IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

S.F., : CASE SEALED

Petitioner :

: No. 574 M.D. 2020

v. :

: Argued: December 15, 2021

Pennsylvania Department of Human :

Services; Teresa D. Miller, in her :

official capacity as secretary of the :

Department of Health and Human :

Services; Pennsylvania Professional :

Standards and Practices Commission, :

:

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge1

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge

2

(P.)

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: July 11, 2023

 

S.F. (Petitioner), a former teacher certified by Pennsylvania Department 

of Education (PDE) and employed by a public school district (School District), has 

filed a six-count petition for review (PFR) in the nature of a complaint in equity, 

mandamus, and for declaratory relief against the Pennsylvania Department of Human 

1 This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 7, 2022, when Judge Cohn 

Jubelirer became President Judge.

2 This matter was assigned to the panel before January 3, 2022, when President Judge Emerita 

Leavitt became a senior judge on the Court.
2

Services (DHS), Teresa D. Miller,3in her official capacity as Secretary (Secretary), and 

the Pennsylvania Professional Standards and Practices Commission (PSPC) 

(collectively, Respondents). Petitioner has filed an application for partial summary 

relief on Counts I, III, and V. The application for partial summary relief calls upon 

this Court to address the question of whether the process available to an alleged 

perpetrator under the current version of the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL), 23 

Pa. C.S. §§ 6301-6386, satisfies constitutional procedural due process standards in the 

context of teachers.

4

 Specifically, Petitioner asks this Court to hold that she, and 

teachers like herself, are entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing prior to being listed as a 

perpetrator in either (1) an indicated report of child abuse; or (2) a founded report of 

child abuse when the basis of the founded designation is entrance into an accelerated 

rehabilitative disposition (ARD) program. Respondents have filed a cross-application 

for partial summary relief on those same counts on grounds of lack of standing and 

ripeness. 

Although in recent years, this Court and our Supreme Court have 

expressed concerns that the CPSL may permit the deprivation of protected interests 

without required constitutional protections, no court has, until now, addressed whether 

due process requires pre-deprivation procedures in the CPSL with regard to teachers. 

After careful consideration, we conclude that the CPSL, when implemented together 

with the Educator Discipline Act5(Educator Discipline Act), contained within the 

3

 Teresa D. Miller is no longer the Secretary of Human Services. Dr. Val Arkoosh is now 

the Secretary of Human Services as of June 29, 2023.

4 As used herein, the term “teacher” includes those individuals who hold one of the

enumerated teaching certificates listed in Section 1201 of the Public School Code of 1949 (School 

Code), Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 12-1201. 

5 Act of December 12, 1973, P.L. 397, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 2070.1a-2070.18c.
3

School Code, does not provide for our Constitution’s guarantee of due process. It is 

without question that the government has a paramount interest in keeping child abuse 

out of our schools and doing so in an expeditious manner. As this has necessarily 

involved the preliminary deprivation of constitutionally protected interests in property 

and reputation, the government also has an equal interest in not stigmatizing those who 

are innocent or wrongfully accused or foreclosing them from employment and other 

opportunities prior to being named on an indicated report of child abuse. The predeprivation procedures provided for below do not hinder the expeditious removal of an 

abuser from the school premises; they merely ensure that those teachers who are 

alleged to be an abuser are not deprived of their constitutional right to due process 

before being listed as a perpetrator of abuse in an indicated report of child abuse. This 

case does not involve the determination of whether child abuse occurred in this matter, 

but only whether the CPSL protects constitutional guarantees to due process before a 

teacher is listed in the ChildLine and Abuse Registry (ChildLine Registry). Our 

determination also does not prevent a school from implementing any lawful procedures 

to initially remove a teacher whom it believes has engaged in child abuse. For the 

reasons that follow, Petitioner’s application for partial summary relief as to Counts I

and III is granted. With respect to Count V, we agree with the arguments advanced 

by Respondents and deny Petitioner’s application for partial summary relief. The 

cross-application for partial summary relief filed by Respondents is granted as to Count 

V only and denied in all other respects.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the fall of 2018, Petitioner was a special education teacher in the School 

District. On September 14, 2018, Petitioner was alleged to have forced a 6-year-old 

special needs student to walk up and down a flight of stairs over 100 times. A report 
4

of suspected child abuse was referred to the local County Children and Youth Services 

(CYS), which investigated and interviewed Petitioner and the child and reviewed video 

surveillance footage of the incident. Petitioner acknowledged making the child walk 

up and down the stairs as a form of getting the child to calm down. CYS’s investigation 

concluded that the allegations of abuse were substantiated and that an indicated report 

of child abuse would be issued. Petitioner was notified that as of November 30, 2018, 

she was listed on the statewide ChildLine Registry as a perpetrator in an indicated 

report of child abuse. The notice from DHS informed Petitioner,

An indicated report means that a county children and youth 

agency or the Pennsylvania [DHS] has made a determination 

that you committed abuse. Your name will remain on file in 

the statewide database indefinitely if your social security 

number or date of birth is known.

As a perpetrator in an indicated report, you will probably be 

prevented from working in an organization serving children 

or a public or private school or from becoming a foster care 

or adoptive parent. As a perpetrator, you could also be 

prevented from volunteering in an organization serving 

children or public or private school or from obtaining certain 

educational degrees or certificates. Other volunteer and 

employment opportunities may also be negatively affected. 

If you disagree with the determination that you have 

committed abuse, and you want your name removed 

from the Statewide Database, you have two options.

(1) You must appeal to [DHS] within 90 days of the mailing 

date listed at the top of this notice.

To appeal you can use the enclosed form and check off the 

first box on the form. You may also write a letter requesting 

the appeal.

OR
5

(2) You have a right to a hearing now. You can skip the 

appeal described above and ask the Bureau of Hearings and 

Appeals [(BHA)] for that hearing. This request must be made 

within 90 days of the mailing date listed at the top of this 

notice.

(Exhibit B to Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Application for Summary Relief) 

(emphasis in original).

Petitioner was interviewed but received no hearing before a neutral 

adjudicator prior to being listed as a perpetrator of child abuse on the ChildLine 

Registry. Petitioner sought administrative review of the indicated report pursuant to 

Section 6341(a)(2) of the CPSL, 23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(a)(2).

6

 

On December 26, 2018, an educator misconduct complaint was filed with 

the PDE pursuant to section 9 of the Educator Discipline Act, 24 P.S. § 2070.9,

7 which 

alleged that Petitioner was the subject of an indicated report of child abuse. By letter 

dated March 12, 2019, DHS denied Petitioner’s request for administrative review, 

concluding that the report was accurate and was maintained in a manner consistent with 

the CPSL. Petitioner appealed to BHA, and a hearing was scheduled before an 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for July 21, 2019. 

6 Section 6341(a)(2) provides:

Any person named as a perpetrator, and any school employee named, 

in an indicated report of child abuse may, within 90 days of being 

notified of the status of the report, request an administrative review by 

. . . . the secretary to amend or expunge an indicated report on the 

grounds that it is inaccurate or it is being maintained in a manner 

inconsistent with this chapter. The request shall be in writing in a 

manner prescribed by [DHS].

23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(a)(2). 

7 Added by the Act of December 14, 1989, P.L. 612.
6

Before the hearing, CYS requested a stay because Petitioner was charged 

with a misdemeanor count of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4303, Endangering the Welfare of Children 

(EWOC), and criminal proceedings had commenced. The BHA then stayed 

Petitioner’s administrative appeal. Also due to the criminal charge, the PSPC directed 

the PDE to suspend Petitioner’s teaching certificate and employment eligibility 

pursuant to section 9.2(a)(1) of the Educator Discipline Act, 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(a)(1),

8

which requires such suspensions.

On June 26, 2020, Petitioner entered into ARD in connection with her 

EWOC charge. As a condition of entering ARD, the District Attorney required 

Petitioner to surrender her teaching certificate in lieu of further disciplinary 

proceedings. By order dated September 29, 2020, the PSPC accepted Petitioner’s 

surrender of her certificate of employment eligibility. 

On October 15, 2020, Petitioner filed her PFR. In Count I, Petitioner

seeks a declaration that section 6368 of the CPSL, 23 Pa. C.S. § 6368, is 

constitutionally deficient under article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution9

and the United States Constitution (as applied to Petitioner and other teachers and on 

its face) as it provides no pre-deprivation due process to such individuals listed as 

perpetrators in an “indicated” report of child abuse. In Count III, Petitioner seeks a 

declaration that section 6303 of the CPSL, 23 Pa. C.S. § 6303, is unconstitutional as 

applied to Petitioner and other teachers and on its face because it provides no due 

process to individuals listed as perpetrators of a “founded” report of child abuse when 

the basis of the founded report is acceptance into ARD. Count V seeks a writ of 

8

 Added by the Act of December 20, 2000, P.L. 918.

9 Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: “All men are born equally free 

and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying 

and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and 

of pursuing their own happiness.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
7

mandamus ordering Respondents to remove Petitioner’s existing report from the 

ChildLine Registry. Respondents timely filed an answer with new matter on February 

8, 2021.

On July 9, 2021, Petitioner filed her application for partial summary relief, 

seeking judgment in her favor as to Counts I, III, and V.

10

 Respondents filed a crossapplication for partial summary relief on Count I, Count III (lack of standing because 

Petitioner has never been the subject of a “founded” report of child abuse), and Count 

V (because DHS has no duty to remove an indicated report of child abuse from the 

ChildLine Registry). 

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

 A. THE CPSL SCHEME AS APPLIED TO TEACHERS

1. The Initial Report and Investigation

The CPSL provides a comprehensive framework for reporting and 

investigating child abuse. The CPSL created a statewide database of protective 

services known as the ChildLine Registry. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6331. This registry contains, 

inter alia, reports of suspected child abuse. Id. Section 6312 of the CPSL allows “[a]ny 

person” with “reasonable cause to suspect” child abuse to make a report of suspected 

child abuse. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6312. Additionally, Section 6311(a) of the CPSL requires 

certain adult individuals designated as mandated reporters (including health care 

workers, school employees, clergy, law enforcement officers and foster parents), to 

report suspected child abuse if they have “reasonable cause to suspect that a child is a 

10 Rule 1532(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that “[a]t any time 

after the filing of a petition for review in an appellate or original jurisdiction matter, the court may on 

application enter judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear.” Pa. R.A.P. 1532(b). In 

constitutional challenges, “the challenger bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that the statute 

‘clearly, plainly, and palpably violates the Constitution,’ as [courts] presume that [their] sister 

branches act in conformity with the Constitution.” Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation 

v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 929 (Pa. 2017).
8

victim of child abuse.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 6311(a). Once an allegation of child abuse is

submitted to the ChildLine Registry, DHS refers the matter to the child protective

services agency of the county where the alleged abuse has occurred. 23 Pa. C.S. §

6334(b). Within 24 hours of receiving the allegation, a caseworker employed by the 

county agency must begin an investigation. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6368(b), 6368(d)(4). The 

CPSL requires that, at a minimum, the caseworker must interview the victim and 

alleged perpetrator, if the alleged perpetrator can be found. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6368(d)(4).11 

DHS regulations provide that the investigator shall, if possible, also interview the 

child’s parents, the reporter, eyewitnesses, neighbors, relatives, day care providers, or 

school personnel. 55 Pa. Code § 3490.55. The investigation shall include: 

(1) A determination of the safety of or risk of harm to the 

child or any other child if each child continues to remain in 

the existing home environment.

