made necessary an interlude before a second drive toward Tunis, was 

improved and organized for better co-operation. A new Allied offensive required more 

fighter support of the ground troops, which 

in turn depended upon preparing forward 

airfields, bringing up steel matting for runways, obtaining fuel and other supplies, and 

establishing a rapid flow of replacement 

aircraft. The air arm of the Allied Force 

was faced with a monumental task!2 The 

number of planes at the forward airfields 

increased. Intermediate fields at Tclergma 

and Canrobert, southwest and southeast of 

Constantine, began operations. At Biskra, 

on the edge of the desert, another field permitted American heavy bombers to operate 

without plunging into mud whenever they 

overran a runway. B-17's (Flying Fortresses) and Wellington heavy bombers 

equipped for night operations used the allU (I) Fifth Panzer Army, la, Befehl luer das 

weitere Vorverlegen der Brueckenkopfstellung, Nr. 

157/42, 15 Dec 42, in Fifth Panzer Army, KTB, 

Anlagen, Geh. und Geh. Kdo. Sachen, Band I, 

16.XI.42-12.l.43. (2) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB II, 

1.-31.XII.42, 16 D('c 42. 

" (1) Info supplied by Air Ministry, London. 

(2) Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 

87-91. 

335 

weather field at Maison Blanche and the 

one paved runway at Blida. Light and medium bombers from Morocco came to 

Youks-les-Bains. 43 The headquarters of various air commands were scattered and linked 

by primitive signal facilities. During the 

forthcoming offensive, control over both 

British and American tactical air units 

would be maintained by the principal air 

officer on General Anderson's staff.44 

Reducing the enemy's rate of reinforcement to stop him from successfully counterbalancing each increment of the Eastern 

Task Force was a major objective for Allied 

aviation. Royal Air Force units based on 

Malta sank or crippled seven small merchant vessels, including oil tankers, in December, and bombed airfields in Sicily. 

American and British aircraft of the Eastern 

Air Command struck repeatedly at the 

Tunisian terminals of the airlift and at the 

ports of Bizerte and Tunis. The enemy's 

improved antiaircraft defenses and numerous intercepting fighters, as well as the network of accessible airfields at his disposal, 

enabled him to take a high toll of Allied 

fighter escort. Allied fighter units were 

worked to the limit to meet the demands for 

escort missions and sweeps against enemy 

dive bombers. 

The Plans for the Final Attack 

AFHQ estimated the effective Allied 

combat troops at 20,000 British, 11,800 

4.' At Youks-lcs-Bains 15 fighters plus 17 light 

and 14 medium bombers were assembled. These 

were protected by British and American antiaircraft 

units, by one company of French infantry, by Company L of the U.S. 26th Infantry, and by about 

650 service troops of all three nationalities. Memo, 

Gcn Rooks for Gen Gruenther, 20 Dec 42, sub: 

Garrison of Youks-Ies-Bains. AFHQ G-3 Ops 22/7, 

Micro Job lOA, Reel 5C. 

"Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 

107-08. 
336 

Americans, and 7,000 French, while the 

opposing Axis forces were set at about 25,-

000 combat and 10,000 service troops, most 

of them in the Tunis bridgehead. The 

enemy was credited with eighty German 

tanks. The Allies were stronger in longrange artillery, although the enemy's 88-

mm. gun was deeply respected. The Allied 

tanks, though weaker, were somewhat more 

numerous. It was recognized that Axis aviation would be superior to that of the Allies. 45 

After postponements caused both by adverse weather and by the rate of build-up, 

General Anderson, under General Eisenhower's prodding, concluded on 16 December that D Day must be set at 23-24 December in order to take advantage of a full 

moon for night infantry attacks.4~ He intended to concentrate maximum strength 

on a relatively narrow front for a direct push 

toward Tunis. This arrangement would 

make the most of his artillery and antitank 

resources. He would reduce flank protection 

to the minimum consistent with safety. He 

proposed to keep the British 6th Armoured 

and 78th Divisions in close co-operation 

and to hold Combat Command B, U.S. 1st 

Armored Division (which he estimated at 

half-strength), in corps reserve. The attack 

could be maintained, he believed, for from 

seven to ten days only.47 

" (1) The estimate is from G-3 AFHQ, Estimate 

of the Situation in Tunisia, 15 Dec 42. AFHQ 

G-3 Ops 22/7, Micro Job lOA, Reel 5C. (2) For 

the actual weekly Italian increment of over 2,000, 

s('e daily reports, German General, Rome, to OKW / 

WFSt and others, in OKH GenStdH/Op Abt, File 

Tunis, IO.XI.42-2. V.43. (3) On 17 December, 

601st Tank Destroyer Battalion left the Oran area 

to reinforce Combat Command B ncar Medjez el 

Bab. Msg 337, CTF to AFHQ, 1135, 17 Dec 42. 

IG Msg, Eisenhower to Anderson, 14 Dec 42. Copy 

in CinC AF Diary, Bk. IV, p. A-79. 

" (1) Msg, CG First Army to CinC AF, 16 Dec 

42. AFHQ G-3 Ops 58/2.1, Micro Job IOC, Reel 

188D. (2) See also Anderson's analysis of the 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Headquarters, British 5 Corps, prepared 

the plan. The attack was again to be along 

the Medjerda river, but this time with the 

main effort on the southeastern side. In 

November, the stream had been a protection 

for the Allied south flank as the attacking 

force converged on Djedei:da with the intention of crossing there. In the December 

attempt, the river was to be a protection for 

the north (left) flank, and except for a small 

force using the bridge at El Bathan, the 

Allied forces would cross it from the northwest at Medjez el Bab and even farther upstream. The two British divisions, 6th 

Armoured and 78th, with the American 

18th Combat Team (1st Infantry Division) 

attached to the latter, were expected to approach Tunis via Massicault from the southwest. Two artillery groups were organized 

to support the attack by massed fires. Their 

employment necessitated maneuver off the 

roads, which became more feasible as the 

rains abated for a few days. The Allied 

center, near Sidi Nsir, was to be held by a 

mixed force of French and British infantry 

and American artillery. On the north flank, 

Brigadier Kent-Lemon's 36th Brigade 

Group was to threaten Mateur, but Anderson considered his strength sufficient only to 

contain, not to capture, that town. No parachute or Commando operations in the rear 

of the enemy were scheduled. 

Preliminary to the advance south of the 

Medjerda river, the Allies had to gain its 

northwestern bank as far as Tebourba, beginning with the capture of Djebel el Ahmera (290, Longstop Hill), about seven 

miles northeast of Med jez el Bab. That hill 

dominated the highway and railroad routes 

prospective condition of First Army on 22 December in Msg 0566, CG First Army to CinC AF, 1900, 

15 Dec 42. Copy in AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

between Medjez el Bab and Tebourba, and 

furnished unimpeded observation over a 

wide area from its long, knobby crest. The 

Axis commander had less than a battalion 

of infantry in positions on the mountain and 

along the base, particularly at the small railroad station (Halte d 'el Heri) near the eastern end of Longstop Hill. 

Although the main Allied attack on Tunis 

was scheduled for 24-25 December, preliminary operations by the 78th Division 

were planned for each of the two preceding 

nights to gain the approaches to the 

Tebourba-Djedei'da area. On 22-23 December, British troops were to seize the village of Grich el Oued on the southeast bank 

of the Medjerda, a few miles northeast of 

Medjez el Bab, while a battalion of the 

Coldstream Guards, followed by the 1st 

Battalion, U.S. 18th Infantry Regiment, 

was to occupy Longstop Hill. Next day the 

5th Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment, 

on a march through the mountains toward 

Tebourba gap, would pass through the 3d 

Battalion, 3d Algerian Infantry Regiment, 

and that night further advances were 

scheduled which would regain for Allied 

troops possession of Bordj Toum bridge, 

Djebel el Guessa, and Tebourba gap. On 25 

December, when the main offensive began, 

the left flank of the main thrust at EI 

Bathan-Tebourba-Djedei'da would be held 

by the British 11th Infantry Brigade. 48 

The m~in Allied attack was prefaced by 

operations which the French Army undertook on the southern flank, a drive to gain 

possession of the commanding heights at the 

juncture of the Eastern and Western Dorsals. The objective was the high ground from 

.. (I) 78th Div Opns Order 4,21 Dec 42. (2) 

CT 18 FO 7,21 Dec 42. 

337 

Djebel Fkirine (988), to Djebel Zarhouan 

(1295), south and east of Pont-du-Fahs. 

Rebaa Oulad Yahia was occupied on 16 

December, but during the next four days, 

while Col. Marcel Carpentier's reinforced 

7th Moroccan Infantry Regiment continued northeastward, the Superga Division 

also strengthened its outposts with armor, 

self-propelled guns, and air support. The 

first lunge of the French was stopped on 22 

December after two days' fighting had 

gained the Barrage de rOued Kebir at considerable cost. A second attempt in greater 

strength, directed by Gen. Maurice Mathenet and supported by small Allied units of 

armor, antitank guns, and aviation, was 

made on 27 December, also without success. These operations were co-ordinated 

with others by the Eastern Task Force, but 

a unified command over the whole Allied 

front was not yet in existence.49 

General Giraud proposed to General 

Eisenhower on 17 December that the supreme command in Tunis should now pass 

to him, in general agreement with a formula 

indicated in the discussions at Gibraltar, 

when he was ready to become the French 

leader in Northwest Africa. He reminded 

the Allied commander in chief that an estimated 40,000 French troops were in the 

forward area. The proposal required some 

satisfactory accommodation of Giraud's 

claims, for the French troops, though ill 

equipped, were essential both to cover the 

" (1) French losses, 20-22 December, were 14 

killed, 95 wounded, and 58 missing. They cap'turcd 

10 German and 26 Italian soldiers. CSTT Jnl, 20-

22 Dec 42. French losses in the 27-29 December 

attack were 37 killed, 156 wounded, and 188 missing. They also lost 9 American-made tanks and 9 

guns. Captured were 7 German and 122 Italian 

prisoners. CSTT Jnl, 27-29 Dec 42. (2) Msg, 

CinC AF to CCS, 17 Dec 43, NAF 43. 
338 

southern flank of the Eastern Task Force 

and to deliver aggressive pressure at selected 

points. General Giraud was not willing to 

put French units under General Anderson's 

command. Despite the need for unified control, its exercise by Giraud could not be reconciled with military and political realities. 

The Allied commander in chief later resolved the problem by creating an advance 

command post at Constantine through 

which he himself would co-ordinate the 

parallel operations of French, British, and 

American commands; however, long before 

the activation of the post in January, Giraud 

had been diverted by other problems of 

great urgency. 50 

During the night of 16-17 December a 

small raid on Maknassy was carried out by 

eighty selected men from Company L, U.S. 

26th Infantry, under Lt. Col. John W. 

Bowen. They struck the town from the flank 

and rear with complete surprise to the much 

larger garrison. They took twenty-one Italian prisoners from the Ariete Division, men 

who had survived EI 'Alamein and arrived 

at Gabes on 10 December as members of 

the Italian 50th Special Brigade, but who 

were now, within a week, taken out of combat. 51 

In preparing for a possible Allied offensive, Kesselring chose to strengthen von 

Arnim's command in Tunisia rather than 

meet Rommel's insistent requirements for 

the means of making a stand at Buerat el 

Hsun. On 17 December, when Rommel 

argued the futility of keeping his army 

.0 CinC AF Diary, 17 Dec 42. 

" (1) Lt Col W. S. Myrick, Jr., AGF Obsr's Rpt, 

27 Jan 43. Copy in OPD 381 Africa, Case 61. (2) 

Phone Msg, Maj Balfour to G-2 AFHQ, 17 Dec 42. 

AFHQ G-3 Ops 22/6, Micro Job lOA, Reel SC. 

(3) Ltr, Bowen to Col Stark, 22 D('c 42. Copy in 

26th Inf AAR, 24 Apr 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

there in view of the failure of the supply 

line and the inadequacy of the men and 

materiel he had been receiving, Kesselring 

assured von Arnim in Tunis that both men 

and materiel would soon be on the way to 

him. Three regiments of infantry and the 

truck transport with which to motorize the 

reserves would come to Tunisia. Stevedores 

and cranes from Italy would speed up port 

operations. Air support would take the form 

which von Arnim requested-strikes on the 

concentration areas and close support during future engagements. The Axis command also called for an extensive program 

of sabotage by parachutists and gliderborne troops intended to disrupt Allied supply traffic between the ports and the front, 

and to delay Allied advance to the coast 

in the vicinity of Sfax and Gabes. This attempt (Operation RIGA) was frustrated 

for the most part by Allied countermeasures. 5Z 

The Engagement at Longstop Hill 

The second Allied attempt to take Tunis, 

it will be recalled, was to be preceded during the night of 22-23 December by the 

seizure of Grich el Oued by a reinforced 

company of the 3d Grenadier Guards and 

the capture of Longstop Hill by the 2d 

Battalion, Coldstream Guards. After Longstop had been secured, the Coldstreams were 

to hand it over before dawn to the 1st 

Battalion, U.S. 18th Infantry, and return 

to Medjez el Bab in order to participate in 

62 (1) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB II, 1.-31.XI1.42, 

16 and 17 Dec 42. (2) Order, Fifth Pan::!er Army, 

18 Dec 42, in Fifth Panzer Army, KTB, Anlagen, 

Geh. und Geh. Kdo, Sachen, Band 1, 16.XI.42-

12.1.43. 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

the main phase of the attack on Tunis.53 

Longstop Hill, the objective of this initial 

phase of the attack, is not quite seven miles 

to the northeast of Med jez el Bab. ( Map 7) 

The mountain, rising to more than nine 

hundred feet, is separated from the higher 

ground to the west by a saddle, to the north 

by a small basin that widens into the plain 

of Toungar. Between the eastern slopes and 

a loop in the Medjerda river is a gap, less 

than half a mile wide, where a railroad station, Halte d 'el Heri, is located. The dominating ridge stretches for almost two miles 

in an east-northeasterly direction and is 

marked by a succession of knolls, the highest 

being Point 290, near the center of the crest. 

At the far end, separated by a ravine from 

the main feature, rises another somewhat 

lower hill, Djebel el Rhar (243). The tactical significance of this hill, even its existence, 

had not been discovered during the reconnaissance for the attack. 54 

53 ( I) Info supplied by the Cabinet Office, London. (2) 1st Bn 18th Inf AAR, Engagement at 

Longstop Hill, 20 Mar 43. (3) Fifth Panzer Army, 

KTB II, 1.-31.XII.42, 22-26 Dec 42. (4) Rpt, 

Auszugsweise Absehrift aus dem Gefeehtsberieht 

ueber die Kaempfe uom 23.-25.XII.42, in 10th 

Panzer Diu, Ie, TB Anlagen, 29.XI.42-15.III.43, 

Anlage 40. (5) Lt. Col. E. R. Hill, "The Coldstream at Longstop Hill," Army Quarterly, 

XLVIII, No.2 (July, 1944), 175-80. (6) MS # 

D-173, Die Kaempfe der Kampfgruppe Lang in 

Tunisien (10 Pz. Diu.) Dezember 1942-15, April 

1943 (Col Rudolf Lang). (7) 334th Inf Diu, la, 

KTB, I.XII.42-4.IV.43, and Anlagen zum KTB 

Nr. 1, I4.xI.42-15.I.43. 

Combat Team 18 of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division moved up from Or an with elements of the 

U.S. 36th Field Artillery Regiment (155-mm. 

guns) for the final attack. 

54 Although Djebel el Rhar has been described as 

masked during reconnaissance and not shown on the 

map used by the Guards battalion, it is clearly 

shown on Sheet 19 (Tebourba) of the 1:50,000 

map published by the British War Office in 1942 

and attached to the 78th Division's attack orders 

held by Combat Team 18. 

339 

The battalion plan was to capture Longstop Hill by advancing with two companies 

on the left, via Chassart Teffaha, to take the 

col with one of them and secure the crest 

with the other. Meanwhile a third company, 

proceeding along the main road, was to take 

Halte d'el Heri. The reserve company, following the same route, would be assembled 

at the southern base of the hill close to the 

battalion headquarters. 

On the German side, the 69th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment with attached elements 

of the newly arrived 754th Infantry Regiment, both under the command of Colonel 

Lang, held the line north of the Medjerda, 

the boundary between Lang's sector and the 

one held by the adjoining 86th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, south of the river. During 

the night of 21-22 December elements of 

the crack 69th Panzer Grenadiers who had 

occupied positions on the hill and at the 

railroad station had been relieved by two 

companies of the hastily organized 754th 

Infantry Regiment. To speed up their commitment the men had been shipped to 

Tunisia with hand weapons only. They 

occupied the line without special equipment, lacked organic transport, and consequently had been unable to carry their full 

basic load of ammunition. 

The German main line of resistance ran 

through Point 290, Djebel el Rhar, and 

Halte d'el Heri. The latter position was 

well protected by mine fields, some of which 

were not known to the Allies. As early as 21 

December enemy artillery observers on 

Longstop Hill had recognized substantial 

Allied movements in the vicinity of Medjez 

el Bab. Patrols had reported Chassart Teffaha and Smidia reoccupied by the Allies. 

At noon, the next day, German air confirmed these reports. When the attack 

started, it lacked the element of surprise. 
22

- 26 Dl u"'!>I . 194 2 

_ ." ... Au"" ............ "'".u,," ~ .............. 0 .... .. 0 .. n·r4 0 .. 

.......... fo( h.~ • .,.., •••• 12 0« 

__ GI .. ....... " •• • 21 "" 

40::::: G. · .... W"''''''''''.'''' .• ""'.". 

C!:!:l " ......... , 

£11-.1_, " _II., 

• 

....... , , I 

• , .'1.0

.", .. 

MAP 7 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

The British troops who engaged in the 

preliminary attack advanced through heavy 

rains which began late in the afternoon, 22 

December, and continued throughout the 

night. Grieh el Oued was taken without 

opposition and held until 26 December, but 

vehicles had to be sent back lest they be 

trapped in the mire. The company of the 3d 

Grenadier Guards (3/GG) relied henceforth on mules for transport. 

North of the river the 2d Battalion, Coldstream Guards (2/CG), executed the initial 

phase of its assault according to plan. It 

secured Longstop Hill as far as Point 290; 

it also reached the railroad station. The 

green troops of the 754th Infantry Regiment. disheartened by the powerful Allied 

artillery preparation, soon exhausted their 

ammunition, and after a valiant effort to 

defend their position, with bayonets only, 

some elements withdrew. Things appeared 

to be going well for the Allies. But then the 

Germans counterattacked at the railroad 

station and drove the Coldstream Guards 

back. A reserve platoon which the Guards 

committed in an attempt to stabilize the 

situation ran into an antipersonnel mine 

field. The British commander, under the 

mistaken impression that he held all of 

Longstop Hill, abandoned the attack and 

left the Germans in control of HaIte d'el 

Heri. 

The 1st Battalion, U.S. 18th Infantry, 

had meanwhile begun its advance from 

Medjez el Bab, but had fallen somewhat 

behind schedule. The British commander 

expected two of the U.S. rifle companies to 

take the route via Chassart Teffaha and the 

others including the battalion headquarters 

to follow the main road. The Americans, 

however, were disposed to take the left road 

with three companies, including the heavy 

weapons company and battalion head341 

quarters, while sending only Company A 

and the battalion antitank platoon to Halte 

d'el Heri. The guides left by the Coldstream 

Guards to lead the several units into position 

either missed them in the dark rainy night, 

or did not know where to take them. The 

resulting confusion made orderly relief quite 

impossible. While the two commanding officers finally managed to meet at the British 

command post, their headquarters never did 

link up. At 0430 the 1st Guards Brigade 

ordered the Coldstream back to Medjez el 

Bab. The battalion, under the impression 

that only a handful of the enemy remained 

to be mopped up, left the hill before all 

positions previously held by them were 

reached by the Americans. The existence of 

Djebel el Rhar had gone unnoticed. 

In the morning of 23 December the 

Americans realized that they held little more 

than half of Longstop Hill. Company A, 

reinforced by tanks, struck again for the railroad station, advancing between the road 

and Longstop Hill's eastern slopes. In the 

gap a reinforced panzer grenadier company 

successfully enveloped most of the company, 

capturing or killing all but one officer and 

thirteen men. Meantime the lst Battalion, 

69th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, had 

counterattacked the Americans dug in on 

the hill. Strong German elements circled 

the northwestern base of the Longstop 

massif and drove the Americans off Point 

290. By 1500 Colonel Lang reported all 

positions of his former main line of resistance 

recaptured. An hour later the 1st Battalion, 

18th Infantry, supported by British artillery, 

launched a co-ordinated counterattack 

against Point 290. In the face of determined 

German resistance the attack failed. By 

1800 the U.S. battalion had to take up defensive positions to the west and south. B 

Company was now in an advance position 
342 

on the knob closest to Point 290 with C and 

D Companies in support. Communications 

were exceedingly difficult. Wire lines were 

frequently cut; the radios got soaked in the 

heavy rain and failed. Those still operational were handicapped by the screening 

effect of the hills. 

After the first setbacks the commanding 

officer of the 18th Infantry, Col. Frank U. 

Greer, requested reinforcements, lest the 

whole mountain be lost. The Coldstream, 

back at Med jez el Bab since 1030, were the 

only reserve available. The 1st Guards 

Brigade now ordered them back. One company returned during the afternoon to the 

scene of its night battle, but it was not until 

late at night that the rest of the battalion 

was assembled at the entrance to the col. 

In the drenching rain all roads beyond 

Chassart Teffaha had become impassable. 

There were no mules to take the place of 

motor vehicles. 

As both sides brought up additional 

forces, the battle for Longstop Hill came 

to a temporary halt. The enemy had 

watched the battle with deep concern. General von Arnim, his chief of staff, and General Fischer came forward during the day 

to Colonel Lang's command post near the 

hill. Early in the morning von Arnim had 

sent elements of the 7th Panzer Regiment 

and an organic 88-mm. flak battery of the 

10th Panzer Division to Toungar. The 2d 

Battalion, 69th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 

was rushed to Tebourba gap. Additional elements of the 754th Infantry Regiment were 

also brought up and attached to Colonel 

Lang's command. 

In accordance with the Allied plan the 

5th Northamptons, during the night of 22-

23 December, had embarked on the highly 

difficult mission of advancing through the 

mountains from Toukabeur via Heidous 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

and Sidi Ahmed to Tebourba gap. At noon 

(1235), meanwhile, 5 Corps had decided to 

postpone the main Allied attack, continuing only the battle for Longstop Hill. Desperate efforts were immediately undertaken 

to reach the Northamptons and order them 

back, but planes sent out were unable to 

locate the battalion in the cloud-covered 

mountains. The Germans, however, had 

been warned by Arabs. Patrols sent out confirmed the threat to Colonel Lang's right 

flank. In the afternoon two companies of 

the 754th Infantry Regiment were dispatched to drive the British off Hill 466, 

some four miles north of Longstop Hill. In 

a bitter night engagement the Germans succeeded, but before this reassuring news 

could reach the German command the 

panzer grenadiers on Longstop had been 

almost driven off the mountain. 

By 0600, on 24 December, the Coldstream Guards had again assembled in the 

col. This time the battalion planned to pass 

one company through B Company, 18th 

Infantry, still clinging to the hill opposite 

290. The Guards company was to clear the 

ridge all the way to the east. It would thus 

be in a position to dominate the gap. Another British company would follow in support, while one reserve company would be 

held in the col. The fourth company was 

organized into carrying parties. At 1700, 

two hours before dark, the attack went off. 

Following closely behind a rolling barrage, 

the Coldstream again drove the Germans 

off the crest, "but when No.4 [Company] 

reached the final peak they saw in the failing light what had never been appreciatedDjebel el Rhar staring at them across a 

gully. They thereupon inclined to the left 

and gallantly attempted to deal with this 

new objective. It was found, however, to be 

strongly held and to be a much larger area 
STALEMATE BEFORE TUNIS 

than anyone company could possibly cope 

with." 55 

Nevertheless the Coldstream temporarily 

reached Djebel el Rhar's highest peak, 

Point 243, but in the darkness evidently 

never realized it. From the north slope the 

Germans continued to subject the companies to accurate and devastating mortar 

fire, while the men were struggling to dig 

in on the rocky crest as best they could. 

F or the German command Christmas 

Eve had brought a serious crisis. Colonel 

Lang's forces were still fighting to eliminate 

the threat to their right flank. The units on 

Longstop Hill had been driven off the massif 

and were regrouping in the eastern reen~rants. Losses had been painful, though 

considerably below those of the Allies. 

Faced with this situation Lang decided to 

counterattack the next morning. A small 

group in the center of the German line was 

able to regain Point 243 on Djebel el Rhar 

during the night. This unit was ordered to 

hold down the Allies with strong frontal fire. 

Armored elements of the 7th Panzer Regiment, swinging around the northern slopes 

of Longstop Hill, were to advance to the 

saddle, destroy the Allied troops there, and 

exploit by pushing toward the southern entrance of the pass. The main attack would 

round Longstop Hill's base from the east 

with the objective of completing the double 

envelopment. 

On Christmas Day, 0700, the enemy 

struck his final blow. In the col a company 

of French native troops without any antitank weapons was quickly dispersed by the 

German armored thrust. When the French 

50 See Lt. Col. E. R. Hill, "The Coldstream at 

Longstop Hill," The Army Quarterly, XLVIII, No. 

2 (July, 1944), 175-80, which conflicts at many 

points with 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, After Action Report, Engagement at Longstop Hill, 20 

March 1943. 

343 

withdrew they exposed the Allied left flank. 

The enemy's main-effort group, personally 

led by Colonel Lang, caught the Americans 

from the rear. The Coldstream Guards were 

thus isolated in their position on top of 

Longstop Hill. The Allied situation soon became untenable and when the Germans retook 290 by 0900, General Allfrey ordered 

his troops to withdraw. Against stubborn resistance the Germans took all of the remaining knobs of the hill, but when they sortied 

toward Chassart Taffaha they were stopped 

by mine fields and the 3d Grenadier Guards 

who had been committed on the high 

ground to the east of the village. The enemy 

remained on Longstop Hill, and for understandable reasons called it thereafter 

"Christmas Hill." 

Losses during the four-day engagement 

had been heavy. American casualties 

amounted to nine officers and three hundred 

and forty-seven men; the Coldstream 

Guards lost one hundred and seventy-eight 

officers and men. 

Obviously a number of mistakes had been 

made in the planning and execution of the 

attack. Insufficient reconnaissance contributed to the fact that Longstop Hill was 

never completely captured. Requiring one 

battalion to secure the objective and perfect the transfer in the same night was asking the impossible. The Allied troops also 

lacked air support, largely owing to the 

weather conditions. During the decisive German counterattack on Christmas Day artillery support was highly unsatisfactory 

because the forward observers had been 

withdrawn the night before and were unable 

to return. 

On 24 December, at 5 Corps headquarters, General Eisenhower and General 

Anderson had reached the conclusion that 

the weather dictated an indefinite defer-
344 

ment of the second Allied offensive aimed at 

capturing Tunis. After all troops which had 

moved east of the 11 December line had returned during the night of 25~26 December 

it was evident that not even the preliminary 

phase of the Allied attack, with the objective of gaining the approaches of the 

Tebourba~Djedelda area, had been 

realized. \Vith the greatest reluctance, General Anderson and General Eisenhower in 

Constantine concluded that the race with 

the Axis forces had been lost. Tunisia would 

have to be taken by a prolonged struggle 

and with a strategy substantially revised. 

In his periodic review for the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, General Eisenhower indicated that the initial, opportunistic phase 

of operations would now be followed by 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

initiative in another quarter while the vast 

supplies and reinforcements needed to capture Tunis and Bizerte were slowly being 

accumulated. 

The Allied Force would begin reorganizing immediately. Weather would not permit resumption of the attack in northern 

Tunisia for about two months. Acknowledging that abandonment of the attempt to 

capture Tunis was a severe disappointment, 

the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, 

deemed the evidence conclusive that any 

attempt to make a major attack in northern 

Tunisia under existing conditions would be 

to court disaster. 5

" 

'" (1) Msg, 5 Corps to AFHQ, 2353, 23 Dec 42. 

Copy in AFHQ CofS Cable Log. (2) Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 26 Dec 42. 
PART FIVE 

CONCENTRATION OF FORCES IN TUNISIA 

CHAPTER XVIII 

The New Situation: Allied Reaction 

The failure of the final phase of Operation TORCH required a major revision of 

Allied strategy in Africa and considerable 

modification in the Allied chain of command. The pressure for an early capture 

of Tunisia was intensified by an Allied decision in January at highest levels to seize 

Sicily. To meet their timetable, the Allies 

had to win Tunisia by early spring. Furthermore, they had to prepare for a Sicilian attack at the same time that they built up 

strength, improved efficiency, and made a 

final successful drive. A full-scale offensive 

in northern Tunisia could not be resumed 

until after the winter rains were over, normally about the end of March. 

One of the aims in the original concept 

of operation in Northwest Africa-trapping 

Rommel's rump army in Tripolitania between a British force in Tunisia and the 

westward-moving Eighth Army-had to be 

jettisoned. It was now apparent that Rommel would have to be driven back into 

Tunisia, and that the Eighth Army should 

itself continue west of Tripoli. The final 

stage of operations in Tunisia would thus 

become a struggle between two pairs of 

armies. Each adversary would be faced with 

hard problems in co-ordinating tactical 

operations and in meeting the logistical requirements of these forces. By the middle of 

January, decisions made at the Casablanca 

Conference had determined the new strategy in Africa and the changes in Allied command structure. Before those decisions were 

made, the Allied Force had reviewed and 

agreed on appropriate tactical read justments to be executed forthwith in the form 

of offensive operations in central Tunisia. 

Central Tunisia: The Terrain 

Although some attention was paid to the 

terrain of central Tunisia in Chapter XV, it 

will be helpful at this point to look more 

closely at some of its features. Central Tunisia lies between latitudes 36° north and 

34° 30' north. (See Map V.) Sousse on the 

coast, about ninety miles south of Tunis, and 

Kairouan, about thirty-six miles inland 

from Sousse, are near its northeastern corner. Mahares at the southeast and Gafsa at 

the southwest are at the border betwen central and southern Tunisia, closely linked 

with each. Djebel Zarhouan (1295), at the 

yoke of the inverted Y from which the Eastern and Western Dorsals flare to the south 

and southwest, is well within northern 

Tunisia, as is Le Kef near the Algerian border. The mountain chains, the intermediate 

plateaus between them, and the lesser hills 

which divide these plateaus into a series of 

valleys, were to be the scene of many actions 

before the major campaigning returned to 

northern Tunisia in April. 

On the coastal plain, Kairouan and Sfax 

began serving the Axis powers as early as 

November as bases for defense forces which 

operated toward the west. Detachments 

were installed at vantage points in the East-
348 

ern Dorsal; beyond them in the interior, 

mobile patrols and a few outposts ranged 

the sparsely settled, semiarid region. Kairouan, a holy city and the goal of perennial 

Moslem pilgramages, was the hub of many 

roads and tracks across the coastal plain. 

The city was connected with the interior 

by two main roads, the most northerly of 

which was a route over the saddle between 

Djebel HaIfa (572) and Djebel Ousselat 

(887) to the valley and village of Ousseltia. 

The other road forked southwest of Kairouan, one branch climbing over Djebel ech 

Cherichera (462) to Pichon, the other rising more gradually to penetrate the mountain chain through Fondouk el Aouareb gap 

on the way to Hadjeb el Aioun. Sfax was 

connected with the interior by a good road 

through Fald pass, seventy-five miles inland. 

The road branched after reaching the interior plain, one fork running northwestward to connect with Sbeltla and the other 

southwesterly through the village of Sidi 

Bou Zid and Bir el Hafey to Gafsa. 

Mahares, on the coast south of Sfax, was 

connected both by road and railroad with 

Maknassy and Gafsa. Few of the towns and 

villages were of any great size, the largest, 

Sfax, with about 45,000 in 1942, having 

almost twice the population of Kairouan, 

and about nine times that of Gafsa, while 

all the others were smaller. 

The plateau immediately west of the Eastern Dorsal is generally lower than the one 

along the base of the Western Dorsal. It is 

subdivided, moreover, into four major sections, of which the northernmost is the 

Ousseltia valley at the apex of the triangular 

area between the two mountain chains. 

That valley is separated from the Pichon 

basin by higher ground which extends westward toward Maktar from Djebel Ousselat. 

To the south is the area adjacent to Pichon, 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

drained toward Kairouan by the Marguellil 

river and its tributaries. This section is 

rimmed with hills and high ground except 

at the southeastern corner, where the river 

flows near the base of the precipitous Djebel 

Trouzza (997) and out through Fondouk el 

Aouareb gap. Far more extensive is that 

portion of the eastern plateau which starts 

to widen south of Djebel Trozza, and which 

extends as far south as Djebel Meloussi 

(622) beyond Sidi Bou Zid. The fourth 

area of the lower plateau lies between the 

ridges of which Djebel Meloussi forms a 

part and the corner at which the Eastern 

Dorsal swings to the southwest toward 

Gafsa. Sbei'tla and Bir el Hafey are near the 

irregular limit between the eastern and western plateau. Sbiba, Kasserine, and Feriana 

lie at the other edge of the upper level, near 

the base of the Western Dorsal. 

Five main routes through the Western 

Dorsal connected the interior plateaus with 

the mountainous area between the Western 

Dorsal and the Algerian border: (1) into 

northern Tunisia north of Djebel Bargou 

( 1266) to the Rebaa Oulad Yahia valley 

and thence to Siliana and on to Le Kef; 

(2) via Maktar, northwest of Pichon, across 

a high basin ringed by higher hills; (3) 

through Sbiba and Ksour; (4) by the defile 

northwest of Kasserine into the Bahiret 

Foussana valley, and thence through the 

Monts de Tebessa to Tebessa, or by skirting 

them at the north, through Thala; and (5) 

by one of the gaps in Djebel Dernala 

(1204), northwest of Fcriana, to Tebessa. 

Tebessa, near the center of a high plain at 

the eastern edge of Algeria, was linked with 

Souk Ahras, seventy-five miles north-northwest by road and railroad, which continued 

to Bone on the coast, sixty-five miles farther. 

Central Tunisia's hills and mountains are 

in general barer, sharper in contour, and 
THE NEW SITUATIO~: ALLIED REACTIO~ 349 

more varied in color than those of northern 

Tunisia. The plateaus and valleys are much 

eroded and are covered with bunch grass, 

with cultivated cactus patches on which the 

Arabs feed their animals, and with scrub 

growth along some of the streams. Water 

draining from the higher slopes across the 

intermediate plateaus has been impounded 

and since Roman times drawn to the coastal 

towns by aqueducts. Farms are fewer in central Tunisia than farther north, for the rainfall through much of the year is as light as, 

from December to March, it is plentiful. 

In the wet season the powdery top soil becomes slushy mud, and the many dry stream 

beds fill with water and justify the bridges 

which at other times seem superfluous. 

Many ancient ruins have survived for nearly 

twenty centuries. Sousse has its extensive 

Christian catacombs; Maktar, Sbei:tla, and 

Kasserine, their Roman triumphal arches; 

Sbiba, Sbei:tla, and Kasserine and innumerable other places, the remnants of many a 

mausoleum, Roman bath, or temple. Near 

Siliana is the site of the decisive Battle of 

Zama of the Second Punic War. In earlier 

centuries, the soil of central Tunisia apparently sustained a large population and was 

dotted at many points with olive orchards 

and other cultivation which no longer can 

be maintained. Here in this wide area of 

camel tracks and tarmac roads, dry fords 

and steel bridges, palm-fringed oases and 

treeless plains, the war in Tunisia was to be 

fought. 

Operation SATIN and Related Problems 

At AFHQ operations possible in January 

and February were under study at the same 

time that the final winter drive down the 

Medjerda valley was coming to a halt. 

Among the moves considered likely were 

subsidiary attacks in northern Tunisia to pin 

down enemy forces and take advantage of 

local situations, since the Fifth Panzer Army 

there would be protected against a major 

Allied offensive for many weeks by the 

weather. But if the British Eighth Anny adhered to the schedule reported to General 

Eisenhower by General Alexander from 

Cairo on 27 December, Rommel's army 

would be pursued into southern Tunisia late 

in January. Allied Force operations to 

weaken or destroy the German-Italian Panzer Army would be in order, and central 

Tunisia would be the likely scene.1 

\Vhat form should the operations in central Tunisia take? Should a mobile American armored force attempt to disrupt Rommel's line of supply? Although success in 

such a venture was likely to bring a large 

reward, certain hazards were involved. 

The Fifth Panzer Army's line in the north 

might be thinned without enabling General Anderson to punch through to Tunis. 

General von Arnim might be able to gather 

enough armored strength for an attack 

southwestward through the French sector 

to strike the American force on a vulnerable 

northern flank. Whether the Fifth Panzer 

Army did so or not, the German-Italian 

Panzer Army would certainly move quickly 

to protect its line of communications, the 

nature of its counterblows depending upon 

how much freedom of maneuver the pursuing British Eighth Army allowed. Rommel's force might be substantial, in which 

case it could strike effectively either independently, or in conjunction with a force 

from General von Arnim's command. The 

Americans would then be opposed by experienced German armored units, whose pres1 (1) Cbl, CinC AF to CCS, 29 D("c 42, XAF 61. 

(2) Butcher, My Three Yean With Eisenhower, 

pp. 228-31. 
350 

tige at that stage of the war it would be difficult to exaggerate. Furthermore, the Americans would then find themselves engaged in 

a hard all-out fight against battle-seasoned 

veterans instead of gradually supplementing their training by small and successful 

actions---a method more conducive to full 

combat efficiency. But in spite of these hazards, Operation SATIN, for understandable 

reasons, remained one of the projects favored by the Americans. An outline plan 

for such an attack toward Sfax was approved at AFHQ on 28 December. 2 

General Eisenhower believed that the 

British First Army had worked hard and 

"fought well," and he intended that it 

should eventually "deliver the decisive 

blow." 3 This role might justify General Anderson in curtailing First Army's local attacks in the next few weeks, thus enabling 

it to husband its resources rather than use 

them up in supporting the proposed attack 

farther south. After all, which would be 

the main effort-that toward Sfax or that 

toward Tunis? It might be better to abandon the American project and to concentrate American armor in a mobile force-inbeing on the southern flank of First Army, 

thus deterring Rommel's possible aggressive 

inclination in that area. Despite such considerations the Commander in Chief, Allied 

Force, concluded that the immediate Allied 

objective was not the capture of Tunis and 

Bizerte but the destruction of Rommel's 

army. He tentatively approved planning for 

the risky thrust to the coast. General Anderson then agreed to make the subsidiary at-

, ( I) Memo, Lt Col R. H. Barry for Brig C. S. 

Sugden, 22 Jan 43. AFHQ G-3 Ops 58/1.6, Micro 

Job 10C, Re-ei 188D. (2) Msg, FREEDOM to 

AGWAR, 29 Dec 42, CM.IN 12717. 

'Msg, FREEDOM to USFOR (Eisenhower to 

Ismay for Churchill), 1550, 28 Dec 42. ETOUSA 

Incoming Cables, Kansas City Rcds Ctr. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tacks intended to aid Operation SATIN but 

proposed to retain Combat Team 18 of the 

U.S. 1st Infantry Division for the purpose. 

He was allowed to keep that unit until infantry of the British 46th Division (Maj. 

Gen. H. A. Freeman-Attwood) should 

have arrived in the forward area to relieve 

it. 4 

The Allied situation not only required a 

revision in theater strategy and some appropriate tactical adjustments but presented interrelated problems of command. 

General Giraud, it will be remembered, had 

proposed on 17 December that he be appointed Eisenhower's tactical commander 

in chief over the whole Tunisian front. 

Giraud would not accept a relationship 

which put British First Army in command 

of French forces. For a time, a un;on of 

French and American forces under an 

American commander was considered. 

Such a solution was affected by the fact 

that the American preinvasion plans provided for eventual organization of American units in an American Fifth Army to be 

commanded by General Clark. An American Fifth Army controlling American and 

French troops in a zone south of British 

First Army would not have provided unity 

of command along the whole Allied line 

and would have created a rather exalted 

headquarters for an American force of the 

proportions contemplated. 

On 30 December, while the plan was 

pending, General Clark and Maj. Gen. Carl 

Spaatz (USAAF), surveyed the prospective 

battle area and considered the steps necessary to achieve genuinely effective co-ordi-

.. The British 139th Brigade was in the forward 

area by 19 January after landing at Algiers. The 

remainder of the 46th Division came on the next 

convoy and reached the forward area by 3 'February. Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 
THE NEW SITUATION: ALLIED REACTION 351 

nation between ground and air units. But 

with a decision against an American command in Tunisia of Army grade, General 

Clark soon went to Oujda, west of Oran, 

to activate the American Fifth Army there, 

while the American force in Tunisia was 

designated an army corps. General Marshall was prepared to arrange the promotion of either Patton or Fredendall to a 

lieutenant generalcy at once, if such action 

would help to meet the problem of unifying 

command over French-held sections of 

the front. In the end, General Eisenhower picked Fredendall to command 

the II Corps in central Tunisia and the 

Tebessa area, and the French remained 

independent. 5 

On 1 January 1943 the Eastern Task 

Force was renamed British First Army and 

the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, assumed direct command of military operations on the entire front. He exercised that 

control through an advanced command post 

( FAIRFIELD) at Constantine. In charge of 

that station as Deputy Chief of Staff, Allied 

Force, would be Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. Between U.S. II Corps and British 

First Army, the Detachment of the French 

Army would be commanded from a forward 

post by General Juin, who would control 

two zones, that of General Barres Tunisian 

Troop Command at the north and that of 

XIX Army Corps under General Koeltz at 

the south. In due course, all units of the 

three nationalities found in areas assigned 

to control by the others would be sorted out 

and concentrated with forces of their own 

nationality, but during the intervening 

period some units would be attached to the 

major command of whatever zone they 

5 Memo by Gen Eisenhower for the record, 25 

Feb 43, in CinC AF Diary, Bk. V, pp. 265a-65e. 

happened to be in. The XIX Army Corps 

was to turn over to II Corps the Constantine Division ( General Welvert) . The 

Tunisian Troop Command was to make five 

battalions of French infantry available to 

British First Army and to leave one entire 

groupement (Colonel Bergeron) in the 

British zone. French units thus placed under the tactical orders of an American or 

British commander were to remain under 

control of headquarters of either XIX Corps 

or Tunisian Troop Command in all other 

respects (supply, administration, discipline). All other French units stationed in 

the American or British zones were to remain entirely under the command of Generals Barre or Koeltz. In case of an unexpected inroad by the enemy, the various 

French or Allied Force elements in any zone 

would, within the intent of their missions, 

obey orders of the local headquarters regardless of nationality.6 

Headquarters, U.S. II Corps, began moving to Constantine from Oran on 4 January. 

One week later, its main section was operating there near Headquarters, British First 

Army, while an advance command post 

under Brig. Gen. Ray E. Porter opened in 

Tebessa. Eventually General Fredendall's 

headquarters moved southeast of Tebessa to 

a wooded hillside in which underground 

corridors were constructed while the advance command post went to Gafsa. While 

plans for Operation SATIN were being prepared, the troops to be under Fredendall's 

command shifted from northern Tunisia or 

came eastward from Morocco and Algeria. 

, (1) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 125. 

(2) Dir, Fr Army Detachment to XIX Corps, 

CSTT, et ai., 14 Jan 43. Transl in AFHQ G-3 

Ops 37/4, Micro Job lOB, Reel BIF. (3) Msg, 

Juin to II Corps, 16 Jan 43. AFHQ CofS Cable 

Log, 150. 
352 

Three alternative schemes for this operation were recognized. Plan A prescribed the 

seizure of Sfax, with the subsequent possibility of a northward advance along the 

coast toward Sousse; Plan B called for an 

initial attack farther south, at Gabes, followed perhaps by a northward move against 

Sfax; Plan C specified the capture of 

Kairouan, continuation to Sousse, wrecking its usefulness to the Axis, and withdrawing when that became necessary. \Vhichever the plan adopted by the Commander 

in Chief, Allied Force, the force to execute 

it was to operate directly under AFHQ, with 

a tentative D Day of 22 January.' 

Generals Eisenhower, Anderson, J uin, 

and Fredendall, conferring on II January 

at Constantine, reached final decisions on 

Operation SATIN. The Commander in Chief 

defined the mission as acting aggressively 

against the enemy line of communications in 

the direction of Sfax, interrupting its use as 

much as possible, and he assigned the undertaking to General Fredendall's U.S. II 

Corps. The force was to be comprised of the 

following: the U.S. 1st Armored Division 

(Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward); the U.S. 26th 

Combat Team (Col. Alexander N. Stark, 

Jr.) ; the British 1st Parachute Brigade, less 

one battalion (Brig. J. W. C. Flavell); the 

French Constantine Division (Maj. Gen. 

Joseph Edouard Welvert). The British Middle East Command was to load ships which 

it would hold at Malta and send into Sfax 

when II Corps specified, thus supplementing 

the attenuated line of supply throughrebessa from Algiers.~ Generals Anderson, 

J uin, and Fredendall by further agreements 

at the conference clarified other points nec7 II Corps AAR, 2 May 43. 

R (l)Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 12 Jan 43. (2) 

Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

essary for good interallied co-operation 

along the wide front.o 

General Fredendall planned to station a 

mobile force in the area between Hadjeb el 

Aioun and Sbeitla for the immediate support of the French should the enemy counterattack from Kairouan but to attack with 

the bulk of his command from Gafsa to 

Gabes and thence north along the coast to 

Sfax. This plan received General Eisenhower's tentative approval.111 Detailed planning 

for the operation soon diverged considerably from AFHQ's outline of 28 December. 

A force at first set at 20,000 to 25,000 men 

rose to be more than 38,000. The axis of 

attack adopted by General Fredendall 

threatened to lengthen the line of supply to 

such an extent and to delay the acquisition 

of Sfax for so long, that a daily draught on 

reserve supplies accumulated at Tebessa 

might be necessary. AFHQ did not supervise the detailed planning closely enough to 

discover these deviations and attendant 

problems until they emerged during commanders' conferences from 10 to 14 January, when the specter of logistical overextension raised its head. 1 

t 

After the Allied Force thus had worked 

9 (1) Rcd of mtg between Anderson, Juin, and 

Fredendall, at Hq First Army, 11 Jan 43. Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (2) Msg 101, Adv 

CP AFHQ to AFHQ, signed Truscott, 15 Jan 43. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 144. 

10 During a conference with General Fredcndall 

at Telergma, Algeria. Memo, Gen Rooks for Gen 

Truscott, 14 Jan 43. AFHQ G-3 Ops 58/1.6, 

Micro Job 10C, Ree1188D. 

11 (1) Memos: Chief Admin Officer AFHQ for 

CofS AFHQ, 12 Jan 43; G-4 AFHQ for Chief 

Admin Officer AFHQ, 12 Jan 43; Gen Rooks for 

Gen Truscott, 14 Jan 43; Brig A. T. de Rhe Philipe 

for Chief Admin Officer AFHQ, 15 Jan 43; Telg, 

CinC AF to First Army, 1547, 12 Jan 43. AFHQ 

G-3 Ops 58/1.6, Micro Job lOC, Reel 188D. (2) 

In March II Corps began supporting almost 90,000 

men over the same line of communications. 
THE NEW SITUATION: ALLIED REACTION 353 

out problems of reorganization and unified command and had formulated a plan 

of action to which he had given tentative 

approval, Eisenhower on 15 January flew 

to Casablanca to report to his superiors at 

the second conference of Anglo-American 

military and political leaders (SYMBOL) .12 

The suburban community of Anfa, adjacent to the great Moroccan city, had been 

requisitioned for the first full-scale gatherof these men in more than six months. 

The hotel and neighboring villas were requisitioned, a barbed wire barrier thrown 

around the area, and the site officially 

termed the "Anfa Camp." From 13 to 23 

January 1943, the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff met formally at fifteen meetings, while 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British 

Chiefs of Staff Committee, the two groups 

which made up the Combined Chiefs, met 

separately at other times. On three occasions during the conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff met with the President 

and the Prime Minister to consider the 

agenda, to discuss the matters at issue, and 

to arrive at a final report of decisions taken. 

The relatively sunny comfort which prevailed and the general atmosphere of buoyant confidence which surrounded the President and the Prime Minister contrasted 

sharply with conditions east of Algiers.") 

The site, the fact that the security and 

"homekeeping" arrangements for the conference were re.~pon,<;ibilities of the Allied 

Force, and the fact that some of the deliberations were connected with current operations in Africa, associated the Anfa Con-

'" The first conference was the ARCADIA Conference hdd at Washington soon after the Pearl 

Harbor attack. '-

" (1) Sec Official Casablanca Conference Book. 

(2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, eh. 

XXVII. 

ference with the campaIgns of Northwest 

Africa. Yet its major purpose was to determine the Allied objectives for 1943 in all 

theaters, to establish priorities among them, 

and to reach decisions on the preparation 

and allocation of means to attain them. 

These and other conclusions overshadowed 

arrangements concerned with the forthcoming battles in Tunisia. 

Before a meeting of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff, and then at the first plenary session 

of the Casablanca Conference, General 

Eisenhower reported on the current and 

prospective operations in Tunisia. Gen. Sir 

Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial 

General Staff, quickly questioned the justification for such risks as those he recognized in the projected Operation SATIN. 

General Alexander, newly arrived from 

Cairo, indicated that the British Eighth 

Army would reach Tripoli before the end 

of January, perhaps just as the scheduled 

attack on Sfax was starting. No assurance 

could be given that Rommel's forces would 

then be pinned down by the Eighth Army's 

pressure and thus unable to intervene at 

Sfax. General Montgomery's command 

might well be temporarily immobilized. 

Fuel and supplies would certainly be low 

while the port of Tripoli was being cleared 

and restored to service. 

It was apparent that if the attack on 

Sfax was begun by 23 January, it might 

well provoke a counterthrust which the 

American force would have to withstand 

unassisted. But if it were made at a later 

date, Eighth Army would then have moved 

into Tunisia on Rommel's heels and would 

be a factor limiting his action at Sfax. After 

a further conversation with General Alexander, therefore, General Eisenhower 

agreed that the attack should be canceled 

for the time being, and that if undertaken 
354 

later it would be carefully co-ordinated 

with the operations of the British Eighth 

Army. He returned to Algiers on 16 January with the American portion of his command held on a very short leash.14 

On 18 January General Eisenhower prescribed at a commanders' conference in 

Constantine that operations on the southern 

flank must be defensive and that as much 

as possible of II Corps, particularly the 1 st 

Armored Division, was to be held in mobile 

reserve." He issued a directive to this effect 

at noon, 20 January.If, 

The New Chain of Allied Command 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff at Anfa 

adopted a new system of command for the 

Mediterranean theater, one affecting each 

of the three major arms. The changes 

would go into effect in February. They 

agreed that a boundary should be drawn, 

extending from that between Tunisia and 

Tripolitania to Corfu, to separate the military area under the Commander in Chief, 

Allied Force, from that of the British Commander in Chief, Middle East. After 

General Montgomery's Eighth Army had 

crossed this boundary, it would pass to General Eisenhower's control, although con10 (I) CCS 57th and 58th Mtgs, 15 and 16 Jan 

43. (2) Anfa 1st Mtg, plenary session, IS Jan 43, 

Official Casablanca Conference Book. (3) Rommel's army was estimated by General Alexander 

to be reduced to less than 60 tanks and 20,000 

German combat effectives, plus 30,000 German and 

30,000 Italian troops from whom aggressive fighting could not be expected. (4) On 30 January, II 

Corps reported that 213 medium and III light 

tanks were "operational." First Army Sitr"p, 31 

Jan 43. 

'" (1) CinC AF Diary, Bk. V, p. A-160 (18 Jan 

43). (2) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 140, 

cites this passage of diary. (3) Ltr, Eisenhower to 

Anderson, 26 Jan 43. AFHQ G-3 Ops 58/2.1, 

Micro Job 10C, Reel l88D. 

h'Msg, AFCP to CG II Corps 1200, 20 Jan 43, 

par. 3. AFHQ CofS Cabl" Log, 190. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tinuing to draw its supplies from Egypt. At 

the same time, General Alexander would 

leave Cairo to assume command over a 

newly formed headquarters (18 Army 

Group) and to succeed General Clark as 

Deputy Commander in Chief, Allied Force. 

Allied naval forces also underwent an 

adjustment aimed at better direction of future operations in the Mediterranean. Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham 

was to change his designation from Commander in Chief, Naval Expeditionary 

Force, to the traditional Royal Navy title 

of Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, 

while Admiral Sir Henry Harwood, in the 

eastern district of the Mediterranean, became Commander in Chief, Levant. Admiral Cunningham was to retain important 

powers over the employment of all Royal 

Navy units in both parts of the Mediterranean." 

The basis was laid also for creation of an 

American naval command in the western 

Mediterranean subordinate to the Allied 

Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean 

(Admiral Cunningham). Designated U.S. 

Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters, 

it was organized in February 1943. The 

U.S. Eighth Fleet under Vice Adm. H. Kent 

Hewitt began operations in March looking 

in particular toward the invasion of Sicily." 

Allied air strength in the Mediterranean 

was placed under one air commander in 

chief directly under General Eisenhower. 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder received that designation. His principal sub1;(1) CCS 63d Mtg, 20 Jan 43, Item 4. (2) 

History of Allied Force Headquarters and Headquarters NA TOUSA, December 1942-Deccmber 

1943, Pt. II, pp. 123-25. DRB AGO. (3) Msg, 

USFOR to FREEDOM (COS to CinC AF), 2205, 

3 Feb 43. ETOUSA Outgoing Cables, Kansas City 

Rcds Ctr. 

"Morison, U. S. Naval Operations, II, 225. 
THE NEW SITUATION: ALLIED REACTION 355 

ordinates were to be General Spaatz, as 

Commander of the Northwest African Air 

Forces, Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas as Air Officer Commander in Chief, 

Middle East, and the Air Officer Commanding, Malta. General Spaatz's command was subdivided along functional 

lines. Pressing need to co-ordinate the air 

resources of the U.S. Army Air Forces and 

Royal Air Force in eastern Algeria and 

Tunisia without waiting for a more permanent arrangement brought into temporary 

existence on 4 January the Allied Air Forces. 

General Eisenhower, with the approval of 

the British Chiefs of Staff, placed this force 

under command of General Spaatz, who 

had for the preceding month been the principal Allied Force staff officer for air while 

retammg his status as Air Officer, 

ETOUSA. His chief of staff at Algiers was 

Air Vice-Marshal J. M. Robb. The two 

existing major headquarters, Twelfth Air 

Force (U.S.) and Eastern Air Command 

(Bf. ), were preserved, but their responsibilities were modified in order to leave, with 

a single major exception, one subordinate 

headquarters in charge of each major type 

of air operations. Strategic bombing was the 

job of XII Bomber Command. Offshore 

reconnaissance, convoy protection, and the 

defenses of ports fell to the coastal segment 

of the Eastern Air Command. The exception was that support of ground operafons 

was divided: Royal Air Force 242d Group 

continued to support the British First Army 

while the XII Air Support Command 

moved eastward from Morocco to take over 

(on 10 January) the control of air co-operation with the U.S. II Corps.H' 

,. (1) Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, 

II, 106-13. (2) Msgs 4140 and 4269, FREEDOM to 

USFOR, 4 and 5 Jan 43. ETOUSA Incoming 

Cablt's, Kansas City Reds Ctr. 

Giraud Replaces Darlan 

A flare-up of political problems bearing 

on the future of the whole Allied war effort 

in Europe came at the end of Operation 

TORCH. This situation was precipitated 

seven weeks after the landings by the assassination in Algiers on 24 December of the 

French High Commissioner, Admiral DarIan. The resulting emergency required 

General Eisenhower's abrupt return from 

the Tunisian front, where he and General 

Anderson had been making critical decisions in connection with plans for the final 

try for Tunis. The new regime in Algiers, 

vital as it was to the Allied cause in Northwest Africa for other reasons, was even more 

significant as an opportunity to promote 

unification of all anti-Axis Frenchmen able 

to take up arms. Darlan's administration 

rested upon a military agreement with the 

Allied commander in chief which had 

brought aid to the Allies but only after first 

involving the American and British governments in a torrent of adverse criticism and 

in the problems of French factionalism. The 

opprobrium with which this military arrangement was greeted began later to 

moderate, and as time went on some hope 

appeared for a working relationship between Darlan's anti-German following and 

the anti-German and anti-Vichy Frenchmen in General de Gaulle's growing organization. Darlan had begun to speak, shortly 

before he was murdered, of retiring from 

political leadership.20 

Up until the last moment, the Fighting 

French nonetheless continued to fear that 

the admiral would make permanent the 

temporary arrangements for his control over 

, • .Msg, Murphy via Eist'nhowt:f and Marshall to 

Hull, 24 Dec 42. AFHQ AG 336/36, Micro Job 24, 

Rt'd 78D. 
356 

civil administration in Northwest Africa and 

elsewhere. At the very outset, he took the 

title of High Commissioner, established an 

Imperial Council, communicated with the 

diplomatic representatives of Vichy France 

in several countries, and sought ties with the 

civil governors of some French overseas territories. Apparently he wished to make 

Algiers the actual center of government instead of Vichy. In the opinion of de Gaulle's 

followers, Darlan's actions were hardly consonant with a temporary military expedient; 

to them it seemed, moreover, that after its 

eventual liberation, France would be delivered to the exponents of French fascism. 

This was perhaps the most troublesome repercussion of what was labeled at the outset 

and repeatedly denounced thereafter as the 

"Darlan deal." 21 

Attempts through intermediaries to establish a basis of co-operation between the 

Fighting French and the pro-Allied Frenchmen in Africa began in December. Gen. 

Georges Catroux, one of the outstanding 

military figures to join the Fighting French, 

on 12 December met at Gibraltar a former 

member of his staff then serving with Admiral Darlan. General Catroux was reliably 

informed that, contrary to his previous beliefs, the French in North Africa were actually mobilized and actively engaged against 

the Axis forces in Tunisia; he was also 

advised that Admiral Darlan was greatly 

preferred in North Africa, especially among 

the armed forces, to General de Gaulle and 

his associates. The suggestion that General 

de Gaulle, General Catroux, and others 

"The arrangement was approH'd by Stalin, th,' 

Soviet dictator, who t'xpressed his opinion in the 

Russian proverb that, for military purposes, onc 

must be able to usc "even the De\·il himself and his 

grandma." Copy of excnpt from translatC'd note, 

Stalin to Churchill, 28 Nov 42. OPD Exec 10, Item 

63. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

should soon replace Admiral Darlan in 

Algiers was described as certain to produce 

internal disturbances, annulment of the 

agreement by which French West Africa 

was being joined to French North Africa, 

and adverse consequences elsewhere. 22 On 

20 December, Gen. Fran<;;ois d' Astier de la 

Vigerie arrived at Algiers for discussions 

looking toward amalgamation of the Fighting French of London with the French 

fighting in Northwest Africa, but found his 

mission was premature."' 

The government in French North Africa 

in 1940-1942 had followed the example of 

Vichy in establishing press censorship, political imprisonments, and repressive treatment of native Jews. Communist delegates 

of the French Chamber of Deputies had 

been incarcerated in French North Africa 

on charges of hindering the war effort during the period when Stalin was allied with 

Hitler. Outspoken Gaullist sympathizers 

were assembled in concentration camps. As 

a further complication, the proverbial antiSemitism of the Moslems in French North 

Africa intruded in the situation. Some 25,-

000,000 Mohammedans in the three major 

territories treated the 350,000 Jews with 

deep and inveterate hostility. Fascistic organizations of war veterans and others 

adopted methods of terrorism towards Jews, 

Communists, or Gaullists of a sort with 

which the world was distressingly familiar. 

Darlan, in his administration of French 

North Africa, had to deal with these kinetic 

facts in such a way as to allow the fighting 

in Tunisia to be carried on without hindrance. 

"Rpt, Murphy to Leahy, in Msg, FREEDOM to 

AGWAR, 14 Dec 42. AFHQ G-3 Sec, Micro Job 

24, Red 79D. 

"Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 

225-26. 
THE NEW SITUATION: ALLIED REACTION 357 

Complaints that Vichy's policies in 

French North Africa were kept in force under Darlan soon reached disturbing proportions. The admiral's administration met an 

Allied request for information with a memorandum, "Notes on the reforms undertaken by the High Commissioner in French 

Africa," which General Eisenhower forwarded to General Marshall on 13 December 1942.21 The commander in chief believed that Darlan, in a month's time, had 

made a sincere effort to go as far as local 

conditions would permit in the way of reforms. The pace was deliberate in an attempt to avoid offending Arab susceptibilities, for Admiral Darlan was under pressure 

from Arab leaders to improve the position 

of their people. 

On the day preceding Christmas, Darlan 

explained to Murphy what changes had 

taken place or could be expected, after 

which the two men discussed at considerable length French individuals outside areas 

of Axis occupation who might have the talent and ability necessary to succeed Darlan 

if he should retire. 20 That noon, at a luncheon, he dwelt again on the theme of his prospective retirement. In mid afternoon, DarIan was shot down at his office in the Palais 

d'Ete and died at a hospital soon afterward. 26 

General Giraud was informed of the assassination when he arrived at a French 

command post in Le Kef that evening to 

supervise the forthcoming French attack. 

" AFHQ AG 336, Micro Job 24, Reel 78D. 

"Msg, Murphy via Eisenhowf'r and Marshall to 

Hull, 24 Dec 42. AFHQ AG 336/36, Micro Job 24. 

Reel 78D. 

,'J The youthful murderer was identified eventually as Fernand Bonnier de la Chappelle, but his 

motives and accessories were not publicly disclosed. 

Kammerer, Du debarquemenl Africain au meurtre 

de Darlan, pp. 615-28. 

The death of Darlan brought an end to the 

arrangement which had freed Giraud from 

political matters, and permitted complete 

attention to the conduct of military operations and the rebuilding of a French Army. 

He started back to Algiers that night, arriving on Christmas afternoon. There, as 

military commander in chief, he ordered an 

immediate court-martial of the assassin. He 

was condemned to death and executed early 

next morning.21 

Generals Clark and Smith, with the cooperation of Darlan's deputy, General Bergeret, were able to cope with the situation 

in Algiers until General Eisenhower returned. News of the assassination was suppressed until preparations had been taken 

to forestall possible disorders, planned or 

spontaneous. American troops in Algeria 

and Morocco were held ready to meet any 

new hostilities. Members of Darlan's Imperial Council were summoned. They met 

the crisis on 27 December by swiftly agreeing on General Giraud as High Commissioner. \Vhatever claims might have been 

made for General Nogucs, he showed no 

eagerness for the place and proposed the 

selection of General Giraud. The othersBoisson, Chatel, and Bergeret-overcame 

Giraud's objections to the post. The choice 

was known to be welcome to the Allied 

commander in chief and was probably acceptable to many Frenchmen in North 

Africa and West Africa who had been opposed to Giraud on 8 November. 

The death of Darlan in many respects 

relieved the Allies of a burden in their relations outside French Africa-his co-operation with the Allies had not been able to 

" (1) Giraud, Un seul but: la uictoire, pp. 70-

79, says no appeal could be taken from the courtmartial. (2) Kammerer, Du debarquement Africain 

au meurtre de Darlan, pp. 625-28. 
358 

extinguish his record as a collaborator with 

the Nazis. But in the theater of war, he had 

become, as General Eisenhower described 

him somewhat earlier, "the source of all our 

practical help. . . . All the others including Giraud await his lead and will do nothing definite until he speaks. So far he has 

refused us nothing. If he is playing a crooked 

game with us locally it is so deep that he 

can afford to give away initial advantages 

of every kind, even those upon which our 

existence depends in our present attenuated 

conditions." 2, Although he had caused difficulties outside French North Africa, he had 

kept his promises to the Allies most effectively. 

At the time of Darlan's death, another 

political storm was in the making because of 

an Allied agreement, upon Darlan's request, 

to recall to Algeria the experienced colonial 

administrator, Marcel Peyrouton, former 

Resident General of Tunisia. Frenchmen 

equal to the tasks of governing Algeria were 

rare. Peyrouton had the qualifications. But 

he had once been directly involved in some 

of the most unsavory acts of the Vichy government, and although he had finally withdrawn because of his implacable opposition 

to Laval's pro-German policies, he could not 

be put in a position of power without reviving deep antipathies and sharp distrust. 

His return was arranged, despite admonitions from the Department of State, on the 

ground of military necessity, a factor which 

that department later agreed was controlling.20 

In the bewilderingly complex role of administering territories populated by such 

discordant elements, both native and Euro-

"Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 Dec 42. Copy 

in CinC AF Diary, Bk. IV, pp. A-38, A-39. 

'" Msg, AGW AR to FREEDOM, 12 Dec 42, CMOUT 4072. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

pean, General Giraud proved less competent 

than his predecessor. He was not only less 

competent but less interested, for as indicated earlier, his paramount concern was 

with military measures; political problems 

were for him a dragging nuisance. Moreover, sensitive over the subordinate position 

of the French, he requested that they be 

treated as an ally in accordance with the 

promises stated to General Mast at Cherchel, repeated in Mr. Murphy's letters to 

Giraud just before he consented to leave 

southern France, and embodied in the 

"North African Agreement" negotiated by 

General Clark with Admiral Darlan. While 

the Allied commander in chief was well 

aware of this obligation, President Roosevelt 

held a different view. He thought that General Eisenhower should have put the Imperial Council's selection of Giraud in the 

light of a nomination rather than a choice, 

and that he should have impressed on General Giraud that his position depended directly upon his capacity to provide the kind 

of government required by the Allies to 

support the war effort.°" This misconception 

General Eisenhower firmly challenged in a 

letter to General :YIarshall, and it was not 

allowed to animate subsequent relations 

with Giraud in Africa.'" Giraud succeeded 

Darlan as a leader of the French who accepted a voluntary association with the 

Anglo-Americans in Northwest Africa. Unlike the latter, he did not claim to be giving 

effect to Marshal Petain's secret thought. 

Nor could he hold the Allies to promises 

which had once been made to him in return 

"" Min of Conf at White House, in prep for Casablanca Conf, 7 Jan 43. OPD Exec 10, Item 45. 

" (1) Msg-, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jan 43. 

WDCSA 381 Africa Jan-May 43. (2) Eisenhower's 

rpt to conf at Anfa in Official Casablanca Conferenc(' Book. (3) CCS 57th Mtg, 15 Jan 43, Item 2. 
THE NEW SITUATION: ALLIED REACTION 359 

for undertaking leadership since Darlan, 

and not he, had actually filled that role. 

The ~orth African Agreement remained in 

force and regulated the relations between 

the Allied Force and the French North 

African civil and military administration. 

French Factionalism Persists 

Giraud had been in office less than one 

month when another crisis occurred in 

Anglo-American relations with the French. 

This crisis arose from the fact that the Allies 

still maintained separate relations both with 

the French in Algiers and with de Gaulle's 

organization in London, despite the manifest desirability of unifying all anti-Axis 

French forces. Efforts in this direction were 

under way. Darlan's death had stopped de 

Gaulle on the very brink of departure for 

a conference in Washington with President 

Roosevelt. The meeting was postponed by 

the President until after the conference of 

Allied leaders near Casablanca. In the 

meantime de Gaulle made overtures to 

Giraud looking toward a merger of the 

French empire in a single organization for 

the achievement of victory. He proposed 

that they meet on French soil to discuss the 

problem."2 Giraud, although well disposed 

toward the idea, parried de Gaulle's proposal by asking him to wait until the military situation in French North Africa had 

become less demanding and political conditions less disturbed. Both men were invited to Casablanca by the Allies. Giraud 

accepted at once and arrived on 18 January. 

" (I) Msgs, USFOR to FREEDOM (de Gaulle to 

Giraud), 26 Dec 42, and replies, FREEDOM to 

USFOR (Eisenhower to Hartle and Giraud to de 

Gaulle), 27 and 29 Dec 42. ETOUSA Outgoing 

and Incoming Cables, Kansas City Rcds Ctr. (2) 

COM:\AVEU, U.S.-French Relations, 1942-194+, 

App. B, Pt, II, Itcm 41. OCMH. 

De Gaulle refused, then came there under 

some duress on 22 January."" 

The basic contrast in their positions 

promptly became evident. The Fighting 

French were addicted to recrimination; 

they wished to sweep from office high officials who had accepted Marshal Petain's 

authority, and they regarded as traitors those 

who had resisted or injured the Gaullists. 

Even Giraud was expected by de Gaulle 

to defend his patriotism. In contrast with 

such views, Giraud believed in rallying any 

kind of Frenchmen who could contribute to 

liberation, postponing accountability for 

earlier actions until France had been freed. 

It seemed likely that most of the French 

nation could be unified behind de Gaulle 

only at the cost of rigorous and even unfair 

measures against much of the population, 

while they could follow Giraud only at the 

risk of internal strife. It had already been 

shown that Giraud's personal capacity to 

aid the Allies was much less than Admiral 

Darlan's.31 

As the two French leaders discussed a 

basis of unification at Casablanca, they indicated that it would be impossible for either 

to accept subordination to the other. Giraud 

at one time had had de Gaulle under his 

command in the French Army. He was by 

far the senior in age and grade. De Gaulle 

had been the first to rally the French against 

the Germans after other leaders had accepted military defeat, and while Giraud 

remained a prisoner. Each man led organizations combining civilian and military elements which exercised control over large 

parts of the French empire. The Fighting 

French held Syria, Equatorial Africa, 

French Somaliland, Yladagascar, French 

33 Giraud, Un seul but: la vic/oire, pp, 85-101. 

'" CCS 57th Mtg, 15 Jan 43, It<:m 2. 
360 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

CASABLANCA CONFERENCE, 24 January 1943. From lift, Gen. Henri Giraud, 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Gen. Charles de Gaulle, and Prime Minister Winston 

Churchill. 

India, and insular territories (such as New 

Caledonia) in the Pacific. Giraud headed 

the High Commission governing the much 

more populous French North Africa and 

French West Africa. Neither organization 

was accepted by the French admirals of 

squadrons harbored in Martinique and 

Alexandria, Egypt. Gaullist units were already fighting with the British Eighth Army 

in Libya, and more were crossing the Sahara 

to join Montgomery in southern Tunisia. 

Giraud's forces fighting the Axis troops in 

Tunisia were perhaps three times as large 

as de Gaulle's, and the men in training were 

even more numerous. Resistance organizations in metropolitan France were not yet 

unequivocally committed in the main to 

either leader. Each man had reason to know 

that his name was honored in France among 

patriots. Which should have accepted a 

secondary role? 

If a single organization were created, its 

character could be expected to influence 

strongly the character of the postwar government of France. The two Allied governments refrained on this account from trying 

to prescribe a form of political settlement 

but left such arrangements to be determined 

by the French themselves. Yet patriotic 

Frenchmen everywhere for years had been 
THE NEW SITUATION: ALLIED REACTION 361 

divided on political and economic issues, 

and the weakness arising from their divisions, so fatal in 1940, was still a factor 

with which to reckon. Giraud was known 

as a man of somewhat aristocratic, conservative views. De Gaulle's adherents represented many shades of political opinion and 

included a large segment with leftist principles. If it was true that all wished to unite 

in 1943 to throw the Nazis out of France, 

it was also true that none wished to see 

France free of the Germans only to be controlled by Frenchmen of objectionable political views. The union so desirable for 

military ends was gravely impeded by its 

political implications. Ultimately, Giraud 

and de Gaulle decided at Anfa to continue 

their separate ways, maintaining liaison 

through representatives in Algiers and London, and perhaps one day achieving the 

basis for unity. Giraud remained the French 

military leader accepted by the AngloAmerican Allies in the Mediterranean area. 

De Gaulle continued in a parallel capacity 

for other areas where Anglo-American military operations required co-operation with 

the French.a5 

The outcome of their conversations was a 

serious misfortune for the Allies. A French 

Army to be strong not only had to be well 

armed but well disciplined. Political factionalism threatened discipline. The two 

major Allies could not permit themselves 

to fall completely into a situation in which 

each had its own protege. If support was 

withheld from either French organization, 

Allied interests would suffer. The future 

promised a situation in which dual French 

leadership would persist, in which jockey-

." (1) Teig, Gen Giraud to Fr Mission in Washington, 26 Jan 43, reprinted in Giraud, Un seul 

but: La victorie, pp. 355-56. (2) COM~AVEU, 

U.S.-French Relations, 1942-1944, App. B, Pt. II, 

p. 80fT. OCMH. 

ing for position could be expected, and in 

which each Allied government might be 

tempted to play one side against the other, 

and thus threaten their own collaborative 

unity. 

Rearming the French 

The Allies, as already pointed out, promised Giraud, Mast, and other Frenchmen 

who had dared work for unopposed Allied 

landings in North Africa, that arms would 

be furnished to modernize a French Army 

and thus again enable the French to take 

the field against the Axis. Preliminary steps 

to this end had already been taken by the 

Allies in December. To expedite redemption of that promise Giraud sent representatives to Washington. Furthermore, at 

Casablanca, he sketched French capabilities to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and 

discussed the problems of meeting French 

armament requirements with Lt. Gen. 

Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces), U.S. Army.36 

Giraud, in a somewhat offhand manner, 

received from President Roosevelt on 24 

January a signed "Agreement in Principle" 

to deliver the materiel required for three 

armored and eight infantry divisions, as 

well as 1,000 first-line airplanes.'" French 

naval vessels were to be reconditioned in 

American shipyards. The franc in French 

North Africa was to be exchanged hence-

:., (1) Giraud, Un seul but: la victorie, pp. 94" 

96,100-101. (2) CCS 62nd Mtg, 19 Jan 43. (3) 

For a detailed exposition see Vigneras. Rearming 

the French. 

J7 Resume of the Agreements in Principle Resulting from the Anfa Conversations, 24 Jan 43, and 

supplied to WD by Col LeBel. Copy in WDCSA 

France Super-secret File. For manner of delivery, 

compare Giraud, Un seul but: fa v;ctoire. p. 112, 

with Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 

558-59. 
362 

forth at the new and more favorable rate 

of fifty to the dollar.3B 

These agreements were supplemented by 

a redefinition of the Allied position concerning a government of France. France was 

declared to have no government. The 

promises of American aid in liberating the 

nation made during the negotiations between Mr. Robert Murphy and General 

Giraud prior to the landings of 8 November 

were confirmed. Giraud, as the French 

Commander in Chief, was recognized as 

rightfully acting for the French people to 

preserve all their interests-military, economic, financial, and moral.") To the extent 

that such a document signed by the President but not the Prime Minister could do so, 

the Allies had committed themselves henceforth to support General Giraud. These decisions, on the literal interpretation and 

swift execution of which Giraud placed 

great trust, greatly cheered him as he returned to Algiers. 

President Roosevelt's acceptance in principle of the schedule of rearmament submitted by Giraud after his appearance 

before the Combined Chiefs of Staff soon 

produced a tangle of interrelated difficulties.4() The President considered it a tentative agreement rather than a detailed 

contract. For him it apparently defined the 

maximum French hopes but left the United 

States free to "do the right thing" after 

weighing other demands upon American 

production. Token shipments, training and 

replacement materiel, and as much more as 

possible were sent. But the shipping situa-

'" Msg, FRU:DOM to AGWAR, 29 Jan 43, CM-IN 

13770. 

"M"mo, 24 Jan 43, signed with that relating to 

military mattns by the President. OPD Exec 1, 

Item 13. 

" Vigncras, Rearming the French. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tion grew troublesome in the extreme, and 

the program lagged seriously behind what 

Giraud considered vital for the maintenance 

of his prestige. 

The French put into the Allied pool vessels totaling initially 165,000 ship tons and 

before the end of the war 420,000 tons." 

They claimed a lien on enough of this 

French tonnage to meet civilian and French 

military requirements. Their claim to a separate right to tonnage was denied!2 The 

Anglo-American Allies allotted 25,000 tons 

per convoy from the United States for the 

French armed services!·1 Anything in excess 

would be available only if the limit of fortyfive ships per convoy could be increased to 

forty-eight. Eventually General Giraud had 

to include the Gaullist units in his elevendivision program. As they passed under his 

control, they ceased to receive equipment 

through British General Headquarters, 

Mideast, and like all other French forces 

drew equipment from AFHQ. H 

General Eisenhower, in December 1942, 

established a Joint Rearmament Committee 

at AFHQ on which the French were represented. Since the assignment of shipping priorities involved tactical considerations, such 

assignment was determined in the theater. 

Contributions toward the needs outlined by 

General Mast prior to 8 November and revived by General Giraud at Anfa in January tended to grow as time passed but their 

estimates were never fully realized!" 

41 Msg, Bethouart to Marshall, 7 Apr 43. OPD 

400 France, Sec 1. H. H. Dunham, The U.S. Army 

Transportation Corps and the Conquest of North 

Africa. OCT HB Monograph 9, Jan 45, p. 118. 

OCT HB. 

"Msg, AGWAR to FREEDOM. 3 Feb 43, CMOUT 608. 

"Msg, FREEDOM to AGWAR, 26 Jan 43, eMIN 12711. 

H CCS 104th Mtg, 31 J ul 43. 

I .• Vigncras, Rearming the French. 
CHAPTER XIX 

The New Situation: Axis Reaction 

Revision of Axis Plans 

In January the Axis powers like the Allies 

were obliged to revise their operational objectives in Northwest Africa. Earlier Axis 

decisions, it will be remembered, were to 

maintain two armies there by reinforcing 

Rommel's command while establishing in 

Tunisia the Fifth Panzer Army of four or 

more divisions. General von Arnim assumed 

command of this army on 9 December with 

the prospect of an aggressive campaign before him. Rommel was authorized to retire 

from Marsa el Brega to Buerat el Hsun if 

necessary to avoid being cut off, but he was 

expected to bold at Buerat el Hsun indefinitely while his losses were made good and 

his army was restored as an instrument of 

offensive power. To the commanders in the 

field it soon became evident that such plans 

could not be carried out without reinforcements, a radical improvement in transportation, and the provision of more equipment 

and supplies. 

General von Arnim within a week of assuming command of the Fifth Panzer 

Arm)', reported to Commander-in-Chief, 

South. that the current rate of supply was 

far below African requirements. He estimated the volume at 12,000 tons per month 

for his army and an equal amount for Rommel's. Since only half his army was then in 

Tunisia, shipping to transport the remainder 

must also be found. The opportunity to 

complete the building up of the Fifth Panzer 

Army and reach the 24,OOO-ton-per-month 

level of resupply for the two armies was expected to last only six to eight weeks longer, 

this being the period during which prevailing rains would prevent the Allies from renewing their attack. 1 Yet at the existing rate, 

the concentration of Axis forces scheduled 

to come under his command would take 

several months. 

Rommel at the same time was facing a 

critical shortage of supply and therefore, on 

17 December, the very day on which he had 

got his army into position at Buerat el Hsun, 

urgently renewed his recommendation of 30 

November that he be authorized to pull 

back into Tunisia, only to have his proposal 

again rejected. 2 

When Hitler, to establish the foundations 

of further operations, called a conference 

with Italian representatives at his Rastenburg headquarters on 18c

22 December, he 

was presented by Kesselring's headquarters 

with a survey of Allied capabilities and a 

plan for providing the North African bridgehead with supplies and equipment. Hitler 

then reaffirmed his position that North 

Africa must be held in order to check the 

increasing power of the Allies, and concluded also that it was an Italian theater 

which wOllld remain under Italian command. He would send reinforcements into 

1 ~1sg, Fifth Panzer Army 10 OB SOUTH, 15 Dec 

42 in Fifth Panzer Army, KTB Anlagen, Geh. u. 

Geh, Kdo. Sachen Band I, 16.XI.42-12.I,43, 

'SeC' pp, 322-23 above. 
364 

Tunisia, including some of his best troops, 

bringing the German strength there up to 

130,000-140,000 men, and take measures 

that would insure air superiority over the 

line of communications from Italy. He 

painted an optimistic picture. But it was one 

which recognized the critical nature of the 

logistical con test. 

Before the end of the year, a second factor which Hitler was bound to recognize 

forced adjustments in the Axis program for 

Northwest Africa. The battle for Stalingrad 

began absorbing the reserves at the disposal 

of OKW, taking away to an operation of 

the highest priority the German divisions 

with which Hitler might have redeemed his 

earlier promises to Mussolini. The only opportunity to gain the preponderance of force 

necessary for aggressive action in Tunisia 

seemed likely to take place during the few 

weeks intervening between the arrival of 

Rommel's army and that of the pursuing 

British Eighth Army. Mussolini therefore 

issued a directive, which Marshal Bastico 

delivered to Rommel on 31 December at 

Misurata, authorizing his conditional withdrawal into Tunisia. The German-Italian 

Panzer Army was to move to the Mareth 

Position south of Gabcs in several stages and 

at a rate which would consume at least 

two months. This much time would be 

needed to develop the Mareth Position. It 

was stipulated that Rommel must have the 

approval of Marshal Bastico for the timing 

of each step in the withdrawal.This restraint was a precaution against the loss 

of Italian foot soldiers to motorized enveloping attacks. When Rommel protested that 

the duration and staging of his withdrawal 

would have to take account of Allied maneuver, Comando Supremo, with Hitler's 

concurrence, gave him freedom of action 

[or six weeks, the length of time regarded as 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

necessary for him to reach a position just 

east of Tripoli. 3 

On 2 January, Rommel began sending 

back part of his nonmotorized force from 

Buerat el Hsun. By mid-January the rest 

of Rommel's forces, less the 21 sf Panzer 

Division, had been forced back to the 

Tarhuna-Homs position. The rate of retirement which was to have kept Tripoli 

in Axis possession until the middle of February was suddenly accelerated by a British 

maneuver which Rommel accepted as a 

genuine threat of envelopment at TarhunaHoms. On the night of 19-20 January, he 

ordered movement to start still farther west; 

this step began the last stage of retreat to 

the next defensible position, that in southern 

Tunisia! Rommel sent his rear area commander to Sfax on 19 January to open a 

headquarters from which to regulate traffic southward through Gabcs to the retreating army. The stage was therefore set in 

Tunisia for the union of the Axis forces." 

Since early January Comando Supremo 

had feared an Allied offensive from the 

Tcbessa-Gafsa area intended to prevent the 

junction of the two Axis armies. Retaining 

all of the present bridgehead and keeping 

open the connection to Rommel's army was 

naturally the first preoccupation of the Axis. 

OKW therefore concurred in Comando 

Supremo's proposal to seize Gafsa to counter 

the Allied threat. To carry out this plan the 

depleted 2 I sf Panzer Division was ordered 

3 Mins of Conf between Rommel and Bastico, 31 

Dec 42, 1215 hrs, at Misurata, in Panzer Army 

Africa, KTB, Anlngenband 6, Anlage 713/2. 

'Memo, Rommel, Panzer Army Africa (Nr. 

324/43),22 Jan 43, Rpt Romm"1 to Cavallero for 

the Duce, in OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, File A JAfrika Berichte, Band 3, J6.J.-JB.V.43. 

G MS # D-072, Aus dem Arbeitsgebiet des Kalllmandanten des Rueckwaertigen Arllleegebiets Nardafrika, Teil II (Generalmajor Ernst Schnarrcnberger). Based on personal diary. 
THE NEW SITUATION: AXIS REACTION 365 

to the Sfax area to be re-equipped and used 

to make the attack on Gafsa. Kesselring, 

more than ever anxious about the adequacy 

of the forces in his African theater, pointed 

out that the shifting of units from one of the 

armies to the other could not be regarded 

as reinforcement and requested two motorized divisions in addition to the units that 

had been promised him. Though he carried 

his views up to Hitler himself on 12 J anuary, he could get nothing more than permission to send the Hermann Goering Division into Tunisia immediately. 

While the seizure of Gafsa was being 

planned, the possibility of more far-reaching 

operations was kept in view. Preparations 

to wrest control of the T ebessa area from 

the Allied force by an attack through Gafsa 

and Sbeltla were ordered, and the possibility of driving all the way to Bone and 

Constantine was contemplated. It was recognized that such ambitious operations 

would require at least three mobile divisions, 

one of which would have to come from 

Rommel's army, and that they would be 

possible only when the Fifth Panzer and 

German-Italian Panzer Armies had been 

combined and only as long as the improved 

Mareth Position could be counted on to protect the southern flank. The immediate decision, made in early February, was to break 

up the Allied concentrations at Sidi bou Zid 

and Gafsa. G 

The Axis Logistical Problem 

The enemy's capacity for offensive operations remained conditioned by the ability of 

the Axis to improve the logistical support 

of the forces defending the Tunisian 

bridgehead. The arrival of Rommel's GerG OKW/WFSt, KTB, 19 Jan 43. 

man-Italian Panzer Army in southern 

Tunisia on the turn of January-February 

did nothing to reduce the problems facing 

the Axis command. On 12 January Kesselring discussed the supply situation with 

Hitler and his staff. The combined armies 

in Tunisia, it was now estimated, would 

need 60,000 tons of supply a month. The 

C ommander-in-C hief, South, optimistically 

assured Hitler that with additional shipping, 

which was becoming available from ports in 

Southern France, these increased demands 

could be met. Kesselring had misgivings 

as to surface protection for the convoys but 

felt that the ports of Bizerte and Tunis could 

handle the flow.7 Although abandonment 

of the line to Tripoli permitted a concentration of effort and a considerable reduction of mileage over the highways, to meet 

the new schedules the sea and air transportation systems would have to be revolutionized. 

The flow of men and materiel from 

Europe to Tunisia ran through Italy and 

Sicily overseas to the ports and airfields at 

Bizerte and Tunis. Railroad and highway 

connections with these terminals permitted 

speedy distribution to depots at various 

points along the coastal plain. The shallow 

ports of Sousse and Sf ax were used by 

smaller cargo craft, but most traffic to 

Tunisia passed through Bizerte and Tunis. 

The channels into the harbors of Tunis, 

Bizerte, and Sfax were partially blocked by 

wrecks. Power cranes at the piers of Bizerte, 

and to a lesser degree at Tunis were 

damaged by Allied bombers and had to be 

replaced by cranes shipped from Toulon, 

Marseille, and after the first shipment wa~ 

sunk on the way, from Germany. Meanwhile unloading was slow and cumbersome. 

7 MS # C-065a (Greiner), 12 Jan 43. 
366 

The transport vessels were not fitted out 

with heavy-lift equipment, and were forced 

to use their own cargo gear and improvise 

as best they could. The labor in the ports 

was not wholly reliable. Arabs fled rather 

than risk being caught in air raids. For the 

same reason few of the Tunisian Italians 

promised to Nehring for stevedore service 

ever appeared. German labor troops and 

Hamburg stevedores were finally imported. 

The turn-around rate for ships in Tunisian 

ports, unloading at piers from one side only, 

was approximately one day per 1,500 metric 

tons, which meant that the larger vessels 

remained long enough to experience one or 

more raids.s 

Transport to Tunisia by air had begun on 

9 November 1942 and continued until 11 

May 1943. At the peak of the operation, the 

daily flight consisted of an average of 200 

Junkers-52 aircraft, which carried 1.8 

metric tons of useful load, and 15 of the 

gigantic six-motored Messerschmidt 323 

planes, which carried 10 tons of useful load. 

Since part of the Junkers-52 elements made 

two trips a day from Sicily to Tunisia, the 

average total each day in this maximum 

period reached 585 metric tons. The volume 

dropped rapidly in April, as a consequence 

of successful Allied countermeasures, sinking to a daily average of less than 190 tons. 

These totals were achieved only by revising 

the emergency improvisations of November 

and eSLablishing a routine intended to continue for a prolonged period. In December, 

Generalleutnant Ulrich Buchholz became 

the Air Transport Commander in the Medi-

, (1) Opns Rpt, Fifth Panzer Anl/)', 0 Qu, 

Taetigkeitsbericht, Abt Qu 3-0Q Tunis, lS.XI.-

31.X!I.42. (2) MS # D-067 (Deichmann). (3) 

MS # D-093, Eisenbahn-, SchifJahrts- und Transportlage fuer Nachschub ueber Italien nach 

Afrika, J an-M ai 43 (Generalmajor Conrad Scibt). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

terranean (Lufttransportfuehrer Mittelmeer-LTFM) and instituted a system 

whereby planes were concentrated at relatively few airdromes, with dispersion to 

numerous airfields occurring only in temporary emergencies. 9 

For the long pull in the Tunisian campaign, the German air transport service was 

organized under a central headquarters at 

Rome. Wing staffs were located at Capodichino near Naples and Trapani, Sicily, 

with control officers at the Tunisian airports 

of Sidi Ahmed (Bizerte) and El Aouina 

(Tunis), and at some of the fields in the 

Sicily-Calabria and Naples areas. One 

round trip from Naples and two from Sicily 

were made each day. 10 The first Sicilian 

flight came in before 0700 and the second, 

late in the afternoon. Formations of from 80 

to 120 planes each (Pulks) skimmed over 

the water at elevations of about 150 feet as 

they headed for Tunisia. Detection by radar 

or other means of observation was thus minimized, while attacks from below, against 

which the transports were defenseless, were 

avoided. The formations from Naples were 

escorted by fighters from Trapani during the 

crossing of the Sicilian narrows and by 

others based in Africa during the period of 

landing, unloading, reloading, and return. 

When these flights arrived off the Golfe de 

Tunis, they separated into sections for Bizerte or Tunis-sections scheduled to arrive 

during the normal noon lunch period for the 

Allied air forces-a time when hostile interference was found to be relatively unlikely. 

'MS # D-071, Versorgung des erweiterten 

Brueckenkopfes Tunis durch Lufttransport in der 

Zeit vom 1.XII.42 bis 11. V.43 (Gencralkutnant 

Ulrich Buchholz). 

10 The principal airfields were, in thc i\i aples 

area, Capo die hi no, Pomigliano, and Capua, and in 

the Sicily-Calabria region, Trapani, Palermo, Reggio di Calabria, and Vibo Valentia. 
THE NEW SITUATION: AXIS REACTION 367 

GERMAN SIEBEL FERRY used to transport supplies from Italy and SiciLy. 

Experience showed the necessity for removing cargoes quickly and sending the planes 

off without avoidable delay. 

The Northwest African Air Force eventually perfected the means of detecting and 

surprising Pulks approaching the African 

coast. German fighter escort was small and 

the speed was controlled by the slower 

planes, sometimes at a rate which rendered 

the heavy Messerschmidt 323's so unstable 

that the formations had to string out. But 

not until April did Allied depredations pass 

the point of bearable loss. Meanwhile, suspension of the railroad ferry service across 

the Strait of Messina, or breakdown in the 

movement of trains on the Italian peninsula, required temporary modifications. 

For supply by sea, Axis forces in North 

Africa could initially draw on a shipping 

pool of Italian and German merchant ve~­

sels with a combined tonnage of approximately 150,000 tons. The fleet consisted 

mostly of small merchantmen which had 

been used on short passages in the Mediterranean. In November when conditions were 

still favorable, the Axis command was able 

to use 37 merchant ships. This tonnage was 

supplemented by employing 20 ferries 

(Naval ferries with 80 tons capacity and 

Siebel ferries with 40 tons capacity) and 14 

submarines. By an agreement with Vichy 

France the Germans were able to utilize 

about 100,000 tons of French merchant 

shipping found suitable for providing transportation to North Africa. As a result of Allied bombings the capacity of Italian shipyards was so reduced that only a fifth of the 

tonnage theoretically available was actually operational at anyone time. To an even 

larger extent Allied sinkings curtailed Axis 

tonnage. Out of 95 ships of all categories 

which made the passage to Africa in November, thirteen were sunk. In December, 

26 ships were sunk and 9 damaged out of a 

total of 127. 

The Italian Navy was unable to protect 

the lines of supply. The Luftwaffe's effort to 

provide air cover proved equally inadequate. 

When, late in December, thirteen destroyers 

were diverted from escort duty to transport-
368 

ing- 300 to 350 troops at a time in swift passages at intervals of about three days, the 

practice exposed the freighters to an accelerated rate of depletion. As losses at sea and 

in port continued to mount, the Axis stock 

of cargo vessels, oil tankers, and troop transports fell so low that frantic efforts were undertaken to ship everything on small ferries. 

In January the number of such craft rose to 

ninety, but it was estimated that to be sufficient the fleet of ferries would have to be 

more than quadrupled. An increasing number of small coastal vessels and barges, some 

culled from France's interior waterways, 

were requisitioned but their total capacity 

was insignificant. Even before the period 

when almost half of all shipments to Tunisia by sea were lost en route (during the 

month of April) it became gradually and 

painfully clear to the Axis Command that 

adequate sea transport was an unattainable 

goal. Resourceful ingenuity could not outstrip Allied power. 

Despite staggering losses the Axis managed to ship to Northwest Africa a surprising amount of troops and supplies. During 

the period from November 1942 through 

January 1943,81,222 Germans and 30,735 

Italians, a total of 111,957 troops, arrived 

there. Supplies brought in by air and sea 

during the same period amounted to 

100,594 tons.ll 

Axis Reorganization in January 

The presence in Tunisia of both Axis 

armies required a major alteration of the 

Axis command structure. Hitler, when 

11 (1) S('c Appcndix B. (2) (lpns Rpt, Fifth 

Panzer Arm)', 0 Qu, Taetigkeitsbericht, Abt 

Qu 3-0Q Tunis, IS.xI.-3J.XII.42. (3) Rpt, 

Afrika Transporte, Nr. 1701/43, 7 Feb 43, in 

OKH /CenStdH/Op Abt (11), Afrika-A II 

Kraefte, I.I2B.V.43. (4) MS # D-093 (Seibt). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

warned in early December that the Italians 

would probably seek to command the Axis 

forces in Tunisia, declared his determination to retain effective control in German 

hands. He believed that the Italians would 

acquiesce, in view of the preponderance of 

German forces on which offensive action 

would depend, and because the Germans 

would be supplying most of the materiel 

and the supplementary (French) vessels 

to transport it to Africa. 12 His expectation 

was not fulfilled. As a result of the conference at Rastenburg the Germans had to 

concede that the conduct of operations in 

Tunisia as in Libya would be the responsibility of Comando Supremo. OB SOUTH 

would become commander of all German 

forces in the central Mediterranean and, 

although relieved of responsibility for 

ground operations in the Balkans, would 

control German air forces in the entire 

Mediterranean. Close eo-operation in Tunisia between the Axis partners, it was 

agreed, would be sought by attaching a 

German operations staff to Comando 

Supremo for the purpose. Hitler accepted 

this arrangement. He also agreed to meet 

Cavallero's proposal that when Rommel's 

army had retired to Tunisia, it would be 

redesignated the First Italian Army, and 

Rommel would be replaced by an Italian 

commander. 13 

The Italians and Germans agreed that 

the retreat of Panzer Army Africa into Tunisia would make necessary a superior authority in the field to co-ordinate the two 

armies. The German military authorities 

wanted this to be an army group (Army 

Group Africa) with a German commander, 

12 Fuehrn Confcf('nce Fragments, 1 Dec 42. 

I" (1) MS # C-065a (Greiner), 19 Dec 42. (2) 

OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.I.-31.III.43, 2 Jan 43. (3) 

Cavallero, Comando Supremo, p. 428. 
THE NEW SITUATION: AXIS REACTION 369 

reporting to a German armed forces headquarters, commanded by Kesselring. Hitler 

rejected this plan as politically inopportune 

and decided that Comando Supremo should 

exercise direct command of both armies. 14 

The reorganization of command could 

not be fully carried out until Rommel had 

withdrawn into Tunisia. In the meantime, 

the first concrete result of the discussions 

and maneuvers for position that went on 

throughout December and January was 

Kesselring's reorganization of his headquarters at Frascati to carry out his new 

duties. During January, Kesselring reorganized his headquarters from an Air Force 

into an armed forces staff with operations, 

quartermaster, and transport sections. The 

first two had Army, Navy, and Air Force 

groups, and the last included sea, air, and 

administrative groups, with a general officer 

on special assignment as deputy transport 

officer.15 A separate staff was formed to 

control the Second Air Force. 

As for the Tunisian theater, Kesselring, 

in addition to being Commander-in-Chief 

of the German forces, was to convey to the 

supreme Italian command the views of the 

Fuehrer and of OKW on the conduct of 

operations in that theater. To implement 

this relationship Kesselring in late January, 

as previously agreed, installed the whole of 

his operations staff except one officer in 

Comando Supremo. This move further 

strained the relationship between the Germans and Italians and endangered Hitler's 

policy of mollifying the susceptibilities of his 

anxious Italian partners. Marshal Ambrosio, who replaced Cavallero as Chief of 

" OKW /WFSt, KTB, I.I.-31.IIl.43, 22 Jan 43. 

" (1) OKW /WFSt, KTB, 1.I.-31.IIl.43, 5 Jan 

43. (2) Directive, Der Fuehrer, OKW jWFSt, 

NT. 6620/43.5 Jan 43, in OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt 

HTunis." 

Comando Supremo on 2 February, protested to Kesselring against the size of this 

contingent which outnumbered the whole 

operations staff of Comando Supremo, 

but he had to be content with the assurance 

that German influence on operations in 

Tunisia would be confined to recommendations and requests. ' " 

To summarize Kesselring's position, he 

now had under his command: 

1, The Second Air Force. 

2. The German Air Force General at 

Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces. 

3. The Commander of the German 

Naval Forces, Italy, under the restriction 

that basic operational directives would be 

issued by the Navy High Command. 

4. The German General at Headquarters, Italian Armed Forces (Comando 

Supremo), under the restriction that, in his 

capacity as liaison officer between OKW 

and Comando SUjJremo and in his missions 

outside of the Central Mediterranean, he 

was subject to direct control of OKW. 

The directives issued by Hitler on 28 

January indicates the complexity of on 

SOUTH's responsibilities and powers. 

Kesselring was to have the following tasks: 

1. Represent the Fuehrer's concepts of the 

conduct of operations in the Central Mediterranean in negotiations with the Duce and 

Comando Supremo. 

2. Assure German influence on the unified 

command of the panzer armies in North 

Africa which are placed under Comando 

Supremo's control. 

3. Within the range of these powers, be the 

superior officer of thc German Commander in 

Chid of the central headquarters for the two 

armies in Tunisia. 

4. Control German Air Force and Navy 

operations in the Central Mediterranean, i~ 

,. (1) MS # C-065 (Greiner) 16 Feb 43. (2) 

OKW /WFSt, KTB l.I-31.IlI.43, 18 Feb 43. 
370 

conformity with directives from the Commanders-in-Chief of those services, as in the 

past. 

5. Direct t~e entire system of supply to German troops m the Central Mediterranean 

t~rough his Chief of Supply and AdministratIOn and the Armed Forces Transportation 

Section under his control. 

6. Submit requests and recommendations 

on matters of organization, including those of 

Coman do Supremo, to OKW /WFSt or the 

High Commands of the several services. 

To carry out the agreements rearranging 

the system of command in the Tunisian 

theater, on 23 January Mussolini designated 

General Giovanni Messe to assume command of the new First Italian Army when 

its organization had been effected. On 26 

January the Fifth Panzer Army was put 

under direct operational control of Comando Supremo. Until the activation of 

Headquarters, Army Group Africa, the conduct of operations in Tunisia was, initially, 

to be co-ordinated by von Arnim. " 

Axis air strength in Tunsia was consolidated in a single tactical air headquarters, 

Fliegerkorps Tunis, under Brig. Gen. Hans 

Seidemann, with headquarters at La Fauconnerie, northwest of Sfax, and with subordinate headquarters at Tunis and Gabes. 

Seven principal airdromes from Bizerte to 

Kairouan, six near Gabcs, and others at 

Mezzouna, Sfax, and La Fauconnerie were 

to be linked for maximum performance by 

the 53d and 77th Fighter Wings. The Luftwaffe had expended 201 aircrews and 340 

aircraft out of a total of 877 in stopping the 

Allied advance toward Tunis but could expect a period of at least temporary pre17 (1) Directive, OKW/WFStjOp Nr. 66214, 28 

Jan 43, in Panzer Army Africa, KTB Anlagen, 

Anlage 945. (2) Ciano Diaries, p. 574. (3) Panzer 

Army Africa, KTB Anlagen, Anlage 943/3, 26 Jan 

43. (4) Rad, OKW/WFSt (H), Nr. 66185, 25 Jan 

43,in OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt "Tunis." 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ponderance in fighters and fighter-bombers 

in northern and central Tunisia." 

Rommel's relief, which he was informed 

on 26 January would be given him for reasons of health, was postponed for more than 

a month beyond the time when his army entered Tunisia in early February. This action, 

according to the Axis plan, was to have been 

the signal for transfer of command to an 

Italian. The plan was amended first on 22 

January to defer Rommel's departure until 

the army was firmlv established in the 

Mareth Position, and' a second time on 18 

February to enable Rommel to command 

certain offensive operations before retiring. 

The commander designate of the First I talian Army, General Messe, was meanwhile 

familiarizing himself with the duties of his 

new command, and the Italian leaders 

waited with some impatience for Rommel's 

departure.'" 

The Axis Forces-Strenoth and .'> 

Disposition 

The strength of the Axis forces in Tunisia 

rose during January until it reached a total 

of approximately 100,000, of which 74,000 

were Germans, and 26,000 Italian troopS."" 

During the transition month of January 

the Fifth Panzer Army was responsible for 

the defense of the Tunisian front sector from 

the sea to the thirty-fourth parallel, the 

boundary with Rommel's forces. Early in 

"(1) MS # T-3 (Nehring e! al.), Pt. 3. (2) 

German Air Hist Branch (Ab! 8), "German Air 

Force Activities in the Mediterranean. Tactics and 

Lessons Learned, 1941-1943," 30 Oct 44. 

'" .(1) Rommel,Kri.eg ohne Hass,p. 338. (2) Rad, 

Bastleo to Rommel, In Panzer Army Africa, KTB 

Anlagen, Anlage 943. (3) OKW/WFSt, KTB, 22 

Jan and 18 Feb 43. 

2<' Rpts, 10 Dec 42, 1 Jan and 1 Feb 43, in 

OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt (II), A IV-Afrika-Transporte Allgemein, 10.XII.42-29.VII.43. 
THE NEW SITUATION: AXIS REACTION 371 

February the boundary was shifted northward to run from a point on the coast ten 

miles northeast of Sfax through Mezzouna 

and Station de Sened to the Kbir river northwest of Gafsa. Initially Fifth Panzer Army's 

headquarters continued operating with 

minimum staff and without a German corps 

staff intervening until von Arnim organized 

the provisional Headquarters, Korpsgruppe 

Fischer on 4 January. One reason for the 

activation of this headquarters was the arrival, late in December, of elements of the 

334th Infantry Division (Colonel Friedrich 'Veber) which was inserted between 

Division von Broich in the north and the 

JOt h Panzer Division (reinforced by the 

5th Parachute Regiment) in the Med jerda 

Valley and as far south as Pont-du-Fahs. 21 

The Italian 1st (Superga) Division continued operating directly under Fifth Panzer 

Army in its sector which extended to Djebel 

Bou Dabouss (816) . Headquarters, Italian 

XXX Corps, on 12 January, assumed command over the portion of the Fifth Panzer 

Army front south of the Superga Division, 

with Group Benigni, the 47th Grenadier 

Regiment (Lt. Col. Buse), and 50th Special 

Brigade (Gen. Giovanni Imperiali). The 

190th Panzer Battalion was held in reserve, 

to be committed only on von Arnim's 

orders.22 

Rommel's German units when they arrived in southern Tunisia were down to 

about half strength. They had approximately one third of their full tank strength 

(129 tanks, of which less than half were 

operational), one third of their complement of armored personnel carriers, about 

one fourth of their antitank guns, and one 

"Anothl'f rcason was Kesselring's order of 2 

January to capture Medjcz eI Bab. See p. 373 

below. 

"Fifth Panzer Army, KTB, Bands 2, 4,12 Jan 43. 

sixth of their artillery strength. Wheeled 

transport was down to roughly one third. 

Only in the truck category was the picture 

somewhat brighter. Here the Germans had 

managed to preserve 60 per cent of their 

allotted total. 

German forces brought back by Rommel 

consisted of the German 15th and 21st 

Panzer, 90th and 164th Light Africa Divisions, supplemented by the 1st Luftwaffe 

.Iaeger Brigade, corps troops and reconnaissance units with a combat effective 

strength of almost 30,000. The Italian divisions were the 131st (Centauro) Armored, 

16th (Pistoia) , 80th (La Spezia) , JOIst 

(Trieste), 13th (Young Fascists) Divisions 

and the Saharan Group. Italian troops 

numbered about 48,000.":1 Of these units 

Rommel was about to lose the Centauro 

Division (temporarily) as it moved to positions guarding the El Guettar defile, and the 

21 st Panzer Division (on 20 January) when 

it passed to the direct control of Fifth Panzer 

Army to be rehabilitated in the area of Sfax 

and simultaneously serve as army reserve. 2 I 

None of these divisions was anywhere 

near full combat strength. Kampfgruppen 

continued to undertake operations adapted 

to the requirements of particular missions 

rather than by divisions or standard subdivisions of larger units. No new divisions 

could be sent to Tunisia after mid-January. 

Not even the normal process of replacement 

by allocating troops from replacement bat-

,.1 (1) Tabulations, 1 Feb 43, in Panzer Army 

Africa, KTB, Anlagenband R, Anlage 1031/9. (2) 

Giovanni Messe, La Ia Armata Italiana in Tunisia, 

Ministero della Difcsa, Stato Maggiore Escrcito--

Ufficio Storico (Rome, 1950), p. 27. 

" Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Band 2, 20 Jan +3. 

The main body of the panzer division crossf'd the 

Tunisian horder on 20 January. The division left 

its tanks and most of its heavy weapons with 

Rommel. 
372 

talions to fill up depleted units could be carried out. Instead, it became a practice to fill 

out regiments by assigning to them Tunis 

Field and Africa Replacement Battalions, 

units numbering about 900 men each, with 

their full complement of officers and light 

weapons. 

In the seven weeks which followed the 

suspension of the drive on Tunis, during 

which the operational objectives of the two 

coalitions were modified and their forces 

were reorganized for action in central 

Tunisia, the new situation in Tunisia had 

thus developed several significant aspects. 

The Allies had temporarily lost the advantage of numbers; they retained the advantage of position, although lacking enough 

forward, all-weather airfields. Neither adversary could be dislodged readily from 

existing positions, although the French were 

somewhat vulnerable because of their lack 

of antitank defenses. The stalemate before 

Tunis and the conditions of weather and 

terrain encouraged both sides to extend 

southward, and each to attempt balancing 

the other's build-up along the Eastern 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Dorsal. Both the British First Army and the 

Fifth Panzer Army anticipated early reinforcement by second armies from Tripolitania, and each prepared plans and reorganized commands in order to guarantee well 

co-ordinated operations when the four 

armies faced each other at various points 

along the very broad front. Each coalition 

struggled with logistical problems, recognizing that the degree of success in this effort 

would control future operations. The Allies 

in this period confidently adopted a course 

of action for the next major operation in the 

Mediterranean, that in Sicily, for which 

French North Africa was to be a base, and to 

which the Allied Force engaged in liberating Tunisia would contribute much of the 

means. 

The tactical initiative in Tunisia, which 

the Axis forces had seized near Tebourba, 

remained with them throughout these 

transitional weeks except for minor offensives by elements of British First Army and 

a limited success by the French. The tactical 

operations of this transitional period are the 

subject of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER XX 

Sparring Along the Eastern Dorsal 

Fighting To Keep the Initiative 

During the period of Allied strategic decisions, reorganization, and accumulation of 

force which characterized the transition 

from Operation TORCH to the Allied offensives in March, the Allied Force was sparring for advantage with the Fifth Panzer 

Army. Each side sought to improve its positions and to seize the initiative. 

Allied operations from 27 December to 

17 January were essentially for consolidation or improvement of local situations and 

to keep the enemy under pressure. This was 

particularly true of the northern zone, where 

another attempt by the 36th Brigade Group 

on 5-7 January to capture the enemy's 

Djefna position on the road between Djebel 

Abiod and Mateur, at the defile between 

Djebel Adjred (556) and Djebel Azag 

(396), although it came closer to success 

than the effort in the last week of November, again fell short of the objective. Farther 

south, the British 6th Armoured Division 

shifted to the Bou Arada area to keep opposite the 10th Panzer Division, and tried 

unsuccessfully to drive enemy detachments 

from their advanced positions on hills east 

of the road between Bou Arada and Goubellat. On 11-13 January, two attempts to 

take the hills revealed how strongly the enemy had organized these positions, with interlocking bands of machine gun fire, and 

with mortars registered exactly on those targets in defilade from other weapons. Here, 

as at the Djefna position, the enemy's shelters were proof against highly accurate Allied artillery shelling, enabling him to put 

up a strong defense against infantry attacks 

and to prepare counterattacks quickly to 

retake positions briefly occupied by the 

British.' 

The enemy's determination to hold these 

hills may well have been strengthened by 

his intention of shortly making an attack 

through the area as part of a projected operation called OLIVENERNTE. By this 

operation the enemy planned to outflank 

Medjez el Bab from both the north and the 

south. Elements of the 334th Division 

would attack through the mountains to take 

Oued Zarga and thus cut the road from 

Medjez el Bab to Bedja. The 10th Panzer 

Division was to capture Testour and 

Slourhia just below Medjez el Bab on the 

Medjerda river, and the 5th Parachute 

Regiment to take Djebel Rihane (720) and 

guard the south flank along a blocking position due west of the djebe!. Von Arnim ordered this operation and assigned it to Corps 

Fischer after receiving Kesselring's order of 

2 January to capture Medjez el Bab. Execution was postponed for about two weeks 

by continued bad weather and the chronic 

shortage of artillery and transport. Meantime two limited French offensives, 27-30 

December and 12-15 January, gained important positions in the Eastern Dorsal on 

1 Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 
374 

either side of Karachoum gap and Kairouan 

pass, defiles which lead from the Ousseltia 

valley onto the coastal plain and southeastward to Kairouan. (Map 8) Although German reinforcements, sent to bolster the lines 

of the Italian 1st (Superga) Division in this 

sector, were able to check any tendency of 

the French to carry the attack beyond the 

mountains, von Arnim decided on 13 January to eliminate the developing threat to 

this part of the Tunisian bridgehead. Troops 

for such an operation, if the attack was to 

be timely, had to be drawn largely from the 

334th Infantry and 10th Panzer Divisions, 

so that Operation OLIVENERNTE had to 

be abandoned. 2 

An offset to the French success northwest 

of Kairouan was the loss a few days earlier 

of Fondouk el Aouareb gap to a well coordinated attack by superior Axis forces. On 

3 January, a preparatory air strike in two 

waves, a powerful artillery bombardment, 

and a determined tank and infantry assault 

overwhelmed the French defenders with 

the loss of more than 300 men and several 

guns. This assault was made by elements 

of the 47th Grenadier Regiment (reinforced) and the 190th Panzer Battalion. 

Allied air support was credited with knocking out ten enemy tanks in repeated attacks. The enemy gained a stronghold in 

the area of the Fondouk el Aouareb gap. 

The French sought to contain the Axis 

forces at the gap and to prepare for a counterattack with American armor in an effort 

to recover control of this key opening in the 

mountain barrier. 3 

2 MS # T -3 (Nehring et ai.), Pt. 3a. 

" (1) Giraud Hq, Rapport d<'S operations, pp. 

34-35. (2) Gen Mathenet, Rpt of 1 st Moroccan 

Div Opns, 27-30 Dec 42, and Comments by Gen 

Jurion, Deputy Comdr CSTT, in CSTT Jnl, 30 

Dec 42; see also same jnl, 26-30 Dec 42, 11-15 

Jan 43. (3) XIX Corps Jnl, 6-15 Jan 43. (4) 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Headquarters, II Corps, opened in Constantine during the first week of January 

and, as already noted, first prepared to 

direct Operation SATIN, for the seizure of 

Sfax.4 The force under its command, as 

contemplated on 12 January, was to consist 

of the U.S. 1st Armored Division (Maj. 

Gen. Orlando Ward) with the 26th Combat Team (Col. Alexander N. Stark, Jr.) 

of the 1st Infantry Division attached, the 

1st British Parachute Brigade (less one battalion) for an airborne mission, and the 

French Constantine Division, plus corps 

troopS.5 Combat Command B, U.S. 1st 

Armored Division, passed to General Robinett's control with the return of General 

Oliver to the United States to take a divisional command. Combat Command B, 

after commitment under British 5 Corps, 

reverted to General Ward's control on 7 

January and, beginning next day moved to 

Sbeitla for participation in the impending 

French-American attack to regain Fondouk 

el Aouareb gap and perhaps for flank protection during Operation SATIN. 

The remainder of General Ward's division came eastward from Oran to central 

Tunisia in early January, as did the 26th 

Combat Team (less its 3d Battalion, which 

had already come up near the end of N 0-

vember). Mobile antiaircraft protection for 

Journal de Marche de la Division de Marche 

d'Alger (hereafter cited as DMA Jnl), 7-15 Jan 

43. (5) Phone Msg, XIX Corps to G-2 AFHQ, 

1830, 3 Jan 43; Msg, Liaison Officer First Army 

to AFHQ. 4 Jan 43. AFHQ G-3 Ops 22/6, Micro 

Job lOA, Reel 5C. (6) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB 

III, 3 Jan 43 . 

• General Fredendal\'s staff was headed by the 

following: Chief of Staff, Col. John A. Dabney; 

G-I, Lt. Col. Lon H. Smith; G-2, Col. B. A. 

Dickson; G-3, Col. Robert A. Hewitt; and G-4, 

Col. Robert W. Wilson. Other staff officers of 

Center Task Force had been reassigned to AFHQ, 

First Army, or the War Department. 

"Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 12 Jan 43. 
i\.f!IP 8 
376 

the armored division was brought to Tunisia 

from Morocco in two sections: A provisional battalion under Maj. Werner L. Larson in January; and the remainder of the 

443d Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion (SP) 

under Lt. Col. John C. Smith in February. 

Although the multiple weapons on halftracks, each mounting a 37 -mm. gun and 

two air-cooled .SO-caliber machine guns, 

could be used in an antitank role, it was 

possible only by placing the vehicles down 

a forward slope, or with their front wheels 

in a ditch. As antiaircraft weapons, they 

were destined to reduce the losses from 

enemy dive bombing appreciably. 

Ten days' supplies of all types were accumulated at a new II Corps depot in 

Tebessa and at supply points extending eastward as far as Kasserine. A provisional 

ordnance group, assembled from northern 

Tunisia and Algeria, established its principal shops in Tebessa. An evacuation hospital and medical supply depot opened in 

Tebessa. Plans for an attack on Sfax via 

Gabcs were being perfected by General 

Fredendall's staff at the very time when, as 

noted, the higher command felt obliged to 

cancel the undertaking and to direct II 

Corps to "act defensively." G 

The Enemy's Attack, 18-28 .January 

As if to confirm the wisdom of the Allies 

decision to abandon an attack against Sfax, 

the enemy on 18 January began an operation to obtain control over Djebel Mansour 

(678) and over the main source of the water 

supply for Tunis~the great reservoir and 

" (1) II Corps AAR, 2 May 43; 1st Armd Div 

G--3 Rpt 22; 26th Inf AAR. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Wernn 

L. Larson to author, 27 Mar 51, with incl, Hist Rpt 

of 443d CA (AA) Bn (SP). (3) Info supplied by 

Cabinet Office, London. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

dam on the Kebir river (Barrage de l'Oued 

Kebir) about twelve miles southwest of 

Pont-du-Fahs. Another purpose of his attack was to drive the French from the 

Eastern Dorsal near Kairouan between the 

reservoir and Kairouan pass. 

Von Arnim, on 13 and 14 January, withdrew from Corps Group Fischer the Headquarters, 334th Infantry Division with the 

756th Mountain Regiment and two organic 

artillery batteries. From the 10th Panzer 

Division he drew the 2d Battalion, 69th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the 10th Motorcycle Battalion, and the 501 st Heavy 

Panzer Battalion. In addition, he earmarked 

for his attack (EILBOTE I) the entire 

north wing of the 1st (Superga) Division 

(Group Stolz), and elements of the 190th 

Panzer Battalion, and of the 20th Flak Division. To support his main effort, and protect the exposed north flank of the attack, 

von Arnim ordered 10th Panzer Division 

with elements of 5th Parachute Regiment 

and armored Kampfgruppe Burk to execute 

a secondary drive in the direction of Bou 

Arada. He put Friedrich Weber in command. The force temporarily organized for 

the attack was known as Kampfgruppe 

Weber. Its movements were accomplished 

by using Fifth Panzer Army transport at 

night, with the intention of concealing the 

build-up.7 

Colonel Weber organized his attacking 

force in three sections. The first consisted 

of the newly arrived 756th Mountain Regiment. This was reinforced by two armored 

sections, consisting of four Mark VI (Tiger) 

and four Mark III tanks, and engineer, 

artillery, and antiaircraft elements. The 

7 FO, Fifth Panzer Army, 14 Jan 43, in 334th 

Inf Diu, la, Anlagen zum KTB Nr. 1, Unternehmen Eilbote I, 13.-25.1.43 (cited hereafter as 334th 

Inf Diu, la, KTB Anlagen, File Eilbote 1). 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 377 

force thus composed was sent to .open the 

pass southeast of Pont-du-Fahs and to take 

Djebel Mansour. They were to support the 

movement of a second section, Armored 

Croup Lueder) into the Ousseltia valley. 

This armored group consisted of one company of tanks, partly Mark VI Tigers and 

partly Mark IV's, and a battalion of 

armored infantry, with a platoon of engineers and some antiaircraft units. It was 

to push up the Kebir valley to the road fork 

at the southwest end of the reservoir, then 

swing south for about twelve miles to Hir 

Moussa crossroads. After the mountain regiment had closed to the same area, Armored 

Croup Lueder would turn east toward Karachoum gap. The third section of Weber's 

command was a composite German-Italian 

infantry regiment of the 1 st (Superga) Division, consisting of four battalions and reinforced by a company of 190 Panzer Battalion (Kampfgruppe Stolz). It was to exploit by advancing to the west on an axis 

perpendicular to Weber's main effort and 

thus to complete the destruction of the 

French units on the Eastern Dorsal. Stolz 

would then build up a new line seven to 

nine miles farther west, extending from 

Djebel Mansour in the north to the heights 

just west of Hir Moussa. This would constitute the first phase of Operation EILBOTE l.s Finally, the operation might be 

extended southward to secure the better 

Kairouan~Ousseltia road which ran through 

the gap between Djebel HaIfa (572) and 

Djebel Ousselat (887), connecting the 

the valley with the coastal plain at Aln 

Djeloula.9 

, FO, K ampfgruppe Weber, 17 Jan 43, in 3341h 

In! Diu, la, KTB Anlagen, File Eilbote I. 

II (1) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB III, 13-21 Jan 

43. (2) AAR, Kampfgruppe Weber, in 334th In! 

Div, la, KTB Anlagen, File Eilbote I. (3) MS 

t T-3 (Nehring et al.), PL 3a. 

The attacks opened early in the morning 

of 18 January with diversionary thrusts by 

parachute infantry and tanks against the 

extreme south wing of British 5 Corps in the 

vicinity of the Bou Arada crossroads. Although the British parried these attacks successfully, fighting continued in this area 

intermittently during the following week 

without much change in position but with 

considerable losses on both sides. In the 

meantime the first section of vVeber's force 

broke through the French and opened the 

way into the Kebir valley for the armored 

force. Lueder, after lending support to this 

operation, regrouped at 2lO0, then pushed 

ahead to his objective, the roadfork southwest of the reservoir, reaching it by midnight. Kampfgruppe Stolz, meanwhile, 

achieved what the enemy considered satisfactory progress in the subsidiary drive 

across the heights between the reservoir and 

Djebel Chirich (717) .10 

The enemy's intentions were still uncertain on 19 January, for although some of his 

armored forces were observed passing the 

northern edge of D jebel Bargou ( 1216) into 

the Ousseltia valley, a report by air reconnaissance of a movement from the reservoir 

area of an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 truckborne troops made a dual thrust seem possible. By the end of the day the Axis forces 

had almost completed the first phase of their 

operation as planned. With a small but powerful force Armored Croup Lueder blocked 

the road to Rebaa Oulad Yahia near Sidi 

Said. The main force had advanced to Hir 

Moussa crossroads. Col. Stolz's battalions 

had continued to move west and begun to 

relieve the 756th Mountain Regiment on 

" (I) 334th Inf Diu, la, KTB Anlagen, File 

Eilbote I. (2) AAR, 5015t Ii eavy Panzer Bn, in 

Fifth Panzer Army, Anlagen zum KTB III A, 2.-

3l.I.43. 
378 

Djebel Mansour thus freeing these units to 

follow Lueder. All along the front the 

French defenders were driven out. The 

remnants began to regroup northwest of 

Djebel Mansour and on Djebel Bargou. 

One group was isolated on the slopes of the 

Eastern Dorsal in the area of Karachoum 

gap. Neither Rebaa Oulad Yahia nor Ousseltia had more than miniature garrisons 

with meager antitank weapons manned by 

scanty British and American detachments. 

A small reinforcement of armored cars and 

engineers was sent forward by the British 

to Rebaa Oulad Yahia during the night. 

General Juin's appeal for Allied reinforcements, for commitment at a point to be determined after the enemy's hand had been 

more clearly shown, brought orders from 

AFHQ to the U.S. II Corps to divert a suitable force northward for the purpose." 

About 1715,19 January, General Robinett, commanding Combat Command B, 1st 

Armored Division, then in bivouac near 

Sbeitla, was ordered by General Fredendall 

over the telephone: 

Move your command, i. e., the walking 

boys, pop guns, Baker's outfit and the outfit 

which is the reverse of BahT's outfit and the 

big fellows to M, which is due north of where 

you are now, as soon as possible. Have your 

boss report to the French gentleman whose 

name begins with J at a place which begins 

with D which is five grid squares to the left of 

M. Further, CC/B will enter Corps Command net not later than 0900 hours, 20 January. CC/B will remain in contact with 

SATIN Force at Tebessa. 

The tanks, tank destroyers, infantry, and 

artillery, with engineer, medical, service, and 

maintenance companies, in all over 3,400 

men, were on the road after dark and 

11 (I) Giraud Hq, Rapport d~s operations. pp. 

35-37. (2) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

reached a point near Kesra before morning. 

The next day, the force received its mission.l2 

The situation on 20 January caused General Eisenhower's advance command post 

to arrange for co-ordinated resistance to the 

Axis attack by ground units of French, 

American, and British nationality, and by 

Allied air forces. The orders directed British First Army elements to move southeast 

and south toward the Rebaa Oulad Yahia 

valley to cut off and block the enemy's advance there, while Combat Command B, 

U.S. 1st Armored Division, was placed at 

Juin's disposition for operations as a unit in 

either the Rebaa Oulad Yahia or Ousseltia 

valleys as the situation should require. The 

arrangement also specified that General 

Fredendall should assemble an armored 

mobile force comparable to Combat Command B in the Sheitla area, to be used under his command to join the French in an 

attack against Fondouk el Aouareb starting 

on 23 January.'3 

General Juin assigned Robinett's force 

to General Koeltz's XIX Corps for commitment in the Ousseltia valley, to which it was 

ordered to move during the night of 20-21 

January. By 0933, next morning, the force 

'" (I) CCB 1st Armd Div AAR, 19-29 Jan 43, 

12 Feb 43. (2) The components of Combat Command B on 19 January 1943 were: Headquarters 

Company, Reconnaissance Company, Service Company (less detachment), and 2d Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment (mediums); 2d Battalion, 6th 

Armored Infantry Regiment; 27th Field Artillery 

Battalion; 60lst Tank Destroyer Ba'ttalion (less 

Company A) : Company B, 16th Armored Engineer 

Battalion (C); Company N, 47th Medical Battalion: Battery D, 106th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion: and Company C, Main'tcnance Battalion. 1 st 

Armored Division. 

'" (I) Dir, Truscott to Anderson, Juin, and 

Fredendall. 1200. 20 Jan 43. AFHQ G-3 Ops 22/2. 

Micro Job lOA, Reel 5C. (2) II Corps AAR, 2 

May 43. (3) Msg 6436, Algiers to Atlantic Bast' 

Section (SAL), 1752, 20 Jan 43, AFHQ CofS 

Cable Log. 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 379 

was assembled about five miles southwest 

of Ousseltia and engaged in active reconnaissance, with the 601st Tank Destroyer 

Battalion (less Company A) out ahead.14 

The German and Italian forces, which 

had met in the northern part of the Ousseltia valley on 20 January after converging 

on it from the northwest and northeast, had 

already accomplished most of their mission 

before the American reinforcements under 

General Robinett arrived. They had an opportunity, too tempting to resist, to clear 

the eastern mountain chain completely as 

far as Djebel Ousselat southeast of Ousseltia village and to envelop French troops 

caught on the heights by pushing along the 

ridge as well as attacking northwestward 

from the coastal plain. Only a shortage of 

infantry prevented them from mopping up 

the whole area and establishing themselves 

astride the passes. By midnight, 20-21 J anuary, Lueder overran the three lightly held 

Allied roadblocks on the roads leading into 

Ousseltia village, and reached the Ousseltia-Kairouan road about four miles 

northwest of the Kairouan pass. During the 

night only one battalion of the 756th M ountain Regiment, using trucks borrowed from 

other units, was able to reinforce Lueder. 

Nevertheless, the enemy could now block 

access to Kairouan pass from the west. He 

proceeded to destroy the French units, cut 

off on the ridge to the north of Djebel Bou 

Dabouss, assisted by Italian elements attacking from east of the pass.'" 

On the morning Robinett's command 

made its slow and difficult march from the 

Maktar area into the Ousseltia valley, an 

advance group of the British 36th Brigade, 

H CCB 1st Armd Div AAR, 19-29 Jan 43,12 Feb 

43. 

I., 334th In! Div, la, KTB Anlagen, File 

Eilbote I. (2) XIX Corps J nl, 19-21 Jan 43. 

the 5th Battalion, Royal Buffs (5/RB), 

came up the valley of the Siliana river from 

Gafour to Rebaa Oulad Yahia before daylight and took up defensive positions north 

of the village. During the next night, 21-22 

January, the British 36th Brigade, which 

had very recently been relieved after a long 

period in the line northeast of Bed ja, shifted 

to Rebaa Oulad Yahia with the 6th Battalion, Royal West Kents (6/R WK), with 

part of the 12th Battalion, Royal Horse 

Artillery, and with detachments of engineers and light antiaircraft artillery. They 

took over the defense of the valley under 

attachment to the British 6th Armoured Division. The enemy's main effort had by 

then shifted to the Ousseltia valley.w 

General Robinett received orders from 

General Koeltz at 1245, 21 January, to 

counterattack eastward along the OusseltiaKairouan road. He was determined not to 

fritter away strength by piecemeal commitment after an arduous march. His counterattack from Ousseltia toward the western 

entrance of the Kairouan pass began about 

1500, after an air bombing and when 

strong artillery support was ready. It 

progressed steadily until nightfall against 

stiff resistance, but did not dislodge 

Armored Group Lueder from its blocking 

position along the road. At darkness, the 

enemy pulled back into a defensive perimeter. This allowed French troops, previously 

cut off on the heights near the pass, to slip 

southward and escape.'7 

At 1830, 21 January, XIX Corps put 

Robinett's command under the control of 

Gen. Agathon Deligne of the Algiers Divi-

"Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

11 (1) DMA Jnl, pp. 20-21,21 Jan 43. (2) 601st 

TD Bn AAR, 28 Feb 43. (3) Msg 138, Adv CP to 

AFHQ, 21 Jan 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 199. 

(4) XIX Corps Jnl, 21-22 Jan 43. 
380 

sion, units of which had been holding the 

pass under enemy attack. General Deligne 

at 0435, 22 January, in conformity with 

Allied plans, directed Robinett to abandon 

the counterattack, to adopt defensive 

measures toward the east, and to drive 

northward to a point of junction with 

British forces at the northeastern end of 

Djebel Bargou. Combat Command B's ammunition and supply train failed to get 

through during the night, so that a dawn 

attack could not be made. The enemy for 

his part was weakened by a breakdown of 

radio communications and by the fact that 

the direct road between Lueder's force and 

the 756th M oltntain Regiment was temporarily cut at Hir Moussa by fire from the 

6th Battalion, Royal West Kents. The reinforced 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, began a thrust northeastward up the 

Ousseltia valley at 1430, 22 January only to 

be stopped soon by stiff resistance.'s 

Late that day, II Corps asked Robinett 

what reinforcements, if any, he would need 

to carry out the mission given him by General Deligne. In reply he gave his estimate 

of the forces opposing his command-one 

battalion of infantry, two companies of 

tanks, four 88-mm. guns, and three or four 

batteries of howitzers of at least 105-mm.-

against which he had disposed one battalion 

of armored infantry, one battalion of thirty 

operational medium tanks, nine self-propelled and six towed 105-mm. howitzers, 

twelve 75-mm. tank destroyers, and a battery of 40-mm. antiaircraft weapons. The 

enemy had succeeded in placing his artillery 

on high ground along the eastern edge of the 

is (1) 3341h In! Diu. la, KTB Anlagen, File Eilbole I. (2) CCB 1st Armd Div AAR, 19-29 Jan 43, 

12 Feb 43 : Chronological Sequence of Events in the 

Oussdtia Valley Campaign, 10 Feb 43, in 1st Armd 

Div Hist Reds, Vol II. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

valley. Robinett therefore reported that any 

attack whatever northward over the floor 

of the valley would be unduly hazardous 

until infantry could engage the enemy in the 

eastern hills and prevent the flanking fire 

which might otherwise be expected. To clear 

the valley, he estimated necessary reinforcements as two battalions of infantry, one battalion of field artillery, and one company of 

tank destroyers, as well as indirect assistance 

from an anticipated strong push from the 

west into the valley by British units. 

Elements of the 1st Infantry Division 

were already being sent from Guelma in 

Algeria via Maktar to the Ousseltia valley 

sector in order to take over part of the Allied 

line formerly held by the French, after 

Combat Command B should have restored 

the situation. General Fredendall expected, 

in the light of decisions taken at a command 

conference at AFHQ Advance Command 

Post on 21 January, that his zone was to be 

extended northward and that these troops 

would be controlled by II Corps. He expected to command them directly, and to 

have them operate under Col. D' Alary 

F echet, regimental commander of the 16th 

Infantry, in co-ordination with Robinett's 

forces rather than under Robinett's command, while the latter was withdrawing. 

Fredendall instructed Robinett to discontinue his attack northward, the operation 

which General Deligne had ordered, and 

instead to hold Combat Command B near 

Ousseltia village on the defensive. Robinett's command was still attached to French 

XIX Corps and under orders by General 

Deligne to carry out the offensive, orders he 

was unable to execute without the reinforcements which, upon arrival would be operating, as just stated, only in co-ordination with 

Combat Comand B, rather than under attachment to it. While Lt. Col. Russell F. 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 381 

Akers, Jr., an Assistant G-3 of II Corps, 

attempted to straighten out this tangle, 

Robinett's force held its positions. 

As the night of 22-23 January passed, 

persistent efforts to get Allied aviation to 

furnish a controlled air support mission next 

day finally proved successful. The request 

was approved about 1000, 23 January, for 

execution at 1230. When the planes arrived, 

one smoke shell was placed on the target, 

which then came under accurate bombing. 

Damage included the destruction of two 

enemy trucks loaded with ammunition. 

During the bombing and a subsequent artillery shelling, a truckload of American 

prisoners of war was able to scatter, and 

later to infiltrate back to their own lines 

after darkness. But with its mission and 

command relations uncertain, Combat 

Command B lost the opportunity to follow 

up with an attack to seize the area. 

The first elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry 

Division began arriving before the end of 

the day, too late to organize an attack for 

24 January. They were attached by II 

Corps to Combat Command B. The principal unit for commitment toward Kairouan 

pass was the 26th Infantry Combat Team 

(less 3d Battalion) commanded by Colonel 

Stark, which included the 33d Field Artillery Battalion. The 7th Field Artillery 

Battalion also supported an attack begun 

by Colonel Stark's force at 0900, 25 J anuary. By that time, Weber's force started its 

withdrawal, leaving the newly established 

main line of resistance across the northern 

end of the Ousseltia valley and along the 

eastern edge to Djebel Ousselat to be defended by an Italian force consisting of elements of the 1st (Superga) Division and 

Group Benigni. Stark's attack first encountered about noon a battalion of Italian 

infantry which had been recruited in Tunisia, drove it back, and continued advancing 

through the following night. By the next 

morning, it had gained the western end of 

the Ousseltia-Kairouan pass and had 

come up against a German unit. Its offensive continued during the next two days. 

Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, after assisting these infantry operations 

to a successful outcome at the pass, and after 

more uncertainty about its mission, received 

orders from General Koeltz in person to 

move north on 27 January to clear the enemy from the valley. At 1530, this attack 

began, and moved smoothly along the western edge of the valley at the base of Djebel 

Serd j (1357). During the following night, 

the 1 st Battalion, 16th Infantry, and 7 th 

Field Artillery Battalion moved under 

armored escort to the northern end of Djebel 

Serdj. The enemy had stepped up his air 

attacks in the valley beginning on 25 J anuary, but the Allied hold on the southern and 

western portions was not otherwise contested, and Stark's progress at the pass 

promised eventual control not only over its 

western exit but along its entire length. 

Combat Command B and the 26th Combat 

Team (less 2d and 3d Battalions) were 

needed elsewhere, however, so that both 

were withdrawn from the valley during the 

night of 28-29 January. While Robinett's 

force made a long road march to Bou 

Chebka, Stark's shifted to the vicinity of 

Sbeitia, where it joined Combat Command 

A, 1st Armored Division.lD 

Before these two forces left, the U.S. 1st 

Infantry Division (General Allen) with 

l\' (1) CCB, 1st Armd Div AAR, 19-29 Jan 43; 

Chronological Sequence of Events in Ousseltia Valiey Campaign, 10 Feb 43, in 1st Armd Div, Hist 

Reds, Vol. II. (2) XIX Corps, Jnl, 23-27 Jan 43. 

(3) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (4) 

601st TD Bn AAR, 28 Feb 43; 26th Inf AAR, 25-

28 Jan 43,23 Apr 43. 
382 

headquarters in Maktar temporarily assumed defense of the Allied line running 

along the Ousseltia valley and southeast 

toward Pichon. Colonel Fechet's 16th Combat Team was to be on the north and Brig. 

Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.'s, mixed command of American and French units, on the 

south. The French units were to be relieved 

as rapidly as possible by the 18th Combat 

Team (Colonel Greer) and a combat team 

from the U.S. 34th Infantry Division: Eventually the 34th Division was expected to 

relieve all 1st Infantry Division units and 

thus permit their consolidation in British 

First Army reserve. It was during an early 

stage in these preparations that Combat 

Command B and 26th Combat Team (less 

2d and 3d Battalions) returned to II Corps 

control from that of General Koeltz. Their 

battle in the Ousseltia valley was ended. 

Robinett's command had lost 5 killed, 54 

wounded, and 25 missing, had captured 11 

Germans and 28 Italians, and had killed an 

estimated 205 of the enemy. It claimed to 

have destroyed six Mark III and three Mark 

IV tanks, eight 88-mm. guns, one mortar, 

four 20-mm. guns, and two enemy aircraft. 

The 26th Infantry (less 3d Battalion) had 

lost 7 killed, 47 wounded, and 64 missing, 

while taking 211 prisoners. 2o 

The enemy had dealt a hard blow, especially to the French, one battalion being 

reduced to only 196 men. His prisoners totaled 3,449. Material captured or destroyed, 

as reported, included 87 machine guns, 16 

antitank guns, 36 artillery pieces, 21 tanks, 

4 armored reconnaissance cars, 4 self-pro-

" (I) Msg N22/29, Adv CP AFHQ to AFHQ, 

30 Jan 43, AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 272. (2) Ltr, 

Cm Alkn to CinC AF, 7 Feb 43. AFHQ C-3 Ops 

22/2, Micro Job IDA, Reel 5C. (3) 3d Bn 16th Inf 

Battle Rpt, 8 Mar 43; CCB 1st Armd Div AAR, 

19-29 Jan 43, 12 Feb 43. (4) XIX Corps Jul, 24 

Jan 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

pelled gun carriages, more than 200 other 

vehicles, and over 300 horses. Allied aviation and artillery had inflicted considerable 

damage on the enemy, but control of the 

passes west of Kairouan was worth this price 

to the Fifth Panzer Army.21 

At the tactical level, the battIe in the 

Ousseltia valley yielded some valuable lessons to the Allies. The enemy was discovered 

to have an unexpectedly defensive attitude, 

for he twice abandoned strongly held positions under cover of darkness without waiting for the Americans to press their attack 

home, leaving at least ten mobile artillery 

pieces. The morale of the Italian troops was 

found to be low; among the prisoners taken 

were a conscripted Pole, a Yugoslav, and 

several Austrians. Among the probable 

causes for this low morale was a failure of 

supply, many units going without rations for 

a long period. Another probable cause was 

the fact that Axis air support was not as 

strong or as co-ordinated with ground operations as it had been near Tebourba, while 

at the same time the Allied air effort was 

noticeably greater. 22 By standing up to the 

attacking force and refraining from a premature attack or ill-advised armored lunges, 

Combat Command B had been able to avoid 

enemy traps and to retain its ability to strike 

back at a favorable time. Because of the termination of its commitment, and that of 

Colonel Stark's Combat Team on 28 January, Combat Command B lost the opportunity of regaining the passes through the 

Eastern Dorsal before the enemy could become solidly established astride them. The 

French had fought ably, but they were handicapped by the lack of heavy weapons and 

means of communication. From now on it 

"' 334th In! Diu, la, KTB Anla,;en, File Eilbote I. 

"CCB 1st Armd Div Intel! Rpt, 21-28 Jan 43. 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 383 

would be necessary to reinforce their sector 

with U.S. and British units until their equipment could be brought up to modern 

standards. 

Changes in Allied Field Command 

The enemy's attack from Pont-du-Fahs 

to Ousseltia in the week following 18 J anuary had far-reaching consequences. It did 

not, as was once supposed, cause the cancellation of Operation SATIN, for as already 

pointed out, that decision had been made 

by General Eisenhower at Casablanca."3 But 

it did bring an end, after less than four 

weeks, to the period of national commands 

by the British First Army, American II 

Corps, and French XIX Corps, each directly under General Eisenhower. 

The enemy's attack had been well aimed. 

Striking first between British 5 Corps and 

the French, it forced the two Allied forces to 

attempt the difficult task of co-ordination 

across their boundaries and, as just shown, 

even involved American II Corps in remedial measures. General Eisenhower discovered that to control the entire Allied line 

through his advanced command post would 

not be practicable. On 21 January he flew 

with General Spaatz and Brig. Gen. Lauence S. Kuter to Constantine, met Generals 

Anderson, Fredendall, Truscott, Cannon, 

and J uin, and transferred to Anderson responsibility for co-ordinating operations in 

the three national sectors. General Juin accepted the new situation and General Giraud made no objection."' 

Unified air support along the broad Tu-

"II Corps AAR, 3 May 43. 

,. (I) CinC AF Diary, 21 Jan 43. (2) Eis('nhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 127. (3) Msg 6436, 

AFHQ to Atlantic Base S('ction (SAL), 1752, 20 

Jan 43, AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 

LT. GEN. K. A. N. ANDERSON 

leaving the command post oj Gen. Louis 

Koelt;:;, Tunisia. 

nisian front had proved to be as essential as 

a single command over the ground forces. 

During the early part of January, the XII 

Air Support Command had declined requests to send units over the area for which 

Royal Air Force 242d Group held responsibility. The impending operations by II 

Corps required that its resources for air support be carefully husbanded. In close sequence, Operation SATIN was canceled; 

Brig. Gen. Howard A. Craig, commanding 

XII Air Support Command, became ill and 

was relieved by Col. Paul L. Williams; 

American air support was furnished over 

the Ousseltia valley to stranded troops on the 

heights and to Combat Command B, U.S. 

1 st Armored Division; and General Kuter 

was installed in command of an Allied air 

support command, charged with controlling 
384 

Allied operations until the Northwest African Tactical Air Force under Air ViceMarshal Sir Arthur Coningham should 

come into being.25 

It became clear after about four days 

more that simple co-ordination of forces 

was insufficient; the situation req uired 

command. General Anderson could not 

maintain the pace which had already taken 

him over more than 1,000 miles of Tunisian 

roads in order to confer with independent 

commanders and guide them toward decisions conforming to a general plan of 

action. \Vhen Generals Eisenhower and 

Anderson met at Telergma airfield, southwest of Constantine, on 24 January, the 

next step toward improvement of the command situation had to be taken. The same 

motives which had induced the commander 

in chief to transfer Combat Command B, 

U.S. 1st Armored Division, from SATIN 

Force to French XIX Corps on 20 January 

now caused him, four days later, to make 

Anderson "responsible for the employment 

of American troops" in accordance with 

general directions from AFHQ. The II 

Corps was attached to First Army. General 

J uin was urged to take parallel action for 

French troops, whose sector was to be narrowed materially. Following a long conference with General Anderson that evening, 

General J uin yielded, effective 3 February, 

acting in this vital matter on his own responsibility since General Giraud was attending the conference at Casablanca. 26 

General Eisenhower's directive to General 

Anderson followed at once: 

" Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

" (1) Despatch, Lt Gen K. A. N. Anderson, p. 8. 

OCMH. (2) Memo, Deputy CofS AFHQ (Truscott), for CC's of First Army, II Corps, and 1st 

Inf Div, 24 Jan 43, sub: Attachment of Amer 

troops to Br. First Army. AFHQ Micro Job lOA, 

Reel 5C. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

The object of your current operations must 

be: 

a. To re-establish your central forces on the 

general line: FONDOUK [el AouarebJeastern exit of the pass cast of OUSSEL TIAthe terrain feature DJ BOU DABOUSS 

(0-85) -road junction 7 miles northeast 

of ROBAA [Rebaa Oulad YahiaJ-BOU 

ARADA. 

b. As soon as you have accomplished a, to 

seize and hold the eastern exits of the passes 

along the general line: EL GUETT ARMAKNASSY -F AID-FONDOUK. 

c. To protect your right (south) flank with 

particular attention to the air bases in the 

TERESSA area. In this connection, I deem 

it essential that you keep the bulk of the 1st 

Armored Division well concentrated, so as to 

be prepared to take advantage of any opportunity the enemy may offer to act aggressively 

as well as to counter strongly any enemy thrust 

that may develop. 

The command arrangements arrived at by 

you in conferences with General J uin to meet 

the situation resulting from the enemy breakthrough in the area of the DORSALE ridge 

arc confirmed. Under these arrangements 

you are given command of all Allied forces on 

the TUNISIAN front, including, in addition 

to the troops presently assigned to the First 

Army, the II Corps (U.S.), and a Composite 

Corps (French and U.S.). The Composite 

Corps will consist ultimately of the 34th Division (less detachments) and certain French 

elements now in the OUSSEL TIA area, all 

under a French corps commander. 

I know that you will be fully sympathetic 

with the efforts of General Juin to conserve 

the French forces and uphold the honor of 

France, and that you will always welcome him 

at your headquarters and at the front, and 

afford him every facility which will contribute 

to that end. 

The regroupment of your forces incident to 

the above will envisage the relief of all elements of the 1st Division (U.S.) and their 

movement to an assembly area in the vicinity 

of GUELMA, where it will later pass to your 

control prior to the attack. To this end, it is 

contemplated that the 168th CT (U.S.) will 

be made available to you for the relief of the 

26th RCT (U.S.). 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 385 

You are to bear in mind always that all 

operations now to be undertaken are for the 

purpose of facilitating the launching of a 

powerful coordinated attack as soon as the 

weather will permit and the necessary forces 

and supplies can be assembled in position. In 

this latter interest we must look well to the 

security of lines of communication and to increasing by every possible means the daily delivery of supplies in the forward area. 

For your information, the Allied Air Force 

is being directed to continue to pound Rommel's line of retreat including his critical ports 

so as to hamper to the utmost his withdrawal. 

General Giraud has been shown this directive and has concurred in it.e1 

The AFHQ orders of 20 January prescribing the transfer to French command of 

Combat Command B, 1 st Armored Division (see page 378 above), had also contained instructions to General Fredendall to 

assemble in the Sbei"tia area an armored 

force of comparable strength. But a French 

attack in the Pichon-Fondouk el Aouareb 

sector starting 23 January, which this U.S. 

armored unit was to have reinforced, had to 

be abandoned. eR 

After II Corps had been attached to it, 

First Army directed General Fredendall to 

assume command of the ground troops of all 

three nationalities operating south of a line 

running through Morsott-Thala-Sbiba (all 

exclusive), Djebel Trozza (997)-Fondouk 

el Aouareb (all inclusive), and north of a 

line from the salt marshes to Gabes."" (See 

27 Ltr, Eisenhower to Anderson, 26 Jan 43, 

AFHQ G-3 Ops 58/2.1, Micro Job IOC, Reel 

188D. (Italics supplied by author.) 

"II Corps AAR, 2 May 43. 

29 (1) First Army Opns Instruc 11, 26 Jan 43. 

DRB AGO. (2) Fredcndall and Juin agreed that 

Fondouk cl Aouareb should be within II Corps' area 

in a conference at Tebessa on 27 January 1943, 

reported via AFCP to AFHQ and First Army in 

Msg 94/27, 28 Jan 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 

p.257. 

Map V.) The mISSIOn of II Corps was 

limited to protecting the right flank of the 

Allied forces in Tunisia. The French were 

to be largely withdrawn for rest and rearming, and prepared for the new command 

arrangements to become effective on 3 

February.3o 

The decision to withdraw the majority of 

the French forces from forward areas required a modification of the mission assigned 

to General Anderson in the commander in 

chief's directive of 26 January. As altered, it 

was: 

a. To protect the airfields at SOUK EL 

KHEMIS, TEBESSA, and THELEPTE 

... so that our air forces may operate continuously from them; and to secure the defiles 

at MEDJEZ EL BAB and BOU ARADA 

which First Army will require when, in conjunction with Eighth Army, the offensive 

against the enemy in Tunisia begins. 

b. Without prejudice to the role in a 

above: 

(1) to secure the defiles at present held 

by the enemy which will improve our position 

when the offensive begins. 

(2) to interfere with the enemy's lines of 

communication in the coastal plain. 

In undertaking minor offensive operations, you are to consider the effect upon 

morale of costly failures. Sufficient means 

should be assembled to give reasonable assurances of success. 

The revised directive continued with the 

following admonition: 

In the execution of the above rl1lSSlOn, I 

deem it essential that your mobile striking 

forces in the south be held well concentrated 

so as to strike en masse when the need arises. 

I realize that it will not be possible for you 

", (I) Giraud Hq, Rapport des operations, p. 39. 

(2) First Army Opns Instruc 11,26 Jan 43. DRB 

AGO. 
386 

to withdraw the 1st Division (U.S.) into r('-

serve in the vicinity of GUELMA.'" 

If the dispersion of the 1st Armored Division did not disturb the commander in chief 

because of its adverse effect on Operation 

SATIN, it was objectionable because of the 

fundamental need of covering the south 

flank. He wished the division concentrated 

as soon as possible, and repeatedly made his 

desires known to General Anderson.32 

The Enemy's Next Aloues 

In the struggle for the advantages of position and initiative prior to 29 January 1943, 

the enemy had gained the larger measure 

of success. In northern Tunisia, he retained 

his positions guarding the routes to Bizerte 

and Tunis. Farther south, he controlled all 

the important passes giving access to the 

coastal plain in the vicinity of Kairouan. 

His thrust from the north into the Ousseltia 

valley had forestalled an Allied operation to 

recover the gap at Fondouk el Aouareb. To 

protect the line of communications along 

the coast from Tunis toward Tripoli, which 

had just become the only source of supplies 

for Rommel's army approaching the Mareth 

Position, the enemy next planned to take 

control of the routes by which the Allies in 

central Tunisia could attempt a disrupting 

attack and subsequently destroy the Ameri31 (I) Ltr, Eisenhower to Anderson, II Feb 43. 

AFHQ C-3 Ops 58/2.1, Micro Job 10C, Reel 

188D. (2) In addition to Combat Team 18 

(strength approximately 4,500), First Army had 

under command 62,456 British officers and enlisted 

men on 27 January 1943. Q (Maint) Tab Rpt of 

Admin Sitrep 10, 1800, 27 Jan 4:1. AFHQ CofS 

Cable Log. 

"Memo, Brig J. F. M. Whiteley for Gen Rooks, 

22 Jan 43; Memo, Rooks to Whiteley, 22 Jan 43: 

Ltr, CinC AF to CG First Army, 26 Jan 43; Mins 

of Conf, I Feb 43. AFHQ G-3 Ops 58/2.1, Micro 

Job 10C, Re,-1188D. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

can forces in the Tebessa area. To facilitate 

this task Comando Supremo on 28 January 

ordered the Fifth Panzer Army to take offensive action at three points-the Rebaa 

Oulad Yahia valley, the pass through the 

Eastern Dorsal at Fai'd, and the road center 

and oasis of Gafsa." Preparations for an attack at Fai'd pass were already far advanced. 

II Corps Plans 

Ten days earlier U.S. II Corps had devised its own program in the light of its new 

directive to act defensively. If an active 

defense like that of the enemy was not authorized, the problem for II Corps was to 

determine what ground it needed to hold in 

order to protect the southern flank of British First Army. The main corps supply base 

at Tebessa and a growing airbase at Thelepte were the only installations of consequence in the corps area which required 

protection. Everything else existed for the 

purpose of supporting Allied forces holding 

Fai'd pass and Gafsa, on the one hand, and 

covering the pass at Fondouk el Aouareb 

on the other. Mere possession of a pass by 

one side offered a threat to the other. The 

French were convinced that both F aid pass 

and the oasis of Gafsa should be defended 

strongly. The II Corps could employ elements of the 1st Armored Division (reinforced) to strengthen the garrisons at those 

two points, or it might attempt to take Fondo uk el Aouareb, Maknassy, or other places 

from the enemy, or it might hold the division well concentrated and in readiness to 

fend off any hostile intrusion and to threaten 

retaliatory action. The last course, although 

'" Msg, Cavallero, Coman do Supremo (Nr. 027/ 

OP/A) to Fifth Panzer Army, 1830,28 Jan 43, in 

Fifth Panzer Army, KTB, Anlagen, g. Kdos. (Chefsachen), 16.I.-26.II.43, Tunesien. 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 387 

specifically ordered by General Eisenhower, 

was postponed until after all elements of 

the 1st Armored Division had had a taste of 

combat. 

General Fredendall's first plan of action 

preceded the summons to send Combat 

Command B, 1 st Armored Division, to the 

support of French XIX Corps in the Ousseltia valley. It provided for four simultaneous 

assaults against different objectives, to begin on 22 January. One attack would be 

launched from the vicinity of Hadjeb el 

Aioun, in conjunction with General Koeltz's 

command, to recapture Fondouk el 

Aouareb from the enemy. The other three 

operations were all to be based in the Gafsa 

area, about 100 miles airline from F ondouk 

el Aouareb, and to be directed against 

Maknassy, El Guettar defile, and Bir 

Mrabott, respectively.34 Mountains and 

substantial distances would separate each of 

the three forces engaged in these operations. 

The overly ambitious project was suspended 

when Combat Command B, 1st Armored 

Division, shifted to Maktar en route to 

Ousseltia. 85 

The attacks on El Guettar defile and Bir 

Mrabott were dropped but Combat Command A, 15t Armored Division (Brig. Gen. 

Raymond E. McQuillin) , was sent to 

Sbeitla to take over the mission which Combat Command B had been fulfilling there, 

while the seizure of Maknassy remained on 

the agenda for early execution. To carry out 

that attack, General Ward improvised a 

Combat Command C, 1st Armored Division, under control of a headquarters consisting chiefly of the staff of the 6th Armored 

Infantry Regiment (Col. Robert I. Stack). 

'" Bir Mrabott is about 20 miles southeast of 

Gafsa on the Gabes road. 

"II Corps FO I, 19 Jan 43. (2) II Corps AAR, 

3 May 43. 

Before sending this force against Maknassy, 

and despite the objection of Generals Ward 

and Welvert that the prospective attack 

there would thus be revealed, General 

Fredendall sent elements of Combat Command C in a hit-and-run raid on Station de 

Sened. It occurred on the night of 24-25 

January 1943.36 

The raiding force, protected by Allied air 

cover, left Gafsa at about 0400, 24 January. 

Company C, 81 st Reconnaissance Battalion, 

took up a position east of Station de Sened 

from which it could stop any reinforcements 

coming from Maknas5Y. Battery B, 68th 

Field Artillery Battalion, opened fire about 

1115 from positions west of the objective. 

At noon, Company I, 6th Armored Infantry, with one mortar platoon jabbed 

from the west while the tanks of Company I, 

13th Armored Regiment, and the remaining 

infantry swung around the right flank and 

struck Station de Sened from the south. The 

tanks overran some antitank guns at the 

southern edge and continued among the few 

houses and the olive trees, while infantry 

followed mopping up. In a little more than 

three hours from the opening artillery concentration to the last, the place had been 

overwhelmed and Combat Command C 

could reorganize for the return march. By 

1800, it was back in bivouac near Gafsa. 

Two men wounded, one tank damaged by 

a mine and another by gunfire, were the 

36 Combat Command C for this engagement consisted of: the 6th Armored Infantry (less the 1st 

and 2d Battalions and Company G) ; Company C 

(plus one platoon of Company D), 81st RC'connaissa nee Battalion; Company I, 13th Armored Regiment; Battery B, 68th Field Artillery Battalion; the 

3d Platoon of Company D, 16th Engineer Battalion; the 2d Platoon of Battery B, 443d Coast 

Artillery (AA) Battalion (SP); and detachments 

of the 141st Signal Company and 47th Medical 

Battalion. See 1st Armd Div Opns Instruc I, 23 

Jan 43. 
388 

only American casualties. Prisoners totaled 

ninety-six, with the killed and wounded estimated to be about the same number. For 

the American troops, it had been principally 

a morale-building exercise. They were better prepared for the next operation. For the 

enemy, it was a distraction, luring reinforcements to Station de Sened and drawing increasing air activity toward the Gafsa area.s

, 

General Fredendall faced an immediate 

choice between occupying Maknassy and 

the pass just east of it or strengthening the 

Allied hold on Fald pass, as General Giraud 

and General Juin desired. Either operation 

would be undertaken in the face of known 

enemy preparations for an offensive toward 

Ttbessa or Gafsa. The 1st Armored Division had been considering operations against 

Maknassy since early January. Fredendall's decision was to seize Maknassy, on 

the ground that such action would effectively protect Faid pass and would inflict 

direct damage on the enemy:18 

Maknassy, it will be recalled, is in the 

southeastern corner of central Tunisia on a 

plain where the Eastern Dorsal bends to the 

southwest toward Gafsa. The fertile, irrigated olive orchards close to the village are 

in turn surrounded by undulating stretches 

of bunch grass and cactus which stretch not 

only to steep hills on the east and south but 

to a screening arch of hills and ridges on the 

west and north, a barrier which projects 

from the Eastern Dorsal. A narrow-gauge 

railroad and highway enter the ~hknassy 

plain at the southwestern corner through 

an opening at Station de Sened and continue east through a defile between low hills. 

Entry from the north is made via a pass 

between Djebel Maizila (522) and Djebel 

"6th Armd lnf AAR, 23 Jan-26 Feb 4:1, 

", Rpt of Conf, Frcdendall and Juin, 

Tebessa, 27 Jan 43, AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 252, 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Gouleb (736) through which runs a road 

from Sidi Bou Zid. ( Map 9) 

The plan for the attack on Maknassy 

would send two forces against the objective 

in simultaneous assaults, one approaching 

from the direction of Malzila pass and the 

other by way of Station de Sened. At the 

same time, in reserve, a third element of the 

18t Armored Division would be near SbeItla. 

For the Maknassy attack, scheduled for 1 

February, Colonel Stack's Combat Command C was to march on the previous day 

from Gafsa along the northern side of the 

screening hills to enter the plain via Maizila 

pass, while on the same day, a temporary 

Combat Command D under CoL Robert V. 

Maraist moved from the Bou Chebka area 

through F eriana and Gafsa against Station 

de Sened, and thereafter eastward along 

the route of the railroad to Maknassy.3li 

The Enemy Attacks Fa'id Pass 

Before this attack on Maknassy could 

begin, the enemy launched an attack of his 

own against Fald pass, committing the 21 st 

Panzer Division, directly under Fifth Panzer Arm)' control, aided by elements from 

the Italian 50th Special Brigade (General 

Imperiali) and by army troops. The mission 

was to control the pass, to install security 

detachments on the chain of mountains 

from north of Faid pass to Sened village, 

and to reconnoiter halfway to Sbeltla. At 

the conclusion of the operation, the attacking force was expected to withdraw all but 

strong security detachments. These detachments, with others from Brigade Imperiali. 

would occupy key points in the Eastern 

Dorsal. Italians would hold the area of 

Station de Sened, blocking the narrow plain 

3' 1st Arrnd Div FO ~, 30 Jan 43. 
l 

) 

;lfAP 9 
390 

there and maintaining liaison with Division 

Centauro east of Gafsa, at a pass between 

Sened village and Sakket!O 

Faid pass is a broad opening between 

Djebel Sidi Khalif (705) on the north and 

Djebel Bou Dzer (473) on the south through 

which ran the main tarmac highway from 

Sfax to Sbeitla, and beyond. There were 

two other gaps in the Eastern Dorsal, which 

were crossed by inferior roads or trails. The 

first, about six miles north of Faid pass, near 

Sidi Khalif, the other just south of Djebel 

Bou Dzer at Ain Rebaou. A detachment of 

about 1,000 men from General \Velvert's 

Constantine Division defended these passes 

under command of Brigadier General 

Schwartz. An attacking force, immediately 

after passing through Faid defile on an approach from the coastal plain, would find, 

one mile to the southwest, the village of 

Fald, a small collection of block-shaped, 

white masonry houses. The road forked at 

this village, the main road leading seven 

miles straight across the level plain to Poste 

de Lessouda while a secondary road ran 

west-southwest for eight miles to Sidi Bou 

Zid. Just to the north of Poste de Lessouda 

is the isolated hill mass of Djebel Lessouda 

(644) a bold butte with excellent observation over the wide stretches of plain which 

encircle it. Well to the southwest are a series 

of similar hills of which Djebel Ksaira 

(560), near Ain Rebaou pass, and Djebel 

Garet Hadid (620), west of Djebel Ksalra, 

are prominent. Sidi Bou Zid's dark evergreens and gleaming white low buildings 

are about five miles south of Djebel Lessouda and four miles north-northwest of 

Djebcl Garet Hadid. Geometric patterns of 

cultivated fields and orchards are adjacent 

'" 21st Panzer Diu, la, KTB-Anlagen, Nr. 9, 

l.I.-31.IIl.43, Afrika, (cited hereafter as 21st 

Panzer Diu, KTB Anlagen, Band 9). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

to bright stuccoed buildings. Elsewhere are 

the irregular extensive fields of cactus and 

thin grass which grow generally without the 

benefit of irrigation. Here was the area in 

which the U.S. II Corps was to meet its first 

true challenge. 

