IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-1781

Filed January 13, 2016

IN THE INEREST OF J.E.,

Minor Child,

L.E., Mother,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel L. 

Block, Associate Juvenile Judge.

A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

D. Raymond Walton of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris, Hoffman 

& Johnson, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant 

Attorneys General, for appellee State.

David Zellhoefer of Zellhoefer Law Offices, Waterloo, attorney and 

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.

Following a contested hearing on August 5, 2015, the juvenile court 

ordered termination of L.E.’s parental rights to her child, J.E., born in May 2014. 

The court, employing the proper three-step analysis, see In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 

33, 40 (Iowa 2010), found the State proved grounds for termination under Iowa 

Code section 232.116(1) paragraphs (g) and (h) (2015), termination of the 

mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests, and none of the 

exceptions set forth in section 232.116(3) applied. The mother now appeals, 

arguing the court inappropriately based its order on her mental disability, as well 

as challenging some of the court’s other findings. Our review is de novo. In re 

D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010).

GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION. The juvenile court cited two

independent grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), and 

we may affirm on either ground on appeal if the ground is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. We choose to address the 

ground found under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) paragraph (h). Under (h), the 

court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child if: (1) the child is three years 

old or younger, (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance 

under section 232.96, (3) the child has been out of the parent’s custody for at 

least six of the last twelve months or the last six consecutive months, and 

(4) “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to 

the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present 

time.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). There is no dispute that the child meets the 

first three requirements. At issue is whether the child could be returned to the 
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mother’s custody under section 232.102 at the time of the hearing. See id.; 

D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707.

It is true that a parent’s “lower mental functioning alone is not sufficient 

grounds for termination.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 708. “But where it affects the 

child’s well-being, it can be a relevant consideration.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 

100, 111 (Iowa 2014). In this case, it is the mother’s overall decision making and 

inability to adapt to new, spontaneous situations that is the fundamental problem. 

See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41 (emphasizing that the father’s “poor decision making 

makes him unable to provide a safe and nurturing home for his child”). Following 

the mother’s 2014 psychological evaluation, the mother’s psychologist opined 

she was concerned the mother had not improved “in her presentation and ability 

to flexibly problem-solve for her child, compared to when she was assessed for 

parental fitness” in 2012 for her other child, to whom the mother’s parental rights 

were subsequently terminated. The psychologist explained in her evaluation:

As before, [the mother] continues to have difficulty separating her 

child’s needs from her own; this was evident from the current 

interview as well as from an assessment conducted in February 

2012. [The mother] has appropriately sought out community 

service providers to assist her in developing parenting skills; 

however, it is not likely that she would ever be able to develop the 

skills, knowledge, and cognitive flexibility to terminate [the need for] 

such services. As was documented in [the 2012] report, [the 

mother] has not yet had to manage her son while she or her son 

are experiencing stressful circumstances (such as lack of sleep, 

emotional duress, novel situations that naturally [occur] as children 

age). It is evident from the observation and the testing that [the 

mother] is working hard to learn specific parenting skills that are 

age-appropriate; however, she is likely not able to flexibly or 

instinctively respond to her child as he ages due to her cognitive 

limitations, historic challenges with inattention and impulsive 

behavior, and ongoing mental health concerns.
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The mother herself expressed concerns to the psychologist “about her ability to 

parent [the child] without extensive assistance from varying community 

programs.” Because the mother “continues to struggle with flexible problem 

solving important for independent parenting,” the psychologist opined the mother 

could not be an independent provider for the child and recommended the child 

remain in the custody of the Iowa Department of Human Services or alternative 

providers.