(2) A determination of the nature, extent and cause of any 

condition listed in the report.

(3) Any action necessary to provide for the safety of the child 

or any other child in the child’s household.

11 Section 6368(d)(4) of the CPSL states in this regard:

(d) Investigative actions--During the investigation, all of the 

following shall apply:

* * *

(4) The investigation shall include interviews with all subjects 

of the report, including the alleged perpetrator. If a subject of the report

is not able to be interviewed or cannot be located, the county agency 

shall document its reasonable efforts to interview the subject and the 

reasons for its inability to interview the subject. The interview may be 

reasonably delayed if notice of the investigation has been delayed 

pursuant to subsection (m).

23 Pa. C.S. § 6368(d)(4).
9

(4) The taking of photographic identification of the child or 

any other child in the child’s household, which shall be 

maintained in the case file.

(5) Communication with [DHS’s] service under section 6332 

(relating to establishment of Statewide toll-free telephone 

number).

23 Pa. C.S. § 6368(c). 

If a report of child abuse possibly includes a violation of the criminal laws, 

the county agency’s investigation must be conducted jointly with local law 

enforcement. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6334.1. In such circumstances, county agencies and the

district attorney for the county where the alleged abuse occurred must convene a 

“multidisciplinary investigative team” that coordinates interviews with the alleged 

perpetrator. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6365. 

After completing its investigation, the agency must submit a CY-48 form 

to ChildLine designating the report of child abuse as “unfounded,” “indicated,” or 

“founded.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 6368(c); 55 Pa. Code § 3490.67. A report is indicated if 

“substantial evidence of the alleged abuse exists” based on available medical evidence, 

the child protective service investigation, or an admission by the perpetrator. 23 Pa. 

C.S. § 6303. “Substantial evidence” is defined as “[e]vidence which outweighs 

inconsistent evidence and which a reasonable person would accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Id.

2. Teachers Named in Indicated Reports

If the allegations relate to a teacher, the CPSL imposes a mandatory duty 

on DHS to send notice of the allegations to the relevant school employer. 23 Pa. C.S. 

§ 6340(a)(13). Upon receiving notice of an investigation of suspected child abuse 

involving a teacher, school employers must “immediately implement a plan of 
10

supervision or alternative arrangement for the individual under investigation to ensure 

the safety of the child and other children who are in the care of the school.” 23 Pa. C.S. 

§ 6368(i). This plan of supervision or alternative arrangement must be approved by 

the county agency and continue until the county agency completes its investigation. Id. 

3. Post-Deprivation Remedies Available to Teachers

The CPSL provides individuals named as perpetrators in an indicated 

report of child abuse with post-deprivation remedies. First, the CPSL provides for 

administrative review by DHS. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(a)(2). DHS must provide notice of 

the decision to the alleged perpetrator within 60 days of the request for administrative 

review. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(a)(3). Second, if DHS refuses to grant relief at the 

administrative review stage, “the perpetrator or school employee shall have the right to 

appeal and request a hearing before the secretary to amend or expunge an indicated 

report on the grounds that it is inaccurate or it is being maintained in a manner 

inconsistent with this chapter.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(c). Individuals also have the right 

to skip the administrative review stage and go directly to a hearing. 23 Pa. C.S. §

6341(a)(2). Hearings are conducted by ALJs working within BHA, and the burden of 

proof falls on the county agency that made the determination. Id. Hearings must be 

commenced within 100 days of the date DHS receives the appeal. 23 Pa. C.S. § 

6341(c.2) (requiring BHA to issue a scheduling order within 10 days, and that a hearing 

shall commence within 90 days of the scheduling order). The CPSL also requires the 

hearing examiner to issue a decision within 45 days, or 105 days if the hearing examiner 

has good cause for a 60-day extension. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(c.3). Indicated reports 

remain on the ChildLine Registry while any requests for review or appeals are pending.

4. Founded Report
11

A “founded report” of child abuse is a determination where a suspect is 

deemed guilty of child abuse through a judicial process that is distinct from the county 

agency investigation detailed above. A “founded report” is defined by an exhaustive 

list of situations in Section 6303 of the CPSL, and, as relevant here, may include when, 

inter alia, “there has been an acceptance into an [ARD] program and the reason for the 

acceptance involves the same factual circumstances involved in the allegation of child 

abuse.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 6303(2). The CPSL affords individuals named as perpetrators 

in founded reports of child abuse no rights to administrative or judicial review.

5. ARD

ARD is a pretrial disposition of certain criminal cases, governed primarily 

by Chapter 3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which suspends formal 

criminal proceedings before conviction and provides the accused with certain 

rehabilitative conditions, the completion of which results in the dismissal of the 

pending criminal charges and a clean record for the defendant. J.F. v. Department of 

Human Services, 245 A.3d 658, 661-62 (Pa. 2021). If a district attorney agrees to a 

defendant’s request for inclusion into ARD, a hearing on the motion is held in open 

court wherein it is “ascertained on the record whether the defendant understands that 

(1) acceptance into and satisfactory completion of the [ARD] program offers the 

defendant an opportunity to earn a dismissal of the pending charges,” and (2) failure to 

complete the program waives applicable statute of limitations and the right to a speedy 

trial. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 312. The judge hears the facts presented by the district 

attorney and any information the defendant and the victim choose to present. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 313(b). If the judge believes ARD is appropriate, the judge states the 

conditions of ARD on the record; otherwise the case proceeds on the charges. Pa. R. 

Crim. P. 313(c). The defendant then states whether she accepts conditions of ARD and 
12

agrees to comply, and if she agrees, the judge may grant the motion for ARD and enter 

an order imposing conditions. Pa.R.Crim.P. 313(D). Upon satisfactory completion of 

the program, a defendant may move the court for an order dismissing the charges, and 

if the motion is granted, the judge also enters an expungement order of the defendant’s 

arrest record. Pa.R.Crim.P. 320.

6. Educator Discipline and the ChildLine Registry

Teachers who hold certificates from PDE are subject to the provisions of 

the Educator Discipline Act. In situations where a certificated teacher is named as a 

perpetrator in an indicated report of child abuse, the PSPC may, after providing notice 

and offering a hearing, impose professional discipline upon the teacher. If, however, 

the teacher is named as a perpetrator in a founded report of child abuse, the Educator 

Discipline Act mandates immediate revocation of the teacher’s certificate. 24 P.S. §

2070.9d(a)(1). Section 9.4(a)(1) of the Educator Discipline Act provides that the PSPC 

shall:

[d]irect [PDE] to revoke the certificate and employment 

eligibility of an educator who is named as the perpetrator of 

a founded report of child abuse or named as an individual 

responsible for injury or abuse in a founded report for a 

school employe under [the CPSL] upon receipt of 

documentation verifying the founded report.

24 P.S. § 2070.9d(a)(1).12

The Educator Discipline Act does not provide certificated teachers with 

an opportunity to be heard on the revocation of teaching certificates when the basis for 

revocation is that the teacher was named as a perpetrator in a founded report of child 

abuse. Instead, the Educator Discipline Act provides that if a founded report is 

“reversed or determined to be unfounded,” the PSPC “must immediately reinstate a 

12 Added by the Act of December 18, 2013, P.L. 1205.
13

certificate upon receipt of a certified document establishing” that fact. 24 P.S. §

2070.9d(a)(2).

III. DISCUSSION

A. PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY RELIEF

1. Count I – Declaratory Relief – Constitutionality of section 6368 of the 

CPSL

In her first issue, Petitioner seeks summary relief on Count I of her PFR, 

which asks for a declaration that section 6368 of the CPSL is constitutionally deficient 

under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions as applied to Petitioner and 

other teachers because it provides no pre-deprivation due process to teachers listed as 

perpetrators in indicated reports of child abuse.

13

 Petitioner contends that teachers, like 

her, who hold a teacher’s certificate have a constitutionally protected property right in 

the practice of that profession. She maintains that individuals accused of child abuse 

also have a protected liberty interest in their reputations which entitles them to 

procedural due process under the Pennsylvania Constitution. She argues that teachers 

named as perpetrators in indicated reports face reputational and employment 

consequences to a significantly greater degree than other individuals so named. 

Petitioner argues that due process requires that she and other teachers receive some sort 

of pre-deprivation hearing prior to being named as a perpetrator in an indicated report 

13 We note that the relief Petitioner seeks in Counts I, III, and V of her application for partial 

summary relief is narrower than the relief requested in the PFR in that Petitioner does not seek a 

declaration here that Sections 6303 and 6368 of the CPSL are unconstitutional on their face. Rather, 

she seeks a declaration that Sections 6303 and 6368 of the CPSL are unconstitutional under the 

Pennsylvania Constitution as applied to herself and other teachers.

A facial attack tests a law’s constitutionality based on its text alone and does not consider the 

facts or circumstances of a particular case. An as-applied attack, in contrast, does not contend that a 

law is unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular person under particular 

circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right. Peake v. Department of Human Services, 

132 A.3d 506, 517 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
14

of child abuse. She acknowledges that she may seek recourse through a postdeprivation hearing. However, she argues that the fact that a hearing occurs after an 

indicated report is issued does not satisfy the demands of constitutional due process. 

In response, Respondents counter that there has been no deprivation of 

Petitioner’s constitutional reputational interest because the ChildLine Registry is a 

closed and confidential database. They further contend that Petitioner has not proven 

how she has been deprived of her right to pursue her lawful occupation by being placed 

on ChildLine Registry because she is free to pursue her profession. They also argue

that even if Petitioner is successful in proving a sufficient deprivation of a 

constitutional interest by being identified on an indicated report on the ChildLine 

Registry, due process is satisfied by the post-deprivation administrative review and 

hearing process established by the General Assembly in the CPSL, and because of the 

undisputed urgent need to protect children from further abuse. 

a. Due Process and the Child Protective Services Law

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 

property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. V. A similar protection, 

that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 

process of law,” is contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 

Due process is fully applicable to administrative hearings involving 

substantial property and/or liberty rights. C.S. v. Department of Human Services, 

Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, 184 A.3d 600, 603-04 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Under 

both our federal and state constitutions, the basic elements of procedural due process 

are “adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself 
15

before a fair and impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the case.” Commonwealth 

v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 764 (Pa. 2013).14 The United States Supreme Court has 

consistently held that “some form of hearing” is required before a final deprivation of 

a protected interest, although the exact nature and mechanism of the required procedure 

will vary based upon the unique circumstances surrounding the controversy. Mathews

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); C.S., 184 A.3d at 607. The fundamental 

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in

a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

Courts examine procedural due process in two steps: the first asks whether 

there is a life, liberty, or property interest with which the state has interfered, and the 

second examines whether the procedure attendant to that deprivation are 

constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 

U.S. 454, 460 (1989). In Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, the Supreme Court developed, and 

we have embraced, a balancing test that augments the second step of the due process 

analysis to assess the constitutional sufficiency of the statutory procedure. First, we 

must consider the private interest that will be affected by the official action. Second,

we consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 

used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 

Third, we consider the government’s interest, including the function involved and the 

14 There is a strong presumption that legislation like the CPSL is constitutional and, therefore, 

cannot be declared unconstitutional unless it is found to “clearly, palpably and plainly” violate the 

Constitution. Commonwealth v. Craven, 817 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa. 2003) (quotation omitted); 1 Pa. 