The 21st Panzer Division, commanded 

by Colonel Hans Georg Hildebrandt, organized for the attack in two major groups, 

Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer and Kampfgruppe 

Gruen. Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer was further 

subdivided into northern, central, and southern task forces. The small northern task 

force was to assume protection of the north 

flank and to hold Sidi Khalif pass. This comprised the 2d Tunis Battalion (-) reinforced by Italian elements. The center 

group, directly commanded by Major Pfeiffer, was to attack Faid pass from the east, 

using the 3d Battalion, 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (reinforced). One company 

of infantry from the 2d Tunis Battalion 

would climb Hill 644 at the southern end of 

Djebel Sidi Khalif to strike the defenders of 

Faid pass from the northern flank at the 

same time that the attack from the east began. The somewhat weaker southern task 

force consisting of the 1st Battalion, 104th 

Pan,:er Grenadier Regiment (reinforced) 

was expected to seize and block Ain Rebaou 

pass and protect the southern flank against 

the French on Djebel Ksaira. To the south, 

nearer Maknassy, Kampfgruppe Gruen 

(I st Battalion, 5th Panzer Regiment, reinforced) was to make a longer encircling 

march through Malzila pass. This maneuver would enable it to attack the French garrison at Faid village from the rear and 

thence to join in seizing the pass. Kampfp,rup/Je Gruen would be preceded by the 

580th Reconnaissance Battalion as far as a 

supporting position west of Djebel Boudinar 

(716). It was then to reconnoiter as far as 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 391 

Bir el Hafey. A division reserve was held 

near the Sfax-Fald road!' 

The attack began early on 30 January. 

The northern and southern task forces 

(Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer) attained their objectives readily, but the center task force 

and Kampfgruppe Gruen were held up for 

five hours. They finally forced a stubbornly 

intervening French force back into Sidi Bou 

Zid and, after another one and one-half 

hour's fighting, captured Fald village. It 

was then midafrernoon, Kampfgruppe 

Gruen drove off an American armored 

force that approached from the northwest, 

after which the German tanks continued toward the pass in an effort to envelop the defenders. Mines knocked out four tanks and 

the effort was postponed at nightfall. By that 

time they had made contact with the company of the 2d Tunis Battalion and sealed 

off the pass on the west. At the eastern end 

of the pass, Major Pfeiffer's center task force 

was twice stopped short; under cover of 

darkness, it got only 200 yards into the 

opening before being held up again. The 

French kept the area illuminated by parachute flares, forestalling night movement up 

the slopes by Axis troops to positions from 

which to aid a renewed attack in the 

morning. Thus during the night of 30 J anuary the French defenders were surrounded 

but the Germans were far from holding Fald 

pass. 42 

The American reconnoitering force which 

had approached Fald from the northwest 

during the late afternoon was a small portion 

of General McQuillin's Combat Command 

A, U.S. 1st Armored Division, from Sbei:tla. 

McQuillin had been directed to help regain 

41 21 st Panzer Diu, FO for the capture of the Faid 

strongpoint, 26 Jan 43, ibid. 

., 21st Panzer Diu, KTB, 1.I.-31.III.43, 30 Jan 

43. 

control of the pass. 43 In spite of early and repeated requests from the French, these first 

American reinforcements had been unable 

to travel the distance of more than thirty 

miles in time to intervene before the loss of 

Fald village or the encirclement of Fald pass. 

Allied air action also had been too weak to 

deter the enemy's advance. The II Corps' 

orders, received about 0930, 30 January, 

had prescribed that Combat Command A 

was to counterattack in order to restore the 

French positions at Fald, but without reducing the covering force operating northeast of 

Sbei:tla or materially weakening the defense 

of Sbcltla. At about 1000 General McQuillin dispatched a reconnaissance company to 

reconnoiter the Djebel Lessouda-Fald area. 

Shortly thereafter he sent a group consisting 

of a company of tanks, a company of armored infantry, and an artillery battery, 

southward to Sidi Bou Zid ordering them to 

advance along a secondary route via Bir el 

Hafey. This reconnaissance company reported by 1400 that the enemy was holding 

the sector from Rebaou pass to Fald village 

with infantry and tanks. Meantime enemy 

air intercepted American efforts to reinforce 

the advanced groups during daylight. At 

1430, therefore, McQuillin decided to postpone his counterattack until early on 31 

January. Dividing his command, he ordered 

a northern group to assemble in the vicinity 

of Poste de Lessouda, and a southern group 

'" 1st Armd Div FO 4, 30 Jan 43. Troops available to Combat Command A were: the" I st Armored 

Regiment (less the 1st and 2d Battalions) ; the 1st 

Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry; the 26th Infantry 

(Jess Company C and 2d and 3d Battalions); the 

1st Reconnaissance Troop; the 33d Field Artillery 

Battalion: th" 91 st Fidd Artillery Battalion; Company A, 70 I st Tank Destroyn Battalion; Company 

C, 16th Armored Combat Engineers; and Battery D 

(less two platoons), 4+3d Coast Artillery (AA) 

Battalion (SP). 
392 

in the Sidi Bou Zid area. These movements 

were to be executed under the cover of darkness. About 0330, 31 January, General McQuillin, who was accompanied by General 

Truscott of the AFHQ Advance Command 

Post, issued orders from Paste de Lessouda 

for an attack at 0700. One part of his force 

under Lt. Col. William B. Kern was to strike 

through Rebaou pass from Sidi Bou Zid to 

get east of the enemy at Fald pass and the 

other under Colonel Stark, to advance 

against the Fai'd area from Djebcl 

Lessouda. 44 

American efforts to relieve the French in 

F aId pass on 31 January were not !-'uccessful. 

The enemy during the preceding night had 

emplaced and concealed his antitank and 

heavy machine guns, mortars, and artillery, 

and had put many of his tanks in defiladed 

positions. The American infantry, after 

making a limited penetration into the lower 

foothills north of FaId pass, was repulsed 

by a thick curtain of fire. The medium tanks 

of Company H, U.S. 1st Armored Regiment, were lured within range of well-sited 

antitank weapons which destroyed at least 

H Info supplied by Gen McQuillin to author. 

OCMH. 

The northern group consisted of: tht' I st Battalion (--), Headquarters and Cannon, 

Antitank, and Medical 26th Infantry: 

a platoon from the ·H3d Coast Artillery (All.) Battalion (SP): and II, 1st Armored RE'gimE'nt, with a platoon 70lst Tank D('strowf 

Battalion attached. The tanks were to leave this 

force after taking Fa'id village in order to attack 

southward along the mountains to Aln Rebaou. The 

southern group included: the 1 st Battalion (\ess 

Company B), 6th Armored Infantry: Compa ny G 

and a platoon from Reconnaissance Company, 15t 

Arrnort'd Regiment: Company A (less a platoon), 

701 st Tank Destroyn Ba ttalion: and one platoon 

from Company C, 16th Armon'd Combat Engineers. Batt"r), B, 915t Fidd Artillery Bi.! t lalion, 

Wi.!S to support from a position east of Djebel Lessauda. CCA 1st Armcd Div AAR, 2:1 Jan~6 F('b 

1:1; 26th Inf AAR, 11 No," 42 14 Apr 43,2:1 Apr ·n. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

eight vehicles. The American supporting 

artillery came under long-range counterbattery fire and was also heavily attacked by 

dive bombers. The southern force was delayed by enemy aviation and then driven 

back by the enemy ground troops. By 1400 

on 31 January the enemy had succeeded in 

capturing FaId pass. The American attack 

not only failed to relieve the French, but 

also, through absence of Allied air support, 

failed to prevent the enemy from bringing 

up reinforcements. The Germans were now 

firmly established on the Eastern Dorsal 

from Djebel Sidi Khalif to Mai'zila pass 

where they had gained a foothold south and 

west of that gap. 

At 0930 on 1 February Giraud called 

General \Velvert's headquarters ordering 

that a strong protest be made to General 

Fredendall regarding the slowness of American intervention and ineffectiveness of U,S. 

air and artillery. But by 1 February the 

French in the pass could not be relieved nor 

Allied possession restored. 45 Nevertheless, 

efforts to drive out the enemy were not 

abandoned. 

The Allied Attack on J\Jaknassy Begins 

The Germans had struck at Faid pass 

while the Allied attack on Maknassy was 

being organized, As a result, General Fredendall faced the difficult tactical decision 

whether he should send Colonel Stack's 

forc(', Combat Command C, to join the 

counterattack at F aId or usc it for the attack on Maknassy. ),' Generals Giraud and 

,", Phone Msg, Cl'n Giraud to Capt Ciarlet to be 

transmittFd to Cen Fredcndall et al., I F('b 43, 

in DMC Jnl, I Fd) 41. 

I" Combat Command C, 1st Armored Division, 

on :W January 19{3 consisted of: the 6th Armored 

Infantry (kss thl' 1st and 2d Battalion), Company 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 393 

Welvert recommended that the force be 

brought south of Djebel Ksai'ra to the Ai'n 

Rebaou area by a route enabling it to strike 

the enemy from the rear. At 1300, 30 J anuary, Stack received orders by telephone to 

start northeastward from Gafsa toward the 

area of Sidi Bou Zid with the mission of 

hitting ". . . in flank the force of enemy 

tanks and infantry thrusting at SIDI BOU 

ZID from the east, and also to strike any 

force moving from MAKNASSY toward 

SIDI BOU ZID." 47 Stack was out of direct 

communication with McQuillin, during 

the night of 30-31 January, which Combat 

Command C spent in bivouac about thirty 

miles southwest of Sidi Bou Zid. As he was 

nearing the F ai'd battle area on 31 January, 

he received radioed orders at 1600 to "turn 

south and join in co-ordinated effort with 

Maraist on Maknassy." During the following night when he was only a few miles 

northeast of Mai'zila pass on the trail to 

Maknassy, he was still out of communication with McQuillin at Fai'd. Stack, following his instructions, blocked the northern 

mouth of Mai"zila pass and prepared for 

a morning attack, leaving the action at Fai'd 

pass to be completed by Combat Command 

A and General Welvert's troops!S 

The orders sending Stack south were 

based on an overoptimistic concept of what 

was happening at Ai'n Rebaou, for American troops were then understood to be adB (plus 2d Platoon, Company D), 81st Reconnaissance Battalion; Battery C, 68th Field Artillery 

Battalion; Company G, 13th Armored Regiment; 

the 1st Platoon, Company D, 16th Engineers (C) ; 

a detachment of Company B, Maintenance Battalion; a detachment of the 47th Medical Battalion; 

and the 1 st Platoon, 443d Coast Artillery (AA) 

Battalion (SP). 6th Armd Inf AAR, 23 Jan-26 

Feb 43. 

., 6th Armd Inf, Rpt of Combat Opns in North 

Africa, Nov 42-May 43, Pt. II, p. 9. 

.. Ibid. 

vancing north along the eastern side of 

Djebel Bou Dzer when in fact they had been 

repulsed!" The opportunity for McQuillin 

and Stack to co-operate late on 31 January 

had thus been rejected in favor of combining Stack's attack on Maknassy with that by 

Maraist's force, but during the night of 31 

January-l February it was still feasible to 

postpone the Maknassy operation and to 

recall Combat Command C to the Fai'd 

area. General Welvert was so thoroughly 

convinced of the merit of such a course that 

he sought out Stack that night and induced 

him to raise the question again with General Ward. Ward confirmed Fredendall's 

orders for Stack to co-operate with Maraist 

in attacking Maknassy, while McQuillin 

and French units under General Schwartz 

made one last attempt to recover Fai'd pass 

from its Axis occupants. 50 

The Enemy Retains Fazd Pass 

Near Sidi Bou Zid, General McQuillin 

sent Colonel Stark's force south by foot during the night to make the next day's main 

attack on Ai'n Rebaou, converging on 

Kern's axis of approach. The advance on 1 

February was not begun until noon when 

the sun was no longer low in front of the 

American forces. It opened with an extraordinarily heavy artillery preparation, followed by an infantry assault; the tanks were 

initially held in reserve for a later sweep 

against Fai'd, if it should prove advisable. 

The infantry, after first advancing methodically behind the barrage, started up the 

lower slopes where they were eventually 

pinned down by machine gun, mortar, and 

., II Corps Sitrep, 1700,31 Jan 43 . 

00 DMC Jnl, 31 Jan 43. This contains a special 

note by General Welvert describing his efforts to 

co-ordinate American operation at Fald. 
394 

hea vy artillery fire as the barrage lifted. At 

this point fifteen enemy tanks made a sortie 

out of Faid village and struck the left 

(northern) flank of the attacking infantry 

throwing their assault into confusion. The 

3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, was 

now sent forward to get the attack in motion 

again but the American tanks were subjected to severe shelling from guns so skillfully hidden that observers and searching 

American artillery fire had failed to find 

them. By now the infantry was already falling back. There were no reserves. The 1st 

Battalion, 26th Infantry, pulled back to 

positions three to fi"e miles east of Sidi BOt! 

Zid, while the 1 st Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, turned southwest and occupied 

Djebcl Ksaira." 

McQuillin acknowledged candidly at the 

end of the day that he had failed to accomplish his mission. He pointed out that his 

right wing had been stopped and the infantry on the left had been driven back "in 

disorder" from a point close to the enemy's 

positions by the sudden attack of nine or 

more Mark IV tanks which had emerged 

from concealment. 'Vhilc these enemy tanks 

were being driven back by four American 

self-propelled 75-mm. guns, by tanks, and by 

tank destroyers, and pursued until they 

reached the cover of German antitank guns, 

the disorganized infantry had been able to 

withdraw. 

Under orders on 2 February to pass to 

the defensive, Combat Command A organized positions on Djebcl Ksaira and set up a 

line east of Sidi Bou Zid while the Allied 

high command determined where to estab-

'.1 (1) CCA 1st Arrnd Di\' S--2 Rpt, 1800-2300, 

1 Feb 43. (2) 3d Bn 1st Arrnd Regt AAR, 1 Jan21 Fcb 43, 30 Jul 43, (3) 26th Inf AAR, 23 Apr 

43, which reports casualties of ninety wounded and 

SIX or seven HllssIng. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

lish the main line of resistance. The enemy 

had already moved onto high ground east 

of Diebel Ksaira and directly south of 

Rebaou pass, onto the heights north of that 

pass, and along the western slopes of Djebel 

Sidi KhaliL His observation points surveyed 

all approaches to the Faid area. His tanks 

were withdrawn into the passes, but he emplaced artillery as heavy as 210-mm. howitzers where they could interdict Allied 

movement toward his infantry positions and 

outrange American and French guns in 

counterbattery fire. He remained in Faid 

village while Sidi Bou Zid was occupied by 

the Allies. Ge 

o jJerations Southwest of Pont-du-F ahs 

While the enemy's attack at Faid pass 

was succeeding, another attack, ordered by 

von Arnim on 28 January, directed against 

Hir Moussa crossroads and the heights 

northeast of Rebaa Oulad Yahia, was 

thrown back. (See Map 8) Success in this 

endeavor would have forced the Allied 

troops in the heights west of the Ousseltia 

" (1) 6th Armd Inf AAR, 23 Jan-26 Ft'b 43, 

(2) Memo, CG CCA to CG 1st Armd Div, in 1st 

Arrnd Div Sitrc·p, 1-2 Feb 43, (3) 1st Armd Div 

FO 5, 1200, 3 Feb ·13, (4) Losses reported by the 

26th Infantry wen' 1 killed and 56 wounded and 

for 6th Armored Infantry 4 killed and 16 wounded. 

(5) French losses known on 2 February were 905 

officers and men, killed or missing in action. DMC 

Jnl, 2 Feb 43, (6) The enemy reported ,aptur<' of 

1,047 prisoners of war (mostly French), 25 armored 

cars, :) guns, 2 antiaircraft guns, 15 antitank guns, 

8 mortars, 57 machin" guns, 10 trucks, and 5 aircraft either destroyed or damaged. Msg, OKH/ 

GenStdH/Op Abt, Nr. 1563/43, to army groups, 

4 Feb 43, in OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, File' Abendorientierungen Afrika, 11-/3, V.43. (7) Msg, CG 

II Corps to CG 1st Armd Div, 1030, 2 Feb 43, in 

IT Corps G-3 J nL This message said: "MissionContain enerny at Faid and Fondouk [el AouarebJ. 

Actin' defense. Patrolling, Active use of arty fin", 

Insure no exit by enemy. ='Iotify McQuillin at once." 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 395 

valley to pull back in order to avoid being 

cut off, but on 31 January the armored 

force was repulsed short of Rebaa Oulad 

Yahia at Sidi Said by the British 36th 

Brigade (with the 2d Battalion, U.S. 16th 

Infantry, attached). Although the enemy 

broke off the attack that evening, his threat 

brought Combat Command B, U.S. 1st 

Armored Division, hurrying back from the 

area southeast of T6bessa to which it had so 

recently been recalled from the Ousseltia 

valley. It spent 1 February at Hadjeb e1 

Aloun, and during the next night continued 

to its new station in the vicinity of Maktar, 

out of II Corps' area and in First Army 

reserve. 

British 5 Corps (General Allfrey) attempted early in February to get into a position to cut the Pont-du-Fahs-Rebaa Oulad 

Yahia road at the junction just south of the 

reservoir. To accomplish this purpose, it became essential to gain control of Djebel 

Mansour (678) and its spur Djebe1 Alliliga, 

commanding the road at a point southeast 

of Bou Arada. Using elements of the British 

1st Guards Brigade and 1st Parachute 

Brigade, Allfrey's attack in approximately 

battalion strength on 3 February did not 

quite succeed. Reinforcements by each side 

balanced out during the next two nights. 

After his counterattack on 5 February 

gained control of Djebel Mansour, the enemy finally drove the remaining British 

troops from Djebel Alliliga. The adversaries were left in deadlock fifteen miles southwest of Pont-du-Fahs, but with the Axis in 

firm possession of the approaches to that 

town."" 

C3 (1) Info suppii('d by Cabinet Office, London. 

(2) MC #T-3 (Nehring et a/.), Pt. 3a. (3) Capt. 

Nigel Nicholson, The Grenadier Guards in the War 

of 1939-1945 (London, 1949), II, 277. British casualties came to 260, with at kast 35 killed and 16 

missing. 

II Corps Attack on 11;[ aknassy Ends 

While the enemy's initiative southwest of 

Pont-du-Fahs and at Faid pass drew Allied 

forces into containing positions, the operations by II Corps to seize Maknassy came to 

an end. 

As Colonel Stack's Combat Command C 

opened its attack on Ma'izila pass on 1 February, under II Corps order~ which General 

Ward had confirmed during the previous 

night, it soon found that enemy reinforcements had been brought up during the night. 

Enemy infantry and armored cars, supported by artillery, counterattacked at 0730. 

The enemy was driven back, but new divisional orders to Combat Command C to 

postpone full commitment in the pass kept 

the forces waiting until afternoon. The 

course of Maraist's battle for Station de 

Sened, of McQuillin's at Faid pass, and of 

the enemy attack northeast of Rebaa Oulad 

Yahia for a time made it difficult to decide 

the best way to employ Combat Command 

C. Then at 1400, orders terminating this 

indecision came through to Colonel Stack: 

"Secure Ma'izila Pass, including both exits. 

Reconnoiter to south with view to attack on 

Maknassy." The afternoon assault opened 

with a twenty-minute artillery preparation 

followed at 1710 with an advance by the 

tanks and two companies of infantry on foot. 

Other infantry were carried in half-tracks to 

objectives already captured in order to organize them quickly for defense. Soft ground 

and antitank fire delayed the general advance, but the troops gained the southwestern side of the pass and part of the northeastern side before darkness forced them to 

suspend the attack. Preparations were made 

to complete the task in the morning. Reported losses were 3 killed, 20 wounded, and 

43 missing. Combat Command C might rea-
396 

son ably expect to reach Maknassy on the 

next day. As it prepared for the last phase 

of its operation, its orders were abruptly revised. Combat Command C was recalled 

from the pass and sent north to Hadjeb el 

Ai'oun on the night of 1-2 February as part 

of a general defensive ~hift to counter an 

enemy threat against that sector of the Allied 

line."4 

Meanwhile, Colonel Maraist's force, 

called Combat Command D, led by clements of the 81 st Reconnaissance Battalion, 

marched on Station de Sened from Gafsa 

early on 31 January. The reconnaissance 

force slipped around Station de Sened to 

occupy high ground east of it. The infantry 

was ordered to move in trucks cross country 

on a wide front to a point about ten miles 

west of the objective, then to detruck and 

proceed on foot, attacking from the south 

with two companies abreast and a third 

echeloned to the right rear. The tanks were 

to approach parallel to the road but were to 

bypass the objective on the north and turn 

in order to strike from the east. The artillery 

was to support the attack from position~ 

northwest of the hamlet. 

The scheme of maneuver somewhat resembled that which had been so successful in 

the raid a week earlier, but factors 

in the situation were markedly different. 

The attack began much later in the day. 

OJ 6th Armd Inf AAR, 23 Jan~26 Feb 43. 

,.c. The force was built around the medium tanks 

of tht' 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, less 

Company G (Lt. CoL Ben Crosby), the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry (Lt. CoL John C. Petty), and 

the 70 I st Tank Destroy"r less Companies 

A and B. The Cannon Company, 39th Infantry: 

68th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery C; Company D, 16th Armored EnginC'ers (C): and one 

platoon of the 443d Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion 

(SP) were included. 

,;0 CCD 1st Armd Div Hist Reds, 1 Mar 43, in 

1st Armd Div Hist Reds, Vol. XI. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Although the tanks and artillery were in 

position at 1345, the infantry convoy was 

slow in coming up, kept marching past the 

assigned detrucking point, and was insufficiently dispersed. From the beginning, 

heavy enemy air attacks repeatedly harassed 

the operation, with Allied planes unable to 

be of help. A dive-bombing attack by eight 

Stukas at 1330, and another by twenty-four 

at 1656, stunned the infantry and caused 

substantial casualties. The troops could not 

be formed for an assault by 1700; so the entire force was reorganized for the night, and 

the attack was rescheduled for dawn. The 

175th Field Artillery Battalion and the 2d 

Battalion, 168th Infantry, were sent up during the night to supplement the 1 st Battalion, but except for a small 168th Infantry 

regimental group with Col. Thomas D. 

Drake, and a portion of the 2d Battalion, 

the troops were unwittingly guided past the 

American lines into the enemy's rear area. 

In the morning, most of the "lost battalion" 

was either taken captive or otherwise prevented from taking part in the attack, even 

though some troops managed to find their 

way back before noon. 57 

Station de Sened was more strongly defended than on 24 January_ Combat Command D had expected about 250 men with 

eight machine guns, four 47 -mm. antitank 

guns, and two 75-mm. field guns emplaced 

behind mine fields west of the village. A 

few armored cars had also been observed 

there, but the main force was supposed to be 

east of Maknassy. Actually, the objective 

was well defended from the start and when 

,.7 (1) M,.mo, H. P. Dittemore for CG 1 st Armd 

Div, 11 Feb 43, sub: Investigation. Copy in possession of Brig Gen Hamilton H. Howze. (2) 17 5th 

FA Bn War Diary, 31 Jan-2 Feb 43. (3) Memo, 

Gen Fredendall for CinC AF, 10 Mar 43, sub: Notes 

on reCt'nt opns on the Tunisian front, par. 8. 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 397 

the position was threatened, the enemy reacted quickly by sending reinforcements 

from Gabes.,g In a slow attack on 1 February, the Americans finally penetrated the 

hamlet about 1640, held the town during 

the night, and prepared to continue the advance next morning to the cast, where 

stronger enemy forces had assembled. 

"It is of vital necessity for you to get 

forward and place the infantry on its objective four (4) miles east of Sened Station," 

General Fredendall informed Colonel Maraist, "Too much time has been wasted already. I shall expect you to be on the 

objective not later than 1000 hours, 2 February. Use your tanks and shove. From 1800 

hours, this date, (1 February) General Ray 

E. Porter, USA, will be in command of your 

operation until completion of your mission, 

after which you will revert to Corps control 

in the Gafsa area." f>>l 

On the same night, General Ward, unaware of these orders, informed Colonel 

Maraist that the units of the 168th Infantry 

and 17 5th Field Artillery were to revert to 

General Porter's command after Combat 

Command D had gained the position east 

of Station de Sen ed, and only then was 

Maraist to move to the Gafsa area to enter 

corps reserve. The 81 st Reconnaissance Ba ttalion would then shift to Sbeitla, where the 

1st Armored Division headquarters would 

open at 0200, 2 February. Maraist was directed finally to secure a position favorable 

to defense "three to four miles east of Sened 

Station." After it had been organized by the 

168th Infantry (less the 3d Battalion), he 

( I) Memo by Arty and Rcn Survey Officer 

1st Armd Div. Copy in OCMH. (2) 21st Panzer 

Div, KTB, l.I.-3I.III.43, 31 Jan and I Feb 43. 

',0 (I) 1st Armd Div Hist Reds, Vol. II. (2) 

Memo by Arty and Rcn Survry Officer. Copy in 

OCMH. 

was to remain in a supporting position until 

relieved by Porter's direction. ,;0 

These confusing orders were issued in 

ignorance of General Eisenhower's directive, drawn up in conference with General 

Anderson and Truscott at Teiergma airfield 

that same morning, that the central front 

must be securely held by employing the 

U.s. 1st Armored Division as a concentrated force, even if that involved pulling 

back the line from the Eastern Dorsal, 

evacuating Cafsa, and forfeiting the use of 

Thelcpte airfield. "If Maknassy is not taken 

by tonight, the whole division should be 

withdrawn into a central position and kept 

concentrated," Eisenhower had insisted. o1 

The morning attack toward Maknassy on 

2 February proceeded rapidly against light 

artillery and machine gun fire until about 

0930, when it was interrupted by a very 

heavy dive-bombing attack on the tanks. By 

noon, the infantry in force held the ridge 

east of Sened. The tanks reassembled in 

readiness to meet a counterattack; the infantry dug in; the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion's units took up positions protecting 

the north and south flanks; and the 701st 

Tank Destroyer Battalion's reconnaissance 

elements pushed five miles farther east. The 

counterattack came about 1600. A dive 

bombing by twenty-four Stukas first shook 

up the infantry. When sixteen enemy tanks 

approached on the left flank, some excited 

troops started running back and others 

jammed the road with vehicles headed west. 

These troops had to be firmly checked and 

turned around. Five enemy tanks got 

through to the main position, but were 

driven off by American tanks and tank de-

,. Copies in 1st Armd Div Hist Reds, Vol. II. 

m Mins of Conf between Eisenhower and Anderson, Feb 43. AFHQ C-3 Ups 58/2.1, Micro Job 

10C, Reel 188D. 
398 

stroyers over an hour later. By 1900, the 

position was generally restored, and held 

throughout the night. 62 

The attack toward Maknassy was renewed at daylight on 3 February with tanks, 

tank destroyers, and assault guns out in frJnt 

of the infantry line to repel any counterattack by Axis forces. Well forward was 

the reconnaissance unit of 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, which got within six miles 

of Maknassy by noon. Artillery fired on 

elusive enemy detachments, and fifteen 

American B-25's bombed enemy tanks near 

Maknassy at about 1530 and Station de 

Sened (in American possession) by mistake 

soon afterward. At this juncture, Maraist's 

attack on Maknassy from the west was 

broken off when orders from II Corps' advanced command post were received directing Combat Command D's withdrawal at 

1830 to Gafsa. The move was completed 

before daylight. 

Losses inflicted on the enemy amounted 

to seven light tanks, two French 75-mm. 

guns, and two 88-mm. dual-purpose guns, 

considerable transportation equipment, 

along with a small quantity of ammunition, 

destroyed or captured, and about 160 prisoners taken. American losses reported included four light tanks, nine half-tracks, one 

self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer, one 75-

mm. pack howitzer, two self-propelled and 

one towed 37-mm. guns, as well as lesser 

weapons and transport vehicles. Casualties 

were 51 killed, 164 wounded, 116 missing.'" 

The force Colonel Maraist and Colonel 

6Z (1) Memo, Col Thomas D. Drake for ACofS 

G-2, 14 May 45, sub: Account of 168th Inf opns 

24 Dec 42~17 Feb 43. DRB AGO. (2) 175th FA 

Bn War Diary, 31 Jan-2 Feb 43. 

fl, (1) Casualty List (omitting 81 st Rcn Bn after 

1 Feb), 5 Feb 43. Copy in 1st Armd Div Hist Reds, 

Vol. II. About half the casualties were in the 168th 

Infantry. (2) General von Arnim consid ... red that 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Stack had encountered was Kampfgruppe 

Strempel. When American attacks on Sened 

Station and Mai'zila pass threatened to interfere with the 21st Panzer Division's operations in the Fai'd pass area, Colonel Hildebrandt organized a provisional headquarters 

under his chief of staff, Lt. Col. Strempel, 

ordering him to defend at all cost the sector 

from Djebel Matleg (477) to Djebel Bou 

Hedma (790), boundary with the Italian 

Centauro Division. Group Strempel consisted of the 334th Reconnaissance Battalion, 29th Africa Battalion, 580th Reconnaissance Battalion, and miscellaneous units 

of the Italian 50th S pedal Brigade, reinforced by artillery and flak. The 190th 

Panzer Battalion, ubiquitous "fire brigade" 

of the Tunisian bridgehead, was at hand as 

a tactical reserve held in the Meheri Zebbeus 

area. 64 

II Corps Goes on the Defensive 

At 1200, 3 February, Headquarters, 1st 

Armored Division, issued new orders based 

upon the loss of Faid pass and the vulnerability of the poorly armed French forces in 

the Fondouk el Aouareb-Pichon area to an 

attack of the kind which had succeeded at 

Faid.o5 The mission given the division was 

to contain the enemy from F ondouk el 

Aouareb gap to Maizila pass, a distance exceeding fifty miles. The division was directed 

to plan to reinforce the French troops 

quickly wherever indicated, to engage in 

active reconnaissance and patrols, to use 

artillery freely, and to employ mobile striking forces in counterattacks against any 

enemy penetrations of the eastern mountain 

when Maraist's attack was caHed off, all means of 

defending Maknassy against it had dropped to 

minor proportions. MS #C-098 (von Arnim). 

'" 21st Panzer Div, KTB, 1-3 Feb 43. 

co FO 5. 
SPARRING ALONG THE EASTERN DORSAL 399 

chain. At Maktar, in First Army reserve was 

Combat Command B, still withdrawn from 

General Ward's control. 6G Near Hadjeb 

el Aloun, was Combat Command C, only 

nominally under division control and 

directed by II Corps to cover the twentymile zone from north of Djebel Trozza to a 

screening ridge southeast of Hadjeb el 

Aloun. Combat Command A covered the 

rest of the chain of mountains as far as 

Djebel Meloussi, west of Malzila pass. At 

First Army's insistence Combat Command 

D was recalled from its operation toward 

Maknassy in order to enter II Corps Reserve at Bou Chebka in place of Combat 

Command B. The 81 st Reconnaissance 

Battalion (less Company B) went into 1st 

Armored Division Reserve at Sbeltla. The 

168th Infantry (less 1 st Battalion) was also 

to pass to direct corps control and to move 

from Gafsa to Sbeltla and thence to Sidi 

Bou Zid. The 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, 

went into II Corps Reserve at Feriana. 

Greater mobility in the northern sector was 

accomplished by the improvement of a road 

from Hadjeb el Aloun to El Ala, a project 

carried through by Company B, 16th 

Armored Engineer Battalion, and units from 

the U.S. 34th Division. 

These dispositions were intended to hold 

as much as possible of the forward areas 

while the Allies prepared for sustained, aggressive action in the month of March. As 

soon as an opportunity for a blow at the 

Axis line of communications on the coastal 

plain should present itself, the forces could 

assemble west of the mountain barrier, in 

which all the gaps were held by the enemy, 

and fight its way through whichever gap 

n" The British 6th Armoured Division was being 

rearmed with U.S. Sherman tanks at this time and 

was not, therefort', ust'd as First Army Reserve. 

Memo, Eisenhower for the record, 25 Ft'b 43, in 

CinC AF Diary, Bk. V, pp. 256a-256t'. 

seemed to offer most hope of success. But it 

was hardly to be expected that the enemy 

would quietly permit strong forces to be organized for the purpose of piercing the barrier and wreaking havoc in the rear of Field 

Marshal Rommel's army. The loss of Fald 

pass, moreover, made the Allies so much 

more vulnerable to hostile, disruptive incursions that retention of the areas east of 

the Western Dorsal was correspondingly 

more hazardous. The dispositions described 

above were risky, and the result of difficult 

decisions reached by Anderson, Fredendall, 

and their chiefs of staff, on the evening of 

5 February.G' 

Anxiety about the Axis forces at Fald led 

Fredendall not only to assign specific responsibility for containing them to the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, on 

10 February, after a visit to his command 

post near Sbeltla, but in addition, to issue 

orders very specifically controlling the means 

made available there. On 11 February, Maj. 

Warren H ugulet, liaison officer of the 1 st 

Armored Division, brought to Sbeltla the 

following directive from General Fredendall: 

HEADQUARTERS II CORPS 

APO NO. 302 

11 February, 1943 

SUBJECT: Defense of FAID Position. 

TO: Commanding General, 1 st Armored 

division. 

1. You will take immediate steps to see that 

the following points concerning defense of the 

F AID position are put into effect: 

a. Scheme of Defense.' D.J. KSAIRA on 

the South and DJ LESSOUDA on the North 

are the key terrain features in the defense of 

FAID. These two features must be strongly 

<i' (1) Msg, Gen Kuter to CinC AF, 6 Feb 43. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log 46. (2) A counterattack 

to be It'd by General Porter to regain Fald pass was 

abandoned on 5 February 1943. He was transferred 

to AFHQ advanct'd command post from II Corps. 
400 

held, with a mobile reserve in the vicinity of 

SID I BOU ZID which can rapidly launch a 

counter attack. Plans for all possible uses of 

this reserve should be prepared ahead of time. 

A battalion of infantry should be employed for 

the defense of D J. KSAIRA, and the bulk of 

a battalion of infantry together with a battery 

of artillery and a company of tanks for the defense of DJ. LESSOUDA. Remainder of 

artillery is at present satisfactorily located. It 

should, however, furnish its own local protection, and be prepared to shift rapidly. 

b. Additional Reserves: The 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, now under your control, 

should immediately send a liaison officer to 

Hq., CC A. Inasmuch as this Battalion will 

likely be employed by McQuillin should an 

attack in the F AID area develop, the Battalion Commander, in collaboration with McQuillin should prepare plans for the use of his 

Battalion. These plans should ensure rapid 

movement and employment of this Battalion 

once it has been ordered. 

c. Reconnaissance: It is extremely important that reconnaissance and counter 

reconnaissance be conducted by you from 

HADJEB EL AIOUN on the North to the 

pass between DJ. MAIZTLA [Djebcl MaizilaJ 

and DJ. GOULEB on the South. In this 

area strong listening posts should be established 24 hours a day from which raids, when 

appropriate, can be conducted. It is essential that this reconnaissance and counter 

reconnaissance link up with that now being 

conducted by the 1st British Derbyshire Yeomanry. The force now at McQuillin's disposal is not sufficient for the area for which 

he is responsible. The bulk of your 81st 

Reconnaissance Battalion should be used in 

the area HADJEB EL AIOUN-MAIZTLAGOULEB PASS. 

d. Patrols: It is vital that strong infantry 

foot patrols be sent forward at night from DJ. 

LESSOUDA and DJ. KSAIRA. These patrols must be offensive. They must keep 

track of the enemy's strength and organization. They should be especially watchful for 

any attt'mpt of the enemy to debouch from the 

passes at night. They must take prisoners. 

It is also important that these patrols locate 

the presence of minefields, if any, in areas like 

the gap between DJ. RECHAIB and D J. 

NOR THWEST AFRICA 

BOU DZEL [Djebel Bou DzerJ. The latter 

would, of course, be of great importance in the 

event we decide to capture FAID. 

e. Use of Wire, AT Mines, Trip Wire, 

etc: I desire that you make maximum use of 

all available means to strengthen the positions 

outlined above. The necessary materiel is 

available and should be used immediately. 

f. Photography: I have instructed my 

G-2 to furnish you as soon as possible a photographic strip covering the area: Pass at 

T8358-FAID PASS-REBOU [Ain RebaouJMATLEG PASS. I have asked that every 

effort be made to secure good pictures of the 

Pass at T8358, F AID PASS, and MATLEG 

PASS. 

2. I desire that a copy of this directive, together with your own comments, be sent to 

McQuillin. 

3. You will inform me when the instructions enumerated in this directive have been 

complied with. 

L. R. FREDENDALL 

Major Gcneral, U.S.A. 

Commanding. 

[The following was written in longhand: ] 

In other words I want a very strong activt' 

defcnse and not just a passive one. The 

encmy must be harassed at every opportunity. 

Reconnaissance must never be relaxedespecially at night. Positions indicated must 

be wired and mined now. L. R. F.GS 

The note of hopefulness with which 

January had opened, and the high expectation of II Corps of carrying the battle to 

the enemy, had led early in February to 

temporary frustration. Gn The enemy was still 

calling the tune. Until the Allies were strong 

enough to resume the offensive in March, 

they would have to fight the enemy where 

he chose to attack, and when. 

" 1st Armd Div Rpt of Opns, 3-18 Feb 1943, 

1st Armd Div Hist Reds, Vol. IV. 

GO Operations thus far had cost II Corps 699 

casualties only (50 killed, 487 wounded, 152 missing, 10 captured). Msg, 10 Feb 43, Entry 174, II 

Corps G-3 Jnl. 
CHAPTER XXI 

The Enemy Strikes At U.S. II Corps 

Allied Expectations 

No one doubted that the enemy would 

attack again in central Tunisia; the only 

question was where. The movements of his 

mobile, armored troops were attentively 

watched, for they would deliver the blow. 

The 21st Panzer Division was known to be 

in the Fai'd-Maknassy area. The 10th Panzer Division had shifted southeastward from 

the Medjerda valley so that most of it was 

in the vicinity of Kairouan, opposite the 

French XIX Corps. The Italian 131 st 

(Centauro) Armored Division was northwest of Gabes in position extending up toward El Guettar and Gafsa. The 15th 

Panzer Division was near the Mareth Position in southern Tunisia. There were indications that an attack might be made toward 

Pichon, either by way of Fondouk el Aouareb gap or by one of the routes north of it. 

Various signs seemed to point to enemy attacks along more than one axis. The evidence led Col. B. A. Dickson, II Corps 

Intelligence Officer (G-2), to warn of a 

main attack on Gafsa from Gabes plus a 

major diversionary effort in the Pichon or 

Pont-du-Fahs areas. To the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, 

the enemy's situation seemed to indicate a 

major attack on the Sfax-Tebessa axis and 

an auxiliary attack from Kairouan moving 

west and northwest.' 

General Eisenhower had hoped that the 

Allies could stabilize the front and at the 

same time free a force large enough to retake Fai'd pass. In view of enemy capabilities 

this hope could not be realized. Instead, 

General Anderson decided to abandon a 

contemplated counteroffensive from Le Kef 

to Fai'd, to concentrate mobile armored 

forces at Feriana and Sbei'tla, with forward 

elements in the vicinity of Gafsa and Fai'd, 

and to hold the existing Allied positions 

from Medjez el Bab to Pichon against all 

but the strongest enemy pressures. Provision 

was made for temporarily switching the bulk 

of Allied tactical air support, which would 

1 (1) MS # T-3 (Nehring et a/.), Pt. 3a. (2) 

AFHQ Rpt, G-2 Estimate of Axis Offensive Capabilities After Panzer Armee Rommel Is in Occupation of the Mareth Line, 7 Feb 43. AFHQ Micro 

Job 26, Reel 72 Spec. (3) Msg 1784, USFOR to 

FREEDOM, 1700, 17 Feb 43, sub: Axis forces in 

North Africa. Non-Current Permanent Rcd File, 

Misc Cbls-1942-43, AG 311.22. (4) II Corps 

G-2 Estimate 8, 7 Feb 43; II Corps Periodic Rpts 

39, 13 Feb 43, and 40, 14 Feb 43; 1st Armd Div 

G-3 Periodic Rpts 16,9 Feb 43, and 18, 11 Feb 43. 

(5) DMC Jnl, 9 Feb 43. (6) Msg, XIX Corps to 

II Corps (G-3), 2100, 9 Feb 43, in II Corps G-3 

Jnl, 0641, 10 Feb 43. (7) Intnv with Col B. A. 

Dickson (Ret.), 13 Dec 50. 
402 

normally be assigned to the northern sectors, 

to central Tunisia when necessary.2 

Anderson's revised mission became that 

of protecting airfields at Souk el Khemis, 

Tebessa, and TheIepte for continuous use 

by Allied air units, and of securing the openings at Medjez el Bab and Bou Arada 

through which the First Army would make 

its ultimate attack on Tunis in conjunction 

with Eighth Army. Second in importance 

only to this paramount role was another 

mission: recapture of the defiles held by the 

enemy, in order to improve the Allied position when the final offensive began, and to 

interfere with the enemy's line of communications on the coastal plain. Anderson was 

to avoid "costly failures" injurious to morale 

by committing sufficient forces in any attack. 

Finally, he was directed to keep the mobile 

striking forces in the south well concentrated 

in order to strike en masse when the need 

should arise, and to forego for the present 

the intended assembly of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division m army reserve near 

Guelma .. 

1 

Allied Dispositions, 13 February 

British First Army undertook to reorganize its 5 Corps front while the enemy's 

attack was being prepared, partly to restore 

the many small units separated from their 

parent organizations and partly to achieve 

the long-deferred establishment of a substantial First Army reserve. The withdrawal 

of 10th Panzer Division from positions along 

the northern front into a mobile reserve 

, (1) Ltr, Eisenhower to Fredendall, 4 Feb 43. 

OPD Exec 3, Item la. (2) Msg, Adv CP Allied 

ASC to CinC AF, 6 Feb 43. AFHQ CofS Cable 

Log, 46. 

'Dir, CinC AF to CG First Army, 11 Feb 43. 

AFHQ G-3 Opns 58/2.1, Micro Job 10C, Red 

188D. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

farther south, the arrival of the British 46th 

Division, in the forward area, and the introduction into the French sector of elements of the U.S. 1st and 34th Infantry 

Divisions-all made it possible to consider 

withdrawing the British 6th Armoured Division from the Bou Arada valley into army 

reserve. The division was to be refitted near 

Rhardimaou with new Sherman tanks 

which were being brought in via Bone, and 

was to relinquish its own lighter tanks for 

use by the French. Orders on 12 February 

specified relief of the British 6th Armoured 

Division between 15 and 28 February; the 

16/5 Lancers had already begun to leave its 

old tanks at a depot at Ebba Ksour on 12 

February preparatory to receiving the Shermans! Forward areas would be held during 

the reorganization by a smaller concentration of infantry than heretofore. To offset 

this weakness General Anderson prescribed 

that each likely route of approach by enemy 

armor be heavily mined, that the mine fields 

be covered by infantry and artillery, that a 

mobile reserve be kept in each sector, and 

that observation be continuous and be supplemented at night by energetic patrolling. 

The much desired army reserve, once in 

being, would make it possible to counter 

each Axis thrust without improvising formations for each defensive operation. 

The 133d and 135th Combat Teams, 

U.S. 34th Infantry Division, made the long 

wintry journey from the Oran area to Tunisia during the second week of February. 

They were ordered to relieve French units 

from the Algiers Division, and indeed, Col. 

Robert W. Ward's 135th Infantry had 

barely completed that process near Pichon 

before the enemy's attack began. The 133d 

, (1) First Army Ops Instruc 14, 12 Feb 43. 

DRB AGO. (2) Info supplied by Cabin!'t Office, 

London. 
THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 403 

Combat Team (Col. Ray C. Fountain) 

farther west was then diverted to the vicinity 

of Had jeb el Ai:oun. The 34th Division 

( General Ryder) took control as the enemy's 

attack started. 

General Allen's U.S. 1st Infantry Division (less Combat Teams 18 and 26) remained under General Koeltz's command 

and in positions in the Ousseltia valley. The 

18th Combat Team farther north was withdrawn on 13-14 February by British 5 Corps 

into reserve preparatory to transfer to the 

French XIX Corps. The unit was scheduled to relieve the British 36th Brigade in 

the Rebaa Oulad Yahia valley later that 

month. It would thereby extend the American-held portion of General Koeltz's front 

before the end of February, while the 26th 

Combat Team would come from General 

Fredendall's corps about 3 March to relieve 

French troops scheduled for rest and reequipment. These arrivals would reunite the 

U.S. 1st Infantry Division after almost three 

months of dispersal. In the Pichon area was 

the French Light Armored Brigade which 

had passed to the command of General St. 

Didier on 6 February." 

The southern flank of the French Corps 

was covered on the eve of the attack by 

Combat Command B, U.S. 1st Armored 

Division. This force, which included 110 

medium tanks and 69 guns, and was directly 

under First Army control, was east of Maktar. Next to it on the south was Colonel 

Stack's Combat Command C, of the same 

division, a somewhat weaker group, and 

south of that unit was General McQuillin's 

Combat Command A, reinforced by the 

168th Combat Team (less 1 st Battalion) 

under Colonel Drake, both controlled by 

.• (1) 133d Inf and 135th Inf Hists. (2) 1 st Inf 

Div G-3 Rpt of Opns, 15 Jan-8 Apr 43. (3) XIX 

Corps Jnl, 1-13 Feb 43. 

II Corps through Headquarters, 1st Armored Division." 

Headquarters, U.S. 1st Armored Division, near Sbei"tla and the division reserve 

there were connected through Kasserine 

with French and American units at Fcriana, 

Gafsa, and El Guettar. At Feriana, a small 

force of all arms was assembling under command of Colonel Stark. At Gafsa, and southeast of it at the village of El Guettar, was 

the extreme south wing of the active Allied 

front. The Allied high command, after some 

irresolution, determined that Gafsa could 

not be strengthened enough to hold it 

against any probable enemy force. In case 

of necessity, the Gafsa force would be evacuated toward Feriana, where a counterattack in sufficient strength could be mounted. 

In the Advance Headquarters, II Corps, at 

the Hotel de France in Gafsa, Col. Frederic 

B. Butler relieved General Porter and with 

Colonel Morliere of the Constantine Division directed operations by a mixed American and French command as far as El 

Guettar.' The arc from Sbei"tla through 

Kasserine and Feriana to Gafsa and El 

Guettar was screened to the east and south 

by security detachments and beyond them, 

by roving patrols. The latter were conducted 

for II Corps by Squadrons Band D, 1st 

Derbyshire Yeomanry. 

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower and General 

Anderson met at General Fredendall's headquarters near Tebessa on 13 February to 

0(1) II Corps AAR, 2 May 43. (2) 1st Armd 

Div Tank Status Rpt, 12 Feb 43, Entry 210 in II 

Corps G-3 Jnl. 

7 (1) II Corps AAR, 2 May 43. (2) Msg, Truscott to AFHQ G-3, 6 Feb 43. AFHQ CofS Cable 

Log, 49. (3) Phone ConY, CG First Army to G-3 

II Corps, 1355, 8 Feb 43, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

(4) II Corps FO 1 (Stark Force), 14 Feb 43. (5) 

DMC Jnl, 9 and 12 Feb 43. (6) Interv with Brig 

Gen Frederic B. Butler, 11 Jan 50. 
THE DORSAL POSITIONS 

IN CENTRAL TUNISIA 

13-18 FUr ua r, 1943 

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THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 405 

review the disposition of forces, American, 

British, and French. (Map 10.) The Commander in Chief, Allied Force, then concluded that they were "as good as could be 

made pending the development of an actual 

attack and in view of the great value of 

holding the forward regions, if it could possibly be done." During the night, he went 

forward as far as Sbeltla and Sidi Bou Zid, 

getting back to T€bessa a little before daylight. All along the line from Pont-du-Fahs 

to Gafsa, the word had been flashed from 

First Army's headquarters in Laverdure 

late on 13 February that an attack would 

be made by the enemy the next day." 

The Enemy's Intentions 

The enemy had considered making the 

forthcoming attack ever since Rommel in 

November first pointed out the advantages 

of combining his retreating force with that 

already in Tunisia in order to gain the margin of superiority necessary for a drive into 

Algeria. 9 On 4 February, when the volume 

of logistical support to Tunisia had not yet 

reached a level which could sustain a drive 

for long, Rommel revived his suggestion in 

another memorandum to Comando Supremo. Rommel then proposed that he leave 

part of his army at the Mareth Position in 

order with its mobile portion to strike Gafsa 

from the southeast while mobile elements of 

von Arnim's command hit simultaneously 

8 (1) II Corps G-3 Jnl, 14 Feb 43, Entry 306. 

(2) XIX Corps Jnl, 13 Feb 43. (3) Ltr, Eisenhower 

to Marshall, 16 Feb 43. Copy in WDCSA 381 

Africa. (4) Generals Patton and Smith were at 

Eighth Army headquarters in Tripoli; General Clark 

was ill; and General Alexander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder had not yet assumed their new commands. 

"See pp. 322-23 above. 

from the northeast.1o The situation, Rommel believed, was temporarily propitious. 

The longer the attack was postponed, the 

greater the likelihood that the British Eighth 

Army could hamper its full execution, and 

the stronger the American forces to be overcome. On the other hand, should no such 

attack be attempted, the Allies would be 

far more likely to succeed in pinning down 

von Arnim's army while striking that of 

Rommel from both the front and the rear. 

The conditions for success therefore seemed 

to be: swift and surprising attack within 

the next few days; concentrated attack by 

superior forces; and unified command disregarding the boundary between the two 

Axis Army zones. 

The German high command had already 

formulated plans to establish a unified command when the presence of two Axis armies 

in Tunisia made such a headquarters necessary, but at this juncture, conditions made 

them unready to put those plans in effect. 

Operations as aggressive as those which 

Rommel was advocating would lack the 

degree of control essential to success. As 

soon as possible, Axis strategy required the 

extension westward of the bridgehead near 

Tunis so that it embraced at least the Djebel 

Abiod-Medjez el Bab road. The plans for 

the attacks on Sidi Bou Zid and Gafsa were 

therefore essentially defensive in concept. 

Because the Axis command left the ground 

forces to be co-ordinated rather than commanded, a swift adjustment of plans to take 

advantage of opportunities could not be 

made. 

10 Memo, German-Italian Panzer Army to C!0-

mando Supremo, 4 Feb 43, in Panzer Army A/nca, 

KTB, Anlagenband 8, Anlage 995. A blow through 

Gafsa and Sbeitla on Tebessa was earlier described 

as an objective of second priority on 19 January 

1943 in OKW /WFSt, KTB, 19 Jan 43. 
406 

Fifth Panzer Army had independent 

plans for the employment of both 10th 

Panzer Division and 21st Panzer Division. 

It also controlled the growing Division 

Centauro. Its southern boundary extended 

to the 34th parallel until 12 February, when 

the area for which Rommel's army was responsible was extended northward to include Gafsa, Sen ed, and Sfax, covering an 

area vital to the security of that army but 

beyond its power to defend effectively 

against strong simultaneous attacks there 

and in southern Tunisia. Thus the planning for what Rommel referred to as a 

"Gafsa operation" involved the use of troops 

chiefly controlled by von Arnim. The latter 

was planning to push back that part of the 

Allied forward line which ran between 

Pichon and Maknassy, using all his mobile 

troops not otherwise inextricably committed elsewhere.l1 

Comando Supremo first ordered an attack against the Gafsa area, primarily to 

destroy Allied forces, and only secondarily 

to gain territory. In this operation Rommel 

would command all armored and mobile 

elements of the two panzer armies not absolutely indispensable to operations on other 

fronts. The 10th Panzer and 21st Panzer 

Divisions from the northern army and the 

15th Panzer Division from the southern 

force would be supported by Fliegerkor/)s 

Tunis.'" 

When Kesselring, Rommel, and von 

Arnim met on 9 February to discuss these 

orders, the most recent reconnaissance reports revealed that American units were 

leaving Gafsa for more northerly stations. 

"Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Band 2, 3~13 Feb 

+3. 

"Rad, Comando Supremo to German-Italian and 

Fifth Panzer Armies, 8 Feb 43, in Panzer Arm)' 

A/rica, KTB, Anlagenband 8, Anlage 1016. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

The two army commanders then revised 

the plans. The attack was now to consist of 

an initial operation against Sidi Bou Zid by 

Fifth Panzer Army, using 10th Panzer and 

21 st Panzer Divisions, and a later joint attack under Rommel's command against 

Gafsa by a Kampfgruppe taken from the 

German Africa Corps and supported by elements of the 21 st Panzer Division. C omando Supremo revised its directive and 

Kesselring approved the plans to execute 

it. 13 

The armored strength of the Axis forces 

available for the attack at Sidi Bou Zid exceeded 200 Mark III and Mark IV tanks, 

plus 11 or 12 Mark VI Tigers. The 10th 

Panzer Division had 110 tanks in four battalions; 21st Panzer Division, 91 tanks in 

three battalions; and Division Superga had 

an attached German company with several 

Tigers. By delaying the attack on Gafsa until the elements of the 21st Panzer Division 

could also take part, a force of some 160 

tanks might be employed there. The 

armored units to be drawn from south 

Tunisia came to 53 German and 17 Italian 

tanks. H The Axis forces were matched by 

the 1st Armored Division, which had 202 

medium and 92 light tanks in operation, and 

lighter armored vehicles and artillery that 

considerably outnumbered those of the attacking force. 1

:; The American division, if 

concentrated, could provide formidable opAfrica, KTB. Band 2,9 Feb 

43. (2) MS (Kesselring), Pt. 2. (3) MS 

#C-075 (Kesselring), comments on MS #T~ 3 

(Nehring et aI.), Pt, 3a. 

"Memo, K raeftegegenueberstellung, 19 Feb 't~-\, 

in OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, File Tunis, 1O.XI.42-

2.V.43. 

n (1) 1st Armd Div Tank Status Rpt, 12 F"b 4-3, 

Entry 210, in II Corps G-3 In!' (2) Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Feb 43. Copy in Cine AF 

Diary, Bk. V, p. A-240-2. 
THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 407 

position to the forthcoming attack. But since 

its tanks had lighter armor and guns of 

shorter range, it would have to outnumber 

its opponents in a battle if its opposition was 

to be effective. 

Allocation of Axis forces to the two successive operations remained a matter of negotiation for about a week. Rommel was 

inclined to exaggerate the resistance still to 

be expected at Gafsa, and in addition to 

obtaining a promise of the major part of the 

21 st Panzer Division, nibbled at the rest 

of von Arnim's mobile armored units. Thus 

the blow at the southern flank of the British First Army in February originated as 

two separate, if related, operations under 

different commands. The first was an effort 

by von Arnim to complete his hold on the 

Eastern Dorsal from Faid north to Pichon, 

and perhaps to push the Allies well to the 

west. The second was Rommel's endeavor 

to disperse and destroy the American II 

Corps in the general vicinity of Gafsa. \\Then 

the first had been completed, the second 

could start, and von Arnim planned, after 

relinquishing the 21st Panzer Division, to 

bring as much as possible of 10th Panzer 

Division northward along the western edge 

of the Eastern Dorsal to gain full possession 

of the gaps at Fondouk el Aouareb and 

Pichon, and to roll up the Allied line north 

of Pichon. Beyond Sidi Bou Zid and Gafsa, 

the forces committed to these two operations were expected only to engage in reconnaissance toward Sbei:tla and Feriana, 

respectively.16 

16 (1) Rad, Comando Supremo to Fifth Panzer 

Army and Panzer Army Africa, 11 Feb 43, in Panzer 

Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 8, Anlage 1038. 

(2) Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Band 2,11-13 Feb 

43. 

Axis Plans for Taking Sidi Bou Zid 

and Gafsa 

The Fifth Panzer Army's attack against 

Sidi Bou Zid was placed under the direct 

command of General von Arnim's chief of 

staff, General Heinz Ziegler, and designated 

Operation FRUEHLINGSWIND on 8 

February. (Map 11) The 10th Panzer Division (now commanded by General von 

Broich) was ordered to move from its position near Kairouan by night marches, assemble east of Faid pass, get through before daybreak, and launch an attack along 

the Faid-Sbeitla road." The nonmotorized 

units of the 21st Panzer Division (Colonel 

Hildebrandt), which had been stationed 

near Faid since 31 January, would participate in a second phase of the attack against 

Sidi Bou Zid; but the division's mobile elements were to pass along the coastal side of 

the mountain chain to Maizila pass, about 

twenty miles farther south, and then to approach Sidi Bou Zid from the south and 

southwest. IS The 10th Panzer Division organized three assault groups: groups Gerhardt and Reimann, and a reserve force. 

Group Gerhardt was to open the operation 

by crossing F aid pass, then swinging to the 

northwest around Djebel Lessouda (644) 

to neutralize its defenders and to bar intervention from the direction of Sbeitla or 

Hadjeb el Aioun. This force was built 

around the 7th Panzer Regiment (less a 

battalion), and a battalion of the 69th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Group Reimann was to proceed along the highway 

11 Von Broich took command when General 

Fischer was killed on 1 February by an Italian mine. 

Fifth Panzer Army, KTB IV, 1 Feb 43. 

1R FO, Fifth Panzer Army, Nr. 260/43,8 Feb 43, 

in 21st Panzer Diu, la, KTB-Anlagen, Nr. 9, I.I.-

3I.III.43, Afrika (cited hereafter as 21st Panzer 

Diu, KTB Anlagen, Band 9). 
I 

" 

, • 

1 

• , ..... u 

1 .... ooo(n.' 

, ;1 ... ,1. 

MAP /I 
THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 409 

from Faid to Sbeitla toward the southeastern corner of Djebel Lessouda, and then to 

turn southwesterly for an attack on Sidi Bou 

Zid. This aggregation included the 86th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment (less a battalion) and a company of heavy Tiger tanks, 

plus one platoon of 88-mm. dual-purpose 

guns, as well as supplementary infantry, 

engineers, and artillery. The reserve 

(Kampfgruppe Lang) consisted of the 10th 

Motorcycle Battalion reinforced by armored 

engineers, an antitank gun platoon and two 

88-mm. dual-purpose gun detachments. 

From the hills east of Faid, most of the 

artillery of both the 10th and 21st Panzer 

Divisions would be employed to support the 

infantry attack. 19 

The 21st Panzer Division was organized 

for the operation into two combat teams: 

Kampfgruppe Schuette (with Headquarters, 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment) 

and Kampfgruppe Stenkhoff (with Headquarters, 5th Panzer Regiment). The core 

of each was a battalion of tanks, reinforced 

with armored infantry, supporting artillery, 

and flak. Schuette was to open Maizila pass 

for the main body of the division, and turn 

north against Sidi Bou Zid. While this 

secondary attack was driving the Allied 

troops back to the village and containing 

them there, Stenkhoff's group reinforced by 

a second battalion of tanks, was to execute 

a wide flanking maneuver. This move would 

take his force as far west as Bir el Hafey, 

about 25 miles cross country from Ma'izila 

pass. During this move, whose difficulty was 

by no means underestimated by General 

Ziegler, Colonel Stenkhoff's group would 

be protected on the southern flank by the 

580th Reconnaissance Battalion (rein19 FO, 10th Panzer Diu, 9 Feb 43, and supplement, 12 Feb 43, in 21st Panzer Diu, KTB Anlagen, 

Band 9. 

forced). From Bir el Hafey, Stenkhoff was 

to swing to the northeast and bear down 

on Sidi Bou Zid. This maneuver, if executed 

in time, would enable Stenkhoff's group to 

co-operate with units of the 10th Panzer 

Division, Group Schuette, and nonmobile 

elements located at Ain Rebaou pass, closing a ring around the AlIied force in Sidi 

Bou Zid. A force would be sent to clear 

the Allies from Djebel Garet Hadid (620) 

in order to deny its usefulness for observation. If the rather exacting schedule of the 

operation could be met by the 21 st Panzer 

Division, Combat Command A (reinforced), 1st Armored Division, would be 

caught and annihilated. 20 

The other operation, that against Gafsa, 

was planned and conducted by the German 

Africa Corps (DAK) staff. The Kampfgruppe DAK which they assembled was a 

composite German-Italian force in division 

strength consisting of infantry and armored 

units supported by artillery, flak, and miscellaneous other detachments. It was placed 

under the command of Colonel Freiherr 

Kurt von Liebenstein, formerly commanding officer of the 164th Light Africa Division. 21 Kampfgruppe DAK was to move 

against Gafsa from the southeast. The elements approaching it from Gabes would 

be joined by mobile Italians at their station 

near EI Guettar. Mobile elements would be 

drawn from the 21 st Panzer Division operat-

,. (1) FO, 21st Panzer Diu, Nr. 102/43, 12 Feb 

43, in 21st Panzer Diu, KTB, Anlagen, Band 9. (2) 

Gefechtsbericht ueber die Kampfhandlungen im 

Abschnitt Faid uam 13.-18.1I.43 (cited hereafter 

as Gefechtsbericht Faid), in Fifth Panzer Army, 

Anlage zum Kriegstagebuch IV A (cited hereafter 

as KTB, Anlagen, Band IV A), 1.-26.1I.43, Anlage 

117. 

H (I) Panzer A rmy Africa, KT B, Band 2, 10 Feb 

43. (2) MS # D-124, Beitrag zum Varstass ueber 

Gafsa gegen den Kasserine-Pass (Generalleutnant 

Freiherr Kurt von Liebenstein). 
410 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

37-MM ANTITANK GUN (M3Al) AND CREW waltJor the expected enemy coLumn 

through Faid Pass, 14 February 1943. 

ing in the area of Sidi Bou Zid to reinforce 

the DAK for its drive on Gafsa. The objective was the Gafsa basin, but Rommel 

in persistent adherence to his original proposals had in mind the possibility of exploiting as far as Tebessa. 22 

On 13 February, Rommel, von Arnim, 

and General Hans Seidemann, the Luftwaffe commander, met General Ziegler and 

his division commanders at La Fauconnerie 

east of Fald pass to review plans, confirm 

boundaries, and reach full understanding of 

respective roles and missions. Rommel was 

inclined to be pessimistic about what lay 

ahead of the force approaching Gafsa, but 

von Arnim was confident that the bulk of the 

American forces would be drawn to his 

'2 (I ) Rpt, German-Italian Panzer Army to 

Coman do Supremo, 16 Feb 43, in Panzer Army 

Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1081 / 4. The 

Gafsa operation was termed UnteT7<ehmen MORGENLUFT. ( 2) FO, Panzer Army Africa, Nr. 1, 

in Panzer Army Africa, Anlagenband 8, Anlage 

1028/ 1. 

front, and that Gafsa would be lightly held. 

Ziegler again assured Rommel that the 21st 

Panzer Division would be detached at the 

first possible moment to reinforce von 

Liebenstein. Then Ziegler and Colonel 

Heinz Pomp tow, his operations officer, went 

to the hills overlooking F aid village and 

the Sidi Bou Zid plain for a final reconnaissance before the attack!~ 

The Battle of Sidi Bou Zid, 14 February 

Combat Command A was waiting for the 

enemy column whi ch came through Fald 

pass at 0630, 14 February. Plans had been 

prepared to cope with possible enemy moves 

through that defile or through the gaps immediately north or south of it. In compliance 

with the II Corps orders of 11 February, a 

"Lessouda Force" of infantry, tanks, artillery, and tank destroyers, commanded by Lt. 

"(I) 21st Panzer Diu, KTB, 13 Feb 43. ( 2 ) 

Gefechtsbericht Fa/d. 
THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 411 

Col. John K. Waters, executive officer of the 

1 st Armored Regiment, had been stationed 

on Djebel Lessouda, north of Sidi Bou Zid. 24 

Engineers assisted in preparing defensive 

positions on the hill. The force sent out 

patrols each night. The tanks, tank destroyers, and artillery occupied varying positions 

on the flat during the day, and retired after 

dark to others within the defensive area 

where they remained until just before daylight. The Lessouda Force was expected to 

block an attack until a mobile armored reserve of about forty tanks (3d Battalion, 1 st 

Armored Regiment) under Lt. Col. Louis V. 

Hightower, stationed nearer Sidi Bou Zid 

than the Lessouda Force, counterattacked. 

An artillery-infantry observation post on 

Djebel Lessouda was in communication with 

the command posts of both Lessouda Force 

and Combat Command A, 1 st Armored 

Division, in Sidi Bou Zid. 

A similar arrangement was made by the 

168th Combat Team (less 1 st and 2d Battalions) and a platoon of the 109th Engineers on Djebel Ksaira (560), under Colonel Drake. The 91 st Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery B) and 2d Battalion, 17th 

Field Artillery Regiment (155-mm. howitzers), were placed astride the Sidi Bou 

Zid-Ain Rebaou road at the base of 

Djebel Ksaira, where they were protected 

by elements of the 443d Coast Artillery 

(AA) Battalion (SP). From an observation post there, watchers could note enemy 

activity along the road to Meheri Zebbeus. 

On 13 February, a strong northwest wind 

smothered all sounds except of tank motors to the east after dark, but though faint 

"It consisted of the 2d Battalion, 168th Infantry 

(reinforced) (less Company E); Company G, and 

Reconnaissance Company, 1st Armored R,.giment; 

Battery B, 91 st Field Artillery; and one heavy platoon of Company A, 701st Tank Destroyer 

Battalion. 

they were heard and reported. All units 

were therefore alerted and trains were ordered back to Sbei'tla. At 2130, Colonel 

Waters conferred at Combat Command A's 

command post in Sidi Bou Zid with General McQuillin and Col. Peter C. Hains, 

III, commanding officer of the 1st Armored Regiment. Waters then returned to 

Djebel Lessouda to await the enemy.20 

Elements of the 86th Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment and the 7th Panzer Regiment 

began emerging from Faid pass onto the 

misty plain about 0630, 14 February. As 

they started northwestward toward Djebel 

Lessouda they encountered some of the 

patrolling tanks of Company G, 1st Armored Regiment, under command of Maj. 

Norman Parsons. 21i Early in the action 

Major Parsons' tank was knocked out, and 

with it all radio communications with Colonel Waters was destroyed at a time when 

light was not yet sufficient for direct observation that far from Djebel Lessouda. 

The prepared artillery barrage on Faid pass 

was consequently not requested. But the 

Americans soon recognized that a tank battle was in progress near the pass, the proportions of which could not yet be appreciated. "To clear up the situation," Combat 

Command A sent Companies H and I, 1st 

Armored Regiment, and most of Company 

A, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (75-

mm. guns), up the road from Sidi Bou Zid 

to Poste de Lessouda. As the men got 

started, the first of several Axis air strikes 

in the area that day began. Then they were 

"" ( 1) Rpt by Col Hains, 12 Mar 43, in 1 st 

Armd Div Hist Reds; 1st Armd Regt AAR, 10 Jul 

43; CCA 1st Armd Div AAR, 23 Jan-26 Feb 43. 

(2) Interv with Col Hains, 26 Apr 51. 

2<; (1) See n. 24. (2) Ltr, Col Louis V. Hightower 

to Col Hamilton H. Howze (then G-3, 1st Armd 

Div), 1 J ul 46. In private possession. (3) Info 

supplied by Brig Gen Raymond E. McQuillin 

(Ret.). OCMH. 
412 

warned from Djebel Lessouda that about 

twenty Mark IV tanks were at Poste de 

Lessouda, apart from whatever force was 

still engaged near the pass. The American 

armored force under Colonel Hightower 

came within sight and range of the enemy 

a few minutes later, and was subjected to 

fire from what were believed to be 88-mm. 

guns and from perhaps as many as four 

Mark VI Tiger tanks. Hightower's men 

might have cleared up doubts concerning 

the strength of the enemy, but they were 

outranged and were unable to drive him 

off or destroy him. 

The next discoveries reported from Djebel 

Lessouda were that the first engagement 

near the pass had ended without information of what had become of Company G, 1st 

Armored Regiment, and that there was 

movement toward the northern end of the 

hill by an enemy force of eighty armored 

vehicles and trucks. By 0900, the enemy's 

strength already on the western side of 

Djebel Lessouda was described as thirtynine Mark IV tanks, perhaps a few Mark 

VI's, and mobile infantry. This force moved 

very slowly southward toward the road from 

Faid to Sbeitla, firing on the slopes of Djebel 

Lessouda as it passed. Colonel Hightower 

was warned of the approach of this second 

force which might cut him off. He redirected Company H, 1st Armored Regiment, 

to delay the enemy, and with Lt. Col. 

Charles P. Summerall, Jr.'s, 91st Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery B, which had 

been in the path of the first attack and was 

now about to be caught again, this time 

from the rear) opposed this strong northern 

prong of the enemy attack by fire and 

maneuver. American losses were heavy, and, 

in the last hour of the morning, the unequal 

contest ended in a withdrawal southwestward. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Heavy attacks by dive bombers and 

fighter-bombers between 1000 and 1100 

supported ground attacks on Sidi Bou Zid 

from Faid village and Ain Rebaou pass. 

These ground attacks were intended to pin 

down General McQuillin's forces and permit the armored columns to close in from 

the northwest and southwest. The enemy's 

drive was recognized as too powerful for the 

defenders, but they held on under division 

orders as the situation deteriorated. The 2d 

Battalion, 17th Field Artillery, was ordered 

from its exposed positions east of Sidi Bou 

Zid to an area southwest of the village. As 

it moved back by batteries, enemy dive 

bombers repeatedly struck it and eventually 

destroyed it as a fighting unit. 21 

At the same time that the 10th Panzer 

Division and part of the 21st Panzer Division were preparing to attack through 

Faid pass, the mobile elements of the 21st 

Panzer Division had moved southward to 

Maizila pass, and after darkness 13-14 

February, started through it. The first elements of Kampfgruppe Schuette followed 

by the 5th Panzer Regiment began emerging from a path through a mine field there 

shortly after 0600. The soft sand of the road 

through the pass proved hard going for the 

tanks and slowed the rate of advance. Reconnaissance to the north revealed no Allied 

threat. Indeed, no contact with Allied forces 

occurred until, at 0920, low-flying planes 

strafed one of the marching columns. 28 But 

at 0940, Company C, 81st Reconnaissance 

Battalion, reported to the 1st Armored Division that twenty unidentified vehicles were 

27 Ltr, Lt Col Henry P. Ward to Col Charles E. 

Hart, 16 Feb 43, in 17th FA Regtl Hist. 

"(1) II Corps C-3 Jnl, 14 Feb 43, Entry 314. 

(2) 1 st Lt Frank S. Sears, Supply Operations in 

Combat, 1 May 48. The Artillery School, Cen 

Instruc Dept. (3) 21st Panzer Diu, KTB, 13-17 

Feb 43. 
THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 413 

emerging from Ma"izila pass, ten going west 

and ten north. A little later, Company A 

in the pass south of Djebel Matleg (477) 

was cut off and captured with all its vehicles. 

The road from Ma"izila pass to Sidi Bou 

Zid ran between Djebel Ksalra on the east 

and Djebel Garet Hadid on the west. The 

elements of Colonel Drake's command 

which moved onto Djebel Garet Hadid during the morning attack saw an enemy force 

of about thirty vehicles, approaching along 

this road at noon, a force they had been 

warned to expect. They engaged it in the 

defile, the skirmish continuing throughout 

the afternoon. This column, an advance 

element of Kampfgruppe Schuette was 

joined by the remainder of that group late 

in the afternoon. 29 Meanwhile, Group 

Stenkho If, the main force of the 21 st Panzer 

Division, pushed along the northern edge 

of Djebel Meloussi (622) under the eyes 

of its commander, Colonel Hildebrandt, 

screened to the west and south by the 580th 

Reconnaissance Battalion. Progress was interrupted chiefly by muddy dips in the plain 

or mechanical failures in some of the vehicles. Opposition on the ground was nil. 

Group Stenkho If reached Bir el Hafey 

on the Gafsa-Sidi Bou Zid highway about 

noon, assembled, and at 1345 proceeded 

in force northeastward along the highway 

toward Sidi Bou Zid, some eighteen miles 

distant. 

Reports of the battle filtering through 

from General Ward's headquarters to that 

of General Fredendall near Tebessa were 

sketchy. The successive appearance of the 

enemy's armored groups left total numbers 

in considerable doubt. The reported loss of 

'''(1) 21st Panzer Diu, KTB, 14 Feb 43. (2) 

Memo. Col Drake for G-2 WD, 14 May 45, sub: 

Account of l68th Inf Opns 24 Dl"c 42-17 Feb 43. 

DRB AGO. 

artillery and the identification of Mark VI's 

among the enemy tanks brought early requests from the division for reinforcing 

artillery. The II Corps shifted a battery of 

the 68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 

and two platoons of Company A, 805th 

Tank Destroyer Battalion, from Fcriana to 

Sbeltla. 

General Ward at first did not consider 

the situation grave,30 but when towards 

noon, the loss of about half the tanks of 

Hightower's 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, was reported, along with the fact 

that the force south of Sidi Bou Zid was 

described as very substantial, it became clear 

that not only had Djebel Lessouda been 

surrounded but that Colonel Drake's troops 

were marooned on Djebel Ksalra and 

Djebel Garet Hadid. It also became apparent that elements of McQuillin's force 

in and around Sidi Bou Zid were being 

driven out and would have to move without delay to avoid being caught on both 

flanks. Authorization to pull out was finally 

given to McQuillin early in the afternoon. 

By 1405, Combat Command A's command 

post was seven miles southwest of Sidi Bou 

Zid, Hightower's depleted tank force was 

stubbornly covering the withdrawal of Combat Command A, fighting off a threat from 

Group Stenkholf on the southwestern flank, 

and Colonel Drake's infantry force by division order was necessarily left in isolation 

until it could be relieved by a counterattack 

already being planned for the next morning. 

It could not have withdrawn in daylight 

without being subjected to repeated air 

attack and heavy losses."' 

'0 Rpt by Gen Welvert, in DMC Jnl, 14 Feb 43. 

'I (I) Entries 303, 307, 309, 334, 335, and 353, 

in II Corps G-3 Jnl, 14 Feb 43. (2) Ltr, Col Hightower to Col Howze, I Jul 46. In private possession. 

(3) 168th Inf AAR, 12 Nov 42-15 May 43. 
414 

Diebel K SO.,o 

CHILL ~60J 

I 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

OJObel Garel Hgd,d 

I HILL 620-

F AID PASS, looking southwest. 

From division reserve near Sbeitla, General Ward had sent the 1 st Battalion, 6th 

Armored Infantry (Colonel Kern) , and one 

company of light tanks during the morning 

to a crossroads eleven miles northwest of 

Sidi Bou Zid on the Sbeitla-Faid road.:l~ It 

established a protective line west of which 

Combat Command A could reorganize, 

after a cross-country retreat via Zaafria. 

During this withdrawal some vehicles were 

stalled in soft sand or in the wadies and 

were left behind to be salvaged after dark. 

Long-range artillery and tank fire harried 

the Americans, and some of Stenkhoff"s 

tanks threatened to disrupt the movement 

"' This point was known thereafter to the 1st 

Armored Division as "Kern's Crossroads." 

by penetrating the southwestern flank. Colonel Hightower's own tank moved to this 

danger point, where alone it knocked out 

several enemy vehicles and drove off the 

remainder; at the very end of the engagement his tank was itself destroyed but its 

crew escaped. At dusk, Combat Command 

A, less the isolated troops of the 168th Infantry, began arriving at the rallying point 

near Djebel Hamra (673), where it reorganized for defense of Sbeitla .. "l Thus, Com-

" (I) Based on AAR's of CCA 1st Armed Div, 

168th Inf, 3d Bn 1st Armd Regt, 1st Bn 6th Armd 

Inf, and Co A 70lst TD Bn. (2) M. Sgt. Clarence 

W. Coley, A Day With the 1st Armored Division, 6 

Jul 51, in George F. Howe, The Battle History of 

the I st A rmore d Division (Washington, 1954), pp. 

150-53. (3) Info supplied by Gen McQuillin, 13 

Jan 51. OCMH. 
THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 415 

'0 S8EITLA 

OJEBEL LESSOUOA 

j t-t'll 64. I 

POI'O d. Lonoudo 

SIDI BOU ZID, looking northeast. 

bat Command A, which might have been of the 91st Armored Field ArtIllery Battalpursued and perhaps destroyed, was able ion, and all the ISS-mm. howitzers of the 

to get away. 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery.34 

At 1705, Croup StenkhofJ established At 1530, General Ziegler considered that 

contact with elements of the 10th Panzer his initial mission had been achieved. He 

Division west of Sidi Bou Zid. By nightfall, 

that village was firmly held by the Germans. 

Its former Allied defenders had withdrawn 

toward Sbei'tla or had been caught and isolated on Djebel Lessouda, Djebel Ksa'ira, 

and Djebel Garet Hadid. On the plain west 

of Sidi Bou Zid, abandoned, burning, or 

broken-down vehicles marked the route of 

withdrawal. Combat Command A's losses 

had been heavy: 6 killed, 22 wounded, 134 

missing, 44 tanks, all but 2 tank destroyer 

guns, 9 of the authorized IOS-mm. pieces 

ordered the 10th Panzer Division to recon-

" ( 1) Rpt by Col H ains, 12 Mar 43, and Rpt 

by Col Hightower, 1 Jul 46, in 1st Armd Div Hist 

Reds. (2) 10th Panzer Diu, Ie, Taetigkeitsbericht , 

14 Feb 43, lists the following Allied losses: 71 

prisoners, 40 tanks, 7 armored personnel carriers, 

15 self-propelled mounts, 1 antitank gun, 9 machine 

guns, 1 prime mover, 4 trucks, and 18 other vehicles. 

(3) The initial estimate of Combat Command A's 

losses in personnel was 62 officers and 1,536 enlisted 

men killed, wounded, or missing in action (see Msg, 

G- 3 1st Armd Div to' G-3 II Corps, 0745, 16 Feb 

43, Entry 116 in II Corps G-3 Jnl). Of these, 573 

were 1st Armored Division troops (see 1st Armd 

Div G- 3 Jnl, 14 Feb 43). 
416 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

SPAHIS WITHDRAWING FROM THE SIDI BOU ZID AREA, 14 February 

1943. 

noiter aggressively to Hadjeb el Aioun, 

twenty-five miles north of Sidi Bou Zid, the 

21 st Panzer Division (reinforced ) to assemble for an expeditious move against Gafsa, 

probably starting at noon next day, and 

both divisions to employ some of their nonmobile units in mopping up around Sidi Bou 

Zid. The fact that the tenacious defense of 

Djebel Ksaira and Djebel Garet Hadid by 

the Americans was proving troublesome, 

and the possibility of an American counterattack deterred Group Ziegler from dispersing to any great extent. 3 5 

Allied divisional reserves at Sbeitla consisted of the light tank battalion ( 1st ) of the 

13th Armored Regiment at about halfstrength; the 1 st Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry; Company B, 16th Armored Engi-

,., Gefechtsbericht Faid. 

neers; and two antiaircraft guns of Battery 

B, 443d Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion 

(SP ). The French units in the area were 

not equipped with weapons suited to successful counterattack on an enemy who employed Mark IV and Mark VI tanks, 88-

mm. dual-purpose guns, and other modern 

arms. For that matter, neither were the 

Americans, although they were far more 

fortunate in their armament and much more 

mobile than the French. 

Allied PrelJarations for Counterattack 

To make the next day's counterattack, 

General Ward brought south from Hadjeb 

el Aioun Colonel Stack's Combat Command C, and via II Corps got First Army 

to release to him the 2d Battalion, 1 st Armored Regiment (Lt. Col. James D. Alger ), 
THE ENEMY STRIKES AT CS. II CORPS 417 

from Combat Command B near Maktar. 

The arrangements were completed shortly 

after noon, 14 February. Alger's battalion 

took to the road that afternoon using the 

new twenty-twa-mile route between El Ala 

and Hadjeb el Aioun which had been constructed by American Engineers. 

The enemy was much stronger than the 

Americans realized. Among other indications of their misapprehension was the small 

size of the reinforcement requested. General Welvert emphasized to the Chief of 

Staff, French XIX Corps, that all of Combat Command B should be sent to Sbei:tla 

and early on 14 February, in view of what 

seemed to him the slowness of II Corps' 

decisions, tried to expedite action at General Anderson's headquarters through 

French channels.as But First Army would 

not release Combat Command B from 

Maktar for commitment near Sbei'tla even 

on the basis of the situation as estimated 

late on 14 February. No unit of the 10th 

Panzer Division had been identified in the 

Sidi Bou Zid attack. The total number of 

tanks, computed at from 90 to 130, could 

be those of the 21st Panzer Division and 

the separate 190th Panzer Battalion only, 

without including any from the 10th Panzer Division. If that calculation was correct, the Allies reasoned, the 10th Panzer 

Division was remaining opposite the French 

XIX Corps for an attack there, and Combat Command B would be needed in the 

area. Indeed, it was decided that Alger's 

battalion would have to be replaced, a requirement which First Army was happily 

3. (1) DMC Jnl, 14 Feb 43. (2) Phone Convs, 

Fredendall to Ward, 1250 and 1305, 14 Feb 43, 

Entries 318 and 330; Phone ConY, Anderson to 

Fredendall, 1300, 14 Feb Entry 329; Rad, Adv 

First Army to II Corps, 14 Feb 43, Entry 

346. II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

able to meet because it had anticipated 

some such need and on the previous day 

had called back the 16/5 Lancers Regiment from Ebba Ksour, where it was engaged in exchanging old tanks for new.37 

General Eisenhower left II Corps headquarters late in the morning of 14 February 

and with Truscott and others drove to Constantine, sight-seeing at Timgad en route. 

The word of an attack at Sidi Bou Zid was 

not believed to indicate a major offensive. 

But as news came to the AFHQ advance 

command post on the next two days, General Eisenhower participated in the decision 

to hold Allied strength in central Tunisia 

and to evacuate Gafsa. The enemy's power 

and apparent intentions indicated that 

Gafsa could not be successfully defended but 

that there was time for an orderly withdrawal spread out over two successive nights. 

All supplies and transportation equipment 

could be removed and the place boobytrapped and mined. First Army's orders to 

bring back the French on the first night and 

the Americans on the second were questioned by II Corps on the ground that 

secrecy could not be maintained and that 

the enemy would interfere with the second 

night's operations. 

The actual evacuation of Gafsa was accomplished during the night of 14~ 15 F ehruary, a night of rather confused and excited 

activity, especially on the part of civilians 

who could remember the brief Axis occupation of the preceding November. The troops 

pulled back as far as Feriana. The medical 

services of the 51st Medical Battalion and 

48th Surgical Hospital moved farther back. 

31 (I) Phone Cony, Col Arnold with Col Williams, 1900, 14 Feb 43, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. (2) 

Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (3) 

Msg, Eisenhower to CCS (Review 30),15 Feb 43, 

NAF 149. (4) Adv First Army Sitrep, 1700, 15 

Feb 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 97. 
418 

The railroad bridge north of Gafsa was prematurely demolished before all the rolling 

stock had been removed; it was therefore 

taken west to Metlaoui where it was concealed in a tunnel. In the old Kasba of the 

abandoned town six tons of French ammunition were blown up, unfortunately 

damaging adjacent buildings and injuring 

their native occupants. Last to leave Gafsa 

was the 1 st Ranger Battalion. The movement to Feriana was covered on the east by 

Squadrons Band D of the 1st Derbyshire 

Yeomanry. 

While the U.S. II Corps pulled in its 

southwestern flank from Gafsa and extracted reinforcements from north of Sbeltla, 

its northern boundary was shifted so that 

after midnight, 14--15 February, Thala 

(north of Kasserine) , Sbiba (north of 

Sbeltla), and Fondouk e1 Aouareb gap, all 

fell in the area of General Koeltz's Corps.s" 

First Army suspended all scheduled reliefs 

of French units and arranged to cover the 

gap between Djebel Trozza (997) and Djebel el Abe'id (697), south of EI Ala, by the 

U.S. 133d Combat Team, and to block the 

road leading into Sbiba from the east with a 

French force, the 1st Battalion, 1st Algerian 

,. (1) Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 16 Feb 43. 

Copy in WDCSA 381 Africa. (2) Msg 0-409, Adv 

First Army to II Corps, 14 Feb 43. AFHQ CofS 

Cable Log, 96. (3) Msg, CG II Corps to CG .First 

Army, 0035, 15 Feb 43, Entry 2, in II Corps G-3 

Jnl. (4) Adv First Army Sitrep, 1700, 15 Feh 43. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 97. (5) Memo. Brig 

Whiteley for G-2 and G-3 AFHQ, containing Phone 

ConY, Whiteley with Brig C. V. McNabb, 1850, 14 

Feb 43. AFHQ Micro Job 26, Reel 71 Spec. (6) 

DMC Jnl, 14 Feb 43. (7) II Corps AAR, 2 May 

par. 5. (8) 175th FA Bn War Diary, 14-15 Feb 

(9) Msg, II Corps Surgeon to G-4 II Corps, 

1950, 14 Feb 43, Entry 386, in II Corps G-3 JnL 

(10) Rpt by Capt John D. Upton. in 19th Engr 

Rt"gt (Cl Hist Reds, Oct 42-Jan 44. (11) Interv 

with Brig Gen Frederic B. Butler, II Jan 50. 

"Msg, II Corps to CG 1 st Armd Div, 20 I 0, 14 

Feh 43, Entry 369, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Infantry, and with artillery, tanks, and antitank guns. East of Kasserine village, the 19th 

Combat Engineers (Col. Anderson T. W. 

Moore) began to arrive that night to organize a defense line. III 

Late on 14 February General Fredendall 

received the following instructions from 

First Army: 

As regards action in the Sidi Bou Zid area, 

concentrate tomorrow on clearing up situation there and destroying enemy. Thereafter 

colleet strong mobile force in Sbeitla area 

ready for action in any direction, Press 

on with defenses as ordered ... 7 February ... ,41 

The decision to counterattack with Combat Command C, reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, had been 

adopted before this optimistic directive was 

received. During the following morning, 

while the counterattack was being launched, 

General Fredendall's order to General 'Ai ard 

specified: 

Desire you carry out plan to withdraw 

168th Infantry from positions on DjebeI 

Lessouda and Djebel Ksaira. Place 168th 

Infantry on new position Djcbel Hamra. Details of withdrawal left to your judgment but 

should be designed for maximum security of 

infantry withdrawing.42 

General 'Vard defined Colonel Stack's mission in the following terms: 

MISSION TO COMBAT COMMAND C 

This force will move south, and by fire 

and maneuver destroy the enemy armored 

forces which have threatened our hold on the 

Sbeitla area. It will so conduct its maneuver 

as to aid in the withdrawal of our forcf's in the 

,. (1) XIX Corps Jnl, 14 Feb 43. (2) 19th Engr 

Rpg-t (e). Hi5t Reds, Oct 42~Jan 44. 

11 Msg 0-409, Adv First Army to II Corps, 14 

FFb 43. AFHQ CoES Cabk Log, 96. 

12 Ms£(. CG II Corps to CO 15t Armd Div, 1120, 

15 FFb 43. Entry 17, in II Corps 0-3 Jnl. 
THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 419 

vicinity of Dj Ksaira, eventually withdrawing 

to the area north of Dj Hamra for further 

action.4" 

Colonel Stack's orders had to be prepared 

with the aid of two small-scale maps of the 

anticipated battle area, and in lieu of adequate reconnaissance by Stack's own attacking force, of supplementary data provided 

by two officers of the Reconnaissance Company, 1st Annored Regiment, and by Colonel Hains, all of whom had been in the 

preceding day's battle. Stack understood 

the enemy's strength to consist of forty 

tanks north of Sidi Bou Zid and fifteen to 

twenty tanks south of it, belonging to enemy 

units not yet identified. By pushing a column 

through or beyond Sidi Bou Zid, he might 

succeed in screening the withdrawal of the 

southernmost American groups under Lt. 

Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., on Djebel 

Ksai"ra and Colonel Drake on Djebel Garet 

Hadid. The Lessouda Force under Colonel 

'Vaters could be assisted in a subsequent and 

much easier operation. 44 

The Counterattack at Sidi Bou Zid, 

15 February 

Combat Command C, including Alger's 

2d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, reinforced, after its arrival from Maktar, 

marched south from Hadjeb el Ai"oun on 

15 February over a fairly direct road to an 

assembly area northeast of Djebel Hamra." 

"Original in CCC 1st Armd Diy Opns Jnl, 

Feb 43. 

"Msg, Lt Col Hamilton H. Howze to CCC 1st 

Armd Diy, 1350, 15 Feb 43, and Phonc ConY, Cols 

Williams, Hamlett, and Arnold, 1900, 14 Feb 43, 

in II Corps G~3 Jnl. 

I"~ For the counterattack of 15 February 1943 at 

Sidi Bou Zid, Combat Command C consisted of: 

the 6th Armored Infantry (less the 1st and 2d 

Battalions); the 2d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, Company G, 13th Armored Regiment; thc 

Leading elements reached the assembly area 

by 0945, but the column was strafed by enemy planes near the end of its march and 

did not complete reorganizing until just 

after noon, when it began the attack. 

From Colonel Stack's command post on 

Djebel Hamra, the battlefield stretched out 

below with unimpeded view for miles 

through the clear dry atmosphere of a sunny 

afternoon. Even through field glasses, Sidi 

Bou Zid, about 13 miles distant, was a tiny 

spot of dark hued evergreens and white 

houses behind which rose the hazy slopes of 

Djebel Ksai"ra. At the left was Djebel Lessouda, toward which the road from Sbei"tla. 

extended as straight as a taut string, and 

from which Colonel Waters radioed reports 

of what could be seen from its heights. On 

the right, the road from Bir el Hafey slanting northeastward to Sidi Bou Zid could be 

identified, and roughly parallel with it, the 

long ridge of Djebel el Kebar (793). There 

was considerable mirage. The dips and folds 

of the plain were for the most part gradual, 

but several steep-sided deeper wadies 

creased it in general from north to south. 

The monotonous brown-gray of the landscape was marked at various points by 

patches of darker cactus, by the geometric 

figures of cultivated fields and orchards, and 

by small clusters of low, block-shaped white 

buildings. At 1240 the attacking formation 

started over this expanse with great precision until its vehicles were reduced by distance to the size of insects, and obscured by 

heavy dust. 

701st Tank Destro)",r Battalion (less Companies 

A and C) ; the 68th Field Artillery Battalion (less 

Battery A); the 1st Platoon, Company D, 16th 

Armored Enginel'r Battalion; thl' 1st Platoon, 443d 

Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion (SP); a detachm('nt of Company B, 13th Armored R('giment; and 

Company A, 47th Armored Medical Battalion. Sec 

II Gorps G~3 Jnl, 1420, 15 Feb 43, Entry 28. 
420 

In the lead were the tanks. They started 

slowly southeastward in column of companies, led by Company D, followed by 

Company F, the assault guns, and Company 

E in that order. Tank destroyers were 

grouped on each wing. The artillery and 

then the infantry in half-tracks followed. At 

1 340 a formation of ten to twelve enemy 

fighters and nine enemy bombers swept over 

the column for the first time, strafing and 

bombing it near Djebel Hamra. An hour 

later the Germans dive-bombed Sidi Bou 

Zid well in advance of the American force, 

and at 1630 subjected the infantry to another bombing just as it passed through the 

artillery positions. In 

While Colonel Stack's force was delayed 

by enemy air attack, the Germans found 

time to prepare for their scheme of defense. 

Three companies of Group Stenkhoff were 

to strike the American south flank while elements of Group Gerhardt, from a position 

northwest of Sidi Salem, were to envelop 

Combat Command C from the north flank. 

Three heavy and two light batteries began 

firing briskly on the attacking force after 

withholding fire until it had neared its objective and its tanks were all in range. 

Stukas joined the ground forces in opposing 

the American advance. Enemy planes were 

also used to divert attention from a slow 

shift by elements of the 5th Panzer Re[!,imen! aimed at turning the southern flank. l7 

A steady stream of radio reports from 

Djebel Lessouda and Djebel Ksaira to Combat Command C via the 1 st Armored Division described enemy movements and 

indicated that the Axis forces, although 

large, were considerably dispersed. Colonel 

Stack was urged to push on aggressively 

'" CCC 1st Armd Div Jnl, IS Feb 43. 

" (I) Gefechtsbericht Faid, IS Feb 43. (2) Int('n' witb Col Hains, 26 Apr 51. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

while he retained this advantage."' Colonel 

Alger's tanks could cross the series of wadies 

in the path of attack only at a few points. 

Toward these crossings his armored units 

converged in temporary concentrations before again spreading out in attack formation. While Company D, 1st Armored Regiment, was reconnoitering to find a way 

across the first great ditch, at a point a little 

beyond the village of Sadaguia on the left 

flank, a tank destroyer platoon entered that 

village and there the enemy's first resistance, 

a Stuka attack, knocked it out. The tanks, 

with one exception, crossed the first wadi 

successfully and after fanning out resumed 

the advance toward the second. As they arrived at the one good crossing point there, 

the enemy opened up with air burst and 

then with antitank artillery fire. On the 

northern flank, an enemy battery including 

four 88-mm. and two 47-mm. antitank guns 

had been waiting in concealment. Before 

their fire took effect, they were observed and 

overrun by the advance platoon of Company D, 1st Armored Regiment. The air 

burst, coming from artillery pieces emplaced 

on the shoulders of Djebel el Kebar and 

other vantage points to the southeast, forced 

the tank crews to "button up" and to continue movement with restricted vision. 

While Company E, in reserve, remained 

near the second wadi, Companies D and F, 

and the assault guns pushed on. Batteries B 

and C, 68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, took up firing positions and began 

counterbattery fire, or shelled enemy tanks, 

in response to calls from forward observers 

in the leading American vehicles. As the infantry began to pass through the artillery, 

an air attack struck the area and threw the 

troops into some confusion. 

"Msg, CG 1st Armd Div to cee, 1422, IS Feb 

43, in ece Jnl. 
THE ENEMY STRIKES AT U.S. II CORPS 421 

The tanks arriving at the third wadi came 

under much heavier fire, especially on the 

southern flank. Company D on the north 

was able to send tanks into the village of 

Sidi Salem, where they shot up the buildings and a motor pool to the east, and 

stopped the progress of an enemy tank force 

trying to pass the village's northern edge. 

But when Company D tried to emerge 

northeast of the village, heavy fire from the 

north drove the tanks back to cover. Company F moved toward the area south of Sidi 

Bou Zid along a route in defilade pointed 

out by Colonel Alger. Alger's tank, while 

heading back toward Sidi Salem to rejoin 

Company D, was knocked out. The radio 

operator was killed but the others survived, 

only to be captured. Company E, in the 

meantime, came forward and pressed toward the village and then, about 1630, encountered the spearhead of an enemy armored force striking from the northern 

flank. Company F became involved at about 

the same time against a similar thrust from 

the south. On either flank, the enemy sent 

additional enveloping forces. That at the 

south escaped detection until it had reached 

a threatening position from which it was 

finally driven off by Battery C, 68th Armored Artillery Battalion. The threat nonetheless remained and caused the attacking 

American forces to start a hurried withdrawal. The enemy's slowly advancing column, reinforced with Tiger tanks, heading 

toward the deep northern flank in the area 

of Kern's Crossroads, was reported from 

Djebel Lessouda in time for Combat Command C to commit its reserve company of 

medium tanks (Company G, 13th Armored 

Regiment) to try to intercept it. The company took a course too far to the northwest 

and missed the enemy, who turned southward into the battle area, thus avoiding also 

some long-range fire from the 91st Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion near Djebel 

Hamra. 

At 1645, Colonel Stack reported to General Ward that it had become doubtful that 

Combat Command C would reach Djebel 

Ksaira before sundown. A few minutes 

later, when Colonel Alger was asked by 

Stack to report his situation and to state 

what help he could use, he replied laconically: "Still pretty busy. Situation in hand. 

No answer to second question. Further details later." Then his radio went silent. His 

further details were reserved until the year 

1945, when he was released from imprisonment and could supply an account based 

on the recollections which he and his fellow captives from the battalion had shared 

during the intervening period. By 1740, 

the armored infantry was escaping the 

threatened envelopment. The tank battalion, whose losses were already severe, 

started back through a gantlet of enemy 

antitank fire from which only four emerged 

that evening. A few dismounted crews also 

escaped. After darkness had fallen, the 68th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion (less 

Battery A), marched from the battlefield 

where it had been briefly cut off at dusk, 

leaving the enemy in possession and many 

fires blazing. The Germans energetically 

salvaged both their own equipment and 

that left behind by the Americans, but two 

months later, more than forty rusting tanks 

were found when the Allies recovered control over that region.~!1 Thus on the second 

10 (1) CCC 1st Armd Div Jnl, 15 Feb 43. (2) 

10th Panzer Diu, Ie, Taetigkeitsberieht, 15 Feb 43. 

(3) Ltr, Col Drake to Gcn Ward, 15 Jan 51. 

OCMH. (4) Interv with Col Hains, 26 Apr 51. 

(5) Rpt by Lt Col James D. Alger, The Attack 

on Sidi BOli Zid by th<: 2d Battalion, 1 st Armored 

Rt'gimmt, 15 Feb 43. In private possession. 
422 

successive day, a small American armored 

force had been driven from the battlefield 

with heavy losses. The estimate of the damage inflicted by Combat Command C, 1st 

Armored Division, upon the enemy was 

thirteen Mark IV tanks, five 88-mm. and 

ten other artillery pieces damaged or destroyed, and upwards of fifty men killed. 

The 2d Battalion, 1 st Armored Regiment, 

on 16 February reported 15 officers and 

298 enlisted men missing in action and one 

officer wounded and evacuated.''') 

The Allies were slow to realize that they 

had lost another tank battalion. The enemy's motor pool near Sidi Bou Zid con50 (1) Msg, CO CCC to G-3 1st Armd Div, 

1348, 16 Feb 43, in CCC 1st Armd Div Jnl. (2) 

The Germans themselves claimed to have salvaged 

every tank of their own, but listed as American 

materiel captured or destroyed: 39 tanks, 17 

armored personnel carriers, 4 antitank guns, 3 

self-propelled mounts, 8 machine guns, 1 105-mm. 

howitzer, and about 100 vehicles. 10th Panzer Div, 

Ie, Taetigkeitsberieht, 15 Feb 43. (3) The estimate at 0325, 16 February, by G-3, 1st Armored 

Division, was 46 medium and 2 light tanks, 130 

vehicles, and 9 self-propelled lOS's. II Corps G-3 

Jnl, 16 Feb 43; Entries 76 and 87. (4) See sketch 

map, Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, p. 164. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tinued to burn into the night, but the 

Americans interpreted it as a group of German tanks. "We might have walloped them 

or they might have walloped us," reported 

General Ward to II Corps as late as 2230 

hours that evening. Through messages 

dropped by air on Djebel Lessouda before 

darkness, he had, however, ordered Colonel 

Waters to get his force back during the 

night.'" The enemy had been surprised at 

the weakness of the counterattack and remained alert for a second wave of attack. 

He knew exactly from captured orders the 

units which had been fighting thus far.'" 

The Allies, however, were maintaining a 

defense line near Kern's Crossroads east of 

Sbei"tla and reorganizing for defense, as already noted. In fact, at the highest levels 

a decision of the greatest moment to subsequent operations had been made during 

the day. 

',I Phone Con v, Gen Ward with Col Akers, 2220, 

15 Feb 43, Entry 65, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

" (1) Lt Col James D. Alger, The Attack on 

Sidi Bou Zid by the 2d Battalion, 1st Armored 

Regiment, 15 Feb 43. In private possession. (2) 

10th Panzer Div, Ie, Taetigkeitsberieht, 15 F"b 43. 
CHAPTER XXII 

The Enemy Drives Back the Allied 

Sou thern j:-'lank 

The Decision To Fall Back to the West 

On 15 February, General Anderson concluded that his attempt to hold onto forward 

positions had been too ambitious, that "a 

very exposed southern Rank" existed in the 

light of current and impending operations, 

and that the whole Allied force was in danger of being outflanked and cut off from the 

south. The threat could be covered by strong 

armored forces in the Sbeltla-Sbiba areas, 

but since U.S. II Corps would have "other 

responsibilities to the south," such a concentration of armor would be impracticabk. 

"I feel therefore," he wrote to General 

Eisenhower, "that it is wise to consider in 

good time whether we should not voluntarily 

withdraw to the main ridge of the Grande 

Dorsale from Djebel Bargou (1266) southwards, linking up with Kef el Ahmar and 

down to the Sbeitla area." He also pointed 

out that an early withdrawal intact would 

be preferable to a costlv effort to hold the 

Pichon area and the Eastern Dorsal. On 

the other hand, he continued, "I think it 

is essential that we hold the Grande Dorsale 

itself, and I am prepared to fight all out to 

insure this." He stated further that to hold 

the Grande Dorsale might not be possible 

if the Allies first lost heavily while being 

driven out of their easterlv positions. (See 

MaplO.) 

The decision was submitted to the commander in chief as a matter of major policy 

and received his approval. 1 First Army iswed a warning to II Corps at 1700, 15 

February, that early withdrawal had been 

determined and that General Anderson 

would send instructions governing the 

methods to be employed to cover the withdrawal and to establish the new line. In the 

meantime, the first task of II Corps would 

be to extricate the infantry from the hills 

near Sidi Bou Zid, and then to pull back to 

positions insuring the security of S beltla, 

Kasserine, and Feriana, while retaining a 

mobile reserve capable of operating to the 

northeast, east, south, and southwest. First 

Army expected II Corps to be prepared to 

engage the enemy should he move west or 

southwest from Fondouk cl AouarebPichon gap, or northward toward Hadjeb el 

Aloun from the Faid area." 

The decision to fall back to the Western 

Dorsal was a hard one. It meant the abandonment of a forward base for both American and French units at Sbeltla, and of the 

1 Msg 0-420, Anderson to Eisenhower, 15 Feh 

-1-3. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 100. 

, Dir, CG First Army to CG II Corps, 1700, 15 

Feb 43, Entry 121, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 
424 

newly constructed air base at Thelepte. It 

required hasty improvisation of defenses at a 

number of passes in the western chain. It 

required troops only recently brought eastward to meet the severe test of large-scale 

retirement. An orderly withdrawal under 

enemy pressure would require valor, skill, 

and good leadership. On the other hand, the 

decision was bound, if satisfactorily executed, to make the enemy exert a prodigious 

effort if he was to obtain from it any further 

advantage. \Vith what the Allies estimated 

as an unfavorable Axis supply situation, and 

with the British Eighth Army's advance 

against the Mareth Position scheduled to 

oceur soon, the enemy would be obliged to 

gain his successes quickly. To fight his way 

through the \Vestern Dorsal could be made 

very costly to him and might, indeed, be 

prevented. Nevertheless, General Anderson's 

decision to commit his reserves to cover the 

withdrawal in the critical area on the southern flank left him without the means to 

make, as General Eisenhower had suggested, 

any diversionary attack in the north in order 

to lighten the pressure whieh the enemy 

could exert from Pichon to F eriana.:' 

During the next night, 15-16 February, 

the force under attack on Djebel Lessouda 

(644) attempted to escape the encirclement. 

A substantial group infiltrated through the 

enemy's outpost line before daylight. Before 

dawn, 231 succeeded in reaching Djebel 

Hamra (673), bringing with them some 

enemy prisoners. Others got through to the 

north or south. Three American officers and 

58 men were captured at once and later a 

few more, including Colonel \Vaters! The 

'Msg 254, Truscott to Eisenhower, 16 Feb 43, 

reporting views of Maj Gen Sir Richard L. McCreery, CofS designate of 18 A Gp. AFHQ CofS 

Cable Log. 

• (I) CCC 1st Armd Div Jnl, 16 Feb 43. (2) 

10th Panzer Diu. Ie. Taetigkeitsbericht, 16 Feb 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

troops still stranded in two groups on Djebel 

Ksalra (560) and Djebel Garet Hadid 

(620) were kept under relentless attack until, thristy and hungry, they had been 

crowded on 16 February into limited areas 

on each hilL" (See Map 11.) They were 

ordered to withdraw during the night of 

16-17 February. Each force destroyed all 

of its weapons and equipment except what 

could be carried to advantage. The men 

worked their way down the slopes and out 

across ploughed fields onto the plain, continuing toward Djebel Hamra, about fifteen 

miles away, in complete darkness. In a 

weakened condition, they jettisoned heavy 

pack weapons but were still a few miles short 

of the hills at dawn. Before they could leave 

the plain, they were observed and pursued 

by motorized troops, who circled out of 

range, cut them down with heavy machine 

gun fire, drove most of those surviving into 

a large cactus patch, and eventually captured all but a few. Both groups had similar 

experiences. About 800 prisoners were taken 

in the first group and 600, including Colonel 

Drake. in the second. 

The Axis Attack Pauses 

The Kampfgruppe from the German 

Africa Corps which Rommel had placed 

under command of Colonel von Liebenstein 

approached Gafsa from Gabes cautiously, 

for Rommel wa" disturbed by his lack of 

reserves, convinced that a serious reverse 

would have catastrophic consequences, and 

still inclined to overestimate the Allied 

". ( 1) Report of Activities of the 168th Infantry 

in the Sidi Bou Zid Area, 14-17 February 1943, 

27 Feb <1·3, by four officers who escaped, in 168th 

Inf Hist, Jan-Feb 43. (2) Memo, Col Drake for 

G-2 WD 14 Mav 45, sub: Account of 168th Inf 

Opns 22 Dec 42-i 7 Feb 43. DRB AGO. 
THE ENEMY DRIVES BACK THE ALLIED SOUTHERN FLANK 425 

strength in the Gafsa area. G The actual attack on Gafsa was scheduled to begin only 

after Ziegler had released the 21st Panzer 

Division (reinforced) to participate in it by 

converging on the objective from the northeast as Kampfgruppe DAK was approaching through El Guettar. When Axis troops 

discovered the Allied evacuation of Gafsa on 

15 February, they occupied the town that 

same evening. Rommel sent reconnoitering 

elements southwest toward Metlaoui'-Tozeur, and northwest toward Feriana, while 

Division Centauro established positions in 

the heights around Gafsa. The 21 st Panzer 

Division which was to have reinforced 

Kampfgruppe DAK for the battle at Gafsa 

was held in the vicinity of Sidi Bou Zid until 

its next commitment had been determined. 7 

With Sidi Bou Zid and Gafsa in enemy 

hands, what would be his next aggressive 

move? If command of the Axis forces had 

been unified, exploitation of the first successes might have been much more energetic 

and effective. As matters actually were, 

'Th~ German forces were: Headquarters, German Africa Corps; Panzer Grenadier Regiment 

Afrika; 1st Luftwaffe Jaeger Brigade (two weak 

battalions); one armored battalion (twenty-six 

tanks) of the 15th Panzer Division; 33d Reconnaissance Battalion; Headquarters and I st Battalion, 

I st Artillery Regiment Afrika; 1st Battalion, 190th 

Artillery Regiment; 3d Battery, 71st Rocket Projector Regiment; 1st Company, 200th Engineer Battalion; 1st Panzer Jaeger Company (7S-mm. antitank guns); Headquarters, 135th Flak Regiment 

(with five heavy and two light antiaircraft batteries) ; and medical service. The Italian reinforcements were from Division Centauro: two infantry 

battalions, two artillery battalions, one motorized 

battalion (Bersaglieri) , one tank battalion (23 

tanks) and one assault gun battery. Rpt, GermanItalian Panzer Army to Comando Supremo, 16 Feb 

-13, in Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 9, 

Anlage 1081/4. 

7 (I) Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Band 2, 12-IS 

Feb 43. (2) MS # D-124 (von Licbenstein), 16 

Jun 47. (3) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB IV, 14-16 

Feb 43. 

most of 16 February passed in efforts to 

clear the Americans from Djebel Ksai'ra 

and Djebel Garet Hadid, and to ascertain 

Allied intentions. During a flying visit to 

Hitler's headquarters, Kesselring had to 

order the attack on Sbei'tla to proceed. 

General Ziegler, shortly after midnight 

15--16 February, directed the 10th Panzer 

Division to reconnoiter toward Sbei'tla early 

in the morning and be prepared to attack 

the town during the day. At about the same 

time Ziegler conferred by telephone with 

von Arnim and pointed out that he would 

not be able to attack toward Hadjeb el 

Ai'oun in the general direction of the Fondouk el Aouareb gap unless he could retain 

command over the 21st Panzer Division. 

At 0745 von Arnim informed the Kampfgruppe DAK that he would not send the 

21 st Panzer Dillision to the Gafsa area now 

in Axis possession. Immediately thereafter 

he called Ziegler and ordered him to strike 

against Sbei'tla with a brief, but powerful 

blow, destroy Allied supply dumps, and 

then turn north against Fondouk el Aouareb 

with the mission of destroying the Allied 

forces south of the gap. This second phase 

would be executed on 17 February. Elements of the 10th Panzer and 21st Panzer 

Divisions were meanwhile still engaged in 

the final effort to eliminate the stubbornly 

defended Allied strongholds on Djebels 

Lessouda, Garet Hadid, and Ksai'ra. The 

main bodies of both divisions were assembled in the vicinity of Sidi Bou Zid.' 

The Allied screening force in the vicinity 

of Djebel Hamra and Kern's Crossroads 

impeded the morning's reconnaissance. The 

American troops on the hills south of Sidi 

Bou Zid refused to yield although under 

'(I) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB IV, 15, 16 Feb 

·1-3. (2) Gefechtsbericht Faid. 
426 

persistent pressure and short of rations. 

When Ziegler conferred with his commanders at noon in F a"id over plans to attack 

Sbe"itla, he could not count on keeping the 

21 st Panzer Division from Rommel indefinitely. Neither could he count on using all 

of 10th Panzer Division because of von 

Arnim's projected employment of at least 

an armored task force to cut off the Allied 

units defending the mountainous positions 

south of Pichon. But what concern Ziegler 

may have had was lessened after Gerhardt's 

afternoon attack on Kern's Crossroads, and 

after he received intelligence that the Allied 

forces had been instructed to avoid battle 

at Sbeltla." 

The Allied plan to evacuate Sbe"itla altered the enemy's situation drastically and 

its discovery brought about a swift change 

in General Ziegler's arrangements for the 

attack. Since he had not been obliged to 

send the 21st Panzer Division to join in 

seizing Gafsa or for other commitment in 

that area he could therefore use it against 

Sbeltla, thus freeing the 10th Panzer Division for the next phase of its operations. 

In support of this operation Fifth Panzer 

Army ordered Group Buhse (47 Grenadier 

Regiment) to pin down the Allies by a 

frontal attack. With this operation von 

Arnim returned to an earlier concept, 

planned for the end of January, that had 

been frustrated when the Americans had 

struck against Maknassy. 

For the immediate drive on Sbeltla, General Ziegler initially was forced to employ 

Group Gerhardt (10th Panzer Division). 

But after the first contact with the Americans had been made at the outer defenses 

of Sbeltla, the 21 st Panzer Division passed 

" (1) Memo for the record, 16 Feb 43, in Panzer 

Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1084. 

(2) C,fechtsbericht Fald, 16 Feb 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

through the advanced force and Colonel 

Hildebrandt assumed responsibility for the 

operations there. Gerhardt and other elements of General von Broich's 10th Panzer 

Division assembled during the night of 16-

17 February near Kern's Crossroads for 

the thrust toward Fondouk. Using the less 

mobile elements of both panzer divisions, 

Colonel Rudolph Lang organized the defense of the Sidi Bou Zid-Fald pass area. 

While Ziegler's advance detachments 

were probing the defenses at Sbeltla, finding them too strong to risk an attack that 

night, Colonel Pomptow, his chief of staff, 

briefed Rommel's headquarters on the situation. As a direct result, Rommel ordered 

Colonel von Liebenstein to advance from 

Gafsa without delay and capture Feriana 

by surprise, but avoid being tied down in 

a costly battle. 

In striking for Feriana and Sbeltla Rommel and von Arnim were going beyond the 

mission assigned to them by Comando Supremo and anticipating instructions for the 

second phase of the offensive. At 2250, 16 

February, Comando Supremo directed von 

Arnim to exploit the successes in his sector 

with the strongest possible forces that supplies and available mobile reserves would 

permit. Rommel's mission~securing the 

Gafsa area~was left unchanged.10 

The Axis Forces Squander a Day 

As Sbeltla, Feriana, and Thelepte were 

being seized on 17 February, the Axis forces 

were at the threshold of a much deeper 

penetration into the Allied southern flank 

'0 (1) Msg, Comando Supremo to Fifth Panzer 

Army, 16 Feb 43, and Ltr containing the same 

directive, both in Fifth Panzer Army, la, KTB. 

Anlagen, Ceh. und Geh. Kdo. Sachen (Africa), 

Band 2. (2) Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Band 2. 

17 Feb 43, and KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1094. 
THE ENEMY DRIVES BACK THE ALLIED SOUTHERN FLANK 427 

than that for which any firm plans existed. 

Rommel was inclined to encourage a thrust 

against Tebessa, perhaps advancing the entire Axis forward line to the westward. He 

asked von Arnim if he intended to exploit 

his successes in such a way.ll The latter replied that he intended to use the 21 st Panzer 

Division around Sbei:tla and the 10th Panzer 

Division, as originally planned, in the Fondouk-Pichon area. He would advance his 

main line of resistance only to the crests of 

the Eastern Dorsal in view of the state of his 

forces and supplies.12 

The thrust which Rommel had in mind 

would have required combining the 10th 

and 21st Panzer Divisions with the Kampfgruppe DAK. In the absence of authoritative co-ordination from above, the two 

commanders made no preparations on 18 

February to press beyond the Western Dorsal but merely reconnoitered from Sbe"itla 

and Thelepte. Rommel even started his 

only substantial reserves on the route back 

to the Mareth Position, while von Arnim 

committed the 10th Panzer Division with 

Group Buhse near Fondouk as described 

above. One reconnaissance detachment of 

the Kampfgruppe DAK drove Allied defenders back into the passes near El Ma el 

Abiod, and another entered the undefended 

village of Kasserine. There it captured 

about sixty French soldiers as they arrived 

from farther east, and welcomed a reconnaissance unit from the 21st Panzer Division which had come to Kasserine from 

Sbei"tla. In dismal rainy weather which 

" (1) Panzer A rmy Africa, KT B, Band 2, 17 Feb 

43. (2) Rommel, Krieg ohne H ass, pp. 352-53. 

(3) Panzer Arm)' Africa, KTB, A nlagenband 9 

Anlage 1095. 

"Msg, Fifth Panzer Army, von Arnim to Comando Supremo, 1935, 17 Feb 43, Fifth Panzer 

Army, la, KTB, Anlagen, Geh. und Geh. Kdo. 

Sachen (Afrika), Band 2, p. 281. 

greatly curtailed air activity, Axis air reconnaissance west of Kasserine showed that 

the Allies were not yet assembling at any 

point for a strong counterattack.'" 

The opportunity for exploitation beyond 

the Western Dorsal was still available, but 

the Allies had gained time for partial recovery while the Axis forces had become 

more dispersed. The momentum of the attack had slackened. Could it now be renewed? If so, what would be the objective? 

Would it be to weaken more severely the 

Allied ability to interfere with the Axis line 

of communications to their forces in the 

south, or would it be to threaten the Allied 

line of communications to the British First 

Army in the north? At what point could 

an Axis attack now bring about the westward withdrawal of the Allied forces in 

northern Tunisia? 

The Allied Line Swings Back 

The night of 16-17 February, on which 

the U.S. 1st Armored Division defended 

Sbei'tla, was the second night of extensive 

and complicated Allied troop movements 

carrying out the Allied decision of 15 February to swing the front from the Eastern 

to the Western Dorsal. The innumerable 

transfers of smaller units fell into a general 

pattern. This pattern consisted of southward shifts by British armored forces in 

order to cover westward withdrawals 

through these elements by American and 

French units, after which the British forces 

also moved west and southwest to join in 

defending critical points along the new line. 

The easterly bulge in the Allied front north 

of Sbei"tla--Sidi Bou Zid on 15 February 

13 Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Band 2, 18 Feb 

43 and Rpt, DAK to Panzer Army Africa, 18 Feb 

43, in KTB, Anlagenband .9, Anlage 1102/2. 
428 

was flattened out first at the south, where 

it was largest. North of this point the bulge 

rolled like a shrinking wave as far as the 

Ousseltia valley, where French and American troops simply moved back a short distance to the heights fringing the valley on 

the west. Just before the decision to pull 

back, General Ryder's 34th Infantry Division (less the 168th Combat Team and the 

2d Battalion, 133d Infantry) had assumed 

responsibility for the Pichon-Djebel Trozza 

(997) section of the Allied front under 

General Koeltz. On 16-17 February it 

began shifting to Sbiba gap. 

The shortened Allied line resulting from 

the changes in the Ousseltia-Pichon area 

permitted the subsequent withdrawal of the 

16th Regimental Combat Team of the U.S. 

1st Infantry Division from the Ousseltia 

heights southwestward to the II Corps area 

between Tebessa and Feriana. The exigencies of the situation during the week of 17-23 

February brought elements of the British 

6th Armoured Division and British 1st 

Guards Brigade into Sbiba and Thala, and 

hastened the arrival at Thala of the artillery 

of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division after a 

dramatically timed march from beyond 

Oran. 11 

First Army finally released Combat Command B, U.S. 1st Armored Division, to II 

Corps on 15 February for employment at 

Sbeitla. During the following night the unit 

moved by two routes to Sbeitla, where it 

passed to division control. Late on 16 February it moved into position southeast of the 

village. 

Sbei:tla, site of an ancient Roman town, 

lies about one mile south of a tip of Djebel 

Mrhila (1378), a long and lofty ridge ex11 (1) Info supplied by Cabint't Offict', London. 

(2) II Corps AAR, 2 May 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tending eighteen or more miles north-northeastward. About five miles south of Sbeitla 

is a lower chain of hills, with widely spaced 

crests, running roughly westward from 

Djebel Hamra (673). To the northeast of 

these hills, Combat Command A, reinforced 

on 15-16 February, maintained its covering 

outer line. (Map 12) Thus Sbeitla lies in a 

wide gap between hills, approached from the 

east over a rising plain. It has at its back another wide expanse of open plateau reaching to the base of the Western Dorsal, from 

Kasserine village north to Sbiba. Two 

streams, one the Sbeitla river, the other a 

tributary from the southwest, converge some 

five miles east of the village and drain northeasterly, eventually joining the Zeroud river, 

which flows through the Eastern Dorsal near 

Hadjeb el Aioun. The Sbei:tla river runs in a 

deep-sunk channel along the northeastern 

side of the town. Olive groves and cultivated 

fields are plentiful along these streams. A 

narrow-gauge railway which connects 

Sousse on the coast with the mining town of 

MetlaOUI in the southwest runs through 

Sbeitla to Kasserine and beyond. A railroad 

bridge and another of three arches, formerly 

an aqueduct, cross the Sbei:tla river about 

half a mile east of the modern village. For 

almost two miles east of the highway bridge, 

the road from Faid runs through olive 

groves. The Allies expected the attack to 

come along this road, first to a bridge five 

miles east-southeast of Sbei:tla, and thence 

perhaps fanning out on either side of the 

road to find any weak point in the main defense line nearer the village. 

First Army needed time to organize the 

defense of Sbiba gap with troops which 

were to move in on the night of 16-17 F ebruary and on the following night. The 1st 

Armored Division had to cover from the 
ENGAGEMENT AT SBE"iTLA 

---x 

MAP 12 

"'l~l(g '01"1(1", .r("'''''COT~'' 

..... s '" ii(~ "U .... c. " 

DaT( ~DIC'HD 

_. " aUD u .. ",,(.r, ttB .. " .. 211T PI OIV, 17 '[I 

C"~"I""'. '" ... ,." 

• , 

• 

....... , ...... 

/ 
south the organization at Sbiba until all 

these troops had come in. As long as First 

Army set no specific time for evacuating 

Sbeïtla, II Corps was obliged to leave the 

1st Armored Division in the dark, or at 

least in the fog of war, about it. Meanwhile 

the division had the problem of adapting 

its defensive tactics to the requirements of 

a situationin which it was not only expected 

to gain an indefinite amount of time but 

also to preserve itself “as a fighting force." 15 

The defending troops must neither be 

pinned down nor enveloped and cut off. 

The delaying action had to be conducted 

in an area where Djebel Mrhila on the 

north and the lower ridge on the south 

protected the flanks, but which had very 

little depth, since the loss of Sbeïtla would 

immediately open the northward route to 

Sbiba. From Djebel Hamra westward for 

about eight miles, there was little cover 

and there were no strong positions. Three 

miles east of Sbeïtla, at the edge of extensive olive groves, General Ward elected to 

establish his main line of resistance, with 

Combat Command B holding the southern 

sector and Combat A, upon withdrawal 

from the Djebel Hamra line late on 16 

February, the northern sector. The Faïd— 

Sbeïtla road was the boundary between 

them. Throughout the day Combat Command C was attached to General McQuillin’s force. 

The Attack on Sbeïtla Begins. 16 February 

During 15 and 16 February, with the 

enemy's intentions still uncertain, Sbeïtla 

remained screened by the forward line near 

15 Phone Conv, Gen Ward with Col Akers, 16 

Feb 43, Entry 109, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

Kern's Crossroads and Djebel Hamra.16 On 

16 February all counterattacks were prohibited by General Anderson's orders; General Fredendall’s forces were henceforth to 

concentrate on defending Sbeïtla, Kasserine, 

and Fériana.17 

Enemy tanks of Group Gerhardt crept 

over the plains southwest of Djebel Lessouda 

(644) toward the forward defenses of 

Sbeïtla during 16 February, and in midafternoon, it seemed apparent that others 

farther southwest were assembling for an 

attack. Colonel Crosby’s 3d Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment (less Company G), was 

sent forward at 1600 from a position in reserve south of Sbeïtla to reinforce the screen 

and prolong the defense until Combat Command A could move into the positions 

which General McQuillin and Colonel 

Hains had reconnoitered earlier that afternoon and had assigned to the various units.18

The infantry and artillery, under orders to 

withdraw to these new positions, started 

bark in the latter part of the afternoon, leaving as a covering force Colonel Hightower's 

provisional unit and Company G (Capt. 

Herman McWatters), 13th Armored Regiment, and for lack of orders to move back, 

16Units under McQuillin’s command were: his 

own Combat Command A with 1st Armored Regiment (-1st Battalion), 1st Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, 

701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (—), 91st Field 

Artillery Battalion, one battery, 68th Field Artillery 

Battalion, C Company, 16th Engineer Battalion, 

five guns, 106th Coast Artillery, one battery, 213th 

Coast Artillery (90-mm. guns); and Combat Command C consisting of 3d Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment 

(—), 68th Field Artillery Battalion (—), 16th 

Ensingeer Battalion (—), elements 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, one company, 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion. 1st Armd Div G-3 Jnl. 

17 Msg, Adv First Army to II Corps, 1045, 16 

Feb 43, Entry 97, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

18 Copy in CCA 1st Armd Div AAR, 23 Jan-26 

Feb 43, pp. 33-34. 

 

430 

south the organization at Sbiba until all 

these troops had come in. As long as First 

Army set no specific time for evacuating 

Sbeitla, II Corps was obliged to leave the 

1 st Armored Division in the dark, or at 

least in the fog of war, about it. Meanwhile 

the division had the problem of adapting 

its defensive tactics to the requirements of 

a situation in which it was not only expected 

to gain an indefinite amount of time but 

also to preserve itself "as a fighting force." " 

The defending troops must neither be 

pinned down nor enveloped and cut off. 

The delaying action had to be conducted 

in an area where Djebel Mrhila on the 

north and the lower ridge on the south 

protected the Ranks, but which had very 

little depth, since the loss of Sbeltla would 

immediately open the northward route to 

Sbiba. From Djebel Hamra westward for 

about eight miles, there was little cover 

and there were no strong positions. Three 

miles east of Sbeitla, at the edge of extensive olive groves, General Ward elected to 

establish his main line of resistance, with 

Combat Command B holding the southern 

sector and Combat A, upon withdrawal 

from the Djebel Hamra line late on 16 

February, the northern sector. The Fald--

Sbeitla road was the boundary between 

them. Throughout the day Combat Command C was attached to General McQuillin's force. 

The Attack on Sbeitla Begins, 16 February 

During 15 and 16 February, with the 

enemy's intentions still uncertain, Sbeltla 

remained screened by the forward line near 

'" Phone Conv, Gen Ward with Col Akns, 16 

Feb +3, Entry 109, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Kern's Crossroads and Djebel Hamra.,t; On 

16 February all counterattacks were prohibited by General Anderson's orders; General Fredendall's forces were henceforth to 

concentrate on defending Sbe"itla, Kasserine, 

and Feriana.17 

Enemy tanks of Group Gerhardt crept 

over the plains southwest of Djebel Lessouda 

(644) toward the forward defenses of 

Sbeitla during 16 February, and in midafternoon, it seemed apparent that others 

farther southwest were assembling for an 

attack. Colonel Crosby's 3d Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment (less Company G), was 

sent forward at 1600 from a position in reserve south of Sbeitla to reinforce the screen 

and prolong the defense until Combat Command A could move into the positions 

which General McQuillin and Colonel 

Hains had reconnoitered earlier that afternoon and had assigned to the various units." 

The infantry and artillery, under orders to 

withdraw to these new positions, started 

back in the latter part of the afternoon, leaving as a covering force Colonel Hightower's 

provisional unit and Company G (Capt. 

Herman Mc Watters), 13th Armored Regiment, and for lack of orders to move back, 

JO Units under McQuillin's command were: his 

own Combat Command A with 1st Armored Regiment (-1st Battalion), 1st Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, 

701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (-), 91st Field 

Artillery Battalion, one battery, 68th Field Artillery 

Battalion, C Company, 16th Engineer Battalion, 

five guns, 106th Coast Artillery, one battery, 213th 

Coast Artillery (90-mm. guns) ; and Combat Command C consisting of 3d Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment 

(-), 68th Field Artillery Battalion (-), 16th 

EngineC[ Battalion (-), elements 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, one company, 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion. 1 st Armd Div G-3 J nl. 

17 Msg, Adv First Army to II Corps, 1045, 16 

Feb 43, Entry 97, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

" Copy in CCA 1st Armd Div AAR, 23 Jan-26 

Feb 43, pp. 3:1-34. 
THE ENEMY DRIVES BACK THE ALLIED SOUTHERN FLANK 431 

elements of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion on the southern flank. The enemy's 

forward elements attempted to turn the 

northern flank of Me \'\Tatters' company 

about 1700, but the reinforcements led by 

Colonel Crosby arrived at an opportune 

time to catch the Germans by surprise and 

quickly drive them back. Hightower's tanks 

successfully stopped another German column and then withdrew. Darkness was. falling, but the troops saw a strong enemy 

armored force in three columns approaching along the axis of the Fai"d-Sbei"tla road 

behind Company G as that unit followed 

the remainder of the 3d Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment, toward Sbei"tla. A rear 

guard action with sporadic firing ensued, 

while the bulk of Combat Command A, 

after replenishing fuel and ammunition supplies from dumps in the olive grove about 

two miles east of Sbe:itla, moved into new 

defensive positions. The tank destroyers, 

after being cut off on the south flank at 

Djebel Hamra, dispersed and filtered back 

farther south during the night.19 

The attacking force, Group Gerhardt, was 

heading for the bridge on the Fald-Sbeltla 

road about five miles east-southeast of 

Sbe:itla. A second group (Pfeiffer's), consisting of one tank battalion, one armored 

infantry battalion, two field batteries, and 

some antitank units of the 21 st Panzer Division, was expected to pass through the 

advanced force near the bridge and make 

the attack. 20 The Germans expected the 

" (1) 3d Bn 1 st Armd Regt AAR, 1 J an-21 Feb 

43, 30 Jul 43. (2) 3d Bn 13th Armd Regt Hist, 

18 Oct 42-13 Noy 43, compiled by Maj Harold 

F. Blodgett. (3) Phon(' ConY, Col Howz(' with Lt 

Col John T. Honeycutt, 1327, 16 Feb 43, Entry 

106, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. (4) 1st Armd Div G-3 

J nl lists a total of seventy-six killed, wounded, and 

missing on 16 February 1943. 

". Gefechtsbericht Faid, 16 Feb 43. 

Allies to abandon Sbeltla, and hoped to 

hasten the process by following closely on 

the heels of Colonel Crosby's command. 

It was a frosty night with a pale moon 

showing between patches of moving overcast. When Pfeiffer's forward detachment 

came near enough to the American rear 

guard to see the dim outlines of its vehicles, 

the Germans opened fire. Some fire carried 

into the olive groves beside the highway and 

fell either near the command post of Combat Command A, or among troops refueling 

vehicles, or on supply dumps under the trees. 

An improvised mine-laying unit which had 

been sent out that night to strengthen the 

defense line was dispersed, with its work 

barely begun. On the southwestern side of 

a wide, deep, straight-sided wadi about one 

mile east of Sbe:itla, General McQuillin's 

command had emplaced some 90-mm. 

dual-purpose guns. The 68th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion had its 105-mm. howitzers under olive trees along the FaidSbe:itla road, and the 91 st Field Artillery 

Battalion was expected to take adjacent 

positions when it arrived in the area. The 

3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, had 

the mission of protecting this artillery and 

of supporting Combat Command A's armor, 

which was assigned to defensive positions at 

various points along the line~north of the 

Fald road, astride the railroad, and in front 

of the artillery~and which was ordered to 

keep in readiness to counterattack. The 

main line of resistance was to be held until 

a time to be set by corps order. 21 

Combat Command B under General 

Robinett, south of the Sbeltla-Fald road, 

had already moved into its area during the 

afternoon in time to reconnoiter and or-

" (1) CCC 1st Armd Div S-3 Jnl, 16 Feb 43. 

(2) 6th Armd Inf AAR, 2 Sep 43; CCA 1 st Armd 

Div AAR, 23 Jan-26 Feb 43, pp. 33-34. 
432 

ganize for an active defense by maneuver 

and counterattack. Co-ordination between 

the combat commands remained to be 

arranged during the night. Most of Combat 

Command A was not yet well established in 

its new positions, which many of its units 

reached in the dark after their withdrawal 

from the Djebel Hamra line, and the situation was being straightened out, when the 

enemy's reconnaissance by fire neared the 

line. General McQuillin shifted his command post west of Sbeitla, and for a time 

he was out of communication with division 

headquarters. Colonel Hains remained temporarily in the Combat Command A's advance command post at the old location 

two miles east of Sbeitia, although small 

arms fire had begun falling in the vicinity. 

At this juncture the situation suddenly got 

out of hand. 

For most of the troops it was a first experience under night attack. They were hit 

at a time when the effect of defeats and exhaustion during the past three days was 

intensified by a pervading sense of confusion, a belief that those in command were 

at best "playing by ear." The firing could 

be widely heard. Some vehicles moved from 

the olive groves, where scattered enemy fire 

was falling, onto the road and started westward. Soon others joined them. Before long 

the road was a dense mass of churning traffic 

which streamed through Sbeitla in the darkness, choking the roads and threatening to 

leave Sbeitla half-defended. Other important elements of Combat Command A 

stood fast, including many of the tanks of 

the 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, 

and the provisional company, 1st Armored 

Regiment. 22 

" (1) 3d Bn 13th Arrnd Regt Hist, 18 Oct 42-

13 Kov 43. (2) Interv with Col Ben S. Crosby, 

19 Mar 51. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Many troops who heard the explosions 

and saw the fire attributed the demolition of 

a water pumping station, an ammunition 

dump, and the railroad bridge to enemy 

action. The enemy force, apparently unaware of the actual situation, recognized 

that Sbdtla was being evacuated but reported that the Allies were still resisting 

strongly rather than making a full withdrawal. It received orders to wait for daylight. By then, the Allied situation at Sbeitla 

had been clarified and improved.2~ 

General Ward, for a time without enough 

accurate knowledge of the situation to exert 

control, received some first-hand oral reports about midnight and concluded that 

Combat Command A was under imminent 

attack by a very large armored force. After 

taking appropriate steps to meet the immediate problems, he reported to General 

Fredendall that the situation was extremely 

grave, since the Germans were at the edge 

of Sbeitla with about nine Mark VI and 

eighty Mark IV tanks, a spearhead of that 

force having already pierced the covering 

line three miles to the east. This dire estimate was transmitted to Brig. C. V. McNabb at Advance Headquarters, First 

Army, to General Anderson, and to General 

Truscott at the Advance Headquarters, 

AFHQ. Truscott had sent Colonel Carleton 

to Sbeitla during the day, and received a 

confirmatory report from him shortly after 

hearing from Fredendall. 

By 0130, 17 February, Anderson via McNabb authorized Fredendall to withdraw 

Ward's command from Sbeitia and from 

Fcriana a force under Colonel Stark that 

" (1) 21st Panzer Diu, KTB, 17 Ft'b 43. (2) CCC 

1st Armd Div Jnl, 16-17 Ft'b 43. (3) CCB 1st 

Armd Div AAR, 1 Mar 43. 
THE ENEMY DRIVES BACK THE ALLIED SOUTHERN FLANK 433 

had previously withdrawn from Gafsa.24 

Now satisfied that this attack was the main 

enemy offensive, he had taken steps to expedite the reinforcement of Sbiba through 

emergency daylight moves by the British 1st 

Guards Brigade (less one battalion), with 

Combat Team 18, U.S. 1st Infantry Division, attached, supplemented first by General Ryder's U.S. 34th Infantry Division 

(less 168th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 133d 

Infantry), and next, by the British 26th 

Armoured Brigade (less 16/5 Lancers) under command of Brig. Charles Dunphie. 

Somewhat later in the day, General Keightley's Headquarters, 6th Armoured Division, 

was transferred to XIX Corps with the mission of defending Sbiba gap. The corps 

boundary was redefined to extend from a 

point four miles south of Sbiba to Hadjeb el 

Aioun. 25 

General Fredendall instructed Colonel 

Stark to place a small covering detachment 

of infantry, light tanks, and heavy artillery 

( 155's) in defense of Feriana until 1800, 

17 February, while the remainder of his 

command, with elements of the Constantine Division, took position on the heights 

north of Thelepte. He alerted Col. Paul L. 

Williams, of the XII Air Support ComSee pp. 417-18 above. It comprised the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, the 1st Ranger Battalion, the 

175th Field Artillery Battalion, E & C Squadrons, 

British Derbyshire Yeomanry, French units of the 

Constantine Division, and, beginning 8 February, 

the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, held in Feriana 

after that date as II Corps reserve. 

(1) DMCJnl. (2) 168thInfHist. (3) 1.75thFA 

War Diary. (4) 1st Armd Div G-3 Jnl. 

" (I) CCC 1st Armd Div Jnl, 16-17 Feb 43. (2) 

Ltr, Col Hightower to Col Howze, I Jul 46. In 

private possession. (3) Intervs with Col Hains, 26 

Apr 51, and Col Crosby, 19 Mar 51. (4) Msg R255, Truscott to Rooks for Eisenhower, 17 Feb 43. 

Copy in AFHQ CofS Cable Log, Ill. (5) Msg 

0436, Adv First Army to II Corps, 5 Corps, and 

XIX Corps. Same file, 112, (6) DMC Jnl, 17 

Feb 43, 

mand at Thelepte, that his planes must be 

flown off at daybreak. He ordered Col. 

Anderson T. W. Moore's force (19th Engineers and 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry) 

defending a line east of Kasserine village 

to hold it until General Ward's force had 

passed through, and then to organize Kasserine pass for defense. During the night of 

17~18 February this order was executed.2 /i 

Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, received a division order at about 

0300, 17 February, which indicated that 

Sbettla must be held at all costs until 1100. 

It was superseded by another about an hour 

later which directed it to hold on a line 

south and east of the town until ordered 

to withdraw. This change reflected a disagreement between Fredendall and Anderson, who had wanted Sbeitla held all day. 

General Robinett reorganized his command 

for static defense. He placed his tanks (2d 

Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment) in 

defiladed positions about four miles southeast of Sbeitla and brought the guns of the 

27th Armored Field Artillery back of the 

tanks. He designated the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion to man the outpost line a 

few miles east of the main line of resistance. 

Using every opportunity to hide, hit, and 

maneuver, it was to help hold off the expected enemy onslaught. Two companies 

of the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Elton W. 

Ringsak), 6th Armored Infantry, were 

placed on the high ground of Djebel El 

Koumin (698) and Djebel Sabel Dilou 

( 811 ) in position to command a road which 

ran between them northward to Sbeitla."' 

" ( I) II Corps G-3 J nl and Msg file, (2) Msg 

261, T~uscott to Rooks, 17 Feb 43. Copy in AFHQ 

CofS Cable Log, 116, 

"7 (1) CCB 1st Armd Div AAR, I Mar 43. (2) 

601st TD Bn, Detaikd Opns Rpt to CG 1st Armd 

Div, 17 Feb 43. OPD 381 Africa, S(>c 4, Case 120, 
434 

The enemy did not attack Sbei'tia at 

dawn, as the Allies had expected. At 0715, 

the advanced element of the attacking force 

stayed in contact, watching Allied truck 

trains leave Sbei'tia, while the main force 

waited for additional units from Sidi Bou 

Zid in order to make a full-scale assault at 

noon. Both sides kept up harassing artillery 

fire. Probing attacks during the morning 

indicated that the terrain of the northeastern approaches was not suited for a largescale tank attack. Colonel Hildebrandt 

therefore decided to launch his main effort 

with Group Stenkhoff south of the Sbei'tiaSidi Bou Zid road. At the same time Pfeiffer's infantry would attack directly from 

the east. Shortly after noon the assault was 

launched against Combat Command B at 

Sbei'tia. 28 

The armored attack (Stenkhoff's) came 

over the rough plain, the wadies, and other 

impediments, on a broad front. It was supported by enemy aviation, but exposed to 

Allied artillery. The defenders were organized in depth and had taken advantage of 

all the cover and defilade available. The 

enemy found the tanks in sand dunes, hull 

down, and interspersed with antitank guns. 

The German tanks first hit Combat Command B's north flank, screened by the 601st 

Tank Destroyer Battalion (Lt. Col. Herschel 

D. Baker), in overwhelming strength. Three 

groups of enemy tanks converged on the 

American half-tracks in quick succession. 

Some of the tank destroyers fired smoke 

shells and gained a chance to shift position 

and continue firing for about half an hour. 

By that time, others, and soon all the vehicles, were streaking back to a designated 

rally point only to find it under enemy fire. 

One platoon was extricated from envelop-

"' (1) Gefechtsbericht Fald, 16-17 Feb 43. (2) 

21st Panzer Diu, KTB, 16-17 Feb 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ment by the courageous guidance of the battalion executive, Capt. Edward Austin. The 

bulk of the battalion passed out of control 

and hurried toward Sbei'tla. Some were 

stopped by staff officers of Combat Command B near its command post. Those who 

may have planned to reorganize near Sbei'tla 

and swing back into battle found that place 

under fire and in a turmoil of traffic and 

air bombardment. They then allowed themselves to be swept along in the stream of 

vehicles toward Kasserine. A few emerged 

west of the town and circled back to the 

southeast but were of no benefit to the forces 

engaged there. The remainder continued to 

Kasserine and joined in the defense arrangements at that point. 

During the latter part of the 601st Tank 

Destroyer Battalion's delaying action, and 

while it was falling back, another encounter, 

the critical episode in the defense of Sbei'tla 

by Combat Command B, was being stubbornly fought farther south. The tanks of 

the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Henry E. Gardiner), 13th Armored Regiment, had been 

placed hull down in a wadi from which 

they could oppose heavier German armor 

trying to break through. A frontal attack 

against their position about 1315 by Stenkhoff's much superior tank group gave them 

the opportunity for which they had hoped. 

Waiting until the range was very close, they 

fired a volley which instantly knocked out 

five or more tanks and completely disrupted 

the enemy formation. Stenkhoff's force, 

recognizing that it had entered a trap, pulled 

back under fire from the 27th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion. 

An hour after the frontal attack on Gardiner's tanks, the enemy had reorganized 

and was threatening Robinett's south flank. 

At this point his troops received orders to 

begin a gradual withdrawal, taking care not 
THE ENEMY DRIVES BACK THE ALLIED SOUTHERN FLANK 435 

to uncover the most forward artilIery battery, and to use routes south of Sbeitla to 

reach new positions south and east of Kasserine village. The shift to the west began 

about 1430. One platoon of medium tanks 

under Lt. John C. Gleason was sent to cover 

the north flank in Sbeitla, which had been 

uncovered when Combat Command A had 

begun to withdraw at 1130. The 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, pulled out of 

its hill positions and followed a trail between 

Djebel Sabel Dilou and Djebel Rheradok 

(791) into Kasserine. Company A, 16th 

Engineers, marched independently to Kasserine pass with one of Colonel Ringsak's 

companies. Last to leave were Gardiner's 

tank battalion, along with Battery C, 27th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and the 

Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored 

Regiment. Between 1730 and darkness, 

which came about 1900, they disengaged 

with a loss of nine tanks, among them Colonel Gardiner's. Their route brought them 

to the Sbeitla~Kasserine road about five 

miles east of Kasserine. They swung into a 

divisional gasoline dump north of the highway and in blackout gassed up their vehicles 

and piled on all possible five-gallon containers before continuing through Kasserine 

pass to a bivouac on the road between it and 

Thala. 2fl 

Combat Command A, now much reduced, meanwhile continued its withdrawal 

under a dive-bomber attack after noon 

(1) CCB 1st Armd Div AAR, 1 Mar 43. (2) 

Brig Grn Paul M. Robinett (Ret.), Among the 

First, MS. In private possession. (3) The Germans 

reported counting twenty-seven disabled or destroyed American tanks and tank destroyers an thc 

battlefield southeast of Sbc·ida. They could salvage 

all their own losses and had sixty-five tanks ready 

for action. 21st Panzer Div, KTB, 18 Feb 43. 

Col. Henry E. Gardiner, "We Fought at Kasserine, 

Armored Caz!alry Journal, LVII, No.2 (MarchApril, 1948), 8fT. 

along the road leading northward through 

Sbiba. After stopping here during the night 

to cover the withdrawal of Allied units into 

the Sbiba position, it swung westward in a 

wide loop to Tebessa. Combat Command 

C, after short movements by some of its 

elements during the morning to get out of 

enemy artillery range and after covering 

McQuillin's withdrawal, made its first westward bound toward Kasserine at 1430. In 

successive jumps of 1,000--1,200 yards, the 

3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, and 

elements of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, then the 68th Field Artillery Battalion, and finally the 1 st Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment (less two companies), 

broke contact with the enemy in Sbe'itla and 

withdrew on division orders to new positions 

northwest of SbeItla covering the road to 

Kasserine village. At midnight these troops, 

with whom were intermingled rear elements 

of Combat Command B, began the march 

down the last stretch to Kasserine. The enemy, moving into Sbei'tla after 1700, organized his defense without interrupting the 

Allied withdrawal."!) 

With the loss of Sbei'tla, the II Corps had 

experienced the consequences of an overextended defense and a successful concentration of enemy force. It could gain some 

satisfaction in the fact that the enemy found 

no booty in the almost deserted town. Most 

supplies had been removed or destroyed. 

The Allies had blown up bridges, water 

mains, and the aqueduct supplying Sfax. 

They had placed obstacles and mines on 

some of the approaches. Shells had fallen 

on the city all day, and from time to time, 

:10 (1) cce 1st Armed Div Jnl, 17 Feb 43. (2) 

6th Armd Inf AAR, 23 Jan-26 Feb 43. (3) Interv 

with Lt Col Jacob Shapiro (RI;'t.) (then CO, Co A, 

13th Armd Regt), 7 Dec 51. (4) 21 sf Panzer Division, KTB, 17 Feb 43. 
436 

enemy aircraft had bombed it. The great 

Roman arch and temples, which earlier had 

loomed up now and then, as intermittent 

showers of cold rain cleared the air of a 

pall of smoke and dust, were now concealed 

by darkness despite the smoldering fires. 

The 1st Armored Division's withdrawal, although protected by only a few Allied Spitfires, was carried through on the whole in 

an orderly and effective manner. All trains, 

even those in the Sidi Bou Zid area, had 

been ordered out in time. Enemy aircraft 

had inflicted considerable damage along 

the roads but the enemy had captured very 

little equipment which he could use.31 

The 21st Panzer Division claimed that 

it had wrecked the American 1 st Armored 

Division and the U.S. 168th Infantry Regiment. Others were to share this view, but 

the fact was that Combat Command B bad 

emerged from one defensive battle in shape 

to fight another, and by 1800 on 18 February had been brought through Kasserine 

pass and T ebessa to the forested mountains 

near El Ma el Abiod. Combat Commands 

A and C were again consolidated in positions a little farther south along the mountain chain. The division, after trooping 

back in low spirits near columns of French 

infantry and cavalry, took up positions on 

the plain southeast of Tebessa, and during 

the night of 18-19 February received the 

"The 21st Panzer Division concluded the day's 

action on 17 February with 65 tanks ready for 

action and with a record for the past four days 

which it tabulat("d as follows: 2,546 Allied prisoners; 103 tanks and 5 aircraft destroyed; 280 

v("hicks, 18 field guns, 3 antitank guns, 1 antiaircraft battery, and equipment from 1 service and 1 

medical company captured or destroyed. (1) Msg, 

2 I st Panzer Div to Panzer Army Africa, 2359, 17 

Feb 43, in Panzer Army Africa, KTB. Anlagenband 

9, Anlage 1090;5. (2)Anlage zurn Divisionsbefehl 

Nr. 4, 21st Pzr Div, 18 Feb 43, 21st Panzer Diu, 

KTB. Anlagenband 9. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

mission of protecting T ebessa from the east 

and south in co-ordination with other Allied units which had withdrawn from Gafsa 

and Feriana.3

" 

Withdrawal to Sbiba-Loss of Feriana 

and Thelepte 

While the 21 st Panzer Division was capturing Sbeitla on 17 February, Group 

Gerhardt of the 10th Panzer Division began its northward march toward Pichon 

in conformity with General von Arnim's 

plan for what should follow Operation 

FRUEHLINGSWIND. His intention was 

to have this force and Group Buhse, attacking from the east, seize Pichon and cut off 

the Allied forces in the Eastern Dorsal. 

Group Gerhardt, advancing via Hadjeb el 

Aioun, and Group Buhse established contact 

at 1600 on 1 7 February. But their advance 

was slowed down by mines, and except for 

a rear guard at Pichon the Allies extricated 

themselves from both positions well in advance of the move to cut them off. General 

von Arnim's mistaken estimate of Allied 

strength and intentions and the delayed 

movement of the 10th Panzer Division had 

turned the drive to the north into a blow at 

thin air. 33 

The Allies completed their withdrawal 

to the Western Dorsal during the night of 

17-18 February. (See Map 10.) At Sbiba, 

after Combat Command A passed through 

the defile on the 17th, British engineers 

closed the gap in the mine field. The Sbiba 

position, thus protected, was held at first by 

two units under command of Headquarters, 

32 Memo, CG 1 st Armd Div for CG CeE, 19 

Feb 43. 1st Armd Div Hist Reds, Vol. II. 

"" (1) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB IV, 17 Feb 43. 

(2) Gefechtsbericht Faid. (3) 10th Panzer Diu, Ie, 

Taetigkeitsbericht, 17 Feb 43, (4) XIX Corps 

Journal de Marche, 16-18 Feb 43, 
THE ENEMY DRIVES BACK THE ALLIED SOUTHERN FLANK 437 

British 6th Armored Division-the 1st 

Guards Brigade, and the 18th Infantry, 

U.S. 1st Infantry Division. On a line to the 

northeast of Sbiba, three battalions of the 

U.S. 34th Infantry Division, one from the 

133d Infantry (Colonel Fountain) and two 

from the 135th Infantry (Colonel Ward), 

and attached French troops, were moved 

into position. The 135th Infantry was in 

contact with elements of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division farther north. Not until 

late on 18 February did the enemy begin 

to probe these new lines of defense.'" 

Meanwhile, Kampfgruppe DAK on 17 

February captured Feriana, as Allied rearguards after a short fight pulled out about 

noon. Continuing the pursuit DAK pushed 

on to Thclepte. Allied demolitions left the 

"Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

Thelepte airbase with little of military value. 

Thirty-four planes which could not be flown 

away were demolished. The Germans captured some French ammunition stocks and 

fuzes. At the fuel depot, they salvaged 20 

tons of aviation gasoline and 30 tons of lubricants. 35 In these engagements Liebenstein 

was wounded by a mine and turned his command over to General Karl Buelowius, 

formerly artillery commander of the Afrika 

Korps.3G 

" (1) Rpt of Capt John B. Upton, in 19th Engrs 

(C) Hist Rcds, Oct 42-Jan 44. (2) Rad, DAK Qu 

to 0 Qu German-Italian Panzer Army, 19 Feb 43, 

in Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 10, 

Anlage 187. 

" (1) Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Band 2, 15·-17 

Feb 43. (2) Deutsches Afrika Korps, Abt la, Kriegstagebuch vom 1.1.-28.11.43 (cited hereafter as 

DAK, KTB), 17 Feb 43. (3) MS #D-124 (von 

Liebenstein) . 
CHAPTER XXIII 

Rommel's Thrust Through Kasserine Pass 

The first phase of exploitation after the 

battles near Sidi Bou Zid had come to an 

end when not only Gafsa but also Sbei'tla 

and Fhiana, and the airfield at Thelepte, 

were abandoned by the Allies. On 17 February the two main axis forces, DAK at 

Feriana and 21 st Panzer Division at Sbei:tia, 

had accomplished their separate missions. 

The 10th Panzer Division had established 

contact with the Axis forces at Fondouk el 

Aouareb gap and, in conformity with von 

Arnim's orders, was on its way to an assembly area north of Kairouan. Reconnaissance 

in force was probing the gaps in the Western 

Dorsal from Sbiba to EI Ma el Abiod on 18 

February, and air reconnaissance revealed 

that Allied troops were moving westward 

from the Kasserine pass and Bou Chebka 

areas. It appeared that the Allies were concentrating their forces around Tebessa, and 

perhaps leaving only rearguards to defend 

the passes through the Grand Dorsal. 

Clearly, the initiative was still with the Axis 

forces." 

The Axis Decision of 18 February 

These developments led Field Marshal 

Rommel, in an uprush of sanguine antic i1 (1) Panzer Army Afri.ca, KTB, Band 2,17,18 

Feb 43. (2) Rpt, German-Italian Panzer Army to 

OB SOUTH, 17 Feb 43, in Panzer Army Africa, 

KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1099/3. (3) Fifth 

Panzer Army, KTB IV, 17, 18 Feb 43. (4) Gefechtsbericht Fatd, 17, 18 Feb 43. 

pations, to go beyond the views he had expressed on the previous evening (17 February), that his own forces were not strong 

enough to undertake an attack against 

Tebessa and that such an operation could 

succeed, but only if reinforced by the main 

body of von Arnim's mobile forces and supported by a holding attack along the Fifth 

Panzer Army's northern and central sectors.2 

It now seemed to him that the opportunity 

had returned to accomplish the very kind of 

operation that he had once hopefully advanced as a reason for bringing his army 

swiftly back from Libya to Tunisia. At 1420 

in the afternoon of the 18th, after an exchange of messages and a telephone conversation had revealed to Rommel the unyielding opposition of von Arnim to his proposals, 

the field marshal turned to Comando Supremo and Kesselring with this message: 

On the basis of the enemy situation as of 

today, I propose an immediate enveloping 

thrust from the southwest [sic] on Tebessa and 

the area to the north of it, provided Fifth 

Panzer Army's supply situation is adequate. 

This offensive must be executed with strong 

forces. I therefore request that 10th Panzer 

and 21 st Panzer Divisions be assigned to me 

and move immediately to the assembly area 

Thelepte-Feriana. 3 

2 Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Band 2, 17 Feb 43. 

, (1) Msg, German-Italian Panzer Army, Rommel 

to Comando Supremo and OB SOUTH, 1420, 18 

Feb 43, in Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 

9, Anlage 1107. (2) Panzer Army Africa, KTB, 

Band 2, 18 Feb 43. 
ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 439 

FIELD MARSHAL ROMMEL (thirdfram left) and members a/his staff, Tunisia. 

Rommel's concept was that a wide enveloping operation through Tebessa with the ultimate objective of Bone, outflanking the 

reserves that the Allies were feeding into 

their lengthening southern front and disrupting their lines of communication, would 

force the British First Army to pull out of 

Tunisia altogether. 

Rommel's proposal met with full approval 

from the Commander in Chief, South, who 

had just returned to Frascati from a visit to 

Hitler at his headquarters in East Prussia. 

In his absence from Rome the vague C amanda Supremo order of 16 February, 

ordering exploitation of the successes gained 

at Sidi Bou Zid, had made von Arnim instead of Rommel responsible for such operations- a critical departure from OB 

SOUTH's original concept. One result had 

been the dissolution of Group Ziegler at a 

time when it might, despite the original 

plans, have been concentrated for pursuit: 

Supporting Rommel's proposal, Kesselring 

radioed to the two army commanders in 

Tunisia: 

I consider it essential to continue the attack 

toward Tebessa and northward by concenI ( 1) See pp. 426-27 above. (2) MS # C-07S 

(Kesselring ) . (3) MS # D-309 (Deichmann ). 
440 

trating all available forces on the left .wing 

and exploiting our recent successes wIth a 

blow that can still have vast consequences for 

the enemy. This is for your preliminary information. I shall speak in this sense to the 

Duce and [General] Ambrosio today." 

Rommel waited impatiently for the decision. Late on the evening of the 18th he sent 

another urgent message to Comando Supremo asking that the 21st Panzer Division 

be rushed to Thelepte and the 10th Panzer 

Division, to Kasserine to launch the proposed offensive by the next evening. Clearly, 

Rommel's objective was still Tebessa." 

Shortly before midnight the order requested by Rommel reached him at his advanced headquarters. Comando Supremo, 

stating that "a unique opportunity is now offered to force a decisive success in Tunisia," 

directed that a deep thrust be made toward 

the north to threaten the rear of British 5 

Corps; if possible to isolate it; in any event 

to force its withdrawal. With all available 

mobile elements of his own German-Italian 

Panzer Army, as well as the 10th Panzer 

and 21 st Panzer Divisions, now assigned to 

him Rommel was directed to attack toward 

Maktar-Tadjeroulne with Le Kef as his 

initial objective. He was to concentrate his 

forces along a line from Sbeltla to Tebessa. 

A modicum of forces could provide flank 

security along the line Tebessa-Tozeur. 

Comando Supremo was convinced the Mareth Position would be safe from powerful 

attacks for another week or longer. That 

sector, defended with a minimum of mobile 

.', Rad, Kesselring to Rommel and vO.n Arnim, 

1630 18 Feb 43 in Panzer Army Afnea, KTB, 

A nla~enband 9, A nlage 1108, and Fifth Panzer 

Army, KTB, Anlagen, g. Kdos. (Chefsachen), 

16.1-26.11.43, Tunisien, Anlage 23/43. 

"Rad Rommel to Comando Supremo, 2230, 18 

Feb 43,'in Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 

9, A nlage 1109. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

reserves, was to remain under Rommel's 

command. 

Fifth Panzer Army was directed to prepare itself to launch a holding attack on a 

wide front between the coast and Pont-duFahs. In the meantime it was tG tie down 

and harass the Allies by frequent local attacks. In co-operation with the Naval Command, Africa, von Arnim was also to prepare to land troops at Tabarka. The Second 

Air Force was to organize a parachute mission to destroy the bridges at Le Kef. Comando Supremo assured the army commanders of stepped-up shipments of troops 

and su pplies by air and sea. 7 

The directive from Comando Supremo 

disappointed Rommel. It set an objective 

deep in the rear of the position of the Allies 

in the north; to this extent it was in accord 

with his intention of forcing a general Allied 

withdrawal into Algeria. But by making Le 

Kef the objective Comando Supremo's directive rejected the method which Rommel 

had proposed-a wide circling movement 

through Tebessa. Tebessa, to be sure, was 

named, but only as the western anchor of 

his drive in the direction of Le Kef instead 

of being the first objective of a wide enveloping sweep toward Bone. This shift Rommel 

regarded as appallingly shortsighted, since 

it would send the main Axis drive into the 

midst of Allied reserves, and it would jeopardize seizure and destruction of the vital Allied nerve center at Tebessa, the base from 

which as Rommel was aware, II Corps had 

been ~reparing to launch an aggressive drive 

eastward into the Sfax-Gabcs area." 

7 (1) Msg, Comando Supremo to Rommel ~nd 

von Arnim, 2115, 18 Feb 43, in Panzer Army Afnea, 

KTB, Anlalienband 9, Anlage 1113/1. (2) Msg, 

DB SOUTH, 0 Qu to Panzer Army Rommel, 2030, 

18 Feb 43, ibid., Anlage 1113/2. 

'Rommd, Krieg ohne Hass, pp, 353-54. 
ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 441 

Kesselring believed, and von Arnim 

feared, that this ambiguous order left Rommel free to begin his operation with a fullscale attack on Tebessa. But, Rommel, anxious to avoid delay and believing that he 

had been directed to make Le Kef instead 

of Tcbessa the first objective of his drive to 

the north, was convinced that it would require the bulk of his mobile forces to reach 

Le Kef quickly. He ordered them to concentrate for an advance on a direct, northwesterly axis to Le Kef, either through Kasserine Pass or Sbiba, depending on which 

was found to be less firmly held. 

Rommel ordered his commanders to 

launch the initial phase of the attack at 

first light on the 19th. The 21st Panzer 

Division, starting at 0800 along the road 

from Sbeitia, was to tryout the Sbiba gap 

with Ksour, fifty miles north on the road 

to Le Kef, as its objective. Kampfgruppe 

DAK was to strike into the Kasserine pass 

in an attempt to clear it in one swift push. 

Rommel ordered the 10th Panzer Division 

to return immediately from the PichonKairouan area to Sbeitia, reserving its subsequent commitment for decision until he 

could determine the relative progress at 

Sbiba gap and Kasserine pass. Mobile elements of the Centauro Division were called 

up from Gafsa, and ordered to strike toward 

Tcbessa from the southeast. While Kampfgruppe DAK had decided to probe the 

southernmost opening through the Western 

Dorsal at El Ma el Aboid rather than the 

more difficult approach through Dernaia--

Bon Chebka, Rommel directed Centauro to 

crack open the latter pass. It was to be supported by a detachment from Kampfgruppe 

DAK which was to circle around Djebel 

Chambi (1544) and assault the defenders 

from the rear. The field marshal planned 

to open his command post south of Fcriana 

at noon, 19 February, and subsequently 

move nearer the main effort when its area 

had been determined." 

On Rommel's urgent request Comando 

Supremo during the night of 19-20 February followed up its directive with an order 

for reorganization of command. Under the 

designation Group Rommel, the field marshal was to command the combined forces 

of the First Italian Army (General Messe), 

charged with the defense of the Mareth 

Position, and a force comprising 10th Panzer, 21st Panzer Division, and DAK (Angriffsgruppe Nord); the latter he personally 

led in the battle now under way. The 

change, long overdue, went into effect at 

0600 on 20 February."° 

Early in the morning, 19 February, Kesselring flew to Tunisia to confer with von 

Arnim in order to guarantee that everything 

possible would be done to make the Axis 

offensive succeed. Kesselring had ample 

reason for being apprehensive. While he was 

absent from Rome Fifth Panzer Army's report of operations had led OB SOUTH to 

believe that the 10th Panzer Division (not 

the 21st Panzer Division) had captured 

Sbeitla, and consequently, that Group Ziegler was concentrated in that vicinity.ll Only 

after German air reconnaissance had also 

reported a large-scale movement near Fondouk gap, which turned out to be that of 

the 10th Panzer Division, did von Arnim's 

"Telephone orders, Rommel to Lt Col Stolbeck. 

DAK, Lt Col Pomptow, Fifth Panzer Army, and 

Diu Centauro, all 19 Feb 43, in Panzer A rmy Africa. 

KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlagen 1114/1,2,3,4 and 

1121/1,2,3 and 1122/1. The operation was named 

STURMFLUT. 

10 Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 9, 

Anlagen 1123, 1124, 1125. 