The mother’s own guardian testified the mother had problems meeting her 

own needs without regular assistance, noting the mother struggled “with following 

through with instructions and understanding the intent when it comes to medical 

recommendations” and even staying “hydrated and eating appropriately” without 

staff supervision. The guardian believed the mother was “going to continue to 

need support for her in order for her to be able to take care of her ongoing 

medical and psychiatric needs,” and she testified that she believed if the child 

were placed in the mother’s custody, it “would become overwhelming” for the 

mother. Though the mother “tries very hard to listen to what’s being conveyed to 

her but she struggles with . . . following through with what the recommendations 

are.” One example was the mother’s independent decision to go outside her 

normal medical providers to have her birth control implant removed. The mother 

failed to give the other medical providers “the current information on that and 

removed the [implant] and placed her on the birth control pill. Within two weeks 

she suffered a pulmonary embolism.” The mother reported to the psychologist 

that she had the implant “removed because it ‘moved’ in her arm and was no 
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longer effective,” and she became pregnant with J.E. when she took her birth 

control “pill ‘a half-hour later’ than she was supposed to.”

Finally, the child’s guardian ad litem recommended termination of the 

mother’s parental rights, noting the mother

chooses inappropriate friends, people to hang around with. . . . 

Those are choices she made, but I don’t know if she knows better. 

I think because of her intellectual disabilities she probably doesn’t 

know better.

She can’t handle money. [The mother’s guardian] testified, 

quite accurately, I think, that if you leave [the mother] on her own 

without an army of social workers and other well-meaning 

individuals she will fail. She will fail and fall hard. And I can’t allow 

my client to be under her care and guidance when she does.

I’m not saying she’s a bad mother. I bet she’s trying harder 

than half the mothers I’ve run into [in] my [thirty-five] years of doing 

this. But she just can’t. It’s impossible.

While there is no question the mother loves the child, it is clear the mother 

could not internalize the necessary skills to keep the child safe and developing 

properly without the constant intervention of a bevy of service providers. At least 

twice the child choked in the mother’s care while a service provider was present

and had to be told the child was choking. In these instances, the mother had 

turned away from the child and had her back to him, though it had been stressed 

to her that she needed to watch the child eat to make sure the child did not 

choke. The choking incidents, coupled with the mother’s inability to care for her 

own needs, her inability to administer medication as directed, her continued 

relationships with unsavory and unsafe persons, such as her most recent 

boyfriend who was an acknowledged substance abuser, along with the mother’s 

own doubts of her ability to care safely for the child despite the receipt of 

significant services, evidence the child could not be returned to her care at the 
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time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. We agree with the juvenile 

court that the State proved the ground for termination under Iowa Code section 

232.116(1)(h).

FACTORS IN TERMINATION. “Having found statutory grounds for 

termination exist, we turn to further consider the circumstances described in 

section 232.116(2) that drive the actual decision-making process.” D.W., 791 

N.W.2d at 708. Under section 232.116(2), we “give primary consideration to the 

child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and 

growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and 

needs of the child.” Additionally, a parent’s lower mental functioning is a relevant 

consideration in the best-interests analysis if the disability affects the parent’s 

ability to provide for the needs of the child. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 708 (citing 

Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(a)).

Upon our de novo review, we find the considerations guiding the decision 

support termination. The mother’s lower mental functioning is a contributing 

factor to her inability to provide a safe and stable home for the child. See id. As 

the child continues to grow and develop, his needs will only become more 

challenging. The case progress reports and service providers’ testimony indicate 

the mother has difficulty overcoming her intellectual impairment to adequately 

provide a safe and reliable home for the child, and even herself at times. 

Furthermore, the mother was unable to care for the child without relying heavily 

on service providers. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of 

permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 
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232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to 

provide a stable home for the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40.

The record shows that the child is doing well with his foster family, who 

has also been very supportive of the mother. The child is adoptable and 

deserves a permanent home. Termination will enable him to achieve 

permanency. See id. at 113. Taking into account all of the relevant factors, we 

conclude termination is in the child’s best interests. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 

112.

Because we agree with the juvenile court that the State proved a ground 

for termination and the record evidences termination is in the child’s best 

interests, we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling terminating the mother’s parental 

rights.

AFFIRMED.