C.S. § 1922(3) (presuming that “the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of 

the United States or of this Commonwealth”). Further, because Petitioner is challenging the 

constitutionality of the CPSL, she “bear[s] a heavy burden of persuasion” with respect to her claims. 

Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 752 A.2d 384, 388 (Pa. 2000). Any doubts about whether Petitioner 

has met this high burden must be resolved in favor of finding the statute constitutional. 

Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 393 (Pa. 

2005).
16

fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 

requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; City of Philadelphia v. Perfetti, 

119 A.3d 396, 403 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc). The Mathews calculus contemplates 

a judicious balancing of these concerns. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).

i. Private Interest Affected by Official Action

Applying the above precedent, we first decide as a threshold matter 

whether Petitioner, a special education teacher, has a protected liberty or property 

interest that is affected by being listed in the ChildLine Registry. This is easily 

answered as our Court has previously answered this question in the affirmative. While 

our courts have not yet answered the question of “how much process is due” in this 

situation, the notion that a teacher’s due process rights are implicated by placement on 

the ChildLine Registry is settled. 

In J.P. v. Department of Human Services, 170 A.3d 575, 581 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2017), a teacher was accused of student abuse and he was reported to the ChildLine 

Registry as a perpetrator. In response to the notice, the petitioner sent a letter 

requesting that the indicated report be destroyed or amended based on errors in the 

report, and he requested a hearing if one was necessary. Id. at 578. DHS sent two 

more notices indicating its belief that the report was accurate. The petitioner did not 

respond to the subsequent notices and continued to work as a teacher. Approximately 

15 years later, the petitioner learned he was listed on the ChildLine Registry and 

requested, nunc pro tunc, a hearing on the indicated report. Id. Before the ALJ, the 

petitioner testified that he did not receive the second and third notices and argued that 

he had requested a hearing in his response to the first notice. The ALJ recommended 

dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal as untimely, which the BHA adopted, and the 

petitioner appealed to this Court. The issue before us was whether the process the 
17

petitioner received was constitutionally sufficient. Because the petitioner argued that 

he was denied procedural due process, we examined whether placement on a registry 

for alleged child abuse causes damage to the alleged abuser. In concluding that it does, 

we explained that “[p]lacement on a registry for alleged child abuse causes damage to 

the alleged abuser, primarily in the form of reputational harm and employment 

repercussions.” Id. at 581. 

Subsequently, in C.S., we found that the provisions of the CPSL, which 

prohibited an accused individual from using transcripts of witnesses’ testimony in a 

child abuse expunction proceeding to cross-examine those witnesses in a licensing 

matter, violated due process. Reviewing the pertinent case law, we first found that the 

petitioner, a certified teacher, had a 

protected property interest in his profession and a 

fundamental liberty interest in his reputation. See D.C. v. 

Department of Human Services, 150 A.3d 558, 564 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc). It is a bedrock principle that once 

a professional license is acquired, it becomes “a valuable 

privilege or right in the nature of property,” Shah v. State 

Board of Medicine, . . . 589 A.2d 783, 787 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1991), and “[t]here is little doubt that [the p]etitioner has a 

substantial interest to be protected.” Bhattacharjee v. 

Department of State, [State Board of Medicine], 808 A.2d 

280, 283 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); see Telang[v. Bureau of 

Professional and Occupational Affairs], 751 A.2d 1147[,] 

1150 [Pa. 2000)]. Where, as here, an administrative body is 

empowered to impose sanctions, which may include the 

revocation of a license to practice in the Commonwealth, 

“our courts have frequently recognized the severity of 

depriving a person of the means of a livelihood.” Shah, 589 

A.2d at 789.

C.S., 184 A.3d at 604.
18

We explained that “[u]pon receiving his educator’s license, [the 

petitioner] secured a protected property interest in the practice of his profession, and as 

such, ‘he must be afforded procedural due process in adjudicating any administrative 

charges against him.’” Id. We concluded that the petitioner also possessed a protected 

liberty interest in his reputation, which independently entitled him to procedural due 

process protection under the Pennsylvania Constitution as an individual accused of 

child abuse. Id. 

Based on this precedent, we agree with Petitioner that, because she is a 

certificated teacher, her property and reputational interests are impacted by being 

named as a perpetrator in an indicated report of child abuse. 

ii. Mathews - Constitutional Sufficiency of Procedures 

We turn next to the Mathews factors to determine if the procedures

available to Petitioner to protect the interests at stake were constitutionally sufficient. 

The constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s current process under the CPSL, which allows 

the name of a certificated teacher to be placed on the ChildLine Registry as a 

perpetrator in an indicated report without a pre-deprivation hearing, is a matter of first 

impression.15 

 

15 As noted, although the issue is one of first impression, our courts have previously expressed 

concerns that the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing before being named in an indicated report on the 

ChildLine Registry raises serious due process questions. In D.C., the lack of a pre-deprivation 

hearing in the CPSL was not directly at issue, but we noted that

[b]ecause the indicated report goes into the registry without a hearing, 

the perpetrator does not know the evidence on which the determination 

was made. The indicated report itself contains only a brief description 

of abuse. 

150 A.3d at 564. The Court further stated: “The lack of a pre-deprivation hearing in the [CPSL] raises 

a serious due process question.” Id. See also K.J. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
19

a. Private Interest Affected by Official Action

The first Mathews factor requires us to identify the weight to be given to 

the private interests affected by the official action challenged. As discussed above, we 

have concluded that Petitioner has a property interest in pursuing her employment as a 

teacher and working with children and she has a fundamental liberty interest in not 

being labeled a child abuser. In this first Mathews factor, we consider the “degree of 

potential deprivation” or “impact” created by the official action on the private interests. 

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341.

Impact on Reputation

The preservation of an individual’s reputation is fundamental as it is 

recognized and protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution. As such, and as we have 

previously stated, that right cannot be abridged without compliance with constitutional 

standards of due process and equal protection. Simon v. Commonwealth, 659 A.2d 

631, 639 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (noting that lack of a forum for an individual who believes 

that his reputation has been adversely affected to seek a remedy until after the possible 

767 A.2d 609, 616 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (Friedman, J., dissenting) (noting that by the time [DHS] 

orders the expunction of an indicated report, “a person’s reputation already may be tarnished 

erroneously”); G.V. v. Department of Public Welfare, 91 A.3d 667, 675-76 (Pa. 2014) (Saylor, J.,

concurring) (noting “the inquiry into whether the [CPSL] reflects adequate process remains seriously 

in question,” adding that the current system “is in tension with the constitutional preference for predeprivation process”). 

 We also note that other courts have already addressed the issue and held that due process 

requires a pre-deprivation hearing before a citizen can be placed on a government-maintained list of 

child abusers. See, e.g., Jamison v. State of Missouri, Department of Social Services, 218 S.W.3d 

399 (Mo. 2007) (holding that held that Missouri’s version of the CPSL violated due process because 

it failed to provide a pre-deprivation hearing before the alleged perpetrator is listed on a child abuse 

registry); Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1186 (9th Cir. 2008), as amended

(January 30, 2009), rev’d on other grounds, Los Angeles County, California v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 

29 (2010); Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994); In re W.B.M., 690 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. Ct. App. 

2010); Cavarretta v. Department of Children and Family Services, 660 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. Ct. App. 

1996).
20

damage has been done was “clearly an unconscionable abrogation of a state protected 

constitutional right without due process”). It goes without saying that serious adverse 

social consequences flow from being placed on the ChildLine Registry as a person 

suspected of child abuse.

16

 However, the parties disagree as to the degree of the harm

to Petitioner’s reputation as the result of being named as a perpetrator in an indicated 

report, with Petitioner arguing it is substantial and Respondents arguing that is not. 

A central argument raised by Petitioner is that the CPSL scheme imposes 

far greater harm to teachers accused of child abuse than to other accused individuals. 

With respect to reputational harm, Petitioner argues that the number of people to whom 

notice of an indicated report is given is exponentially higher for teachers as compared 

to non-educators. For example, as it pertains to teachers, school administrators receive 

notice of a pending allegation and the final status of the report following the 

investigation as to whether the report is indicated, founded, or unfounded. 23 Pa. C.S. 

§ 6340(a)(13)(i). If the alleged perpetrator is a teacher, the notice of the final status of 

the report shall be sent to the PDE within 10 days of the completion of the investigation. 

23 Pa. C.S. § 6340(a)(13)(iii). Upon receiving formal notice, school employers must 

take action and “immediately implement a plan of supervision or alternative 

arrangement for the individual under investigation.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 6368(i). This 

requirement invariably involves others in the school and community. Furthermore, 

potential employers are required to receive notice of a teacher’s inclusion in the 

ChildLine Registry. Under Section 111.1(b)(1)(iii)(A) of the School Code, before a 

16 It cannot seriously be questioned that an allegation of child abuse harms an individual’s 

reputation and deters others from associating or dealing with the individual. Indeed, as one court 

directly observed, “to be accused of child abuse may be our generation’s contribution to defamation 

per se, a kind of moral leprosy.” Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1186. See also Thomas v. Buckner, 2011 

WL 4071948, at *14 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 2011) (“mere allegation of child abuse is enough to make 

one a pariah of society”).
21

school entity may offer employment to an applicant who would be in a position 

involving direct contact with children, the school entity is required to determine if the 

applicant has been the subject of an abuse investigation. 24 P.S. § 1-

111.1(b)(1)(iii)(A).17 Concomitantly, a teacher who isthe subject of an indicated report

must disclose to potential employers that she has been the subject of an abuse 

misconduct investigation. Id. Under the CPSL, if the teacher seeks any other job that 

has direct contact with children, she must disclose to prospective employers that she is 

named in the ChildLine Registry as a perpetrator in an indicated report. 23 Pa. C.S. § 

6344(b)(2). Thus, argues Petitioner, the moment she is placed on the ChildLine 

Registry as an alleged perpetrator in an indicated report, her reputation in the eyes of 

her employer, any potential employers, state agencies, and possibly colleagues, 

students, and parents, is irreparably damaged. 

For their part, Respondents disagree that Petitioner suffered any injury to 

her reputation of a constitutional significance by being named as a person suspected of 

child abuse on the ChildLine Registry. They cite to R. v. Department of Public Welfare, 

636 A.2d 142 (Pa. 1994), and G.V., and argue that because the ChildLine Registry is 

confidential and closed, Petitioner has not been deprived of her right to reputation. 