11 Evening Rpt, Comando Supremo to OKW / 

WFSt, 17 Feb 43, copy in OKH/GenStdH/Op 

Abt, Lagemeldungen Ob. Sued-Cdo. Supremo, 1.1.-

2B.Il. 1943. 
442 

headquarters report its withdrawal. OB 

SOUTH immediately ordered the movement stopped, but the damage had been 

done. 12 

Kesselring's flying visit to Tunisia on 19 

February was therefore designed to ensure 

prompt execution of Comando Supremo's 

directive. Kesselring found that von Arnim 

had interpreted the directive to read that 

Group Rommel " ... was to break through 

[the Allied front] between Le Kef and Tebessa ... " and that he expected Rommel 

to move on Tebessa with his main forces. 

Therefore von Arnim had prepared a 

counterproposal which he felt would bring 

decisive success, provided the necessary 

means of combat and supply could be made 

available. He wanted to bring to bear on the 

Allies a concentric attack toward Le Kef, 

and thence down the Medjerda river, with 

Bedja as the objective. Such an attack, he 

argued, would insure complete surprise. In 

execution, the 21st Panzer Division was to 

attack from Sbei'tla, and the 10th Panzer 

Division from Pichon. The drive, moving 

closer to the Axis supply base than Rommel's expected advance on Tebessa, would 

engage all the Allied forces; it would permit 

participation by all Axis forces rather than 

by only the mobile elements. He felt the 

operation would subject co-ordination of 

Allied command to a severe test, and that 

" ... it alone [would] ensure the complete 

liberation of Tunisia." Rommel's plan, he 

argued, would merely force the Allies to fall 

back toward their principal centers of supply, much as the British had done in Egypt. 

Kesselring unequivocally rejected von 

Arnim's concept. The Commander in Chief, 

12 (I) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB IV, 18 Feb 43. 

(2) MS # D-309 (Deichmann). (3) MS # C075 (Kesselring). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

South, had intended a wide envelopment of 

the main Allied forces including Tebessa as 

well as Le Kef as essential objectives. Not 

until later was he to find out that his directive, as worded by Coman do Supremo, had 

failed to make this intention clear to Field 

Marshal Rommel.].' 

The Allied Line in the South 

Defense of the new Allied line brought 

American, British, and French troops to 

each of the areas of possible penetration, 

moves which required much hasty adjustment of the front and of the chain of command. By the morning of 19 February, when 

Group Rommel began to probe at Sbiba and 

Kasserine passes, a considerable force of 

Allied troops had already assembled at both 

places. (Map VIII) 

Sbiba was in the zone of the French XIX 

Corps commanded by General Koehz. The 

British 6th Armoured Division opened its 

headquarters at Rohia, nine miles north of 

Sbiba, at 2000, 18 February, to control the 

defense of Koeltz's southwestern sector, 

while directly under First Army. On the 

same night one component of that division, 

the Headquarters, 26th Armoured Brigade 

(Brig. C. A. L. Dunphie), shifted from 

Sbiba to Thala, with part of its subordinate 

units. Another element, the British 1 st 

Guards Brigade, with the U.S. 18th Combat Team (1 st Infantry Division), and the 

U.S. 34th Infantry Division coming into the 

line, remained to hold Sbiba gap. The 18th 

Combat Team's three battalions took up 

positions east of the Sbeitla-Sbiba road. 

13 ( 1) Mins of confs between Kesselring, von 

Arnim,' and others, 19 and 20 Feb 43, in Fifth 

Panzer Army, KTB IV, (2) MS #C,075 (Kesselring). (3) MS #T-3-P II (Kesselring), Pt. 2. 
ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 443 

Before daylight the 133d and 135th Infantry of the 34th Division, supported by three 

artillery battalions, extended that line along 

a ridge southeast of Sbiba. The 18th Combat 

Team had been placed under General Ryder's command. In general support were the 

16/5 Lancers and elements of the 72d and 

93d British Antitank Regiments, Royal 

Artillery. The French Light Armored Brigade and a Detachment Guinet maintained 

roadblocks between Sbiba and Rohia.14 

At Thala, Brigadier Dunphie's force concentrated during the night of 18-19 February in a key area for opposing the enemy's 

main effort. He planned to provide reserves 

at either Sbiba or Kasserine pass, or at any 

secondary pass which the enemy might attempt to envelop. At 0600, 19 February, his 

command passed to the control of U.S. II 

Corps, although its commitment in battle 

was subject to specific prior approval by 

General Anderson.'5 

On 19 February, General Fredendall's 

corps was split into three forces along the 

Western Dorsal with a fourth in a supporting position on the south flank and a fifth 

being brought into position during the following night. (1) At Kasserine pass was 

Stark Force, a miscellaneous aggregation 

under the command of Colonel Stark, commanding officer of the 26th Infantry. His 

own 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, the U.S. 

33d Field Artillery Battalion, and elements 

of the U.S. 19th Combat Engineers Regiment had been moved into the pass under 

" (1) 133d and 135th Inf Hists, 1943. (2) Info 

supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (3) XIX 

Corps Jnl, 17-19Feb43. 

" Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. Dunphie's command included Headquarters, 26th Armoured Brigade; the 2d Battalion, Lothians; 10th 

Battalion, Royal Buffs (-); 17/21 Lancers (-); 

Squadron A, 56th Reconnaissance Regiment; engineers, and smaller artillery and antitank units. 

command of Colonel Moore on 17-18 February, with the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and a battery of the French 67th 

African Artillery (7 5-mm.). Reinforcements, moving toward the pass by various 

routes, arrived on 19-20 February while 

the battle was in progress. (2) Northwest 

of Feriana, guarding the Dernaia position 

with the routes from Feriana to Tebessa 

through Bou Chebka, was an American and 

French force commanded by General Welvert. It included the U.S. 1st Ranger Battalion; the 1 st Battalion, 168th Infantry; 

the U.S. 36th and 175th Field Artillery 

Battalions; Company D, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion; Company B, 19th Combat 

Engineers; Battery A, 213th Coast Artillery 

(AA) Battalion; three battalions of French 

infantry and four batteries of French artillery. (3) At the extreme southwestern flank, 

south of El Ma el Abiod, was Bowen Force. 

It was backed by the U.S. 1st Armored 

Division.'6 

On the night of 18-19 February, General Fredendall gave 1st Armored Division 

the mission: (1) to act defensively to protect Tebessa against attacks from the south 

and southwest; (2) to place mine fields and 

cover with artillery fire the passes at Kasserine, Dernaia, and El Ma el Abiod northwest of Feriana; and (3) to co-ordinate 

defense with the 3d Battalion, 26th Combat 

Team (reinforced), known as Bowen Force, 

and with the Derbyshire Yeomanry, and be 

ready to counterattack southeast to restore 

the Dernaia position, if it should be penetrated. General Ward instructed Generals 

Robinett and McQuillin to prepare plans 

and conduct the reconnaissance necessary 

16 Msg L-1, Liaison Officer First Army (Boye) to 

Fairfield (Truscott) and FREEDOM, 20 Feb 43. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 
444 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

TERRAIN AT KASSERINE PASS, looking southeast. 

to make such a counterattack upon further 

orders." 

T he T errain at K asserine Pass 

Viewed from the air Kasserine pass is 

shaped like a crude capital X. It is one of 

11 (1) Memo, Gen Fredendall to CG 1st Armd 

Div, 18 Feb 43, in CCB AAR, 22- 27 Feb 43. (2) 

FO # 6, 1st Armd Div, 1300, 19 Feb 43, in 1st 

Armd Div History, Vol. V. 

the three major gaps in the southwestern 

projection of the Grand Dorsal (the others 

are at Sbiba and Dernaia ). The defile at 

Kasserine at its narrowest point is about one 

mile wide. The axis of movement through 

the pass is that of the Hatab river, which 

flows from northwest to southeast down a 

gentle grade through the Bahiret Foussana 

valley and Kasserine pass. To one approaching from Kasserine village, the entrance is 
ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 445 

marked by a rocky spur of Djebel Chambi 

at the southwestern corner and, more than 

three miles to the north, by the rounded 

contours of Djebel Semmama (1356). 

These mountains converge to a narrows 

about four miles northwest of the entrance, 

while the triangular floor of the pass between them rises steadily over gently undulating ground. A road and a narrowgauge railroad cross this area to the hamlet 

of Bordj Chambi, at which the road forks, 

one part branching to the left to reach 

Tebessa; the other, like the railroad, traversing the Hatab river and then continuing 

to Thala. Long shoulders extend into the 

pass from the mountain heights northeast 

and southwest of it but they are not exactly 

opposite each other nor in any respect 

symmetrical. 

The rising shoulder of Djebel Semmama 

has several flattened knolls at successively 

higher altitudes. Transverse ridges extend 

from these knolls down the sides of the 

shoulder to the floor of the valley. A force 

approaching from either Kasserine or 

Thala could work its way up long draws 

adjacent to these ridges to achieve the summits of the knolls. To attain Hill 1191, the 

one next below the main southern height 

of Djebel Semmama, would require a hard 

climb of more than a mile, but the hilltop 

dominates those below it and gives an unimpeded view for many miles over the roads 

approaching the pass from either end. 

The main projection into the pass from 

Djebel Chambi on the southwestern side is 

about half a mile farther from the Kasserine entrance and more than two miles 

from the top of Hill 1191. As one approaches from Kasserine it looks like a long 

ridge which drops to the floor of the pass 

much more gradually than Diebel Semmama. From Bordj Chambi, however, it 

is recognizable as a steep-sided curving 

ridge on the south side of the pass's western 

exit, a ridge extended by several small low 

hills with which it may once have been connected before erosion cut openings between 

them. The projection is sufficiently distinguishable from the main mass of Djebel 

Chambi to be separately named Diebel 

Zebbeus (812). 

The unpaved road to Tebessa passes 

along the base of Djebel Zebbeus in a defile 

lying between that mountain and low hills 

on the northern side. Here in effect is a 

subordinate pass within the main Kasserine 

gap. The black-top road to Thala runs close 

to the base of Djebel Semmama and, like 

the Tebessa route, passes through a short 

inner defile created by another low hill. 

The throat of the pass and the valleys at 

each end of it are bisected by the Hatab 

river. Its channel on the Kasserine end is 

broad and shallow, but within the throat 

and across the valley northwest of it, the 

stream zigzags in a wadi which is often 

deep, with sheer sides, and is very difficult 

to cross. Moreover, the main wadi is fringed 

with draws and gullies through which short 

streams drain into the Hatab from the 

mountains. The scrub growth at the water's 

edge and the cultivated fields and groves 

of a few scattered farms near the river make 

a pattern of dark green against the brownish-gray pastel of the sparse vegetation that 

covers the clay soil. In the pass itself, much 

of the underlying rock is exposed and the 

rest is very thinly covered. In the valley to 

the northwest, large patches of cactus 

abound. 

As one leaves Djebel Zebbeus on the road 

to Tebessa, one travels a route which extends west-northwest for some fifteen miles 

to Diebel el Hamra (1112) at the far edge 

of the Bahiret Foussana valley. The road 
446 

skirts the northern edge of a rough area, 

almost one third of the valley, which tips 

northward from the mountain mass west 

of Djebel Chambi toward the Hatab river. 

In effect this area resembles a gigantic, 

crudely corrugated shed roof draining into 

a badly bent and twisted gutter. The remainder of the valley is a much more level 

basin, and its surface is correspondingly wet 

and spongy in such a rainy month as February 1943. The road to Thala bends northward around the westernmost tip of Djebel 

Semmama, six miles north of Djebel Zebbeus, and passes from view behind low 

ridges. 

The Bahiret Foussana valley is ringed except at the northeastern portion by mountains with crests rising from 3,000 to 4,000 

feet above sea level. Along the southern 

edge, between Djebel Chambi and Djebel 

el Hamra, are Djebel Nogueza (1127) and 

the eastern end of Djebel es Sif (1352). On 

the northern side are Djebel el Adjered 

( 1385) at the west and Djebel Bireno 

( 1419) at the east. A wide opening between 

Djebel Bireno and Djebel Semmama is 

used by the Kasserine-Thala-Tad jerouineLe Kef road. The main Kasserine-Tebessa 

dirt road skirts Djebel el Hamra to lead 

directly westward over the Algerian border to Tebessa. Running north and south 

along the base of Djebel el Hamra is a section of the narrow dirt track connecting 

Haidra, thirteen miles west of Thala, with 

Bou Chebka, a village on the plateau southwest of Djebel Chambi, about halfway between Feriana and Tebessa. Other tracks 

cross the Bahiret Foussana valley, using 

fords over the Hatab river, and pushing up 

the draws and through openings in the 

mountain rim. The American troops created 

much confusion by renaming this area the 

"Kasserine Valley," despite the fact that 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Kasserine lies in another valley of its own. 

The area into which one emerges after leaving Kasserine behind and coming through 

the Kasserine pass cannot very logically also 

be considered as the Kasserine Valley. 

Kasserine pass is not impregnable, perhaps, but it offers such advantages to defense that a sufficient force could exact an 

exorbitant price from a foe determined to 

take it at all costs. Through possession of 

the heights on either side, an elementary 

requirement of any such defense, troops can 

dominate the triangular area of approach 

from the Kasserine side. That area lacks 

cover; any force attempting to take the 

heights could probably be readily detected, 

and one seeking to push into the throat of 

the pass by moving along the valley floor 

has to come under flanking fire from one 

side or the other. The pass is at an elevation 

of some 2,000 feet, between crests which 

tower about 2,000 feet higher still, so that 

winter clouds and mist limit visibility. 

Nevertheless, since the opening is less than 

a mile wide, an attacking force could not 

escape observation; in fact, it could be restricted by mine fields to areas still narrower 

and covered by prearranged fires. Even before attackers reached the throat of the pass 

from the east, they could gain control over 

the road fork from the defenders, thus denying them the best roadway between one side 

of the pass and the other, although a secondary track does connect the two roads about 

half a mile farther into the narrows. The 

wadi of the Hatab river splits the steadily 

widening area northwest of the throat into 

two sections. Advance along either fork of 

the road at first leaves an attacking force 

vulnerable to flanking fire from the other 

side of the pass, but shortly thereafter takes 

the force out of range. The two subordinate 

defiles through which each branch of the 
RO~1MEL'S THRCST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 447 

road then runs are critical points which cannot be bypassed by vehicles and at which an 

adequate defense force can exact a drastic 

toll from any enemy which has penetrated 

thus far. But such a defense force, to be 

successful, must be both strong and well 

co-ordinated if it is to take full advantage of 

the possibilities of mutual support from 

either side of the Hatab. 

The Defense of Kasserine Pass. 19 February 

An enemy demonstration in front of the 

eastern entrance of Kasserine pass during 

the evening of 18 February convinced General Fredendall that an attack \vas imminent. From Tebessa he telephoned Colonel 

Stark at El Ma el Abiod at 2000 hours and 

said: 

"I want yOll to go to Kasserine right away 

and pllil a Stonewall Jackson. Take over up 

there," 

"You mean tonight, General?" asked Colonel Stark. 

"Yes, immediately; stop in my CP on the 

way up," was the answer.IS 

Before morning, Colonel Stark had assumed command of the provisional force, 

directly in the case of the infantry from his 

regiment along the Thala road, and indirectly through Colonel Moore of the reinforced 19th Combat Engineers on the other 

side of the gap.IO 

The first defensive organization in Kasserine pass had been carried out by Colonel 

Moore, beginning with a small, mine-laying 

party on 16 February. He then shifted all 

units under his command from the line east 

"26th Inf AAR, 19-24 Feb. 43, 

1. Basic sources for the dt'fense of Kasserine pass 

are: (1) AAR's of 1st Div, 26th Inf, 33d FA Bn, 

19th Engr Regt, and II Corps. (2) DAK, KTB, 

18-23 Feb 43. (3) lOth Panzer Div, Ie, Taetigkeitsbrericht, 19,-21 Feb 43, 

of Kasserine village into the pass during the 

night of 17-18 February. He placed the 1st 

Battalion, 26th Infantry, astride the Thala 

road about two miles northwest of the fork 

in the pass, and his own unit on the southwestern side of the gap, from the Hatab 

river to Hill 812 (Djebel Zebbeus), on a 

line through Hill 712 and crossing the 

Tebessa road. His main line of resistance extended almost three miles and he held it 

with about 2,000 men. He planned to defend behind a triple belt of miles across the 

roads, by small arms and machine gun fire, 

and to hold the enemy's armored vehicles 

at the eastern approach to the pass by the 

fire of two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers 

of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion and one 

battery of towed French 75's. Patrols covering the high hills on the flanks would check 

infiltration while a reserve company on each 

side, plus the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion, would protect the rear and throw 

back any of the enemy who had slipped past 

the patrols.20 

Colonel Stark found these plans only 

partially realized when he assumed command in the pass at 0730, 19 February. A 

night of fog and rain left the whole area 

blanketed in mist. The actual situation is illustrated by the experience of a mine-laying 

party on the preceding night. An engineer 

lieutenant had been ordered at about 1930 

hours to supervise the laying of a mine field 

in front of the 18t Battalion, 26th Infantry, 

on the northern side of the pass. The engineers loaded the mines on a truck sent by the 

battalion, which was expected to furnish the 

force to install them. The officer went along 

Msg, Col Moore to CG II Corps, 2002, 17 Feb 

43; Memo, Moore for his troops, 8 Mar 43, sub: 

Kasscrine pass defense; Overlay, Exhibit 0, Disposition during Kasserine pass battle, 19th Engr 

Regt Hist Reds, Oct 42-Jan 44. 
448 

, .- i - -

., 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

lOS-MM. HOWITZER OF THE 33D FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION In 

position, Kasserlne Pass area, 20 February 1943. 

with the mine-laden truck and after midnight arrived at Headquarters, Company C, 

26th Infantry, where he tried to locate the 

mine-laying force. Unable to find anyone at 

the command post who knew anything 

about the matter, on their advice he set out 

along the road toward Kasserine in the belief that he might there discover someone 

with the necessary information. A trip of a 

few miles toward the enemy did not bring 

about such a meeting, so he returned, roused 

the company commander, and at about 

0330, was joined by a detail under an infantry lieutenant. The latter had no idea where 

the mine field should go, or whether it was 

to be covered by fire. The engineer lieutenant, who had never seen the terrain in 

daylight, had to select the site and then had 

to instruct the troops in the methods of laying and arming the mines. The infantry had 

no implements for excavation except their 

short-handled intrenching tools, which were 

of little avail on the road and in the rocky 

soil on either side of it. In the end, to get the 

task done before daylight, the detail merely 

strewed the mines unburied across a gap 

about 100 yards wide, from a hill on one 

side of the road to an embankment on the 

other. 21 

On the morning of 19 February, Colonel 

Stark set up his command post about three 

miles back of the narrows and quickly 

realized that the proportion of forces sent to 

the heights on either side of the pass was insufficient. By the time Colonel Akers of the 

G-3 Section, II Corps, arrived at 1000 to 

check the situation, enemy 88-mm. shells 

were already falling near Stark's tent. The 

3d Battalion, 39th Infantry (9th Infantry 

" Memo by 1st Lt Edwin C. Dryden, 20 May 43, 

in 19th Engr Regt Hist Reds, Oet 42-Jan 44. 
ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 449 

Division), was on its way to the pass. Company I, 13th Armored Regiment, was in 

reserve near the Tebessa road and available. 

The British 26th Armoured Brigade (-) at 

Thala might be committed if First Army 

approved. With the strength of the enemy 

unknown, it was uncertain whether existing 

Allied forces would be able to hold out until 

prospective reinforcements could be put into 

position. 

At 10 15, thirty-five to forty truckloads of 

enemy infantry were observed unloading 

southeast of the pass and making for the 

heights. A little after noon, some French 

troops reported to the command post that 

they saw German soldiers scaling the steep 

slopes on both sides of the pass. Colonel 

Stark had just reported to General Fredendall that the enemy's fire in the pass indicated either that he was feeling out the 

defenses or in a preliminary stage of an 

actual attack. Now, in view of the report of 

the French troops, there could be little 

doubt. The attack was on!2 

Rommel had sent the 33d Reconnaissance Battalion to seize the pass, if possible 

at daybreak, by a sudden, surpise attack. 

The defenders were on the alert and much 

too strongly established to be driven out by 

such a small force. Kampfgruppe DAK 

then took over the mission. Group Menton, 

consisting of two battalions of the veteran 

Panzer Grenadier Ref!,iment Afrika, supported by the corps artillery and antiaircraft units, took up the attack. The 2d Battalion, Panzer Grenadier Regiment Africa, 

started up the mountainside to gain control 

of the shoulder of Djebel Semmama, while 

the main body moved along the floor of the 

" (1) CT 26 Unit Jnl, 19-24 Feb 43, in 26th Inf 

AAR, 11 Nov 42-14 Apr 43, 23 Apr 43. (2) Interv 

with Lt Col Russell F. Akers, Jr., 27 Jul 49. 

pass near its base. The enemy took Hill 

974, one of the prominent knolls part way 

up the shoulder, but could not continue 

down the mountain's western face under the 

severe fire which came from the direction 

of the lower hills northwest of the road 

fork at Bordj Chambi. On the floor of the 

pass Colonel Menton's 1 st Battalion pushed 

past Bordj Chambi and penetrated the narrows about as far as the Wadi Zebbeus before being stopped by artillery fire. The 

absence of the air support to which the 

enemy infantry were accustomed and the 

low effectiveness of German counterbattery 

fire under conditions of poor visibility reduced the power of the attack. To push beyond the positions thus far reached, General Buelowius now decided to commit the 

1 st Battalion, 8th Panzer Regiment (Group 

Stotten). At about the same time that Colonel Stark was informing General Fredendall that a strong attack might be beginning, Field Marshal Rommel was surveying the situation with General Buelowius 

near the southeastern entrance of the pass. 

He intended, he then said, to make his main 

attack through Sbiba and northward. At 

Kasserine pass he wished to gain control 

only in order to make a feint toward 

Tebessa and to bar Allied use of the opening while he was striking farther east. General Buelowius expressed confidence that 

his forces would win the pass before the 

end of the day.23 

Allied reinforcements began arriving in 

the pass early in the afternoon. Colonel 

Stark sent Company I, 39th Infantry, to 

the highest ground in the center of the pass; 

Company L, 39th Infantry, to reinforce 

Company A, 26th Infantry, on the extreme 

north flank at Hill 1191 on Djebel Sem-

"DAK, KTB, 19 F"b 43. 
450 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

GENERAL GRANT MEDIUM TANK M3 of the 13th Armored Regiment, Kasserine 

Pass area, 20 February 1943. 

mama; and he split Company K, 39th Infantry, between the two other companies. 

The 26th Infantry regimental band and 

five tanks of Company I, 13th Armored 

Regiment, were placed in supporting positions along the road to Thala, where they 

guarded against enemy encirclement from 

the shoulder of Djebel Semmama to the 

valley and thence down the road from 

Thala toward the road fork. The remainder 

of Company I's tanks and the mobile guns 

of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion 

waited near the defile on the T€bessa road, 

with four mobile 75's of the 26th Infantry 

Cannon Company. These dispositions were 

partly executed before the enemy's attack 

was resumed at 1530 and partly after it 

had begun."' 

"26th Inf AAR, 11 Nov -+2-14 Apr 43, 23 Apr 

l:l. 

The afternoon attack came northwestward along the Tcbessa road between the 

road fork and the narrow gap at the base 

of Djebel Zebbeus. Wadi Zebbeus, a tributary running eastward from the base of 

Djebel Chambi to the Hatab river, flows 

under this road about half a mile from the 

road fork. The enemy tanks and infantry 

drove northward across this stream bed as 

far as an American mine field against considerable machine gun and antitank fire 

from a low hill (712) and from Djebel ZebbellS, as well as from artillery farther back. 

Five German tanks were knocked out at the 

mine field while the 19th Engineers, reinforced, fought stubbornly on ground cut by 

ravines and low ridges. One company of 

enemy mountain troops tried to climb along 

the high ground south of the T€bessa road, 

above Hill 812, with a view tn enveloping 
ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 451 

the American right flank. It was driven off. 

On the other side of the pass, the enemy 

retained Hill 974 against several attempts 

to dislodge him, but could not exploit possession of that vantage point while American fire could be poured from Hill 712 

against the exposed slope above the Thala 

road, although some infiltration to the road 

took place late in the afternoon. Toward 

evening a detachment of Menton's 2d Battalion pushed higher up the shoulder of 

Djebel Semmama, reaching Hill 1191 after 

nightfall. The enemy had captured about 

100 Americans before breaking off the main 

attack at dusk. 25 

The enemy had observed some withdrawal along the Tebessa road during the 

afternoon which he thought might indicate 

an intention to abandon the pass. He sent 

strong patrols under orders to keep in close 

contact during the night, and placed his 

infantry well forward with a view to prompt 

pursuit, but withdrew the tank battalion into 

bivouac southeast of Djebel Chambi. During the night DAK was reinforced by a battalion of tanks of the Italian 131 st (C entauro) Armored Division and the 5th Bersaglieri Battalion, which came up from the 

F eriana-Thelepte area. 

Colonel Stark's improvised force had 

grown enough during the afternoon to frustrate the enemy's expectation that he could 

take the pass in one day and with the forces 

thus far committed. Stark remained rather 

hopeful that he could hold the pass in spite 

of some ominous developments late in the 

day. He asked General Fredendall at 2035 

hours for armored and tank destroyer units, 

as well as for infantry and artillery, and for 

air support in the morning. He moved his 

command post to a site where enemy artil-

'" (1) 19th Engr Regt (C), Hist Reds. Oct 42-

Jan 44. (2) DAK, KTB, 19 Feb 43. 

lery fire would not keep breaking his wire 

communications back to II Corps. Late in 

the afternoon, Brigadier Dunphie and some 

of his officers of the British 26th Armoured 

Brigade drove from Thala to reconnoiter 

the pass, where they thought they might 

be committed. Dunphie regarded Stark's 

situation as unsatisfactory and deteriorating. 

Stark could not furnish sufficient precise information about the conditions along his 

front, and it seemed to Dunphie that he 

lacked adequate control. The enemy had 

already infiltrated between Stark's command post and part of his forces, and might 

be expected to build up at that soft spot 

during the night. The Americans had no 

reserves with which to counterattack against 

a break-through or a substantial infiltration. 

The situation at the pass seemed to Dunphie 

to justify committing his armored command 

to clear it up, and he so recommended to 

British First Army.2 1

; 

Brigadier McNabb, General Anderson's 

chief of staff, investigated the situation in 

the pass and rejected Dunphie's recommendation. He limited the force released from 

Thala to a detachment of eleven tanks, one 

company of motorized infantry, one battery 

of artillery, and a small unit of antitank 

guns, which was placed under the command 

of Lt. Col. A. C. Gore, 10th Battalion, 

Royal Buffs and sent to the northwestern 

corner of the pass about 0400, 20 February. 

\Vhen Stark supported a proposal to have 

the rest of the armored brigade near the 

pass, as insurance rather than because he 

thought they would have to be committed, 

Brigadier McNabb stood by his earlier decision. He considered that Stark's line was 

'" (1) Mf'mo by Gt'nt'ral Dunphic, Scp 51, supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (2) DAK, KTB. 

19 Feb 43. (3) CT 26 Unit Jnl, in 26th Inf AAR. 

II No\' 42 14 Apr 43. 
452 

too far west for the British armored units to 

be of much help, and expressed his belief 

that although Stark had enough troops to 

"handle things as they are," he did not seem 

to have a "grip on things." Moreover, he 

believed that something might develop near 

Sbiba which would require Dunphie's unit 

there. Stark therefore prepared to provide 

American infantry and artillery support for 

an advance southeastward along the Thala 

road by Colonel Gore's detachment in the 

morning. The 3d Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry (Lt. Col. W. W. Wells), came 

under Colonel Stark's command during the 

early morning. 27 

What happened during the night of 

19-20 February cannot be clearly reconstructed from the record. After dark the 

enemy advanced to the northwest as far as 

the Thala road at Hill 704 but was then 

driven back. On the slopes of Djebel Semmama the American line was enveloped or 

pierced, so that Company A, 26th Infantry, 

was cut off, its commander was captured 

for a time, and the other companies went 

out of battalion control. Stragglers reported 

the situation after daylight on 20 February, 

a second foggy morning. The 19th Combat 

Engineers (reinforced) on the other side of 

the Hatab river spent a night under steady 

pressure from enemy patrols but apparently 

nothing like a persistent attack by a major 

force. It was 0830, 20 February, when 

the enemy resumed the offensive there. But 

before taking up the second day in Kasserine 

pass, where the enemy was operating under 

a revised plan, it is necessary to consider the 

action south of Sbiba gap on 19 February, 

Z7 (1) Phone Conv, McNabb, Dunphie, and Hewitt, 20 Feb 43, Entry 345, in II Corps G-3 In\. (2) 

Info supplied by Cabinet Officc, London. (3) CT 

26 Unit Jnl, in 26th Inf AAR, 11 Nov 42-14 Apr 

43,2::1 Apr 43. (4) 26th Inf Hist. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

for the outcome there led Rommel to a 

major decision during the night.28 

The 21st Panzer Division Is Stopped 

at Sbiba. 19 February 

The 21st Pan::.er Division started north 

from Sbeltla at 0900 on 19 February with 

its objective a road junction at Ksour. Its 

progress was uneventful until, shortly before noon, the point of the column arrived 

at a narrow belt of Allied mines across the 

road about six miles southeast of Sbiba. The 

attackers readily opened a gap while covering the operation with artillery fire against 

any Allied force on the higher ground to 

the northwest. A short advance then brought 

the column up against a much better laid 

mine field within the range of British artillery. Enemy observers, assisted by Arabs, 

could see the positions held by twenty Allied 

tanks, two battalions of artillery, and a 

considerable number of infantry on the high 

ground on either side of the road, three to 

four miles farther north. While the main 

column stopped, one armored battalion 

with twenty-five tanks from 5th Panzer Regiment and some truck-borne infantry attempted a sweep to the east out of range 

of the British artillery and then northward 

against the U.S. 18th Combat Team. A detachment of the British 16/5 Lancers tried 

to move within range to deter the attack 

but lost four of its light tanks to the longerrange guns of the enemy's vehicles. The 

Germans brought up several batteries of 

light field howitzers, emplaced them, and 

began counterbattery and preparation fire 

on the Allied ridge positions while the in-

"(1) II Corps AAR, 2 May 43. (2) Interv with 

Col Akers, 27 Ju149. (3) 26th Inf AAR, 23 Apr 43. 

(4) DAK, KTB, 19-20 Fcb 43. 
ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 453 

fantry (104th Pan.zer Grenadier Regiment) 

got ready to attack. 

At about this juncture, Field Marshal 

Rommel arrived at Colonel Hildebrandt's 

command post to ascertain the course of his 

operations and to urge an all-out, concentrated attack for a break-through rather 

than the cautious more dispersed frontal 

attack which seemed in prospect. Colonel 

Hildebrandt's attack stopped short without 

his infantry's ever being committed. He lost 

ten to twelve tanks, for the U.S. 151 st Field 

Artillery Battalion and the other American 

artillery units supporting the 34th Infantry 

Division had platted more than 100 concentrations and fired on the enemy tanks with 

the benefit of good observation. British engineers went out after dark and demolished 

seven of the enemy's vehicles, while Colonel 

Hildebrandt pulled back his armored unit 

behind a defensive line of infantry, sent the 

580th Reconnaissance Battalion to the eastern flank, and covered the west flank by the 

609th Flak Battalion. The Americans used 

the night to lay mines and barbed wire in 

front of their line in expectation of an attack on the next day.29 

The successful defense at both Kasserine 

and Sbiba passes on 19 February obliged 

Rommel to review his original plan to commit the 10th Panzer Division through Sbiba 

toward Ksour and Le Kef, while merely 

sealing Kasserine pass behind a feint toward 

Tebessa. He decided that the prospects at 

Kasserine pass were better. General von 

Broich's 10th Panzer Division. which he had 

ordered back from the Pichon-Kairouan 

"(1) 21st Panzer Div, KTB, I.I.-31.l1I.43, 19 

Feb 43. (2) 133d Inf Rist. 7 Jun 43, and, in particular. AT Co 133d Inf Rist, Jan-Jun 43. (3) Interv 

with Brig Gen Benjamin F. Caffey, Jr., 21 Feb 43. 

(4) Journal de Marchc de la Brigade Legere 

Mecanique (Ligh't Armored Brigade), 19 Feb 43. 

Photostat in OCMR. 

area, therefore received instructions to continue through Sbei:tla to Kasserine. It was 

then to pass through Kampfgruppe DAK in 

Kasserine pass and proceed northward toward Thala. DAK. having opened the pass, 

was to continue northwestward to Djebel el 

Hamra, seize the passes there, and leave defensive elements facing west. In execution 

of these plans the 10th Panzer Division was 

to have assembled at Kasserine village by 

daybreak on 20 February. The division was 

at only half strength because important elements, notably its heavy panzer battalion 

(including Tiger tanks), remained committed in von Arnim's sector. Delayed by 

poor roads and bad weather the division did 

not arrive at Kasserine village at the time 

specified. As late as the night of the 19th its 

advance elements had got only as far as 

Sbeitla. 30 Rommel's decision thus to employ 

the 10th Panzer Division in the western wing 

of his attack rather than to commit it nearer 

the 21st Panzer Division was in conformity 

with his directive from Comando Supremo, 

which specified that the greater weight 

should fall there, and in agreement with the 

tactical situation, which promised quicker 

success at Kasserine pass. 

The Loss of Kasserine Pass, 20 February 

The Allied defense at Kasserine pass on 

20 February began with the advance at first 

light by Colonel Gore's small armored force 

from a ridge about 6 miles northwest of the 

road fork in the pass. He moved toward the 

main defensive line on the Thala side of the 

narrows. There he supported the remaining 

American elements and sent his squadron of 

light tanks forward on reconnaissance to30 (1) DAK, KTB, 19 Feb 43. (2) Panzer Arm)' 

Africa, KTB 2,19-20 Feb 43. 
454 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

MEN OF THE 894TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION on reconnaissance at 

Kasserine Pass on the Kasserine- ThaLa road. 

ward the road fork. At the same time, 

Colonel Stark sent the 3d Battalion, 6th 

Armored Infantry, climbing up the southwestern slopes of Djebel Semmama to surmount the shoulder at Hill 1 191. It was 

expected to protect the northern fl ank, and 

to re-establish contact with Company A, 

U.S. 26th Infantry, and the other units on 

the northern flank. The 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Lt. Col. Charley P. Eastburn ) was sent forward by II Corps during 

the early morning, 20 February, to be in 

position to counterattack against a breakthrough at the pass. H 

General Buelowius sent into the assault 

at 0830, 20 February, both battalions of 

" ( I ) Msg, Hewitt to Eastburn, 0505, 20 Feb 43, 

Entry 348, in 11 Corps G-3 Jnl. ( 2 ) CT 26 Jnl, in 

26th Inf AAR, 23 Apr 43. (3) Info supplied by 

Cabinet Office, London. (4 ) 6th Armd Inf AAR, 2 

Scp 43. (5) DAK, KTB, 20 Feb 43. 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment Africa, supported by all his field artillery and dualpurpose 88-mm. guns, plus a battery of new 

German rocket projectors which had been 

brought up during the night. Once the road 

to Tebessa had been opened, the two armored battalions ( 1st Battalion, 8th Panzer 

Regiment and that of Division Centauro) 

and a reconnaissance battalion would also 

be committed. The leading elements of the 

10th Panzer Division were temporarily held 

east of Kasserine village until needed. The 

attack on the right was weakened by the 

necessity of preventing part of the 3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, on the upper 

slopes of Djebel Semmama from regaining 

possession of Hill 1191 and adjacent knolls 

from German detachments, and then turning against the attacking German infantry 

in the narrows. The extremely difficult terrain west of Hill 712, and accurate artillery 
ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 455 

and mortar fire, slowed down the 1st Battalion, Panzer Grenadier Regiment Africa, 

and the 5th Bersaglieri Battalion attacking 

on the left. Rommel himself appeared in 

that area in the forenoon with Buelowius 

and von Broich, and he ordered up infantry 

reinforcements to the strength of almost two 

battalions. Finally he also committed the 

motorcycle battalion of the 10th Panzer Division t~ expedite the attack along the Thala 

road. Rommel believed that he had to 

break through quickly at all costs, for if he 

were to prolong the attack until night, the 

rate of the Allied build-up would rob him 

of the opportunity for subsequent exploitation. He therefore eventually ordered all 

available elements of both Buelowius' and 

von Broich's commands to make a side-byside attack at 1630,20 February. The 10th 

Panzer Division would be on the right, its 

two battalions of armored infantry pushing 

over Hill 974 and turning west onto the 

valley floor behind the Allied line. Kampfgruppe DAK on the southwest, would thrust 

along the Tebessa road and would also push 

infantry over the rough ground onto Hill 

812 and to the high ground northeast of it. 

The concentration of German artillery support would be extraordinarily high."2 

Long before this attack began, it seemed 

to the defenders that the enemy was moving 

forward relentlessly and successfully. In fact, 

just before noon an enemy column penetrated between two of Colonel Moore's companies, and shortly afterward, observers 

spotted enemy tanks and infantry getting 

through the mine field on the T ebessa road. 

By noon, Colonel Moore's command post 

had been overrun and his command was 

" (I) DAK, KTB, 20 Fpb 43. (2) 10th Panzer 

Dil·, KTB, 20 F~b 43. 

falling hack. The eight medium tanks of 

Company I, 13th Armored Regiment, had 

been placed astride this road, near the inner 

defile, with elements of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion nearby. Radio communications between the tanks had broken down 

and none existed with Colonel Stark's headquarters or with the tank destroyers. Communication was by courier and was infrequent. As the enemy tanks began getting 

through the mines, the American artillery 

was sent farther back. The French, after 

running out of ammunition, disabled their 

75's and abandoned them. The tank destroyers moved out and, after being held 

in position for some time, so did the tanks. 

Although the defense crumbled, it persisted 

and in fact still seemed strong to the enemy. 

The enemy's afternoon attack finally 

cleared the pass. The two battalions of 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment Africa, the 5th 

Bersaglieri Battalion, two armored infantry 

battalions, and the motorcycle battalion of 

the 10th Panzer Division, supported by five 

battalions of artillery extending from one 

side of the pass to the other, moved methodically northwestward. They opened the 

road to Tebessa first. The armored battalion 

from the Centauro DilJision in a five-mile 

pursuit along that road could find no Allied 

troops. 

On the northern side of the pass, the 

valiant stand of Colonel Gore's detachment 

forced General Buelowius to commit his 

I st Battalion, 8th Panzer Regiment, to force 

the break-through. The British fought until 

their last tank was destroyed. Casualties 

were severe. Gore's unit bore the brunt of 

the full-scale afternoon attack and withdrew, with five American tank destroyers of 

the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion, past 
456 

the northwestern entrance point (Hill 704 ) 

at dusk. \Vhen the enemy's tanks also overran a platoon of Company I, U.S. 13th Armored Regiment, the 3d Battalion, 6th 

Armored Infantry, and elements of the 1st 

Battalion, 26th Infantry, and 3d Battalion, 

39th Infantry, were cut off on Djebe1 Semmama. All the troop carriers of the armored 

infantry waiting in their park near the base 

of the mountain were endangered. The 

drivers hastily took out as many vehicles as 

possible along the wadies, leaving the scattered remnants of the battalion to infiltrate 

westward through the enemy across the 

Bahiret Foussana valley and northward 

through the Thala area. The enemy was 

amazed at the quantity and quality of the 

American equipment captured more or less 

intact. 

At noon, 20 February, Kesselring visited 

Rommel's advanced command post northwest of Kasserine in the broad entrance to 

the pass. The two field marshals agreed 

that the Axis forces must break out of the 

pass during the day if the operation was to 

succeed. En route back to Rome Kesselring 

stopped at the Tunis airdrome, where he 

summoned von Arnim to meet him. He 

found the latter still suspicious that Rommel 

intended to conduct his attack toward Tebessa rather than toward Le Kef, and he 

again urged that the whole 10th Panzer Division be restored to his control, for operations in conjunction with the 21 st Panzer DiVISIon. It is Kesselring's later recollection, 

" (I) II Corps AAR, 2 May 43. (2) First Army 

Sitrep, 1700, 20 Feb 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 

(3) 26th Inf AAR, 22 Apr 43. (4) DMC Jnl, 20 

Feb 43. (5) 3d Bn Hist, 2 Sep 43, in 6th Armd 

rnE Hist. (6) 33d FA Bn AAR, 1 Mar 43. (7) DAK, 

KTB, 18~20 Feb 43. (8) Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, 

pp. 355ff. (9) 3d Bn Hist by Maj Harold F. Blodg('tt. 14 Oct 43, in 13th Armd Regt Hist. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

but not a matter of contemporary record, 

that he censured von Arnim for withholding 

important elements of the 10th Panzer Division from Rommel, thus weakening the attack. Kesselring was later to attribute the 

Axis failure in part to von Arnim's departure 

from orders, although holding Rommel responsible for not having insisted on full 

compliance. ~4 

Before taking off for Rome, Kesselring in 

agreement with General Gandin of 

Comando Supremo, ordered immediate diversionary attacks by Fifth Panzer Army 

toward Maktar, and prescribed that an 

armored battalion should be held in readiness near Pont-du-Fahs to exploit any success. "In order to guarantee coordination of 

these operations by unified command," he 

stated, "I shall recommend to Comando 

Supremo that Field Marshal Rommel assume command of Fifth Panzer Anny in so 

far as elements of that army are, or will be, 

participating in the drive." He also ordered 

von Arnim to try to withdraw from the 

Medjerda sector those elements of 10th 

Panzer Division that had been withheld 

from Rommel. The intention was to make 

them available for the main drive. Supply 

of 10th Panzer Division would pass to Rommel's control forthwith .. 1

" Thus 21 February 

was to be a critical day in the battle for 

Tunisia. 

" (I) But von Arnim insists that the clements 

he was accused of withholding were already in contact with Allied forces in the Medjerda valley, 

not in reserve, and that the 10th Panzer Division 

was s('nt as it stood at the time orders were received. 

MS C~094 (von Arnim). (2) MS # T~3~P II 

( ,Pt. 2. (3) MS # C~066 (K('sselrin~). 

Fifth Panzer Army, KTB IV, 20 Feb 43, and 

Ms~, Fifth Panzer Army to German-Italian Panzer 

Army, 20 Feb 43, in Panzer Army Africa, KTB 

Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1132. 
ROMMEL'S THRUST THROUGH KASSERINE PASS 457 

Allied Defenses in the Rear 

of Kasserine Pass 

Significant countermeasures were begun 

on the night of 19-20 February by the Allies, when the course of the first day's defense 

of Kasserine pass had made precautionary 

steps seem desirable if not essential. General 

Anderson had ordered the U.S. 1st Infantry 

Division, less Combat Team 18 (at Sbiba) 

and Combat Team 26 (at several points), 

to shift from the Allied front in the Ousseltia~Maktar sector, under General Koeltz's 

command, to the vicinity of Bou Chebka, in 

General Fredendall's area. General Fredendall gave General Allen a rather broad mission-to control the defense of the area 

south of the Bahiret Foussana valley and 

along the Western Dorsal from Djebel 

Chambi to E1 Ma el Abiod, an area in which 

there were elements of the French Constantine Division (General Welvert) as well as 

various American and British units. On Allen's orders the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, 

moved to the northern edge of the Bou 

Chebka plateau, where it established communication with Colonel Stark during 20 

February. The remainder of the 16th Combat Team was also available. General Allen 

disposed the other units of his command for 

the defense of the many secondary routes 

through the mountains. 

Combat Command B, U.S. 1st Armored 

Division (General Robinett), after being 

alerted during the previous night for possible movement from positions south of Tebessa, was ordered directly by II Corps at 

1030,20 February, to move immediately toward Thala via T ebessa and Hai'dra. At this 

juncture, the enemy's success of the previous 

night on the northeastern side of the pass, 

including the seizure of Hill 1191, and perhaps other factors, made it seem likely that 

he might first thrust toward Thala. Robinett 

was instructed to assume command of 

Colonel Stark's troops as well as his own. At 

corps and higher headquarters, where the 

actual situation was not well understood, he 

was then expected to counterattack in the 

pass before the end of the day."" 

During the afternoon of 20 February, another Allied defensive move of major importance was taken. Brigadier Dunphie's 

26th Armoured Brigade (less 16/5 Lancers) 

established a defensive line on the road from 

Kasserine to Thala aoout nine miles north 

of the pass. He placed the 2d Lothians on 

the east, and the 17/21 Lancers on the west, 

and the 10th Royal Buffs in the center with 

field artillery in support. The 2d Battalion, 

5th Leicestershire Regiment (46th Division), expected during the night, would dig 

in on a ridge astride the road about four 

miles south of Thala. 

General Fredendall, his chief of staff, Col. 

John A. Dabney, and others reconnoitered 

toward the pass along this road late in the 

morning, 20 Februarv, while General Robinett's c~mmand echelon, far ahead of Combat Command B's main column, continued 

through Thala toward the pass. When the 

two parties met south of Thala, Fredendall 

was returning, convinced that the enemy 

had broken through on the T ebessa road, 

having overrun the infantry and combat 

engineers there but not the artillery, tank 

destroyer, or tank units. His earlier plans 

for Robinett's force were no longer practicable. The new arrangements involved two 

3<\ (1) 1st Div G-3 Opns Rpt, 15 Jan-B Apr 43. 

(2) Memo, 2d Bn 16th Inf in Kasscrine pass action, 

attached to Ltr, Col Joseph B. Crawford to author, 

27 Jun 51, (3) Msg, Porter to Rooks (signed Truscott), 20 Feb 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 133. (4) 

Robinett, Among the First, MS. In private possession. This memoir is a basic source for part of the 

action On 21-22 February 1913. 
458 

distinct defense forces. American troops 

would cover Tebessa; British units would 

defend Thala. General Robinett was to 

command all the troops in an undefined 

area south of the Hatab river and to defend 

the passes at Djebel el Hamra. He was to 

stop the enemy's advance toward Tcbessa, 

then drive him back into the Kasserine pass, 

and eventually restore the Allied positions 

there. General Fredendall gave Brigadier 

Dunphie a similar mission with reference 

to Thala. He put Dunphie in command of 

all troops remaining on the north side of 

the Hatab, including Colonel Stark's forces, 

and expected him to use Stark's communications to II Corps. "For the co-ordination 

of this attack, Robinett comes under your 

command," General Fredendall informed 

Dunphie, who was in turn to be directly 

under U.S. II Corps. Direct communication between Robinett and Dunphie by 

liaison officer was arranged later in the day.H7 

The II Corps had in effect passed to 

Dunphie a responsibility which he lacked 

the means to carry out, requiring him not 

only to command his own force in battle 

but also to co-ordinate these operations on 

one side of the broad valley with Robinett's 

on the other, despite inadequate means of 

communication. The First Army, now convinced that the enemy's main effort would 

be made at Kasserine rather than Sbiba, 

inserted another link in the chain of command, designating Brig. Cameron Nichol-

" Msgs, CG II Corps to Col Stark, Brig Dunphie, 

and Gcn Robinett, 20 Feb 43, Entries 419, 420, and 

421, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

son, second in command of the British 6th 

Armoured Division, to control, in behalf of 

II Corps, the operations of all the increasing number of units-British, American, 

and French--which were assembling south 

of Thala. His provisional organization was 

named "Nickforce." While Nicholson was 

struggling through the mire of a third-rate 

track from Rohia to Thala, Robinett and 

his operations officer, Lt. Col. Edwin A. 

Russell, Jr., attended a commanders' conference with Brigadier McNabb, Brigadier 

Dunphie, and others, at Thala at midnight 

20-21 February. The conferees agreed on a 

plan of battle .. " Dunphie would organize 

south of Thala; Robinett would cover the 

passes to Tebessa and Hai"dra; both forces 

would await attack, and once the enemy 

was committed, both would counterattack, 

making their main efforts on their outer 

flanks. Allied tanks were to be conserved. 

The battle was to be fought mainly with 

other arms. Overlays were prepared, liaison arranged, and although the conference 

terminated before Brigadier Nicholson 

could reach Thala, he confirmed the plans 

upon his arrival at 0315. The initiative 

remained with Rommel but to retain it he 

would have to continue winning .. '" 

OR (I) CCB 1st Armd Div AAR, I Mar 43. (2) 

Info supplied by Brig Dunphie, Sep 51. 

"" (I) The II Corps disposed of 99 medium, 47 

light, and 74 nonoperational tanks at 1900, 20 

February. Msg, Maj W. B. Chase to Adv First Army, 

Entry 359, in II Corps G-3 J nl. (2) Robinett, 

Among the First, MS. In private possession. (3) 

Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 
CHAPTER XXIV 

The Enemy Is Turned Back 

The continuation of a successful defense 

at Sbiba gap on 20 February enabled the 

Allies, like the enemy, to shift their main 

weight westward. The enemy tried on this 

second day at Sbiba to make a two-battalion infantry attack, with artillery support, 

on the Allied ridge positions, while sending 

his armor (thirty-three Mark III and six 

Mark IV tanks) with a battery of field artillery, on a wide sweep around the eastern 

flank. (See Map VIII.) The armor was to 

take the Allied ridge positions from the rear, 

and then envelop Sbiba and cut the road 

north of it. This plan was beset with difficulties and was executed, moreover, in a 

manner which seemed to the Allies peculiarly tentative and to the enemy's higher 

command distinctly reprehensible. 

Fog and rain over the battle area and 

elsewhere in Tunisia deprived the 21st 

Panzer Division of preparatory Stuka attacks or promised fighter-bomber support. 

It did not, on the other hand, prevent Allied artillery observers from adjusting fire 

with disturbing accuracy on German 

troops, vehicles, and batteries. The Germans found that the ground to be traversed 

was extremely difficult, with deep wadies 

and extensive soft areas, and they discovered that the route of advance designated 

for the armored force was impassable. The 

infantry, after being subjected to the artillery shelling, at noon came close enough to 

the Allied line on the ridge to be hit by 

small arms and mortar fire. Four enemy 

tanks penetrated the. U.S. 34th Infantry 

Division's line before they were knocked out 

by antitank weapons. The rest were driven 

back. Although the enemy casualties were 

not high, the infantry attack came to a 

complete standstill, and the armor pulled 

back in the early afternoon. The whole 

day's offensive was ineffective and irresolute, mainly as a consequence of the devastating volume and accuracy of Allied 

artillery. 1 

Rommel ordered the 21st Panzer Division to send the 580th Reconnaissance Battalion during the night of 20-21 February 

to Kasserine pass for commitment there. 

He needed mobile troops. The 10th Panzer Division had not been sent back from 

the Fondouk-Kairouan area intact. Only 

somewhat more than one half the division 

had reached the Kasserine area before 

nightfall, 20 February. The remainder, 

even if Rommel insisted on its coming, 

could not arrive in time for the next day's 

operations. At Sbiba, therefore, the 21st 

Pan zer Dil,ision was ordered to take up an 

active defense from a base line running between Kef el Korath (1100) on the north1 (11 Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

(2) 135th Inf Hist, 1943. (3) 18th Inf AAR and 

Jnl, 16 Feb-9 Mar 43. (4) Nicholson, The Grenadier Guards in War of 1939-1945, II, 281-82. 

(5) Intcrv with Brig Gen Benjamin F. Caffey, Jr., 

21 Feb 50. (6) 21st Panzer Diu, KTB, 19-20 Feb 

43. 
460 

west and the tip of Djebel Mrhila (1378) 

on the southeast, at a distance from Sbiba 

village of five or more miles. Colonel Hildebrandt's division was to be ready for Allied 

counterattack. The division had about 

thirty operational tanks, two battalions of 

armored infantry, six batteries of field artillery, and two companies of antiaircraft 

artillery. To strengthen the Allied side, a 

provisional British tank unit equipped with 

twenty-five new Churchill tanks came to 

Sbiba from Le Kef during the night. Already concentrated there by 22 February 

were eight American and three British infantry battalions, three or more field artillery battalions, and other units. 2 

The Enemy Is Held on the Tebessa Road 

The Kasserine battle entered a new phase 

on the night of 20~21 February, after Rommel's forces had gained possession of the 

pass's northwestern exits. Allied precautionary measures of the previous day were now 

to be tested in the broader area north and 

west of the pass. The Allied task was to 

contain these forces after they had first advanced far enough along the diverging roads 

to be too widely separated for mutual support. Rommel did not have sufficient forces 

for strong attacks along both. The Axis problem was to decide which road to block and 

which to use in an effort to extend the attack toward a major objective. After taking 

two days to get through Kasserine pass and 

after being forced to commit both Kampfgruppe DAK and 10th Panzer Division in 

the process, Rommel was becoming hesitant, once more showing an attitude of discouragement which was most unusual for 

him. Should he continue under his directive 

221st Panzer Div, KTB, 19-21 Feb 43. (2) 

Opns Order No.6, 20 Feb 43, ibid., Anlagenband 9. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

to push toward Thala, or should he seek 

permission to employ reinforcements to feint 

in that direction but actually hit what might 

be weaker Allied resistance in a drive on the 

American base at Tebessa, as Kesselring 

claims to have suggested to him during his 

visit at Kasserine? Or should he wait to 

discover in which direction the prospects 

were brighter? His immediate course on the 

night of 20~21 February was to prepare for 

an Allied counterattack and to send out 

reconnaissance forces along each road." 

The Allies sought to establish containing 

forces on both roads, and to bar not only the 

gaps at Thala and Djebel el Hamra ( 1112), 

but even the secondary routes from the Bahiret Foussana valley onto the Bou Chebka 

plateau. Brigadier Nicholson, who had 

opened "Nickforce" headquarters at 0600, 

21 February, in Thala sent more infantry 

to the defensive position begun by Brigadier 

Dunphie south of the village and prepared 

to employ reinforcements expected to arrive 

at Thala during the next two or three days. 

General Robinett's Combat Command B, 

U.S. 1st Armored Division, struggled over 

a churned-up dirt road leading southward 

from Ha'idra to the vicinity of Djebel el 

Hamra, and behind a light forward screen, 

reorganized along the eastern face of that 

ridge and in the passes at its center and 

northern end. Many stragglers from Kasserine pass and from even as far east as 

Djebel Ksa'ira (560) were assembled at a 

line along the eastern base of the ridge, 

given rations and ammunition, and organized in provisional companies to defend the 

passes there. The 2d Battalion, U.S. 16th 

Infantry (Lt. Col. Joseph B. Crawford), 

was found waiting at the crossroads east of 

3 (I) Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, pp. 355ff. (2) 

MS # T-3-P II (Kesselring), Pt. 2. (3) MS # 

C-066 (Kesselring). 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 

Djebel el Hamra for commitment. Combat 

Command B during the early morning sent 

the battalion to block the routes from the 

Bahiret Foussana valley up onto the Bou 

Chebka plateau at a point where they ran 

through three secondary passes. It found 

camel trails running through two of these 

passes and a slippery, steep, dirt road in the 

most westerly (the Bou Chebka pass). A 

French Senegalese unit also moved into this 

area. Energetic preparations around the 

edges of Bahiret Foussana valley continued 

throughout the morning of 21 February as 

each side awaited offensive action by the 

other! 

The unit sent out by Rommel along the 

Tebessa road, 33d Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced by a small number of Italian 

tanks, some light howitzers, and some engineer troops, struck out to the northwest 

from Kasserine pass at 0200, 21 February. 

The force first encountered retiring American units. It then ran up against the Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment, of Robinett's command which barred 

'(1) CCB 1st Armd Div AAR, 1 Mar 43. (2) 

Memo, 2d Bn 16th Inf in Kasserine pass action, 

attached to Ltr, Col Crawford to author, 27 Jun 

51. (3) 1st Inf Div G-3 Opns Rpt, 15 Jan-8 Apr 

43. (4) II Corps AAR, 3 May 43. (5) Combat 

Command B, U.S. 1st Armored Division, consisted of the following: Reconnaissance Company 

and the 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, with 

Companies G and I attached; the 2d Battalion, 6th 

Armored Infantry; the 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion; the 60lst Tank Destroyer Battalion 

(less one company) ; the 443d Coast Artillery (AA) 

Battalion (SP); detachments, the 105th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion; Company D, 16th Armored 

Engineer Battalion; Maintenance and Supply Companies, 13th Armored Regiment; detachments, 16th 

and 49th Medical Battalions; the 68th Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion, by temporary attachment; 

the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion; the 7th and 

33d Field Artillery Battalions; elements, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry; and the 2d Battalion, 16th 

Infantry. Rpt by Lt Col John T. Honeycutt, 21 

Feb 43, Entry 164, in II Corps G-3 In!. 

461 

its progress until after daylight at a point 

about eight miles from Djebel el Hamra. 

The enemy then withdrew eastward out of 

range. A similar force of armored cars and 

self-propelled guns pushed Allied rear 

guards northward during the night along 

the road to Thala until it discovered, after a 

preliminary engagement in the morning fog 

'Nith the 17/21 Lancers, supported by field 

artillery, that a substantial Allied force was 

in its path. The attackers knocked out six 

light Crusader tanks before this preliminary 

action on the Thala road was terminated. 

At 1125, 33d Reconnaissance Battalion 

reported that only small American forces 

had thus far appeared east of Djebel el 

Hamra. Without waiting for similar reports 

from air reconnaissance, Rommel therefore 

decided to resume the offensive. In the absence of an immediate threat from the west, 

he could at once attack the Allied forces 

south of Thala with the 7th Panzer Regiment of the 10th Panzer Division, which 

had been organizing within sight of Allied 

observers and under harassing artillery fire. 

At the same time, Kampfgruppe DAK under General Buelowius could seize the passes 

at Djebel el Hamra to secure his western 

flank. Beginning about noon, 21 February, 

operations began to follow the pattern determined by these decisions. Since General 

Robinett's communications with Brigadier 

Dunphie had been disrupted by the air 

bombing of the liaison officer's communications vehicle, the battles of 21-22 February along the two roads although simultaneous were somewhat independent of each 

other. Brigadier Nicholson was not in touch 

with Robinett and II Corps was in only 

intermittent contact. 

The bulk of General Robinett's command 

entered the valley during the morning, and 

although not completely deployed, was suf-
462 

ficiently well established by the time Buelowius' force approached to oppose it firmly, 

and in Rommel's opinion, "very skillfully." " 

The enemy sought the pass at the northern 

end of Djebel el Hamra, where a road to 

Haidra connects with a branch leading to 

Tebessa. Protecting this area were the 

medium tanks of the 2d Battalion plus Company I, U.S. 13th Armored Regiment, supported by the 27th and 68th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalions, the 601st and 894th 

Tank Destroyer Battalions, and the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry. Also present 

in the area were units of the 443d Coast 

Artillery (AA) Battalion (SP) and the less 

mobile 105th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion. Buelowius' instruction in the early afternoon to 33d Reconnaissance Battalion to 

seize the gap by a sudden raid came too late 

to be executed. The unit waited between 

the road and the Hatab river near a slight 

ridge (Point 732) for the main body of 

Kampfgruppe DAK to come forward. 

General Buelowius' main force left Kasserine pass at 1400. One battalion of infantry came up to the left flank of the reconnaissance unit about 1530, and the tank 

battalion of Division C entauro followed 

shortly afterward. At 1630 they started 

northwestward along the road but almost 

at once came under increasingly strong artillery fire from unlocated American guns on 

the south flank. A Stuka squadron divebombed the 27th Armored Field Artillery 

Battalion with some effect, but itself received fire from the 443d Coast Artillery's 

multiple antiaircraft guns which destroyed 

at least two planes. The 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion maneuvered to the enemy's south flank and strengthened the fire 

from that quarter. The 2d Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment, in hull defilade refused 

"Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, p. 360. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

to be lured from the cover of American 

artillery to the potent antitank screen which 

the enemy habitually organized, and simply 

held its ground except to head off what 

looked like an effort to envelop its own 

northern flank. One tank of Company I, 

but not its crew, was lost in parrying this 

attempt. The enemy pulled back to the 

southeast about 1800, at least temporarily 

frustrated. At the same time, 580th Reconnaissance Battalion crossed the rough, 

sharply eroded foothill area north of Djebel 

Nogueza (1127) along a camel track leading up to the Bou Chebka plateau. It was 

under orders to swing southeastward at Ain 

Bou Dries in order to take from the rear 

the Allied troops guarding the passes northwest of Thelepte and Feriana. 

The attack by Kampfgruppe DAK had 

stopped about four miles short of its objective. Level plain intervened, a flat almost 

devoid of cover and under ready observation from the scrub-covered hills on three 

sides. Frontal attack in daylight seemed out 

of the question and, even at night, would 

be met by the Allied troops in strength and 

on terrain well adapted to defense. A direct 

thrust westward to the base of Djebel el 

Hamra, followed by a northward march 

along its eastern ridge would be open to prolonged attack on the flank, and was therefore deemed too risky. The remaining possibility was a night attack on the defile in 

the middle of Djebel el Hamra, three miles 

south of the unattainable gap at the mountain's northern tip. Rommel authorized a 

wide envelopment to the south during the 

approaching night. 6 

6 (1) DAK, KTB, 21 Feb 43. (2) Msg, GermanItalian Panzer Army to DAK, 21 Feb 43, in Panzer 

Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1151/3. 

(3) Msg, Ditto to 580th Rcn Bn, 21 Feb 43, ibid., 

Anlage 1151/4. 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 

The numbrr of Allied forces along the 

southern edge of the Bahiret Foussana valley increased on 21 February but suffered 

from faulty co-ordination arising from defective communications and confused channels of command. The companies of the 2d 

Battalion, 16th Infantry, attached to Combat Command B, were interspersed with 

some Senegalese troops near Bou Chebka 

pass. Company G, 16th Infantry, moved 

north at midnight to protect the new positions of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion on 

a low ridge north of that pass. Company E, 

16th Infantry, stationed in the upper valley 

of the Cherchara river, would be in the 

path of the 580th Reconnaissance Battalion 

if it continued to Aln Bou Dries. General 

Robinett also sent the 2d Battalion, 6th 

Armored Infantry, southward toward Bou 

Chebka pass, where it would be in readiness 

to move eastward on the right flank of the 

2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, 

when the time arrived for a counterattack 

toward Kasserine pass. During the night, 

General Allen sent the 3d Battalion, 16th 

Infantry, from the Bou Chebka area northward beyond Aln Bou Dries, to a point from 

which it could reinforce the 2d Battalion, 

16th Infantry, as needed. The I st Combat 

Engineer Battalion he sent northeastward to 

work along the slopes of Djebel Chambi 

( IS44) toward Kasserine pass. The 1 st Battalion, 16th Infantry, made an elaborate, 

circuitous march by truck to the western 

side of Djebel el Hamra which it approached 

cautiously in attack formation next morning, 

only to find that Combat Command B, 1st 

Armored Division, had held it securely for 

more than a day. This event was probably 

one illustration of the inadequacy of information at Headquarters, II Corps, and 

the confusion of responsibility which had 

come about, and which might have been 

463 

seriously damaging had the enemy been 

able to take advantage of it.7 

The enemy's attack against Combat 

Command B on 22 February opened at the 

southwestern corner of the Bahiret Foussana valley against positions held by the 

2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, with the 33d 

Field Artillery Battalion. The enemy, in a 

column of infantry supported by artillery 

and tanks, was apparently as surprised as 

the Allied units to find himself engaged at 

daylight not near Djebel el Hamra but 

nearly seven miles to the southeast near 

the Bou Chebka pass. His night march had 

been both delayed and misdirected, while 

he advanced through difficult terrain and 

recurrent downpours. The two battalions 

of Pan.zer Grenadier Regiment Africa cut 

off Battery C, 33d Field Artillery Battalion, 

and captured intact five 10S-mm. howitzers, three 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, and 

thirty vehicles. The rest of the American 

line was able to pull back, leaving the enemy in possession of Hill 812," but pinned 

down by American artillery fire through 

which he dared not withdraw over the open 

plain. The enemy's artillery and tanks had 

been far enough in the rear of his attack 

to pull back, but his infantry could not return to the main axis of attack, that toward 

the south pass of Djebel el Hamra. 

The 5th Bersaglieri Battalion was opposite General Robinett's line, which he had 

established about half a mile east of a secondary road connecting the two Djebel el 

7 (1) 1st Div G-3 Opns Rpt, 15 Jan-8 Apr 43, 

Annex 6. (2) Mt'mo with Ltr, Col Crawford to 

author, 27 J un 51. (3) Robinett, Among the First, 

MS,pp.412-13. (4) Battk Rpt, 3dBn 16th Infto 

CO 16th Inf, 8 Mar 43, in 1st Div AAR. (5) CCE 

1st Armd Div S-3 Jn1, 22 Feb 43. 

"This point is not to be confused with Djebd 

Zebbeus, which is the same height. 
464 

Hamra passes. The line utilized the cover 

afforded by wadies and low ridges and 

benefited from superb observation points on 

the high hills in directing the fire of artillery batteries. The 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (reinforced), of Robinett's 

force, was in hull defilade astride the enemy's path of advance. At about 0930 Buelowius was misled by a reconnaissance report into believing that his right flank, 

toward Djebel el Adjered (1385), was 

threatened. Prevented from regrouping his 

infantry by American artillery fire on his 

position at Hill 812 he instead reoriented 

his artillery toward the north. Earlier in 

the morning he had ordered the 1st Battalion, 8th Panzer Regiment with the assault guns of Division Centauro, to launch 

an attack against the American positions 

opposite the 5th Bersaglieri Battalion with 

the objective of pushing General Robinett's 

armor and infantry back into the Djebel el 

Hamra defiles. The drive seemed necessary 

because the Italians were showing signs of 

an impending breakdown in morale. Between 1030 and noon this movement relieved the pressure in their sector, but soon 

ran into powerful antitank defenses and 

devastating artillery fire of marked effectiveness. It was now apparent that the effort 

to reach the passes of Djebel el Hamra 

could not succeed. The enemy was never 

to get any nearer to Tebessa. He was already planning to pull back into Kasserine 

pass after dark when the situation on the 

southern edge of the valley boiled over." 

Even before 0800, the 3d Battalion, 16th 

Infantry, had been ready to begin a counterattack on the left of the 2d Battalion, 16th 

Infantry, to restore the situation of the early 

morning and to prevent any penetration by 

the enemy between the 1st Infantry DiviU DAK, KTB, 22 F~b 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

sion's units at Bou Chebka pass and those 

of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, to the north. General Terry Allen kept 

trying all morning to get the counterattack 

started but without success. Finally by utilizing communications to General Robinett 

through the command post of Colonel 

Ringsak's 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, preparations for the counterattack 

were co-ordinated; it began at 1600. The 

3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, advanced 

against Hill 812. It was supported by fire 

from the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, on the 

right and from the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, on the left. Aided by a 

sortie of Company G, 13th Armored Regiment, the battalion drove the enemy off the 

hill. He abandoned eight American guns 

and the vehicles which he had captured 

earlier that morning, all in serviceable condition, and after suffering heavy casualties 

withdrew in some disorder toward Kasserine 

pass. Some of his troops retired into the zone 

of other elements of the 13th Armored Regiment, where they were captured. Near Hill 

732, in another action, the 5th Bersaglieri 

Battalion was overtaken at the end of the 

day by a few of Robinett's tanks. They 

forced the enemy to scatter in headlong retreat, and captured many vehicles and 

supplies intact. In 

Thala Narrowly Escapes Capture 

The defense of Thala on 21 February 

pitted the British 26th Armoured Brigade, 

under "Nickforce," against thirty tanks, 

twenty self-propelled guns, and thirty-five 

half-track carriers of the 10th Panzer Division (-). American participants played 

no significant part. Brigadier Dunphie, com10 DAK KTB, 22 Feb 43. 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 

manding the brigade, had understood at 

his midnight conference with McNabb and 

Robinett at Thala that he was to defend 

Thala at all costs, gaining a day for the 2/5 

Leicesters and others to prepare a main defensive line on the ridge south of the village. 

He did not share General Robinett's understanding that all tanks were to be conserved. 

Indeed, his tanks were so light and equipped 

with guns of such short range as to be at 

severe disadvantage against German Mark 

Ill's and Mark IV's. They were about to be 

replaced by American Shermans and could 

be expended. And to gain the necessary time 

against a determined and aggressive foe 

without heavy losses was out of the question. 

On the road from Kasserine to Thala 

several ridges extend like widespread fingers 

eastward from Djebel Bireno (1419) across 

the road. During 20 February Dunphie, 

commanding the 26th Armored Brigade, 

had taken an armored force (17/21 Lancers 

and 2d Lothians) to the south of these 

ridges. On the morning of the 20th, Brigadier Nicholson had ordered the 10th Battalion, Royal Buffs, to move up to this 

blocking position. The enemy tanks of von 

Broich's 7th Panzer Regiment formed up 

in view but out of effective artiIIery range. 

At about 0930 on 21 February they began 

to advance. But they were extremely deliberate as they searched for mines along the 

route of advance. German air reconnaissance revealed the weakness of the opposition on the eastern side of the road, the 

observers correctly estimating British artillery at only two batteries. The enemy 

avoided these weapons by a flanking maneuver east of the road. Dunphie's tanks 

fell back as slowly as possible and, being 

outranged and lightly armored, used the 

shelter of each ridge to fire from cover at 

close range. The enemy promptly met such 

465 

tactics by moving to positions from which 

to enfilade the ridges. 

On a ridge about nine miles south of 

Thala the British, at the cost of fifteen tanks, 

held up Kampfgruppe, 10th Panzer Division) until 1600. Rommel, well aware that he 

was in a desperate race against time and disturbed by von Broich's slow advance, had 

spent most of the early afternoon with von 

Broich's spearhead. Taking command of 

the situation himself, he ordered the infantry 

to entruck and follow the tanks until they 

came up to the British line of defense. On 

this line a tank battle raged for over an hour. 

Then Dunphie ordered his force to fall back 

to the last ridge south of Thala where the 

2/5 Leicesters were in position on the final 

line of defense. The British eked out their 

diminished power of resistance by a skillful 

use of smoke in a delaying action which 

permitted all British forces to slip through 

a gap in the defensive line in front of Thala 

at about 1900, when Dunphie's command 

vehicle followed the others through to supposed security. Enemy tanks followed directly after Dunphie's through the very center of the infantry positions guarding the 

ridge, erupting with gunfire only after they 

had penetrated well within the British lines.ll 

Soon the northern slope of the ridge was 

a scene of wild confusion. Burning vehicles, 

flares, pointblank fire from tanks, both German and British, and from the British artillery, provided a tumultous melee. The 

enemy adroitly knocked out signal vehicles 

at the start, thus preventing prompt reports 

to Thala. Machine gunners following the 

tanks took positions along the heights and 

soon completed the job of wrecking the 

whole line of defense on which so much effort had been expended. At severe disadvanJl (1) Rommel, Krieg ohne H ass, p. 359. (2) Info 

supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 
466 

tage, the British drew on every resource to 

hold the enemy, to destroy his tanks, and 

to throw him back. After three hours, the 

enemy's offensive was stopped. He had 

withdrawn, taking with him about 700 

prisoners, but nothing remained with which 

to check him if he should return at daylight. 

During the afternoon, the U.S. 9th Infantry Division's artillery was approaching 

from Tebessa, and, in preparation for an 

arrival during the night, positions for the 

guns had been selected and surveyed under 

the direction of Brig. H. J. Parham, British 

First Army artillery officer. A tidal flow of 

supply vehicles away from Thala during the 

critical battle at the end of the day came 

under control as the American column approached. The arrival of Brig. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin's command could not have been 

more opportune. Summoned when Sbei'tla 

was being evacuated, it had come from the 

vicinity of Tlemcen in western Algeria in 

four days, an uninterrupted march of over 

800 miles. The twelve 155-mm. howitzers 

of the 34th Field Artillery Battalion were 

emplaced during the early hours of 22 February along the road running west from 

Thala, with the six 75-mm. howitzers of the 

47th's Cannon Company protecting their 

westernmost flank. The twenty-four 105-

mm. howitzers of the 60th and 84th Field 

Artillery Battalions went into position about 

3,000 yards farther south, with six 75-mm. 

howitzers of the 60th's Cannon Company 

on their right. About 2,000 yards still farther south was the new main line of defense, 

and 1,200 yards south of it, on the dominating ridge, formerly the main defense line, 

were the Germans. 12 

General Irwin's arrival with the Ameri12 (1) Interv with Maj Cen S. LeRoy Irwin, 25 

Jan 50. (2) 60th Inf Hist, 1943, pp. 1-5. (3) Div 

Arty Rpt, Thala Engagement, in 9th Div AAR. (4) 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

can artillery at Thala was highly encouraging, but the defending force was very low on 

infantry, especially after losing so many from 

2/5 Leicesters at the ridge line, and it was 

deficient in armored fighting vehicles. Those 

tanks which the 17/21 Lancers and 2d 

Lothians had been using arrived, after almost twenty-four hours of continuous operation, in an undependable mechanical condition, thus adding to other vulnerable 

characteristics. British forces at Sbiba sent 

one battalion of infantry (2d Hampshires), 

the 16/5 Lancers, partly equipped with new 

Shermans, and an artillery regiment, the 

152d, Royal Artillery (-), but these did 

not reach Thala until well along in the 

afternoon. Help from Combat Command 

B, U.S. 1st Armored Division, was sought. 

Brigadier Nicholson reported to II Corps 

that he had about seventy enemy tanks waiting on his front to attack, and First Army 

supported his request to II Corps for help 

from Robinett by stating rather incorrectly 

that Nicholson was bearing the whole weight 

of enemy armor.'3 

This reinforc('ment was the most dramatic of several. 

Thirty-five M4 tanks and crews by rail and seventeen more M4 tanks by sea and rail were sent from 

Morocco to Tebessa; twenty-five British Churchill 

tanks were sent to Sbiba; 800 replacement troops 

per day and the bulk of the 9th Infantry Division 

were also sent eastward in accordance with plans 

scheduled before the attack, and later expedited 

to meet probable needs; other reinforcements were 

scraped from existing units in the west and sent up 

to make good the earlier losses which the Axis 

forces had inflicted. Before the Axis troops were 

thrown back, two tank destroyer battalions, one 

tank battalion (separate) with fifty-six more medium tanks, elements of the 17th Field Artillery 

Regiment and the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, plus 

a considerable increase in antiaircraft units, were 

en route to Tunisia. AFHQ C-3 Rpts 100-107. 

13 The II Corps ordered Robinett "to bring all 

possible forces to bear in order to assist" Nicholson's command, but he was doing so already as a 

matter of course. 13th Armd Regt Opns Jnl, 0845, 

22 Feb 43. 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 

Nicholson, to offset the severe disadvantage inflicted on him by the loss of the ridge 

position in front of his artillery, sent some of 

his remaining tanks on a counterattack just 

before dawn. The attempt miscarried with 

the loss of five or more tanks, and the survivors brought back the alarming and incorrect report of enemy strength alreadY 

mentioned. But the foray actually had a 

beneficial effect. The aggressive character 

of the action seemed to von Broich to confirm erroneous intelligence, gained from 

early reconnaissance and from Arabs, that 

the Allies in Thala were preparing a substantial counterattack using reinforcements 

which had been coming in during the night. 

After himself reconnoitering, Rommel approved von Broich's decision to postpone 

any offensive drive on Thala until the expected Allied thrust had been contained at 

positions favorable for such action, but to 

lunge forward immediately after stopping 

the Allied attack. He could then expect to 

continue through Thala to the north. 14 

The morning passed without an Allied 

counterattack-only heavy air strikes, artillery exchanges, and what the enemy took 

to be small probing ground attacks along 

the front.'5 The lines remained unchanged. 

Neither side co-ordinated low-level air attacks with efforts at ground advance. Axis 

air support was primarily devoted to opposing the arrival of Allied reinforcements at 

Thala by strikes on columns north and 

11 (1) Msgs, 22 Feb 43, Entries 145, 147, and 

152, in II Corps G-3 JnL (2) Info supplied by 

Cabinet Office, London. (3) 10th Panzer Div, Ie, 

Taetigkeitsberieht, 22 Feb 43. 

"The 9th Division Artillery sustained forty-five 

casualties, fired 1 ,904 rounds on this and the following day, and had only fifteen minutes of !05-mm. 

fire left at the end of the battle. 

467 

northwest of it. 16 Although General von 

Broich assumed that more Allied reinforcements were to be expected, he might have 

tried to break through Thala that afternoon, had he not before starting such an 

attack received orders from Field Marshal 

Rommel to pass to the defensive. Thus the 

best opportunity to penetrate the secondary 

mountain barrier beyond Kasserine pass 

toward Le Kef was allowed to slip away 

without being pushed to the limit. By 23 

February reinforcements at Thala rendered 

the Allied position much less vulnerable. 

The enemy reckoned Allied losses at the 

end of the action at 571 prisoners, 38 tanks, 

12 antitank guns, 1 antiaircraft gun, 16 

heavy mortars, 3 self-propelled guns, 9 motor vehicles, and 3 aircraft. 1 7 

The XII Air Support Command participated in the battle south of Thala and east 

of Djebel el Hamra under most adverse 

conditions, but with observable effect. Enemy operations had confined Allied planes 

to the one airfield at Y ouks-Ies-Bains, where 

bad weather limited take-offs to the steel 

planked airstrip. Low clouds and repeated 

showers hampered flights, but 114 sorties 

over the Thala area were completed on 22 

February. Fighter-bombers roaring over the 

enemy at about 1630 caught infantry, guns, 

and tanks and seemed to produce a perceptible reduction in the volume of enemy 

fire. 

Air co-operation with Combat Command 

B proved far less satisfactory. American antiaircraft fire on 21 February turned back 

two friendly missions and damaged five 

American planes beyond repair. Next day, 

in spite of the most specific admonition to 

'<I Compilation of sorties from KTB, Fliko, Ie, in 

JOth Panzer Diu, lc, TB Anlagen, 29.XI.42-J5. 

III.43. 

11 10th Panzer Diu, Ie, Taetigkeitsbericht, 22 

Feb 43. 
468 

MAJ. GEN. ORLANDO WARD, 

Commanding General, U.S. 1st Armored 

Diuision. 

expect friendly planes to fly straight over 

American troops at low altitudes, when they 

would rock their wings, rather than dive or 

glide in a chandelle as the enemy normally 

did when striking, and after attention had 

been called to the dark-painted noses of 

American aircraft in contrast to the white 

or yellow of the enemy, antiaircraft fire 

nonetheless shot up five American P-38's. 

It could not be attributed to faulty identification, for their distinctive, double fuselage had no counterpart in the enemy's air 

force. In order to remedy this lack of coordination, General Robinett issued a most 

definite order that troops were not to fire 

on any aircraft whatever until after it 

attacked.'" 

'" (I) CCB 1st Armd Div S- 3 Jnl, 0230, 22 Feb 

43, and 0917, 23 Feb 43. (2) Msg, CO XII ASC to 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

On 22 February, at 1415, the command 

of all Allied troops within II Corps' area was 

clarified with the establishment of a boundary along the southern edge of the Bahiret 

Foussana valley. All troops north of it came 

under the control of General Ward as Commanding General, U.S. 1st Armored Division; all troops south of it, except units 

attached to Combat Command B, 1st 

Armored Division, were subordinated to 

General Allen as Commanding General, 

U.S. 1st Infantry Division. Ward's mission 

was "to hold general line of Djebel HamraThala and to cover left flank of II Corps, 

preventing Germans moving to west. Liaison 

to the British 6th Armoured Division (Gen. 

Kiethly [sic] now at Sbiba." He was to 

undertake such offensive operations as were 

practicable to recover Kasserine valley, 

maintaining close liaison with General Allen. 

This arrangement straightened out the uncertainties in the southwestern corner of the 

valley before the end of the day, but it gave 

General Ward a mission also involving control of Brigadier Nicholson's command. 

While General Ward and his operations officer, Lt. Col. Hamilton H. Howze, came 

forward to check the situation and to prepare a standard field order for further defensive operations, British First Army altered 

the relationship of "Nickforce" to II Corps, 

General Anderson placing Headquarters, 

6th Armomed Division (General Keightley), at Rohia in command of "Nickforce," 

directly under II Corps, effective at 2000 

22 February.19 

All Air Support Parties, 1935, 21 Feb 43, Entry 

20, in 1st Inf Div G-3 Jnl. 

,. (1) Msg, II Corps to Allen and Ward, 14l.5, 22 

Feb 43, Entry 185, in II Corps G- 3 Jnl. (2) Info 

supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (3) 1st Armd 

Div FO 7, 23 Feb 43. (4) Gen Ward, Personal 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 

The Enemy Retires Through Kasserine Pass 

Group Rommel on 22 February had 

enough fuel to cover from 250-300 kilometers, a somewhat low stock of German 

ammunition augmented by considerable 

captured stocks of all calibers, and rations 

for four days. Reserves already accumulated 

at Sousse, Sfax, and Gabes for the entire 

southern army consisted of fuel for 150-200 

kilometers, more than a day's supply of ammunition, and rations for more than six 

days.20 

Axis reconnaissance along the north 

Tunisian front on 22 February indicated 

that the advanced positions of British 5 

Corps and French XIX Corps had not beer. 

seriously weakened or deprived of local 

reserves.21 Air reconnaissance west of the Allied southern flank revealed the fact that reinforcements were approaching Thala from 

Le Kef and moving from Tebessa toward the 

Bahiret Foussana plain. With a fairly correct picture of the Allied dispositions, Rommel recognized that his offensive could not 

succeed. Mud and mountain terrain ill 

suited to tank action, rain and fog impeding 

air support, and the lowered combat 

strength of the Axis units had all contributed 

to final failure. To be sure, any Allied intention of cutting through to the sea near Sfax 

and breaking communications between 

Rommel's and von Arnim's armies had been 

frustrated for several weeks. But Axis hopes 

Diary. In private possession. (5) Two memos by 

Gen Ward, 22 Feb 43, in 1st Armd Div Hist Reds, 

Vol. II. 

20 Rpt on Supply Situation, 22 Feb 43, in Panzer 

Army Africa, 0 Qu, Anlagen zum KTB, 16.II31.III.43, Anlage 215. 

21 Daily Rpt for 22 Feb 43, Fifth Panzer Army to 

Panzer Army Africa, 1005, 23 Feb 43, in Panzer 

Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1159. 

46C) 

MAJ. GEN. TERRY ALLEN, Commanding General, u.s. 1st Infantry DiuiHon. 

for a successful penetration to Le Kef and 

beyond were completely extinguished.22 

Field Marshal Kesselring, accompanied 

by General Seidemann and others, visited 

Rommel's command post northwest of Kasserine again on the afternoon of 22 February. Both commanders agreed that 

Comando Supremo should be advised that 

the time had come to withdraw the attacking forces from west central Tunisia. They 

proposed now a speedy shift to the Mareth 

area, in order to hit the British Eighth Army 

assembling there with a sudden attack before it could prepare for offensive operations 

and become a serious threat. While waiting 

for a new directive from Comando Supremo, Rommel ordered his troops to begin 

the retirement into Kasserine pass. General 

22 Panzer Army Africa, KTB 2, 22 Feb 43. 
470 

Ambrosio issued his order for retirement 

shortly before midnight.n 

To aid Rommel's withdrawal and regrouping, enemy units began exerting pressure at various points in the British First 

Army's line on 22 February. Fifth Panzer 

Army units attacked across the Ousseltia 

valley and into the mountain range west of 

it. A provisional German force (Colonel 

Lang), of which 47th Grenadier Regiment 

was the major component, started for Maktar during 22 February skirting the mountains of Kesra. The force was about six 

miles from Maktar when a radioed order 

canceled its attack. 2

' 

Withdrawal by the Axis forces northwest 

of Kasserine pass into that gap was completed by forenoon of 23 February. While 

the 10th Panzer Division took over defensive positions, Kampfgruppe DAK in the 

afternoon started for F eriana-Thelepte and 

there relieved Division Centauro. Allied and 

Axis aviation were both extremely active 

over the area, the former bombing and 

strafing the roads east of the pass and near 

Feriana, the latter discouraging Allied pursuit of the retreating troops by bombing 

and machine gunning the roads near Thala 

and Djebel el Hamra. 25 One hundred and 

four Allied planes were counted over the 

" (1) Daily Rpt for 22 Feb 43, German-Italian 

Panzer Army, 0030, 23 Feb 43, in Panzer Army 

Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1163. (2) 

Kesselring's recollection in 1949 was that Rommel 

was excessively depressed, inclined to exaggerate 

the British Eighth Army's threat to the First Italian 

Army whose rear guard was the 1Sth Panzer Division, and unable to appreciate the advantages of 

the initiative which he still possessed. MS # C-066 

(Kesselring). (3) Rad, Comando Supremo, Ambrosio to Rommel and others, 2310, 22 Feb 43, 

Transl in Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 

9, Anlage 1162. 

,. (I) Fifth Panzer Army, KT B IV, 21-22 Feb 

43. (2) MS # D-173 (Lang). 

25 Panzer Army Africa, KTB 2, 23 Feb 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Kasserine area in one period of fifteen minutes. From four to eight Axis fighters engaged in sweeping flights almost steadily 

from 0840 to 1728.2G Allied pressure lacked 

punch and the withdrawal continued in 

good order. 27 

Direction by II Corps of ground operations against the retreating enemy became 

extraordinarily hesitant at just the time that 

the enemy was most vulnerable. General 

Eisenhower thought late on 22 February 

that an Allied counterattack should start at 

once. Rommel's situation was not recognized, however, by First Army or by II 

Corps for more than a day after his decision 

to abandon the attack. In the case of British 

First Army, the forces defending Sbiba 

actually drew back near Rohia during the 

night of 22-23 February in order to be ready 

for an enemy attack from Thala northeastward toward Rohia and then south toward 

Sbiba. The 21 st Panzer Division might have 

entered Sbiba village unopposed but instead 

watched, as its orders required, until the 

Allies cautiously returned after an absence 

of about twenty-four hours. 28 At General 

Fredendall's headquarters, preparations 

were made to shift the II Corps front in 

case of an enemy break-through at Thala, 

and the total evacuation of Tebessa in consequence seemed a possibility. 

Aside from the delay in correctly understanding Rommel's purpose, the main reason for the faltering direction of operations 

to hit the enemy as he pulled back, was the 

2' Compilation of sorties, KTB, Fliko, Ie, in 

10th Panzer Div, Ie, TB Anlagen, 29.xI.42-

IS.III.43. 

27 Memo, Conf at Headquarters, Group Rommel, 

23 Feb 43, in 21st Panzer Div, KTB Anlagen, Band 

9, Anlage 64. 

" (I) 21st Panzer Div, KTB, 23 Feb 43. (2) 

Brigade Legere Mecanique Jnl, 22-23 Feb 43. 

(3) Info supplipd by Cabinet ORicp, London. 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 471 

CREW OF HALF-TRACK waiting for orders to fire at approaching enemy aircraft, 24 

February 1943. This weapon mounted a 37-mm. gun and two .50-cal. machine guns. 

shuffling of the command. Fredendall had 

shifted the 1st Armored Division northeastward and placed its commander in charge 

of operations by all units, American, British, 

and French, west and northwest of Kasserine pass. But he had already proposed to 

General Eisenhower that General Ward 

should be replaced. The commander in 

chief, thinking in terms of the rehabilitation 

which the U.S. 1st Armored Division might 

require, was prepared to approve Ward's relief by Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, then 

Commanding General, 2d Armored Division, under General Patton in Morocco, 

until he received conscientious advice to the 

contrary. While Harmon was flying east, 

General Eisenhower concluded that any 

such change was, aftEr all, inexpedient. 

Harmon accordingly went on from Algiers 

to the zone of battle in the capacity of "a 

useful senior assistant" to General Fredendall in the "unusual conditions of the present battle," for the corps commander to 

employ as he chose, but not with Eisenhower's encouragement to relieve Ward of 

his command. 2

!l 

Just as General Ward was about to issue 

his first orders to his division, with the 

British 26th Armored Brigade attached, for 

operations in the Bahiret Foussana valley, 

he learned that Harmon was soon to arrive 

to assume command in the capacity of deputy corps commander. He issued the defense 

orders but withheld those for counterattack. 30 He ordered Robinett and Dunphie 

"Msg 1922, CinC AF to CG 18 A Gp, 20 Feb 

43. Smith Pa pers. (2) Msg, CinC AF to CG II 

Corps, 22 Feb 43, CinC AF Diary, 22 Feb 43. 

(3 ) Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

p. 271, citing remarks by Harmon. (4) Interv with 

Maj Gen Ernest N. Harmon (Ret.), 15 Scp 52. 

30 1st Armd Div FO 7, 23 Feb 43. 
472 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

THE RAILROAD STATION AT KASSERINE VILLAGE. 

to continue on unchanged missions, their 

common boundary being the KasserineHaj'dra railroad; their outer boundaries 

were also clearly defined. Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division, under General McQuillin, was to be held east of 

Haidra in Division Reserve, available for 

counterattack either through Thala or Djebel el Hamra on Ward's orders. The 16th 

Armored Engineer Battalion (less detachments) was to continue working on the 

torn-up Haj'dra-Djebel el Hamra road and 

to conduct route reconnaissance. 

During the night of 22-23 February, General Harmon's' long and hurried journey 

from Morocco brought him to Fredendall's 

advance command post at Djebel Kouif. 

He had made the last part of the trip, from 

Algiers via Constantine and Tebessa, by 

automobile. At each of these points he obtained military intelligence which was fragmentary and already out of date. At Fredendall's headquarters, the situation was still 

not well enough known to permit issuance 

of orders for an Allied counterattack. Fredendall gave Harmon written orders placing him in direct command of the U.S. 1st 

Armored Division and such elements of the 

British 6th Armored Division as were within 

the II Corps area. Harmon had no staff, 

only the aide who had accompanied him 

from Morocco and an assistant operations 

officer (Lt. Col. Barksdale Hamlett) from 

the II Corps Artillery Section. A radioequipped vehicle with driver and radio 

operator was lent him by II Corps. He drove 

on during the night to see Ward at Haj'dra 

and Nicholson at Thala, and next morning, 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 473 

MARCHING THROUGH KASSERINE PASS, 26 February 1943. 

Robinett near Djebel el Hamra, as well as 

miscellaneous units which he encountered 

during these strenuous movements. 

Although not relieving Ward of his status 

as Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, Harmon did assume Ward's mission 

and was given Ward's staff and command 

post. Harmon insisted that Hains's provisional unit of M 4 medium tanks with diesel 

motors and British radios be sent to occupy 

a defensive position near Thala. He took 

responsibility for holding at Thala the 9th 

Division artillery which British First Army 

had ordered sent back to Le Keel 

The next day, 23 February, passed without significant Allied pressure on Rommel's 

troops. Combat Command B, 1 st Armored 

31 Interv with Gen Harmon, 15 Sep 52. 

Division, moved gingerly toward the pass. 

The weary troops of Brigadier Dunphie's 

command also marked time. It became 

gradually clear that the enemy was not coming out of the pass to attack again but was 

going to retire through the eastern exit. At 

2000, 23 February, "Nickforce" was officially dissolved. General Harmon reconnoitered and prepared for the forthcoming 

counterattack to clear the enemy from Kasserine pass. After darkness, a heavy air attack on the enemy in the pass was delivered 

by Royal Air Force night bombers without 

advance co-ordination with the American 

ground troops, who missed the opportunity 

to press forward before the enemy could 

recover from its effects."2 It was after mid-

"Robinett, Among the First, pp. 423-44. 
474 

night when General Ward received the following orders from General Harmon: 

Your mission with 16th RCT, attached. 

You will drive enemy from the valley, destroying as much of him as possible, and rerapture Kasserine Pass. Thereafter you will 

place 16th RCT in defense of the pass, at 

which time 16th reverts to [theJ control [ofJ 

1 st Infantry Division. 

CG, II Corps 

2301A/23 Feb 43 ;lO 

Harmon had also given Robinett similar 

oral orders. The time set for the Allied counterattack according to what Harmon called 

"Plan Howze" was 0630, 25 February.34 

The general scheme of maneuver was that 

which the terrain dictated to any intelligent 

commander. Two forces must converge 

from starting points which were perhaps 

fifteen miles apart and work along the 

heights to control Djebel Semmama and 

Djebel Chambi on either side of the gap, 

making their main effort on the outer flanks 

and co-ordinating the action on the inner 

flanks, especially as they drew closer to the 

pass. Harmon strengthened Combat Command B, U.S. 1 st Armored Division, for 

the attack by the attachment of the 16th 

Infantry. In effect, this attachment required 

bringing the regiment back from participation in General Allen's push eastward over 

rugged mountain terrain on the 1st Infantry 

Division's side of the divisional boundary, 

after it had gone much of the way to the 

eastern entrance of the pass, and holding 

the regiment for a later assault along the 

edge of the valley. On the other side of the 

Bahiret Foussana valley, the British 26th 

Armoured Brigade worked slowly to the gap 

between Djebel Bireno and Djebel Semmama, lifting quantities of mines, until late 

" 1st Armd Diy Hist Reds, Vol. II. 

"CCB 1st Armd Diy 5-3 Jnl, 2315, 24 Feb 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

on 24 February. On that day the 1st Guards 

Brigade, reinforced, took over to make the 

attack southeastward over the heights and 

across the shoulder of Djebel Semmama as 

well as along the Thala-Kasserine road. 

The Allies attacked against a phantom 

foe. Since they were so short of reserves, they 

prepared with appropriate care. But the 

actual operation turned out to be an unopposed march, impeded only by road demolitions, mines, and booby traps. The 210-

mm. mortar shells which had fallen at 

random during the previous afternoon on 

the Bahiret Foussana plain were no longer 

observed by Combat Command B, and were 

described by the British force across the 

valley as infrequent. The troops which had 

barred occupation of Djebel Zebbeus by a 

provisional American infantry unit late on 

24 February had gone by the next morning. 

The American artillery preparation drew 

no response. Both American and British 

forces moved into the pass as rapidly as 

routes could be opened. By 1000, General 

Ward was at the defile on the TebessaKasserine road, where General Roosevelt 

and Colonel Gardiner soon appeared. On 

the far side, the 2d Battalion, Coldstream 

Guards, and a squadron of tanks of 16/5 

Lancers, with artillery in support, could be 

seen along the road, with the 3d Battalion, 

Grenadier Guards, on the heights to the 

north. The pass was free of the enemy, and 

once the mine fields could be cleared, the 

Allies would be free to guard it against attack from the east and to prepare for the 

time when they would regain the initiative 

in central Tunisia.'" 

" (1) II Corps AAR, 2 May 43. (2) CCB .1 st 

Armd Diy AAR, 20-25 Feb 43. (3) Info supphed 

by Cabinet Office, London. (4) Memo by Gen 

Ward, in 1st Armd Diy Hist Reds, Vol. II. (5) 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 

The New Army Groups 

The Allied and Axis coalitions each 

emerged from the February battles with 

new army group commands in Tunisia. Gen. 

Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander took command of 18 Army Group late on 19 

February. Field Marshal Rommel was designated commander of Army Group Atrica 

on 23 February. Each commander was occupied at once with the aftermath of the 

recent battles and the prospect of future 

offensive operations under his control .. 'G 

Alexander had toured the Tunisian front 

during the latter part of the Axis offensive 

and thus saw the principal commanders and 

troops of British First Army when they were 

under strong enemy pressure. The effect of 

a struggle to overcome defects in organization left from the initial race for Tunis while 

at the same time meeting the enemy's unbalancing January jabs was manifest. He 

found the system of command and responsibility not clear-cut enough, and the provision for control inadequate for successful 

operations. He took command, moreover, 

at a time when the performance of American troops was in his opinion clouded by 

enough disappointing incidents to discredit 

their actual performance and even to throw 

doubts on their capacities. A disparaging attitude toward American troops was found 

Ward, Personal Diary, 22-25 Feb 43. In private 

possession. (6) Robinett, Among the First, pp. 

430-32. 

" (I) Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, "The African Campaign from EI Alamein to 

Tunis, from 10th August, 1942, to 13th May, 1943," 

printed in Supplement, February 3, 1948, to The 

London Gazette, February 5, 1948 (cited hereafter 

as Alexander, "The African Campaign"), p. 870. 

(2) Rad, Comando Supremo, Ambrosio to Rommel 

and von Arnim, 1530, 23 Feb 43, in Panzer Army 

Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1172; see 

pp. 485, 509-19 below. 

475 

by German interrogators of British and 

French prisoners of war. General Alexander's unfavorable estimate was destined to 

linger, encouraging him to depend more 

heavily upon British units than later circumstances warranted. 

His first task was to hold certain vital 

areas, including the existing line in central 

Tunisia and the approaches to Tunis which 

were best adapted to the eventual "final 

attack." He directed General Anderson to 

do what he had in fact, under General 

Eisenhower's instructions, been trying to accomplish for more than a month, namely: 

to regroup his forces in distinct national sectors and to establish a general reserve, 

chiefly of armored units, with which to meet 

enemy threats. Meanwhile, Alexander proposed to revise the leadership in order to 

bring about firm direction and centralized 

control, and to restore morale. For the latter 

reason, he directed that the Americans 

should first receive battlefield experience, 

guaranteeing them small successes and later, 

the tests of larger undertakings. In the effort to improve leadership he had to consider both the relief of existing commanders 

by new ones and the possibilities of producing competent field grade officers more 

swiftly by special training. In both matters 

he had to avoid damaging Allied unity of 

effort by offending national susceptibilities. o

• 

General Alexander's participation in the 

battles along the W' estern Dorsal was not 

extensive. He supported General Anderson's wish to concentrate British armor at 

Thala, even though by this step the front 

farther to the northeast might be subjected 

to grave risk. In any event the enemy had 

" (I) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

(2) Intcrvs, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. 

Alexander with Dr. Sidney T. Mathews, 10-15 Jan 

49, Ottawa, Canada. In private possession. 
476 

already decided to abandon the offensive 

when this decision was made. He tried to 

expedite the advance of Montgomery's 

Eighth Army into southern Tunisia with a 

view to alleviating Rommel's pressure ncar 

Kasserine pass, but the enemy had started 

back toward Mareth before Montgomery 

was prepared to exert any such influence; 

Rommel's decision to retire was in no sense 

made necessary by the Eighth Army's movements. Alexander arranged with General 

Juin for French light forces to protect the 

extreme southern flank of the British First 

Army, southwest of Gafsa, and to transmit 

intelligence from the French to First Army.R8 

The Axis had long considered how to 

organize a central unified command in 

Tunisia."!! The organizational preparations 

had been made and were ready when, on 

23 February, Comando Supremo ordered 

the activation of Army Group Africa. Headquarters, Army Group Africa, was primarily 

formed from that of the former GermanItalian Panzer Army, which had been inactivated on 20 February and replaced by 

the First Italian Army. One major departure from previous planning was the substitution of Rommel for von Arnim as the 

first army group commander. As late as the 

day before, Rommel had expressed to Kesselring an extreme reluctance to accept it. 

Comanda Supremo endeavored to meet 

Rommel's reluctance by asking him to set 

the time when he would be ready, subject to 

oral agreement with Field Marshal Kesselring, to turn over the army group to von 

"(1) MS # C-075 (Kesselring). (2) Maj Gell 

Sir Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (London, 1947), p. 242. (3) Msg MCS/9, 18 A Gp to 

First Army, 21 Feb 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 141. 

'" (I) Rad, OKW/WFSt/Op to German-Italian 

Panzer Army and Fifth Panzer Army, 28 Jan 43 in 

Panzer Africa, la, KTB, Anlagenband 8, Anlage 

945. (2) OKW/WFSt,KTB, 14Feb43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Arnim. Until Rommel left, von Arnim was 

to continue as commander of Fifth Pan::.er 

Army!r. 

In addition to altering the chain of command in Tunisia, the Camando Supremo 

directive of 23 February spelled out the conduct of future operations. While complimenting command and troops for the 

achievements in the Kasserine operation, 

Comando Supreme acknowledged the fact 

that Allied strength had so increased that 

the offensive would have to be broken off 

immediately. The mobile forces were to 

withdraw to the original line of departure 

while at the same time inflicting maximum 

casualties on the pursuing Allies, and using 

demolitions to obstruct their movements. 

Army Group Africa's next mission would 

be to destroy British Eighth Army's spearheads as they approached the IvIareth position. For this mission it was to assemble the 

10th Panzer Division in the Sfax area, and 

the other mobile units, 21 st Panzer Division 

and DAK, near Gabes. Fifth Panzer Army 

was ordered to plan for an offensive operation on its north wing, while generally improving its positions and disrupting potential Allied offensive preparations by strong 

local attacks. Comando Supremo promised 

to ship to von Arnim the Hermann Goering 

Division, specifying that it be held in reserve 

behind the northern sector of his front. Behind his south sector, he was to assemble a 

mobile group drawn from available forces. 

The Axis naval forces were ordered to abandon the planned Tabarka landings. The Air 

Force's missions were reiterated: protection 

4. Rad, Comando Supremo, Ambrosio to Rommel 

and von Arnim, 1530, 23 Feb 43, in Panzer Army 

Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 9, Anlage 1172. In his 

memoirs Rommel has stated that one rcason for his 

unwillingness to be designated commander-in-chief 

was disbclid in the competence of his superiors at 

Rome. Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, p. 361. 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 

of supply convoys and support of army 

ground operations.4 1 

Balance Sheet of the February Battles 

The Axis forces had pursued two objectives in the offensive against Sidi Bou Zid, 

Gafsa, Sbeitla, Feriana, and through the 

Western Dorsal. They sought to reduce Allied capabilities of attack by the destruction 

of men and materiel, and to bring about a 

westward withdrawal of the British First 

Army in the north by deeply penetrating its 

southern flank. The Allied defense had frustrated the second of these intentions, and 

Allied forces eventually returned to the very 

ground from which they had been driven, 

with their capabilities for attack not significantly impaired. The enemy had inflicted 

substantial losses in men and t< riel on 

the British, Americans, and French. The 

extent of these losses, in prisoners and in 

materiel destroyed or captured, is refl ected 

in the incomplete claims made by Group 

Ziegler for the period 14- 18 February and 

by Group Rommel for 19- 22 February: 42 

-"1:1" /(01 111111 " 01111 

I I(IIB ClfJ l1l1.J ClaimJ Claim.r 

Pri a nn . 2,876 845 3.72 1 

Tank 16? M 235 

If-propelled guns and 

r c:onnai a nc:/' 

vrhi clc: 36 74 110 

nt itank guns 19 4R 

Pl' onn"1 ca rri,,", ?!i n " <)5 

Guns 3 to 13 

Pla n 5, h ' grou nd 

action h 8 14 

H ( I ) Rad, Com ando Supremo, Ambrosio to 

Rommel and von Arnim, 1530, 23 Feb 43, in 

Panzer A rmy A frica, KTB, A nlaJ! enband 9, Anlage 

11 72. ( 2 ) Panze r A rm y Africa, KTB 2, 20 Feb 

1943. 

42 (1) Fiflh Panzer Armv, A"FB I V, 19 Feb 43. (2 ) 

Rpt, n~all -Italian Pall?er Arnry to Comalldo Supremo, 

OR SOUTH and others, 22 Feb 43, in Pallzer Army 

:1jrica, K TB, Alllgmhallda 9, Allla!;e 17ti3. . 

477 

A later consolidated report of captured 

personnel and materiel only, for the period 

16-24 February 1943 lists the following : 'J:! 

Prisoners : 4 02 I 

Ind ividual ","" pa n ; I ndefinite 

~(' i!ll' guns: 58 

40-mrn , gun~: 2 

87 .Ii-mrn. guns: 5 (Britilh 25-p und/'n ) 

nd" I"rminrd raliber: 

2 

1 I ,'r,,'Y morta r : l:l 

ntiai r('ra ft "um: 11 

7S-mrn, dr-prop IIrl.! 

gl.lns: 2 

I 5-nlln, rl£-propdkd 

guns : :S 

M tOr \,('hidn: 1 I 

Armon'd \,(,hi It, : 61 

Ta nks : :~ 

,\ rnmunilion : "-5 tO Il ~ 

lilll': Ion cuhit, 

mr!t'r 

Lullrit', nt~ ; 115 .. ubi,' 

nlC'trr., 

large- 31110unt of ('n -

int','r materiel 

T he erman \oi:'!'es jn th 

sou lhw Slern Tuni. ia, 1 

op ration in 

_4 Fcnru ary, 

w<: n" rep r l cI foil ws: " 

PUJO,lntl 

Towl ___ 8 

Killr-d _______ . _ 20 1 

Wounded _______ 53fi 

M i sin ________ _ 252 

M tlle,iel 

I ndi id ll[\l w apon : .. 7 

Li ht lII<lr hill!" 'uns: 11 

:H)·mm, an liair ra ft 

g un: 'l 

C' lf-propr'llr-d gll n ; ~ 

. ntitank un : 5 

1 SO-mm. rock" l l.lIln h· 

l'rs: + 

Motor v,' hid : ) 1 

Armort'd \, .. hirl ... : 

Tanh: 20 

Records of the Allies suffer from the conditions of the battle but tend to bear out 

the losses of materiel, and to indicate also 

considerable personnel losses unknown to 

the y,~ '; 

" Rad, Ge rman-Italian Pan ze r Arm y, OQu, to 

OB SO UTH, O Qu, 1 and 4 M a r 4 3, in Panz er 

Arm y Africa, O Q u KTB, Anlagenb and wm KTB, 

16.Il.- 3 1.111 .4.1, AnlaJ!f 230. 

" I bid. 

.:, ( I ) At K asserin(' pass, casu alti es of the 1st 

Ba ttalion, 26 th Infa ntry, werc reported as 6 killed, 

35 wounded, and 11 9 missing in action ; the 19th 

Engi nee rs lost I I kilkd, 28 ou nd , and 89 missing in ac tion ; the 3d Ba ttalion, 39th Infantry, 

fighting there and with Comba t Comman d B, 1 st 

Armored Division, lost II killed, 30 wounded , and 

136 missing in ac tion. The I st Armored Division's 

casualties, in all three categori es, came to 1,40 I. 
478 

Most heavily hit on the Allied side was 

the U.S. 1st Armored Division, the 1st Armored Regiment of which suffered such 

losses to its 2d and 3d Battalions that they 

were temporarily combined in a provisional 

"23d" medium tank battalion, while one 

company each of the 81st Reconnaissance 

Battalion, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion, and 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion, had to be wholly re-equipped. Losses 

by the 168th Infantry of the 34th Division 

through the encirclement of Djebel Lessouda (644), D jebel Ksaira ( 560 ), and 

Djebel Garet Hadid (620) also ran high. 

The 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery, had 

to be rebuilt. Yet these casualties were 

serious rather than devastating. The 1st 

Armored Division's withdrawal from SbeYtla 

had been skillful. Stubborn resistance there 

and in the Bahiret Foussana valley by Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, was 

successful against elements of the 21st Panzer Division and Kampfgruppe DAK, both 

of which had long fought under Rommel. 

The U.S. 1st Infantry Division, although it 

emerged from these operations still disappointed in its hope of fighting as a division 

instead of in separate components variously 

attached, retained an abundant capacity for 

effective action in the immediate future. 

The eastward movement by U.S. 9th Infantry Division units and by II Corps troops 

was not much delayed. British losses were 

chiefly in tanks for which replacements had 

been planned before the battle. In short, the 

Axis had achieved a tactical success rather 

than a major victory influencing the strategy 

of the campaign. 

(2) 26th Inf Hist, Kasserine Operation, in 26th 

Inf AAR, II Nov 4214 Apr 43. (3) 19th Engr 

Regt Hist Reds, Oct 42··Jan 44. (4) 39th Inf 

Hist, 1943. (5) 1st Armd Div G-3 Opns Jnl, 14-22 

Ff'b 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Why had the enemy not gained more? 

His initial success in forcing the Allies to 

withdraw to the \Vestern Dorsal was cheaply 

won, for the Allied decision to withdraw 

was made as soon as he took Sidi Bou Zid 

with what the First Army insisted was only 

part of his available mobile striking forces. 

I t was a belated decision which rested on 

the fact that the Allies were overextended 

along too great a line and their forces dispersed in combat groups of minor 

which would have to be committed piecemeal to meet the enemy's main effort. The 

Germans had thus been able to bring much 

stronger forces to bear on the hapless defenders of Sidi Bou Zid on 14 February and 

on the ill-fated counterattack by Combat 

Command C, 1st Armored Division, next 

day. The enemy's preponderance of force 

had in effect been increased by the disposition of Allied forces at Sidi Bou Zid, enabling him to isolate substantial elements on 

the hills, keep them out of the battle on the 

plain, and then to deal with them separately. 

The Germans on 14~15 February were not 

only more strongly equipped and more 

numerous but also wilier and more skillful 

than their American adversaries. Subse· 

quent German attacks against a more experienced foe were adroitly parried and 

obstinately contested. 

The enemy broke through Kasserine pass 

against a defense which seemed haphazard; 

but he failed in the attempt to exploit the 

break-through because these defenses actually turned out to be formidable in character. The organization of the pass for defense 

by adequate means was tardy, in part because of the belief that the enemy's main 

effort might be made from Gafsa or Feriana 

against Tebessa. Since the Allies had to 

comb the forces with which the pass was 

defended from other points along the front 
THE ENEMY IS TCRNED BACK 

and put them into action as they arrived, an 

atmosphere of improvisation was inescapable. But, to repeat, Rommel at least considered the defense stubborn and the performance of the U.S. troops superior!" 

Obviously, Allied resistance cannot be 

given all the credit for stopping the Axis 

advance. To a extent Rommel's failure 

may be attributed to an aggregate of Axis 

mistakes. The most consequential was the 

lack of unity of command and the indecision demonstrated after the successes gained 

in the battles near Sidi Bou Zid." The second serious mistake made by the Axis command was the critical weakening of the 

attack forces just before Angriffsgruppe 

Nord was assigned its mission. This \vas 

compounded by repeated violation of the 

principle of mass. Twice Rommel divided 

his force, first by ~ending the 21st Panzer 

Division against Sbiba and DAK into Kasserine pass, then sending DAK toward Tebessa and 10th Pan::.er Division against 

Thala. Attacking at too many places at the 

same time, he was too weak to achieve a 

break-through in anyone sector. In attacking the passes tactical errors were made by 

Rommel's subordinates who stubbornly attempted to the defiles in a frontal 

,n In Krieg ohne HaJS, p. 357, Rommd wrote 

of the def<:ns(' in Kasserine : "Die Amerikann 

hatten sich vorzueglich 

It is Kesselring's claim, but nOI a mattE'r of the 

contemporary record, that Rommel was authoriz.-d 

to take command of Group Ziegler after it had completed its mission at Sid; Bou Zid and kad the 

combined mobile forces of both panzn armies in 

an offensive against Tebessa. General D('ichmann 

asserts that R~~nmel did not usc this authority because he distrust('d Coman do Supremo. The fact 

H'mains that Rommel did not press his point--

perhaps because Kesselring was absent from his 

Rome headquarters-and acquiesced when von 

Arnim dissolved Group Ziegler, Scc MS # C-075 

(Kpsselring) and MS # D-:m9 (Deichmann). 

479 

attack instead of first gaining the shoulders. 

Finally, adverse weather conditions prevented the Luftwaffe from supporting the 

attack effectively. Thus Rommel's last big 

offensive stopped short of success. The \vhole 

operation from Sidi Bou Zid to the end resembled the actions of a fruit picker in the 

branches of a tree, reaching to the utmost 

before moving gingerly out farther along 

a limb and, in the end, leaving the best 

prize untouched for fear of falling. 

American troops learned a number of 

lessons about enemy methods from these 

battles. German tank attacks, they found, 

\".'ere made in the dusk as well as at dawn, 

and under the light of star shells and Hares 

were pressed until an American tank force 

was scattered. The enemy was apparently 

familiar with American practices, expecting 

two thirds of a force in the assault and one 

third in support, and meeting the situation 

repeatedly by a double envelopment. He 

continued to lure Americans into such trap." 

and into the ambush of antitank guns. German antitank ammunition was incendiary 

while American armor-piercing shells 

merely knocked out tanks in a manner permitting repair after sah'age from the battlefield. Germa'n tanks crept o\'er the ground 

at a slow pace intended to avoid creating 

dust clouds and noises which would attract 

attention. Often they seemed immobile unless checked with reference to a prominent 

terrain feature at intervals. Once in battle, if 

taken under fire, a German tank was likely 

to stop and to appear to be knocked out. 

When once its adversary turned to a different opponent, the German would open 

up with rapid and accurate fire. 

The Americans also noted deficiencies in 

their weapons. They found the 113 light 
480 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

GERMAN MEDIUM TANK MARK IV knocked out by American artillery fire, 

K asserine Pass area. 

tanks suited only for reconnaissance. The 

75-mm. half-track gun carrier turned out 

to be extremely vulnerable. A soldier, when 

asked if enemy aircraft bullets went through 

the half-tracks replied, "No sir, they only 

come through the wall and then they rattle 

around." In Army slang they were known as 

" Purple Heart Boxes." The 37 -mm. antitank gun with standard ammunition was 

effective only against scout cars and light 

vehicles except at very close ranges. Longerrange guns with better telescopic sights on 

tanks and for antitank roles were needed. 

Training and equipment for the avoidance, 

detection, and removal of mines, and for 

the use of mines against the enemy were 

inadequate. 

Finally, air-ground co-ordination was still 

below expectations. The Axis dominance in 

the air was so great that training in aircraft 

identification seemed fruitless. Up front, experi enced men were learning never to fire 

from the ground at an airplane, for fear of 

drawing attack, unless that airplane fired 

first. Air reconnaissance had given too little 

help to the forward clements. Air bombing 

mIssIons were executed too slowly to influence most current battle situations. 
THE ENEMY IS TURNED BACK 

Tactical air support was still "in short 

supply." 4R 

The month of February had fulfilled 

"These observations are derived from several 

sources: (1) Msg 2771, Eisenhower to Marshall, 

24 Feb 43, CinC AF Diary. (2) Interv, 1st Lt H. F. 

Hillenmeyer with Maj Gen Omar Bradley. OPD 

381 Africa Sec 3, Case 96. (3) Obsr's Rpt, Lt Col 

481 

Giraud's anxious antlCIpations; the month 

of March would test the ability of the Allied 

Force to benefit from earlier plans and from 

February's seasoning and experience. 

Boyd Hubbard, Jr., via Brig Gen John E. Hull to 

Gen Arnold, 19 Apr 43. OPD 381 Africa Sec 3, 

Case 97. (4) Ltr, Eisenhower to Handy, 20 Mar 43. 

OPD Exec 3, ltc-m lao 

PART SIX 

SHIFT TO NORTHERN TUNISIA 

CHAPTER XXV 

The Allies Prepare for Decisive Action 

Both the Allies and the Axis began regrouping and preparing for the next stage of 

the Tunisian campaign as soon as Rommel 

had abandoned the February offensive. The 

Allies intended to press all Axis forces inside 

a firmly held cordon in the narrow northeastern corner of Tunisia, isolate them from 

Europe, and then split them into segments 

for piecemeal destruction. Operations to 

constrict the enemy within the limited 

bridgehead would consist of two major 

phases. First, the British Eighth Army (Gen. 

Sir Bernard Montgomery) would push 

northward along the coast through the 

Gabes narrows and central Tunisia beyond 

Sousse. Second, Allied engineers would construct new airfields and reconstruct captured enemy airfields close to the new front 

so that increasing Allied air power could be 

used against the enemy with full effect in the 

final stage of the campaign. 

The British Eighth Army's drive northward would be the main Allied effort in it~ 

first phase. The British First Army when it 

had regrouped was expected to engage only 

in small holding attacks along the northern 

front and, of course, to hold onto its avenues 

of approach to Tunis and Bizerte. The U.S. 

II Corps in central Tunisia would durin,g 

this phase also play only an auxiliary role. 

While the Eighth Army attacked the l\fareth 

and Chott Positions near Gabes, the II 

Corps was expected, by carefully timed, well 

prepared, and suitably controlled attacks, to 

seize dominating positions along the enemy \ 

line of communications. These restricted 

operations would not only absorb enemy reserves which could otherwise be used against 

the British Eighth Army but would also, in 

the army group commander's judgment, 

advance the training of II Corps, increase 

its self-confidence, and improve its morale. 

He had no intention of employing II Corps 

to cut the enemy's line of communications 

by thrusting beyond the Eastern Dorsal onto 

the coastal plain, but only to threaten such 

action and thus attract enemy reserves to 

engage in defensive measures. The Eighth 

Army's attack on the Mareth Position would 

begin in the middle of March. The auxiliary 

operations in central Tunisia were adjusted 

to that schedule.' 

Reorgani::.ing the Allied Command 

When General Alexander arrived in Algiers on 15 February to confer with the 

Commander in Chief, Allied Force, arrangements for his headquarters at Constantine 

were completed, his responsibilities defined, 

and his directive prepared." Headquarters, 

18 Army Group, assumed principally those 

responsibilities previously discharged at 

AFHQ relating to the control of operations. 

1 Alexander, "TI.(' African Campaign," 

, (I) ~ote of War Room Mtg, 22 Jan 43, AFHQ 

G-3 Ops 58/2.1, Micro Job IOC. Reel 1880, (2) 

AFHQ Opn Memo 30 (rev.). 18 Feb 43. (3) Dir, 

17 Feb 43. printed in Alexander, "The African 

Campaign." App. B, pp, 88586, 
486 

By close liaison, special staff VISItS, and a 

system of observation (called PHAKTOM) 

and reporting over direct radio channels 

from the subordinate units in the field to 

army group headquarters, it undertook to 

achieve the necessary co-ordination between 

ground, air, and sea activities in the Tunisian 

area. Tactical air support was to be centrally controlled through air commanders 

with each British army and with II Corps, 

all under the higher command of the Headquarters, Northwest African Tactical Air 

Force. A naval liaison officer at 18 Army 

Group headquarters would furnish advice 

on naval problems to the ground commanders. 

In Algiers, G-3, AFHQ, kept in close 

communication with General Alexander's 

command, and sent liaison officers on frequent visits. Army group controlled and coordinated the collection of intelligence by 

both the First and Eighth Armies, and by 

means of its own supplementary efforts was 

able to make full and accurate estimates 

of the Axis order of battle. General summaries and reports of interrogations of prisoners of war went directly to G-2, AFHQ, 

from forward collection agencies, with army 

group disseminating the resulting analyses. 

British troop training fell under its control 

but that of American troops was reserved 

for G-3, AFHQ. Logistical support, including transportation, remained outside the 

army group's province. Only the control 

over level of supply and assignment of priorities in delivery was exercised by army 

group. 

Although it was an Allied headquarters 

with a certain number of American officers, 

18 Army Group was predominantly British. At first most of its officers consisted of 

~taff members of General Alexander's earlier 

command brought by airplane from Cairo. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

I t was organized on British staff lines, with 

a list of about 70 at the outset, and over 

100 before the end of March. The preparations for 18 Army Group's activation involved the removal of Headquarters, British 

First Army, from Constantine, to Laverdure, about 110 miles farther cast, and closing of the AFHQ advanced command post 

at Constantine. The 18 Army Group occupied offices and billets thus vacated, and was 

ready for activation about 12 February, 

waiting only for the commanding general's 

arrival." His chief of staff was Maj. Gen. 

Sir Richard L. McCreery. Brig. L. C. 

Holmes was in charge of operations, and 

an American, Brig. Gen. William C. Crane, 

was his deputy. 

On 8 March the 18 Army Group began 

by active direction in the forward areas to 

supplement the planning and co-ordination 

which it had hitherto undertaken! Although the regrouping which followed Rommel's retreat to the Eastern Dorsal had not 

yet been completed, the pattern was already 

apparent. The three headquarters directly 

subordinate to General Alexander were 

British First Army, U.S. II Corps, and 

British Eighth Army. The chain of command was to be in the form shown on the 

accompanying chart. The French XIX 

Corps' front was narrowed while most 

French troops were being rearmed and 

, (I) 18 A Gp Staff Appointments List, 27 Feb 

43 and Mar 43. AFHQ Micro Job lOA, Reel 6C. 

(2) History of Allied Force Headquarters and 

Headquarters NATOUSA, December 1942-December 194~, Pt. II, pp. 110-16,324-26. DRB AGO. 

(:)) Memo, G-:) AFHQ for CofS AFHQ, 30 Jan 

43, sub: A Gp Hq. AFHQ Micro Job lOA, Reel 

6C. (4) Alexander, "The African Campaign." (5) 

Intervs, Alexander with Mathews, 10-15 Jan 49. 

In private possession. 

'First Army Opn Instruc 20, 7 Mar 43. DRB 

AGO. 
THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR DECISIVE ACTION 487 

trained, and General Koeltz remained under General Anderson's command. 

General Alexander's survey of the Tunisian front and of his principal subordinates 

resulted in a decision to retain General 

Anderson, whom he then regarded as a 

sound soldier. His estimate of the performance by the U.S. II Corps commander during the recent battle was unfavorable, and 

he welcomed the possibility of a change for 

the better at that headquarters. The command of II Corps in future weeks had to 

be exercised by someone in whom Alexander had confidence and who, in turn, could 

claim the confidence of the American division commanders. Both General Ryder, 

whose 168th Infantry had been so badly 

affected by Fredendall's orders for its employment at Sidi Bou Zid, and General 

Ward, whose relief General Fredendall had 

proposed during the battle, lacked confidence in Fredendall's leadership, which 

they deemed responsible for assigning tasks 

and then prescribing both means and methods ill-adapted to their accomplishment; 

Fredendall, moreover, had precipitated a 

choice between himself and Ward, if either 

was to be retained. After an attempt at 

Headquarters, II Corps, at Djebcl Kouif on 

:) March to diagnose the state of the 

U.S. 1st Armored Division had revealed 

how much life and substance remained, and 

after General Alexander's estimate of General Fredendall had been taken into account, 

General Eisenhower determined to bring in 

a new corps commander, a conclusion in 

which he was confirmed by the information 

that his chief of staff, General Smith, his 

special representative, Maj. Gen. Omar N. 

Bradley, his former deputy chief of staff at 

the Advance Command Post, AFHQ, General Truscott, and his G-3, General Rooks, 

were able to furnish. 

Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., whom 

General Eisenhower selected, was brought 

to Tunisia from I Armored Corps in Morocco to participate in operations for which 

he had been thirsting. He took command 

of II Corps on 6 March, bringing with him 

a new chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Hugh J. 

Gaffey, and other staff officers in case of 

need. His service in Tunisia was to be an 

interruption in his planning and preparation 

to command the American troops in the 

forthcoming invasion of Sicily. Most of his 

I Armored Corps staff officers were not required in Tunisia. General Bradley was 

designated to succeed him as soon as operations in southern Tunisia were completed, 

and was made deputy corps commander 

until Patton's retirement from Tunisia. This 

change was the major modification of the 

chain of command in the Allied Force .. ' 

General Eisenhower's instructions to Patton defined his immediate task as the rehabilitation of the American forces in II 

Corps with all possible speed in order to 

make an attack already directed by 18 Army 

Group. Intensive training, re-equipping, reorganization, and application of all lessons 

thus far learned, and careful planning of the 

logistics of the attack, were to come first, 

along with an effort to instill in American 

forces a spirit of genuine partnership with 

the British forces. Patton was advised to 

train all combat forces, rather than engineers alone, in detection and removal of 

mines and in the proper use of mines for 

defensive purposes. He was also advised to 

" (1) Intern, Alexander with Mathews, 10-15 

Jan 49. (2) CinC AF Diary, 1-5 Mar 43. (3) Msg 

4267, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Mar 43: Msg 4580, 

Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Mar 43: Msg 3471, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 Mar 43. Smith Papers. (4) 

Gen Ward, Personal Diary, 1-5 Mar 43. In private 

possession. (5) Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story 

(New York, 1951), pp. 41-48. 
L T. GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON,JR., and General Eisenhower conferring at beginning 

oj 11 Corps oJfensive, Tunisia, 16 March 1943. 
THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR DECISIVE ACTION 489 

demonstrate the fact that the 37-mm. antitank gun could knock out the German Mark 

IV tank with the latest ammunition. Eisenhower, with Patton's well-known personal 

courage in mind, then remarked, "I want 

you as a Corps commander, not as a casualty." And, he added: "You must not 

retain for one instant any man in a responsible position where you have become doubtful of his ability to do the job. . . . This 

matter frequently calls for more courage 

than any other thing you will have to do, but 

I expect you to be perfectly cold-blooded 

about it. . . . I will give you the best available replacement or stand by any arrangement you want to make." 6 

General Eisenhower's staff received a new 

G-2, a position held by a British officer in 

view of the extensive use of British sources 

of information in the Mediterranean. The 

change was prompted by the fact that excessive reliance on one type of intelligence 

leading to a misinterpretation of the enemy's 

intentions had contributed to the setback at 

Sidi Bou Zid. Brig. Kenneth D. W. Strong, 

a former British military attache in Berlin, 

was sent from the United Kingdom by General Brooke to relieve Brig. Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman at Algiers. 1 

Ground Forces Reorganize 

The reorganization of Allied ground 

forces was intended to include the formation of reserves at each level of command. 

The arrival in Tunisia of British 9 Corps 

'CinC AI<' Diary, 7 Mar 43, Bk. V, pp. 270-71. 

'(1) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 147. 

(2) CinC AF Diary, 20 Feb 43, Bk. V, p. A-236. 

(3) Msg 1977, FREEDOM to TROOPERS, 20 Feb 43; 

Msg 65014, TROOPERS to FREEDOM, 20 Feb 43. 

ETOUSA Incoming and Outgoing Cbls, Kansas 

City Reds Ctr. 

headquarters and troops (Lt. Gen. Sir John 

Crocker) , to be followed during March and 

early April by the British 1st and 4th Divisions, would facilitate the creation of reserves. But in the interval before their arrival, the policy was incompatible with 

current Lattle requirements and with the 

principle of keeping divisions intact, and 

was also hampered in execution by the 

process of sorting out all units into national 

sectors. General Alexander ordered the 

transfer into 18 Army Group reserve of 

Headquarters, British 9 Corps, British 6th 

Armoured Division, and British 78th Division. The scheduled shift was delayed to 

meet General Anderson's needs for infantry 

with which to push the enemy back from 

the hills north of Medjez el Bab, but by 12 

March the reserve was established. General 

Keightley's 6th Armoured Division then 

passed under General Crocker's command 

and resumed the process of refitting with 

Sherman tanks, a process beginning when 

the enemy attacked at Sidi Bou Zid. First 

Army was forced to do without substantial 

re"erves for the next six weeks, and required 

British 5 Corps to dispose its troops subject 

to a possible need to send reinforcements to 

the sector of French XIX Corps. Under the 

plan of 12 February, 18 Army Group had 

contemplated thinning out the front line in 

order to obtain reserves. Early in March 

they expected that the Allied front would 

be shortened by British Eighth Army's 

northward progress, enabling one American 

division then to be shifted from the extreme southern part of the U.S. II Corps 

area to the extreme north of British 5 Corps 

zone. The remainder of the II Corps would 

sideslip northward perhaps as far as the 

Pichon Maktar highway, while the French 

XIX Corps moved northward as far as the 
490 

Pont-du-Fahs-Bou Arada road and its immediate approaches from the north. R 

After the completion of the February 

battles, the Allied main line of resistance 

extended from Cap Serrat to El Ma el 

Abiod, running east of Sidi Nsir, Medjez el 

Bab, Bou Arada, Djebel Bargou (1266), 

Djebel Serd j (1357), Kesra, Sbiba gap, 

Djebel Semmama (1356), and Djebel 

Chambi (1544). It covered the lateral road 

from Djebel Abiod to Bedja, a great advantage to British 5 Corps, and the approaches to the plain of Tunis along either 

side of the Med jerda river. The front cov~ 

ered main gaps in the Western Dorsal from 

Maktar to Sbiba, and thence to the southwestern extremity of the mountain chain. 

(M a p 13) The main landing fields in the 

Med jerda valley, the air landing grounds 

between Le Kef and Thala, and the airfields near Tebessa were protected, but the 

Thelepte airfields were left open to the enemy and were to be recaptured, if necessary, 

as a preliminary step in the forthcoming 

Allied offensive. 

British 5 Corps (46th, 78th, and 6th 

Armoured Divisions) held the front from 

Cap Serrat to the mountains north of the 

Rebaa Oulad Yahia valley, and included 

within its zone Le Kef and Souk Ahras. 

French XIX Corps, commanded by General Koeltz with headquarters at Djerissa, 

defended the next zone to the south. It comprised Divisions Mathenet and Welvert, 

with eight regiments of French infantry, 

two groups of Tabors, and the British 36 

Brigade (reinforced). Its front extended 

into the mountains at a point northeast of 

" (1) 18 A Gp Opn Instruc 6, 6 Mar 43, supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (2) First Army 

Opn Instruc 19-22, 24 F,.b-8 Mar 43. DRB AGO. 

(3) Msg, USFOR to FREEDOM, 2135, 26 F,.b 43. 

ETOUSA Outgoing Cables, Kansas City Rcds Ctr. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Sbiba. The U.S. II Corps held the remainder of the front. The 34th Division, 

reassigned to II Corps, held the northeast 

sector and the 1 st Infantry Division (after 

27 February, the 9th Infantry Division), 

the southwest sector. Nearer Tebessa, the 

1st Armored Division (and beginning 28 

February, the 1 st Infantry Division) prepared for the forthcoming offensive. Headquarters, II Corps, was at Djebel Kouif." 

The American divisions in II Corps required a certain amount of strengthening 

and reorganization. General Ryder's 34th 

Division needed to reorganize and rehabilitate the 168th Infantry, which had lost its 

commanding officer (Col. Thomas D. 

Drake) and much of its strength near Sidi 

Bou Zid. Col. Frederic B. Butler, from G-3, 

II Corps, became its new commander. General Ryder also sought the restitution to the 

133d Infantry of its 2d Battalion, which was 

still being used in the AFHQ security detachment at Algiers, and requested thirtysix 105-mm. howitzers to replace the badly 

worn 25-pounder guns of the division artillery. The 9th Division, which was moving 

east under command of Maj. Gen. Manton 

S. Eddy during the Kasserine battles, lacked 

one of its regiments, the 39th Infantry. 

The 39th had been scattered since the Allied landings, doing guard duty along the 

line of communications, or at the Biskra airdrome, or fighting in Central Tunisia. The 

division had not yet fought as a unit and 

I) (1) First Army Opn Instruc 19, 24 Feb 43. 

DRB AGO. (2) First Army Sitrep 123, 28 Feb 43; 

18 A Gp Cositrcp 7, 26 Feb 43. AFHQ CofS Cable 

Log. (3) DMC Jnl, 28 Feb 43. (4) By 17 March 

French XIX Corps had a strength which approximated 5:,,800, including British units in the corps 

troops. See 18 A Gp SD 1, 17 Mar 43. AFHQ 

Joint Rearmament Committee 370/001, and also 

in AFHQ G···3 (Ops) 37/13, Micro Job 10C, Red 

157F. 
SITUATION IN T UNISIA 

26 February 194 3 

___ ALL'U 'O(J~f ., ~t . 0630 

_ __ A" . 'O(J T ., ~(.0630 

C,.~,,.'" .... ".,~ 

• , , , • '" Z9 "'.U I 

MAl' 13 

( 

fi' 

( 

, 

1 

tG ... o ....... 

r~;III'" 

• F6,~~" 

/ 

I 

""'·'f " 
492 

remained in need of seasoning. The 1st Armored Division required replacement of 

severe losses in men and materiel. Furthermore, General Ward and others deemed 

this division too large. Its current coresix battalions of tanks, three of armored infantry, and three of armored artillery-was 

sufficiently large to invite endless detachment of units, and perhaps too cumbersome for the most efficient employment. Any 

such major change on the eve of the Allied 

attack was considered imprudent, but the 

problem was eventually met by modifying 

the table of organization. General Allen's 

1st Infantry Division needed to recover from 

French XIX Corps the elements of the 26th 

Infantry still under General Koeltz's command while the rest of the division was concentrating for its first action as a division in 

Tunisia.io 

The new commander of the II Corps attempted to transmit to his entire command 

the aggressive spirit with which he himself 

was animated, and to expedite preparations 

for the forthcoming attack. General Patton drove his principal subordinates and 

moved with restless energy throughout this 

area. His regime substituted military decorum for all traces of casualness, and required "spit and polish" as a preventive 

against carelessness. Some of Patton's methods to stamp his personal leadership on the 

entire II Corps seemed trivial to those on 

whom they were imposed. Changes which 

some might attribute to Patton's methods 

were perhaps also traceable to the lessons 

learned by troops in combat. The II Corps 

matured, working at its job, looking ahead 

more than it looked back, and needing more 

IO{I) Msg 1233, Adv AFHQ (Truscott) to 

AFHQ (Eisenhower), 1 Mar 43. AFHQ CofS 

Cable Log. (2) Ltr, Truscott to Ward, 2 Mar 43. 

In private possession. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

than anything else successes to boost its 

morale.ll 

The New Allied Air Command 

Almost simultaneously with the activation 

of 18 Army Group late on 19 February, a 

new system of control over Allied aviation 

came into effect. At Algiers, the Mediterranean Air Command under Air Chief 

Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder began to function on 18 February, having at its disposal 

the Twelfth Air Force and Royal Air Force 

(RAF) Eastern Air Command, the Ninth 

Air Force, and three RAF commandsMiddle East, Malta, and Gibraltar. These 

components were grouped by areas into the 

Middle East Air Command, Malta Air 

Command, and Northwest African Air 

Forces. The last of these was reorganized 

into functional organizations. G e n era 1 

Spaatz, its commander, maintained an administrative echelon of his headquarters in 

Algiers but kept his operations headquarters 

at Constantine and made it a combined 

organization of American and British officers. The Northwest African Strategic Air 

Forces headquarters under General Doolittle controlled bombers and their fighter 

escorts from airfields near Constantine. The 

U.S. XII Bomber Command and two 

squadrons of British Wellington bombers 

continued to furnish the main long-range 

bombing strength. The Northwest African 

Tactical Air Force fell under command of 

Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, who 

assumed control over the Allied Air Support 

Command (with General Kuter as deputy) 

a day or two before its redesignation, and 

established a combined operations headquarters adjacent to the new location of 

11 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 44~45. 
THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR DECISIVE ACTION 493 

Headquarters, First Army, at Laverdure. 12 

There General Alexander set up the advanced command post of 18 Army Group 

and shared facilities in a way which contributed to the maximum effectiveness of 

the Tactical Air Force, on the one hand, and 

the fullest use of First Army's resources on 

the other. 13 

Future collaboration between ground and 

air elements of the Allied Force was to benefit from the proximity of the respective commanders, but its fundamental basis was their 

past association in the Egyptian-Libyan 

desert, where they had together tested a 

successful doctrine of air support. Air 

Marshal Coningham controlled the U.S. 

XII Air Support Command and RAF 242d 

Group from the first, and resumed control 

over the Western Desert Air Force after it 

was transferred on 21 February to Northwest African Air Forces. These air commands were married to the major ground 

commands: XII Air Support Command 

with U.S. II Corps, RAF 242d Group with 

British First Army, and Western Desert Air 

Force with Eighth Army, as heretofore. So 

much for organization. What mattered far 

more than the fact of marriage was the 

nature of the marriage contract. The doctrine developed in the Western Desert of 

close union between air and ground forces 

had an eloquent and determined practi12 On 19 February he announced that he had 

instructed all his command "to cease defensive 

operations involving cover for troops except in 

special circumstances and with his approval." 

Offensive action to maximum capacity should replace such usc. Msg AI 24, Allied ASC 18 A Gp 

to First Army et al., 19 Feb 43. AFHQ CofS Cable 

Log. 

13 (1) Intervs, Alexander with Mathews, 10-15 

Jan 49. (2) Craven and Cate, The A rmy Air Forces, 

II, 161-64. (3) Info supplied by Air Ministry, 

London. 

tioner in the new commander of Northwest 

African Tactical Air Force. 

The fundamental premises of the new 

program to be applied in Tunisia were that 

ground troops would benefit most from a 

lasting Allied supremacy over the enemy 

air force and that, in view of the limited 

Allied resources in air power, no operational 

air unit should remain unemployed, or be 

sent to a minor target. In accordance with 

these premises, control over tactical air units 

had to be centralized and missions had to be 

assigned to them by a commander fully conversant with their capabilities under varying 

military conditions, and thus able to determine priorities among competing projects. 

With such an arrangement, the offensive use 

of Allied air promised results cumulative in 

their value for Allied ground and air elements alike. Air umbrellas over ground 

troops were henceforth to be abandoned in 

favor of strikes on the bases from which 

enemy flights originated. The bombers making these strikes would be escorted by the 

fighter planes which might otherwise have 

put in hours of protective cover over ground 

troops without damaging the enemy.14 To 

summarize, the reorganization of 19-20 

February 1943 was destined, through use of 

the ground-air doctrines tested in Libya, to 

promote by painful but inexorable steps the 

achievement of Allied air supremacy in 

Tunisia.15 

In addition to the Northwest African 

Strategic and Tactical Air Forces, General 

H FM 31-35, Air-Ground Operations, 9 Apr 42. 

Ie (1) Craven and Catc, The Army Air Forces, II, 

136-37, 164-65. (2) See also Col. Kent Roberts 

Grcenfit'ld, Army Cround Forces and the AirGround Battle Team, Including Organic Light 

Aviation, AGF Hist Sec, Study 35, 1948, pp. 1-5, 

which shows how far Army Air Forces doctrine had 

already gone toward integrating thc effort of air 

and ground forces by 9 April 1942. 
494 

Spaatz's command included the Coastal Air 

Forces (controlled from Algiers in conjunction with the headquarters of the Naval 

Commander in Chief, Mediterranean), the 

Training Command, the Air Forces Service 

Command, and a Photographic Reconnaissance \Ving. 

The new air organization, particularly 

the Tactical Air Force, set about preparing 

airfields at sites appropriate for the expected 

pattern of ground operations, and establishing a radar warning and control system with 

which to apply new principles of air support. The mountains seriously impaired the 

effectiveness of radar, while the lack of telephonic communication between dispersed 

installations was likewise a handicap. Radio 

communication had to make up for the deficiencies in wire lines. 

By 11 March, an outline plan of air operations in three 8uccessive phases was 

ready. Headquarters, 18 Army Group, and 

Tactical Air Force were then encamped 

ncar Ain Beida, from which they could cooperate during the imminent operations at 

the :\1areth Position. The XII Air Support 

Command and RAF 242d Group were expected to make successive shifts onto new 

or improved airfields nearer the coast. A 

tactical bomber force of light and medium 

bombers was assembled and organized in 

the vicinity of Canrobert, northwest of Aln 

BeIda. The XII Air Support Command prepared to concentrate at Thelepte, where the 

existing fields, once reoccupied, would he 

impro\'ed and supplemented, and like that 

at Youks-les-Bains, would be stocked with 

enough materiel to provide a surplus for 

the \V estern De~ert Air Force's u.-e when 

it came north. The airfields at Kalaa Djerda 

and Sbei'tla were to be improved, the former 

for the use of bombers. The \\1 estern Desert 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Air Force was expected to devote itself independently to supporting British Eighth 

Army in the main action. XII Air Support 

Command and RAF 242d Group were to 

assail the enemy air forces, carry out tactical reconnaissance, and assist night bombing 

on the line of communications. 

Once Gafsa had been taken by the U.S. 

II Corps, and while the British Eighth Army 

was closing in on Gabes, a second phase of 

air operations was envisaged in the air outline plan of 11 March. It would have two 

aspects. A shift eastward and northeastward 

by those engaged in airfield construction, 

radar erection, and supply would be paralleled by interference with the Axis air movement up the coast. In this phase, the operations of XII Air Support Command and 

\Vestern Desert Air Force would have to be 

co-ordinated, and the latter would find airfields and supplies ready for it near Gafsa 

and at Thelepte. Preparations would be 

completed for the use during the final stage 

of airfields in the area from Souk el Arba 

and So uk el Khemis to Le Kef, Le Sers, and 

Thibar. (See Map V.) 

Air Marshal Coning ham held a commanders' conference at Canrobert on 12 

March at which it was agreed that once 

the battle for the i\tfareth Position had begun, XII Air Support Command and RAF 

242d Group would attempt round-the-clock 

strikes on enemy airfields near Gabes. \Vestern Desert Air Force might thus retain air 

supremacy over the battle area with lighter 

opposition and with greater capacity to engage ground targets in co-ordination with 

the Army clements. As the day for the initial Allied operations arrived, intermittent 

bad weather reduced the number of air 

strikes on enemy landing fields. They were 

hegun on 13 March and taken up from time 
THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR DECISIVE ACTION 495 

to time by units of the Strategic Air Force 

as well as the Tactical Air Force.'G 

Allied Preparations in the Communications 

Zone 

Like the forward area, the rear was reorganized and strengthened for the resumption of the Allied offensive in March. The 

accumulation of forces preparing for the 

eventual invasion of Sicily augmented the 

total number of military personnel with a 

corresponding increase in the complexity of 

the agencies which supervised and supported combat troops. Algiers in particular 

was crowded with American and British 

personnel in addition to members of the 

French civil and military establishments. 

The process of Allied military build-up in 

Algiers had begun long before the planning 

for ~1arch. AFHQ filled up the Hotel St. 

Georges, the Hotel Alexandra, and other 

buildings which were converted to office 

space, and spilled over into several other 

buildings; it also occupied several hundred 

different officer billets. The troops assigned 

or attached to the headquarters command, 

and other units quartered temporarily in the 

vicinity of Algiers, added to the Allied military traffic. Antiaircraft batteries and smoke 

projector units, car and truck companies, 

military police, signal communications, 

postal and radio censorship units, and the 

workers engaged in servicing records-all 

the varied and extensive aspects of the modern great army headquarters contributed to 

the Allied military population in Algiers in 

ever-increasing numbers. 

The North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA), was acti16 (I) Crawn and Cate, The Army Air Forces, 

II, 167~75. (2) Info supplied by Air Ministry, 

London. 

vated at Algiers on 4 February 1943, to 

handle the administrative concerns of the 

growing American Army forces in the area, 

matters which were not properly a subject 

for Allied action. At first, like the commanding general, most of its military personnel 

doubled as both Allied Force and theater 

officers. Later, when some whole sections 

of AFHQ were transferred to comparable 

staff sections of NATOUSA, the total 

.-trength of the staffs in Algiers was still unaffected. But in the course of time, largely 

as a resuit of a determination to undertake 

more and more projects, the total grew. A 

substantial number of the units of AFHQ 

'were operational rather than supervisory 

agencies. They pursued their projects with 

great energy, intent on doing everything 

possible to make them succeed. By April, 

AFHQ exceeded 2,000 officers and enlisted 

men, illustrating how military, like civil administrative establishments, tend to grow 

and rarely to dwindle. 17 

The supply organization in the communications zone with which to meet the requirements of the March offensive was 

created during the preceding month. Brig. 

Gen. Everett S. Hughes, who had been engaged in ETOUSA on the logistical problems connected with Operation TORCH, arrived on 12 February in Algiers to be deputy 

theater commander and commanding general of the communications zone. An Eastern Base Section at Constantine to supply 

the requirements of U.S. II Corps was constituted on 13 February under command of 

Col. Arthur W. Pence and opened on 27 

February. With the Atlantic Base Section 

Hist of AFHQ and NATOUSA, Pt. II. 

pp. (2) Gmnal Eisenhower's directive as 

theater commander is Message ZRH--2624, 

AGWAR to FREEDOM, 20 February 1943. OPD 

Msg elr File. 
496 

at Casablanca and tbe Mediterranean Base 

Section at Oran, the Eastern Base Section 

came under the direct control of General 

Larkin as Commanding General, Services 

of Supply, NATO USA. The flow of materiel to General Patton's corps was to occur 

within the broader pattern of Allied buildup for the operations in Tunisia, the campaign being planned for Sicily, and perhaps 

additional undertakings in the Mediterranean. Supplies for II Corps had to be 

forwarded in a manner minimizing interference with the British Line of Communication to First Army, which in January 

had passed to the control of AFHQ from 

Headquarters, First Army. 

Maj. Gen. J. G. W. Clark (Br.), commanding No. 1 Line of Communications 

Area from headquarters at Setif, with subareas at Algiers, Bougie, Philippeville, Bone, 

Constantine, and Souk Ahras, reported to 

Maj. Gen. Humfrey Gale (Br.), Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ.'8 \Vith the 

three American base sections and the coordinating Headquarters, Services of Supply, NATO USA, reporting to the deputy 

theater commander while the British Line 

of Communication reported to the chief 

administrative officer, and with a separation of American and Bri6sh maintenance 

impossible, and indeed in many respects 

undesirable, the problems were met as they 

arose by steady co-operation between Generals Hughes and Gale. The disproportionately low ratio of service to combat troops 

" (1) Hist of Af'HQ and XATOUSA, Pt. II, 

pp. 175~76, 21517. (2) Trans Sec EBS 

NATOUSA Hist Reds, 22 F('b~30 Apr 43. OCT 

HB. (3) Col. Creswell G. Blak('ney, cd., Logistical 

History ot NATO uSA-MTO USA, 11 August 1942 

to 30 November 1945 (Naples, Italy, 1946), p. 23. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

with which the early operations in Northwest Africa had been undertaken was 

raised during the first four months of 1943.'n 

Allied plans in outline for logistical support were sketched at AFHQ on 27 

February in a conference over which the 

chief administrative officer, General Gale, 

presided, and at which Maj. Gen. C. H. 

Miller (Br.) of 18 Army Group described 

the prospects. First Army's supply base 

would be at Bone, while II Corps would 

draw on the new Eastern Base Section at 

Constantine. 20 Each army would be responsible for deliveries forward of these 

advanced bases. While First Army would 

maintain the air elements in its northern 

area, Line of Communication, Third Area 

Service Command, near Constantine would 

supply those in the southern sector and 

along the Constantine~ Tebessa axis. In addition to the motor transport allotted to each 

army and for AFHQ reserve, a special reserve for British Eighth Army was to be accumulated in the Constantine area on a scale 

to be determined by 18 Army Group. Participation by British troops and air units in 

operations to tbe south would be assisted by 

stocking gasoline and ammunition at accessible points. Tbe principal maintenance center for tanks was to be at Le Kroub, near 

'" The problem remained difficult at Casablanca 

at the time of a visit by the Assistant Secretary 

of War, John McCloy. McCloy reported this 

situation in a mt'mo Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. 

Styer, 22 March 1943. General Handy's comments 

are found in his memo for the Commanding General Armv Service Forces (Attt'ntion: General 

Sty;r), 27'March, subject: Report of the Assistant 

SecretarY of War on conditions in Casablanca. 

OPD 38'1 Africa (1~27-43), Sec 2, Item 89. 

"" U.S. II Corps was under First Army until 2400, 

8 Mar 42, thereafter under 18 Army Group. Info 

supplied by the British Cabinet Office, London. 
THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR DECISIVE ACTION 497 

UNLOADING P-38 FIGHTER PLANES/or the French Army, Casablanca, 13 Aprll 

1943. Note Arab helpers on the dock. 

Constantine, with facilities at Bone for servicing Churchill tanks. 21 

By March, the expansion of Allied logistical support which had been envisaged since 

the end of December began to reflect the 

result of the arrangements then made. The 

main ports of Casablanca and Oran, and 

the satellite ports near them, stepped up 

their operations. The Sixth Port of Embarkation (Mobile ) at Casablanca and the 

Third Port of Embarkation (Mobile) at 

Oran were reinforced by two and three port 

" ( I ) Notes of AFHQ Log Plans Sec Mtg (signed 

by Lt Col]. C. Dalton), 27 Feb 43, dated I Mar 43, 

sub: Admin policy for development of adv opns base 

in Tunisia. OCMH. (2 ) 18 A Gp Admin Instruc I, 

4 Mar 43, supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

battalions, respectively. Each port employed 

several hundred Arab laborers on the docks 

(3) Plans in late January set the daily tonnage 

estimated for the troops in Tunisia as follows: 

Tot. 1. .. 

"'irn Armr · 

Twelfth Ai, Foree· ..•. • 

Line- nfCommunic:uion .. ~. __ ., . . _. 

1-15 16-30 

-[arch M. rch 

3.675 

1.900 

1,155 

1;10 

4 .205 

2.3 0 

1,205 

620 

fI Inc\udin~ U.S. and French forces under First Army (omrna nd a nd RAF in First Army area. 

/) East of Algiers. 

r Including RAF not in First Army area and French forces 

n n line of communication. 

Sour((: Memo, ColS AFHQ lor CG First Army, 29 J an 43, 

sub: Or~n and prep for renewal of offensive. AFHQ G- J 

Ops .lR/2.1. Micro Job IOC, Reel lRRD. 
498 

and also contracted with French companies 

to assist in unloading operations. For the 

Eastern Base Section at Constantine, the 

port of Philippeville was made available. 

It was dredged to a twenty-two-foot depth, 

which permitted four partially loaded Liberty ships and two coasters to discharge 

cargo simultaneously; the port was eq uipped 

with cranes, hoists, and other ;-argo-handling machinery which expedited the unloading process. 22 On occasion, LST's could 

run from Oran to Philippeville with replacement tanks which then went on transporters 

over the road to the vicinity of T ebessa. 

For the operations in April, the deeper port 

of Bone was also to be shared with the British Line of Communication and was greatly 

increased in cargo-receiving capacity. But 

in March, the 91,000 tons which passed 

through Philippeville in addition to that 

brought by rail and highway from the west 

met the requirements of the U.S. II Corps 

and the XII Air Support Command, and 

made possible thf accumulation of reserves 

on which the British Eighth Army could 

shortly draw. 23 

Railroad and highway transportation 

across French North Africa were both 

greatly expanded by March through the 

work of engineers and the Transportation 

Corps, U.S. Army. A very large requisition 

for railroad rolling stock which was made 

when the Allied drive on Tunis failed in December began to be filled in March, by 

which time managing and operating personnel for this equipment had also arrived. Before the end of April, forty-three traim, 

averaging over 10,700 tons daily, were paz;;s22 Trans Sec EBS NA TOUSA, 22 Feb-30 Apr 

43, pp. 7-8. OCT HB. 

,. Ibid., p. 22, citing rpt of Maj Arthur G. Si{'gk, 

OCT, 9 Apr 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ing through Constantine toward the combat "4 zone.-

Expanded highway transport ,vas essential for the accumulation of materiel for the 

Allied campaigns of the spring. A special 

convoy arriving on 6--7 March brought 

more than 4,500 two-and-one-half-ton 

trucks into Casablanca and Oran. 25 Other 

convoys brought more than 2,000 per 

month. Great assembly plants processed the 

twin-unit-packed crates of trucks. Companies and battalions of truck drivers to 

operate them were combed out of various 

units. One battalion which was formed in 

the Casablanca area had its trucks loaded 

with high-priority cargo, and, within a week 

of arrival, started in convoy to Ouled Rahmoun about 1,000 miles away. The battalion arrived there on 23 March with an 

excellent record. Road maintenance, traffic 

control posts and stations, and good organization stepped up highway traffic until, 

late in l\larch, the average number of vehicles reaching Orleansville daily eastwardbound was 600; in the area of the Eastern 

Base Section, some 1,500 trucks and 4,500 

troops were supplementing the railroad. 

From Ouled Rahmoun and Bone to Tebessa, the daily transportation then came 

to 500 tons or more. 211 Clearing the ports 

" (1) Memo, Brig Gen Carl R. Gray, Jr., for 

D{'puty Chid of Trans NATOUSA, 1 May 43, 

cited in H. H. Dunham, U.S. Army Transportation 

and the Conquest of North Africa, 1942-1943, 

Hist Unit OCT, Jan 45, p. 208. (2) Bykofskyand 

Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations 

Overseas. 

Memo, Lt Col Edwin C. Greiner for Brig Gen 

Robert H. Wylie, 3 Feb 43, sub: Cargo for UGS 

5-A: Memo, Gen Wylie for Gcn Styer, 25 Feb 43, 

sub: Cargo shipped on UGS 5;/2 • OCT HB. 

". (1) Trans Sec EBS NATOUSA Hist Reds. 

22 Feb-·30 Apr 43, p. 12. (2) Dunham, U.S. Army 

Transportation and the Conquest of Korth Africa. 

1942--1943. Hist Unit OCT, Jan 45, pp. 263. 266. 

268 
THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR DECISIVE ACTION 499 

and railroad terminals and conveying supplies from depots to dumps required the 

service of hundreds of trucks in addition to 

those used in the longer convoys. Including 

local hauling, the Eastern Base Section recorded movement in April of a total of 

51,541 truck loads amounting to almost 

84,000 tons. 27 

While the vast bulk of overland traffic was 

eastward bound, salvaged materiel began to 

flow back for reconditioning and repair. At 

Oran and Casablanca, the outward-bound 

cargo transports were loaded with French 

North African products such as cork and 

phosphates, or with scrap iron, until their 

return loads were almost half as heavy as 

those which they had brought. 

Substantial numbers of the personnel 

brought to French North Africa in the 

spring troop convoys came there to prepare 

for the invasion of Sicily or to join the U.S. 

Fifth Army. Much of the materiel being 

unloaded at the ports in March was intended to remain in Morocco and western 

Algeria, either to be used by troops in the 

communications zone or to sustain the 

French and native civilian population. Even 

so, the volume of supplies which kept arriving at Casablanca, Oran, and the ports near 

them dwarfed the total which was reaching 

Tunisia from the northeast to support the 

Axis forces. 28 It was apparent by the end of 

March that in Tunisia the Americans alone 

were being supplied at a higher rate than all 

the Axis forces there. 29 Before the Allied 

27 Ibid., p. 269. 

os In March, 146,000 tons were discharged in 

Moroccan ports and 220,000 tons in Oran, Arzew, 

and Mostaganem. Chiefly by reshipment, 91,000 

tons came into Philippeville. 

"Eastern Base Section was 1,000 tons 

per day by tmck alone into Axis importations in March came to less than 29,267 tollS. No 

account is taken in this comparison of what the 

offensive in March, replacement depots 

("repple-depples") were established near 

Oran and Casablanca with a total capacity 

exceeding 11,000:'0 

Preparations by the French 

The rearmament of the French under 

Giraud to which the President had agreed in 

principle at Anfa, and which had required 

much subsequent negotiation, began to take 

form while the Allied forces in Tunisia reorganized. The main problem was that of 

cargo space and convoying, although other 

difficulties also had to be overcome. In accordance with a supplementary understanding, a special convoy of fifteen ships loaded 

with materiel for the French was to be en 

route from the United States by the time the 

Allies began their March offensive in southern Tunisia. Ten more ships would be sent 

later. 

The weapons and equipment to arrive in 

April would, when distributed to French 

units, make ready two infantry divisions, two 

armored regiments, three tank destroyer battalions, three reconnaissance battalions, 

twelve antiaircraft battalions (40-mm.), 

and ten truck companies. Beginning a little 

later, American planes would start arriving 

at the rate of 60 per month until they 

reached a total exceeding 200 fighters, dive 

bombers, and transports. Training of aerial 

gunners could commence in April and of 

pilots in June, at the rate of 100 for each of 

the first two months and 50 per month thereafter. Within French North Africa, training 

in the operation and maintenance of AmcriBritish First and Eighth Armi('s We-f!' then obtaining. 

(See Appendix B.) 

,. Maj Gen William H. Simpson, Obsr's Rpt, 27 

May 43. AGF 319.1/58. 
can matériel would begin before these shipments arrived. 

This program was considerably slower 

and smaller than the one Giraud had anticipated after sampling thePresident’s 

buoyant encouragement in January at Casablanca. The curtailment actually resulted 

from the many competing claims upon 

American munitions and upon Allied shipping, but Giraud was encouraged to believe 

that by more liberal administrative policies 

in French North Africa he could expedite 

the rate at which American arms would be 

delivered to his forces. Although Giraud 

may indeed have suffered some loss in prestige from the dragging pace of French rearmament, his political difficulties arose 

mainly from his disdain for such questions, 

his belief both that the fundamental objective of military success over the Axis powers 

transcended all other considerations, and 

that any attention which he had to give to 

politics constituted an intrusion on his concern with more important affairs. He leaned 

heavily on French political advisers and his 

political decisions were subjected to the close 

scrutiny of the Allied commander in chief, 

such scrutiny being exercised with the aid of 

Mr. Robert Murphy and Mr. Harold Macmillan. The consistent position of the Allied 

leadership was that conditions of political 

tranquillity conducive to immediate military advantage must be maintained, and 

that these conditions should, if possible, be 

made to prevail without forfeiting French 

unity or general future support by the 

French when the main Allied effort would 

be made on the soil of Continental Europe.31

Giraud was finally persuaded, after him31 (1) CinC AF Diary, Bk. V, pp. A-258-59. (2) 

Giraud, Un seul but: la victoire, p. 121. (3) Msg, 

FREEDOM (Murphy) to AGWAR (Hull), 13 Dec 

42. AFHQ Micro Job 24, Reel 78D. 

self sensing political opinion in the French 

armed forces under his control, that unity 

on any terms acceptable to General de 

Gaulle could not be soon achieved. He therefore proceeded to revamp his government 

while reconstructing the French Army with 

American arms. On 6 February and 14 

March 1943, under Allied guidance, he announced the termination of Darlan’s Imperial Council of provincial governors and 

of all the fictitious ties with Vichy. He himself assumed complete power over all civil 

and military authorities in French North 

and French West Africa. He declared that 

he would be advised by a War Committee 

in which the former members of the Imperial Council would be joined by other 

Frenchmen. Political prisoners and refugees 

were to be released from detention at once. 

Organizations of Vichy origin, like the Service d'Ordre Légionnaire, were to be suppressed. Administrative councils representing French and native groups would be 

formed to advise and assist the governors of 

all colonies and municipalities. He instigated 

a trip to London by one of de Gaulle’s leading adherents in Algiers, Professor René 

Capitant, to furnish the Fighting French 

leader with a trustworthy, first-hand report of conditions. Giraud became increasingly receptive to liberal advice, including 

that from M. Jean Monnet, who went from 

the United States to assist him in Algiers. 

On the eve of the Allied offensive, he thus 

had taken a considerable step away from 

an authoritarian attitude toward French 

political republicanism, and had also opened 

negotiations through General Catroux for 

a merger with the Fighting French in 

London.32 

32 Georges Catroux, Dans la bataille de Méditerrnée; Égypte, Levant, Afrique du Nord, 1940- 

1944 (Paris, 1949), pp. 325-30, 340-49. 
CHAPTER XXVI 

The Enemy Strives To Retain the Initiative 

The Allies were not allowed to regroup, 

reorganize, and prepare for the mid-March 

offensive without engaging in some bitter 

battles. The respite gained in central Tunisia had no parallel in northern Tunisia. Here 

von Arnim had plans of his own for resuming the offensive. On 22 February Kesselring, after approving Rommel's decision 

to break off his attack at Thala and Djebel 

el Hamra (1112), had authorized von 

Arnim to prepare an attack that would keep 

the Allies under pressure in the north while 

Rommel's forces were withdrawing to regroup for their attack against Montgomery's 

forces in the south. The Fifth Panzer Army 

operation, timed to facilitate Rommel's disengagement,was to push back the Allied 

lines in the north and expand the narrow 

bridgehead protecting the vital Axis supply 

bases of Tunis and Bizerte.' Von Arnim immediately held a conference with his subordinates to discuss possible plans. He could 

attack either in Manteuffel's sector along 

the coast or in Weber's zone in the Medjez 

el Bab area. In either case the commander 

might hold and firmly defend the newly 

gained positions or, after a spoiling attack, 

withdraw to his original lines.2 

1 Mins of Conf, Kesselring with von Arnim. evening 22 Feb 43, in Fifth Panzer Army, KTB IV, 22 

Feb 43. 

Z Mins of Conf, von Arnim with Weber, Manteuffel, and others, 2200, 22 Feb 43. Ibid. 

Early in the afternoon of the next day 

von Arnim decided on a spoiling attack in 

the Medjez el Bab area. He charged Corps 

Group Weber with this limited attack which 

was to jump off on 26 February. Von 

Arnim chose this solution after it had become painfully evident to him that he 

lacked the strength for a bigger operation. 