In R., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a father’s appeal of an 

indicated report. The father asserted that he was denied due process during his 

administrative hearing when the hearing examiner made credibility determinations of 

witnesses the father did not see or hear testify and allowed the father’s daughter to 

testify in camera. Id. The Court employed the Mathews test and considered the private 

interest at stake. The Court acknowledged that the right to reputation is implicated by 

the CPSL, but reasoned that, as to the father, the information would only be viewed by 

17 Added by the Act of October 22, 2014, P.L. 2624.
22

government officials and only if he attempted to adopt a child or applied to work in a 

position with direct contact with children, a career in which he did not work or have 

any interest in pursuing. 636 A.2d at 149-50. Given the facts in that matter, the Court 

concluded that

[the father] is not being stigmatized in the eyes of the general 

public. To the contrary, his identity is disclosed to a small 

number of persons in a very narrow range of situations 

with the understanding that it will not be revealed to any 

unauthorized individuals. Therefore, any adverse effects 

on his reputation are very limited.

R., 636 A.2d at 150 (emphasis added). 

The circumstances in R. are distinguishable. Here, unlike the father in R., 

whose reputation would not be harmed so long as he did not attempt to adopt a child 

or apply for a job in a school or childcare setting, teachers, like Petitioner, are 

immediately harmed when allegations against them are made to the ChildLine 

Registry. As discussed, teachers accused of child abuse cannot shield accusations from 

the view of their employer, prospective employers, colleagues, and conceivably, the 

parents of the students they serve. 

G.V. is distinguishable for the same reason. In G.V., the Supreme Court 

reaffirmed these tenets with approval and rejected a contrary view that information on 

the ChildLine Registry was likely to be disclosed to others not listed in Section 6340(a)

of the CPSL. G.V., 91 A.3d at 673. There, the Court found that an indicated report 

filed in the ChildLine Registry against an uncle accused of sexually abusing his great

niece did not deprive him of a reputational interest, noting again, the minimal risk of 

disclosure to those not authorized by the statute to receive the same. Id.

The petitioners in R. and G.V. were not teachers and were not subject to 

the provisions discussed above that cause reputational harm to teachers. Unlike the 

confidentiality of the reports filed against the father in R., and the uncle in G.V., 
23

knowledge of the indicated report filed against Petitioner in the vicinage of her 

employment is inevitable and inescapable. See Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1001

(2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting a similar argument that a childcare employee’s inclusion on 

New York’s Central Register resulted in no reputational damage because there was no 

disclosure of information on the Central Register except to authorized state agencies or 

potential employers in the childcare field. The Valmonte Court found that 

“[d]issemination to potential employers . . . is the precise conduct that gives rise to 

stigmatization.”).

Accordingly, we conclude that teachers, like Petitioner, named as 

perpetrators in indicated reports face significant reputational consequences that are 

unique, as present and potential school employers, the PDE, and the PSPC are notified 

of any indicated reports of child abuse involving a teacher. 

Impact on Employment

In addition to damage to her reputation, Petitioner argues that a teacher 

placed on the ChildLine Registry, as a perpetrator in an indicated report, will almost 

certainly have a difficult, if not impossible, time retaining and/or acquiring a teaching 

position. 

Our courts have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person 

of the means of a livelihood. Shah. Employment bars are the most severe form of 

infringement on an employee’s liberty and property interests associated with their 

employment and clearly implicate due process. Peake, 132 A.3d at 518. 

Under Act 168,18 teachers are required, as part of the application process, 

to complete a Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Sexual Misconduct/Abuse Disclosure 

Form (Act 168 Form). Act 168 Forms are standard forms developed by the PDE. 

18 Act of October 22, 2014, P.L. 2624, No. 168, 24 P.S. § 1-111.1.
24

Under the School Code, a school entity must obtain a completed Act 168 Form before 

it may offer employment to an applicant that will “be employed by or in a school entity 

in a position involving direct contact with children.” Section 111.1(b)(1)(iii)(A)-(B) 

of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 1-111.1(b)(1)(iii)(A)-(B). As part of this process, the 

school entity seeking to hire the applicant is required to conduct a review that includes 

contacting former school employers regarding the information required. Act 168 

includes a provision prohibiting prospective employers from hiring any applicant 

unless the employer first requests a statement from the applicant’s previous employers 

as to whether the applicant was the subject of an investigation by a child protective 

service agency. 24 P.S. § 1-111.1(b)(2)(ii)(A). Previous employers are required to 

provide this information to prospective employers within 20 days. 24 P.S. § 1-

111.1(d)(1). Pursuant to Act 168, should a school employee leave her position while a 

hearing on whether she should be classified as a perpetrator of child abuse is pending, 

the employee must disclose to prospective school employers whether or not she has 

been the subject of investigation by a child protective services agency, “unless the 

investigation resulted in a finding that the allegations were false.” Section 111.1(b)(1) 

of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 1-111.1(b)(1). In order to ensure compliance, Act 168 

prohibits school districts from entering into any severance or resignation agreement 

that would have the effect of shielding investigations into allegations that an employee 

committed child abuse from future employers. 24 P.S. § 1-111.1(g). Finally, Act 168 

provides that any applicant for school employment who provides false information to 

prospective school employers may be subject to criminal prosecution, civil penalties, 

and professional discipline. 24 P.S. § 1-111.1(c). 

Thus, we reject Respondents’ argument that Petitioner has not proven how 

her right to pursue her lawful occupation has been deprived by being placed on 
25

ChildLine Registry because she is free to pursue her profession. By her inclusion on 

the ChildLine Registry, a teacher named as a perpetrator in an indicated report of child 

abuse faces an almost insuperable impediment to obtaining a position in education. 

Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 510-11 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Notice of the determination that a teacher is an alleged perpetrator of child 

abuse may provide cause to discharge her pursuant to Sections 514 (applicable to nontenured employees) or 1122 of the School Code (causes for termination of contract). 

24 P.S. §§ 5-514, 11-1122. If the teacher holds a certificate from PDE, DHS must 

provide PDE with notice that the certificated individual is named as a perpetrator in an 

indicated report. Section 9(a) of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 2070.9(a); 23 Pa. C.S. § 

6340(a)(13)(iii). If PDE finds probable cause for educator discipline, which is very 

likely for allegations of child abuse, PDE provides notice to any school employer of 

that fact. Section 9(e)(4) of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 2070.9(e)(4). Applicants for 

school employment must provide to school employers “[a] certification from [DHS] as 

to whether the applicant is named in the [ChildLine Registry] as the alleged perpetrator 

in a pending child abuse investigation or as the perpetrator of a founded report or an 

indicated report.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 6344(b)(2).

In Matter of Allegations of Sexual Abuse at East Park High School, 714 

A.2d 339 (N.J. Super. 1998), the Superior Court of New Jersey considered a teacher’s 

challenge to her placement in New Jersey’s Central Registry without any type of 

hearing, but merely the opportunity to submit a statement to an investigatory body 

known as the Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit. The court analyzed the issue 

presented in light of the factors relevant to the procedural due process analysis set forth 

in Mathews. The court agreed with the aggrieved teacher that inclusion of her name in 

the Central Registry caused injury to her reputation and burdened her employment 
26

rights. To that end, the court observed that “[t]he inclusion of her name in the Central 

Registry is a kind of Sword of Damocles poised above her head. Its clear effect is to 

inhibit her from even considering any life changes for fear of disclosure.” 714 A.2d 

339. An incursion on such liberty interests, the court held, entitled the teacher to due 

process protections under the Federal and New Jersey constitutions. Id. at 347.

We believe, as in East Park, that the potential loss of employment as a 

teacher and the right to pursue similar employment are substantial interests that are 

affected by being named as a perpetrator in an indicated report. Listing a teacher as a 

perpetrator in an indicated report on ChildLine Registry affects not only the teacher’s 

present employment in the child education field; it effectively bars the teacher from 

obtaining similar employment or benefits in the future.

Relying on all of the foregoing, we agree with Petitioner that the harm 

imposed upon teachers is arguably greater than the public at-large and clearly impacts 

in a negative way their protected interests. Although reports are not generally available 

to the public, 23 Pa. C.S. § 6339, the CPSL gives numerous persons access to indicated 

reports involving teachers. Thus, Petitioner has demonstrated that she and other 

teachers have a significant interest that will be affected by the official action being 

challenged.

19 We conclude this Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.

19 Respondents point out that being named as a perpetrator in an indicated report does not 

legally bar a teacher from pursuing her profession. However, employment bans are not the only 

deprivation to the right to pursue one’s occupation protected by the Due Process Clause. See C.S., 

184 A.3d at 607 (finding harm to an educator’s employment prospects based on an indicated report). 

See also Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1001 (noting that an indicated finding “places a tangible burden” on 

employment prospects when employers are required to consult a central registry during the hiring 

process).
27

b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation/Value of Additional Safeguards

Turning to the second Mathews element, the analysis can be broken into 

two separate but related parts—the risk that the private interest is being deprived 

erroneously and the value, if any, of additional safeguards. 

Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

Specifically, we are required to first determine whether the procedures 

contained in the CPSL and applied to Petitioner result in an “erroneous deprivation” of 

her protected property interest in employment and liberty interest in her reputation. As 

we evaluate this factor, we ask “considering the current process, what is the chance the 

state will make a mistake?” Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1194. In other words, what is the 

risk that someone will be erroneously listed? 

Currently, Pennsylvania provides some minimal safeguards against 

erroneously listing someone in the ChildLine Registry. Within 24 hours of receiving 

an allegation of child abuse, a caseworker employed by the county agency must begin 

an investigation, which must include, at a minimum an interview of the victim and the 

accused, if found. 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 6368(b). An indicated report is warranted only if the

county agency determines, after completion of the investigation, there is “substantial

evidence” of the alleged abuse by the accused. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6303. In cases where the

report of child abuse includes an alleged violation of the criminal laws, the county 

agency and the district attorney for the county where the alleged abuse occurred must 

coordinate interviews with the alleged perpetrator. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6365. 

In her dissent in K.J., Judge Friedman expressed concern that a person’s 

name may be entered on the statewide registry based solely on the investigating 

caseworker’s interviews, credibility determinations, and conclusion that there is 

“substantial evidence” of child abuse. 
28

I note that a person’s fundamental interest in protecting his 

reputation is in danger under the [CPSL] even before [DHS]

begins an expunction proceeding. Pursuant to the [CPSL], a 

person with “reasonable cause to suspect” child abuse files a 

report. 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 6311 and 6312. A county caseworker 

investigates the report by interviewing designated persons. 

23 Pa. C.S. § 6368; see 55 Pa. Code §§ 3490.55(d) and 

3490.55(g). The investigating caseworker then, in effect, 

determines the credibility of those persons, the competency 

of their statements, the weight of the evidence and whether 

the weight is substantial enough to support an indicated 

report of child abuse. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6303. Where the 

investigating caseworker decides that a person has 

committed child abuse, an indicated report of child abuse is 

entered on the statewide child abuse register. 23 Pa. C.S. § 

6338. The person named as a perpetrator, i.e., a person who 

has committed child abuse, has forty-five days to seek 

expunction of the report. 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 6303 and 6341(a)(2). 

In the meantime, [DHS] may release the information on the 

statewide register to many individuals and entities for various 

purposes. See 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 6336, 6338 and 6340.

Thus, the [CPSL] allows a person’s name to be entered on 

the statewide register based solely on the investigating 

caseworker’s determination that there is “substantial 

evidence” of child abuse. However, “substantial evidence” 

is that quantum of evidence sufficient to meet a particular 

burden of proof, and, as indicated above, the [CPSL] does 

not specifically set forth a burden of proof to guide the 

caseworker, generally an individual untrained in the law, in

deciding whether a person has committed child abuse. Thus, 

the investigating caseworker makes a report of child abuse 

without applying any particular burden of proof.

It shocks my conscience that the [CPSL] would allow the 

investigating caseworker to render a de facto adjudication 

that is adverse to an individual’s reputation without an 

independent adjudicator having had the opportunity to 

consider the investigator’s evidence of child abuse in 

accordance with established procedures of due process. This 
29

is particularly so because unless, or until, the alleged abuser 

timely requests an expunction hearing, the names of the 

falsely accused may nevertheless be released to physicians, 

child advocates, courts, the General Assembly, the Attorney 

General, federal officials, county officials, law enforcement 

officials, the district attorney and others. Thus, by the time 

[DHS] orders the expunction of an indicated report, a 

person’s reputation already may be tarnished erroneously.

K.J., 767 A.2d at 619 n.9 (Friedman, J., dissenting).

Although the absence of a pre-deprivation hearing in the CPSL was not 

directly at issue in K.J., we find several of Judge Friedman’s observations pertinent 

here. 

Pre-Deprivation Investigation

First, the dangers of providing only a pre-deprivation investigation, as 

opposed to a pre-deprivation hearing, are evident. The investigation alone, without 

some means of testing the charges, creates a high risk for erroneous deprivation of 

rights. An investigation, no matter how extensive, does not replace a hearing. Winegar 

v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 20 F.3d 895, 901 (8th Cir.

1994); Jamison, 218 S.W.3d at 409.

Generally, the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions require some 

kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of a protected liberty or property

interest in order to minimize “substantially unfair or mistaken deprivations.” Zinermon 

v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Fuentes

v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972) (“If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its 

full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can 

still be prevented.”).20 

20 There are limited circumstances where post-deprivation remedies can satisfy due process. 

See, e.g., Shore v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 168 A.3d 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Post-

(Footnote continued on next page...)
30

The right to a hearing before a government agency, whose proposed action 

will affect the rights, duties, powers or privileges of, and is directed at, a specific 

person, has long been embedded in our jurisprudence. In Firman v. Department of 

State, State Board of Medicine, 697 A.2d 291 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), we quoted from the 

decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985), and stated:

[A]n essential principle of due process is that a deprivation 

of life, liberty, or property [interests] be preceded by notice 

and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of 

the case. We have described “the root requirement” of the 

Due Process Clause as being “that an individual be given an 

opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any

significant property interest.” This principal requires “some 

kind of a hearing” prior to the discharge of an employee who 

has a constitutionally protected property interest in his 

employment.

Firman, 697 A.2d at 295 (citations omitted). 

Moreover, as we explained in C.S.:

Broadly speaking, the principles of due process “require an 

opportunity, among other things, to hear the evidence 

adduced by the opposing party, cross-examine witnesses, 

introduce evidence on one’s own behalf, and present 

argument.” D.Z. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 2 A.3d 

712, 720 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “In almost every setting where 

important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process 

requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine 

adverse witnesses,” and this holds true even when 

“administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny.” Goldberg 

v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970); see Hammad v. 

Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State 

deprivation remedies satisfy the Due Process Clause where the situation dictates that the State take 

immediate action or it is impracticable to provide any meaningful pre-deprivation process. Bell v. 

Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971). 
31

Board of Veterinary Medicine, 124 A.3d 374, 381 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015). The United States Supreme Court has 

described cross-examination as “a right traditionally relied 

upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 

truth.” Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 259 (1983). 

Indeed, cross-examination is “the greatest legal engine ever 

invented for the discovery of the truth,” California v. Green, 

399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970), and is “a vital feature of the law.” 

Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 (1959) (citation 

omitted).

184 A.3d at 604.

Under the process currently afforded by the CPSL, Petitioner, and teachers 

like her, do not receive any kind of hearing prior to being listed in an indicated report

in the ChildLine Registry. Instead, the decision of whether a teacher should be placed 

in the ChildLine Registry depends upon a caseworker’s credibility evaluation of the 

accused and the witnesses against her. Consequently, the accused is denied the basic 

elements of procedural due process, i.e., an opportunity to present witnesses, to crossexamine adverse witnesses, and have an impartial adjudicator decide factual and legal 

issues. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 281 A.2d 856 (Pa. 1971); Lawson v. 

Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 744 A.2d 804, 807 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); 

Lehigh Valley Power Committee v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 563 A.2d 

548 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (hearing or trial procedure is necessary to resolve these 

disputed questions of fact). 

Additional procedural safeguards, such as an administrative hearing 

before the BHA, would preclude an erroneous deprivation. See, e.g., Cherillo v. 

Retirement Board of Allegheny County, 796 A.2d 420, 422 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) 

(holding retiree was entitled, prior to the termination of his disability retirement 
32

benefits, to a hearing that comports with the Local Agency Law,21 including the right 

to present and cross-examine witnesses, the right to a full stenographic proceeding, and 

the right to an adjudication containing findings of fact). See also J.F., 245 A.3d at 674 

(“As there was no other appropriate forum for J.F. to be afforded a full and fair 

opportunity to be heard on the record, she should have been allowed the opportunity to 

challenge the founded reports of child abuse in an administrative hearing before the 

[BHA].”).

The nature of the risk of false positive findings of abuse can be 

demonstrated by the effect later hearings had on substantiation decisions. For example, 

in G.V., Justice Saylor’s concurrence highlighted troubling statistics, noting that the 

BHA reversed 97% of cases decided on the merits. 91 A.3d at 675-76. Other courts 

have likewise been troubled by high rates of reversal. In Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1200, 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that an error rate of 50% “does serve as a 

general indication that a large percentage of the individuals listed on [California’s 

registry] might have a legitimate basis for expungement.” In Jamison, 218 S.W.3d at

409, the Missouri Supreme Court determined a reversal rate of 35-40% was 

unacceptable and that “the probable value [of] providing notice and hearing before 

being listed is significant.” In Dupuy, 397 F.3d at 505, the court stated that, “[g]iven 

the importance of the interests of both parties, the decisive factor in this case is the high 

risk of erroneous deprivation, . . . specifically, the unacceptable 74.6[%] reversal rate 

for challenged indicated reports under [the Illinois Department of Children and Family 

Service’s] original method of evaluating these claims.” In Valmonte, the petitioners 

asserted, without contradiction by the State, that 75% of the challenged reports of abuse 

were successfully expunged. According to the Second Circuit, “[i]f 75% of those 

21 2 Pa. C.S. §§ 551-555, 751-754.
33

challenging their inclusion on the list are successful, we cannot help but be skeptical 

of the fairness of the original determination.” 18 F.3d at 1003-004.

Here, Petitioner has presented evidence that reversals of indicated reports 

by ALJs are extremely common. She asserts that administrative review by DHS nearly 

always affirms county determinations of child abuse, but on further appeal to the BHA, 

ALJs frequently reverse. Petitioner has provided, without contradiction, evidence by 

way of the Child Protective Services 2019 Annual Report that establishes in 2019, 293 

individuals who failed to obtain relief at the administrative review stage appealed to 

the BHA, and ALJs affirmed only 2 such appeals. (Exhibit E to Petitioner’s Br.) 

Petitioner has also provided undisputed evidence that ALJs overturned 81% of county 

agency findings, and dismissed numerous others. Id. Only 18 county agency 

determinations out of 340 (roughly 5%) were upheld by ALJs after a hearing.22 Id. 

Petitioner submits that the reason for this reversal rate is the process provided by the 

hearing before the ALJ, including cross-examination and the ability to present 

evidence. Respondents have not challenged the accuracy of these statistics. 

Post-deprivation hearing

Respondents argue that Petitioner and other teachers have an effective

post-deprivation remedy, namely the CPSL’s provision providing for a postdeprivation hearing before the BHA at which the sufficiency of the abuse must be 

established by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, an alleged 

perpetrator has the right to appeal a child abuse determination. Section 6341 of the 

22 These statistics are consistent with previous years. In 2018, the BHA adjudicated 409 

appeals. Out of these 68 (11.5%) were upheld and 301 (74%) were overturned. In 2017, the BHA 

adjudicated 427 appeals. Of these, only 77 (18%) were upheld and 302 (71%) were overturned. In 

2016, the BHA adjudicated 352 appeal. Out of these only 43 (12%) were upheld and 242 (69%) were 

overturned. See https://www.dhs.pa.gov/docs/Publications/Pages/Child-Abuse-Reports.aspx. (Last 

visited June 15, 2023). 
34

CPSL provides that “[a]ny person named as a perpetrator . . . in an indicated report of 

child abuse” may either “request an administrative review by, or appeal and request a 

hearing before, the [DHS] secretary to amend or expunge an indicated report on the 

grounds that it is inaccurate or it is being maintained in a manner inconsistent with [the 

CPSL].” 23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(a)(2); see 55 Pa. Code §§ 3490.40, 3490.106a. This 

includes the right to a timely hearing to determine the merits of the appeal, including 

testifying witnesses, cross-examination, and evidence. 23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(c.2). 

Respondents assert that the administrative review by the Secretary and further statutory 

appeal and hearing process serve as a second check (the first being the investigation 

and standards for abuse determinations by county agency) to minimize any erroneous 

determination or listing on the ChildLine Registry. We are not convinced that the postdeprivation hearing in these circumstances affords Petitioner and other teachers the 

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 

“In terms of the right to be heard at a meaningful time, the second 

Mathews element reflects that avoiding erroneous deprivations before they occur is an 

important concern under the Due Process Clause. There is thus a general preference 

that procedural safeguards apply in the pre-deprivation timeframe.” Bundy v. Wetzel, 

184 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa. 2018). 

In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970), the United States

Supreme Court considered whether due process required that recipients of public 

assistance benefits be entitled to an evidentiary hearing before their benefits were 

terminated. Under the then-current process, a caseworker who had doubts about the 

recipient’s continued eligibility could, after an informal pre-termination review, 

immediately terminate benefits. No pre-termination hearing was provided, but 

recipients were provided with a post-termination fair hearing. Id. at 258-60. The 
35

United States Supreme Court held that when welfare benefits are discontinued, only a 

pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the welfare recipient with due process. 