He picked Medjez el Bab as the objective 

mainly because to shift major elements to 

von l\1anteuffel's sector would have been 

too time-consuming. 3 

Von Arnim had already begun to assemble the forces at his disposal. He stopped 

Group Lang's perfunctory attack on Maktar on 22 February and ordered these units 

to assemble farther north. By scraping the 

barrel, he gathered some six battalions of 

varied composition and combat effectiveness and designated one Tiger and one 

panzer battalion to participate in the projected assault. But he lacked the main body 

of the 10th Panzer Division which continued to be under Rommel's immediate 

control. 

A Major Effort In the North Is Planned 

At dawn on 24 February, von Arnim 

flew to Rome for a conference with Kesselring. He sent his operations officer to Sbei'da 

3 Mins of Conf, von Arnim with Weber, von 

Manteuffel, and others, 1400, 23 Feb 43. Ibid. 
502 

FIELD MARSHAL ALBERT KESSELRING 

to brief Rommel on the limited Medjez el 

Bab attack on which he had decided the 

day before. From the Kesselring-von Arnim 

conference in Rome, however, emerged an 

entirely different plan, couched in a new 

direct order to von Arnim-Fifth Panzer 

Army was to launch a major offensive along 

its entire front from the coast to the Bou 

Arada valley with both von Manteuffel's 

and Weber's forces. The main effort, to be 

executed with the only armored force available, bolstered to 77 tanks by the temporary 

assignment of 15 Mark IV's from Rommel's 

21 st Panzer Division, was to be directed 

at Sidi Nsir with Bedja as its objective! 

'These tanks had just arrived at Tunis for shipments to 21 st Panzer Division. Fifth Panzer Army, 

KTB, 24 Feb 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

The attack was designed to gain for the 

Axis the much desired extension of the 

bridgehead westward to a new main line of 

resistance running from Djebel Abiod 

through Bcdja to Testour and El Aroussa. 

This offensive went far beyond the mission 

so recently assigned to Fifth Panzer Army 

by Comando Supremo and it required considerable aplomb on Kesselring's part to 

explain his authorization to a highly astonished Ambrosio. Kesselring sent his assistant chief of staff, Colonel Westphal, to 

explain the new situation to Rommel and 

to request the field marshal to support von 

Arnim's drive by keeping 10th Panzer and 

21 st Panzer Divisions in positions capable 

of threatening Le Kef. Rommel was flabbergasted by this "completely unrealistic" 

concept contrived by what he later called 

the "nincompoops at Comando Supremo." 5 

Despite Rommel's attitude, the Fifth 

Panzer Army's attack order was issued on 

25 February and the attack began on the 

next day. (Map 14) It was Kesselring's 

and von Arnim's assumption that available 

Allied reserves had already been withdrawn 

from the Fifth Panzer Army front as a result 

of Rommel's drive on Thala. To exploit a 

favorable situation, von Arnim planned a 

deep thrust toward Bedja. He charged 

Corps Group Weber with the main effort 

and Manteuffel with making a secondary 

attack nearer the coast. Weber's main objective was to be Bedja. Simultaneously he 

was to capture Medjez el Bab in a doubleenvelopment operation that would also de5 (1) Conf, Ambrosio and Kesselring, 24 Feb 43, 

in Italian Collection, Item 26. (2) Fifth Panzer 

Army, KTB IV, 24 Feb 43. (3) Msg, von Arnim to 

Fifth Panzer Army, 24 Feb 43, in Fifth Panzer Army, 

KTB, g. Kdos. (Chefsachen), 16.1.-20.II.43, 

Tunisien. (4) Rommel, Krieg ohne Hass, pp. 363-

64. 
~~-... TI' '" ~ ~"i"'-~· Q~ r II_~ \ " 

I 

GERMAN OFFENSIVE 

IN NORTHERN TUNISIA 

__ G . . .... · " .L .... '.ON' L'.'. 26 flU .... 

<Jo=::: GI .... ~·II." u ' '''U. ~ r ... " .. , 

•• • • , •• /01 ,'01,1101 

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MA P 14 

.. . ,,, . 

, .'1£"'( 

., I 
504 

stroy Allied forces at Bou Arada and gain 

the Siliana river between EI Aroussa and 

Testour. Von Manteuffel was ordered to 

reduce the Allied positions at Djefna and 

win the Ez Zouara river sector near Djebel 

Abiod. For his attack von "Nlanteuffel would 

have to draw chiefly upon the forces already 

committed in the line or held in reserve. 

In addition, he received reinforcement by 

one Tunis battalion. This brought his entire 

force to a strength of eight battalions. 

Weber organized his attack forces in five 

groups. Armored Group Lang (with 77 

tanks including 14 Tiger tanks) had the 

mission of moving by way of Manteuffel's 

sector to break through the Allied position 

at Sidi Nsir and drive on toward Bedja. 

Group Eder (755th Grenadier Regiment, 

reinforced) was to advance across Djebel el 

Ang (688), then, turning south, to destroy 

Allied units in the mountains near Chaouach 

and Toukabeur and cut the main highway 

between Bedja and Medjez el Bab east of 

Oued Zarga. Group AudorfJ (754th Grenadier Regiment [ J), reinforced by a battalion of infantry from the Hermann Goering Division, was to launch holding attacks 

opposite Medjez el Bab and subsequently 

open the route through the town. South of 

the Medjerda river Group Schmid (consisting of an armored infantry battalion of 10th 

Panzer Division, the Parachute Regiment, 

Hermann Goering [ ], and the 756th 

Mountain Regiment of the 334th Infantry 

Division, reinforced) was to assist with its 

northernmost force in the capture of Medjez 

el Bab by taking Slourhia and turning north 

to meet Group AudorfJ; the center force was 

to isolate Allied units on Djebel Rihane 

(720) near Bou Arada and subsequently 

reach the Siliana river sector in conjunction 

with the mountain regiment. The fifth 

group, consisting of the 47th Grenadier 

NORTHWEST AF'RICA 

Regiment (- ) and two additional infantry 

battalions, was to be held in reserve:; 

Von Arnim's plan was ambitious indeed, 

but if any two adjacent attacks succeeded, 

the Allies would be forced to pull back their 

lines and yield to the Axis forces a substantial advantage. The north-south road between Djebel Abiod and Bedja, for example, 

was the first good switch line in the mountains west of Tunis, a prize worth seeking. 

Encirclement of Medjez el Bab would give 

the Axis control of an important communications hub. Possession of EI Aroussa would 

also gain for the Axis the crossroads east of 

it at Bou Arada, and in consequence a much 

greater margin of security for the Axis forces 

in Pont-du-Fahs. \Vhile even partial success 

could yield benefits of no little value to General von Arnim's command, the attacks 

would serve Comando Su/nemo's original 

purpose by freeing the troops farther south 

from Allied interference during the necessary regrouping for Rommel's next offensive 

operations. 

The Attack on the Northern Flank 

The British 46th Division (Maj. Gen. 

H. A. Freeman-Attwood) held the northern 

part of the Allied front from the coast to and 

including Oued Zarga. The Allied radar 

station on Cap Serrat, with its small seCllrity force, used a track branching from the 

6 (1) FO, Fifth Panzer Army for Opn OCHSENKOPF, 25 Feb 43, and FO, Corps Group Weber, 

25 Feb 43, in 334th Inf Di!', la, Anlagen zum KTB, 

Band III, 11.-27.II.43 (cited hereafter as 334th 

In! Div, KTB, Anlagenband III). (2) FO, Die 

von Manteuffel for Opn AUSLADUNG, 25 Ft"b 43, 

in Anlagenheft III zum Kriegstagebuch Nr. 2 der 

Diu e. Manteuffel (Akte "Ausladung"), 25.II.-

J.IV.43 (cited hereafter as Diu von Manteuffel, 

KTB 2, Anlagenheft III). (3) Fifth Panzer Army, 

KTB IV, 23-25 Feb 43. (4) MS # T-3 (Nehring 

et al.), Vo!' 3a, Pt. II, Ch. III. 
THE ENEMY STRIVES TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE 505 

Tabarka-Mateur road at Sedjenane gap. 

Two French battalions of the Corps Franc 

d' Afrique (CF A) protected that trail and 

elements of the British 139th Brigade, the 

road junction. Between the enemy's impregnable position west of Djefna and El 

Aouana, other elements of the 139th Brigade 

had taken position. One reinforced battalion 

was astride the road, about two miles east of 

El Aouana. A smaller infantry force was 

near the station and a battalion of infantry 

was in reserve, near Sedjenane. In support 

was one regiment of field artillery. The road 

and railroad ran in close proximity through 

the same valleys. 

At 0630, 26 February, the enemy opened 

his attack. Three groups of Division von 

M anteuffel were committed on the north 

flank. The 10th Bersaglieri Regiment nearest the coast attacked toward Cap Serrat. 

The unit which had pushed eastward along 

the road as far as Djebel Abiod in November, the 11th Parachute Engineer Battalion 

(Witzig), advanced north of the road in 

order to envelop the French and British at 

Sed jenane and attack them from the rear 

in conjunction with elements of Regiment 

Barenthin which pushed ahead south of the 

road. If the operation at Sedjenane proceeded successfully, the next objective for 

Regiment Barenthin would be occupation 

of Djebel Tabouna (564), southeast of it, 

from which a considerable adjacent area 

could be brought under observation. Major 

Witzig's battalion hit the French troops hard 

and cut the connection to Cap Serrat but 

was stopped about two miles north of Sedjenane. The British held on to the El Aouana 

position against light attack for more than a 

day, but, to avoid being cut off there by the 

enemy success at Sedjenane, pulled back 

and on 4 March also lost Sedjenane itself. 

The radar station had been evacuated on 

the previous day. The Germans easily occupied Djebel Tabouna. General von 

Arnim, despite an interest in the operations 

which brought him during the first days to 

the forward command post of Division von 

Manteuffel west of Sedjenane, could not 

provide the means to exploit the initial 

success. 

For a while the Allies maintained a determined defense of. Tamera with reinforcements including the 1st Parachute Brigade, 

although on 10 March the enemy occupied 

an adjacent height (Djebel Bel Harch, 419) 

and went on to capture Tamera. Through 

rugged terrain, von Manteuffel's forces advanced to within two and a half miles of 

Djebel Abiod and by 19 March had fulfilled their mission. But they were too weakened to continue the drive. Thereafter the 

situation once again became stabilized and 

was to remain so until one side or the other 

could commit enough strength to seize a 

substantial advantage. Djebel Abiod was 

thus kept under a steady threat. When this 

phase of the Fifth Panzer Army attack had 

come to an end, Kesselring reported that 

1,600 Allied prisoners, 17 guns, 16 tanks, 13 

antitank guns, and 70 vehicles had been 

taken or destroyed after three weeks of action on this part of the front.7 

The Attack Via Sidi Nsir 

The main attack against the British 46th 

Division on 26 February came in the sector 

of the 128th Infantry Brigade (Brigadiey 

M. A. James) along the road from M ateur 

1 (1) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

(2) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB IV, 26-28 Feb 43, and 

KTB V, 1-19 Mar 43. (3) Rpt, Comando Supremo 

Nr. 1112/43 to OKH/GenStdHjOp Abt, 19 Mar 

43, in OKHjGenStdHjOp Abt, Meldungen des 

Ob Sued, l.III.-30.IV.43, Band I. (4) MS # T-3 

(Nehring et al.), Vol. 3a. 
506 

to Bedja through Sidi Nsir. Here was the 

area in which the U.S. 1st and 34th Divisions would be engaged during the final attack two months later, and here was the 

route which the 1st Battalion, U.S. 1st Armored Regiment, as part of Blade Force, 

had used on 24 November as it rolled eastward toward Chouigui pass, Tebourba, and 

Djedelda. Sidi Nsir is a small agricultural 

village nestled in the valley of the Bou Oissa 

river at the junction of a secondary road to 

Tunis and the railroad to Mateur. The railroad continues northeast along the gentler 

grades and twisting course of the Bou Oissa 

and the Djoumine rivers. The highway 

climbs almost due eastward over heights 

which separate Sidi Nsir from the broad 

Tine river valley. Among the many grassgreen and gray limestone hills, Djebel Tahent (609) is most prominent. Over two 

miles northeast of Sidi Nsir it rises to a broad 

crest from which Mateur itself is readily 

seen, and movement over a wide area can be 

easily observed. A British artillery unit had 

an observation post on Hill 609 during the 

days before the attack but it was an air reconnaissance which discovered, late on 25 

February, that enemy troop carriers and 

tanks were moving on Sidi N sir from the 

east. The position at Sidi Nsir was held by 

one battalion of infantry and one battery of 

artillery simply as a forward patrol base. 

The main line of defense was halfway to 

Bcdja at a long defile, east of Ksar Mezouar, 

which the British had in November renamed 

"Hunt's Gap." 

Von Arnim committed Kampfgruppe 

Lang at Sidi Nsir with the mission of taking 

the village and capturing a road junction 

ten miles beyond it on the way to Bedja. 

Colonel Lang's armored force consisted of 

Group Lueder (501 st Heavy Panzer BatNORTHWEST AFRICA 

talion, armed with Tiger tanks, the 2d 

Battalion, 7th Panzer Regiment, an armored 

infantry and a reconnaissance battalion) . A 

second force, Kampfgruppe Eder (755th 

Grenadier Regiment, reinforced, from the 

334th Infantry Division), had orders to attack farther south over Djebel el Ang and 

through Toukabeur and take the heights 

northeast of Oued Zarga, thus cutting the 

main road to Medjez el Bab. The 47th Grenadier Regiment was initially held in reserve 

and later assigned to Lang. 8 

The Germans opened the attack with 

heavy mortar fire on Hill 609, and enemy 

infantry took it about 1000, 26 February. 

A delaying battle near Sidi Nsir then ensued. The enemy worked along the hills on 

the northwest and southeast of Sidi Nsir 

until his fire enfiladed the defenders from 

both flanks. He then made a frontal assault 

with tanks, led by a Tiger. By 1800, the 

main British position had been overrun, and 

shortly afterward, the British abandoned 

Sidi Nsir. During the night scattered groups 

began working their way back to the main 

force at Hunt's Gap through soaking rain. 

The day's respite was invaluable in allowing time for reinforcements to start toward the 128th Brigade there, reinforcements which enabled the brigade to meet 

the enemy next day in sufficient strength to 

keep him from reaching Bed ja. Sections of 

Kampfgruppe Lang advanced along the 

road into the defile at Ksar Mezouar, the 

tanks in platoons of four interspersed with 

truck-borne infantry and armored cars. Although expert marksmanship knocked out 

some of the British guns before they could 

fire, the attacking force entered what 

amounted to an ambush. The defenders 

were well emplaced along a main line on 

"See n. 6 (1) above. 
THE ENEMY STRIVES TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE 507 

commanding ground, with five batteries of 

field artillery, one battery of antitank guns, 

and excellent observation. Royal Air Force 

bombers assisted in halting the enemy armored column on the road, while the guns 

knocked out tank after tank. The leading 

section could not turn around, could not 

leave the road, could not back out. Some 

of the vehicles, abandoned during what appeared to be a panic, were demolished by 

British engineers after dark. At least eleven 

were never recovered by the foe. 

Colonel Lang attributed the failure of 

the attack to the fact that an infantry battalion sent by a circuitous route through 

the mountains to envelop the British blocking position got lost and did not complete 

its assigned mission. 9 For the next four days, 

the battle continued in the vicinity of Ksar 

Mezouar before the enemy settled down to 

develop defensive positions in the hills. 

The northern wing of the British 78th 

Division (General Evelegh) in the area 

north and west of Medjez el Bab was not 

seriously involved until 28 February. On 

that day elements of the 755th Grenadier 

Regiment (Group Eder) pushed along 

Djebel el Ang to attack Toukabeur. They 

struck two battalions of the French 3d Algerian Infantry under Evelegh, on the 

djebel and south of it near the village of 

Chaouach. The 1st Battalion fell back next 

day on Chaouach. Both battalions had suffered severe losses and were withdrawn to 

Teboursouk during the night of 1-2 March. 

The enemy on the opposite side of the river 

closed in on Med jez el Bab as far as Grich 

el Oued, but did not accept the hazards of 

exposure closer to its strong artillery defenses. On 2 March, the enemy broke off 

action near Medjez el Bab. Two days later 

"MS # D-173 (Lang). 

the German forces went over to the defensive between the Med jerda river and the 

Sidi Nsir sector. The enemy now occupied 

the high ground from T oukabeur to Ksar 

Mezouar, then north and northwest to 

Tamera."o 

The Enemy Fails, South of the Medjerda 

General Weber's attack south of the Medjerda river had been less successful and more 

costly. The assault was executed by Group 

Schmid. It had two objectives. One attack, 

made by the 1st Battalion, 69th Panzer 

Grenadiers, reinforced by artillery and the 

only company of tanks in this sector, and 

directed across the hills toward Slourhia, 

was part of the attempted encirclement of 

Medjez el Bab. The second and more complicated enemy effort was an attempt to envelop Bou Arada by co-ordinating his 

attacks through the hills on either side of 

the Bou Arada valley (Djebel Rihane, 720, 

and Djebel Mansour, 678) with an armored 

drive aimed at Sidi Mahmoud gap (seven 

miles north of Djebel Rihane). The two 

prongs of the attack were to meet at El 

Aroussa on the Siliana river. The northern 

force was Group Koch (Parachute Regiment, Hermann Goering Division [-J) and 

to the south was Group Holzinger (7 56th 

Mountain Regiment, reinforced, from the 

334th Infantry Division). 

The British 11th Infantry Brigade (78th 

Division) bore the brunt of the thrust aimed 

at Slourhia while elements of the 38th Brigade (reinforced) of the British Y Division 

opposed Group Koch's attack toward Djebel 

10 (1) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

(2) XIX Corps Jnl, 28 Feb-l Mar 43. (3) Fifth 

Panzer Army, KTB IV and V, 26 Feb-4 Mar 43. 
508 

Rihane, Testour, and El Aroussa." The attack of the. 756th Mountain Regiment 

( Group Holzinger), launched from the 

heights of Djebel Mansour, with El Aroussa 

as the ultimate objective, was met by the 

British 1st Parachute Brigade, also under 

command of Y Division. The first day's 

action went to the enemy, but on the second, 

the Allies stood their ground, and on 28 

February counterattacked with the aid of 

reinforcements. By the end of the day they 

had restored the position north of Bou 

Arada. The enemy's attack, executed with 

insufficient strength and led by inexperienced officers, failed almost at once and at 

a high price in casualties and irreplaceable 

materiel. Von Arnim now withdrew the 

mountain regiment and shifted it to Colonel 

Lang's sector northwest of Medjez el Bab as 

the action south of the Medjerda faded out 

and the front was again stabilized along the 

originallines.12 

T he Outcome of the 26 February Offensive 

On 3 March, when it had become evident 

that the Axis offensive had not fulfilled the 

hopes of its originators, Fifth Panzer Army 

summed up its gains and losses. Von Arnim 

claimed the capture of 2,500 Allied prisoners and the destruction or capture of 16 

tanks, 20 guns, 17 antitank guns, 7 planes, 

11 Y Division was a provisional unit organized on 

16 February 1943. Its commander was the artillery 

officer, 6th Armoured Division. It hdd the southern flank of the British 5 Corps sector while General 

Keightley's headquarters controlled armored forces 

during the withdrawal to the Grand Dorsal and 

the defense of Sbiba and Thala. Major units of Y 

Division were the 1st Parachute Brigade, 38th Brigade, and dements of the 17/21 Lancers. 

" (1) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB IV and V, 26 

Feb-2 Mar 43. (2) MS # T-3 (Nehring et aZ.), 

Vol. 3a, Pt. II, Ch. II I. (3) Info supplied by 

Cabinet Office, London. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

and other materiel. At the same time, his 

forces had suffered over 1,000 casualties 

and the total loss of 22 tanks."3 But this report does not give the whole picture. In 

addition to the 22 enemy tanks which were 

destroyed, another 49 were disabled, leaving General Weber with only 6 operational 

tanks on 1 March. This was the reason why 

the Axis attack in the main effort sector had 

to be suspended. Reluctantly, the Germans 

had to admit on the same day that their 

losses were higher than those inflicted upon 

the Allies." 4 These tank losses, amounting 

to almost 90 percent, could hardly be expected to escape Rommel's scrutiny. In his 

opinion the armor had been committed in 

violation of sound tactical principles." 5 

Von Arnim paid the price for a poorly 

timed and hastily prepared operation. He 

had sent his tanks into mountainous terrain 

where they were trapped and knocked out 

without the possibility of maneuvering. The 

bulk of the infantry had been wasted in 

the open tank country of the Bou Arada 

valley. But above all, the effort had come 

too late. It might have succeeded if co-ordinated with Rommel's drive on Thala. But 

it was not. Nevertheless, the Axis offensive 

which began on 26 February in northern 

Tunisia, though it fell short of complete success at every point, yielded some important 

results. The enemy had been stopped on the 

northern road near Tamera, but was in a 

fairly strong position for a later attempt to 

reach Djebel Abiod. He was not in possession of the Bedja-Djebel Abiod switch line, 

to be sure, but, farther to the southeast, he 

13 Fifth Panzer Army, KTB V, 3 Mar 43. 

H (1) Rad, Lang to Weber, 0935, 1 Mar 43, in 

334th Inf Diu, KTB 1, Anlagenband IV. (2) Fifth 

Panzer Army, KTB V, 1 Mar 43. 

"Conf, von Arnim with Gause, Chid of Staff, 

Army Group Africa, at Sfax, 6 Mar 43, in Fifth 

Panzer Army, KTB V, 6 Mar 43. 
THE ENEMY STRIVES TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE 509 

held the dominating heights above the 

Med jez el Bab-Oued Zarga road and kept 

Medjez el Bab under constant threat. He 

would have to be driven out of those hills 

before the drive on Tunis could be renewed. 

While making this gain in northern Tunisia, 

the enemy had also been preparing for an 

Allied attack on the Mareth Position and 

had adopted measures intended to meet 

Allied strategy. 

To meet the Axis threat the British, by 

7 March, had executed numerous shifts of 

their forces. The 36th Brigade was withdrawn from the northern wing of the French 

XIX Corps and inserted opposite Toukabeur to reinforce left of the 138th Brigade. 

The 1st Parachute Brigade was relieved by 

the 26th Regimental Combat Team, U.S. 

1st Infantry Division, south of Bou Arada, 

and was moved north to the Tamera position in support of the hard-pressed 139th 

Brigade. The main body of the 1st Guards 

Brigade (Brigadier F. A. V. Copland-Griffiths) , which was still in the Kasserine area 

when von Arnim launched his attack, arrived in El Aroussa on 27 February to relieve the pressure on that town and Testour. 

When the danger in this sector had abated, 

the brigade, on 3 March, moved to the area 

of Bedja and came under the control of the 

British 46th Division. Three days later the 

1 st Guards Brigade was committed at M unchar eight miles east of Bedja. By then the 

enemy's attacks had ceased.'6 

American forces had participated only 

briefly and on the outer fringe of these operations. On 5 March a task force from the 

U.S. 34th Infantry Division under Col. 

Robert W. Ward, commanding officer, 

135th Infantry, made a demonstration toward Pichon. Starting from Sbiba and advancing via El Ala the task force made con16 Info supplied by the Cabinet Office. London. 

tact with the enemy early in the afternoon. 

The engagement took place along the road 

leading from El Ala to Pichon and Fondouk 

el Aouareb in the area just north of Djebel 

Trozza (997). The Americans discovered 

that the Germans were dug in along a well 

prepared defense line. At 1700 Colonel 

Ward received orders to withdraw. Hampered by rain and "ice-slick" muddy roads, 

the task force returned to its original position near Sbiba via a circuitous route that 

took elements of the command through the 

enemy outpost line. Casualties had been 

few."7 

During the entire period of the enemy's 

26 February offensive, the Allied air effort 

in northern Tunisia had been more active 

and more effective than ever before.'s 

New Instructions tor Army Group Africa 

Rommel was to retain command of Army 

Group Africa for only a short time. But before he withdrew he forced another review 

of Axis strategic intentions. He thus instigated the issuance on 8 March, the day 

before his retirement on sick leave, of a new 

directive for operations in Tunisia. 

On 24 February, shortly after assuming 

command of the army group, Rommel had 

called on his two army commanders for 

estimates of the situation confronting their 

forces. General von Arnim pointed out that 

the position of the two Axis armies was such 

17 (1) RAF Middle East Review 2, p. 35. AAF 

Archives. (2) The German troops holding this 

sector were part of Group Fullriede, a provisional 

unit, which had replaced the 47th Grenadier Re"imen! when the latter was pulled out and moved 

north in support of von Arnim's offensive of 26 

February. The Germans claimed to have destroyed 

two American tanks and several vehicles. See Fifth 

Panzer Army, KTB V, 5 Mar. 43. 

18 RAF Middle East Review 2, p. 35. AAF 

Archives. 
510 

as to expose them to the danger of being 

separated and defeated if the Allies delivered heavy simultaneous attacks on them 

from Algeria and Libya. But he did not believe that the Allies needed to launch large 

offensives to achieve their purpose. He 

stated that if he were in General Eisenhower's place he would concentrate on using 

all the means at his disposal to cut the supply 

lines and destroy the ports and air forces 

of the Axis. If this effort succeeded, the Axis 

positions in North Africa would fall before 

July without the possibility of being seriously contested. Any lengthy defenses of 

them would be possible only if one or the 

other of the Allied forces were hit hard 

enough to put it out of action for at least six 

months. This accomplished, all available 

Axis forces could be concentrated in an attack on the other front. Less sweeping successes, achieved by Axis sallies from their 

well-fortified line, could only put off the 

inevitable decision. 

General von Arnim estimated the total 

Axis strength as 350,000, of which 120,000 

were fighting troops. Germans constituted 

two thirds of these combat troops and one 

third of the auxiliary forces. The combat 

elements were so badly strung out along the 

extended front as to average one company 

and two guns to each two and one-half 

miles. The front should, he declared, be 

shortened to prevent the Allies from separating the two Axis armies. The Axis supply 

line by sea should also be improved and 

secured. The current volume of supplies 

reaching Tunisia barely sufficed for current operations. For the all-out offensives 

that he favored von Arnim estimated that 

a supply backlog of at least one month was 

necessary. He calculated that at least 140,-

000 tons a month would be needed to stockpile the material required to meet a largeNORTHWEST AFRICA 

scale Allied attack. General Messe, in his 

report, lamented the Allied air superiority 

in his area, the shortage of men and mao 

teriel, and the lack of unity in newly assembled units. He believed it probable that 

the Allies would launch simultaneous attacks on his position from the southwest, 

southeast, and the west or northwest. Believing his forces incapable of beating off 

such a co-ordinated attack, he recommended preparations to withdraw from the 

Mareth Position after merely a preliminary 

battle there rather than remaining until his 

army became inextricably engaged. 

Rommel on 1 March presented a memorandum to Kesselring which raised the 

issues squarely. He outlined the situation as 

he saw it: a front of 387 miles, of which 341 

were very weakly held, with many vulnerable points and the main defensive effort 

concentrated to the west and southwest of 

Tunis and in the Mareth Position; the Allies 

with 50,000 British, 40,000 American, and 

40,000 French troops along the Fifth Panzer Army's front, armed with 366 tanks, 

440 guns, and 600 antitank guns, and eventually to be reinforced by the 2d Armored 

Division (U.S.) with 390 tanks; while 

across from the First Italian Army's front 

were the estimated 80,000 troops, 900 

tanks, 400 guns, and 550 antitank guns of 

the British Eighth Army. Such strength 

would permit the Allies by co-ordinated and 

simultaneous action to pierce the Axis line 

at any selected point. The Axis forces must 

deliver continuous spoiling attacks to delay 

a major Allied offiensive as long as possible. 

Once the Allies were able to mount such an 

offensive, the weakness of the Axis defenses 

would make its containment impossible. To 

achieve a proper degree of strength and 

depth in defense, the Axis could shorten its 

line from 387 to 93 miles, by combining the 
THE ENEMY STRIVES TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE 511 

two Axis armies in the area northeast of the 

current Fifth Panzer Army's front as far 

south as Djebel Mansour and thence over 

the mountains eastward to Enfidaville, at 

the same time expanding to the west to take 

in the ridges beyond Medjez eI Bab and Bou 

Arada. (See Map V.) If such a withdrawal meant that the two Allied armies 

would be able to establish direct contact, 

and that airfields would have to be abandoned to them, it also meant that such disadvantages would be offset by a line which 

could be held for a long time rather than 

only while awaiting a concentrated Allied 

attack. It promised to forestall an Allied 

attempt to separate the two armies and 

overwhelm them individually. He again 

called attention to the critically deficient 

rate of supply. Only if it could be raised 

to 140,000 tons per month could the Axis 

accumulate the means of withstanding a 

large-scale attack and engaging there;tfter 

in offensive operations. In view of the current situation and the Allied operations expected to begin within the month, Rommel 

asked what specifically were the high command's long-range plans for the campaign 

in Tunisia.19 

The issues before the Axis leaders were 

clear. Should the j\'1areth Position on which 

so much reliance had been placed be abandoned, or should it be defended to the utmost? Should the two armies be brought 

into a narrower area in order to thicken the 

defense of the front? Could lagging logistical 

support be expedited? 

On 3 March Kesselring transmitted the 

'" Rpt, Commanding Gt'nt'rai, Army Group 

Africa, Nr. 45/43, to OB SOUTH, 1 Mar 43, EA~-

21-x-14/16. Attached to it arc estimates of the sItuation by Gt'nerais von Arnim and Messe, each 

dated 26 February 1943. 

views of Rommel to the OKW with his own 

comments, which emphasized a point of 

view natural to an Air Force officer. While 

admitting that the situation called for a 

shortening of the front, he insisted that the 

airfields which would be given up were 

essential to strong defense. To forfeit them 

would defeat the very purpose of shortening 

the line. They should be given up only when 

the situation became desperate and he did 

not regard it as such. His proposal was that 

the current respite from an Allied offensive 

should be prolonged by a series of attacks 

in north and central Tunisia, to be made by 

armored and mobile units. If the planned 

strike of the First Italian Army from the 

Mareth Position against Montgomery succeeded, several weeks would be won there. 

The time thus gained could be used to 

strengthen rear positions and to expand the 

volume of supply and reinforcement to the 

extent necessary to bring the armored units 

up to full strength for offensive operations. 

If the strike failed both the ~1areth and 

Chot! Positions must be organized for defense in depth. Summing up, Kesselring 

took the position that to contract the area 

held by the two Axis armies would increase 

the chance of losing Tunisia. He believed 

that by utilizing fully their advantage of interior lines and holding the Allies off with 

strikes by reinforced mobile units over a 

large area, they could gain ground and 

eventually secure the Axis bridgehead. 

Hitler ~as not pleased with the views of 

his field commanders. After all the urging 

earlier bv Rommel and others that the 

Tunisian' problem could be solved if the 

southern army were pulled back into the 

"NIareth Position, he found it surprising that, 

once there, this army should have to be 
512 

brought still further north.20 To withdraw 

the two armies into a limited bridgehead 

would clearly signify the beginning of the 

end. Concentrated spoiling attacks with 

limited objectives must be undertaken, but 

success could not be achieved by un-coordinated attacks carried out by each army 

separately, with insufficient means. Hitler 

refused to accept the length of the present 

front or the inadequate number of small 

cargo craft as justifying the failure of the 

Axis line of supply. He instructed JodI to 

remind Kesselring that he had promised a 

solution of the supply problem as early as 

the end of 1942. He endorsed Kesselring's 

program for limited attacks but with the 

injunction, fantastically optimistic, that the 

rate of supply would have to be doubled and 

later tripled. 21 

The somewhat flurried re-examination 

of Axis capabilities in Tunisia which Field 

Marshal Rommel had provoked ended on 

8 March with a directive from Comando 

Supremo which conformed with Hitler's 

views. The Commander of Army Group 

Africa was directed to defend the Mareth 

Position, to proceed immediately with the 

preparation of the Chott Position for defense in depth, and to engage in aggressive 

spoiling attacks on the Allied positions. 

These instructions were accompanied with 

the information that Comando Supremo 

would make the utmost efforts to raise the 

rate of supply to 120,000 tons monthly .2~ 

"" Rommel had actually urged a withdrawal to 

the Chott Position north of Gabes and not to the 

:\farcth Position. 

21 (1) OKW /WFSt, KTB, 3-9 Mar 43. 

22 Kesselring had told Comando Supremo that 

one third of this amount would represent an allowance for expected losses, i. e., that 80,000 tons 

would probably be the amount delivered. (1) 

OKW/WFSt, KTB, 9 Mar 43. (2) MS # C-065a 

(Greiner), 6 Mar 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Axis Logistical Preparations 

The prospect of imminent Allied attack 

invited urgent preparatory action by both 

Axis powers, and subjected to new stresses 

and strains the somewhat hypothetical Italian control over Axis operations in the 

Mediterranean theater. Marshal Kesselring 

returned from an inspection trip to Tunisia 

on 10-11 March to report somewhat hopefully to OKW the condition of the defenses, 

despite ammunition shortages, and the low 

morale of General Messe's troops. The 

Mareth attack, he told Mussolini on 11 

March, could be expected between 15 and 

20 March. The dispositions were, he 

thought, well adapted to meet the attack; 

successful defense depended principally 

upon overcoming the scarcities of ammunition and fuel. Both the Duce and Kesselring saw the main threat in a possible Allied 

thrust toward Gabes. Gafsa seemed to be in 

no danger, despite the assembly of what he 

called another American army in the Tebess a area, for the approaches were heavily 

mined and the garrison was strong. In the 

north, Fifth Panzer Army was about to 

break off its attack near Djebel Abiod and 

would either attack Medjez el Bab or set 

up a reserve made up of the troops which 

were withdrawn plus the expected reinforcements from Sicily. Thus the situation 

in Tunisia permitted hope that the whole 

Gabcs position would be successfully defended provided that the supply problem 

was solved. 

The Chief of Supplies and Transportation of Army Group Africa, Colonel Heigl, 

computed the monthly minimum requirement in supplies at 69,000 tons for all pur-

"' (1) Mins of conversation, 11 Mar 43, Italian 

Collection, Itt'm 26. (2) OKW/WFSt., KTB, 11 

Mar 43. 
THE ENEMY STRIVES TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE 513 

poses including civilian needs. With an 

added 25 percent for losses, the total for all 

kinds became 86,000 tons. At the same time, 

about 3,000 motor vehicles could be 

shipped. At the beginning of February, 

Comando Supremo's chief transportation 

officer had calculated that he would be able 

to transfer from 70,000 to 82,000 tons, 

which, if subject to the 25-percent-loss rate, 

would fall below the indispensable minimum. Actually, the total achieved was much 

lower, so that in both January and February 

it was possible only to provision the troops 

and to replace expended materiel. No accumulation against future demands was 

possible. Field Marshal Kesselring promised 

approximately 50,000 tons for the first fortnight of March, an assurance which, if fulfilled, would increase the resources available 

but would still be at a rate far below the 

140,000 tons per month recommended to 

Field Marshal Rommel by General von 

Arnim (before the latter succeeded to the 

command of Army Group Africa) or the 

120,000 tons recommended by Kesselring to 

Ambrosio on 7 March.24 

The attempt to transport 60,000 tons of 

materiel in the first two weeks of March fell 

far short of success. Kesselring estimated the 

amount convoyed during the first eleven 

days at 10,000 tons, with about 19,000 tons 

en route and 3,500 scheduled to leave port 

on 14 March. Thus the crisis in fuel and 

ammunition would persist. About 20,000 

men were waiting to be transported. To cope 

with the emergency, Kesselring proposed 

" (1) Army Group Africa, 0 Qn, Supply and 

Adm, Estimate of the Supply Situation, 4 Mar 43, 

by Col Heigl, in EAP 21~a~14j7. (2) Conf, Kesselring and Ambrosio, 7 Mar 43, in Italian Collection, 

Item 26. (3) Axis supplies reaching Tunisia in 

January w('re 46,069 tons, in February, 32,967 tons. 

Ship losses came to 21 in January and 15, plus 12 

ferries, in February. (See Appendix B.) 

that captured French destroyers being refitted should be temporarily shifted to the 

transport of troops, and that, in general, the 

men be taken on destroyers, the medium and 

heavy weapons by air, and supplies and 

vehicles by steamships. He emphasized, 

however, that every makeshift which could 

expedite the transfer of needed men and 

materiel should also be employed. He urged, 

for example, that the prohibition on transporting fuel and munitions in the same vessel be temporarily lifted, that slower ships 

be escorted by German motorcraft carrying 

antiaircraft guns for protection against Allied torpedo bombers, and that the decks of 

all escort craft be fully used for cargo. When 

one of the ships of a convoy, a ship carrying 

fuel and ammunition, failed to get through 

on 12 March, he had all the small craft 

which had been loaded for the crossing that 

night reloaded and sent with gasoline and 

munitions only. He also induced the Italian 

authorities to comb the upper Adriatic for 

seaworthy motor lighters not in use and to 

consider diverting to Tunisia those normally 

used in the Strait of Messina or for transport to Pantelleria. On 13 March shortly before leaving for a conference with Hitler and 

Doenitz on the ways and means to increase 

the shipment of supplies to North Africa, 

Kesselring saw Mussolini. Mussolini informed Kesselring that he had recently written Hitler a letter regarding the Mediterranean situation and had proposed a conference with him in late March or early 

April on these matters. He agreed with Hitler's appraisal of the Tunisian situation and 

he stressed again the need for more Axis air 

support.25 

Hitler's reaction to the situation in a con-

,. (1) OKWjWFSt, KTB, 14 Mar 43. (2) Conf, 

Mussolini and Kesselring, 13 Mar 43, in Italian 

Collection, Item 26. 
514 

ference on 14 March with Doenitz, Keitel, 

Kesselring, and JodI was to reiterate the 

strategic importance of Tunis for the Axis 

and to point out that the Allies would gain 

four to five million tons of shipping space 

monthly if Tunisia fell. Retention of Tunisia 

was a question of supply, not of 80,000 tons 

as proposed by the Italians but rather of 

150,000 to 200,000 tons. It was impossible 

to supply armies by air. The necessary supplies could only be brought in by sea. The 

need for ships was unlimited. To master 

this problem, organizing ability was needed 

and this only the German Navy could supply. The Italians would have to be confronted cold-bloodedly with the alternative 

of making an all-out effort to get supplies 

to North Africa or of losing Tunisia and 

with it Italy. 

Admiral Doenitz, after meeting some 

opposition from Italian naval authorities, 

was supported by Mussolini and arranged 

for German-Italian naval collaboration on 

a much extended scale in conformity with 

the terms of a formal written agreement 

signed on 17 March. The German Admiral, 

Rome (Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge) , 

who had previously been the commander of 

convoy protection in northwestern waters, 

would pass, with his staff, under control of 

the Italian Naval Commander in Chief, 

Admiral Riccardi, and be integrated into 

Supermarina to help insure the flow of supplies. Germans were to be much more extensively used in Italian naval headquarters 

in the main ports, on the ships, and at antiaircraft training stations. Captured French 

war ships were to be operated by Germans, 

while in mixed German-Italian convoys, 

command would go with seniority. The 

Italians undertook to draw on their merchant and fishing fleets for small craft for 

antisubmarine operations with either Italian 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

or German crews. German position-finding 

and mine-detecting apparatus would be sent 

to Italy for operation by German instructors 

with Italian personnel. Such measures, if 

energetically carried out, could not fail to 

improve the Axis logistical situation in the 

Mediterranean, but to achieve a doubling 

and tripling of tonnages delivered in Tunisia, the changes would have to be prodigious. Theses contemplated arrangements 

could hardly be so regarded. 26 

T he Battle of M edenine 

Field Marshal Rommel was eager to 

strike the British Eighth Army before it had 

assembled in full force near the Mareth 

Position. He fought his last battle in Tunisia 

northwest of Medenine on 6 March. (Map 

15) 

Rommel's troops were opposed by Lt. 

Gen. Sir Oliver Leese's British 30 Corps. On 

26 February, General Montgomery had estimated that 30 Corps would be ready for an 

enemy attack by 7 March, and that Lt. Gen. 

Sir Brian Horrocks' 10 Corps, which was 

still east of Tripoli, would be in Tunisia, pre-

;>ared to attack from forward positions with 

air support on 19 March. Montgomery was 

already planning his attack on the Mareth 

Position as a prelude to the seizure of Sf ax, 

and expected to make the main effort next 

to the seacoast. 

It was apparent at Medenine that the 

enemy would attack before 7 March and, on 

the eve of the assault, that it would be delivered on the morning of 6 March. Surprise had been lost. The situation of General 

Leese's corps had by then improved on General Montgomery's estimate of 26 February. 

General Leese had the following strength 

,. OKW/WFSt, KTB, 18 Mar 43. 
Mill' /5 
516 

at his disposal for a thirty-mile front: three 

seasoned divisions, with lesser units equal to 

a fourth; 300 tanks, 350 guns, and 467 antitank guns; two forward airfields in use by 

three fighter wings, with double the air 

strength expected of the Axis forces; and a 

pattern of control by which to bring this 

very considerable power into play with 

maximum effectiveness. 27 

The British zone of defense around the 

northern and western approaches to Medenine curved like a fine fishing rod at the 

dramatic moment when, the tip drawn 

tautly down, the catch is about to be netted. 

The British 51st Division (with 153d, 152d 

and 154th Brigades in the front line) held 

a sector about fourteen miles wide from the 

coast to the Medenine~Mareth highway. 

To the left was the 7th Armoured Division 

(with 131st and 2018t Guards Brigades in 

the front line). Its zone extended from a 

point two miles north of the Zemlet el Lebene hills to the dominating point 270 of 

the Tadjera Kbir heights. On the southwestern end of the British defense line was 

the 2d New Zealand Division guarding the 

approaches to Metameur and Medenine 

with the 5th New Zealand Brigade in the 

front. Men and guns were well dug in. Antitank guns were part of an organized belt of 

antitank defenses covering almost every 

possible approach, and sited in depth. Field 

artillery was not used in an antitank role 

but brought under centralized control for 

massed fires on prearranged squares in response to observers' calls. Tanks were dispersed behind the infantry lines, ready to 

move to prearranged assembly areas for 

counterattack missions. The airfields had 

ample antiaircraft protection and were organized to meet an armored attack as well. 

" Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

High ground was strongly held. No doubt 

the defenses of Medenine could have been 

improved in detail with more time, but they 

were formidable on the morning of 6 

March. Furthermore, they had apparently 

been brought to their condition of strength 

without enemy recognition of what had 

been done. 

The German Africa Corps (DAK) of 

which Generaleutnant Hans Cramer took 

command on 5 M arch, prepared the plan 

of attack against Medenine. 28 It provided 

for committing the 10th Panzer, 15th Panzer, and 21st Panzer Divisions and elements 

of the 90th Light African and Italian Spezia 

Divisions in co-or dina ted blows from the 

northwest, west, and southwest, using 160 

tanks, 200 guns, and 10,000 infantry. The 

attack was to be launched from the Mareth 

defense zone and its extension on the south. 

The Axis line was held by the Young Fascist, Trieste, 90th Light Africa, La Spezia, 

Pistoia, and 164th Light Africa Divisions, 

strung out in that order from the coast to 

the mountains south of Ksar el Hallou!. The 

enemy hoped with the benefit of surprise 

to take the British forces on the southwestern 

flank, cut through and divide them, and 

by envelopment to dispose of the bulk of 

them. 

But the British on March 4 observed the 

10th Panzer Division's southward movement from Gabes through Matmata towards Ksar e1 Hallouf. They reported a total 

of sixty tanks plus very heavy antiaircraft 

armament. Farther west, they also spotted 

,. (1) Opn CAPRI, dtd 3 Mar 43, copy in 15th 

Panzer Diu, KTB Nr. 7, 26.XII.42-11.XIII.43, Anlage 178. (2) General Cramer had come from 

OKH to Rommel's anny on 22 January as Acting 

Commander, Corps for Special Employment, and 

became Acting Commander, DAK, on 13 February 

1943. He commanded the (:orps until he was captured on 1 May 1943. 
THE ENEMY STRIVES TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE 517 

what was believed to be another approaching armored division. The Eighth Army, uncertain only whether the main thrust would 

be from the southwest or from the north, 

watched on 5 March for the appearance of 

the third enemy armored division. While the 

enemy withheld his attack for another day, 

the British perfected their well-concealed 

firing positions. Advance Headquarters, 30 

Corps, waited expectantly at Ben Gardane. 29 

The main highway from Mareth to Medenine runs south-southeast over open plain 

for about twenty-four miles. The Matmata 

mountain chain west of it curves toward the 

highway at a distance narrowing from ten 

miles at the south to five miles at the north. 

From the mid-point of this chain, a spur 

ridge cut by several passes projects eastward 

almost to the highway. The spur, incorporated in the fore field of the Mareth fortifications, offered cover behind which an 

attacking force could assemble. Rommel 

planned to send two of his armored divisions through the passes of this spur while a 

third rode along the western side of the main 

mountain chain and cut east through it at 

Hallouf pass to reach the plain. This division would form the southern wing of the 

attacking force. The attack would then 

move northeastward to the initial objective, 

the Tadjera hills, rising on the far side of 

the main highway. Elements of the 90th 

Light Africa and Spezia Divisions would attack on the north and the 10th Panzer Division on the south; in the center would be the 

15th Panzer and 21st Panzer Divisions. The 

Hallouf river would separate the two center 

divisions as they made their way along its 

banks to the gap between Zemlet el Lebene 

and the Tadjera hills just short of the 

"Eighth Army Intell Sums, 443, 28 Feb 43, and 

447, 5 Mar 43. AFHQ AG 319.1, Miero Job 24, 

Reel 99D. 

Mareth-Medenine highway. On the northwestern side of this opening the Zemlet el 

Lebene was an early objective of the 15th 

Panzer Division. On the southeastern side, 

two ridges of the Tadjera hills paralleling 

the highway which were believed to be occupied by British artillery, were the initial 

objective of the 21st Panzer Division. The 

panzer division was to speed toward these 

ridges at first light and overrun opposing 

batteries without regard for losses. The 10th 

Panzer Division's objective was the dominant Hill 270 cf Tadjera Kbir and the village of Metameur. DAK sent a reconnaissance force to Beni Kreddache and beyond 

to reconnoiter toward the highway leading 

south from Medenine. This force was to 

furnish flank protection.30 

The attack opened at 0600, 6 March, 

after a rainy night. The use of smoke proved 

unnecessary since a heavy mist masked the 

exit of the armored divisions onto the plain. 

The enemy columns approached Medenine 

on separate converging trails. The fog rose 

slowly into an overcast which frustrated the 

plans for dive bombing and confined both 

Axis and Allied tactical air support to 

fighter bombers, in which the Allies had a 

considerable superiority.31 

The 10th Panzer Division's advance 

group came in contact with the British outposts some four miles west of Metameur at 

about 0730, a fact which the Germans 

learned through intercepted British radioed 

reports. A few minutes later, the spearhead 

30 Orders for Opn CAPRI-( 1) 10th Panzer Diu, 

5 Mar 43, in 10th Panzer Diu, KTB, Anlagenband 

6, 29.X.42-19.JV.43. (2) 15th Panzer Diu, 4 Mar 

43, in 15th Panzer Diu, KTB 7, 26.xII.42-11.III.-

43, Anlage 202. (3) 21st Panzer Diu, 4 Mar 43, in 

21st Panzer Diu, KTB, Anlagenband 9, B.I-31.IIl.-

43. 

31 Montgomery, El Alamein to the Rio Sangro, 

pp. 72-75. 
518 

of the 15th Panzer Division on the north 

side of the Hallouf river came nnder fire 

from Zemlet el Lebene which obliged it to 

stop until its own supporting artillery could 

come forward. The drive of the armored 

group of 21st Panzer Division south of the 

wadi was equally unsuccessful in reaching 

the Tadjera hills. The German armor was 

stopped two miles to the west of its objective, Hill 270. Soon the British guns in positions there and on the two Tadjeras, guns 

which had not been overrun by tanks, struck 

by bombs, or silenced by counterbattery fire, 

were saturating the areas occupied by the 

attacking troops and tanks with an extraordinary volume of adjusted fire. The Germans experienced unusual difficulty in 

identifying the exact sources of this shelling 

which pinned them down and compelled 

their vehicles to seek such cover as the shallow wadies and low hillocks afforded. By 

1000, the attack in the center had been 

completely halted. A slight German penetration on Zemlet el Lebene was restored 

to British control by two troops of Sherman 

tanks. The attack of the 90th Light Africa 

Division and elements of the Italian Spezia 

Division was driven back by counterattacks 

after initial success against the 154th Brigade on the left wing of the 51st Division 

sector. The original plan had thus utterly 

miscarried. 

Plans to renew the offensive at noon by 

sending the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions 

along both sides of the Hallouf river were 

frustrated by the latter's inability to reorganize in sufficient strength in time for such 

an offensive. At 1430, however, preceded 

by Axis dive bombing against the ridges 

and by artillery preparations, Rommel's 

tanks and infantry lunged forward again. 

The 21st Panzer Division attempted to envelop the Tadjera Kbir (held by the 201st 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Guards Brigade) from the north with the 

tanks of the 5th Panzer Regiment followed 

by the infantry of the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Just as this venture began, 

the troop concentration area and the division command post came under such artillery fire that for half an hour the staff could 

not direct movement, and indeed had to 

withdraw to the west out of range. The 

tanks in this attack got separated from the 

infantry which was driven to the ground by 

a curtain of fire after an advance of but 

a few hundred yards. The 5th Panzer Regiment's advance was thus stopped almost 

as soon as it had got under way. The regiment reported its strength reduced to thirtyfive tanks fit for combat. New small gains 

by the 15th Panzer Division against the 

131st Infantry Brigade were wiped out before 2000 by a British counterattack. The 

drive in the center had again been stalled. 

The attack on the right never even got 

started. 

Late in the day, the 10th Panzer Division 

was erroneously reported to have entered 

Metameur and to have gained control of a 

section of the highway north of the village. 

Actually it had never got nearer than from 

one to two miles of its objective. Instead of 

pressing the costly direct assault in the center, the German Africa Corps now contemplated holding the ground thus far gained 

until darkness, then shifting the 21st Panzer 

Division to the defensive while the 15th 

Panzer Division slipped southward to join 

the 10th Panzer Division in exploiting its 

supposed success on the flank. The German 

armored units pulled back to the mountains, 

after disengaging in the center with difficulty and with additional losses in tanks, 

and awaited orders to renew the attack next 

day in accordance with the revised plan. 

But the actual failure of the 10th Panzer 
THE ENEMY STRIVES TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE 519 

Division as well as of the others, and the 

folly of further depleting the severely weakened armor against obviously stronger 

forces, compelled Rommel to abandon the 

attack. Rommel's last battle in Africa became a costly failure. 32 Here, as was to be 

the case at El Guettar a little later, German 

armor was stopped by resolute infantry, 

field artillery, and massed antitank defenses. 

On 6 and 7 March the German Africa 

Corps lost 61 Germans killed, 388 wounded, 

and 32 missing, 33 Italians killed, 122 

wounded, and 9 missing, and at least 41 

tanks.33 For the approaching battles General Cramer had only 85 German and 24 

Italian tanks, and 3 Italian self-propelled 

assault guns ready for action. 34 For such expenditure, the German Africa Corps could 

claim ascertained British losses of 6 tanks, 

16 scout cars, 33 motor vehicles, 32 antitank and antiaircraft guns, and 51 prisoners. The British had committed few of 

their tanks. They had won the victory over 

German armor by several hundred antitank and other guns well concealed, firmly 

protected, and fired with the benefit of good 

observation. They had been aided in their 

success by inefficient employment of the 

German and Italian strength. Indeed, the 

failure of the 15th Panzer Division to ex-

"( 1) 15th Panzer Diu, KTB 7, 4~1O Mar 43, 

and Combat Rpt on Operation CAPRI, dated 7 

Mar 43, Anlage 192, (2) 21st Panzer Diu, KTB, 

4~8 Mar 43. (3) Maj. Gen. Sir Howard Kippenberger, Infantry Brigadier (London, 1949), pp. 

270~75. 

33 Montgomery, El Alamein to the Rio Sangro, 

page 46, says that 52 tanks were left on the field, 

as current reports list 45 on the 7th Armoured 

Division front and 5 Mark Ill's and 2 others on 

the 2d New Zealand Division front. 

31 For the figures on German loss("s and remaining Axis armor, s("e Rpt, Dtsch. Chef A. O. K. I, 

Anlagen 20 KTB, 8.III.~27.IV.43 (cited hereafter 

as German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, Anlagen) . 

pend more than a small percentage of its 

normal quota of small arms ammunition 

and mortar shells was condemned by the 

commander, who cited it as convincing evidence that his infantry had not fought aggressively. The loss of 24 of his tanks-II 

Mark II (special), 9 Mark IV, and 4 Mark 

III (75-mm. )-could hardly have been 

consoling. 35 

Rommel Leaves Tunisia 

Rommel's sick leave at Wiener-Neustadt, 

Austria, interrupted at the time of El 'Alamein and long overdue, took him from 

Tunisia on 9 March; he was never to return. He was succeeded on that day as 

commander of Army Group Africa by General von Arnim, who in turn yielded command of Fifth Panzer Army to General der 

Panzer Truppen Gustav von Vaerst. General Messe's command over First Italian 

Army remained nominal with respect to its 

German elements, once General Bayerlein 

took up his duties as the German Chief of 

Staff with that army. For some time, the 

German 10th Panzer and 21st Panzer Divisions were directly controlled by General 

von Arnim's headquarters as components 

of the Army Group Africa reserve. Only the 

15th Panzer Division at first went under 

Messe's command. 

Field Marshal Rommel's departure from 

Tunisia was kept secret. He stopped briefly 

in Rome, then paid his respects to the 

Fuehrer at the latter's advanced headquarters at Winniza in the Ukraine on 10 

March, and continued to Wiener-Neustadt. 

The revamping of the command structure 

'" Div Order, 15th Panzer Diu, 10 Mar 43, in 

15th Panzer Diu, KTB 7, 26.XII.42~11.III.43, 

Anlage 202. 
520 

in Tunisia and the forthcoming battle on 

the Mareth Line caused some echoes in his 

c.orrespondence but he had learned from 

Hitler that he would not return, and he 

was now free of African matters. The Allies 

continued to believe that he was in Tunisia, 

and for weeks press reports nurtured the 

popular belief that «Rommel's Africa 

Corps" was the only fighting force in Tunisia. In this respect, the Allied public was 

scarcely less well informed then the GerNORTHWEST AFRICA 

mans, who had to wait for the defeat in 

May to discover that the much-publicized 

German commander had not been leading 

Axis operations in Africa for the past two 

months.36 

as (1) Louis P. Lochner, ed. and trans!., The 

Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943 (New York, 1948), 

pp. 352, 369. (2) MS # C-065a (Greiner), 10 

Mar 43. (3) Telgs, von Amini to Rommel, 0345, 

10 Mar, 1045, 10 Mar, 0455, 14 Mar, 1620, 13 

Mar 43, and Ltr, Rommel to von Arnim, 12 Mar 

43, in EAP 21-a-14/7. 
CHAPTER XXVII 

From Mareth to Enfidaville 

The Approach of the British Eighth Army 

The main operation undertaken in March 

by 18 Army Group, aided by Allied aviation, 

was to bring the British Eighth Army 

through the constricted passage along the 

coast in the vicinity of Gabes despite any 

resistance Army Group Africa could offer. 

The attempts to drive the German-Italian 

forces back from prepared defensive positions in this area were made almost wholly 

by troops of the British Empire and by associated units of other nationality under 

General Montgomery's command. American participation was limited to the air and 

to independent auxiliary operations by the 

ground forces of the U.S. II Corps. In 

Northwest Mrica two coalitions tested each 

other's capacity in 1942-1943 to make 

maximum use of a combined total military 

potential. Although the Eighth Army's push 

from Mareth to Enfidaville was a British 

exploit within an Allied military endeavor, 

a general account of it is necessary here as 

background for the description of the concurrent operations by the U.S. II Corps 

which follows. 1 

1 The information from Allied, British, German, 

and Italian sources used in constructing this general 

narrative may also contribute to a better understanding of the Eighth Army's role in the ultimate 

victory. 

The main test of Allied strength and Axis 

power in March was the battle for the 

Mareth Position. The British First Army 

and the Fifth Panzer Army were contending, to be sure, at several points in northern 

Tunisia, where the aggressiveness of General 

von Arnim was unremitting, but the basic 

objective of each army there was simply to 

pin down opposing troops and to prevent 

their direct contribution to a victory or a 

defeat in southern Tunisia. It became the 

purpose of Fifth Panzer Army to free the defenders of the Mareth Position as much as 

possible from Allied pressure. The British 

First Army, for its part, aimed at holding in 

the north Axis men and materiel which 

could otherwise be sent to reinforce the 

Italian First Army at Mareth. During these 

preliminaries, the Eighth Army proceeded 

to the crucial battle with the majestic deliberation of a pachyderm. Its base was 

shifted westward to Tripoli, where harbor 

debris and port wreckage resulting from 

Allied bombing and Axis sabotage was expeditiously removed or repaired. In February Montgomery's troops accelerated their 

advance toward Mareth in order to afford 

relief to the U.S. II Corps beyond Kasser.ine 

pass by threatening Rommel's rear guard 

near Mareth. But with Rommel's with-
522 

drawal the necessity for the action had actually passed before Eighth Army began 

pressing. Rommel did not withdraw in response to the Eighth Army's threat but in 

his eagerness to win an early, easy victory 

over only its advanced elements. British 

Eighth Army's preparations were thorough 

partly because of the methodical approach 

of its commander to any prospective battle 

and partly because the barrier at Mareth 

could be broken only by greatly superior 

strength, after which the enemy had to be 

pursued with celerity and ample resources. 

Permission to pull his army westward into 

Tunisia, as stated earlier, had been granted 

to Rommel by Comando Supremo only 

when such a movement was recognized to 

be inevitable, and only on a schedule which 

would permit the completion in Tunisia of 

new defensive works. The retreat had been 

expedited in a manner which sorely tried 

the already shaken confidence of the Italians 

in Rommel. Although construction work on 

the defenses could no doubt have gone on 

indefinitely before those responsible for defending the position would have deemed it 

complete, the German-Italian Panzer Army 

arrived in the vicinity considerably ahead 

of the date thought appropriate by Comando Supremo. The necessary time still 

remained because General 'Montgomery believed that it would be sounder military 

practice to wait until he could attain full 

preparedness for the attack than to catch 

the enemy only partly ready for defense. By 

the time of the battIe, the Axis forces had 

had about three months in which, with such 

scanty materials as could be procured, and 

using labor and replacement troops, to develop the defenses constituting the 11areth 

barrier. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

The M areth Position 

The coastal corridor between Tripoli and 

Gabes across which the 1-fareth Line was 

established south of Gabes, becomes a narrowing bottleneck between the sea and a 

belt of severely eroded hills, averaging about 

1,300 feet and rising to peaks of 2,200 feet, 

the Matmata chain. The coast line trends 

from southeast to northwest while the eastern front of the hill mass runs more nearly 

north and south. The corridor thus converges to make a gap of slightly more than 

twenty miles from Zarat, near the coast, 

through ~1areth to Toudjane in the hills. 

(Map IX) The main road from Tripoli to 

Tunis passes through Ben Gardane near the 

Tunisian border, then on through Medenine 

and Mareth to Gabes. The narrow gap 

south of Mareth is traversed from southwest 

to northeast by stream beds, and punctuated 

by a few scattered low hills, such as the spur 

running east towards the Zemlet el Lebene 

which furnished cover for the German approach to Medenine on 5-6 March. Of the 

stream beds, the Zigzaou wadi is the most 

considerable, and along it, the French before the war constructed a Tunisian version 

of the Maginot Line. The resemblance was 

chiefly in the defensive concept which underlay both projects. For the ~fareth Position had been erected to defend the colony 

from a possible attack by the Italians, and 

the works were rather primitive. Axis development of the position took account of 

the obsolescence of the concrete and steel 

pillboxes and shelters, and of the necessity 

for establishing defense in depth on the 

ground in front of the Zigzaou wadi rather 

than behind it. By the time the British 

Eighth Army arrived for its attack, the 
FROM MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 

Mareth defensive system had been made 

formidable although far from invulnerable. 2 

The Mareth Position extended for about 

twenty-five miles across the corridor southwesterly from the coast along the course of 

the Zigzaou wadi to high ground in the 

Matmata hills in the vicinity of Cheguimi 

south of Toudjane. The wadi was wide and 

fairly deep, with sheer banks; when the 

bottom was awash with the runoff of recent 

rains and the banks muddy from seasonal 

soakings, the ditch became difficult for tanks 

to cross and even more difficult for wheeled 

vehicles. At all times, wet or dry, it could 

be surmounted by the methods developed in 

modern warfare unless protected by fire of 

sufficient force and intensity, in which case 

it could be an effective element in a system 

of defense. The Zigzaou wadi was extended 

and supplemented by excavated tank ditches 

along which continuous mounds of soft 

earth and occasional concrete or masonry 

obstacles had been erected. A line of twentysix fortified strongpoints stretched from the 

coast to the hills, thence south along the 

eastern front of the high mass, ending in a 

Y, with one prong jutting northwestward to 

Toudjane, and the other southward along 

the escarpment east of Cheguimi. Each 

strongpoint had several concrete dugouts, 

machine gun emplacements, or shelters, 

those in the plain being far less substantial 

than the newer ones in the hills. Two belts 

of mines had been laid around an irregular 

zone from four to six miles wide roughly 

paralleling the Zigzaou wadi on the side 

toward Medenine and enclosing the village 

of Arram. Within this advance sector, from 

the Djebel Sai"kra (302) at the south, to the 

'Generalmajor Fritz Krause describes the program of development undertaken in the Mareth 

Position. See MS # D-046, Beitraege ueber die 

Mareth-Stellung, 2.Teil: Erkundung und Ausbau 

(Krausd· 

523 

northwestern edge of some salt marshes near 

the ocean, the Axis command had placed 

artillery and machine guns behind bunkers 

and wire, and planned to hold off attackers 

at this point as long as possible. Artillery 

observation could be much better in this 

advanced area than in the main line near 

the coast. 3 

The Matmata hills form a belt generally 

less than ten miles wide but broadening to 

more than twenty miles west of Mareth, 

where they enclose an irregular plateau. 

The tracks through these hills at most points 

are unfit for wheeled transport. From the 

plain at Medenine, the roads to the west, 

such as that through Hallouf pass which the 

10th Panzer Division used in the 6 March 

attack, enter the chain through defiles which 

could be blocked by mines and by blasting" 

A road from Medenine to the great oasi~ 

at El Hamma, west of Gabes, leads across 

the southwestern end of the Mareth Position and into the mountains. From Toudjane, a village at the eastern edge of the 

interior plateau, it continues for thirteen 

miles farther northwest to Matmata, another Berber community, and after ten miles 

more of twisting progress, reaches the northern limit of the entire hill mass. Far to the 

south, where the hills become more scattered, a road from Foum Tatahouine leads 

through them to the desert, which stretches 

away to Algeria. The desert is bounded on 

the north by vast, shallow, salt-crusted lakes, 

the great chotts, which extend across the 

middle of Tunisia from close to the Al3 Maps, Nr. 5 (J9.III.43) , NT. 6 (21. u. 22.III.-

43), Nr. 9 (24.III.43), all 1:50,000, in German 

CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, Anlagen, Lagekarlen u. Einsatzskizzen. 

• Rommel so recommended to von Arnim after 

he had reached Wiener-Neustadt. Msg, Rommel 

to von Arnim, 12 Mar 43, in EAP 21-a-14/7. 

Translation in author's file, OCMH. 
524 

gerian border to within fifteen miles of the 

Golfe de Gabes. Ranges of mountains supplement the chotts as a complex barrier to 

north-south movement. At the eastern end 

are Gabes and the Chott (or Wadi Akarit) 

Position. Djebel Tebaga (469) along the 

southern edge of Chott el Fedjadj leaves a 

gap of barely 6,000 yards between its ridge 

and the northwesterly spur of the Matmata 

hills. The Djebel Halouga (222) and adjacent high ground north of the Matmata 

hills in effect extend the gap to the oasis of 

El Hamma. If a force could make its way 

through the Matmata hills to the desert, and 

pass along the rim of the desert toward El 

Hamma, it would still have to penetrate 

this 6,000-yard opening before it could 

break out onto the coastal plain. It might 

swing eastward at once and pass along the 

northern edge of the Matmata hills, but it 

would find the going easier if it continued 

north to El Hamma itself, before turning 

to the east to reach Gabes. Such a maneuver 

would, by first winning a victory over natural obstacles and thereafter over defenders 

in the El Hamma gap, flank the Mareth 

Position and bring the force onto the coastal 

plain in the rear of its defenders. The difficulties were deemed insuperable for a substantial force with wheeled vehicles at the 

time the French were building the Mareth 

Line, but that view no longer prevailed. 

Indeed, advice on how to turn the line in 

this way was submitted from General Catroux to the Allies and transmitted to 

AFHQ." 

Rommel's Analysis of the Mareth Position 

Field Marshal Rommel's confidence in 

the Mareth Position was not very firm. The 

5 Msg, TROOPERS to Mideast, 1730, 15 Jan 43, 

repeated to FREEDOM. AFHQ CofS Cabk Log, 

147. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

line, he thought, could be enveloped by comparatively strong forces from either the 

south or the west. The British could be 

relied upon to attempt such a maneuver. 

Two passes, Beni Kreddache and Ksar el 

Hallouf, through which the British could 

cross the mountain barrier south of the line, 

would require outlying defensive forces. 

The deep northwestern flank would have 

to be protected south of El Hamma with 

other separate mobile elements. Finally, reserves also had to be in readiness to meet an 

attack from the direction of Gafsa. In the 

main Mareth Line, the Axis because of the 

limited time available had to adopt the concrete emplacements and pillboxes of the 

French as the core, but the structures could 

be used for excellent shelter only, since the 

ironwork was very badly rusted. Guns 

would have to be emplaced in field positions between individual pillboxes. The old 

French line of fortifications was dominated 

by heights a few miles in front of the main 

positions. They could thus be brought under 

observed artillery fire while their own observation was seriously restricted. To retain 

possession of the heights as long as possible 

was therefore essential. Moreover, the Italian artillery in the main line, which greatly 

exceeded that of the German units in number of pieces (340 Italian, 65 German), 

would be outranged unless set up ahead of 

the fortification toward the heights. Mines 

and tank traps would be needed to furnish 

security for the guns in these forward 

positions. 

The Gabes-Tripoli highway divided the 

main fortified line into two sectors, with the 

sector to the northeast on the more vulnerable terrain. The British attack on the forward positions would probably begin there 

and, after a successful break-in, would be in 

a position to roll up the forward portion of 
FROM MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 

the southern sector. After gaining possession 

of all the advanced positions, the attackers 

could be expected to move along either side 

of the highway against the Italian X X 

Corps. 

Rommel recommended that the reinforcement and re-equipment of German 

units be expedited and that the lesson of El 

'Alamein with reference to the expenditure 

of artillery ammunition be applied. This 

would require that three units of fire be 

kept at the firing positions, three more in 

accessible dumps, and another three in the 

reserve. He indicated the disposition of 

mobile troops which seemed to promise the 

best results, and added: "If the enemy intends an encirclement to the west . . . as 

is assumed, it is all the more important to 

defend the Beni Kreddache and Ksar el 

Hallouf passes and to force him into a timeconsuming detour as far to the south as possible, at least as far as Foum Tatahouine." 

The Axis could not meet an envelopment 

against the deep northwest flank by counterattack for lack of forces, and even a firm 

defense of the flank would drain off the reserves being held either to resist an attack 

from Gafsa or to support the main front 

(15th Panzer Division, Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment Africa, 1st Luftwaffe .Jaeger 

Brigade, and reinforced 7th Bersaglieri Battalion). But, as Rommel saw it, if the First 

Italian Army were properly replenished, 

had time to finish preparations, kept its 

mobile reserves instead of using them to 

repel an attack from Gafsa, and received 

resolute fighting from its Italian divisions, 

it might at least win a decisive defensive 

success." 

'( 1) Memo, Panzer Army Africa Nr. 30/43, 9 

Feb 43, in Panzer Army Africa, KTB, Anlagenband 

8, Anlage 1031/1. (2) Von Arnim's general din'c525 

The Gap Leading to El Hamma 

From the point of view of Allied forces 

operating in southern Tunisia, the road 

through the valley from Gafsa to El Hamrna and Gabes was potentially a protected 

route for timely intervention from the west 

in any battle in the coastal corridor. North 

of the chotts two mountain chains form 

a valley running east and west. Passage 

through this valley-fifteen miles at the narrowest point-is further restricted by small 

salt marshes and several separate prominent 

hills. The northern chain is broken at the 

western end of Djebel Orbata (1165) just 

south of the oasis of Gafsa, but extends eastward for sixty miles from that opening as 

far as the village of Mezzouna. (See Map 

V.) The U.S. II Corps east of Tebessa 

might drive down this valley either to strike 

at Gabes or to hit the Axis line of communications north of the coastal narrows, compelling Army Group Africa to fight two 

separate but related battles. The very threat 

of such action would divert Axis forces from 

other positions or thin them out where 

strength already barely met requirements. 

Thus the Allies could use the Gafsa-Gabes 

valley in a manner reminiscent of the way 

the Shenandoah Valley was utilized during 

the American Civil War. In the developing crisis of March 1943, all routes in southern Tunisia seemed to lead to the focal point 

near Gabes. 

The small reconnaissance teams of the 

Eighth Army's Long Range Desert Group 

which investigated the routes of overland 

travel west of the Matmata mountains in 

January and early February got as far as 

Tozeur, where they made contact with some 

tive for defense of the Mareth Position, 11 Mar 43, 

in German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, Anlagen, 

Anlage 14. 
526 

men from British First Army. They returned 

to Eighth Army with encouraging reports. 

It appeared that no obstacles existed which 

the Eighth Army could not surmount with 

the aid of bulldozers and other tracked vehicles. A flanking force of considerable 

strength could reach the El Hamma gap! 

On the basis of this information, and what 

was known of the structure and organization of the Mareth Position, General Montgomery drafted the first tentative plan for 

his attack on the Mareth Position (Operation PUGILIST GALLOP) . 

Plans for Operation PUGILIST GALLOP 

The British Eighth Army approached the 

fight for the Mareth Position in a spirit of 

strong confidence. The units were battleseasoned. They had driven Rommel's army 

from the field in one of the war's decisive 

battles. Although they had not brought the 

enemy to a stand, they had won a long series 

of subsequent small victories which they had 

capped by successfully holding their positions against counterattack near Medenine. 

They thought that Rommel was still commanding the opposing forces, but in view of 

their triumphs no longer feared him. 

The plan of attack was incisively explained to all commanders by General 

Montgomery himsclL R The Eighth Army 

planned to move on 20 March, when the 

moonlight would for the first time facilitate 

a night assault after other required prepara-

, (1) R. L. Kay, Lonf!, Range Desert Grou.p in 

the Mediterranean (Wellington, New Zealand, 

1950), pp. 12, 16. (2) MontgoIlwry, El Alamein 

10 the Rio Sangro, p. 76. (3) Philip Furneaux 

Jordan, Tu.nis Diary (London, 1943), pp. 178-79, 

describes meeting one of the reconnaissance teams 

at Tozeur on 5 February 1943. 

• Montgomery, El Alamein to the Rio Sangro. 

p. 79. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tions had been made. About one fourth of 

the force would pass through the mountains 

at a point 60 miles south of the Mareth 

Line, continue over 140 miles to El Hamma 

gap by night marches, and, after breaking 

through there, would swing to the east to 

disrupt the enemy's rear. While this long 

flanking march and ensuing attack were being executed, the main thrust would be made 

near the coast. The terrain there was 

marshy; the area for maneuver was somewhat cramped; the Zigzaou wadi was at its 

widest and deepest; but the belt of advanced 

defenses was narrow and the strongpoints, 

with fields of fire restricted by rolling terrain, 

were therefore less effective than others farther to the southwest." The Italian defenders 

could probably be thrown back somewhat 

more easily than their better armed and 

more determined German associates. Once 

infantry was through the main barrier and 

established on the northern side, two 

armored divisions could cross to exploit to 

the west and southwest. If both the main 

and flanking attacks succeeded, the Axis 

forces would be separated and cut off in 

such a manner that no firm defense could 

be made short of Sfax. That city was named 

as the objective of the operation. 

The Eighth Army entered the battle for 

the Mareth Position organized into two 

regular and one provisional corps. The enveloping march and attack through El 

Hamma gap were assigned to a provisional 

New Zealand Corps under Lt. Gen. Sir 

Bernard C. Freyberg. The force numbered 

about 27,000 men. It consisted of the 2d 

New Zealand Division; the 8th Armoured 

Brigade; the French L Force (General LeClerc) of 2,000-3,000 Senegalese with 

French officers; the King's Dragoon Guards 

'MS #D-046 (Krause). 
FROM MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 

(an armored car regiment) ; one regiment 

each of field and medium artillery; and the 

Greek Sacred Squadron, in some 30 jeeps 

with mounted machine guns. The 120 tanks 

and 112 field and 172 antitank guns, the 

hundreds of trucks, cars, and tracked 

vehicles, after falling back to the road fork 

at Ben Gardane and turning southwest, 

would enter the mountains near Foum 

Tatahouine. 

The main attack was to be delivered on a 

1,200-yard front close to the seacoast by 

30 Corps under General Leese. It would include the British 50th (Northumberland) 

and 51st (Highland) Divisions, 4th Indian 

Division, and British 201 st Guards Brigade. 

The third major element of the army, 10 

Corps, commanded by General Horrocks, 

consisted of the 1st and 7th Armoured Divisions and 4th Light Armoured Brigade. It 

was to be held in reserve at first and then 

pass through a gap gained by the infantry in 

order to exploit access to the enemy's rear 

areas. 10 

The attack by Eighth Army was to receive 

the fullest possible assistance from the Allied 

air forces. In general, plans called for operations on the part of Northwest African Air 

Forces against Axis aviation which would 

provide air supremacy in the battle area, 

permitting the Western Desert Air Force 

and the American Ninth Air Force to concentrate on the tactical support of Eighth 

Army. In fulfillment of this program, the 

Northwest African Tactical Bomber Force 

and the major part of the Strategic Air 

Force were committed to strikes on the Axis 

landing fields in the vicinity of Gabcs, 

Djebel Tebaga Fatnassa (270), and Mezzouna on 20 and 21 March. These operations. along with others by the Tactical Air 

10 Info supplied bv Cabinet Office London. 

527 

Force against these fields and in the air, 

eventually drove Axis air units northward 

to the Sfax-La Fauconnerie area." The 

ground battle was fought with extensive 

assistance by the Western Desert and U.S. 

Ninth Air Forces. 

Defense Plans 

For the defense of the Mareth-EI 

Hamma positions General Messe in midMarch had disposed the forces of his First 

Italian Army along the fortified line as 

follows: 

( 1) On the coastal plain, from northeast 

to southwest-the Italian XX Corps under 

Generale di Divisione Taddeo Orlando, including the 136th ( Young Fascists) Division, commanded by Generale di Divisione 

Nino Sozzani and the 101 st (Trieste) Division under Generale di Brigata Francesco 

La Ferla (the latter's sector embracing the 

village of Mareth). 

(2) In the center, the German 90th 

Light Africa Division under Generalmajor 

Theodor Graf von Sponeck. The seven battalions and six batteries of this unit held a 

sector through which the heavily mined 

highway from Medenine to Mareth ran 

until just south of the village of Arram, 

where it turned northward into Division 

Trieste's sector before again swinging northwestward to Mareth. 

( 3) In the western portion, the Italian 

XXI Corps, commanded by Generale di 

Corpo d' Armata Paolo Berardi, consisting 

of the 80th (La S pezia) Division under 

Generale di Brigata Gavino Pizzolato, and 

the 16th (Pistoia ) Motorized Division under Generale di Brigata Giuseppe Falugi 

11 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II. 

173-78. (2) AFHQ G-3 Rpts. 132,20 Mar 43, and 

146, 2 Apr 43. 
528 

(nearest Toud jane) with the German 164th 

Light Africa Division under Generalmajor 

Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein. This German division was in a zone extending across 

the belt of hills north of Hallouf pass and 

centering on Matmata. It had been reduced 

to four battalions and one battery prior to 

the Mareth battle. Special detachments defended the defiles of Hallouf and Beni 

Kreddache and the tracks leading westward 

from them. 

Along the line in the coastal zone, the 

19th Flak Division (Luftwaffe) under Generalmajor Gothard Frantz had placed sixteen dual-purpose 88-mm. flak batteries and 

numerous 20-mm. antiaircraft batteries. 12 

The hills from Tamezred to Djebel 

Melab (333) and the narrow gap from 

there to Djebel Tebaga were in a sector 

with field works defended by the Saharan 

Group (Raggruppamento Sahariano), 

commanded by Generale di Brigata Alberto 

Mannerini. This force was a miscellaneous 

aggregation amounting to nine battalions 

and eleven batteries. In a second defense 

line to the rear and along the Ez Zerkin 

wadi were the army reserves. Nearest the 

coast the 1st Luftwaffe Brigade, by now 

reduced to the strength of a reinforced battalion, held a narrow sector behind the 

Young Fascists Division. Next to it was the 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment Africa covering the Mareth-Gabes road. The 15th Panzer Division covered the gap between the 

highway and the Matmata mountains. 

Farther to the rear, the 21st Panzer Division, instead of making a contemplated 

swift thrust through Gafsa at French forces 

in Tozeur, on 17-18 March moved to an 

assembly area fifteen miles southwest of 

12 Lagekarte Nr. 1, 1: 100,000, 11 Mar 43, in 

German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, Anlagen, 

Lagekarten u. Einsatzskizzen. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Gabes and ten miles west of Mareth. From 

this position it could support either the 

coastal or the northwestern portions of the 

Mareth Line.13 The 10th Panzer Division 

remained well north of Gabes near Sousse, 

subject to call. None of these divisions was 

up to anything like its full strength in men, 

tanks, or other weapons. Some 50,000 Germans and 35,000 Italians were in the First 

Italian A rmy, according to the highest Allied estimate. This was slightly higher than 

the actual ration strength of that Army 

which amounted to 77,473 late in February, 

with only insignificant changes since that 

date. Eighth Army had 37 infantry battalions in the area to the enemy's 45 (in his 

infantry divisions); 1,481 guns to the enemy's 680; 623 tanks to the enemy's 150, 

and air strength of at least two to one. 14 

The defense of the Mareth Position 

against British Eighth Army's attack was 

undertaken in an atmosphere of strained 

German-Italian relations in the field. This 

condition, recurrent if not continuous, was 

rendered much more severe during the week 

before the attack. The Germans of what 

was formerly Rommel's army were unhappy over its fate. Rommel himself was 

never reconciled to the Italian decision that 

the stand in Tunisia against the Eighth 

Army should be made at the Mareth Line 

rather than just north of Gabes in the 

Chott Position. The decision at the highest 

levels against his proposals of 3 March to 

'"21st Panzer Diu, KTB, 13-17 Mar 43. 

H (1) AFHQ G-2 Weekly Sum, 22 Mar 43. (2) 

Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (3) 

Strength Rpt, 28 Feb 43, in Panzer Army Africa, 

o Qu, KTB, 16.Il.-31.IIl.43, Anlage 232. (4) 

Evening Rpt, Comando Supremo to OKH/GenStd 

H/Op Abt, 16 Mar 43, in OKH/GenStdH/Op 

Abt, M eldungen des Ob Sued, 1.IIl.-30.IV.43, 

Band I. (5) Messe, La Ia Armata Italiana in 

Tunisia, p. 80. 
FROM MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 

concentrate all Axis forces in the Enfidaville line until the supply problem had been 

solved was doubtless disappointing, but he 

would not take no for an answer. In his 

visit to Hitler's headquarters on 10 March 

he again attempted to gain the Fuehrer's 

approval for a withdrawal into the smaller 

bridgehead. Although Rommel was again 

rebuffed, Hitler agreed to a redisposition of 

the forces of the First Italian Army."5 

Rommel argued that the consequences of 

a possible Allied break-through at the 

Mareth Line, coupled with a flanking attack, could be averted only by strengthening the Chott Position at once with all 

available means. He suggested that two 

nonmobile Italian divisions, then in the 

.NIareth Line, be immediately sent to the 

Chott Position to begin the construction 

work and that the defense of Mareth Line 

pass to German mobile units supported by 

Italian motorized elements on the flanks. 

Rommel deemed the combined Italian 

and German forces in the Mareth Line ample for a subsequent defense of the Chott 

Position. The 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer 

Divisions would then be available to operate 

under Headquarters, DAK, as Army Group 

Africa reserve. Such a disposition of forces 

would, in Rommel's view, provide for a 

delaying action in the wider southern approaches to the Gabes corridor and a 

stronger defense near its northern end."s 

Hitler agreed with Rommel and JodI so 

informed OB SOUTH. Kesse'lring was to 

move the S pezia and Pistoia Divisions to 

the Chott Position. The Centauro Division 

was to take over the flank protection mis15MS # C-065a (Greiner), 11 Mar 43. 

1A (1) Ltr, Rommel to von Arnim, 12 Mar 43, 

in EAP 21-a-14/7. (2) OKW/WFSt, KTB, 12 

Mar 43. 

529 

sion of the 164th Light Africa Division in 

the Matmata mountains. The latter would 

then move into the .N1areth Line, while the 

Trieste Division provided security east of 

Gafsa. The Luftwaffe was to win time for 

the ground forces to carry out these moves 

by increasing its activity. Kesselring was 

determined to seek a change in these orders 

when he met Hitler and Doenitz at Rastenburg on 14 March to confer about supply. 

They were not communicated to Comando 

Supremo. The orders went directly to von 

Arnim from OB SOUTH only on 14-

March, the day Kesselring flew to Rastenburg.l1 

On the afternoon of the 14th von Arnim 

went to the headquarters of the First Italian 

Army to see to the immediate execution of 

the orders he had just received. Messe, who 

was busy carrying out the instructions he 

had received only a few days earlier to hold 

to the end in the Mareth Position, was dumfounded. He protested that the change of 

plans would have a bad effect on the morale 

of his Army. He regarded the wholesale 

shift in the disposition of his forces and the 

complicated movements involved as inadvisable in the face of the Eighth Army's expected attack. It seemed to him tantamount 

to the first stage in a withdrawal to the 

Enfidaville Position, in the guise of an order 

to create a unified lvIareth-Chott defense. 

He demanded to know if his organization 

17 Messe, La Ia Armata Italiana in Tunisia, pp. 

72-74. On 13 and 14 March von Arnim complained 

to various officers in higher headquarters that Kesselring on the 13th had forbidden him to send tactieal reports to OKW, OKH, and Rommel. On 23 

March Hitler reaffirmed the right of all higher 

headquarters to eommunicate directly with him, 

sending information copies to their immediate superiors. Msgs, von Arnim (1) to Rommel, OKW / 

WFSt, and OKH, and (2) others, in EAP 21-x-· 

14/2. 
530 

of the Mareth Position, previously directed, 

was now to be replaced by a withdrawal 

to the Chott. Von Arnim merely replied 

that he had received orders that Messe must 

carry out. The only concession Messe obtained was to be allowed to keep the Trieste 

and Centauro Divisions in place, while 

moving the Spezia and Pistoia Divisions. 

Meanwhile, Kesselring obtained from 

Hitler a reversal of the new orders. Notified 

on 16 March, Messe halted all movements 

and returned the troops to their former positions. Comando Supremo, until now basking in happy ignorance of moves and 

countermoves within the German command, was suddenly alerted to the circumvention of its nominal authority and asked 

for explanations from all concerned, but 

received little satisfaction.1s Thus on the eve 

of the Mareth battle, General Messe and 

his German associates in Tunisia were at 

odds; the anti-Italian attitude implied in the 

proposed shifts among the defending troops 

produced resentment; and the changes in 

plan gave the Italians further grounds for 

distrust of German leadership.lO 

The Battle on the Coastal Plain 

Ground operations opened on the night 

of 16-17 March with preliminary attacks 

by elements of the British 30 Corps. The 

British 50th and 51st Divisions launched 

separate assaults with the objective of pressing back enemy outposts in the forefield 

of the Mareth Position. Both divisions succeeded in advancing their lines. A third 

,. (1) Messe, La Ia Armata Italiana in Tunisia, 

pp. 72-74. (2) German CoIS, First Italian Arm),. 

KTB, 14 Mar 43. 

1. (l) OKW/WFSt, KTB, 10-13 Mar 43. (2) 

German Cots, First Italian Army, KTB, 10 Mar 

43. (3) Messe, Come Fini' La Guerra in Africa, 

pp. 88-90. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

attack, launched in the 10 Corps zone 

by the 201 st Guards Brigade, was directed 

against a prominent hill, near the Medenine-Mareth highway, which gave the Germans good observation of the British line 

in this sector. The object of the attack was 

not only to sieze this hill but to induce the 

defenders to expect the main thrust to be 

made between the Mareth road and the 

Matmata mountains. The Germans were 

ready. They drove the Guards back to their 

lines with heavy casualties, and retained 

their observation post. 

These preliminary attacks cost the enemy 

195 killed or wounded and 69 missing and 

yielded British intelligence valuable information on Axis dispositions. 20 

The enemy was husbanding his artillery 

ammunition, especially in 100-mm. shells. 

The First Italian Army had at its immediate 

disposal 56 tanks: 29 German and 27 Italian. The German Africa Corps, with the 

10th and 21st Panzer Divisions, and a total 

of 94 tanks, was in army group reserve. 

The 21 st Panzer Division, which had been 

moved toward Mareth on 17~18 March to 

counterattack if necessary in conjunction 

with the 15th Panzer Division, was not expected to arrive in its assembly area before 

the morning of the 19th. 21 

German air reconnaissance observed the 

movement of the 6,000 vehicles of New 

Zealand Corps on 18 March. General Messe 

was led by this movement, along with other 

Allied preparatory shift", to the conclusion 

on 19 March that an attack at the El Hamrna gap by one armored division, one infan2ll Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

21 See n. 14 (3). (2) 21st Panzer Div, KTB, 18 

Mar 43. (3) Daily Rpt, Comando Supremo tQ 

OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, 17, 18 Mar 43, in OKH/ 

Gen StdH/Op Abt, Meldungen des Ob Sued, v.I. 

III.-30.IV.43, Band I. 
FROM MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 

try division, and one motorized brigade 

should be expected in three or four days, 

at the same time that the main blows were 

being struck against the Mareth Line by at 

least three Allied infantry divisions, two infantry brigades, two armored divisions, and 

two armored brigades. 22 

The Western Desert Air Force participated in the operations to break the Mareth 

barrier with twenty-two squadrons of fighters and fighter bombers (535 aircraft), 

seven squadrons of bombers (140 aircraft), 

and almost three reconnaissance squadrons. 23 The full program of preparatory 

bombing was cut down by inclement weather but on 20 March, the very day of the 

first major attack, escorted bomber formations flew nine missions against Axis gun 

positions, transport, and concentrations of 

troops in the Mareth area. Fighter bombers 

also hit the area once and the Gabes airfield once. During this operation, PUGILIST 

GALLOP, the enemy was bombed each 

night. 24 

The British opened the main attack on 

the Mareth Line with an extremely heavy 

artillery preparation by over 300 guns in 

the evening of 20 March. The enemy estimated that 20,000 rounds fell in the Young 

Fascists sector, nearest the coast, and about 

16,000 rounds in the 90th Light Africa 

Division's area farther west. 25 

22 Msg, Messe to Army Group Africa and German 

CoS, First Italian Army, 19 Mar 43, in German 

CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, Anlagen, Anlage 45. 

2' While the number of squadrons is precise, the 

number of aircraft is in each case an estimate of 

those serviceable, based on statistics for 21 March 

1943 for Western Desert Air Force and Eastern Air 

Defense as supplied by Air Ministry, London. 

,. (1) German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, 

20-23 Mar 43. (2) AFHQ G-3 Rpt No. 133 (for 

20 Mar 43). 

'" Daily Rpt, German CoS, First Italian Army, 

to Army Group Africa, 21 Mar 43, in German CoS, 

First Italian Army, KTB, Anlagen, Anlage 52. 

531 

Eighth Army assigned the attempt to 

punch through the final line to British 30 

Corps. The 30 Corps assigned it to the 

British 50th Division, which gave the mission to the 151st Brigade and 50th Royal 

Tank Regiment (fifty-one tanks, of which 

eight had 6-pounder guns). The British 

69th Brigade and a detachment of the 9th 

Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, were expected to clear a path to the Zigzaou wadi 

and to set up protection on the southwestern 

flank for the crossing of that barrier at three 

points-one for each of two infantry battalions and one for the tanks. Following closely 

an artillery barrage, and led by "Scorpions" 

(tanks equipped with flailing chains on revolving drums to detonate enemy mines), 

the tanks of the armored column would 

carry fascines, ten feet long and eight feet in 

diameter, to make the wadi crossing and 

that of the steep-sided antitank ditch beyond 

it passable for the heavy vehicles. The infantry and tanks were to fan out on the far 

side in a bridgehead from which the enemy 

was to be cleared by battles at numerous 

strongpoints. 

Severe difficulties impeded the first night's 

operations. The British force opened the 

path to the wadi and established the flank 

protection, but the Scorpions failed and the 

mines had to be more slowly removed by 

engineers using detectors. The infantry 

crossed successfully but the tanks were delayed. Some of their fascines were ignited 

and had to be replaced from a stock farther 

to the rear. Enemy fire was heavy and continuous and, near the wadi's edge, knocked 

out several tanks. In the wadi itself, troops 

removed the mines despite intense fire, but 

from one bank to the other they found the 

bottom to be very soft, with the fifty-foot 

channel for the running stream particularly 

so. Four tanks got across both the wadi and 
532 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

SHERMAN TANK WITH "SCORPION" ATTACHMENT. The "scorpion" was 

a revolving drum with chains attached that acted as a flail when in motion and could clear a 

path through a mine field. 

the antitank ditch, but a fifth settled into 

soft ground almost up to its turret, and could 

not be removed with the means at hand. 

Construction of a route around this obstacle 

before daylight was impossible. Thus the 

151 st Brigade, with only these four tanks 

of the 50th Royal Tank Regiment, reached 

the far side of the Zigzaou wadi to establish 

the bridgehead. 

During the next day, the 151 st Brigade, 

reinforced, successfully extended its area for 

about two miles along the wadi and one 

mile in depth. The Italians, in spite of German efforts to prevent them, surrendered 

freely as opportunity offered. One battalion 

of the 90th Light Africa Division, artillery 

units from the 15th Panzer Division, the 

Luftwaffe Jaeger Brigade, and the Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment Africa were committed 

to reinforce the Young Fascists Division. 

British attempts on the second night to get 

the rest of the tanks across were successful, 

but a firm road for wheeled vehicles they 

could not construct, so that antitank guns 

and field artillery had to support the shallow 

bridgehead from the Eighth Army's side of 

the wadi. During the night, the fine weather 

came to an end. March 22 opened with 
FROM MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 

low clouds and intermittent but very heavy 

showers. 26 

At 1300, the 15th Panzer Division 

counterattacked after organizing near 

Zarat, placing the British in a difficult position. Launched with almost thirty tanks and 

two battalions of infantry, the counterattack 

was impeded but not stopped by the rainsoaked ground and was in full course by 

1700. The British Valentine tanks were no 

match for the Mark Ill's and IV's. Support 

by Western Desert Air Force was washed 

out by the weather just as the enemy's drive 

was getting under way. By the time the skies 

had cleared, the battle had brought British 

and Axis units so close together that Allied 

aircraft could not helpfully intervene.27 

Fighting bitterly at various localities, British 

troops held until darkness, when they began 

to withdraw across the wadi. About thirtyfive British tanks and 200 prisoners were 

left in enemy hands. 28 The bridgehead no 

longer existed. All elements on the far side 

of the wadi were recalled before morning, 24 

March. 

Following the storms and rain which 

blighted 30 Corps' effort to enlarge its 

bridgehead across the Zigzaou wadi, the 

weather was brilliantly clear and the nights 

illuminated by an almost full moon. On the 

nights of 24-25 and 25-26 March it was 

possible for the bombers of the Western 

Desert Air Force to make 322 sorties over 

the El Hamma area, where they attacked 

enemy signal and supply and communica-

,. Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

" (1) Info supplied by Air Ministry, London. 

(2) German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, 21-22 

Mar 43. 

" (1) German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, 23 

Mar 43, says forty-five tanks. (2) See also Montgomery, EI Alamein to the Rio Sangro, pp. 81-83. 

(3) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

533 

tions. 29 At the same time, the Strategic Air 

Force hit the port at Sousse and the airfield 

near Djebel Tebaga Fatnassa, northwest of 

Gabes. 30 

The Shift to Operation SUPERCHARGE 

II 

Inability to maintain the bridgehead 

which British 30 Corps had gained during 

the night of 20-21 March and to use it as a 

base for a breakout to the rear of the Mareth 

Position forced General Montgomery to 

adopt an alternative. Operation PUGILIST 

GALLOP had gone awry. In trying to make 

the critical decision whether to try attacking elsewhere on the coastal plain, or in the 

mountains, or on the northwestern flank 

beyond the mountains, he had the benefit of 

an initial success by General Freyberg's provisional New Zealand Corps. That force 

arrived south of El Hamma gap, after almost 

forty-eight hours of arduous and unexpectedly swift marching over the edge of the 

desert, in mid afternoon of 21 March. Here 

the enemy line of mines, tank traps, and gun 

positions curved southward to cover the 

fork formed by the junction of tracks from 

Gabes and El Hamma with the one leading 

past the southern side of Djebel Tebaga 

toward Kebili. The approaching force 

stopped out of artillery range, reconnoitered, 

deployed, and made surveys to enable the 

artillery to fire without preliminary registration. Instead of waiting for the next day, 

General Freyberg's command prepared to 

attack that very night. Much battle experience enabled the New Zealanders to execute 

such an operation in the bright moonlight, 

and in particular to drive an enemy force 

2. Info supplied by Air Ministry, London. 

30 AFHQ G-3 Rpt 138,25 Mar 43. 
534 

from an outpost on Hill 201, a mesa rising 

in the middle of the gap about a mile from 

its southern entrance. Hill 201 dominated 

the lower adjacent ground. The New Zealanders won it at a cost of 65 casualties and 

took nearly 850 Italian prisoners. It remained in Allied hands thereafter, despite 

sturdy counterattacks. 

While the New Zealand Corps was completing its approach on 21 March, the 21st 

Panzer Division started westward to support the Italians in the El Hamma gap and 

the 164th Light Africa Division withdrew 

through the hills northwest of Toudjane 

and Matmata. At 1030, 22 March, the latter division received orders to continue toward the northwestern front, to participate 

in the counterattack to regain Hill 201, 

which the 21st Panzer Division had thus 

far been unable to regain that morning. The 

164th Light Africa Division was consequently on the way there on the same afternoon that the 15th Panzer Division off to 

the east was counterattacking against the 

northern edge of the 50th Division's bridgehead and about to wipe it out altogether. 

As General von Liebenstein's division approached, General Freyberg's forces were 

not only maintaining their hold on Hill 201 

but clearing the hills on either side of the 

gap, working in general to the northeast. 31 

Late on 22 March, having failed to regain 

the hill, the Axis command accepted the 

necessity of pulling its line in the El Hamma 

gap back about three miles from the first 

location. 

By evening of 22 March it had become 

obvious that the attack of British 30 Corps 

against the eastern end of the Mareth Position could make no further progress. Gen31 Kippenberger, Infantry Brigadier, pp. 280-82, 

gives a participant's narrative of the operations. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

eral Freyberg's force, on the other hand, 

had made a successful penetration at El 

Hamma gap. It was also known that the 

enemy had now committed all his available 

reserves. Such was the situation when during the night General Montgomery had to 

determine the future course of the Eighth 

Army's attack. 

With the same rapidity and assurance he 

had employed in meeting the vicissitudes of 

the Battle of El 'Alamein, General Montgomery decided to drop Operation PUGILIST GALLOP and to convert his flanking 

foray into the main effort. 32 His initial problem was to send reinforcements in sufficient 

strength and speed to retain the Allied advantage already gained in the El Hamma 

gap and thus to build up even faster than 

the enemy. He now shifted all his available 

reserves and resources to the west in support of General Freyberg's outflanking 

maneuver. Instructing 30 Corps to make 

every effort to tie down Axis reserves in the 

Mareth Line, Montgomery alerted General 

Horrocks' British 10 Corps headquarters 

with the 1 st Armored Division for movement after dark on 23 March over the same 

route used by the provisional New Zealand 

Corps. From an assembly area east of Medenine, the 4th Indian Division was sent after 

darkness of 23 March toward Hallouf pass 

to open it for a shorter supply route to El 

Hamma gap, and to follow up the withdrawal to the north by 164th Light Africa 

Division. The 4th Indian Division was to 

take Toudjane and gain control of the 

northeastern section of the Matmata hills. It 

thus might obtain a route along which the 

7th Armoured Division could make a short 

western hook around the Mareth Line and 

"Montgomery, El Alamein to the Rio Sangro, 

p. 82. 
FROM MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 

exploit the area south of Gabes. The enemy 

forces in the Mareth Position were to be 

held there by measures designed to look like 

preparations for a renewed thrust. 

General Horrocks arrived at General 

Freyberg's command post during the afternoon, 24 March, to find the latter under 

insistent pressure by General Montgomery 

to make a full-scale attack, if possible on 

the very next afternoon. Freyberg had proposed some alternatives, all of which were 

rejected in favor of speed, and he and Horrocks finally concluded that a blitz attack 

in the manner of that which broke through 

at El 'Alamein, an Operation SUPERCHARGE 

II, could be attempted at 1600, 26 March. 33 

Until then, all fighting would have to remain preliminary to the major battle. 

On the enemy side General Mannerini, 

after canvassing with Generals Hildebrandt 

and von Liebenstein the prospects for a 

successful joint counterattack by their divisions to recapture Hill 201, canceled the 

project. The Allied intention to switch the 

point of their main attack to the El Hamma 

gap was correctly interpreted from Allied 

movements observed late on 23 March and 

again on 24 March. All that day, heavy 

movement to the south was reported by observers in the hills. The 15th Panzer Division, which had been pulled back late on 

23 March to an area northwest of the village of Mareth, continued during the night 

toward an area north of the Matmata hills 

from which it could move either back to 

the Mareth Line or on into the El Hamma 

gap; on the night of 24-25 March, the division took up positions southeast of Djebel 

Halouga. The forward line of enemy defenses from Djebel Tebaga through Djebel 

Melab and southeast to Tamezred was 

"Info supplied by Cabind Office, London. 

535 

thereafter covered by German as well as 

Italian troops. The 164th Light Africa Division took up positions on the northern 

flank, and agreement was reached that the 

boundary between the southeastern sector, 

under Italian XXI Corps, and the northwestern sector, under General von Liebenstein, would be about two miles east of 

Djebel Melab. 34 Despite the Allied grip on 

the southern entrance, these enemy measures seemed likely to make Allied progress 

up the gap toward El Hamma extremely 

difficult. 

Two factors reduced the difficulty. One 

was the Allied air program for Operation 

SUPERCHARGE II. General Montgomery 

accepted Air Vice-Marshal Harry Broadhurst's proposal for extraordinary action by 

the Western Desert Air Force at the inception of the attack. The ground assault 

was to open about 1600, when the sun 

would be low on the horizon behind the 

attacking troops. It was to be preceded by 

a very heavy daylight air assault along El 

Hamma gap, supplemented by a rolling artillery barrage, both of which would be 

followed up closely by infantry and tanks. 

When the enemy's line of defenses had been 

breached, the armor was to pour through 

the opening and to thrust toward Gabes 

before daylight on 27 March. This program 

of co-ordinated attack promised to overcome the substantial advantage of the enemy's gun positions on high ground on 

either flank. The second factor contributing 

to the Eighth Army's success was perhaps 

unknown to its command. General Messe 

had been instructed by von Arnim on the 

morning of 24 March to withdraw to the 

Chott Position before being overwhelmed in 

the Mareth Line. 

3< German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, 24-

25 Mar 43. 
536 

General von Arnim surveyed the situation with Generals Bayerlein and Liebenstein on the morning of 24 March, when 

General Montgomery's new intentions had 

been confirmed, and in view of the Allied 

pressure also at El Guettar and Maknassy, 

decided that the retreat to the Chott Position should be started during the approaching night. Von Arnim told M esse to begin 

his withdrawal by pulling out his nonmotorized Italian infantry at once, while 

holding present positions with mobile units. 

Messe did not agree with von Arnim on 

the urgency of the need to withdraw to the 

Chott Position, and protested that for lack 

of transport he could not begin it until 25 

March. When Kesselring arrived on the 

afternoon of the 24th, he took the same view 

as Messe and advised him to launch a 

counterattack by the 15th Panzer Division 

to improve the situation. General Messe, as 

a consequence of Kesselring's visit, informed General von Arnim, next morning, that he preferred a counterattack on 

the coastal plain to withdrawal from the 

1tIareth Line, but was informed that a 

withdrawal would be necessitated by the 

situation farther north.35 

It took British 10 Corps headquarters and 

the British 1st Armoured Division almost a 

full day longer to reach the northwestern 

battle area than it had taken the New Zealand Corps. They barely made the line of 

departure at the appointed hour on 26 

March, but make it they did. The program 

of air bombardment which was to continue 

for about twenty-four hours preceding the 

assault was stopped in the morning by sandstorms on the airfields, but was executed 

~'German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, 24-

25 Mar 43. (2) Messe, La I a A rmata I taliana in 

Tunisia, Allegato 16. pp. 378-82. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

with overwhelming results in the later phases 

beginning in midafternoon. On the hills beside the gap and to the east, a battle went 

on all day. Far forward, the 2d New Zealand Division waited for the attack to jump 

off. The first to attack was to be the 8th 

Armoured Brigade. Infantry lay all day 

concealed near the enemy in holes which 

had been dug during the preceding night. 

Over their heads the planes began roaring 

on their way to bomb and strafe the area 

to be attacked. 

The air attack at 1530 was made by three 

formations of light and medium bombers, 

which dropped their bombs in pattern from 

low altitudes. Fighter bombers followed immediately in continuous low-level attacks. 

They kept arriving in fifteen-minute relays 

of about thirty planes which flew continuously over the enemy ahead of the ground 

troops for the next two and one-half hours. 

Fighter patrols protected the fighter bombers from enemy intervention, while simultaneous attacks on enemy airfields successfully forestalled opposition by Axis planes. 

Four hundred and twelve sorties were flown. 

With air co-operation to Operation SUPERCHARGE II thus completely undisturbed by 

the Luftwaffe, losses were limited to eleven 

pilots missing. Difficulties in co-ordinating 

the air with the ground action were anticipated and solved by the use of colored smoke 

and other devices for marking the area to 

be attacked. The troops started forward at 

1600 at a swift rate, as prescribed in the 

plans, and closely behind the artillery barrage and the falling bombs.as 

At the designated time the New Zealand 

infantry rose from their cover, marked the 

bomb line with orange smoke signals, and 

,. Info supplied by Air Ministry, London. 
FROM MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 

behind a swiftly creeping artillery barrage 

and low-level air attacks swept forward. 

The two center battalions of the 164th 

Light Africa Division were overrun. 

Through the gap, the British armor then 

poured toward El Hamma and Gabes, 

leaving the infantry in heavy engagements 

behind them on the hills. The tanks penetrated about four miles before dark and, 

after waiting for the moon to rise, passed 

through the enemy's reserve armored elements before daybreak. Dawn on 27 March 

found them on the edge of El Hamma, 

where they were stopped by an antitank 

screen; General von Liebenstein sent reinforcements the·re to deter them as long as 

possible. 

The Enemy Falls Back to the Chou Position 

Full exploitation of the Allied breakthrough on 27 March was prevented for 

two days by determined and resourceful 

measures south of El Hamma by German 

annored elements, especially by General 

Borowiecz' 15th Panzer Division with about 

fifty tanks. Group von Liebenstein left its 

hill positions southeast of Djebel Melab before daylight and took up mobile defense 

of a line between these hills, Djebel Halouga, and El Hamma. The British 1st 

Armoured Division was held off at the north 

and struck by a counterattack, delivered by 

elements of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, on its eastern flank. This situation 

continued through 28 March, while during 

the night of 26-27 March the last of the 

nonmotorized elements of the Italian X X 

Corps pulled out of the coastal sector and 

in one bound shifted to the Chott Position. 

XXI Corps and Group von Liebenstein covered the withdrawal in the temporary posi537 

tion El Hamma-Gabes on 27 March. During the night of 28-29 March a British 

annored force from the south threatened to 

cut off Group von Liebenstein after pushing 

in one flank of the 15th Panzer Division and 

thus gaining access to the area east of Djebel 

Halouga. During the night the Axis line, 

under considerable moonlight bombing, was 

pulled back north of El Hamma and Gabes, 

and on the following night, pulled back into 

the Chott Position. The battle of the Mareth 

Position had been won. 

Ahead of the mobile German units, the 

I talians had been organized on a new defensive line. The 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, and part of the 90th Light Africa 

Division, went to an area west and southwest of Cekhira as army reserves, and reinforcements were soon going to the aid of the 

10th Panzer Division near El Guettar. 37 On 

29 March, El Hamma and Gabes were in 

Allied hands. By the next evening, the most 

advanced Allied elements were in close 

proximity to the Chott Position. 

British Empire Army took about 7,000 

prisoners before winning the Mareth Position. 36 These losses had further sapped the 

resources of a badly equipped Axis force. 

Furthermore, the British had driven the 

enemy farther toward the ultimate constriction in northeastern Tunisia which General 

Alexander had been planning since he took 

command of 18 Army Group. But somewhat 

offsetting these gains for the moment was 

the fact that once again the defenders of a 

aT The reinforcements were the Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment Afrika on 29 March and, from the 21st 

Panzer Division, first one light and then a heavy 

artillery battalion and by 31 March the entire 21st 

Panzer Division. German CoS, First Italian Army, 

KTB, 26-31 Mar 43. 

"Montgomery, El Alamein to the Rio Sangro. 

p.88. 
538 

fixed position had escaped the tentacles of a 

flanking attack by Eighth Army's armored 

elements and had pulled back under orders 

of the high command. Could they now hold 

in the Chott Position at the Akarit wadi, the 

position that Rommel had favored in case 

the troops were not to shift all the way from 

Libya to northeastern Tunisia? 

The two forces which had just concluded 

the major battle south and southwest of 

Gabes now spent a week preparing for a 

second set battle just north of the town at 

the Chott Position. Along this portion of 

the coastal plain, the corridor narrows to a 

short strip about fifteen miles wide, more 

than half of which is screened by a semicircle of low hills with precipitous slopes 

separated by narrow gaps. Across the narrows , the Akarit wadi has worn a trench 

extending inland about three miles from the 

sea before becoming so shallow as to constitute a minor dip in the surface. Although 

shorter than the Zigzaou wadi, in the 

Mareth Position, the Akarit is for the most 

part wider and deeper. Overlapping its 

western end and extending to the nearest 

hill, Djebel er Roumana (170), was a tank 

ditch which the enemy had dug across the 

plain. Other shorter trenches zigzagged 

across the entrances to the openings between 

the various hills in the semicircle. Against 

tanks which might succeed in pushing 

through the defile at the southwestexn end 

of Djebel er Roumana and then start along 

its western side, the enemy, using obstacles, 

had strengthened a series of parallel wadies 

to form a dangerous area for the armored 

vehicles, an area difficult to cross and subject to fire from numerous antitank guns. A 

large double belt of mines from east to west 

in front of the Akarit wadi and its western 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

extension was supplemented at other critical 

points by smaller mine fields. 

Comando Supremo's preference for the 

Mareth Position had delayed measures to 

complete an interrelated system of barriers 

and protecting fire po.;itions. With scarce 

construction materials sent to M areth, the 

Chott Position had been only partly developed. Although it was strong, and although the enemy used the week after the 

lIvIareth Line was abandoned to make it even 

stronger, the position required much more 

work before full use could be made of its 

natural advantages. It also lacked depth. 

The threat of attack from the direction of 

El Guettar or Maknassy against the rear 

contributed to its vulnerability.39 

Axis units were disposed in the Akarit 

position almost as they had been at Mareth. 

The only difference was that the 90th Light 

Africa Division was this time inserted 

between the Young Fascists Division on 

the coast and the Trieste Division on the 

eastern portion of Djebel er Roumana, since 

the main highway passed nearer the shore 

than at Mareth. Farther to the west was the 

S pezia Division. The whole sector from the 

coast to Djebel Tebaga Fatnassa was under 

the command of the Italian XX Corps. 

Strung out along a much wider sector rang~ 

ing across the hills as far as Djebel es Stah 

(318) were the Pistoia Division, covering 

the vital defile through which passed the 

road to El Guettar and Gafsa; next to it, 

from Djebel Hai'doudi (285) to the west, 

the remnants of the 164th Light Africa Di~ 

vision, now completely immobile; and at the 

"" (1) Map, Nr. 19 (I: 100,000), ~ Apr 43, in 

German CoS First Italian Army, K7 B, Anlagen, 

Lagekarten u: Einsatzskizzen. (2) MS #T -3 (Nehring et ai.) , Pt. 3a. 
FRO.Nl MARETH TO ENFIDA VILLE 

extreme west flank, General Mannerini's 

Raggruppamento Sahariano. Some five 

miles to the north, on the boundary between 

XX and XXI Corps, was the 15th Panzer 

Division. The 21st Panzer Division, it will 

be remembered, had been sent to E1 Guettar 

in support of the 10th Panzer and Centauro 

Divisions which were fighting to hold back 

the U.S. II Corps. General ~fesse's troops 

were supported by nine batteries of SS-mm. 

dual-purpose guns (19th Flak Division), 

placed to bolster the rather weak defenses, 

and execute both air and ground missions. 

F our more heavy batteries, with air missions, 

were placed farther north, along the coast. 40 

The enemy was low in artillery ammunition, 

while his infantry had less than one full unit 

of fire. The general terrain formation, the 

nature of the Allied advance up to 4 April, 

and the area of impact of the Allied artillery, 

pointed to a main Allied effort against, and 

on each side of, Djebel er Roumana, despite 

the barriers of ditches, mines, and obstacles. 

Night infantry attacks against the heights 

with simultaneous or subsequent tank 

thrusts on both sides were to be expected, 

as well as local attacks against the passes 

farther west. Division Trieste held the eastern half and the Division S pezia, the western 

half of this principal hill. 

The Enemy' Is Driven to Northeastern 

Tunisia 

After ascertaining on 31 March through 

reconnaissance attacks by British 10 Corps 

that the wadi could be forced, although at 

40 Overlay, Nr. 18, Einsatz du Schweren Flakbatterien zu Erd-v. Luftschutz du 19. Flak-Division in 

der Akarit-Stellung (1: 100,000), 4 Apr 43, and 

map, Nr. 20 (1: 100,000), 6 Apr 43, both in German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, Anlagen, 

Lagekarten u. Einsatzskizzen. 

539 

considerable cost, Eighth Army stopped to 

regroup. The attack was to be made by 30 

Corps, using three divisions to gain a bridgehead for the British 10 Corps, with a division employed to feign an attack. Nearly 

500 British tanks were put in readiness. 

Although the heavy pace of the Allied air 

attacks on the enemy warned him to expect 

the attack soon, he realized that it would 

have to be made at night to avoid observation of even its earliest stages. He therefore expected that it would not begin until 

after 15 April, when the moon would again 

be favorable.41 Actually, General Montgomery had determined not to wait for a 

moonlit night but to attack in darkness. 

Montgomery thus attained surprise, for although the enemy had correctly divined the 

intended zone of British main effort, he had 

not expected it to come so soon. 

The assault began at 0500, 6 April, with 

the British 51 st Division advancing on the 

right, the British 50th Division in the center, 

and the 4th Indian Division on the left, all 

west of the coastal road and through the 

Trieste, S pezia, and Pistoia Divisions sectors. 

The scope of the attack was thus west of the 

deeper part of the Akarit wadi. The troops 

and vehicles crossed lesser tributary stream 

beds draining northeasterly under the thunderous cover of about 450 British guns firing 

on targets directly ahead of them. The main 

thrusts at first were on Djebel er Roumana 

and its companion hillock to the northeast 

(Hill 11 2 ), and against high points of a 

ridge to the southwest (mainly Hill 275). 

41 (1) Montgomery, El Alamein to the Rio 

Sangro, p. 90. (2) German CoS, First Italian 

Army, KTB, 2 Apr 43, and Rpt, German CoS, 

First Italian Army to Army Group Africa, 4 Apr 43, 

ibid., Anlagen, Anlage 116. (3) The- attack was 

Operation SCIPIO. 
540 

In the center advance by the 50th Division 

was held up by the antitank ditch which ran 

squarely across its path, and only during the 

middle of the day could this division gain its 

objective. 

By that time, with many of the Italians 

readily surrendering, the attack had spread 

west along the hills. But counterattacks by 

the 90th Light Africa Division by noon restored to the Axis control over Djebel er 

Roumana and most of the ridge dominated 

by Hill 275. The main body of DAK, Army 

Group Africa's only reserve, was still tied 

down in the battles at EI Guettar. But what 

little armor remained available to DAK 

was released to General Messe at 0930, 6 

April. Toward noon General von Arnim 

arrived at the headquarters of the First 

Italian Army. Concluding that the time for 

a general withdrawal had not yet arrived, 

he took immediate steps to improve the Axis 

situation. From the Fifth Panzer Army sector he ordered the 47th Grenadier Regiment sent to reinforce Bayerlein's German 

units. He also directed General Messe to 

supply transport for the 164th Light Africa 

Division. now immobilized in positions far 

to the west of the Allied attack sector, so 

that the division could be committed where 

it was needed. The counterattack, then in 

progress against Hill 275, was to be relentlessly continued to regain the vital defile beyond it. To make General Bayerlein's 

authority complete, von Arnim authorized 

him to issue orders to German troops in 

the army group commander's name. 

In the afternoon, the 15th Panzer Division counterattacked and contained elements of British 10 Corps which had penetrated deep into the Division Trieste's 

sector. Meanwhile the 200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 90th Light Africa 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Division which had recaptured most of Djebel er Roumana, was forced into the defense and finally, after running out of 

ammunition, withdrew from the dominating hill. In the afternoon the German defenders were exhausted by their efforts 

without having been able to restore the 

original defensive line. The time for another 

large-scale withdrawal had come. 

The next day's battle thus promised success to Eighth Army in breaking out of its 

bridgehead in the defensive positions, and 

in exploiting this break with armor on the 

plain beyond. Orders had already specified 

the separate lines of advance up the coast 

which the major units were to follow in the 

pursuit. The Axis command was aware of 

the prospects. The enemy's division and 

artillery commanders reported to First Italian Army as early as 1700,6 April, that they 

could not hold another day. Generals Messe 

and Bayerlein both supported this view in 

reporting to Army Group Africa. Three 

hours later, the orders to withdraw during 

the night were received. While the mobile 

elements rode to their specified stations, 

large portions of the 90th and 164th Light 

Africa Divisions were obliged to march on 

foot. 

Eighth Army opened the pursuit at ahout 

1000, 7 April, with 30 Corps to the east and 

10 Corps inland. At the same time some 

7,000 prisoners were conducted from the 

battlefield to enclosures. The defensive position, in spite of its many natural advantages, 

had thus succumbed with startling swiftness to an attack made in superior strength, 

and with fierce resolution and unremitting 

pressure. It was a particularly frustrating 

battle for the Germans, who were inclined 

to attribute the defeat to their Italian allies, 

blaming the troops for not fighting and the 
FROM MARETH TO ENFIDAVILLE 

command for ineffective leadership.42 But 

in view of the powerful British attack an 

impartial observer might well question 

whether even the best led force could have 

offered effective resistance with the means 

then available to the First Italian Army. 

Eighth Army pursued the Axis forces up 

the coastal plain toward Enfidaville, 150 

miles away, for the next five days. Its 

strength in operational tanks (almost 400) , 

guns (600), antitank guns (950), and antiaircraft (490) was overwhelming. The airline distance of the pursuit was greatly extended by continuous maneuvering. The 

Italian troops went ahead, covered by the 

German units. The British 30 Corps carried 

out the pursuit with the 51st Division, 23d 

Armoured Brigade, 20 I st Guards Brigade, 

and the 7th Armoured Division. The 50th 

and 4th Indian Divisions were left behind to 

reorganize the area from El Hamma to the 

sea. Advancing along the coastal road the 

30th Corps found its path barred by the 

90th Light Africa Division on the east and 

the 164th Light African Division in the center, while British 10 Corps (1st Armoured 

Division, 2d New Zealand Division, and 

8th Armoured Brigade, attached) contended with the 15th Panzer Division, reinforced by a Tiger tank battalion, on the inland flank. At the extreme west, the troops 

of General Cramer's German Africa Corps 

which had been engaged at El Guettar and 

Maknassy, or were in the hills farther north, 

pulled out of the battle areas in time to keep 

ahead of pursuit. The German troops of 

First Italian Army were controlled completely and directly by their chief, General 

12 (1) Montgomery, El Alamein to the Rio Sangro, pp. 91-92. (2) Kippenberger, Infantry Brigadier, pp. 296-97. (3) German CoS, First Italian 

Army, KTB, 6 Apr 43. (4) Memo, Cen Bayerlein for the KTB, ibid., 5 May 43. 

541 

Bayerlein, under instructions received from 

Army Group Africa. General Messe seems 

to have been generally notified of action 

already taken rather than presented with 

matters for his decision. 

The enemy crossed the Sfax-Faid road 

shortly after noon, 9 April. While Sfax was 

still being evacuated, a threat by the British 

First Army from Fondouk el Aouareb 

against Kairouan caused General Bayerlein 

to string out his troops from northwest to 

southeast throughout the following night. 

British troops took Sfax on the morning of 

10 April, and maintained light pressure 

until late in the evening on German troops 

south and southwest of Sousse. That night, 

the enemy troops shifted northwest of that 

port, and late on 11 April, they began arriving at the outlying defenses of the so-called 

Enfidaville position. British 9 Corps found 

Kairouan undefended. British 10 Corps 

shoved aside rear guards to capture Sousse 

at 0800 on 12 April. At the same time, 10 

Corps established contact with the British 

6th Armoured Division near Kairouan, and 

before nightfall on 13 April, forward elements of the 10 Corps had thrust to four 

miles south-southwest of Enfidaville, where 

they were stopped by German artillery. By 

13 April, then, the Allied line faced an 

enemy concentrated in northeastern Tunisia. Contact was made at points extending 

from Enfidaville on the southeast through 

Pont-du-Fahs and Medjez el Bab to 

Sed jenane. 43 

The Eighth Army's operations had seriously cut down the strength of Italian First 

43(1) AFHQ C-3 Daily Rpts, 151-59, 7 Apr15 Apr 43. (2) Eighth Army's casualties, 2-16 

April were 2,708 (602 killed, 1,557 wounded, and 

559 missing). Info supplied by Cabinet Office, 

London. 
542 

Army." Ammunition was critically low, the 

replacement troops could not be furnished 

with all normal weapons, and morale was 

naturally shaken. However, the enemy command felt relieved that the Allies had failed 

to take advantage of the retreat to destroy 

Messe's army!5 

The line to which these troops had been 

withdrawn consisted at best of rudimentary 

defensive works. On 10 April, General 

Messe recommended to General von Arnim 

that the line be drawn back somewhat into 

the foothills, but von Arnim refused!G Gen-

.. First Italian Army was reduced by 10 April 

1943 as follows: 

Division Young Fascists 

5 battalions (much depleted) and 27 guns 

Division Trieste 

4 battalions (much depleted) and 29 guns 

Division Pistoia 

2 battalions (being reconstituted) and 31 guns 

Divisions Centauro and Spezia 

practically destroyed 

Corps and army artillery 

7 105-mm. and 10 149-mm. guns 

90th and 164th Light Africa Divisions 

together they equal one infantry division (-) 

15th Panzer Division 

equal to a combat team 

Army artillery 

a few heavy batteries 

Heavy antiaircraft 

7 batteries (approximately) 

Memo, First Italian Army to Army Group Africa, 

10 Apr 43, in German CoS, First Italian Army, 

KTT3, Anlagen, Anlage 150. 

45 MS # T -3 (Nehring et al.), Vol. 3a. 

" (I) Memo, First Italian Army to Army Group 

Africa, 10 Apr 43, in German CoS, First Italian 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

eral Bayerlein then set forth his own estimate, that the Enfidaville position was such 

only in name, and that with the supplies 

of ammunition so limited it simply could 

not be held. Finally, on 14 April, General 

von Arnim, after having inspected the positions himself, agreed. He also directed 

that Italian and German units should be 

interspersed, and he sustained General 

Bayerlein in a disagreement with General 

Messe over which division should have the 

mission of defending the coastal road to 

Enfidaville. Accordingly, instead of the 

Young Fascists Division, the 90th Light 

Africa Division was committed there. During the next fortnight, the Eighth Army 

was to engage in some hard fighting but, for 

the present, the story of its activities must 

be left in order to consider what had been 

happening during the past month along 

the deep western flank and in the Eastern 

Dorsal." 

Army, KTB, Anlagen, Anlage 150. (2) German 

CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, II Apr 43. 

47 Major sources for the pursuit up the coast are: 

(I) Montgomery, El Alamein to the Rio Sangro, 

pp. 89-94. (2) Messe, Come Fini' La Guerra in 

Africa, pp. 135-66. (3) German CoS, First Italian 

Army, KTB, 31 Mar-14 Apr 43. (4) MS # D~ 

315, The operations of the 164th Light Africa 

Division from the Chott Position to the end of the 

fighting in Africa, 29 Mar to 13 May 43 (Generalmajor Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein). (5) MS # 

T-3 (Nehringet al.), Vol. 3a. 
CHAPTER XXVIII 

Gafsa, Maknassy, and EI Guettar 

(17-25 March) 

18 Army Group's Plan for II Corps 

The operations by II Corps in March 

were intended to accomplish a threefold 

purpose. Headquarters, First Army, issued 

a formal directive prescribing the corps mission shortly before II Corps passed to 18 

Army Group's direct control,1 The II Corps 

was to draw off reserves from the enemy 

forces facing the Eighth Army; to regain 

firm control of forward airfields from which 

to furnish assistance to Eighth Army; and 

to establish a forward maintenance center 

from which mobile forces of Eighth Army 

could draw supplies in order to maintain 

the momentum of their advance. This prospective supply point was to be established 

at Gafsa, which the II Corps was to retrieve from an Italian garrison by an attack to start not later than 15 March. 

Troops not required for the defense of 

Gafsa could then demonstrate toward 

Maknassy as a menace to the enemy's line 

of communications along the coast. In the 

meantime, the passes in the Western Dorsal from Sbiba southwestward to EI Ma el 

1 Ltr of Instruc, 2 Mar 43, in II Corps AAR, 15 

Mar-10 Apr 43. 

Abiod were to be firmly held, while the 

airfields at Thelepte, in front of the Allied 

defensive line, were to be regained for the 

use of Allied fighter units. Of the enemy's 

combat troops, AFHQ estimated that 

45,100 Germans and 28,000 Italians were 

in the Mareth-Matmata defenses, and 

11,400 German and 12,800 Italians in the 

Gabes-Gafsa-Chott Position area. The garrison at Gafsa, with security forces to the 

west of it, amounted, AFHQ thought, to 

7,100 Italians of the C entauro Division; 

eastward, from Sened to Maknassy were 

only 800 German and 750 Italian combat 

troops.2 If this appraisal of the opposing 

forces was correct, the enemy would be 

forced to send reserves to try to stop the II 

Corps. The American forces had chiefly to 

avoid being caught in a weak situation during an enemy spoiling attack or by a counterattack provoked by an initial American 

success. 3 They were not expected to advance southeast of Gafsa. 

The plans of 18 Army Group for the II 

2 AFHQ G-2 Est 6, Axis Order of Battle, 12 

Mar 43. 

'(1) AFHQ G-2 Rpt 129, 16 Mar 43. (2) II 

Corps G-2 Est 18, 16 Mar 43. 
544 

Corps prescribed a subsidiary role which 

naturally disappointed its more confident 

American officers. The directive in effect 

prohibited an American advance to the sea 

and envisaged a hesitating movement subject at all times to 18 Army Group's approval, a program which indicated lack of 

confidence in the capacity of II Corps to 

execute a full-scale operation on its own 

responsibility. The higher echelons of command apparently considered the capabilities of the American units to be only partly 

developed. The February setback had revealed deficiencies and had presumably 

shaken the morale of participants. The 

forthcoming operations were therefore designed to permit small successes and the 

application of training lessons taught in battle schools instituted by 18 Army Group 

during the preceding fortnight. A few such 

victories, it was hoped, even though minor, 

would bring the performance of American 

units up to the required level by developing 

their capacities and fortifying their selfrespect. But the Americans, particularly the 

more aggressive ones like the new corps 

commander, General Patton, tugged against 

the restraining leash from the start! 

Both 18 Army Group and Army Group 

Africa thought of the area in which the II 

Corps would undertake its March offensive 

operations as the deep northwestern flank 

of the Axis forces in the coastal region south 

of Gabes. A potential Allied thrust from the 

Tebessa area had available two major avenues of approach. The main route ran 

through the mountain-walled valley, north 

of the chotts. This valley could be entered 

at Gafsa and followed to either a southeastern or northeastern exit. The second route 

lay just to the north of that valley, and was 

• (1) Alexander, "The African Campaign," p. 

874. (2) Patton Diary, 25 Mar 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

separated from it by the long mountain ridge 

between Gafsa and Mezzouna. It too was 

protected throughout its eastern half by a 

mountain screen, for north of the ridge between Gafsa and Mezzouna a loop of somewhat lower hills extended between Djebel 

Goussa (625), near Station de Sened, and 

Djebel Zebbeus (451 ), north of Maknassy. 

The Allied forces intending to proceed along 

either of these avenues would necessarily 

begin by taking Gafsa. (Map X) 

That oasis was the key. It lay in an exposed position, from a military standpoint, 

and had changed hands several times. When 

Field Marshal Rommel broke off his February offensive, he left there elements of 

Division Centauro which were linked with 

the main body of Fifth Panzer Army by 

small forward defense units in the F aidMaknassy area, and with the Army Group 

Africa reserves nearer Gabes. Whether in 

Allied or Axis possession, Gafsa was near 

the outer end of a line of communications, 

and correspondingly vulnerable. Tebessa 

was eighty-four miles to the northwest, 

while Sbeltla, either via Feriana and Kasserine, or by way of Bir el Hafey, was almost as far to the north. Fald pass, on the 

other hand, was seventy-two miles northeast by the most direct highway, and Maknassy was fifty miles east-northeast. Although American troops were relatively 

familiar with part of this area, they knew the 

Gafsa-Gabes valley chiefly from the maps, 

on which important topographical features 

were inexactly represented. Initially, Operation WOP, as the II Corps designated the 

undertaking, did not provide for sending 

American troops, except defensive and reconnaissance forces, beyond Gafsa into this 

valley.5 The 1st Infantry Division was to 

'II Corps FO 3, 12 Mar 43, in 1st Armd Div 

Hist, Vol. VII. 
GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR (17-25 MARCH) 545 

make the attack on Gafsa, with the 1st 

Armored Division initially protecting the 

northeastern flank of the advance, while 

troops of the French Southeast Algerian 

Command were to operate on the other 

flank south of the line Metlaoui-Djebel 

Berda (926). 

If II Corps should continue toward Maknassy, an advance contemplated as the 

second phase of the attack, its elements 

would be on both sides of the mountain 

ridge extending between Gafsa and Mezzouna. At its western end the bare and rugged slopes of Djebel Orbata (1165) rose 

abruptly to a crest of about 3,500 feet. The 

contours of this somewhat twisting ridge 

softened, and the crests were lower, along 

its eastern half. Trails through its deeply 

eroded gulches and defiles were narrow and 

few. Contact between the two forces on 

either side would be restricted to the barest 

minimum from Gafsa to Sened village, that 

is, about halfway to Maknassy, and from 

that point to the tip of Djebel Bou Douaou 

(753), five miles east of Maknassy, would be 

severely limited. Simultaneous attacks along 

both sides of the ridge would have to be 

relatively independent of each other. 

The Corps Plan: Operation WOP 

General Patton took over command from 

General Fredendall at Djebel Kouif on the 

morning of 6 March, after conferences with 

Generals Eisenhower and Smith in Algiers 

and with his new superior, General Alexander, and others in Constantine. G Time be-

• (1) Memo of conf at Constantine, CinC AF 

with CG 18 A Gp, 7 Mar 43, in CinC AF Diary, 

7 Mar 43. (2) Patton later described Alexander 

as "extremely able and very fine to serve under." 

Ltr, Patton to Marshall, 29 Mar 43. WDCSA 370 

Africa 11 Apr 43. (3) Patton Diary, 5-7 Mar 43. 

fore the operation was to begin was already 

short, and plans and preparations had to 

be expedited and co-ordinated. The tentative plans for II Corps, 1st Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division, were 

considered in a commanders' conference 

on 8 March 1943, and with some minor 

modifications, were then approved by the 

new commanding general. General Alexander and the Chief of Staff, 18 Army 

Group, General McCreery, spent the next 

two days at II Corps headquarters while 

inspecting the principal elements of the 

corps. D Day was set back from 15 March 

to 17 March, closer to the Eighth Army's 

scheduled attack, by army group orders of 

13 March, despite Patton's apprehensions 

that the enemy might strike first.7 The II 

Corps' role in the forthcoming army group 

operations was, Patton decided, to be like 

that of Stonewall Jackson in the Second 

Battle of Manassas. The corps was to conduct a flank battle which would assist 

Eighth Army to break through enemy lines, 

as Jackson had aided Longstreet's corps.8 

The Axis top command had recognized 

the Allied threat to the garrison at Gafsa 

but discounted it a few days before the at1 (1) Patton Diary, 13 Mar 43. (2) The II Corps 

staff then included the following: chief of staff, 

Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey; G-l, Col. Samuel L. 

Myers; G-2, Col. B. A. Dickson; G-3, Col. Kent 

C. Lambert; G-4, Col. Robert W. Wilson; artillery, 

Col. Charles E. Hart; antiaircraft, Col. Robert H. 

Krueger. The staff of the 1st Armored Division inc1uded: chief of staff, Lt. Col. Grant A. Williams; 

G-l, Lt. Col. Loris R. Cochran; G-2, Lt. Col. 

M. M. Brown; G-3, Lt. Col. Hamilton H. Howze; 

G-4, Lt. Col. Percy H. Brown, Jr.; artillery, Col. 

Robert V. Maraist. The staff of the 1 st Infantry 

Division included: assistant division commander, 

Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.; chief of staff, 

Col. Stanhope B. Mason; G-l, Lt. Col. Charles 

Ware; G-2, Lt. Col. Robert W. Porter, Jr.; G-3, 

Lt. Col. Frederick W. Gibb; G-4, Lt. Col. C. M. 

Eymer; artillery, Brig. Gen. Clift Andrus. 

• Patton Diary, 14 Mar 43. 
546 

task, after Kesselring's assurances to Mussolini that the place was in no danger. The 

force there was strong, he declared, and the 

approaches were very heavily mined. Kesselring, in the same spirit of optimism, also 

advised the Duce to expect a defensive success even at the l'vIareth Position, where the 

British attack was expected as soon as the 

moon turned full. General von Arnim 

thought well of a project to make a swift 

spoiling attack through Gafsa as far, perhaps, as Tozeur. At his prompting, General 

Hildebrandt went to El Guettar and on beyond Gafsa toward Fcriana on the morning 

of 15 March, arranging tentatively with 

General Calvi de Bergolo for an attack by 

his 21st Panzer Division and part of Division C entauro to take place about 19 

~farch, and to extend to Feriana and 

MetIaoul.lO 

The II Corps on 15 March consisted of 

the 1st, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions, the 

1st Armored Division, the 13th Field Artillery Brigade ~ Brig. Gen. John A. Crane) 

and the seven battalions of the 1 st Tank 

Destroyer Group (Col. Burrowes G. Stevens), which had been parceled out to the 

four divisions and to corps reserves, plus 

corps troops-in all, 88,287 men. 11 Army 

group retained control of the 9th Division 

(minus Combat Team 60), the 34th Division, and the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. 

, Mins of eonf, Mussolini, Ambrosio, and Kesselring. II, 13 Mar 43, Nos, 54, 60. In Italian Collection, Item 26, 

1. Memo dated 15 Mar 43, in 21st Panzer Div, 

KTB Anlagen, Band 9. 

11 (1) 1st TD Gp Outline Plan WOP, as given 

in M5g 1355, 12 Mar 43, Entry 64, in II Corps 

G-3 J nl. This lists the following tank destroyer 

hattalions: 6015t attached to the lst Infantry Division, 701st and i76th attached to the 1st Armored 

Division, 8l::lth attached to the :14th Infantry Division, 894th attached to the 9th Infantry Division, 

805th and 899th in II Corps [('serves. (2) II Corps 

AAR,2 May 43, App. A, 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

For tralIllIlg, 75 officers and 175 enlisted 

men of the U.S. 2d Armored and U.S. 3d 

Infantry Divisions were attached to II 

Corps.12 British raiding parties from Eighth 

Army were active in front of II Corps behind the enemy's lines, while in the general 

area of the road through Bir el Hafey to 

Sidi Bou Zid and in the mountains to the 

south, two squadrons of the Derbyshire 

Yeomanry under II Corps control engaged 

in energetic reconnaissance. ' :l 

In the seizure of Gafsa, General Allen's 

reunited 1 st Infantry Division was to be reinforced by the 1st Ranger Battalion and 

by several battalions of field artillery and 

tank destroyers. Elements of General \Vard's 

1st Armored Division, with Combat Team 

60 attached, had the initial mission of providing protection against Axis attacks from 

the directions of Sidi Bou Zid or Maknassy. 

Meanwhile the two reinforced divisions 

completed preparations behind the main 

line of defense at the Western Dorsal, which 

General Ryder's 34th Infantry Division held 

in the Sbiba sector and General Eddy's 9th 

Infantry Division (less the 60th Combat 

Team), from Kasserine to EI .Ma el Abiod. 

General Allen's command was scheduled to 

approach Gafsa via Feriana on the night 

preceding its 17 March attack. General 

\\lard's forces were to emerge through Kasserine pass and via Thelepte move to an 

assembly area east of Djebel Souinia (679), 

near the Gafsa·Sidi Bou Zid road. 

The spring rains began falling heavily a 

few days before 17 March, filling the 

gullies, soaking the ground, and confining 

heavy vehicles to the roads. The II Corps 

sent a provisional detached armored flank 

"~1sgs, 14 Mar 4:1, Entries 153 and 159, in II 

Corps G-3 Jnl. 

,; (I) II AAR, 10 Apr +3. (2) Msg, 23 

Mar 43, Entry 1 in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 
GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR (17-25 MARCH) 547 

force to the Sbeitla area under command 

of Col. Clarence C. Benson, Commanding 

Officer, 13th Armored Regiment, on the 

night of 14-15 March, while Combat Command B of the 1 st Armored Division started 

by daylight on 16 March to make certain 

of reaching its positions in time for the next 

day's attack. The 19th Combat Engineers 

had in only three days graded a new dirt 

road from the vicinity of TheIepte directly 

to the Gafsa-Sidi Bou Zid road. This new 

route, named "the W clvert road," was used 

by General Ward's units. The 1 st Engineer 

Battalion lifted some 2,000 mines along the 

routes of approach beyond Feriana used by 

General Allen's attacking elements.' I 

The Occupation of Gafsa 

General Allen's plan for taking Gafsa, in 

this first operation by his whole division 

against Axis troops, was thorough. Division 

intelligence estimates of the defending forces 

likely to be found there ran to only two 

battalions of infantry, one or two of field 

artillery, up to two companies of tanks, and 

a military police battalion-all Italian. The 

enemy troops at Gafsa could summon reinforcements from El Guettar (one infantry 

battalion), and from the stations along the 

railroad to Maknassy, or from the Faid area. 

\Vithin one day, troops from as far away as 

Gabcs could be brought to Gafsa, provided 

they were not needed for the impending 

Mareth battle. But the enemy garrison at 

Gafsa was expected only to delay the American advance and then to fall back to prepared positions in the mountains either 

toward Gabcs or toward Maknassy. No enH (1) II Corps AAR, 10 Apr 43. (2) 1st Diy 

G-3 Rpt, 15 Jan-8 Apr 43, pp. 7-8. (3) 18 A Gp 

Sitrep 139, 16 Mar 43, AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 

emy counterattack was deemed likely unless the Mareth Position was abandoned." 

Indeed, road traffic observed just before the 

day of the attack indicated that most of the 

Gafsa force had already withdrawn.' " 

Following a half hour's air bombardment, 

regimental combat teams of the 16th (Col. 

d' Alary F echet) and 18th Infantry (Col. 

Frank U. Greer) and one reinforced battalion of the 26th Infantry (Col. George A. 

Taylor) were to make the assault. Five complete battalions of field artillery and one 

battalion of antiaircraft artillery were to be 

employed. The 1st Ranger Battalion would 

be ready, after first supporting the cast flank, 

to reconnoiter to El Guettar and to seize 

an area from which, subsequently, Combat 

Team 26 might attack beyond that village. 

Following the assault, the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion was to be ready to intervene south of Gafsa against any enemy 

mechanized forces that might arrive there 

next day. The 1st Armored Division would 

hold one combat command of three battalions ready to furnish support from the Station de Zannouch area. Participation by the 

13th Ficld Artillery Brigade and by the 1 st 

Battalion, 213th Coast Artillery (AA), was 

to be under corps control.'7 

In preparation for the attack the 1st Infantry Division made an approach march 

of about forty-five miles during the night of 

16-17 March, one that was executed speedily and on a close schedule. The attacking 

elements detrucked north of the Gafsa area 

before daylight. The artillery was ready to 

support an assault at 0800, but the infantry 

was held back until 1000, despite the 

enemy's visible retreat, to await a scheduled 

preparatory air bombardment. By noon, 17 

" 1st Inf Diy G-2 Est, 10 Mar ·13. 

'f< 18th Inf FO 14, 13 Mar 43, Intcll Annex. 

11 1st Diy FO 16, 11 Mar 43. 
548 

March, the 18th Infantry had reached the 

eastern edge of Gafsa; shortly thereafter 

Company I, 16th Infantry, was leading the 

3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, into the village 

from the northwest; and the 3d Battalion, 

26th Infantry (reinforced), was near the 

western limit. They had overrun enemy 

security detachments and although mines 

and booby traps were plentiful, they found 

Gafsa to be free of defenders. While 1st 

Armored Division reconnaissance entered 

Station de Zannouch northeast of Gafsa on 

the route to Maknassy, reconnaissance and 

outpost forces of the 1 st Infantry Division 

continued toward EI Guettar and Djebel 

Mdilla. At Mdilla they made contact with 

some French troops, after initially mistaking 

them for an enemy group. The seizure of 

Gafsa was an encouraging exercise rather 

than a hard battle like those in which the 

1st Infantry Division was later to earn fame. 

During 18-19 March, a period marked by 

drenching rainstorms, the entire division occupied the place and organized for defense 

against counterattack or air bombardment. 

At the same time the 1 st Ranger Battalion 

oecu pied El Guettar on 18 March and sent 

patrols to establish contact with the enemy 

who was holding prepared defense positions 

behind the Keddab wadi. 1

' 

The Seizure of Station de Sened 

The situation at Gafsa justified General 

Patton on 18 March in concluding that the 

second phase of the II Corps' attack could 

be undertaken next day. While the 1st In-

" (1) 1st Div AAR, 11 Nov-14 Apr 43, including 1 st Div Arty Rpt of Opns, 4 Mar-8 Apr 43; 

16th, 18th, and 26th Inf AAR's. (2) Entry 319, 17 

Mar 43, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. (3) 1st Ranger Bn 

AAR, 14 Mar 43. (4) AFHQ G-3 Rpt, 18 Mar 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

fantry Division organized Gafsa strongly for 

defense, the 1 st Armored Division (reinforced) could be committed to the seizure 

of Station de Sened. The bulk of General 

Ward's division was already in areas selected 

with a view both to defense against incursion from the northeast and to the concentration needed to attack Station de Sened. 

Although some elements, and in particular 

Benson's armored task force directly under 

II Corps control, were in the vicinity of 

Sbeitla, and Combat Command B (Robinett) was near Bir el Hafey, Combat Command A (McQuillin) was in the Zannouch 

area and Combat Command C (Stack) 

with the 60th Combat Team (de Rohan) 

were southeast of Djebel Souinia. It was 

General Ward's intention to bring Combat 

Command A northeastward along the railroad line from Gafsa toward Station de 

Sened in conjunction with an approach by 

Combat Command C and Combat Team 

60 over hills north of the objective. But if 

the military situation near Gafsa permitted 

an immediate start of the second undertaking, the weather made postponement unavoidable. Much against his wishes, General 

Patton was forced to accept the fact that the 

mud had made an armored attack on 19 

March out of the question. 10 

Streams were full to overflowing. The 

" (1) II Corps AAR, 10 Apr 43. (2) Patton 

Diary, 19 Mar 43. (3) Msg, Entry 181, in II 

Corps G-3 J nl. This message reports the presence 

at Sbe'itla at 1930, 14 March, of the following units 

of the 1st Armored Division: the 3d Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment (mediums); the 68th Field 

Artillery Battalion; Company A, 701 st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company C, 16th Armored 

Engineers (C). By an agreement between Generals 

Ward and Eddy, the 84th Field Artillery Battalion 

was to remain at Sbeitla. The 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry (9th Division), was already there. The 8 i st 

Reconnaissance Battalion moved to the area east 

and southeast of Sbeitla. 
GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR (1725 MARCH) 549 

earth was soggy and in many places there 

were extensive shallow pools. Bivouac areas 

were flooded. The soft roads were quickly 

cut into deep ruts by heavy trucks or 

churned into a viscous blanket by tank 

tracks. Travel cross-country became impos-

,.ible for wheeled vehicles. Indeed, to assist 

them in reaching the roads from their parks 

required extraordinary effort and much 

extra time. The weather's one compensation was the fact that it restrained enemy 

air activity.20 

While most of the 1st Armored Division 

remained immobilized on 19 March, Patton drove through the downpour to review 

the situation with Ward and Robinett. He 

was enthusiastic and confident, concerned 

only that the enemy should not be given 

opportunity for a spoiling attack while the 

Americans waited for conditions to be 

wholly satisfactory. He would have preferred 

to have the attack on Station de Sened made 

by as much infantry and artillery as could 

be moved on tracked vehicles rather than 

to wait for full co-ordination between the 

elements approaching Station de Sened 

from the north and McQuillin's armored 

force from Zannouch. Ward's orders for the 

attack to be made early on 20 March were 

issued to McQuillin, de Rohan, and Stack, 

while Robinett shifted his forces southwestward to the divisional assembly area, and 

Benson, under II Corps' control, took up 

the position north and east of Djebel el 

Hafey (682) thus vacated by Combat 

Command B.21 

The plan of attack involved a march 

extremely taxing for de Rohan's combat 

'" Robinett, Among the First, MS, pp. 451-53. In 

pri\'ate possession. 

" (l) 1st Armd Div Opn Imtrue 12, 19 Feb 43. 

team."2 It was to climb the western slopes 

of Djebel Goussa to reach the dominating 

terraces along its southern face, which rises 

abruptly some 600 feet above the floor of 

the valley, in order to take the enemy's hill 

positions from the rear. From the heights, 

the attacking force could command the entrenched positions which the enemy had 

constructed on the flats below them near 

Station de Sened. At the same time, Combat 

Command C would be crossing a difficult 

series of ridges and shoulders at the southwestern extremity of the Djebel Madjoura 

(874) across a valley from Djebel Goussa, 

protecting the northeastern flank and giving 

fire support. 23 Its objective was the exit 

(three miles north of Station de Sened) 

from this valley to the broad :\faknassy 

Valley, Working together, the 60th Combat Team and Stack's force would be able 

either to cut off the enemy force defending 

Station de Sened or to compel it to hasten 

its retreat in order to avoid encirclement. 

McQuillin's armored force, which would 

at the same time attack the enemy with 

infantry and artillery from the west, might 

be the beneficiary of the outflanking movement by Stack's and de Rohan's commands, 

22 Combat Tl"am 60 (9th Infantry Division) then 

consisted of: the 60th Infantry Regiment; the 60th 

Field Artillery Battalion; Company C, 15th Engim:ers: Company C, 9th Medical Battalion; thref' 

platoons, 443d Coast Artillf'ry (AA) Battalion 

(SP): dctaehment, 9th Signal Company; Provisional Truck Company, Headquarters, 60th Infantry. 60th Inf Hist, 22 Mar-9 Apr 43, 5 Jul 43. 

'., (1) Combat Command C, 1st Armored Division, then eonsisted of the following: the 6th ArmOff'd Infantry (less thf' 2d and 3d Battalions): 

the 1st Battalion, 13th Armored ; the 

68th Fidd Artillery Battalion; Company B, 16th 

Engineers. It was reinforced for later operations 

east of Maknassy b}' the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry; 

the 58th Field Artillery Battalion: and Company 

B, 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion. (2) CCC 1st 

Armd Div AAR, 18 Apr 43. (3) 60th Inf Hist, 

1943. 
550 

General Ward's plan for the seizure of 

Station de Sened worked in general as he 

had foreseen. The 60th Combat Team approached Djebel Goussa during the night 

of 19-20 March and throughout the next 

day pushed to the heights while Combat 

Command C, 1st Armored Division, was 

gaining its objective somewhat earlier and 

holding positions from which to support 

Combat Team 60, if necessary. By evening 

of the same day Combat Command A had 

struggled from Zannouch to a mine field 

west of Station de Sened. The enemy was 

driven out by artillery fire, some fleeing 

northeastward at dawn of 21 March into 

the path of Combat Command C, which 

took seventy-nine prisoners and two 47 -mm. 

guns after a brief engagement. Another 

part of the garrison took refuge at Sened 

village, where it finally surrendered on 23 

March to Company G, 60th Infantry, supported by elements of the 91st Field Artillery Battalion. A few escaped from Sened 

to Sakket on the other side of the mountains only to be captured there by troops 

of the 1st Infantry Division. Station de 

Sened had thus been taken on 21 March 

by maneuver rather than by storm, and 

without the losses normally to be expected 

in a frontal attack. But the exertion left the 

infantry, particularly of the 60th Combat 

Team, too tired to begin another attack 

effectively.21 

T he Advance Beyond M aknassy 

The capture of Gafsa and Station de 

Sened left only a demonstration to be made 

toward Maknassy, twenty miles farther east 

in order to complete execution of 18 Army 

" (1) II Corps AAR, 10 Apr 43. (2) CCC 1st 

Armd Div AAR, 18 Apr 43. (3) 60th Inf Hist, 

1943. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Group's original instructions to II Corps. 

But those instructions had already been 

changed. On 19 March, Patton returned to 

his headquarters in Feriana after his raindrenched visit to the headquarters of the 

1st Armored Division to find General McCreery, Chief of Staff, 18 Army Group, 

with General Alexander's new plans and 

orders for II Corps. The Corps was now to 

seize the high ground east of Maknassy 

and to send a light armored raiding party 

to the Mezzouna airfields to destroy enemy 

installations there. No large forces, however, were to pass beyond a line extending 

from Gafsa through Maknassy heights, 

Fai'd, and Fondouk el Aouareb. Later, after 

the British Eighth Army had passed up the 

coast beyond Maknassy, the II Corps was 

to be reduced by the transfer of its U.S. 

9th Infantry Division to relieve the British 

46th Division on the far northern flank and 

to operate under British 5 Corps within 

British First Army. The 34th Infantry Division would at about the same time sideslip to the north in order to attack Fondouk 

el Aouareb gap along the axis MaktarPichon. It thus appeared that after the 

enemy had moved north of F ondouk el 

Aouareb, the II Corps would be faced with 

the ignominious prospect of being pinched 

out of the Allied line. These instructions 

would not only prohibit any American advance to the sea but would confine the role 

of II Corps to merely threatening the enemy's western flank without ever actually 

attempting to cut him off; they would also 

prevent the corps, except for 9th Infantry 

Division, from participating in the last 

stage of the campaign. In accordance with 

orders, the II Corps sent attacking forces 

not only to Maknassy but to a defile east 

of El Guettar, on the southern side of Djebel 

Orbata, the purpose being- to draw off en-
GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR ( 17- 25 MARCH ) 551 

RAILROAD STATION AT MAKNASSY. 1st Armored Dzvision men taking a break 

after discovering that Maknassy was free of the enemy . 

emy troops which might otherwise 

strengthen the defense of the Mareth Position. There the main attack was to begin, 

it will be remembered, on the night of 20-

21 March. 

On 21 March General Patton drove to 

General McQuillin's command post in 

order to hurry Combat Command A to a hill 

mass five miles northeast of Station de 

Sened which appeared to the corps commander a possible place of advantage which 

must be denied to Maknassy's defenders. At 

the same time, Combat Command C moved 

northeastward, along a camel trail, and then 

swung south to reach the main route from 

Station de Sened to Maknassy at a point 

about halfway between the two places. For 

a stretch, Combat Command B followed, 

but instead of turning south, continued 

eastward in the valley to an area from which 

to guard the northern flank of the attack on 

Maknassy, and assist in preparatory artillery 

fire on the village. The exhausted troops of 

the 60th Combat Team, meanwhile, assembled just north of Sened station .~ " 

Advance elements of Combat Comma nd 

C, 1st Armored Division, approached Mak-

'-'( 1) Patton Diary, 21 Mar 43. (2) eee 1st 

Armd D iv AAR, 18 Apr 43. (3) 60th Inf Hist, 

19B. (4 ) Robinett, Among the First, p . 45 5. 
552 

nassy before midnight and subjected the 

place to an interdictory shelling, hoping to 

discourage the enemy from laying mines 

and booby traps before withdrawing. Colonel Stack received reinforcements during 

the night and disposed these troops for the 

approaching action. Not until 0715 next 

morning did reconnaissance discover that 

Maknassy was free of the enemy, whom 

some of the inhabitants declared to have 

withdrawn onto the hills near the road to 

Mezzouna, east of the village.2G 

General Ward was then faced with a critical choice. He could attempt to occupy the 

hills five miles east of Maknassy in a daylight attack without waiting to reorganize 

or to prepare for stiff resistance. Enemy 

aviation could strike from airfields only a 

few minutes away, as it had during the battles along the lVledjerda river in November 

and December. If General Ward waited 

until fully ready, the enemy might be able 

to strengthen his hold on the hill position 

controlling the exit from the Maknassy to 

the Mezzouna side of the mountains, so that 

the effort to dislodge him would be difficult 

and costly. The incentive to take great risks 

was slight, because of the orders the Americans were then operating under to threaten 

the Axis line of communications but not to 

commit any large force beyond the hills. 

'Yard decided to make a deliberate, soundly 

organized attack. Although there is a certain amount of inconclusive evidence that 

this choice was approved at the time by 

General Patton, the stronger evidence is to 

the contrary, and Patton was later to conclude that the choice had been founded 

upon considerations which were unduly 

defensive in character, and to condemn 

"ccc 1st Armd Div AAR, 18 Apr 43, 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

himself for not having gone forward that 

day to urge on the advance.27 

18 Army Group Revises II Corps Mission, 

22 March 

At this point, the role of the II Corps 

was again modified. On 21 'March General 

Montgomery, when he recognized that the 

Eighth Army would be engaged for several 

days in trying to breach the main Mareth 

Position near the coast, and before he decided to shift the principal effort to the El 

Hamma gap, suggested to General Alexander that the U.S. II Corps could be of 

substantial assistance by a strong armored 

thrust through Maknassy to cut the SfaxGabes road. At 18 Army Group, such a 

project was considered to be too ambitious, 

particularly in view of the likelihood that 

the 10th Panzer Division would intervene 

during its execution. But General Alexander 

issued instructions to II Corps on 22 March 

to prepare for a possible effort to disrupt 

the enemy's line of communications and 

destroy his supply dumps southwest of 

Mahares. General Patton was to make ready 

a strong mobile column for such a mission. 

Meanwhile, the limited missions of the 1 st 

Armored Division east of Maknassy and of 

the 1st Infantry Division east of EI Guettar 

remained unchanged. Only the tempo was 

2' (1) Gen, Jean Bouley, then lieutenant colonel 

and liaison officer with the 1st Armored Division, 

stated from memory on 1 August 1949 to General 

Robinett that Patton had approved the decision 

not to attack until after dark, during a roadside 

conference with Ward just west of Maknassy after 

the village had been taken, Memo of conv, Robinett 

with Bouley, Rastatt, Germany, 1 Aug 49. OCMH. 

(2) Patton sent his chief of staff, General Gaffey, 

to he with General Ward on 22 March but did not 

go there himself. He thought the 1st Armored 

Division had "dawdled," Patton Diary, 22 Mar 43, 

(3) Entry 106,22 Mar 43. in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 
GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR (17-25 MARCH) 553 

accelerated somewhat. 28 That afternoon 

General Patton gave oral instructions to 

General Ward to seize the heights from 

Meheri Zebbeus, north of Maknassy, to 

Djebel Bou Douaou, southeast of it; to organize and occupy that ground; to send a 

light mobile armored force to raid the Mezzouna airfields; and, in addition, to prepare 

a second armored force and keep it in readiness to harry the enemy's lines of communications in the vicinity of Mahares, more 

than fifty miles east of Maknassy on the 

coast. Patton directed that the attack be 

made that night. 2

" 

The enemy had already recognized the 

operations by Eighth Army and U.S. II 

Corps as concentric attacks upon General 

Messe's First Italian Army. Kesselring decided to commit the reserves of the Fifth 

Panzer Army in holding the heights east of 

Maknassy and to release the 10th Panzer 

Division from Army Group Africa reserve, 

for a counterattack toward Gafsa under the 

control of General Cramer's Headquarters, 

German Africa Corps.'" 

Colonel Dickson, G-2, II Corps, correctly 

concluded on 22 March that an attack by 

the 10th Panzer Division was imminent, 

either at Maknassy or El Guettar, and 

General Patton acted accordingly.31 

The day's reconnaissance on 22 March 

confirmed the reports by inhabitants of 

Maknassy village that the enemy had retreated into the hills, or beyond. The main 

" Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

"Memo, Col Lambert for CG 1st Armd Div, 23 

Mar 43, Entry 163, in II Corps G-3 In!. This confirms oral instructions of the previous day. 

on Daily Rpt, Comando Supremo to OKH/Gen· 

StdHjOp Abt, 21 Mar 43, in OKH/GenStdH/Oj 

Abt, Meldungen des Ob Sued, v.l .lII.-30 .IV .43. 

Band I. 

,., 1!l A Gp Appreciation, 1800, 17 Mar 43. This 

anticipated an enemy armored counterstroke cith,>r 

via Maknassy or Fald. AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 

ridges of the Eastern Dorsal at this southeastern extremity are in the pattern of a large 

figure 5, with Maknassy directly south of 

the vertical stem and about five miles from 

the heights which form the curving section. 

Djebel Zebbeus (451) and Djebel Djebs 

No.1 (369) are north of Maknassy. Djebel 

Dribica (209), Djebel Naemia (322), 

Djebel Bou Douaou (1753), and Djebel 

Bou Hedma (790) form the semicircle, with 

the latter's long ridges extending far to the 

southwest of Maknassy. Between Djebel 

Djebs No.1 and Djebel Dribica, the Leben 

wadi, crossed by a railroad and by a highway bridge north of the village, drains from 

the Maknassy plain to the coastal flats. With 

its tributaries, the Leben wadi forms a 

lengthy tank obstacle north and northwest 

of Maknassy. Djebel Dribica leads southeasterly to Hill 322 on Djebel Naemia, with 

which it is connected by an L-shaped ridge. 

The road and the railroad from Maknassy to 

Mezzouna and Mahares run side by side 

over the southern shoulder of Djebel Naemia, except for a distance of nearly two miles 

through an opening between Hill 322 and a 

second Djebel Djebs, where the railroad 

loops less than a mile south of the road. This 

Djebel Djebs No.2 (312) rises east of a 

broader gap between Hill 322 and Djebel 

Bou Douaou, like a stopper barely removed 

from a bottle, and is admirably situated to 

control movement through the defiles northwest or southwest of it. Djebel Bou Douaou 

and Djebel Bou Hedma extend south and 

west with crests somewhat higher than Maknassy's other neighboring hills and with good 

observation of the "Gumtree road" running 

along their southern bases from El Guettar 

to Mahares. 

Combat Command B's reconnaissance 

observed a few groups of enemy vehicles 

pulling back through the gaps northeast of 
554 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

BRIG. GEN. PAUL M. ROBINETT (facing camera), Commander of Combat Command 

B, 1st Armored Division, on reconnaissance, Maknassy valley . 

.N[aknassy, and drew artillery fire from the 

yicinity of Meheri Zebbeus; but along the 

route of the road and railroad, the enemy 

kept out of sight. 

Enemy Defense of Maknassy Pass, 

23-25 March 

At 14 I 5 on 22 March General Ward issued written orders for an assault at 2330 

that night. a2 He specified that Colonel 

Stack's forces should attack Djebel Dribica 

and Hill 322 north of the pass and Djebel 

Djebs (2), beyond and southeast of it, while 

Combat Team 60 (~) simultaneously 

" 1st Armd Di,' FO 10,22 Mar 43. 

gained control of Djebel Bou Douaou. He 

directed Combat Command B (General 

Robinett) to protect the northern flank in 

the vicinity of Djebel Zebbeus and the upper 

reaches of the Leben wadi. Of the two bare 

and rocky hills north of the pass, Djebel 

Dribica seemed the more imposing obstacle 

and was assigned to the more experienced 

I st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry 

(Colonel Kern), while Hill 322 on Djebel 

N aemia was to be taken by the 3d Battalion, 

60th Infantry (Lt. Col. John J. Toffey, Jr.), 

attached to Combat Command C. This battalion was still weary from climbing Djebel 

Goussa near Station de Sen ed, and from 
GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR (17-25 MARCH) 555 

trying for most of the day to work through 

traffic-clogged roads to the assembly area 

after a night move toward Maknassy.33 

The attack beyond Maknassy was too 

late and too weak. The two battalions under 

Colonel de Rohan, to be sure, met no opposition in securing Djebel Bou Douaou, and 

next morning were ordered to occupy the 

area north of it as far as the road and railroad, and to assist by fire the southern wing 

of Combat Command C. On the northern 

flank after a three-battalion artillery preparation of thirty minutes duration, the 1st 

Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, took Djebrl Dribica in competent fashion against 

only light opposition. But the 3d Battalion, 

60th Infantry, found that Diebel Naemia, 

with Hill 322 in the center, wa:;; by far the 

most strongly defended area. A mine field 

barred the approach to the crest, and was 

covered by concentrated fire from wellplaced machine guns both on the hill ahead 

and on adjacent slopes to the right and 

left. One company commander was killed. 

The battalion commander went forward 

to reconnoiter and was pinned down. The 

attack stopped. The men dug in to wait for 

daylight. 

Next morning, 23 March, the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, pressed forward again. 

This time the attack was supported by' the 

1 st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, and 

by fire from the remainder of Combat Team 

{;O, across the road. ] ust as the enemy was 

heginning to fall back in the belief that the 

Americans were breaking through, Colonel 

Lang reached the battlefield and was able to 

make the small German force hold on until 

the first reinforcements arrived. At about 

t he same time, on the Allied side, Colonel 

"(I eee 1st Armd Div AAR, 18 Apr 43. (2) 

60th Inf Hist, 1943. 