Id. at 264. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that that “termination of aid 

pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient 

of the very means by which to live while he waits.” Id. Concluding that the recipient’s 

interests outweighed governmental interests in conserving fiscal and administrative 

resources, the United States Supreme Court explained:

The requirement of a prior hearing doubtless involves some 

greater expense, and the benefits paid to ineligible recipients 

pending decision at the hearing probably cannot be recouped, 

since these recipients are likely to be judgment-proof. But 

the State is not without weapons to minimize these increased 

costs. Much of the drain on fiscal and administrative 

resources can be reduced by developing procedures for 

prompt pre-termination hearings and by skillful use of 

personnel and facilities. Indeed, the very provision for a 

post-termination evidentiary hearing in New York’s Home 

Relief program is itself cogent evidence that the State 

recognizes the primacy of the public interest in correct 

eligibility determinations and therefore in the provision of 

procedural safeguards. Thus, the interest of the eligible 

recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, 

coupled with the State’s interest that his payments not be 

erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State’s 

competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and 

administrative burdens. As the District Court correctly 

concluded, “(t)he stakes are simply too high for the welfare 

recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irritable 

misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without 

giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires, to be fully 

informed of the case against him so that he may contest its 

basis and produce evidence in rebuttal.”

Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266.
36

In Pennsylvania Bar Association v. Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 

607 A.2d 850 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), this Court held that before an attorney’s name could 

be placed on a suspected fraud list because his/her client was suspected of fraud, the 

Commonwealth was required to give the attorney notice and an opportunity to be heard. 

There, section 1822 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1822, created an index of 

suspected fraudulent automobile insurance claims. As part of the index, the names of 

the attorneys representing the suspected fraudulent claims were included in the index. 

607 A.2d at 854. The Pennsylvania Bar Association (PBA) challenged the 

constitutionality of section 1822, contending that the inclusion of its members’ names 

in the index without notice and an opportunity to be heard was an unconstitutional harm 

to their reputations. In response, the Commonwealth argued that the index was not 

publicly disclosed but was only published to insurers and several other categories of 

individuals. This Court rejected that argument, explaining that the attorneys’ inclusion 

on the index would “inevitably lead[] to the injury of these attorneys’ reputations, based 

upon suspicion alone.” 607 A.2d at 854. We further observed that allowing attorneys 

to seek expungement after-the-fact was inadequate, explaining that “[t]he United States 

Supreme Court has recognized that notice is the most basic requirement of due process. 

Notice is necessary both to inform the interested parties of the pending action and to 

provide an opportunity to present objections.” Id. at 856. We reasoned that by the time 

the listing was brought to the attorney’s attention, the damage to him/her may have 

already been done, and he/she may have lost the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 

time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 857.

We applied the same rationale recently in Fraternal Order of Police 

Lodge No. 5 by McNesby v. City of Philadelphia, 267 A.3d 531 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). 

There, the Philadelphia district attorney began compiling a “Do Not Call List” of 
37

officers who, in the district attorney’s view, were “tainted.” The officers filed a lawsuit 

arguing that their placement on the “Do Not Call List” served as a stain on their 

professional reputations and violated their rights to due process. Labeling the “Do Not 

Call List” a “blacklist of sorts,” this Court determined that the officers had a 

constitutionally protected interest in their professional reputation, which required 

notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to their placement on the list. We explained 

“the appellant police officers should not be required to wait until damage to their 

reputations has been done before they are provided a meaningful opportunity to be 

heard. As in Pennsylvania Bar Association, the negative stigma of being included on 

a Do Not Call List is a threat to the appellant police officers’ reputations.” Id. at 552. 

Under the CPSL, the opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of one’s 

placement on the ChildLine Registry comes only after the fact, and as such it is akin to 

the delayed post-deprivation hearing denounced in Goldberg. Like the sudden and 

unexpected loss of welfare benefits addressed in Goldberg, the placement on the 

ChildLine Registry causes an immediate and irreparable harm to the teacher’s 

reputation and employment prospects. As in Goldberg, we conclude the risks here are 

too high for a teacher and “the possibility for honest error or irritable misjudgment too

great” to allow damage to the teacher’s reputation and employment interests without 

giving her a chance, if she so desires, to be fully informed of the case against her so 

that she may contest its basis and produce evidence before an impartial examiner in

rebuttal. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266. By the time the post-deprivation hearing is held, 

the damage to the teacher’s reputation has already been done and might not be capable 

of being undone by a later finding that the allegations of abuse were unfounded. 

Applying the above precepts to the instant matter, we conclude that, by its 

nature, the post-deprivation hearing is substantially ineffectual and constitutionally 
38

deficient because the adjudicatory process takes place after the act of deprivation has 

taken place. As the above cases teach, procedural due process requires opportunity to 

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at a time prior to actual deprivation. 

Because the CPSL fails to provide teachers with adequate protection prior to the 

critical moment when deprivation occurs, it fails to protect the private interests of 

Petitioner and other teachers.

Value of Additional Safeguards

The second part of the second Mathews factor is the value, if any, of 

additional safeguards. The fact that so many hearings resulted in reversals suggests 

that there is a probable value in adding procedural safeguards, such as a pre-deprivation 

hearing to the process for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and 

cross-examination of adverse witnesses. 

In this particular case, had Petitioner been afforded a hearing before being 

named in an indicated report on the ChildLine Registry, a neutral adjudicator could 

have considered and weighed Petitioner’s evidence/testimony that

• walking a student up and down stairs at a brisk pace is 

a non-aversive behavioral support technique utilized 

in the School District in cases where an autistic child 

is in a highly escalated state. 

• the technique is called “heavy work” or 

“proprioceptive input” in the behavioral science 

literature. While the most common form of heavy 

work is a weighted vest, the literature also supports 

climbing stairs to assist children in controlling 

responses to sensory stimuli.

• the school principal approved the use of the technique 

in the past for use on an 8[-]year[-]old student with 

very similar behaviors to the student in the instant 
39

matter. In the plan for the other student, the School 

District explained the technique as follows. “If [the 

student] goes into a severe tantrum . . . it is most 

beneficial to get this energy out in non-desired tasks. . 

. The most effective way to do this is to walk [the 

student] at a very brisk pace up and down the hall or 

stairs. This strategy has worked time and time again. 

This event could last for as little as 5 minutes but as 

long as it takes to get [the student] to calm down and 

release his energy.” 

• on September 14, 2018, [Petitioner] believed that she 

was implementing a previously-approved therapeutic 

approach to escalated children with autism. Because 

this approach was used on other children with similar 

disabilities, she did not believe that she was harming 

the child or putting him at serious risk. On the 

contrary, she believed that she was helping the child 

reset his brain and gain control over his body. 

• the manner in which the video recording is present 

distorts the facts. It appears that the intervention was 

recklessly implemented in a continuous manner over 

30 minutes. This is not the case. In total, [Petitioner] 

implemented the technique for approximately 30 

minutes over a four hour time period. The longest 

interval lasted 16 minutes. The time breakdown is as 

follows:

• The first interval lasted a little less than 

2 minutes: from 10:57:49 a.m. to 

10:59:33. [Petitioner] and the student 

then walked through the halls.

• The second interval lasted 9 minutes 

from 11:02:26 to 11:11:30. Part of this 

time, another person was performing the 

technique with the student.
40

• The third interval lasted 16 minutes 

from 11:19:40 to 11:37:52 a.m. 

Throughout this time, the student was 

escorted by three different individuals, 

including [Petitioner]. Multiple breaks 

were built into the intervention.

• After the third interval, the video shows 

[Petitioner] and the student in the hall. At 

11:55:30, the student is literally climbing 

the walls of the hallway. This is after he 

was walking the stairway for 27 minutes. 

[Petitioner] is seen using the “child 

control position” that is taught to most 

special education teachers throughout the 

Commonwealth.

• The fourth interval lasted 41 seconds, 

from 12:09:12 [p.m.] to 12:09:53.

• The final interval lasted approximately 

2.5 minutes, from 15:02:57 [p.m.] to 

15:05:25.

• throughout the entire process, [Petitioner] took many 

breaks and held the student in a manner to ensure he 

did not harm himself.

• this particular child, when in these episodes, would 

thrash about on the floor, punch others, and slam 

himself against various objects and that she utilized 

the techniques upon which she was trained to prevent 

injury to the student and the student was not, in fact, 

injured.

(Request for Administrative Appeal, Exhibit C to Petitioner’s Reply Brief.)

A pre-deprivation hearing would have provided additional procedural 

safeguards by allowing Petitioner to present these disputed adjudicative facts. A 
41

neutral arbitrator could have, after making credibility determinations and weighing that

evidence, concluded from the above that Petitioner did not commit child abuse as 

defined by the CPSL. 

c. Countervailing Government Interest/Administrative Burdens 

The final step of the Mathews balancing test is to assess the government’s 

interests and compare them to what we have already found to be Petitioner’s weighty 

interests. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 

Government’s Interests 

Petitioner readily acknowledges, as she must, that the Commonwealth 

clearly has an important interest in protecting children from abuse. There is no doubt 

that Pennsylvania has a vital interest in preventing child abuse and that the creation of 

a central database, such as the ChildLine Registry, is an effective and responsible

means for Pennsylvania to secure that interest. See Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1194; 

Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education, Lock Haven University v. Association

of Pennsylvania State College and University Facilities, 193 A.3d 486, 499 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2018) (explaining that the CPSL was enacted for the overarching purpose of 

protecting children from abuse). Our Supreme Court has long recognized that “the 

Commonwealth’s interests in the need to prevent child abuse and to protect abused 

children from further injury is fostered by maintenance of the statewide central registry 

identifying perpetrators of abuse.” G.V., 91 A.3d at 673 (quoting P.R. v. Department 

of Public Welfare, Office of Hearings and Appeals, 801 A.2d 478, 483 (Pa. 2002)). 

The Supreme Court and General Assembly have described the Commonwealth’s 

interests as an “urgent need” which includes protecting both the child that was abused 

and any children who may be potentially abused. Id.; 23 Pa. C.S. § 6302(a). The CPSL 

is replete with provisions calling for urgent and timely action to prevent child abuse. 
42

See 23 Pa. C.S. § 6302(a) (discussing urgent need); § 6302(b) (calling for swift 

investigation of suspected abuse); § 6333 (continuous availability of DHS to receive 

reports and identify prior reports).

Thus, it is without question that the Commonwealth has a critical interest 

in keeping child abusers out of our schools.

Administrative Burdens

A post-deprivation remedy may be sufficient under certain circumstances, 

and there are occasions when a hearing may legitimately be held after the act of 

deprivation has taken place. For example, a meaningful post-deprivation remedy may 

satisfy due process where it is not “feasible” to provide pre-deprivation due process. 

Bundy, 184 A.3d at 557. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (deprivation 

occurred as a result of a prison cell search); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) 

(deprivation occurred when prison employees accidentally lost an inmate’s property). 

Respondents argue that a pre-deprivation hearing in these circumstances 

would not be feasible. They advocate that minimal procedural safeguards facilitate the 

Commonwealth’s efforts to limit children’s exposure to abuse because they allow the 

Commonwealth to respond quickly to isolate children from potentially dangerous 

contact with adults on the first indication of possible maltreatment and forewarn 

providers and licensing agencies of possible future harm. Respondents argue that the 

Court should defer to the carefully constructed timeline and post-deprivation hearing 

procedure established by the General Assembly in the CPSL. They offer the following 

to illustrate the practical difficulties with interjecting a pre-deprivation hearing into the 

60-day window for the county agency to investigate and issue a report of unfounded, 

indicated, or founded child abuse:
43

What if the alleged perpetrator is unavailable in the 60[-]day 

window but seeks a hearing? What if the perpetrator sought 

a continuance of hearing beyond the 60[-]day window? What 

if witnesses an alleged perpetrator wishes to testify were 

unavailable? Who is to conduct such a hearing and what 

adjudication, if any, is to come from the hearing? Will there 

be appeal rights and, if so, will an appeal hold up the 

investigation?

(Respondents’ Br. at 39-40.)

Respondents further posit that interjecting a pre-deprivation hearing 

process before an alleged perpetrator is listed on the ChildLine Registry would render 

the post-deprivation process provided by the General Assembly meaningless. They 

contend that an alleged perpetrator invoking pre-deprivation review faced with an 

adverse ruling would likely appeal that determination, and it is possible that the appeal 

would determine whether the alleged perpetrator should be included on an indicated or 

founded report. They submit there would be no need to invoke the statutory postdeprivation hearing process to answer the same question. According to Respondents, 

to avoid this absurd result, the Court should rule that the urgent nature of child abuse 

situations and the post-deprivation process provided by the General Assembly satisfies 

due process of alleged perpetrators.

These arguments, as compelling as they are, do not convince the Court 

that there is no solution within the limits of practicability. First, as the United States

Supreme Court explained in Fuentes, “there are ‘extraordinary situations’ that justify 

postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing. These situations, however, must be 

truly unusual.” 407 U.S. at 90 (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court 

went on to observe:

A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, 

and expense, and it is often more efficient to dispense with 

the opportunity for such a hearing. But these rather ordinary 

costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right. . . . Procedural 
44

due process is not intended to promote efficiency or 

accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect 

the particular interests of the person whose possessions are 

about to be taken.

The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to 

achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy 

of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the 

Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and 

efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights 

in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they 

were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable 

citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and 

efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government 

officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. 

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 [(1972)].

Id. at 90 n.22.

Moreover, the theoretical questions Respondents pose are not for this 

Court to answer. It is not the business of a court adjudicating procedural due process 

rights to create new procedures or remedy a statutory deficiency. It is for the General 

Assembly to devise a response or adopt proper methods consistent with a court’s ruling 

that a statutory scheme is unconstitutional. We only note that Petitioner has provided 

unchallenged evidence that only 75 out of the 5,655 alleged perpetrators named in 

either indicated or founded reports of child abuse in 2019 were school employees.23 

Thus, the number of pre-deprivation hearings afforded to teachers would be relatively 

minimal. Further, because DHS already has in place procedures to conduct 

administrative appellate review, it would seem that making that process available to 

teachers prior to placement on the ChildLine Registry would create only a slight 

23 This statistic was roughly the same in previous years. In 2018, only 78 out of 5,968 alleged 

perpetrators were school employees. In 2017, 113 out of 5,623 were school employees. 

See https://www.dhs.pa.gov/docs/Publications/Pages/Child-Abuse-Reports.aspx. (Last visited June 

15, 2023). 
45

administrative burden. In the absence of any evidence from Respondents that a predeprivation hearing will be unfeasible or unduly burdensome when compared to a postdeprivation hearing, we conclude that the post-deprivation remedy is not sufficient 

under these circumstances to satisfy due process.

Moreover, it does not appear that a pre-deprivation hearing would be 

counterintuitive to the urgent nature of child abuse situations in the school setting. 

Under the CPSL, once a report of suspected abuse is received, the county agency must 

immediately provide or arrange for services necessary to protect the child. 23 Pa. C.S. 

§ 6368. When the alleged abuse involves teachers and other school employees, the 

county agency must provide school employers with notice of any investigation 

involving a school employee at the outset of an investigation. 23 Pa. C.S. § 

6340(a)(13)(i). School employers are then required to “immediately implement a plan 

of supervision or alternative arrangement for the individual under investigation to 

ensure the safety of the child and other children who are in the care of the school.” 23 

Pa. C.S. § 6368(i). Petitioner contends that in practice, a “plan of supervision or 

alternative arrangement” means that school employees accused of child abuse are 

either: (1) placed on leave and ordered to not return to the premises or interact with 

students until further notice; or (2) placed under constant supervision by an 

administrator or supervisor when in direct contact with children. (Petitioner’s Br. at 

26.) Respondents do not challenge her account, nor do we have any reason to doubt 

that is the case.

Given these extensive safeguards already in place, the Commonwealth 

does not appear to have a strong interest in denying accused teachers a pre-deprivation 

process before listing them on the ChildLine Registry on the grounds that doing so 

would expose the child and other children from further abuse. There is no reason to 
46

conclude that these procedures would be less effective if pre-deprivation due process 

was provided before DHS can name a teacher on an indicated report.

In sum, as the above analysis demonstrates, the interests of Petitioner and 

other teachers are strong, the risk of error is high, and DHS’s interest in forgoing a predeprivation hearing is low. If erroneous information is added to the ChildLine 

Registry, the damage to the teachers may be done before a post-deprivation hearing is 

conducted to remove that information. Therefore, we conclude that due process 

requires that Petitioner and other teachers must be provided a hearing prior to being 

listed as a perpetrator of abuse in an indicated report on the ChildLine Registry. Where 

an accused challenges the truthfulness of her accusers and contends, as a matter of fact, 

that the charge against her is false, she must be allowed, as a function of procedural 

due process, in addition to fair notice, to be present, to adduce evidence, to be 

represented by counsel, to confront the witnesses against her and to receive a written 

decision. The current CPSL, as applied to Petitioner and other teachers, does not afford 

Petitioner minimal due process protection and has deprived Petitioner and other 

teachers of their procedural due process rights by failing to provide a pre-deprivation 

hearing. These deficiencies are not cured by the post-deprivation hearing.24

Accordingly, we conclude that a pre-deprivation administrative hearing 

before the BHA must be provided to Petitioner and other teachers to safeguard 

important fundamental constitutional rights. Petitioner’s application for summary 

relief as to Count I of the PFR is granted. 

2. Count III – Declaratory Relief – Constitutionality of Section 6303

of the CPSL

24 If a court determines that a pre-deprivation hearing is constitutionally required, “no amount 

of post-deprivation process is adequate to satisfy the demands of [due process].” Burns v. Alexander, 

776 F. Supp. 2d 57, 84-85 (W.D. Pa. 2011).
47

In her second issue, Petitioner seeks summary relief on Count III of her 

PFR, which requests a declaratory judgment that section 6303 of the CPSL is 

constitutionally deficient because it provides no pre-deprivation due process to 

individuals listed as perpetrators of a “founded” report of child abuse when the basis 

of the founded report is acceptance into an ARD program. Although Petitioner 

acknowledges she has not yet been named as a perpetrator in a founded report, she 

contends that because she has entered into ARD, “DHS will imminently enter [her] 

name on the ChildLine Registry as a perpetrator in a founded report of child abuse 

solely on the basis of her acceptance into an ARD program involving the same factual 

circumstances underlying a report of child abuse to the ChildLine database.” (PFR, 

¶87.) 

Section 6303 of the CPSL (Definitions) defines a “founded report” as 

follows:

“Founded report.” A child abuse report involving a 

perpetrator that is made pursuant to this chapter, if any of the 

following applies:

* * *

(2) There has been an acceptance into an [ARD]

program and the reason for the acceptance involves the 

same factual circumstances involved in the allegation of 

child abuse.

23 Pa. C.S. § 6303 (emphasis added).

In J.F., J.F. was identified as a perpetrator of abuse of her 15-month-old

twin children. J.F. filed an administrative appeal. While her administrative appeal was 

pending, J.F. entered into ARD for two criminal counts of endangering the welfare of 

children. As the result of J.F.’s entry into ARD, the county agency changed the status 

of the child protective services report from “indicated” to “founded” and moved to 
48

dismiss J.F.’s pending administrative appeal. 245 A.3d at 664. DHS granted the 

county agency’s motion to dismiss J.F.’s appeal. J.F. appealed to this Court, arguing 

that she was entitled to a hearing to determine the merits of her appeal. She argued 

that in cases of indicated reports, an accused is entitled to a post-deprivation hearing 

under Section 6341 of the CPSL. She argued that an accused named in founded reports 

should also be entitled a hearing, but Section 6341 provides only that “[a] person named 

as a perpetrator of a founded report of child abuse must provide to [DHS] a court order 

indicating that the underlying adjudication that formed the basis of the founded report

has been reversed or vacated.” 23 Pa. C.S. § 6341. The issue eventually reached our 

Supreme Court, which held that because the founded report was based on ARD, as 

opposed to a criminal conviction or a dependency adjudication, there was no agency 

hearing in which J.F. had an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the J.F. Court held 

that, in the absence of another appropriate forum to challenge DHS’s adjudication of 

child abuse in a recorded evidentiary hearing, a named perpetrator in a report 

designated as founded based upon the perpetrator’s voluntary entry into ARD is 

entitled to an administrative hearing.

Petitioner asserts that J.F. did not answer the question of whether the 

administrative hearing should occur after an accused enters ARD but before or after 

the perpetrator is listed in a founded report.25 She asks us to decide that question here

and submits that the administrative hearing required in J.F. should, as a matter of due 

process, occur pre-deprivation. In other words, she submits that the hearing required 

in J.F. should be provided after entry into ARD – but before the report’s status is 

25 We do not agree with Petitioner that the Supreme Court in J.F. did not answer the question 

of whether the administrative hearing should occur before or after the accused enters ARD. In that 

case, the accused mother appealed the founded report and argued that she was entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing after she entered an ARD program for a criminal charge of child endangerment. 

That is the question the Supreme Court answered. 
49

changed from indicated to founded. Revisiting the Mathews factors, she argues that 

perpetrators named in a founded report based on entry into ARD immediately lose their 

teaching certificates; there is a risk of erroneous deprivation because the perpetrator 

has only been through ARD and there is no adjudication of guilt; and there would be 

minimal burden or concern with providing a pre-deprivation hearing. 

In response, and in their application for partial summary relief, 

Respondents argue that Petitioner lacks standing to mount this challenge to the 

constitutionality of the CPSL as it relates to founded reports because she has yet to be

listed in the ChildLine Registry as a perpetrator in any founded report of child abuse. 

They further contend that, although Petitioner entered ARD, she has not demonstrated 

a likelihood that she will, with certainty, become a subject of a founded report. 

“In Pennsylvania, a party to litigation must establish as a threshold matter 

that he or she has standing to bring an action.” Markham v. Wolf, 136 A.3d 134, 140 

(Pa. 2016) (citing cases). To satisfy the standing requirement, a litigant must be 

“aggrieved,” i.e., he or she must have a “substantial, direct, and immediate interest in 

the matter.” Id. “To have a substantial interest, concern in the outcome of the challenge 

must surpass ‘the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.’” 