Toffey was wounded. The German force 

that held the vital Hill 322 was Rommel's 

former personal guard. At the time of the 

imminent break-through it had been reduced to only eighty infantrymen.~' At another critical juncture the covering fire of 

a few tanks aided the enemy to occupy positions along the eastern edge of Djebel Dribica. Hill 322, dominating the pass, remained the objective of a succession of 

American attacks that evening, including 

one supported by four artillery battalions. 

Success seemed so likely that routes were 

reconnoitered for a light armored force preparing to raid the Mezzouna airfields during 

the night of 23-24 March.'" 

After the first attacks were stalled on Hill 

322, a stronger force concentrated for an 

assault at 0700, 24 March. Three battalions 

of infantry, supported by two companies of 

tanks and four battalions of artillery, plus 

some 75-mm. tank destroyers, attacked the 

defenders from the north, west, and south. 

The 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, on the 

west, and the 3d Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry (less Company I), on the south, 

received direct supporting fire from a company of medium tanks, while the 1 st Battalion plus companies G and I, 6th Armored 

Infantry, was protected by others on its eastern flank as it attacked along the ridges 

from the north. 1

'; Throughout the night the 

enemy had been digging in while small 

"Th" rpinforcemenls hastily thrown into th(' 

threatened sector were elements of Kampfgruppe 

Lang (Col. Lang, eommanding offien of the 69th 

Panzer Grenadier Regimen(. 10th Panzer Division). 

These German units were nominally under General Imperiali's 50th Special Brigade. See Fifth 

Panzer Army, KTB, 23 Mar 4~, and :\is # D--166 

(Lang), Part II. 

1st Armd Div Sitr<'p, 1100, 23 Mar 43. About 

700 prisoners of war, mostly Italians, wrre reported. 

'G Rpt, 1st Armd Div to G-3 II Corps, 0855, 24 

Mar 43, Entry 197, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 
556 

groups of reinforcements built up his total 

number to an estimated 350.31 The Americans, their difficulties greatly increased because of the enemy's excellent air-ground 

co-operation, were unable to dislodge these 

troops after hard ground fighting.a8 

Continued failure to gain Hill 322 threatened to frustrate that part of the mission 

assigned to II Corps which appealed most 

to General Patton. He had protested to General Eisenhower the prohibition On American advance beyond Fondouk el Aouareb.39 

He probably counted on the raiding party 

from Maknassy to Mezzouna to demonstrate 

that if such an advance were authorized, it 

could lead to even bigger successes, and for 

that reason had instructed General Ward 

to prepare for an as yet unauthorized aggressive action in the area near Mahares. 

He returned from the greatly extended 1st 

Infantry Division, where he had spent much 

of 24 March, to discover that Ward's at-

" (1) Kampfgruppe Lang, sent to this area by 

Fifth Panzer Army on 22 March 1943, began arriving next day, and by 26 March consisted of: 

Regimental Staff and 1st Battalion, 69th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment; lst Battalion, 86th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment; 26th Africa Battalion; nine 

Mark VI plus fifteen Mark III and IV tanks of 

501 st Panzer Battalion; 580th Reconnaissance Battalion; about thirty men from Kasla O. B. (Rommel) and one company of Kesselring's headquarters 

guards, and of artillery, 9th Battery, 90th Artillery 

Regiment; one battery of Italian 105's; two bat· 

teries of 210-mm. mortars supported by one 170-

mm. gun; two batteries of 88-mm. dual-purpose 

Flak guns; and one platoon of 20·mm. antiaircraft 

guns. Hq, Fifth Panzer Army, KTB, 26 Mar 43. 

MS # D-166 (Lang), Part II. (2) Lang was correctly identified and his units ascertained in the 18 

Army Group Appreciation, 2000, 25 March 1943. 

(3) Kampfgruppe Lang passed to the command of 

Headquarters, DAK (Cramer), on 28 March 1943. 

"Rpt, 1st Armd Div to II Corps, 1420, 24 Mar 

43, Entry 211, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

'" (1) Patton Diary, 22 March 1943, says that 

he sent General Bradley to Algiers on this mission. 

(2) Bradley, A Soldier's Slor}', pp. 56-58, says that 

Bradley obtained Patton's permission to go. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tack on the narrower front east of Maknassy was still unsuccessful. The tanks had 

thrown their tracks on the rough and rocky 

ground and had been of minor service. The 

infantry had lacked the impetus to carry 

the attack through to success. One estimate 

of the time still needed to get the pass 

was twenty-four hours.10 The enemy was 

described as "obviously moving to concentrate" on the 1st Armored Division's front 

and as stepping up the pace of his frequent 

air attacks. General Ward made a request 

for "all available air cover for our troops 

moving up now, and for active reconnaissance, and strafing of the enemy moving up 

on our front this p. m. and tomorrow."' 

Calling General Ward to the telephone, 

General Patton ordered him personally to 

lead an attack next morning which had to 

succeed.42 The orders were partially carried 

out, for the division commander did lead 

an attack by three battalions of the 6th 

Armored Infantry, which began without artillery preparation, and won a brief success. 

But they could not hold the hill under heavy 

fire from German mortars, machine guns, 

and artillery. By noon, 25 March, General 

Ward decided that he must suspend the 

attack while the troops recovered from near 

exhaustion and reorganized.13 In view of 

the enemy's decision to concentrate mobile 

armored elements against the weakening 

American forces of the 1st Infantry Divi40 (1) Phone ConY, Akers and Curtis, 1905, 25 

Mar 43, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. (2) CCC 1st Armd 

Div AAR, 19 Apr 43. 

41 Rpt, 1st Armd Div to II Corps, 1420, 24 Mar 

43, Entry 211, in II Corps, G-3 Jnl. 

.2 (1) Patton Diary, 24 Mar 43. (2) Gen Ward 

Personal Diary, 24 Mar 43. In private possession. 

I, (1) Msg, CG 1st Armd Div to CO 6th Inf, 

1200, 25 Mar 43, Entry 352, in II Corps G-3 Jnl 

(2) Patton Diary, 24 Mar 43. Colonel Kern was 

severely wounded on 24 March and General Ward 

slightly injured on 25 March. 
GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR (17-25 MARCH) 557 

sion east of El Guettar, II Corps ordered 

a provisional armored protecting force under Colonel Benson to be shifted to the 

vicinity of Gafsa. H The initiative at Maknassy was allowed to pass to the enemy 

while the situation east of El Guettar was 

being corrected. 

The 1st Infantry Division Holds the Enemy 

Near El Guettar 

The 1st Infantry Division's part in the 

operations specified by 18 Army Group's 

instructions of 19 March was an attack east 

of El Guettar along the Gumtree road south 

of the Gafsa~Melzouna mountains, to be 

launched after the 1st Armored Division 

had neutralized Station de Sened. This 

drive easterly from El Guettar was to be 

made down the great valley on a front 

which furnished a severe test of tactical efficiency and which broadened beyond the 

capacities of a single infantry division to 

defend or control. 

From Gafsa to EI Guettar, the road 

curves around the southwestern portion of 

Djebel Orbata (1165) and runs along its 

southern base past the Chott el Guettar to 

a road fork some twelve miles distant from 

Gafsa. At this fork, the road to Gabes 

branches off to the southeast, passing between the Djebel Berda (926) complex on 

the south and jumbled hills at the north 

which rise to the horseshoe-shaped Djebel 

cl Mchehat (482). The other branch, 

Gumtree road, continues along the southern 

base of Djebel Orbata and the ridge of 

which it is a part, and strikes across the 

coastal plain north of the Sebkret en Noual 

H ( 1) MS)2;, Col Akers to Col Benson, 2000, 21 

Mar 43, Entry 56, in II Corps G~3 Jnl. (2) II 

Corps AAR, 24-25 Mar 43, 10 Apr 43. The provisional forc", consisted of a battalion of medium 

tanks, a battalion of artillery, and a battalion of 

infantry. 

to Mahares on the sea coast. Three miles 

east of the El Guettar road fork, the Gumtree road enters a long narrow defile between a spur of the Djebel Orbata and the 

Djebel el Ank (621). Near the eastern end 

of the defile are the village of Bou Hamran 

and the junction with a track which leads 

through the mountain hamlet of Sakket and 

over the ridge to the village of Sened. 

The 1st Infantry Division was expected 

to capture the defile at Djebel el Ank and to 

press eastward along the Gumtree road. It 

could not advance very far without becoming vulnerable to an attack up the road 

from Gabcs on the southern side of Djebel 

cl Mchcltat, an attack which could strike 

the division on the flank and either cut it 

off from Gafsa or force a withdrawaL The 

road to Gabes was connected with the Gumtree road by a dirt road through El Hafay 

at the northeastern end of Djebel Chemsi 

(790) some twenty-five miles east of EI 

Guettar. A force from either Gabes or from 

a point much farther north could therefore 

approach El Guettar from the southeast, via 

the Gumtree road and its El Hafay connection with the Gabcs~Gafsa road. The 10th 

Panzer Division, once it had assembled, 

could strike either at Maknassy or toward 

El Guettar and, if the latter, then by either 

the Gabcs road or the Djebel el Ank defile. 

After a day of reconnaissance, observation, and preparations, the 1st Infantry Division opened its attack on the night of 20~ 

21 March. To capture the defile on the 

road to Mahares, the 1st Ranger Battalion 

was sent on a circuitous and difficult tenmile detour over the shoulders of Djebel 

Orbata which brought it back to the road 

at a point east of the Italian defenders for 

a surprise attack from the north. 4

;; At the 

451st Rang<"r Bn AAR, 14 Mar~IO Apr 43, 9 

Apr43. 
558 

same time, the 26th Infantry, aided by artillery preparation and the cover afforded 

by foothills and great rocks, pushed 'itraight 

along the road, closing in to gain a complete victory. The Americans took over 700 

prisoners and after converting captured 

positions for defense toward the east, continued the attack in order to gain control 

over all of Djebel el Ank before going on 

to Bou Hamran"'; 

The 18th Infantry's attack moved southeastward along the road from EI Guettar to 

Gabes and into the adjacent hills against 

dements of Division Centauro. At night, 

and under a hazy moon, the infantry crossed 

a plain where mere six-inch grass was the 

main cover, and where the enemy had already demonstrated that his observation in 

daylight was alert and accurate, and his 

artillery fire swift and precise. Getting 

through a mine field, the troops infiltrated 

past Hill 336 north of the road to take it 

at daybreak with a rush from the rear. General Patton and some of his staff visited the 

hill soon afterward. The first stage of the 

attack "according to plan" yielded 415 

prisoners. During the remainder of 21 

March, the 18th Infantry, limited by the 

enemy's rapid laying of artillery fire on 

moving men, and by very active air strafing 

and dive bombing, particularly of command 

post'l and artillery positions, strove to press 

through foothills onto the Djebel el Mcheltat. Battery A of the 33d Field Artillery 

Battalion lost two 105's and two vehicles in 

a direct hit. At noon, 21 March, the divisional objective was established as a line 

from a crest three miles northeast of Bou 

Hamran to a point about fourteen miles to 

the southeast of El Guettar, a road junction 

east of Djebel el Kheroua (369). Casualties 

"; 26th Inf AAR, 11 Nov +2-14 Apr 43, 19 Apr 

+:~. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

by nightfall were fourteen killed and fortyone wounded. 47 

The Americans during the next day 

consolidated their gains east of El 

Guettar, for the Italians made no 

resolute counterattack and were driven off 

by artillery fire and Allied air action whenever their guns opened up or small groups 

of their tanks assembled. American advance was not as rapid as had been ex· 

pected. The troops improved their positions 

along the Gumtree road by having the 26th 

Infantry probe east of Bou Hamran. The 

16th Infantry occupied the western foothills of the Djebel eI Mchehat, and two 

battalions of tbe 18th Infantry occupied 

heights south of the Gabes road, at the 

northeastern tip of Djebel Berda. Contact 

with the enemy in this area late in the day 

(22 March) promised action of about the 

same tempo for tbe following morning." 

The operations by II Corps had been so 

well correlated with attacks by British 

Eighth Army as to make 22 March a critical day for the enemy. The seizure of Gafsa 

on 17 March had coincided with initial 

British exploratory attacks in the Mareth 

coastal sector. The capture of Station de 

Sened on 20-21 March had occurred while 

British 30 Corps began trying to punch 

through the ~1areth Line and when the 

" (I) 1 st Div G3 Periodic Rpt, 21 Mar 43; 

1 st Div G-3 Rpt, 15 J an-8 Apr 43, 17 Apr 43, 

p. 9. (2) Maj Sam Carter, The Operations of the 

1st Battalion, 18th Infantry (1 st Division), at El 

Gu('ttar, Tunisia, 17 March-25 March 1943, MS. 

Th(' Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., 1947-48. 

(3) 18th InfS-3 Jnl,21 Mar 43. (4) Capt Herbert 

A. Smith, The Operations of the 3d Battalion, 18th 

Infantry (1 5t Division), at EI Guettar, Tunisia, 

MS. The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., 1947 

48. (5) 26th Inf AAR, II Kov 42-14 Apr 43,19 

Apr 43. (6) Phone Conv, Col Gibb with Col Akers, 

1435 21 Mar 43, Enry 34, in II Corps G-3 JnL 

" 1st Div G-3 Periodic Rpt, 22 Mar 43. 
GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR (17-25 MARCH) 559 

INFANTRYMEN NEAR EL GUETTAR occupy ing the heights south if the Gabes road. 

New Zealand Corps was about to seize Hill 

201 south of El Hamma. By the time the 

1 st Armored Division reached Maknassy on 

22 March and the 1st Infantry Division 

pushed beyond El Guettar, the enemy was 

committing some of his reserves near 

Mareth and sending others to the El 

Hamma gap. He had only one mobile division available with which to try to check 

the American approach to the Gabes area, 

the 10th Panzer Division (- ) (Gen. Fritz 

von Broich). 

On 21 March, as noted, Army Group 

Africa released the 10th Panzer Division to 

the German Africa Corps for employment 

in a counterattack toward Gafsa. It was not 

apparent to the Allies where this attack 

would be made, although they were aware 

that it was building up. Actually, the German force assembled during the night of 

22- 23 March near Djebe1 Ben Khei'r (587, 

east of EI Hafay ). At 0300 the 10th Panzer 

Division attacked along the axis of the 

Gabes- Gafsa road to push northwestward 
560 

against the southern flank and perhaps the 

rear of the 1 st Infantry Division before 

daylight.49 

Reinforced American Infantry 

Versus German Armor, 23 March 

General Allen that night had the 26th 

Combat Team advancing along the Gumtree road, while the 1 st and 2d Battalions, 

18th Infantry, were engaged, as they had 

been since the preceding afternoon, in driving out Italian forces northeast of Hill 772 

on Djebel Berda, thus widening the front 

considerably. The trains of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, barely reached the cover 

of the foothills, after crossing in darkness 

from the northern side of the valley, when 

sounds of motors to the northeast were followed by an eruption of tracer fire and the 

echoing rumble of guns. At 0500, while 

darkness was still complete, an enemy motorized force was reconnoitering by fire the 

southern slopes of Djebel el Mcheltat. 

Daylight revealed the presence of the 10th 

Panzer Division, which was methodically 

sweeping the foothills and the lower ground 

north of the road before undertaking bolder 

measures. The 3d Battalions of both the 

18th and 16th Infantry were under direct 

attack. A spearhead moving up the valley 

was engaged by the 60 I st Tank Destroyer 

Battalion until about 0700. The main body 

of the enemy force was in full view of American observers on heights above the valley 

on either side, and from the German Africa 

Corps' command post on Hill 369."" 

40 Morning and Daily Rpt, 23 Mar 43, DB 

SOUTH to OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, in Meldungen des Db Sued, v. l.III.-30.IV .43, Band I. 

5<) ( 1) Carter's account cited n. 47 (2) , above. This 

is based on obs('fvation from a point of vantagc, 

and is relied upon for several dctails. (2) Kampfstaffel DAK, KTB, l.I.-12.IV.43, 23 Mar 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

At first the battle ran entirely in favor of 

the attacking Germans despite determined 

and courageous opposition. Their tanks and 

self-propelled guns, interspersed with infantry in carriers, rolled westward in a hollow square formation and at a slow but 

steady pace. Behind them, a column of 

trucks drove to a predetermined point at 

the western end of Djebel el Mcheltat and 

unloaded more infantry, which followed 

closely the armored rectangle ahead of them. 

Then the mass of the enemy separated into 

three prongs. One group turned northwest 

among the foothills east of Hill 336 overrunning the 32d Field Artillery and part 

of the 5th Field Artillery Battalions; another continued along the road; and the 

third, and much the largest, force tried to 

sweep the hills and northward along the 

edge of the Chott el Guettar. 

German tank-infantry teams overran the 

American artillery and infantry positions 

east of Hill 336 in engagements which 

brought some hand-to-hand encounter, and 

heavy American losses. A curving belt of 

mines extended from Chott el Guettar across 

the road and along the Keddab wadi to the 

southeastern base of Hill 336. There the tide 

of battle changed. 51 American artillery and 

the tank destroyers of the 601 st and 899th 

Tank Destroyer Battalions knocked out 

nearly thirty enemy tanks, and the mine field 

stopped eight more."2 Eventually, the morning attack was contained. The 10th Panzer 

51 This mine belt was partiy completed on the 

night of 21-22 March 1943. Msg, 1st Lt. J. W. Oxford, Jr., CO B 1st Engr Bn (C), to CO 18th CT, 

0335,22 Mar 43, in 18th lnf Jnl and Opns Rpt, 11 

Nov 42-14 Apr 43. 

'" The 60lst Tank Destroyer Battalion lost 

twenty-four guns, of which two were recoverable, 

and had only ninc others after this action. The 

899th Tank Destroyer Battalion lost seven tank 

destroyers (MIO's). Memo, Col Hcwitt for CG II 

Corps, 23 Mar 43, Entry 166, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 
U . S. ARMOR NEAR EL GUETTAR, 23 March 1.943. In foreground is a radioequipped half-track personnel carrier. A 75-mm. gun motor carriage M3 can be seen in the 

background. 
562 

Division pulled back a few miles to the east 

and prepared for a second attack. During 

this withdrawal enemy artillery and aviation 

harassed the American defenders, and 

Allied air units struck back repeatedly. The 

Germans towed their disabled tanks to a 

prepared maintenance point not far from 

where their infantry had first detrucked. 

During this interlude, and running a gantlet of enemy shells and Stukas, nineteen 

American jeeps rushed back for ammunition, all but six returning safely in time to 

oppose the next assault.'" Elements of the 

16th Infantry and the 1 st Ranger Battalion 

were put into the line along the Keddab 

wadi. Headquarters, 1st Division, was ready 

for the second attack (1645 hours) and 

aware of the enemy forces to be committed."" 

Preceded by a German air strike, and on 

the signal of a siren, the ground troops of 

the enemy attacked once more toward El 

Guettar. At 1830, word came that they were 

still advancing, with thirty-eight tanks in 

one group, but barely fifteen minutes later, 

an exultant report arrived from the 18th 

Combat Team: 

Enemy attacked as scheduled, preceded by 

dive-bombers which did little damage. 

Troops started to appear from all directions, 

mostly from tanks. Hit Anti-Tank Company 

and 3rd Battalion. Our artillery crucified 

them with high explosive shclls and they were 

falling like flies. Tanks seem to be moving 

to the rear; those that could move. 1st 

Ranger Battalion is moving to protect the 

flank of the 3rd Battalion, which was practically surrounded. The 3rd Battalion and 

" Smith's account cited n. 47 (4) above. 

" (I) The enemy units were: 2d Battalion, 69th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment .. 2d Batlalion, 86th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment; 10th }.1otorcycle Battalion; 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Panzer Regiment; 

<lnd the 4th Battalion, 90th Artillery Regiment. 

(2) 1st Div G-3 Rpt, IS Jan-8 Apr 43, 17 Apr 43, 

p. II. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

the Rangers drove them off and the 1 st Battalion crucified them. 55 

Thus at the close of 23 March, a reinforced American infantry division, well supported by Allied aviation, mainly by their 

artillery had stopped the bulk of an enemy 

armored division. 56 Kesselring's report to the 

OK''\! acknowledged substantial tank losses 

in the morning attack at the Keddab wadi; 

it called the efforts of the 601 st and 899th 

Tank Battalions a counterattack with tanks 

against the German north wing which had 

been repulsed, and it attributed the failure 

of the afternoon attack to superior Allied 

forces and a threatened penetration through 

the Italian-held positions on the northern 

edge of Djebel Berda.81 Although the 

armored counterattacks of 23 March were 

beaten off, the enemy by no means lost his 

determination to maintain an aggressive defense of the routes of Allied approach to the 

rear of Italian First Army. He might not 

succeed in plunging through the Americans 

with his armor, but he held strong defensive 

positions and could nibble incessantly with 

infantry and artillery, and with tanks used as 

artillery, at the American positions in the 

hills north and south of the Gabes and Gumtree roads. On 24 March he made some 

progress in each sector, especially in the high 

ground on opposite sides of the Gabcs road, 

and on 25 March, he succeeded in recapturing from the 1st and 2d Battalions, 18th 

Infantry, their most exposed position on one 

of the northeastern buttresses of Djebel 

"Rpt cited n. 54 (2) abow. 

5" 18 A Gp Sitrep lSI, 2359, 23 Mar 43. This 

cites 123 bomber sorties, includinp; 2 Hurribomber 

attacks on tanks, motor transport, and bivouacs east 

of EI Guettar, and continuous fip;htcr sweeps. AFHQ 

CofS Cable Log. 

"Intel! Rpt, Gomando Supr1emo to OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, 23 Mar 43, in Meldungen des Ob 

Sued, v. I.III.-30.IV.43, Band I. 
GAFSA, MAKNASSY, AND EL GUETTAR (17-25 MARCH) 563 

LOADING A I55-MM. HOWITZER during the enemy counterattack east of El Cuettar, 

23 March 1.943. 

Berda. When a German patrol reached the 

bare summit of Hill 772 there, mortar fire 

brought it scampering down. But the two 

battalions of the 18th Infantry, even with 

the 1 st Ranger Battalion, managed only to 

hold their position; they could not extend it 

without larger reinforcements, perhaps another entire regiment. With that much 

strength, they believed that they could take 

all of Djebel Berda and the hills east of it, 

and thus open the road to Gabes for American armor. Had such a regiment been sent, 

or had the two battalions simply remained 

in possession, the Germans might not have 

been able to withstand the 9th Infantry Division's efforts later to drive them off. But 

during the night of 25-26 March the battalions were ordered to withdraw through 

the 1st Ranger Battalion. Colonel Darby's 

Rangers, with a purely defensive role, held 

a south flank position in the foothills west of 

Djebel Berda for the next two days.5K 

"" (I) 1st Inf Div G-3 Rpt, 15 Jan-8 Apr 43, 17 

Apr43,p.l1. (2) IstRangerBnAAR, 14 Mar-IO 

Apr 4:1, 9 Apr 43. 
CHAPTER XXIX 

II Corps Operations Beyond El Guettar 

18 Army Group Again Reuises 

the Plan for II Corps 

By 25 March General Patton's operations 

had successfully drawn off one of the German armored divisions which otherwise 

might have opposed the British Eighth 

Army.' General Montgomery's attempt to 

circumvent the Mareth Position through 

the gap southwest of EI Hamma was scheduled to enter a crucial phase on the night of 

26-27 March. After the First Italian Army 

had been uprooted by this maneuver and 

driven in retreat to the Chott Position, the 

II Corps was expected to be of additional 

assistance if it could send an armored task 

force as far as the Chott Position and perhaps farther up the coast. In the meantime, 

by stepping up offensive action at all pos-

,ible points along the Eastern Dorsal, it 

could pin down Axis forces at the time when 

success would bring fluidity to the battle 

near EI Hamma. General Alexander accordingly brought to General Patton at 

noon, 25 March, a new directive for the II 

Corp:;. The corps base line was to be advanced from the Western Dorsal to extend 

between Gafsa and Sbei'tla. He released the 

1 The U.S. 1st Infantry Division reported ras· 

ualties for the period 17-25 March, inclusive, 

51 killed, 309 wounded, and 57 missing. Entry 334, 

26 Mar 43, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

U.S. 9th and 34th Infantry Divisions to II 

Corps for employment in current offensive 

operations. The 9th Division (less Combat 

Team 60) was to attack simultaneously 

with the 1st Infantry Division southeast of 

EI Guettar. The 34th Division (less the 

133d Combat Team) was to attack by itself 

the Axis-held gap through the Eastern Dorsal at Fondouk el Aouareb. 

The II Corps was to abandon the attempt 

to use the pass east of Maknassy to move an 

armored column onto the coastal plain, 

southwest of Maharcs, a plan which had 

been under consideration since 22 March. 

The U.S. 1 st Armored Division would leave 

in the area a force containing a medium 

tank battalion, two artillery battalions, and 

the 60th Combat Team, and would assemble in concealment at least three other battalions of medium tanks ready for commitment in a mobile column thrusting southeastward toward Gabes from El Guettar. 

Operations east of EI Guettar would thus 

be on a much enlarged scale. The 26th Infantrv's zone astride the Gumtree road 

vvould be stabilized while other elements of 

the 1st Infantry Division and the 9th Infantry Division together opened a gap between Djebel cl Mcheltat (482) and 

Djebel el Kheroua (369), southeast of EI 

Guettar, through which the armored column 

could proceed. The attack along the EI 
II CORPS OPERATIONS BEYOND EL GUETTAR 565 

Guettar-Gabcs road would be executed in 

three phases: first, obtaining the road junction east of Djebel el Kheroua; second, 

securing a position as far forward as the road 

loop through EI Rafay between Djebel 

Chemsi (790) and Djebe1 Ben Khelr 

(587); and third, sending the U.S. 1st 

Armored Division to Djebel Tebaga Fatnassa (270), a hill on the western flank of 

the enemy's Chott Position, at a time to be 

determined by 18 Army Group, and with 

the mission of harassing the enemy's line 

of communications without incurring a 

major tank battle. 2 

In preparation for these operations 

ordered by 18 Army Group on 25 March, 

Patton directed General Ward to have General McQuillin defend the pass east of Maknassy with a much reduced force against 

the enemy's increasingly aggressive pressure, 

to send to Gafsa as secretly as possible the 

81 st Reconnaissance and 6th Field Artillery 

Battalions after dark on 28 March.~ Until 

further orders from II Corps Ward was to 

hold at Maknassy the remainder of the 1st 

Armored Division not assigned to McQuillin! 

At the same time that the II Corps was 

attacking at F ondouk el Aouareb and 

strengthening and concentrating its thrust 

beyond El Guettar, the Southeast Algerian 

2 (1) Patton Diary, 25 Mar 43. (2) II Corps 

AAR, 10 Apr 43. (3) 18 A Gp, Opn Instruc 9, 25 

Mar 43. AFHQ Micro Job IDA, Reel 6C. 

.1 McQuillin's command was to consist of his Combat Command A headquarters; the 1st Armored 

Regiment (less 1st and 2d Battalions) ; the 3d Battalion, 6th Armorcd Infantry; Combat Team 60: 

two battalions of the 5th Armored Fidd Artillery 

Group (the 58th and 62d); one battny, 443d 

Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion (SP); and the 776th 

Tank Destroyer Battalion. 

, (1) Ltr, Gen Gaffey to Gcn Ward, 28 Mar 43, 

Entry 9, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. (2) 1st Armed Div 

G-3 Periodic Rpt 56, 30 Mar 43. (3) II Corps FO 

4, 26 Mar 42, and FO 5, 28 Mar 43. 

Command (Gen. Robert Boissau) at the 

right of II Corps was directed by 18 Army 

Group to press forward in the valley between Djebel Berda (926) and Djebel el 

Asker (625), to the south. 

Two Divisions East of El Guettar, 

28-29 March 

The II Corps renewed its attack towards 

Gabes at 0600, 28 March, as the enemy 

farther southeast was occupying the Chott 

Position and abandoning the Mareth Line. 

Opposite II Corps the German Africa Corps 

had built up a strong defensive front. (lv[ ap 

16) Its backbone was the 10th Panzer Division (less elements committed east of 

Maknassy under Group Lang) interlaced 

with units of the Division Centauro. The 

enemy, making the best possible use of terrain well suited for defense, concentrated his 

forces in strongpoints, organized during 

earlier weeks, and effectively supported 

them with artillery and mortars. German air 

reconnaissance had detected Allied movements in the IVlaknassy-Sened area. The 

enemy interpreted these movements to indicate an American shift to the defensive in 

the sector east of Maknassy. But at the same 

time enemy intelligence concluded that these 

moves of Allied armored groups constituted 

a threat to the 10th Panzer Division's north 

Hank via passes southwest of Djebel Bou 

Douaou (753), Mei'ch, Sened, or Sakket. 

(See Map x.) This assumption was altogether incorrect. Nevertheless, it caused 

General von Broich to abandon the idea of 

striking with his main armored force toward 

E1 Guettar along the Gumtree road. Instead, 

he held Group Reimann (2d Battalion, 86th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment, reinforced 

by elements of the 7th Pan:er Regiment 

and artillery) in positions north of the 
566 

ACTIONS NEAR EL GUETTAR 

28 March-I Apr Il 1943 

____ ~:':OI~~~c~:[~D'I'NC:E . 

~ ~~~::(-•. /UL.I'N r A'Ofllr LI NE , 

".".,,,.,.,,. f~: ~H -IU LI~~ (ROlli' ",I E . 

E/t!lfQIUJnJ ;/1 mr'~'s 

o 

MAPI 

Gumtree road at Djebel Hamadi (567) and 

Djebel Bou Small (608) to act as his flank 

force. Von Broich ordered the 2d Battalion, 

69th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, defending the northernmost portion of the curving 

horseshoe of Djebel el Mcheltat, known as 

Rass ed Dekhla (536), to extend its line 

eastward to conform with Group Reimann's 

new defensive mission. The 49th Panzer 

Pionier Battalion, meantime, continued to 

hold the main portion of Djebel el Mcheltat 

with its Hill 482. The gap between it and 

the northeastern tip of Djebel Berda was 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

) 

held by elements of the Centauro Division. 

To their left was the 10th Motorcycle Battalion extending the Axis line to include Hill 

772 on Djebel Berda. Other Italian units 

guarded the extreme south flank as far as 

Djebel el Asker. 5 

On the Allied side, in the EI Guettar sector, the 9th Infantry Division, using five of 

its six available infantry battalions, was expected to seize Hill 369 at the eastern end of 

" (1) 10th Panzer Division, Ie, Taetigkeitsberieht, 28-29 Mar 43. (2) KampfstafJel DAK, KTB, 

l.I.-12.IV.43, 24-28 Mar 43. 
II CORPS OPERATIONS BEYOND EL GUETTAR 567 

Djebel el Kheroua." The division had never 

gone into attack as a unit. The prospective 

test was anything but easy. With imperfect 

maps and inadequate reconnaissance the 

division was to attack at night over several 

miles of open plain in an effort to reach the 

Djebel Berda complex. Those hills were 

steep, deeply eroded into numerous gorges, 

lacking in vegetation, jagged and craggy. 

Trails were difficult. Movement through the 

valleys and gulches was controlled from the 

adjacent high ground. Progress in any given 

direction over the often precipitous slopes 

and twisting ridges would be very difficult 

to maintain. Several peaks and high crests 

provided excellent observation enabling 

those who possessed them to control fire or 

direct the maneuvers of toiling troop units 

which could not see each other. In the 

opinion of those who fought there, the 

Djebel Berda, and particularly its eastern 

extremity, was a natural fortress capable of 

being defended by minimum forces for an 

indefinite period. 7 

, (1) Combat Team 60, 9th Division, was at. 

tached to the 1st Armored Division. (2) Staff of 

the 9th Infantry Division: commanding general, 

Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy; assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Donald A. Stroh; chief of staff, 

Col. Samuel A. Gibson; G~I, Lt. Col. C. F. Enright; G-2, Maj. Robert W. Robb; G~3, Lt. Col. 

Alvar B. Sundin; G~4, Maj. George E. Pickett; 

artillery commander, Brig. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin. 

7 (1) When they later analyzed the problem in 

the light of their experience, they concluded that 

Hill 772, the paramount observation point, should 

first have been captured and held, after which 

simultaneous attacks should have been made from 

west to east along the ridges of three lower mountains [Draa Saada el Hamra (316), Djebel el 

Kheroua, and Djebel Lettouchi (361)] with the 

object of capturing Hills 290, 369, and 361 respectively. Attempts to capture Draa Saada el Hamra 

or Djebel el Kheroua by direct assault against their 

northwestern faces across the open plain and valley 

were almost certain to result in costly failure. (2) 

9th Inf Div AAR, 26 Mar-8 Apr 43, 25 Aug 43, 

Annex B, Terrain Study. 

The 9th Division plan of attack for 28 

March provided that General Eddy's two 

regiments should assemble at the northwestern base of Djebel Berda, in the area 

which had been abandoned three nights 

earlier. The 47th Infantry (Col. Edwin H. 

Randle) was to move to attack Hill 369 

from the west and south, one battalion going along Djebcl Lettouchi, another along 

Djebel el Kheroua, and a third remaining 

in reserve but following toward Djebel el 

Kheroua.8 The 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, 

was to be in division reserve behind the 47th 

Infantry. The remainder of the 39th Infantry was to be motorized and held, near 

the northeastern corner of the Chott el Guettar, also in division reserve. The plan modified another prepared the previous day, and 

was issued too late to enable all units to 

make the necessary adaptations and preparations." 

The attack of 28-29 March started out 

as planned, with the 47th Infantry heading 

for Hill 369 in column of battalions from 

assembly points at the foot of Djebel Berda. 

The 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, followed 

by bounds. But the silhouette of Draa Saada 

el Hamra ridge (with Hill 290) was mistaken for Djebel el Kheroua (with Hill 

369). The 1st and 3d Battalions, 47th Infantry, captured the ridge but did not gain 

and occupy Hill 290, at its tip. The plans 

A 47th Inf Hist, 1943, pp. 5~6. 

, Another handicap may have been lack of maps 

showing Hill 290 at the northeastern extr('mity of 

the Draa Saada cl Hamra and giving an adequate 

picture of the topography west and southwest of 

the divisional objective, Hill 369. But the I st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions had I: 100,000 

maps which show all these features (1st Infantry 

Division J oumal; 1 st Armored Division History). 

Large-scale maps were issued to II Corps units 

throughout the campaign. Ralph F. Weld et al., 

Corps of Engineers: Engineer Operations Against 

Germany, a volume in preparation for the series 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 
568 

MAJ. GEN. MANTON S. EDDY. 

(Photograph taken in 1945.) 

went further astray through the miscarriage 

of a maneuver by the 2d Battalion, 47th 

Infantry. Taking a route of approach during the latter part of the night somewhat 

to the south, this unit marched into a confusing jumble of hills and rough terrain 

between Djebel el Kheroua and Djebel Lettouchi, remained out of touch with the regiment for about thirty-six hours, and lost its 

battalion commander, intelligence officer 

and communication officer, its entire Company E, and the commanders of two other 

companies. I

" The reserve battalion (1st Battalion, 39th Infantry), committed on division order to advance toward the hills 

around Djebel el Kheroua, also became lost 

10 (1) In all, 232 enlisted men and 10 officers 

were taken prisoners. 10th Panzer Diu, Ie, Taetigkeitsbericht, 28 Mar 43. (2) 47th lnf Hist, 1943, 

p. 6. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

for more than a day during which, with 

parts of the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry, it 

fought as a provisional battalion under 

Capt. James D. Johnston in the area of Hill 

772. Thus the first day's abortive operations 

had been costly to the division, which now 

faced the second day with only two more 

infantry battalions on which to draw when 

attacking its true objective for the first time. 

General Eddy arranged during 28 March 

to send the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, 

after dark to the vicinity of Hill 290, which 

it was to skirt in order to approach Hill 369 

from the north for a night bayonet attack 

while the two battalions of the 47th Infantryon Draa Saada el Hamra ridge assisted 

from the west. This venture was also frustrated. The truck column moving down the 

Gabes road drove much too close to Hill 

290, from which it received heavy fire. 

Badly demoralized and severely hurt, most 

of the column pulled out and hurried back 

all the way to the starting point. The remainder, pinned down and unable to move 

in daylight, straggled back thirty-six hours 

later." 

Hill 369 remained in seeming immunity, 

jeopardizing any passage down the road to 

Gabes and prolonging the first phase of the 

II Corps operations under the army group 

instructions of 25 March. The battalions 

on Draa Saada el Hamra ridge and in the 

Djebel Berda complex would have to reorganize before being able to launch an 

effective assault for the capture of Hill 369, 

and the shifts would have to be made at 

night. They could not begin reorganizing 

until the night of 30-31 March and that 

meant that no strong attempt would be 

possible before 1-2 April, although attacks 

on Hill 290 were kept up in the interval. 

11 39th lnf AAR, 25 Mar-8 Apr 43. 
II CORPS OPERATIONS BEYOND EL GUETTAR 569 

Operations thus far had demonstrated not 

only how attacks could go wrong but also 

that the enemy's positions were hewn from 

rock and very effectively placed for shelter 

or defensive fire." 2 Mortars became the favored infantry weapon, once the battle in 

the hills demonstrated their superior effectiveness, while relatively low amounts of 

rifle ammunition were used." 

The 1 st Infantry Division meanwhile 

executed its part of the II Corps attack on 

28 March on a front narrowed by the 9th 

Infantry Division's assumption of the sector from Djebel Berda to the Gabes road 

(inclusive) . General Allen's sector extended 

from this road to the hills north of the Gumtree road. He placed the 16th Infantry on 

the southwest near Hill 336, and the 26th 

Infantry to the north. The 18th Infantry he 

initially held north of Djebel el Ank 

(621).14 By 29 March, the 1st Infantry Division attack, especially in the northeast 

sector along Gumtree road, was progressing 

much more rapidly than the assault of the 

9th Infantry Division farther south. As the 

German line was pulled back, the 18th Infantry ( - ) advanced toward Djebel 

Hamadi and Hill 574, thus protecting the 

flank of the 26th Combat Team, which captured Rass ed Dekhla and subsequently 

turned south in an envelopment movement 

aiming for Hill 482 on Djebcl cl Mcheltat. 

The 16th Infantry also attacked that objective. But its advance was far more diffi12 (1) 9th Div AAR, 25 Aug 43. (2) 47th Inf 

Rist, 1943, pp. 8-9. 

'''47th Inf Hist, 1943, p. 20, estimates an expenditure of 4,200 60-mm., 3,500 81-mm. light, 

and 2,000 81-mm. heavy mortar rounds in tht' ten 

days' fighting by that unit. 

t! 1st Div AAR, 25 Aug 43, Overlay 11, to accompany G-3 Periodic Rpt, 2400, 27 Mar 43, and 

1st Di\· FO 20, 27 Mar 43. 

cult since it had to be executed over a fourmile stretch of open terrain and in full view 

of the enemy. Progress consequently was 

slow and costly. At the end of the day the 

Germans were still in firm possession of 

Hill 482. 

Some units of the 1 st Armored Division 

had already assembled, as noted above, to 

defend Gafsa in the event of a German 

break-through east of El Guettar, and General Patton ordered others brought down 

during the night of 28-29 March. The units 

from Maknassy had been summoned in anticipation of an armored attack from El 

Guettar down the Gabcs road. General Patton had tried to conceal the assembly of this 

force, and was angry because the last contingent arrived at 0700, 29 March, instead 

of before dawn. The day of the 29th passed 

without the capture of Hill 482 on the 

southern portion of Djebel el Mcheltat, an 

event which was to have concluded the first 

phase of II Corps operations east of El 

Guettar. "Weare trying to be simple, not 

change our plans when once made, and 

keep on fighting," wrote General Patton to 

General Marshall that day as he outlined 

what the II Corps had thus far been doing." 

The Armored Attack Toward Gabes, 

30 March-l April 

Late on 29 March, 18 Army Group for 

the fourth time revised its directive to the 

U.S. II Corps. The situation was critical. 

The attack at Fondouk el Aouareb was failing.'" The one at Maknassy had been abandoned. The infantry operations to open a 

gap for the armor southeast of E1 Guettar 

"Ltr, Patton to Marshall, 29 Mar 43. Copy in 

WDCSA 370 Africa, 11 Apr 43. 

,., See pp . .5 78-81 below. 
570 

were making no progress. At this juncture, 

therefore, General Alexander instructed 

General Patton to organize the defense of 

Maknassy, Sened, and Gafsa in accordance 

with a most detailed assignment of Patton's 

units, and to launch an armored force next 

morning to break its own way through the 

enemy's barrier on the El Guettar-Gabcs 

road ahead of the infantry. After some of 

the difficulties involved in this set of instructions had been resolved, Patton determined 

to put the 1 st Armored Division's task force 

under Colonel Benson, whose aggressiveness 

he admired. To make certain that that quality was kept undimmed, he sent General 

Gaffey to "keep an eye on the show." 17 The 

basic plan of operations beyond El Guettar 

had been radically modified by the sudden 

change in 18 Army Group's intentions, a 

change which in turn came as a result of 

developments elsewhere. By 30 March the 

British Eighth Army's battle had shifted 

from the Mareth Position and El Hamma 

area to the Chott Position. While General 

Montgomery reorganized for the next attempt to punch through General Messe's 

prepared defenses on the narrow front along 

the Akarit wadi, an American foray into 

the Axis flank, by drawing off defending 

troops, would obviously assist the impending 

attack. At the same time, during these preparations the enemy would be free at least 

"(1) Patton Diary, 29 Mar 43. (2) II Corps 

G-3 Periodic Rpt 56, 30 Mar 43. This lists the 

elements of Task Force Benson as: 2d Battalion, 

1st Armored Regiment (mediums); 3d Battalion, 

I:)th Armored Regiment (mediums); the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion: the 899th Tank Destroyer 

Battalion; the 65th and 68th Field Artillery Battalions; Company B, 16th Engineer Battalion (C). 

The 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry, was attached from 

the 9th Division on 30 March. The 2d Battalion, 

6th Armon'd Infantry, joined during the night of 

30-31 March. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

temporarily to detach some of his mobile 

reserves. He could thus employ the 21st 

Panzer Division, as in fact he did. He might 

have committed it at Maknassy. For several 

days, he had feared an Allied break-through 

there, although Kesselring recognized that 

such an Allied success, by leading the Americans onto a funnel-like plain and exposing 

them to the danger of encirclement, might 

ultimately benefit the Axis forces. Such fears 

had abated by 30 March, when it was for a 

time possible to consider sending a German 

armored column through Maknassy toward 

Gafsa. But the small force that could then 

be assembled would have been inadequate 

for such a thrust, and it might have been 

encircled and isolated. In the end the Allied 

initiative in concentrating for a drive southeast of El Guettar drew to that front first, 

on 29 March, the Pan.zer Grenadier Regiment, Africa, and, the next day, elements of 

the 21st Panzer Diuision and an intensified 

commitment of the German Luftwaffe. To 

prevent an American success there, the 21st 

Panzer Division on 30 March put Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer (consisting of one battalion 

of panzer grenadiers, artillery, intitank, 

engineer, and Flak units) at the 10th Panzer Division's disposal and on 31 March the 

whole division during the afternoon joined 

in the attempt to repel Task Force Benson.'s 

The II Corps operations near El Guettar 

from 30 March to 1 April had some initial 

success but did not achieve all objectives. 

To assist Task Force Benson's penetration, 

the artillery fire of both infantry divisions 

"( I) Mins, Conf of Kesselring, Ambrosio, and 

Mussolini and of Kesselring, Ambrosio, Westphal 

and Ruge, I Apr 43, in Italian Collection, Item 26. 

(2) MS # D-166 (Lang). (3) 21st Panzer Diu, 

KTB, 29-31.IIl.43. (4) German CoS, First Italian 

Army, KTB, 30.III-4.IV.43. 
II CORPS OPERATIONS BEYOND EL GUETTAR 571 

and of II Corps was massed.m The 9th Infantry Division's attack at 0600, 30 March, 

was prefaced by fifteen battalion and six 

battery concentrations on Djebel Lettouchi 

and Djebe1 e1 Kheroua. This bombardment 

enabled the infantry to take but not to hold 

part of Djebe1 Lettouchi, while it could not 

even establish a footing on other hills. The 

1 st Infantry Division was more successfuL 

After a morning attack, followed first by 

three hours of shelling by four artillery battall ions, and then by a renewed infantry 

assault, the 26th Infantry was able to get 

most but not all the southern portion of 

Djebel el Mcheltat (Hill 482 and adjacent 

ridges) . 

Task Force Benson began its attack at 

noon of 30 March but did not get very far. 

The enemy's artillery and antitank weapons, 

many of them mobile, were well placed and 

proved much too strong. A mine field barred 

Benson's advance through the pass between 

Djebel Mche1tat and Hill 369. Before he 

could pull the column back out of range 

and extricate the leading vehicles, enemy 

fire knocked out five tanks and two tank 

destroyers. But after dark, the Americans 

cleared a lane through the mines north of 

the road and made preparations for an attack next morning at 0600 by the 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry. The object of this 

attack was to clear the enemy from the 

south side of the Gabes road and establish 

contact with the 9th Infantry Division. This 

" ( I') TI1(' 9th Infantry Division was supported 

by thf' 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment, 

and th" 26th, 34th, and 84th Field Artillery Battalions. 9th Div AAR, 25 Aug 43. (2) The 1st 

Infantry Division was supported by the 5th, 7th, 

32d, and 33d Field Artillery Battalions. Corps supplied the 1 st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment; 1st Battalion, 36th Field Artillery Regiment; 

and a battalion of the 178th Fidd Artillt'ry Regimpnt. 1st Div G-3 Rpt, 17 Apr 43. 

task was accomplished. Enemy defenders 

finally abandoned Hill 290 after repeated 

American attacks and fell back one mile to 

their main line of resistance. 2o 

Patton's first inclination on 31 March was 

to send his G-3, Col. Kent C. Lambert, to 

Colonel Benson with instructions to slam his 

way through at the cost, if need be, of a 

whole tank company, but he reconsidered, 

and planned instead an attack at 1600 in 

which supporting artillery and air would be 

co-ordinated with infantry and armor. The 

9th Infantry Division put two companies on 

Hill 290, and one company each on three 

elevations west of that objective, and fed in 

more units to get Hill 772, towering above 

them all. General Eddy decided that his division must extend far enough westward onto 

Djebel Berda to include its crest. 21 Meanwhile the 1st Infantry Division in a twopronged attack sent elements of Combat 

Teams 16 from the west and 26 from the 

north against the southeast tip of Djebel el 

Mcheltat, which they kept under attack all 

day but did not wholly occupy.22 Without 

waltmg for the co-ordinated attack 

scheduled for 1600, Benson organized a 

tank-infantry attack which began at about 

1230. The 2d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, passed through the lane in the mine 

field, fanned out, and although it lost eight 

tanks (four of which were salvaged), it 

gained possession of most of the the ground 

from the road to the foothills at the north 

and destroyed several 88's and lighter antitank guns, plus an estimated six tanks. The 

battalion, without any infantry support, 

(I) II Corps AAR, 10 Apr 43. (2) 9th Div 

AAR, 25 Aug 43. (3) Patton Diary, 30 Mar 43. 

(4) 47th Inf Hist, 1943, pp. 8~1O. 

"Phone Con v, Eddy and Akers, 1045.31 Mar 43, 

Entry 129, in II Corps G3 JnL 

"lstDivG-3 Rpt, 17 Apr43,p.13. 
572 

clung to its gains until the next afternoon. 

The 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, 

then relieved it but had to yield some ground 

to increased enemy pressure. In these attacks 

Benson's force had lost a total of thirteen 

tanks and two tank destroyers. Clearly, the 

tactical situation in the valley was inappropriate for armored exploitation. The enemy 

first had to be ousted from antitank positions 

by infantry and artillery before the armor 

could lunge ahead.23 

To reduce the enemy's resistance to Benson's attacks, Patton ordered a diversionary 

attack by elements of General Ward's command north of Maknassy. Patton hoped that 

this might also assist Ryder's operations at 

Fondouk el Aouareb. 24 On 31 March, General Ward ordered Combat Command A 

under General McQuillin to seize the mining village of Meheri Zebbeus and Djebel 

Djebs No.1 (369) and thus to be in position 

for a breakout toward Sfax. Combat Command C under Colonel Stack remained at 

the railroad pass east of Maknassy. Most of 

McQuillin's units, particularly the infantry, 

had been defending their limited gains east 

and north of Maknassy against unremitting 

pressure from Kampfgruppe Lang ever 

since 27 March. They had had little relief 

or rest, and many casualties, and their performance reflected their poor condition. The 

attack began late and was smothered at its 

inception when its flare-illuminated right 

flank came under heavy machine gun fire at 

the base of the mountain. The defense successfully held off the infantry attack by artillery fire throughout 1 April and by next day, 

when Benson's attack was suspended, the 

"(1) II Corps AAR, 10 Apr 43. (2) 1st Armd 

RegtAAR, 10 Jul 43. (3) Patton Diary, 31 Mar 43. 

(4) TF Benson Plan of Opns for 1 Apr 43 with overlay, Entry 199A, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

"See pp. 578-81 below. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

whole operation had lost purpose and was 

abandoned. 23 

The enemy had by then brought about 

another change in 18 Army Group's instructions to General Patton. Enemy antitank fire 

had for three days thwarted the attempt by 

Benson's armored force to smash through 

his lines. Enemy air attacks by 1 April were 

almost incessant, amounting to at least 163 

sorties in 51 distinct attacks, killing fifteen 

and wounding fifty-five. Late that day, General Alexander therefore ordered that the 

tank attacks be discontinued, and he revived 

instead the original scheme of 25 March 

that infantry operations should open the 

way, with the tanks in support. The second 

phase, that of securing positions as far forward as the pass between Djebel Chemsi 

and Djebel Ben Khei:r, was now to begin.26 

Strict compliance with even these instructions was not yet possible, for the enemy 

still held Hill 772 and Hill 369, and dominated the pass to the north. It was already 

painfully apparent that II Corps' progress 

toward the coast had suffered severely from 

the cautious restraint and frequent changes 

in instructions imposed by 18 Army Group 

at the beginning of Operation WOP. Its restraining influence had permitted the enemy 

to occupy extremely defensible ground 

while the Americans were tethered to Gafsa 

and El Guettar. It was now obvious how 

unfortunate had been the withdrawal of the 

right flank on Djebel Berda on the night 

of 25 and 26 March. Yet it must be remem25 (1) Rad, PHANTOM to Gen Crane (at G-3 II 

Corps), 1415, 2 Apr 43, reported the troops to be 

inactive, and the wadi to be a defensive position of 

dubious merit. PHANTOM reports implied minor 

activity in the sector on 1-2 April. (2) Patton 

Diary, 31 Mar43. (3) 1st Bn 6th Armed InfJnl, 31 

Mar-2 Apr 43. 

" (1) Patton Diary, 1 Apr +3. (2) Bradley, A 

Soldier's Story, pp. 6\-62. 
II CORPS OPERATIONS BEYOND EL GUETTAR 573 

bered that the object of these operations 

remained primarily to divert enemy reserves 

rather than to advance onto the coastal plain 

against the enemy's principal force. Even 

if the American armored column had been 

in a position to gain access, either by infantry action or its own bludgeoning attack, 

to the enemy's rear area, General Alexander would then have had to decide whether 

he thought such an operation was advisable. As General Patton explained to General Marshall, Alexander specified the scope 

of each operation. "All I have is actual conduct of the operations prescribed." 2, 

Tactical Air Support of II Corps 

By 1 April, the new doctrine of air support which had been applied to the operations of II Corps seemed to have failed. The 

three American fighter groups operating 

from Thelepte and the group of light bombers from Y ouks-les-Bains had been visible 

to the ground troops from time to time, but 

most of their accomplishments had been out 

of sight and hearing. They had bombed 

Gafsa on 17 March, before the attack there, 

and on 23 March had helped throw back 

the 10th Panzer Division's counterattack, 

but their main mission was to win air superiority in Tunisia for the Allies by fighter 

sweeps against enemy aircraft in the air, and 

by bombing and strafing strikes against 

planes on the enemy's airfields. Their energies had been fully employed and they were 

inflicting severe damage on the enemy's air 

force, but in the II Corps area, in sharp 

contrast to the situation over the Eighth 

Army, the air was far from being under 

Allied control. The daily report from II 

Corps to 18 Army Group for 1 April de-

"Ltr, Patton to Marshall, 29 Mar 43. Copy in 

WDCSA 370 Africa, 11 Apr 43. 

scribed enemy aviation as operating almost 

at will over the ground troops of II Corps 

because of the absence of Allied air cover. 

Indeed, the many enemy air attacks on 1 

April against Task Force Benson near El 

Guettar intensified the sense of frustration 

brought about by the enemy's reinforcement 

of his opposing ground units. 

Since tactical air support had been furnished without stint, according to the 

Coningham doctrine, this commander of 

the Northwest African Tactical Air Force 

warmly resented Patton's description of 

conditions on his battlefield. He met the 

complaint by a sarcastic and supercilious 

rejoinder reflecting on American troops 

which he subsequently withdrew and for 

which he made appropriate official amends 

at General Patton's insistence. 28 The incident subjected the solidarity of AngloAmerican collaboration in arms to one of its 

severest tests, one through which it emerged 

unshaken. While Air Chief Marshal Tedder, 

General Spaatz, and Brig. Gen. Laurence 

S. Kuter were visiting Patton's headquarters 

the day before Coningham himself came in 

connection with the matter, the Germans 

bombed the area around headquarters as if 

to confirm the protest that the II Corps was 

not benefiting from Allied air superiority.2n 

But numerical superiority was increasing. 

Northwest African Tactical Air Force had, 

on 17 March, 319 aircraft and Strategic Air 

Force, 383; the enemy was operating far 

fewer from Tunisian airfields .. ") The enemy 

was soon trying to maintain his air strength 

by putting Italian crews in German fighters, 

2R Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 62-63, gives an 

excerpt of Coningham's circular (SPEC Nr. 40, 

2 Apr 43). The retraction was dated 5 Apr 43 

(SPEC Nr. 46). 

'" Patton Diary, 3-4 Apr 43. 

'" Twelfth AAF Draft Hist, Ch. X, pp. 44-46. 

AAF Archives. 
574 

dive bombers, and bombers and incorporating them in Luftwaffe formations. 31 The 

Stuka was driven out of use in Tunisia by 

the improved antiaircraft fire to which it 

was subjected and by the ability of Allied 

fighters to jump the dive bombers during 

their operations from forward fields."2 

II Corps Is Held, 2-6 April 

The American forces east of El Guettar 

returned, between 2 and 6 April, to the 

grinding effort to occupy the hills and ridges 

along the Gumtree and the Gabes roads. 

The armored force now followed up the 

infantry line rather than serving as a spearhead. Artillery strength increased, the ammunition expenditure was very heavy.33 The 

line lengthened to almost twenty miles as it 

moved eastward, greatly extending the 

troops of the 1 st Infantry Division. The 9th 

Infantry Division continued to be absorbed 

in unsuccessful struggles to master the 

rugged terrain west of Hill 369 on Djebel el 

Kheroua. Its attacks from various directions 

on Hill 772 on Djebel Berda were repulsed 

again and again. Elsewhere its success was 

incomplete, and the large number of casualties, particularly those of the 47th Infantry, made it less and less likely that the 

tired troops could ever gain the divisional 

objective. 34 Both infantry divisions drew 

31 Mins, Conf of Kesselring and Ambrosio, 15 

Apr 43, No. 103, in Italian Collection, Item 26. 

32 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 

176-77, cite what is believed to have been the last 

appearance of Stukas in the EI Guettar area on 

3 April 1943. 

"For the four battalions supporting the 9th Division alone it totaled 31,583 rounds. With small 

arms and mortar ammunition it totaled 1,489 tons. 

9th Div AAR, 25 Aug 43. 

" ( I) Five of the six battalion commanders were 

casualties; totals reported were 120 killed in action, 

872 wounded in action, 316 missing in action, 186 

injured, 207 exhausted, 111 diseased, and 425 reNORTHWEST AFRICA 

engineer troops into the line as infantry 

before the end, and both were pushed to 

the limit, as was the enemy force which 

opposed them. 35 The 1 st Infantry Division 

drove doggedly ahead to take the village of 

Sakket on 3 April, but slowed down thereafter. Its losses were not greatly different 

from those of the 9th Infantry Division, but 

were sustained by a full three-regiment unit 

and were therefore proportionately lighter. 36 

The badly strained forward supply services 

over the mountains were performed by pack 

mules, Arabs, and Italian prisoners. The 

south flank of the 1st Infantry Division was 

not in contact with the 9th Infantry Division, and continued exposure to flank attack 

threatened eventually to halt the advance. 37 

German preparations for withdrawal 

were observed and misinterpreted as concentration for another armored counterattack like that of 23 March. Special defensive measures were therefore taken on 5 

April. The men dug in, determined to hold 

on. The 19th Engineers (Combat), the 1st 

Ranger Battalion, and elements of the 1st 

Tank Destroyer Group set up a switch line 

along the Keddab wadi to stop any force 

that might come either along the road from 

Gabes or around the western end of Djebel 

Berda. The absence of information at II 

Corps headquarters on the operations of the 

British Eighth Army was partly responsiturned to duty from clearing stations. Ibid., p. 9. 

(2) These figures differ slightly from those in the II 

Corps report of 10 April 1943, which lists 143 killed 

in action, 863 wounded in action, and 360 missing 

in action. 

'" 10th Panzer Diu, Ie, Taetigkeitsbericht, 30 

Mar-6 Apr 43. 

36 At the end of the operations, they were reported as: 126 killed, 1,016 wounded, 159 missing. 

II Corps AAR, 10 Apr 43. 

" 1st Div Sitrep, 1200,2 Apr 43. 
II CORPS OPERATIONS BEYOND EL GUETTAR 575 

ble for the perturbation which for a time 

prevailed.

38 

After an enemy counterattack failed to 

materialize and it became evident that he 

intended to withdraw, the two infantry divisions were again sent into an attack east 

of El Guettar on 6 April with their common 

objective a north-south line roughly equivalent to that of the first phase set out in the 

army group's plan of 25 March. Task Force 

Benson followed up closely in the late afternoon and pushed beyond the road junction northeast of Djebel Berda. After several 

days of artillery dueling, the elements of 

the 1st Armored Division nearer Maknassy 

put on another diversionary attack, Combat 

Command B hitting at Djebel Malzila 

(522) and Combat Command C demonstrating at Hill 322. American hopes of 

breaking through to interfere with the I talian First Army's line of communications or 

with its defensive stand at the Chott Position were flickering out. Progress since 2 

April had been much too slow to achieve 

such results. The higher levels of command 

were disappointed in operations to date, 

feeling that not enough had been achieved 

to promise success. The infantry divisions 

poked and jabbed at the defenders in their 

mountain positions without quite breaking 

their persistent hold. Those divisions seemed 

to be engaging the major part of the enemy's forces. The reinforced armored division, on the other hand, after forfeiting its 

best chance of successful action early on 

22 March at Maknassy, seemed to have 

spent itself against an enemy who was inferior in strength but had exploited skillfully his advantage of position. The Armored division had also been seriously dispersed by the withdrawal of units for Task 

" Patton Diary, 5 Apr 43. 

MAJ. GEN. ERNEST N. HARMON 

arriving to take command of J st Armored 

Division. 

Force Benson directly under II Corps, and 

by the semi-independent operations of 

Combat Command B north of Maknassy. 

After going over to the defensive on 27 

March it had withstood a series of enemy 

attacks, skillfully varied and often temporarily successful, and had sustained heavy 

losses.3o General Patton prodded his sub3. The casualties of 1st Armored Division reported at the end of the operation were (including 

Combat T eam 60, attached): 304 killed, 1,265 

wounded, 116 missing. 
576 

ordinates continually, and in the hope of 

bringing new energy and enthusiasm to the 

1st Armored Division, he acted on a suggestion of General Alexander which confirmed 

his own inclination, and on 5 April replaced its commanner, General Ward, by 

General Harmon. Harmon, who had returned to the 2d Armored Division in Morocco after his February service as General 

Fredendall's deputy, took command as the 

tide was turning in south central Tunisia. 40 

Patton's chief of staff, General Gaffey, 

shortly took command of the 2d Armored 

Division. General Ward returned to the 

United States, was given command of the 

Tank Destroyer Center, and eventually 

commanded the 20th Armored Division in 

Europe.41 

The Enemy Pulls Out, 6-8 April 

To 18 Army Group it was apparent on 

the night of 6-7 April that the battle for the 

Chott Position had reached its critical stage. 

General Patton was instructed to furnish 

maximum aid in the morning. Patton 

ordered American armor to be shoved eastward without regard for casualties, and the 

entire II Corps to drive forward for a spurt 

down the homestretch. 42 

Almost all of the enemy forces disengaged 

and slipped eastward under cover of a very 

heavy artillery bombardment during the 

night of 6-7 April, so that the attack in the 

40 (1) Msg 1043, CinC AF to CG II Corps, 2 

Apr 43; Msg 60, CG II Corps to CinC AF, 2 

Apr 43; Msg 240, CG II Corps to CinC AF, 1955, 

3 Apr 43; Msg 1233, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 

Apr 43. Smith Papers. (2) Patton Diary, 5 Apr 

43. (3) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 64-65. 

41 Msgs 2004 and 2802, Eisenhower to Marshall, 

6 Apr 43 and 9 Apr 43. Smith Papers. 

" (1) II Corps AAR, 10 Apr 43. (2) Patton 

Diary, 7 Apr 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

mornmg encountered no resistance but 

went "smoothly." 43 Task Force Benson, reduced to one battalion of tanks, one tank 

destroyer company, and one company of 

armored infantry, started out early after 

Patton's admonition to the commander to 

plough through all resistance, and under 

Patton's direct scrutiny from Colonel Randle's observation post. Later, as the drive 

got under way, the corps commander 

hounded Benson by radio, then with General Keyes followed him a jeep, and when 

the task force stopped at a mine field, led 

the way through it. The jeep continued 

southeastward until it had reached the Kilometer 70 road marker (from Gabes). Reluctantly turning back, Patton met Benson 

and again told him to keep going "for a 

fight or a bath." Task Force Benson rolled 

eastward as never before. It crossed into the 

British Eighth Army's zone soon after the 

General had given his parting instruction, 

and between 1600 and 1700, if it did not 

reach the ocean shore or the enemy's positions, nevertheless arrived at a point of contact with a British Eighth Army reconnaissance detail southwest of Sebkret en Noua}!4 

The meeting was a juncture of Allied forces 

from the eastern and western limits of the 

Mediterranean littoral. Closing in behind 

the Italian First Army, both were arriving 

at the threshold of the war's final phase in 

Tunisia. Task Force Benson withdrew, in 

43 1st Div G-3 Rpt, 17 Apr 43, p. 15, citing 16th 

Inf Rpt. 

" The co-ordinates Y -8869 given in 1 st Div G-3 

Rpt, 17 Apr 43, p. 16, appear to be in error; Y-9056 

are given in 18 A Gp, Sitrep 166, 2000, 7 Apr, 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log; Y -8868 were reported by 

British Eighth Army; Y -8367, by the British 2d 

Armored Brigade which made the contact. Army 

Map Service P-551/GSGS 4227, 1: 200,000, Sheet 

18, EI Ayacha. Info received from British Cabinet 

Office, London. 
II CORPS OPERATIONS BEYOND EL GUETTAR 577 

conformity with the auxiliary mission assigned to the II Corps, to assist in driving 

the enemy toward Mezzouna into the main 

stream of Axis retreat. American artillery in 

the vicinity of Maknassy, and American 

aviation from the XII Air Support Command, harried the enemy along the Gumtree road and forced him to take secondary 

routes. They blocked the road with enemy 

vehicles, forcing the 10th Panzer Division 

to use a trail near the northern edge of the 

Sebkret en Noual. 45 

On the hills east of Maknassy, Group 

Lang remained through daylight of 8 April, 

covering the withdrawal of the 10th Panzer 

Division, 21 st Panzer Division, and Division 

Centauro from points farther south. After 

dark, Colonel Lang's command joined the 

divisions under control of Headquarters, 

German Africa Corps, to complete the 

northward march along the Eastern Dorsal. 

The pass east of Maknassy, which both sides 

had so long tried in vain to possess and exploit, was occupied by Combat Team 60 

and held until all Axis troops had unmistakably departed. The 1st Armored Division, whether from the Maknassy area, the 

El Guettar area, or elsewhere, concentrated 

45 10th Panzer Diu, Ie, Taetigkeitsberieht, 7-9 

Apr 43. 

near Sbeitla and Sidi Bou Zid pending the 

outcome of operations on the coastal plain 

between Faid and Fondouk el Aouareb. 

Only one slim possibility remained of interfering effectively with the withdrawal of 

the First Italian Army, the German Africa 

Corps, and Fifth Panzer Army into northeastern Tunisia. This possibility was the use 

of Fondouk el Aouareb gap to place a strong 

Allied force on the coastal plain to hit the 

retreating enemy on the western flank while 

the Eighth Army pressed from the south. 

The II Corps might have been used aggressively at this point. Instead, the 9th Infantry Division pulled back at once to the 

Bou Chebka area, preparatory to an early 

shift within the week to the extreme northern flank of the British 5 Corps in the Sedjenane area. The 1st Infantry Division 

withdrew for five days' rest and reorganization near Morsott, north of Tebessa. The 

1st Armored Division remained somewhat 

longer in the Sbeitla-Sidi Bou Zid area. And 

the 34th Division passed from II Corps to 

the operational control of British 9 Corps. 

The 18 Army Group decided to make another attack at Fondouk el Aouareb gap 

using the army group reserve, reinforced by 

elements from II Corps and British First 

Army. Offensive operations by II Corps in 

central or southern Tunisia were at an end. 
CHAPTER XXX 

Attacks at Fondouk el Aouareb and Pursuit 

Onto the Plain 

During the period when II Corps, with 

three of its divisions, was engaged in the battles for Gafsa, Maknassy, and EI Guettar, 

the 34th Infantry Division, and later the 

British 9 Corps, was attempting to gain the 

important gap through the Eastern Dorsal 

near Fondouk el Aouareb. If the Allies could 

thus succeed in driving the enemy out of his 

mountain defenses they would be in a position to threaten Kairouan and possibly cut 

off the enemy's forces in the southern portion of the Tunisian bridgehead. 

General Alexander's plan of 25 March 

specified that the 34th Infantry Division 

should attack as early as possible on the 

axis SbeYtla-Hadjeb el AYoun-Fondouk el 

Aouareb, to seize the heights on the Eastern 

Dorsal south of the gap, and Djebel Trozza 

(997), which is about eight miles west of it. 

( Map 17) "This ground will be firmly 

held," the directive stated, "to enable mobile 

forces to operate from there into the 

Kairouan plain." 1 General Patton later 

passed on these instructions to General 

Ryder, Commanding General, 34th Infantry Division, in an evening conference at 

1 18 A Gp Opn Instruc 9, 25 Mar 43. AFHQ 

Micro Job lOA, Reel6C. 

Feriana on 25 March.2 His directions to 

Ryder were brief and clear. The 34th Division was to make what amounted to a largescale demonstration. Seizing Kairouan was 

not desired. The attack was to gain the pass 

and, after intermediate objectives there had 

been occupied, to make strong demonstrations in the direction of Kairouan. 3 The 

means and method were left to Ryder's 

discretion. 

By moving a regiment on the night of 

25-26 March, and a second on the following night from the area of Sbeltla to the 

vicinity of Hadjeb el Aioun, and leaving 

one regiment at Sbeltla for defense, General 

Ryder could attack at daylight on 27 

March. He left the 133d Infantry (less one 

battalion stationed at AFHQ in Algiers) to 

defend Sbeltla, and sent the 135th and 

'The staff of the 34th Division was as follows: 

commanding general, General Ryder; assistant division commander, General Caffey; chief of staff, Col. 

Norman E. Hendrickson; G-l, Lt. Col. Thomas L. 

Gaines; G-2, Lt. Col. Hubert Demarais; G-3, Lt. 

Col. Robf'ft B. Neely; G-4, Lt. Col. Walter W. 

Wendt; artillery, Brig. Gen. Albert C. Stanford. 

3 (1) Memo, CG 34th Div for CG II Corps, 25 

Mar 43, sub: Opn Plan, with copy of outline plan 

annexed, Entry 321, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. (2) Inten· 

with Gen Ryder, 21 Feb 50. 
ATTACKS AT FONDOUK EL AOUAREB 579 

FIRST ATTACK ON FONDOUK 27 Morcl) 19'13 

MAP 17 

~ US.DVANCE. 

--- GERWAH rRONT LutE 

AFRIC", &AT1Al...lON' 

1-"'--.,..--,_ .......... + __ --,,_ --" MIL£'S 

e KILOM[T[RS 

168th Infantry into the attack. The 175th 

Field Artillery Battalion was to support the 

168th Infantry; the 125th and 185th Field 

Artillery Battalions were to support the 

135th Infantry; and battalions of the 178th 

and 36th Field Artillery Regiments were 

to remain in position near Sbeltla, subject 

to call. Units of the 813th Tank Destroyer 

Battalion and the 751st Tank Battalion 

were to assemble near Had jeb el Aloun and 

be in reserve on the right wing of the attack. Antiaircraft batteries of the 107th 

Coast Artillery were attached to the field 

artillery. The routes of approach through 

a secondary pass east of Had jeb el Aloun 

or via the western side of Djebel Trozza 

were to be covered by reconnaissance elements.4 

The opening at Fondouk el Aouareb, 

through which First Army had expected 

an enemy attack on 14 February that actually came through Fald pass, is about sixteen miles northeast of Hadjeb el Aloun at 

a gap where the Marguellil river goes 

through the eastern mountain chain. The 

shallow stream flows from the northwest 

and in an elbow turn swings eastward at 

the pass through a wide, marshy valley. 

North of the opening is the Djebel ech 

Cherichera (462) and its foothills. Immediately to the south, several precipitous 

knobs along parallel ridges of the Djebel el 

Aouareb (306) lead to a higher hill mass. 

The Zeroud river winds its way around 

them at a distance of 10 to 20 miles south 

of Fondouk. The gap at the village of Fondouk el Aouareb narrows to about 1,000 

yards and the ground appears, except for 

occasional mounds, almost flat both east 

and west of it. Just west of it, on the northern side of the stream, is the Djebel Aln el 

Rhorab (290), a steep-sided ridge above a 

large native village and spring. From this 

hill all of the roads from the west and 

I Northw('st of Pichon, the French XIX Corps 

(Divisions M a thenet and Welvert-also known as 

the Constantine D ivision ) were to push across the 

Ousscl tia valley at this tim". 
580 

DJE8EL AI 

( 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

DJEBEL AIN EL RHORAB as seenJrom Fondouk eL Aouareb. 

southwest that meet in the pass en route to 

Fondouk el Aouareb can be observed and 

brought under fire. All the roads converging 

on the village from these directions are 

dominated also by the massive Djebel 

Trozza, with a crest over 3,000 feet high. 

These roads run over a bare, undulating 

plain cut by wadies but devoid of important 

vegetation except for widely scattered cactus patches and small olive groves. In the 

spring, the time of these operations, desert 

flowers of brilliant hue abound. The attack 

on 27 March approached the pass from the 

southwest along the Hadjeb el Aioun- Fondouk el Aouareb road, which became the 

boundary between the two participating 

regiments. " 

The defenders were in positions on the 

hills. The zone of which this portion was a 

critical part was controlled by the Italian 

X X X Corps (General Sogno) headquarters 

at Sousse, through Group Fullriede at 

Kairouan. The forces were neither numerous nor exceptionally well equipped, and 

were rather thinly strung from outposts near 

5 (I) 135th Inf Hist, Sec. IV, pp. 9-11. (2) 

133d Inf Hist, 7 Jun 43, Incl I, pp. 11-13, and 

Incl 2, pp. 4- 5. (3) Geographical Sec Gen St~ff 

Map 4225, Sheet 70 (I: 50,000 ). (4) Interv With 

Col Ward, 30 Noy 50. 
ATTACKS AT FONDOUK EL AOUAREB 581 

Pichon southward to the Zeroud river. Hills 

northwest of Fondouk el Aouareb toward 

Pichon were held by two companies of the 

1 st Battalion, 961 st Infantry Regiment, each 

with three rifle platoons, one platoon with 

two heavy machine guns and two mortars, 

and one antitank platoon with two guns. 

This unit (of the 999th Africa Division) 

consisted chiefly of court-martialed German 

soldiers to whom combat duty was permitted 

for the purpose of rehabilitation. The defense of Fondouk el Aouareb gap was its 

first important battle. 

Along Djebel ech Cherichera and northeast of it was the 190th Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced with some artillery. To 

the south, along the crest of Djebel el Aouareb, the 27th Africa Battalion was stationed, 

and from there to Djebel Hallouf (481), the 

Headquarters, 961st Infantry Regiment 

(Kampfgruppe Wall), was ready. It consisted of the 1st Battalion (-) and the 2d 

Battalion, 961 st Infantry Regiment, reinforced with artillery and antitank guns. As 

reinforcements for his sector, Colonel Fullriede could also draw on the 34th Africa 

Battalion, the 2d Battalion, Italian 91st Infantry Regiment, and some native Arab 

troop units. The enemy expected an attack 

in view of the information gleaned on 26 

March from prisoners. 6 

The 34th Infantry Division's two regiments organized with the somewhat more 

experienced 168th Infantry (Colonel Butler) on the right nearer the enemy's principal hill positions and the 135th Infantry 

(Colonel Ward) on the northwest. 7 At 

0600, 27 March, the attack opened on a 

, (1) 999th Africa Division, KTB, Anlagenbanct 

2. Einsatz TUNIS, 26.III.-12. V.43, and maps in 

Anlagenband 3. (2) AFHQ G-2 Rpts, 8-9 Apr 43. 

(3) Daily Sitrep, 26 Mar 43, in Fifth Panzer Army, 

KTB, Anlagenband V A, Anlage 117 A. 

, 34th Div FO 34, 26 Mar 43. 

four-battalion front. Each regiment echeloned its leading battalion and put a second 

battalion behind the outer company of the 

assault unit. The troops reached the first 

phase line four hours later in good order 

and without coming under hostile fire. The 

steeply sloped hills of the Eastern Dorsal 

crossed their path of approach obliquely, 

with Hill 306 on Djebel el Aouareb, the 

first objective, still several miles away. The 

next phase of the advance shortly brought 

the leading elements within range of shelling from both the hills to the east and those 

to the northwest in the vicinity of Djebel 

Trozza. Most fire fell at first on the 168th 

Infantry. American artillery drove off an 

enemy reconnaissance group of scout cars 

and two light tanks which approached from 

the northwest and also struck two squads 

of the 135th's Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon at close range. Then, as the 

volume of fire from the hills intensified, the 

135th Infantry, ahead and on the left, 

stopped a little before 1400. The men sought 

cover from both the frontal and enfilading 

fire of heavy machine guns, artillery, and 

mortars. The 1 st and 2d Battalions, 168th 

Infantry, heading for somewhat separated 

objectives on their part of the front, were 

only partly successful. 

As nightfall drew near, the 2d and 3d 

Battalions, 135th Infantry, attacked abreast 

in fading light. They succeeded in penetrating the enemy's main line of resistance, but 

in the darkness which now prevailed the 

unit commanders lost control and could 

not hold their gains. A gap developed during this attack between the 135th Infantry 

and the 168th Infantry on its right." 

8 (1) 135th Inf Hist, Sec. IV, pp. 9-11. (2) 

168th Inf Hist, 12 Nov 42 to 15 May 43, pp. 38-39. 

(3) Interv with Col Ward, 30 Nov 50. (4) Memo, 

Col Ward for Gm Ward, 22 Jan 51. OCMH. 
582 

Another attack next morning after a 

heavy artillery preparation carried the advance elements to the base of the main ridge 

but neither then nor later did assaulting 

forces risk enough troops to gain full possession of the exposed upper slopes. Infiltration tactics were unsuccessful. Three days 

of small infantry attacks followed, and during this period the northern flank of the 

135th Infantry was under persistent enfilading fire by flat trajectory weapons which 

swept the reverse slopes of forward ridges 

and severely hampered daylight movement. 

Several battalion officers were wounded, 

requiring the transfer of Lt. Col. Albert A. 

Svoboda, regimental executive officer, to 

command the 2d Battalion, and the regimental , Capt. Ray Erickson, to be Svoboda's operations officer, while the executive 

officer of the 1st Battalion, Maj. Garnet 

Hall, was shifted to command the 3d Battalion. These vital changes occurred while 

the units were thoroughly engaged, and 

weakened the regimental staff. Farther 

south, elements of the 168th Infantry gained 

some isolated crests. On the morning of 31 

March, a mobile armored force struck an 

enemy group lurking in the cactus and olive 

groves on the northwestern slopes of Djebel 

Touil (665), about five miles south of the 

main battle area, and drove them out despite 

strong fire from adjacent hills and an attack 

by Axis dive bombers. This operation was 

thought to have forestalled, at the cost of 

two tanks, an enemy blow at the 168th Infantry's southern flank.~ 

The 34th Infantry Division's attack was 

stopped short of Fondouk el Aouareb gap 

"(1) See n. 8 above. (2) 751st Tank Bn (M) 

AAR, 30 Apr 43. The force consisted of Company 

C, 751st Tank Battalion; Company A, 813th Tank 

Destroyer Battalion; one motorized company of the 

109th Combat Engineers. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

on 28 March and never actually reached it. 

Furthermore, General Ryder adhered to 

General Patton's oral instruction to make a 

lot of noise but not to run grave risks merely 

to gain ground. to Co-ordination and control 

were defective. The Germans in consequence derived a low estimate of American 

soldiers. "The American gives up the fight 

as soon as he is attacked. Our men feel 

superior to the enemy in every respect," a 

German inspector reported on 2 April.ll 

On the nights of 31 March-l April and 

1-2 April, with the division's combat condition reported as only "fair," the infantry 

units fell back well out of the range of the 

heavy machine guns and artillery in their 

protected emplacements on the Djebel Ain 

el Rhorab, the Djebel el Aouareb, Djebel el 

Djeriri (374), and Djebel Hallouf, to defensive positions four miles to the west. 

There they waited and rested.12 

The Second Attack at Fondouk el Aouareb 

Falters 

Benefiting from his first attempt at Fondouk el Aouareb, during which he realized, 

after testing its defenses, that he had committed too small a force, General Alexander 

directed that the new effort should be part 

of a much broader push extending for fifteen miles from Fondouk el Aouareb northeastward along the mountain chain to the 

northern extremity of Djebel Ousselat 

10 (1) Interv with Gen Caffey, 21 Feb 50. (2) 

Ltr, Lt Col Donald C. Landon to author, 17 Iun" 

51. 

9991h Africa Division, KTB, Anlagenband 2, 

Einsatz TUNIS 26.III.-12.v,43, Rpt Nr. 4 (Capt 

Retzlaff), Sec. III. 

12 (1) 34th Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpts 48, 31 

Mar 43, and 49, 1 Apr 43. (2) 168th Inf Hist, 12 

Nov 42-15 May 43, reported casualties as follows: 

killt:'d, 17; wounded, 108; missing, 178. 
ATTACKS AT FONDOUK EL AOUAREB 583 

(887). For the whole offensive, General 

Koeltz's French XIX Corps (under British 

First Army) and the British 9 Corps commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir John Crocker (directly under 18 Army Group) were to be 

used. British combat units for the prospective operation could not get into position 

before 7 April, when not much time would 

be left for the break-through if the enemy 

was to be intercepted on the coastal plain.13 

The 34th Infantry Division (from U.S. II 

Corps) , the British 6th Armoured Division, 

128th Infantry Brigade, and two squadrons 

of the 51st Royal Tank Regiment (temporarily released by British First Army) comprised General Crocker's command.14 

The ultimate objective, at one time to 

confine the enemy's retreat to the coastal 

road east of Kairouan, was redefined before 

the attack began as interception and destruction of retreating forces.'5 American 

and British infantry were expected to open 

the pass while the British armor went 

through in order to carry out its mission on 

the coastal plain, and while French and 

other British units swept the enemy from the 

hills north of Fondouk el Aouareb gap. 

On the day before the attack, General 

Crocker, at General Ryder's headquarten; 

near the village of Djebel Trozza, held a 

13 Rpt, Brig Sugden to G-3 AFHQ, 7 Apr 43, 

sub: Conv between Sugden and Gen McCreery, 6 

Apr; Memo, Col James F. Torrence, Jr., for G-3 

AFHQ, 3 Apr 43. AFHQ G-3 Ops, Micro Job lOA, 

Ree16C. 

H German officers who took part in this operation 

have stated that a maximum effort at Fondouk el 

Aouareb and by Eighth Army north of Sfax could 

have shortened the war in Tunisia by one month. 

MS :Ii: T-3 (Nehring et at.), Vol. 3a. 

"For former objective, see Colonel Torrence's 

Memo of 3 April based on 2 April conference with 

General McCreery and Brigadier Holmes; for the 

latter, Brigadier Sugden's report of 7 April after 

talking with McCreery. Both cited in n. 13 above. 

command conference which was attended 

by his principal subordinates and by General 

Koeltz. The British 9 Corps plan was set 

forth and the plans for each of the participating major units then explained. General 

Crocker had established the northern 

boundary of the 34th Division's zone along 

the southern edge of the Marguellil river, 

thus splitting the gap itself, as well as the 

approach from the west, into American and 

British areas of attack. (Map 18) In conformity with preliminary understandings, 

General Ryder's plan prescribed the employment of all three of his regiments (including 

the two-battalion 133d Infantry) and more 

armor and artillery than in the first attack, 

after making a sideslip to the northward 

from their current positions southwest of the 

gap.16 The assault would be made squarely 

eastward toward the heights south of Fondouk el Aouareb. Its left flank would depend for protection upon a simultaneous 

attack by the British 128th Brigade aimed 

at denying to the enemy the use of Djebel 

Ain el Rhorab. The ground over which the 

34th Division would attack was so open as 

to make the frontal assault on Djebel el 

Aouareb's steep and craggy slopes a formidable task. But the additional enfilading fire 

to be expected from Djebel Ain el Rhorab 

could be positively devastating. 

At the command conference on 6 April, 

General Ryder learned for the first time that 

the British 128th Infantry Brigade would 

attack initially the heights east of Pichon, 

and then move southward toward Djebel 

Ain el Rhorab, which it could reach at best 

only after the passage of several hours of 

10 (I) General Crocker visited the area for 

ground reconnaissance presumably on I April, Msg, 

18 A Gp to II Corps, 1826,31 Mar 43, Entry 159, in 

II Corps G-3 In!. (2) Interv with Gcn Ryder, 21 

Feb 50. 
.. HAP 18 

.......... Gt~ ..... '_1\..M 

_ AIIl' 01 ...... 0 "1"~ 

• 
ATTACKS AT FONDOUK EL AOUAREB 585 

daylight. Later recollections of the discussion which followed are somewhat conflicting, but General Ryder's misgivings concerning the exposed northern flank of his 

attack, however clearly he may have expressed them, produced no change in the 

corps orders. General Crocker and his chief 

of staff, Brig. Gordon MacMillan, then believed, as they did after the operation, that 

Djebel Aln el Rhorab was much less 

strongly held than the heights east of Pichon 

and was not a serious menace to Ryder's attack. General Ryder's division could not add 

the seizure of Djebel Aln el Rhorab to its 

other responsibilitic~ or even gain permission 

to reply to fire received from it, except to 

cover it with smoke shells during the critical 

opening phase. 

The whole operation, as British 9 Corps 

planned it, would occur in three phases. 

First, the British 128th Infantry Brigade 

would seize crossings over the Marguellil 

river west of the village of Pichon early on 

the night of 7 ~8 April, thus enabling engineers to construct bridging for tanks and 

other vehicles before daylight. At dawn it 

would continue to the east to the 

heights beyond Pichon, then turn southward 

toward Fondouk el Aouareb gap to neutralize or occupy Djebel Aln el Rhorab. The 

second phase would consist of parallel attacks by the 128th Infantry Brigade and the 

34th Infantry Division on opposite s:des of 

the river to drive the enemy from the 

heights. In the third phase, the British 6th 

Armoured Division was to pass through the 

gap. 1 , The decision whether the tanks of 

the 26th Armoured Brigade would be sent 

through first or be preceded by the 18t 

Guards Brigade was deferred until the 

17 Br. 9 Corp' Opn Order 2, 1100, 6 Apr 43, in 

'14th Div G- 3 In!' 

course of the battle had clarified the nature 

of the defense to be overcome. Moreover, 

if General Crocker should have to use the 18t 

Guards Brigade to clear Djebel Aln el 

Rhorab, it would of course leave no alternative to a decision to use British armor at 

the head of the column through the gap.'S 

'Vith the start of operations so near, and 

with the elements of British 9 Corps assembling within sight of Djebel Trozza on 5-6 

April, General Ryder faced an extremely 

difficult situation. His troops had just failed 

in one attack against the objective which 

they were now to assault for the second time. 

It would be extremely difficult to get them 

in motion again once they had been pinned 

down by heavy enemy fire. They might succeed, of course, despite their inexperience in 

night attack, in crossing to the hills under 

cover of darkness, but once they were there, 

they could no longer be aided by an air bombardment.19 Air bombing was more desirable than artillery fire because the enemy 

could take shelter behind great boulders on 

the reverse slopes of Djebel el Aouareb's 

several ridges and emerge unhurt when the 

artillery fire was lifted. Any daylight advance 

on the American side of the Marguellil 

river would be, as noted, in serious jeopardy 

while the enemy could fire from Djebel Aln 

el Rhorab. General Koeltz, whose corps had 

been driven out in January after holding 

" (I) Intcrvs with Gens Ryder, Caffey, and Bull, 

21 Feb 50. (2) Statement by Lt Gen Sir Gordon 

MacMillan, 4 S{'p 50, based on his diary. OCMH. 

(3) Gen Koeltz, Note etablic de memoire sur la 

reunion tcnue Ie 6 avril 1943 au P. C. du General 

Ryder, J 950. OC!\1H. (4) Info supplied by Cabinet 

Office, London. (5) 9 Corps Opn Order 2, 6 Apr 

43. in 34th Div G-3 In\. 

.. The prevailing methods of tactical bombing 

support required that the troops remain west of a 

bomb line 2,000 yards from the target, rather than 

marking their forward line by smoke or panels. or 

using radio communications direct to the plant's. 
586 

Fondouk el Aouareb gap for a time, and 

who had planned several times to retake it, 

knew the terrain very well. He could appreciate General Ryder's conviction, a conviction also reached by Maj. Gen. Harold R. 

Bull on arrival at General Ryder's command 

post during the afternoon before the attack, 

that the U.S. 34th Infantry Division was 

being committed under a faulty plan which 

threatened to result in failure. But it was 

now too late to revise the entire scheme of 

attack.20 

General Ryder balanced the factors affecting his part of the attack and concluded 

that he should get his assault battalions on 

the objective before dawn. He obtained consent from 9 Corps to advance his attack from 

0530 to 0300. Corps concluded that the 

preparatory air bombardment of Djebel el 

Aouareb should be cancelled, and notified 

the division just before midnight, 7-8 April, 

that no such bombing would take place. The 

leading infantry units were then marching 

in a northeasterly loop to the line of departure at a large wadi running generally north 

and south some 5,000 yards from the base 

of the hills. At 0220, a liaison officer left 

division headquarters with orders to cross 

the line of departure at 0300. 21 

The attack was to be made by two regiments in column of battalions, the 135th 

Infantry on the north and the 133d on the 

south. Each regiment put its 3d Battalion 

ahead on a 1,500-yard front. The 1 st and 

3d Battalions, 168th Infantry, were at first 

20 (1) Intervs with Gens Ryder and Bull, 21 Sep 

50. (2) Gen Koeltz, Note etablie de memoire sur la 

reunion tenue Ie 6 avril 1943 au P. C. du General Ryder, 1950. OCMH. 

21 (1) 34th Div FO 30, 0830, 7 Apr 43, and 

amendments, 1130,7 Apr 43. (2) G-S Msg File and 

Jnl, 34th Inf Div, 1-8 Apr 43; 133d Regt Jnl, AprMay 43. (3) Statement by Gen MacMillan, 4 Sep 

50.0CMH. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

to protect the tank and artillery assembly 

areas, and to patrol toward Djebel Touil. 

The 2d Battalion was held in reserve near 

the division command post. One company 

of the 751st Tank Battalion was to assemble 

south of the line of departure for commitment with the assault infantry on division 

order, while the remainder of the tanks, with 

the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less 

one company), were held farther to the 

south for commitment on that flank or elsewhere as required. To the south and rear of 

the line of departure, six battalions of artillery were set up for massed fires. Farther to 

the rear, the 36th Field Artillery Regiment 

(less 1 st Battalion) was emplaced. The deep 

northern flank was protected by a company 

of the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion and 

the 2d Battalion, 168th Infantry. Eventually 

this infantry battalion would be released by 

the division to the 133d Infantry on the 

southern wing of the assault. The 135th Infantry was directed to smoke appropriate 

targets on its left flank by mortars, but 

Djebel Ain el Rhorab would be out of 

mortar range. 22 

Upon arriving at a co-ordinating line 

about 1,500 yards from the base of Djebel 

el Aouareb the two leading battalions on the 

assault line were expected to pause for reorganization while the Commanding Officer, 

3d Battalion, 135th Infantry (Major Hall), 

fired a flare as a signal for the beginning of 

artillery preparation fire. Because of communications difficulties the two battalions 

did not attack until about 0530, instead of 

at 0300 as ordered. Hall's battalion veered 

to the north on the way to the co-ordinating 

line, causing a gap to develop between it 

and the 3d Battalion, 133d Infantry. At 

22 34th Div FO 30, 0830, 7 Apr 43, with amendments, 2350, 7 Apr 43. 
ATTACKS AT FONDOUK EL AOUAREB 587 

0630, the artillery men saw the signal and 

began shelling the objective. At the same 

time the enemy opened up on the attacking 

infantry with mortar and machine gun fire. 

To fill the gap, 1 st Battalion, 135th Infantry 

(Lt. Col. Robert P. Miller), hurried forward across the flats toward the assault line 

as the rising sun shone from behind the 

enemy, and as hostile fire from the left and 

the front quickened. 

At this juncture, General Ryder learned 

that the artillery had been signaled when 

the troops were still considerably short of 

the line specified in the plans and when in 

fact most of them were still west of the 

2,000-yard bomb line. He therefore tried 

at about 0745 to have the infantry stopped, 

the artillery alerted to mark the target by 

smoke shells, and an air bombing mission 

reinstated for the half hour from 0800 to 

0830. Some of the infantry had to pull back. 

The enemy in front quieted down on the 

south and center but remained very active 

on the north, and on the northern flank, as 

the minutes ticked off but the air attack 

failed to materialize. The strike was postponed one hour and, at 0930, was abandoned altogether. The artillery then repeated its preparation with smoke and high 

explosive, and the infantry resumed its 

advance.23 

The attack started forward by bounds 

under increasing enemy fire which in spots 

raised a cloud of dust almost as opaque as 

a smoke screen. Every attempt to reply 

brought a quick response from well-registered enemy artillery. The men then reacted 

as General Ryder had anticipated they 

23 ( I) 34th Div FO 30 with amendments. (2) 

Msgs, 8 Apr 43, in 34th Div G~3 Jnl. (3) Interv 

with Col Ward, 30 Nov 50. (4) Memo, Col Ward 

for Gen Ward, 22 Jan 51. OCMH. (5) Intervs with 

Gens Ryder and Caffey, 21 Feb 50. 

would. They dug shallow trenches, found 

dry wadies, or lay behind sand hummocks 

for cover. Troops comprising the northern 

wing of the attack could not be induced to 

go forward into a curtain of fire such as they 

had never previously encountered.24 Elsewhere the attack also dragged to a stop. 

The British 128th Infantry Brigade, supported by Churchill tanks of the 51 st Royal 

Tank Regiment, attacked at the designated 

time through Pichon to the heights east of 

the village but fell somewhat behind schedule. Turning south at 1500, the brigade 

stopped about a mile and a half from Djebel 

Ain el Rhorab in the latter part of the 

afternoon, after the enemy on Djebel Ain 

el Rhorab switched his heavy mortar fire 

northeastward to oppose its progress. About 

1600, when the 34th Infantry Division, supported by American tanks, renewed its attack toward Djebel el Aouareb the British 

26th Armoured Brigade passed through the 

division's area, much to the Americans' surprise and confusion. American infantry 

reached some of the enemy's positions at 

the base of the hills but could not hold 

them. The 135th Infantry units, after withdrawal, were partly interspersed among vehicles of the British armored force, which 

remained deployed in attack formation. 

Reorganization under enemy observation 

and under the increased fire attracted by 

these vehicles was necessary before the regi24 ( I) 135th Inf Hist, p. 10. (2) Maj Roland 

Anderson, Operations of the 135th Infantry in the 

Vicinity of Fondouk el Okbi [Aouareb], 26 March~ 

II April 1943, MS, pp. 18~19. The Infantry School, 

Fort Benning, Ga., 1947~48. This relates Anderson's 

personal experience. (3) Capt Virgil E. Craven, 

Operations of Company I, 133d Infantry, at Fondouk [el Aouareb] Gap, 8 April~9 April 1943, MS, 

p. IS. The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., 

1949~50. This relates Craven's personal experience. 
588 

ment could again engage, as it did early 

next morning, in co-ordinated action. At 

all points, the first day's attack at Fondouk 

el Aouareb gap had been thwarted.25 

When General Keightley, 6th Armoured 

Division commander, returned to his command post about 1830 from a reconnaissance toward the pass, he found orders from 

General Crocker to create or discover a path 

through the enemy's mine field during the 

night, to push the tanks through early next 

morning, and to protect his own left flank 

from enemy guns and mortars on Djebel 

Ai"n el Rhorab by sending one battalion of 

infantry to take it before daylight. 2G Crocker 

insisted that Djebel Ai"n el Rhorab was 

lightly held or possibly even abandoned and 

must not be "re-occupied." Actually, it was 

strongly defended by a small force which 

was to be reinforced. Keightley sent the 3d 

Battalion, Welsh Guards (3/WG), to patrol as far as Djebel Ai"n el Rhorab that 

night and to attack as early as possible in 

the morning. When General Crocker discovered at daybreak, 9 April, that Djebel 

Aln el Rhorab was just about to be attacked 

but that a path through the mines had not 

been opened, and the enemy's defenses had 

not yet been fully tested, he sent the 26th 

Armoured Brigade into the pass, ordered 

the entire Guards Brigade, if necessary, to 

occupy Djebel Ai"n el Rhorab, and directed 

the 128th Infantry Brigade to assist them. 

At 0900, 9 April, before General Crocker's orders had been executed, thirty-one 

of General Ryder's tanks were on the 34th 

Division objective ahead of his infantry in 

an attack without benefit of artillery preparation, but the infantry remained pinned 

" Info supplil'd by Cabinet Officl', London. 

'" Issued as 9 Corps Opcrat;.on Order 3, at 2050, 

8 April 19+~1, supplied by Cabinet Officl', London. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

down under intensified ground fire and an 

enemy dive-bombing, so that the whole effort went for naught. Five tanks were lost. 

A second attempt about 1130 on a narrower 

portion of the front reached the lower slopes 

of Hill 306 but was then smothered by fire, 

mainly from the north flank.27 The remaining tanks were then sent to the rear, out of 

range. The British 6th Armoured Division 

would apparently have to punch its own 

way through the gap.28 

Djebel Ai"n el Rhorab was captured during the afternoon, 9 April, by the 3d Battalion, Welsh Guards, supported by tanks 

of the 2d Lothians, and was mopped up 

with the help of the 3d Battalion, Grenadier 

Guards (3/GG). They took over 100 German prisoners from the 26th and 27th 

Africa Battalions. The 135th Infantry was 

still receiving fire from the left as late as 

1430, but they were ordered not to reply.2" 

On 8 April the enemy was forced to commit his reserves to prevent the Allies from 

breaking through to the Kairouan plain. 

Shortly before Djebel Ai"n el Rhorab was 

captured by the British, Colonel Fullriede 

reinforced the two companies of the 27th 

Africa Battalion defending Djebel Ai"n el 

Rhorab and the hills to the north of it by 

sending into the line the 26th Africa Battalion. On 9 April, as the situation further 

deteriorated, he committed one company of 

the 334th Reconnaissance Battalion with 

"The Medal of Honor was awarded posthumously to Pvt. Robnt D. Booker, a machine gunner 

of the 133d Infantry for bravt'ry and leadership on 

9 April 1943. 

" (I) Sec n. 2+ aboVl'. (2) Msgs in 168th Inf 

Mise Fill', Apr 43. (3) Ltr, Col Landon to author, 

17 Jan 51. 

en (I) State-ment by Gen MacMillan, 4 Sep 50. 

OCMH. (2) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (3) Intnv with Col Ward, 30 Nov 50. (4) 

34th Div G-3 Jnl, 1430,9 Apr 43. (5) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB V,9 Apr 43. 
ATTACKS AT FONDOUK EL AOUAREB 589 

the mission of regaining the lost ground on 

the d jebel. The antitank company (armed 

with seven self-propelled antitank guns and 

a captured and converted American armored car) took up positions to the south of 

the Marguellil river and the Kairouan road. 

Further to strengthen the antitank defenses 

of the pass area north of the river, the German commander borrowed six self-propelled 47 -mm. antitank guns from the Italian 135th Armored Battalion and two 

88-mm. dual-purpose Flak guns. In the 

thickly mined pass were at least thirteen 

heavy antitank guns on the southern side of 

the river and two more north of it. Through 

this gantlet the British armor was waiting 

to run.''') 

Failure to obtain the pass on 8 April for 

the unimpeded passage of the British 6th 

Armoured Division threatened to frustrate 

the purpose of the whole effort, which, as 

already pointed out, has been running on a 

very close schedule from the first. The Chott 

Position at the Akarit wadi had been defended only briefly. The Italian First Army 

was already streaming northward over the 

coastal plain, on the roads leading east of 

Kairouan. Although the German Africa 

Corps was nearer the mountain chain, it 

could still be intercepted only if the Allied 

armored units were on the plain south of 

Kairouan before 10 April. 

British 6th Armoured Division Breaks Out 

at Fondouk el Aouareb 

While the 3d Welsh Guards and the U.S. 

34th Infantry Division were attacking, the 

30 Gefechtsbericht, 3d Co to 334th Reconnaissance Batlalion for 9 and 10 Apr 43, dtd 11 Apr 

43, and Gefechtsbericht, 334th Reconnaissance 

Battalion to Kampf"rnppe Fullriede, 11 Apr 43, in 

Fifth Panzer Arm)" KTB mit Anlagen vom 11.IV.-

21.lV.43. 

British 26th Armoured Brigade spent the 

morning of 9 April and the first half of the 

afternoon in a successful effort to penetrate the enemy's deep but irregular belt of 

mines across the gap. The 17/21 Lancers 

with some Royal Engineers found a lane 

which permitted one small tank unit to get 

through about 1215 before being stopped 

by fire from Fondouk el Aouareb village, 

400 yards beyond the mine field. As British 

along with a number of American troops 

boldly tried to clear another lane farther 

south, the 16/5 Lancers discovered a twisting and difficult path which involved crossing the stream bed to the northern side, 

working along that bank for almost a mile, 

and then turning south to recross the Marguellil on the far side of Fondouk el Aouareb village. Allied counterbattery fire during this protracted and courageous action 

took its toll of the enemy's antitank guns, 

but they in turn knocked out enough British tanks to bring the total to a considerable 

figure. The Coldstream Guards were ordered to clear the enemy from those heights 

nearest the gap, originally in the U.S. 34th 

Infantry Division's zone. The American 

zone was then narrowed in order to transfer this area to the British 6th Armoured 

Division. Armored units began to emerge 

on the eastern side of the mine field between 

1500 and 1800, 9 April. The enemy in the 

hills facing General Ryder's troops prepared to join the main northward retreat 

during the night. 

The 1 st Battalion, 133d Infantry, attacked to gain the summit of Hill 306 and 

ad jacent ground after dark, 9-10 April. 

The Americans reached the crest while a 

few of the defenders were still there, and 

drove them off. By noon, 10 April, elements 

of the 34th Infantry Division including the 

168th Infantry, which had relieved the 
590 

133d Infantry, held the dominating hills 

on either side of the Marguellil river. The 

British armored units were by that time 

seeking out elements of the enemy near 

Kairouan, which they entered next day 

after the enemy's units had withdrawn. 

The Enemy Slips Past Kairouan 

The Italian First Army's Italian element'S, making good use of the holding action at Fondouk el Aouareb, had passed 

across the Kairouan plain on 8-9 April 

before the British 6th Armoured Division 

could block their path. But the enemy 

needed still more time. The German units 

under General Bayerlein were somewhat 

more slowly moving up the coast, east of 

Kairouan, under light pressure by British 

Eighth Army.'1 The remnants of the lOt h 

Panzer and 21st Panzer Divisions, of 

Kampfgruppe Lang, of Division Centauro, 

and the other units under the command of 

the German Africa Corps were on the line 

Faid-Sfax during the night of 8-9 April, 

and were to pass through Kairouan on the 

night of 9-·10 April. The German forces 

defending at Fondouk e1 Aouareb had 

therefore been requested to hold until 10 

April to permit their passage.32 Before the 

British 6th Armoured Division could reach 

the plain east of Kairouan, it not only had 

to cross the mine field, but it also had to 

overcome antitank guns farther east. At the 

cost of four Shermans, the 16/5 Lancers 

drove off a determined covering enemy 

force at these guns late in the day,"3 

After winning their way through the gap, 

'" See pp. 540-41 above. 

"Fifth Panzer Army, KTB V, 1625, 9 Apr 43. 

"" (1) Sec n. 30 above. (2) Fifth Panzer Army, 

KTB V, 10 Apr 43. (3) Army Group Africa, KTB, 

lO-11 Apr 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

British 9 Corps took account of the losses 

(thirty-four tanks), the approaching darkness, and the possibility of a counterattack 

in the morning by the German Atrica 

Corps. General Crocker decided not to push 

out onto the plain until morning and the 

armored elements already through F ondouk el Aouareb gap were called back into 

the pass to harbor for the night.:l4 The 9 

Corps commander and his staff concluded 

that the main opportunity to strike the 

weaker elements of the enemy had passed. 

They understood, moreover, that the enemy was planning to hold in the area one 

more day. The disappointment and sense 

of frustration engendered by the delay were 

profound. 

The second attack at Fondouk el Aouareb gap subjected Allied relations to a considerable strain, for General Crocker not 

only recommended withdrawal of the 34th 

Infantry Division for retraining of junior 

officers at the rear under British guidance 

but blamed the failure of his operation 

toward Kairouan on the inability to get 

through the pass expeditiously, and that 

failure, in turn, upon the incapacity of the 

34th Division. Similar disparagements were 

published shortly thereafter in the United 

States, where the public had quite wrongly 

been encouraged to expect an American 

drive to the sea between the two Axis armies. 

The German retreat was described as though 

"Rommel" had again succeeded in outwitting the Allies, this time because of American deficiencies. American officers aware of 

the issues involved later condemned the 

corps plan of attack on which General 

Crocker had insisted as being unnecessarily 

prodigal with American troops and mate-

"9 Corps Opn Order 4, 2252, 9 Apr 43, Supplird by Cabinet Office, London. 
ATTACKS AT FONDOUK EL AOUAREB 591 

riel. They absolved the 34th Division of sole 

responsibility for failure, emphasing heavily 

General Ryder's predicament in being obliged to attack with an exposed flank, and 

minimizing the faulty aspects of his division's operations. Generals Eisenhower and 

Alexander took swift steps to suppress the 

mounting tide of recrimination, while the 

34th Division acted energetically to forestall 

future failures. The division, after beginning 

at once a program of intensive training in 

the various types of attack-by night, with 

tanks, behind a rolling artillery barrage, and 

in mountainous terrain-and after some 

changes in command, was whipped into 

effective condition. 35 

During the night of 8-9 April all but the 

rear guard of the German Africa Corps 

rolled past the Fondouk el Aouareb-Kai-

[ouan area undeterred. At about 1000 on 

10 April the British 6th Armoured Division 

completed the transit of Fondouk el 

Aouareb gap in time to start for Kairouan, 

eighteen miles away. With about 110 Sherman tanks, it moved astride the Fondouk el 

Aouareb-Kairouan road on a broad front. 

It fought several small armored engagements during a day and netted about 650 

prisoners, 14 tanks, and 15 guns. At 1110, 

10 April, 18 Army Group issued a new 

instruction to British 9 Corps. After cleanmg up the area near Kairouan, it was to 

" (I) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. lSI. 

(2) Intt'rvs with Gens Ryder and Caffey, 21 Feb 

50. (3) The British 6th Armoured Division lost 

19 killed, 48 wounded, and 34 tanks in Fondouk 

d Aouareb gap, and suffered 109 casualties at 

Djebel Aln el Rhorab. In the 34th Infantry Division, the 135th Infantry reported, 8-10 April, 73 

killed and 184 wounded, and the I st Battalion, 

133d Infantry, IS killed and 82 wounded (out of 

685 personnel). The 2d Battalion, 133d Infantry, 

was in Algiers; the 3d Battalion, 133d Infantry, 

was committed late and its casualties were not 

dated. The 168th Infantry had few losses. 

turn toward Sbikha in an attempt to cut 

off enemy forces stranded in the northern 

portion of the Eastern Dorsal. These instructions were put into effect on 11 April. During 10 April, Combat Command A, U.S. 

1 st Armored Division, pushed through Ai"n 

Rebaou pass south of Fai"d under General 

Patton's personal supervision and moved 

along the eastern side of the mountain chain. 

By late evening its 81 st Reconnaissance Battalion had come in contact with elements 

of the 168th Infantry east of Fondouk el 

Aouareb village. 36 

By nightfall, 10 April, General Koeltz's 

command had succeeded in pushing through 

the Djebel Ousselat to the coastal plain. 

The Ain Djeloula pass between Ousseltia 

and Kairouan, scene of the January battles, 

had come into French possession. (See Map 

8.) Over 1,000 prisoners had been taken. 

Yet for the French, 10 April had been an 

extremely costly day. Their gallant General 

Welvert had been fatally wounded by a 

mine, a heavy price even for the important 

gains achieved':'7 

The mission of the II Corps from 17 

March to 10 April had been to menace the 

enemy's line of communications, threaten 

an incursion into the rear of the First Italian 

Army, and absorb enemy strength, thereby 

weakening the resistance of the Axis forces 

to the British Eighth Army. General Montgomery's army was at the same time faced 

with the task of overcoming the enemy's 

advantage of prepared positions, first at 

Mareth and later at the Chott Position, an 

advantage which could be extremely costly 

" (I) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

(2) Patton Diary, 10 Apr 43. (3) 168th Inf Hlst, 

II Nov 42-15 May 43, p. 43. 

31 Giraud Hq, Rapport des operations, p. 52. (~) 

Rpt, Capt Ducos to Col Carichon, II Apr 43, In 

App. to DMC Jnl. 
592 

to any attacking force and which could be 

nullified only if the enemy was deprived of 

reserves. The Americans in Tunisia and elsewhere would have been gratified if the II 

Corps had broken through the eastern 

mountain chain to deliver disastrous blows 

on the main body of the enemy. It was hard 

for them to accept the view that the II 

Corps was not yet equal to such a mission 

against the more experienced foe. But the 

18 Army Group would not have authorized 

any large-scale American thrust beyond the 

mountains, once a pass through them had 

been secured, unless such a maneuver were 

likely to save a bad situation or to supply 

the margin of strength necessary to exploit 

a triumph. The issue never came to a decision, since the enemy held at all points on 

the II Corps front and at Fondouk el Aouareb until he was ready to withdraw. 

On 13 April, the middle period of the 

Allied campaign in Tunisia ended. Constriction of the enemy into northeastern 

Tunisia had eliminated his freedom to maNORTHWEST AFRICA 

neuver and had cost him important airfields. The 18 Army Group made arrangements to convert and supplement these 

airfields, and to tighten the ring which 

hemmed in Army Group Africa. General 

Alexander assigned II Corps a substantial 

role in the final phase of the campaign, and 

by 11 April it was already taking steps to 

shift to its new zone of attack.:lS 

3S (1) The commander of A,my Group Africa 

later e-xpresse-d the belief that the- war would have 

be-en much shortened in Tunisia if the- Eighth Army 

had hdd along the- Mareth Lin,. with two divisions 

and se-nt the remainder on a wide- weste-r1y swe-ep 

to the Gafsa~Fald are-a, thus rel,.asing U.S. II Corps 

for a pownful attack on weakly hdd Kairouan in 

mid-March. The- southern Axis army and Group 

Imperiali would th,.n have been cut off and would 

inevitably have perished. Se-c MS # C~098 (von 

Arnim). (2) Allied losses we-re- reported as 603 

killed, 3,509 wounde-d, 1,152 missing, and I captur,.d. Enemy prisoners totakd 4,679. Estimated 

additional e-ne-my losse-s were 1,600 killed and 8,000 

wounde-d, figures undoubtedly much exaggerated. 

Entry 229, 14 Apr 43, in II Corps G~3 In!' (3) 

Total Axis prisone-rs from all fronts, 20 March~14 

April, were reporte-d to be more than 6,000 German 

and 22,000 Italian. Msg 1/286, 18 A Gp to AFHQ, 

IS Apr 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 85. 
PART SEVEN 

ALLIED DRIVE TO VICTORY 

CHAPTER XXXI 

Preparations 

fhe Terrain of the Enemy's Bridgehead 

The campaign in Tunisia moved during 

April to the opening of its final phase. At 

the beginning of the month, the enemy's 

defense in southern Tunisia had collapsed. 

During the second week, he had gathered 

his forces in a compact sector in northeastern Tunisia behind a great arc extending 

from a point on the north coast east of Cap 

Serrat to Enfidaville and the Gulf of Hammametonthesoutheast. (Map 19) His forward positions extended over mountains 

and valleys, plains, and marshlands, at a distance of thirty or more miles from the ports 

of Bizerte and Tunis, the main Allied objectives. While the enemy was strengthening 

his line, the Allies also regrouped and reorganized, with a view to pushing the line 

back on the flanks and piercing it in the center, south of the Medjerda river. They were 

ready, by the third week of April, to launch 

the culminating offensive. The incentive to 

complete the campaign in northwestern 

Africa at the earliest possible moment was 

very great. The seizure of Sicily, which was 

next on the Allied schedule, had to be accomplished early in the summer if it were 

to leave time for an important sequel in 

1943. 

The enemy's bridgehead contained five 

major regions to which the Allies had to adjust their plans and operations: (1) that 

north of the Med jerda river; (2) that between the Medjerda and the MiHane river 

with its tributary, the Kebir river; (3) that 

from the MiHane and Kebir rivers to the 

foothills on the western edge of the coastal 

plain; (4) the coastal plain and the fiats at 

the base of the Cap Bon peninsula; and (5) 

the Cap Bon peninsula. 

The first of the subdivisions is an almost 

rectangular area trending northeast-southwest, with Bizerte in the northeastern corner and Medjez el Bab at the southwest. 

Its western half is covered by hills and low, 

unforested mountains except close to the 

seacoast between Cap Serrat on the west and 

Bizerte on the east. The hills defy all efforts 

to organize them into recognizable patterns 

but, in general, consist of a series of widely 

varying complexes in which a higher crest 

and neighboring hills form interlocking 

groups. Foremost among these complexes is 

the one including Djebel Tahent (Hill 609) 

near Sidi Nsir, from whose summit it is 

possible to see Mateur. Fingers of high 

ground project from the mountain area 

northeastward across the coastal plain, thus 

enclosing a section adjacent to Bizerte and 

separating it from a second and narrow area 

north of the Medjerda between Tebourba 

and the ocean. Two great shallow lakes, the 

Garaet Ichkeul and the Lac de Bizerte, 

southwest and south of Bizerte, confine all 

overland approach to the city to narrow 
596 

COP S"'OI 

MAP 19 

• 

-• . 

, • 

" 
11 , Zttnbta 

ATTACKS ON AXIS BRIDGEHEAD 

19 Ap ri l-I May 1943 

,..-..,...... GER WA N - IT ALI AN I 'UOG[MEAO. 22 APftil 19 4 3 

--____ GERMAN -ITALI AN BR IDGtW(AD. I IoAA.,. 1943 

-.. AL. LIED &rUC.K , DATE IHD IC aT[D 

~ GE RMAN COU NTE,.AT,A C.K.O .TE INDICATED 

10 Q tO WfL£5 

..... ' ........ "'f,b .... '.....,.' ... ' .,.,'+~----,- 'LO-'~r TE~5 

597 

belts between the shores and the hills. The 

Tine river runs northeast and north from 

sources south of Hill 609 to the plain near 

Mateur. 

Access from this northern portion of the 

enemy's bridgehead to that south of the 

Medjerda river is easiest via bridges at 

Med jez el Bab, El Bathan (near Tebourba ) , 

Djedelda, and Protville nearest the river's 

mouth. This second subdivision is narrower, 

and more nearly trapezoidal, with a western 

side running almost due south from Medjez 

el Bab to Djebel Mansour (678 ) and the 

Kebir river, and with the Medjerda on the 

northwest and the Miliane at the southeast 

converging somewhat as they approach the 

ocean. In this area the enemy had pushed 

an even shorter distance into the hills from 

the inland margin of the coastal plain. Of 

the two fingerlike extensions of lower hills 

projecting northeastward here, the one 

nearer the Medjerda had been the scene of 

the battles of Combat Command B, U.S. 

1st Armored Division, in defense of Medjez 

el Bab in early December. The other is a 

wedge narrowing from the Sebkret el Kourzia at its southwestern base to a point 

southeast of Massicault. Between these two 

fingers is the Goubellat plain, from which 

a force approaching Tunis could emerge 

onto the coastal plain by passing through 

an opening northwest of Ksar Tyr. The 

principal road from the west to Tunis crosses 

the Medjerda river at Medjez el Bab to 

enter this second subdivision of the bridgehead, continues generally east through a 

gap in the northern series of hills, and swings 

northeastward through Massicault to Tunis. 

Another road passes through Pont-du-Fahs, 

on the southern edge of the area, and along 

the Miliane river to Tunis. From the Bou 

Arada valley west of Pont-du-Fahs, an easy 

approach to Tunis requires a route either 
598 

through Pont-du-Fahs or over the Goubellat 

plain, routes that in each case arrive at the 

broad coastal plain from a slightly higher 

area after passing through relatively narrow outlets. Tunis itself is in this region, and 

is ringed closely on the north and west, and 

at a greater distance on the south and southeast, by a series of low hills. The city lies 

between the western edge of EI Bahira lake 

and the northeastern rim of the still shallower Sebkret es Sed joumi. 

The relatively long and narrow third subdivision of the enemy's bridgehead, that 

between the Miliane river and the coastal 

plain on the Gulf of Hammamet, includes 

a segment of the higher mountains which 

stretch across Tunisia northeasterly as far 

as Cap Bon. Here the enemy's forward line 

in April continued southeast from Djebel 

Mansour, crossed the Kebir river, and 

turned northeastward, after circling Djebel 

Chirich (717), into the hills which formed 

the enemy's Enfidaville position. The mountains in this subdivision are divided into two 

major sections by an east-west valley at the 

northern edge of Djebel Zarhouan (1295), 

along which runs a road connecting the 

Miliane valley road net with the coastal 

highway at Bou Ficha. The mountainous 

section north of this transverse valley is further divided into an eastern and a western 

segment by a valley and north-south road 

between Tunis and Ste. Marie-du-Zit. Here 

was an area which offered opportunity for 

a long-drawn out defense and which contained valuable routes that could be used 

to shift strength quickly to effective points 

for counterattack. 

The coastal plain at the southeastern 

limit of the enemy's forward line narrows 

to a ribbon of flatland adjacent to the Gulf 

of Hammamet as the foothills on the west 

jut eastward near Djebibina and Takrouna 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

toward the shore. Enfidaville is a road center 

at the southern end of this ribbon. Although the coastal plain throws out an arm 

toward Zarhouan west of Bou Ficha, it remains narrowly confined as it extends northeastward. Near Hammamet it merges with 

the triangular-shaped flats at the base of 

the Cap Bon peninsula, and on the other 

side of these flats, narrows to the very limited shelf near Hammam Lif, where the 

distance between steep heights and the surf 

of the Golfe de Tunis is only a few hundred 

yards. The coastal plain is thus readily defensible against an armored force by troops 

possessing the heights and equipped with 

appropriate weapons. 

Cap Bon is at the northeastern tip of a 

peninsula approximately fifty miles long and 

from fifteen to twenty-five miles wide. A 

ridge extending from Hammamet to Cap 

Bon falls away in a great series of shoulders 

and gullies to coastal lowlands and, except 

near the base, confines the roads to a loop 

around the outer edge. The peninsula has no 

sheltered ports of any consequence, but its 

long coast line has many stretches of beach 

and several small ports which could be used 

for the reinforcement, supply, or the evacuation of troops by small craft. The Allies 

were alert in April to the possibility that the 

Cap Bon peninsula might be used as the site 

of a last-ditch, Bataan-like defense which 

could drag out the operations in Tunisia and 

disrupt preparations to seize Sicily. 

The Allied Plan of Attack 

Allied plans for the attack were under 

consideration at the highest levels of command even before operations in southern 

and south central Tunisia were at full scale. 

General Alexander's thorniest problems 

were to determine the axis of main attack 
PREPARATIONS 

and the mission for U.S. II Corps. He had 

retained General Anderson in command of 

British First Army, to whose operations he 

himself gave close personal attention, and 

he decided to follow General Eisenhower's 

suggestion that the chief effort be made toward the east through First Army's sector. 

Allied concentration and preparation there 

could be completed sooner, and subsequent 

maintenance would be easier. First Army, 

which may have felt that its hard fighting 

had not been properly recognized by the 

general public, would thus have its chance 

to gain renown. But what would be done 

with II Corps? "I desire that you make a 

real effort to use the II U.S. Corps right up 

to the bitter end of the campaign, even if 

maintenance reasons compel it to be stripped 

down eventually to a total of two divisions 

and supporting Corps troops," wrote the 

Commander in Chief, Allied Force, at the 

same time that he suggested a major role 

for First Army.l It should be given a mission, 

he prescribed, which would keep it committed aggressively. If any Allied sector was 

to be narrowed or pinched out by the northward progress of Eighth Army and the eastward drive by First Army, the best interests 

of the Allied military effort required that the 

sector not be that of the U.S. II Corps. That 

force must be used fully until the enemy 

capitulated, both in order to furnish experience which would be devoted subsequently to training the only great body of 

Allied reserves-that being organized in the 

U.S.-and to serve the needs of American 

morale. 2 

1 Ltr, CinC, AF to CG 18 A Gp, 23 Mar 43. Copy 

in OPD Exec 8, Bk. 8, Tab 53. 

"Queries, CinC AF to CG 18 A Gp, in FRCOS 

to 18 A Gp, No. 1044, 2 Apr 43; Ltr, CinC AF to 

CofS, 29 Mar 43. Copies in OPD Exec 8, Bk. 8, 

Tab 53. 

599 

In conformity with these suggestions, 

General Alexander's staff drafted plans by 

8 April which included provision for a II 

Corps zone at the northern flank of the 

Allied front. The Combined Chiefs of Staff 

approved the project on 9 April, and on 

the next day the plans were back in General Alexander's hands with instructions to 

execute them. He then issued preliminary 

instructions to the commanders of British 

First Army and Eighth Army. He directed 

Anderson to prepare to make the main attack about 22 Apnl. He instructed Montgomery, who had requested on 11 April the 

immediate transfer of the British 6th Armoured Division to his operational command, that the Eighth Army was to conduct 

a subsidiary operation rather than to attempt a sudden piercing of the Enfidaville 

position, and that Montgomery was to release an armored division and an armored 

car brigade to strengthen First Army's attack. On 12 April, discussing with General 

Alexander the role of II Corps, General 

Patton objected to a proposal that II Corps, 

which had operated since 8 March directly 

under 18 Army Group, should be subordinated once more to British First Army. On 

14 April, General Eisenhower flew to Hai'-

dra to confer with Generals Alexander, Anderson, Patton, and Bradley on the plans, 

and in particular on the arrangements respecting II Corps. British 9 Corps' attribution of the blame for failure at Fondouk el 

Aouareb to inferior performance by the U.S. 

34th Infantry Division, the low regard in 

which General Alexander and some of his 

staff held the U.S. 1st Armored Division, 

and the reluctance of Alexander's logistical 

advisers to see the Allied line of supply in the 

north burdened by the requirements of a 

full four-division American corps, were all 
600 

factors which had led Alexander to reconsider the subject of fully using American 

troops under American command during 

the next phase of the Tunisian campaign. 

At the insistence of the Americans, he assented to these arrangements. On 16 April, 

18 Army Group issued the final plan. The 

Allied operations were intended to tighten 

the cordon around the enemy, to drive a 

wedge dividing the portion of his bridgehead adjacent to Tunis from that near 

Bizerte, to seal off the Cap Bon peninsula, 

and to overwhelm first the defenders of 

Tunis and next the defenders of Bizerte. A 

program to strangle the Axis line of supply 

was ready as well as another operation to 

forestall the evacuation of substantial forces 

to Sicily or Italy.3 

Alexander directed Eighth Army to exert 

continuous pressure on its front, and to 

advance on the axis Enfidaville~Hammamet Tunis in order to bar access to the Cap 

Bon peninsula. First Army was to capture 

Tunis, then aid U.S. II Corps in capturing 

Bizerte, and be prepared to aid the Eighth 

Army if the enemy should succeed in withdrawing onto the Cap Bon peninsula. British Eighth Army prepared to attack the 

" (I) 18 A Gp Opn Instruc 12, 16 Apr 43. 

AFHQ Micro Job lOA, Reel 6C. (2) Msg 2921, 

AFHQ G-3 to 18 A Gp, to Apr 43, (3) Patton 

Diary, 9,11, and 12 Apr 4:3. (4) Alexander, "The 

African Campaign, p. 878. (5) Leahy, I Was 

There, p. 147, cites approving action by the Joint 

Chids of Staff and thf' British Chids of Staff on 

9 April 1943. (6) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 

72-73. (7) Msg, AGWAR to FREEDOM, 9 Apr 43. 

CM-OUT 5656. 

The II Corps was to remain under 18 Army 

Group but with First Army authorized to issue 

directly the orders necessary for co-ordinating the 

corps' operations with those of First Army. In 

effect, First Army commanded II Corps in the name 

of the army !,roup, but the Commanding General, 

II Corps, was free to bring any matter of serious 

disagreement to Alexander for decision. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Enfidaville line on the night of 19-20 April, 

an operation timed to draw enemy reinforcements to that portion of the front, 

where they were to be held by continued 

pressure. 

West of the Eighth Army, at the southwestern corner of the enemy's bridgehead, 

British First Army had directed the French 

XIX Corps to attack on the axis Rebaa 

Oulad Yahia~Pont-du-Fahs in order to reopen the road and make possible progress 

toward Zarhouan. This mission involved the 

clearing of Djebel Chirich and Djebcl 

Fkirine (988) on the south side of the road 

and Djebel Mansour on the north side of 

the road, an effort which was to be started 

only after the attack on each flank had 

reached a suitable stage. 

British 9 Corps was to mount its attack 

from an area southwest of Bou Arada, with 

its objective the high ground adjacent to 

the Sebkret el Kourzia, northwest of Pontdu-Fahs. From this point 9 Corps could 

threaten the main highway between Pontdu-Fahs and Tunis, and could also assist 

British 5 Corps. 

British 5 Corps was to make the main 

effort. It was first to regain Longstop Hill 

and "Peter's Corner" (southeast of Medjez 

e1 Bab on the Medjez el BabMassicault 

highway; see Map VII) and next to gain 

the high ground between El Bathan and 

Massicault. The attacks by British 9 and 5 

Corps were both to be launched on 22 April, 

the former at daybreak and the latter shortly 

after dark. 

On the northern flank, the U.S. II Corps 

was expected to advance eastward from 

Bcd ja to Choulgui, and at the same time, 

nearer the northern coast, to expel the enemy from Bald and Green Hills (known as 

the Djefna position) and gain control of 
PREPARATIONS 

high ground dominating a road junction 

northwest of Garaet Ichkeul! 

An elaborate Allied air forces' program 

to choke off the air supply line from Italy 

became effective during the planning. 

Known as Operation FLAX and postponed 

for various reasons since February, it began 

as the enemy came under attack in the Chott 

Position on 5 April. Two Allied flights struck 

formations of enemy transports en route to 

Tunisia over the Sicilian straits early that 

morning, while a little later B-17's hit the 

Bizerte and Tunis airdromes in an effort to 

catch those transports which got through. 

Other bombers went to Sicily to destroy any 

transport aircraft which might be staging 

there in a second flight en route from Italy 

to Tunisia. Fighter sweeps contributed to 

the whole operation, which may have de4 First Army Opn Instruc 37, 19 Apr 43, copy 

in II Corps AAR, 15 May 43. The order of hattk 

for British First Army and U.S. II Corps was given 

as follows: 

U.S. II Corps 

Bri tish 5 Corps 

British 9 Corps 

1st Armored Division (less 

1 st Armored Regiment) 

1 st Infantry Division 

9th Infantry Division 

34th Infantry Division 

Corps Franc d'Afrique 

(three battalions) 

1 st Infantry Division 

4th Infantry Division 

78th Infantry Division 

25th Tank Brigade (less 

51st Royal Tank Regiment) 

1st Armoured Division 

6th Armoured Division 

46th Infantry Division 

51 st Royal Tank Rt'giment 

French XIX Corps Moroccan Division 

Algiers Division 

Oran Division 

Tank Battalion (Valentines 

and Somuas) 

18th King's Dragoon 

Guards 

601 

stroyed as many as 161 aircraft on the 

ground and 40 in the air. 5 

The Western Desert Air Force soon afterward occupied bases from which its fighters 

could operate over the Golfe de Tunis and 

join in intercepting enemy air transports. 

On 18 April, five squadrons intercepted a 

mixed and scattered formation of Junkers 

52's and Messerschmitt 323's at a very low 

altitude and already in sight of the coast, 

and striking from the right rear, destroyed 

thirty-eight of them." Next day, a smaller 

success was achieved, and as the ground offensive began on 22 April, thirty-nine more 

enemy transports were intercepted and destroyed. Some burst into flames as if carrying cargoes of gasoline. Thereafter, the 

enemy limited his air supply route to night 

operations and to individual rather than 

formation flights.' Allied night fighters 

interfered with that method, too. 

The Enemy's Plans and Regrouping 

However desperate the Axis position 

might seem after the loss of the Chott Position, Hitler did not budge from his determination to hold on. On 8 April he had to 

confront Mussolini, now deeply concerned 

about the expected Allied invasion of Italy, 

when the Duce arrived at Schloss Klessheim, with an Italian delegation, for the 

annual conference of the Axis partners. 

As in previous discussions with Goering 

and Ciano, Mussolini pleaded that Germany come to terms with the USSR and 

turn all its energies against the Allies in the 

Mediterranean. His plan for prevent5 AAF, History of the Twelfth Air Force, Operation FLAX, pp. 1-6. AAF Archives. 

.; MS # D-071 (Buchholz). Estimates then were 

sev('nty-four destroyed and twenty-nine damaged. 

7 (1) Ibid. (2) Info supplied by Air Ministry, 

London. 
602 

ing the Allied invasion of the European 

mainland was to hold in Tunisia and fall on 

the Allied forces from the rear by attacking 

through Spain and Spanish Morocco and 

seizing the Balearic Islands. 

Hitler was interested only in holding in 

Tunisia. The conflict with the Soviets admitted of no compromise, and even if forces 

were available a move through Spain or a 

seizure of the Balearics would arouse the 

Spaniards to stubborn, unending resistance. 

The Axis could hold Tunisia indefinitely, 

and as long as the Allies were kept fighting 

there, they could not undertake other largescale operations; Italy, Sicily, and the 

French Mediterranean coast were therefore 

in no immediate danger. In any case, the 

best Axis troops were in Tunisia and their 

evacuation was impossible. Mussolini had to 

be satisfied with the old assurance that Italy 

and Germany would stand or fall together. 

Hitler even induced him, in exchange for 

renewed promises of reinforcements, to 

agree to having the Italian cruisers and destroyers still in action used to transport men 

and materials to Tunisia-an agreement 

from which Mussolini began to retreat as 

soon as he reached the soberer atmosphere 

of his own headquarters in Rome.s 

The Duce, conferring with Kesselring on 

12 April after he got back from Germany, 

reiterated that the Axis had to get sufficient 

8 (1) Ltr, Mussolini to Hitler, 26 Mar 43. (2) 

Tels, Mackensen to Ribbentrop, 31 Mar, 1 Apr 43. 

(3) Aufzeichnung ueber die Unterredung: zwischen 

dem RAM und diem Staatssekretaer Bastiniani in 

Anwesenheit der Botschafter von Mackensen and 

Alfieri im Schloss Klessheim am 8. April 1943, 

nachmittags und am 9. April 1943 vormittags; 

zwischen dem RAM und Staatssekretaer Bastiniani 

im Schloss Klessheim am 9. April nachmittags; 

zwischen dem Fuehrer and Marschall Antonescu in 

Klessheim am 12. April um 5 Uhr nachmittags. 

AI! in German Foreign Office Files, Historical Division, Dept of State. (4) OKW/WFSt, KTB, 

I.vII.-30.IX.43, 15 Jul 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

men, ammunition, replacement parts, and 

fuel to Tunisia without delay. 

We have to hold [he said] .... We can 

hold out two months. We must create a 

system of defense with one line behind another in depth . . . . I am convinced that 

the Americans will do nothing [elsewhere] 

before haviI?-g settled the Tunisian problem. 

~n~y then WIll they eventually attack Sardinia, 

SICIly, Crete, etc. If we succeed in shifting the 

start of these attacks, we shall see that in the 

short ti~e remaining before winter, they will 

do nothmg . . . . Everything can happen if 

we persist, and therefore we shall hold. D 

Army Group Africa prepared to hold 

out in conformity with the decision of the 

two Axis political leaders. All men in Tunisia were to be used either to fight or to 

construct field fortifications. Troops of the 

rear were placed under the general control 

of Headquarters, Fifth Panzer Army, and 

were to be assembled in units of 500 under 

command of energetic officers for commitment as needed. Motor vehicles were organized in transport columns of fifty-ton 

capacity and held at the disposal of the 

army group. The primitive Enfidaville line 

was to be developed in depth. Coastal defense as well as retention of interior sectors 

became the responsibility of the two Axis 

armies. After the front was firmly established, with German and Italian battalions 

interspersed, and with all Axis tanks and 

at least two armored divisions available for 

a mobile reserve, the armored forces were 

to be placed under the control of H eadquarters, German Africa Corps. Italian 

tanks would pass to Division C entauro, 

which would in turn be attached to a German armored division.lO 

"Conf, Duce with Kesselring, 12 Apr 43, in Italian Collection, Item 26. 

10 Operation Order, A rmy Group Africa, Nr. 

2006/43, dated 11 Apr 43, in Fifth Panzer Army, 

KT B mit A nlagan vom II.IV -21.43. 
PREPARATIONS 

Kesselring reported to M ussolini on the 

situation in Tunisia on 17 April, directly 

after making his last personal visit there. 

The Axis line had been rendered satisfactory, he said, in all but two points: at Medjez el Bab and on the coastal plain near 

Enfidaville. Here General von Arnim was 

withdrawing the main line to stronger and 

more favorable positions and, while preparing a second line, was already planning 

a third. Axis reserves were being flown to 

Tunisia at a daily rate expected to average 

from 1,800 to 2,000 men, after a week in 

which air transports brought in 4,000, while 

destroyer-transports brought others at a 

slower rate. He would hold in Italy a pool 

of about 12,000 from which to draw. On 

20 April, as a birthday gift to the Fuehrer, 

he planned to make an attack, despite some 

materiel shortages, especially in fuel. Allied 

aviation was ominously quiet but Allied airfields were being kept under close surveillance and were about to be subjected to 

Axis attacks. Although Allied tank strength 

was still greatest on the coastal plain in the 

southwest, Kesselring expected much of the 

British armor to be shifted to the north before the Allied attack began." 

The enemy's forward line was under 

steady and sometimes overwhelming Allied 

pressure as the main offensive was being prepared. At the northern end, the British 46th 

Division forced Division von M anteufJel to 

give ground so that when the U.S. 9th Infantry Division took over the British positions at 1800, 14 April, most of the area 

gained by Axis attacks since 26 February 

had already been recovered by the British. 

Just before the Allied attacks began on 19 

April, that portion of the Axis front ran, 

therefore, from a cape north of Djebel Dar11 Conf, Duce, Kesselring, and Ambrosio, 17, 20 

Apr 43, in Italian Collection, Item 26. 

603 

dyss (294) through the Djefna position to 

the vicinity of Sidi Nsir. The 334th Division 

(Korpsgruppe Weber) had successfully 

withstood the attacks of the British 4th Division toward Sidi Nsir and the hills south of 

it, but after stubborn defense northwest and 

north of Medjez el Bab, was pushed back 

from the crest of Djebel Bech Chekaoui 

(667) and neighboring heights. From these 

bold ridges Allied observers could keep 

"Longstop Hill" (290) under surveillance 

and see over it to the Med jerda river plain 

beyond. 

East of Medjez el Bab and south of the 

main highway to Tunis, the Hermann Goering Division (-) held a section of the front 

extending to Djebel Mansour, in contact 

there with the right flank of the German 

Africa Corps. After the withdrawal into the 

Enfidaville Position, this corps had assumed 

command of the zone between the Fifth 

Panzer and Italian First Armies with the 

Superga, 10th Panzer and 21st Panzer Divisions, and the remaining Italian troops of 

the XXX Corps and 50th Special Brigade. 

Starting on 21 April the armored and mobile 

elements of the panzer divisions were gradually withdrawn from this sector which was 

mountainous. The 10th Panzer Division 

(-) was initially moved to the Medjerda 

plain west of Tunis to serve as mobile Fifth 

Panzer Army reserve against the expected 

Allied thrust against Tunis.'2 

12 (I) Maps, Lage Nordafrika (1 :500,000) GenStdH/Op Abt IIIb, Pruef Nr. 19457 and 19629,18, 

19 Apr 43. (2) Daily Rpts, Army Group Africa to 

OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, 19-21 Apr 43, in OKH/ 

GenStdH/Op Abt, Tagesmeldungen H. Gr. Afrika 

vom l.lV.-12.v.43 (cited hereafter as Army Group 

Africa, Sit reps ). (3) Contemporary estimate at 

AFHQ of these units was as follows: Division von 

Manteuffel, 4,500; 334th Division, 9,450 ; Hermann 

Goering Division, 10,000; 10th Panzer Division, 

10,000. Units of the 999th Division, part of which 

was used to reinforce Division von M anteuffel, 

5,800. 
604 

The southeastern portion of the bridgehead was defended by Italian First Army, 

with XXI and XX Corps headquarters. The 

S pezia Division was farthest inland, then the 

164th Light Africa Division, and on hills 

farther east, the Pistoia, Y oung Fascists, and 

Trieste Divisions. On the coastal plain was 

the 90th Light Africa Division, with the 

15th Panzer Division under Army Group 

Africa's control in a second, supporting position southeast of Zarhouan. The remnants of 

the Luftwaffe Parachute Brigade, now commanded by a Major von der Heydte, the 

19th Flak Division, and Division Centauro 

were used to strengthen this part of the 

bridgehead's defense. German elements of 

Italian First Army were controlled through 

General Bayerlein. A Bizerte Coast Defense 

Command under Gen. Kurt Bassenge of the 

20th Flak Division furnished small units 

used in the northern sector but was principally concerned with operation of the 

coastal and antiaircraft guns used to defend 

that port and its neighboring airfield. The 

Tunis Coast Defense Command had similar 

duties." 3 

Allied Regrouping 

Allied regrouping along the new line involved the transfer of a considerable force 

from the British Eighth Army on the coastal 

plain near Kairouan to the zone of British 

9 Corps east of Le Kef, and the shifting of 

over 90,000 men of the U.S. II Corps from 

south central Tunisia to a new zone northeast of Bedja. Since it had been in prospect 

for nearly a month the movement by U.S. 

10 Strength of the German units was estimated, 18 

April, to be as follows: 15th and 21 st Panzer Divisions, 5,600 each; 90th Light Africa Division, 6,000; 

164th Light Africa Division, 3,000; 19th and 20th 

Flak Divisions, 13,000 ; Marsch Battalions, 14,930. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

9th Infantry Division to the northern end 

of the line of commitment under British 5 

Corps was accomplished as soon as the fighting near El Guettar had ceased. The division moved northward in eastern Algeria 

along the main road between Tebessa and 

Souk Ahras, and thence northeastward 

through the cork forest near Tabarka and 

the village of Djebel Abiod to the hills near 

Sedjenane. (Map 20) The 47th Infantry 

Regiment began relieving elements of the 

British 46th Division on the night of 12-13 

April. The decision to install the whole U.S. 

II Corps in that part of the Allied front was 

reached later and less firmly, so that planning and preparations to move it were more 

hurried. To regulate the heavy transverse 

movement of II Corps across the very active 

east-west supply routes of First Army, and 

to shift British armored troops from the east 

coast through the II Corps area to that of 

British 9 Corps, required a high degree of 

co-ordination between staffs of II Corps and 

of First Army. Most of the mileage covered 

by II Corps units lay within British First 

Army's zone, where a new corps area was 

not established until after the bulk of the 

American troops had arrived, and where 

all troop movements were under First 

Army's control. 

Actual arrangements were preceded by 

a road reconnaissance in which representatives of the G-3, provost marshal, and Engineer sections of II Corps joined officers 

of the Movement Controls Branch, British 

First Army. They selected a route along 

which, it was believed, control points could 

be established and traffic be regulated to 

meet an average rate of 100 vehicles per 

hour. 

The most direct route from Tebessa to 

Roum es Souk (about fifteen miles southwest of Tabarka and in the cork forest) 
PREPARATIONS 

II CORPS ROUTES 

April \943 

--- ,J~ " wl \l [ Hf 

MAP 20 

totaled about 140 miles. It ran through 

Haldra to Tadjerouine to Le Kef, a road 

junction on an important British supply 

route from Souk Ahras eastward. North of 

Le Kef the second half of the route became 

twisting, narrow, and subject to poor visibility and to one-way traffic except at limited 

passing points. Bridges were narrow and 

grades often steep. At Souk el Arba, the 

route crossed the principal highway and 

railroad from Souk Ahras to Tunis, and con605 

tinued through Fernana and Aln Draham 

to the Roum es Souk area. The northbound 

traffic crossed the two major west-east highway and railroad routes, and made use of 

almost ten miles of one of these roads in approaching the road junction at Le Kef. The 

narrow road north of Le Kef was used alternately for traffic going in each direction. 

In order to make the fullest use of the time 

allowed for American northbound columns , the II Corps vehicles assembled near its 

southern terminus in numbers calculated 

to make fullest use of each allotted period, 

and to take advantage of any unscheduled 

additional opportunities. 

Besides the 1st Infantry, 1st Armored, 

and 34th Infantry Divisions, the corps had 

to transfer its headquarters and approximately forty Ordnance, Medical, Quartermaster, Engineer, Chemical Warfare Service, and Signal units of varying size. The 

divisions were subdivided into combat 

teams, which along with the corps troops, 

were given priorities in a tentative schedule 

providing for 2,400 vehicles per day. Each 

day's contemplated movements were reported on the previous day through the 

British Movements Control liaison officer 

at Tebessa to Headquarters, First Army, 

which regulated traffic across its area to 

the vicinity of Roum es Souk. The II Corps 

assembled its units in the Tebessa area at 

those periods between 14 and 18 April 

which were best adapted to the whole volume of transportation within First Army's 

area, and fed them from these assembly 

points to the southern terminus of the main, 

one-way bottleneck. There the intermediate 

assembly served as a sort of reservoir, with 

earlier arrivals marching out as often and 

as long as the route farther north could be 
606 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

MAJ. GEN. OMAR N. BRADLEY (r~ght) after he assumed command if U.S. II Corps 

and Lt. Cen . Kenneth A. N A nderson, commander of the British First Army. 

held open, while others were arriving from 

the initial points of departure. 14 

The plan thus created was modified on 

army group instructions during 17 and 18 

April, when all II Corps units were sent to 

Roum es Souk by the longer road which 

part of the 9th Infantry Division had used 

a week earlier, the one through Morsott, 

Souk Ahras, and Le Tarf, thus avoiding 

the congestion near Le Kef. 15 The 1st InH ( 1) Info supplied by Col Robert A. H ewitt, 

former G-3 II Corps. OCMH. (2) II Corps G-3 

and G- 4 Jnls, 12- 23 Apr 43. 

15 ( 1) Msg 18 A Gp to First Army a nd II Corps, 

2145, 16 Apr 43, Entry 65, in II Corps G-3 In!. 

(2) 1st Div AAR. 

fantry Division moved northward over this 

route on 18 April. The U.S. 1st Armored 

Division, leaving its Combat Command A 

to move by way of Morsott, started north 

behind the British 1st Armoured Division 

and King's Dragoon Guards. The division 

assembled near Sbeitla and moved up the 

road through Sbiba to Le Kef on 19 April. 

The British column which preceded them 

had covered the characteristically tawny 

paint on 4,000 British Eighth Army vehicles 

with the dark green of First Army, and left 

the coastal plain in a wide southerly loop 

through Faid pass, Sbei:tla, and Ksour to 

Le Kef. The 105 tank transporters which 
PREPARATIONS 

had been placed at the head of the long 

column were released temporarily to supplement those of the U.S. 2622d Tank 

Transporter Company in moving Combat 

Command B, U.S. 1st Armored Division's 

medium tanks through Le Kef to a staging 

point near Rhardimaou. Meanwhile lighter 

elements of the division passed through 

Souk el Arba to the cork forest near Roum 

es Souk.'G 

The 34th Infantry Division, in order to 

avoid conflict with the British 6th Armoured 

Division in joint use of the road between 

Pichon and Maktar, was brought northward 

in two major sections, via Le Sers and east 

of Le Kef to Souk el Arba and the cork 

forest, on the nights of 21-22 and 23-24 

April.'7 

Transfer of the bulk of II Corps to the 

northern zone required good administrative 

co-ordination but was not otherwise extraordinarily difficult. The marches were 

much shorter than those which many of the 

units had made in coming east into Tunisia 

from Algeria, and they were not made under air attacks of such strength and persistence that all traffic had to be done at 

night and under blackout conditions. The 

problems were principally to make effective 

use of all available transportation facilities 

and to avoid congestion at critical points. 

A more threatening difficulty was the provision of sufficient supply and maintenance 

to the II Corps in the new zone. Simultaneously with the northward shift of troops, 

II Corps had to accumulate a six days' level 

of supply at accessible forward dumps and 

to arrange for systematic resupply in the 

amount of 800 tons daily. Stocks in central 

Tunisia were allowed to dwindle, and a 

'"1st Armd Div FO 21, 0900,19 Feb 43. 

17 34th Div FO 34, 1700, 20 Apr 43, and Annex 

A (March table). 

607 

substantial quantity of ammumtlOn was 

trucked from there to the vicinity of Djebel 

Abiod to meet initial requirements. On 20 

April, out of a total requirement of 3,780 

tons of ammunition, all but 1,123 were on 

hand or en route and the supply system 

was in order. Bone was the site of the Eastern Base Section's main depot on which II 

Corps was expected to draw. Railheads at 

Bed ja, Sidi Mhimech a few miles northeast 

of it, and Djebel Abiod were to become the 

main corps supply points. Eastern Base Section and the G-4 section of II Corps under 

Col. Robert W. Wilson, worked in close 

co-operation, the former taking over forward dumps as soon as the attack moved 

eastward a few miles. To have on hand the 

means to begin the attack during the night 

of 22-23 April, all available trucks were 

used around the clock, with alternating 

crews, and with headlights as needed. '8 

The burden on Allied supply lines from 

the western Mediterranean was increased by 

the quantities they provided for the British 

Eighth Army. Stocks of gasoline held at 

Gafsa and Bou Chebka totaled 3,700 tons. 

Lighters began unloading supplies for the 

Eighth Army at Gabes on 3 April and small 

vessels at Sfax on 14 April. But a railhead 

for the Eighth Army at Sbeltla was also 

scheduled to receive 500 tons per day from 

the west. When large units were shifted from 

the Eighth to the First Army before and 

1H (1) Memo, Ordnance Officer II Corps to CO 

EBS, 20 Apr 43, sub: Ammo sit at La Calle. (2) 

Both ammunition and gasoline consumption (68,633 

gallons daily) ran under estimates, although some 

kinds of ammunition became scarce. Memo, G-4 

II Corps for CofS II Corps, 30 Apr 43, in II Corps 

G-4 In!. (3) Msg EC-I0ll, EBS to FREEDOM, 21 

Apr 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 123. (4) See Lt. 

Co!. J. W. Smith, "Logistics As Seen From a Corps 

Level," Military Review, XXVI, No.7 (October, 

1946), pp. 58-62. 
608 

during the last battles, they drew rations and 

ammunition from the railroad through Le 

Kef to Bou Arada, or from the highway 

between Le Kef and Teboursouk at Le 

Krib." 9 

On 15 April, command of II Corps 

passed quietly from Patton to his deputy 

commander of the past six weeks, General 

Bradley. Patton returned to the planning 

for American participation in the invasion 

of Sicily (Operation HUSKY) as had been 

contemplated when he took command of 

the II Corps on 6 March. Bradley's earlier 

active participation in direction of the II 

Corps minimized the consequences of the 

shift. On 16 April, his headquarters moved 

from Gafsa to a newly established site near 

Bedja. The relief of the British units by the 

Americans and all road movements remained under control of British 5 Corps 

until 1800, 19 April, when Headquarters, 

II Corps, officially assumed command of 

its new area, with a forward line running 

19 (1) Info supplied by Cabinet Office, London. 

(2) Msgs Q 419, Q 420, and Q (M) 130,18 A Gp 

to FREEDOM, 16 May 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

from the ocean east of Cap Serrat to Hill 

667, five miles west of Heidous. 20 

As the time for the attack drew near, the 

Allied forces moved into battle position. 

General Alexander's headquarters shifted on 

20 April to a point about fifteen miles southwest of Le Kef. General Anderson was already established in a farm near the White 

Fathers' monastery on the heights of 

Thibar, fifteen miles along the road from 

Bedja south to Teboursouk, and on the 

south side of the Medjerda river. General 

Bradley's command post was organized on 

15 April two miles northwest of Bedja in 

tents on a farm belonging to the mayor. The 

corps commanders of First Army explained 

their respective plans at a conference at 

Thibar on 18 April, and next morning General Bradley went over plans with his staff 

and division commanders.21 

'" (1) II Corps AAR, 15 May 43. (2) Msg, 18 

A Gp to FREEDOM, 19 Apr 43. AFHQ CofS Cable 

Log. (3) Col. William B. Kean relieved General 

Hugh Gaffey as chief of staff, and Col. Robert A. 

Hewitt resumed his functions as G-3 as Colonel 

Lambert took command of Combat Command A, 1st 

Armored Division, in place of General McQuillin. 

21 (1) II Corps G-3 J nl, 19-20 Apr 43. (2) 

Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 75. 
CHAPTER XXXII 

The Attack Begins 

General Alexander's plan of attack encountered severe strain at the outset. The 

preliminary offensive begun by the reduced 

British Eighth Army on the night of 19--20 

April proved difficult and costly. The southernmost positions in the Enfidaville line, 

which the enemy had converted into mere 

screening stations held by light forces while 

taking the main line back onto higher 

ground, gave way at once. The Allied bombardment of the past few days, culminating 

in five hours of intensive shelling, drove the 

Italian defenders off part of the objective 

and facilitated an advance north of Enfidaville in the zone near the coast. But the 

ranking German officer with the Italian 

First Army, General Bayerlein, was in a 

forward position, able to organize and control the shift of German forces to contain 

the penetration and thus to save the line 

in general on the western and mountainous 

sector. The Eighth Army captured Takrouna and the southern portion of Djebel 

Garci (412) about twelve miles to the west 

at such cost that Montgomery broke off 

the attack there and planned to pursue it 

only along the coast. Regrouping for this 

effort and related measures calised the 

Eighth Army's holding attack to be suspended late on 21 April for four days.' This 

1 (1) German CoS, First Italian Army, KTB, 

11-14, 20-21 Apr 43, and Anlage Memo for the 

KTB dated 5 May 43. (2) Montgomery, El Alamein 

to the Rio Sangro, p. 96. 

suspension at the very time the other attacks 

were beginning was a serious departure 

from the army group's general plan. (See 

Map 19.) 

An Axis attack in the sector of Goubellat 

began in the British First Army's zone while 

the 9 Corps and 5 Corps were organizing 

for their attacks of 22 April. It had the effect of a "spoiling attack," but was less disturbing to 18 Army Group than Montgomery's cessation of pressure at the southeast. The Axis attack was carried out by 

the If ermann Goering Division (-) on the 

night of 20-21 April. It was directed against 

the heights southeast and south of Medjez 

el Bab, with the southernmost flank along 

the edge of the Goubellat plain. Its mission 

was to lighten Allied pressure on adjacent 

sectors and disrupt Allied offensive preparations. 

The attacking troops, under command of 

General Schmid, were organized into three 

groups. Just south of the main highway leading into Medjez el Bab, Group Audorff 

(754th Grenadier Regiment of the 334th 

Infantry Division) had orders to attack toward "Grenadier Hill" (Djebel Bou Mouss, 

250) with a reinforced infantry battalion. 

In the center, Group Schirmer (consisting 

of the Parachute Regiment Hermann Goering ( - ), reinforced by the 7th Panzer Regiment (-) and supporting troops) had the 

mission of capturing Allied strongholds on 

the hills northwest of Goubellat while keep-
610 

ing close contact with the first group. The 

third force, Group Funk (a battalion of the 

Grenadier Regiment Hermann Goering), 

was to protect the southern flank by advancing against the northern foothills of Djebel 

Rihane (720). As these forces pulled out 

of their positions to form for the attack, 

their place in the enemy's main line of resistance was temporarily taken by two companies of infantry and the 10th M~ otorcycle 

Battalion. 

Shortly before midnight 20~21 April the 

Germans jumped off. The attack, favored by 

surprise, initially wrought some confusion 

among British troops and penetrated the 

Allied lines along a twelve-mile sector to a 

depth of about five miles. But at daybreak, 

as the enemy ran up against the main British 

position, the drive stalled. British tanks and 

artillery moved in and forced the attackers 

back. After nightfall the Germans withdrew 

to their original lines. Although the enemy 

claimed to have taken over 300 prisoners 

and to have destroyed five batteries of artillery, about 80 trucks and motor vehicles, 

and seven tanks, at a price of over 300 

casualties, he had not been able to deter the 

Allied offensive in this quarter, but had only 

subjected its beginnings to greater strain.2 

British 9 Corps began its planned assault 

on 22 April when General Crocker sent the 

46th Division (General Freeman-Attwood) 

2 (1) Gefechtsbericht der Division Hermann 

GoeringIuer die Zeit v.16.IV.-l. V.43> 1. Teil> dated 

5 May 43> in Folder eRS No. 77513/4. (2) Daily 

Rpt, Army Group Africa> Ie to OB SOUTH> 21 

Apr 43, in OBS/Fuehr Abt Ie, Heeresgruppe 

Afrika, 43 (cited hereafter as Army 

Group Africa, Rpts). (3) Morning Rpt, 22 

Apr 43, ibid. (4) Noon Rpt, OB SOUTH to OKH/ 

GenStdH/Op Abt, 21 Apr 43, and G-2 Rpt, 

Comando Supremo to OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, 21 

Apr 43, both in OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, Meldungen des Ob Sued v. 1.111.30.1V,43, Band 11. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

to gain possession of the high ground west of 

the Sebkret el Kourzia. 

The enemy made the best possible use of 

the terrain he held by defending all major 

hills in strength and by blocking the approaches with extensive mine fields. The 

sector under attack was held by two battalions of the Grenadier Regiment Hermann 

Goering and, to the south of the Bou Arada~ 

Pont-du-Fahs road, by a reconnaissance unit 

and a Tunis Battalion under Headquarters, 

Regiment Ewert. Two German and two 

Italian artillery battalions and units of the 

Flak Regiment Hermann Goering, in an 

antitank role, were in support. The spoiling 

attack of 20~21 April had confirmed the 

enemy in his assumption that the Allied offensive was imminent. 3 When therefore the 

attack of the British 46th Division jumped 

off after an extraordinarily heavy artillery 

preparation, the Germans were ready and 

offered determined resistance. South of the 

Sebkret el Kourzia they managed to hold. 

But north of the marsh, the British successfully penetrated the enemy defense line. 

Here, late on 23 April, General Crocker 

committed his 6th Armoured Division to exploit toward the Pont-du-Fahs~ Tunis road. 

General Keightley's armor rolled into the 

opening and broke through, forcing the remaining element.e;; of the Grenadier Regiment back onto the hills to the east. The 6th 

Armoured Division rounded the northern 

edge of the salt lake and one element drove 

ahead toward Pont-du-Fahs. Thus the German front had been pierced. The German 

Africa Corps' northwest flank was immediately threatened, and beyond it the entire 

3 (1) Gefechtsbericht der Division Hermann 

Goering tuer die Zeit v. 16.JV.-l. V,43, 1. Teil, 

dated 5 May 43. (2) MS #T3 (Nehring et al.), 

Vol. 3a. 
THE ATTACK BEG INS 

southern front along the Enfidaville Position appeared in danger. 

Army Group Africa met the crisis by 

ordering a withdrawal in the sector of the 

Africa Corps opposite the French XIX 

Corps and relinquished control over the 

Djebels Mansour (678), Chirich (717), 

and Fkirine (988) in favor of a shorter defense line nearer Pont-du-Fahs! Simultaneously, von Arnim ordered the German 

Africa Corps to extend its front to include 

the crumbling south wing of the Hermann 

Goering Division and sent Fifth Panzer 

Army's only mobile reserve, the 10th Panzer 

Division (-) into the breach. Here, under 

the German Africa Corps, the division was 

soon engaged in a prolonged seesaw battle 

with General Keightley's tanks. During the 

following days the embattled armor was 

fought to a standstill in the area east and 

northeast of the Sebkret el Kourzia in the 

vicinity of a dominating hill known to the 

Germans as "Kamelberg." 5 

Losses on both sides were heavy. For the 

period from 20-26 April Army Group 

'The withdrawal was executed under some pressure from the French XIX Corps, especially in the 

Kebir river valley. During the night of 24-25 April 

the Africa Corps completed the movements in good 

order. In the process General Cramer reorganized 

his forces. He switched the 21 st Panzer Division 

from the south to the northwest, near the breakthrough area at Pont-du-Fahs. The Superga Division took up positions on the southwestern slopes 

of Djebel Zarhouan (1295), and Group Schmidt, 

a composite force consisting of the remaining immobile elements of the 10th Panzer and 21 st Panzer 

Divisions, held the eastern portion of the new defense line to the boundary with the First Italian 

Army. 

"Djebel Bou Keurnine (396), about three miles 

east-northeast of Sebkret eI Kourzia, was named 

"Camelback Mountain" for its characteristic silhouette. (I) Second Intermediate and Daily Rpt, 

Army Group Africa to OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, 

24 Apr 43, in Army Group Africa, Sit reps. (2) MS 

# T-3 (Nehring et al.) Vol. 3a. 

611 

Africa claimed to have destroyed 162 British 

tanks, 24 guns, 67 motor vehicles, and 23 

planes. G After the first two days of battle, 

the 10th Panzer Division had been reduced 

to 25 operational tanks. But reinforcements, 

drawn from the First Italian Army and 

15th Panzer Division, increased its strength 

by 26 April to 55 German and 10 Italian 

tanks. At the same time Fifth Panzer Army 

held another tank force of about 15 tanks 

in support of the 334th Infantry Division, 

and nearer the Medjerda river. 7 

As the enemy braced himself to meet a 

resumption of the Allied attack, he found 

his capabilities seriously reduced. The fuel 

situation imposed a critical limitation on 

maneuver and troop transport, while the 

ammunition shortage threatened to reach 

dangerous proportions if strong Allied attacks in the south should be resumed. For 

the time being, however, the Axis counterbalanced its heavy expenditures on the 

western front with forces withdrawn from 

the sector opposite Montgomery as he suspended his attack against the Enfidaville 

Position.s 

• Rpt, Army Group Africa, Ic, to OB SOUTH, 26 

Apr 43, in OKH/GenStH/Op Abt, Meldungen des 

Ob Sued v. 1.III.-30.lV.43, Band II. 

7 Daily Rpt, Army Group Africa to OKH/GenStH/Op Abt, 26 Apr 43, in Army Group Africa, 

Sitreps. 

8 The 10th Panzer and 15th Panzer Divisions 

were down to about one half of one unit of consumption, limiting their operations to a radius of 

about thirty miles. The remaining armored units 

and the two armies were reduced to about one 

quarter of a unit of consumption. At the prevailing 

rate of ammunition expenditure the army group 

estimated its ability to sustain operations as follows: 

for small arms, three days; for light artillery, five to 

six days; for medium artillery, three days; for heavy 

artillery, one to two days; and for antitank units, 

four days. Rations were sufficient to last through 

at least another week. Daily Rpts, Army Group 

Africa to OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, 23-25 Apr 43, 

in Army Group Africa, Sitreps. 
612 

The British 9 Corps offensive of 22-26 

April against the Hermann Goerinf, Division and the 10th Panzer Division fell short 

of a break-through. But to prevent it, Army 

Group Africa had been forced to commit 

almost all of its mobile reserve, to withdraw from the salient opposite the French 

XIX Corps, and to expend a critical amount 

of its dwindling supplies. Thus the attack 

in the southern portion of the British First 

Army's zone had not only gained valuable 

ground, but inflicted crippling blows. 

British 5 Corps (General Allfrey) began 

its operations nearer the Medjerda river with 

a preliminary attack on 21 April to retake 

Longstop Hill (290) after four months of 

German occupancy. The attempt was resisted for five days with fierce determination 

by elements of the enemy's 756th j\;fountain 

Regiment (reinforced) of the 334th Division, but the attacking troops of the 78th 

Division (General Evelegh) made their way 

doggedly along the ridge from southwest to 

northeast, much as in late December 1942, 

except that this time they remained after 

gaining control of the northeastern tip on 

24 Apri1.9 ( See Map 7.) The northern flank 

of Evelegh's division fought along the loftier 

Djebel el Ang (668), where the struggle for 

the ridges near Hei'dous had ebbed and 

flowed for a week. 

South of the Medjerda, the British 1st 

Division (Maj. Gen. W. E. Clutterbuck) 

and the British 4th Division (Maj. Gen. 

J. L. I. Hawkesworth) made the principal 

attack toward Massicault on 23 April. Here 

the British were opposed by the 754th Grenadier Regiment (Group A udorfJ) and the 

, (1) Info supplied by British Cabinet Office, 

London. (2) Morning Rpt, Army Group Africa 

to OKHIGenStdHIOp Ab/., 25 Apr 43, in Army 

Group Africa, Sitreps. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

501 st Heavy Panzer Battalion (reinforced). 

Grich el Oued, where in December one unit 

had been surrounded by mire as the attack 

ended, fell into British possession as these 

enemy units fell back through Peter's Corner. This road junction, where the routes 

from Medjez el Bab and from Goubellat to 

Massicault converge about eight miles from 

Medjez el Bab, was firmly defended. Mine 

fields covered by artillery, mortar, and heavy 

machine gun fire slowed the Allied advance, 

which got as far as Djebel Bou Aoukaz 

(226) near the river, and Ksar Tyr on the 

south flank. There the British were stopped 

by elements of the Hermann Goering Division on 26 April. 

But the critical sector was in the area of 

Djebel Bou Aoukaz, scene of some of the 

early fighting in Tunisia in December 1942. 

On 24 April Army Group Africa realized 

that the Allied main effort toward Tunis 

must be expected south of the Medjerda 

river. Just as soon as the British 9 Corps 

attack north and east of the Sebkret el 

Kourzia had been stopped, von Arnim 

merged nearly all his remaining armored 

units into one composite force, Panzer Brigade Irkens.lO He entrusted his most capable 

tank leader, Colonel Irkens, commander of 

the 8th Panzer Regimen!., 15th Panzer Di10 Group lrkens initially consisted of all available 

ehcments of 7th Panzer Re,(!iment, 10th Panzer Division; Sth Panzer Regiment, 15th Panzer Division; 

5th Panzer Regiment, 21st Panzer Division; 501st 

lJ cavy Panzer Battalion, 47th Grenadier Regiment; 

one German and one Italian artillery battalion; and 

two Flak battalions, in addition to the remnants 

of Group Audorff, all together armf'd with sOmewhat less than 70 tanks, (1 1 Daily Rpt, Fifth 

Panzer Arm)' to Army Group Africa, Anlage C. 

28 Apr 43, in Fifth Panzer Army, KTB. Anla!!en, 

Tei/e, 7.11.-2S.IV.43. (2) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB 

des Pz. AOK 51 ANF (Armee Nachrichten Fuehrer) 

tuer die Zeit 16.30.IV,43, 27 Apr 43. (3) MS # 

T-3 (Nehring et al.l, Vol. 3a. 
THE ArrACK BEG INS 

vision, with the command. On 28 and 29 

April Group lrkens. under the personal supervision of the Fifth Panzer Army commander General von Vaerst, once more 

wrested the initiative from the British attackers, regained control of the dominating 

heights of Djebel Bou Aoukaz and stopped 

the British 5 Corps advance. In these battles which raged from 27-30 April, the Germans claimed to have destroyed 90 Allied 

tanks. \Vhen the Germans took count of 

their remaining armor, they reported a total 

of 69 operational tanks including 4 Tigers 

on 1 May. They had won a Pyrrhic victory 

since the Axis force had immobilized itself 

by expending all the available fuel. The 

small amounts of gasoline that arrived in 

Tunisia thereafter came by air and had to 

be sent directly to the units at the front to 

meet their most urgent needs. Army depots 

were empty, except for minute quantities 

held in iron reserve. 

Generals von Arnim and von Vaerst now 

assigned to Group lrkens the most critical 

sector, that between the Medjerda river and 

the Medjez el Bah-Tunis highway. This 

narrowed the 334th Infantry Division's 

zone to the north. Irkens' command was 

reinforced by the remaining elements of 

the 15th Panzer Division. The reconnaissance battalions of the Hermann Goering 

Division and 10th Panzer Division were 

withdrawn from the line, the former to bolster von Manteuffel's sector in the north, 

the latter to become Army Group Africa's 

only remaining reserve. Thus the Allied attacks had reduced von Arnim's reserves to 

one armored battalion. The First Italian 

Arm)" meanwhile, proved strong enough for 

its mission of holding the Enfidaville position despite the substantial transfers needed 

to enable the hard-pressed units of the Fifth 

613 

Panzer Army to block the direct Allied 

thrust on Tunis.n 

The II Corps Plans 

General Bradley had devised a plan of 

attack to meet the directive that II Corps 

make its main effort in the southern part of 

its sector. The 18 Army Group conceived 

the II Corps mission as initially merely to 

guarantee the security of the British 5 Corps 

northern flank while the latter made the 

principal Allied attack along the Medjerda 

river. The corps therefore placed major emphasis on the effort by the U.S. 1st Infantry 

Division to gain control of the high ground 

between the Sidi Nsir~Mateur road and the 

Tine river valley, and of the hills rising on 

the southern side of that valley as far as 

the watershed between it and the Medjerda. 

The southwestern approaches to Mateur 

and the hills adjacent to Choulgui pass 

(from the Tine valley to the coastal plain 

near Tebourba) were ultimate objectives in 

this part of the II Corps zone. (Map XI) 

The 9th Infantry Division was expected 

simultaneously to threaten Mateur from the 

west and to close the roads west of the 

Garaet Ichkeul. In general, the 1st Infantry 

Division was to move through the zone of 

Blade Force's late November thrust and the 

9th Infantry Division was to circumvent the 

barriers on the Sedjenane~Mateur highway 

which the British 36th Brigade Group had 

then found impregnable. 

In its plan of approach to Mateur and 

Choulgui, II Corps applied the lessons so 

painfully learned during recent weeks farther south. The upper Tine river valley ,vas 

a tempting route, for the terrain near the 

11 Rpts, Army Group Africa to OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, 24 Apr-l May 43, in Army Group 

A/rica, Sit reps. 
614 

river banks, despite the lack of good roads, 

promised smoother transit for vehicles than 

the hillsides. But the valley here cons:sted 

of several broad alluvial plains connected 

by narrowing gaps between closely adjacent 

hills, and it was labeled "The Mousetrap." 

The enemy could be expected to convert this 

route into a succession of positions in which 

he could fully exploit his defensive advantages. Mine fields, antitank and artillery 

positions, and observation posts would be 

in readiness and would enable the enemy to 

subject any attacking force to ruinous losses. 

Instead, therefore, of fighting the enemy 

with co-ordinated infantry, artillery, and 

armor on terrain where he might be most 

efficient. the II Corps chose to fight him 

on the hills where he might be weaker but 

where the terrain almost precluded the use 

of Allied armor, as well as being a serious 

obstacle to rapid advance by other arms. 

After initially occupying the hills west of 

the Tine river's headwaters, the Americans 

would seize the high ground on either side 

of the valley, thus avoiding The Mousetrap 

until ground from which it could be dominated had been brought into American control, and mines had been cleared from routes 

along the stream. Then the U.S. 1 st Armored Division would be emoloyed in a 

swift thrust toward Mateur. The 9th Infantry Division (reinforced) was also to be 

sent over the northern hills rather than 

along the lower ground in its zone as it set 

about the task of flanking and cutting off 

the Djefna position. 

The enemy had had months to develop 

strongly some of his most advantageously 

situated defensive positions. He had excavated dugouts with pneumatic drills, and 

had strengthened them with concrete. Defiles between hills and approaches up the 

slopes and in the draws were freely sown 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

with antipersonnel mines. Routes likely to 

be used by American patrols, and good 

points of observation which the enemy 

would have to evacuate as he retired, were 

also heavily mined. The 47th Infantry, for 

example, found one small area of 50 by 100 

feet in which as many as 600 mines had been 

placed.'2 

American superiority in artillery was to be 

exploited fully. The corps, including the 

weapons of the cannon companies, had 24 

heavy, 72 medium, and 228 light artillery 

pieces. Allotted to the 1st Infantry Division's 

initial attack were its own three battalions of 

105-mm. howitzers and one battalion of 

155-mm. howitzers supplemented by the 

corps artillery of six battalions of 105-mm. 

(of which five were armored), three battalions of 155-mm. howitzers, and two 

battalions of 155-mm. field guns (less one 

battery). The 9th Infantry Division had 

four battalions of 105-mm. howitzers (of 

which one was armored) , two battalions of 

155-mm. howitzers, and one battery of 155-

mm. guns.'~ 

Preparations for the Attack in the North 

U.S. II Corps opened its attack during 

the early hours of 23 April with a tremendous artillery preparation. In some respects, the ensuing operations were simultaneous but nonetheless distinguishable and 

to some degree independent, with but a very 

thin connection between the northern attack 

by the U.S. 9th Infantry Division (reinforced) under General Eddy and the southern advance by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division (reinforced) under General Allen. The 

9th Infantry Division's attack will be con1247th Inf Rist, 1943. 

13 II Corps AAR, 15 May 43, par. 42. 
THE ATTACK BEGINS 

OJEBh £L AZZAG 

'HILL 961 

RAILROAD 

Ojefno 

OJE8EL ADJR£D 

f MILL "6. 

Moteur 

615 

DJEFNA AREA, looking east to the plains if Mateur. 

sidered first and then the one by General 

Allen's troops. 

General Eddy's forces, the 39th, 47th, 

and 60th Infantry Regiments, and the 

Corps Franc d' Afrique (CF A), with supporting units, all participated from the start. 

Their mission, it should be remembered, 

was to reduce the enemy's strongly fortified 

Djefna position on Green and Bald Hills 

astride the Djebel Abiod-Mateur highway 

and railroad, and to gain control of the 

road along the western edge of the Garaet 

Ichkenl. H The divisional zone extended in-

" (I) 9th Div AAR, II Apr- 8 M ay 43, 10 Sep 

43, and 39th, 47th, and 60th AAR's. (2) Giraud 

Hq, Rapport des operations, pp. 52-53. (3) The 

Corps Franc d'Afrique ( under 4,000 men) was 

established by General Giraud as a special unit 

land from a point on the coast east of Cap 

Serrat for over twenty miles. Two means of 

approach toward the objectives crossed this 

area from southwest to northeast. The improved highway and railroad which ran 

through the narrow valley between Green 

Hill and Bald Hill under the guns of the 

Djefna position used the first approach 

route, and an unimproved track about halfintended to utilize all elements in French North 

Africa-politically active French subjects, nonFrench refugees, natives and J ews under restrictions-who could not readily be put in the regular 

French Army. They had already fought as part of 

British First Army, in British uniforms. General de 

Monsabert h ad originally commanded the Corps 

Franc d 'Afrique. Memo by M aj Leon E. Dostert, 

AFHQ Liaison Sec, 26 Mar 43 . Joint Rearmament 

Committee 320/ 004, DRB AGO. 
616 

way between this route and the seacoast 

used the second. The Sedjenane and Malah 

river valleys, through which those shallow 

streams flowed into the Garaet Ichkeul, separated three belts of rough terrain, covered 

by major hills and ridges and cut transversely by many shorter valleys, fringed with 

deep draws and gulches. The resulting 

topography was a jumbled series of hills 

dominated by high crests, of which six towered so boldly above the remainder that 

they became the keys to successful operations in their vicinity. North of the Sedjenane river was the Djebel Dardyss (294). 

Between the Sedjenane and the Malah 

were "Big Alnchouna" (438) and "Little 

Alnchouna" (432); Djebel el Akrat (513) 

was in the southwestern sector; and at the 

northeast was one of several Kef en Nsours 

in Tunisia (Hill 523). This Kef en Nsour 

was so placed at the western edge of Garaet 

Ichkeul that it furnished excellent observation over movement in either the Sed jenane 

or Malah river valleys or toward Mateur. 

Within the 9th Infantry Division zone, no 

north-south road of consequence existed 

west of that which skirted Garaet Ichkeul 

at the eastward base of Kef en Nsour. 

Where that road swung easterly toward 

Bizerte, it crossed a stream bed, the Douimis 

river, and then entered a narrow shelf at 

the base of the Djebel Cheniti, an advantageous position from which to oppose an 

attacking force. The area to be traversed 

by General Eddy's command was somewhat 

to the east of the principal rain forest of 

the north coast but was extensively covered 

with thick brush, much of it about five feet 

high and so dense as to impede contact even 

within small units. 

The 9th Division could not advance 

along the southern edge of its zone to attempt envelopment of the Djefna position 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

except over very rough ground and under 

good enemy observation. The 47th Infantry was therefore sent forward nearer the 

road to engage in holding attacks while a 

flanking movement was tried at the north. 

The 39th Infantry was there expected to 

slip by Green Hill in order to cut communications between the Djefna position and 

Mateur or Bizerte, while the 60th Infantry 

advanced along a still more northerly path 

before swinging to the southeast for the 

same purpose. The Corps Franc d' Afrique 

was to seize Kef en Nsour. For the 47th 

Infantry's attack toward the Djefna position, the 84th and 185th Field Artillery 

Battalions, and four 155-mm. guns of Battery C, 36th Field Artillery Battalion, with 

the 601 st Tank Destroyer Battalion (after 

26 April), were committed in support. For 

the push farther north on either side of 

the Sedjenane valley by the 39th and 60th 

Infantry, the 9th Reconnaissance Troop 

reconnoitered the south side and the 894th 

Tank Destroyer Battalion, the north side 

of the river. The 26th, 34th, and 60th Field 

Artillery Battalions and the 62d Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion, and units of the 

434th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion furnished supporting fires for these two regiments and for the Corps Franc d' Afrique. 

Enough flexibility was retained between the 

two artillery groups to permit mutual support when needed. 15 

General Eddy's division faced the main 

body of Division von M anteuffel. In the 

north, the 962d Infantry Regiment defended the sector from the coast to the hills 

south of the Sedjenane river valley with 

four battalions. Next to it, the 160th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment held a nine-mile zone 

with another three battalions. Von Manteuf159th Div AAR, 10 Sep 43. 
THE ATTACK BEGINS 

fel's third regiment, Barenthin, was still 

farther south, opposite the U.S. 1st Infantry 

Division. In the hills which the 9th Infantry 

had to win were therefore initially seven 

enemy infantry battalions. On 27 and 28 

April two Italian units and tw" German 

reconnaissance battalions would raise this 

figure to a total of nine battalion-size units. 

Effective combat strength of all of these 

forces was approximately S,OOO men, about 

one fourth of whom were Italians.Is 

16 Headquarters, 962d Infantry Regiment, was 

technically part of the 999th Infantry Division 

whose commander was shot down during his flight 

to Tunisia. Division headquarters was never organized. Within the sector of thc 962d Infantry Regiment were initially the remnants of the 10th 

Bersaglieri Regiment amounting to a battalion, and 

by 27 April, the 5th Bersaglieri Regiment, and Battalion Grado of the San Marco Regiment 

(Marines), which had been pulled out of the 

Africa Corps sector earlier; the 2d Battalion, 962d 

Infantry Regiment; the llth Parachute Engineer 

Battalion (Witzig); and the Deutsch-Arabische 

Lerh Abteilung (German-Arabian Training Battali on) which was the only unit that was left of the 

Regimental Command of German-Arabian Troops. 

The command had been organized into the M oroccan, Algerian, 1st and 2d Tunisian, and the Training Battalions. The volunteer battalions, two of 

them on eamels, proved unreliable and were converted to labor battalions, then disbanded. The 

Headquarters, 160th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 

controlled the lsi and 4th Tunis Battalions and 

the 30th Africa Battalion. Regiment Barenthin consisted of three organic battalions. The two battalions sent to reinforce Manteuffel were the Reconnaissance Battalion, Hermann Goering Division, 

and the 334th Reconnaissance Battalion. (1) Daily 

Rpts, Fifth Panzer Army to Army Group Africa, 

27~28 Apr 43, in Fifth Panzer Armv, KTB (Teile) 

mit Anlagen (7.II.-28.IV.43) , 27.IV.-28.IV.43, 

Afrika. (2) Fifth Panzer Army, KTB, Anlagen, Id~ 

Akten zu KTB I-V, 29.XI.1942-4.III.1943. (3) 

Maps, Lage v. Manteuffel (1: 50.000) and Fifth 

Panzer Army (1: 200,000) in Fifth Panzer Army, 

KTB, Anlagen, Folder containing four maps and 

miscellaneous documents, 29 Apr 43. (4) MS #D00 I (von Vaerst), (5) Maps, Phases of the Battle 

for Bizerte, in II Corps AAR, 15 May 43. (6) For 

the strength figure of Division von Manteuflel see 

Div von Manteuflel, KTB 2, I.I.-H.III.43. 

617 

Enemy artillery positions had been carefully and correctly spotted by British and 

American reconnaissance before the attack 

began. Two 1 70-mm. guns, a battery of lS0-

mm. guns and another of 10S-mm. howitzers, and nearest the front, some selfpropelled 7S-mm. howitzers, faced the 

southern part of the attacking force, while 

opposite the northern elements were another 

battery of 105-mm. and a few 7S-mm. 

howitzers. Some of these weapons were to be 

shifted to the north after the attack had been 

in progress for a few days, and six or more 

S8-mm. dual-purpose guns were then 

brought forward, but at the beginning of the 

attack the Americans knew where to direct 

neutralizing counterbattery fire. British intelligence had also mapped the enemy's 

works at the Djefna position as well as at 

the head of the Sedjenane valley, thus assisting the 9th Infantry Division to undertake 

an enveloping movement to avoid the prepared positions.17 

General Eddy's command planned not 

only to work around the enemy's stronger 

positions but in doing so to make full use 

of the preponderance of American over Axis 

artillery. That superiority was very large, 

for the attacking forces had eighty-three 

artillery pieces plus antitank and antiaircraft 

weapons. Antiaircraft protection of gun 

positions, command posts, and the Djebel 

Abiod~Sedjenane road was furnished by one 

battery each from the 67th and 107th, and 

by the entire 434th Coast Artillery (AA) 

Battalion. For reconnaissance and antitank 

protection, in addition to the 9th Reconnaissance Troop, the 9Ist Reconnaissance 

11 (1) 9th Div AAR, 10 Sep 43; (2) WD, Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign, 15 Oct 43, p. 13. 
618 

Squadron and two tank destroyer battalions 

were attached. 18 

The Attack in the North Begins 

As the attack opened on 23 April the 

Corps Franc d' Afrique and the 60th Infantry on the north side of the Sedjenane 

river, the 39th Infantry opposite Djebel 

Ainchouna (Hills 432 and 438), and the 

47th Infantry south of the Sed jenaneMateur road and railroad, started for their 

objectives at 0530. The 60th Infantry at the 

north and the 47th Infantry at the south 

easily reached their D-Day objectives and 

continued further eastward. The Corps 

Franc d' Afrique ran into trouble. Against 

stronger resistance, the 39th Infantry in the 

center sought even less successfully to occupy 

its objective, Djebel Ainchouna, from a base 

on the Djebel el Garsia (295), to the west 

of it. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 39th Infantry, moved to a line of departure at the 

base of Hill 432 during the previous night, 

and attacked with the 3d Battalion on the 

right. The 1st Battalion achieved the crest 

of Hill 432 and tried to swing along the 

ridge to the higher summit of Hill 438, 

stretching off to the northeast. A counterattack on its left rear in the latter part of the 

afternoon arrested its progress. The 3d Battalion reached a point about half a mile 

south of Hill 432, and then tried to get on to 

18 (1) 9th Div AAR, 10 Sep 43, App. C. (2) For 

the 9th Infantry Division the density of artillery was 

estimated at one piece per 630 yards of front. 

Memo, Col Kean for CG AGF, 17 May 43, sub: 

Obsr's rpt on II Corps 21-26 Apr 43. Copy in 

OPD 381 Africa Sec 5, Case 124. (3) The American preponderance in artillery was not only in the 

number of guns but in the volume of fire which 

they delivered. A total of 40,576 field artillery 

rounds, of which 10 percent was smoke shell, was 

reported expended in 9th Div AAR, 10 Sep 43, 

Annex 2, p. 2. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

the hill itself through dense underbrush and 

over steep rocky crevasses and cliffs. One 

company got only as far as the base of its 

objective; the rest were farther back. 

Control of the regiment was disrupted by 

the intrusion on Djebel el Garsia of an 

enemy force of approximately 150 men 

which cut off and captured the regimental 

commander, Col. J. Trimble Brown, his 

executive officer, the commanding officer of 

his 2d Battalion, and a small force stationed 

at the regimental observation post. One 

American group shot its way out. Then 

Company G, 39th Infantry, cut off the 

enemy and freed several other Americans 

while capturing some Germans, and killing 

or wounding about forty-five more. Papers 

which the enemy seized at the observation 

post were not recovered. 19 The first day's 

attack by the 9th Infantry Division thus 

ended with its main thrust in the center 

frustrated and with the enemy organizing his 

defense more strongly. 

Casualties and confusion, moreover, jeopardized chances of a successful renewal of 

the attack next day. During the night, 23-24 

April, Brig. Gen. Donald A. Stroh, the assistant division commander, took temporary 

command of the 39th Infantry Regiment 

pending the arrival of the new commanding 

officer, Col. William L. Ritter. The regiment got set for a hard fight next day. And 

they had such a fight. It was not until the 

afternoon of 25 April that Hill 438 was held 

by the two battalions, after both had worked 

their way along the ridge. The 1st Battalion 

in the lead had lost its commander, executive officer, intelligence officer, and heavy 

weapons company commander, and on 24 

19 (1) 39th Inf AAR, 15 Apr-9 May 43, 27 Jun 

43, and 39th Inf Jnl. (2) Msg 38, 23 Apr 43, in 

9th Div G-3 Jnl. (3) 9th Div AAR, 10 Sep 43, 

App. C, p. 5. 
THE ATTACK BEGINS 

April was severely reduced by casualties and 

straggling. But it had pushed on, with the 

3d Battalion south of it, to occupy the crest 

and two principal shoulders, and to get 

ready for any enemy counterattack. 

On 26 April, the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, continued the attack southeast of 

Djebel Ainchouna along a second ridge with 

its peak at Hill 513. Meeting slight resistance, it was able to continue on 27 April 

to another ridge about four miles beyond 

Djebel Ainchouna to the east. There the 

enemy was found in strength, and was engaged first by an advance platoon of Company G, next by the rest of the company, 

and, after considerable artillery fire on the 

enemy's mortars and presumed positions on 

the northeastern slopes, by the rest of the 

2d Battalion. The whole battalion was soon 

under fire from what it identified as six 

88-mm. guns to the east-southeast at Sidi 

Bou Zitouna. Heavy machine gun fire from 

a hill to the south soon supplemented that 

of the 88's. The battalion was at the end of 

a tortuous line of supply, with mules picking up from motor traffic, and with two to 

three miles of hand-carrying beyond the 

"mulehead." It was advised to dig in and 

hold its positions. Thus at the conclusion of 

four days of fighting, the 39th Infantry in 

the center of the 9th Infantry Division's 

attack had been stopped about two miles 

north of Green Hill, northern anchor of the 

Djefna position. There the regiment remained for the next four days. 20 

The 47th Infantry's mission south of the 

39th Infantry was to keep up a continuous 

aggressive demonstration in front of the 

Djefna position in an effort to keep the 

defenders pinned down, while farther to the 

'·39th Inf AAR, and 39th Inf Jnl, 1752-1808, 

27 Apr 43. 

619 

north the 39th and 60th Infantry advanced 

on flanking missions to try to cut them off. 

After initial success in seizing the hills nearest the line of departure, the troops met resistance, principally in the form of enemy 

artillery fire and combat patrols. The enemy expended his artillery ammunition 

parsimoniously and never in concentrations 

exceeding six weapons. After three days, 

orders from II Corps were to keep pushing 

eastward "until you draw something." 21 For 

its part the 1 st Battalion, 47th Infantry, 

executed this order by working forward as 

far as a group of hills southwest of Bald 

Hill, of which the highest was Hill 598. On 

the afternoon of 26 April, strong fire revealed the enemy's presence there in force. 

The 3d Battalion (Capt. Gordon H. Sympson), operating north of the road and railroad in a narrowing zone, moved to Hill 

398, near the western limit of an open area 

at the base of Green Hill, and sent patrols 

through the area. One patrol eventually reported going as far as the western slope of 

Green Hill. Contact with the 2d Battalion, 

39th Infantry, to the north was lost during 

this phase. 

While the 39th Infantry was painfully 

wresting the vantage point of Djebel Ainchouna from the enemy, and the 47th Infantry slowly approached the enemy's main 

position, the 60th Infantry's simultaneous 

attack on the other side of the Sed jenane 

river progressed more readily. The terrain 

rather than the enemy presented the major 

difficulties. The relatively speedy advance 

by the 60th Infantry could be attributed in 

part to the determination and courage of 

its men. One outstanding example was Sgt. 

William L. Nelson, who commanded a sec21 (I) 47th Inf Hist, 1943. (2) 9th Div AAR, 10 

Sep 43. 
620 

tion of heavy mortars needed desperately to 

check an enemy counterattack at Djebel 

Dardyss (Hill 294) on the second day. Under intense fire, he crawled to a good observation post from which to direct on the enemy concentrations of such effectiveness that 

they brought the German counterattack to 

a halt. The enemy then tried to drive Nelson off and wounded him mortally with 

hand grenades. Through the fire which 

swept the area, he nevertheless crawled farther toward a more exposed but still more 

effective point of observation from which 

his direction of fire resulted in further weakening the opposition to the American assault. Djebel Dardyss remained in American 

possession. 22 On April, the 60th Infantry 

had run ahead of its supplies and stopped 

to permit the accumulation of necessary materiel in forward dumps, as rapidly as donkeys and burros could bring it. The Corps 

Franc d' Afrique had experienced severe difficulties at Hill 107, about three miles north 

of Djebel Dardyss, and by 25 April clearly 

required reinforcement and stronger support to overcome the enemy units in its path 

of advance. 203 The 60th Infantry was therefore deflected northeastward from its original route. It was directed to outflank from 

the south the enemy occupying DjebeI 

Touro (499) and the adjacent high ground 

through which the French must pass to 

reach the final group of hills north of Garaet 

Ichkeul. Kef en Nsour thus also became an 

objective for the 60th Infantry. By 26 April, 

the 9th Infantry Division was adapting its 

22 For this heroic exploit, Sergeant Nelson was 

posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of 

Honor. 

Reported by a German prisoner of war to be 

one battalion of four companies, each consisting 

of 84 men with 10 mort an: and 42 machine guns. 

Msg, 25 Apr 43, Entry 80, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

attack to local situations and accepting a 

substantial delay in the original tentative 

schedule of advance. 

The II Corps Southern Attack Begins 

The southern portion of the II Corps 

front, that initially held by the 1 st Infantry 

Division, reinforced, extended southeasterly 

about fourteen miles from the vicinity of 

Djebel Grembil (499), west of Sidi Nsir, 

to that of Djebel Bech Chekaoui (667), five 

miles west of Heidous. The northern limit 

of this zone of attack stretched to the northeast along the heights between the Malah 

and Djoumine rivers, while the southern 

edge extended toward Tebourba and Djedelda, along the crest of Djebel Lanserine 

( 569). Like the 9th Infantry Division zone, 

that of the 1 st Infantry Division embraced 

two river valleys which trended generally 

northeastward and three belts of ridges and 

hills on either side of the two valleys. The 

Tine river flowed through alluvial basins 

wide enough at most points to furnish a 

substantial gap between the southern belt of 

rough terrain and that in the center. The 

center section was so irregular and so 

strongly occupied as to require from the beginning of the attack the full strength of 

the 1 st Infantry Division. The northern 

flank along the Djoumine river was therefore protected by Company B, 81st Reconnaissance Battalion, which maintained contact with the 91st Armored Reconnaissance 

Squadron on the southern flank of the 9th 

Infantry Division, and by the 1st Battalion, 

168th Infantry, temporarily attached to the 

1 st Infantry Division. The southern wing 

of the 1 st Division sector was taken over by 

the 6th Armored Infantry (less the 2d Battalion). This unit had relieved a battalion 

of the 18th Infantry on Djebel Bech Che-
THE ATTACK BEGINS 621 

PACK ANIMAL BRINGING SUPPLIES up the mountainous terrain for the 60th 

lnfant~y, 26 April 1943. 

kaoui on 21-22 April, and next day had 

reconnoitered in preparation for attack 

along the heights north of Djebel el Ang 

(Hill 668) and Heidous, all the while in 

steady contact with the British 78th Division 

on the British 5 Corps northern flank. 

Division von M anteuffel held not only 

the enemy line in front of the 9th Infantry 

Division but part of that in the southern 

portion of the II Corps zone of advance. 

The area nearest Sidi Nsir thus was defended by the three battalions of Luftwaffe 

Regiment Barenthin and the remainder by 

the northern wing of the 334th Infantry 

Division. The area near Sidi Nsir and the 

sector extending north for about ten miles 

was defended by two battalions of Luftwaffe Regiment Barenthin with a third 

battalion in reserve. Southward from this 

area, across the Tine river valley, to the 

heights of Djebel Lanserine, was the main 

body of the 334th Infantry Division. The 

eight infantry battalions holding the front 

were organized in three regiments. North 

of the Medjerda river were the 755th Infantry, a provisional headquarters, and the 

756th Mountain Regiment. Two more battalions and elements of the 504th Heavy 

Panzer Battalion were in tactical reserve. 

The 334th Division sector to the south, 

across the Medjerda river to the Medjez el 

Bah--Tunis highway (inclusive), was held 

by the 754th Infantry Regiment. There 

British 5 Corps was attacking at the same 
622 

time that the U.S. II Corps was engaged 

on its northern flank.24 

The terrain over which the 1st Infantry 

Division and other southern elements of II 

Corps were to advance was covered with 

less dense underbrush than that to the 

north. Its valleys held cultivated fields of 

short, swiftly maturing wheat and numerous olive groves extending up the lower 

slopes. The hills were rocky, covered at best 

with thin grass, but the contours were generally more rounded than those at EI Guettar, for example. Most of the hills occurred 

in groups so related that several had to be 

attacked simultaneously. Their proximity to 

each other enabled the enemy to furnish 

supporting fire from hill to hill. Furthermore, the enemy's sweeping observation 

from certain loftier crests made it possible 

for him to direct artillery and mortar fire 

by batteries well to the rear, and even out 

of range of American artillery, and to prevent surprise in daylight operations. Of the 

higher hills, Djebel Tahent (Hill 609), 

three miles east of Sidi Nsir, was an outstanding example of a major objective surrounded by lesser hills in an interlocking 

system of defense. There were other clusters, with the one containing Hill 575, near 

the road from Bedja to Sidi Nsir, requiring 

protracted and costly efforts by the attacking force. 

The three combat teams (26th, 16th, 

and 18th) of the 1 st Infantry Division attacked early on 23 April after very heavv 

artillery preparation against the principal 

crests and forward slopes of the first objec-

,. (1) Maps, Lagekarte 334th I nf Diu (1: 50,-

000) and Fifth Panzer Army (1: 200,000) in Fifth 

Panzer Army, KTB, Anlagen, folder containing 

four maps and miscellaneous documents, 29 Apr 

43. (2) Army Group Africa, Sitreps, 20-24 Apr 43. 

(3) 1st Div G-3 Jnl, 24 Apr 43. (4) II Corps 

AAR, 15 May 43, Map 2. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tive. The summits were identified as Hill 

575 (Kef el Goraa) at the northwest, Hill 

400 in the center, and Hills 407 (Djebel el 

Beida) and 350 (Djebel Rmel) at the 

southeast. Each was the nucleus of a group 

of hills in a rugged area from two to seven 

miles southeast of Sidi Nsir, and north or 

northeast of a semicircular arc of lower 

ground. The path of advance beyond these 

first groups between the Tine valley and the 

Sidi Nsir-Chouigui road became an area 

of strongly defined, somewhat converging 

ridges and valleys, with Djebel Touta 

(444)-Djebel el Berakine (391 )-Djebel el 

Anz (289) on the north and Djebel Sidi 

Meftah (341) and Djebel Badjar (278) on 

the south. The topography of this subarea 

differed from that of the tangled hill masses 

farther north across the road, near Hill 609. 

Once the attack had pushed beyond the 

first line, the elements of the division on the 

right would be drawn along the ridges toward a narrowing front, while the remainder of the division was being committed to terrain much more like that in 

which the attack began. 

Hill 575 was the bulbous western extremity of a saw-tooth ridge which extended 

for 7,000 yards almost due east, where a 

low saddle separated it from Djebel Sidi 

Meftah. Hill 400, not quite 3,000 yards to 

the southeast of Hill 575, was surrounded 

by rounded knobs and bold heights. Hill 

407, 3,100 yards farther southeast and Hill 

350, almost as far again in the same direction, could each be approached from the 

west over gently rolling ground but each 

was flanked by other hills in close proximity on north, east, and south. The plan 

of attack sent the 26th Infantry against 

Hill 575, the 16th against 400, and the 18th 

to gain Hills 407 and 350. In each instance, 

adjacent crests had to be occupied before 
THE ATTACK BEGINS 

the major objective could be taken and 

held. 25 The central thrust by Combat Team 

16 against Hill 400 first crossed some gentle 

slopes to the bases of two hills located 600 

and 1,000 yards to the southwest of the 

objective. Each of these eminences was 

firmly defended, particularly with automatic and mortar fire, and with the greatest 

stubborness. The attack promised to succeed by the next day but by nightfall had 

not gained firm possession of Hill 400. 26 

On the south wing the 2d Battalion, 18th 

Infantry (Lt. Col. Ben Sternberg), attacked 

Hill 350 while the 3d Battalion was sent 

against Hill 407. A specific objective on 

Hill 350 was the "Windmill Farm" on its 

southern slopes. The 2d Battalion gained, 

lost, and regained the crest before daylight, 

and then lost it to a strong infantry counterattack from the northeast, made with direct 

artillery support which hurt the American 

units severely. To take the hill in daylight 

from a fully alerted defending force, a dense 

artillery preparation was delivered prior to 

1145 hours, and then Company F, 18th 

Infantry, supported by one company of light 

tanks of the 1st Battalion, 13th Armored 

Regiment, drove the Germans off the hill by 

an assault from the northeast despite intense machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. 

Some 60 prisoners were taken, identified as 

from the 3d Tunis Battalion. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, lost 43 killed, 161 

wounded, and 20 missing during the day.27 

" 1st Div G-3 Opns Rpt, Tunis Opn, 15 Apr-7 

May 43, including Overlay 2 and Map. 

2. 1st Div G-3 Opns Rpt, Tunis Opn, 15 Apr-7 

May 43. 

27 (1) 2d Bn 18th Tnf Hist, 19 Apr-8 May 43, 

in 18th Tnf AAR. (2) The 1st Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment, lost thirteen light and five 

medium tanks on 23 April 1943. Msg, 1st Armd 

Div Periodic Rpt 80, 23 Apr 43, Entry 24, in II 

Corps G-3 In!. 

623 

The division's southern flank in the high 

ground above the Tine river valley was securely established. 

The 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry (Lt. Col. 

C. P. Brown), went against a stronger opponent in trying to take Hill 407 . Its numerous shoulders, separated by bare draws, 

enabled the defenders to cover the approaches with machine gun and mortar fire. 

The enemy also received reinforcements 

from the north and east during the day. 

The attack followed a twenty-minute artillery preparation and at about 0430 hours 

brought the head of the American column 

to the southwestern base of Hill 407, where 

the troops began receiving considerable machine gun fire. One platoon of Company L 

reached the upper slopes only to be cut off 

and captured, while the remainder of the 

battalion was driven into a deep draw and 

pinned down there for the rest of the day. 

The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, was then 

released from division reserve to pass 

through the 3d Battalion during the early 

morning and to resume the attack. By the 

time this relief was completed, the 3d Battalion's casualties were 17 killed, 73 

wounded, and 48 missing in action.2s 

The northern wing of the 1st Infantry 

Division's attack was undertaken by the 

26th Infantry. Colonel Bowen planned to 

employ the 3d Battalion in a limited holding 

attack toward two hills between Hill 575 

and the Bedja-Sidi Nsir road, while the 1st 

and 2d Battalions seized Hill 575, Hi1l549, 

just east of it, and other heights northeast of 

them, in order to protect the north flank of 

Combat Team 16. After the artillery preparation, the attacking troops would follow a 

rolling barrage. The attack on Hill 575 

283d Bn 18th Tnf Jnl, 23 Apr 43, in 18th Tnf 

AAR, 12 Apr-8 May 43. 
624 

would require an approach from the west 

by the 1st Battalion and from the southwest 

by the 2d Battalion. Finally, six medium 

tanks of the 13th Armored Regiment were 

to go along the road to Sidi Nsir as a diversion, while the 26th's Antitank Company 

and two platoons from the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion protected a roadblock behind them. 

The attack before dawn soon revealed 

that the enemy was strongly established on 

Hill 575. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 

occupied a hill a thousand yards west of 

Hill 5 7 5 without serious opposition, but then 

came under fire too strong for the battalion 

to continue eastward onto Hill 575. Likewise, the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, could 

secure no foothold on Hill 575 from the 

southwest, and General Roosevelt estimated 

that to take it would be "a tough fight." 29 

More artillery fire was called for, and the 

American forces withdrew until the hill 

could thus be softened up and reinforcements could arrive. Under this fire, the 

enemy was also reinforced, and he dug 

additional positions among concrete emplacements which he had already constructed on the western slopes. The 3d 

Battalion, 26th Infantry, was directed to 

plan for participation in the attack after it 

had been relieved next day by the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry. 30 

South of the Tine river, the first day's 

attack also met with a limited success. There 

the dismonted 6th Armored Infantry (less 

"Msg, 0625, 23 Apr 43, Entry 24, in 1st Div G-3 

In!. 

30 (1) Msg, 2240, 23 Apr 43, Entry 77, in 1st Div 

G-3 Jnl. (2) The 168th Infantry, with Company 

C of the 701 st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, 

relieved the 26th Infantry on the night of 24-25 

April. 168th Inf FO 14, 24 Apr 43. (3) 1st Div 

G-3 Opns Rpt, 24 Apr 43. (4) Msg, 24 Apr 43, 

Entry 44, in II Corps G-3 In!. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

the 2d Battalion) under command of Col. 

Robert I. Stack sent its 3d Battalion against 

three adjacent hills northwest of Heidous. 

The three objectives were Hill 420, the western height of a curving ridge (Djebel 

Bateune Slama) in the center, Hill 388 to 

the north, and Hill 485 to the southeast. 

The crests were approximately one mile 

apart but the rugged slopes dropped to narrow defiles and were under observation or 

fire from each other. Stack's men took Hill 

388 at the edge of the valley but could not 

retain it against the enemy's counterattack. 

Hill 420's western slopes were seized and 

held, but the attack on the northeastern 

slopes of Hill 485 was successfully stopped 

by flanking fire from the high ground farther 

east on Djebel Bateune Slama. The natural 

advantages for defense in this extraordinarily rough terrain required a considerably 

stronger effort if the infantry was to succeed 

in pushing ahead. 31 

The first day's operations of the reinforced 

1st Infantry Division established the relative 

strength of the enemy's defenses at certain 

points along the broad front. The 26th Infantry at Hill 575, the 18th Infantry at Hill 

407, and the 6th Armored Infantry at Hill 

420 ran into resistance not only from wellplaced enemy positions on the main objective but also from adjacent heights. They 

had already sampled the enemy's effective 

placing of mine fields, and had taken note 

of his ability to organize counterattacking 

forces rapidly in order to regain lost ridges. 

The fact that it would be necessary for the 

Americans to follow their artillery preparation closely in order to occupy any ground 

for effective defense against counterattack 

was confirmed. Which hills to seize as the 

key crests in the various interlocking groups 

31 6th Armd Inf AAR, 2 Sep 43. 
THE ATTACK BEGINS 

had also been ascertained during the first 

day's attack. 

On 24 April, the 16th Infantry's experience was an outstanding example of the 

widening consequences of a success at a particular hill. The 1 st Battalion, 16th Infantry, 

fought its way to the top of Hill 469 (Djebel 

Berboukr) in a battle which took much of 

the day. As the battalion cleared the enemy 

from that height in the late afternoon, the 

3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, which had been 

pinned down by flanking fire from Hill 469, 

was at last able to push northeastward up 

Hill 394 (Djebel Bou Achour), about a 

mile east of Hill 469. At the same time, the 

2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, extended its line 

eastward along the ridge south of Hill 575 

toward Hill 469, and held its positions there. 

Thus the 1st Infantry Division's line was 

pushed forward, southeast of Hill 575, until 

it faced almost north on a front nearly four 

miles long. 

The 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry, had been 

stopped at the base of Hill 407 for much of 

23 April, but the 1st Battalion, which passed 

through the 3d during the night, readily 

captured the crest after a thirty-minute artillery preparation. Two infantry companies 

and the heavy weapons company dug in to 

hold it against counterattack, while patrols 

and elements of the 701st Tank Destroyer 

Battalion worked through the valleys to the 

east. They confirmed the presence on Hill 

346, the next ridge 1,500 yards to the northeast, of an undetermined number of the 

enemy, supported by an 88-mm. dualpurpose battery, two tanks, and a self-propelled gun. 32 

South of the Tine valley the 6th Armored 

Infantry, on 24-25 April, renewed its at32 (1) 1 st Bn 18th Inf Hist, 21 Apr-8 May 43, in 

18th Inf AAR. (2) 701 st TD Bn AAR, 19 Apr-9 

May 43. 

625 

tack against the same three hills it had assaulted the day before. A reinforced 

company of the 1st Battalion, 6th Armored 

Infantry, tried unsuccessfully to gain Hill 

388 on the north, while elements of the 3d 

Battalion swung around the southern side of 

Hill 485 in order to strike it from the southeast, in defilade from Djebel Bateune 

Slama (Hill 420). Before completing these 

measures, the Americans won all three hills 

by default as the enemy pulled back under a 

certain amount of pressure during a general 

Axis withdrawal undertaken on 25 April. 

The next line at which he appeared ready to 

resume his stand was about four miles to the 

northeast, on a group of hills located at a 

point where the Tine valley pivots to the 

north. 33 

The II Corps modified the scheme of attack between Sidi Nsir and the Tine vallev 

after the second day's operations in view of 

certain factors-the enemy's firmer grip on 

the hills near Sidi Nsir, the successes thus far 

attained near the northern edge of the Tine, 

the prospective arrival of the whole 34th 

Infantry Division, and the availability of 

Headquarters, 1st Armored Division, to assume responsibility for operations in the 

Tine valley and on the extreme south flank. 

General Allen's front was narrowed to take 

account also of the salient over which his 

attack had already advanced. The 26th and 

18th Infantry were expected to converge as 

the former drove along the ridges of Djebel 

Touta-Djebel el Berakine-Djebel el Anz to 

the eastern edge of the mountain area, and 

the latter advanced along the steep-sided 

Djebel Sidi Meftah to Djebel Bad jar. The 

33 (1) 1st Bn 6th Armd Inf Diary, 1942-43. (2) 

6th Armd Inf Hist, 21-11 May 43, 14 May 43. (3) 

6th Armd Inf AAR, 2 Sep 43. (4) 1st Armd Div 

AAR,2 May 43. 
626 

16th Infantry would be pinched out and 

held in divisional reserve. 34 The 6th 

Armored Infantry was expected to gain control of the heights east of Djebel Badjar 

where the Tine river runs through a narrow 

defile before crossing the Sidi Nsir-Chouigui 

Road. 35 

By the time the attack jumped off early on 

25 April, the enemy had pulled quietly back. 

Only security detachments remained to protect the enemy's retirement, but his artillery 

was zeroed in to strike the hills under American attack once they were occupied, and 

succeeded at 0400 in driving the American 

troops off two of them (Hills 469 and 394) 

for a time. 3G The enemy left booby-trapped 

mine fields as he withdrew to a new line. 

He appeared to be in greater strength than 

before on Hill 473, a mile and a half west 

of Sidi Nsir, but by 2000 the 1st Infantry 

Division had occupied the western end of 

Djebel Sidi Meftah, and the hills leading 

to it from the southwest; Djebel Touta, 

close to the Sidi Nsir-Chouigui road, and 

hills directly west of Djebel Touta; and in 

the Tine valley, was at a line which stretched 

southeastward to advanced elements of the 

6th Armored Infantry at Point 350, about 

a mile and a half north of Djebel el Ang 

(668) .31 General Allen intended to continue on 26 April toward the intermediate 

objectives sketched in the current plan of 

attack, but the 1st Infantry Division's salient 

was projecting well into enemy-held terri3< Msg, 24 Apr 43, Entry 44, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

"" 1st Div G3 Opns Rpt and Jnl, Overlay 3, 25 

Apr 43. 

:m Msg, 25 Apr 43, Entry 13, in 1st Div G-3 JnL 

" (1) Msgs, 25 Apr 43, Entries 79, 80, and 84, 

in 18t Div G-3 J nl. (2) The 18t Engineer Battalion 

lifted 1,400 mines in the 26th Infantry zone on 25 

ApriL See Col Miehael Buckley, Jr., Obsr's Rpt, 26 

JUIl 43, sub: II Corps Artillery 21-26 Apr 43. 

M;F 319.1/3 (For. Obs). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tory with a northern flank extending for 

10,000 yards along the road to Chouigui. 

For operations on 26 April, the fourth day 

of the offensive, the 1st Infantry Division 

would no longer have the support of the 1st 

Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, which 

returned to the control of the 1 st Armored 

Division during the preceding night, but 

instead was to be supported on the northwestern flank by the 168th Infantry. That 

unit had not only occupied Hills 344 and 

533, northwest of Hill 575, but now took 

over from the 26th Infantry the mopping 

up on Hill 575. 

Through a heavy early morning fog on 26 

April, General Allen's troops toiled and 

groped along the ridges of Djebel Sidi Meftah and Djebel Touta almost a..'l far as their 

eastern extremities. Patrols in the forenoon 

crossed to the area north of the Sidi NsirChoulgui road, southeast of Hill 609. Observers on newly gained heights spotted 

enemy troop movements and directed artillery fire on many points, including the top 

of Hill 609. General Allen formulated a 

tentative modification of the division's objectives before the day was over. The new divisional front under this revision would be 

narrowed to less than five miles, to be held 

by one battalion each from the 26th and 

18th Infantry Regiments, at a line running 

eastward from Hill 531 (about a thousand 

yards south of Hill 609) over the western 

end of Djebel el Anz and then southeastward via the eastern slopes of Djebel Sidi 

Meftah to the Tine river valley. Other units 

were then to reconnoiter in preparation for 

eventual resumption of the advance, and the 

16th Infantry was alerted for possible commitment on the left of the 26th Infantry 

along the northern edge of the divisional 
THE ATTACK BEGINS 

zone in co-ordination with the 34th Infantry 

Division's operations to seize Hill 609.38 

The operations of U.S. II Corps by 26 

April had shown how hard a fight must be 

expected before it could open the way to 

Mateur either at the north through the envelopment of the Djefna position or at the 

south by driving the enemy from the hills 

on either side of the Tine river valley. In 

the center, the front had been pushed along 

the Sidi Nsir-Chouigui road far enough to 

deny its use to the enemy but not far enough 

for use by American traffic. The enemy had 

hung on persistently to Hill 575 and to those 

hills near Sidi Nsir which he had defended 

successfully for the last two days against the 

168th Infantry. On 26 April, General 

Ryder's 34th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for a zone between the 9th and 

38 (1) Msgs, 26 Apr 43, Entries 13, 14, 19, 22, 29, 

47,49, and 50, and Overlay, Entries 52 and 53, in 

1st Div G-3 Jnl. (2) 1st Div G-3 Opns Rpt, 27 

Apr 43. 

627 

1st Infantry Divisions, from Djebel Grembil 

( 499) and Djebel el Hara (473) on the 

northwest to Hill 575 on the southeast. At 

the same time elements of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, were searching out areas in which they could provide 

greater support, but the policy of II Corps 

was to keep the division concentrated for a 

swifter thrust, later, out of The Mousetrap 

and into the more open countryside near 

Mateur. General Bradley did not intend to 

squander his mobile strength in winning a 

path through the enemy's antitank defenses. 

The entire Allied offensive after two days 

had coerced the enemy into shortening his 

line by a general withdrawal to a second 

set of positions, but by 26 April the progress 

of the attack was slowed from one end 

of that line to the other. 39 

3. For the decision to pull back, see Daily Rpt, 

Army Group Africa to OKHjGenStdHjOp Abt, 

24 Apr 43, in Army Group Africa, Sitreps. 
CHAPTER XXXIII 

The Advance To Mateur 

The 34th Division's attack was expected 

to continue on a northeast-southwest axis 

against the westward bulge in the enemy's 

line along the hills north of the Sidi NsirChouigui road, and thus to bring under 

Allied control the heights of Hill 609. 1 

(Map XII) 

Hill 609 

Hill 609's upper contours rising from a 

much larger, less steeply slanting base, when 

seen from above, resemble a crude Indian 

arrowhead pointing toward the east. From 

tip to base, this arrowhead extends for more 

than 800 yards, while the distance from 

the northern to the southern barb approximates 500 yards. Deep notches, bounded 

by precipitous slopes, pierce the northern 

and southern sides. Its top is divided into 

two major areas, a fairly level table rising 

gradually from west to east in the triangular section between tip and barbs, and an 

irregular amphitheater falling off to the 

west, with a narrow level shelf above the 

white southwestern escarpment. That cliff 

because of its great height masks from the 

adjacent ground to the south and southwest 

the existence of the higher slopes on the 

1 (l) 168th Inf Hist, 1943. (2) 168th Inf FO 

15, 26 Apr 43. (3) Maj Ross P. Thrasher, Operations of the 2d Battalion, 168th Infantry, at HiJl 

473 (Djebel el Hara), 26-28 Apr 43, MS. The 

Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., 1949-50. 

western portion of the crest and gives the 

appearance of a substantial mesa resting on 

a massive ridge. Low vegetation, mostly 

bunch grass, growing among rocky outcrops over much of Hill 609, offered little 

concealment, while the rocky ground made 

digging in with infantry tools out of the 

question. 2 

The triangular eastern section juts up 

from its base, while the western end rises 

gradually on the northwest and most steeply 

of the entire mass on the southwest. There a 

great palisade, looming brightly in the April 

sun high above the surrounding ground, 

was visible to the attacking forces for many 

miles. An unimproved road crosses the western part of the arrowhead to an Arab village which nestles at the base of the southern notch. Another track skirts the crest 

at the east, giving access to scattered olive 

orchards on the lower slopes. Hill 609 is no 

monadnock but its summit projects at least 

200 feet above the crests of any neighboring 

hills, and it furnished excellent observation 

over much of the II Corps zone of attack. 

A British artillery observation post there in 

February had proved its value. 

Hill 609 could be captured and retained 

only by driving the enemy from adjacent 

hills which controlled the approaches. A 

2 Foxholes were blasted out with "bee-hive" explosive charges by American troops at many of the 

hills in this zone. 
THE ADVANCE TO MATEUR 629 

HILL 609, looking north. 

mountainous mass directly west of the main 

objective has two great shoulders, Hill 490 

and Hill 435 (northwest of Hill 490). A 

second massif northwest of Hill 609, divided by a narrow defile from Hill 490, is 

known as Hill 461. Opposite the southeastern quarter of Hill 609 and northwest of 

the Sidi Nsir--Chouigui road is a wide hilly 

zone with two rows of crests or ridges. An 

observer on Hill 609 sweeping the horizon 

from south to east sees the crests designated 

on the map as Hills 529,531,455,523,545 

and then 558. Almost parallel to these hills 

and between them and the Sidi Nsir-Chouigui road is a lower series of heights rising 

from a second ridge, of which the most 

prominent hills are 428 and 476. The contours of these hills are usually rounded except at the northwest, where they are more 

sharply eroded, so that from Hill 609 this 

area looks somewhat like a rolling tableland 

extending back from a steep edge. From the 

southwest, even from observation points on 

the shoulders of hills within the American 

lines, observers could see the upper slopes 

only on some of these hills, leaving important details of the terrain near their bases 

to be ascertained by reconnaissance patrols. 3 

The boundary between the 34th Infantry 

Division and the 1st Infantry Division cut 

across this area from the southwest to the 

northeast in such a way as to require mutual 

3 (1) Geog Sec Gen Staff Map 4225 (Tunisia) , 

1: 50,000, Sheets 11, 12. (2 ) Aerial and ground 

photos by Lt Col John C. Hatlem (USAF ). 

OCMH. 
630 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

HILL COMPLEX IN SIDI NSIR AREA, looking northeast. 

support between the units on either flank. 

The boundary sliced across the southeastern 

slopes of Hill 531, with the smaller part of 

that mile-long ridge inside General Allen's 

area, and the rest reaching its highest point 

at 531 in the attack zone of the 34th Infantry Division. The 16th Infantry could 

best approach the southeastern portion of 

Hill 531 by passing through the saddle of 

Kef el Guebli (529). The regiment could 

not continue to other assigned objectives to 

the east and northeast without being subjected to flanking fire from Hill 531. The 

1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, could attack 

Hill 531 only over ground already being 

occupied by elements of the 16th Infantry. 

A battalion commander of the 135th Infantry on occasion directed American artillery fire on an enemy target in the 16th 

Infantry's area. Lt. Col. Robert P. Miller, 

commander of the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, was mindful of the disastrous consequences which a failure of co-ordination 

could cause because of his own recent experience on the left flank at Fondouk el 

Aouareb near Djebel Ai"n el Rhorab, and 

he took the initiative in arranging a telephone connection with the command post 

of the adjacent unit of the 16th Infantry. 

Regimental liaison was also established. The 

difficulties of co-ordinated operations in 

such a complex area severely strained the 

possible arrangements.4 

4 (1) Report of Activity of 1st Battalion, 135th 

Infantry, Vicinity of Hill 531, dated 10 May 43, 

in 3d Bn 16th Inf AAR. (2) Ltr, Col Robert P. 

Miller to author, 14Jan51,withincls. (3) Ltr,Brig 

Gen George A. Taylor (Ret.) to author, 22 Nov 

and 20 Dec 50. (4) Ltr, Col Landon to author, 27 

Jan 51. 
THE ADVANCE TO MATEUR 631 

HILL 609 AREA, looking south, southwest. 

The Attack Opens 

Hill 609 was wholly in the 34th Infantry 

Division's zone. The strength and the determination with which the enemy would 

defend his possession of that dominating 

height, and the nature of the interlocking 

defense of its satellite hills, were discovered 

during the first stage of the operations to 

seize it. General Ryder's initial plan of attack assigned the task of taking the hill to 

the 135th Infantry (Colonel Ward), which 

gained control on 26 April of lightly held 

heights, but discovered almost at once that 

a direct approach to Hill 609 from the 

southwest would be strongly resisted from 

Hill 490 (to the west ), Hill 531 (to the 

south), and from Hill 609 itself. The Americans did not then know that the relatively 

small forces on these hills would be able to 

hold them back. General Ryder, after being 

advised that Hill 609 itself might be "bypassed," approved Colonel Ward's plan to 

send one battalion against Hill 490 and a 

second battalion to occupy the part of HilI 

529 in the division zone and then continue 

to Hill 531.5 

Neither of these two attacks on the night 

of 26-27 April was successful. The two battalions gained footholds, but failed to reach 

their objectives. Hill 490 was won on 28 

April only after an additional battalion had 

been committed and a series of enemy 

counterattacks had been repulsed. Control 

over the upper slopes of this large hill mass 

west of Hill 609 was extended northwcst5 (1) Interv with Col Ward, 30 Nov 50. (2) Ltr, 

Col Miller to au thor 14 Jan 51, wi th incls. (3) 

Interv with Gen Caffey, 21 Feb 50. (4) 34th Div 

FO 35, 26 Apr 43, and FO 36, 27 Apr 43. 
632 

ward onto the Hill 435 shoulder. The 1st 

Battalion, 135th Infantry, discovered at the 

same time at Hills 529 and 531 what the 

16th Infantry had already ascertainedthat American troops could send patrols 

or small attacking forces without being resisted, but any substantial movement was 

likely to be observed from one of the heights 

in enemy possession and to receive prepared 

artillery fires. Although an attacking force 

might work its way up a southwestern slope 

and reach the bare top, once there, it would 

be pinned down by heavy machine gun fire 

from a neighboring hill and subjected to 

severe casualties by enemy artillery air 

bursts. The enemy used a reverse slope defense, firing his automatic weapons in quick 

bursts, then ducking for cover, and dropping 

high trajectory fire into draws and gulches 

through which attacking troop~ could be 

expected to move. 'Many such areas were 

mined. \Vhenever American troops gained 

a summit and survived the subsequent 

enemy fire, they could expect counterattacks before they had organized a defense 

unless they were extraordinarily quick about 

it. At Hill 529, the enemy had been temporarily driven off the top before noon, 27 

April, but Hill 531, the next objective, 

seemed unattainable a day later, because 

of the fire which he could place on the hill 

from various quarters." Furthermore, the 

enemy was able to deliver flanking fire from 

Hill 531 both eastward upon the 16th Infantry during its operations toward Hill 523 

and northwestward over the open area between Hill 490 and Hill 609. Hill 531 

r, (1) Msg, Capt Fanning (CO Co C 135th lnf) 

to Bn Comdr, 1125, 28 Apr 43, Inc! 4 to Ltr, Col 

Miller to author, 14 Jan 51. (2) Ltr, Col Landon to 

author, 27 Jan 51. (3) Msgs, 0700, 28 Apr 43, Entries 11-13, and 0930, 28 Apr 43, Entry 23, in 1st 

Div G-3 Jnl. 

NOR'I'HWEST AFRICA 

seemed on the map much like any other hill, 

but for a time, the course of the battle implied that it was the key to the 18t Division's 

seizure of Hills 523 and 545, northeast of 

it, and to any succe&<; against Hill 609, still 

the main objective of the 34th Division, 

from the south. On April, General Anderson proposed to General Bradley that 

Hill 609 be bypassed, but was persuaded 

that such a move would not be good tactics. 1 

First Failure and Broadened Plans 

The inability of General Ryder's division 

to seize Hill 609 on 28 April in turn frustrated the 1 st Infantry Division's costly attempts on that day to press northeastward as 

far as Hills 523 and 545, which masked the 

enemy's line of supply and principal route of 

reinforcement. General Allen then at 1400 

ordered all units under his command to hold 

up offensive movement pending the capture 

of Hill 609 by the 34th Division.s General 

Ryder next planned to take Hill 609 early 

on 29 April by envelopment from the north, 

west, and south. Three interrelated attacks 

would be made by the three battalions of 

the 135th Infantry. The 3d Battalion had 

captured Hi11490 the day before. It was now 

to advance from this hill behind a rolling 

barrage to make a holding attack against 

the southwestern section of Hill 609 while 

the 2d Battalion gained Hill 461 and swung 

southeast, and while the 1st Battalion took 

Hill 53] and attacked northward. Defense 

of Hill 490 (and Hill 435) was assigned to 

1 (1) See II Corps plans as arranged betwel.'n 

General Bradley and Generals Allen and Ryder, and 

recorded next morning in Entry 231, 28 Apr 43, 

in II Corps G-3 Jnl. (2) Bradley, A Soldier's Story. 

pp,85-87. 

'Msgs, 28 Apr 43, Entries 13, 14, and 83, in 1st 

Div G-3 Jnl. 
THE ADVANCE TO MATEUR 

TROOPS MOVING TO A NEW 

POSITION NEAR HILL 609, 28 

April 1943. 

the 3d Battalion, 133d Infantry, attached to 

the 135th Infantry. These moves were made 

in the hope that if all three battalions in the 

assault were to strike Hill 609 simultaneously, the defenders might be taken off 

balance by at least one of them. 9 

The plan could not be executed on 29 

April. The enemy held positions in the draw 

between Hill 435 and Hill 461 from which 

enfilading fire struck the western flank of 

the 2d Battalion, 135th Infantry, already 

much weakened by the bitter fighting of the 

previous day, and pinned it down short of 

Hill 461. The northern envelopment was 

thus checked before it was fairly in progress. 

On the other flank, the 1st Battalion, 135th 

Infantry, could not get a firm hold at any 

o 135th Inf Hist, Sec. IV, Pts. e, f. 

633 

point on Hill 531, and withdrew at nightfall, as it had on the two preceding days, toward Hill 529 (Kef el Guebli). Maj. Garnet 

Hall's 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, made 

its attack from the base of Hill 490 toward 

the southwestern quarter of Hill 609 and 

got across the intervening ground behind a 

rolling barrage as far as the base of the objective. When the barrage was lifted, however, the enemy counterattacked and forced 

the Americans back a quarter of a mile. 

There they reorganized amid rocky outcrops 

along a low rise and started a second attack 

with renewed artillery support. This advance 

brought the troops part way up the hills to 

the shelf, where many sought cover from 

alert enemy riflemen and machine gunners 

among the buildings of the Arab village, 

and thus passed out of control of the battalion commander. At that stage, darkness 

fell. The enemy was still in full possession of 

Hill 609.10 

The attack by II Corps in the south had 

reached a critical point after the failure on 

29 April. Casualties included 183 killed, 

1,594 wounded, and 676 captured or missing.l1 General Allen's battered units were 

obliged to operate at an enormous disadvantage. The 16th Infantry had been 

severely punished trying to reach Hill 523. 

The 26th Infantry, fighting to occupy 

Djebel el Anz (289), drew flanking fire 

from Hills 523 and 545 northwest of it. To 

10 (1) Interv with Col Ward, 30 Nov 50. (2) 

135th Inf Hist, 18 Oct 42-15 May 43, pp. 12-13. 

(3) Maj Arnold N. Brandt, Operations of the 1 st 

Battalion, 135th Infantry, at Hills 609 and 531, 26 

Apr-2 May 43, MS. The Infantry School, Fort 

Benning, Ga., 1947-48. 

11 Half of the wounded (781) had been evacuated. 

Strength remained 95,194. II Corps Weekly Rpt, 

30 Apr 43, copy in II Corps G-4 Jnl. 
634 

attack and hold Hills 523 and 545 before 

the enemy had been driven off Hill 609 was 

certain to be costly and likely to prove impossible. Those heights, although not so close 

to Hill 609, were as exposed to fire as Hill 

531. Yet General Allen was not disposed 

to accept a plan in which his own command 

had to wait for another to discharge its part 

of the burden of attack.'2 He reasoned that 

if in addition to Hills 523 and 545, he 

took another height, Hill 558 (Djebel el 

Facuar), about 4,000 yards east-northeast 

of Hill 609, he might thereby enclose Hill 

609 in a pocket from which the enemy 

would feel compelled to withdraw before it 

became too late. Although the enemy had 

lost only 408 prisoners, he was weakening, 

for his troops had been under incessant pressure by substantially greater forces. Furthermore, his reinforcements and supplies were 

brought in under American observation and 

fire and his rations and ammunition were 

running critically low.'3 There were other 

signs that the enemy was resorting to improvisation and persisting under severe 

strain. In the whole operation from Hill 609 

to the Tine river valley, therefore, it was 

perhaps better to keep pushing everywhere 

rather than to concentrate on some key objective as a method of winning the battle. 

It was possible, moreover, that if the enemy 

failed in his efforts to defend the Hill 609 

complex the effort would leave him so depleted that he would be unable to hold 

firmly the area farther to the northeast. An 

12 Memo, Maj Gen Terry Allen (Ret.) for Chief 

of Mil Hist, 4 Jan 51. OCMH. 

13 ( I) Msgs, 29 Apr 43, Entries 30, 31, 36, and 41 

in 1st Div G-3 In!. (2) Ltr, Maj John A. Lauten 

(then 5-2, 16th Inf) to Gen Taylor, 28 De'c 50. 

Copy in OCMH. (3) Army Croup Africa, Sit reps, 

28-29 Apr 43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

attempt to capture an obstacle to American 

advance was thus at the same time a major 

opportunity for the destruction of the 

enemy's fighting power. 

During the afternoon of 29 April, General Ryder planned an attack with tanks for 

execution that night and early next day. 

With one company of medium tanks and a 

fresh battalion of infantry (the 1st Battalion, 

133d Infantry) attached to Colonel Ward's 

command, that force, jumping off from a 

point 800 yards east-southeast of Hill 490, 

was to make a predawn assault with the objective of gaining a foothold on the northwestern slopes of Hill 609 for subsequent 

infantry exploitation. The tank unit, Company I, 1st Armored Regiment (Capt. 

Robert D. Gwin), made its own reconnaissance before darkness and devised its own 

tactical plan, which was co-ordinated with 

others and approved by General Ryder at 

one of his daily command conferences within sight of the area to be attacked.14 

At the same time, General Allen ordered 

an attack during the night by the 16th Infantry to seize Hill 523. Hill 523 could not 

be held unless the enemy was also driven 

from Hill 545, the next crest to the east on 

the same major ridge. Colonel Taylor therefore worked out a plan for the 1st Battalion, 

16th Infantry (Lt. Col. Charles J. Denholm), to cross the open area south of Hill 

523 in darkness and seize its crest before 

daylight, while the 3d Battalion would clear 

the southern sector of Hill 531 by pushing 

north toward the reverse slope where the 

enemy had dug his positions. The 2d Bat-

"(I) 34th Div FO 37, 2000,'29 Apr 43. (2) 

Memo, Capt Gwin for CO 3d Bn 1st Armd Regt, 

14 May 43, sub: Opns of Co I while atta,he'd to 

34th Div near 5idi Nsir 30 Apr-4 May 43, III 3d 

Bn 1st Armd Regt AAR 
THE ADVANCE TO MATEUR 

talion, 16th Infantry, was to hold itself in 

readiness to attack Hill 545 at the earliest 

opportunity.10 These two major attacks on 

29-30 April would be conducted while the 

1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, returned to 

the offensive for the third day in the attempt to clear the northwestern slopes of 

Hill 531, and while at Djebel el Anz the 

26th Infantry improved its positions on the 

western approach in the of the enemy's 

apparent intention to challenge that hold 

by strong counterattack. 

Successful General Attack, 30 April-ll'vlay 

On 30 April American troops reached 

the summit of Hills 609, 531, and 523 and 

began to defend these gains against determined enemy counterm<;asures. As expected, some of these hills proved more 

costly than others. The early morning attack to reach the northwestern slopes of 

Hill 609 by Lt. Col. Carley L. Marshall's 

1st Battalion, 133d Infantry, and Captain 

Gwin's Company I, 1st Armored Regiment, 

was a success. Not only did these units push 

through, but on their left, the 2d Battalion, 

135th Infantry, was able to renew its advance onto Hill 461, and captured it. From 

there the battalion fanned out to the southeast and by 1100 made contact with Colonel Marshall's battalion. Elements of the 

latter, which had "grabbed and held onto 

the tails" of the tanks, cleaned out enemy 

gun positions. The German defenders 

knocked out four of the tanks (two of which 

were recoverable), but the remainder were 

ready to roll back over the saddle between 

Hill 490 and Hill 609 in order to mop up. 

15 Opns Overlay for CT 16 Attack, 29 Apr 43, 

Entry 41, in 1st Div G-3 Jnl. 

635 

Colonel Miller's battalion by then was 

heavily engaged in what proved to be the 

final attack on Hill 531. Since the small 

hours of the day the 1 st Battalion, 135th 

Infantry, had made repeated efforts to 

reach the summit but had failed. The troops 

had beaten off a series of German counterattacks by making excellent use of well directed artillery fires. But in their own attempt to seize Hill 531 they were at a 

distinct disadvantage owing to the failure 

of the 16th Infantry to maintain its hold on 

Hill 523. The right flank of Colonel Miller's 

battalion was thus dangerously exposed. At 

about 1530 Miller's battalion renewed its 

attack from the slopes of Hill 529 with the 

mission of capturing Hill 531 and pushing 

beyond to Hill 455. Covered by an artillery 

preparation, including smoke, and by mortar and overhead machine gun fire from 

Hill 529, Company A, 135th Infantry, 

worked up the northwestern bulge of Hill 

531 while Company C fought its way up 

the southern slopes. At some points, particularly in the center between these two enveloping companies, the hillside rose in 

steep escarpments and cliffs, which made 

these attacks up the two flanks necessary. 

The enemy pressure on Company A's left 

flank from Hill 609 was greatly diminished 

by the simultaneous operations against that 

hill, and the 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, 

near the Arab village, assisted the 1st Battalion at Hill 531 by firing on the enemy's 

reverse slope positions and checking his repeated attempts at reinforcement. The Germans supplemented other weapons by 

tying together bundles of "potato masher" 

grenades and dropping them on the attacking troops from higher crags. When Company C was stopped just short of the top by 

German rifle and machine gun fire, the 

heavy weapons platoon, from a rocky shelf, 
636 

knocked out some of the enemy's fire power 

by mortar shells and made possible a renewed advance. Company A left its weapons platoon in position on Kef el Guebli 

(Hill 529) and used most of one platoon as 

ammunition carriers. Late in the day, the 

light machine gun squad and a detail 

heavily loaded with hand grenades crossed 

from Hill 529 to Hill 531 and climbed to 

the crest, where the attack was thereupon 

renewed. By nightfall, 30 April, Hill 531 

was "owned" by Colonel Miller's battalion. 

But Hill 455 stilI seemed out of reach and 

the gap between the battalion and its left 

neighbor, the 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, 

was yet to be closed. The simultaneous operations against Hill 609 had prevented 

the enemy from subjecting the top of Hill 

531 to the sort of fire with which the arrival of the Americans might previously 

have been greeted. '6 

Hill 523 cost the 1st Infantry Division a 

heavy price. The hill was taken by the 1st 

Battalion, 16th Infantry, in a night attack 

(29~30 April) against light resistance. The 

approach due north by compass through 

open fields of short wheat brought the battalion to the base of its objective undiscovered, and it reached the crest in a swift 

climb under fire, culminating in an assault 

with hand grenades and knives. By 0445, 

it had seized the hill. Colonel Denholm's 

misgivings, which Colonel Taylor had 

shared, applied to the difficulty which could 

be expected not in taking, but in holding, 

the hill. The line of communications would 

be under enemy fire. The southern slopes 

of Hill 523 could be observed and struck 

" (1) Brandt, Opnations of the 1st Battalion, 

135th Infantry ... 26 Apr-2 May 1943, MS. 

The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., 1947-48. 

(2) Ltr, Col Miller to author, 14 Jan 51, with 

incls. (3) 135th Inf Hist, Sec IV. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

from Hill 609 to the west and from lower, 

intermediate knolls in the area of the German stronghold around Hill 455. On the 

rocky summit of Hill 523, Denholm's men 

erected parapets for a perimeter defense. 

Foxholes were out of the question. An attempt to extend control along the heights 

to the crest of Hill 545 (northeast of Hill 

523) was stopped by an unexpected, deep 

earthquake fault between two parts of the 

ridge with a gap too wide to jump and 

sides too sheer and high to climb. Daylight 

was certain to bring enemy countermeasures which might cut off the battalion. The 

expected reaction came at dawn in the form 

of light fire from the southeast and south, 

and heavy fire from southwest and west. 

In shelling from the southwest the Germans 

employed in particular one captured American self-propelled gun or tank destroyer, 

and several of their own antitank guns for 

effective direct fire. All wire lines were 

broken and all radios were shot out so that 

by midmorning the battalion lost communication with the rear except by courier. 

During this preparation fire, the enemy organized a counterattack. He swung around 

the shoulder of the hill from the southwest 

and simultaneously attacked from the northeast, encircled the men on the hill, and 

killed or captured them in a wild melee on 

the summit. The commander and about 

150 men were eventually taken prisoner. 

The rest were killed." T 

17 (1) Msgs, 0445, 30 Apr, Entry 4, and 1034, 

30 Apr 43, Entry 27, in 1st Div G-3 Jnl. (2) Cf. 

Maj Robert E. Cullis, Operations of the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, in the Attack on Hill 523, 

Vicinity of Mateur, 30 April-1 May 1943, MS, 

and Maj David Milotta, same title, MS. The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga. Cullis was then 

the executive officer of the 16th Infantry, and 

Milotta was a platoon leader in Company A, 16th 

Infantry. (3) Intcrvs with Cols Mason and Gibb, 

13 Nov 50, and with Col Crawford, 16 Nov. 50. 
THE ADVANCE TO MATEUR 

As soon as he learned that the situation 

on Hill 523 was critical, General Allen tried 

to relieve it by sending a company of medium tanks (Company H, 1st Armored 

Regiment, commanded by Capt. Herbert 

F. Hillenmeyer), which had been attached 

to his command. At about the same time, 

Company I, 1st Armored Regiment, was 

beginning to work along the southern slopes 

of Hill 609 from west to east. A combination of enemy mine fields, antitank gun fire, 

and air attacks and the absence of arrangements for co-ordinated tank-infantry-artillery operations soon frustrated this attempt 

by Captain Gwin's company and forced 

Captain Hillenmeyer's company to be redirected to Hill 523 over a longer, slower 

route. In the interval, other measures to 

support Colonel Denholm were tried without success. The tanks arrived at approximately 1645. Despite the quick loss of four 

vehicles to antitank guns, the tank unit then 

supported a successful small attack to drive 

the enemy off, but the battalion had been 

lost. For lack of troops, neither Colonel Taylor nor the enemy could reoccupy the hill 

in strength." 

By midafternoon on 30 April the fall of 

Hill 609, after four days of fighting, seemed 

imminent. The troops of the 1st Battalion, 

133d Ihfantry, which had attacked with the 

tanks, had built up a co-ordinated defense of 

the sector to the northwest of Hill 609, tying in with the 2d Battalion, 135th Infantry, 

on Hill 461. The 3d Battalion, which had 

spent the night in isolation in the area of the 

Arab village, sent a patrol around the west1~ (I) Ltr, Gcn Taylor to author, 20 Dec 50. (2) 

Ltr, Col Denholm to author, 13 Dec 50. (3) 1st 

Div G-3 Jnl, 30 Apr 43, particularly Entries 29, 

45, and 59. (4) Intcrvs with Cols Mason and 

Gibb, 13 Nov 50. 

637 

ern slopes of Hill 609. At long last these 

men got to the summit and established an 

observation pOSt." B The Americans had 

driven the enemy from Hill 609, but their 

ability to hold it was to be tested by a series 

of counterattacks during the following night 

and on 1 May. 

During the afternoon of 30 April, the 2d 

Battalion, 168th Infantry (Lt. Col. Edward 

W. Bird), was attached to Colonel Ward's 

command for the last phase of operations 

against Hill 609. The battalion moved forward to an assembly area north of the Sidi 

Nsir road about 2,000 yards southwest of 

Hill 609. Colonel Bird's battalion was 

directed to advance toward the saddle between Hill 609 and Hill 531, clearing it of 

the enemy and, by attacking around the 

eastern and northeastern base of Hill 609, to 

establish contact with the 1st Battalion, 

133d Infantry on its left, while on its right 

it was to tie in with the 1 st Battalion, 135th 

Infantry on Hill 531. This night assault was 

ordered for 2300. As the battalion moved 

toward the saddle and the base of Hill 609 

the troops caught by surprise a platoon of 

enemy infantry trying to infiltrate up the 

western slopes of Hill 609 behind the lines 

of the 1st Battalion, 133d Infantry. Before 

dawn, the Germans sent about a company 

from Hill 455 to reinforce this advance 

group. Company F, 168th Infantry, nearest 

Hill 609, intercepted this attempt to regain 

the lost position and drove the enemy off 

with substantial losses. Meanwhile the 1st 

Battalion, 135th Infantry, had continued 

its attack in the area of Hill 531 and, after 

securing the long-contested stronghold, 

finally closed the gap between it and Hill 

609 by also seizing the area of Hill 455 in 

'" (I) 135th Inf Hist, Sec. IV, p. 13. (2) 1st Bn 

133d Inf AAR in 34th Div Opns Rpt, II Dec-IS 

J11143. 
638 

the afternoon of 1 May. These operations 

completed the American ring around Hill 

609. German countermeasures on 1 May 

were ineffective and un-co-ordinated. The 

enemy undertook a number of desperate efforts to restore his positions, but his movements were now subject to the superb 

American observation from the very heights 

which had previously served the German 

defenders so well. Heavy concentrations 

from the combined artillery of the 34th and 

1st Divisions broke up every enemy attempt 

to assemble his forces for counterattack. 20 A 

final German effort at dusk ended in failure. 

By the end of 1 May, the enemy had failed 

to make a dent in the newly won positions 

of the American troops. 

Approaching "The Mousetrap" 

Elsewhere in the area under attack in the 

southern part of the II Corps zone, the 

enemy was forced off critical heights, the 

most noteworthy of which was Djebel el 

Anz, just north of the Sidi Nsir-Choulgui 

road. The enemy's efforts to retake it 

reached a climax on 30 April in five unsuccessful counterattacks supported by a last 

flicker of Stuka attacks and effective fire 

from 88's. In the possession of the 26th Infantry, Djebel el Anz offered an advantageous position from which to su pport the 18th 

Infantry's attack on Djebel Badjar (278), 

the hill about one mile to the southeast on 

the opposite side of the road, which guarded 

the northern side of the narrow Mousetrap 

2·(1) 168thlnfHist, 1943,pp.46-47. (2) 135th 

Inf Hist, Sec. IV. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

exit from the upper Tine valley.21 (See Map 

XI.) 

The operations on the southern side of the 

Tine valley were geared to the advance of 

the British 5 Corps farther south, and to 

the progress of the two infantry divisions 

fighting between the valley and the area 

of Hill 609. The tank units of the U.S. 1st 

Armored Division awaited the signal from 

General Bradley to emerge from The 

Mousetrap onto the broader plain near 

Mateur for the rapid exploitation of success by the infantry in the mountains. When 

the signal came, Combat Command B 

would be ready to go. By 1 May, the time 

seemed very near. Meanwhile, the 6th Armored Infantry, with the 27th, 68th, and 

91st Armored Field Artillery Battalions, 

and reconnaissance troops, fought among a 

series of shoulders protruding into the Tine 

valley from Djebel Lanserine (569). Advance was difficult indeed and correspondingly slow, despite determined and often 

heroic efforts. On 28 April, Company A, 

6th Armored Infantry, was held up by 

enemy machine gunners until Pvt. Nicholas 

Minue alone boldly crept behind them and 

cleared them out by bayonet. He persisted 

against other enemy positions until he was 

mortally wounded. 22 

A seesaw struggle in these hills had settled 

into a deadlock by 1 May. Company D, 

16th Armored Engineer Battalion, mean-

" ( I) 26th Inf AAR, 14 Apr-9 May 43. (2) 26th 

Inf Jnl, 30 Apr 43. Casualties: four killed, twentynine wounded. (3) 1st Di,' G3 Jnl, Entrit's 18 and 

20, 30 Apr 43. 

"For this heroic exploit, he was posthumously 

awarded the Congn'ssional Medal of Honor. Howe, 

Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, pp. 

232-33. 
THE ADVANCE TO MATEUR 639 

MATE UR, looking northeast. 

while lifted mines from two routes along 

the banks of the stream and prepared roadbeds toward the narrows for the armored 

vehicles. The enemy faced the choice of 

fighting at a growing disadvantage back 

through the last narrow segment of hills or 

of pulling back to a shorter line closer to 

Bizerte and the hills east of the Tine. His 

decision was affected by the progress of the 

9th Infantry Division's attack in the northern part of the II Corps zone. 23 

The Enemy Is Forced To Withdraw, 1-3 

May 

The 9th Infantry Division's attack waS 

conducted, as already noted, according to 

a revised plan, beginning on the night of 

26-27 April. The 60th Infantry then sent its 

northern elements along the north side of the 

Sedjenane river toward Djebel Touro 

( 499 ), converging on the path of advance 

of the Corps Franc d' Afrique, while its center and right pushed more nearly eastward 

toward Kef en Nsour (523) . Thus the 

northern envelopment of the Djefna position devolved upon the 39th Infantry alone 

rather than upon both regiments. The 2d 

Battalion, 39th Infantry, after four days 

of assiduous effort under recurrent strong 

"( 1) 1st Div G-3 Jnl, 1 May 43. (2) 135th Inf 

Hist, Sec. IV, p. 14. (3) 6th Armd Inf Hist, 14 May 

43; 6th Armd Inf AAR, 2 Sep 43. (4 ) 1 st Armd 

Div AAR, 3 May 43. 
640 

enemy artillery fire, gained possession of 

Hill 382, three miles east of Djebel Ainchouna, at daylight on 30 April, and started 

toward its next objective only to be pinned 

down by accurate shelling, obviously directed by some hidden enemy observer. The 

locations of the firing batteries were established by American observation and confirmed by enemy prisoners, but they were 

out of range of the supporting American 

artillery. The mission of neutralizing these 

batteries was passed to tactical air support, 

which was unable to find the one which 

caused most damage. 2

' While the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, was thus held back, 

the other two battalions moved from Djebel 

Ainchouna by trails northeast of it toward 

a long Hill 406 (Djebel Nechat el Maza) 

and a smaller, lower mound, Hill 299, south 

of its eastern extremity. The 1st Battalion 

took Hill 406 during the forenoon, organized it, and after 1400 supported the attack 

of the 3d Battalion on Hill 299. By nightfall, Hill 299 was also occupied. It had been 

possible from Hill 406 to observe enemy 

vehicles and a supply dump south of Hill 

299, and to bring artillery fire upon the area 

about an hour after the 3d Battalion's attack on Hill 299 began. Possession of that 

hill, which had a very steep southeastern 

slope rising from a small plain, made possible domination of the enemy's supply lines. 

It was a further menace to the enemy as a 

base from which the Americans could 

thrust less than three miles eastward onto 

the open Mateur plain or southeastward to 

cut the Sedjenane-Mateur highway in the 

"Reconnaissance at 4,500 feet for ten minutes 

proved unavailing. Air Support Party Jnl, 27 Apr 

43, in Msg, 2 May 43, Entry 31, in II Corps G-3 

In!. 

" (1) 9th Div AAR, 27-30 Apr 43, 10 Sep 43. 

(2) 60th Inf Hist, 1943, pp. 38-42. (3) Msgs, 30 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

rear of Djefna position. 2

' Plans for a onebattalion attack by the 47th Infantry on 

Green Hill in conjunction with the 39th 

Infantry's next spurt were ready when the 

9th Infantry Division, on corps orders, suspended offensive movement on 1 May."" 

The 60th Infantry struggled northeastward across country along the Sedjenane 

river, through dense underbrush, with the 

benefit of few trails or roads, but overcoming 

the drastic supply difficulties. The attacking 

forces suffered to such a degree from the 

enemy's use of the observation points on 

Kef en Nsour (523) that occupation of 

that height finally seemed imperative. The 

3d Battalion approached Kef en Nsour on 

30 April, while the remainder of the regiment held strong positions on and near the 

Djebel Guermach (490), southwest of it. 

On 1 May, therefore, the Allies threatened to cut the enemy off from both Bizerte 

and Mateur. He was obliged to move 

speedily from the Djefna position. A retirement on Mateur along the Sedjenane road 

also necessitated a withdrawal from the hills 

adjacent to the Sidi Nsir road, in the area 

surmounted by Hill 609, if the forces there 

were not to be attacked from the flank and 

rear. The enemy facing the II Corps thus 

simultaneously found all his positions west 

and southwest of Mateur untenable. His 

forces had become insufficient to close the 

gaps in his line. The supply situation had become acute. The lack of artillery ammunition was such that at some points in the 9th 

Infantry Division zone, as early as 29 April, 

about 90 percent of the enemy's shells which 

fell failed to detonate either because of deApr 43, Entries 71, 78, 119, and 123, in 39th Inf 

In!. 

20 9th Div AAR, 30 Apr-l May 43,10 Sep 43. 
THE ADVANCE TO MATEUR 

fective fuses or other imperfections. 27 On 

1 May, only four Siebel ferries and two small 

craft from Italy reached Tunisian ports, discharging 90 tons of fuel and 60 tons of 

ammunition. It was a hand-to-mouth situation, with a partly filled hand at that. In 

the circumstances, the high command chose 

to pull back the Fifth Panzer Army's line 

in the sectors of the Division von M anteu!feZ 

and 334th Infantry Division, anchoring the 

northern end in the prepared defenses between the Garaet Ichkeul and the sea, and 

swinging down the eastern side of the Tine 

river to Djebel Lanserine. 28 

By 1 May, the Allies estimated that the 

enemy, far from evacuating the Tunisian 

bridgehead, would be resolute in defending 

it, so that they would have to force him back 

into separate bridgeheads around Bizerte, 

Tunis, and Cap Bon, or drive him out altogether. Previous expenditure of enemy reserves was believed to have reduced him to 

shifting units from point to point to meet 

Allied threats, but not yet to last-ditch perimeter defense of smaller, isolated areas. 29 

The enemy skillfully and quietly withdrew on the nights of 1-2 and 2-3 May. 

The scope of this retirement was suspected 

on 2 May and confirmed next day. From 

Hill 609, a large fire was visible in Mateur.:Jo 

Elsewhere, explosions and fires indicated the 

demolition of bridges and destruction of 

materiel. The northern elements of Division 

von M anteu !feZ pulled back more slowly for 

lack of vehicles rather than as the result of 

27 (I) 9th Div AAR, 10 Sf'P 43. (2) Msgs, 29 

Apr 43, Entrif's 64 and 69, in 39th Inf J nl. 

OR (I) Daily Rpt, Army Group Africa to OKH / 

GenStdH, I May 43, in Army Group Africa, Sit reps. 

(2) MS # D-OOI (von Vaerst). 

" 1st Armd Div G-2 Est, 2400, 30 Apr 43. 

30 Msg, 0610, 3 May 43, Entry 9, 1st Div, G-3 Jnl. 

641 

more determined opposition. The U.S. 9th 

Infantry Division diverted the 47th Infantry 

from the Djefna position to the area northwest of Garaet Ichkeul and sent the 39th 

Infantry to high ground west of it. 

The Fall of Mateur, 3 May 

Mateur fell on 3 May with dramatic suddeness to the 1 st Armored Division, which 

was finally released after being held for a 

week on leash. Armored detachments from 

the division where feasible had assisted 

from the start in offensive operations with 

infantry, and had stood in corps reserve 

ready for a short time to meet an enemy 

counterattack near Sidi Nsir which was 

never delivered. They had tipped the scales 

with the reinforced 135th Infantry in the 

battle for Hill 609. The 1st Armored Division's zone of attack, in which Combat 

Command A ( Colonel Lambert) had 

directed operations, had been narrow, and 

all operations there had been subsidiary. 

Now the division was to advance out of the 

upper Tine valley by two cleared routes 

and, turning northward, to seize Mateur. 

This operation would not be the classical 

role of the armored division, exploiting a 

break-through into the enemy's rear, for the 

enemy had already pulled back. The 

maneuver would instead be a rapid pursuit. 

General Hannon had earlier assigned the 

mission to Combat Command B under General Robinett.'" 

:J1 The 1st Armored Division reported 52 light 

and 154 M4 medium tanks operational at noon, 3 

May 1943. See Msg, 3 May 43, Entry 100, in II 

Corps G-3 Jnl. Combat Command B, 1st Armored 

Division, then consisted of: Headquarters, Combat 

Command B; 13th Armored Regiment (less 1st 
642 

The road from the mouth of the upper 

Tine valley to Mateur runs almost due 

northward across a series of broad terraces 

by which the mountainous area of the recent 

fighting recedes to the plain adjacent to 

Mateur. The Tine river sweeps farther to 

the east around the tips of these contours 

before flowing northeastward toward Mateur. The base of the western hilly area, extending along a northwest-southeast line, 

forms one boundary of a triangular area of 

open undulating plain. Across the northern 

edge of the plain is the Garaet Ichkeul and a 

dome-like, sentinel height, Djebel Ichkeul 

(508). The eastern border is marked by another area of rounded hills which extends 

from the southeastern corner of the Garaet 

Ichkeul to Chouigui pass and Eddekhila. 

In addition to Choulgui pass, which had 

been the scene of the first American armored 

action against German tanks in World War 

II, these mountains are crossed by a broader 

trough which connects the Mateur plain 

with the Garaet el Mabtouha, ten miles east 

of it. Through this valley run the main highway and railroad linking Tunis and Mateur. 

Roads connect Mateur with Bizerte by way 

of either the western or eastern rim of the 

Garaet Ichkeul. The latter route passes 

through a very restricted gap at the southeastern corner of Garaet Ichkeul, and continues northward over the narrow strip of 

land which separates it from the Lac de 

Bizerte. 

In approaching Mateur from the mouth 

of the upper Tine valley, Combat Command 

B, 1st Armored Division, crossed the westBattalion) ; 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company C, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion; 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry; 27th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion-a force which included 18 75-

mm. tank destroyers and over 100 medium tanks. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

east road from Sidi Nsir to Chouigui northeast of Djebel Badjar. Along this road advance elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division emerged from the hills eastward bound 

at the same time that the armored force 

was heading northward. Enemy long-range 

artillery fire was falling close to the junction, where traffic congestion seemed likely 

to furnish a juicy target. Alert adjustment 

enabled the two long columns to cross each 

other without delay, by sending the vehicles 

of one through the intervals in the other. 32 

The 81 st Reconnaissance Battalion arrived 

at the edge of Mateur at approximately 

1100, with the main armored force rolling 

up in the early afternoon. 

The enemy was demolishing the eastern 

entrance to Mateur as the Americans arrived from the south and west. A few German and Italian prisoners were taken near 

Mateur but most of the enemy had disappeared in the direction of Ferryville or 

into the hills south of Lac de Bizerte. Elements of Combat Command B forded the 

stream east of Mateur to mop up the town 

while others reconnoitered to the northwest 

and northeast. General Harmon sent forward the bridge train of the 16th Armored 

Engineers, and by 2130, that unit had the 

first of five crossings in operation despite 

constant artillery shelling, which continued 

for the next two days, supplemented by air 

attacks. Combat Command A began its 

preparations to move up next day. General 

Harmon's command post was set up about 

eight miles southwest of Mateur, and from 

it he issued orders to reconnoiter on 4 May 

north and east of Mateur. The 9th Infantry 

Division in the vicinity of Djebel Ichkeul, 

the 1st Infantry Division along the Tine 

"" Robinett, Among the First, MS, p. 495. In 

private possession. 
THE ADVANCE TO MATEUR 

r{. • t 

MATruR 18· 

TUNIS GO· 

• :J - ) 

643 

1 ST ARMORED DIVISION TANK speeding toward Mateur, 3 May 1943. 

river southeast of Mateur, and the 34th In- had the valley toward Garaet el Mabtouha 

fantry Division along the road to Choulgui and the fiats adjacent to Garaet Ichkeul and 

pass and Eddekhila, also re-established con- Lac de Bizerte on which to operate, but the 

tact with the enemy. adjacent heights in enemy possession unThe U.S. 3d Infantry Division (less 7th doubtedly held strong antitank positions 

Regimental Combat Team), commanded which would make themselves felt when, 

by General Truscott, was brought eastward after reconnaissance, II Corps resumed its 

as far as Aln M'lilla, about thirty miles south attack. 34 

of Constantine, to pass from U.S. Fifth 

Army to British First Army reserve. From 

3 May on, its units came under General 

Anderson's control in the RhardimaouSouk el Arba area, not necessarily to be committed in the II Corps area, but to be available where most needed. 33 For the infantry, 

the prospect was another series of attacks in 

the hills. The armored division near Mateur 

33 (1) Memo, Col B. M. Archibald for G-3 

AFHQ, 27 Apr 43, sub: Rpt of visit to 18 A Gp. 

AFHQ Micro Job lOA, Reel 6C. (2) Msg 0814, 18 

A Gp to AFHQ, 29 Apr 43; Msg 8040, AFHQ to 

Fifth Army, 29 Apr 43; Msgs, 18 A Gp to FREEDOM, 

3 and 14 May 43; Msg E-1516, EBS to FREEDOM, 

8 May 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 

3< (1) II Corps AAR, 15 May 43. (2) Phone 

Convs, CG 1st Armd Div with G-3 and Asst G-3 

II Corps, 0710, 0923, and 1050, 3 May 43, Entries 

67,73, and 78, in II Corps G-3 Jn1. (3) Bradley, 

A Soldier's Story, pp. 90-91. (4) 1st Armd Div 

AAR, 13 Apr-14 May 43. 
CHAPTER XXXIV 

The End in Tunisia 

Plans To Take Tunis 

The enemy's withdrawal in the north on 

the nights of' 1-2 and 2-3 May took place 

while Allied preparations were being made 

farther south to renew in greater strength 

the drive on Tunis. Here the first attempt 

had been stalled well short of its goal. The 

enemy, apparently aware that the British 

Eighth Army lacked the power to penetrate 

the mountainous line which faced it, had 

been able to shift forces to meet the British 

5 Corps by a vigorous counterattack on 28 

and 29 April. 

:'{orth of Enfidaville's olive orchards, the 

hills bordering the coastal plain had to be 

brought under control before General Montgomery could renew his attack, which was 

scheduled for 29 April, over the lower 

ground. The 2d New Zealand Division and 

the 201st Guards Brigade protected his 

western flank. On 29 April, the British 51st 

Division was given the mission of holding on 

the western portion of the front while the 

4th Indian and 2d New Zealand Divisions, 

and the untried British 56th Division, 

opened the way for possible exploitation by 

armor toward Hammamet. But this attack 

got off to an unsatisfactory start. General 

Montgomery, faced with a possible failure, 

obtained General Alexander's authorization 

to abandon his attempt to reach Hammamet, and to convert the Eighth Army's 

role to that of holding the enemy by purely 

local offensive measures, in conjunction with 

the northeasterly drive of French XIX 

Corps.! 

The 18 Army Group next undertook to 

split the enemy by overwhelming force 

rather than further to construct his bridgehead. Although the attacks by II Corps on 

the north beginning on 27 April and by 

French XIX Corps on the southwest on 28 

April increased in scale, General Alexander 

decided to make a lightning attack through 

Massicault at the earliest opportunity. On 

30 April, he ordered General Montgomery 

to send to British First Army as additional 

reinforcements the best units which could 

be spared. In response, Montgomery released the most experienced of his divisions, 

the 7th Armoured and 4th Indian, as well 

as the 201st Guards Brigade, thus arranging for participation in the final Allied drive 

by the oldest units of the Eighth Army.2 

The 18 Army Group issued a formal 

order for the final attack on 3 May. First 

Army was expected to attack and take Tunis 

while the u.S. II Corps co-operated by preventing the enemy from shifting troops to 

defend it. After taking Tunis, the British 

First Army was to exploit rapidly to the east 

and southeast in order, with the aid of the 

British Eighth Army, to prevent the enemy 

1 AI('xand(,f, "The African Campaign." p. 879. 

, (1) Ibid., p. 881. (2) XIX Corps Opns Order 

21,2 May 43, cited in DMO Jnl, 3 May 43. 
THE END IN TUNISIA 

from falling back on Cap Bon peninsula. 

This accomplished, General Anderson was 

to turn his attack northward against Bizerte 

in co-operation with the U.S. II Corps.' 

(Map2l) 

The main thrust by British First Army 

through Massicault was intended to benefit 

if possible from surprise. General Anderson 

tried to create the appearance of a powerful 

concentration of forces by assembling 

groups of dummy tanks and other vehicles 

behind the British 1st Armoured Division in 

the area northwest of Pont-du-Fahs. The 

French XIX Corps was encouraged to renew its attacks across the road between 

Pont-du-Fahs and Saouf, on either 3 or 4 

May. Troop columns passing through 

Djebibina to a point adjacent to the flank 

of the Eighth Army on 4 May suggested to 

the enemy that the Allies were planning to 

strengthen the attack there against the center and southern flank of German Africa 

Corps." While these efforts to draw enemy 

units to the southern part of the Axis bridgehead were in progress, the British 9 Corps 

was actually to assemble within the British 

5 Corps zone for a powerful lunge northeastward on a 3,OOO-yard front. After a saturation bombardment by artillery and air, 

infantry would be expected to open a gap 

in the manner characteristic of British 

Eighth Army, and armored clements would 

grind through the opening at once. By this 

operation the troops were to reach Tunis 

with but one night intervening, forging 

ahead through a narrow corridor. The attack on the flanks was to be made either by 

9 Corps after Tunis had fallen, or by 5 

Corps while Tunis was being taken. 

, 18 A Gp, Opns Instruc 13, 3 May 43, supplied 

by Cabinet Office, London. 

4 Army Group Africa, Sit reps, 4 May 43. 

645 

Regrouping and other preparations for 

the main attack could not be completed before 5 May, so the attack was to open with 

a French offensive on 4 May, then continue 

with seizure by British 5 Corps of Djebel 

Bou Aoukaz (226) southwest of Tebourba 

late on 5 May, and reach its climax in the 

combined air-ground assault on Massicault 

at dawn of 6 May. At the time these plans 

were formulated, it was hoped that, by 6 

May, the U.S. II Corps would be nearing 

Mateur. For a time, 18 Army Group contemplated an amphibious operation against 

the Cap Bon peninsula, where, the Military 

Intelligence Division of the War Department had concluded, the enemy could be 

expected to concentrate, possibly for "a 

Bataan-like defense" in a series of positions. 

During this defense, intelligence officers reasoned, the enemy would evacuate as many 

troops as possible to protect Sicily from 

seizure." 

The fact of the matter was that, as the 

Italians had been informed in the Schloss 

Klessheim conference on 8 April, the 

enemy's high command had made its decision to fight on with no regard for evacuation or the possibility of defeat. On 1 May 

when the Italians through naval channels 

tried once more to get a hearing at Berlin 

for their view that there was no hope for 

saving Tunisia and that the Italian fleet 

should be thrown into an effort to secure 

Sardinia and Sicily, they were sharply rebuffed, and told that reinforcement of Tunisia was the only alternative to surrender 

'(I) 18 A Gp Opn Instruc 13,3 May 43, supplied by Cabinet Office, London. (2) First Army 

Opn Instruc 41, 4 May 43. DRB AGO. (3) Memo, 

Col James F. Torrence, Jr., for G-3 AFHQ, 5 May 

43, sub: Liaison visit to 18 A Gp. AFHQ Micro 

Job lOA, Reel 6C. (4) Cbl, AGWAR to FREEDOM (G-2 WD to CinC AF), 6 May 43, CMOUT 2139. 
646 

j 

J 

MAP 21 
VICTORY IN TUNISIA 

3-13 May 1943 

- ...... G[~ "A" -ITALIAN UIOO! ~[&O. 3 MAY 1943 

---. ALLIED ArTACMi. OATE 'NOICATED 

M DIVISION VON MAHT£U"El.. 

HG HERMANN GOUING DIVISION 

10 0 10 " IL£S 

...-"'.l,'T''''''''''' i ... I......,~I----IOT"i ",--' LO ET[R5 

647 

of the Axis ground forces in the Tunisian 

bridgehead.

6 

The reduced scale of the attacks on 26 

April aroused some hopes of a longer lull 

in the Allied offensive, but Field M arshal 

Kesselring was even then convinced that the 

attacks would shortly pick up, and that the 

problem of reinforcement was critical. Almost all of General von Arnim's mobile reserves had already been committed. The 

troops were becoming exhausted. " Perhaps 

the present positions could be held with several battalions," Kesselring said to General 

Ambrosio, "but the present rate of transportation is too slow to bring the necessary 

reinforcements in time." He suggested the 

diversion to Tunisia of small ships then being used to convoy materiel to Sardinia, and 

in Hitler's name again proposed the temporary employment of a convoy of ships of 

the Italian Navy to carry up to one division 

from the backlog of German troops awaiting shipment to Tunisia. He repeatedly 

urged the use of Italian destroyers even for 

carrying supplies, since everything was 

needed at once-fuel, munitions, and men. 7 

In spite of British deception measures, the 

enemy expected the main attack by First 

Army in the general area where it was 

launched. He had intercepted Allied radio 

messages revealing the shift of major forces 

away from Montgomery's army to the 

British First Army. But knowing where to 

expect the main Allied thrust, even if it did 

'The Italia n view was urged on the German 

Naval Hi gh Command in Bt'rlin by a representative of the Italian Naval Department, accompanied 

by Vice admiral Friedrich Ruge, the German Admiral a t Supermarina. SKL, KTB, /.- 3 /. V .43, 

pp.6- 8. 

, Min of Confs, Ambrosio,.Kesseiring, and oth ers, 

27, 28 Apr, 4 May 43 in GMDS, Itali an Collection, 

Item 26, Nos. 12 2, 124, 136. Quotation is from 

General Gause. 
648 

cost the British the benefit of surprise, could 

be of little consolation to von Arnim at a 

time when his capacity to counteract was 

subject to the severest strain. Nevertheless, 

Army Group Africa proceeded to implement the plan, first projected on 24 April, to 

mass all available mobile reserves in the 

threatened sector between the Medjerda 

river and the area northwest of Pont-duFahs. Concurrently with the general 

shortening of the lines of the Fifth Pan,-cer 

Army, effected on 1-3 May, the Axis forces 

in the sector north of the Medjerda plain 

were reorganized. General von Vaerst assigned the sector from the coast to the north,· 

western comer of the Garaet Ichkeul to the 

Bizerte Defense Command (BDC) under 

General Kurt Bassenge. There a conglomeration of German, Italian, Navy, and Luftwaffe units manned the last defense line 

ahead of Bizerte. The harbor defenses could 

be of no value to them since these faced toward the sea. To form the backbone of an 

improvised line, 88-mm. Flak guns were 

hauled out of harbor defense positions. To 

the south of the salt lake, Division von M anteuffel (now commanded by General 

Buelowius) anchored its right wing on the 

bald eminence of Djebel Ichkeul (508). 

From there the line extended east and then 

south along the lesser ridges fringing the 

Tine river valley as far as a point in the hills 

northwest of Choui·gui pass. The greatly reduced 334th Infantry Division (now under 

the command of General Fritz Krause) was 

next in the line which ended on the bank of 

the Medjerda river, north of the much contested Djebel Bou Aoukaz. From here to the 

MassicauIt-Tunis highway stood Group 

Irkens. Von Arnim, moving what reinforcements he could still comb from Italian First 

Army short of risking a collapse of its front, 

assigned to this most threatened sector the 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

remaining elements of the 15th Panzer Division (consisting mainly of the 115 Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment and the 33d Antitank 

Battalion). Although additional reinforcements were planned-such as antiaircraft 

battalions from the 19th Flak Division and 

battle-tested units of the 10th Panzer and 

21 st Panzer Divisions still with German 

Africa Corps-they could not be brought in 

for lack of transportation and fuel. By ·4 

May, when these shifts had been accomplished, General Willibald Borowietz, 

Commanding General, 15th Panzer Division, assumed personal command of this 

defense zone. The Africa Corps and First 

Italian Army sectors remained unchanged. 

In the Medjerda plain, nearer Tunis, Fifth 

Panzer Army organized a second blocking 

position and manned it with the remaining 

88-mm. dual-purpose guns of the 20th Flak 

Division (General Neuffer) and the 10th 

Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. After two 

days of costly seesaw battle at Djebel Bou 

Aoukaz, Fifth Panzer Army's remaining 

armor totaled some 60 to 70 operational 

tanks and was assembled near Massicault. 

As the last substantial supply shipments 

reached Tunisia on 4 May they brought a 

desperately needed, though short-lived relief. Small vessels and ferries brought 1,100 

tons of ammunition and 110 tons of fuel; 

transport planes landed 70 tons of fuel and 

another 30 tons of special types of 

ammunition. 

In view of the possibility that an Allied 

armored thrust might achieve a breakthrough to Tunis and separate the Axis 

forces, enemy military leaders reached the 

agreement that troops found south of an 

Allied corridor, wherever it lay, would pass 

to the control of General Messe while those 

north of it would remain under command of 
THE END IN TUNISIA 

General von Vaerst. 8 Enemy airfields in 

Tunisia were cleared of almost all aircraft, 

including more than 400 single- and twinengine fighters in operating condition, which 

were then crowded on the airdromes of 

Sicily. There they provided a vulnerable 

target for Allied bombers." 

The Liberation of Tunis 

Allied bombing missions in preparation 

for the main 6 May attack through Massicault toward Tunis struck a series of targets: 

Protville, the area southwest of Tunis, the 

Cap Bon peninsula, and, on the night of 

5-6 May, intermediate strongpoints between Tunis and its outer defenses. On that 

night, as the attack began, Wellington 

bombers from Misurata joined the Tactical 

Bomber Force in hitting areas near La 

Sebala and El Aouina, Djedei"da, Tebourba, 

and Cheylus. During the preceding two 

days, the British 1st Infantry Division of the 

British 5 Corps had seized, and held against 

counterattacks, the heights of Djebel Bou 

Aoukaz, on the southern side of the 

Medjerda river. 

Massed artillery that night dropped a 

dense pattern of shells on the selected zone 

of advance of British 9 Corps southeast of 

the mountain. General Crocker's 4th Indian 

Division on the left and the British 4th Division on the right of the Medjez el Bab-Massicault-Tunis highway prepared to attack 

at 0330. Fires then shifted to a rolling barrage. As the mists of dawn rolled away, the 

Allied air units launched the most intensive 

air attack thus far exhibited in Africa, deepg (1) Arm" Group Africa, Sitre ps, 24 Apr-4 May 

43. (2) MS # D-OOI (von Vat'rst). 

o Air Hist Branch, German Air Force, "A Tactical 

Apprt'ciation of the Air War in Tunisia," 6, transl 

from Air Hist Branch, Air Ministry, London. 

649 

ening the area of bombardment in a zone 

three and one-half miles wide and four miles 

long. Within it, the area of Massicault and 

St. Cyprien received marked attention."° 

The infantry swept open a channel for the 

armor, and shortly after 1100, the British 

6th and 7th Armoured Divisions with four 

battalions of Churchill tanks began rolling 

toward Massicault in great clouds of dust 

on a front of about 3,000 yards. Some of 

the antitank weapons which the enemy had 

so laboriously set up were demolished before they were fired. The attack overran 

the two battalions of the 115th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment and pushed back the 

remainder of the 15th Panzer Division to 

Massicault. The British occupied Massicault 

in the latter part of the afternoon, completing the first stage of the Allied push. The 

attack was a success in spite of the fact that 

traffic had been dense, with units becoming 

intermingled as a result of insufficient signposts. General Borowietz's battered units 

strove during the night to establish a new 

line from Djedei"da to St. Cyprien, but their 

mobility was poor, and the fall of Tunis 

next day became certain. Indeed, General 

von Arnim wondered why the attack had 

stopped at all in view of the flimsy resistance 

remammg after Massicault had been 

taken. 11 General Crocker's 9 Corps resumed 

the offensive with his two armored divisions, 

while the British 4th and Indian 4th Infantry Divisions reverted to 5 Corps after 

nightfall. The armor proceeded to bypass 

IO( 1) Army Group Africa, Sitreps, 6 May. (2) 

RAF 242d Group and XII Air Support Command 

fkw 1 112 sorties and Western Desert Air Force 

flew 924 on 5 M~y. Msg, First Army to FREEDOM, 

6 May 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 44. 

11 (1) MS # S-098 (von Arnim). (2) Army 

Group Africa, Sitreps, 6 May 43. 
650 

St. Cyprien with the intention of taking it 

from the rear. 

Next morning, the British 6th Armoured 

Division engaged the bulk of the German 

armored elements southeast of the village 

and drove them back toward the Sebkret es 

Sedjoumi. This success facilitated the operations of the British 7th Armoured Division 

at St. Cyprien. That division speedily overcame the defenders. Farther to the northwest the enemy abandoned Tebourba, while 

British tanks and armored cars of the 7th 

Armoured Division entered Le Bardo, a 

suburb of Tunis. Grinding past Le Bardo's 

grain elevator and railroad yards, and delayed only briefly by a brisk skirmish at the 

main highway junction west of the city, and 

by light sniping elsewhere, the foremost elements of the 22d Armoured Brigade were 

inside Tunis itself by midafternoon. The 1st 

Derbyshire Yeomanry and 11 th Hussars 

mopped up during the night. Axis troops 

there were relatively few. Many had been 

sent up to the crumbling defense lines and 

others had withdrawn southward. The rapidity with which the British seized Tunis 

permitted the city to escape the general destruction inherent in a last-ditch defense, if 

indeed the Germans ever contemplated such 

a defense. Stalingrad, which Hitler had 

cited to Mussolini with unintentional irony 

as an example to be followed in Tunisia, 

was fortunately in no sense a model for what 

happened. 

'When the attack toward Tunis began, 

Allied aircraft spotted an Italian steamer 

waiting outside the harbor for naval escort 

and drove it back to shallow water near La 

Goulette, where it rested on the bottom on 

an even keel and sustained a series of air 

attacks. At the time of these attacks the ship 

was evacuating nearly 500 Allied prisoners, 

including men of the 1st Battalion, U.S. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

16th Infantry, who had been captured on 

Hill 523, near Hill 609, earlier in the week. 

Although one man was killed and three were 

wounded, the remainder succeeded in getting ashore and returning to Tunis, from 

which the cnemy was trying to escape. Some 

of the enemy readily surrendered to the 

Americans who had so recently themselves 

been in captivity.'2 

The enthusiasm of the populace for the 

arriving British units was dwarfed by the 

fervor of the greeting extended next morning to Generals Barre and Bergeron, and 

later in the day, to General Juin, the new 

Resident General of Tunisia. Six months 

previously, the Allied Force had landed in 

Algeria and Morocco and the first of the 

Axis emissaries had landed in Tunisia. The 

week of uncertainty which followed these 

first landings was to have no counterpart in 

May, for the fighting of the next few days 

in Tunisia could have but one outcome. 

To the rumble and smoke of battle from 

Hammam Lif, observable in Tunis, the 

city's population celebrated its deliverance. 

The 4th Zouaves and units of the 4th African Chasseurs on 9 May brought back to 

Tunis some of the troops of General Giraud's 

army. 13 

As the British attack rolled into Tunis the 

anticipated split of Axis forces took place. 

Fifth Panzer Army was confined to the area 

north of the Medjerda and east of the Tine 

rivers. The remnants of the 15th Panzer 

Division with attached elements of the 10th 

Panzer and 334th Infantry Divisions withdrew to the north of the Medjerda. The 

" Ltr, Colonel Denholm to author, 20 Feb 51. 

13 (1) CSTT Jnl, 7-9 May 43. (2) Barre, Tunisie, 

1942-1943, pp. 30203. (3) On 8 May, at 2400, 

the Allied forces set clocks ahead one hour to "B" 

time. 
THE END IN TUNISIA 

GEN. ALPHONSE jUIN. Photograph 

taken when General Juin was Commander 

in Chiif of all French A rnry Forces in North 

Africa. 

334th Infantry Division was immobilized 

in the mountains around Eddekhila and 

Choulgui pass and for lack of fuel was forced 

to fight to the end wherever they happened 

to stand, as were von Manteuffel's forces. 

General von Vaerst moved his command 

post to El Alia, east of Lac de Bizerte, and 

on 9 May passed out of communication with 

Headquarters, Army Group Africa. Von 

Arnim was left with the German Africa 

Corps and First Italian Army and attempted 

to build up a new defense line across the 

base of the Cap Bon peninsula from 

Hammam Lif through the mountains to 

Zarhouan and Enfidaville. He assigned the 

Hermann Goering Division to General 

Cramer's German Africa Corps. Threatened with encirclement from the north, the 

651 

division was ordered to fall back to the 

Hammam Lif position where a Flak regiment of General Frantz's 19th Flak Division 

and a parachute battalion were building up 

a powerful blocking position. During the 

night of 8-9 May, Army Group Africa 

rushed the two battalions of Panzer Grenadier Regiment Africa and an artillery battalion to the same position. After the H ermann Goering Division had extricated its 

units it was inserted to the south of that 

defense line. The remainder of the Africa 

Corps' new front was held by elements of 

the 10th Panzer Division which had withdrawn into the mountains east of Cheylus. 

N ext, the 21st Panzer Division (-), Division Superga, and Kampfgruppe Schmidt 

(at the end commanded by Colonel Pfeiffer) fought their way back to the area of 

Zarhouan and north of the town. 14 

Bizerte Falls to the U.S. II Corps 

When an enemy counterattack failed to 

materialize after the fall of Mateur, it was 

apparent that the II Corps needed only to 

complete its regrouping and reconnaissance 

before renewing the assault. General Bradley advanced his command post from the 

vicinity of Bed ja to that of Sidi Nsir. Eastern Base Section took over some of II Corps' 

supply points in the Djebel Abiod and Bedja 

areas, and established new dumps along the 

two major roads leading toward Mateur 

and Choulgui pass, while the Americans 

bridged the streams near Mateur at several 

points. Northeast of Mateur, a reconnaissance in force by Combat Command B on 

5 May drew enough antitank and artillery 

,. ( I ) Army Group Africa, Sitreps, 7-9 May 43. 

(2 ) MS # C- 098 (von Arnim). (3) MS # D-OOI 

(von Vaerst ). 
65 2 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

BIZERTE 

fire to demonstrate the enemy's defensive 

positions.'" 

The II Corps planned to resume its general attack on 6 May in conformity with 

the plans of 18 Army Group. The 9th I nfan try Division was to drive against the hills, 

north of Caract Ichkeul and eventually to 

overcome the fortified positions which the 

enemy had occupi ed in anticipation of at-

\C, ( I ) 1 st Armd Div AAR , 2 May 43. (2 ) Rob· 

in ett, Among the First, MS, p . 50:l . In private poss('ssion. (3 ) Cas lt ~s in II Co rps in the week ending 6 M ay wrre : killl'd 11 2, wound,.d 870, missing 

4:):0' , evac ua ted 798. Strength was 94,202. Priso ners 

ta ke n we rt' 1,344. Rpt, AG II Corps to 18 A Gp, 

8 May 43, in II Corps G 4 Jnl. 

tack on Bizerte. Combat Command A, 1st 

Armored Division, was to seize Ferryville, 

east of the Garaet Ichkeul on Lac de Bizerte, 

and to cover the southern side of the lake, 

while Combat Command B clea red the 

route from Mateur toward Djedelda . The 

1 st Infantry Division on the north and the 

34th Infantry Division on the south would at 

the same time attack the enemy in the hilb 

east of the Tine river, including thme heights 

abutting Cholligui pass. T he enemy was 

making extensive usc of the pass. Such dispositions reflected the exchange of zones earlier 

plan ned for the I st and 34th T nfantry Divisions, since the 1 st Infantry Division h ad 
THE END IN TUNISIA 

continued generally northeastward while 

the 34th Infantry Division sideslipped 

southward from the vicinity of Hill 609 and 

then drove eastward along the Sidi NsirChoulgui road. Both divisions, moreover, 

crossed the route of advance of the 1st Armored Division, although after 4-5 May, 

the bulk of that armored unit had already 

reached the vicinity of Mateur. With the 

corps antiaircraft and engineer units as well 

as the various elements of these divisions 

shifting into place, traffic became unavoidably congested at the road fork eleven miles 

south of Mateur and only skillful regulation 

of movement and Allied air superiority enabled the next attack to be mounted on 

schedule and without risk of disaster.'6 Before daylight on 6 May, from north of the 

Garaet Ichkeul to Pont-du-Fahs, the Allied 

forces were once more on the offensive. 

The II Corps made satisfactory progress 

on 6-7 May against an enemy who manifested no diminution in his will to resist. The 

northern wing of the attack, which was already in motion on 5 May, had to press past 

Djebel Cheniti (209), a dominating height 

about fifteen miles from Bizerte just north 

of the Garaet Ichkeul, and to traverse a narrowing shelf with but one road along the 

salt lake. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 60th 

Infantry, relieving the battered Corps Franc 

d'Afrique, acquired Djebel Cheniti on 6-7 

May after the preliminary seizure of adjacent ridges to the north by the 47th Infantry. 

The crossing of the Douimis river proved less 

difficult than had been anticipated. Before 

noon on 7 May, Company A, 751st Tank 

Battalion (medium tanks), and the 894th 

Tank Destroyer Battalion were on the eastern side of it, hunting for enemy units alongthe northern flank. The 9th Reconnaissance 

"II Corps G-3 Jnl, 4-5 May 43, passim. 

653 

Troop approached Bizerte along the road to 

the east with the imminent prospect of 

reaching the city's outer limits at midday.17 

Early seizure to forestall sabotage of the port 

was of vital importance. General Bradley accordingly ordered General Eddy to rush an 

occupying force to the city. 

Reconnaissance elements of the 894th 

Tank Destroyer Battalion reported their entry into Bizerte at 1615, 7 May. They had 

followed the 9th Reconnaissance Troop as 

it cleared mines along the road from the 

west, and close behind them came the first 

two tanks of Company A, 751st Tank Battalion. Troops comprising the spearhead of 

the 9th Infantry Division's attack quickly 

verified earlier reports from prisoners and 

from the 9th Reconnaissance Troop that the 

enemy had pulled back through Bizerte, had 

abandoned the city, and was now in position 

along the far side of the ship channel to Lac 

de Bizerte. Indeed, enemy guns fired on 

American troops, from points southwest of 

the city, while in the city itself movement 

was subject to sniping, to mines, and to 

booby traps. Extensive demolition was attributable to recent bombing and enemy 

sabotage. Units of the 15th and 20th Engineers cleared away wreckage and removed 

mines and booby traps in the city during the 

night. Official entry was to come with the 

arrival of elements of the Corps Franc 

d' Afrique on 8 May."8 

On orders received early in the evening, 7 

May, the 47th Infantry with elements of the 

17 (I) II Corps AAR, 15 May 43. (2) 9th Div 

AAR, 10 Sep 43. (3) Plan of Attack for 7 May, 

dated 6 May 43, and Msg, 7 May 43, Entry 43, in 

9th Div G-3 Jnl. (4) 751st Tank Bn AAR. (5) 

Bradley, A Soldier's Siory, p. 93. 

1R For the time of entry by the 894th Tank 

Destroyer Battalion, see (I) Msgs, 7 May 43, Entries 65 and 67, in 9th Div G-3 Jnl, and (2) Msg, 

7 May 43, Entry 394, in II Corps G-3 Jnl. 
654 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

TROOPS OF 60TH INF ANTR Y on the afternoon of 7 May just before entering BI;:;erte. 

894th Tank Destroyer Battalion in support 

started on a march of 8-10 miles to a sector 

only two and a half miles southwest of 

Bizerte. The 2d Battalion was put in positions of defense along the shore of the ship 

channel while the other two battalions occupied heights overlooking the lake and the 

city. In Bizerte, the Cannon Company's forward observer, 2d Lt. Orion C. Shockley, 

had taken up an observation post on the 

roof of the Hotel de la Marine. From this 

vantage point he was able at daylight to 

direct counterbattery fire across the channel 

against positions from which the enemy had 

been shelling the 47th Infantry during the 

night. This fire silenced some eight artillery 

pieces and other lighter weapons.

19 

Very early on 8 May, the 47th Infantry 

lP 47th Inf Hist, 1943. 

entered Bizerte, then withdrew while French 

troops completed the mopping up. When 

the regiment returned on 11 May, fewer 

than a dozen natives were on the sidewalks 

to observe the procession through the battered streets. 

U.S. II Corps Pushes Beyond Mat eur 

Following the occupation of Mateur on 

3 May, the U.S. 1st Armored Division established contact with the 9th Infantry Division 

southwest of the Garaet Ichkeul and, while 

preparing to defend its possession of Mateur, 

reconnoitered for subsequent operations to 

gain control of the routes leading from the 

town to the north or the east. The incentive 

to begin the next stage of the attack at once, 

before the enemy could consolidate his defensive positions in the heights along these 
THE END IN TUNISIA 655 

TANKS AND INF ANTR YMEN IN BIZER TE, 7 May 1943. Note bomb-damaged 

building behind tank. 

routes, was strong but General Harmon and 

his principal unit commanders were reluctant to attack until the division was able to 

construct ample bridges near Mateur to replace those destroyed by the enemy, to reconnoiter, and to strike an overwhelming 

blow. Thus the main offensive beyond 

Mateur opened only on 6 May, after a reconnaissance in force had ascertained the 

enemy's strength and dispositions. The 

enemy had to be ready to meet attacks along 

either or both routes. He concealed his antitank gun positions until some Sherman tanks 

of Company H, 13th Armored Regiment, 

drew fire. These tanks had been committed 

on 5 May to the east of Mateur and north 

of the Mateur-Tunis highway, in what may 

have seemed like the beginning of the main 

Allied attack. The recent multiplication of 

American armor in the II Corp's assault was 

met in part by a transfer of enemy dualpurpose 88-mm. guns from locations in 

which they had been defending various targets against air attack to sites on the ridges 

from which to stop the tanks. 

American operations near Mateur were 

subject to enemy observation and resistance 

from the bold cone of Djebel Ichkeul, the 

steep-sided hill just south of Garaet Ichkeul, 

and from a line of antiaircraft gun positions 

running along the belt of hills and ridges 

south of Lac de Bizerte. Djebel Ichkeul was 

brought under partial control by the 91st 

Reconnaissance Squadron on 4-5 May, althought several hundred men of the Reconnaissance Battalion, Hermann Goering Di-
656 

Vlszon and their French captives continued 

to hold out in its coves and other strong 

positions for another week. 2

() 

The 1st Armored Division attacked on 6 

May with Combat Command A under 

Colonel Lambert driving along the route to 

Ferryville and Combat Command B under 

Col. Clarence C. Benson pushing into the 

hills north of the Mateur-Djedelda road. 21 

At 0445, before dawn, both operations began. Combat Command A occupied hills 

about seven miles southwest of Ferryville 

against light resistance, but a series of enemy 

counterattacks by tank-supported infantry 

regained some of the heights. That night the 

Americans won back these losses. Early on 

the morning of 7 May, Combat Command 

A started northward toward Ferryville in 

what became a running fight past the extremely narrow point four miles southwest 

of that place. 22 It is at this point that the 

hills and the Garaet Ichkeul are closest. The 

force occupied the town that afternoon and 

prepared to drive to the east on 8 May. 

Combat Command B's part of the attack 

on 6 May had as its major objective a road 

junction about six miles east of Mateur. 

20 (I) Rpt, 10 May 43, Entry 141, in II Corps Jnl. 

(2) 1st Armd Div Hist, Vol. IX. (3) Bradky, 

A Soldier's Story, pp. 97-99. 

21 (I) Gennal Robine'lt had been wounded by a 

shell on the previous day. (2) Lt. Col. Leonard H. 

Nason, "Reconnaissance by Medium ArmorMateur, May 1943," Military Review, XXIII, No. 

10 (January, 1944), pp. 55-57. 

"Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division, 

then consisted of the following: Headquarters, 

Combat Command A; 6th Armored Infantry (less 

the 1st Battalion) ; 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment; 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment; 58th 

and 91st Field Artillery Battalions; and elements 

of 81 st Reconnaissance Battalion and 91 st Reconnaissance Squadron. It was reinforced during the 

day by the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry (attached 

from the 9th Infantry Division). See AAR's of 1st 

Armd Div, CCA and CCB 1st Armd Div, 6th Armd 

Inf, 1st Armd Regt, and 3d Bn 13th Armd Rcgt. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Both the 2d and 3d Battalions, 13th 

Armored Regiment, and elements of the 

776th Tank Destroyer Battalion opened the 

attack just as a brilliant sun broke above the 

horizon behind the enemy, completely masking his positions. The 2d Battalion, 13th 

Armored Regiment (Lt. Col. Henry E. 

Gardiner), ran at once into strong opposition which stopped its attack with a loss of 

seven tanks. Colonel Gardiner was wounded 

and remained missing until after dark. Command of the 2d Battalion passed to the regimental executive officer, Lt. Col. Hamilton 

H. Howze. The 3d Battalion, 13th Armored 

Regiment (Lt. Col. Ben Crosby), was 

driven back. To pierce the enemy barrier, a 

stronger force and much heavier artillery 

preparation seemed to be required. While 

the enemy was kept under persistent American artillery fire the 2d Battalion prepared 

another attack for late afternoon. Most of 

Crosby's battalion tried to strike the enemy's 

north flank from the Ferryville road without 

success. The heaviest available artillery concentration (fifty-four guns) blanketed the 

area of attack and laid smoke on the southern flank, where the antitank guns appeared 

to be the most plentiful. While the German 

gunners kept under cover, the tanks and 

tank destroyers started over the crest and 

across the valley in the formation of a hollow trapezoid, followed by a second wave of 

six tanks and nine tank destroyers. They 

overran the strongpoints and despite heavy 

antitank fire, reached the top of the next 

rise, hesitated there for a few critical 

minutes, and then proceeded for some two 

miles before darkness required organization 

in place for the night. The battalion shifted 

po~ition just before dawn to escape being 

caught in daylight within a ring of antitank 

guns, and continued carefully eastward on 7 

May past the road junction against 
THE END IN TUNISIA 

moderate resistance. Combat Command B's 

losses on 6 May were approximately 60 men 

and 12 tanks, plus 15 tanks briefly knocked 

out. Behind the 2d Battalion, 13th Armored 

Regiment, the Reconnaissance Company of 

that unit mopped up 135 prisoners and 2 

47-mm. guns. On 7 May, Ferryville was cut 

off and the enemy south of Lac de Bizerte 

were near encirclement. Casualties that day 

were lighter, and about twice as many prisoners were captured. 20 

The 1st Infantry Division's depleted units 

on 6 May made an aggressive attack against 

troops of the Luftwaffe Regiment Barenthin in the hills just east of the Tine river, 

where, in a narrow valley, it flows north beside the Mateur-Choulgui road. General 

Bradley at this point expected the division 

merely to keep the enemy under pressure but 

General Allen felt that he should resume the 

drive of 23 April-1 May.24 The 18th Infantry, after crossing on two newly prepared 

bridges, was ordered to attack eastward 

against a djebel about seven miles southwest 

of Mateur, with the 26th Infantry on its 

southern flank. Company H, 1st Armored 

Regiment, furnished support. The attack 

opened auspiciously at 0300, but soon ran 

into difficulties. The 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry, on the left diverged to the northeast 

from its planned route of approach and lost 

contact with the 1st Battalion. It was caught 

on the open plain at daylight near the base 

of an enemy-occupied hill and subjected to 

the devastating crossfire of machine guns 

and mortars. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, was next driven off a hill into the shelter 

" (1) Lt Col Hamilton H. Howze, Action East 

of Mateur, 6 May 1943, MS. In private possession. 

(2) Interv with Col Howze, 15 Nov 50. (3) 1st 

Armd Div AAR, 2 May 43. (4) CCB 1 st Armd Div 

AAR, 13 May 43. 

,. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 93. 

657 

of a wadi where it seemed likely to be cut 

off. Only four of the tanks which were to 

furnish support got across the Tine river 

before the bridge collapsed, forcing the remainder to confine their participation to 

direct fire. The division's attack became an 

effort chiefly to extricate the pinned-down 

elements of the 18th Infantry while avoiding 

exposure of the 26th Infantry's northern 

flank, and to hold the enemy where he was. 

The 26th Infantry pushed two battalions 

onto foothills, and broke up an enemy 

counterattack against its 3d Battalion with 

the aid of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion. 

General Allen alerted the 2d and 3d Battalions, 16th Infantry, for action in aid of 

the 18th Infantry, but did not use them, 

confining the 1st Infantry Division's commitments to troops already in contact with 

the enemy. In order to protect the division's 

north flank, he had the 2d Battalion, 16th 

Infantry, echeloned to the west of the 18th 

Infantry for greater depth in defense. Darkness permitted the 18th Infantry to pull 

back. This move in turn necessitated withdrawal by the 26th Infantry. Except for 

patrols, the 1 st Infantry Division broke contact with the enemy and occupied positions 

on the western bank of the Tine river. 25 

The first elements of the U.S. 3d Infantry 

Division (less 7th Regimental Combat 

Team) came forward for possible commitment. The last elements of the division left 

Aln M'lilla on 7 May in time to reach their 

concentration area before morning, while 

the leading lIDit, Combat Team 15, assembled in the rear of the 1 st Infantry Division's positions. General Truscott expected 

the 15th and 30th Combat Teams to pass 

throu.gh the division on the night of 10 May 

" (1) 18th Inf AAR (Capt Thomas E. Bennett), 

15 Apr-8 May 43. (2) 26th Inf Unit Jnl, 6-8 May 

43. (3) 1st Div G-3 Opns Rpt, 15 Apr-7 May 43. 
658 

to complete mopping up in the eastern extremities of the II Corps zone.:'>;; Before it 

could be put into effect, this plan was altered by the sudden collapse of enemy 

resistance. 

Operations on the extreme southern flank 

of II Corps in the final phase of the attack 

passed to the 34th Infantry Division. General Ryder gave his unit commanders oral 

orders on 4 May. His division had the mission of seizing Chou'igui pass, the high 

ground north and south of it, and Choulgui 

village held by the 334th Infantry Division. 

Before the general attack of the corps on 6 

May, the 34th Infantry Division began an 

attempt to occupy the village of Eddekhila 

in the southeastern corner of the Tine valley. Patrols on the afternoon of 4 May made 

no contact with the enemy when they went 

to Eddekhila and the adjacent hills. But by 

this time well aware of the enemy's habitual 

care to avoid revealing his presence except 

to the main body of an attacking force, the 

Americans carefully prepared a reconnaissance in force for the next morning. The 

route, moreover, was to be along the foothills at the southern edge of the valley rather 

than on the more exposed, if smoother, 

ground nearer the stream. The 168th Infantry, supported by the 175th Field Artillery Battalion, led the advance on 5 May in 

column of battalions, with a reconnaissance 

platoon and the Antitank Company protecting the left flank. West of Eddekhila the 

head of this column ran into resistance too 

strong to be overcome in daylight without 

disproportionate losses. Artillery fire from 

the left and front, mortar and long-range 

machine gun fire from the right and right 

rear, and unfavorable rising ground ahead 

without sufficient cover, made it inadvis-

" Msg, II Corps to FREEDOM, 8 May 43, AFHQ 

CofS Cable Log. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

able to rush forward. Instead, a night attack by two battalions ahreast, each advancing on a I,OOO-yard front behind a swift 

rolling barrage from four battalions of light 

and two battalions of medium artillery, was 

scheduled. A third battalion was to push 

over the hills to the south, protecting that 

flank and tying in with the British. In this 

way, the 34th Infantry Division was to participate on 6 May in the general offensive 

throughout the II Corps zone.~7 

The infantry assault on 6 May got past 

Eddekhila and into the heights east of it 

but when the supporting artillery barrage 

was lifted, the enemy returned to his machine gun and mortar positions, and severely 

hurt two infantry battalions while they tried 

to reorganize for a second advance. 

Throughout the day, the three battalions of 

the 168th Infantry and the 1 st and 3d Battalions, 133d Infantry, pushed into the hills 

south and east of Eddekhila toward the area 

in which Generals Nehring and Fischer had 

thrown back the first Allied attempt to reach 

Tunis in November 1942. Progress was slow 

and the Americans gained no dominating 

height. On 7 May, when they resumed the 

attack at 0500, they continued to advance 

northeastward over several crests hut were 

stopped just short of the pass. They continued their pressure on the defenders until, 

just before dawn the next day, the enemy 

hurriedly withdrew. 

The II Corps' participation in the last 

great offensive by the Allies had by darkness 

on 7 May arrived at it,;; final phase. Advance 

elements of the V.S. 9th Infantry Division 

held Bizerte, from which the enemy had 

withdrawn. The V.S. 1st Armored Division 

had cut the road and railway connections 

"168th Inf Hist, 12 Nay 42-15 May 43. pp. 

47-54. 
THE END IN TUNISIA 

between Bizerte and Tunis via Ferryville or 

Mateur at several places. It had driven the 

enemy back from his prepared line of defense at some points and had pierced that 

line east of Mateur and F erryviIle. The 

fighting elements of General von Vaerst's 

Fifth Panzer Army facing the II Corps had 

been driven into three separate segments in 

the hills around the Lac de Bizerte, east of 

the Tine river, and northwest of Tunis. The 

numbers of Germans readily surrendering 

had suddenly swelled. Shortages of fuel and 

of all types of ammunition rendered the 

enemy's final line a brittle crust more likely 

to shatter than to sag. For General Bradley's 

command, the remaining operations were to 

consist of a number of deep thrusts to the 

water's edge at the extreme eastern limit of 

the II Corps zone, thrusts meant to divide 

the enemy's forces into smaller, disorganized 

fragments. 

Total Surrender in the North 

Early on 8 May, a Royal Navy motor torpedo unit tried to enter Bizerte harbor but 

was driven off by shore batteries near it. 28 

It was evident that the defenders along the 

coast would have to be cleared out by 

ground attack from the rear. For this part 

of the final attack near Bizerte, Combat 

Command A, U.S. 1st Armored Division, 

established two task forces to move from 

Ferryville around the southern and eastern 

rim of Lac de Bizerte. The first, consisting 

of the 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment 

(Lt. Col. Lydon B. Cole), and the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, late on 7 May 

moved out to seize a crossing over the Ben 

Koceine river, about four miles southeast of 

Ferryville, and was ready next morning to 

"' Msg G/62, 18 A Gp to FREEDOM, 9 May 43. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 

659 

work along the right (south) flank, while 

the second, consisting of the 1st Battalion, 

13th Armored Regiment (Lt. Col. Frank 

F. Carr), and the 3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, advanced along a route 

nearest the lake. The enemy had emplaced 

numerous antitank guns and self-propelled 

artillery pieces in the hills that commanded 

the flat shore, and near Bizert(:, had a battery of lOS-mm. dual-purpose antiaircraft 

guns equipped with radar. These guns were 

able to reach targets near El ALib, toward 

which Colonel Carr's task force was heading. Supported by the 91st Reconnaissance 

Squadron (less Troop A) , and the 58th and 

918t Armored Field Artillery Battalions, the 

attack progressed along the hills during the 

forenoon toward the southeastern sector of 

the lake shore. 

That afternoon, Carr's force swung 

northward to seize El Azib. In a narrow 

corridor between the lake and a ridge to the 

southeast, the battalion sent two companies 

of light tanks with directions to "drive like 

hell, pray, and rally in a wooded area a 

mile south of El Azib." 29 At 25-30 miles 

an hour, the tanks roared northward, exposed for about eight minutes before they 

reached the cover of trees. Six tanks remained behind, knocked out along the way. 

The others, soon reinforced by part of the 

91 st Reconnaissance Squadron, overcame 

all local resistance. By nightfall, the enemy 

forces which had abandoned Bizerte were 

cut off from retreat at Menzel pjemil on the 

highway, and next morning, American units 

reached the coast to the north. 

From its night positions of 8-9 l\1ay controlling a road junction six miles southeast 

" ( I) 1 st Bn 13th Armd Regt AAR, 8 May 43, 

dated 20 May 43. (2) 3d Bn 1st Armd Rf'gt lEst, 

19 May 43. 
660 

of EI Azib, the 3d Battalion, 1st Armored 

Regiment, pressed east between Carr's force 

on its left and Howze's force advancing on 

its right. Hundreds of prisoners began pouring in at daylight, and were collected at a 

point about one mile south of the road 

junction. The enemy in front of Combat 

Command B on the southeast, in spite of 

continued resistance, was driven back into 

the path of Colonel Coe's right company. 

By midmorning, from the vicinity of EI Alia, 

the 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, 

was preparing a drive on Metline to the 

north when it received word of the surrender 

of all the enemy facing II Corps, and new 

orders which turned the force toward the 

coast west of Metline. The first resistance it 

received, which came from a group of ten 

German tanks after the surrender, was 

abruptly terminated when the enemy 

learned of the situation, ignited his own 

tanks, and hastened off toward the north."O 

Colonel Benson on 8 May ordered Colonel Howze, with reinforcements,31 to cut the 

Bizerte-Tunis highway, a mission which required him to approach by either an exposed 

route at the northern edge of the Garaet el 

Mabtouha, west of Protville, or over the hills 

five miles farther to the north. The dangers 

of the mountain crossing were great but the 

prospect of thus surprising the enemy was 

alluring. If the tanks could be forced over 

the mountains, at the risk of ignominious 

failure, their success would be all the more 

complete. Colonel Howze chose the moun-

" (1) 3d Bn 1st Armd Regt Rist, 19 May 43. 

(2) CCA 1st Armd Div AAR, 3-7 May 43. 

'" They were the following: the 1 st Battalion, 

6th Armored Infantry (less one company) ; COIllpany A, 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company 

B, 81st Reconnaissanc(" Battalion; Battery A, 27th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion (self-propelled 

IOS-mm. howitzers); a platoon, 16th Armored 

Engineer Battalion. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

tain route and, starting at 1230, led his 

column of tanks, tank destroyers, and infantry over the craggy slopes, deep gullies, 

and rugged shoulders, terrain that at several 

points was seemingly impassable. Late on 

8 May they arrived at the final slope, above 

the main highway near Douar Gournata, 

where a road to Porto Farina branches off 

the main highway, and near an enemy airfield. They were greeted by 88-mm. shelling, 

but the appearance of their forty tanks in 

such a totally unexpected quarter doubtless 

contributed to the enemy's awareness of defeat. Colonel Howze deferred the descent of 

his force to the plain until daylight, but all 

during the night, saw hundreds of burning 

enemy vehicles dotting the plain while tracer 

ammunition, being expended before an 

imminent collapse, laced the sky. At sunrise 

on 9 May, and throughout the day, the 

enemy surrendered in droves while this 

mobile force continued to the northeast, out 

along the coastal road, as far as Rass el 

Djebel. On the right of Task Force Howze, 

the 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, 

now under Lt. Col. Bogardus S. Cairns, 

drove toward Protville and cut the road between Tunis and Bizerte during the night of 

8-9 May. Next day on Colonel Benson's 

orders the unit pushed northeastward to 

Rass Sidi Ali cl Mekki (then known as Cap 

Farina), where it prevented enemy evacuation in small barges. 

Part of the 1st Armored Regiment-the 

Reconnaissance Company and 3d Battalion-had participated in operations northeast of Bcdja ever since 23 April, as already 

pointed out, while the remainder of the 

regiment was held in II Corps reserve. During 6--7 May, Colonel Hains's command 

was brought to the vicinity of Mateur, and 

on 8 May, after the 1st Battalion, 1st Ar-
THE END IN TUNISIA 

mored Regiment, had been attached to 

Combat Command B, and the 3d Battalion, 

39th Infantry, and reinforced 68th Armored 

Field ArtiIIery Battalion had been placed 

under Hains's control, the force moved 

eastward to take up defensive positions near 

the edge of Garaet el Mabtouha. The 1st 

Battalion, moving ahead of this force, got 

about twelve miles along the same Mateur<-

Djedelda road before being stopped by an 

enemy group. On the morning of 9 May, it 

continued its sweep around the southern 

limits of the salt marsh, turning eastward at 

Sidi Athman along a road link leading to 

the main Tunis-Bizerte highway. Near 

ProtviIle, where the II Corps boundary ran 

along the northwestern bank of the :Nledjerda river, troops of the British 7th Armoured Division were found to be already 

in control. Swinging northward toward Bizerte, and branching northeastward to Porto 

Farina, the armored column pushed along 

the corps boundary. By nightfall, enemy 

forces along the lower section of the Medjerda river had been completely destroyed. 

Wholesale surrenders were making the process of mopping up more tedious than risky.~e 

The 34th Infantry Division had taken 

the heights on the southern side of Chouigui 

pass during the first two days of the last 

offensive, and on the night of 7-8 May were 

preparing to attack the hills on the northern 

side at daylight. After the success of the attacks on Tunis and Bizerte, and the evacuation of Tebourba and Djedeida on 7 May, 

continued operations to seize the hills seemed 

unnecessary. Indeed, daylight revealed that 

the pass was defended by only a few riflemen, either stragglers or an expendable rear 

guard. By 0800,8 May, the division not only 

:l2 (1) 1st Armd Div AAR, 2 May 43. (2) 1st 

Armd Rcgt AAR, 10 Jul 43. (3) 3d Bn 13th Armd 

Regt Hist, 1942-43. 

661 

held the dominating heights adjacent to the 

pass but had a patrol in Chouigui village, 

east of it. The fighting elements of the 334th 

Infantry Division were attempting to reach 

a line beyond the Mateur-Djedeida road. 

In midmorning, a British patrol from the 

Tebourba area appeared at Choulgui. What 

remained was to corral the thousands upon 

thousands of the enemy who sought the opportunity to surrender, and to mop up the 

encircled areas.33 

The opportunity to exploit the situation 

by continuing across the coastal plain, perhaps to Tunis, was tempting to General 

Ryder's men, who had struggled through 

the hills since 24 April. But the boundary 

between U.S. II Corps and British 5 Corps 

had been carefully defined, and the Americans were under the most explicit admonitions to remain northwest of the Medjerda 

river. The 34th Division reassembled its battalions, sent patrols to Djedei'da, outposted 

the hills near Eddekhila, investigated the 

food resources of its area, and mopped Up.34 

By the afternoon of 8 May, the Axis 

forces under Fifth Pan.ur Army had been 

isolated in two major pockets. The northern 

group, consisting mainly of Fifth Panzer 

Army headquarters and the remainder of 

Division von Manteuffel and 15th Panzer 

Division (with elements of the 10th Panzer 

Division) fought under the personal command of General von Vaerst in the hills 

north of Garaet el Mabtouha and EI Alia, 

preparing to make their last stand in EI Alia 

and the hills to the northeast.:l3 After having 

lost contact with the south, the very con-

'" (1) 168th Inf Hist, 12 Nov 42-15 May 43, pp. 

54-55. (2) 133d Inf Hist, 1943, IV, 14. 

"' Msg, 10 May 43, Entry 78, in II Corps G-3 

Jnl. 

1) Army Group Africa, Sitreps, 8 and 9 May 

43. 2) MS # D-OOI (von Vaerst). 
662 

siderable enemy force trapped near Bizerte 

might have tried to recross the ship channel 

to make a last stand in the streets and buildings of the city, but any such desperate endeavor was forestalled by the prompt organization of a provisional American force 

along the northwestern side of the channel 

with antitank, automatic, and artillery 

weapons. 

In the other pocket to the southwest, beyond some twenty miles of Allied-held 

ground and the impassable salt marshes, 

the 334th Infantry Division and small 

groups of other units were encircled in the 

hills between Mateur and Tebourba. The 

hope that these troops could fight their way 

out of the pocket and join the main group to 

the northeast had to be abandoned early on 

8 May. On the eastern half of the solitary 

peak of Djebel Ichkeul, making good use 

of caves dug into the mountainside, was a 

group of less than 300 men of the Reconnaissance Battalion Hermann Goering, defying surrender until 10 May. At 0930 in 

the morning of 9 May General von Vaerst 

sent his last situation report to von Arnim: 

"Our armor and artillery have been destroyed; without ammunition and fuel; we 

shall fight to the last." "6 At 1000 his emissaries reached General Harmon's headquarters to request an armistice while the 

surrender of all troops north of Tunis was 

being arranged. General Bradley's headquarters, when apprised of this development, transmitted instructions in the formula decreed at Casablanca: "The terms 

of surrender are unconditional." By noon, 

" Army Group Africa, Sit~eps, 9 May 43. 

or (1) Msg, 9 May 43, Entry 12, in II Corps G-3 

In!. (2) II Corps AAR, 10 Scp 43. (3) Fifth Panzer Army was out of communication with Army 

Group Africa. Morning Report, 1015/8 May 43, in 

Army Group Africa, Sitreps. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

these terms had been accepted. 3T At 1250, 

General Harmon reported the surrender of 

the 10th Panzer and 15th Panzer Divisions. 

Eventually, the number of enemy prisoners 

reached the surprising total of almost 

40,000. 38 Generals Gustav von Vaerst, Fritz 

Krause, Karl Buelowius, and Willibald 

Borowietz of the German Army, and Generals Kurt Bassenge and Georg Neuffer of 

the German Air Force, spent 9-10 May in 

custody at Headquarters, II Corps, near 

Mateur, and were then transferred to Headquarters, British First Army. Another prisoner taken at this time was Major Hans 

Baier, the somewhat legendary commander 

of the Regiment Barenthin.39 

The Fighting Ends in the South 

The end of operations north of the Allied corridor to Tunis which the British 

First Army's attack of 6-7 May had created, came sooner than it did to the south. 

A considerably larger proportion of the 

enemy's forces remained on that side, where 

they were enclosed by the British 5 and 9 

Corps, the French XIX Corps, and the 

British Eighth Army, but were in an area 

better adapted to prolonged defense. The 

first objective of the Allies was to cut them 

off from the sea and from Cap Bon peninsula, where enemy troops might have held 

out for an extended period. The British 6th 

Armoured Division, followed by British 4th 

Division, went southward along the TunisHammamet-Enfidaville road to block retirement into a peninsular redoubt. The 

"( 1) Ibid., No. 24. (2) Msg 39, II Corps to 

FREEDOM, 9 May, AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 64. (3) 

Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 97-99. 

'"( I) Msg, 9 May 43, Entry 56, in II Corps G-3 

In!. (2) II Corps AAR, 10 Sep 43. (3) Msg, 

FREEDOM to USFOR, 10 May 43, NAF 218. (4) 

1st Armd Div AAR, 2 May 43. 
THE END IN TUNISIA 

British 1 st Armoured Division, now under 

9 Corps, cut across eastward from the Goubell at area to reinforce them. The British 

armored column reached Hamman Lif defile, a gap of 300 yards between cliff and 

surf, only to find it strongly defended by 

Kampfgruppe Frantz armed with antitank 

guns and other artillery (see p. 651 above). 

Here was a Tunisian Thermopylae. For approximately two days the defenders successfully repulsed all attacks of the 6th Armoured Division, later reinforced by the 1 st 

Armoured Division, and defied all stratagems. Then a tank force, risking immobilization and destruction, succeeded in navigating a course over the firm wet sand at the 

very edge of the surf. The tanks broke into 

the enemy's positions, and cleared the way 

for an accelerated rush to Hammamet by 

the entire column. 

On 10 )..iay, as the French celebrated the 

liberation of Tunis, the campaign was being 

brought to a close farther south. British 26th 

Armoured Brigade of the 6th Armoured 

Division captured Soliman about 1400. 

Three hours later, the 2d Armoured Brigade of the same division had advanced as 

far as Grombalia, almost half way across 

the base of Cap Bon peninsula, and was 

pushing on to the southeast. Elements of the 

brigade penetrated the area west of Grombalia between the Tunis~Enfidavi1le highway and the El Hamma river. Patrols of the 

12th Royal Lancers linked up with the 

French XIX Corps in the vicinity of Zarhouan. Pockets of enemy resistance still held 

out in Zarhouan, and the enemy counterattacked unsuccessfully at a point five miles 

west of that town.~" Army Group Africa's 

'" (1) 18 A Gp Sitrep 199, 1800, 10 May 43. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log. (2) Army Group Africa, 

Daily Report, 10 May 43, in Army Group Africa, 

Sitreps. 

663 

headquarters moved from the northern side 

of Cap Bon peninsula to the mountains between Zarhouan and Hammamet and 

joined there headquarters of the German 

Africa Corps.!l 

Elaborate naval and air plans to prevent 

enemy withdrawal from Tunisia to Italian 

territory were ready in what was designated, 

perhaps with Norway and Dunkerque in 

mind, as Operation RETRIBUTION. It was 

supposed that the Axis high command 

would first extricate specialists needed for 

the defense of Italy, at least, and in a second 

phase would attempt an unselective transfer 

of as many men as possible. The overwhelming naval and air superiority of the Allies 

permitted plans to employ enough warships 

and airplanes to thwart such Axis withdrawals."2 Actually, only a very limited effort was 

made to salvage German specialists and 

none at all to bring back to Sicily the troop 

units so necessary for its defense. The 

enemy's means of transportation and escort 

were so far below requirement as to condemn such an attempt to failure from the 

start. The strength of the concentration of 

British naval vessels at Malta, Bone, and 

Algiers was not tested. From the sea the 

British shelled possible points of exit from 

n ( 1) Map, Lage N ordajrika (I: 500,000) GenStdH/Op Abt lJIb, Pruel Nr. 24139, evening 8 May 

43. (2) MS #C098 (von Arnim) 

'" The Italian Navv was eredited with 5 battleships, 6 cruisers, 25 ~erviceable destroyers and 80 

ksscr rraft, and 25 submarines. Twelve German 

submarines were considered available to the enemy. 

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, was prepared to use 3 battleships, 8 cruisers, 40 destroyers, 

23 mine sweep('fS and trawlers, and 14 flotillas of 

smaller motor craft. Allied aircraft were estimated 

at 744 bombers, not including torpedo bombers, 

compared to 640 Axis bombers based in Sicily and 

Sardinia, and Allied fight('fs at almost 1,000, greatly 

exceeding those available to the Axis in the southern 

half of the Sicilian strait. Appendixes II, III, 

Cine, Mt:'d No. 00235/22, 13 Apr 43. 
664 

GEN. JUERGEN VON ARNIM after 

the surrender. Behind him on the left is A1aj. 

Gen. Hans Cramer. 

the Cap Bon peninsula on 10-11 May, and 

eventually intercepted enough small craft to 

yield a total of some 77 prisoners from them, 

while 126 were taken from the Ile Zembra 

off the coast. 43 

The enemy was caught before he could 

effect any major withdrawal even onto the 

Cap Bon peninsula. He remained, therefore, to be surrounded in the hilly area south 

" (1) Proposals to evacuate specialists were made 

by the Chief of the Army Personnel Office, General 

Schmundt, to Jodi on 20 April, and by the German 

Admiral Commanding in Italy to Kesselring on 

14 April. Both proposals were rejected. When 

Schmundt renewed his proposal on 7 May it was 

accepted, but too late for important results. OKH, 

Chef des H eerespersonalamtes, TB, 1.X.42-

l2.X.44, 20 Apr, 7 May 43; Befehlshaber Deutsches 

Marille-Kommando ltalien, KTB, 1.-30.lV.43, 14 

Apr 43. (2) 18 A Gp, Sitrep 200, 11 May 43. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

and southwest of Grombalia by the enveloping tentacles of British First Army and 

Eighth Army. 

The British 10th Infantry Brigade of the 

4th Division on 11 May made the circuit of 

Cap Bon peninsula along the coastal road, 

meeting the 12th Brigade of this division 

along the southeastern side near Menzel el 

Heurr, while the 26th Armored Brigade and 

one battalion of the 1 st Guards Brigade 

pressed through all opposition to take Bou 

Ficha at 1800. At that point, about twelve 

miles north of Enfidaville, a strong antitank 

screen stopped the progress of the tanks, on 

many of which the infantry hitherto had 

been taken boldly up to any opposition encountered. At nightfall on 11 May, the British 4th Division controlled the peninsula 

while the 6th Armoured Division held the 

road from Hammamet to Bou Ficha. At 

the same time, General Boissau's Oran Division had driven well north of Zarhouan and 

General Mathenet had received the surrender of Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer's 10,000 

men of the German Africa Corps with all 

equipment. 44 Southeast of Zarhouan, in the 

hills between that town and Enfidaville, the 

First Italian Army held out, its XXI and 

X X Corps and the troops of its remaining 

units interspersed among the Germans of 

the 90th and 164th Light Africa Divisions 

and the 21 sl Panzer Diuision. General Graf 

von Sponeck, commanding the 90th Light 

Africa Division, declined an invitation from 

the 2d New Zealand Division to surrender 

until his resources were exhausted}'-' 

The collapse in the south on 12 May was 

all but complete at nightfall. In front of 

" Colonel Pfeiffer had replaced Colonel 

Schmundt who had returned to lath Panzer Division as artillery commander. 

or. Msg, 1/277, 18 A Gp to FREEDOM, 12 May '}3. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 
THE END IN TUNISIA 

British Eighth Army, the only serious resistance was that encountered by the Free 

French elements in the center of the army 

line. All enemy resistance, from Saouf to 

Zarhouan, in front of the French XIX 

Corps had ended in capitulation. General 

von Arnim surrendered towards noon north 

of Ste. Marie-du-Zit. With Allied troops 

closing in and surrender imminent, he prepared for the end of his command, sending 

a final report to the Oberkommando der 

Wehrmacht, taking leave of his principal 

staff officers, and committing to flames by 

his own hand the command post trailer 

which Rommel had turned over to him two 

months earlier.46 A few hours later, General 

Graf von Sponeck also surrendered. The 

prisoners poured into custody. Only the 

Trieste and 164th Light Africa Divisions 

remained of the larger enemy units which 

had not yet succumbed. First and Eighth 

Armies established contact south of Bou 

Ficha. Air patrols swept the Cap Bon peninsula in search of groups of the enemy and 

watched the coast f(~r escaping boats. Allied 

aircraft bombed enemy positions north of 

Enfidaville, but the chaotic conditions made 

air support generally impractical. There 

could be no bomb line. At the end of the 

day, the Allies held more prisoners than 

they could count and far more than had 

been anticipated. Included among them 

were most of the principal Axis commanders.47 

,. MS # C-098 (von Arnim). He attributes his 

capture to troops of the Reconnaissance Battalion, 

4th Indian Division. A contemporary report credited the 1st Royal Sussex Regiment with that action. 

Msg, 0/321, First Army to FREEDOM, 13 May 43. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 

"18 A Gp, Sitrep 201,12 May 43; Msg, 0/321, 

First Army to FREEDOM, 13 May 43. AFHQ CofS 

Cable Log. 

665 

The last step in the enemy's capitulation 

was not taken until the commander of the 

First Italian Army surrendered on 13 May. 

Through General Mancinelli, Messe arranged to make his surrender to the British 

Eighth Army rather than to the First Army, 

the French elements of which had been his 

direct opponents for the last few days. His 

troops were ordered to turn themselves over 

to the nearest Allied unit, to destroy no more 

materiel, and to furnish plans of any mine 

fields in their sectors. He himself, after radio 

communication with the headquarters of 

General Freyberg, British 10 Corps commander, surrendered in the grade of field 

marshal, to which he had been promoted 

that very morning. 4R Thus ended hostilities 

in Tunisia. 

Allied Reorganization 

The weeks which followed the enemy's 

collapse in Tunisia were a period of swift 

transition to the next Allied overseas invasion. The Allies celebrated their victory 

but gave much more attention to the near 

future than to the recent past. Throngs of 

Axis prisoners of war moved slowly westward toward the ports from which eventually they would be shipped to camps in 

North America. Columns of Allied units in 

Tunisia shifted to other parts of Northwest 

Africa where they began getting ready for 

their next important missions. Le&'lons 

learned in combat in Tunisia were recorded 

and distilled for the benefit of those yet to 

be sent against the enemy. Military activities 

lR (I) Msg U-3897, Eighth Army to 18 A Gp 

et ai., 13 May 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 108. 

(2) DMOJnl,pp.18-19. (3) Messe, Come Fini' La 

Guerra in Africa, pp. 232-37, gives Mancinelli's 

account of the surrender at great length. 
666 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

AERIAL VIEW OF ENEMY PRISONERS NEAR MATEUR, 9 May 1943. 

proceeded in an atmosphere of strong political tension, while the separate elements of 

the actively belligerent French moved toward a long-postponed political and military unification. From Morocco to Tunisia, 

Northwest Africa witnessed intense and 

varied Allied preparations for the next great 

venture, which would bring Allied forces 

to the European side of the Mediterranean. 

The last week of the fighting had brought 

about 275,000 prisoners into Allied custody, 

a flood which all but swamped the victors. 

The prisoners poured into detention areas 

in long columns either on foot, riding on 

miscellaneous vehicles, or even sometimes 

astride burros. The compounds repeatedly 

had to be enlarged. Enemy morale was generally good, for if some were stolidly sad or 

deeply dejected, more were resigned or even 

cheerful, and all were submissive. They 

needed guides to the prison compounds 

more than guards. The Allies had been mistaken in expecting an attempt at mass evacuation. Hitler and Mussolini, intending to 

hold Tunisia as long as possible, were unwilling to risk the effect on morale which 

preparations for a withdrawal would inflict. 

Hitler had refused to permit the evacuation 

of German military specialists of the types 

so badly needed at other fronts, and only at 
THE END IN TUNISIA 

the very end did he authorize withdrawal of 

a specified list of individuals. The collapse 

had come with startling suddenness. An attempt at prolonged defense on Cap Bon 

peninsula had been prevented by the extreme shortage of fuel and ammunition. Indeed, General von Arnim's Army Group 

Africa headquarters there had been able to 

return from the peninsula eventually to 

join General Cramer's command post north 

of Ste. Marie-du-Zit only by the providential discovery of a drum of aviation gasoline among the flotsam on a nearby beach. 

The shortage made any considerable withdrawal of troops onto the peninsula impossible. All flight by sea in small craft was unorganized and insignificant, and Allied 

offshore patrols found little to do. 49 Guarding and moving the prisoners became a 

protracted operation. 

General Alexander's headquarters left 

Tunisia, disbanded at Algiers at the end 

of 15 May, and became Headquarters, 15th 

Army Group, in charge of ground force 

preparations for Sicily. 50 General Anderson's First Army headquarters settled in 

Carthage, at the edge of the sea some ten 

miles northeast of Tunis, while on 16 Mav , , 

"(1) MS # P-049 (Warlimont). (2) MS # C0750 (Kesselring). (3) Befehlshaber, Deutsch,;s 

M arine-Kommando Italien, KTB, 1.-30.IV.43, 14 

Apr. 43. (4) OKH, Chef des H eerespersonalamptes, TB, 1.X.42-12.X.44, 20 Apr, 7 May 43. (5) 

Msgs, First Army to FREEDOM, 0223, 4 May, 0376, 

17 May 43. AFHQ. CofS Cable Log. (6) Msg, W817, FREEDOM to AGWAR, 18 May 43. (7) Msg, 

CofS to President, 11 Jun 43, sub: Msg from Eisenhower concerning German morale in Tunisia. 

WDCSA 381 Germany (II Jun 43). (8) MS # 

C-098 (von Arnim). 

'"( 1) Msgs, 18 A Gp to FREEDOM, 0920, 13 May. 

and No. Q/487, 14 May 43. AFHQ CofS Cable 

Log. (2) Msg 774, AFHQ to 18 A Gp, 13 May 43. 

667 

General Montgomery withdrew Eighth 

Army Headquarters to Tripoli, leaving all 

British troops in Tunisia under Anderson's 

control.. In conformity with First Army 

orders Issued 4 May, Tunisia was divided 

into four subordinate sectors along the 

coast, each defended by a garrison of one 

division. Air defense of northern Tunisia 

was undertaken by the 242d Group, RAF, 

with its operational center at Djedei:da airfield. Antiaircraft defense at airdromes and 

ports was assumed by the British 22d and 

52d Antiaircraft Brigades. Internal security 

became a responsibility of the French, exercised through General Barre's 9 , 000 troops , 

mainly by the 4th Zouaves and 15th Senegalese Infantry. The French and the British 

shared the task of coastal defense. 51 

General Bradley left for Algiers on 13 

May with part of his staff for conferences on 

the Sicilian plans, and then went to a new 

II Corps headquarters at Relizane in the 

Oran area. The Eastern Base Section, which 

held temporary control of an area adjacent 

to Mateur and Bizerte, soon released that 

control to First Army, and before long, only 

the U.S. 34th Infantry Division of the 

former units of U.S. II Corps remained as a 

garrison force in northeastern Tunisia. The 

1st Armored Division moved all the way 

across French North Africa to Morocco in 

the zone of the U.S. Fifth Army. The 1st 

and 9th Infantry Divisions went as far west 

as the Oran area. The 3d Infantry Division 

shifted to eastern Algeria. The 1 st and 3d 

Infantry Divisions, scheduled to make assault landings in Sicily, became involved 

"( 1) First Army Opn Instruc 42, 4 May 43. DRB 

AGO. (2) Msg, First Army to AFHQ, 0338, 14 

May 43; 18 A Gp Sitrep 203, 2359, 14 May 43. 

AFHQ CofS Cable Log. 
668 

in amphibian and mountain training and 

planning with little opportunity for rest.52 

British Eighth Army, like U.S. II Corps, 

had been nominated for a role in the seizure 

" (1) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 102-08. 

(2) Memo, CinC AF for CG's First and Eighth 

Armies, 18 May 43, sub: Command of Allied 

ground forces in Tunisia. (2) Memo, AFHQ G-3 

for Comdr Tunisia Ditrict, 22 May 43, sub: Garrison of Tunisia. AFHQ G-3 Ops 58/2.1, Micro Job 

10C, Reel 188D. (3) Diary of Maj Gen John P. 

Lucas, pp. 3, 12, 15. Photostat copy in OCMH. 

NOR THWEST AFRICA 

of Sicily, and while its scattered elements 

prepared for that undertaking, British First 

Army completed its service by supervising 

the reorganization of Allied control in Tunisia. The command was to be disbanded, 

a fact not made known to General Anderson in Tunis until the day of the official 

celebration of the Tunisian victory. fiR 

53 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

p. 311. 
CHAPTER XXXV 

Fruits of Victory 

French Unification 

The Allied victory parade in Tunis took 

place on 20 May. French administrative ties 

with General Giraud's government in Algiers had already been re-established by the 

temporary assignment of General Juin as 

Resident General. French troops were 

prominent among the marchers, with the 

warmest applause going to the yloroccan 

goumiers. On the reviewing stand with Generals Eisenhower and Giraud were Generals 

Anderson and Juin, Admiral Cunningham, 

and Air Chief ylarshal Tedder. K ear by 

\vere about fifty other commanders and 

leading staff officers-American, British, 

and French. The ceremony was both a celebration of victory and a commemoration of 

the many whose sacrifices had made it 

possible. 

Ten days after the parade in Tunis, General de Gaulle arrived in Algiers to conclude 

with Giraud the negotiations through which 

they had already agreed upon a method of 

uniting their followers. Preliminary exchanges, largely through the mediation of 

General Georges Catroux, had cleared the 

path to organization of a nucleus of what 

was eventually called the French Committee of National Liberation. The two free and 

actively belligerent sections of the French 

nation which had accepted leadership by 

Giraud and de Gaulle, respectively, were 

thus to be welded into a single entity. The 

Anglo-American high command gave direct 

and close attention to these transactions, 

since the security of the northwest African 

base and the contribution of French forces 

to the projected invasion of continental 

Europe were involved. De Gaulle came to a 

French North Africa where political sentiment had changed remarkably since 8 November 1942, and even since Giraud's 

accession to the position from which Darlan 

had been so abruptly removed by death. 

Although Giraud in May 1943, could claim 

the respectful admiration of thousands, his 

popularity had by this time somewhat diminished despite the recent victory, while 

de Gaulle had gained in popularity with the 

resistance movements of continental France 

and among part of the French population 

in Northwest Africa. 

The strongest impediment to the merger 

of the French Korth and West African administration under Giraud and de Gaulle's 

French National Committee was the determination of the Gaullists to proscribe or 

punish Frenchmen who had accepted the 

authority of Marshal Petain. This vindictiveness had been shown toward Giraud 

himself by de Gaulle's entourage during the 

Casablanca Conference, and toward other 

men actually engaged in fighting the Germans, by General LeClerc, the distinguished 

Gaullist officer, when Giraud later met him 

at Montgomery's Eighth Army command 

post. The Gaullists seemed to others to be 
670 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

ALLIED LEADERS IN TUNIS, MAY 1943. Front, from Left: GeneraL Eisenhower, 

Air Chief MarshaL Sir Arthur Tedder, Gen. Sir HaroLd R. L. G. Alexander, and Adm. Sir 

Andrew Browne Cunningham. Back, from left: Mr. HaroLd MacmiLLan and May". Gen. WaLter 

BedeL! Smith. The other two in the group are not identified. 

victimized by their own propaganda, which 

declared that any connection with Marshal 

Petain's government was a disqualification 

for responsible service against the Axis 

powers. They had carried it so far that when 

LeClerc's forces were in proximity to those 

of Koeltz's XIX Corps, at a time when the 

latter were in contact with the enemy, LeClerc's men had even engaged in recruiting 

activities among them. In the victory parade 

in Tunis, the Gaullists refused to march in 

a French section with Giraud's troops, preferring, with General Anderson's permission, to march with British units in the 

Eighth Army. The attitude which such incidents revealed made unification most 

difficult.' 

Although Giraud and de Gaulle compromised on other matters successfully, they 

could not reach a satisfactory understanding over the control of the French armed 

forces, for which the Allies were supplying 

, (1 ) CSTT Jnl, 5 May 43. (2) Msg 9721, AFHQ 

to 18 A Gp, 6 May 43. AFHQ CofS Cable Log, 38. 

(3) Memo, G-3 AFHQ for CofS AFHQ, 15 Apr 43, 

sub: Fighting French formations. AFHQ G-3 Ops 

37/4, Micro Job 10C, Reel 157F. (4) Barre, 

Tunisie , /942- 1943, pp. 309-17. 
FRUITS OF VICTORY 

the munitions. De Gaulle proposed to make 

Giraud the commander in chief only of that 

part of the French forces actually engaged 

against the enemy, while reserving for himself, as Commissioner of Defense, full control over the entire French military establishment. Giraud was unwilling to accept 

so subordinate a role or to subject the French 

Army which he was reconstructing to the 

control of men imbued with a spirit such as 

General LeClerc's. A deadlock ensued 

which lasted for many weeks, during which 

pressure on both factions by the Allies, who 

supported Giraud, contributed to an eventual adjustment. It provided for a complicated and inefficient dual control, and 

postponed for almost a year de Gaulle's 

acquisition of complete authority, which he 

gained by astute and gradual steps. In the 

interval, the United States, British, and 

Russian Governments recognized the French 

Committee of National Liberation as a de 

facto government. 2 

Some "Lessons Learned" by the Army 

While the Allied force reorganized for the 

attack on Sicily, and amid a turmoil of 

varied activities, u.s. headquarters reviewed the fighting of recent weeks as set 

forth in operations reports. They extracted 

from these accounts the tactical lessons 

which could be transmitted to troops in 

training.3 Experience in Tunisia had confirmed the basic principles taught in standard U.S. Army training manuals but it had 

2 (1) COMNAVNEU, U.S.-French Relations, 

1942-44, App. B. OCMH. (2) Giraud, Un seul 

but: La victoire, pp. 133-88. (3) Catroux, Dans La 

bataiile de Mediterranee; Egypte, Levant, Afrique 

du Nord, 1940-44. (4) Vigneras, Rearming the 

French. 

3 Compiled in a WD Manual, Lessons from the 

Tunisian Campaign, 15 Oct 43. 

671 

emphasized certain aspects and revealed 

certain deficiencies in the application of 

those principles. It had required actual combat and casualties to make the average 

American soldier sufficiently wary and determined. Even then, the soldiers not only 

had to know what to do and how to do it, 

but also to be under the unremitting control 

of officers who knew their business. 

Of the basic tactical principles, none had 

been more emphatically upheld than the 

necessity of seizing key terrain features affording effective observation posts for artillery. Dispositions in depth, deployment of 

infantry in depth, and the mutual support 

of all heavy weapons from positions organized in depth were repeatedly shown to be 

essential, particularly in resisting armored 

attacks. The prevalence of mountain and hill 

warfare seemed to call for instruction of all 

infantry in the basic principles of mountain 

tactics rather than simply the training of 

specialized units therein. Among the infantry, scouting and patrolling had to be continuous and aggressive. The campaign revealed serious deficiencies in map reading, 

in use of the compass and other methods of 

controlling direction, in movement by 

stealth, avoidance of ambush, in clarity of 

plans and instructions, in accuracy of reporting, in daylight reconnaissance to prepare for night patrolling, and in control 

over the members of a patrol. Infantry near 

Hill 609 had followed artillery preparations at much too great an interval, allowing the enemy after shelling ceased, to return to his weapons before the American 

troops closed in. At Djebel Cheniti north of 

the Garaet Ichkeul, where the infantry followed only 100 yards behind the artillery 

fire, they caught the enemy still seeking 

cover or barely recuperating, and took the 

height without loss. Then they made the 
672 

error of remammg on the crest instead of 

continuing down the forward slope and digging in, so that enemy shells soon struck and 

hurt them. In general, infantry needed to 

"lean against" a barrage but that alone was 

not enough. 1 

American artillery had been employed 

with what seemed to the enemy great prodigality and with great effect. Prolonged 

concentrations of slow fire on enemy positions proved more effective than a heavier 

mass of fire for a shorter period, what the 

artillerymen called a "serenade." Time fire 

with high explosive shell obtained remarkable results. Among the precautions for the 

future which Tunisian experience seemed 

to justify was to allow artillery units sufficient time fo, reconnaissance, after receipt 

of plans and orders, before going into action 

from new locations. Night moves to unfamiliar areas in order to support an assaulting force at dawn resulted in inefficient performance by the batteries and on occasion, 

left them open to capture by enemy attacks 

while the American assault was being made 

ready. The artillerymen in Tunisia were 

gratified by the results of their arrangements 

for flexible employment although aware of 

their dependence upon signal troops and 

upon strict wire and radio discipline:' 

The armored units were impressed by the 

fact that they had rarely been employed in 

a concentrated mass of sufficient strength, 

and that their tactics could not fulfill the 

expectation, prevalent in the States, that 

speedy aggressive thrusts could always be 

made without incurring disastrous losses. In-

, Rpt, Maj Gen Walton H. Walker to CG AGF, 

12 Jun 43, sub: Visit to NATOUSA. OPD 381 

Africa. 

"Col Michael Buckley, Jr., Obsr's Rpt, 26 Jun 

43, sub: II Corps artillery 21-26 Apr. 43. AGF 

319.1/3 (For. Obs). 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

stead of attacking with such reckless audacity, tanks had to advance steadily and 

skillfully, as the enemy's did, while utilizing 

every available means of reconnaissance and 

covering fire. American armored units had 

found that attacks in depth on a narrow 

front, the rear elements exploiting gains by 

pushing through the leading units, and thus 

extending the blow forward, were more successful than a simultaneous advance on a 

broad front. They laid down the formula 

that three battalions of artillery should support one battalion of tanks in an attack. 

Moreover, the Tunisian battles had demonstrated that chance of success was greater by 

taking enough time to prepare an attack 

thoroughly and to disseminate the plans 

completely than by hurrying to the offensive 

in an attempt to get the jump on the enemy. 

In defense, the armored division was more 

effective if it was concentrated for timely 

intervention at a given point rather than 

dispersed to cover a wide front. 

Tanks and regular, as distinguished from 

armored, infantry found that co-operation 

worked to their mutual advantage, whether 

in preparing for a tank penetration through 

a gap made by the infantry or in furnishing 

close infantry support during a breakthrough by tanks. Infantry support proved 

indispensable, especially in consolidating 

the ground overrun by tanks. 

The Tunisian campaign tested various 

methods of employing the tank destroyer, a 

mobile 75-mm. antitank gun on either a 

half-tracked or full-tracked vehicle. Much of 

the time use of these weapons differed little 

from that of standard artillery, for they were 

not committed in battalion strength but 

were employed in platoons. Experience 

demonstrated that they could not be used 

to "hunt tanks," since in a fire fight with 

tanks they soon succumbed. Their mobility 
FRUITS OF VICTORY 

was chiefly useful to avoid hostile fire or to 

get in better firing position. They could reconnoiter for the approach of enemy tank 

formations and then meet the onslaught 

with defensive fire from hull-down positions 

in what constituted a trap for the enemy. 

Best results came from establishing a base 

of fire, and giving close support to other tank 

elements from hull-down positions. 

Support of ground operations by Allied 

aviation during the last phase of the Tunisian campaign took the form of attack on 

enemy troops and positions in the path of 

ground attack with much greater frequency 

than it had earlier. Tunisian experience left 

the air and ground commanders in disagreement, nonetheless, concerning the proper 

relationship of air and ground units. Disagreement which focused on the right degree 

of centralized control over air power actually revolved about the relative importance 

of air targets. Ground commanders generally sought the kind of air support which 

General Montgomery had received at El 

'Alamein and El Hamma, that is, the use 

of aviation for neutralizing hostile fires, 

harassing the enemy, or covering friendly 

ground movements. Since the Americans 

could not procure support of that type in 

northern Tunisia under the system of "requests" (through a channel of several 

echelons up to the 242d Group, RAF), they 

urged that specific air units be placed under 

a ground commander's continuous control. 

The air commanders could, on the other 

hand, show that such an arrangement would 

be wasteful of air power in various ways, 

and might even cost the ground forces the 

ba~ic benefit of air superiority. The endless 

conflict could not be resolved except by a 

more comprehensive approach to tactics 

than either ground or air officers were in the 

habit of employing, and remained to be 

673 

worked out in subsequent months when 

Allied air resources were more plentiful." 

Some «Lessons Learned" by the Enemy 

While American troops derived these and 

other tactical lessons from their combat experience, the enemy learned what to expect 

from the Americans. The Germans must 

have been amazed to find themselves losing 

at any point on the Tunisian front to men 

whose motives for fighting seemed, from 

their interrogation of American prisoners, 

fantastic. "Most of them came over to earn 

money, or to have an exciting time, or to 

see something new, or simply to do as others 

did, with no thought of any political objective; they are rowdies who cannot stand 

up under an emergency," Hitler was told. 

"America will never become the Rome of 

the future, Rome was a country of peasants," he commented in reply. "[American] 

farmers are so miserable. I have seen pictures of them. Too pitiful and stunted; 

something altogether uprooted that wanders 

around .... '" 

The professional German military men 

were also struck by the inflexible, methodical fashion in which over-equipped American units adhered to fixed, prearranged 

plans rather than alertly adjusting their 

operations to grasp favorable opportunities, 

and by the heavy dependence of American 

infantry on numerical and materiel supe-

, (1) Col Henry V. Dexter, Obsr's Rpt, 11 Jun 

43, sub: Air-ground support in ~orth Africa. AGF 

:119.1/21 (For. Obs). (2) For subsequent developments in Italy, sec Col Kent Roberts Greenfield, 

Army Ground Forces and the Air-ground Battle 

Team, Including Light Aviation, AGF Hist Sec, 

Study 35, 1948, pp. 76-85. 

7 Stenogr Dienst in FHQ, Lagebesprech ung vom 

May 3 1943 (Fragment No. 39), p. 23 (Com' of 

Hitler, Jodi, and Hewel). 
674 

riority. Basing their opinion on the performance of the U.S. II Corps at Faid, Kasserine, F ondouk el Aouareb, and Gafsa, the 

Germans felt that the American command 

clung too rigidly to the practice of forming 

combat commands and armored task forces 

which, in the German estimate, resulted in 

scrambling and inability to achieve a concentration of their forces where tactical success called for it. The Germans noted that 

the American soldiers fought more courageously in units than as individual fighters. 

American artillery had not shown its full 

capabilities and effectiveness despite extraordinarily high expenditure of ammunition. Benefiting from British experience and 

applying British principles, the Americans 

had achieved more effective air-ground cooperation. The Germans had learned to respect the clever and efficient manner in 

which American troops organized for defense. The German High Command concluded that, despite defects in combat 

leadership and lack of experience in organization, training, and operations, the Americans were quick to learn and their performance in future operations would show 

marked improvement. 8 

The enemy had studied the amphibious 

landings of November 1942. Kesselring felt 

that the relatively weak nature of the defense made them resemble a mere peacetime 

maneuver. He assumed, moreover, that the 

Allied capture of Northwest Africa would 

be a prelude to further operations which 

would give the Germans and Italians a second chance to oppose the Allies in an attempted beach landing. After the fall of 

Tunis, Kesselring believed that the prediS Rpt, Evaluation of American Command and 

Troops in North Africa, 18 May 43, in OKH/ 

GenStdHjOp Abt (II), Afrika-A I Berichte-Bd. 3, 

16.1.-18. V.43. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

lection of the Allies for air cover in November furnished an important clue to the next 

point of attack. He concluded that the right 

mode of defense would be to assemble assault reserves in positions for early counterattack against the Allied beachheads. The 

landings could not well be prevented but 

the beachheads would be weak and vulnerable to a concentrated counterattacking 

force. 9 

Allied Leadership 

The Tunisian campaign not only produced seasoned troops and revealed lessons 

in tactics, but it also tested and developed 

officers capable of performing well the functions of staff and command in combat conditions. Hundreds of company and battalion officers were sifted by situations in which 

they showed what they could give and how 

much they could take. Regimental and division officers were winnowed by the same 

process. The extraordinary progress which 

General Bradley's fighting divisions had 

made by the time the fighting ended was 

demonstrated in Sicily and Italy. A substantial number of officers later looked back 

to Tunisia as a point of departure from 

which they rose to higher command. One 

group soon returned to the United States to 

assume key positions in the Army's program 

of expansion and training, and to take command of new units which eventually fought 

in Europe or in the Pacific. Others remained in the theater to participate in the 

seizure of Sicily or the occupation of southern Italy, before shifting to the European 

Theater or driving up the spine of Italy to 

the Po valley."° 

"MS # T -3-P II (Kesselring), Pt. II. 

10 Msgs, FREEDOM to AGWAR, No. W-570, 15 

May, No. W-739, 17 May 43. 
FRUITS OF VICTORY 

The end of the fighting in Tunisia found 

General Eisenhower's integrated international staff at Allied Force Headquarters 

in Algiers a successful going concern ready 

for what the future might bring. AngloAmerican co-operation had survived some 

hard tests during the preceding months. If 

the coalition, with the disappointments, 

frustrations, and recriminations inherent in 

such a union, could survive the initial and 

struggling phases, it seemed certain to remain effective as the war in the Mediterranean proceeded, and as the staff sections 

and commanders utilized the knowledge 

gained in the preceding months. 

675 

Strategic Consequences 

Any survey of the gains and losses from 

the operations in Northwest Africa requires 

comparison of what had been achieved with 

what had been anticipated in July 1942 

when the Prime Minister and the President 

decided to send Allied forces there. (Table 

5) General Eisenhower had been directed 

to gain, in conjunction with Allied forces 

in the Middle East, complete control of 

North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red 

Sea. From lodgments on the Atlantic and 

Mediterranean coasts of French North Africa, he was expected to extend control over 

TABLE 5-BATTLE C ASUALTIES SUSTA INED BY THE ALLIED FORCES IN THE T U N I SIAN 

C AMPAI GN: 12 N OVEMBER 1942-l3 MAY 1943 

TotaL ..... ____ •. _ . .. _. __ .••. _ ..••. ____ ___ . . 

U. S. orc~ ............•. .. _ ..•. . ...... " "'" 

1st Infantry Division _ ••• •..... " .. . • _ ... __ .. _ ." •.... 

3rd Infantry Division ..... .•.• _ ........ _ ...... .... . 

9th Infantr), Division ..•.•..•••. •.. .. .•.....•.....• 

34t h Infantry Division_ .. _ __ .....• _. _ •• ~ . •.. " . •.• 

I at Armored Divilion_ ....... • _ ....... . . . . . " • . •.. . _ 

2nd Armored Division _. _ . ". __ ., _' " . _. _ .. ". __ . .. . . 

Army and Corps T roops. _ .. •. ., .•...• _.. . .. . . ___ _ 

T welfth Air Force .... _____ •• .. , . ••... _. _ •• 

British Forces b ... •. ._ 

First Army... .. • . . . . . .• __ . . ______ _ _ 

Eigh th Arm y ' . __ ...... _ . ,_ _. __ . ... . , . , 

French Forces .. . .. •.•.•.•. . . .. _ •....•.•...•• 

Toul 

70, 341 

• 18, 221 

3,916 

38 

2, 724 

4, 049 

3, 407 

41 

2,046 

2, 000 

35,940 

23,545 

12,395 

16, ISO 

Killed 

10, 290 

2, 71 5 

634 

5 

-lit 

444 

547 

II 

259 

404 

6,475 

4,439 

2, 036 

1, 100 

Wounded 

38,688 

8. 978 

2. 585 

33 

1,825 

1,539 

1, 633 

25 

915 

423 

21,630 

12,575 

9, 055 

8, 080 

Mi .. inl 

21,363 

6.528 

697 

o 

488 

2. 066 

1,227 

5 

872 

1, 173 

7, 835 

6, 53 1 

1, 304-

7, 000 

• Th",~ pr<limina, y dIU (April 1945) diffe, .0me.hAt I,om fin.1 Report of Rani. Cuualti •• of World War II (TAG. Ju ne 195 JJ. 

The 6na l report. (otali n" 2.190 killed in .c-tio~ 8 15" wounded, and 3.0 17 ca{»lu_rtd or millin,l. however, doe. nOI .how distribution by di vi.ion. 

• Fipreo . hown Irc for Ih. period 8 Novem r 1942- 11 Ma~ 1943 . .. hiell ma y includ. , I ... , c .. u.lt ~ ••• ff,r. d by ,h. Brl,i.h Pi", 

Army in inilial landinl!' in AllI" ri •• 

• Induda dua for Bri,i.h Domi nion ,roopl ",rvitl, ..tlh Ih. ElShth Army. 

5o.r"; U. S. Army dUa (includin. Air Fo,«).re from BaLlle Catualtieo of lhe Army (prd iminaryl. I April I94S. prepared by Maohinc 

Record. Branch, AGO. R,iti.h dOl. w . ..... upplicd by lhe B,ili.h C.binet Office, Hi"orical Sect ion. French data arc from ,h. Ollie< of ,h. 

Military Alu<he. Pari., France. In,. lIill"nc. Report of f re nch Army C .. ualtica DurinR World Wlr II (1942- 19451. 27 J une 1946. which 

cil" II primary lOu,.c. Inlormation. Mili,a;, ... No. S9. )I M.y 1946. 
676 

the entire area, including Tunisia, and to 

create conditions favorable for further offensive operations through Libya against 

the rear of the Axis forces in the Western 

Desert. The ultimate objective was complete 

annihilation of the Axis forces in Africa facing the Eigh~h Army and an intensification 

of air and sea operations against the Axis 

on the continent of Europe. Events had not 

worked out on schedule, but by May 1943 

the Allies had obtained all these goals and 

more. With the southern side of the Sicilian 

straits in Allied possession, Allied surface 

vessels could henceforth move witb fair security through the central Mediterranean. 

The Allies now held a threat to the Axis 

positions in Sicily, Italy, the Balkans, Crete, 

and the Dodecanese islands. Airfields along 

the African coast permitted long-range 

bombing missions deep into the enemy's 

European fortress, and long-range reconnaissance flights over the Atlantic in the 

endless warfare against the Axis submarine. 

These benefits had been anticipated but 

there were others. The Allies had destroyed 

not only the forces opposing Montgomery 

in the Western Desert but another whole 

Axis army and an immense amount of materiel. Casualties, for the Gennan elements 

of Army Group Africa alone, totaled 155,-

000 men. These losses, added to those sustained by the Axis at Stalingrad a few 

months earlier, left the Axis powers unable 

to take the initiative henceforth except for 

local operations. The Axis partnership, 

moreover, suffered a severe strain. The Italians would have preferred to have the Germans go on the defensive on tbe Eastern 

Front in order to concentrate to meet the 

western threat with overwhelming power. 

In fact, Mussolini would even have welcomed a separate peace with the Soviet 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Union. After the disaster in Tunisia, it was 

only a question of time before Italy would 

drop out of the war. 11 

Hitler had determined that Tunisia must 

be held at all costs, but his concern with the 

military problem seemed fitful and superficial. He apparently recognized after the 

surrender that the heavy losses could be 

justified only by an elaborate explanation. 

It would have had to include his personal 

decision, made against the urgent representations of the Italians and his own military advisers, that the attempt to take Malta 

was not to be made, and Malta in Allied 

hands had doomed to failure his efforts to 

supply the Axis armies in Africa. To his 

principal commanders on the Eastern Front 

he declared early in July 1943 that he had 

prevented a loss of the war by defending the 

Tunisian bridgehead. He pointed out that 

the Italians would otherwise have dropped 

out, allowing the Allies to march to the 

Brenner Pass unopposed at a time when 

the Germans were in no condition to stop 

them there. His decision had not only saved 

the war, he insisted, but had cost the Allies 

dearly and had delayed a "second front" 

in Europe for six months.12 Whatever may 

be said against this explanation, the fact 

that it was given amounts to acknowledgment that in Africa the Allies had not only 

won territory of strategic worth but had 

inflicted such losses on the Axis powers 

as to weaken their ability, and perhaps to 

undermine their will, to fight. 

The Allies had made a hard choice in 

11 See pp. 260, 363-70 above. 

12 (l) MS # T~3 (Nehring et a/.), Pt. lIla. 

(2) Excerpt from an unsigned memo carried by 

Rommel, "The Struggle for the African Outpost--

The Balance Sheet of the Campaign in North 

Africa," in Box 371, EAP 21-a-14/7, CRS. 
FRUITS OF VICTORY 

July 1942 between seeking a quick success 

in French North Africa before winter and 

building up strength in the United Kingdom 

until the following spring for an attack 

across the English Channel. The decision to 

gamble on occupying French North Africa 

ahead of the Axis forces led to a failure in 

December which could not be remedied before May 1943. One may well doubt that 

this failure alone caused deferment of a 

cross-Channel attack until 1944, in view of 

the many other considerations involved. 

But one important conclusion concerning 

the relation of the decision to occupy French 

North Africa to the fundamental Allied 

strategy seems beyond question. Even if the 

Allies had succeeded in establishing a bridgehead in Normandy in 1943, their experience 

in Tunisia demonstrated that they would 

have been unprepared for breaking out of 

677 

this bridgehead and thrusting far toward 

the heart of Nazi Germany. This experience 

they gained by meeting the enemy at the 

outer periphery of the area to be liberated 

at ;] time when the Eastern Front continued 

to absorb the bulk of Axis military power. 

The triumph of Allied arms in Tunisia was 

achieved under conditions which taught 

them the way to win battles together, to 

meet and to recover from reverses, and to 

push on aggressively to the far harder 

struggle for final victory. For the U.S. Army, 

the operations in Northwest Africa were of 

inestimable value in making it a far more 

efficient fighting force. At their conclusion, 

the Axis alliance had become seriously 

weaker and the Allied coalition far stronger 

than when they began. On the road to complete military victory in Europe, the Allies 

had made an auspicious start. 

Appendix A 

Allied Troop and Supply Shipments 

TABLE 6-STRENCTH AND SUPPLI ES OF ALLIED ASSAULT FORCES IN THE INVASION OF NORTH 

AFRICA: 8 NOVEMBER 1942 

Suppliu (Long Too.) 

·T .. k rore< Numbe~ol umber 01 umber 01 

Ship. Troop. Vehicln 

Torll Vehicles Other 

TotaL . . _ ... ____ •...... _ . ...... 107 107,453 9,911 96,089 40,406 55,683 

"Veatern ._ •. . • _ •.•.. _ ................ 30 • 33,843 2,953 41,262 10,344 30,918 

Center •• _ •••.•...... _ •.......... _. _., 44 40,800 2,843 17,536 b 14,935 12,601 

Eastern. __ ..•. . • _ •................... 33 32810 4, liS 27,291 15. 127 12.164 

• The number 01 .S. 11001" in convoy UGF-l .... oririnoUy .. ""nod .. 40.397. but ,hi. figure .... luer revi.ed ( ... ASP MPR-3. 

May 31. i94l. p. 85). 

b Eltimlted. 

Sow,,,: Office 01 the Chid oIT",n.porto tion; Service. 01 Suppl y. War o.plnment. Monthly Pro8r ... Rcpon. Tun.poru,ion. Section 

J. JlnUIfY H. 1943. p . .38. 

TABLE 7-STRENCTH OF ALLIED FORCES LANDED IN NORTH AFRICA AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1942 

Convoy Arrival. 

ulonlliw and Till Foret Toul 

KM- I KM- 2 KM- l UG-I UG-2 

(8 ov) (\I 0\') (21 No ~ 

2l 0\' ) 

(8 ov) (18 Noy- lOre) 

All Troops . . __ ___ .... . _ ..... _. 253,213 73.610 51.150 62,820 33, 843 31,790 

Eastern ..••.•......•• , ••••...•. _ • .••. 1l2,860 32,810 30,270 49, 780 0 0 

Center. __ •••.....••• _ ••••.... _ ... __ .. 74,720 40,800 10.880 13,040 0 0 

Wenem ... __ ................ _ ....... 65,633 0 0 0 33, 843 31.790 

. S. Troop,- _ .. .~ ...... -.--.--- 146,453 46,920 20.860 13, 040 33,84J H,790 

Eutern ............ . ........... _ .. _ .. 10,020 9,860 160 0 0 0 Cent~r •.••• _ .• __ • •• ..• __ •.• _ •. _ • . _ 70,800 37,060 20. 700 13,040 0 0 

\Veatern . __ ..... _. __ • _ ••••• _ •• _. _. 65,633 0 0 0 .H. 843 J\,790 

British Troops ...... ...... _ ..•.... 106. 760 26.690 30.290 49. 780 0 0 

Eastern ......... _ .. ____ •.•••••. - ~- ...... 102.840 22,950 JO.110 49,780 0 0 

Cen!er. .. _ ........ _. _ ........... __ .•. 3,920 :1,740 ISO 0 0 () 

Western •. .. -... ~ ... ---...... --.-------. 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Source; KM Convoy,. AFHQ, Shipping Allocation Meeting No.7, 18 November 1942.0100/21 AFHQ AG 337, Conferences, II. Reel 

24. 79-D, Seri,1 276. UG Convoys, ASF Monthly Progre .. Report. Section 3. Transportation, 31 May 1943. 
TABLE 8-STRENGTH OF U.S. ARMY IN NORTH AFRICA: NOVEMBER 1942-ApRIL 1943 

30 NOVtmMr 1942 31 DecemMr 1942 31 January 1943 

Orlilinization 

Total OtIicen Enlintd Toul OtIiCtn Enliated Toul OfliCtn 

TotaL __ _______________ ____ ____ _ 128,567 7,528 121,039 227,099 14,467 212,632 260,771 17,214 

Hcadquarten ____________ __ _____ ___ ____ 559 116 443 789 181 608 1,393 301 

Air Force ______ ___ __ _________ __________ 23,259 1,552 21,707 42,906 2,912 39,994 49,967 3,528 

Divisional. __ ______ • _________________ __ 52.519 2,608 49,911 90,103 4,805 85,298 86,255 4,513 

ht Infantry ___ _______________ _____ 14,883 716 14,167 16,682 808 15,874 16,274 810 

3rd Infantry ____ _______ ______ ______ 12,590 721 11,869 15,106 808 14,298 15, 784 858 

9th Infantry _______ ________ ____ • ___ 11,917 548 11,369 14,066 696 13,370 14,433 746 

34th Infantry ___ ___ _____ __ ____ _____ 5,107 218 4,889 13,676 753 12,923 14,087 744 

36th Infantry ______________ ____ ____ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

ht Armored ____ ___ ________ ________ 3,979 195 3, 784 15,800 852 14,948 10, 158 546 

2nd Armored __ ___ _____ _____________ 4,043 210 3,833 14,773 888 13,885 15,519 809 

82nd Airborne ____________ ______ ___ _ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

NondivisionaL ______ __ __ __ __ _____ _____ 50,977 2,904 48,073 86,590 5,456 81,134 113,834 7,134 Combat Arms __________ ____________ 4.374 478 3,896 14,360 1,209 13,151 21,652 1,608 

Technical Services __ __________ ______ 46,603 2,426 ",177 72,230 4,247 67,983 92, 182 5,526 

Adjutant GeneraL ____________ _ 34 9 25 1,365 84 1,281 6,003 324 

Chemical Warfare ___ _ ___ ______ lOS 6 102 473 18 455 847 33 

Engineer Corps _________________ 17,086 712 16, 374 21,154 879 20,275 25,444 1,089 

Medical Corps __ ________ ___ ___ _ 2,938 615 2,323 9,313 1,745 7, 568 12,139 2, 169 

Military Police _____ _______ __ ___ 231 8 223 1,127 29 1,098 1,600 56 

Ordnance __ ___ _________________ 7,486 286 7,200 10, 757 446 10,311 13,368 566 

Quartermaster __ _________ ___ _ . _ 6, 727 216 6.511 10,219 342 9,877 10,896 366 

SignaL __ _____ ____ . ___ __ ____ ____ 7,248 335 6.913 13,144 532 12,612 15,686 640 

Transportation ___ _______ _______ 4, 745 239 4,506 4,678 172 4,506 6,199 283 

Miscellaneous ____________ . ___ _________ _ 1,253 348 905 6,711 1,113 5,598 9,322 1,738 

Enliated 

243,557 

1,092 

46,439 

81, 742 

15,464 

14.926 

13,687 

13,343 

0 

9,612 

H,710 

0 

106, 700 

20,044 

86,656 

5,679 

814 

24,355 

9,970 

1,544 

12,802 

10,530 

15,046 

5,916 

7,584 

Ol 

OJ 

o 

z 

o 

~ ..., 

::z= 

~ tr:l 

r:n 

..., 

~ ~ ..... 

(1 

~ 
lli,;.niUlion 

Total .••. ___ . __ . ___ . __ .. __ ____ ._ 

Headquarters _____ ___ _____ _________ ._._ 

Air Force ____ ___ ______ __ ___ ___________ _ 

DivisionaL _____ ___ ___________ _ ._. ____ _ 

1st Infantry ___________ ___________ _ 

3rd Infantry ___ ._._. ____________ _ 

9th Infantry ______________________ _ 

34th Infantry ______ , __ __ _____ ._. __ _ 

36th Infantry ___ ______ __ _ • ________ _ 

lst Ar o~d __ _ . ___ . ___ . __________ _ 

2nd Armon=d . __ __ __ . ___________ . __ _ 

82nd Airborne _______________ ___ . __ _ 

NondiviaionaL ______ . _____ • ____ • ______ _ 

Combat Arms _._ . ___ ____ __________ _ 

Technical St:rvicr. _____ __ ________ . __ 

Adjutant GeneraL _____ ~. _____ _ _ 

Chemical Warfare _____________ _ 

Engineer Corps ____ __ ___ _______ _ 

Medical Corps. ____ ______ __ ___ _ 

Military Police __ ___________ __ _ _ 

Ordnance ____________ _________ _ 

Quartermaster __ __ • ___ e ____ 0 __ _ 

SignaL ___________________ ___ _ _ 

Transportation ____________ __ __ _ 

Miscellaneous _________________________ _ 

28 February 19U 

Toul Office" 

298,545 21 , 186 

2, 292 463 

63, 705 6, 148 

8i,952 

16. 214 

1l, 798 

14,609 

13,978 

o 

14,910 

14,H3 

o 

1ll,718 

23,194 

108, 524 

820 

1,038 

32,305 

14,094 

2,229 

14, 933 

14,783 

17,2H 

11, 078 

12, 878 

4,739 

800 

804 

745 

761 

o 

866 

763 

o 

7,904 

I, 173 

6,731 

86 

37 

1, 386 

2,668 

80 

635 

553 

805 

481 

1,932 

Enlined 

277,359 

1,829 

57, 557 

83,213 

15,414 

12,994 

13,864 

13,217 

o 

14,044 

13,680 

o 

123,8 14 

22,021 

101,793 

734 

1,001 

30,919 

11 , 426 

2,149 

14,298 

14,230 

16, 439 

10,597 

10,946 

Tot.1 

3H, 488 

1,598 

75,919 

89,345 

17,080 

13,478 

15,409 

14,091 

o 

14,807 

14,480 

o 

160,722 

22,426 

138,296 

8,695 

1,166 

32,711 

17, 777 

3, 425 

17,642 

22,638 

21, 33; 

12,907 

16,904 

1I M,rch 1943 • 

Office" 

25, 173 

408 

7,590 

4, 720 

815 

764 

768 

742 

o 

846 

785 

o 

9,757 

1,169 

8.588 

691 

41 

1,439 

3, 137 

134 

784 

812 

978 

572 

2,698 

Enlilled 

319,315 

1, 190 

68,329 

84,625 

16, 265 

12,714 

14,641 

13,349 

o 

13,961 

13,695 

o 

150,965 

21,257 

129,708 

8,004 

I, 125 

31, 272 

14,640 

3,291 

16. 858 

21,826 

20,357 

12,335 

14,206 

Toul 

395,461 

1,653 

81, 169 

106,110 

16, 412 

14,895 

15, 155 

1l,917 

15,626 

15,504 

14,549 

52 

172, 723 

24,738 

147, 985 

1,310 

1,175 

39,549 

21,928 

4,882 

18,318 

27,567 

20, 382 

12, 874 

33,806 

30 April 1943 • 

Offictl1l 

29,299 

413 

8,220 

: u;') .. ,"''''''' 

786 

757 

775 

728 

757 

875 

772 

12 

10,787 

1, 288 

9,499 

76 

42 

1,693 

3,989 

173 

857 

1, 051 

1, 012 

606 

4,417 

Enlined 

366, 162 

1, 240 

72,949 

100,648 

15,626 

14,Il8 

14,380 

13, 189 

14,869 

14,629 

13,777 

40 

161,936 

23,450 

138,486 

1,234 

I, 113 

37,856 

17,939 

4,709 

17,461 

26,5 16 

19, 370 

12, 268 

29, 389 

• Inchldea troope. not identifiable es«pt in the cau of the 16th Infantry and 8lnd Airborne Djv;.jon., lent 10 NOrTh Africa in March 1943 and .lIbteqllent month. in prep.tltion 

rOf' the inv .. ion of Sic;ly. 

StlMru: Suensth of Bale. by Orsan;UI;on, R.A:port SfM 10, compiled monthly by Machine Rec:ord. Branch, AGO, 

:> 

"" "" t>1 

Z 

I:) 

-

>< 

:> 

a. 

CO 
Appendix B 

Axis Troop and Supply Shipments 

TABLE 9-GERMAN SUPPLY S H I P ME NTS R ECEIVED IN NORT H AFR ICA : NOVEMBER 

1942-MAY 1943 

1942 1943 

Dnlination a nd ~ Total 

Nov Ike j an Feb Mar Apr 

Total Tonna~ ___ ___ ___ _ 188,517 36,062 28,206 36,326 32,966 29, 267 23,017 

Air Tranaport (Tona) ___________ 31,386 3,688 5,593 .,6M . , 953 7,651 .,327 

Sea Transport (Tona)-__ __ ___ ___ 157, 131 32,37. 22,613 31,662 28,013 21,616 18, 690 

Ton. of Ammunition _______ .7, 789 7,899 8,OS5 7, 073 8, 775 7,619 6,842 

TonI of POL __ ____________ 66,652 16,003 9, 332 17,511 7,978 7,322 8,128 

TonI of Other Supplies ____ _ 42, 690 8,472 5,196 7,078 11,260 6,675 3, 720 

Number of Tankl ___ __________ _ 54-4 187 191 50 52 20 4-4 

Number of Vehiclea ______ ___ __ _ 8,173 1,493 2, 178 2,017 1,483 711 277 

Number of Guns ____ ___ _______ _ 1, 093 230 250 249 157 153 47 

TUNIStA 

Total Tonnage ___ ___ ___ __ 161,576 13,208 2-i,9.o 35,505 32, 966 29,267 23, 017 

Air Transport (Tons) __ _________ 25,572 581 3,503 .,047 4,953 7,651 4,327 

Sea Tranlport (Tons)- _______ ___ 136, 004 12, 627 21,.37 31,458 28,013 21,616 18,690 

Tons of Ammunition _____ __ 43, 376 ., 136 7,504 7,004 8, 775 7, 619 6,8-i2 

Tons of POL ___ ______ _____ 55,576 5,285 9, 109 17,376 7,978 7, 322 8, 128 

Tons of Other Supplies _____ 37,052 3, 206 .,824 7,078 11,260 6, 675 3, 720 

Number of Tanu ____ ________ __ .95 149 ISO 50 52 20 « 

Number of Vehicles ____ _____ ___ 7,692 1,079 2, III 2,017 1, 483 711 277 

Number of Guns ___ ______ ______ 975 127 235 249 157 153 47 

LIBYA 

Total Tonnage __ __ __ _____ 26,941 22,854 3,266 821 0 0 0 

Air Transport (Tons) ____ ____ __ _ 5,81. 3, \07 2,090 617 0 0 0 

Sea Transport (Tons)-__ ____ ____ 21,127 19, 7.7 1, 176 204 0 0 0 

Tons of Ammunition ______ _ 4,.13 3, 763 581 69 0 0 0 

Tons of POL __________ ___ _ 11,076 10, 718 223 135 0 0 0 

Tons of Other Supplies _____ 5, 638 5, 266 372 0 0 0 0 

Number of Tanks __ __ __ ________ 49 38 II 0 0 0 0 

Number of Vehicles __ __ ___ _____ .81 414 67 0 0 0 0 

Number of Guns __ ____ _______ __ 118 103 15 0 0 0 0 

.. O nes no t include tonnage of the number of tanks. vehicles, and guns. 

Soura: Tables and Rpts in OKHIC,.StdHIOp Ab, (II). A II'-AJrika-Tranfporu- AlIg,mai • • IO.X II.42-1.rlI.4.i. 

May 

2,673 

510 

2,163 

1,496 

378 

289 

0 

.. 

7 

2, 673 

5\0 

2,163 

1, 496 

378 

289 

0 

14 

7 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 
APPENDIX B 683 

TABLE 10--- GERMAN LOSSES IN SEA TRANSPORT TO NORTH AFRICA, NOVEMBER 

1942-MAY 1943 

1942 9~3 

Ship" and Type of Supply Toul 

Nov Ike Jan t-.b Mat Apr May 

Number of ships; 

LoIL ______ __ __ ___ • __ ___ 168 13 26 21 29 26 29 U 

Damaged __ _____________ 18 0 9 3 1 2 2 1 

Tons of Supplies. ___ ________ __ 81,520 10,4<K 17,840 7,605 11,874 11,338 15,516 6,943 

Number of Tanks _. _______ . __ 79 9 54 10 0 0 3 3 

Number of Guns_ . _____ __ ____ 320 37 III 41 25 60 17 29 

Number of Vehicles ___________ 2 546 14 964 545 212. 482 2tI 58 

Sourer; Tables and Rpts, in OK HjGtnStdHjOp Abt (fl), A I V-Ajrika-TranJportt-AlIgtmtin, IO.X II,42-J. VII.43. 

TABLE ll-AxIS TROOPS TRANSPORTED TO NORTH AFRICA : NOVEMBER 1942-MAY 1943 

1942 1943 

Deuinat,ion and Nationalit)' Toul 

Nov Dec Jan Feb Mlr Apr MlY 

Total 0 ___ ______________ "172,782 32,022 38,549 41,386 029,233 020,135 011,142 a 315 

GermalL __________________ 142,047 20,975 30,773 29,474 29, 233 20,135 11, 142 315 

Italian a __________________ a 30,735 11,047 7, 776 11,912 (a) (a) (a) (a) 

TUNISIA-Total 0 ______________ a 167, 884 28,187 37,757 41, 115 029,233 a20, 135 all,142 0315 

German __________ _________ 137,149 17,140 29,981 29,203 29,233 20,135 bll, 142 315 

By Air _______ _______ __ 81,021 15,273 18,162 14,257 12,893 11,756 b 8, 388 292 

By Sea ___ ____________ 56,128 1,867 11,819 14,946 16,340 8,379 b 2, 754 23 

Italian a __________________ a 30,735 11,047 7, 776 11,912 (0) (a) (0) (a) 

LYBIA-TotaI O __ _____ ________ _ a 4, 898 03,835 0792 a 271 0 0 0 0 

German ________ ___________ 4,898 3,835 792 271 0 0 0 0 

By AiL ____ __________ 4,319 3,323 730 266 0 0 0 0 

By Sea _______________ 579 512 62 5 0 0 0 0 

Italian ____________________ (a) (0) (a) (0) 0 0 0 0 

8 Excludes unknown number of Italians transported to Libya in November 1942 through J anuary 1943, and to Tunisia in Feb ruary 

through May 1943, 

b Data from Rpts, Afrika Tran sportt, in OKHjGtnStdHjOp Abt (fl), Af,ika-A I1 Kratft(, I , I-28./'. 43. This source and the o ne cited 

in source note below contain irreconcila.ble differences which may have resulted from hasty compilation and typographical errors ca rried over 

from OB SOUTH reports into the OKiI IC(nStdH rabies. Careful evaluation of all available documen ts makes it reasonably certai n t h at 

rhe figures give n for April are the correct ones. 

Source: German troops in OK HjGtnStdHjOp Abt (fl), A I /'-Ajrika- Transportt-AlIgtmrin, IO.X II.42-J Y II.43. Italian trOO p s to 

Tunisia in Rpts, German Grneral at tht Htadqll arurs. Italian Armtd Forets, in OKHjGtnStdHjOp Abt (fl), Tunis, JO.X 1.42- 2. 1'.4.1. 
Note on Sources 

Sources for 'this history are now held in 

six principal repositories: (1) Departmental 

Records Branch, The Adjutant General's 

Office (DRB T AGO), Alexandria, Va.; 

(2) Military Personnel Records Center, The 

Adjutant General's Office, St. Louis, Missouri; (3) Kansas City Records Center, 

Kansas City, Missouri; ( 4) Division of 

Naval History, Washington, D. C.; (5) 

Archives Branch, U.S. Air Force Historical 

Division, Director, Research Institute, Air 

University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; and (6) Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH), Department of the 

Army, Washington, D. C. 

The most important single collection of 

records in the preparation of this volume 

has been the AFHQ records. This consists 

of reports, messages, correspondence, planning papers, and sundry other material on 

all phases of Operation TORCH and the subsequent campaign in Tunisia. The sprawling body of this collection is in the United 

Kingdom, but microfilm copies of all these 

records are located in DRB T AGO. Some 

of these microfilm copies have been photoenlarged and arranged in file folders. Both 

the microfilm and the photo-enlarged documents are organized by job and reel number, 

as well as by a topical or chronological 

classification. Use of these records is greatly 

facilitated by two unpublished bibliographical guides: ( 1) Kenneth W. Munden, 

Analytical Guide to the Combined BritishAmerican Records of the Mediterranean 

Theater of Operations in World War II, 

prepared in 1948; and (2) the three-volume Catalogue of Combined British-American Records of the Mediterranean Theater 

of Operations in World War II, a more 

complete listing of these records. Both of 

these guides are located in DRB T AGO. 

Two collections subsidiary to this larger 

one are the AFHQ Chief of Staff Cable Log 

and the Smith Papers. The former is located 

in DRB TAGO and contains an abstract 

of all incoming AFHQ messages. It was for 

the use of the Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander in Chief, and Commander in Chief, 

Allied Force. The complete copies of these 

documents are in the AFHQ records. The 

Smith Papers are now at the Army War 

College Library, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 

Much reliance has been placed upon contemporary messages, correspondence, and 

papers. Although these have not been found 

in anyone single collection, the Operations 

Division (OPD) records are of the utmost 

importance for high-level decisions and 

planning. These are divided into several subdivisions of which the following were used: 

( 1) the official central correspondence files 

of OPD; (2) Executive Group file (OPD 

Exec), which contains messages exchanged 

between President Roosevelt and Prime 

Minister Churchill as well as other highlevel papers; (3) the Strategy and Policy 

Group file (0 PD ABC). All of these files 

are in the custody of DRB TAGO. (4) Microfilm copies of the War Department 

Message Center file which contains all official incoming (CM-IN) and outgoing 

(CM-OUT) messages sent to and from 

Washington during the war are in the 

custody of the Staff Communications Office 

of the Office of the Chief of Staff. 
NOTE ON SOURCES 

Other files and documents which are of 

importance for the planning, strategy, and 

high policy are the following: 

ETOUSA Incoming and Outgoing 

Cables, Kansas City Records Center. 

CinC Allied Force Diary, in General 

Eisenhower's custody when consulted. A 

diary kept for General Eisenhower which 

contains messages, papers, and other 

materials. 

NAF -FAN messages. These are the messages between CinC Allied Force and the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. They may be 

found in several locations, one of which is 

AFHQ Microfilm, Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat. They are listed with 

other messages to and from the AFHQ 

Message Center. 

Patton Diary. This was in private possession when consulted. 

WDCSA file, DRB AGO. This includes 

correspondence and papers of the Office of 

the Chief of Staff, Army. 

CCS and JCS minutes and papers. Copies 

are in the custody of DRB T AGO. 

The basic sources for the landings in 

North Africa are the task force reports. The 

Western Task Force (WTF) Final Report, 

which is located in DRB T AGO, covers the 

landings on the Atlantic coast. The Report 

of Proceedings, Operation TORCH, by the 

Naval Commander in Chief (NCXF, 

TORCH Despatch), contains the reports of 

the Center Task Force (CTF) and the 

Eastern Assault Force (EAF). TORCH Despatch is part of the AFHQ microfilm collection. These documents are supplemented 

by various naval reports-action reports 

and war diaries of U.S. warships as well 

as other records-which are located in the 

Division of Naval History, and by the reports and other official records of the U.S. 

Army units involved. 

685 

The story of the ground action was constructed primarily from the reports of the 

U.S. Army units, which are filed according 

to the organizational units where they originated, such as II Corps, etc. These documents consist of after action reports 

(AAR's) histories, journals, war diaries, 

field orders (FO's), general orders (GO's), 

situation reports (sitreps), combined intelligence and situation reports (cosintreps), 

and operations instructions (opn instrucs). 

They are located in DRB TAGO. The information obtained from these official reports was supplemented by selected monographs prepared at The Infantry School, 

Fort Benning, Georgia, and at The Armored 

School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, as well as by 

diaries and memoirs of other participants. 

The records of the British units have not 

been systematically and completely assembled in the United States in anyone 

collection. Many are scattered among the 

records of AFHQ or of the American units 

directly involved. In a few instances photostat copies are held by DRB TAGO. Details 

concerning the activities of British Army 

forces were for the most part extracted from 

an unpublished narrative of the Campaign 

in Tunisia which was prepared by the Historical Section, Cabinet Office, London, or 

were furnished in response to specific 

inquiries. 

For the activities of the Allied air forces 

in North Africa, the work of Thomas J. 

Mayock in Wesley F. Craven and James 

1. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, Vol. II, Europe-TORCH to 

POINTBLANK (Chicago, 1949), is indispensable. Historical reports of the Army 

Air Force are located in the Archives 

Branch, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 

Other records are scattered throughout the 
686 

AFHQ collection. Data concerning the 

Royal Air Force came chiefly from an operational narrative and statistics which were 

provided by the Air Historical Branch, Air 

Ministry, London. 

The information in the official records 

has been amplified, clarified, and interpreted in the light of the author's interviews and correspondence with participants, 

now filed in OCMH. Such evidence depends fundamentally on memory from five 

to eight years after the events. 

Material dealing with relations with the 

French have come from many sources. The 

files of the Liaison Section, AFHQ, and of 

the Joint Rearmament Committee, AFHQ, 

are in the AFHQ microfilm collection. 

Also of importance are Haute Cour de Justice, Le Proces du M arechal Pitain (Paris, 

1945), and a documentary appendix for an 

unpublished report by the U.S. Naval Commander, Europe (Admiral Harold R. 

Stark), which is entitled U.S.-French Relations, 1942-1944. A copy of the latter is 

held by OCMH. 

Certain combat records of French units 

operating in Tunisia were photo-copied for 

the files of OCMH by Mr. Marcel Vigneras 

with the co-operation of the Service Historique de FArmee, the Ministere de fa 

Guerre, and others in French Army. These 

consist of the Journaux de marche of the 

French divisions and armored brigade in 

Tunisia, of the Commandement superieur 

des troupes de Tunisie, and of the XIX 

Army Corps, and the report written in General Giraud's headquarters after the liberation of French North Africa. The account 

of German planning and operations is based 

on original records of the German Army 

and on a series of interrogation reports and 

monographs written by German officers 

after the war. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Included among original records are war 

diaries (KT E's) and their supporting papers~special orders, reports, telegrams, and 

conference minutes--of army, corps, and 

division headquarters. These documents are 

in the Captured Records Section of the Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, 

Virginia. German naval, air force, and diplomatic records were also used to some 

extent. 

The interrogation reports and monographs were prepared under the direction 

of the Historical Division, USAREUR, by 

German officers relying at first on unaided 

memory, and later, on memory supported 

by copies of pertinent records, and by discussion with other participants. The Foreign Studies Branch, OCMH, has custody 

of such writings. They are mainly concerned 

with matters of strategy, logistics, and command and are supplemented by a series of 

briefer es~ays on a wide range of topics, including the tactical history of certain task 

forces in Tunisia. The author used these 

memoirs in manuscript form; subsequently 

some of the writers published the substance 

in books which appeared too late for 

consultation. 

Contemporary archives relating to Italian forces in Northwest Africa are confined 

to those arising from Italy's association with 

Germany in the Axis partnership, and to 

German-Italian military-diplomatic relations. Some of Mussolini's papers have survived, either in the records of AFHQ or 

elsewhere, and Italian policy is recorded in 

a special group of Count Ciano's Papers 

which fell into German hands and were 

translated into German, the form in which 

they were recovered at the end of the war. 

Copies of these papers are in OCMH. Material on Italian operations was also available in the volumes covering the North 
NOTE ON SOURCES 

African campaign published by the Ministry 

of Defense, Army General Staff, Rome, 

Italy, and from other published postwar 

narratives. Extracts from the diary of Chief 

of the Italian Armed Forces Staff (Co687 

mando Supremo) have been published 

under the title: U go Conte Cavallero, C 0-

mando Supremo (Rome, 1948). 

Secondary sources are listed only in the 

footnote citations. 
AAF 

AAR 

ABC 

ACofS 

Admin 

Adv 

AF 

AFCP 

AFHQ 

AGF 

AGWAR 

Amph 

Anlage 

Annd 

Arty 

ASC 

BAR 

BLT 

Bn 

Br. 

grig 

CCA, CCB, CCC, CCD 

CCS 

CG 

CIA 

CinC 

CNO 

CO 

Co 

Comdr 

Commandement de l'Est 

Saharien 

COMNAVEU 

Conf 

Conv 

COS 

Cosintrep 

CP 

Glossary 

Army Air Forces 

After action report 

American-British Conversations 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

Administration 

Advance 

Allied Force 

Allied Force Command Post 

Allied Force Headquarters 

Army Ground Forces 

Adjutant General, War Department (Washington) 

Amphibious, amphibian 

Appendix or annex 

Annored 

Artillery 

Air support command 

Browning automatic rifle 

Battalion landing team 

Battalion 

British 

Brigade or brigadier 

Combat Command A, B, C, and D 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Commanding general 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Commander in Chief 

Chief of Naval Operatir)lls 

Commanding officer 

Company 

Commander 

Eastern Saharan Group 

Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Europe 

Conference 

Conversation 

Chiefs of Staff Committee (British) 

Combined situation and intelligence report 

Command post 
GLOSSARY 

CRS DRB TAGO 

CSTT 

CT 

CTF 

CTG 

Ctr 

D/A 

Dept 

Detachement de Couverture 

Div 

DMC 

Doc 

DWStK 

EAF 

EAP 

EBS 

Engr 

Env 

ETF 

ETOUSA 

Exec 

FA 

Fuehrungsgruppe 

Fuehrungsstab 

G-l 

G-2 

G-3 

G-4 

GenStdH 

GO 

Gp 

Heeresgruppe 

Hist 

Incl 

Inf 

Info 

Instrucs 

Intell 

Interv 

Captured Records Section, Departmental Records 

Branch, The Adjutant General's Office 

Commandement Superieur des Troupes de Tunisie 

(Tunisian Troop Command) 

Combat team 

Center Task Force 

Commander, Task Group 

Center 

Department of the Army 

Department 

Cover Force 

Division 

Division de marche de Constantine (Constantine 

Division) 

Document 

Deutsche Waffen Stillstandkommission (German 

Armistice Commission) 

Eastern Assault Force 

Eastern Assault Plan 

Eastern Base Section 

Engineer 

Envelope 

Eastern Task Force 

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

Executive 

Field Artillery 

Operations group 

Operations staff 

Personnel Officer of division or higher staff 

Intelligence 

Plans and operations 

Logistics and supply 

Generalstab des H eeres (General Staff of the Army) 

General order 

Group 

Army group 

History or historical 

Inclosure 

Infantry 

Information 

Instructions 

Intelligence 

Interview 

689 
690 

JCS 

Jnl 

JSM 

Kampf gruppe 

Kasta 

KTB 

LCM 

LCP 

LCP (R) 

LCV 

LST 

Lt Comdr 

LVT 

Maint 

Micro 

Mil 

Min 

Mise 

Msg 

Mvmt 

NAF 

NATOUSA 

NC 

NCXF 

Ob d H 

OBSlJED 

OB WEST 

Oberkommando 

Obsn 

Obsr 

OCT 

OKH 

OKL 

OKM 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Journal 

Joint Staff Mission (British) 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

German combat group of variable size 

Kampfstaffel (combat detachment) 

K riegstagebuch (war diary) 

Landing craft, mechanized 

Landing craft, personnel 

Landing craft, personnel (ramp) 

Landing craft, vehicle 

Landing ship, tank 

Lieutenant commander 

Landing vehicle, tracked 

Maintenance 

Microfilm 

Military 

Minutes 

Miscellaneous 

Message 

Movement 

North Africa 

North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

Naval commander 

Naval Commander Expeditionary Force 

Oberbefehlshaber des H eeres (Commander in Chief 

of the Army) 

Oberbefehlshaber Sued (Headquarters, Commander in Chief South [southern Germany and 

several army groups on the Eastern Front]) 

Oberbefehlshaber West (Headquarters, Commander in Chief West [France, Belgium, and the 

Netherlands] ) 

Headquarters of an army or higher military organization 

Observation 

Observer 

Office, Chief of Transportation 

Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) 

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe High 

Command) 

Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (Navy High 

Command) 
GLOSSARY 

OKW 

Op (H) 

Org Abt 

OPD 

Opn 

Opnl 

OSS 

Par 

Prep 

Plat 

Rad 

RAF 

Rcd 

Rcn 

RCT 

Regt 

Rev 

RLG 

RN 

RNR 

Rpt 

S-1 

S-2 

S-3 

S-4 

SCR 

SD 

S.LM. 

S.LS. 

Sec 

Secy 

Sitrep 

SNO 

SNOL 

SOE 

SOS 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces 

High Command) 

Operations A bteilung (H) (Operations Branch 

Army) 

Organizations Abteilung (staff section in charge of 

organization) 

Operations and Plans Division 

Operation 

Operational 

Office of Strategic Services 

Paragraph 

Preparation 

Platoon 

Radiogram 

Royal Air Force 

Record 

Reconnaissance 

Regimental combat team 

Regiment 

Revised 

Regimental landing group 

Royal Navy 

Royal Navy Reserve 

Report 

Personnel section of a unit not having a general staff 

Military intelligence section of a unit not having a 

general staff 

Operations and training section of a unit not having 

a general staff 

Supply and evacuation section of a unit not having 

a general staff 

Signal Corps radio 

Sicherheitsdienst des Reichfuehrers SS (The Nazi 

Party Security Service) 

Italian Army Intelligence 

Italian Naval Intelligence 

Section 

Secretary 

Situation report 

Senior Naval Officer 

Senior Naval Officer Landings 

Special Operations Executive 

Services of Supply 

691 
692 

SP 

Spec 

Sub 

Sum 

Supp 

TAG 

TD 

Telg 

TF 

Tng 

Trans 

Transl 

USFOR 

USN 

WDCSA 

WFSt 

WTF 

Self -propelled 

Special 

Subject 

Summary 

Supplementary 

The Adjutant General 

Tank destroyer 

Telegram 

Task force 

Training 

Transportation 

Translation 

U.S. Forces (London) 

U.S. Navy 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army 

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Armed Forces Operations Staff) 

Western Task Force 
ANTON 

ARCADIA 

AUSLADUNG 

BOLERO 

BREASTPLATE 

CAPRI 

EILBOTE 

FELIX 

FLAX 

FRUEHLINGSWIND 

GYMNAST 

HERKULES 

HUSKY 

MINERVA 

MORGENLUFT 

OCHSENKOPF 

OLIVENERNTE 

PERPETUAL 

POINTBLANK 

Code Names 

German occupation of southern France, up to this 

time unoccupied and under the administration of 

Vichy France, 1O~11 November 1942 

U.S.-British staff conference at Washington, Decem· 

ber 1941 ~ January 1942 

German secondary attack, part of Operation 

OCHSENKOPF, designed to extend the Tunis 

bridgehead in the north 

Build-up of troops and supplies in the United Kingdom in preparation for a cross-Channel attack 

Seaborne attack on Sousse mounted in Malta, 

planned but not attempted 

Plan for attack against Medenine 

German operation to capture the Kebir river dam 

and drive the French off the Eastern Dorsal, 

January 1943 

Plan to capture Gibraltar and close the straits 

Program to choke off the air supply line from Italy 

German (Fifth Panzer Army) attack against Sidi 

Bou Zid, February 1943 

Plan of 1941 for invasion of French North Africa 

Planned German operation to capture Malta in 

1942 

Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 

Embarkation of Gen. Henri Giraud from southern 

France,6 November 1942 

German (Africa Corps) attack against Gafsa, after 

Operation FRUEHLINGSWIND, February 

1943 

German operation to extend the Tunis bridgehead 

by capturing Bedja and Medjez el Bab, 26 February 1943 

German planned operation to capture Medjez el 

Bab in January 1943. Not executed. 

Eastern Task Force reserve landing at Bougie, 11 

November 1942 

The Combined Bomber Offensive from the United 

Kingdom against Germany 
694 

PUGILIST-GALLOP 

RESERVIST 

RETRIBUTION 

ROOFTREE 

ROUNnL'P 

SATIN 

SCIPIO 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Offensive to outflank Mareth Line 

Seizure of vital points at Oran and landing of Allied 

forces to prevent sabotage in the harbor 

Plan to prevent any of the enemy from reaching 

I tali an territory if they should attempt to evacuate Tunisia ( April-June 1943) 

Joint Army-Navy Plan for Participation in TORCH 

Various 1941--43 plans for a cross-Channel attack 

Allied attack toward Sfax, December 1942. Not 

executed. 

Eighth Army attack at the Akarit wadi, 6 April 

1942 

SEA LION (SEELOEWE) The German planned invasion of England in 1940-

41 

SLEDGEHAMMER 

STURMFLUT 

SUPERCHARGE 

SUPER-GYMNAST 

SYMBOL 

TERMINAL 

THESEUS 

TORCH 

WOP 

Plan for a limited-objective attack across the Channel in 1942 designed either to take advantage of 

a crack in German morale or as a "sacrifice" operation to aid the Russians 

German (Rommel's) operation against Kasserine 

Pass and Sbiba gap, 19-22 February 1943 

Operations by the Eighth Army in the Western 

Desert in November 1942 

Plan for Anglo-American invasion of French North 

Africa, combining U.S. and British plans and 

often used interchangeably with GYMNAST 

Casablanca Conference, 14-23 January 1943 

Operation in harbor of Algiers, 8 November 1942 

Planned German operation for Libya, 1942 

The Allied invasion operation in North Africa, November 1942 

Opening attack by II Corps against Gafsa, 17 

March 1943 
Basic Military Map Symbols * 

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within 

a triangle an obse'rvation post, and within a circle a supply 

point. 

Military Units-Identification 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Armored Command 

Army Air Forces. 

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery 

Cavalry, Horse 

Cavalry, Mechanized. 

Chemical Warfare Service. 

Coast Artilkry 

Engineers 

Infantry .. 

Medical Corps 

Ordnance Department. 

Quartermaster Corps. 

Signal Corps 

Tank Destroyer. 

Transportation Corps 

Veterinary Corps. 

~ 

I~I 

B 

~ 

C2J 

~ 

IT] 

EE 

[TI 

C8J 

EE 

[K] 

[§J 

IT] 

ITol 

[IDJ 

[S2] 

Airhorne units are designated by comhining a gull wing 

symbol with the' arm or service symbol: 

Airhorne Artillery. 

Airborne Infantry 

*For COlllplt-tc li~ting of symbols in liSl' during the \,,"odd \Var II period. sec 

Ftvl 21 Jo, dated October 19+:L from which tlH'~(, arc taken. 
696 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Size Symbols 

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or 

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying 

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization: 

Squad • 

Section. •• 

Platoon ••• 

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight 

Battalion, cav'alry squadron, or Air Force squadron II 

Regiment or !STOUp; combat team (with abbre\'iation CT following identifying numeral) III 

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force 

vVing x 

XX 

XXX 

XXXX 

YXXXX 

Division or Command of an Air Force 

Corps or Air Force 

Army 

Group of Armies. 

EXAMPLES 

The letter or number to the kft of the symbol indicates the 

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent 

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below 

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines: 

Company A, 1:17th Infantry A~137 

8th Field Artillery Battalion 

Combat Command A, 1 st Armored Division. 

Observation Post, 23d Infantry. 

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division 

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry 

Weapons 

Machine gun 

Gun 

Gun battery 

Howitzer or Mortar 

Tank 

Self-propelled gun 

8 8 

AI~II 1)..' 

~23 

~5 137 

-111-

138 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The following volumes have been published or are in press: 

The \Var Department 

Chip;{ojStafJ Prewar Plans and Preparation.> 

v'Vashington Command Post: Thf' Opf'mtiol7s Division 

Slnllegic Planningfor (:oaliliorl Warfare: 1941-1942 

Slralegir Plmmingfor Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 

Global Logistics and 5;tralegy: 1940-1943 

Global Logistics and Strafeg:;: 1943-1945 

The Arm)' and Fcollomir ;'vlo/Jilization 

The Army and Industrial Manpower 

The Army Ground Forces 

Thl' Organization of Ground Combat TroojJS 

Thl' Procuremmt and Training of Ground Combat Troops 

The Army Service Forces 

The Organization and Role o/lhe "1mlJ Servia Fora:s 

The Western Hemisphere 

17U' Framework of Hemisphere Defense 

Guarding the United Slale, and Its Outposts 

The War in the Pacific 

The Fall of the Philippines 

Guadalmnal: The Fint O[j('nsive 

Victory in Pajnw 

CARTWHf<~EL The Hl'durliorl ofRabaul 

Seizure althe Gilberts and Marshalls 

Camjmig!l in the /lc1fl17ana5 

The Approach to the PhililJpines 

Leyte: The Return to the PhilitJpines 

Triumph in the Philif)pines 

Ollinawa: The I~ast Ballle 

Strategy and Cmnmand: The Fint Tuw lean 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

Northwest Afrim: Seizing the Initiative in the West 

Sici(V and the Surrender of Italy 

Salerno to Cassino 

Cassino to the Alps 

The European Theater of Operations 

Cross-Channel Altark 

Breakout and Pursuit 

nw Lorraine Cam/Jai,rsn 

1ile Siegfried Line Campai,l.,rrI 

The Ardennes: Batlie of the BU(lJe 

'171(, hlst Offensive 

'171(, Supreme Command 
698 NORTHWEST AFRICA 

hJgislical SUjJjJOrt of the Armies, Volume I 

Logislical Support rif'the Armies, Volume 1l 

The Middle East Theater 

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia 

The China-Burma-India Theater 

StilweW5 Mission to China 

StilweWI' Command Problems 

Time Runs OUl in CBI 

The Technical Services 

The Chemical Warfmy Service: Organizing for War 

The Chemical Warfare Service: From I~aboratory to Field 

The Chemical Warfare Servia': Chemicals in Combat 

The Corps of Engine en: Trooj}s and Equipment 

The Corj}s of ~'ngineers: The War Against Japan 

The Corps of J~ngineers: The War Against Germany 

The Corps of Enginrers: Military Construction in the United States 

T'he Medical Department: Ho,lpitalizalion and Evacualion; Zone of Inlenor 

The Mediral j)epartment: Meriiral Srrvice in the Mrriilerranean and Minor 

Thealers 

The Medical Dej}([rtrnent: Medical Service in the f~'uropean Theater of OjJerations 

171e Ordnance Dej)(lrtment: Planning Munitions for Wrlr 

The Ordnance Departmrnt: Procurement and Suj}j}ly 

Thr Ordnance Drparlmrnt: On Beachhead and Balllrfront 

Thr (J.uartermaslrr Corj},l: Organization, SUpj)ly, and Servicr,l, Volume I 

The Quartermaster Corj}s: Organizalion, SUpj)ly, and Services, Volume II 

171e Quartermasler Corps: Operations in the War AgainsLJaj}{ln 

The Quartermaster Corps: OJ}erations in lhe War Againsl Germany 

The Signal Corps: The Emergenr) 

The Signal Corps: The Tesl 

The Sip:nal Corj},l: T'he Outcome 

The Transporlation Corps: Re,lj)(Jrlsibililies, Orp:anizalion, and OjJemtions 

Thr TransjJOrtation Corps: Movements, Training, and SUj}j}ly 

The TransjJortation Corj},l: OJ}erations Over5eas 

Special Studies 

Chronology: 1941-1945 

Military Relations BPlween lhe Unitrd States and Canada: 1939-1945 

Rearminp; the French 

Three Baliles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidl 

The Womrn ~5 Army Corj}s 

Civil A/lain: Soldiers Become Governor, 

Buyinp; Aircmft: Materiel Procuremenl j(}r lhe Army Air Forces 

Thr Employment of Nep:ro Troops 

Manhaltan: The Us. Army and lhe Alomic Bomb 

Pictorial Record 

Thr War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Ari?as 

Thr War Ap;ainst Germany: Europe and Adjacent Arras 

Thr War AgainsLJajHlr/ 
Index 

Aboulker, Jose: 189 

Adcock, Col. Clarence L.: 46 

Aegean Sea, coast defense of: 73 

Africa, Northwest, landings in. See Landings III 

Northwest Africa; TORCH. 

Agadir: 41, 179 

Ain Beida: 494 

Ain Bou Dries: 462-63 

Ain Djeloula: 377 

Ain Draham: 604-05 

Ain et Turk: 193n, 200-01, 213,224-25 

Ain M'lilla: 643, 657-58 

Ain Rebaou: 388-94,409,412,591 

Ain Sebaa: 142-43 

Ain Seymour: 330 

Ain Taya: 52, 246-47 

Ain Temouchent: 198 

Air actions: 109-10,601 

Air attacks 

Allied: 109-10, 139, 160-61, 279-80, 293-94, 

302, 306, 308, 310, 335-36, 379, 381-82, 398, 

412-13,467,470,473,518,573,577,600-02, 

649. See also Air-ground co-operation; Air 

support; Army Air Forces units; Northwest 

African Tactical Air Force; Western Desert 

Air Force. 

enemy: 110-11,112,114,187,248-49,257,272-

73,278,287,293-94,300, 315, 318-19, 374, 

391-92, 396, 397-98, 411-12, 419-20, 435-

36,462, 470, 573 

French, at Mehdia: 158, 159-60 

Air forces, Allied 

command structure and reorganization: 36-37, 

335, 354-55, 492-95 

missions assigned: 354-55 

strength in March: 573 

strength in Tunisia area: 295, 335n 

Air forces, enemy 

consolidation of in Tunisia: 370 

strength in Tunisia area: 295 

transfer from Tunisia to Sicily: 648-49 

Air forces, French: 21,40,52,118-19,193,230 

Air Forces Service Command: 493-94 

Air Forces Training Command: 493-94 

Air Officer, ETOUSA: 354-55 

Air Officer Commander in Chief, Middle East 

(Br.): 354-55 

Air Officer Commanding, Malta (Br.): 354-55 

Air reconnaissance 

Allied: 139, 640n 

enemy: 179-80,185-86,216,287,427,438,441-

42,465,469,530-31,565-66 

Air supply, enemy, at Tunis: 648-49 

Air support 

Allied: 36-37,46,48,50,53-54,61,109,110-

11,114,116,119-21,133,145,150,152-53, 

162-63, 165, 192-93, 204-05, 211-12, 215, 

216, 231-34, 236-37, 244, 278, 279-80, 

288-89, 299-300, 308-09, 314-15, 374, 381, 

383-84, 387-88, 391, 393, 401-02, 411-12, 

435-36,467-68,485-86,493-94,509,514-16, 

517-18, 527, 531, 532-33, 535-37, 547-48, 

556, 558-59, 562, 573-74, 585-86, 640, 672-

73 

enemy: 287-89, 291, 304-05, 307-08, 324, 338, 

367-68, 382, 406, 434, 449, 459, 467, 479, 

517-18, 529, 556, 558, 560-62, 572, 574n, 

582, 588, 637, 638 

French: 144-45, 154 

Air support parties: 280 

Air supremacy 

Allied: 335,493-94,527,573 

enemy: 21, 302, 316-17 

Air transport 

Allied: 212-13, 280 

enemy: 365-66, 601-02, 603 

Air-ground co-operation: 61,480-81,493-95,536-

37, 585n, 672-73 

Air-warning equipment, deficiency: 279-80 

Airborne operations 

Allied: 48,192,210-11,212-13,306,309 

enemy: 7, 53, 54, 440 

Aircraft, Allied, for French use: 499-500 

Aircraft losses 

Allied: 111, 139, 204-05, 212-13, 436n, 437, 

467-68, 467n, 477, 611 

enemy: 300-301,370,462,601 

French: 110-11, 139n, 158-59,204-05,207-08, 

211-12,218-19 

Aircraft, night-fighters: 293-94 

Airdromes. See Airfields. 

Airdrops: 212-13, 278-79, 289, 306, 309 

Airfields 

Allied: 21,41,46,48,49,52,278-79,592 

defense of: 490 

development: 335, 485, 493-95 

in Morocco, rehabilitation of: 180 

Thelepte, withdrawal from: 433, 437-38 

in Tunisia, protection of: 401-02 

enemy: 254-55, 366n, 370, 527 

Akarit wadi: 322,537-41. See also Chott position. 

Akers, Col. Russell F., Jr.: 224, 380-81, 448-49 

'Alam el Haifa: 75 
700 

Alexander, Gen. Sir Harold R. L. G.: 349, 353-54, 

489,492-93,537-38,545,550,552,564,569-

70,572-73,575-76,578-79,582-87,590-91, 

592, 598-600, 608-09, 644 

assigned to command 18th Army Group: 474-75 

assigned to command Middle East theater: 72 

directive from CinC: 485-87 

directive on regrouping forces: 475-76 

estimate of American troops: 475 

Patton's estimate of: 545n 

Alger, Lt. Col. James D.: 416-17, 421-22 

Algiers: 16, 17,292,352,496 

air attack, enemy: 248-49, 254, 293-94 

air support at: 230,231-34,236-37,244, 247-

48 

airfields at: 52,238-41 

AFHQ established: 309 

Allied strength, enemy estimates: 260 

armor support, Allied: 230, 248-4:9 

armor support, French: 52, 216, 247 

assault, character of, to be American: 50-51 

attack plan: 229-34,237,241-42 

beach organization: 230-31, 245-46 

casualties, Allied: 173, 243, 244n, 246, 248-49 

coastal defenses: 52, 230, 234-35, 236, 242-43, 

244 

communications: 235, 237-38 

debarkation at: 234-39, 241, 24348 

De Gaulle, arrival at: 669 

drainage systc-m: 51--52 

eastern landings: 244-49 

Eastern TF, departure of: 277-78 

first day's results: 240-41,251 

French, reaetion to assault: 186-87, 188-90, 

235-36, 236n, 238, 239, 243-44, 246, 249-51 

French forces in: 52 

French forces, treatment of: 251-52 

garrison strength: 229-30 

Giraud's association in: 188-90 

government, President's message to: 57 

highway system: 230-31 

importance of: 229 

landing operations: 52, 188, 234-36, 237-39, 

241, 244-45, 246-47 

marine obstacle at: 241-42 

military population: 495 

naval operations: 190-91,231-34, 244n, 248 

night operations: 241-49 

plans for operations at: 50-54 

political problems: 229, 249-51 

port facilities: 19 

prisoners, Allied: 244n 

prisoners, French: 248-49 

sabotage activities: 241, 244 

secured by Allies: 250-52 

security measures: 249 

seizure of: 229--52 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Algiers--Continued 

shore party at: 235 

surrender negotiations: 243-44, 249, 251-52 

TERMINAL Force operations: 241-44 

topography: 5152, 230~3J, 241-42 

Vichy attitude toward occupation: 250-51 

western landings: 235-38 

Algorab, USS: 153, 170n 

Allen, Capt. G. R. G. (RN): 195-96 

Allen, Maj. Gen. Terry: 47, 205, 213, 215, 220, 

223, 381-82, 45657, 463, 464, 468, 546-48, 

559-60, 614-15, 626, 632, 634, 636-37, 

656-57 

Allen, USS. See Henry T. Allen, USS. 

Allfrey, Gen. (Br.): 329-30, 331-32, 394-95,612 

Allied air forces, command reorganization: 354-55 

Allied Air Support Command: 492-93 

Allied Force Headquarters: 495. See also Allied 

Forces: Commander in Chief, Allied Force; 

Eisenh~wer, Gen. Dwight D. 

at Algiers: 309 

armistice terms, plans for: 57 

Axis strength, estimates of: 543 

Clark-Darlan negotiations: 262-69 

Darlan relations with: 265-69, 272 

Deput; Chief of Staff, appointment of: 33 

directive to Anderson: 401-02 

in England: 32-33 

at Gibraltar: 84 

Joint Rearmament Committee: 270,362 

North African Agreement: 269-70 

personnel strength: 495-96 

Poli tical Affairs Section: 54-57 

political missions, assignment by JCS: 55 

political warfare, plans for: 54-57 

propaganda activities: 54-57 

SOS request for supply plan: 66 

staff organization: 15, 33 

staff relations, results of experience: 674-75 

taxes, plans for collecting: 58 

Allied F orees 

activation: 33 

air command, unity of, established: 383-84 

air-ground co-operation, lack of: 480-81 

American tardiness, complaints of: 417, 

573, 590-91, 599600 

Anderson appointed to co-ordinate operations: 

383 

armor strength: 354n 

army groups, activation: 474-77 

boundary designations: 418 

British and Americans, juncture of: 576-77 

build-up after landing, rate of: 65, 65n, 66 

campaign experience, usefulness to: 669-77 

casualties in Tunisian campaign: 675 

Chief Civil Administrator for: 58-59 

Chief of Staff, appointment of: 33 
INDEX 

Allied Forces---Continued 

civil affairs, plans for administering: 5 7~59 

command organization and relations: 3 2~3 7, 

264~65, 350, 380~81, 382~86, 47071, 474-76, 

600n 

communications zone, reorganization: 494-99 

composition in Tunisia: 295-96 

consolidation in Tunisia: 373-76 

estimate of intentions, by enemy: 322 

Faid pass, result on of Axis attack: 392-93, 399 

financial activities, control of: 57-58 

Frcdendall assigned to command ground troops: 

385 

French collaboration, organizing: 272-73 

French commanders, criticism of appointment of: 

267-68, 270 

French West Africa, collaboration by: 270-72 

genesis: 15 

German appraisal of effort: 583n, 592n 

liaison organization: 485-86 

logistical support: 486, 495-99 

Ousseltia Valley operations, effect of: 382~83 

regrouping forces, directive on: 475-76 

reorganization of battle line: 427-30 

reorganization after victory: 665-68 

Rommel's estimate of strength: 510-11 

Rommel's proposal for countering: 322~24, 326 

Sicily, preparations for invading: 665-68 

southern sector, defense of: 442-43 

strength, enemy, estimates by: 260 

strength tables for U. S. forces, periodic: 679-81 

Tunisia, advance into: 277-80 

Tunisia, strength in: 335-36 

supply organization: 495-99 

weapons deficiencies: 479-81 

Allied Powers, recognition of French Committee of 

National Liberation by: 671 

Allison, Col. Richard: 211 n 

Almaack, USS: 71, 235, 24445, 246 

Ambrosio, Gen. (It.): 369, 469-70, 502, 645~4 7 

Ambushes: 284,306-07,506-07,671-72 

Ammunition supply 

Allied: 139-40, 217, 607 

enemy: 611, 611n, 634, 640-41, 648-49 

Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet: 60, 62, 68-70 

Amphibious training: 60-63,89, 103-04, 185 

Anderson, Maj. Gen. Jonathan W.: 42,42n, 121, 

128, 132, 136, 139, 145, 172-73 

Anderson, Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N: 63, 71, 84, 

279-80, 291, 295-96, 298, 326, 336-37, 343~ 

44, 349-52, 355, 383-84, 399, 401-02, 403~ 

05,423,430,432-34,443, 456-57, 468, 475, 

486-87, 489, 599, 632, 643, 644-45, 667-71 

appointed Eastern TF commander: 35, 252 

appointed to co-ordinate operations: 383 

background: 35n 

directives to on operations: 384-86, 401-02 

701 

Anderson, Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N.-Continued 

mission as commander of Eastern TF: 51 

proposal for withdrawal to west: 423-24 

proposes seizure of Philippeville and Bone: 53 

Andrus, Brig. Gen. Clift: 220-21 

Anfa Conference: 352--54 

Anne Arundel, USS: 153 

Anthony, USS. See Susan B. Anthon", USS. 

Antiaircraft defense 

Allied: 118, 119, 138~39, 205-05, 374-76, 462, 

516, 574, 574n 

enemy, at Mareth position: 527-28 

Antiaircraft installations, attack on at Fedala: 128 

Antiaircraft units 

105th Coast Artillery Battalion: 199n, 461 n, 462 

106th Separate Coast Artillery Battalion: 195-

96, 195n, 21~ 210n, 378n 

106th Coast Artillery Regiment: 430n 

107th Coast Artillery Regiment: 578-79 

213th Coast Artillery Regiment: 430n, 443, 547-

48 

434th Coast Artillery Battalion: 614-20 

443d Antiaircraft Battalion: 121, 138-40, 376, 

387n, 391n, 392n, 396n, 411, 416-17, 419n, 

461n, 462, 549n, 565n 

692d Coast Artillery Battalion: 158-59 

Anti-British alliance, enemy plans for: 5 

Anti-Semitism: 356 

Antitank defense 

Allied: 394, 397-98 

enemy: 393-94, 420-21, 522-23, 537-38, 539-

40 

ARCADIA Conference: 10 

ARCADIA Program, revision of: II 

Arco dei Fileni, enemy planning conference: 323~ 

24 

Areole: 221-22 

Arcturus, USS: 140,145 

Argus, HMS: 231~34, 278 

Armistice negotiations. See Surrender negotiations. 

Armor support 

Allied: 102,105,107-08,109,114-16, 121, 128, 

14344, 145, 14950, 152-53, 160-65, 192, 

211, 215, 216-20, 222-23, 248-49, 291-92, 

306,307,314,315,31617,328,331,341,378-

79, 386~88, 393-94, 406-07, 440, 451, 453, 

464, 466-67, 516, 535, 539, 555, 556-57, 582, 

585-90, 623~24, 634-38, 639, 641~42, 642n, 

649-50, 657 

enemy: 312, 318~19, 320, 374, 393-94, 406, 

407-09, 456, 516~17, 539-40, 556n 

French: 156-57, 160-61,239,247 

Armor-versus-armor actions: 139, 161-62, 168-69, 

209-12, 300-301, 30405, 315-16, 317-18, 

411-15, 434-35, 465, 559-63, 569-73, 591, 

610-11,642,656-57,659-60. See also Armor 

support. 
702 

Armored car action: 200-201, 207-08, 248-49 

Armored division, organization: 590-92 

Armored divisions. See also Combat commands. 

1st: 112-13, 227, 305-06, 352, 354, 374-76, 

385-88, 397, 398-99, 403, 406-07, 412-13, 

420, 427, 428-30, 435-36, 443, 467-68, 470-

73, 477-78, 487, 490-92, 544-50, 552-53, 

556-57, 558-59, 564-67, 569-70, 572, 575-

77, 599-600, 605-07, 614, 625-26, 638-43, 

652-56, 658-59, 667-68 

2d: 42,61,179-80,180-81,332,546,575-76 

Armored Engineer Battalions 

16th: 195n, 197, 210, 210n, 378n, 387n, 391n, 

392n, 396n, 399, 416-17, 419n, 430n, 435, 

443, 461n, 472-73, 477-78, 548n, 549n, 570n, 

639-40, 642-43, 642n, 660 

17th: 121 

Armored Field Artillery Battalions 

27th: 195n, 210n, 223, 315, 319-20, 328, 331, 

378n, 433-35, 461n, 462, 638-39, 642n, 660 

58th: 549n, 565n, 656n, 659 

62d: 565n, 614-20 

68th: 387-88, 387n, 392n, 396n,413,419n,420-

22, 430n, 431, 435, 461n, 462, 548n, 549n, 

570n, 586-87, 660-61 

78th: 121 

9lst: 391n, 392n, 411, 411n, 421, 430n, 431, 

477-78, 550,638-39, 656n, 659 

Armored forces, Allied 

Casablanca, start for: 114-15 

comparison with enemy: 316-17 

concept of balanced team: 291-92 

critique of tactical employment: 672,673-74 

effect on enemy plans: 310 

at Fedala, air attack on: 139 

at Mateur: 642n 

misuse at Djebel el Guessa: 329 

Oran, plans for use at: 48-49 

ports required for landing: 40-41 

Safi, scheduled landing at: 41 

strength in Allied Force: 354 

transports for, availability: 44 

Armored forces, enemy 

merger of, in Tunis drive: 612-13, 612n 

misuse: 371-72 

North Tunisia, plans for use in: 602-03 

tactical methods: 479-80 

Tunisia area, strength in: 335-36, 371, 611, 

612n, 648-49 

Armored forces, French: 21, 52, 108, 230 

Armored Infantry Regiments 

6th: 195n, 202, 210, 210n, 218-19, 315, 319-20, 

328, 332n, 378n, 387-88, 391-92, 392n, 394, 

413-14,416-17, 419n,430n, 431, 433-34,435, 

452, 453-54, 455-56, 461n, 462-64, 549n, 

554-55, 556, 565n, 570n, 620-21, 624-26, 

638-39, 642n, 656n, 659, 660n 

41st: 121 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Armored Medical Battalion, 47th: 195n, 210n, 

378n, 387n, 392n, 419n 

.A.rmored Reconnaissance Squadron, 91 st: 614-21, 

654-55, 656n, 659-60 

Armored Regiments 

1st: 210-11,217-19,223, 284n, 296, 298n, 299-

301,311,314,316-17,326-27,331,332,332n, 

391n, 392, 392n, 393-94, 411-22, 411n, 430n, 

432, 477-78, 505-06, 565n, 570n, 571, 634-

35, 656n, 657, 659-61 

3d: 150,153,154,161,162 

13th: 49, 195n, 196,210, 210n, 292, 298n, 303, 

307,307-08,311,315-17,328,331-32,378n, 

380,387-88, 387n, 392n, 396n, 416-17, 419n, 

421, 430-32, 430n, 433-35, 448-49, 449-50, 

455, 461, 461 n, 462-64, 546-47, 548, 548n, 

549~ 570n, 572, 623-26, 642~ 655-57, 659-

61 

67th: 102,116,121,122,140,144-45, 332n 

Armored Signal Company, 141st: 195n, 21On, 387n 

Armored Support Battalion, 1 st: 210n 

Army Air Forces, concept of tactical air support by: 

61, 493-94, 573-74, 585n, 672-73 

Army Air Forces units 

XII Air Support Command: 43n, 116, 145, 150, 

153, 291-92, 294, 383, 433, 467-68, 493-95, 

497-98,576-77,649n 

XII Bomber Command: 354-55, 492-93 

14th Fighter Group: 293-94 

31st Fighter Group: 212n 

52d Fighter Group: 212n 

64th Troop Carrier Group: 278-79 

97th Bombardment Group: 293-94 

Army Gro.up Africa: 369-70,374,474-77,509-10, 

512-13,519-21,525,529,540-41,544,552-

53, 559-60, 592, 602, 604, 610-11, 612-13, 

647-48,650-51,663,667 

Rommel assigned as commander: 474-75, 476 

Army Groups 

activation: 474-77 

15th: 667 

18th: 354, 474-75, 485-94, 496-97, 521, 573, 

576-77,582-83,591-600,608-09,613,644-

45, 652-53 

Alexander assigned to command: 474-75 

command structure: 486-89 

disbanded: 667 

plans for March: 543-45,550-53,556-57, 

564-65, 569-71, 572-73 

staff structure: 486-87 

Army-Navy Joint Board, succeeded by JCS: 37 

Army-Navy TORCH Committee, decisions formulated for ROOFTREE: 39 
INDEX 

Arnin, von Gen. Juergen: 333, 338, 342, 349-50, 

363,370,370-71,373-74,376,394-95,405-

06, 409-10, 425-27 436-37, 438-42, 455-56, 

476, 479n, 501-09, 521, 523n, 535-36, 539-

40, 541-42, 603, 611, 612-13, 645-50, 651, 

662 

Bedja, directive on: 501-04 

Bedja, proposal for seizing: 441-42 

Chott position, directive on: 529-30 

estimate of Axis strength: 510 

Gafsa, plan for: 546 

Kairouan, estimate of Allied effort at: 592n 

review of situation in February: 509-12 

succeeds Rommel: 519 

supply tonnages, estimate of: 510, 512-13 

surrender of: 664-65 

Tunisia, assumes command in: 326, 363 

Arnold, General of the Army Henry H.: 14 

Arram: 523, 527-28 

Artillery support 

Allied: 108, 121, 139-40, 143, 144, 145, 157-

58, 157n, 159, 162-63, 164-65, 167-68, 208, 

220-21, 227, 228, 230-31, 234, 303, 331, 

336-37, 379, 382, 387-88, 393-94, 395-96, 

406-07,411,413,421,431,433-34,447,453, 

454-55,459, 462, 463-6~ 46~ 467, 47~ 516, 

518, 519, 531-533, 535, 536-37, 539-40, 

547-48, 550, 555, 557-58, 559, 560-62, 570-

71,574, 574n, 575, 577, 581-82, 585-87, 614, 

616-18, 618n, 622, 623-24, 625-26, 629-30, 

632-33,635,638,640,642-43,649,655,656-

57, 658-59. See also Armored Field Artillery 

Battalions; Field Artillery Battalions. 

enemy: 319-20,374,407-09,413-14,420,449, 

452-53,453-54,518, 556n, 558, 560-62, 571, 

572,576,587,588-89, 610-11, 617, 618-19, 

623,635,636-37,638,640,642-43,659 

fire on own units: 581-82 

French, at Oran: 217-19, 218n 

infantry fails to benefit from: 671-72 

Arundel, USS. See Anne Arundel, USS 

Arzew: 193, 220-21, 225 

aircraft losses, French: 207-08 

armored cars, French, destroyed: 207-08 

artillery support, Allied: 208 

city secured: 207-08 

coastal defenses neutralized: 205-06 

command structure, Allied: 205n 

defenses of: 48 

landings along gulf: 205-07 

naval support at: 205 

plans for seizure: 48-49 

port operation: 499n 

port secured: 206 

prisoners, French: 207-08 

Ranger force action: 205-06 

topography: 47 

Assault boats. See Landing craft. 

Astier, d', Henri: 189 

Astier de la Vigerie, d', Gen. Fran<;ois: 356 

A tlantic, Battle of: 11 

Atlantic Base Section: 495-96 

Atlantic Coast: 89-180 

Atlas Mountains: 89-180 

703 

Augusta, USS: 68-69, 74, 116, 128, 131, 131n, 

134, 143 

Aurora, HMS: 192-93, 199,222-23 

Austin, Capt. Edward: 434 

Automobiles. See Motor convoy operations; Motor 

vehicles. 

Avenger, HMS: 231-34 

Aviation fuel. See POL. 

Awatea, HMS: 234-36, 278 

Axis forces 

Allied intentions, estimate by: 322 

Americans, estimate of: 582,673-74 

Arco dei Fileni conference: 323-24 

armor, methods of employment: 479-80 

Arnim assumes command: 326, 363 

assault on II Corps: 401-22 

attack, halt in: 424-27 

boundaries in Tunisia: 370-72,405-06 

coastal plain, pursuit to: 539-42 

collapse of in Tunisia: 659-78 

command reorganization: 368-70, 441, 475, 

476-77, 519-20 

dispo$ition in Tunisia: 294-95, 312-13, 333-35, 

370-72, 401-02, 647-49, 650-51 

February battles, objectives in: 477 

France, alert in: 187 

French, break with: 287-88 

French shipping, use of: 367-68 

Goering conference of commanders: 325-26 

Hitler, directives from: 322-23, 363-64, 369-70 

Hitler's review of capabilities in February: 511-

12, 513-14 

impressions of campaign on: 673-74 

initiative during transitional period: 372 

Italian shipping, supply by: 645-48 

I talians, distrust of: 540-41 

Italy, Concern over invasion of: 601-02 

Kesselring's directive to Nehring: 311, 322 

Kesselring's review of capabilities in February: 

509·-12 

lines of communication in Tunisia: 401-02 

logistical support: 324-25 

materiel shortages: 373-74 

Mediterranean operations, responsibility for: 

363-64, 368-69 

Messe's review of capabilities in February: 510-

11 

morale, state of: 512,541-42 

Mussolini's agreement on capabilities: 513-14 

north Tunisia, proposal for holding: 601-03 
704 

Axis forces-Continued 

northeast Tunisia, pursuit to: 539-42 

Ousseltia valley, tactical attitude in: 382 

ports, use of in supply: 365-66 

principle of mass, violation of: 479-80 

Rastenburg conference: 363-64, 368 

relations among troops: 528-30 

reorganization for defense: 333-35 

Rommel's proposal for merger: 405-06 

Rommel's review of capabilities in February: 

509-12 

Schloss Klessheim conference of commanders: 

601-02 

shipping losses during campaign: 683 

shipping requirements: 365 

Soviet Union, proposal for compromise with: 

601-602, 676 

strategic decisions for Tunisia: 321-26 

strength, Arnim's estimate: 510 

strength, Rommel's forces, estimate of: 354n 

strength in Tunisia: 291-92,294-95, 603n, 604n 

success, failure to exploit: 426-27 

supply levels required: 363, 365-66, 512-13 

supply shipments during campaign: 368, 682 

tactical methods: 479-80 

TORCH success, reaction to: 253-54 

troop quality, Fischer's criticism: 315-16 

troop shipments during campaign: 682, 683 

Tunis, strategic importance of: 513-14 

Tunis stalemate, revision of plans after: 363-72 

Tunisia, estimate of capabilities in: 645-47 

Tunisia, juncture of forces in: 364-65, 368-69, 

371-72 

Tunisia operations, directive for: 288-90, 476-

77, 645-47, 665-67 

Azemour: 114 

Bachaquero (Maracaibo): 196-98 

Badoglio, Marshal Pietro (11.): 6 

Baer, Lt. Col. Dewey H.: 283 

Bahiret Foussana valley: 445-46,455-57,460-61, 

474 

II Corps boundaries established: 467-68 

attack, Allied: 471-73,478 

attack, enemy: 463 

armor support, Allied: 463-64 

artillery support, Allied: 463-64 

communications, Allied: 463-64 

counterattack, Allied: 464 

materiel losses, Allied: 463 

materiel losses, enemy: 464 

reinforcements, Allied: 463, 469 

Baier, Major Hans (Ger.): 662 

Baker, Lt. Col. Herschel D.: 434 

Bald Hill: 306-09, 373, 614-21. See also Djefna 

position. 

Balearic Islands, enemy proposal for seizing: 601-

02 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Balkans, as flank security for Germany: 6 

Banking activities. See Financial activities. 

Barb, USS: 103 

Barenthin, Col. Walther (Ger.): 289-90 

Baril, Col. (Fr.): 189,236,239 

Barlow, Major Rudolph: 223,300 

Barnegat, USS: 70, 169 

Barrage de rOued Kebir: 330, 337, 376-83 

Barrau, Gen. Jean (Fr.): 271-72 

Barre, Gen. Georges (Fr.): 273,279,283,286-87, 

296,298,326-27,330,350-51,650 

evasion of Axis demands: 254-60, 287 

forbidden to act against Axis: 287 

views on support of TORCH: 78 

Bassenge, Gen. Kurt (Ger.): 604, 647-48, 662 

Bastico, Marshal Ettore (It.): 323, 324-25, 363-

64 

Batory, SS: 195-96 

Battalion landing teams. See Infantry Regiments; 

Regimental Combat Teams. 

Batterie du Lazaret: 230,244,246-47,248-49 

Batterie du Pont Blondin: 118,127,129-30 

Batterie EI Hank: 133,134,142,145 

Bayerlein, Gen. (Ger.): 519, 536, 540-42, 590, 

604, 609 

Bayonet attack, at Hill 369: 568 

Beach matting, use of: 195 

Beach organization: 192,230-31,245-46 

Beatty, USS: 104-05 

Beaufre, Capt. Andre (Fr.): 84 

Beckett, 1st Lt. William: 218 

Bedja: 259-60, 279, 287, 288-89, 290-91, 298-99, 

326, 374, 379, 490, 508-09, 600-01, 604, 608 

attacks on, enemy: 290-91,293-94,502-09 

Kesselring's directive on: 501-04 

railhead: 607 

seizure, Arnim's proposal for: 441-42 

supply point: 651 

tank losses, enemy: 290-91 

Bell, Ensign John J.: 103-06 

Ben Gardane: 517,522,526-27 

Ben Koceine River: 659 

Benalbenech, HMS: 196, 198 

Beni Kreddache: 517, 524-25, 527-28 

Bennehof, Capt. Olten R. (USN): 187-88 

Bennett, Rear Adm. Andrew C.: 50, 225 

Benson, Col. Clarence C.: 547, 549, 556-57, 569-

70, 576, 656, 660-61. See also Task Force 

Benson. 

Bentley, Col. William C., Jr.: 212-13,225-27 

Berardi, Generale di Corpo d' Armata Paolo (It.): 

527-28 

Bergeret, Gen. (Fr.): 357-58 

Bergeron, Gen. (Fr.): 351,650 

Bergolo, de, Gen. Calvi (It.): 546 

Bermuda, HMS: 231,248 

Bernadou, USS: 97, 102-05, 114 
INDEX 

Bernard, Lt. Col. Lyle W.: 121,125,129-30 

Bethouart, Maj. Gen. Emile (Fr.): 80,92-95,131-

32, 176-77, 188,265 

Bieri, Rear Adm. Bernhard H.: 174 

Billings, Major William H.: 138 

Billot, Lt. Comdr. G. P. (RNR): 202, 203-04 

Bir el Hafey: 348, 390-91, 409, 413, 546, 548-49 

Bir Mrabott: 386-87 

Bir Touta: 234-35 

Bird, Capt. Edward W.: 237-38, 637-38 

Birmandrels: 240-41 

Biskra: 335 

Biter, HMS: 192-93 

Bizerte: 17, 257-59, 272-73, 277, 280, 288-90, 

295-96, 305, 365-67,485, 501, 595, 599-600, 

659-60,662 

advance beyond: 654-55 

air attack, Allied: 293-94,601 

amphibious landing: 309 

armor action: 659-60 

artillery support, enemy: 659 

attack plans, Allied: 600-601, 652-53 

casualties, Allied: 309 

coastal defenses: 294-95 

communications, Allied: 309 

counterbattery action: 654-55 

defense reorganization, enemy: 333-35 

engineer support: 653-54 

ground observation from: 654-55 

mines, employment: 653-54 

reinforcements, Allied: 659-60 

seizure of: 644-45,651-55 

surrender of French to enemy: 321 

tank losses, Allied: 659-60 

threat to, Allied: 640 

withdrawal by Allies: 309 

withdrawal by enemy: 654 

BLACKSTONE operation: 42 

BLACKSTONE Sub-Task Force: 101-15 

Blade Force: 613-14 

Bledsoe, Major Carl E.: 150 

Blida: 294, 335 

Blida airfield, seizure of: 52,238-41 

Bliss, USS. See Tasker H. Bliss, USS. 

Blyskavica (destroyer): 234-35 

Boissau, Gen. Robert (Fr.): 189, 193, 212n, 565 

Boisson, Gen. Pierre (Fr.) 270-72, 357-58 

Bolte, Brig. Gen. Charles L.: 23n 

Bond, Lt. Col. Van H.: 150 

Bone: 277-80, 288-89, 292, 293, 294, 323-24, 

365, 402, 438-39, 440, 542-45 

landing, plans for: 26-27 

port facilities: 19, 278-79 

seizure, Anderson's proposal for: 53 

supply depot: 292-93, 607 

tank maintenance center: 496-97 

Booker, Pvt. Robert D.: 588n 

Bordelaisc Rock: 246-47 

Bordj Chambi: 445, 449 

Bordj Toum: 331-33, 337 

Bordj Toum bridge: 307 

705 

Borowietz, Gen. Willibald (Ger.): 536-37, 648, 

661 

Bou Arada: 290-91, 329-30, 373, 377, 394-95, 

401-02, 489-509, 510-11, 595-97, 600, 608 

Bou Chebka: 381,388,399,438,441,446,456-57, 

460-61, 462-64, 577, 607 

Bou Ficha: 598, 664-65 

Bou Guedra: 114 

Bou Hamran: 557-59 

Bou Sfer, 200-21, 213, 223 

Bou Tle1is: 195-96, 198-99 

Bougie: 19,277-78,496 

Bouisseville: 193n, 200-201 

Bouley, Gen. Jean (Fr.): 552n 

Boundary designations 

Allied: 418,467-68, 471-73 

enemy: 405-06 

Bowen, Lt. Col. John W.: 338, 623 

Bowen Force: 443 

Bradley, Maj. Gen. Omar N.: 487, 510n, 599, 608, 

613,627,632,638-39,651,653,656-57,667 

Bramham, HMS: 234 

Bredea: 198-99 

Bremner, Lt. (RN): 219-20 

Bridge construction: 198, 303, 651, 654-55 

Brigade group, definition: 296n 

Brilliant, HMS: 200 

Bristol, USS: 134 

British air units. See Royal Air Force. 

British Broadcasting Corporation: 90 

British Chiefs of Staff: 352-53, 354 

disagreements over assault landings: 25-31 

role in Combined Chiefs of Staff: In 

views on selection of French leader: 80-81 

Bri tish forces 

counteroffensive against Rommel: 8, 72-73 

directive placing under Eisenhower: 36, 36n 

Greece, diversion to: 7 

Iraq, seizure by 7 

British Joint Staff Mission: In 

British units 

First Army: 35, 50-51, 63, 291-92, 295-96, 

298, 329-30, 349, 350-52, 353-54, 355, 372, 

378-79,381-83, 384, 386n, 394-95, 399, 401-

02, 417, 423, 427-28, 428-30, 432, 438-39, 

442-43, 448-49, 451-52, 458, 466-67, 468, 

470-71,473,475-76,477,478,485-87,489, 

492-93, 495-96, 496-97, 497n, 499n, 526, 

541, 543-45, 550, 577, 578-79, 582-83, 599-

600, 604-07, 608-09, 612, 643, 644-48, 662-

68 
706 

British units-Continued 

Eighth Army: 7,9,75-77,323-24,363-64,401-

02,405-06,423-24,469-70,475-76,476-77, 

485-94,496-98, 499n, 510-11, 517, 521-27, 

531-34,537-42, 543, 545-46, 550, 552, 558-

59,564,570,573-74,577, 583n, 590, 591-92, 

599-600, 604, 606-07, 609, 644-48, 662-63, 

664-68 

1st Parachute Battalion: 279,284, 284n, 301-02 

2d Parachute Battalion: 305, 309 

3d Battalion, Grenadier Guards: 338-41, 343, 

474, 588-89 

3d Battalion, Welsh Guards: 587-89 

12th Royal Horse Artillery Battalion: 379 

84th Light Antiaircraft Battery: 240 

457th Light Battery, Royal Artillery: 284n 

Blade Force: 284-86, 287-88, 296-98, 299-301, 

303-06,311-17,326-27 

1st Guards Brigade: 308, 326-27, 330, 341-42, 

394-95,427-28,432-33,436-37,442-43,474, 

508-09, 585, 588, 664 

1st Parachute Brigade: 352, 374-76, 394-95, 

505, 508n, 508-09 

2d Armoured Brigade: 663 

4th Light Armoured Brigade: 526-27 

5th New Zealand Brigade: 516 

8th Armoured Brigade: 526-27, 536, 541 

10th Infantry Brigade: 664 

10th Rifle Brigade: 284n 

11 th Infantry Brigade Group: 52-53, 234-36, 

230-41, 296-98, 299-300, 301-03, 305, 306, 

307-08,311-12,314-17,329,330,337,507-

08 

12th Infantry Brigade: 664 

22d Antiaircraft Brigade: 667 

22d Armoured Brigade: 650 

23d Armoured Brigade: 541 

26th Armoured Brigade: 432-33 

36th Armoured Brigade: 442-43, 448-49, 451-

52, 457, 464-65, 471, 473-74, 486-87, 587-

89,611-12 

36th Infantry Brigade Group: 52,235,278,279, 

284, 295-96, 299, 306, 308-09, 312, 336-37, 

373,379,394-95,402-03,490,508-09,613-

14 

38th Infantry Brigade: 507-08, 508n 

52d Antiaircraft Brigade: 667 

69th Infantry Brigade: 531 

128th Infantry Brigade: 505-06, 507, 582-85, 

587-88 

131 st Guards Brigade: 514-16 

131st Infantry Brigade: 518 

138th Brigade: 508-09 

139th Brigade: 350n, 504-05, 508-09 

151st Brigade: 531-32 

152d Infantry Brigade: 514-16 

153d Infantry Brigade: 514-16 

154th Infantry Brigade: 514-16,518 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

British units-Continued 

201st Guards Brigade: 514-16,518,526-27,530, 

541,644 

1st Commandos: 235-36, 240, 244-47, 248-49, 

305, 309 

6th Commandos: 235-37,278-79,308-09 

5 Corps: 295-96, 329, 336, 342, 343-44, 374, 

377, 383, 394-95, 402-03, 440, 469, 489-90, 

550,577,600,604,608,609,612-13,620-22, 

638-3~ 644, 645, 649-50, 661, 662-63 

9 Corps: 489, 495, 577-78, 582-86, 590-91, 

599,600,604,609-10,612,645,649-50,662-

63 

10 Corps: 514,526-27,530,534-36,539-41 

30 Corps: 514-16, 517, 526-27, 530, 531-35, 

539, 540-41, 558-59 

New Zealand Corps: 526-27, 530-31, 533-37, 

558-59 

1st Armoured Division: 526-27, 534-35, 541, 

606-07, 644-45, 662-63 

6th Armoured Division: 284, 292-93, 295, 308, 

327,336,373,379,399n,402,427-28,432-33, 

436-37, 442-43, 468, 472-73, 489-90, 495, 

582-91, 599, 606-07, 610-11, 649-50, 662-

64 

7th Armoured Division: 514-16, 519n, 526-27, 

534-35, 541-42, 545-46, 660-61 

1st Division: 489,612,649 

4th Division: 489, 603, 612, 649-50, 662-63, 

664 

4th Indian Division: 526-27,534-40,541,644, 

649-50, 665n 

46th Division: 350, 402, 490, 504-05, 506, 508-

09, 550, 603, 604, 610-11 

50th (Northumberland) Division: 526-27,530-

31, 534, 539-40, 541 

51st (Highland) Division: 514-16,518,526-27, 

530, 539-40, 541, 644 

56th Division: 644 

78th Division: 277,278-80, 284, 287n, 292-93, 

293-94, 295-96, 305-06, 336-37, 489-90, 

507, 612, 620-21 

Y Division: 507-08 

2d New Zealand Division: 516, 519n, 526-27, 

536, 566-67, 644, 664-65 

Hartforcc: 284, 284n 

1st Parachute Regiment: 278-79 

1st Derbyshire Yeomanry: 284n, 314, 403-05, 

417-18, 433n, 443, 546, 650 

1 st Royal Sussex Regiment: 665n 

2d Hampshires: 466-67 

2d Lothians: 443n, 457, 464-65, 466-67,588-89 

2/5 Leicesters: 464-67 

5th Leicestershire Regiment: 457 

7th Guards Regiment: 307n 

10th Royal Buffs: 443n, 451-52, 457, 464-65 

11 th Hussars: 650 
INDEX 

British units-Continued 

12th Royal Horse Artillery: 284n 

12th Royal Lancers: 663 

16/5 Lancers: 402, 417, 432~33, 442~43, 452-

53, 457, 466-67, 47~ 589-90 

17/21 Lancers Regiment: 284n, 301, 311-12, 

314, 315, 316, 443n, 457, 461-62, 464-65, 

466-67, 507-08, 589 

50th Royal Tank Regiment: 531-32 

51st Light Antiaircraft Regiment: 284n 

51st Royal Tank Regiment: 582~83, 587 

56th Reconnaissance Regiment: 52, 284n, 443n 

72d Antitank Regiment: 284n, 442-43 

93d Antitank Regiment: 442-43 

138th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery: 284n 

152d Artillery Regiment: 466~67 

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders: 278, 306-

07, 328 

Coldstream Guards: 337, 338-43, 474, 589-90 

East Surrey Regiment: 235, 240, 307-08, 315 

Hampshire Regiment: 308, 314~15, 316, 318-19 

King's Dragoon Guards: 526-27, 606-07 

Lancashire Fusiliers: 235, 240, 302 

Northamptonshire Regiment: 240-41, 284n, 302, 

303,306-08,311,315,337,342 

Royal Buffs: 379 

Royal West Kent Regiment: 240-41,278, 284n, 

308~09, 379, 380 

Surrey Regiment: 303-04,315,316,318-19 

Royal Engineers: 589 

5th Field Squadron, Royal Engineers: 284n 

9th Field Squadron, Royal Engineers: 531 

Broadhurst, Air Vice Marshal Harry (RAF): 535 

Broich, von, Col. Fritz Freiherr (Ger.): 286n, 300-

301, 407, 454-55, 467, 559-6~ 565-66 

Broke, HMS: 241~42, 243-44, 244n 

Brooke, Gen. Sir Alan (Br.): 353, 489 

Brooklyn, USS: 116,121,130,134,139 

Brown, Lt. Col. C. P.: 623 

Brown, Col.]. Trimble: 618 

BRUSHWOOD Force: 42. See also Casablanca; 

Fedala. 

BRUSHWOOD Sub-Task Force: 122, 172-73 

Bruss, Lt. Col. Hyman: 306,316-17, 328-29 

Buchholz, Gen. Ulrich (Ger.): 366 

Buelowius, Gen. Karl (Ger.): 437,449-50,453-55, 

461-62, 463-64, 648, 662 

Buerat el Hsun: 322, 323-24, 326, 338, 363, 364 

Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R.: 585-86 

Bulolo, HMS: 71,231-34 

Burrough, Adm. Sir H. M. (RN): 36, 36n, 71, 

234, 241 

Buse, Lt. Col. (Ger.): 370-71 

Butler, Col. Frederic B.: 403~05, 490, 581 

Caffey, Brig. Gen. Benjamin F., Jr.: 51, 244-45, 

578 

Cagliari (Sardinia), air attack on: 293-94 

Cairns, Lt. Col. Bogardus E.: 660-61 

Calabria (Italy), principal airfields: 366n 

Calvert, USS: 68, 103, 108, III 

Camardella, Major Ralph R.: 150 

Camelback Mountain: 611n 

Camp de la Jonquiere: 142,144 

Camp St. Philippe: 223-24 

Campbell, Brig. Gen. William A.: 121 

Canaris, Adm. Wilhelm (Ger.): 321 

Cannon, Brig. Gen. John K.: 37, 43n, 383 

Canrobert: 294, 335, 494-95 

Cap Bon: 598 

Cap Bon peninsula: 595, 598, 599-600, 649 

amphibious assault on: 645 

defense by enemy: 650-51 

enemy intention, estimate of: 645 

prisoners, enemy: 663-64 

sealing off: 644~45, 662-65 

topography: 598 

Cap Carbon: 192,278 

Cap Caxine: 235-36 

Cap de Fedala: 127-29. See also Fedala. 

Cap Falcon: 193n, 200-201, 213 

Cap Farina: 660-61 

Cap Figalo: 192, 196 

Cap Matifou: 52, 234, 244-45, 246, 248-49 

Cap Serrat: 490, 504-05, 595, 608, 614-15 

Cap Sidi Ferruch: 234-35, 237~38 

Capitant, Prof. Rene: 500 

Capodichino (Italy): 366, 366n 

Capua (Italy): 366n 

Cargo transports: 43-44, 367-68 

Carleton, Col. Don E.: 150, 432 

Carpentier, Col. Marcel (Fr.): 337 

Carr, Lt. Col. Frank F.: 659 

Carroil, USS. See Charles Carroil, USS. 

707 

Cars, passenger. See Motor convoy operations; 

Motor vehicles. 

Casablanca: 17, I 79~80 

advance to from Fedala: 118, 144~46 

air strength, French: 118-19 

air support, Allied: 133, 145 

air support, French: 144~45 

airfield: 41 

ammunition supply: 140 

antiaircraft defenses: 19 

armor operations, Allied: 114-15,143-44,145 

artillery support, Allied: 143, 144, 145 

assault by Force BRUSHWOOD: 142 

attack plan, Allied: 46 

casualties, Allied: 143, 144 

counterbattery action: 143 

defenses of: 40-41, 119 

French reaction: 139, 141~42 

garrison strength: 118-19, 145-46 

importance of preserving: 45 

landinl!". DIan for: 25, 26-29, 31 
708 

Casablanca-Con tin ued 

materiel captured: 143 

motor convoy operations: 498-99 

naval operations, Allied: 96, 133-34, 143-44 

naval support, French: 96, 143 

Patton's proposal to bombard: 44-45 

port facilities and operations: 17-18, 40-4-1, 

119, 180,495-99 

reinforcing convoy, arrival: 174-75 

replacement dcpot capacity: 499 

seizure of: 114-15, 116 46_ See also Fedala. 

seizure plans, alternate: 44-45 

surrender negotiations: 131-32, 171-73 

SYMBOL Conference: 352-54 

target for Western TF: 40 

topography: 119 

unloading operations: 174-76 

Cass, Brig_ E. E_ (Br.): 295-96, 311-12, 316-17 

Castiglione: 234-35 

Casualties, Allied: 582n, 591 n, 592n. See also 

Prisoners_ 

Aln Rebaou: 394n 

Algprian-French Moroccan campaign: 173 

Algiers: 243, 244n, 246, 248-49 

Bizprte: 309 

Casablanca: 143, 144, 145 

D j"bel Alliliga: 395n 

Djebel Abiod: 283-84 

Djebel Badjar: 638n 

Djebel Mansour: 395n 

Djedelda: 300--301, 306-07 

Mareth position: 508 

EI Guettar: 558, 564n, 572, 574n 

EI Hamma gap: 536 

evacuation of: 140-41 

Faid pass: 394n 

F edala: 136-37 

Hill 201: 533-34 

Hill 350: 623 

Hill +07: 623 

Hill 609: 633-34 

Kasserint' pass: 477-78,477n 

Longstop Hill: 338 

Malzila pass: 395-96 

Maknassy: 398, +OOn, 575n 

Mateur and offensi'T beyond: 651n, 656-57 

Medjcz cl Bab: 302 

Morocco and off Moroc('o coast: 172-73, 176 

Oran: 20+,227 

()udna airfield: 309 

Ousseltia valley: 381-82 

Port-Lyautpy: 164-65, 170 

Safi: 109-10, 114n 

Sidi Bou Zid: 415n, 422 

Station de Sened: 387-88 

Tebourba gap: 320n 

Thala: 467n 

Tunis drive: 609-10 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Casualties, enemy 

'Alam d Haifa: 75 

Djebel Abiod: 283-84 

Djcd6da: 308n 

Fondouk el Aouareb: 592n 

Kasserine pass: 477 

Marcth position: 478-79, 542n 

Medenine: 518-19 

Ousseltia valley: 381-82 

Sidi Bou Zid: 422 

Tunisian campaign: 675-76 

Casualties, French: 227-28,373-74 

Catarina Costa (IL): 257-58 

Cathay, HMS: 278 

Catroux, Gen_ Georges (Fr.): 356,500,524,669 

Ca,-allero, Marshal Count Ugo (IL): 185-86,255, 

323-24, 325, 368, 369_ See also Comando 

Supremo. 

Cavalry Brigade, 1st Provisional: 179-80 

Cekhira: 537 

Ct'nsorship, in French colonies: 356 

Center Naval Task Forct': 36, 49. See also Naval 

forces, Allied_ 

Ct'nter Task Force 

air attacks on com-oy: 187 

air reconnaissance against: 185-86 

air support plans: 48, 50, 192-93, 204-05, 211-

12 

airborne support of landings: 48, 192, 210-11, 

212-13 

amphibious training: 62, 185 

armor support: 48-49, 192, 195-99, 195n, 21On, 

211 

artillery support: 208 

Arzew, plan for seizure of: 48-49 

attack plan: 192- 93 

beach organization: 192 

command structure': 49, 205n 

commander, selection of: 35 

communications: 57, 212 

convoy, dete'ction by enemy, 185-86 

('om-oy organization: 71 

debarkation: 193 94, 197 98 

employment, plans for: 46-50 

first day's operations: 192-213 

Fort du Nord, plan for seizing: 49 

Gibraltar, arri,-al at: 185- 86 

Golfe dt' Arzew, landings along: 205 -07 

headquarters transferred ashore: 224-25 

lar.ded force, strength: 213 

landing sites, t'nt'my confusion conn·rning: 186-

87 

l<mding t('ams, composition: 48, 199n, 202, 205 

Les Andalouses, plan for seizing: 48-49, 199-202 

Luftwaffe, alert against: 187 

Mersa bou Zpdjar, plan for seizing: 48 -49, 195-

99 

Illotor vehicles landed: 213 
INDEX 

Center Task Force-Continued 

naval action against; 187-88 

naval support of: 49, 185~88, 190-91, 192-93, 

205 

Oggaz airfield, plan for seizing: 49 

()ran, seizure of: 48-49,192-94,202-04,215-27 

planning, results of: 227 

Ranger forcp in: 20506 

RESERVIST Operation: 202-04 

submarine anions against; 186-87 

surpris,", loss of: 196 ~97 

TORCH, departure for: 70-72 

training scheduk; 63 

U nitrd Kingdom, departure frolll; 70-i2 

unloading operations: 198,213-14 

Z Beach, seizure of: 48~49, 20610 

Chaouach, enemy attack on: 504, 507 

Charles Carroil, USS: 123, 124n, 126, 176n 

Charybdis.HMS: 231-34 

Chase, USS. See Samuel Chase. USS. 

Chassart TdIaha; 339-43 

Chatel, Gen. Y"es (Fr.): 17,265-66,357-58 

Cheadle, Col. Henry B.: 208, 221 

Chcguimi: 522-23 

Chema'ia: 112 

Chenango, USS: 111,145, 150, 153, 165-67 

Cheragas: 235, 238-39 

Chnchara River valley: 46:) 

Cherchcl: 234 

Cht'rchel meeting of Allied commanders: 8183 

Chcrqui; 118, 128-30, 131 

Cht'ylus: 649, 65051 

Chittenden, Capt. A. 0.: 160-61 

Chott, definition; 282, 322 

Chott el Ft'djadj; 523·~24 

Chott el GuNtar; 556-57, 560~62, 567 

Chott position; 523-24 

air support, enemy: 

artillery strength, Allied: 614 

artilkry support, enemy: .')76 

attack by Allies; 570, 575 

battlt' for; 485, 535-39 

defense, Comando Supremo directivt' on; 51::! 

defense, Rommel's proposal for: 528~·29 

defense by enemy; 511, 529-30 

driw through, Allied: 61 :1-27, 642-~3, 648~52, 

658, 661 

mines, employment: 576 

night operations: 576 

stn:ngth, ent'my, estimate of: 543 

topography; 53738 

vulnerabilitv: 537-38 

withdrawal 'to and from, by enemy: 564,576-77 

Chouigui pass: 296-308, 311-16, 326, :n9, 600-

601,658,661 

air attack, enemy: 300 

armor support, Allied: 314 

Chou'igui pass-Continued 

armored action: :)00, 301~O:!, 642 

counterattack, t'nemy: 311-21 

counterbattery action: 313-14 

reconnaissance, Allied; 300~301 

rcpulsc, Allied: 314 

seizure by Allics: 657-58, 661 

tank losses, Allied: 301,314 

tank losses, ent'my: 301 

withdrawal by enemy; 300 

Christmas Hill. See Longstop Hill. 

Churchill, Winston: 266-68, 352~ 5-1 

breaks TORCH dt'adlocks: 13 

709 

Eisenhowt'r's political decisions, approval of; 

272n 

North African Agr('t'ment, support of: 270 

Roos('velt conversations regarding TORCH: 28-

29 

Stalin conversations on TORCH: 29 

analysis for 1942-43: 10-13 

Ciano, Galt'azZQ: 255-56 

Citta di Napoli (It.): 257-58 

Civil affairs; 16. See also Political situation. 

administration of, plans for: 57-59 

military control, transfn to: 17 

in Morocco, after surrender: 177-78 

in Oran: 225-27 

planning for: 57-59 

political offic<,rs of French colon it's : 17 

staff composition: 58-59 

Civilians, behavior at Safi; 108-09 

Clan MacTaggart, HMS: 199 

Clark, Maj. G('n. J. G. W. (Bf.); 292, 496 

Clark, Maj. Gen. Mark W.: 28,47,63,66,84,252, 

292, 350-51, 35~ 357, 358 

appointed Deputy CinC: 3'2 

directive to for Giraud conversations: 81 

negotiations with Darlan: 262-69 

relinquishes command of II Corps: 35 

role in contacting Fr<'nch kadrr 81-83 

Clark-Darlan Agrt't:ment. See North African 

Agreement. 

Clark-Darlan negotiations; 262-69 

Clarke, Col. Brien: 55 

Close air support. See Air support. 

Cloud, Major Eug<'ne H.: 90 

Clutterbuck, Maj. Gen. W. E. (Br.): 612 

Clymer, CSS. See George Clymer, CSS. 

Coast Guard vessds; 202n 

Coastal Air Forces: 493~~94 

Coastal defenses 

Algiers: 5152. 230, 234-35, 236, 242-43, 244 

Arzew; 48, 205~ 06 

Bizert(': 294-95 

Casablanc<1: 119 

Fedala; 118,127,129 30,133-34 

Les Andalouses: 201-02 
710 

Coastal defenses-Continued 

Mehdia: 154, 156 

Oran: 48, 19294, 203-04, 223 

Port-Lyautey: 14749 

rehabilitated ports: 180 

Safi: 97-101 

Tunisia afea: 294-95 

Coastal featufes of l'\orthwest Africa: 17-19 

Coastal plain, battk for: 530 -33, 539-42 

Corke, Capt. Philip St. G.: 331-32 

Cole, Lt. Col. Lydon B.: 659 

Cole, TJSS: 97,10203, 104, 105, 114 

Collaborationists: 500, 669-70 

Colonies. Northwest African. See French colonies. 

Combat 'Commands. See also Armored Divisions. 

A. 1st Armored Division 381 ·82, 391, 393-94, 

399, 403, 40910, 43537, 472-73, 

548-51,564-65, 565n, 572, 1,595-97,606-

07, 641-43, 652-53, 656, 656n, 659 

B, 1st Armored Division: 49,63, 195-96, 195n, 

198, 205, 206-07, 208, 209-12, 213, 216-23, 

291-92,308,315-1 326-32, 332n, 336, 374-

87, 394-95, 403, 416-17, 427-36, 

456-57, 460-61, 473-74, 478, 546 

47, 548, 550-51, 575, 606-07, 627, 

638-39, 641-43, 656-57, 659-60, 

660-61, 660n 

B, 2d Armored Division: 42, 102, 114-15, 116, 

145 

C, 1st Armored Division: 387-88, 393, 395-96, 

:)99,40'1,41617,41821,428 32, 430n, 435, 

436, 478, 548-52, 549n, 553-·55, 572, 575 

D, 1st Armored Division: 388, 396-99 

Combat teams, regimental. See Regimental Combat Teams. 

Comando Suplemo: 261, 288 89,363-64,406,423, 

441, 456, 469 70, 476, 521 22 

Ambro,io succeeds Cavallero: 369-70 

Chott position, directive 0:1: 512, 529-30 

Corsica, plan for seizing: J 87 

Eastern Dorsal, plan for controlling: 386 

Egypt, plan for attack on: 4, 7 

Gafsa attack, directive on 406 

German fore!'" control of: 6--7,9 

Gt'rman General with, as liaison officer: :,69·-70 

K('sse\ring, rdation to: 369 

Mareth position, dir('ctive on: 512 

Mediterra-:ean operations, hypoth('tical control 

of: 7:1-74,36364,512 

reorganization: 7 

Rommd, rplations with: 9n, 324-25, 363·64, 

405-06. 476n, 479n, 50204, 528-29 

Sid; Bou Zid, directivc on: 438-40 

supply capability, estimate of: 512-13 

Tebessa, Rommrl's proposal for seizing: 438-41, 

442, 455-56 

Tebessa attack, direni\·(' on: 440-41, 453 

Tunisia operations, directivc on: 47677 

NOR THWEST AFRICA 

Combint'd Chids of Staff: ::15254, 361 

Allied-French arrangements, approval of: 268 

command structure proposed for TORCH: 14 

commander for TORCH, selection of: 15 

composition and mission: In 

compromise and agrl'ement on TORCH: 13 

disagrt'emcnts over landings: 16, 25-31 

North African Agreement, approval of: 269-70 

northern Tunisia, attack plan, approval of: 599 

ROOFTREE, dccisions formulated for: 39 

West Africa, approval of agreement with: 271 

Combined Operations Training Center (Br.): 62 

Combined Planning Staff: 25-31 

Command relations 

Allied: 264-66, 298, 335, 350, 600n 

enemy: 6-7,9, 9n, 260-61, 369 

Fr('nch: 93-94, 272-73 

Command structure, Allied 

18th Army Group: 486-89 

for air command: 383-84, 492-95 

air commander, relation to CinC: 37 

British forc('s, directive placing under CinC: 36, 

36n 

in Centn TF: 49, 205n 

chain of command, organization: 32-37 

Commander in Chief, relations with other services: 3335 

directive on command and transfer of control: 

38, 39 

in Eastern TF: 51, 53 

field command, reorganization of: 382-86, 485-

89 

Giraud's conditions for support of TORCH: 82-83 

joint opt'rations, transfer of command in: 39 

Kasserinc reorganization: 470-71, 474-76 

MTOt;SA, reorganization in: 352-58 

naval forces, command of: 36, 37-38 

Ousseltia valley, conflict in: 380-81 

systrJn proposed by CCS for TORCH: 13-14 

in task forces: 33-35 

in Western TF: 137 

Command structurt', en<>my 

ddects in Axis system: 77 

din'ct communication, Hitler's authorization: 

529n 

discretionary authority of commander, lack of: 

76 

Kasserinf' reorganization: 474-75,476-77 

Medeninc reorganization: 519-20 

Tebessa reorganization: 441 

for Tunisia area: :168-70, 648-49 

Command, unity of 

Axis lack of, factor in defeat: 77,405-06 

established by Allied directive: 38-39 

TORCH a test of: 39 

Commander in Chief, Allied Air Fore"s: 354-55 
INDEX 

Command"r in Chid, Allied Force: 17+, 354. See 

also Allied Force Headquarters; Eisenhower, 

Gen. Dwight D. 

Alexander, directive to: 485-87 

Anderson, directive to: 384-85 

assumes direct command: 350-51 

British forces, directive authorizing control of: 

36, 36n 

Combin,.d Chids of Staff, selection by: 15 

command relations with oth('[ services: 33-35, 

37, 38-39 

deputy, appointment of: 32 

directive on mission: 15, 16 

directive on use of II Corps: 599600, 600n, 604 

f'rcnch commanders, approval of assignment of: 

265-66 

Gibraltar headquarters: 84 

Giraud's demand for position: 33738 

:\farshall, proposed for: 15 

North African Agreement, role under: 269 71 

Patton, directive to: 487-89 

political responsibilities: 55, 269, 272, 272n 

powers, President's restriction on: 270-71 

reviews of situation, periodic: 309, 320-21, 329-· 

30, 403-05, 417 

Roosevelt statement on arrangements with DarIan: 268 

titk, designation of: 32 

West Africa, negotiations for collaboration of: 

270-72 

Commander in Chief, Levant (Br,) 354 

Commander in Chief, Libya (It,): 7,9n 

Commander in Chief, Mcditcrran('an (BL): 354 

Commander in Chief, Middk East (BL): 354 

Commander in Chief, Naval Expeditionary Fore<': 

354 

Commander in Chief, South: 9, 289-90, 317-18, 

365, 43840, 441-42. See also Kesselring, 

Marshal Albert. 

Commando units: 52,277, See also Ranger units. 

Commodities. See Consumer goods. 

Communications 

Allied: 137-38, 159-60, 222-23, 235, 419-22, 

,451, 457-58, 'J.64, 485-86, 517-18, 647-48 

enemy: 312 

Communications equipment, lack of in Force 

BRUSHWOOD: 139 

Communications failure 

Allied: 161,198-99,212,216,219,237- 38,280, 

309,316-17,34142,411,421-22,432,455, 

461-62, 463, 465-66, 494, 636-37 

f'nemy: 379-80 

Communications Zone, reorganization of: 494.--99 

Communist infiltration: 356 

Compass, need for training in use of: 671-72 

Coningham, Air Marshal Sir Arthur (RAF): 

383-84, 492-93, 573 

711 

Constantine: 358-59, 277, 327-28, 330, 350-52, 

365, 417, 485-86, 492-93, 495-98 

II Corps headquarters established: 374 

medical facilities: 376 

motor transport resnvc at: 496-97 

railway capacity: 498 

Consumer goods, plan for controlling: 58 

Con tessa, SS: 44,68,69,150,169 

Convolvulus, HMS: 234 

Convoys, motor 

attack on, in Fref'ch reinforcement of Safi: 110-

14 

capacities of: 498-99 

movement of II Corps to north flank: 604-07 

Convoys, naval: 68-72, 90 

Conway, Major Theodore J: 150 

Copland-Griffith, Brig. F, A. V. (BL): 326-27, 

508-09 

Corps, II: 350-55, 380-86, 391, 398, 402-23, 427-

28,435,440, 443, 451, 453-71, 473, 478,485-

98,519-22,525,538-39,549,556-57,558 59, 

565-77, 582-83, 592-607,644-51 

air attack on headquarters: 573 

air support: 573-74 

assault on: 401-22 

Bradley succeeds Patton: 608 

Choulgui, drive through: 613-27 

Constantine headquarters established: 374 

directive on use of: 599, 600n, 604 

Eastern Dorsal, defense measures at: 398-400 

Eastern Dorsal, mission at: 591-92 

flank protection mission: 385-86 

Gafsa order of battk: 546 

intelligence estimates by: 40 I 

Mateur, driw on and beyond: 613-43, 654-59 

northern flank, movement to: 604 -07 

northern flank offensive: 614-43 

Oran, plans for seizing: 46-50 

Patton succeeds Fredendall: 487-89, 490-92, 

545 

plans for March: 543-47, 550-53, 556-57, 564-

65, 569-71, 572-73 

Sfax order of battle: 374-76 

staff composition: 374n, 545n 

task force assignment: 35 

Tunis drive: 609-13,649-51 

Corsica, ('nemy plan for seizure: 187,255-56 

Cota, Col. :':orman D,: 47 

Coult('ux d(' Caumont, de, CoL Guy (Fr.): 287-88 

Counterbattery anion: 143, 163, 22'3, 313-15, 392, 

420-21, 452-53, 589-90, 654-55. See also 

Artillery support. 

Cowdray, HMS: 235, 246, 248 49 

Cowie, USS: 69,114,169 

Coxen's Farm: 301-02, 309 

Craig, Brig. Gen. Howard A.: 383-84 

Cramer, Generalleutnant Hans (Ger.): 516, 516n, 

611 
712 

Crandall, Capt. Robert W.: 124 

Crane, Brig. Gen. John A.: 546 

Crant', Brig. Gen. William C.: 486 87 

Craw, Col. Demas T.: 150, 154-55 

Crawford, Lt. Col. Josrph B.: 150,460-61 

Crete: 7,73 

Crocker, Lt. Gen. Sir John (Br.): 489, 582-91, 

610-11 

Crosby, Col. Ben: 396n, 430-31, 656 

Cross-Channel attack: 11-14,73,676-77 

Culbert, Frederick P.: 177 

Cunningi,am, Adm. Sir Andrew Browne (Br.): 36, 

84, 264-66, 354, 669 

Currency, exchange rates established: 361-62. 

See also Financial activities. 

Cyrenaica, assembly of enemy forct's for attack on 

Egypt: 4 

Dabney, Col. John A.: 374n,457--58 

Dakar: 10, 74,271 

DnllrlJ. USS: 152,158, l6.J. 67,170 

Damesme: 208 

Darlan, Adm. Jean Fran<;ois (Fr.): 141,171,176-

77, 178, 257-58 

Allied command assignment: 265--69, 272 

arrest by Allies: 263 

assassination: 355, 357 

attitude toward Allies: 2·t9-51 

directi,,' from Petain: 251 

distrust of by Fighting French: 355-56 

effect of death on French-Allied relations: 357-

58 

French preference for: 356 

issues neutrality order: 263- 6.J. 

liaison with Luftwaffe: 254-55 

military for civil posts, substitutes: 17 

order to resist Axis: 26.J. 

political n.forms instituted: :,56-57 

Roosevelt's statement on arrangements with: 268 

succceded hI' Giraud: 355-59 

surrender negotiations, authori7f's: 251 

TOR<CH, rok in support of: 77-82 

Darby, Lt. Col. William 0.: 205-06 

Darlan-Clark ncgotiations: 262-69 

Dashel. HMS: 192-93 

D'l\idson, R"ar Adm. Lval A.: 70, 10.J., 109, 111 

Davis, Lt. Col. Ke' mit Le V.: H:1 

Debarkation operations: 68, 71, 10:1-0.J., 106 07, 

123- 26, I:W, 116, HO-tl, 15:" 155, 157-59, 

193 94, 197-98, 217, 235-:,6, 237 38, 2.J.0-

41, 243,245 -47,248. See also Ports, operation of: Unloading op..ra tions. 

Deception in concentrations at Massicault: 6·H- 48 

Decisions, political: 31, 272n 

Decisions, strategic 

on Allied seizure of Northwest Africa: 25 ·31 

hy Axis, for Tunisia: 321- 26 

concept of Allied operations determined: 29-:W 

final decisions rcaehed by Allies: 31 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Decisions, tactical, for ROOFTREE: 39 

Deichmann, Gen. Paul (Ger.): 261, 479 

Delay, Gen. (Fr.): 272-73 

Delhi, EMS: 192-93 

Dcligne, Gen. Agathon (Fr.): 273,379-81 

Demarais, Lt. Col. Hubert (Fr.): 578n 

Demolitions, usc of: 289, 417-18, 435-36, .J.37, 

153, 6.J.2-.J.3 

Dempo, HMS: 235, 248 

Denholm, Lt. Col. Charles J: 634-37 

Dentz, Gen. Henri F. (Fr.): 286-87 

Dcpienne: 309 

Derb)'shire, HMS: 209-10 

Derna'ia: 441, 443 

De Rohan, Col. Frederick ].: 150, 156, 167, 548, 

5.J.9, 553-54 

Dcrrien, Adm. Louis (Fr.) : 25859, 260, 286, 29.J.-

95, 321 

D"sn" Brig. Gen. Raymond (Fr.): 9.J., 171-72 

Deutsches Marinekomnwndo Italien. See German 

Naval Command, Italy. 

Deuve, Major (Fr.): 100 

Dewdale, HMS: 234 

Dewoitine fighter plane: 4n 

Dick, Capt. Royer M. (RN): 262 

Dickman, USS. See Joseph T. Dickman, USS. 

Dickson, Col. B. A.: 37+n, 401, 553 

Dilley, Major John H.: 156-58,168 

Dishl"r, Harold Leo: 202 n 

Dive bornbl"r, deft-at by Allied antiaircraft: 574, 

571n 

Dix. USS. See Dorothea L. Dix, USS. 

Djebd, definition: 47n 

Djebels 

Aboid: 279, 283-84, 291, 296, 299, 330, 373-

7.J.,190,502 05,508,512,604,607,651 

Adjred. See Bald Hill. 

Ain el Rhorab: 579-80, 582, 58:,-89 

A'inchouna: 615 21,640 

Alliliga: 394-95, 395n 

Azag. See Gr('('n Hill. 

Badjar: 622-23,625 26, 638-39, 6:,8n, 642 

Gargou: :l77 78, :179-80, 423, 490 

Bat('une Slama: 624 

Bech Ch('kaoui: 603, 620 21 

Bel Harch: 505 

Ben Kheir: 559-60,564-65,572-73 

Bml,,: 544 45,5.17-69,571,572 73,57475 

Berboukr. Sre Hill 469. 

Bin'no: 445-46,464-65.474 

Bou Achour. See Hill 394. 

Bou Aoukaz: :,28-30, 612 

artillery support, Allied: 649 

attack by Allies: 512-13 

seizure by Allies: 645, 648-49 

withdrawal, Allied: :l31 32 

Bou Dabouss: :l70-71, 379 

Bou Douaou: 544-45, 552 55, 565 -66 
INDEX 

Djebels-Continued 

Bou Dzer: 388-90, 393 

Bou Hedma: 398, 553-54 

Bou Keurnine: 611 n 

Bou Mouss. See Grenadier Hill. 

Bou Smail: 565-66 

Boudinar: 390-91 

Chambi: 441, 444-45, 451, 456-57, 463, 474, 

490 

Chemsi: 557,564-65,572-73 

Cheniti: 615-16,653,671-72 

Chirich: 377,598,600,611, 611n 

Dardyss: 603,615-16,619-20 

Dir: 273 

Djebs (Nos. 1 and 2): 553-55, 572 

Dribica: 553-55 

ech Cherichera: 578-79, 580-81 

elAbeid: 418 

el Adjered: 445-46, 463-64 

e1 Ahmera. See Longstop Hil!. 

el Akrat: 615-16 

el Ang: 327,330,504,506-07,612,620-21 

el Ank: 557-58,569 

el Anz: 622-23, 625-27, 633-34, 635, 638 

el Aouareb: 579-87,589-90 

el Asker: 565-66 

el Asoud: 328, 329-30, 331-32 

el Beida. See Hill 407. 

el Berakine: 622-23, 625-26 

el Djeriri: 582 

el Facuar. See Hill 558. 

el Garsia: 618 

el Guessa: 326-30, 337 

air support, enemy, 328 

armor action: 328-29 

attack plan, enemy: 327-28 

battle for: 328-30 

tactical value: 328 

ta ~ k losses, enemy: 328 

el Hara: 627 

el Kebar: 419-21 

el Kheroua: 558,564-68, 567n, 570-71, 574 

el Koumin: 433-34 

el Mcheltat: 557-60, 564-71 

el Rhar: 339-43 

er Roumana: 537-40 

es Sif: 445-46 

es Stah: 538-39 

Fkirine: 281-82,337,600,611, 611n 

Garci: 609 

Garet Hadid: 390,409-11,419,424-26,477-78 

Gouleb: 388 

Goussa: 544, 549-50, 554-55 

Grembil: 620-21, 627 

Guerrr..ach: 640 

Haidoudi: 538-39 

Haifa: 377 

Djebels-Continued 

Hallouf: 580-82 

Halouga: 523-24, 535, 536-37 

Hamadi: 565-66, 569 

713 

Hamra: 414-15,419,421,424,428-32,445-46, 

457-58,460-62,472-73 

air action: 419-20, 462, 470 

aircraft losses, enemy: 462 

antiaircraft defenses, Allied: 462 

attack by enemy: 424,425-26,461-62,501 

defense by Allies: 460, 463 

dispositions, Allied: 462 

night cperations: 462-63 

prisoners, Allied: 424 

tank losses, Allied: 462 

Ichkeul: 642, 648, 655, 662 

Khar: 207 

Kouif: 472-73,487,490 

Ksaira: 390-91,393,394,411-16,419-21,424-

26, 460-61 477-78 

Lanserine: 311-12, 326, 333, 620-21, 636, 6'38-

39 

Lessouda: 390,391-92,410-11,407-31 

Lettouchi: 567n, 568,.570-71 

Madjoura: 549 

Maiana. See Hill 186. 

Maizila: 575 

Mansour: 376-83, 394-95, 395n, 507-08, 510-

II, 595-9~ 60~ 603, 611, 611n 

Matleg: 398,412-13 

Mdilla: 547-48 

Melab: 527-28, 535, 536-37 

Meloussi: 399, 413 

Mrhila: 428-30, 459-60 

Murdjadjo: 198-99, 201-02, 216, 219, 224-25 

Naemia: 553-55 

Nechat d Maza. See Hill 406. 

Nobueza: 445-46, 462 

Orbata: 525, 544-45, 556-58 

Ousselat: 377, 379, 381, 582-83, 591, 592n 

Rheradok: 435 

Rihane: 373-74,504,507-08,510 

Rme!. See Hill 350 

Sabel Dilou: 433-35 

Saikra: 523 

Santon: 193, 201-02, 213 

Semmama: 444-56,474,490 

Serdj: 381, 490 

Sidi Khalif: 388-91, 392, 394 

Sidi Meftah: 622-23, 625-27 

Souinia: 546-47,548 

Tahent. See Hill 609. 

Tebaga Fatnassa: 523-24,527-28,533-35,538-

39, 564-65 

Touil: 582, 586 

Touro: 620, 639 

Touto: 622-23, 625-26 
714 

Djebcls-Continued 

Trozza: 399, 418, 427-28, 509, 578-80 

Zarhouan: 337,347-48,598, 611n 

Zebbeus (Hill 812): 445-51, 474,544, 

553-55 

Djebibina: 598, 644-4-5 

Djedcida: 296-306,311-15, 326, 336~37, 343-44, 

595-97, 620-21, 649-50, 652-53, 661 

air action: 304-06, 307-09, 649 

aircraft losses, em'my: 300-301 

airfield, destruction by Allies: 307 

airfield, occupation by enemy: 302 

ambush of Allied forces: 306-07 

armor attack on enemv aircraft: 300-30 I 

armor support, Allied': 307 

artillery support, Allied: 307-08 

attack plan, Allied: 305-06 

battle for: 304-·10 

casualties, enemy: 308n 

d"fense organization, enemy: 307 

motor vehicle losses, Allied: 306-07 

prisoners, Allied: 306--07 

reconnaissance, Alli"d: 307 

reinforcements, Allied: 307 

repulse, Allied: 307-09 

stratt:gie value: 283, 28990 

tank 'Iosses, Allied: 300-301, 307 

topography: 307 

Djdna: 299, 306-07, 309, 333, 502-05 

Djefna position 

air support, Allied: 640, 640n 

ammunition shortage, ('nemy: 640-41 

artilkry support, Allied: 616-18, 618n, 640n 

artillery support, 617,618-19,640 

attack on, Allied; 600-601, 603, 614-21, 

639-43 

counterattack, enemy: 373~·74 

deknsive measures, enemy: 622 

dispositions, enemy: 616-17, 61 7n, 621-22 

ground observation: 640 

highway system: 615-16 

reconnaissance, Allied: 617 

str('ng;th, enemy: 616-17 

supply lines, enemy, threats to: 616-17,640-41 

supply problems, Allied: 61920 

withdrawal by enemy: 640-41 

D jeloula pass: 591 

Djcrissa: 490 

Djidjdli: 277-7B 

Djoumine Riv<:r: 280, 620-21 

Dody, Maj. Gf'n. Andre (Fr,): 92, 132, 141 

Docnitz, Adm, Karl (Ger.) : 513-14 

Doolittle, Brig. Gen. James H,: 37, 46, 71 n, 84, 

294,492-93 

Dorothea L Dix, USS: 106, 111 

Douar Gournata: 660 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Douglas, Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto (RAF): 

354-55 

Douimis Rivcr: 615~16, 653 

Dovera: 234-35 

Doyk, Lt. Col. Edward J,: 237-39 

Draa Saada el Hamra: 567, 567n, 568-69 

Draft Outline Plan (Partial) for TORCH: 27 

Drainage systcms: 18-19,52,116-17, 281-82, 303~ 

04, 348~·49, 428, 445-46, 522-23 

Drake, Col. Thomas D.: 396,403,411,419,424, 

490 

Dressendorfer, LL D. C. (USN): 167 

DRYSHOD operation: 63 

Duke of York, HMS: 185 

Dunphil', Brig. Charles A, L. (BL): 432-33, 442-

43,451-65,471 

Durban Castle, HMS: 209-10 

Duvivier: 278-79 

Duzervilk: 278-79 

Eagles, Brig. Gen, William W.: 121, 128, 172-73 

Eastburn, Lt. Col. Charley P.: 453-54 

Eastern Air Command, 278-79, 308, 354-55, 492 

commander, selection of: 37 

landings, mission in supporting: 37 

organization difficulties: 280 

plan for build-up of: 54 

Eastern Air Force: 279-80 

Eastern Assault Force: 35, 50-54 

Eastern Base Section, 495~99, 501, 516, 607 

Eastern Dorsal: 281-83, 347-48, 372, 423, 427, 

485, 486-87, 578~92 

Allied swing from: 427-30 

attack by Allies: 337.564 

attack plans, Allied and enemy: 386-88 

dt'fensive measures, Allied: 378-79, 398-400 

enemy forces establish"d: 333-35, 392 

French attacks: 373--74 

maneU\Tring for advantage on: 373-400 

mission of II Corps: 591-92 

plans for controlling, Allied and enemy: 386-88, 

40102,406-07 

reinforcements, Allied: 377-78 

reinforcements, enemy: 373-74 

topography: 553-54 

Eastern Naval Task Force: 36, 231-34, 248, 254. 

See al.\O Naval forces, Allied. 

Eastern Task Force 

air attack on: 278 

air reconnaissance against: 185-86 

air support of: 53-54, 279-80 

"lirbornc support of: 53-54 

Algiers, departure from: 277-78 

Algiers, seizure of: 50-54, 229-52 

amphibious training: 62, 185 

Anderson aSSUllH'S command: 252 

command structure: 35, 50-51, 53 
INDEX 

Eastern Task Force-Continued 

commander's mission: 51 

commando units in: 52 

confusion in landings: 236-39, 246-47 

convoy: 71, 185-86, 187, 234 

departure for TORCH: 70-72 

eastern landings: 244-49 

first day's operations: 240-41, 251 

force landed: 234-35 

Gibraltar, arrival at: 185-86 

landing force, strength: 234-36, 241, 244-45 

landing sites, enemy confusion as to: 186-87 

line of communications: 309 

Luftwaffe, alert of against: 187 

mission: 35 

naval action against: 186, 187-88 

naval losses: 278 

naval support of: 185-86 

progress rate, anticipated: 54 

redesignated British First Army: 350-51 

reinforcement, plans for: 53n 

reorganization for drive on Tunis: 291-92 

shipping for, shortage of: 53 

submarine actions against: 186-87 

TERMINAL Force operations: 241-45 

Tunis, preparations for drive on: 277-98 

Tunisia, advance into: 253,277-80 

United Kingdom, departure from: 70-72 

western landings: 235-38 

Ebba Ksour: 281, 417 

Eberle, USS: 155, 165-67 

Economic Accord of March 1941: 23 

Eddekhila: 642-43, 650-51, 658-59, 665-67 

Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S.: 66, 490-92, 567n, 

568,571,614-15,653 

Eddy, Lt. Col. William A. (USMC): 24, 55, 212n 

Edgar, Capt. Campbell D. (USN): 245-46 

Edward Rutledge, USS: 175-76 

Edwards, Lt. T. E. (RN): 199 

Egypt, battle for: 4,7,10,75-77 

Eighth Fleet (U.S.): 354-55 

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.: 71, 264-65, 266-68, 

292, 343-44, 349-57, 358, 362, 378, 382-84, 

386-87,401-02,403-05,417,470-71,487, 

545, 556, 590-91, 599, 669. See also Allied Force Headquarters; Commander in 

Chief, Allied Force. 

Commander in Chief, selection as: 15 

French commanders, approves assignment of: 

265-66 

French leader, views on acceptance of: 80-81 

French officers, action on plight of: 177 

Giraud, conference with: 189-92 

North African Agreement, view on: 269n, 270n 

Outline Plan for TORCH, reaction to: 27-31 

political alI airs, role in: 55, 269 

EI Agheila: 8 

715 

EI Ala: 399,416-17,509 

EI 'Alamein: 9, 72-73, 75-77, 322, 324, 524-25, 

672-73 

EI Alia: 650-51, 659-60, 661 

EI Ancor: 200-201, 213 

EI Aouana: 504-05 

EI Aoulna: 255,257, 293-94, 366,649 

EI Aroussa 

air action: 291 

attack by enemy: 502-04, 507-08 

counterattack, Allied: 508-09 

occupation and withdrawal by enemy: 290-91 

EI Azib: 659-60 

EI Bahira lake: 598 

EIBathan: 290-91,296,299-305,307-08,311-20, 

327-28,336,337,595-97,600 

EI Gazala line: 8 

EI Guettar: 335, 371-72, 403-05, 409-10, 425, 

536, 537-40,541, 553-54, 604 

air actio", Allied: 558-59, 562, 577 

air action, enemy: 558, 560-62, 565-66, 572, 

574n 

armor action: 556-57,559-63,569-73 

artillery support, Allied: 557-58, 559, 560-62, 

570-71,574, 574n, 575, 577 

artillery support, enemy: 558, 560-62, 565-66, 

571,572 

attac'k by Allies: 550-51,552-53,556-57,564-

75 

battle for: 556-77 

casualties, Allied: 558, 564n, 572, 574n 

counterattack, enemy: 559-63 

defense by Allies: 574 

dispositions, enemy: 565-66, 569-71 

engineer support: 574 

intelligence estimates, enemy: 565-66 

materiel losses, Allied: 558, 560n, 571 

mines, employment: 558, 560-62, 571 

motor column, enemy, routed: 289 

night operations: 557--63 

operations beyond: 564-77 

prisoners, enemy: 557-58 

reconnaissance, Allied: 547 

reconnaissance, enemy: 559-60 

seizure by Allies: 386-87, 547-48 

supply methods, Allied: 574 

tank losses, Allied: 571-72 

tank losses, enemy: 560-62,571 

topography: 556-57 

withdrawal by enemy: 574-77 

EI Hafay: 557, 564-65 

El Hamma gap 

air actio:1, Allied: 533, 535-37, 672-73 

armor support, Allied: 535 

artillery support, Allied: 535-37 

attack by Allies: 523-27,530-31,533-37,564 

casualties, Allied: 536 
716 

EI Hamma gap~Continued 

counterattack, ennny: 536~37 

defense by e:lemy: 526-27, 533-34, 536~37 

Mart'th position, as appro~ch to: 525-26 

night operations: 526 

reinforct'ments, Allied: 534-35 

reinforcements, enemy: 536-37 

secured by Allies: 537 

Shenandoah Valley, comparison with: 525 

smoke, employment: 536-37 

EI Hamma River: 663 

EJ Ma e1 Abiod: 427,436,438,441,443,456-57, 

490, 543, 546 

Electra, USS: 153 

Elizabeth C. Stanton, USS: 176n 

Elmas (Sardinia): 293-94 

Emmett, Capt. R. R. M. (USN): 121, 123~24, 

130, 136 

En Nekala: 208, 217 

Enchantress, HMS: 234 

Enfidaville: 333-35, 510-11, 595, 598, 600, 603, 

644, 650-51, 665 

Enfidaville position: 54142, 598, 599-600, 602-

03, 609 

Engineer Amphibian Brigadt', I 5t: 50, 62, 195n 

Engineer Aviation Battalion, 871st: 167-68 

Engineer Boat Maintenance Compa'lY, 561st: 62 

Engineer Boat Regiment, 591st: 195n, 210, 210n 

Engineer Combat Battalions. See also Armored 

Engineer Battalions. 

1st: 463,546-47 

10th: 121 

15th: 549n, 653-54 

19th: 213,418,433 

109th: 411,582 

540th: 167 

Engineer Combat Regiments 

15th: 164-65, 167-68 

16th: 331 

19th: 216, 217, 443, 446, 447, 450-51, 452, 

546-47, 574 

20th: 122, 138, 165,65354 

36th: 42, 121 

Engineer Shore R('giment, 531st: 199n 

Engin('('r Special Brigadc , 1st: 49 

Engin('er support in combat: 410-11,418,531,574, 

589, 642-43, 653-54 

England. See United Kingdom. 

Enright, Lt. Col. C. F.: 567n 

Equipment, unit, for TORCH: 62 

Er Rahd: 198 

Er Refifida: 144 

Er Rif mountains: 17 

Erickson, Capt. Ray: 582 

Esteva, Vice Adm. Jean-Pierre (Fr.) : 25960, 286-

87 

evasive action toward Axi.5: 286-87 

liaison with LuitwajJe: 254-55 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Esteva, Vice Adm. Jean-Pierre (Fr. )~Continued 

Resident Gem'ral for 'runisia: 17 

support of TORCH, views on: 78 

Ethiopia, projected attack on Egypt from: 4 

Ettrick, HMS: 207 

Evans, Maj. John B: 107 

Evt'legh, Maj. Gen. Vyvyan (Br.): 71, 240, 277, 

280, 295-96, 305-10, 315~16, 331-32, 507, 

612 

Excel/er, USS: 235, 244-45, 2-46 

Exchang1:' rates for local currency: 362 

Ez Zerkin wadi: 528 

Ez Zouara Rivt'"r: 502-04 

Factionalism in Frt'"nch forces: 355-56, 358-61, 

500,669-71 

Fai'd: 282-83, 401-02, 406-10,412, 423-24, 544 

550,590 

air attack, enemy: 391-92 

counterattack, Alli('d: 391-92,401-02 

reconnaissance, Allied: 391-92 

reinforcements, Allied: 391 

security measures, enemy: 394 

seizure by enemy: 391 

Fa'id pass: 335, 390-91, 393-94,407-09, 410-13, 

544, 606-07 

air action, Allied: 391-92,411-13 

armor action: 411-12 

artillery support, Allied: 411 

artillery support, enemy: 411-12 

attack by ('nemy: 388, 392-93 

casualti('s, Allied: 394n 

control, ('nemy plans for: 386 

counterattack, Allied: 399n 

counterbattery action: 392 

defense plans, Allied: 386-88, 399-400 

French complaints of American tardiness: 392-

93 

loss of, effect on Allies: 399 

materiel losses, Allied: 394n 

prisoners, Allied: 394n 

pyrotechnics, use of: 391 

recapture, Allied plans for: 401-02 

r{'connaissance, ('nemy: 412-13 

reinforcements, enemy: 392 

security measures, en('my: 388-90 

seizure by AlIi{'s: 327 

tank losses, Allied: 392 

tank losses, enemy: 391 

topography: 388-90 

Falugi, Generale di Bl'igata Giusf'pPf' (It.): 527-

28 

Faneourt, Capt. H. L. St. J. (RN): 241 

Farndale, HMS: 217 

Fechf't, Col. d'Alary: 380-81,547 

Fedala: 179-80. See also Cap de F('dala. 

advance from to Casablanca: 118, 144-46 

advance inland: 137-42 
INDEX 

Fedala-Continued 

air attacks on armor: 139 

air support at: 116, 119-21 

aircraft losses, Allied and French: 139, 139n 

antiaircraft operations: 118, 128, 139 

armor support: 116, 121, 128-29, 139 

artillery support: 121 

attack near coast: 142 

beach organization: 117-18 

casualties, Allied: 136 

coastal batteries, defense by: 118, 127-30, 133-

34 

command structure: 137 

communications, Allied: 137--38 

composition of assault force: 121 

debarkation at: 123-26, 130, 136, 140-41 

drainage system: 116-17 

garrison strength: 118 

landing craft losses: 125-26, 131, 135 

landing site, selection as: 46 

landings at: 123-27, 129-30, 130-31 

main effort, target of: 41 

maneuver plan: 121-22, 124-25, 136 

naval action: 133-34 

naval defense, French: 118, 133-34 

naval support: 116,127-28,130, 131-32 

patrol operations: 139 

port facilities: 41, 116-17, 135-36, 137 

prisoners, French: 130-31 

reaction of French forces: 125, 131-33 

searchlight employment: 125, 130-31 

secured by Allies: 127 

security measures: 136-37 

seizure by Allies: 116-46. See also Casablanca. 

shore parties: 135, 137 

strength of assault force: 121 

submarine action: 134 

supply dump establishment: 140-41 

topography: 116-18 

troop tra!1sports for: 119-21 

unloading operations: 126, 134-37, 140-41, 144-

45, 174-75 

Feil, Major Frederick C.: 103 

Fenard, Vice Adm. Raymond (Fr.): 17, 78 

Fcrenbaugh, Col. Claude B.: 46, 224 

Feriana: 282-83, 348, 388, 399, 401-02, 403-05, 

413,417-18,424,425,427-28,441,451,470, 

477,478,546-47 

air attack, Allit'd: 470 

attack by enemy: 426-27,462 

defense by Allies: 430, 433 

loss of by Allies: 422-23,436-37 

mines, t'mploymt'nt: 546-47 

reconnaissance, enemy: 407 

security measures, Allied: 423 

seizure by enemy: 437 

withdrawal to and from, Allied: 289, 437-38 

Ferme Combier: 193n, 200-201, 213 

Ferme Ste. Marie: 193n, 201-02 

Fernana: 604-05 

Ferryville: 642-43, 652-53, 656-57, 659 

Pes: 141, 160-61, 179-80 

717 

Field Artillery Battalions. See also Armored Field 

Artillery Battalions. 

5th: 307,311,315,560, 571n 

6th: 565 

7th: 217,381, 461n, 571n 

9th: 121,139-40,143 

10th: 121,139,143,145 

26th: 571n,614-20 

32d: 207,215,222,560, 571n 

33d: 199n, 200-202, 220-21, 381, 391n, 443, 

447, 461n, 463, 558, 571n, 657 

34th: 466, 571n, 614-20 

36th: 443,614-20 

39th: 121,139,144,145,171-72 

41st: 121, 138 

60th: 157-59, 157n, 162--63, 165-67,466, 549n, 

614-20 

65th: 570n 

67th: 614-20 

74th: 466n 

84th: 108, 466, 548n, 571 n, 614-20 

107th: 614-20 

125th: 578-79 

151st: 453 

17 5th: 284-86, 284n, 287, 298n, 302, 303n, 307, 

331,396,397, 433n, 443, 578-79, 658 

185th: 578-79,614-20 

Field Artillery Brigade, 13th: 466n, 546, 547-48 

Field Artillery Group, 5th: 565n 

Field Artillery Regiments 

17th: 411,412,477-78, 571n 

36th: 338-39, 571n, 578-79, 586 

178th: 571n, 578-79 

Fifth Army: 35, 350-51, 499, 643, 667-68 

Fighter aircraft, enemy employment: 366-67 

Fighting French. See also French forces. 

Algiers, seizure by: 249-50 

British-American support of: 22-23 

contacts with: 23 

Darlan, distrust of: 355-56 

De Gaulle-Giraud relations: 358-61 

government for, Allied position on: 361-62 

landings, role in: 24-25 

mt'rger with other French forces: 500 

occupation, areas of: 359-60 

plans withheld from: 24 

Syria, seizure by: 7 

Vichy France, attitude toward: 22, 669-71 

Financial activities: 57-58, 361-62 

Firth of Clyde, concentration at: 70-71 

Fischer, Gen. Wolfgang (Ger.): 296, 306, 311-16, 

327-28, 342, 407n, 658-59 
718 

Flavell, Brig. J. W. C. (BL): 352 

Fleurus: 208-09, 221 

Florence Nightingale. USS: 153, 169 

Fondouk ~I Aouareb (d Okbi): 282-83,418,423, 

425, 438, 541 

air action, enemy: 374,441-42,582,588 

air action, Allied: 374, 585-87 

armor actions: 591 

armor support, Allied: 582, 585-90 

armor support, enemy: 374 

artillery fire, Allied, On own units: 581~·82 

artillery support, Allied: 581-82, 585-87 

artillny support, ~nemy: 374,587-89 

American tardiness, complaint of: 590-91,599-

600 

attacks by Allies: 550, 556, 564-65, 569, 572, 

577, 578-79, 582-87 

attacks by enemy: 426-27 

battle for: 578-92 

br~akout, Allied: 589-90 

casualties, Allied: 582n, 591n, 592n 

casualti~s, enemy: 592n 

casualti~s, French: 374 

counterbattery action: 589-90 

defense plans, Allied: 386-87, 398-99 

dispositions, Allied: 578-79 

dispositions, encmy: 580-81 

engineer support: 589 

First Army directive on: 578-79, 582-83 

German estimate of Allied effort: 583n, 592n 

materit'l loss~s, enemy: 591 

mines, ~mployment: 587-91 

night operations: 586-90 

occupation by Allies: 237 

order of battle, Allied: 582-83 

patrol operations: 586, 588 

prisoner interrogation: 580-81 

prisonns, Allied: 592n 

prisoners, en~my: 588-89, 591 

recanture. Allied plans for: 374-76,378-79,385, 

386-87 

seizure by enemy: 374,426-27 

smoke, employment: 586-87 

tank losses, Allied: 582. 5!l8, 590, 591 n 

tank losses, enemy: 374,591 

topography: 578-80 

withdrawal, Allied: 585-86 

withdrawal, enemy: 591 

Foreign exchange. See Financial activiti~s. 

Formidable, HMS: 185,248 

Forts: 

de l'Eau: 247-48 

de la Pointe: 193n, 205-06 

de Sidi Ferruch: 234-35, 236, 239-40 

d'Estn'es: 247-49 

du Nord: 49, 193n, 205-06 

du Santon: 48,201-02,223,224-25 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Forts~Continued 

Duperre: 230, 235, 236-37 

Independence: 286 

Lamoun~: 19:1n 

I'Empereur: 238-39 

Fougier, Gen. (It.): 325n 

Foum Tatahouine: 52:1-24, 525, 526·~27 

Fountain, Col. Ray C.: 402-03, 436 37 

France, metropolitan: 187 

Franco, FranciscCl: 5, 7. See also Spain. 

Frantz, Gcncralmajor Gothard (GeL): 527 28 

Frascati: 368-69 

Fredendall, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R.: 47, 71, 195-96, 

213, 220, 224-27, 350-52, 378, 380-81, 

385, 386-88, 392-93, 396~97, 399, 403-05, 

432 :13, 443-51, 456~57, 470-73, 486-87 

Allied ground troops, assigned to command: 38.1 

background: 35n 

Centt'r Task Force, selected as commander: 35 

Fai'd pass directive: 399·-400 

Ousscltia valley directive: 378 

Sidi Bou Zid directive: 418 

Station de Sened directive: 396-97 

succeeded by Patton: 4c~ .0 7 , 545 

Free French. See Fighting French. 

Freeman-Attwood. Maj. Gen. H. A. (BL): 350, 

504-05,610 

French colonies 

administrative unification: 669-71 

censorship in: 356 

collaborationists, suppression of: 500 

decisions, Allied, on ultimate status: 31 

Imperial Council of Governors: .100 

landing sites, identification of to officials: 56 

North African Agrt'ement, provisions of: 269-71 

officials, President's message to: 91, 95 

political officers in 1942: 17 

political problems: 22, 23-24, 77-83, 2.13-54, 

355-62 

political rdorms instituted: 356~ 57 

political structure: 16, 500 

nopulation, composition: 16-17 

Vichy France policies. emulation of: 5. 356-57 

French Committt'e of National Liberation: 22,669-

71. See also Fighting French. 

French forces. See also Fighting Fr~nch. 

aircraft for use of: 499-500 

Algiers, strength and reaction: 52, 229-30, 235-

16. 216n. 238, 239, 243-44, 246 

Alli~d appointments, reaction toward: 267-68 

American tardiness, complaints of: 392~ 93, 417 

Bizerte, surrender at: 321 

br<>ak with Axis: 287 ·88 

capability, t'stimate of: 82n 

Casablanca, strength and reaction: 118·~19, 139, 

141, 142, 14.1-46 

Cherchcl me~ting with Allied leaders: 81-83 
INDEX 

French forces-Continued 

Clark-Darlan negotiations: 262-69 

collaborationists, vindictiveness toward: 669-70 

CCS approval of arrangements with: 268 

command relations within: 93-94, 272---73 

commandn for: 77-84 

commanders, assignmt'nt of: 267-68,270,272 

commanders, attitude toward Allies: 249-50 

co-operation, ent'my efforts to gain: 254-60 

co-operation with Allies, attempts to establish: 

356-58 

Darlan, preference for: 356 

Darlan's neutrality directive to: 263--64 

De Gaulle acquires complete authority Over: 671 

disarming ordered by Hitler: 321 

distrust of by Axis: 286-87, 294-95 

distrust of De Gaulle: 356 

employment, plans for: 56 

evasive actions toward Axis: 283, 286-87 

factionalism in: 354-55, 358-69, 500, 669-71 

Fedala strength and reaction: 124-26, 131-33 

Fighti g French, mt'rgerwith: 359-61,500,669-

71 

Giraud accepted as commander: 264-66, 272, 

361-62 

Giraud-De Gaulle differences over control: 670-

71 

Giraud's proposals for employment: 272-73 

Kairouan pass, relief at: 379-80 

landings, role in: 89-96 

materiel expected from Allies: 361-62 

Mehdia, reaction at: 157-58 

in Morocco, collaboration with after surrender: 

176-78, 180 

Morocco garrison, es timate of: 40 

North African Agreement, role under: 269-70 

Oran, garrison strength: 193, 202-03 

Oran-Algiers landings, role in: 186-87, 188-89 

organization for collaboration: 272-73 

Petain, devotion to: 23-24 

pilot training by Allies: 499-500 

Port-Lyautey, strength and rt'action: 149-50, 

153-57 

Rabat, reaction at: 139 

rearmament by Allies: 270,361-62,499-500 

reorganization: 499-500 

shipping, allotment to: 362 

state of for Allied use: 273 

strength in 1942: 21 

supply, oversea: 499 

TORCH, role in supporting: 81-82, 82-83, 82n, 

85, 253-54 

training: 499-500 

treatment of: 30-31, 45-46, 56, 251-52 

Tunisia, disposition in: 258-59, 283-84 

Tunisia, juncture with Allies: 279 

Tunisia, reaction to Axis occupation: 258-60 

French forces-Continued 

ultimatum to by Axis: 287 

unification achieved: 669-71 

719 

Vichy France, attitude on collaboration with Allies: 262-63, 287,500 

Vichyites, recruitment of: 670-71 

West Africa, collaboration by: 270-72 

French Navy: 5, 193,257-58 

French Northwest Africa, invasion of. See TORCH. 

French units 

1st Battalion, Foreign Legion: 220n 

3d Battalion, Foreign Legion: 180n 

8th Tabor Battalion: 154 

Algerian Light Armored Brigade: 273, 442-43 

XIX Corps: 298, 350-51, 378-81, 382-84, 

386-87, 402-03, 417, 418, 432-33, 469, 

486-87, 489-92, 508-09, 579n, 582-83, 591, 

600,610-11, 611n, 612, 614-20, 639-41, 644-

45, 662-63, 664-65, 670-71 

Corps Franc d' Afrique: 504-05, 615n, 653-54 

Detachment Guinet: 442-43 

Algiers Division: 52, 239, 273, 379-80,402-03 

Casablanca Division: 52, 171 

Constantine Division: 273,351-52,374-75,388-

90,433, 433n, 456-57, 579n 

Fes Division: 141 

Meknes Division: 141 

Division Mathenet: 490, 579n 

Oran Division: 48, 193, 664-65 

Tunis Division: 257, 258-59, 286-87 

Division Welvert: 490 

Foreign Legion: 208 

L Force: 526-27 

7 th Legion of Guards: 52 

I st Regiment, African Chasseurs: 139n, 160n 

1st Algerian Infantry Regiment: 418 

1st Moroccan Infantry Regiment: 154, 156-57 

2d Algerian Infantry Regiment: 208, 216 

2d Regiment, Foreign Legion: 101, 112 

2d Moroccan Tirailleurs Regiment: 10 I, 112 

2d Zouaves Reg:ment: 188,217,221-22 

3d Algerian Infantry Regiment: 337, 507 

4th African Chasseurs Regiment: 650 

4th Mixed Zouaves-Tirailleurs Regiment: 303n, 

307n, 331 

4th Zouaves Regiment: 650, 667 

6th Senegalese Infantry Regiment: 127 

7th Algerian Infantry Regiment: 327 

7th Moroccan Tirailleurs Regiment: 160n, 164, 

180-81, 337 

15th Senegalese Infantry Regiment: 290-91, 

667 

16th Tunisian Infantry Regiment: 208,220n 

43d Colonial Infantry Regiment: 307n 

62d Artillery Regiment: 303n, 307n, 331 

64th African Artillery Regiment: 180n 

66th African Artillery Regiment: 222 
720 

French units-Continued 

67th African Artillery Regiment: 443 

68th African Artillery Regiment: 208, 221 

Moroccan Colonial Artillery Regiment: 112 

Southeast Algerian Command: 544-45, 565 

11 th Squadron, African Chasseurs: 112 

Tabor units: 490 

6th Motorcycle Troop, Moroccan Guard: 161 n 

Tunisian Troop Command: 350-51 

French Vichy Government. See Vichy France. 

French West Africa: 270--72 

Freyberg, Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard C. (Br.): 526-27, 

533-34, 5.'l5, 665 

Front de Mer: 100,104, 107 

Fullriede, Col. (Ger.): 580-81,588-89 

Furious, HMS: 49, 192-93,204-05,216 

Furna: 327-28,330,333 

Gabes: 260, 278-79, 288-89, 338, 351-52, 364-65, 

370, 409-10, 440, 469, 476-77, 485, 494-95, 

512,516,521-28,534-37,544,557,564,607 

approaches to: 544 

drive on, Allied: 494,565-77 

occupation by enemy: 289 

port operation: 607 

secured by Allies: 537-38 

Gabes position: 322 

Gaffey. Brig. Gm. Hugh J.: 102, 107,487,552, 

569-70, 575-76, 608n 

Cafour: 379 

Cafsa: 327,347-48,351-52,364-65,370-71,387-

88,392,396-98,399,401-06,441,477,478-

79,494-95, 512,524-25,528,529. 544, 550, 

556-57,564-65,607-08 

air action, Allied: 547-48,573 

air support, enemy: 406 

artillery support, Allied: 547-48 

a ttac k by Allies: 494 

attack by enemy: 401,405-07,409-10,415-16, 

546, 570 

control, enemy plans for: 386 

counterattack, enemy: 559-60 

defense by Allies: 386--88,475-76,569-70,572-

73 

demolitions, employment: 417-18 

dispositions, Allied: 546-47 

dispositions, enemy: 544 

Kesselring's assurance on security: 545-46 

mines, employment: 547-48 

night operations: 417-18 

occupation, changes in: 289 

order of battle, II Corps: 546 

reconnaissance, Allied: 546 

reconnaissance, enemy: 406,409-10,425 

reinforcements, Allied: 569 

Rommel's role in attack: 406-07, 409-10, 424--

25, 426-27 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Gafsa-Continued 

Second Manassas, comparison with: 545-46 

security measures, Allied: 417-18 

seizure by Allies: 543-48, 558-59 

seizure by enemy: 388,424-25,427 

strength of Allied forces: 546 

strength of enemy forces, estimate: 543 

as supply point: 543 

vulnerability: 544 

withdrawal, Allied: 417-18,438 

Gaines, Lt. Col. Thomas L.: 578n 

Gale, Maj. Gen. Humfrey (Br.): :>3, 496-97 

Gales (training center): 62 

Gambetta: 193n 

Gandin, Gen. Antonio (It.): 288-89, 325n, 456 

Garact d Mabtouba: 642-43, 660-61 

Garaet Ichkeul: 280,595,600-601,613-15,622-

23, 640-43, 647-48, 652-56 

Gardiner, Col. Henry E.: 434-35,474,656 

Gardner, Major Arthur W.: 1.'lI, 138 

Gariboldi, Gen. Italo (I t.): 7 

Gasoline supplies. See POL. 

Gaulk, de, Gen. Charles (Fr.): 358-61,500,669-

70 

Algiers, arrival in: 669 

appointments, Allied, attitude toward: 267-68 

background: 22 

conversations with Allied leaders: 23 

distrust of by French forces: 356 

Fighting French, recognized as chid by: 22 

French forces, acquires complete authority over: 

671 

French forces, conflict with Giraud over control 

of: 670-71 

Giraud, conference with: 358-61 

popularity, gain in: 669-70 

role in TORCH, not considered for: 56 

Gaullists. See Fighting French. 

Gause, Gen. Alfred (Ger.): 261,321, 327n 

Gay, Col. Hobart S.: 39, 132, 171 

General Headquarters, Mideast (Br.): 362 

Geography. See Topography. 

George Clymer, USS: 150, 153, 164-65 

German Admiral, Rome: 514 

German air units. See Luftwaffe units. 

German armistice commissioners, capture of: 127, 

141, 225-27 

German forces. See also Rommel. 

armor, shift of to Africa: 6-7 

Comando Supremo, control by: 7, 8-9, 9n 

commander's discretionary authority, lack of: 76 

counteroffensive against, British: 8 

Greece, conquest of: 7 

I talians, distrust of: 540-41 

landing points, confusion as to: 186-87 

Libya, conquest of: 7 

reinforcements for during campaign: 8-9 
INDEX 

German General, Rome: 9, 77, 261, 369-70 

German-Italian Panzer Army: 76n, 260, 261, 322, 

349-50, 363-65, 440, 476, 521-22 

German Naval Command, Italy: 186-87 

German Naval High Command: 186-87 

German units 

Panzerarmee Afrika: 8, 72, 75-77, 76n, 368-69 

AngrifJsgruppe Nord: 430-31,441 

First Army: 257n 

Fifth Panzer Army: 326, 333-35, 349-50, 363-

65, 369-70, 370-72, 373, 382, 386, 388,405-

07,426,436-37,438,441-42,453,470,476-

77,501-05,508,510-11,512,519,521,540, 

544,552-53,577,602-03,611,640-41,647-

51,659,661 

Army Group Felber: 257n 

1st Tunis Battalion: 617, 617n 

1st Tunis Field Battalion: 259n, 371-72 

2d Tunis Battalion: 390-91,617 

3d Tunis Battalion: 623 

3d Tunis Field Battalion: 300-301 

4th Tunis Battalion: 617n 

lath Motorcycle Battalion: 306n, 376, 407-09, 

562, 565-66, 609-10 

lath Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion: 648 

lIth Parachute Engineer Battalion: 284n, 299-

300, 504-05, 617 

26th Africa Battalion: 556, 588-89 

27th Africa Battalion: 580-81,588-89 

29th Africa Battalion: 398 

30th Africa Battalion: 617 

33d Antitank Battalion: 648 

33d Reconnaissance Battalion: 425n, 449, 461-62 

34th Africa Battalion: 580-81 

49th Panzer Pionier Battalion: 565-66 

90th Tank Destroyer Battalion: 306n 

190th Panzer Battalion: 259n, 301-02, 311-12, 

370-71,37+-77,398,417 

190th Reconnaissance Battalion: 333-35, 580-81 

200th Engineer Battalion: 425n 

334th Reconnaissance Battalion: 398, 588-89, 

617n 

SOlst Heavy Panzer Battalion: 330-31, 376, 506, 

556,612, 612n 

S04th Heavy Panzer Battalion: 621-22 

S08th Reconnaissance Battalion: 390-91, 398, 

409, 412-13, 453, 459, 462-63, 556 

609th Flak Battalion: 453 

Africa Replacement Battalion: 371-72 

Algerian Battalion: 617n 

German-Arabian Training Battalion: 617n 

Moroccan Battalion: 617 

Training Battalion: 617n 

Tunis Battalion: 610 

Tunis Replacement Battalion: 315-16 

Bizerte Coast Defense Command: 604, 647-48 

Tunis Coast Defense Command: 604 

721 

German units-Continued 

1st Panzer Jaeger Company: 425n 

Africa Corps: 7, 8n, 76, 406, 409, 424, 425n, 516. 

517-19,529,530-31,539-40,541,553,559-

60, 565, 577, 589-90, 602-03, 610-11, 611n, 

644-45, 648, 650-51, 663, 664-65 

XLV Corps: 257n 

XC Corps: 295,312,327-28 

19th Flak Di"ision: 648,650-51 

lath Panzer Division: 260, 294-95, 306, 311-12, 

317-18,333-36,342,370-71,373-76,401-17, 

425-27, 436-37, 438-42, 453-56, 459-62, 

464-65, 470, 476-77, 501-04, 516-19, 523, 

528-31, 537, 538-39, 552-53, 559-62, 565-

66,570,573,576-77,590,603,611-13, 611n, 

648,650-51,661-62 

15th Panzer Division: 371,401,406, 425n, 516-

19, 525, 528-29, 530-37, 538-41, 604, 611, 

611n, 613, 648-51, 661-62 

20th Flak Division: 376, 648 

21st Panzer Division: 364-65, :>71-72, 371n, 

388-90, 398,401,40506,425-27,431,435-

36, 436n, 438-42, 452-55, 459-60, 470-71, 

476-77,478,479,502,516-19, 528-31, 533-

34, 536-39, 546, 570, 577, 590. 603, 611, 

611 n, 648, 650-51, 664-65 

90th Light Africa Division: 371,516-18,527-28, 

5:j 1-32, 537-42, 550, 664-65 

164th Light Africa Division: 371,516,527-29, 

533-41, 604, 664-65 

334th Infantry Division: 260. 370-71, 603, 611-

13,62122,640-41,648,650-51,658,660-62 

999th Africa Division: 580-81 

Division /'on Broich: 333-35, 370-71 

Hermann Goering Division: 260, 365, 476-77, 

504,507-08,603,611-13, 617n, 650--51, 655, 

662 

Division Man~eufJel: 501-05,603,616-17,621-

22,640-41,648,661 

Kampfgruppe AudorfJ: 504,609,612-13 

Kampfgruppe Buhse: 426-27,436 

Kampfgruppe Burk: 376 

Kampfgruppe DAK: 409-10, 425-27, 437-38, 

441,449,451,453-55,460,461-62,470,476-

77,478-79 

Group Djedeida: 313-15 

Kampfgruppe Eder: 504. 506-07 

Kampfgruppe Frantz: 662-63 

Kampfgruppe Fullriede: 509n, 580-81 

Kampfgruppe Funk: 609-10 

Kampfgruppe Gerhardt: 407-09, 420, 425-26, 

430-31, 436 

Kampfgruppe Gruen: 390-91 

Kampfgruppe Holzinger: 507-08 

Kampfgruppe H udel: 312-14, 317-18 

Kampfgruppe lrkens: 612-13, 612n, 648 

Kampfgruppe Koch: 312-13,507-08 
German units-Continued 

Kampfgruppe Lang: 407-09, 501-02, 504, 506-

08, 555n, 556n, 565, 572,577, 590 

Kampfgruppe von Liebenstein: 536-37 

Kampfgruppe Lueder: 312-15, 317-19, 376-79, 

506 

Kmnpfgruppe Menton: 449-50 

Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer. 390-91, 431, 434, 570, 

664-65 

Kampfgruppe Reimann: 407-09, 56566 

Kampf,gruppe Rommel: 441-42, 469, 470-71, 

477 

Kampfgruppe Schirmer: 609-10 

Kampfgruppe Schmid: 504, 507 

Kampfgruppe Schmidt: 611n, 650-51 

Kampfgruppe Schuette: 409, 412-13 

Kampfgruppe Slenkhoff: 409,413-20,434-35 

Kampfgruppe Stolz: 376-77 

Kampfgruppe Stotten: 449-50 

Kampfgruppe Strempel: 398 

Kampfgruppe Weber: 376-77, 381 

Kampfgruppe Witzig: 306-07, 306n, 308-09, 312 

Kampfgruppe Wolf: 580-81 

Kampfgruppe Ziegler: 416-17, 441-42, 

477, 479n 

Kasta 0, B.: 556 

Korpsgruppe Fischer: 370-71,373-74,376 

Korpsgruppe Weber: 501-04, 50708, 603 

Panzergruppe Afrika: 8n 

1 st Artillery Regiment, Afrika: 425n 

2d Artillery Regiment: 259n 

5th Panzer Regiment: 390-91,409,412-13,420, 

452-53, 518, 612n 

5th Parachute Regiment: 259n, 287, 288n, 291, 

301-02, 370-71, 373-74, 376 

7th Panzer Regiment: 306n, 328, 330-31, 342-

43, 407-09, 411, 461-62, 464-65, 506, 562, 

565-66, 609-10, 612n 

8th Pan:z:er Regiment: 449-50, 453-55, 463-64, 

612n 

47th Grenadier Regiment: 333-35,370-71,374, 

426,470,504,506, 509n, 540,612--13 

69th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 339-42, 376, 

407-09, 507, 509-10, 562, 565-66 

71 st Rocket Projector Regiment: 425n 

86th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 317-18, 330, 

339,407-09, 411, 556, 562, 565-66 

90lh Artillery Regiment: 556, 562 

l04th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 259n, 390-

91,409,452-53, 518 

115th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 648, 649-50 

I3S/h Flak Regiment: 425n 

160th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 616-17, 617n 

190th Artillery Regiment: 259n, 425n 

200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 540 

754th Grenadier Regiment: 504, 609, 612 

754th Infantry Regiment: 339-42, 621-2::' 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

German units-Continued 

755th Grenadier Regiment: 504, 506-07 

755th Infantry Regiment: 621-22 

756th Mountain Regiment: 376-79, 504,507-08, 

612,621-22 

961st Infantry Regiment: 580-81 

962d Infantry Regiment: 616-17, 61 7n 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment Afrika: 425n, 449, 

453-55,463,525,528,531-32,570,650-51 

Regiment Barenthin: 308-09, 504-05, 616-17, 

617n, 621-22, 656-57 

Re giment Ewert: 610 

Hermann Goering Grenadier Regiment: 609-11 

Hermann Goering Parachute Regiment: 609-10 

Germany 

occupation of France, policy regarding: 73-74 

internal politics, effect on Allied plans: 11-12 

Italy, offer of military aid to: 6 

Soviet Union, attack on: 6,7-8 

Vichy France, military policy toward: 

254 

Gershenow, Major Louis: 106 

Gibb, Major Frederick W.: 221, 222 

Gibraltar: 294 

AFHQ established: 84 

convoys, arrival at: 185-86 

Eisenhower-Giraud conference: 189-91 

force concentrated at: 84 

safeguarding, plans for: 26, 65 

seizure by Spain, Axis plans for: 5, 7 

Gibraltar Air Command (RAF): 492 

Gibson, Col. Samuel A,: 567n 

Giffen, Rear Adm. Robert C.: 68 

Giraud, Aspirant Bernard: 84 

Giraud, Gen. Henri: 239-40, 252, 262-63, 264-65, 

326-27, 330, 350, 358-61, 361-62, 388, 392, 

615n, 669-70 

Algiers, associations in: \88-89 

American aid, conditions regarding: 81-82, 82-

83, 82n, 83n 

background: 79 

command position, demand for: 82-83, 83n 

De Gaulle, conference with: 358-61 

Eisenhower, conference with: 189-91 

French commander, selection as: 55-56,79, 176-· 

77, 178-79,264-66, 272, 361-62 

French forces, conflict with De Gaulle over control: 670-71 

French forces, plans for employing: 272-73 

High Commissioner, appointment as: 357-58 

Oran, associations in: 188-89 

political role: 358, 499-500 

popularity, diminution of: 669-70 

succeeds Darlan: 355-58 

supreme command position, d{'mand for: 190, 

337-38 

TORCH, role in support of: 80-85 
INDEX 

Glassford, Rear Adm. William A., Jr., mission to 

Dakar: 271-72 

Gleason, Lt. John C:: 435 

Glengyle, HMS: 199 

GOALPOST: 42, 151. See also Mehdia; PortLyautey. 

Goering, Field Marshal Hermann (Ger.): 324 

Goering conference of commanders: 325-26 

Golfe d'Arzew: 213-14 

Golfe de Bougie: 277 

Golfe de Tunis: 366-67, 598, 601 

Gore, Lt. Col. A. C. (Br.): 451-55 

Goubellat: 283-84, 290-91, 326-27, 330, 373, 

609-10 

Goubellat plain: 595-98 

Goumiers: 154,669 

Graham, Capt. D. C. (RN): 205 

Grand Dorsal. See Western Dorsal. 

Grand Mufti of Jerusalem: 321 

Graziani, Marshal Rodolfo, replaced in Libya: 7 

Great Britain. See United Kingdom. 

Greece: 6, 7 

Greek Sacred Squadron: 526-27 

Green Hill: 306-07,308-09,373. See also Djefna 

position. 

Artillery support, Allied: 616-18, 618n 

attack by Allies: 614-21,640 

night operations: 308-09 

topography: 614-16 

Greer, Col. Frank U.: 207, 220, 341-42, 381-82, 

547 

Grenadier Hill: 302, 309, 609-10 

Grich el Oued: 331-32,336-37,338-41,507,612 

Griggs, Major Farrar 0.: 246-47 

Grombalia: 663-64 

Ground observation 

Allied: 246, 628-29, 638, 640, 654-55 

enemy: 636, 640 

Group Schlagtot: 175-76 

Gruenther, Brig. Gen. Alfred M.: 25, 33 

Guelma: 380-81, 402 

Guensch, Col. ( Ger.): 312 

Guereif: 179-80 

Gulf of Hammamet: 595, 598 

Gumtree road: 553-54, 556-65,569,574,576-77 

Gwin, Capt. Robert D.: 634 

GYMNAST Task Force: IOn 

Hadjeb PI Aioun: 352,386-87,394-95,399,402-

03,407-09,415-·16,419,425,473,476,485-

86, 490, 578-79 

Ha('cke, Col. Jean Van (Fr.): 189 

Haidra: 446,457-58,460-61,472-73,599,604-05 

Hains, Col. Peter C., III: 411,419,430-31,432, 

473 

Hall, Major Garnett: 582, 586, 632-33 

Hall, Rear Adm. John Leslie, Jr.: 46 

Hallouf River: 517-18 

Halte d'el Heri: 336-37,339-41 

Hamblen, Col. Arche1aus L.: 81 

Hambleton, USS: 175-76 

723 

Hamilton, Capt. Edgar Guerard (Fr.): 206n 

Hamilton, Major Pierpont M.: 150, 154-55, 164, 

169-70 

Hamlett, Lt. Col. Barksdale: 472-73 

Hammam Lif: 598, 650-51, 662 

Hammamet: 598, 600, 644, 662-63 

Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation: 67 

Handy, Gen. Thomas T.: 496n 

Harlinghausen, Col. (Ger.): 257, 258-59, 284-86, 

286n 

Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest N.: 42, 42n, 102, 107-

08, 111, 113-14, 471-74, 575-76, 641-43, 

654-55, 662 

Hartland, HMS: 202-04 

Harris, USS: 103-04,106-07,111 

Harry C. Lee, USS: 68 

Harwood, Adm. Sir Henry (RN): 354 

Hatab River: 444-47,452,457-58,462 

Hawkesworth, Maj. Gen. ]. L. 1. (Br.): 612 

Hawkins, Col. John R.: 212n 

Haydon, Maj. Gen. ]. C.: 63 

Heidous: 342, 612, 620-21 

Heigl, Col. (G('r.): 512-13 

Hendaye conference, Franco-Hitler: 5 

Hendrickson, Col. Norman E.: 578n 

Ht'nney, Lt. Col. Fred('ric A.: 150, 164-65 

Henry T. Allen, USS: 150,153, 157 

Hewes, USS. See Joseph Hewes, USS. 

Hewitt, Adm. Henry Kent: 36,44,60, 111, 155, 

170, 171-74, 354-55. See also Amphibious 

Force, Atlantic Fleet. 

Hewitt, Col. Robert A.: 374n, 608n 

Heydte, von der, Major (Ger.): 604 

Hightower, Lt. Col. Louis V.: 411-13,430-31 

Highway syst('ms: 20, 155-56, 199-200, 230-31, 

281-83, 293, 298, 347-48, 419, 428, 444-46, 

615-16,642 

Hildebrandt, Col. Hans Georg (Ger.): 390, 398, 

407, 413, 426, 434, 452-53, 459-60, 535, 546 

Hill, Lt. Col. S. ]. L.: 287--88, 288n 

Hillenmeyer, Capt. Herbert F.: 636-37 

Hills 

58: 158-59, 163 

74: 158-59 

104: 314-15 

107: 620 

112: 539-40 

145: 328 

148: 328 

186 (Djebel Maiana): 303, 306, 311, 315, 316, 

318-19 

201: 533-34, 558-59 

258: 312-13 

270: 517-18 

275: 539-40 
724 

Hills-Continued 

290: 567-71, 567n 

294: 619-20 

299: 640 

306: 581-82, 588, 589-90 

322: 553-56,575 

336: 558-62, 569 

344: 626 

346: 625 

350: 622-24 

361: 567n 

369: 560,566-74, 568n 

382: 640 

388: 624-25 

394: 624-26 

398: 619-20 

400: 622-24 

406: 640 

407: 622-25 

420: 624-25 

428: 628-29 

432: 617-18 

435: 628-33 

438: 617-19 

455: 628-38 

461: 628-37 

466: 185-86, 342 

469: 624-26 

473: 626 

476: 628-29 

482: 565-66, 569, 571 

485: 624-25 

490: 628-35 

513: 618-19 

523: 628-37 

529: 628-36 

531: 626-27,628-38 

533: 626 

545: 628-36 

549: 623-24 

558: 628-29, 634 

574: 569 

575: 622-27 

598: 619-20 

609: 504-06,595-97,622 

air support, enemy: 637 

ammunition shortage, enemy: 634 

armor support, Allied: 634-38, 641-42 

artillery preparation, infantry fails to benefit 

from: 671-72 

artillery support, Allied: 622, 626, 629-30, 

632-33, 635, 638 

artillery support, enemy: 635,636-37 

attack by Allies: 622-24,626-27,628-35 

battle for: 628-43 

casualties, Allied: 633-34 

communications, Allied: 636-37 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Hills-Continued 

609-Continued 

counterattacks, enemy: 631-38 

defensive measures, enemy: 630-32 

ground observation, Allied: 628-29, 638 

ground observation, enemy: 636 

mines, employment: 632, 637 

night operations: 631-32, 635-38 

patrol operations: 637-38 

prisoners, Allied: 633-34, 636-37 

prisoners, enemy: 634 

reconnaissance, Allied: 634 

reinforcements, Allied: 637-38 

reinforcements, enemy: 634, 637-38 

smoke, employment: 635 

supply shortage, enemy: 634 

tank losses, Allied: 635, 637 

topography: 628-31 

644: 390-91 

667: 608 

668: 620-21 

704: 452, 455-56 

712: 447,450-51,454-55 

732: 464 

772: 559-60, 562-63, 565-66, 567n, 568, 571, 

572-73, 574 

812 (not Djebel Zebbeus): 463-64 

974: 449-51, 454-55 

1191: 445, 502-04, 507-08, 509-10 

Hinley, Capt. Lacey W.: 332n 

Hir Moussa: 376-77,379-80 

Hitler, Adolf: 186-87, 321-26, 363-65, 368-69. 

See also German forces; Germany. 

Allied-French collaboration, reaction to: 253-62 

Americans, estimate of: 673 

anti-British alliance, attempts to foster: 5 

Axis capabilities in February, review of: 511-12, 

513-14 

Chott position directive: 529-30 

Ciano, conference with: 255-57 

commanders, authorizes direct communication 

by: 529n 

conference with commanders: 513-14,529 

Cross-Channel attack, concern for: 73 

EI 'Alamein, demand for resistance at: 76 

England, plans for invading: 4-5 

Franco, conference with: 5 

French forces, order to disarm: 321 

I talian shipping, proposal for use: 602 

Kesselring, directive to: 369-70 

Malta, blunder in postponing assault on: 9 

Middle and Near East, plans for invading: 8 

Rommel, conference with and directive to: 322-

23, 324-25 

supply requirements, estimate of: 511-12,513-14 

Tunisia, proposal for holding: 601-02, 665-67 

Vichy government, distrust of: 254 
INDEX 

Holmes, Col. Julius: 58-59,81 

Holnws, Brig. L. C. (Br.): 486-87 

Homs: 364 

Hopkins, Harry: 12 

Horrocks, Lt. Gm Sir Brian (Br.): 514, 526-27, 

535 

Horseshoe Hill: 109 

Hospital, evacuation, at Constantine: 376 

Howard, Col. Edwin B.: 46, 225-27 

Howzt', Lt. Col. Hamilton H.: 468, 656, 660-61 

Hudel, Capt. (Ger.): 312 

Hugh L. Scott, USS: 175-76 

Hughes, Brig. Gen. Everett S.: 495-96 

Hughes-Hallett, Com.modore John (RN) : 63 

Hup;ulct, Major Warren: 339 

Hull, Col. R. A. (Br.): 284n, 287n, 295-96, 299-

300, 303-04 

Hunt's Gap: 505-07 

[-[ussc"in Dcy: 235, 247 

Iceland, American garrison replaces British: 11 

Identification of units, failure at Mehdia: 162 

lie Zembra, enemy prisoners captured: 663-64 

Imperial Council of Governors: 500 

Impcriali, Gen. Giovanni (It.): 333-35, 370-71, 

388 

Imports, plan for control of: 58 

Infantry, American, critique on methods: 660-61, 

673-74 

Infantry Divisions 

1st: 192, 213, 220-21, 223-24, 227, 380-81, 

402-03,436-37,456-57,464,468,474,478, 

490-92, 505--06, 544-65, 564n, 567n, 569, 

570-71, 571~ 574-77, 605-07, 613-14, 

620-27, 629-38, 642-43, 652-53, 656-58, 

667-68 

3d: 42,61,116,179-81,546,643,657-58,667-

68 

9tr.: 42,61, 66n, 180-81,427-28,465-66, 466n, 

467n, 473, 478, 490-92, 546, 550, 562-71, 

571n, 574-77, 603-07, 614-18, 639-41, 

642-43, 652-53, 658-59, 667-68 

34th: 53, 241, 381-82, 399, 402-03, 427-28, 

432-33, 442-43, 459, 490, 505-06, 509, 

546, 550, 564, 572, 577-92, 599, 605-07, 

625-28,642-43,652-53,658-59,661,667-

68 

Infantry Regiments. See also Armored Infantry 

Rt'giments: Regimental Combat Tt'ams. 

7th: 121, 136, 138-40, 142-45 

15th: 121-36, 138-40, 144-46 

16th: 381,394-95, 398n, 456-57, 460-64, 461n, 

474, 547-48, 558-62, 569, 622-23, 624-27, 

629-38, 650, 657-58 

18th: 215-22,224-25,337-43,436-37,547-48, 

557-63, 569, 620-27, 657-58 

Infantry Regiments-Continued 

26th: 338, 391n, 392n, 393-94,433, 433n, 443, 

447-48,449-50, 452, 453-55, 490-92, 547-

48,557-59,564-65,569,571,622-27,633-

39, 657-58 

30th: 121-36,138,145,171,179-80 

39th: 180-81, 187-88, 327-28, 396n, 448-50, 

455-56, 461 n, 490-92, 567-68, 570n, 571, 

614-20, 639-41, 656n, 660-61 

47th: 97, 99, 103-08, 179-80,466, 548n, 567-

68, 574, 604, 614-20, 640-41, 653-55 

60th: 466, 549n, 550, 554-55, 614-20, 639-41, 

653 

133d: 427-28, 432-33, 436-37, 442-43, 490, 

578-92, 632--38, 658-59 

135th: 244n, 402-03, 436-37, 442-43, 509, 578-

92, 629-38, 641-42 

168th: 396, 396n, 397, 399, 411 n, 412-13, 433n, 

435-36,443,477-78,486-87,490,578-92, 

620-21, 624, 624n, 626-27, 658-59 

Innsbruck conference, Keitel-Badoglio: 6 

Intelligence collection: 485-86, 489 

Intelligence estimates 

Allied: 401,553, 556n, 645 

enemy: 74, 565-66 

Intelligence operations: 23, 24-25 

Inverary. See Combined Operations Training 

Center. 

Inwrchaolain peninsula: 63 

Iraq, British occupation of: 7 

Irkens, Col. (Ger.): 612-13 

I rwin, Brig. Gen. S. L" Roy: 465-67, 567n 

Italian air forces, reinforcement of in Tunisia: 257 

Italian Naval High Command: 186,514 

Italian Navy, in policinp; of Mediterranean: 7 

Italian units 

First Army: 368-70,441,476,510-11,519,521, 

525,527-31,540-41,552-53,562-64,575-

77,589-90, 591-92,603-04,609,611,611n, 

613,648, 650-51,664-65 

Battalion Grado: 617n 

5th Bersaglieri Battalion: 451, 454-55, 463-64 

7th Bersaglieri Battalion: 525 

135th Armored Battalion: 588-89 

136th Tank Destroyer Battalion: 259n 

557th Assault Gun Battalion: 259n 

50th SPecial Brigade: 333-35, 370-71, 388-90, 

398, 555, 603 

X X Corps: 524-25, 527, 536-37, 538-39, 664-65 

XXI Corps: 527-28,535,536-37,538-39,664-

65 

XXX Corps: 8n, 295, 370-71, 580-81,603-04 

Ariete Division: 338 

1st (Superga) Division: 295, 295n, 333-35, 337, 

370-71, 373-74, 376-77, 381, 406, 603, 

611n,650-51 
726 

Italian units-Continued 

16th (Pistoia) Motorized Division: 371, 516, 

527-30, 538-40, 604 

80th (La Spezia) Division: 371, 516-18, 527-30, 

538-40,604 

101st (Trieste) Division: 371,516,527-30,538-

40, 604, 665 

131st (Centauro) Armored Division: 371-72, 

388-90, 398, 401, 405-06, 425, 425n, 441, 

451,453-54,455,462,463-64,470,529-30, 

538-39, 543-44, 546, 557-58, 565-66, 577, 

590, 602, 604 

136th (Young Fascist) Division: 371,516,527-

2~ 531-32, 538, 542, 604 

Group Benigni: 370-71,381 

Group Imperiali: 592n 

Saharan Group: 371,527-28,538-39 

10th Bersaglieri Regiment: 504-05,617 

91st Infantry Regiment: 580-81 

Italy. See also Comando Supremo; Mussolini, 

Benito. 

anti-British alliance, plans for: 5 

distrust of by Germans: 540--41 

Greece, attack on: 6 

invasion, expectation of: 74, 601-02 

Mediterranean, paramount interest in: 6 

military aid, German offer of: 6 

Tunisia, effect on of loss: 676 

Vichy France, attitude toward: 73-74, 255-56 

Jamaica, HMS: 192-93, 217, 222-23 

James, Brig. M. A. (Br.): 505-06 

Jamison, Comdr. J. W. (USN): 136 

Japan, consideration of main effort against: 12 

Jean Bart (Fr.): 40,96,118,133,143-44 

Jean-Bart (town): 246-47 

Jeeps. See Motor convoy operation; Motor vehicles. 

Jefferson, USS. See Thomas Jefferson, USS. 

Jemmapes: 295-96 

Jetee du Nord: 230,243,244 

Jewish population, propaganda among: 178-79 

Jodi, Gen. Gustav (Ger.): 511, 513-14, 529 

John Penn, USS: 153 

Johnson, Major Charles E.: 131 

Johnston, Capt. James D.: 108, 568 

Joint Army-Navy Plan for Participation in TORCH. 

See ROOFTREE. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 352-54 

disagreements over landings: 25-31 

political missions, assignment by: 55 

role in CCS: In 

successor to Army-Navy Joint Board: 3i 

Joint operations, direction of: 37-39 

Joint Rearmament Committee: 270, 362 

Joseph Hewes, USS: 175-76 

Joseph T. Dickman, USS: 123, 124n, 126 

Jousse, Lt. Col. Louis G. M. (Fr.): 81, 189 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Juin, Gen. Alphonse: 132, 178, 189, 258-59, 263-

64, 272-73, 298, 326-27, 329-30, 350-52, 

377-78, 383-84, 388, 475-76, 650, 669 

Algiers, role in surrender of: 251-52 

command assignments: 17, 265-66, 272 

Resident General of Tunisia, appointment: 669 

support of TORCH, views on: 78, 84-85, 249-50 

surrender, authorized to negotiate: 251 

Kairouan: 370,407,438,441,453,541,578,580-

81, 583, 588-91, 592n, 604 

Kairouan pass: 294-95,327,347-48,351-52,373-

74, 379, 381 

air attack by Allies: 379 

artillery support, Aliied: 379 

attack by enemy: 376-77, 379 

communications, enemy: 379-80 

counterattack, Allied: 379-80 

French forces, relief of: 379-80 

occupation by enemy: 289 

reinforcements, enemy: 379 

supply, enemy: 379-80 

Kalaa Djerda: 494 

Kamelberg: 611, 611n 

Karachoum Gap: 374, 376-78 

Karanja, HMS: 234, 235, 278 

Kasba. See Port-Lyautey. 

Kasba Tadla: 179-80 

Kasserinc: 282-83, 348, 349, 403-05, 439-40, 453, 

546 

air reconnaissance, enemy: 427 

defense by Allies: 430, 433-35 

engineer support: 418 

prisoners, French: 427 

reinforcements, Allied: 460-61 

security measures, Allied: 423 

seizure by enemy: 427 

Kasserine pass: 521-22, 546-47 

air attack by Allies: 473 

air support, enemy: 449, 479 

aircraft losses, Allied: 477 

armor support, Allied: 449-51, 453-54 

artillery support, Allied: 447, 462 

artillery support, enemy: 449, 453-54 

battle for: 438-80 

boundary designations, Allied: 471-73 

casualties, Allied: 477-78, 477n 

casualties, enemy: 477 

command reorganization, Allied: 470-71 

communications, Allied: 451,455,457-58,461-

62 

counterattack, Allied: 457-58,470-75 

defense at and beyond, Allied: 433-35, 446-58 

defense features: 446-47 

dispositions, Allied: 449-50, 456-57, 472-73, 

478--79 

drainage system: 445-46 
INDEX 

Kasserine pass-Continued 

highway system: 444-46 

lessons gained by Americans: 479-81 

loss of by Allies: 453-56 

rna teriel losses, Allied: 477 

materiel losses, enemy: 477 

mines, employment: 447-48, 450-51, 455, 474 

night operations: 452 

patrol operations, Allied: 447 

POL losses, Allied: 477 

POL supply, enemy: 469 

principle of mass, enemy violation of: 479-80 

prisoners, Allied: 450-51, 477 

reconnaissance, Allied: 451, 457-58, 473 

reinforcements, Allied: 443, 449-51, 474 

reinforcements, enemy: 451, 454-55, 459-60 

road construction: 472-73 

rocket support, enemy: 453-54 

Rommel's decision to shift to: 453 

summary of operations: 478-81 

tank losses, Allied: 461-62, 477 

tank losses, enemy: 450-51, 477 

thrust through, enemy: 438-58,478-79 

topography: 444-47 

withdrawal, Allied: 450-51 

withdrawal through, enemy: 469-75 

Kasserinc Valky (misnomer): 446 

Kaufman, Gauleiter (Ger.): 325-26, 325n 

Kbir River: 370-71 

Kean, Col. William B.: 608n 

Kearny, USS: 163, 165-67, 170n 

Kebili: 335, 533-34 

Kebir River: 595-98, 611n, 612 

Kebir River reservoir. See Barrage de l'Oued 

Kebir. 

Kebir River valley: 376-77 

Keddab wadi: 548,560-62,574 

Kef el Ahmar: 423 

Kef 1"1 Goraa. See Hill 575. 

Kef el Guebli. See Hill 529. 

Kef el Korath: 459-60 

Kef en Nsour (Hill 523): 615-20, 639-40 

K('ightley, Maj. Gen. Sir Charles F.: 326-27, 468, 

587-88 

Keitel, Marshal Wilhelm (Ger.): 6, 322-23, 513-

14. See also German forces; Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. 

Kelly, Lt. Col. Joseph E.: 287n 

Kelly, Rear Adm. Monroe: 70, 155, 170 

Kennedy, Capt. Kenneth: 195n 

Kent-Lemon, Brig. A. L. (Br.): 295-96,312 

Keren, HMS: 234-35, 238 

Kern, Col. William B.: 195n, 196-97, 219-20, 

223-24, 391-92, 393-94, 413-14, 554-55, 

556n 

Kern's Crossroads: 414n, 421, 422, 425-26, 430 

Khemisset: 132, 141 

Kesra, 327, 378, 490 

727 

Kesselring Marshal Albert (Ger.): 77,186-87,254, 

262, 288-89, 294-95, 300-301, 302, 321-24, 

325~ 338, 364-65, 368-69, 373-74,406,425, 

439-42,455-56,460,469-70,476,479, 501-

04, 513-14, 536, 552-53, 562, 570, 602-03, 

645-47 

airfield retention, emphasis on: 511 

Axis capabilities, estimates of: 509-12, 645-47 

B€dja attack directive: 501-04 

Chott position directive: 529-30 

Comando Supremo, relation to: 369 

commander's discretionary authority, conviction 

of need for: 76 

Gafsa, assurance of: 545-46 

Hitler conferences and directive: 369-70, 513-

14 

landings, cond usions on: 674 

Mareth, assurance of security of: 545-46 

Mareth position, decision to shift to: 469-70 

Mediterranean-Aegean coast, charged with defense of: 73,260-61 

Mussolini, subordination to: 8-9 

Nehring, directive to: 311, 322 

at Rastenburg conference: 529 

supply capability, estimate of: 512-13, 512n 

T€bessa, Rommel's proposal to for seizure: 438-

42, 455-56 

T€bessa attack directive: 439-40 

Tunisia inspection trip: 512 

Keyes, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey: 42, 42n, 137, 178-79, 

576 

King, David W.: 92 

King, Adm. Ernest J.: 12 

Knight, Ridgeway B.: 81, 189 

Knight, USS: 106, 114 

Knoche, Capt. Wilhelm (Ger.): 287 

Knox, Frank: 268n, 270 

Koch, Lt. Col. (Ger.) : 286n, 312 

Koeltz, Gen. Louis-Marie (Fr.): 78, 189,239,250-

51, 298, 350-51, 379, 381, 427-28, 442-43, 

486-87, 490, 583, 585-86 

Kolea: 234-36, 239-40 

Krause, Gen. Fritz (Ger.): 648, 662 

Ksar el Hallouf: 516-17,523-25,527-28,534-35 

Ksar Mezouar: 506-07 

Ksar Tyr: 290-91, 333-35, 595-97, 612 

Ksour: 298, 441, 452-53, 606-07 

Kut('r, Brig. Gen. Laurence S.: 383, 492-93, 573 

La Bouzan~a: 235, 239 

La Calle: 278-79, 288-89 

La Fauconnerie: 370,409-10,527 

La Ferla, Generale di Brigata Francesco (It.): 527 

La Macta: 208-09,216-17,221 

La Moh ammedia: 312 

La Railkuse: 100 

La Sebala, Allied air attack on: 218-19,649 

La Senia: 193, 210-13, 217-25, 239, 241 
728 

La Surprise (Fr.): 199 

Labor, native, employment of: 497-98 

Labor units, See Service units. 

Laborde, de, Adm, (Fr.): 263-64 

Lac de Bizerte: 280. 595, 642A3, 659-60 

Lahoulk,Gen. (Fr.): 93,132,171 

Lake Maracaibo oil tankers, See Maracaibos. 

Lakehurst (seatrain): 102, 107, 108 

Lalande, HMS: 234 

Lambert, Col, Kent C.: 40, 571, 608n, 641-42, 

656 

Lamberton: HMS: 278 

Lambiridi, Allied seizure of: 237-41 

Landing craft: 12n, 62-63, 125-26, 135, 158, 

168-69, 187-88, 196-97 

amphibian tractors: 135n 

LCPR: 105 

LCV: 106 

Landing forces, agreement on: 29, 43 

Landing strips. See Airfields. 

Landings in Northwest Africa 

Ain Taya, selection of: 52 

air support of: 37,48,53-54 

airborne support of: 37,53,54 

Algiers, selection of: 52 

American effort, identification as: 29, 50-51 

armor, plan for employment: 48-49 

Arzew, plans for seizing: 48-49 

Commando units in: 52 

Center TF, composition: 48, 49 

convoy routes to sites: 70,71-72 

date, factors influencing: 25-26, 28 

disagreements over: 25-31 

Fedala, confusion at: 125-26, 129-30, 130-31 

hazards affecting: 43-45 

Kesselring's conclusions on: 674 

Les Andalouses, plans for seizing: 48-49 

Mehdia, landing miscarried: 153, 157, 158-59 

Mersa bou Zcd,iar, plan for seizing: 48-49 

methods to be employed: 89-90 

Oran, plan for seizing: 48-49 

plans for, considerations affecting: 32 

reinforcement of: 53n 

RESERVIST Force, role in: 49-50 

resistance, forces available for: 90-91, 92 

resistance forces, friendly, role in: 24-25 

shipping in support of: 53, 65 

signals for returning hostile fire: 45 

sites, identification of to French officials: 56 

sites selected for assault: 25-29, 31, 475-76 

subtask forces, composition: 46 

tides, effect on: 43 

time set for: 89 

weather, alternate plans for meeting: 44-45 

Z Beach, plan for seizing: 48-49 

Lang, Col. Rudolph (Ger.): 339-43, 426, 470, 

506-07, 555 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Largs, HMS: 71, 195-96, 202, 203, 224-25 

Larkin, Brig. Gen. Thomas B,: 46, 66, 495-96 

Larson, Major Werner L: 376 

Lascroux, Gt'n. Georges (Fr.): 92, 93, 132, 141, 

160-61,171 

Lauer, Col. Walter E,: 121 

Laval, Pierre: 253, 254, 255-56, 263-64 

Lavcrdurt': 405, 486, 492-93 

Lawson, Air Commodore G. M, (RAF): 71, 280 

Layard, Lt. Comdr. A. F. C, (RN): 241 

Le Bardo: 312, 650 

Le Kef: 273, 326-27, 330, 347-48, 440--42, 453, 

467,469-70,473,490,502, 604-08 

Le Krib: 608 

Le Kroub, tank maintenance center: 496-97 

Le SCI's: 494-95, 606-07 

Le Tarf: 606-07 

Leadership, Allied, critique of: 674-76 

V'ahy, Adm, William D.: 14, 250 

Leben wadi: 553-55 

Le Beau, Col. Leon (Fr,): 169 

Le Clerc, Gen. Jean (Fr.): 526-27,669-71 

Lederer, Col. Hans: 258-59, 286n 

Leedstown, USS: 71 n, 235, 244-46, 248-49 

Lees, Capt. E. V. (RN): 199 

Leese, Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver (Br.): 514,526-27 

Leinster, HMS: 202 

Lemnitzer, Brig. Gen. Lyman L: 47,81 

Leonard Wood, USS: 121, 123, 124n, 125, 128, 

176n 

Les Andalouses: 196,213-14,217 

ammunition shortage, Allied: 217 

armored cars destroyed: 200-201 

beach abandoned: 225 

coastal defenses, reaction by: 201-02 

highway system: 200-201 

landings at: 199-202, 199n 

naval action: 199-200 

seizure, plans for: 48-49 

topography: 200 

Les Eucalyptus radio station: 52n 

Lessouda Force: 410-13,419,424 

Leyer, Gen, Roger (Fr.): 132, 141 

Liaison orga!'izations: 485-86 

Libby, Lt. Col. Donald M,: 150 

Libya: 7, 9n 

Liebenstein, von, Generalleutnant Freiherr Kurt: 

409-1~ 424, 426-27, 437, 527-28, 535-37 

Lig,!:ett, Capt. John C.: 150 

"Lincoln" (clandestine radio station): 91 

Lines of communication: 28283, 288-89, 

292-93, 309, 325-26, 327, 365-66, 401-

02,485,496-97,552-53,575, 1-92, 616-17 

Llangibby Castle, HMS: 199. 201 02 

Loerzer, Gen. Bruno (Ger.): 255 

Logistical support: 38-39, 43-44, 63-67, 75, 292-

93, 310, 324-26, 36568, 474, 495-99, 512-

14 
INDEX 

Long Range Desert Group: 525-26 

Longstop Gap: 329, 329n 

Longstop Hill: 336-37, 338--44, 600, 603, 612 

Lort'nzdli, Gen. Dante (It.): 295 

Lorraine (Fr.): 153 

Lourmel: 195-96, 198-99,213 

Loycke, Capt. (Ger.): 259 

Lubricants. See POL. 

Ludlow, USS: 121,124,130,134 

Luftflotte 2: 260-61 

Luftwaffe 

airfields in Tunisia, use of:. 254-55 

Darlan, liaison with: 254-55 

Esteva, liaison with: 254-55 

Italy, shift of units to: 6-7 

Mediterranean convoy, attacks on: 187-88 

potential in 1942: 21 

RAF, failure to eliminate: 4-5 

strength, attempts to maintain: 187, 370 

Luftwaffe units 

Second Air Force: 9, 369, 440 

1st Jaeger Brigade: 371, 437n, 525, 528, 531-32 

Parachute Brigade: 604 

19th Flak Division: 527-28, 538-39, 604 

Fliegerkorps Tunis: 370,406 

II Fliegerkorps: 255 

X Fliegerkorps: 6, 9 

53d Fighter Wing: 370 

77th Fighter Wing: 370 

Lutes, Brig. Gen. Le Roy: 66 

Lyon, USS: 97,103,108,111 

Macharda, HMS: 235, 248 

Machine gun employment, enemy: 373 

Mack, W. H. B.: 54 

MacMillan, Brig. Gordon (Br.): 583-85 

Macmillan, Harold: 499-500 

Macon, Col. Robert C.: 121 

Magnan, Col. Pierre (Fr.): 177 

Mahares: 347, 552-54 

Maison Blanche airfield: 235, 239-40, 247-48, 

278, 279, 335 

Maison Carree: 52, 235, 247 

Maizila pass: 388, 390-91, 392, 395-96, 398-99, 

407-09, 412-13 

Maknassy: 282-83, 355, 386-87, 406, 536, 538, 

541,544,546,550,557,564,577 

advance beyond: 543, 544-45, 550-54 

air action, Allied: 398, 556 

air action, enemy: 397-98, 556, 562 

antitank action: 397-98 

armor support, Allied: 555, 556 

armor support, enemy: 556n 

artillery support, Allied: 555 

artillery support, enemy: 556n 

attack by Allies: 386-87, 292-93, 550-55, 569-

70, 572, 575 

Maknassy-Continued 

attack by enemy: 501-02 

casualties, Allied: 398, 400n, 575n 

communications, Allied: 393 

729 

defense by Allies: 564-65,569-70, 572,575-76 

defmse by enemy: 553-57 

intelligence estimate, Allied: 553, 556n 

materiel losses, Allied and enemy: 398 

mines, employment: 555 

night operations: 338, 553-57 

prisoners, enemy: 338, 398, 555n 

raid on: 338 

reconnaissance, Allied: 552, 553-54 

reinforcements, Allied: 552 

reinforcements, enemy: 555-56 

seizure by Allies: 577 

>trength, enemy, estimate of: 543 

tank losses, Allied and enemy: 398 

topography: 388, 553-54 

wi thdra wal by enemy: 553-54 

Maknassy pass: 553-57, 558-59 

Maktar: 282-83,298,327,349,379,380-81,387, 

394-95, 398-99, 403-05, 417, 440, 456, 470, 

490, 507 

Malah River: 280, 615-16, 620-21 

Malcolm, HMS: 241-42, 243, 244n 

Malta, 8, 9, 73 

Malta Air Command (RAF): 492 

Manchester, HMS: 234 

Mancinelli: 665 

Manhart, Lt. Col. Ashton H.: 131 

Manly, Lt. Col. L. A.: 240 

Mannerini, Generale di Brigata Alberto: 527-28, 

535, 538-39 

Map reading, need for training in: 671-72 

Maps, inadequacy of: 419,566-67, 567n 

Maracaibos, plan for transporting armor in: 48-49 

Maraist, Col. Robert V.: 388, 393, 396-97 

Marches, arduous 

1st Infantry Division: 547-48 

9th Infantry Division: 465-66, 466n 

9th Division Artillery: 427-28 

47th Infantry: 180 

60th RCT: 549 

II Corps, to north Tunisia: 604-07 

Mareth position: 322-23, 364-65, 370, 405, 423-

24,427,522 

air reconnaissance, enemy: 530-31 

air support, Allied: 509, 527, 532-33, 536, 582 

antiaircraft support, enemy: 527-28 

antitank measures: 522-23 

approaches to: 525-26 

artillery strength, enemy: 524-25 

artillery support, Allied: 531-33 

attack on, Allied: 526-27, 558-59, 564 

battle for: 485,494-95,508-09,514,521-37 

casualties, enemy: 530-31, 542n 

Catroux's proposal for turning: 524 
730 

Mareth position-Continued 

coastal plan battle: 530-33 

counterattack, enemy: 532-33 

defense by enemy: 440,441,511-12, 512n, 514, 

516,527-30 

defensibility: 522-25 

directive on by Comando Supremo: 512 

dispositions, Allied: 508-09, 526-27 

dispositions, enemy: 527-29 

drainage system: 522-23 

engineer support: 531 

mines, employment: 523-24, 525, 527-28, 531-

32 

morale, Allied: 526 

materiel losses, Allied: 505, 508 

materiel losses, Axis: 542n 

night operations: 531-33 

objectives, contending: 521-22 

prisoners, Allied: 505, 508, 533 

prisoners, enemy: 537 

reconnaissance, Allied: 525-26 

relations among Axis forces: 528-30 

river crossing operations: 531-32 

security of, Kesselring's assurance: 545-46 

shift to, enemy decision to: 469-70, 475-76, 

477 

strength, Allies: 475-77 

strength, enemy: 476-77,530-31,543 

SUPERCHARGE II, shift to: 533-37 

tank losses, Allied: 505, 508, 532-33 

tank losses, enemy: 508 

topography: 522-24, 525 

withdrawal by enemy: 565 

Marguellil River: 578-80, 583-86, 588-90 

Marigold, HMS: 234 

Mark Twain, USS: 196 

Mark VI (Tiger) tank: 305 

Markoe, Lt. Col. Francis A.: 46 

Marnix van Suit Aldegonde (Dutch): 234, 235, 

278 

Maron, HMS: 235,248 

Marrakech: 46, 110, 111-14, 141, 171, 179 

Marsa el Brega: 261-62, 322-24, 363 

Marshall, Lt. Col. Carley L.: 635 

Marshall, Gen. George C.: 12,13,15,268,350-51, 

356-57, 358, 569, 572-73. See also Joint 

Chiefs of Staff; Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

Marshall, Lt. Col. George F.: 202, 203-04 

Martin, Maj. Gen. Henri (Fr.): 92, 111, 132 

Mar}" Slessor, HMS: 196 

Mascara: 210 

Mass, principle of, violated by enemy: 479-80 

Massachusetts, USS: 96, 133, 134n 

Massicault: 311, 327-28, 330, 331, 333, 336, 595-

97, 600, 612, 644-50 

Mast, Maj. Gen. Charles E. (Fr.): 80,81-82, 82n, 

84, 85, 188-89, 236n, 239-40, 249-50, 262, 

265, 358, 361, 362 

NOR THWEST AFRICA 

Materiel, enemy shortages in: 373-74 

Materiel losses 

Allied: 175-76,284,319-20, 320n, 321-22, 332-

33, 394n, 398, 412-13, 414-15, 415n, 422n, 

436n, 453-54, 467n, 477, 490-92, 505, 508, 

519,558, 560n, 609-10, 611 

enemy: 76,381-82,398,421-22,464,477, 542n, 

550, 571, 591,656-57 

French: 142-43, 218-19, 224-25, 382 

Matpur: 286-87, 290-91, 296, 299-307, 308-09, 

312,373,595-97 

armor action: 656-57 

armor strength and support, Allied: 638-39, 

642n, 657 

artillPry strength and support, Allied: 614, 642-

43, 656, 657 

artillery support, enemy: 642-43, 655 

bridge construction: 651, 654-55 

casualties, Allied: 651 n, 656-57 

demolitions by enemy: 642-43 

drive on, by Allies: 613-43 

engineer support, Allied: 642-43 

highway system: 642 

materiel losses, enemy: 656-57 

mines, employment: 626 

ollensive beyond, Allied: 654-59 

prisoners, enemy: 651n, 656-57 

reconnaissance, Allied: 651, 655 

river crossings: 642-43,651,654-55 

seizure by Allies: 641-43 

smoke, employment: 656 

strategic value: 283 

tank losses, Allied: 656-57 

threat to: 640 

topography: 622-23, 642 

traffic congestion: 652-53 

Mathenet, Gen. Maurice (Fr.): 132, 154, 160-61, 

169-70, 337, 664-65 

Matmata: 516-17, 522-24, 526, 527-30, 534-35 

Matthews, H. Freeman, role in Civil Affairs Section: 57-59 

Mazagan: 114,179 

McBride, Capt. Verle: 167 

McCarley, Major Percy De W., Jr.: 157-58 

McCleod, Lt. Col. William R.: 150 

McCloy, John J.: 496n 

McConnaughy, Col. Donald S.: 71n 

McCreery, Maj. Gen. Sir Richard L. (Br.): 486-

87, 545, 550 

McGinness, Lt. Col. John R.: 331-32 

"McGowan, Lt. Col." See Murphy, Robert. 

MeKowsky, Capt. William S.: 150 

McNabb, Brig. C. V. (Br.): 432-33,451-52,458, 

464-65 

MeN arney, Gen. Joseph T.: 14 

McQuillin, Brig. Gen. Raymond E.: 387-94,411, 

412, 413, 430-32, 430n, 435, 443, 472-73, 

548, 548n, 550-51, 564-65, 572, 608 
INDEX 

Me Watters, Capt. Herman: 430-31 

Me Whortcr, Rear Adm. Ernest D.: 68 

Medal of Honor awards 

Minuc, Pvt. Nicholas: 638-39, 638n 

Nelson, Sgt. William L.: 619-20, 620n 

Wilbur, Brig. Gen. William H.: 128n 

Medeninc: 514-19, 522-24, 527-28, 534-35 

Medical Battalions, See also Armored Medical 

Battalions. 

9th: 549n 

16th: 461n 

49th: 461n 

51st: 417-18 

Medical supply, Constantine depot: 376 

Mediterranean Air Command: 492 

Mediterranean Base Section: 495-96 

Mediterranean theater 

air transport operations, enemy: 365-68 

as Axis theater: 4-10 

cargo transport for, enemy: 367-68 

coast defenses, Kesselring charged with: 225, 

260-61 

command structure, enemy: 260-61 

convoys, naval support of: 190-91 

invasion capabilities, Allied, enemy estimates: 

74 

Italian hypothetical control of operations: 6, 

73-74, 323, 363-64, 368-69, 512 

lines of communication, enemy: 365-66 

logistical problems, enemy: 365-·68 

Luftwaffe, alert of: 187 

naval forces, enemy, disposition: 186 

naval policing of by enemy: 7 

operations prior to TORCH: 4-10 

plans, em'my, r('vision of: 363-65 

shipping strength aT'd losses, en('my: 36768 

situation in 1940-42: 1-14 

situation in, effect of EI 'Alamein on: 76 

situation, enemy, on eve of TORCH: 72-77 

supply routes, enemy: 6,7,365-66 

transports, Allied, arri\'al in: 84 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, USA 

activation: In 

boundaries established: 354 

command structure established and reorganized: 

354-59 

Medj('rda, enemy withdrawal from: 456 

Medjerda River valley, operations in: 266~67, 

280,281,294,296,298,300, 303-04,307-08, 

311,18, 326-39, 370-71, 442, 490, 504, 507, 

508, 595-97, 603, 611-14, 621-22, 647-48, 

650-51,661 

Medjez e1 Bab: 299-300,307,315,317, 326-28, 

329-32. 336, 338-42, 371n, 401·02, 490, 

541, 595~97, 603 

action at: 331 

air action, enemy: 287-89, 302 

Medjez eI Bab-Continued 

air attack, Allied, on own units: 302 

artillery support, Allied: 489 

attack by Allies: 489 

731 

attack by enemy: 330-31,373-74, 501 .. ·09, 510~ 

11,512 

bridges at: 303 

casualties, AlIi('d: 302 

counterattack, I"n('my: 302 

first battlc in Tunisia: 287-89 

night opprations: 302 

occupation by Allies: 303 

occupation by en('my: 288 

reinforc('ments, Allied and enemy: 287-88 

repulse, Allied: 302 

security measurt's, Allied: 303 

tank losses, Allied and enemy: 331 

withdrawal by enemy: 302 

Mehdia: 179-80. See also Port-Lyautey. 

air action, Allied: 150, 152-53, 157-58, 157n, 

162-63 

air action, French: 154,158-60 

armor action, first in Morocco: 161-62 

armor support, Allied: 152-53, 160-61, 162 

armor support, French: 156-57, 160-61 

artillery support, Allied: 159, 162-63 

basic plan abandoned: 159 

beach organization: 150-53 

coastal defenses, and attack on: 154, 156 

communications, Allied: 159-61 

counterattack, French: 156-57, 161-63 

debarkation at: 153,155,157-59 

French reaction to landing: 157-58 

highway system: 155-56 

identification, failures in: 162 

landing craft losses: 158 

landing site, selection of: 46 

landings, conduct of: 15053, 155-56, 157~60 

naval support: 150, 155, 158-63 

port capacity: 17-18 

Port-Lyautey, advance to from Mehdia: 147-70 

prisoners, Allied: 157 

reinforcements, Allied: 162 

r('inforcements, French: 156~58, 159-60, 162-63 

river crossings: 152, 163, 16567 

roadblocks at: 157 

sabotage, failure of: 153 

s('archlight ('mployment: 155 

situation on D-day: 159-60 

staff structure at: 150 

surprise, loss of: 153-54 

tank 10m's, French: 161 

unloading cargo: 16061 

Mchdia-Port-Lyautey, substituted for Rabat as 

objective: 42 

Meheri Zebbeus: 398 .. 99, 411, 552-54, 572 

Meich: 565-66 

Meknes: 160-61, 179-80 
732 

Mdlah River: 130, 131, 136 

Menzel Djemil: 659-60 

Menzel el He-urr: 664 

Merchandise quay: 105 

Mers cI Kebir: 193n, 225 

Mersa Bou Zedjar: 213-14 

beach abandoned: 225 

landings at: 195-99, 195n 

seizure, Allied plans for: 48-49 

topography: 196 

M~ervine, ess: 104, 106 

~1esse, Fie-ld );larshal Giovanni 441, 519, 

527-31,535, 

Chott position directive: 

re\·icw of enemy capabilities in F("bruary: 510-11 

succeeds Rommel; 368-69, 370 

Metameur: 516-18 

Metlaoui; 417-18, 544-45,546 

Medin,,; 659-60 

M("yrick, Lt. Comdr. P. C. (Rn): 202 

Mezzolma: 370-71, 525, 527, 544-45, 550-56, 

57677 

Mhignat Touama: 162-63, 168 

Michelicr, Adm. Franl;ois (Fr.): 92-95, 132, 171-

73, 176-78, 185 

Middle East, enemy plans for invading: 8 

Middle East Air Command (RAF): 492 

Middle East Command (Br.): 352 

Milan, ss: 134 

Miliane River: 280, 595-98 

Military government, civil affairs transferred to; 17 

Military Intelligence Division, WD, estimates by: 

401 

Military Police Battalion, 204th: 122 

Miller, Maj. Gen. C. H. (Br.): 496-97 

Miller, Lt. Col. Robert P.: 586-87, 629-31 

Mines, land, employment of: 75, 331, 343, 402, 

431, 436-37, 447-48, 450-51, 452-53, 455, 

474, 487-89, 523-25, 527-28, 531-32, 538, 

546-48,555, 560-62,571,576,587-

90, 610, 612, 614, 632, 637, 639-40, 

653-54 

Mines, marine: 325 

Minue, Pvt. Nicholas: 638, 638n 

Mirage, appearance of: 419-20 

Misoa (Maracaibo): 209--10 

Misurata; 363-64 

Misserrhin: 

Mockler-Ferryman, Eric E, (Br.): 489 

Mogador: 41, 179 

Molle, Lt. Col. Eugene (Fr.): 93 

Molotov-Roosevelt conversations: 12 

Afonarch of Bermuda, HMS: 199, 202 

Monnet, Jean: 500 

Monroe, Col. Thomas H.: 121 

Monsabert, de, Brig. Gen. A. J. (Fr.): 189, 239-

40, 615n . 

Monstre1et, Col. Leon (Fr.): 240 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Montesquieu; 298 

Montgomery, Gen. Sir Bernard L.: 73, 485, 514, 

521-22, 526, 533-35, 539-,40, 552,570, 599, 

609, 611, 644 

Moore, Col. Anderson T W,: 418,433,443,446-

47, 455 

Moore, Major Robert R.: 238 

Moore, Lt. Col. Roy E.: 121, 127, 128, 138 

Morak 

Allied: 70, 526 

enemy; 382,512,541-42,66567 

Fn'neh: 382-83 

~lof('au, Adm. Jacques: 267-68, 272 

Morgan, Lt. Gen. Frederick E. (Br.): 65 

Morliere Col. Louis (FL): 403-05 

Morocco 

air reconnaissance, Allied: 179-80 

airfields, rehabilitation of: 180 

amphibious operations in: 89-181 

armor action, first: 161-~B2 

attack, Allied, enemy expectation of: 74 

attitude of French forces: 176-78 

ca.sualties, Allied: 1 72~ 73 

ci\'il affairs problems: 17678 

civil officials, retention: 177-78 

collaborationist activities: 177-78 

collaboration with French after surrender: 180 

French forces, estimate of: 40 

French plans disrupted: 132-33 

as French and Spanish spheres: 179 

go\'crnment officials, communication to from 

President: 57, 91, 95 

hostilities, end of: 171-81 

naval losses: 175-76 

political atmosphere: 176-79 

poli tical structure: 16 

port facilities, operation and rehabilitation: 40-

41, 179-80, 499n 

propaganda activities after surrender: 178·-79 

railroads, rehabilitation of: 180 

reconnaissance, Allied: 179-80 

siege, state of, proclaimed: 96 

submarine activities: 174-76 

surrender negotiations; 171-74 

training by Western TF after surrender: 171-81 

treatment of French forces: 1 176-77 

Morsott; 577, 606-07 

Mortar employment, enemy; 373 

Moslem population, propaganda among: 178-79 

Mostaganem: 216, 499n 

Motor convoy operation: 498-99 

;\lotor transport. See also ~Motor convoy operation: Motor vC'hic1es. 

Axis strength and use in Tunisia: 371, 602 

deficiencies, Allied; 292-93 

expansion, Alli<"d; 498-99 

movement of II Corps to north sector: 604-07 

reserve at Constantine: 496-~97 
INDEX 

Motor vehicles 

Allied losses. See Materiel losses. 

lack of in BRUSHWOOD Force: 139-40 

landed at Oran: 213 

Mountain warfare, need for training in: 671-72 

Mountainous areas, Northwest Africa: 17-18 

Mousetrap. See Tine River valley, operations in. 

Msoun: 179-80 

M unchar: 508-09 

Murphy, Robert: 23,92, 188,262,265,269,356-

57, 361-62, 499-500 

appointed Chief Civil Administrator: 58 

role in finding French leader: 80-83, 84-85 

role in political preparations: 54-57 

role in surrender of Algiers: 249-52 

Murphy, USS: 121,124,130 

Mussolini, Bmito: 186,260-61,262,289, 323-25, 

512. See also Comando Supr'emo; Italy; 

Italian forces. 

Axis capabilities, agreement with Hitler on: 

513-14 

Balearic Islands, proposal for seizing: 601-02 

El 'Alamein, demand for re-sistance at: 76 

invasion of Italy, concern over: 601-02 

Ke-sselring, subordination of: 9 

Kesselring's assurance on security of Gafsa and 

Mareth: 545-46 

Malta, consent to postponement of assault on: 9 

Soviet Union, proposal for compromise with: 

601-02, 677 

Spain, proposal for attacking through: 601-02 

Spanish Morocco, proposal for attacking through: 

601-02 

Tunisia, determination to defend: 601-03,665-

67 

Naples (Italy), principal airfields: 366-67, 366n 

Nation, Lt. B. H. C. (RN): 240n 

Native-s, enemy efforts to recruit: 321 

Naval actions: 133-34, 143-44, 187-88, 196, 199-

200, 203-04, 213 

Naval Command Africa: 440 

Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean: 493-

94 

Naval forces, Allied. Sele also Naval task forces; 

Center, Eastern and Weste-rn Naval Task 

Force-s. 

command structure and reorganization: 36-37, 

354-55 

control of by CinC: 36, 37 

detection by ene-my: 185-86 

role in landings: 29, 43-45 

shortage-s in: 27-28 

Naval forces, enemy: 186, 514 

Naval forces, French: 40, 92-95, 118, 133-34 

Naval Force-s, Northwest African Waters: 354-55 

N a val losses 

Allied: 175-76, 203-04, 244n, 278 

French: 213 

Naval support 

733 

Allied: 49,97, 104-05, 106-08, 116, 127-28, 

130, 131-32, 133-34, 143, 150, 158-59, 160, 

161, 162-63, 165-69, 185-88, 190-93, 205, 

220-21, 222-23, 231-34, 248 

French: 142, 143 

Naval task forces: 36-38 

N car East, enemy plans for invading: 8 

Neely, Lt. Col. Robert B.: 578n 

Ncfifikh River: 130, 131, 139 

Nehring, Gen. Walther (Ger.): 75, 261-62, 287, 

294--95,298, 300-301, 302, 303-04, 305, 306, 

307, 309, 310, 315-16, 327-28,658-59 

assumes command in Tunisia: 284-87 

background: 262n 

mission assigned: 288-91,311,322 

succeeded by Arnim: 326 

ultimatum to French: 287 

Nelson, Major Richard E.: 121 

Nelson, Sgt. William L.: 619-20, 620n 

Nl"uffcr, Gen. Georg (Ger.): 311n, 333-35, 648, 

662 

Nevins, Col. Arthur S.: 46 

New Jersey (seatrain): 44, 67 

New York, USS: 97,104,109 

Nicholson, Brig. Cameron: 423, 458, 460-61, 464-

65, 466-67, 468 

Nickforce: 423-24, 458, 460, 464-65, 468 

Night ope-rations: 163-65, 219-20, 221, 241-49, 

302, 308-09, 338, 342-43, 376-77, 381, 382, 

417-18, 424, 427, 431-34, 462, 462-63, 526, 

531-33, 539-40, 553-63, 568-69, 576, 586-

90,609-10,631-32,635,636,637-38,658 

Night training, need for: 671-72 

Nightingale, USS. See Florence Nightingale, USS. 

Ninth Air Force-: 492, 527 

No. 1 Line- of Communications Area: 496 

Nogues, Gen. Auguste Paul: 115, 132, 141, 146, 

171, 172-73, 176-78,277,357-58 

assigned authority by Vichy: 264, 265-67 

command assignment, Allied: 265-66 

me-ssage to from President: 95 

Resident General for Morocco: 17 

support of TORCH, role in: 78, 92-95 

Norstad, Col. Lauris: 37,46,71 

North Africa, operations in. See British forces; 

Rommd, Marshal Erwin. 

North African Agreeme-nt: 269-71, 358-59 

North African Theater of Operations, USA, activation: In, 495-96 

Northern Task Force-: 65, 266-67 

Northwest African Air Forces: 354-55, 366-67, 

492, 493, 527 
734 

.\[orthwe-st Africa!) campaign 

Allied leadership, critique of: 674-76 

as contribution to Allied war effort: 669-77 

Cross-Channel succcss, enhancement of in ligh t 

of experience gained: 676-77 

impression on encmy: 673-74 

strate-gic consequences: 675-77 

,upply shipments, Allied: 679 

supply shipments, enemy: 682 

tactical methods, critique of: 671-73 

troop shipments, Allied: 679 

troop shipments, ene-my: 682, 683 

troop strength, Allied, periodic: 679-81 

victory parade for: 669 

Northwest African Strategic Air Force: 492-93, 

494-95, 527, 533, 573 

I\orthwest African Tactical Air Force: 414-15, 

485-86, 492-95, 527, 573 

Northwe-st African Tactical Bomber Force: 527, 

649 

Norway, British readiness for operations in: 12 

Oakes, Major Walter M.: 187-88 

OB South. See Commander in Chief, South; 

Kesselring, Marshal Albert. 

Oberkommando der Marine. See German Naval 

High Command. 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht: 260-61, 363-65, 

369-70 

Oberkommando West: 185-86 

Observa tion, ground, at Sidi Bou Zid: 411 

Obstacles, marine: 152, 154, 155, 159-60, 164-

65, 203, 241-42 

Ocean Rider, HMS: 248 

Ocean Viceroy, HMS: 234 

Ocean Wanderer, HMS: 234 

O'Daniel, Col. John W.: 51, 235-36, 238-39 

Office of Coordinator of Information, agents of: 

24 

Office of Strategic Services: 58-59, 165, 212n. 

Office of War Information: 58 

Offict:'rs, combat, benefits of African experience 

to: 674-76 

Oggaz airfield: 49,210 

Oil supplies. See POL. 

OLIVENERNTE (code name): 373-74 

Oliver, Brig. Gen. Lunsford E.: 47, 195, 198-99, 

205, 209-10, 220-23, 292, 305-06, 315-16, 

317, 326-27, 328, 331-32, 374. 

Oran: 351-52,402,427-28 

aftermath of operations: 225-28 

air action, Allied: 48, 192-93, 204-05, 211-12, 

215-16 

air strength, French: 193 

air transports, mislandings: 212-13 

airborne force, plans for employment: 48 

aircraft losses, French: 204-05, 211-12, 218-19 

airdrops from transports: 212-13 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Oran-Continued 

airfields, seizure of: 48, 218-19 

antiaircraft action: 204-05 

approach of assault force: 220-23 

armor support, Allied: 48-49, 192,209-10,215, 

216-18, 219, 227 

artillery support, Allied: 220-21 

artillery support, French: 217-18, 218n, 219 

attacks by Allies: 192-93, 222-25 

beach organization: 192 

casualties, Allied: 204, 227 

casualties, French: 227-28 

Center TF, role in: 49, 192-94 

civil affairs administration: 225-27 

coastal defcnses, action against: 192-94,203-04, 

223 

collaborationist activities: 225-27 

communications, Allied: 212, 216, 219, 222, 

223 

countcrattack, French: 215-17 

counterbattery action: 223 

debarkation: 193-94, 217 

defenses of: 48 

envelopment of: 222-23 

first day's operations: 192-214 

French, friendly, aid of landing: 188-90 

French forces, hostile, rcaction of: 186-87 

garrison strength: 193, 202-03 

Giraud's associations in: 188-90 

harbor, assault on: 202-04 

landed force, strength: 213 

landings, plans for: 27, 28, 29, 31 

materiel losses, French: 218-19, 224-25 

motor convoy operations: 498-99 

motor Vt:' hicles landed: 213 

naval actions: 203-04, 213 

naval strength, French: 193-94 

naval support of landing: 190-91, 192-93, 220-

21, 222-23 

night operations: 219-20, 221 

obstacles in harbor: 203 

political problems: 225-27 

population: 47 

port facilities, operation and rehabilitation: 19, 

225, 495-99, 499n 

postponement of landing, French request for: 

188 

prisoners, Allied: 212-13,223-24 

prisoners, French: 218-19, 224-25 

propaganda activities: 204-05 

reconnaissance, Allied: 211 

reinforcements, Allied: 216, 222 

reinforcements, French: 208-09, 216, 222 

replacement depot, capacity: 499 

RESERVIST Force, mission and operations: 49-

50, 202-04 

resistance expected: 215 

salvage operations: 225 
INDEX 

Oran-Continued 

secured by Allies: 225 

seizure by Allies: 46-50, 215-28 

surrender negotiations: 224 

tank destroyer support: 218 

tank losses, French: 218 

topography: 47, 203 

unloading operations: 213-14 

Orlando, Gen('raJe di Divisione Taddeo: 527 

Or1eansvill(', motor convoy operations at: 498-99 

Orders, confusion in: 397-98, 441-42 

Ordnance shops, at Tebessa: 376 

Osprey, USS: 158, 169 

Otranto, HMS: 234-36, 238 

Oudna airfield: 305, 309 

Oued Zarga: 288, 291, 329-30, 373-74, 504-05, 

506 

Oujda: 350-51 

Ouled Fayet: 238 

Ouled Rahmoun: 498-99 

Ousscltia: 377-81 

Oussdtia River valley, operations in: 348, 376-

84, 386-87,402-03, 427-28, 470 

Pacific theater, competing claims upon Allied resources: 10-11 

Palermo (Sicily): 366n 

Palomares, HMS: 234-35 

Panther, HMS: 187 

Parachute Infantry Regiment, 509th: 279, 289 

Parham, Brig. H. J. (Br.): 465-66 

Paris, Col. (Fr.): 112 

Parker, USS: 170n 

Parsons, Major Korman, 411 

Patrol operations: 139,284,403-05,447,586,588, 

637-38 

Patrolling, need for training in: 671-72 

Patton, Maj. Gen. S.: 66, 70n, 108-10, 

144-45, 172-74, 1 178, 350-51, 548-56, 

558, 564-65, 569-77, 578, 582, 591, 599 

air support, complains of lack: 573 

Alexander's abilities, estimate of: 545n 

arrival at beachhead: 131-32, 136-37 

assumes command of II Corps: 487-89, 490-92, 

545 

attack of primary objectives, insistence on: 44-45 

background: 35n 

Casablanca, requests directive to bombard: 44-

45 

confidence, admonition to instill: 70 

directive to from CinC: 487-89 

eagerness to engage enemy: 45, 543-44 

French, action On plight of: 177-78 

succeeded by Bradley: 608 

unloading operations, speeds: 137 

Western TF, selection as commander: 35 

Pence, Col. Arthur W.: 495-96 

Penn, USS. See John Penn, USS. 

735 

Perregaux: 210 

Petain, Marshal Henri Philippe: 5, 170, 250-51, 

257, 263-64, 265-67, 271, 287 

Peters, Capt. Frederic T., (RN): 202, 224 

Peter's Corner: 330, 600, 612 

Petty, Lt. Col. John C.: 396n 

Peyrouton, Marcel: 358 

Petit, Col. Charles (Fr.): 154-55, 164 

Petite Darse: 105 

Petitjean: 132, 141, 179·-80 

Pfeiffer, Col. (Gcr.): 390-91, 650-51, 664n 

PFlANTOM FORCE: 485-86, 572 

Philadelphia, USS: 97n, 104, 107-08, 109, 114, 

115 

Philippeville: 19, 28, 53, 496, 497-98, 499n 

Pichon: 282-83, 291, 294-95, 315, 316-20, 423-

24,426-28, 436, 441, 442, 453, 579, 580-81, 

583-85, 587, 606-07 

attack by Allies: 509 

attack by enemy: 401-03, 407, 436 

mines, employment: 436 

occupation by Allies: 327 

tank losses, AlIicd: 509n 

Pickett, Major George E.: 567n 

Piddock, Lt. Col. Charles A.: 150 

Pilots, French, training by Allies: 499-500 

Pizzolato, Generale di Brigata Gavino: 527-28 

Plaine des Andalouscs: 213 

Plains area of Northwest Africa: 17 

Plan Howze: 474 

Plans, Allied. See also Decisions, strategic; TORCH. 

air support: 46, 50, 53-54 

airborne support: 53, 54 

Algiers operations: 50~54 

ARCADIA program and revision: 10, 11 

armistice terms: 57 

Casablanca seizure: 44-45 

for Center TF: 46-50 

Churchill's strategic analysis for 1942-43: 10 

civil affairs administration: 57-59 

Cross-Channel attack, 1942: 11-13 

directive to CCS to plan for TORCFl: 13 

French forces, employment and treatment: 56 

Germany, effect of political disturbances in: 11 

guiding principle in 1942: 10 

Japan, main effort against considered: 12 

landings, considerations affecting plans for: 32 

logistical support of TORCH: 38-39, 63-67 

Mehdia seizure: 150-53 

naval forces employment: 43-45, 49, 185-86 

Northwest Africa, decision to seize: 10-14 

Oran seizure: 46-50 

political considerations affecting: 22-25 

political planning: 54-59 

political warfare: 54-57 

preparations for TORCFl, completing: 60-85 

propaganda activities: 54-57 

reinforcement of Eastern TF: 53n 
736 

Plans, Allied-Continued 

Roosevelt's commitment to TORCH: 13-14 

sabotage in support of TORCH: 92 

Safi seizure: 102-03 

shipping, protection of: 50 

SLEDGEHAMMER plans: 11-14 

SOS request for AFHQ supply plan: 66 

Soviet Union, difficulties in assistance to: 11-12 

strategic planning for TORCH: 15-31 

tactical plans for TORCH: 32-59 

tactical plans for Tunisia: 485-86 

Tripoli seizure: 10 

weather, plans for meeting: 44-45 

for Western Task Force: 39-46 

Plans, enemy 

Corsica seizure: 255-56 

based on German viewpoint: 73-74, 77 

after TORCH: 260-62 

Plans, French: 89-96, 132-33 

Plans, tactical, need for training III preparation 

of: 671-72 

Platon, Vice Adm. Rene (Fr.): 259,286-87 

Pohl, Gen. (Ger.): 325n 

Points 

243: 343 

270: 235,236,516 

290: 210-13 

732: 462 

Pointe Canastcl: 193, 222 

Pointe de la Tour: 100, 104, 106, 107 

Pointe d'Espagnole: 193n 

Pointe El Hank: 119 

POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants): 111 

comurnption and requirements in north Tunisia: 

607-08, 607n 

deficiencies, Allied: 293 

delivery problems: 44 

losses at Kasserine, Allied: 477 

reserves for Tunisia: 278-79,496-97 

shortage, Axis, in Tunis drive: 611, 611 n, 612-

13 

supply, Axis, at Kasserine pass: 469 

supply, Axis, at Tunis: 648-49,650-51 

Political Affairs Section, AFHQ: 54-57 

Political negotiations in French colonies: 55, 77-

83, 269 

Political preparations: 54-59 

interpretation of role by CinC: 55, 269 

officials, President's message to: 91, 95 

President, personal direction by: 55 

proclamations, preparation of: 57 

Political prisoners: 356, 500 

Political problems: 77-83, 176-79, 225-27, 229, 

249-51, 253-54, 355-62 

Political situation in French colonies: 16. See 

also Civil affairs. 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Political structure in French colonies, revision of: 

500 

Political warfare, plans for: 54-57 

Pomigliano (Italy): 366n 

Pomptow, Col. Heinz (Ger.): 409-10, 426-27 

Pont Blondin: 130 

Pont-du-Fahs: 290-91,327,333-35, 339, 370-71, 

376-77, 394-99, 401, 403-05, 440, 456, 504, 

541, 595-97, 600, 610-11, 644-45, 547-48, 

653 

Popula tion of French Northwest Africa: 16-17, 

47 

Port-aux-Poules: 208 

Porter, Capt. M. E.: 130 

Port-Lyautey: 179-81. See also Mehdia. 

advance from Mehdia to: 147-70 

air action, Allied: 160-61, 165-68 

airfield, seizure of: 41, 46, 149-·53, 164-68 

armor action: 168-69 

armor support, Allied: 149-50, 152-53, 164-65 

artillery support, Allied: 163, 164-68 

attack by Allies: 157-70 

casualties, Allied: 164-65, 170 

coastal defenses: 147-48 

counterbattery action: 163 

French forces, reaetion to assault: 153-57 

garrison strength: 149-50, 154 

Kasba, capture of: 167-68 

landing craft losses: 168-69 

naval suport at: 163, 165-69 

night operations: 163-65 

port capacity: 17-18 

prisoners, Allied: 164 

prisoners, French: 164-65, 168 

reinforcements, French: 160-61, 168-69 

salvage operations: 169-70 

secured by Allies: 167-68 

submarine action: 169 

surrender negotiations: 154-55, 169-70 

topography: 147-49 

unloading operations: 168-69 

Port-Lyautey-Mehdia, substitute for Rabat: 42 

Porter, Brig. Gen. Ray E.: 50-51, 251, 351-52, 

396-97, 399n, 403-05 

Porto Farina: 661 

Ports. See also Debarkation operations; Unloading operations. 

air attack by Allies: 306, 308, 335-36 

antiaircraft defense of: 293-94 

armor, required for seizing: 40-41 

artificial, French development: 18-19 

availability to enemy: 365-66 

capacities of: 18, 497-98 

conversion to Allied use, plans for: 270-71 

native labor, employment of: 497-98 

rehabilitated ports, defense of: 180 

rehabilitation by Allies and enemy: 179-80, 258, 

292-93 
INDEX 

Ports-Continued 

st'izure, plans for: 25 

supply operations: 497-99 

Ports, facilities at: 40-41,97-98,116-17,119,135-

36, 139-40,278-79 

Ports, operation of: 495-99, 499n, 607 

Ports of embarkation, as supply control agencies: 

66-67 

Portugal, communication to government from 

President: 57 

Poste de Lessouda: 391-92,411-12 

Pozarica, HMS: 234 

Primauguet (Fr.): 134 

Princess Beatrix, HMS: 196 

Prisoners. See also Casualties. 

Allied: 157, 164, 212-13, 306-07, 330n, 394n, 

396,412-13,424, 436n, 450-51, 465-66, 467n, 

477,505,508,519,533, 568n, 592n, 609-10, 

633-34, 636-37 

enemy: 320, 338, 381-82, 387-88, 398, 486, 

537,540-41,550, 555n, 557-58, 580-81, 588-

89, 591, 592n, 623, 634, 651n, 656-57,662, 

663-64, 665-67 

French: 109,130-31,164-65,168,207-08,218-

19, 224-25, 248-49, 382, 427 

Prisoners, interrogation of: 486, 580-81 

Prisoners, recovered: 223-24, 381,650 

Proclamations, preparation of: 57 

Propaganda activities: 54-57, 178-79, 204-05, 

324 

Protville: 312, 598, 660-61 

Provisional Assault Group: 160-62 

Provisional outline plan for TORCH: 29-30 

Public Garden (Safi): 101 

PUGILIST-GALLOP, abandonment of: 533-35 

PulkJ, definition: 366-67 

Pyrotechnics, employment: 391 

Queen Emma, HMS: 196-·97 

Rabat: 18,41-42, 132, 139, 145,179-80 

Radar employmt'nt: 279-80, 366-67, 493-94 

Radio activities: 57, 91. See also Communications. 

Radio Alger (THA), plan for seizing: 52 

Raeder, Grossadmiral Erich (Ger.): 73 

Raff, Col. Edson D.: 212-13,279,289 

Rahn, Dr. Rudolph: 286-87 

Railway operation: 19·20, 180, 281-83, 292-93, 

498, 607 

Rainfall in Tunisia: 281-82 

Randle, Col. Edwin H.: 107,567 

Ranger Battalion, 1st: 49, 192,205-06,216,417-

18. 433n, 443, 546-48, 557-58, 562-63, 574 

Ranger, USS: 68, 121, 133, 139, 175-76 

Rass Acrata: 235-36 

Rass ed Dekhla: 565-66, 569 

737 

Rass el Djebel: 660-61 

Rass Sidi Ali el Mekki. See Cap Farina. 

Rastenburg conference of Axis commanders: 363-

64, 368, 529 

Raven, USS: 169 

Ravin Blanc: 193n 

Rebaa Oulad Yahia: 377-78, 379, 402-03, 490, 

600 

Rebaa Oulad Yahia valley: 337, 377-79, 386, 394 

Rebaou pass: 391-92,394 

Reconnaissance, air. See Air reconnaissance. 

Reconnaissance Battalions 

81st: 387-88, 393n, 396, 397-98, 399, 412-13, 

477-78, 548n, 565, 570n, 591, 620-21, 642-

43, 656n, 660n 

82d: 121 

Reconnaissance, ground. See also Observation; 

Patrol operations. 

Allied: 179-80,198,211,300301,307,378-79, 

391-92,407, 420, 461, 457-58, 473, 525-26, 

546,547, 552-S4, 566-67, 617, 634, 651, 65S, 

672 

enemy: 283-84,286-87,406,407,409-11,412-

13,415-16,425-26,427,438,467,471,517, 

559-60 

Reconnaissance Troops 

1st: 391n 

3d: 125, 128 

9th: 614-20, 653-54 

Refugees, release of: 500 

Reggio di Calabria (Italy): 366n 

Regimental Combat Teams 

7th: 643,657-58 

15th: 657-58 

16th: 49, 63, 192, 205, 206-07, 208-10, 215-

17, 221-22, 381-82, 427-28, 547, 571, 622-

23, 624 

18th: 49, 63, 192, 205, 206-08, 213, 336, 338-

39, 350, 381-82, 402-03, 432-33, 442-43, 

452-53, 456-57, 547, 562, 622 

26th: 49,63, 192, 199-201, 199n, 213, 216-17, 

2242S, 352, 374, 381, 382-83,402--03,443, 

456-57, 508-09, 547-48, 559-60, 571, 622 

30th: 657-58 

39th: 42,51-52,62,67,71,235,244-48,291-

93 

47th: 114 

60th: 150-52, 155-61, 162-63, 546-S5, 564, 

565n, 567n, 575n, 527 

133d: 402-03, 418, 564 

135th: 402 

168th: 51,52,62,63,234-39,291-92,403,411, 

427-28 

Region du Tell: 17 

Rehearsals of landings: 68, 71 

Reid, W. Stafford: 91 

Reina del Pacifico, HMS: 205, 207 
738 

Reinforcements. See also Troop shipments. 

Allied: 111-14,162,174-75,216,222,287-88, 

307-08,326-27,376-78,380-81,391-92,395-

96,430-31,432,443,449-50,451-52,459-60, 

463, 465-67, 466n, 467, 469, 474, 506-07, 

534-35, 552, 569, 637-38, 659-60 

enemy: 9, 26-27, 255-56, 259n, 277, 288, 305-

06, 310, 317-18, 323, 335-36, 338, 363-64, 

368, 373-74, 379, 392, 396-97, 451, 454-55, 

459-60, 536-40, 555-56, 603, 611, 613, 623-

24 

French: 111-14, 156-61, 162-63, 208-09, 216, 

222 

Rdizane: 667 

Renan: 207-08 

Renown, HMS: 185 

Replacement depots, at Casablanca and Oran: 499 

Reports, tactical, need for training in preparation 

of: 671-72 

RESERVIST Force at Oran: 49-50, 202-04 

Resistance forces, French. See Fighting Frt'nch. 

Resources, Allied, competing claims in Pacific upon: 

10-11 

RETRIBt:TION (codt' name): 663 

Rhardimaou: 225-26, 402, 606-07, 643 

Riccardi, Gt'n. (It.): 325n, 514 

Richelieu (Fr.): 40,271 

Rigault, Jean: 189 

Ringsak, Lt. Col. Elton W.: 433-34 

Rintelen, von, Gen. Enno (Ger.): 9,77,261,369-

70 

Rio Salado: 195-96 

Rioult, Adm. (Fr.): 224 

Ritter, Col. William L.: 618-19 

River-crossing operations: 152, 163, 165-67,531-

32,642-43,651,654-55 

River systems. See Drainage systems. 

Road construction: 399, 416-17, 472-73, 546--47 

Road systems. See Highway systems. 

Roadblocks: 157, 195-96, 198-99,379,418,443 

Robb, Air Vice Marshal J. M. (RAF): 354-55 

Robb, Major Robert W.: 567n 

Roberts, HMS: 234-35, 278 

Robinett, Brig. Gen. Paul McD.: 47, 195, 198, 

219-24, 317, 332, 374-81, 431, 433-34,443, 

457-74,548, 552n, 554, 641, 656n 

Roches Noires: 142 

Rocket support, enemy, at Kasserine pass: 453-54 

Rodney, HMS: 49, 185, 192-93, 202, 222-25 

Roe USS: 156, 165, 169 

Rogers, Col. Arthur H.: 121, 128 

Rohia: 442-43, 458, 468, 470-71 

Rommel, General Field Marshal Erwin: 260-61, 

325n, 406, 426-27, 440-41, 449-57, 459-69, 

479, 479n, 501-02, 508, 509-10, 517, 518-19, 

521-22, 523n, 526 

Allied strength, t'stimate of: 354n, 510-11 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Rommel, General Field Marshal Erwin-Continued 

assigned to command Army Group Africa: 474-

75, 476 

Axis capabilities in February, review of: 509-12 

Chott position, proposal for defense of: 528-29 

Comando Supremo, acct'ptance of proposals by: 

324-25 

command status in 1941: 6-7 

departure from Africa and return: 75-76 

directive from Coman do Supremo: 363-64 

distrust of Comando Supremo: 476n, 479n, 502-

04, 528-29 

eclipse of: 77 

force transferred to control of Comando Supremo: 

9n 

Gafsa attack, rolt' in: 406-07, 409-10, 424-25, 

426-27 

Hitler, conference and directive: 322-25 

Kasserine pass, decision to shift to: 453 

Mareth position, proposal to shift to: 469-70, 

475-77,524-25 

promotions: 8n, 9n 

proposals for combining Axis forces: 405-06 

proposals for countering Allies: 322-24, 326 

reinforcement of: 363 

relation of operations to Tunisia action: 321-22 

second offensive, 1942: 8-10 

succeeded by Arnim: 514, 519-20 

succeeded by Mt'sse: 368-70 

supplies to: 9, 325-26 

supply tonnages, estimate of: 511,512-13 

Tebessa, proposal for seizing: 426-27, 438-41, 

442, 455-56 

Tunisia, withdrawal of forces into: 363-65 

Ronarc'h, Adm. Pierrt' Jean (Fr.): 171-72 

ROOFTREE: 37-39 

Rooks, Brig. Gen. Lowell W.: 47, 47n, 216, 487 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 352-54, 358-59, 361-62, 

499-500 

Churchill conversations on strategy: 10-13, 28-

29 

Commander in Chief, restriction on powers of: 

270-71 

commits U. S. to TORCH: 13-14 

Darian, statement on arrangement with: 268 

expectation of U. S. engagement in 1942: 12 

French officials, message to: 57, 91, 95 

Giraud's conditions, "approval" of: 83, 83n 

North African Agreemt'nt, approval of: 269-70 

political activities, personal direction of: 55 

Roosevelt, Brig. Gen. Theodore: 199, 213, 217, 

223, 381-82, 474, 623-24 

Roosevelt-Molotov conversatiens: 11-12 

Roper, Col. Harry McK.: 172-73 

Rosef'fcld, Lt. Col. A. H.: 246-47 

Rosneath (training center): 62 

Roubertie, Gen. Jean (Fr.): 239 

Roum es Souk: 604-07 
INDEX 

Rounds, Leland L.: 71, 225-27 

ROUNDUP: lIn, 12-13, 15 

Route de Grande Ceinture: 142, 145 

Royal Air Force, failure of Luftwaffe to eliminate: 

4-5 

Royal Air Force units 

43 Squadron: 247-48 

81 Squadron: 248n 

82 Squadron: 248n 

242 Group: 355, 383-84, 493-95, 649, 667 

272 Squadron: 257 

Royal Navy. See Naval forces, Allied. 

Royal Scotsman, HMS: 205-06 

Royal Ulsterman, HMS: 205-06 

Ruge, Vice Admiral Friedrich (Ger.): 514, 647n 

Russell, Comdr. A. B.: 241 

Russell, Lt. Col. Edward A., Jr.: 458 

Russell, H. Earle: 91 

Rutledge, USS. See Edward Rutledge, USS. 

Ryder, Maj. Gen. Charles W.~ 36-37, 37n, 51,71, 

234, 251-·52, 442-43, 486-87, 490, 578-87, 

590-91, 631-32, 634, 658 

3d "S" Boat Flotilla: 254 

Sabotage activities: 49·-50, 56-57, 92, 153, 241, 

244, 338 

San.: 17, 179-80 

air action. Allied: 109-11 

armor counterattack on: 108 

armor support, Allied: 102, 105, 106-09 

artillery support, Allied: 108 

beach organization and expansion: 98-99, 109 

casualties, Allied: 109, 114n 

civilians, behavior of: 108-09 

d .. barkation at: 102-04, 106-07 

defenses of: 97-101 

garrison strength: 99-101 

landing at: 41,46, 105-06 

landing forces, composition: 42-43, 102 

naval support at: 97, 104-08 

port facilities: 17-18, 41, 97-98 

prisoners, French: 109 

r .. inforcements, French, attack on: 1l0-II, 112-

14 

security measures: 109 

seizure by Allies: 97-115 

submarine support of landing: 102-03 

surrender negotiations: 172-73 

topography: 97-98 

unloading operations: 111 

Sf. Amiel (Fr.): 165-67 

St. Cloud: 207-08, 213, 215, 220-21, 224-25 

St. Cyprien: 300-301,305,312,649-50 

St. Denis-du-Sig: 210 

St. Didier, Gen. (Fr.): 402-03 

St. Eugene: 221 

St. Jo~eph's Farm: 301 

St. Leu: 198,208-11,225 

St. Lucien: 217-18 

Ste. Barbe-du-TIelat: 210-11, 216, 218 

Stc. Marie-du-Zit: 598, 667 

Sakket: 38890, 550, 557, 565-66, 574 

Salacia, HMS: 199 

Sale: 18,41,46,170,179-80 

739 

Salients, Allied, at Sidi Bou Zid and Sbeltla: 427-

28 

Salvage operations: 62, 169-70, 225. See also 

Ports, operation of. 

Salzmann, Lt. Col. Rafael L.: 121,129,130,138 

Samuel Chase, USS: 71,235,244-46 

Sanborn, Lt. Col. Olil.'er T., Jr.: 150 

Sandagu'ia: 420 

Sanders, Air Commodore A. P. (RAF): 84 

Sangamon, USS: 68, 150, 153, 165 

Santee, USS: 68,97,109-10,112,114 

Saouf: 644-45, 664-65 

Sardinia, enemy expectation of attack on: 645-47 

SAT/:\,; 374, 382-84, 385-86 

Savannah, USS: 150, 153, 158-59, 160, 165 

Sbeltla: 327, 3'48, 349, 352, 365, 374-76, 377-78, 

381,385,387,388-90,391,397,399,401-05, 

407-09,411,413-14,417-18,423-24,427-

28, 440-42, 452-53, 477, 494, 544, 546-47, 

548, 564, 577-79, 606-07 

air action, Allied: 436, 436n 

air action, enemy: 434·-36 

armor action: 377-78, 434-35 

artillery support, Allied: 431, 433-35 

attack by Allies: 425-27, 428-36 

communications, Allied: 432 

counterattack, enemy: 434-36 

defense by Allies: 578-79 

demolitions operations: 435-36 

drainage system: 428 

highwiy system: 428 

materiel losses, Allied: 436n 

minelaying operations: 431 

night operations: 427,431-34 

prisoners, AlIied: 436n 

reconnaissance, enemy: 407, 425-26, 427 

reinforcements, Allied: 430-31 

salient, Allied, retraction of: 427-28 

security measures, Allied: 423 

seizure bv Allies: 289-90 

seizure by enemy: 289, 435, 441-42 

as supply point: 607 

tank losses, Allied: 435, 435n, 436n 

tank losses, enemy: 434-35 

topography: 428 

withdrawal by Allies: 423-24, 426, 428-36, 438, 

478 

Sbiba: 282-83, 348, 349, 418, 423, 427-28, 438, 

441, 442-43, 449-50, 451-52, 470-71, 479, 

490, 509, 543, 546, 606-07 

air support, enemy: 459 
740 

Sbiba-Continued 

artillery support, Allied: 453-55, 459 

artillery support, enemy: 452-53 

attack by Allies: 428-30,433 

attack by enemy: 452-53, 458-60 

counterbattery action: 452-53 

defense by Allies: 436-37 

demolitions operations: 453 

mines, employment: 436-37, 452-53 

reinforcements, Allied: 432-33, 459-60 

roadblock established: 418, 443 

security measures, Allied: 453 

tank losses, Allied: 452-53 

tank losses, enemy: 453, 459 

withdrawal from and to, Allied: 436-37,470 

Sbikha: 591 

Schirmcr, Capt. (Ger.): 288n 

Schloss Klessheim conference of Axis Commanders: 

601-02, 645-47 

Schmid, Gcn. (Ger.): 609 

Schmuf'dt, Col. (Ger.): 664n 

Schuermeycr, Capt. (Ger.): 254 

Schwartz, Brig. Gen. Jacques (Fr.): 390, 393 

"Scorpion" tanks: 531-32 

Scott, USS. See Hugh L. Scott, USS. 

Scouting, need for training in: 671-72 

S cyl/a, HMS: 231-34 

Sea Frontier Forces, Western TF, composition: 46 

Seaplane anchorages. See Airfields. 

Searchlight employment: 125, 130, 155, 243 

Seatrains. See Shipping, Allied. 

Scbou River: 41, 147-68 

Sebkra, definition: 47 

Sebkra d'Oran: 198-99, 218-19 

Sebkret el Kourzia: 595-97, 600, 610-12 

Sebkret en Noual: 557,576-77 

Sebkret es Sedjoumi: 598, 650 

Second front, Soviet demands for: 11-12, 28-29 

Second Manassas, comparison of Gafsa to: 545-46 

Security measures 

Allied: 65,68-69,72,109,136-37,225-27,249, 

303,379-81,394,403-05,417-18,423,453, 

667 

enemy: 303-06, 307, 388-90, 394 

Sedjenane: 308-09, 504-05, 541, 577, 604 

Sedjenane River: 280, 296,616-20,639-40 

Seidemann, Brig. Gen. Hans (Ger.): 370, 409-10, 

469-70 

Semmes, Lt. Col. Harry H.: 157-58, 169 

Sened: 388-90, 397-98, 405-06, 543, 544-45, 550, 

565-66,569-70 

Sened Station. See Station de Sened. 

Service units, employment as combatants: 293 

service units, enemy: 365-66 

Service d'Ordre Legionnaire: 500 

Services of Supply, ETOUSA: 65 

Services of Supply, NATOUSA, 496 

Services of Supply, War Department: 66 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Setif: 277-78,292,294,496 

Sfax: 260, 294-95, 338, 347-50, 351-53, 364-66, 

371-72, 405-06, 440, 469-70, 476-77, 527, 

583n, 590 

antiaircraft support, Allied: 374-76 

attack plans, enemy: 401 

objective of Mareth operation: 526-27 

occupation by enemy: 289 

order of battle, Allied: 374-76 

port operation: 607 

seizure by Allies: 374-76,514,541 

supply points for: 376 

Shaw, Capt, R. ]. (Rn): 235-36 

Sheffield, HMS: 231-34 

Shenandoah Valley, comparison of EI Hamma to: 

525 

Shipping, Allied. See also Cargo transports; Troop 

transports. 

availability for TORCH: 43-44 

convoy organization: 65-66, 68-70, 71 

French, allotments to: 362, 499 

loading, plans and training for: 63, 67-68, 70 

plans for protecting: 46, 49-50 

responsibilities of eacb service for: 38-39 

shortages in: 11, 53 

usc in support of landings: 65 

Shipping, enemy 

air attacks on: 73, 335-36 

air support of: 367-68 

losses during campaign: 367-68, 683 

rcquiremf'nts for Tunisia: 325-326, 365 

resort to coastal routes: 73 

strength in Mediterranean: 367-68 

supply deliveries, reliance on for: 513-14 

Shipping, French 

conversion to Allies, plan for: 270-71 

directive on treatment of: 30-31 

use by enemy: 367-68,513-14 

Shipping, Italian: 602, 645-48 

Shockley, 2d Lt. Orion C.: 654-55 

Shore parties: 135, 137, 195,210,235 

Shore-to-shore operations, Tabarka to Bizerte: 309 

Sicily: 366n, 494-95, 499, 595, 645-47, 648-49, 

665-68 

Sicily, strait of, enemy naval forces in: 7 

Sidi Ahmed: 258, 293-94, 342, 366 

Sidi Amor gap: 273 

Sidi Athman: 312-13, 660-61 

Sidi bel Abbes: 210, 216 

Sidi Bou Zid: 365, 390-91, 393-94, 399, 403-05, 

425-26, 433-34, 435-36, 477, 479, 487-90, 

546, 577 

air attack by enemy: 412,419-20 

antitar,k support, enemy: 420-21 

armor action: 413-15 

armor support, Allied: 406-07 

armor support, enemy: 406-09 

artillery support, Allied: 406, 413, 421 
INDEX 

Sidi Bou Zid-Continued 

artillery support, enemy: 407-14,420 

attack by enemy: 405-07, 489 

battle for: 410-11 

casualties, Allied: 415n, 422 

casualties, enemy: 422 

communications, Allied: 411, 421-22 

counterattack, Allied: 411, 416-17, 419-22 

counterbattery action: 420-21 

defense plans, enemy: 419-20 

directive, enemy, on exploitation of: 435-40 

dirccti ves, Allied: 418 

highway 'system: 419-20 

materie11osses, Allied: 414-16, 415n, 422n 

materiel losses, enemy: 421-·22 

observation, ground: 411 

reconnaissance, Allied: 420 

reserve forces, Allied: 39192, 416-17 

salient, Allied, retraction of: 427-28 

secured by enemy: 414-16 

security measures, Allied: 394 

seizure by enemy: 478-79 

tank losses, Allied: 413-15, 415n, 421-22, 422n 

tank losses, enemy: 421-22 

topography: 419-20 

withdrawal by Allies: 413, 423 

Sidi Bou Zitouna: 619 

Sidi Fcrruch: 237-38 

Sidi Mahmoud: 507-08 

Sidi Mediene: 331. See also Peter's Corner. 

Sidi Mhimech, supply point: 607 

Sidi Nsir: 284, 290-91, 296, 298, 305-06, 330, 

336-37,490,502-08,613-14,621-27,641-42, 

651 

Sidi Said: 377 

Sidi Salem: 420-21 

Siebel ferries: 367-68, 640-41 

Siglin, Major Carl: 299-301 

Signal Companies. See also Armored Signal Companies. 

3d: 145 

9th: 549n 

71st: 42 

72d; 42 

Signal Operation Company, 239th: 138 

Signal Service Battalion, 829th: 137 

Siliana: 349, 502-04, 507-08 

Siliana River valley: 379 

Sixth Port of Embarkation: 497-·98 

Sladen, Lt. Col. Fred W., Jr.: 121, 130-31 

SLEDGEHAMMER: 11-14, lin, 12n 

Slessor, HMS. See Mary Siessor, HMS. 

Slopes, defense of, need for training in: 671-72 

Slourhia: 288, 330, 373-74, 504, 507-08 

Smidia: 339 

Smith, Lt. CoL John C.: 376 

Smith, Lt. Col. Lon H.: 374 

Smith, Maj. Gen. Walter B.: 33,270,357,487,545 

741 

Smoke, employment of: 381,465,536-37,586-87, 

635, 656 

Sobieski, SS: 234-35 

Sogno, Gen. Vittorio (It.): 295, 580~81 

Soliman: 662-63 

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.: 361 

Souk Ahras: 277, 292, 490, 496, 604~07 

Souk el Arba: 273, 279, 287, 292-94, 305, 333, 

494-95, 604-07 

Souk eI Khemis: 293-94,295-96,326-27,401-02, 

494-95 

Sousse: 260, 279n, 289, 347, 348~49, 351-52, 365, 

469, 485, 528, 533, 541, 580-81 

Soviet Union 

assistance to, difficulties in: 11-12 

attack on, German: 6-8 

second front, demand for: 11-12, 28-29 

compromise with, Mussolini's proposal for: 601-

02,676 

Cross-Channel attack, Allied dependence on for: 

11-12 

German success in 1952: 9-10 

TORCH, approval of: 28,,29 

Sozzani, Generale di Divisione Nino: 527 

Spaatz, Maj. Gen. Carl: 350, 354--55, 383, 492, 

493-94, 573 

Spain: 5,26,57,601-02. See also Franco, Francisco. 

Spanish Morocco, enemy proposal for attack 

through: 601-02 

Sp{'cial Operations Executive Section (Br.): 59 

Spey, HMS: 187-88 

Spoll(:ck, von, Generalmajor Theodor Graf: 527-

28, 664-65 

Sprindis, 2d Lt. S. W.: 157 

Stack, CoL Robert 1.: 387, 392-96, 418,419-21, 

430,548,549,552,572,624 

Staff relations, Allied, results of African experience: 674~75 

Staff structure, Allied: 15, 33, 150, 486-87 

Stalin, Joseph V.: 28, 356n 

Stalingrad, {'ffect on of Tunisia operations: 363-

64 

Startton, USS. See Elizabeth C. Stanton, USS. 

Stark, CoL Alexander N., Jf.: 199, 352, 374-76, 

381, 391-92, 393-94, 403, 432-33, 443, 446-

52,453-54,456-57. See also Stark Force. 

Stark, Adm. Harold R.: 23, 267-£8, 270 

Stark Force: 443,451-52,457-58 

Starkweather, Lt. M. K. (USNR): 161-65 

Station de Sened: 370-71,388-90,551 

air attacks by enemy: 396 

air support, Allied: 387-88 

armor support, Allied: 387-88 

artillery support, Allied: 387-88, 550 

attack by Allies: 387-88,396-99, 556-57, 558-

59 

easualties, Allied and enemy: 387-88 
742 

Station de Sened-Continued 

directives to Maraist on: 396~97 

materiel losses, enemy: 550 

orders, confusion in: 397~98 

prisoners, Allied: 396 

prisoners, enemy: 387~88, 550 

rf'inforcements, Allied: 396 

reinforcements, enemy: 396-97 

seizure by Alllies: 396~97, 548-50 

tank losses, Allied: 387-88 

Station de Zannouch: 547-50 

Sternberg, Lt. Col. Ben: 623 

Stevens, Col. Burrowes G.: 546 

Stimson, Henry L.: 14, 268 

Stokes, Lt. Col. W. M.: 112~13 

Stolz, Lt. Col. (Ger.): 286-87, 289~90, 312 

Stone, USS. See Thomas Stone, USS. 

Stork, HMS: 234 

Strategic consequences of Northwest African campaign: 675-77 

Strategic decisions. See Decisions, strategic; Plans. 

Strempel, Lt. Col. (Ger.): 398 

Stroh, Brig. Gen. Donald A.:567n, 618~19 

Strong, Brig. Kenneth D. W. (Br.): 489 

Stuka. See Dive bomber. 

Stumme, Gen. Georg (Ger.): 75, 76 

Styer, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D.: 496n 

Submarine, support by: 68-69, 102-03 

Submarine actions: 7,11,72,134, 169, 174-76, 

186-87 

Subversive activities, plans for fomenting: 57 

Summerall, Lt. Col. Charles P., Jr.: 412 

Sundin, Lt. Col. Alvar B.: 567n 

SUPERCHARGE II: 533-37. See also El Hamma 

gap. 

Supermarina. See Italian Naval High Command. 

Supply, Allied. See also Unloading operations. 

Crete, threat to: 7 

daily tonnage estimates: 497n 

at Djefna position: 619-20 

at El Guettar: 574 

at Kairouan pass: 379-80 

in Mediterranean: 6, 7 

in north Tunisia: 607-08 

organization: 495-99 

plans for: 66-67 

through ports: 66, 497-99 

requirements for TORCH, estimate of: 6566, 67 

reserve in U ni ted Kingdom, level established: 

6667 

responsibility for classes of: 65, 65n 

rou ting mt"thods: 65-66 

to Soviet Union, difficulties in: 11 

supply shipments: 679 

at Tebessa, accumulation: 376 

Tebourba, resupply at: 315 

within task forces: 66 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Supply, enemy 

by air in Tunis: 648-49 

amounts delivered to enemy during campaign: 

368 

capability, Comando Supremo estimate: 512 

capability, Kesselring's estimate: 512-13, 512n 

deficiencies in Tunisia: 325-26 

diversion from Rommel to Tunisia: 325-26 

failure in Ousseltia valley: 382 

Italian shipping for, use of: 602, 645-48 

Malta, threat of: 8 

Mediterranean routes: 365-66 

naval forces, use in: 514 

receipts in March: 499n 

requirements, Hitler's estimate: 511-12, 513-14 

to Rommel's forces: 9 

shipping, reliance on: 513-14 

shortage at Hill 609: 634 

supply lines, threats to: 600-602, 640-41, 640n 

supply shipments during campaign: 682 

Tobruk, threat of: 7 

tonnages required, estimates of: 363, 365-66, 

510, 511, 512~13 

Supply points: 141,293,376,543,607,651 

Supreme Allied Commander. See Allied FOTce 

Headquarters; Commander in Chief, Allied 

Forces; Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D. 

Suprem1e Command (General Staff), Italian. See 

Coman do Supremo. 

Surgical Hospital, 48th: 417-18 

Surprise, loss of: 153-54, 196-97, 303-04, 339--41 

Surrender negotiations: 57-58, 131-32, 154-55, 

169-70, 171-74,224,243-44,249-52,662 

Susan B. Anthony, USS: 153, 158, 170n 

Suwanee, USS: 68, 121, 133 

Svoboda, Lt. Col. Albert A.: 581-82 

Swanson, USS: 121,124,130, 134 

Swenson, Lt. Col. Edwin T.: 241, 244 

Syfret, Vice Adm. Sir Neville (RN): 185 

Sympson, Capt. Gordon H.: 105, 619-20 

Syria, French seizure of: 7 

Tabarka: 272-73, 279, 286-87, 288-89, 309, 410, 

476-77, 604 

Table d'Oukacha: 119, 133, 142-43 

Tactical air support. See Air-ground co-operation; Air support. 

Tactical me'thods, Allied, critique of: 671-73 

Tactical methods, enemy: 479-80 

Tadjcra Kbir: 516,517-18 

Tadjeroulne: 273,298,440,604-05 

Tafaraoui airfield: 193, 195-96, 198-99, 209-12, 

213, 216~17, 221-23, 225, 294 

Takrouna: 598,609 

Tamera: 330, 505, 507-09 

Tamezred: 527-28, 535 
INDEX 

Tank Battalions 

70th: 42,102,114,162,164,169 

751st: 578-79, 582n, 586,653-54 

756th: 42, 121, 128, 138 

60lst: 378-79, 378n, 433·-35, 461 n, 462, 546n, 

547-48,56062,614-20 

Tank Destroyer Battalions 

603d: 42 

609th: 42 

701st: 195n, 210, 210n, 289n, :{02, :nl, 391n, 

392n,396n,397-98,411-12,411n,419n,430-

31, 430n, 435, 546n, 548n, 623-24, 624n, 625 

702d: 42 

776th: 546n, 549n, 565n, 642n, 656, 660n 

805th: 413, 430n, 443, 447-50, 455-56, 546n 

813th: 546n, 578-79, 582n, 586 

894th: 453-55, 461 n, 462, 546n, 614-20, 653-

54 

899th: 546n, 560·62, 570n 

Tank Destroyer Group, 1st: 546,574 

Tank destroyer support: 218 

Tank employment, critique of tactical methods: 

672-73 

Tank losses 

Allied: 300301,304-05,307,314,317,319-20, 

331·32, 332n, 387·88, 392, 398, 413-15, 

415n, 421-22, 422n, 435, 435n, 436n, 452-53, 

459, 461-62, 46667, 467n, 477, 505, 508, 

509n, 519, 532-33,571-72, 582, 588, 590, 591, 

591n, 609·10, 611n, 612-13, 623, 635, 637, 

656-57, 659-60 

enemy: 283-84,290-91,301,328,331,374,381-

82, 391, 398, 421-22, 434·35, 450-51, 453, 

+77,508,518-19,519, 519n, 560-62, 571,611, 

61213 

French: 161,218 

Tank maintenance centers, at Bone and Le Kroub: 

496-97 

Tank It'cowry, Allied, at Bordj Toum: 332 

Tank support, See Armor support. 

Tank Transporter Company, 2622d: 606·,07 

Tank transporters, employment: 497-98, 606-07 

Tank types: 306, 531-32 

Tank versus tank, See Armor versus armor action. 

Tarhuna: 364 

Tasajera (Maracaibo): 209-10 

Task Force A, Provisional Corps: 66 

Task Force Benson: 570-77, 570n 

Task Force GREEN, See Center Task Force: ()ran, 

Task Force Howze: 660-61 

Task Force RED. See Center Task Force; Oran, 

Task Force 34, Atlantic Fleet. See Western Naval 

Task Force. 

Task forces, for TORCH: 31,35,66 

Tasker H. Bliss, USS: 128, 175-76 

Taxes, plans for collecting: 58 

Taylor, CoL G('or!.(c A,: 547,634, 6:i6-37 

Taza: 179 

Taza gap: 17 

743 

Tebessa: 272-73, 279, 292, 326-27, 35152, 364-

65, 394-95, 401-02, 403-05, 409-10,427-28, 

457,465-66,470-71,478-79,490,496-

99, 2, 525, 54~ 604-06 

attack hy enemy: 388, 401, 405-06, 426-27, 

439-42, 449-50, 453, 455-56, 479n 

command reorganization, enemy: 441 

concentration, Allied: 438 

defense by Allies: 436,443,457-58 

mines, employment: 512 

motor convoy operations: 499n 

orders, enemy, confusion in: 441-42 

ordnance shops at: 376 

supply dumps at: 376 

Tebourba: 290-91,296,299-307,311-20,336-37, 

343-44, 372, 595, 620-21 

air attack by Allies: 64 9 

air attack by enemy: 318-19 

armOr attack by enemy: 304-05 

artillery support, enemy: 319-20 

defense organization, enemy: 303-06 

dispositions, Allied: 311 

drainage system: 303-04 

occupation by Allies: 303 

reinforcements, Allied: 307-08 

resupply at: 315 

tactical importance: 303-04 

tank losses, Allied: 304-05 

topography: 303-04 

withdrawal by Allies: 318-20 

withdrawal by enemy: 300-301, 304 05, 650 

Tebourba gap: 311-20,329-31,337,342,371-72, 

373-74 

air attack by enemy: 315-19 

air SUppO'l't, Allied: 314-15 

armor action: 315-19 

artillery support, Allied: 314-15, 317 -20 

casualties, Allied: 320n 

communications, Allied: 316-17 

counterbattery action: 314-15 

materiel losses, Allied: 320, 320n 

prisoners, Allied: 320 

tank losses, Allied: 317, 319-20 

topography: 311 

withdrawal from and to, Allied: 314-15, 316~-17 

Teboursouk: 287, 293-94, 326-27, 330, 507, 608 

Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur (RAF): 

354-55, 49~ 573, 669 

Tegelberg (Dutch): 207 

TeJergma: 335 

TERMINAL f'orce operations: 53, 241-44 

Terrain description, See Topography, 
744 

Terrain features, necessity for selzmg: 6 71 ~-72 

Testour: 291, 329-30, 373-74, 502~04, 507-09 

Texas, USS: 150, 153, 159, 165-67 

Thala: 418, 427-28, 435, 442-43, 448, 451-53, 

457-58,460-62,47073,479,490 

air action, Allied: 467-68, 467n 

air action, enemy: 465, 467, 470 

armor action: 465-66 

armor support, Allied: 466-67 

artillery support, Allied: 466-67 

attack by enemy: 460,501,508 

casualties, Allied: 467n 

communications failure, Allied: 465-66 

defense by Allies: 457-58, 460, 464-73 

failure to exploit, enemy: 467 

materiel losses, Allied: 467n 

prisoners, Allied: 465-66, 467n 

reconnaissance, enemy: 467 

reinforcements, Allied: 466n, 465-67, 469 

smoke, employment: 465 

tank losses, Allied: 466-67, 467n 

Thelepte: 401--02,439-40,451,470,490,494-95, 

546-47,573 

aircraft losses, Allied: 437 

airfield, seizure of and withdrawal from by 

Allies: 423-24, 433, 436-38, 543 

attack by enemy: 462 

demolitions, employment: 437 

materiel losses, Allied: 437 

reconnaissance, enemy: 427 

road construction: 546-47 

Thibar: 326-27,494-95,608 

Third Port of Embarkation: 497-98 

Thomas Jefferson, USS: 123, 124n, 125, 176n 

Thomas Stone, USS: 71, 187, 187n, 188, 245 

Thurston, USS: 140, 176n 

Tides, effect on landing operations: 43. See also 

Weather. 

Tine River: 280 

Tine River valley, operations in: 299-301, 304-05, 

309, 333-35, 495-97, 613-14, 620-27, 634, 

638-40,641-43,648-53,656-58 

Tit Mellil: 142,144, 145 

Titania, USS: 102, 108, 111 

Tobruk: 7-9 

Tlemcen: 466 

Todd, Lt. CoL John: 195n, 198-99,218-20,223-

24, 328-29 

Toffey, Lt. Col. John J., Jr.: 157-58,554-55 

Togoland, collaboration with Allies: 270-72 

Topography: 19-20,47-48,51-52,97-99,116-18, 

119, 147-49, 196, 200, 203, 230-31, 241-42, 

280-83,303-04,307,338-39,388-90,419-20, 

428, 44447, 505-06, 517, 522-24, 525, 537-

38, 544-45, 553-54, 557-58, 566-67, 578-80, 

598,604-05,613-16,620-21,622-23,628-31, 

642 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

TORCH (landing in Northwest Africa) 

air build-up for: 50 

Algiers, plans for operations at: 50-54 

Allied capabilities, enemy estimates: 74 

Allied commander, selection and directive to: 

15-16 

amphibious training, inadequacy of: 185 

Center TF, role in: 46-50, 70-72 

Churchill-Roosevelt conversations: 13, 28-29 

Churchill-Stalin conversations: 28-29 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, role in: 13-14, 16 

command, unity of, tested: 37,39 

command structure proposed: 14, 37-38, 39, 

50-51, 53 

concept of operation determined: 29 

conclusion of operation: 253-73, 295-96 

convoy organization and routt'S; 68-70, 71-72 

D-day, selection of: 27 

deadlock on, broken: 13 

decision to undertake: 10-14 

Draft Outline Plan (Partial): 27, 29-30 

Eastern TF, role in: 35, 70-72 

enemy plans after: 260-62 

enemy reaction to Allied success: 253-54 

French co-operation after, efforts to gain by 

enemy: 254-60 

French forces, role in: 13n, 82, 82n, 83, 92-95. 

253-54 

joint Army-Navy participation, directives for: 

37-39 

landing forces, agrecmen t on: 29 

landing sites, enemy confusion regarding: 186-

87 

landings, time set for: 89 

logistical support, plans for: 63-67 

mission of: 16-21 

naval support, plans for: 36-37, 185-86 

Northern TF, role in: 65, 266-67 

Oran, plans for seizing: 46-50 

phases of, two major: 89-90 

planning responsibilities, directive providing for: 

38 

plans, tactical: 32-59 

political considerations involved: 54-59, 77-83 

postponement, French request for: 85 

preparations for, completing; 60-85 

radio activities: 90-91 

Raeder's warning on: 73 

reinforcements for Eastern TF: 53n 

Roosevelt decisions on: 13-14 

sabotage plans in support of: 92 

ship loading plans: 67-68, 70 

shipping in support of landings: 65 

Soviet approval of: 28-29 

strategic planning for; 25-31 

submarine protection of: 68-69 

supply plans: 65-67 
INDEX 

TDRCH-CDntinued 

target, failure Df enemy to' identify: 74 

target date, factors affecting: 13 

task fDrces, cDmpDsitiDn: 31 

training for assault: 60-63 

transpDrts, arrival in Mediterranean: 84 

Western TF, rDle in: 39-46,67-70 

TDstain, CDI. Paul (Fr.): 188-89 

TDudjane: 522-24,534-35 

TDukabeur: 342, 504, 506-07, 508-09 

TDuIDn, French warships scuttled at: 321 

TDungar: 342 

TDward (training center): 62 

TDzeur: 425,440,525,528 

Traffic cDngestiDn, at Mateur: 652-53 

Training, amphibiDus. See AmphibiDus trammg. 

Training, Df landing fDrces: 61,62,63, 171-81 

TranspDrtatiDn. See MDtDr CDnVDY DperatiDn: 

MDtDr vehicles. 

TranspDrts. See CargO' transpDrts: Shipping: 

TrDDp transpDrts. 

Trapani (Sicily): 366-67 

TrevDr, Lt. CDI. T. H.: 236, 239-40, 246-47 

TripDli: 10, 353-54, 364, 365, 521-22 

TripDlitania: 323-24 

TrDDp shipments 

Allied: 679 

enemy: 682, 683 

TrDDp transpDrts 

arrival in Mediterranean: 84 

attack Dn, Allied: 600-601 

availability fDr TDRCH: 43-44 

fDr Fedala landing: 121 

1Dading, plans fDr: 67-68, 70 

Troubridge, CDmmDdDre Thomas H. (R='I): 36, 

36n, 71, 191-93, 195-96, 213,224 

Trucks. See MDtDr CDnVDY DperatiDn: MDtDr vehicles. 

Truscott, Maj. Gen. Lucian K.: 42n, 145, 149, 

150, 153-54, 157-58, 159-62, 168, 169, 350-

51, 383, 391-92, 417, 432, 487, 643, 657-58 

Tuck, S. Pinkney: 250-51 

Tuck, MajDr William R.: 218, 219-20, 300 

Tunis: 17,258-59,277,280,288-89,290,295-96, 

305-06, 365-67, 370, 485, 501, 595-98, 599-

600, 604-05 

air actiDn, Allied: 257, 293-94, 299-300, 601 

air supply, enemy: 648-49 

airbDrne DperatiDns: 306, 309 

aircraft IDsses, Allied: 611 

aircraft IDsses, enemy: 370 

ammunitiDn supply, enemy: 611, 611n, 648-49 

armDr, enemy, merger Df: 611, 612-13, 612n 

armDractiDn: 610-11 

armDr strength, enemy: 648-49 

armDr suppDrt, Allied: 291-92, 312 

artillery suppDrt, Allied: 336-37 

Tunis- -CDntinued 

artillery suppDrt, enemy: 610-11 

attack, enemy discDvery Df: 303-04 

attack frDm north, Allied: 299-302 

745 

attack plans, Allied: 277-98, 326-28. 329<,0, 

335-39, 402, 644-49 

attack from sDuth, Allied: 301-05 

attack tDward, Allied: 299-310 

ba ttle fDr: 601-51 

bridgehead, enemy, extensiDn Df: 405-06 

casualties, Allied: 609-10 

climax Df Allied drive: 307-08 

cDmmand reDrganizatiDn, Allied: 354 59 

cDmmand structure, enemy: 648-49 

cDmmunicatiDns, enemy: 312 

cDunterattacks, enemy: 311-21, 644 

defense plans, enemy: 300-301, 333-35, 603 

dispDsitiDns, enemy: 312-13, 647-49, 650-51 

dispDsitiDns, French: 326-28 

drive Dn, by Allies: 609-13, 649-51 

effect Df defeats Dn Allied advance to': 317-18 

effect Df DperatiDns Dn enemy fDrces: 310 

materiel IDsses, Allied: 609-10, 611 

mines, emplDyment: 610,612 

perimeter established by enemy: 289-91 

POL supply, enemy: 611, 611n, 612-13, 648-51 

pDstpDnement Df Allied secDnd attack: 343-44 

prisDners, Allied: 609-10, 650 

regrDuping, Allied, fDr attack: 291-92, 329-35 

reinfDrcements, enemy: 611, 613 

stalemate at: 311-44,363-72 

strategic impDrtance to' enemy: 513-14 

tank IDsses, Allied: 609-10, 611 n, 612-13 

tank IDsses, enemy: 611, 612-13 

victory parade in: 669 

Tunisia 

advance intO', Allied: 277-80 

air attacks, Allied: 279-80, 293 - 94, 310, 494-

95, 600-602 

air attacks, enemy: 278,287,293-94 

air cDmmand reDrganizatiDn, Allied: 492-95 

air defense, Allied, DrganizatiDn after surrender: 

667 

air fDrces, Allied, missiDns: 354-55 

air fDrces, enemy, cDnsDlidatiDn: 370 

air pDwer, Allied, problems faced: 335 

air recDnnaissance, enemy, Dn SDU thern frDn t: 

469 

air reinforcements, enemy: 257 

air strength, Allied: 335n 

air strength, enemy: 295 

air suppDrt, Allied: 278, 279-80, 401-02, 485·-

86 

air suppDrt, enemy: 338 

air transpDrt, Allied, use Df: 280 

air transpDrt, enemy, in reinfDrcement rDle: 603 

air warning equipment, deficiency in: 279-80 
746 

Tunisia-Continued 

airborne support: 277, 278-79, 289 

aircraft, enemy, transfer to Sicily: 648-49 

aircraft losses, enemy: 60 I 

airfield development and defense: 335, 401-02, 

485, 493-95 

airfields, enemy: 254-55,370 

airfields seized: 277, 278-79 

AlJied intentions, enemy estimate of: 322 

ammunition supply, Allied: 607 

Arabs, enemy efforts to recruit: 321 

armor action, first, 301-02 

armor employment, enemy plans for: 602-03 

armor strength, enemy: 310, 335-36, 371 

armor support, enemy: 305-06 

attack, enemy, halt in: 424-27 

attack plans, Allied: 295-98, 349-54, 595, 598-

602,605-07 

attack plans, enemy: 333-35,405-16 

boundary designations, Allied: 418 

boundary designations, enemy: 370-72, 405-06 

bridgehead, enemy, defensibility: 288-91 

casualties, Allied, during campaign: 675 

casualties, enemy: 675-76 

coastal defenses: 294-95 

coastal plain, area: 281-82 

coastal plain, battle for and pursuit to: 530-33, 

539-42 

collapse of enemy farces: 659-68 

command, unity of, enemy: 405-06 

command relations and reorganization, Allied: 

298,382-83,474-77, 485-89,600n 

command reorganization, enemy: 474-75, 476-

77 

Commandos, plans for employment: 277 

communications, Allied: 280, 485-86, 494 

communications zone, reorganization: 494-99 

composition of Allied forces: 295-96 

concentration of Allied forces: 347-481 

consolidation of Allied forces: 373-76, 427-30 

contact with enemy, first: 283-86 

defense, enemy plans for: 363-64, 419-20, 476-

77, 601-04, 645-47, 665-67 

defense, Rommel's proposals for: 322-24, 326 

defense lines, enemy: 595-98 

defense organization, Allied, after surrender: 

667 

demolition teams, Allied: 289 

directive on employment of II Corps: 599-600, 

600n, 604 

directives to Anderson: 401-02 

dispositions, Allied: 402-05, 486-87, 489-92, 

604-08 

dispositions, enemy: 294-95, 333-35, 401-02, 

601-04 

dispositions, French: 258-59, 283-84 

drainage system: 280-82, 348-49 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

Tunisia-Continued 

Eastern TF, landing and advance toward: 253, 

278 

Eighth Army, approach of: 521-22 

Eisenhower assumes direct command: 350-51 

enemy capabilities, estimate of: 645-47 

February battles, enemy objectives: 477 

February battles, situation after: 477-81,490-92 

February offensive, enemy, summary of: 508-09 

final phase of operations: 593-668 

first battle at Medjez eI Bab: 287-89 

French, Axis break with: 287-88 

French forces, attitude toward Axis: 283-86, 

294-95, 321 

French forces, contact with: 279 

German occupation, appearance of: 257 

government, communications to from President: 

57 

highway system: 281-83, 298, 348-49 

importance to enemy: 321-22, 323-24 

intelligence collection in: 485--86, 489 

Juin appointed Resident General: 669 

juncture of Allied forces: 576-77 

juncture of enemy forces: 364-65,368-69.371-

72 

lines of communication, Allied: 277-78, 282 

292-93, 309, 327, 352 

lines of communication, enemy: 288-89, 325-

26, 401-02, 591-92 

logistical support, enemy: 310, 324-26, 512-14 

loss of, effect on Italy: 676 

loss of, Hitler's explanation: 676-77 

mass, principle of, violation by enemy: 479-80 

middle phase, end of: 592 

mines, employment: 402, 487-89 

mission, enemy: 288-91 

morale, enemy, after surrender: 665-67 

motor march of II Corps: 604-07 

motor transport strength and use, enemy: 371, 

602 

Nehring assumes command of enemy forces: 

284-87 

northern sector, enemy attack on: 501-05, 508-

09 

northern sector, operations in: 483-96, 600-62 

northern sector, pursuit of enemy to: 539-42 

occupation, enemy, and French reaction: 256-

57, 258-60 

off ensive, Allied: 586-91 

offensive of II Corps: 613-43 

order of battle, Allied: 60 I n 

patrol operations, Allied: 403-05 

pocketing of enemy forces: 661-62 

POL consumption and requirements, Allied: 

278-79,496-97,607-08,607n 

policy in, enemy: 257 

political structure: 16 
INDEX 

Tunisia"· ·Continued 

ports, air attacks on by Allies: 306, 308 

possession required for control of NW Africa: 

26-27 

prisoners, enemy: 592n, 662, 66567 

propaganda activities, enemy: 324 

radar, employment: 493-94 

railway systems: 278-79, 281-83, 292-93 

rainfall: 281-82 

rearmament of Frl"neh by Allies: 361-62 

reconnaissance, enemy: 283-84, 469 

reinforcements, Allied: 326-27 

reinforcements, 255-61, 277, 305-

06, 310, 317-18, 338, 363-64, 368, 

603 

reorganization, Allied, after surrender: 665-68 

repulse, enemy: 459-81 

review of situation by Arnim in February: 509-

12 

reviews of situation, periodic, by CinC: 403-05, 

417 

Rommel's operations, relation to: 321-22 

Rommel's withdrawal into: 36365 

sabotage activities: 338 

security measures, Allied: 403-05, 667 

SATIN operation: 349-54 

shift of operations to: 483-96 

shipping, enemy: 325-26 

southern sector, operations in: 423-37, 442-43, 

662-65 

stalemate in after Tunis: 371-72 

Stalingrad, effect of on enemy forces: 363-64 

strategic decisions, enemy: 321-26 

strategic plans, Allied: 485-86 

strength of Allied forces: 335-36 

strength of enemy forces: 291-92,294-95, 370-

72, 603n, 604n 

supply It"vei requirements, Allied: 607 

supply level requirements, enemy: 363, 365··66 

supply operations, Allied: 607-08 

3upply operations, enemy: 325-26, 368, 602, 

645-48 

surrender of enemy forces: 659-62 

topography: 280-83, 347-49, 595-98, 604-05 

vegetation: 280-81, 34849 

withdrawal by enemy, operations to prevent: 

663-64 

withdrawal to west, Allied plan for: 423-24 

Turkey, neutrality proclaimed: 7 

Tuscaloosa, USS: 96, 133 

Twain, USS. See Mark Twain, USS. 

Twelfth Air Force: 37,53,211-12,215,223,225, 

293-94, 354-55, 492, 497n 

Tynwald, HMS: 235, 278 

Typhon, (Fr.): 204 

U-130: 175-76 

U173: 175-76 

Underground forces. See Fighting French. 

Ulster Monarch, HMS: 205-06 

Unification of French forces: 66971 

U nit of fire, definition: 62n 

United Kingdom 

747 

American troops in, plans for concentrating: 11 

Cross-Channel attack in 1942, doubt concerning: 

12 

departure of task forces froll1: 70-72 

invasion of, German plans for: 4-5 

Norway, readiness for operations in: 12 

supply levels establishcd for: 65-66, 67 

Vichy France in Africa, potential support of: 10 

Unloading operations: 111, 125-27, 134-37, 140, 

144-45,160,161,168-69,174-76,198,213-

14, 237-38, 365-66. See also Deharkation. 

Vaerst, von, General der Panzer Truppen Gustav: 

519, 612-13, 647-49, 650-51, 661-62 

Valmy: 218-23 

Van Nostrand, 1st LL Richard H.: 195, 198 

Van Vliet, LL Col. John H., Jr.: 419 

Vegetation in Tunisia: 280-81, 348-49 

Veteran organizations, activities of: 356 

Vibo Valentia (Italy): 366n 

Viceroy of India, HMS: 234, 235 

Vichy France 

action against Axis, forbids: 287 

Algiers occupation, reaction to: 250-51 

anti-British alliance, plans for: 5 

attitude of population toward Allies: 22 

collaboration with Allies, reaction toward: 262·-

63 

colonies, pledge to defend: 5 

colonies, relations with 5, 22-24, 500 

distrust of by Axis: 254-56 

distrust of by French military forces: 669-71 

Fighting French, attitude toward: 22 

government, communications to from President: 

57 

government, recognized by U. S.: 23 

Hitler's aspirations, attitude toward: 5 

:'\Iogues, assignt'd as commander: 264, 265 67 

occupation of by Axis forces: 256-57, 264 

Oran, activities a't: 225-27 

policies, emulation of by colonies: 356-57 

policy of friendly relations with Axis: 73-74 

policy toward, Allied, objective of: 22-24 

reaction to Mediterranean landings: 187 

recruitment of supporters of for Fighting French: 

670-71 

support, military, Axis offer of: 254 

support of by British, potential: 10 

Ultimate status, decisions on: 31 

United States, break with: 251 
748 

Victorious, HMS: 185 

Victory parade in Tunis: 669 

Vigier, de, Col. J. L. Touzet (Fr.): 273 

Vincent, Lt. Col. Stewart T.: 238-39 

Viret, Lt. de Vaisseau Hubert (Fr.): 84 

VVadi Zebbeus: 449-51 

Walney, HMS: 202-04 

Walt Whitman, USS: 196 

VVard, Maj. Gen. Orlando: 352,374-76,387,393, 

395,397,399-400,413-17,418,421-22,428-

30, 432-33, 443, 468, 471-74, 487, 490-

92, 549-56, 564-65, 572, 575-76 

VVard, Col. Robert VV.: 402-03,436-37,509,581, 

630-32 

VVaters, Lt. Col. John K.: 210,218-19,220,223-

24,299,410-11,419,422,424 

VVeapons, comparison of Allied and enemy: 479-81 

VVeather, alternative plans for meeting: 44-45 

VVeber, Col. Friedrich (Ger.): 370-71, 376-77 

VVeichold, Adm. (Ger.): 325-26, 325n 

VVells, Lt. Col. VV. VV.: 452 

VVe1sh, Air Marshal Sir VVilliam L. (RAF): 37, 

84,294 

Welshman, HMS: 174 

VVelvert, Gen. Joseph Edouard (Fr.): 273, 351, 

352,387,392-93,417,443,456-57,591-92 

"VVelvert Road": 546-47 

VVendt, Lt. Col. VValter VV.: 578n 

VVest Africa, co-operation of French forces in: 270-

72 

VVestern Air Command: 37,46 

VVestern Desert Air Force: 493-95,527,531,532-

33, 535, 547-48, 649n 

VVestern Dorsal: 281-82, 348-49, 477, 490 

air reconnaissance, enemy: 438 

attack by Allies: 337 

defense by Allies: 438, 456-57 

dispositions, Allied: 443 

failure to exploit by enemy: 426-27 

reconnaissanct', enemy: 438 

swing to by Allies: 427-30 

withdrawal to, Allied: 423-24,436-37 

VVestern Naval Task Force: 44, 103-04, 176-80. 

See also Naval forces, Allied. 

VVestern Task Force 

air support of: 43, 46 

amphibious training: 60-63 

Casablanca selected as target: 40 

commander, selection of: 35, 36 

convoy organization: 68-70 

departure for TORCH: 67-70 

deputy commander, assignment of: 42 

Fedala landings: 121,123-27,130-31 

NORTHWEST AFRICA 

VV estern Task Force-Continued 

mission finally established: 40 

naval support of: 46 

operations after surrender: 178-81 

Oran, target changed to: 40 

plans for employment: 39-46 

reorganization in Morocco: 178-81 

shore headquarters established: 137 

subtask forces, composition: 46 

supply levels fixed: 66 

in surrender negotiations: 171--72 

training after surrender: 171-81 

units, assignment of: 42, 43-44, 44n 

VVestphal, Col. Siegfried (Ger.): 260-61, 502 

VVeygand, Gen. Maxime (Fr.): 17,23 

Wheatland, HMS: 278 

VVhite Fathers' monastery: 608 

VVhite1ey, Brig. J. F. M. (Br.): 33 

Whitman. USS. See Walt Whitman, USS. 

Wichita, USS: 96, 133 

VVilbur, Brig. Gen. VVilliam H.: 96, 128, 128n, 132 

Wilkes, USS: 121, 124, 130, 134 

VVilliams, Col. Paul L.: 383-84, 433 

VVillkie, VV endell: 268 

VVilson, Brig. Gen. Arthur R.: 66 

VVilson, Col. Robert VV.: 374n,607 

VVilson, Capt. Thomson: 105 

Wilton, HMS: 234-35 

Winchester Castle, HMS: 234-35, 237 

VVindmill Farm: 623 

Winooski, USS: 121,175-76 

VVitzig, Major Rudolph (Ger.): 284n, 504·-05 

VVolfe, Col. Henry C.: 62 

Wood, USS. See Leonard Wood, USS. 

VVOP Operation: 544-47 

VVright, Capt. Jerauld (USN): 81 

X Beach. See Mersa Bou Zedjar 

Y Beach. See Les Andalouses. 

Youks-Ies-Bains: 279, 293-94, 335, 494, 573 

Z Beach: 48-49, 206-10, 210n 

Zaafria: 413-14 

Zarat: 522, 532-33 

Zarhouan: 290-91, 327, 333-35, 598, 600, 604, 

650-51, 663, 664-65 

Zemlet e1 LebenI': 516-18,522 

zeralda: 235-36 

Zeroud River: 579-81 

Zetland, HMS: 235, 244, 246, 248 

Ziegler, Gen. Heinz (Ger.): 326,407-10,415-16, 

425-26 

Zigzaou wadi: 522-23,526,531-34 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1993 330-588 
1 

I No,lhwe'l Af,;eon I 

Strategic Air Force 

Aa; Gen J. H . Doolittle 

I 

Mediterranean Air Command 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Arthur Tedder 

I 

Lt Gen Carl W. 

SPOOl" USAAF 

I 

1 : I NO'lhwe'l Ah;eon I 

Air Service Command 

Bri g Gen D. H. Dunton 

I 

Air Vice Marshal 

Sir Keith Park 

1 

Northwest African I 

Tra ining Command 

Brig Gen J. K. Connon 

RAF 8, 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir W. Sholto Douglas 

I RA F Mideast 

9th Air 

Force 

Ma; G en 

U. S. 

I No,lhw .. 1 Afdeon I No"hwe,1 Ah;eon I l. H . Brereton 

Northwest African 

Tactical Air Force Coastal Air Force Photographic 

Reconnarssance 

Air Marshal Air Vi ce Ma rshal Wing 

Sir Arthur Coningham HU9h P. Lloyd 

It Col Elliott Rooseve lt 

CHART 2-ALLIED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS I N TH E MEDITERRANEAN, MARCH 1943 

ALLIED FORCE HEADOUARTERS 

GEN DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

xxxx 

First Br 

Lt Gen Kenneth 

Anderson 

XXX 

~8' LI Gen C. W. A lnrey 

I 

xx 

[2'J 1 8, 

XX 

1=1 68, 

Ma; Gen W. E. 

Clutterbuck 

Maj G en C. 

Kei'3 htle y 

XX 

~46Br 

Ma; Gen H . A. 

Freeman-Attwood 

xx 

xxx 

~h 

Gen l. Koehl 

xx 

C8J F, 

G en Mauri ce 

Methene' 

C8I 788, 

Me; Gen 

V . Evelegh 

XX 

C8::l F, 

Gen E. 

Welve,' 

xxx xx 

I 18 A,m:Y G,oup I 

Gen Sir Harold R. L. G . A lexander 

xxx 

II I u. S. 

Lt Gen G. S. Patton , JI. 

I 

xxx 

NZ I B, (P,ov) 

Lf Gen 

Sir B. C. Freyberg 

xxx X 

~8' Gen Sir Berlnord 

Montgomery 

xxx 

xx 

F' 

Gen Edgar de 

Lorminot 

10 18, 

Sir Brion G . Horrocks 

~----~-------~------~----~ 

xx 

9U.S . 

Ma; Gen M. S. Eddy 

xx 

XX 

1=1 U.S. 

Ma; Gen O . Wo,d 

XX 

C8J 34 U. S. C8:J 

Ma; Gen Ma; Gen 

C. W. Ryd .. Terry Allen 

XX 

2NZ (Freyberg) 

U. S. 

X 

I2$J F, 

Gen 

Jacques LeCle rc 

8 

X XX XX 

1~1 8de nd Br ICD 1 8, 

From 71h Moj Gen Mej Gen 

Armd Oiv F. 1. S. Tuker R. Bri9gs 

I 

Commander-in-Chief 

Mediterranean 

Adm Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, RN 

r 

Admiral Sir Henry 

Harwood 

XX 

50 0 8, 

Ma; Gen 

J. S. N ichols 

I 

8, 

Vice Admiral 

H. K. Hewitt 

xxx 

30 I B, 

Lt Gen 

Sir O liver Le ese 

XX XX 

51 8, 7 [ c:::> 1 8, 

Ma; Gen Ma; Gen 

O. N. Wimberley G . Ersk ine 

U. S. 

xxxx 

F;:lh I u. S. 

LI Gen Mark 

Wayne Clark 

XXX 

I U S. 

Ma; Gen 

Geoffrey Keyes 

XX 

2 1 =Iu. S. 

Ma; Gen 

E. N. Harmon 

xxx 

VI I U S. 

Ma; Gen 

E. J. Dawley 

XX 

. S. 

Maj Gen 

l. K. Truscott , Jr. 
THE LANDING PLAN 

BilL a[lC~~ [lD ~IN [ 

+ A'Rfl(lD 

r-----' 

I TRANSPORT I 

I 

I l~4T!-l I 

: 3[967 

I 

I 2§67 

I 

I AREA I L _____ J 

BEAOt 

BLUE 

SAFI LANDING AREA '"(Ne~ OE'(N$U os n_NN[O A"O pA~".LLf RUllHO 

8 NO~( .. au 1942 

o ","os,,,on "U @ N,"'~! eln 

ill llG""'OUS[ 0 POfITUCUES[ rOIlT 

® MERC"."DlSE OU.' ® PoST OHICt 

® PtrllOt.[u" 'A"", ® AR'" UllRA,,,, 

® P[TlTt OAII S!: (@) (uROP[n (t .. nUT fl Ot <u.S! UU 

MAPl 
LANDINGS AT FEDALA 

6 November 1942 

O~I __ C'Ooor;0:,-_"oooo::; VJO,ROS 

o 1000 2000 .. nuls 

" 

Tobit 

d'Ouko'"0 

OF CASABLANCA 

Operations B- II November 1942 

~ FOIIWAIID POSITIONS, 0100, 9 NOVEMB£R 

rTT'1 rrn FORWARO POSITIONS, 2400, 9 NOV(/ot BE" 

PosITIONS R["'HEO 0130, 11 NOVE"'8£" 

FREHCH D£HHSE PERIMETER, 0730, 11 NOVEMBER 

Camp - Camp de 10 JonqUlfrt 

ON HIE ' " SET 

PLANHEO LAtIOor<GS _ ACTUAl. LANDINGS 

_ FREHCH COASTAL UTT(IIIES 

____ ELEVATIONS IN M[HIIS 

" " '00 

MAP II 
TAKING PORT-LYAU T EY 

8 -10 November 1942 

"' ~~-~' ''' LANDINGS AS PL ANNED 

~ ACTUAL LAND INGS 

~ POSI TIONS , NIGHT 8/9 NOYEMBER 

• • a __ "" ACTION, 9 NOYEMBER 

--~ ACTION, NIGHT ANO MORNING 9/10 NOYE MBER 

1TITtTTITm" POSITIONS, MORNING 10 NOYEMBER 

-... AXIS OF FREtlCH COUNTE RATTACK 

ELEYATIONS IN METERS 

ABOYE 

,/ ~" 

3~~~: > 

dR. C,.o~'tI'I 

(t) LANDEO 

AS PLANN ED 

, 

, 

,+ 

.0' 

,-

& 

.,0 

.$-" ~ ., ~~" 

~,/" 

, 

, 

, 

, 

// 

.- / 

0+ .,> 

MAP III 
SEIZURE OF ORAN 

8-10 November 19 4 2 

--.. 

~ 

AlliS or ALLIED AOVAHC£, DUE IHole . T(O 

FIIE ... CH COUNT[R.urIoCKS 

e C[tHEII OF FIIE"'CH RES'SUNCE 

MAJOR FRENCH COAST 

CD FOIIT OU S" "'TOH 

® FUNE CoNIIEIt 

® F£" ... £ 5TE M""II[ 

DEFENSE BATTERIES 

® POINT IE C,I "' ''ST[l 

® FOIIT au NO II O 

® FOIIT DE LA POINTE 

EI .. £VATIOHS IN ",nuts 

I I 1:1 o 100 200 4 00 AND .nOVE 

Elms B 

Coo 

B £ 5 l r I $ A 

0' 

R A 

i< 

l A " E' 

----

o 

3~6(-1 ON HMS WALNEY 

AND HMS HARTLAND 

IRI'I 

~" ~16(-1 

B~l(-) 

elF REOl 

MA P IV 
" • 

[J 

,. 

s 

4 

THE TUNISIAN BATTLEGROUND 

:::~ 

1114 1" o ... ~ 

or .. u "0 .1.01 ""D lUCKS 

NOIIV.l.L G.lUGt 1Uo 1LltOAO 

N.lIUOW ' A.UC;[ U IL"o.a O 

SAtf LI<[ OfUIrI 0'''' 

I [UVI,I IOliS , .. "(l UI 

. I I ' 

\--" --"-

4 

-". 

,. 

-" --" 

(l 

GOLFe DC TUNIS 

G 0 L F C 

D C 

~ • £ s 

,-

" 

~ 

". 

GOII 80ft 

" 

" -' 

" " 

.r 

" 

.l 

MAP V 
Elm5 I(OCH 

I.e. C,.oo,u/ry 

TEBOURBA ENGAGEMENT 

1- 3 Dec ember 1942 

--ALLlEO POSITIONS,OA'E INDICATED 

- ALLIEO .-.OV"'N(;[,O.-.Tf INDICATEO 

X AIIMOA[O [ NGAGE N ENT, DATE INDICATE O 

rTT'n"T"> GEAIoIAN PO$ITlON$, I,IDANING I DEC 

-.... GEAMAtI PO$ITIONS. EVENING 3 DEC 

+-AXI $ or Gtll "' '''''' AHACK, OAf[ iNDIC ATEO 

OUVE GROVE 

[\.EVUION$ IN I,I[T[AS 

o " '" '" 

o 

300 400 .. NO ASOVE 

• MILES 

, /. I ,,; .. i ', ,' ; I , 0 • MILD!.I ( f [A$ 

MAP VI 
GERMAN ATTACK ON MEDJEZ EL BAB 

6 -10 December 1942 

~ ALLIED POSITlOU, 6 Ote 

rTTT'IrTTn ALLIED POSITlQI', 7- '0 D(c 

--+- AXIS or ALLIED CDUNT[RATTACI<.OAT( .".OIeATED 

X AR MOR ED [ 11(iAG£ IoI EtH,OAlE ItlDlCAHO 

- - GERM AU PQ5ITIOU. "' OAIIING , 6 Dcc 

r--"I ~ GEA .... AN POSIHOr •. [IIEI'lItIG, 6 D[c 

~ A~IS OF GCRt.lAN ATTACK. DAfE INDICA TEO 

OUVE GROVE 

,_,,,,, £I..EIIATlOtl5 Ifl METEAS 

, " '" '" oo 4 00 AND "eOIlE 

o I M ILES 

Wo' -r,''r, hi ,';", f: ,M',",,,, f-i ----,--" 

OJ EL ANG 

' 668 

, , 

-

'0 

EIfT1S !2,17 

--

Ksor Tyr 

MAP VII 
No te : 

19 -2 2 February 1943 

mrrrmmrr ALL I EO POSITION 

~ AXIS Of G DUE DIC ~~~;N ATTACK. 

PASS 

A narrow 0 10 Haldr o 90/~g~ roi/Tood ron tTom • 9nm~nl unc~rloln J(oss~Tln~ 

o 

ELEVATIONS IN METERS 

I ~ I I ! 1000 . >o"...d..~ 1200 14 00 AND -.l ABOVE 

(' 

o 

I 

o 

~ MILES 

5 KILOMETERS 

~ f' 

'" 

( TO L~"'l"F--.J 

" ( 

( 

~ 

f 

t' 

/" 

OJ ~ Chombi 

KASSERINE PASS 

19-20 Fe br uor~ 1943 

'000 0 

I, , 

,o~o~o:"''"'".o;'' __ ~'O,!,OO YA ROS 

1000 METE RS 

MAP VIII 
; 

• 

o J , 

GROUP ,..-, 

) 

(/" 

--

", 

MARETH AND CHOTT POSITIONS 

16 March- 6 April 1943 

BRITtSI'! EIGHTH ARMY FRONT LINE,16 MARCH 

'''''',",'''hI''';;;'''"''''"'''"' BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY FRONT LINE, 20 MARCH 

:=::::::::::> BRITISH ATTACK, DATE INDICATEO 

• AXIS OF BRITISH ADVANCE, DATE INDICATED 

___ GERNAI'.I-ITALIAN FRONT LIIIE,I6 MARCH 

•••••••• GERMAN-ITALIAN FRONT LINE, 26 MARCIi 

I'T'T'T'1 I'TTT'I GERIolAN-ITIILIAN FROtH LINE , 27 MARCH 

,........,,........, GERMAN-ITALIAN FRONT LINE, I APR il 

J GERMAN COUNTERATTACK, DATE INDICATED 

ELEVATIONS IN 

o Ii ~O 100 'ISO 400 AND AeOvE 

'--~-,'~, ~,~, -.'~-if'---__ -,-__ ;T MILES 

o b IIllOI.IETERS 

';'E. Crowley 

Sollane" 

ROUTE OF ADVANCE 

NZ CORPS 19 20 MARCH 

10 CORPS 23-25 MARCH 

':\ 

",,- " j 

{ " 

t ," CJ / \ r C 

.... 

CHOTT POSITION 

(1-6 APR) 

\. , 

\ 7/ 

" 

\ 

/ 

/ 

( 

, 

o 

o 

f 

t 

\ 

MAP IX 
FRO M 

eou CHEBKA 

16 MA R 

IOS9 

\ 

\ 

\ 

FiR/ANA 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

.... ' .............. 

li St; 

" , 

, , 

\ 

\ 

\ 

" , 

'" 

, , 

I 

• 

\ \.-// 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Note 

IkIts (.) 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , 

• • 

, • 

: 

, • 

, ., • " '5O 

• • • • • • • • • 

911'r Tnf D .... H ond 341n Inf 0, ... 

cuo)' 9 pOSII.Ons on tnt 

Western 00 "01, 16 Mor 

1029 

.679 

, 

/ 

16 -20 MAA 

OPERATIONS OF II CORPS 

IN SOUTHERN TUNISIA 

16- 23 Marc h 1943 

~ us AOUTE or AOVANCE, OATE 

INDIC A fED 

GERM AN - ITALI AN rRONf LINE, 

17 MAACH 

US rRONf LINE , 23 MAACH 

ELEVATION S IN METEAS 

o 200 &00 AND ABOVE 

~ _ _ ~~", ___ ~_--l' MilES 

~ 0 ~ KILOMETEAS M

AP )( 
COD Serrol 

/ 

c 

, 

/ '-..,)., 

) " '- / c'r:~ ( 

) '\1 -' 

) \ 

<-

"- ) " /. - , 

/ 

GARA£r fCHKEIJL 

/ 

! 

I -------

LAC OE BI.lERT£ 

(iAflAC f 

I 

/ 

CL 1."18 fOI.l 8"'; 

II CORPS OPERATION S 

IN NORTHERN TUNISIA 23 Apr il - 3 May 1943 

rrrmmrmrr ALliED r~ONT l'NE IAPP~O~) , 23 ~l l 

11/11111/11/1/1 D COIOPS fllO'l1 l iNE IAPPROlll, l M Al 

"1TTTTTTT GEII >.! AN-ITAlIA'l fIlON! liNE , 3MI>Y 

ELEVAT IONS IN >.! ETEIIS 

[ l ---,j J!!II!II!!II_ ~O 200 . 00 600ANO A80VE 

o 

o 

~ MIL ES 

SKllOMETE"S 

MAP X I 
Q 

BATTLE FOR HILL 609 

1IIIIIIIIIIIIIn 

= -

(DJEBEL TAHENT) 

27 April-l Moy 1943 

us FRONT LlNE,NOON ,Z7APRIL 

US FRONT Ll IGH, 2I n~IL 

US F/tONT LlNE,EVENING,30APRIL 

AXI, Of US ADVANCE, DATE .... DlCATED 

GE RMAN POSITION (A .... /tOX) 

Conl()W 1111_'''01 25 m.r.n 

'000 YAItO' 

O~,o~""..,. ~T;~. , ...,.-+' lYt---------;',"'O'OO METE/t' ,doti ',1,;" , ° 

MAP X II