Id. (quoting In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. 2003)). To satisfy the criterion 

of directness, a litigant must “demonstrat[e] that the matter caused harm to the party’s 

interest.” Id. at 140 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Finally, the concern is 

immediate if that causal connection is not remote or speculative.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

In some situations, our courts have held that although the harm alleged 

had not yet been imposed, the challenge was nevertheless not speculative because the 

harm would be imposed by operation of law. For example, in Gregory v. Pennsylvania 
50

State Police, 160 A.3d 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (Cohn Jubelirer, J., single-judge op.), 

we held that an inmate who was granted parole but not yet released had an immediate 

interest in whether the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act26 (SORNA) 

applied to him. Relying on Williams v. Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

353 M.D. 2014, filed October 15, 2015) (en banc), where we held death row inmates 

had standing although there were no active death warrants in effect, we determined 

“the harm [wa]s not speculative because the harm will be imposed by operation of 

law.” Gregory, 160 A.3d at 277 (emphasis added). We explained that as soon as his 

home plan was approved, the inmate would be subject to SORNA’s registration 

requirements. Id. With regard to ripeness, we held that the issues were fully developed 

for the Court’s review, and waiting for SORNA to be imposed would add little to this 

Court’s review of the legal issues raised. Id. Regarding hardship, we concluded that 

the inmate would face hardship by delaying review and waiting for the Pennsylvania 

State Police to place him on the sex offender registry. 

Petitioner argues that she “will” imminently be listed in a founded report 

as the result of her entry into ARD because under the CPSL, the county agency is 

required, by operation of law, to change the status of the reports from indicated to 

founded as the result of an accused’s entry into ARD. We agree.

Here, Petitioner has standing to pursue Count III because, by law, an 

accused’s entrance into an ARD program transforms a pending or indicated report of 

child abuse into a founded report. It is immaterial that CYS, the relevant local child 

protective services agency, has not revised its investigative determinations or that DHS 

has not updated the ChildLine Registry, since the effect of Petitioner’s admittance into 

an ARD program is unmistakably clear from a legal standpoint. Indeed, the child abuse 

26 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
51

allegations made against Petitioner must now be considered a founded report, despite 

the fact that those agencies have thus far, for reasons unexplained, avoided some of 

their ministerial and nondiscretionary responsibilities, because that is what the CPSL 

requires. See 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 6303, 6338(a). We therefore conclude that Petitioner has 

articulated an interest in Count III that is substantial, direct, and immediate, and 

consequently deny Respondents’ cross-application for partial summary relief as to 

Petitioner’s standing to make the claim she presents therein.

Having concluded that Petitioner has standing to pursue the claim she set 

forth in Count III of the PFR, we turn to Petitioner’s assertion that she is entitled to a 

declaration regarding the unconstitutional nature of CPSL’s procedure relating to the 

treatment of an accused’s acceptance into an ARD program and the change in the 

report’s status from indicated to founded.

For the most part, our analysis as set forth above applies equally here. 

Petitioner’s interests in her reputation and in pursuing her employment as a teacher are

protected by due process. Teachers, like Petitioner, named as perpetrators in founded 

reports face significant reputational consequences and employment impacts that are 

unique as the result of being named in a founded report. Educators who are named as 

perpetrators in a founded report of child abuse lose their right to work in their chosen 

profession. 24 P.S. § 2070.9d(a)(1); 23 Pa. C.S. § 6344(c). This revocation, and the 

reasons for it, are published on a publicly accessible Internet website. Section 15 of 

the Educator Discipline Act, 24 P.S. § 2070.15(d).

27

 

We agree with Petitioner that there is a high risk of erroneous deprivation 

of these rights if an educator who has entered an ARD program is named in a founded 

report without being afforded a hearing. As noted, our Supreme Court has already 

27 Added by the Act of December 14, 1989, P.L. 612.
52

held, given the nature of ARD proceedings, there is no “full and fair” opportunity to be 

heard provided in due course when the founded report reflects an ARD. J.F., 245 A.3d 

at 673. Our Supreme Court held that, because the founded report was based on ARD, 

there was no agency hearing in which J.F. had an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, 

the J.F. Court held that, in the absence of another appropriate forum to challenge an 

adjudication of child abuse in a recorded evidentiary hearing, a named perpetrator in a 

report designated as founded based upon the perpetrator’s voluntary entry into ARD is 

entitled to an administrative hearing. 

Because being named in a founded report unquestionably affects her 

reputational rights and her rights to pursue her career as an educator, Petitioner is 

entitled to a “full and fair” opportunity for a hearing at a time when the deprivation can 

still be prevented. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132. We hold here that the administrative 

hearing must be held before the educator is named in the founded report. 

Accordingly, for these reasons, we conclude that Petitioner and other 

educators like her are entitled to pre-deprivation process in the form of a BHA hearing 

before entry into the ARD program can been deemed to have transformed an indicated 

child abuse report into one that is founded.

Petitioner’s application for partial summary relief to the extent it seeks 

relief under Count III of the PFR is granted. Respondents’ application is denied as it 

pertains to this Count.

3. Count V - Mandamus

In her third issue, Petitioner seeks summary relief on Count V of her PFR, 

which seeks a writ of mandamus directing DHS to remove the report on Petitioner from 

the ChildLine Registry as she was not provided with appropriate due process 

protections. 
53

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is designed to compel the 

performance of a purely ministerial act or mandatory duty on the part of a public 

officer. Flaherty v. City of Pittsburgh, 515 A.2d 91 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). In order to 

prevail in her action for mandamus, Petitioner must establish that she has a clear legal 

right to the relief requested, that Respondents have a corresponding duty to perform a 

ministerial act or mandatory duty, and that no other adequate remedy at law is available. 

Borough of Plum v. Tresco, 606 A.2d 951 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). 

Here, Petitioner has not established her right to mandamus relief because 

she has a clear and adequate remedy at law, which she is free to pursue. That is, 

Petitioner may request that the Secretary, under section 6341(a)(1) of the CPSL,

28

expunge her name from the ChildLine Registry unless and until such time as she is 

provided with a pre-deprivation hearing, as more fully described in this Opinion.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s application for partial summary relief is denied 

as to Count V, and her petition in mandamus is dismissed.

28Section 6341(a)(1) of the CPSL provides:

(a) General rule.--Notwithstanding section 6338.1 (relating to 

expunction of information of perpetrator who was under 18 years of 

age when child abuse was committed):

(1) At any time, the secretary may amend or expunge any record 

in the Statewide database under this chapter upon good cause shown 

and notice to the appropriate subjects of the report. The request shall 

be in writing in a manner prescribed by [DHS]. For purposes of this 

paragraph, good cause shall include, but is not limited to, the following:

(i) Newly discovered evidence that an indicated report of child 

abuse is inaccurate or is being maintained in a manner inconsistent with 

this chapter.

23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(a)(1). 
54

B. RESPONDENTS’ CROSS-APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

RELIEF

Much of Respondents’ cross-application for partial summary relief echoes

the arguments made in opposition to Petitioner’s application for partial summary relief. 

There is one argument, however, that does not overlap. In their cross-application, 

Respondents argues that insofar as Petitioner asserts claims on behalf of all other school 

employees affected by the CPSL or any other individual other than herself, because 

Petitioner has not brought a class action, has not joined these non-parties via permissive 

joinder, and does not have third-party standing to bring these claims on their behalf, 

the Court should dismiss all such claims. (Respondents’ Cross-Application for 

Summary Relief ¶ 12.) We must disagree.

There have been many cases where this Court and our Supreme Court 

have considered constitutional challenges brought by an individual and concluded that 

a law was unconstitutional as to a group of individuals. See, e.g., In re J.B., 107 A.3d 

1 (Pa. 2014) (where, although appellants did not bring the case on behalf of all 

juveniles, the Supreme Court held that “the application of SORNA’s lifetime 

registration provision as applied to juveniles is unconstitutional”); Wajert v. State 

Ethics Commission, 420 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. 1980) (in a case brought under the Public 

Official and Employee Ethics Act29 by a former common pleas court judge on behalf 

of himself, the Supreme Court concluded that the law was unconstitutional as to all 

attorneys because it infringed upon the Supreme Court’s power to regulate the practice 

of law); Gmerek v. State Ethics Commission, 751 A.2d 1241, 1263 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), 

(although action was brought by two lawyers, the court held that what is known as the 

29 65 Pa. C.S. §§ 1101-1113.
55

Lobbying Disclosure Act30 was unconstitutional as applied to all lawyers who engaged 

in lobbying). 

IV. CONCLUSION

We recognize the burdens agencies such as DHS face. Nonetheless, it is 

critically important that we ensure that our agencies act within the bounds of the 

Constitution. 

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that, as applied to Petitioner 

and other teachers, Section 6368 of the CPSL does not provide adequate procedural 

due process protection. After consideration and application of the three factors of the 

Mathews test, the Court finds that as to Counts I and III all three Mathews factors, as 

applied to this case, weigh in favor of Petitioner and other teachers and against 

Respondents. On balance, Petitioner’s constitutional rights and the high risk of 

erroneous deprivation, when compared to the Commonwealth’s interests in denying 

Petitioner a pre-deprivation hearing,

31 the feasibility of providing a prompt predeprivation hearing, and the many safeguards that are in place to protect the students 

once a possible abuser is identified, tilt toward the conclusion that Petitioner and other 

teachers must be afforded a pre-deprivation hearing before an impartial ALJ before 

being listed as a perpetrator in an indicated report on the ChildLine Registry and in a 

founded report, based on ARD. The post-deprivation process as applied to Petitioner

and other teachers is simply not adequate to cure the constitutional violation caused by 

placement on the ChildLine Registry without a pre-deprivation hearing. 

30 65 Pa. C.S. §§ 13a01-13a11.

31 We reiterate that it is without question that the government has a significant interest in 

keeping child abusers out of our schools. However, as the Superior Court of New Jersey in East Park

astutely observed, it also has, or should have, an equal interest in not stigmatizing the innocent or 

foreclosing them from employment and other opportunities. 714 A.2d at 347-48. 
56

Petitioner’s application for partial summary relief as to Counts I and III

of the PFR is granted. Petitioner’s application for partial summary relief as to Count 

V of the PFR is denied. Respondents’ cross-application for partial summary relief is 

denied, except to the extent it requests judgment in its favor as to Count V of the PFR. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

S.F., :

Petitioner :

: No. 574 M.D. 2020

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Department of Human :

Services; Teresa D. Miller, in her :

official capacity as secretary of the :

Department of Health and Human :

Services; Pennsylvania Professional :

Standards and Practices Commission, :

:

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 11th day of July, 2023, Petitioner S.F.’s Application 

for Partial Summary Relief as to Counts I and III of the Petition for Review is 

hereby GRANTED. Petitioner S.F.’s Application for Partial Summary Relief as to 

Count V of the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. 

The Cross-Application for Partial Summary Relief filed by 

Respondents Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, Teresa D. Miller, in her 

official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and 

the Pennsylvania Professional Standards and Practices Commission is hereby 

GRANTED only as to Count V of the Petition for Review only. It is DENIED in 

all other respects.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge