BORDER PATROL

Issues Related to 

Agent Deployment 

Strategy and 

Immigration 

Checkpoints

Report to Congressional Requesters

November 2017

GAO-18-50

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-50, a report to 

congressional requesters

November 2017

BORDER PATROL

Issues Related to Agent Deployment Strategy and 

Immigration Checkpoints

What GAO Found

According to U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol), agent deployment decisions are

based on factors such as staffing levels and the availability of agents, among 

other things. As of May 2017, nationwide, Border Patrol had about 1,900 fewer 

agents than authorized, which officials cited as a key challenge for optimal agent 

deployment. In recent years, attrition has exceeded hiring (an average of 904 

agents compared to 523 agents) according to officials. GAO analyzed scheduling 

data, including time that agents were scheduled to be not working (for example, 

off duty or on leave) because these activities can affect deployment decisions by 

reducing the number of agents available on a particular day. GAO found that 

agents were available for deployment about 43 percent of the time.

Percentage of Agent Hours Scheduled for Time Off and Deployment Activities for the 

Southwest Border, Fiscal Years 2013–2016

From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, Border Patrol apprehended a total of 

almost 2 million individuals along the southwest border, and these 

apprehensions increasingly occurred closer to the border, with 42 percent of 

apprehensions occurring one-half mile or less from the border in fiscal year 2016 

compared to 24 percent in fiscal year 2012. One driver for this change is the 

increasing number of apprehensions of children, whom officials report may turn 

themselves in to Border Patrol without attempting to evade detection. Meanwhile, 

over this period, the locations where seizures of contraband occurred remained 

roughly the same, with the majority occurring 10 or more miles from the border.

For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, GAO found that 2 percent of apprehensions 

and 43 percent of seizures occurred at checkpoints; however, determining the 

extent to which apprehensions and seizures are attributable to checkpoints is 

difficult because of long-standing data issues. More apprehensions and seizures 

may be attributable to checkpoints, but Border Patrol’s reporting does not 

distinguish apprehensions that occurred “at” versus “around” a checkpoint. 

Border Patrol is drafting guidance to clarify how checkpoint apprehension and 

seizure data are to be recorded that would respond to a 2009 GAO 

recommendation to improve the internal controls for management oversight of 

checkpoint data. GAO also determined that seizures at checkpoints differed from 

those at other locations. Specifically, 40 percent of seizures at checkpoints were 

1 ounce or less of marijuana from U.S. citizens. In contrast, seizures at other 

locations were more often higher quantities of marijuana seized from aliens.

View GAO-18-50. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Border Patrol has primary 

responsibility for securing the border 

between U.S. ports of entry. On the 

southwest border, Border Patrol 

deploys agents along the immediate 

border and in areas up to 100 miles 

from the border as part of a layered 

approach known as the defense in 

depth strategy. Immigration

checkpoints, generally located 

between 25 and 100 miles from the 

border, are one element of this 

strategy. GAO was asked to review the 

defense in depth strategy. 

This report addresses: (1) the factors 

Border Patrol considers in deploying 

agents, (2) where apprehensions of 

illegal crossers and seizures of 

contraband are occurring, and (3) what 

data show about how checkpoints 

contribute to apprehensions and 

seizures, among other objectives. To 

answer these questions, GAO 

analyzed Border Patrol documents and

data on apprehensions and seizures 

from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, 

visited two southwest border sectors, 

interviewed officials from the other 

seven southwest border sectors and 

Border Patrol headquarters, and 

reviewed prior GAO work on border 

security.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any new 

recommendations at this time but has 

previously recommended that Border 

Patrol establish internal controls for 

checkpoint data, among other things. 

DHS concurred with this 

recommendation and has taken some 

steps to improve the quality of 

checkpoint data, but additional actions 

are needed to fully implement the 

recommendation.
Page i GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Letter 1

Background 6

Border Patrol Deploys Agents Based on Availability and 

Geography, Among Other Factors, and Agent Activity 

Schedules Vary By Sector 16

Apprehensions Occurred Closer to the Border in Fiscal Year 2016 

Compared to Fiscal Year 2012, While Seizure Locations 

Remained Relatively Unchanged 30

Long-Standing Data Quality Issues Make It Difficult to Precisely 

Measure Checkpoints’ Contributions to Apprehensions and 

Seizures 36

Collecting Additional Data Could Improve Border Patrol’s Existing 

Efforts to Identify and Respond to Community Concerns 

Regarding the Defense in Depth Strategy 49

Agency Comments 56

Appendix I Status of GAO Recommendations Related to Checkpoints 57

Appendix II Trends in Southwest Border Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 

through 2016 63

Appendix III Trends in Southwest Border Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 

through 2016 72

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 82

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 86

Tables

Table 1: Number of Authorized and On-Board Agents, by 

Southwest Border Sector, as of May 2017 9

Table 2: Agent Hours Scheduled for Southwest Border 

Checkpoints, by Sector, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 29

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Table 3: Southwest Border and Rio Grande Valley Sector 

Apprehensions from Mexico and Select Central American 

Countries, Fiscal Years (FY) 2012 and 2016 33

Table 4: Categories Describing the Relationship between 

Apprehension and Seizure (Event) Locations and 

Checkpoints 39

Table 5: Southwest Border Checkpoint Apprehensions and 

Seizures by Location Category, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 41

Table 6: Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector and by 

Distance from the Border for Fiscal Years (FY) 2012–

2016 65

Table 7: Southwest Border Checkpoint Apprehensions by Sector 

and by Location Category, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 68

Table 8: Type and Number of Southwest Border Seizures, Fiscal 

Years (FY) 2012–2016 72

Table 9: Southwest Border Seizures by Sector and by Distance 

from the Border for Fiscal Years (FY) 2012–2016 75

Table 10: Southwest Border Seizures by Sector and by Location 

Category, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 77

Table 11: Southwest Border Marijuana Seizures by Quantity 

Seized at Checkpoints and at Non-Checkpoint Locations, 

Fiscal Years 2013–2016 81

Figures

Figure 1: Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border and 

Border Stations and Zones in the Tucson Sector 7

Figure 2: Images of a Forward Operating Base (FOB) and 

Checkpoints 11

Figure 3: Permanent Checkpoints near the Southwest Border 13

Figure 4: Checkpoint Canine Team Inspects a Vehicle 14

Figure 5: Percentage of Agent Hours Scheduled for Time Off and 

Deployment Activities for the Southwest Border, Fiscal 

Years 2013–2016 19

Figure 6: Distribution of Border Patrol Agents’ Scheduled Work 

Time, by Sector, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 26

Figure 7: Percentage of Border Patrol Agents’ Time for Operations 

and Patrol Scheduled for Different Zone Types, Fiscal 

Years 2013–2016 28

Figure 8: Distribution of Southwest Border Apprehensions by 

Distance from the Border, Fiscal Years 2012–2016 31
Page iii GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 9: Distribution of Southwest Border Seizures by Distance 

from the Border, Fiscal Years 2012–2016 34

Figure 10: Percentage of Seizures by Distance From the Border 

for the Tucson, Big Bend, and Rio Grande Valley 

Sectors, Fiscal Years 2012–2016 35

Figure 11: Maps of Apprehensions Surrounding Two Checkpoints, 

Fiscal Years 2013–2016 42

Figure 12: Breakdown of Seizures by Type of Seizure, Location of 

Seizure, and Individuals Associated with the Seizure, 

Fiscal Years 2013–2016 47

Figure 13: Mangled Gate Suspected to Have Been Caused by 

Illegal Border Crossers along Highway 281 in Brooks 

County, Texas 51

Figure 14: Southwest Border Apprehensions by Border Patrol 

Sector, Fiscal Years 2012–2016 64

Figure 15: Southwest Border Seizures by Border Patrol Sector, 

Fiscal Years 2012–2016 74

Abbreviations

BCL Border Community Liaison

Border Patrol U.S. Border Patrol 

BPAPRA Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014

BPETS Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CCMS Compliments and Complaints Management System

checkpoint immigration checkpoint

CPMO Checkpoint Program Management Office

DHS Department of Homeland Security

FOB Forward Operating Base

FY fiscal year

GPS Global Positioning System

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Page 1 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 8, 2017

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

U.S. Senate

The Honorable Martha McSally

Chairwoman

Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The United States’ international border with Mexico continues to be 

vulnerable to illegal cross-border traffic. The U.S. Border Patrol (Border 

Patrol)—an office within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that has primary responsibility 

for securing the border between the U.S. ports of entry1

—recorded more 

than 400,000 apprehensions and more than 15,000 seizures in fiscal year 

2016.2 Agents are among the key resources Border Patrol deploys—

along with infrastructure and technology—to respond to cross-border 

threats, and Border Patrol’s most recent strategic plan calls for a riskbased approach to resource deployment.

 1

Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the 

United States. Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated location (seaport, 

airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear 

passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws, and where DHS 

officers inspect persons entering or applying for admission into, or departing the United 

States pursuant to U.S. immigration law.

2

See 6 U.S.C. § 211(a) (establishing CBP within DHS), (c) (enumerating CBP’s duties), 

(e) (establishing and listing duties of U.S. Border Patrol within CBP). Apprehensions refer 

to arrests of aliens (persons who are not U.S. citizens or nationals; i.e., foreign nationals) 

who are potentially removable on grounds of inadmissibility or deportability. We refer to 

these individuals in this report as potentially removable aliens. Border Patrol agents may 

also encounter and, as appropriate, arrest U.S. citizens or non-removable aliens for 

violating U.S. law, such as smuggling contraband. In this report, a seizure refers to the 

confiscation of one type of contraband from an individual (who may be a foreign national 

or a U.S. citizen and who is arrested in conjunction with the seizure). There may be 

multiple seizures associated with a single arrest. For example, Border Patrol could seize 

both marijuana and cocaine from the same individual, and for the purposes of this report 

that would be considered two seizure events.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Along the southwest border, Border Patrol deploys agents along the 

immediate border and in areas up to 100 miles from the border as part of 

a layered approach the agency refers to as the defense in depth strategy. 

As part of this strategy, Border Patrol deploys agents on temporary duty 

assignments to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) located in difficult to 

access areas near the border to reduce the response time to threats in 

these areas, and it also deploys agents to immigration checkpoints 

(checkpoints) that are generally located on highways 25 to 100 miles from 

the border.

At checkpoints, Border Patrol agents screen vehicles for aliens who were 

able to illegally cross the border undetected at or between ports of entry. 

Border Patrol checkpoints are located on major U.S. highways and 

secondary roads. This permits checkpoints to be far enough inland to 

detect and apprehend aliens in violation of U.S. immigration law, 

smugglers, and potential terrorists attempting to travel farther into the 

interior of the United States on ingress routes after evading detection or 

otherwise avoiding required inspection at the border. According to Border 

Patrol data, there are about 140 locations that Border Patrol uses for 

checkpoint operations near the southwest border, although not all of them 

are operational at all times.3 Some of these checkpoints have a 

permanent structure with off-highway inspection lanes and technology to 

facilitate inspection and convenience, while other checkpoints have 

temporary infrastructure in the form of trailers and generators. DHS’s 

Congressional Justification for the fiscal year 2018 budget notes that, 

because checkpoints are an integral part of the defense in depth strategy, 

measurements of checkpoint events (apprehensions and seizures) serve 

as barometers of the effectiveness of Border Patrol’s overall strategy to 

deny illegal entries into the United States.

Communities located near the southwest border may be positively or 

negatively impacted by the placement and operation of checkpoints and 

other Border Patrol resources deployed under the defense in depth 

strategy. You requested that we review Border Patrol’s defense in depth 

strategy. This report addresses the following questions:

1. What factors does Border Patrol consider in deploying agents to the 

different layers of the defense in depth strategy along the southwest 

border, including FOBs along the border and checkpoints?

 3

Border Patrol also has checkpoints near the northern border.
Page 3 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

2. Where are apprehensions and seizures occurring in relation to the 

border, as a reflection of Border Patrol’s defense in depth strategy?

3. What do data show about how checkpoints contribute to 

apprehensions and seizures?

4. What is known about the effects of Border Patrol’s defense in depth 

strategy on surrounding communities, and how, if at all, does Border 

Patrol engage with these communities to identify and respond to any 

such effects?

To address these objectives, we analyzed Border Patrol data and 

documents, visited two southwest border sectors, and interviewed Border 

Patrol officials from the other seven southwest border sectors and Border 

Patrol headquarters.4 Specifically, we analyzed Border Patrol data on 

planned agent deployment, apprehensions, and seizures across all nine 

southwest border sectors from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. We 

selected these years because they were the five most recent fiscal years 

for which complete data were available at the time of our review.

We also selected the two sectors to visit (Tucson sector and Rio Grande 

Valley sector) based on the role of checkpoints in those locations, the 

presence of FOBs, the role of known community groups that engage with 

Border Patrol, and a relatively high level of known cross-border illegal 

activity in those sectors, among other factors. In these two sectors, we 

met with sector and station officials, local law enforcement agencies, and 

community groups. We selected local law enforcement agencies and 

community groups based on recommendations from sector officials and 

geographic considerations, such as proximity to checkpoints.5 We also 

visited Border Patrol facilities including checkpoints and FOBs. Both inperson during our visits to the two selected sectors and by phone with the 

remaining seven sectors, we interviewed officials responsible for making 

agent deployment decisions to discuss how sectors and stations decide 

to deploy agents, the operational results of agent deployment, and how 

 4

Border Patrol divides responsibility for southwest border security operations 

geographically among nine sectors, each with its own sector headquarters. Each sector is 

further divided into varying numbers of stations each with its own area of responsibility.

5

In the Tucson sector, we met with the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Cochise 

County Sheriff’s Office, Pima County Sheriff’s Department, Sahuarita Police Department, 

Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Office, Douglas Unified School District, and the Santa Cruz 

Valley Citizens Council. In the Rio Grande Valley sector, we met with the Brooks County 

Sheriff’s Office, Hidalgo County Sheriff’s Office, and the South Texans’ Property Rights 

Association.
Page 4 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

sectors and stations respond to any effects of Border Patrol’s defense in 

depth strategy on the surrounding community. We also interviewed 

officials from Border Patrol headquarters—specifically officials from the 

Checkpoint Program Management Office (CPMO) and from the Border 

Community Liaison (BCL) Program—and officials responsible for 

overseeing and analyzing Border Patrol deployment, apprehension, and 

seizure data. These interviews focused on Border Patrol’s oversight of 

and data regarding agent deployment, enforcement actions, and 

checkpoints.

We also reviewed our prior work regarding checkpoints, the defense in 

depth strategy, and issues related to private property damage along the 

southwest border.6 In particular, we reviewed recommendations from our 

August 2009 report on checkpoints and assessed actions taken in 

response to these recommendations to determine whether they had been 

implemented.

To address our first objective, we analyzed data on planned agent 

deployment from the Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System 

(BPETS) for fiscal years 2013 through 2016.7 We reviewed the activities 

in the data to determine broad categories represented among the 

activities.8 Border Patrol officials responsible for overseeing the data 

concurred with our categories and how we organized the activities into 

these categories. We assessed the reliability of these data by testing for 

missing data and obvious errors, reviewing related documentation, and 

 6

GAO, Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but More 

Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness, 

GAO-09-824 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2009); Border Patrol: Key Elements of New 

Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, 

GAO-13-25 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2012); and Southwest Border: Issues Related to 

Private Property Damage, GAO-15-399 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2015).

7

We requested and received planned scheduling data for fiscal year 2012, but fiscal year 

2012 data were not comparable to subsequent years’ data because Border Patrol 

modified its approach to scheduling in March 2012. In particular, prior to this time, 

scheduling activities were recorded in 1-day increments, with the ability to assign one 

activity per day. Data recorded after the change were recorded in hours and an agent’s 

work shift could be split into multiple activities with hours assigned to each activity.

8

To determine categories for this analysis, we reviewed BPETS data to identify themes 

among the activities in the data. We proposed categories and the assignment of activities 

to these categories to Border Patrol officials for the purpose of our analysis. We sought 

input from and reached agreement with officials who oversee the BPETS data and the 

Personal Requirements Determination project regarding the categories and how activities 

were organized into the categories.
Page 5 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

interviewing knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the data 

used in our analyses were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report.

To address our second and third objectives, we obtained and analyzed 

apprehension and seizure data from Border Patrol’s Enforcement 

Integrated Database/e3 (e3) database for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. 

We assessed the reliability of these data by testing for missing data and 

obvious errors, reviewing related documentation, and interviewing 

knowledgeable agency officials. We used Global Positioning System 

(GPS) coordinates contained in the e3 data to analyze distance from the 

border and proximity and relation to checkpoints for apprehensions and 

seizures. In assessing the reliability of these data, we identified some 

apprehension and seizure records with GPS coordinates that were 

outside the scope of our review. We excluded the small percentage of 

records that had missing GPS coordinates or had GPS coordinates that 

were not within the boundaries of southwest Border Patrol sectors.9 We 

determined that the data used in our analyses were sufficiently reliable for 

the purposes of this report.10 For our analysis of apprehensions’ and 

seizures’ proximity and relation to checkpoints, we analyzed data for 

 9

Some GPS coordinates were recorded as being outside of the United States. GPS 

coordinates for the U.S. southwest border region have a positive number for latitude 

(northern hemisphere) and a negative number for longitude (western hemisphere). If the 

latitude coordinate was recorded with a negative sign (indicating the southern

hemisphere), we removed the negative sign. Similarly, if the longitude coordinate 

excluded the negative sign (indicating the eastern hemisphere), we added the negative 

sign. For any such adjustments we made, we determined if the adjusted coordinates 

would be within the United States and a southwest border sector. We included records 

with adjusted coordinates that were within southwest border sectors, and excluded the 

records that remained outside the United States and/or southwest border sectors. After 

making such adjustments, we identified 11,710 apprehensions and 443 seizures that had 

missing GPS coordinates, had coordinates outside the United States, and/or coordinates 

outside the boundaries of southwest border sectors, and we therefore excluded these data 

from our analyses.

10The GPS coordinates were sufficiently reliable for determining the locations of 

apprehensions and seizures. Using the GPS coordinates, we mapped the locations of 

apprehensions, seizures, and checkpoints. We analyzed these maps to assess the 

reliability of other data fields that Border Patrol uses to attribute apprehensions and 

seizures to checkpoints. The results of that analysis revealed data quality issues for the 

other data fields related to checkpoints, and the issues related to these other data fields 

are discussed in detail later in this report.
Page 6 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

fiscal years 2013 through 2016 because a listing of checkpoints that were 

operational in fiscal year 2012 was not available.11

To address our fourth objective, we reviewed BCL program documents 

from headquarters and all nine southwest border sectors, interviewed 

officials in these sectors, and met with community members and local law 

enforcement officials in the two sectors we visited. We spoke with officials 

from all nine southwest border sectors about their views on the effects 

that Border Patrol and illegal cross-border activity have had on nearby 

communities up to 100 miles from the border. Our interviews also focused 

on Border Patrol’s efforts to identify and respond to any effects, including 

the organization of and actions taken as part of the BCL program. 

Although the information we obtained from these interviews cannot be 

generalized to other communities near border checkpoints, these 

interviews provided important insights and perspectives about the 

checkpoints.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to November 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Border Patrol divides responsibility for southwest border security 

operations geographically among nine sectors, each with its own sector 

headquarters. Each sector is further divided into varying numbers of 

stations. For example, the Tucson sector has divided geographic 

responsibility across eight stations, seven of which have responsibility for 

miles of land directly on the U.S.-Mexico border. Stations’ areas of 

responsibility are divided into zones. Border Patrol refers to “border 

zones”—those having international border miles—and “interior zones”—

 11At the end of each fiscal year, Border Patrol creates a record of checkpoints that were 

potentially operational during that year. Border Patrol began documenting these lists of 

checkpoints in fiscal year 2013, and therefore no such list for fiscal year 2012 was 

available for the purposes of our analysis.

Background

Border Patrol’s 

Organizational Structure
Page 7 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

those without international border miles. For example, as shown in figure 

1, within the Tucson sector, the Sonoita station has only border zones, 

the Willcox station has only interior zones, and the other stations have a 

mix of both border and interior zones. According to Border Patrol officials, 

dividing stations into zones allows sectors to more effectively analyze 

border conditions, including terrain, when planning how to deploy agents. 

Zone dimensions are largely determined by geography and topographical 

features, and zone size can vary significantly.

Figure 1: Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border and Border Stations and Zones in the Tucson Sector
Page 8 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, Border Patrol was statutorily required 

to maintain a minimum of 21,370 full-time equivalent agent positions, but 

Border Patrol has faced challenges in staffing to that minimum level.12 As 

of May 2017, Border Patrol had about 19,500 agents on board. 

Additionally, in January 2017, an executive order called for the hiring of 

5,000 additional Border Patrol agents, subject to available appropriations, 

and Border Patrol is aiming to have 26,370 agents by the end of fiscal 

year 2021.13 The Acting Commissioner of CBP reported in a February 

2017 memo to the Deputy Secretary for Homeland Security that from 

fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2016, Border Patrol hired an average of 523 

agents per year while experiencing a loss of an average of 904 agents 

per year.14 The memo cited challenges such as competing with other 

federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations for applicants. In 

particular, the memo noted that CBP faces hiring and retention 

challenges compared to DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (which is also planning to hire additional law enforcement 

personnel) because CBP’s hiring process requires applicants to take a 

polygraph examination, Border Patrol agents are deployed to less 

desirable duty locations, and Border Patrol agents generally receive lower 

compensation.

 12Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 

112-10, div. B, tit. VI, § 1608, 125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, 

Pub. L. No. 112-74, div. D, tit. II, 125 Stat. 786, 946 (2011); Consolidated and Further 

Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, div. D, tit. II, 127 Stat. 198, 345; 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5, 249; 

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-4, tit. II, 129 

Stat. 39, 41; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. F, tit. II, 129 

Stat. 2242, 2495 (2015). For fiscal year 2017, Border Patrol was not mandated to have a 

minimum number of agents, but Congress directed CBP to continue working to develop a 

fully justified workforce staffing model that would provide validated requirements for all 

U.S. borders and to brief the appropriations committees on its progress in this regard 

within 30 days of the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017. See 

Explanatory Statement (163 Cong. Rec. H3327, H3809-10 (daily ed. May 3, 2017)) 

accompanying Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135.

13Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13767, § 

8, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8795 (Jan. 30, 2017).

14The Acting Commissioner’s memo outlines plans and requests to assist Border Patrol in 

hiring more agents, including the additional 5,000 agents called for in the Executive Order 

on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. We have ongoing work 

regarding hiring and retention challenges at CBP. This work is being conducted for the 

ranking members of the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Subcommittees 

on Border and Maritime Security and on Oversight and Management Efficiency.

Staffing Levels and Agent 

Deployment
Page 9 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Border Patrol headquarters, with input from the sectors, determines how 

many authorized agent positions will be allocated to each of the sectors. 

According to Border Patrol officials, these decisions take into account the 

relative needs of the sectors, based on threats, intelligence, and the flow 

of illegal activity. Each sector’s leadership determines how many of the 

authorized agent positions will be allocated to each station within their 

sector. Sector leadership also distributes newly assigned agents—those 

agents recently hired whom headquarters has assigned to the sector, or 

existing agents who are being transferred—to specific stations within the 

sector. Table 1 shows the number of authorized agent positions for each 

southwest border sector as well as the number of agents who were 

assigned to each of those sectors, as of May 2017.

Table 1: Number of Authorized and On-Board Agents, by Southwest Border Sector, 

as of May 2017

Sector Number of authorized 

agent positions

Number of on-board 

agents

Difference

San Diego 2,484 2,262 222

El Centro 1,120 888 232

Yuma 792 843 -51

Tucson 3,825 3,716 109

El Paso 2,415 2,193 222

Big Bend 640 495 145

Del Rio 1,642 1,398 244

Laredo 1,852 1,584 268

Rio Grande Valley 3,201 3,143 58

Total 17,971 16,522 1,449

Source: Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50

Once a sector assigns agents to a station, station officials assign agents 

to a shift. Most agents work 10-hour shifts, which allows for some overlap 
Page 10 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

in time for the outgoing shift to relay key information to the incoming 

shift.15 Most agents work 5 days per week with 2 off duty days.

Border Patrol has 17 FOBs that are established in forward or remote 

locations in five of the nine southwest border sectors to sustain Border 

Patrol operations.16 According to Border Patrol officials, the primary 

function of these facilities is to give the Border Patrol a tactical advantage 

by reducing response time to threats or actionable intelligence. Typically, 

agents are assigned for 7 days, during which they reside at the FOB and 

deploy to their assigned duties.17 FOBs allow agents to be pre-positioned 

at these locations, which reduces the portion of an agent’s shift that is 

spent in transit between the station and the patrol location. In addition, 

these facilities are intended to increase security awareness and presence 

in the border areas where they are located. FOBs are staffed by Border 

Patrol agents on temporary duty assignments from their permanent duty 

station. After their shift, they are normally required to remain at the FOB 

to rest, prepare for their next shift, and be available, if needed, to respond 

to operational issues. Figure 2 includes a photo of a FOB in the Rio 

Grande Valley sector. Five of the nine southwest border sectors—Yuma, 

Tucson, El Paso, Big Bend, and the Rio Grande Valley—have FOBs, 

whereas the other four sectors—San Diego, El Centro, Del Rio, and 

Laredo—do not.

 15The Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014 (BPAPRA) established the current 

overtime compensation system for Border Patrol agents, in which agents individually elect 

and are subsequently assigned by the agency to one of three rates of pay commensurate 

with the amount of scheduled overtime the agents elect or are assigned to work. See Pub. 

L. No. 113-277, 128 Stat. 2995 (2014) (amending titles 5 and 29 of the United States 

Code with respect to overtime compensation for Border Patrol agents). In general, 

BPAPRA provides that at least 90 percent of all Border Patrol agents at each duty location 

shall be assigned to the rate of pay that corresponds with a 10-hour daily schedule for 5 

workdays per week, yielding a 25 percent overtime supplement.

16Some of these facilities are permanent structures while others, also known as camps, 

are more temporary in nature. Border Patrol has 12 permanent FOBs and 5 camps, and 

we refer to these facilities collectively as FOBs in this report.

17DHS Office of the Inspector General, Conditions at CBP’s Forward Operating Bases 

along the Southwest Border, OIG-16-37 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2016).

FOBs and Checkpoints
Page 11 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 2: Images of a Forward Operating Base (FOB) and Checkpoints
Page 12 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Border Patrol operates two types of checkpoints—permanent and 

tactical—that differ in terms of size, infrastructure, and location. While 

both types of checkpoints are generally operated at fixed locations, 

permanent checkpoints—as their name suggests—are characterized by 

their brick and mortar structures, that may include off-highway covered 

lanes for vehicle inspection and several buildings including those for 

administration, detention of persons suspected of smuggling or other 

illegal activity, and kennels for canines used in the inspection process.18

Figure 2 shows examples of permanent and tactical checkpoints we 

observed in the Rio Grande Valley and Tucson sectors, and figure 3 is a 

map depicting the locations of permanent checkpoints near the southwest 

border.

 18The Tucson sector is the only sector along the southwest border without permanent 

checkpoints. Although other sectors along the southwest border deploy a combination of 

permanent and tactical checkpoints, the Tucson sector has only tactical checkpoints that 

operate from fixed locations. Legislation effectively prohibited the construction of 

permanent checkpoints in the Tucson sector, beginning in fiscal year 1999. Specifically, 

the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, stated 

that “no funds shall be available for the site acquisition, design, or construction of any 

Border Patrol checkpoint in the Tucson sector.” See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 

2681-59 (1998).The effect of this legislative language was that no permanent checkpoints 

could be planned or constructed in this sector, which had no permanent checkpoints when 

the prohibition took effect.
Page 13 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 3: Permanent Checkpoints near the Southwest Border

Border Patrol agents at checkpoints have legal authority that agents do 

not have when conducting roving patrols away from the border. The 

United States Supreme Court ruled that Border Patrol agents may stop a 

vehicle at fixed checkpoints for brief questioning of its occupants even if 

there is no reason to believe that the particular vehicle contains illegal 

entrants, and also held that the operation of a fixed checkpoint does not 

require a judicial warrant.19 The Court further held that, provided the 

intrusion is sufficiently minimal so as not to require particularized 

justification, Border Patrol agents “have wide discretion” to refer motorists 

selectively to a secondary inspection area for additional brief 

questioning.20 In contrast, the Supreme Court held that Border Patrol 

agents on roving patrol may stop a vehicle only if they have reasonable 

suspicion that the vehicle contains aliens who may be illegally in the 

 19U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).

20Id. at 563-4.
Page 14 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

United States—a higher threshold for stopping and questioning motorists 

than at checkpoints.21 The constitutional threshold for searching a vehicle 

is the same, however, and must be supported by either consent or 

probable cause, whether in the context of a roving patrol or a checkpoint 

search.22 Probable cause can include a canine detecting something it is 

trained to detect (e.g., concealed people, narcotics). Figure 4 shows a 

Border Patrol canine team inspecting a vehicle at a checkpoint.

Figure 4: Checkpoint Canine Team Inspects a Vehicle

We have previously reported on topics related to the defense in depth 

strategy, and specifically on checkpoints.23 In August 2009, we reported 

on the measurement of checkpoint performance and the impact of 

checkpoint operations on nearby communities, among other things 

 21U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-2 (1975).

22U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-8 (1975).

23See GAO-13-25, GAO-09-824, and GAO, Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior 

Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance, GAO-05-435 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 22, 2005).

Previous GAO Work
Page 15 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

related to checkpoints.24 In that report, we made recommendations to, 

among other things, strengthen checkpoint design and staffing and 

improve the measurement and reporting of checkpoint effectiveness, 

including measuring community impacts. CBP has implemented two of 

our recommendations from that report—specifically, Border Patrol 

explored and considered the feasibility of a checkpoint performance 

model and required that traffic volumes be studied and considered when 

designing new permanent checkpoints. Appendix I provides details on the 

status of all six recommendations from that report. We also reported in 

December 2012 on how Border Patrol manages personnel resources at 

the southwest border, including aspects of the defense in depth strategy, 

such as where apprehensions and seizures were occurring relative to the 

southwest border. That report focused on the Tucson sector—which at 

the time had the most Border Patrol apprehensions of the nine southwest 

border sectors—and compared data on agent deployment, 

apprehensions, and seizures from the Tucson sectors with data for other 

sectors.25

 24GAO-09-824.

25In that report, we also reported on Border Patrol’s implementation of its 2012–2016 

strategic plan. We made recommendations that Border Patrol develop milestones and 

time frames for developing border security goals and measures to assess progress made 

and resource needs to support the implementation of the strategic plan. Border Patrol has 

not yet fully implemented these recommendations. See GAO-13-25.
Page 16 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

According to sector officials, decisions about agent deployment in terms 

of location and activity are based on multiple factors, including the 

availability of agents for a given shift, the geography in a station’s area of 

responsibility, and illegal traffic patterns. For example, when considering 

the various assignments that need to be filled for a given day, supervisors 

must take into account agents that are unavailable because they are off 

duty, on scheduled leave, or are scheduled to attend training. The 

geography in a station’s area of responsibility can also affect decisions 

about where to deploy available agents. For example, Border Patrol may 

have limited access to certain areas because of challenging terrain, 

limited or poor quality roads, or private ownership. Supervisors also 

review information about illegal traffic patterns in their areas of 

responsibility to determine where enforcement operations may be 

needed.

One key factor in how Border Patrol makes deployment decisions at the 

station level is the overall number of agents available. Officials from all 

nine southwest border sectors cited current staffing levels and the 

availability of agents as a challenge for optimal deployment. Nationwide, 

as of May 2017, Border Patrol had nearly 1,900 fewer agents than 

authorized and has faced hiring and retention challenges in recent years. 

As shown in table 1 earlier, eight of the nine southwest border sectors 

were below their authorized agent staffing levels as of May 2017.26 As 

 26As of May 2017, Yuma sector had 51 agents more than its authorized amount. Yuma 

sector officials said that this does not result in being overstaffed because the workload for 

the sector has increased as a result of increased illegal traffic, and thus the sector has 

sought additional authorized positions to account for the heightened risk in the sector.

Border Patrol Deploys 

Agents Based on 

Availability and 

Geography, Among 

Other Factors, and 

Agent Activity 

Schedules Vary By 

Sector

Border Patrol Assigns 

Agents Based on Factors 

Such As Availability, 

Geography, and Illegal 

Traffic Patterns

Number and Availability of 

Agents
Page 17 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

such, resources are constrained and station officials must make decisions 

about how to prioritize activities for deployment given the number of 

agents available.

Within sectors, some stations may be comparatively more understaffed 

than others because of recruitment and retention challenges, according to 

officials. Generally, sector officials said that the recruitment and retention 

challenges associated with particular stations were related to quality of 

life factors in the area near the station—for example, agents may not 

want to live with their families in an area without a hospital, with lowperforming schools, or with relatively long commutes from their homes to 

their duty station. This can affect retention of existing agents, but it may 

also affect whether a new agent accepts a position in that location. For 

example, officials in one sector said that new agent assignments are not 

based solely on agency need, but rather also take into consideration 

agent preferences. These officials added that there is the potential that 

new agents may decline offers for stations that are perceived as 

undesirable, or they may resign their position earlier than they otherwise 

would to pursue employment in a more desirable location.

Supervisors make decisions about how to deploy agents based on the 

number of agents assigned to a shift who are available to work the shift 

on a particular day. On any given day, some agents will be off duty, in 

training, or have annual or sick leave scheduled, thereby reducing the 

number of agents available for deployment during a shift.

To assess how Border Patrol has scheduled and deployed agents across 

the southwest border sectors, we analyzed the scheduled deployment 

data that supervisors entered into BPETS for fiscal years 2013 through 

2016. Supervisors enter data into BPETS in advance of a shift to track 

expected time and attendance. Supervisors record work status by 

indicating whether an agent will be working, off duty, or otherwise not 

working (for example, on annual leave or scheduled sick leave), and for 

agents who are working, the supervisors also record an assignment to 

which the agent is expected to be deployed that day. We analyzed these 

assignments to determine how agents’ work time was distributed among 

activities in the following categories:27

 27Supervisors record scheduled hours in BPETS based on a combination of four data 

fields: (1) work status, (2) activity, (3) subactivity, and (4) assignment. In coordination with 

Border Patrol officials, we paired the activity and subactivity options in BPETS and 

assigned each pair to the higher-order categories.
Page 18 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

• Operations and Patrol refers to frontline activities that involve identifying 

and apprehending illegal entrants and identifying and seizing contraband. 

Some specific examples include linewatch, sign cutting, and checkpoint 

duties.28

• Operational Support refers to activities, such as intelligence gathering or 

surveillance, that support frontline agents conducting operations and 

patrol activities.

• Processing refers to activities that occur after apprehending an individual, 

including transport, processing, detention, and removal.

• Legal Support and Litigation refers to activities, such as attending court 

proceedings, that involve prosecution of apprehended individuals.

• Training refers to activities that involve providing instruction, attending 

training, or completing qualification/certification tests.

• Administrative and Other Non-Enforcement Activities refers to activities 

other than those above, including public relations, hiring and recruitment, 

and policy and compliance.

Our analysis included time that agents were scheduled to be off duty or 

on scheduled leave because scheduled time off can affect supervisors’

deployment decisions by reducing the number of agents available on a 

particular day.

As shown in figure 5, agents were unavailable for deployment for a total 

of 42 percent of time (off duty time, scheduled non-work time, and 

training), and about 43 percent of agents’ time was scheduled for 

operations and patrol activities in the field.29 As an example, this means 

that a station with 300 total agents—with 100 agents assigned to each of 

three shifts—would have had on average about 42 of the 100 agents per 

shift unavailable because of planned time not working (off duty or other 

scheduled non-work time) or in training. Of the remaining 58 agents, on 

average, about 43 would have been scheduled to field-based operations 

and patrol activities, and 15 would have been assigned to other activities.

 28Linewatch involves maintaining surveillance from a covert position to detect, prevent, or 

apprehend illegal entrants at or near the land border. Sign cutting involves following 

tracks, marks, and other physical evidence to detect illegal entrants.

29Border Patrol provided us with scheduling data for fiscal year 2012; however the data 

are not comparable to more recent years because in March 2012 Border Patrol adjusted 

its scheduling processes to record agent time in hours rather than days and to allow agent 

time to be split across multiple assignments in a given day. As a result, we omitted fiscal 

year 2012 from the scope of our deployment scheduling data analysis.
Page 19 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 5: Percentage of Agent Hours Scheduled for Time Off and Deployment 

Activities for the Southwest Border, Fiscal Years 2013–2016

Legend: Operations and Patrol = frontline activities that involve identifying and apprehending illegal 

entrants and identifying and seizing contraband. Some specific examples include linewatch, sign 

cutting, and checkpoint duties; Operational Support = activities, such as intelligence gathering or 

surveillance, that support frontline agents conducting operations and patrol activities; Processing = 

activities that occur after apprehending an individual, including transport, processing, detention, and 

removal; Legal Support and Litigation = activities, such as attending court proceedings, that involve 

prosecution of apprehended individuals; Training = activities that involve providing instruction, 

attending training, or completing qualification/certification tests; Administrative and Other NonEnforcement = activities other than those above, including public relations, hiring and recruitment, 

and policy and compliance; Other Nonwork Time = time that agents are scheduled to be not working 

(other than time they are off duty) such as annual leave or scheduled sick leave.

Furthermore, it is important to note that BPETS deployment schedules 

reflect the scheduled availability and deployment of agents, rather than 

actual deployment. Actual availability or deployment may have differed 

because of changes in circumstances or other factors, and supervisors 

are not required to update BPETS to reflect these deployment changes.30

For example, an agent who was assigned to patrol the border might do so 

 30The data we analyzed document how agents are expected to be deployed on a given 

shift, at least 3 days in advance of that shift. According to Border Patrol officials, changes 

for an upcoming shift are normally updated and finalized just prior to the start of the shift,

but changes that occur after the shift starts may not always be reflected in the scheduling 

data.
Page 20 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

for part of a shift, but upon apprehending an illegal entrant the agent may 

spend some or all of the remainder of the shift processing the 

apprehended individual. According to Border Patrol officials, additional 

agents in the field may also be pulled from their patrol activities to 

conduct processing when large groups are apprehended.

Border Patrol station officials also make deployment decisions based on 

the unique geographical factors in their area of responsibility, such as 

proximity to population centers and access to certain areas (including 

remote areas where FOBs are located). In addition, whether the station is 

responsible for the operation of checkpoints is another factor that station 

officials consider in making decisions about how to most effectively use 

available agents for operations and patrol activities in the field.

Proximity to Population Centers

In relatively populated areas close to the border, the window of time 

Border Patrol has to respond to illegal crossings may be shorter than in 

more remote areas where agents may have more time to apprehend 

illegal crossers. Thus, proximity to population centers is a factor that 

officials consider when deciding how many agents to deploy to particular 

locations within a station’s area of responsibility. In February 2017, we 

reported that Border Patrol officials said that populated urban 

environments offer an advantageous setting for illegal entrants because 

within seconds to minutes these entrants can blend in with the local U.S. 

community after crossing the border. Therefore Border Patrol has 

intended to divert illicit cross-border activities into more remote or rural 

environments, where illegal entrants may require hours or days to reach 

the nearest U.S. community.31 For example, El Centro sector officials told 

us that an outlet mall located at the immediate border posed a threat in 

terms of the limited time it would take illegal crossers to assimilate into 

the population. Similarly, officials in one station in the Rio Grande Valley 

sector identified a town that is very close to the Rio Grande River, and 

Border Patrol agents must aim to apprehend crossers within a two to 

three block distance to prevent crossers from blending in with residents of 

 31GAO, Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing’s 

Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps, 

GAO-17-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2017). We have also previously reported on 

Border Patrol’s strategy to push illegal entrants into rural areas where they can be more 

easily apprehended. See GAO-09-824 and GAO, INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: 

Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 2, 2001).

Geography
Page 21 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

the town. Sector officials generally stated that stations prioritize 

deployment to areas along the immediate border.

Land and Road Access

Border Patrol may have limited access to certain areas because of land 

ownership or limited road infrastructure, and this may affect decisions 

about how to deploy agents (if at all) to these areas. Some sectors 

consist primarily of privately owned land, and Border Patrol officials must 

obtain permission from the landowner, or a judicial warrant, to access any 

private lands further than 25 miles from the border.32 Border Patrol 

officials in one sector noted that some landowners do not want Border 

Patrol on their property. Additionally, the availability and condition of road 

infrastructure can make it challenging for agents to get to some locations. 

For example, officials in sectors with mountainous terrain cited challenges 

related to accessing and patrolling mountainous areas. In particular, 

officials in the Tucson sector noted that the sector includes seven 

mountain ranges and estimated that about 20 percent of the 262 miles of 

land border in the sector are inaccessible by vehicle. As a result, these 

officials said that agents deployed to those areas patrol by foot, 

horseback, and air.

FOBs

In some areas where there are terrain and road access challenges, 

Border Patrol may establish FOBs to facilitate access to areas near the 

immediate border and enable agents to spend a greater proportion of 

their shifts on patrol. Border Patrol sector officials in the five sectors that 

currently operate at least one FOB, as well as officials in one other sector 

that previously operated a FOB, said that FOBs are beneficial for 

maximizing patrol time in difficult to reach locations. Assigning agents to 

these locations on temporary duty assignments reduces the portion of an 

agent’s shift that is spent in transit between the station and the patrol 

location. For example, officials in one sector said that the transit time 

between the station and the FOB is a 5 to 6 hour round trip. Thus, transit 

to that location could comprise 50 to 60 percent of a shift for agents 

 32Border Patrol agents have the authority, without a warrant, to enter private lands (but not 

dwellings) within 25 miles of the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United 

States and to search a railway car, aircraft, or vehicle for aliens within 100 miles of the 

border. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2); for additional authorities, 

including those not specifically limited by distance from the border, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1225, 1357; 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1581, 1589a, 1595(b); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1.
Page 22 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

deployed to that patrol area if they were to report to the station each day 

prior to beginning their patrol duties. Instead, agents travel between the 

station and the FOB only as part of the first and last day of their multi-day 

assignment to the FOB, and on the days in between they are prepositioned at the FOB to begin patrols at the start of their shift.

Although FOBs can help facilitate access to some remote locations, there 

can also be associated challenges, and therefore, they may not be an 

effective solution in all cases to improving access to remote areas. For 

example, officials in one sector noted that Border Patrol had considered 

establishing a FOB to improve accessibility to that location, but there 

were challenges to securing the rights to access private property and 

providing for adequate facilities given that the area of interest did not 

have infrastructure to supply water to the FOB if it were to be built. In 

February 2016, the DHS Office of the Inspector General reported that

although the challenge of supplying water to FOBs rarely causes Border 

Patrol to shut down a FOB, it is a frequent problem that often requires 

additional resources to resolve.33 Additionally, some remote or difficult to 

access locations may be located on private or tribal lands, which require 

Border Patrol to negotiate access and other aspects of FOB operations, 

or on wildlife refuges, which may have limitations regarding the types of 

infrastructure or operations in order to preserve the local habitat.

Checkpoints

Stations that have responsibility for checkpoints in their areas of 

responsibility consider checkpoint operations in their deployment 

decisions. Border Patrol’s checkpoints policy includes a recommended 

minimum number of agents to operate the checkpoint. The nature of a 

checkpoint—whether it is permanent or tactical—can also affect 

deployment. Permanent checkpoints are generally intended to be 

operational most of the time, meaning that stations with responsibility for 

permanent checkpoints generally assign at least the minimum number of 

agents to those checkpoints to ensure continuous operation.34 In contrast, 

tactical checkpoints are intended to be set up for short-term or intermittent 

use. Accordingly, a station can make a decision about whether to operate 

 33DHS Office of the Inspector General, OIG-16-37.

34Border Patrol policy states that checkpoint operations should be suspended if either 

agents or the public are in danger of being injured. Conditions that could pose such a 

danger include traffic congestion or weather.
Page 23 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

a tactical checkpoint based on a determination of whether it is more 

effective to staff the checkpoint or whether it is more effective to deploy 

those agents elsewhere. Stations with responsibility for both the 

immediate border and interior checkpoints must balance agent 

deployment across both responsibilities. In contrast, border stations that 

do not contain checkpoints in their areas of responsibility do not have to 

distribute agents between checkpoint and patrol activities. Similarly, 

interior stations that do not have responsibility for the border can prioritize 

checkpoints.

Additionally, for stations with checkpoints, supervisors must determine 

how many agents, if any, to deploy to the areas around a checkpoint 

through which illegal entrants or smugglers may travel to circumvent the 

checkpoint (known as circumvention routes). We reported in August 2009 

that Border Patrol policy highlights the need to detect and respond to 

circumvention activity, but at the time, officials stated that other priorities 

sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum number of agents 

and resources in checkpoint circumvention routes.35 Similarly, as part of 

this review, sector officials said checkpoint circumvention routes may not 

be patrolled at all times because of the need to deploy agents elsewhere, 

including to the checkpoint itself to meet the minimum number of agents 

needed to keep the checkpoint operational. According to officials, in some 

locations, sensors and cameras assist with monitoring traffic in 

circumvention routes, and when technology detects traffic, agents can be 

deployed to respond.

In our August 2009 report, we reported that checkpoint performance can 

be hindered by limited staffing at checkpoints. Border Patrol policy 

recommended the minimum number of agents for checkpoint operation, 

but sector managers may have had other priorities for staff placement, 

and thus stations may have only staffed checkpoints—and circumvention 

routes—with the minimum number of agents. Additionally, as part of that 

review, we found that design and planning documents for the planned 

Interstate 19 checkpoint in the Tucson sector did not include an estimate 

of the number of agents who would be deployed to address circumvention 

activity at the new checkpoint. We recommended that, in connection with 

planning for new or upgraded checkpoints, CBP should conduct a 

workforce planning needs assessment for checkpoint staffing allocations 

 35GAO-09-824.
Page 24 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

to determine the resources needed to address anticipated levels of illegal 

activity around the checkpoint.

In January 2017, Border Patrol began construction of a new checkpoint 

facility on U.S. Highway 281 south of Falfurrias, Texas, that will replace 

the existing checkpoint. The current checkpoint has a maximum of five 

lanes of traffic, whereas the new checkpoint will have a maximum of eight 

lanes. Border Patrol provided us an estimate for the number of agents, 

supervisors, and canine units that are expected to be needed to operate 

the new checkpoint; however, the information provided lacked supporting 

details, such as a discussion of what data were collected and how the 

data were analyzed to determine how many agents would be needed to 

staff the checkpoint and the surrounding circumvention routes.36 Given 

existing staffing constraints, having an accurate workforce planning needs 

assessment is important to inform future considerations for how to deploy 

agents to address anticipated levels of illegal activity at and around the 

checkpoint. Therefore, we continue to believe this recommendation is 

warranted.

Sector officials said they consider intelligence information—such as 

information about illegal traffic patterns and data on apprehensions and 

seizures; the types of threats in the area (e.g., illegal border crossing, 

drug smuggling); and transnational criminal organizations’ tactics, 

techniques, and procedures—when determining where to deploy 

available agents. Officials said they also receive information on suspected 

illegal traffic from community members, and stations may deploy agents 

to respond.

 36Valid and reliable data are critical to assessing an agency’s workforce requirements as 

part of strategic human capital planning. For more information, see GAO, A Model of 

Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2002).

Intelligence Information about 

Illegal Traffic Patterns
Page 25 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

From fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the nine southwest border sectors 

varied in how they distributed work time scheduled to activities in the six 

categories previously discussed—(1) operations and patrol, (2) 

operational support, (3) processing, (4) legal support and litigation, (5) 

training, and (6) administrative and other non-enforcement—although all 

the sectors scheduled the majority of agents’ time (between 61 and 77 

percent) to operations and patrol activities.37 As shown in figure 6, the Rio 

Grande Valley sector scheduled the smallest percentage of agents’ work 

time to operations and patrol activities (61 percent) and the highest 

percentage of time to processing (13 percent). As discussed later in this 

report, the Rio Grande Valley had the highest number of apprehensions 

out of the nine southwest border sectors from fiscal year 2012 through 

2016, thereby affecting the time needed for processing or otherwise 

attending to apprehended individuals.38

 37These categories represent scheduled work time. In analyzing variations in deployment 

by sector, we focused on how agents who were scheduled to work were deployed. As 

such, our analysis by sector does not include comparisons of off duty time and other nonwork time, such as annual leave.

38In November 2016, Border Patrol announced that it was detailing 150 agents from the 

Tucson, San Diego, and Del Rio sectors to processing centers in the Rio Grande Valley in 

light of recent increases in apprehensions along the southwest border.

Sectors Vary in How Much 

Time Agents Are 

Scheduled for Operations 

and Patrol Activities and 

Where Such Activities Are 

Scheduled to Occur
Page 26 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 6: Distribution of Border Patrol Agents’ Scheduled Work Time, by Sector, Fiscal Years 2013–2016

Legend: Operations and Patrol = frontline activities that involve identifying and apprehending illegal 

entrants and identifying and seizing contraband. Some specific examples include linewatch, sign 

cutting, and checkpoint duties; Operational Support = activities, such as intelligence gathering or 

surveillance, that support frontline agents conducting operations and patrol activities; Processing = 

activities that occur after apprehending an individual, including transport, processing, detention, and 

removal; Legal Support and Litigation = activities, such as attending court proceedings, that involve 

prosecution of apprehended individuals; Training = activities that involve providing instruction, 

attending training, or completing qualification/certification tests; Administrative and Other NonEnforcement = activities other than those above, including public relations, hiring and recruitment, 

and policy and compliance.

The scheduling data also show variations in the locations where sectors 

plan to deploy agents to operations and patrol activities in proximity to the 

border. Specifically, as shown in figure 7, the sectors ranged from 

scheduling 34 to 61 percent of operations and patrol time in border zones 

(for the Big Bend and Rio Grande Valley sectors, respectively) and from 

17 to 52 percent of operations and patrol time in non-border zones (for 

the Del Rio and Big Bend sectors, respectively). In some cases, the data 

do not include a zone assignment, and sectors varied in what percentage 
Page 27 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

of operations and patrol scheduling assignments did not have a zone 

assignment. Including a zone assignment is not required by Border Patrol 

policy, and headquarters and sector officials identified some possible 

reasons why an assignment may not include a zone. For example, 

officials said that an agent could be deployed to an activity that has 

responsibility for multiple zones or no specific zone, such as roving patrol, 

specialty units (such as an intelligence unit or special operations), or 

assisting CBP’s Air and Marine Operations. Officials from one sector 

noted that a zone may not be assigned in the data because supervisors 

assign them orally when agents arrive at the start of a shift, and this 

provides supervisors flexibility to make the assignments based on the 

most up-to-date information about traffic patterns. Border Patrol 

headquarters officials said that the reasons for variations in border zone 

deployment are the same as we previously reported in December 2012—

specifically, differences in geographical factors among the southwest 

border sectors (such as varying topography, ingress and egress routes, 

and land access issues, and structural factors such as technology and 

infrastructure deployments) that can affect how sectors operate and may 

preclude closer deployment to the border.39

 39GAO-13-25.
Page 28 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 7: Percentage of Border Patrol Agents’ Time for Operations and Patrol Scheduled for Different Zone Types, Fiscal 

Years 2013–2016

Note: This analysis is not comparable to a similar analysis we reported in December 2012. See GAO, 

Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet In Place to Inform Border Security Status 

and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2012). For our December 2012 report, 

we reported on zone assignments across all agent activities, whereas the data in this report reflect 

zone assignments for a subset of agent time scheduled for operations and patrol activities. 

Additionally, in fiscal year 2012, Border Patrol changed the way it recorded scheduling data to allow 

supervisors to break up an agent’s workday by assigning hours to one or more activities, whereas 

previously supervisors could only assign a full workday to one activity.

Sectors also varied in terms of the proportion of operations and patrol 

time scheduled for checkpoint-related activities.40 Across the nine 

southwest border sectors from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2016, 

approximately 9.4 percent of agents’ time scheduled for operations and 

patrol was scheduled for checkpoint activities. However, the number of 

agent hours scheduled for checkpoint activities—and what percentage of 

operations and patrol time these hours represent—vary by sector 

 40Border Patrol’s data include three types of activities related to checkpoints: an activity 

for general checkpoint responsibilities, an activity for supervisory responsibilities at 

checkpoints, and an activity for canine team assignments to checkpoints.
Page 29 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

because of differences in factors, such as the number of checkpoints in a 

sector, the relative size of checkpoints, and the overall number of agents 

in a sector. For example, as shown in table 2, the El Centro and Big Bend 

sectors scheduled a similar number of hours to checkpoint-related 

activities, but these hours represented different percentages of total 

scheduled operations and patrol activities time—13.9 percent and 21.0 

percent, respectively—which partly reflects that the El Centro sector has 

almost double the number of agents and fewer checkpoints than the Big 

Bend sector.

Table 2: Agent Hours Scheduled for Southwest Border Checkpoints, by Sector, Fiscal Years 2013–2016

Sector Number of checkpoints Number of agent 

hours scheduled for 

checkpoint activities

Number of agent hours 

scheduled for all 

operations and patrol 

activities

Percent of operations 

and patrol scheduled 

time assigned to 

checkpoints

Permanent Tactical

San Diego 6 20 1,182,904 12,256,126 9.7

El Centro 2 3 684,753 4,925,938 13.9

Yuma 3 8 643,517 4,314,316 14.9

Tucson 0 15 1,577,446 21,624,421 7.3

El Paso 7 9 1,688,869 13,777,824 12.3

Big Bend 4 24 683,440 3,260,394 21.0

Del Rio 5 14 497,708 8,765,982 5.7

Laredo 5 9 702,604 10,118,891 6.9

Rio Grande Valley 2 1 1,084,344 14,333,928 7.6

Total across all 

southwest border 

sectors

34 103 8,745,585 93,377,820 9.4

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50

Note: Hour amounts are rounded to the nearest whole hour.
Page 30 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, 33 percent of southwest border 

apprehensions were made one-half mile or less from the border, and over 

this time period apprehensions increasingly occurred closer to the border, 

as shown in figure 8. Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, 

apprehensions one-half mile or less from the border increased from 24 

percent to 42 percent. During the same time period, the percentage of 

apprehensions occurring more than 20 miles from the border steadily 

dropped, from 27 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 15 percent of all 

apprehensions in fiscal year 2016.

Apprehensions 

Occurred Closer to 

the Border in Fiscal 

Year 2016 Compared 

to Fiscal Year 2012, 

While Seizure 

Locations Remained 

Relatively Unchanged

Apprehensions
Page 31 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 8: Distribution of Southwest Border Apprehensions by Distance from the 

Border, Fiscal Years 2012–2016

Notes: Percentages may not total to 100 because of rounding.

These data exclude apprehensions with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

While all nine southwest border sectors exhibited this trend of an increase 

in apprehensions one-half mile or less from the border and a decrease in 

apprehensions farther than 20 miles from the border, the Rio Grande 

Valley sector had the greatest influence on the overall southwest border 

trend because that sector accounted for almost half (42 percent) of all 

southwest border apprehensions during this time period. Consistent with 

the overall trend for southwest border apprehensions in figure 8 above, 

the percentage of Rio Grande Valley sector apprehensions one-half mile 

or less from the border increased (from 27 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 

48 percent in fiscal year 2016) and the sector’s percentage of 

apprehensions more than 20 miles from the border decreased (from 30 

percent in fiscal year 2012 to 12 percent in fiscal year 2016). Appendix II 

provides more detailed information about trends in apprehensions by 

sector for fiscal years 2012 through 2016.

According to Border Patrol officials and apprehension data, one key driver 

for apprehensions occurring closer to the border is the increasing number 
Page 32 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

of apprehensions of children (either unaccompanied or as part of family 

units) from countries other than Mexico.41 We have previously reported 

that CBP officials have attributed high apprehension rates in the Rio 

Grande Valley sector to the high number of unaccompanied children and 

adults with children, many of whom turn themselves in to Border Patrol

without attempting to evade detection.

42 Officials said children are often 

told by smugglers to wait in specific locations where agents frequently 

patrol so that they will be found. According to Border Patrol officials, 

persons apprehended from Central America are often fleeing violence, 

and once apprehended they may assert claims for asylum in the United 

States.

As shown in table 3, apprehensions of individuals, particularly children, 

from Central American countries (specifically, El Salvador, Guatemala, 

and Honduras) increased, while apprehensions of Mexicans, including 

children, decreased. In particular, in the Rio Grande Valley sector, the 

number of children apprehended from El Salvador, Guatemala, and 

Honduras increased almost tenfold, from 6,869 in fiscal year 2012 to 

60,084 in fiscal year 2016. Such apprehensions also increasingly 

occurred closer to the border. In fiscal year 2016, Border Patrol 

apprehended 36,882 children from these countries (about 61 percent) 

one-half mile or less from the border, compared to 1,830 (about 27 

percent) in fiscal year 2012. Although other sectors accounted for smaller 

percentages of overall southwest border apprehensions, all sectors saw 

notable increases in the percent of apprehensions who were children 

from Central America and who were apprehended closer to the border. 

Border Patrol officials said other factors may also have contributed to the 

change in apprehension patterns, such as changes in where patrols 

occurred during the time period we analyzed.

 41Children are those under 18 years old. Border Patrol reported that 59,692 

unaccompanied alien children were apprehended in fiscal year 2016, in addition to 

children crossing the border as part of a family unit. Our analysis is of apprehensions 

where the person was under 18 and does not distinguish between unaccompanied 

children and those children in family units.

42GAO-17-331.
Page 33 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Table 3: Southwest Border and Rio Grande Valley Sector Apprehensions from Mexico and Select Central American Countries, 

Fiscal Years (FY) 2012 and 2016

Total Individuals (All Ages) 

Apprehended

Children Apprehended

FY 2012 FY 2016 FY 2012 FY 2016

All Southwest Border 

Sectors

All Apprehensions 355,553 405,755 30,745 101,288

From Mexico 261,366 189,267 18,918 13,731

From El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 86,400 197,966 11,051 84,710

Apprehensions one-half mile or less from the 

border

85,427 171,472 8,376 62,935

From Mexico 67,744 57,832 5,573 4,769

From El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 15,524 101,980 2,523 55,841

Rio Grande Valley Sector

All Apprehensions 97,449 186,271 12,564 65,011

From Mexico 47,670 46,191 5,470 4,170

From El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 46,156 134,221 6,869 60,084

Apprehensions one-half mile or less from the 

border

26,110 88,993 4,040 39,235

From Mexico 14,348 17,713 2,138 1,897

From El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 10,864 68,643 1,830 36,882

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50

Notes: The apprehension numbers for individuals from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 

Honduras and for children reflect data for which the country of citizenship was known. For fiscal years 

2012 through 2016, a total of 19 apprehension records were missing information on citizenship. We 

cannot determine to what extent these records may correspond to individuals from these selected 

countries.

These data exclude apprehensions with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, seizure locations 

remained roughly the same, with between 64 and 70 percent of seizures 

occurring 10 or more miles from the border each year and between 9 

percent and 11 percent of seizures occurring one-half mile or less from 

the border each year, as shown in figure 9.

Seizures
Page 34 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 9: Distribution of Southwest Border Seizures by Distance from the Border, 

Fiscal Years 2012–2016

Notes: Percentages may not total to 100 because of rounding.

These data exclude seizures with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates corresponding 

to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest border sectors.

Trends within individual sectors varied, but unlike with apprehensions, no 

single sector dominated the proportion of seizures to strongly influence 

the overall pattern for the southwest border. The greatest number of 

seizures during the 5 fiscal years occurred in the Tucson, Big Bend, and 

Rio Grande Valley sectors (34, 19, and 16 percent of all seizures 

respectively). These sectors each had different distributions of where 

seizures occurred, as shown in figure 10. In particular, about 1 percent of 

seizures in the Big Bend sector occurred within 1 mile of the border, 

compared to 13 percent of seizures in the Tucson sector and 37 percent 

of seizures in the Rio Grande Valley sector. Appendix III provides more 

detailed information about trends in seizures by sector for fiscal year 2012 

through fiscal year 2016.
Page 35 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 10: Percentage of Seizures by Distance From the Border for the Tucson, Big 

Bend, and Rio Grande Valley Sectors, Fiscal Years 2012–2016

Notes: Percentages may not total to 100 because of rounding.

These data exclude seizures with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates corresponding 

to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest border sectors.
Page 36 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

According to our analysis of Border Patrol data, checkpoints accounted 

for about 2 percent of apprehensions and almost half of seizures in 

southwest border sectors. However, determining the extent to which 

apprehensions and seizures farther from the border are attributable to 

checkpoints is difficult because of data quality issues that have persisted 

since we previously reported on checkpoints in August 2009.43 In that 

report, we found that Border Patrol had established a number of 

measures for checkpoint performance to inform the public on program 

results and provide management oversight, including measures related to 

apprehensions and seizures at checkpoints and on circumvention routes. 

However, we reported that information gaps and reporting issues 

hindered public accountability and that inconsistent data collection and 

entry hindered Border Patrol’s ability to monitor the need for program 

improvement. Specifically, we found that a lack of management oversight 

and unclear checkpoint data collection guidance resulted in the 

overstatement of checkpoint performance results in agency performance 

reports, as well as inconsistent data collection practices at checkpoints. 

For example, officials at some checkpoints were including apprehensions 

that occurred within a 2.5-mile radius of the checkpoints in their reporting 

of apprehensions at checkpoints, which led to inconsistent reporting 

across checkpoints. We reported that the lack of oversight and unclear 

data collection guidance hindered management’s ability to monitor the 

need for program improvement. We therefore recommended, among 

other things, that Border Patrol establish internal controls for 

 43GAO-09-824.

Long-Standing Data 

Quality Issues Make 

It Difficult to Precisely 

Measure 

Checkpoints’

Contributions to 

Apprehensions and 

Seizures

Checkpoints’ Role in 

Apprehensions and 

Seizures Is Difficult to 

Measure with Precision 

Because Of LongStanding Data Quality 

Issues
Page 37 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

management oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness 

of checkpoint performance data.44

In response to our recommendations, Border Patrol issued several 

memoranda in 2009 and 2010 related to the collection of checkpoint data, 

including guidance intended to distinguish between apprehensions and 

seizures occurring at checkpoints compared to those occurring in 

circumvention routes.45 In particular, these memoranda stated that:

• “At the checkpoint” is defined as the area including the checkpoint itself 

and the roadway prior to the checkpoint marked with cones and/or 

warning signs related to checkpoint operations (which, according to 

Border Patrol’s checkpoint policy, are to begin on the roadway one-half 

mile from the checkpoint itself).46 Apprehensions and seizures occurring 

at a checkpoint are to be recorded by selecting the appropriate 

checkpoint location from a dropdown list of landmarks (landmark data 

field).47

• “Circumvention” is defined as “any deviation from a normally used route 

of egress in order to avoid detection by a checkpoint,” and if an individual 

was apprehended while attempting to circumvent a checkpoint, the 

apprehension is to be recorded by marking a checkbox labeled 

“Circumvention App?” (There is no data field for seizures that indicates 

that Border Patrol seized contraband from someone attempting to 

circumvent a checkpoint, but the seizure can be associated with an 

apprehension or arrest record for the person carrying the contraband, 

 44As we reported in 2009, internal control standards require that agencies accurately 

record and report data necessary to demonstrate agency performance, and that they 

provide proper oversight of these activities. See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).

45The memorandum that defined how data for checkpoint and circumvention 

apprehension should be recorded was issued in October 2009. The memorandum that 

defined an occurrence at a checkpoint compared to a circumvention was issued in 

January 2010. In addition, an April 2016 memorandum reminded sector officials of the 

importance of recording accurate and consistent data.

46Based on this definition, we considered an apprehension to occur “at the checkpoint” if it 

occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint. 

47Sector officials define landmarks and which landmarks are checkpoints within e3 for 

their respective sectors. Border Patrol began recording GPS coordinates for 

apprehensions and seizures in 2011, and prior to that, landmarks were used to denote the 

general area where an apprehension occurred.
Page 38 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

and the apprehension or arrest record may have the “Circumvention 

App?” box checked.)

However, as discussed below, these memoranda have not fully 

addressed our recommendation because our analysis indicates that 

issues persist regarding the accuracy and consistency of data on 

checkpoint apprehensions and seizures. These issues continue to affect 

how Border Patrol monitors and reports on checkpoint performance 

results.

According to Border Patrol officials, since the implementation of these 

memoranda, Border Patrol has reported on apprehensions and seizures 

at checkpoints based solely on the landmark data field. Specifically, an 

apprehension or seizure event is reported as having occurred at a 

checkpoint if the landmark associated with the event corresponds to the 

landmark for a checkpoint (checkpoint landmark). In September 2016, the 

Border Patrol Chief testified before a congressional committee that 

Border Patrol apprehended 8,503 individuals and seized over 75,000 

pounds of drugs at checkpoints nationwide in fiscal year 2015, and the 

officials responsible for overseeing and analyzing the data said that these 

numbers were generated by determining the number of apprehensions 

and seizures associated with a checkpoint landmark.48 Furthermore, 

CBP’s fiscal year 2018 congressional budget justification noted that 

measurement of checkpoint activities—such as apprehensions at 

checkpoints—can gauge checkpoint operational effectiveness and 

provide insight into the effectiveness of the Border Patrol’s overall 

national border enforcement strategy. CBP reported in the budget 

justification that apprehensions at checkpoints ranged from 1.34 to 2.52 

percent of nationwide apprehensions across fiscal years 2013 through 

2016.

To assess Border Patrol’s efforts to implement our August 2009 

recommendation and determine the extent to which Border Patrol’s 

reporting of checkpoint statistics provides accurate information about 

enforcement actions at and around checkpoints, we analyzed 

 48Mark A. Morgan, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, Moving the Line of Scrimmage: Reexamining the Defense-in-Depth Strategy, testimony before the U.S. House of 

Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., September 13, 2016.
Page 39 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

apprehension and seizure data from fiscal years 2013 through 2016.49

For example, as shown in table 4, an apprehension or seizure event that 

occurred one-half mile or less from a checkpoint (according to the GPS 

coordinates of the event) and that was also associated with the nearest 

checkpoint landmark was considered category 1.

Table 4: Categories Describing the Relationship between Apprehension and Seizure (Event) Locations and Checkpoints

Category Global 

Positioning 

System (GPS) 

coordinates

Landmark 

associated with 

the event

Included in Border 

Patrol reporting of 

events at checkpoints

Implications for analysis and reporting of 

checkpoint activities

1 One-half mile or 

less from a 

checkpoint

Corresponds to 

the nearest 

checkpoint 

landmark

Yes Event occurred at a checkpoint—both the GPS 

coordinates and landmark indicate that the event 

occurred at a checkpoint.

2 One-half mile or 

less from a 

checkpoint

Corresponds to a 

location other 

than the nearest 

checkpoint 

landmark

No Event’s relation to a checkpoint is unclear—the GPS 

coordinates indicate that the apprehension or seizure 

occurred one-half mile or less from a checkpoint, but 

the landmark indicates that the apprehension or seizure 

did not occur at a checkpoint.

3 Farther than 

one-half mile 

from a 

checkpoint

Corresponds to 

the nearest 

checkpoint 

landmark

Yes Event’s relation to a checkpoint is unclear—the GPS 

coordinates indicate that the apprehension did not occur 

at a checkpoint, but Border Patrol’s reporting of 

apprehensions and seizures at checkpoints would 

consider these as occurring at checkpoints because of 

the landmark.

4 Farther than 

one-half mile 

from a 

checkpoint

Corresponds to a 

location other 

than the nearest 

checkpoint 

landmark

No Event did not occur at a checkpoint—both the GPS 

coordinates and landmark indicate that the 

apprehension or seizure did not occur at a checkpoint.

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data and policies. | GAO-18-50

Note: We based these categories on Border Patrol’s policy that “at a checkpoint” refers to the area 

including the checkpoint itself and the roadway prior to the checkpoint marked with cones and/or 

warning signs, which are to begin one-half mile from the checkpoint.

 49Specifically, for each apprehension and seizure record for this time period, we analyzed 

the landmark associated with the apprehension or seizure and the GPS coordinates. We 

also analyzed the use of the “Circumvention App?” field to determine the extent to which 

this field could be used to provide information about other effects of checkpoints. We 

assigned each apprehension and seizure (event) into one of four categories based on 

whether the GPS coordinates for the event occurred close enough to the GPS coordinates 

for a checkpoint to be considered “at a checkpoint” and whether the event’s landmark 

corresponds to the nearest checkpoint landmark. Our analysis of checkpoint 

apprehensions is limited to fiscal years 2013 through 2016 because Border Patrol began 

maintaining checkpoint lists for such historical analysis in fiscal year 2013.
Page 40 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Our analysis of Border Patrol data, as shown in table 5, indicates that at 

least 31,639 apprehensions and 30,449 seizures—those that are in 

category 1—occurred at checkpoints from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 

based on both the GPS coordinates and the landmarks associated with 

those apprehensions and seizures.50 These apprehension and seizure 

events would be considered as occurring “at checkpoint” for Border Patrol 

reporting purposes because a checkpoint landmark was associated with 

the event.

However, for the 19,759 apprehensions and 1,182 seizures in category 

2—which are not included in Border Patrol’s reporting—it is unknown 

what proportion should be considered “at a checkpoint.” This is because 

for each of these apprehensions and seizures, the associated landmark 

does not correspond to the nearest checkpoint landmark, even though the 

GPS coordinates indicate that these apprehensions and seizures 

occurred one-half mile or less from a checkpoint location. Border Patrol 

officials said that one reason why the checkpoint landmark might not be 

indicated for apprehensions and seizures that occur one-half mile or less 

from a checkpoint is if the checkpoint is nonoperational at the time. 

However, our analysis suggests that not all apprehensions and seizures 

recorded in category 2 would reflect instances of checkpoints being nonoperational. For example, about 30 percent of apprehensions that were 

one-half mile or less from the Falfurrias, TX, checkpoint (4,278 of 14,345 

apprehensions) did not use the landmark for that checkpoint. Border 

Patrol officials in the Rio Grande Valley sector said the Falfurrias 

checkpoint is rarely closed, so the checkpoint being closed does not fully 

explain why the relevant checkpoint landmark was not used. Because 

Border Patrol’s policies do not provide guidance about recording data 

differently when a checkpoint is operational or nonoperational, it is 

unclear what proportion of apprehensions or seizures in category 2 reflect 

inconsistent application of Border Patrol’s guidance versus instances of a 

checkpoint being nonoperational.

 50Sectors varied in the extent to which their apprehensions occurred at checkpoints. See 

appendix II for our checkpoint analysis of apprehensions by sector. 
Page 41 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Table 5: Southwest Border Checkpoint Apprehensions and Seizures by Location Category, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 

Location Category Number of 

apprehensions

(percent of total 

southwest border 

apprehensionsa)

Number of 

apprehensions with 

“Circumvention 

Apprehension?” box 

checkedb

Number of seizures

(percent of total 

southwest border 

seizuresa)

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the 

checkpoint and is associated with the landmark for 

the nearest checkpoint

31,639

(1.9 percent)

165 30,449

(43.3 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the 

checkpoint and is associated with a landmark for a 

location other than the nearest checkpoint

19,759

(1.2 percent)

592 1,182

(1.7 percent)

3. Occurred farther than one-half mile from the 

checkpoint and is associated with the landmark for 

the nearest checkpoint

1,746

(0.1 percent)

108 582

(0.8 percent)

4. Occurred farther than one-half mile from the 

checkpoint and is associated with a landmark for a 

location other than the nearest checkpoint

1,570,437

(96.7 percent)

27,682 38,123

(54.2 percent)

Total 1,623,581 28,547 70,336

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50

Note: These data exclude apprehensions and seizures with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS 

coordinates corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the 

southwest border sectors.

a

Percentages may not total to 100 because of rounding.

b

The number of apprehensions where the “Circumvention Apprehension?” box is checked is a subset 

within the overall number of apprehensions for each location category.

There are also inconsistencies in how Border Patrol is recording and 

reporting on apprehensions and seizures on potential circumvention 

routes. Events in category 3 appear to have occurred in circumvention 

routes rather than at checkpoints—they occurred farther than one-half 

mile from a checkpoint, and thus do not fit Border Patrol’s definition of an 

apprehension that occurs “at a checkpoint”—but because they are 

associated with a checkpoint landmark, Border Patrol’s reporting of 

events at checkpoints includes these apprehensions and seizures.

Additionally, officials responsible for compiling checkpoint data said that 

they have not analyzed the use of the “Circumvention App?” checkbox to 

separately determine apprehensions that occur around checkpoints. 

Although the GPS coordinates and associated landmarks suggest that 

apprehensions in category 4 are not related to checkpoints, there were 

over 27,000 apprehensions in this category that had the “Circumvention 

App?” box checked. However, these apprehensions have not been 

included in statistics related to checkpoints because Border Patrol’s 
Page 42 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

reporting to date has focused on events associated with checkpoint 

landmarks and has not separately analyzed or reported the number of 

apprehensions for which the “Circumvention App?” box was checked. In 

doing so, Border Patrol’s reporting does not differentiate between 

apprehensions that occurred at versus around a checkpoint. Border 

Patrol officials agreed that the agency’s policies could better differentiate 

between these areas and how to record data for events that occur in each 

location.

Examining apprehensions specific to an individual checkpoint further 

illustrates the inconsistencies in data recorded for checkpoints. Figure 11 

shows how apprehensions at and around one checkpoint have been 

recorded using GPS coordinates and landmarks, in relation to the onehalf mile radius around the checkpoint.

Figure 11: Maps of Apprehensions Surrounding Two Checkpoints, Fiscal Years 2013–2016

Notes: Not all apprehensions attributable to these checkpoints are visible on the maps due to multiple 

apprehensions occurring at the same location and apprehensions occurring beyond the scale of the 
Page 43 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

map. In particular, some of the apprehensions farther than one-half mile from the checkpoint and for 

which the landmark code matches the checkpoint are outside the area depicted.

These data exclude apprehensions with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

Border Patrol’s methodology for determining the number of 

apprehensions and seizures at checkpoints—which counts only 

apprehensions and seizures associated with checkpoint landmarks—may 

result in overstating or understating apprehensions and seizures that 

occurred at checkpoints; however, the precise number of apprehensions 

and seizures that occurred at checkpoints cannot be determined because 

of the data inconsistencies noted above. For example, Border Patrol’s 

reporting—such as in the Border Patrol Chief’s testimony or CBP’s fiscal 

year 2018 budget justification—may overstate apprehensions at 

checkpoints by including apprehensions in category 3, while it may 

understate apprehensions by not including some portion, or all, of the 

apprehensions in category 2. For the 4 fiscal years of data we analyzed, 

this means that Border Patrol’s methodology for attributing apprehensions 

to checkpoints would potentially overstate by 1,746 apprehensions (about 

0.1 percent of total southwest border apprehensions) and potentially 

understate by as many as 19,759 apprehensions (about 1.2 percent of 

total southwest border apprehensions). Although these numbers 

represent relatively small percentages of total southwest border 

apprehensions, they are important for the measurement of checkpoint 

apprehensions given that Border Patrol has generally reported that about 

2 percent of apprehensions occur at checkpoints, and in particular, 

adding 1.2 percentage points to the reported 2 percent would increase 

the reported contributions of checkpoints by about 50 percent.

Although Border Patrol issued guidance in 2009 and 2010 in response to 

our recommendation, our analysis demonstrates that this guidance does 

not provide sufficient clarity on how data are to be recorded, and as a 

result data quality issues have persisted. For example, Border Patrol’s 

guidance does not indicate what landmark should be used when an agent 

apprehends an individual who was attempting to circumvent a checkpoint. 

Additionally, Border Patrol has not provided sufficient oversight of the 

accuracy, consistency and completeness of checkpoint data since the 

guidance was issued. In July 2013, Border Patrol issued a memorandum 

to establish the Checkpoint Program Management Office (CPMO), and 

the memorandum tasked CPMO with overseeing checkpoint data quality 

and accuracy, among other things. However, CPMO was not officially 

formed until the summer of 2016 when we began this review. Officials 

noted that while Border Patrol staff had been consistently assigned to 
Page 44 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

oversee checkpoint data as a collateral duty, these assignments were not 

within an officially formed CPMO and there was no centralized oversight 

of checkpoint data or performance. The Associate Chief responsible for 

overseeing CPMO told us he had not been aware of the memorandum 

establishing CPMO until we requested checkpoint policies as part of this 

review, and he explained that CPMO had not been formally established 

under his predecessor at the time of the July 2013 memorandum.

In late summer 2016, the Associate Chief formally established CPMO 

with the two Border Patrol agents who were, at the time, assigned parttime to oversee checkpoints. However, the CPMO establishing memo 

called for two full-time staff members, and one of the staff assigned to 

CPMO part-time moved to another position within Border Patrol several 

months later. The first full-time staff person was assigned to CPMO in 

January 2017. In March 2017, CPMO officials said they agreed with our 

findings regarding inconsistent recording of checkpoint data, and they 

said they have drafted a policy to provide additional guidance, including 

how to distinguish how data are recorded for apprehensions and seizures 

that occur at the checkpoint versus around the checkpoint. The Assistant 

Chief for CPMO, in consultation with sector and data analysis officials, 

has drafted additional guidance for recording apprehensions and seizures 

data in a manner that differentiates between events that occurred at 

versus around checkpoints. According to this official, this guidance will be 

included in a larger update to Border Patrol’s checkpoint policy because 

the checkpoint policy was last updated in 2003. Border Patrol officials 

said they expect the updated checkpoint policy with additional data entry 

guidance and procedures will be in place by March 2018, following Border 

Patrol and CBP management review and approval and programming 

changes to Border Patrol’s data systems.

Having quality control procedures in place to accurately document 

apprehensions and seizures that occur at and around checkpoints is 

important to enable Border Patrol to measure checkpoint effectiveness 

and to make better deployment decisions about the extent to which 

circumvention routes should be staffed. Distinguishing between the 

locations of apprehensions and seizures, relative to checkpoints, would 

provide more visibility into illegal traffic patterns at and around 

checkpoints that can be used for staffing and other resource decisions. 

Until revised internal control practices are in place, including data 

collection guidance and sufficient oversight of the recording of the data, 

our 2009 recommendation that Border Patrol establish internal controls 

for management oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and 

completeness of checkpoint performance data remains warranted. As 
Page 45 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

part of our regular follow up on implementation of our recommendations, 

we will monitor Border Patrol’s progress in issuing and implementing the 

planned update to its checkpoint policy.

In addition to analyzing where apprehensions and seizures occurred, we 

analyzed marijuana seizure data to determine how seizures that occurred 

at checkpoints compared to those that occurred at other locations.51 As 

shown in figure 12, out of the 30,449 seizures that occurred at 

checkpoints, at least 12,214 (40 percent) were 1 ounce or less of 

marijuana52 seized from U.S. citizens.53 In contrast, seizures occurring at 

non-checkpoint locations were more often higher-quantities seized from 

aliens. For example, more than three-quarters of marijuana seizures at 

non-checkpoint locations were of over 50 pounds (25,792 out of 33,477 

 51We analyzed seizure data using the four location categories previously identified (based 

on GPS coordinates and landmarks), and because it is unknown the extent to which 

seizures in categories 2 and 3 are related to checkpoints, we focused on comparing 

category 1 seizures against category 4 seizures. Seizures in categories 2 and 3 represent 

a small percentage (1.7 percent and 0.8 percent, respectively) of seizures over the time 

period we analyzed. Furthermore, because the majority (about 92 percent) of all seizures 

from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 consisted of narcotics, and most (86 percent) of 

those narcotics seizures were marijuana, we compared marijuana seizures at checkpoints 

against marijuana seizures at other locations (non-checkpoint seizures). Our analysis of 

checkpoint seizures compared to other seizures is limited to fiscal years 2013 through 

2016 because Border Patrol began maintaining checkpoint lists for such historical analysis 

in fiscal year 2013. In comparing checkpoint and non-checkpoint seizures, we analyzed 

the quantities seized and the reported alienage or citizenship status, and removability, of 

the individuals arrested in connection with the seizure—in other words, whether the 

individuals were U.S. citizens, potentially removable aliens, or not subject to removal. See 

appendix III for the number of checkpoint seizures for each sector during the 4 years 

analyzed.

52Under federal law, anyone who is found in possession of marijuana in any amount may 

be subject to criminal prosecution. Possession with intent to manufacture, distribute or 

dispense a controlled substance carries more severe criminal penalties (21 U.S.C. § 841) 

in comparison to simple possession (21 U.S.C. § 844). Possession of a personal use 

amount of certain controlled substances, including marijuana (1 ounce or less), would 

generally subject an individual to a civil penalty. See 21 U.S.C. § 844a.

53As noted in figure 12, some seizures are not associated with a particular arrest or 

apprehension record, and in these cases we cannot determine the alienage or citizenship 

of the individual arrested in connection with the seizure. In particular, there were 2,952 

marijuana seizures at checkpoints not associated with a particular arrest or apprehension 

record, and 1,678 of these were for quantities of 1 ounce or less. 

Almost Half of Seizures 

that Occurred at 

Checkpoints Were One 

Ounce or Less of 

Marijuana from U.S. 

Citizens
Page 46 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

seizures).54 (Appendix III includes additional detail on the distribution of 

marijuana seizures by quantity seized.)

 54The majority of marijuana seizures at non-checkpoint locations (63 percent, or 21,205 

out of 33,477) were not associated with a particular arrest or apprehension record, and in 

these cases we cannot determine the alienage or citizenship of the individual arrested in 

connection with the seizure. Out of the 33,477 marijuana seizures at non-checkpoint 

locations, 7,583 were seized from a potentially removable alien, 2,588 were seized from a 

non-removable alien, 2,101 were from U.S. citizens, and the remaining 21,205 were not 

associated with a particular arrest or apprehension record.
Page 47 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 12: Breakdown of Seizures by Type of Seizure, Location of Seizure, and Individuals Associated with the Seizure, Fiscal 

Years 2013–2016

Notes: These data exclude apprehensions with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

a

The category for unspecified subject refers to a seizure for which a Border Patrol agent did not 

attribute the seizure to a particular individual who was arrested or apprehended in conjunction with 
Page 48 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

the seizure. Some examples when this might occur are if there were multiple people in the vehicle 

that contained the contraband or if Border Patrol found the contraband while it was unattended.

b

As discussed in this report, the relationship between some seizures and checkpoints is unclear 

because such seizures either (a) occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and were 

associated with a location other than the nearest checkpoint or (b) occurred farther than one-half mile 

from the checkpoint but were associated with the checkpoint location.

Border Patrol officials said that the primary purpose of checkpoints is to 

enforce immigration laws, but agents at checkpoints are also expected to 

take action when they incidentally encounter violations of other federal 

laws. In particular, they noted that when a trained canine alerts agents to 

the presence of a concealed human or substance the canine was trained 

to detect, agents are required to respond to the alert. Based on the 

canine alert, agents do not know until they conduct a search of the 

vehicle what the canine detected (concealed human or illicit substance) or 

what quantity of a substance might be present—and therefore, agents 

cannot determine prior to an inspection whether the occupants of the 

vehicle are travelling with what would generally be considered a personal 

use quantity of a substance or whether they are carrying larger quantities 

potentially with the intent to distribute, dispense, or manufacture.
Page 49 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Members of state and local law enforcement and business and 

community groups that we spoke to generally support Border Patrol’s 

efforts, but some raised concerns about checkpoint operations and the 

broader defense in depth strategy. Members of all three community 

groups we met with during our visits to the Rio Grande Valley and Tucson 

sectors generally supported Border Patrol. Additionally, officials from law 

enforcement agencies we interviewed generally said they had a positive 

working relationship with Border Patrol and that Border Patrol has played 

a role in limiting cross-border illicit activity in their communities. For 

example, one law enforcement official from the Tucson sector said that 

the community would be overwhelmed without Border Patrol’s efforts in 

the area, and another said that without the defense in depth approach, 

illegal activity would likely be worse, although this latter official noted 

there can be communication and coordination challenges in working with 

Border Patrol. Some residents and law enforcement officials we met with 

in the two sectors we visited said that they support Border Patrol’s use of 

checkpoints. For example, the leader of one community group said the 

group’s members viewed checkpoints positively, and members from 

another group said that some residents in their community believe that 

their local checkpoint is making the community safer through law 

enforcement presence.

However, Border Patrol’s defense in depth deployment strategy may also 

result in communities ranging up to 100 miles from the border 

experiencing effects associated with Border Patrol enforcement actions to 

interdict illicit cross-border activity. In April 2015, we reported that illicit 

cross-border activity can negatively affect business and the safety of 

Collecting Additional 

Data Could Improve 

Border Patrol’s 

Existing Efforts to 

Identify and Respond 

to Community 

Concerns Regarding 

the Defense in Depth 

Strategy

Defense in Depth 

Strategy’s Effects on 

Surrounding Communities 

are Difficult to Quantify, 

but Collecting Additional 

Data Could Inform Actions 

to Address Such Effects
Page 50 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

farms and ranches on or near the border.55 Although data are limited to 

support the extent of criminal activity tied to cross-border illegal traffic, 

available data indicate that cross-border traffic affects areas beyond the 

immediate border. For example, in fiscal year 2016, 20 percent of all 

Border Patrol apprehensions and 77 percent of all seizures occurred 

more than five miles from the border. Therefore, illegal crossers and drug 

smugglers may sometimes travel near or through communities and 

private property in areas that are not along the immediate the border, 

prior to being apprehended by Border Patrol. For example, members of 

one community group we interviewed said that there are hundreds of 

illegal crossers and smugglers who attempt to circumvent the local 

checkpoint by walking through the surrounding ranches. Echoing views 

from ranchers we interviewed for a December 2012 report,56 members of 

one community group we spoke with as part of this review said that they 

would like to see Border Patrol direct more enforcement efforts at the 

immediate border to prevent illegal crossers from entering their 

communities or properties. Officials we interviewed from two sheriffs’

departments in nearby counties said they have heard similar views from 

residents.

Community groups and law enforcement officials we met with as part of 

this review identified concerns regarding private property damage and 

public safety resulting from illegal cross border traffic, similar to concerns 

we have reported in the past.

• Private Property Damage: Community members have reported damage 

to private property suspected to have occurred as a result of individuals 

trying to illegally cross the border or Border Patrol enforcement actions. 

Border Patrol officials we spoke with in six of nine sectors cited concerns 

from community residents about illegal crossers and Border Patrol agents 

traveling on their private property. Additionally, officials from two sheriffs’

departments told us that ranchers in their communities have voiced 

complaints about damage on their properties resulting from illegal 

crossers or Border Patrol activity. These concerns are similar to concerns 

we identified in an April 2015 report, in which we reported that 

landowners had reported damage to private property—including broken 

 55GAO-15-399.

56GAO-13-25.
Page 51 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

gates, destroyed crops, and injured or lost livestock—as a result of 

individuals trying to illegally cross the border (see fig. 13).57

Figure 13: Mangled Gate Suspected to Have Been Caused by Illegal Border 

Crossers along Highway 281 in Brooks County, Texas

In addition to identifying damage suspected to be caused by illegal 

crossers, landowners we spoke with as part of that review also reported 

damage that may have resulted from Border Patrol’s enforcement efforts. 

We previously reported in April 2015 that some landowners had filed tort 

claims alleging damage to their property as a result of the conduct of an 

employee of Border Patrol or any CBP component that was acting within 

the scope of his or her official duties. Examples of such claims include 

CBP vehicles crashing through properties and damaging fences, gates, 

irrigation pipes, and crops.

 57GAO-15-399.
Page 52 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

• Public Safety: Additionally, according to Border Patrol and local law 

enforcement officials, illegal entrants and smugglers could pose a public 

safety risk to communities along the border or further inland. We 

previously reported in December 2012 that ranchers in the Tucson sector 

said they were most concerned about safety.58 Officials from law 

enforcement agencies that we interviewed as part of this current review 

said that crime resulting from illicit cross-border activity has affected 

border communities. In particular, law enforcement officials we spoke 

with cited drug smuggling (including recruiting juveniles to engage in drug 

smuggling), home invasions, burglaries, and vandalism. The effects 

related to public safety and private property associated with Border 

Patrol’s defense in depth strategy may be felt more acutely in 

communities near checkpoints; in particular, one of Border Patrol’s stated 

goals for checkpoints is to deter and disrupt smuggling efforts, and as a 

result, smuggling traffic may be pushed onto checkpoint circumvention 

routes, which may pass through these communities. We previously 

reported in August 2009 that Border Patrol officials acknowledge that this 

approach can adversely impact communities near checkpoints, and said 

that sometimes there were not enough agents in place to deter illegal 

activity or apprehend trespassers in surrounding areas.59 As noted earlier 

in this report, this remains true—checkpoint circumvention routes are not 

always patrolled.

We are unable to measure the extent Border Patrol’s defense in depth 

strategy has affected communities through measures such as crime rates 

or effects on property values. As part of previous reviews, we have 

reviewed information related to the impacts of illegal cross-border activity 

on local communities, including reports of property damage (such as tort 

claims) and available crime data. As a result, we have previously reported 

that methodological challenges existed and data were unavailable to 

substantiate the extent to which illegal border crossings and drug 

smuggling have affected local communities in terms of public safety and 

private property damage. In August 2009 we reported that a comparison 

of community impacts for the time before and after a checkpoint was 

established would require a complete set of historical data to develop a 

baseline understanding, before interpreting factors that can change the 

baseline. However, there are limited data sets for specific geographic 

areas around checkpoints, with county level data being the smallest 

possible geographic area, in many cases. For instance, in terms of crime 

 58GAO-13-25.

59GAO-09-824.
Page 53 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

data, officials from one police department in the Tucson sector told us 

that they did not track criminal activity committed by illegal entrants. In 

2011, as part of Border Patrol’s efforts to implement our August 2009 

recommendations, Border Patrol requested a study to identify the effects 

of checkpoints on nearby communities and develop an approach to 

measure these effects, and this study also noted data limitations that 

affect conclusions regarding the effects of checkpoints on surrounding 

communities.60

Implementing two of our August 2009 recommendations could help 

Border Patrol collect relevant data to examine the community effects of 

checkpoint operations specifically and take corresponding actions to 

respond to ongoing community concerns. In August 2009 we reported 

that Border Patrol had previously identified performance measures to 

examine the effect checkpoint operations have on quality of life in the 

surrounding communities, but the agency was not using these measures. 

As a result, Border Patrol was hindered in its ability to assess the impact 

of checkpoints on local communities. We recommended that Border 

Patrol (1) implement quality of life measures identified by Border Patrol to 

evaluate the impact that checkpoints have on local communities; and (2) 

use the information generated from the quality of life measures in 

conjunction with other relevant factors to inform resource allocations and 

address identified impacts.

Border Patrol agreed with the recommendations but has not yet fully 

implemented them. In 2010, Border Patrol asked a DHS Center of 

Excellence, co-led by the University of Arizona and the University of 

Texas at El Paso, to conduct a study to help address our 

recommendations. The resulting December 2012 report made several 

recommendations to Border Patrol on evaluating the impact of 

 60In 2014, at the request of Border Patrol, the National Center for Border Security and 

Immigration at the University of Arizona released a study that investigated the effect that 

the construction of a canopy on a checkpoint in the Tucson sector had on real estate 

values. A regression analysis provided marginally statistically significant evidence of 

downward pressure on housing prices south of the checkpoint following the canopy’s 

construction compared to housing prices north of the checkpoint. The analysis was 

focused on the difference in real estate prices in one geographic area before and after the 

construction of a canopy at one checkpoint, therefore any suggested effects from this one 

case study is not generalizable to apply to other checkpoints along the southwest border. 

Moreover, according to a written statement submitted to Congress by the study’s coauthor, because of limited data availability and the difficulty in isolating the checkpoint 

canopy’s effect from those of the housing crisis and other economic conditions, the results 

should be seen as suggestive rather than definitive. 
Page 54 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

checkpoints on local communities using quantitative measures and with 

maintaining regular contact with the public to elicit opinions on 

experiences with the checkpoint, both positive and negative. Border 

Patrol has since reported plans for implementing our recommendations 

but has revised the estimated completion dates several times. (See 

appendix I for more information about Border Patrol’s planned actions to 

address these recommendations.) As discussed later in this report, 

Border Patrol provides opportunities for members of the community to 

express concerns related to the defense in depth strategy since our 

previous review of checkpoint operations in 2009, however, some 

residents and local law enforcement officials near checkpoints we spoke 

to for this review remain concerned about the effects checkpoints may 

have on their communities. Measuring performance, such as quality of life

measures related to checkpoints, would give Border Patrol critical 

information on which to base decisions for improving checkpoint 

operations. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendations 

remain warranted.

Border Patrol uses a variety of methods to collect feedback from 

community members related to the defense in depth strategy. It receives 

feedback through direct communication and informal relationships, which 

are facilitated in part by communication and outreach events organized by 

sector Border Community Liaison (BCL) programs. Border Patrol initiated 

the BCL program in April 2011 in an effort to enhance Border Patrol’s 

relationships with landowners and the community as a whole. According 

to the July 2012 CBP implementation memo, the BCL program’s function 

and associated positions are intended to enhance CBP’s interaction with 

communities and provide a fact-based understanding of community 

views, concerns, and issues as they relate to CBP. According to Border 

Patrol officials, sector BCL agents interact with members of the local 

community to address complaints and also introduce the community to 

how Border Patrol operates so that there is a better understanding and 

relationship between Border Patrol agents and the surrounding 

community.

Each sector has its own BCL program designed to address complaints 

and improve the relationship between Border Patrol agents and the 

surrounding community, and the efforts within each program range from 

official events to informal communications. Sector and station BCL 

programs organize official events such as cook-offs, stakeholder events, 

and open houses where community members learn about Border Patrol’s 

activities and have the opportunity to share their concerns. As an 

Border Patrol Is Taking 

Steps to Identify and 

Respond to Community 

Concerns
Page 55 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

example of informal communications, Border Patrol officials from one 

station in the Rio Grande Valley sector told us that agents and officials 

make an effort to be very approachable to community members, as 

demonstrated through actions such as the station’s patrol agent in charge 

providing a personal cell phone number to local residents to facilitate 

direct communication.

In addition, every southwest border sector uses the Compliments and 

Complaints Management System (CCMS). The CCMS is a computerized 

system that allows users to log and track complaints or compliments. The 

CCMS is meant to identify trends and patterns in community comments to 

better address complaints and compliments, but Border Patrol officials 

have questioned its usefulness. Following a pilot program, in January 

2017, CCMS became a permanent program to all CBP offices that have 

interaction with the public. Comments can be entered directly by residents 

or by Border Patrol officials who have received feedback from the 

community. According to the memo, CBP also standardized the response 

time for compliments and complaints entered into the system throughout 

the agency. Agency officials are to send an acknowledgment of receipt 

within 5 business days and complete responses within 45 days.

Officials from six of nine sectors said they generally preferred the less 

formal methods of interacting with the community, as discussed above, 

compared to the CCMS. Some of the reasons they identified included that 

community members often prefer to speak with an agent instead of 

inputting their concern into a system, very few complaints or compliments 

are logged into the CCMS by residents, the system is not user friendly, 

and it is rarely used for data recall. According to a report generated by 

Border Patrol headquarters, there were 599 comments entered into the 

CCMS nationwide in calendar year 2016. Of those, 81 were compliments.

Border Patrol takes various actions to respond to community concerns it 

has identified, including considering the input of local stakeholders when 

making deployment decisions. For example, officials from the Tucson 

sector told us that agents engage with ranchers who have game cameras 

on their properties so station officials can consider the flow of illegal 

entrants or drug smugglers on their properties when making deployment 

decisions. Moreover, officials from the Rio Grande Valley sector said that 

sector and station officials take into account population centers when 

making deployment decisions to attempt to deploy agents in positions to 

apprehend entrants prior to reaching population centers because once 

they enter the general population they are more difficult to detect and 

apprehend. Additionally, community members and Border Patrol officials 
Page 56 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

told us that agents respond to calls of suspected illegal cross-border 

activity on private lands. Border Patrol has various mechanisms in place 

for community members to notify agents of suspected activity. For 

example, one station in the Rio Grande Valley sector created a mobile 

phone application and released a limited number of licenses for ranchers 

and landowners to take a picture if they see suspicious activity and send 

it directly to Border Patrol. Moreover, landowners in the Rio Grande 

Valley sector told us that Border Patrol has been responsive to calls when 

something out of the ordinary has been spotted on private land.

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security 

for their review and comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix 

IV, DHS provided an update on planned actions to implement the four 

open recommendations from our August 2009 report. DHS also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix V.

Rebecca Gambler

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Agency Comments
Appendix I: Status of GAO Recommendations 

Related to Checkpoints

Page 57 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

In August 2009, we reported on and made recommendations regarding 

the measurement of checkpoint performance and the impact of 

checkpoint operations on nearby communities, among other things 

related to checkpoints.1 In comments provided on our August 2009 report, 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with those 

recommendations. This appendix provides additional detail regarding the 

status of the recommendations from that report, including two 

recommendations that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 

implemented.

Recommendation 1: Establish milestones for determining the feasibility 

of a checkpoint performance model that would allow the Border Patrol to 

compare apprehensions and seizures to the level of illegal activity 

passing through the checkpoint undetected.

Status: Closed – Implemented

In August 2009, we reported that the Border Patrol had developed some 

useful measures of checkpoint performance, but the agency lacked a 

model or method that would allow the agency to compare the number of 

apprehensions and seizures made at the checkpoint to the level of illegal 

activity passing through the checkpoint undetected. The lack of this 

information challenged the Border Patrol’s ability to measure checkpoint 

effectiveness and provide public accountability. In 2010, Border Patrol 

asked a DHS Center of Excellence to study checkpoint performance, 

including developing a checkpoint performance model, and the DHS 

Center of Excellence issued its report in December 2012. In June 2013, 

Border Patrol reported that the agency had considered the checkpoint 

performance models proposed by the National Center for Border Security 

and Immigration—the DHS Center of Excellence—but determined it was 

not feasible to use the proposed models due to cost prohibitions and 

other factors. This action was responsive to the intent of our 

recommendation to study the feasibility of a checkpoint performance 

model, and this recommendation has been closed as implemented.

Recommendation 2: Establish internal controls for management 

oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of checkpoint 

performance data.

 1

GAO, Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but More 

Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness, 

GAO-09-824 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2009).

Appendix I: Status of GAO 

Recommendations Related to Checkpoints
Appendix I: Status of GAO Recommendations 

Related to Checkpoints

Page 58 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Status: Open

In August 2009, we reported on inconsistencies in the way agents 

collected and entered performance data into the checkpoint information 

system. As a result, data reported in the system were unreliable. In 

October 2009, Border Patrol issued a memorandum specifying which 

data fields agents should use to indicate that an enforcement activity 

occurred at a checkpoint (or on a circumvention route, for 

apprehensions), and in January 2010 Border Patrol issued an additional 

memorandum on checkpoint data integrity that further specified 

definitions for “at the checkpoint” and “circumvention.” In subsequent 

years, Border Patrol officials reported to us that they were taking steps to 

develop a redesigned checkpoint information system, implement a data 

oversight procedure, and provide training, and estimated completion 

dates were revised several times. In its comments on this report (see app. 

IV), DHS stated that it expects to issue an updated checkpoint policy, 

including updates on data entry guidance and oversight to address data 

integrity, by February 28, 2018. As discussed earlier in this report, data 

quality issues have persisted, and without established internal controls, 

the integrity of Border Patrol’s performance and accountability system 

with regard to checkpoint operations remains uncertain.

Recommendation 3: Implement the quality of life measures that have 

already been identified by the Border Patrol to evaluate the impact that 

checkpoints have on local communities. Implementing these measures 

would include identifying appropriate data sources available at the local, 

state, or federal level, and developing guidance for how data should be 

collected and used in support of these measures.

Status: Open

In August 2009, we reported that Border Patrol had identified some 

measures to evaluate the impact that checkpoints have on local 

communities in terms of quality of life, but Border Patrol had not 

implemented the measures. As a result, the Border Patrol lacked 

information on how checkpoint operations could affect nearby 

communities. In October 2009, the Border Patrol reported that it was 

reevaluating its checkpoint performance measures, including quality of life 

measures. In December 2012, the DHS Center of Excellence completed 

a study for CBP on checkpoints. This study made several 

recommendations to Border Patrol on evaluating the impact of 

checkpoints on local communities using quantitative measures and with 

maintaining regular contact with the public to elicit opinions on 
Appendix I: Status of GAO Recommendations 

Related to Checkpoints

Page 59 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

experiences with the checkpoint, both positive and negative. At the time, 

the Border Patrol noted it intended to develop quantitative measures on 

community impact, such as on public safety and quality of life, using 

information collected in the new checkpoint information system it was 

planning. Border Patrol also noted that it was considering the budgetary 

feasibility of (1) conducting a survey of checkpoint travelers to gather 

detailed information about the community and impact metrics that are of 

highest importance to the public and (2) implementing an expedited lane 

for regular and pre-approved travelers. In July 2014, the Border Patrol 

revised the expected completion date for its actions to address this 

recommendation to March 2015, noting that it planned to request ideas 

from the field commanders on what the agency could measure that would 

accurately depict the impact of checkpoints on the community. In June 

2015, Border Patrol revised the expected completion date to September 

2015. In September 2016, officials from Border Patrol’s Checkpoint 

Program Management Office said quality of life measures had not been 

implemented and they were not aware of any plans to develop and 

implement such measures. In its comments on this report (see app. IV), 

DHS stated that it expects to establish performance measures related to 

community impacts by February 28, 2018. As noted earlier in this report, 

residents and local law enforcement officials near checkpoints we spoke 

to for this review remain concerned about the effects checkpoints may 

have on their communities. Measuring performance, such as quality of life 

measures related to checkpoints, would give Border Patrol critical 

information on which to base decisions for improving checkpoint 

operations.

Recommendation 4: Use the information generated from the quality of 

life measures in conjunction with other relevant factors to inform resource 

allocations and address identified impacts.

Status: Open

In August 2009, we reported that while the Border Patrol’s national 

strategy cites the importance of assessing the community impact of 

Border Patrol operations, the implementation of such measures was 

lacking in terms of checkpoint operations. In October 2009, the Border 

Patrol reported that once it had completed an upgrade of its existing 

checkpoint data systems and had reevaluated its checkpoint performance 

measures, the agency would begin using information garnered by these 

performance measures to inform future resource allocation decisions. 

This was originally expected to be completed by September 30, 2010, but 

due to budgetary and other issues, the checkpoint system upgrades were 
Appendix I: Status of GAO Recommendations 

Related to Checkpoints

Page 60 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

not yet completed as of June 2013. Border Patrol then reported to us in 

June 2013 that the redesigned and upgraded checkpoint information 

system was expected to be implemented in September 2014, but this 

system has not been developed or implemented, and in September 2016, 

officials from Border Patrol’s Checkpoint Program Management Office 

stated that they were not aware of any planned or completed actions to 

address this recommendation. In its comments on this report (see app. 

IV), DHS stated that it expects to establish performance measures related 

to community impacts by February 28, 2018, and that these measures will 

be used to inform resource allocation decisions. As noted earlier in this 

report, residents and local law enforcement officials near checkpoints we 

spoke to for this review remain concerned about the effects checkpoints 

may have on their communities. Measuring performance, such as quality 

of life measures related to checkpoints, would give Border Patrol critical 

information on which to base decisions for improving checkpoint 

operations.

Recommendation 5: Require that current and expected traffic volumes 

be considered by the Border Patrol when determining the number of 

inspection lanes at new permanent checkpoints, that traffic studies be 

conducted and documented, and that these requirements be explicitly 

documented in Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines and standards.

Status: Closed – Implemented

In August 2009, we reported that Border Patrol did not conduct traffic 

studies when designing three recently constructed checkpoints. As a 

result, we could not determine if the Border Patrol complied with its 

checkpoint design guidelines to consider current and future traffic 

volumes when determining the number of inspection lanes at the three 

checkpoints. In the absence of documented traffic studies, the Border 

Patrol could not determine if the number of inspection lanes at each of 

these checkpoints was consistent with current and projected traffic 

volumes, or if a different number of lanes would have been more 

appropriate. On October 28, 2009, the Border Patrol finalized an 

addendum to the Border Patrol Facilities Design Standard, which requires 

the Border Patrol to acquire, document, and utilize traffic study data 

collected by the state Departments of Transportation regarding current 

and projected traffic volumes on roadways where permanent checkpoints 

are to be constructed. The traffic studies are to be documented by the 

Border Patrol and utilized as the baseline requirement to determine the 

number of inspection lanes at new permanent checkpoints, and therefore 

this recommendation has been closed as implemented.
Appendix I: Status of GAO Recommendations 

Related to Checkpoints

Page 61 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Recommendation 6: In connection with planning for new or upgraded 

checkpoints, conduct a workforce planning needs assessment for 

checkpoint staffing allocations to determine the resources needed to 

address anticipated levels of illegal activity around the checkpoint.

Status: Open

In August 2009, we reported that Border Patrol’s checkpoint strategy to 

push illegal crossers and smugglers to areas around checkpoints—which 

could include nearby communities—underscores the need for the Border 

Patrol to ensure that it deploys sufficient resources and staff to these 

areas. In October 2009, Border Patrol reported that the agency was 

evaluating its checkpoint policy regarding the establishment of a new 

checkpoint or the upgrade of an old checkpoint, and checkpoint policy 

changes would be finalized by September 30, 2010. Border Patrol also 

reported that checkpoint system upgrades that capture data on 

checkpoint performance would help management determine future 

resource needs at checkpoints. In June 2013, Border Patrol reported that 

due to budget and other issues, the checkpoint system upgrade had not 

been completed, and the rewritten checkpoint data protocol had not been 

approved. In June 2013, Border Patrol reported that as part of the 

checkpoint study conducted by the DHS Center of Excellence, the Center 

created checkpoint simulation tools that would help inform resource 

allocations when determining the number of inspection lanes on current 

or new checkpoints. The Border Patrol agreed with the utility of such a 

model, but noted that the Border Patrol would need to purchase modeling 

software—a cost-prohibitive measure in the current budget environment. 

In the interim, Border Patrol is developing a formal workforce staffing 

model to identify staffing strategies for all Border Patrol duties. Border 

Patrol expected to implement this model for checkpoint staffing 

assignments in fiscal year 2014. However, in July 2014, Border Patrol 

reported that the Border Patrol’s Personnel Requirements Determination 

project was still being developed and that process would inform staffing at 

checkpoints, although the project is not specific to checkpoint staffing 

needs. As a result, Border Patrol revised its expected implementation 

date to September 2015. However, according to the Border Patrol official 

overseeing the project, subsequent changes in leadership and factors 

unrelated to checkpoints have affected the overall time frames for the 

Personnel Requirements Determination project. In September 2016, 

Border Patrol officials reported that the agency’s Personnel Requirements 

Determination process would not provide information on staffing needs 

until fiscal year 2017 or 2018. In its comments on this report (see app. 

IV), DHS stated that it expects to use information from the Personnel 
Appendix I: Status of GAO Recommendations 

Related to Checkpoints

Page 62 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Requirements Determination process to determine staffing requirements 

and address our recommendation by September 30, 2019. Given that 

local residents continue to express concerns about the impacts of 

checkpoints on communities, conducting a needs assessment when 

planning for a new or upgraded checkpoint could help better ensure that 

officials consider the potential impact of the checkpoint on the community 

and plan for a sufficient number of agents and resources.
Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Page 63 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

This appendix contains additional detail about trends in southwest border 

apprehensions from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, including trends in 

the:

• number of apprehensions by sector,

• distribution of apprehensions by sector and by distance from the border, 

and

• distribution of apprehensions by sector and by proximity to checkpoints.

From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, Border Patrol apprehended a total 

of almost 2 million individuals in southwest border sectors.1 The number 

of apprehensions over this period rose to a peak in fiscal year 2014, 

declined in fiscal year 2015, and rose again in fiscal year 2016. Over this 

5-year period, about two-thirds of the apprehensions occurred in the Rio 

Grande Valley and Tucson sectors (42 percent and 23 percent, 

respectively), and the Rio Grande Valley sector accounted for an 

increasing percentage of total southwest border apprehensions over this 

time period (from 27 percent of all southwest border apprehensions in 

fiscal year 2012 to 46 percent of apprehensions in fiscal year 2016). As 

shown in figure 14, apprehensions also increased in five other sectors, 

but the other sectors represented consistently smaller percentages of all 

apprehensions over the 5-year period.2

 1

Border Patrol records data on each individual the agency arrests, including certain 

information about the individual (e.g., age, citizenship), the Global Positioning System 

(GPS) location of the arrest, and closest physical landmark (selected from among a 

dropdown list of preprogrammed locations). Upon arrest, Border Patrol determines 

whether foreign nationals are potentially removable on grounds of inadmissibility or 

deportability. Border Patrol also may encounter and, as appropriate, arrest U.S. citizens or 

foreign nationals with legal status in the United States for violating U.S. law, such as 

smuggling contraband.

2

In addition to the Rio Grande Valley sector, apprehensions increased in the San Diego, 

Yuma, El Paso, Big Bend, and Del Rio sectors.

Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Apprehensions by Sector
Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Page 64 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 14: Southwest Border Apprehensions by Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 

2012–2016

Note: These data exclude apprehensions with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security stated during 

testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs that apprehensions have dropped sharply since the 

beginning of 2017. He stated, for example, that Border Patrol 

apprehended approximately 1,000 unaccompanied alien children in 

March 2017 (a time of year he noted when apprehensions generally are 
Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Page 65 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

higher) compared to over 7,000 unaccompanied alien children in 

December 2016.3

As noted in this report, apprehensions overall for the southwest border 

increasingly occurred closer to the border. Table 6 shows the distribution 

for each sector of apprehensions by distance from the border during fiscal 

years 2012 through 2016.

Table 6: Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector and by Distance from the Border for Fiscal Years (FY) 2012–2016

Sector

Distance from the border

Percentage of sector’s apprehensions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016

San Diego

0 mile to 0.5 mile 42 50 47 49 50

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 10 12 12 12 11

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 25 24 27 28 27

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 7 6 8 6 8

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 6 4 4 4 3

More than 20 miles 10 4 3 2 1

El Centro

0 mile to 0.5 mile 46 45 42 51 62

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 8 8 9 12 9

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 27 26 28 23 19

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 9 10 10 6 5

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 3 3 2 3 1

More than 20 miles 7 8 9 5 4

Yuma

0 mile to 0.5 mile 22 28 41 58 80

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 4 5 6 3 2

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 8 9 10 7 3

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 7 8 8 7 3

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 5 6 6 4 3

More than 20 miles 55 44 30 21 8

 3

Our analysis includes up to September 30, 2016, the last complete fiscal year available 

at the time of our review.

Distribution of 

Apprehensions by Sector 

and by Distance from the 

Border
Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Page 66 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Sector

Distance from the border

Percentage of sector’s apprehensions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016

Tucson

0 mile to 0.5 mile 14 15 26 26 21

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 5 5 7 7 7

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 25 28 25 23 26

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 17 15 10 10 11

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 14 14 12 12 12

More than 20 miles 25 23 20 21 23

El Paso

0 mile to 0.5 mile 39 29 34 33 44

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 8 11 11 11 13

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 16 19 20 21 18

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 8 7 5 6 6

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 10 11 8 8 5

More than 20 miles 19 24 21 21 14

Big Bend

0 mile to 0.5 mile 1 2 4 18 16

More than 0.5 miles to 1 mile 1 1 2 12 11

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 4 4 6 5 8

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 9 11 15 9 8

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 29 32 31 25 23

More than 20 miles 57 49 41 32 35

Del Rio

0 mile to 0.5 mile 12 22 41 30 32

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 5 6 6 5 7

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 19 19 16 18 20

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 15 12 8 11 10

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 21 19 12 16 14

More than 20 miles 29 23 17 20 17

Laredo

0 mile to 0.5 mile 26 30 37 32 30

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 6 7 7 8 9

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 14 13 12 16 17

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 8 8 7 7 6

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 9 7 5 5 6

More than 20 miles 38 36 33 33 32
Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Page 67 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Sector

Distance from the border

Percentage of sector’s apprehensions

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016

Rio Grande Valley

0 mile to 0.5 mile 27 27 37 40 48

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 17 19 20 21 24

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 18 18 16 16 14

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 4 4 3 2 1

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 4 3 2 2 1

More than 20 miles 30 29 22 20 12

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50

Notes: Percentages may not total to 100 because of rounding.

These data exclude apprehensions with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the percent of apprehensions 

occurring at checkpoints varied by sector.4 We assigned each 

apprehension into one of four location categories based on whether the 

GPS coordinates for the event occurred close enough to the GPS 

coordinates for a checkpoint to be considered “at a checkpoint” and 

whether the event’s landmark corresponds to the nearest checkpoint 

landmark.5 Table 7 shows the distribution of apprehensions for each 

sector by location category during fiscal years 2013 through 2016, and 

the extent to which apprehensions were identified as checkpoint 

circumventions based on use of the “Circumvention App?” checkbox. 

Differences in sector apprehensions at checkpoints could depend in part 

on the number of checkpoints within a sector, the amount of time 

checkpoints are operational, and the extent to which sectors consistently 

apply guidance on how to enter data for apprehensions that are related to 

checkpoint operations.

 4

Our analysis of checkpoint apprehensions is limited to fiscal years 2013 through 2016 

because Border Patrol began maintaining checkpoint lists for such historical analysis in 

fiscal year 2013. 

5

When recording data for an apprehension at a checkpoint, agents are to select the 

appropriate checkpoint location from a dropdown list of landmarks (landmark data field). 

Sector officials define landmarks and which landmarks are checkpoints within e3 for their 

respective sectors. Border Patrol began recording GPS coordinates for apprehensions 

and seizures in 2011, and prior to that, landmarks were used to denote the general area 

where an apprehension occurred.

Apprehensions at 

Checkpoints by Sector
Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Page 68 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Table 7: Southwest Border Checkpoint Apprehensions by Sector and by Location Category, Fiscal Years 2013–2016 

Sector

Location category

Number of apprehensions 

(percent of sector’s 

apprehensions)a

Number of apprehensions 

with “Circumvention 

Apprehension?”

box checkedb

San Diego

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with the landmark for the nearest checkpoint

2,055

(1.79 percent)

4

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a location other than the 

nearest checkpoint

9,623

(8.37 percent)

53

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint

39

(0.03 percent)

0

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with a landmark for a location other than 

the nearest checkpoint

103,216

(89.81 percent)

273

San Diego Total 114,933 330

El Centro

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with the landmark for the nearest checkpoint

1,217

(2.03 percent)

8

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a location other than the 

nearest checkpoint

341

(0.54 percent)

72

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint

307

(0.49 percent)

86

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with a landmark for a location other than 

the nearest checkpoint

60,773

(96.94 percent)

442

El Centro Total 62,692 608

Yuma

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with the landmark for the nearest checkpoint

508

(1.53 percent)

0

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a location other than the 

nearest checkpoint

153

(0.46 percent)

2

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint

72

(0.22 percent)

0

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with a landmark for a location other than 

the nearest checkpoint

32,408

(97.79 percent)

114

Yuma Total 33,141 116
Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Page 69 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Sector

Location category

Number of apprehensions 

(percent of sector’s 

apprehensions)a

Number of apprehensions 

with “Circumvention 

Apprehension?”

box checkedb

Tucson

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with the landmark for the nearest checkpoint

1,890

(0.56 percent)

5

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a location other than the 

nearest checkpoint

1,962

(0.59 percent)

28

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint

187

(0.06 percent)

2

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with a landmark for a location other than 

the nearest checkpoint

331,035

(98.79 percent)

629

Tucson Total 335,074 664

El Paso

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with the landmark for the nearest checkpoint

2,234

(3.56 percent)

3

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a location other than the 

nearest checkpoint

79

(0.13 percent)

1

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint

56

(0.09 percent)

1

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with a landmark for a location other than 

the nearest checkpoint

60,322

(96.22 percent)

130

El Paso Total 62,691 135

Big Bend

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is

associated with the landmark for the nearest checkpoint

1,827

(9.56 percent)

0

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a location other than the 

nearest checkpoint

351

(1.84 percent)

5

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint

32

(0.17 percent)

1

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with a landmark for a location other than 

the nearest checkpoint

16,906

(88.44 percent)

162

Big Bend Total 19,116 168
Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Page 70 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Sector

Location category

Number of apprehensions 

(percent of sector’s 

apprehensions)a

Number of apprehensions 

with “Circumvention 

Apprehension?”

box checkedb

Del Rio

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with the landmark for the nearest checkpoint

436

(0.49 percent)

4

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a location other than the 

nearest checkpoint

479

(0.54 percent)

1

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint

91

(0.10 percent)

0

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with a landmark for a location other than 

the nearest checkpoint

88,416

(98.87 percent)

60

Del Rio Total 89,422 65

Laredo

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with the landmark for the nearest checkpoint

6,749

(4.07 percent)

1

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a location other than the 

nearest checkpoint

1,708

(1.03 percent)

5

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint

386

(0.23 percent)

1

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with a landmark for a location other than 

the nearest checkpoint

156,828

(94.66 percent)

262

Laredo Total 165,671 269

Rio Grande Valley

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with the landmark for the nearest checkpoint

14,669

(1.98 percent)

140

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a location other than the 

nearest checkpoint

5,063

(0.68 percent)

425

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint

576

(0.08 percent)

17

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint 

and is associated with a landmark for a location other than 

the nearest checkpoint

720,533

(97.26 percent)

25,610

Rio Grande Valley Total 740,841 26,192

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50

Notes: Border Patrol began maintaining checkpoint lists used for our analysis in fiscal year 2013.
Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border 

Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 

2016

Page 71 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

These data exclude apprehensions with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

a

Percentages may not total to 100 because of rounding.

b

The number of apprehensions where the “Circumvention Apprehension?” box is checked is a subset 

within the overall number of apprehensions for each location category.
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 72 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

This appendix contains additional detail about trends in southwest border 

seizures from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, including trends in the:

• number of seizures by type of contraband seized,

• number of seizures by sector,

• distribution of seizures by sector and by distance from the border,

• seizures related to Border Patrol checkpoints each available year by 

sector, and

• marijuana seizures at checkpoints by quantity seized.

Border Patrol seized almost 90,000 prohibited items in southwest border 

sectors from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016.1 Most of these 

seizures (92 percent) were narcotics, and 87 percent of narcotics 

seizures were marijuana. The remaining seizures were of firearms, 

ammunition, currency, or other property. As shown in table 8, the number 

of seizures on the southwest border generally decreased from fiscal year 

2012 to fiscal year 2016, with the exceptions of slight rises in the amount 

of methamphetamines and heroin seized during this period.

Table 8: Type and Number of Southwest Border Seizures, Fiscal Years (FY) 2012–2016

Type of Property FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 Total

Narcotics

Marijuana 14,982 16,084 14,493 13,296 12,304 71,159

Cocaine 482 366 378 429 446 2,101

Hashish 274 287 321 268 258 1,408

Heroin 127 187 151 147 173 785

Methamphetamine 591 674 764 722 840 3,591

Other drugs 624 646 512 446 584 2,812

Firearms 578 533 486 319 343 2,259

Ammunition 629 632 547 364 393 2,565

 1

The number of seizures refers to a single property seizure, regardless of the size of the 

seizure. Different types of prohibited items seized from the same individual count as 

different seizures—for example, if marijuana, cocaine, and a firearm were seized from an 

individual, this would count as three seizures.

Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Seizures by Type of 

Contraband Seized
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 73 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Type of Property FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 Total

Currency 608 632 424 448 430 2,542

Other Property 1 7 1 1 0 10

Total Seizures 18,896 20,048 18,077 16,440 15,771 89,232

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50

Note: These data exclude seizures with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

The greatest number of seizures during the 5 fiscal years occurred in the 

Tucson, Big Bend, and Rio Grande Valley sectors (34, 19, and 16 percent 

respectively). Collectively, these three sectors accounted for 69 percent 

of southwest border seizures from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. For all 

southwest border sectors except the Big Bend sector, the numbers of 

seizures decreased during this 5-year period. For example, the number of 

seizures in the Tucson sector decreased 12 percent, and the number of 

seizures in the Rio Grande Valley sector decreased 36 percent during this 

period. The number of seizures in the Big Bend sector increased 39 

percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Figure 15 shows the 

number of seizures from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 by sector.

Seizures by Sector
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 74 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Figure 15: Southwest Border Seizures by Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2012–

2016

Note: These data exclude seizures with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

As noted in this report, the location where seizures occurred remained 

relatively stable from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, with the 

majority of seizures occurring 10 miles or more from the southwest 

border. Table 9 shows the distribution of seizures for each sector by 

distance from the border during fiscal years 2012 through 2016.

Distribution of Seizures by 

Sector and by Distance 

from the Border
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 75 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Table 9: Southwest Border Seizures by Sector and by Distance from the Border for Fiscal Years (FY) 2012–2016

Sector

Distance from the border

Percentage of sector’s seizures

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016

San Diego

0 mile to 0.5 mile 1 2 2 2 3

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 0 1 1 1 1

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 2 2 3 5 10

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 10 8 11 15 20

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 50 54 53 45 34

More than 20 miles 36 33 31 31 32

El Centro

0 mile to 0.5 mile 19 17 11 15 28

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 23 16 2 4 4

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 5 6 5 5 4

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 5 6 4 3 3

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 6 3 4 6 2

More than 20 miles 41 53 73 68 59

Yuma

0 mile to 0.5 mile 8 9 2 2 2

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 0 0 0 0 0

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 2 2 2 3 2

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 3 4 4 4 5

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 14 21 54 36 37

More than 20 miles 73 64 39 54 54

Tucson

0 mile to 0.5 mile 10 8 9 10 9

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 4 4 4 3 3

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 21 19 20 18 17

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 17 16 13 13 14

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 13 15 15 15 14

More than 20 miles 35 37 39 42 43
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 76 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Sector

Distance from the border

Percentage of sector’s seizures

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016

El Paso

0 mile to 0.5 mile 5 2 7 7 8

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 1 2 0 3 4

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 5 6 7 10 9

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 9 4 4 6 4

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 5 5 4 6 7

More than 20 miles 75 81 77 69 69

Big Bend

0 mile to 0.5 mile 0 0 0 0 0

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 0 0 0 0 0

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 1 0 0 0 1

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 1 0 1 1 0

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 90 94 90 85 75

More than 20 miles 8 5 9 13 23

Del Rio

0 mile to 0.5 mile 19 19 11 10 4

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 6 6 7 2 1

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 13 16 10 11 8

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 19 27 35 42 42

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 8 8 11 8 10

More than 20 miles 36 23 26 28 34

Laredo

0 mile to 0.5 mile 17 15 18 20 13

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 5 5 7 6 6

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 14 14 9 8 8

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 4 2 3 2 1

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 2 1 2 2 2

More than 20 miles 58 63 61 61 71

Rio Grande Valley

0 mile to 0.5 mile 24 22 24 30 34

More than 0.5 mile to 1 mile 9 8 10 14 12

More than 1 mile to 5 miles 10 9 13 12 10

More than 5 miles to 10 miles 14 12 9 8 6

More than 10 miles to 20 miles 7 7 7 4 4

More than 20 miles 36 43 37 33 35

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 77 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Notes: These data exclude seizures with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

Percentages may not total to 100 because of rounding.

For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the percent of seizures occurring at 

checkpoints varied by sector. We assigned each seizure into one of four 

location categories based on whether the GPS coordinates for the event 

occurred close enough to the GPS coordinates for a checkpoint to be 

considered “at a checkpoint” and whether the event’s landmark 

corresponds to the nearest checkpoint landmark.2 Table 10 shows the 

distribution of seizures for each sector by checkpoint location category 

during fiscal years 2013 through 2016. Differences in sector seizures at 

checkpoints could depend in part on the number of checkpoints within a 

sector, the percent of time checkpoints are operational, and the extent to 

which sectors consistently apply guidance on how to enter data for 

seizures that are related to checkpoint operations.

Table 10: Southwest Border Seizures by Sector and by Location Category, Fiscal Years 2013–2016

Sector

Location category

Number of seizures 

(percent of sector’s seizures)a

San Diego

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

3,400

(69.8 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

321

(6.6 percent)

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

26

(0.5 percent)

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

1,127

(23.1 percent)

San Diego Total 4,874

 2

When recording data for a seizure at a checkpoint, agents are to select the appropriate

checkpoint location from a dropdown list of landmarks (landmark data field). Sector 

officials define landmarks and which landmarks are checkpoints within e3 for their 

respective sectors. Border Patrol began recording GPS coordinates for apprehensions 

and seizures in 2011, and prior to that, landmarks were used to denote the general area 

where a seizure occurred.

Seizures at Checkpoints 

by Sector
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 78 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Sector

Location category

Number of seizures 

(percent of sector’s seizures)a

El Centro

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

742

(55.5 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

7

(0.5 percent)

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

13

(1.0 percent)

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

575

(43.0 percent)

El Centro Total 1,337

Yuma

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

3,501

(57.4 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

141

(2.3 percent)

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

140

(2,3 percent)

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

2,322

(38.0 percent)

Yuma Total 6,104

Tucson

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

2,206

(9.0 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

219

(0.9 percent)

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

82

(0.3 percent)

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

21,907

(89.7 percent)

Tucson Total 24,414
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 79 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Sector

Location category

Number of seizures 

(percent of sector’s seizures)a

El Paso

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

1,817

(43.3 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

29

(0.7 percent)

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

63

(1.5 percent)

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

2,287

(54.5 percent)

El Paso Total 4,196

Big Bend

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

13,354

(95.2 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

49

(0.3 percent)

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

13

(0.1 percent)

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

613

(4.4 percent)

Big Bend Total 14,029

Del Rio

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

729

(49.4 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

47

(3.2 percent)

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

30

(2.0 percent)

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

669

(45.4 percent)

Del Rio Total 1,475
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 80 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Sector

Location category

Number of seizures 

(percent of sector’s seizures)a

Laredo

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

1,252

(42.7 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

139

(4.7 percent)

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

154

(5.3 percent)

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

1,385

(47.3 percent)

Laredo Total 2,930

Rio Grande Valley

1. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

3,448

(31.4 percent)

2. Occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

230

(2.1 percent)

3. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with the 

landmark for the nearest checkpoint

61

(0.6 percent)

4. Occurred further than one-half mile from the checkpoint and is associated with a 

landmark for a location other than the nearest checkpoint

7,238

(66.0 percent)

Rio Grande Valley Total 10,997

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50

Note: Border Patrol began maintaining checkpoint lists used for our analysis in fiscal year 2013.

These data exclude seizures with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates corresponding 

to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest border sectors.

a

Percentages may not total to 100 because of rounding.

Most southwest border seizures were narcotics, and most narcotics 

seizures were marijuana. As noted in this report, marijuana seizures at 

checkpoints were often for smaller quantities compared to marijuana 

seizures at non-checkpoint locations. Table 11 shows that about 67 

percent of marijuana seizures at checkpoints were for quantities less than 

or equal to 1 ounce, whereas the quantities seized at non-checkpoint 

locations were often larger. For example, more than three-quarters of 

marijuana seizures at non-checkpoint locations were of over 50 pounds 

(25,792 out of 33,477 seizures).

Marijuana Seizures by 

Quantity Seized
Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border 

Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

Page 81 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Table 11: Southwest Border Marijuana Seizures by Quantity Seized at Checkpoints and at Non-Checkpoint Locations, Fiscal 

Years 2013–2016

Quantity of marijuana seized Number of marijuana seizures per location categorya

At checkpoints

(occurred one-half mile or less from 

the checkpoint and is associated with 

the landmark for the nearest 

checkpoint)

At non-checkpoint locations

(occurred further than one-half mile 

from the checkpoint and is 

associated with a landmark for a 

location other than the nearest 

checkpoint)

Unspecifiedb 540 101

1 ounce or less 14,299 1,789

More than 1 ounce, less than 1 pound 3,348 1,012

1 pound or more, less than 50 pounds 1,723 4,783

50 pounds or more, less than 250 pounds 1,098 15,911

250 pounds or more 366 9,881

Total 21,374 33,477

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. | GAO-18-50

Note: These data exclude seizures with missing GPS coordinates or with GPS coordinates 

corresponding to a location outside the United States or outside the boundaries of the southwest 

border sectors.

a

This table focuses on seizures for which the data on locations (landmark and GPS coordinates) 

consistently indicated the location was either at a checkpoint or at a non-checkpoint location. As 

discussed in this report, the relationship between some seizures and checkpoints is unclear because 

such seizures either (a) occurred one-half mile or less from the checkpoint and were associated with 

a location other than the nearest checkpoint or (b) occurred farther than one-half mile from the 

checkpoint but were associated with the checkpoint location. Such seizures represent a small 

percentage (2.5 percent) of total seizures over the time period we analyzed.

b

The category for unspecified subject refers to a seizure for which a Border Patrol agent did not 

attribute the seizure to a particular individual who was arrested or apprehended in conjunction with 

the seizure. Some examples when this might occur are if there were multiple people in the vehicle 

that contained the contraband or if Border Patrol found the contraband while it was unattended.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 82 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 83 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 84 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 85 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 86 GAO-18-50 Border Patrol

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Adam Hoffman (Assistant 

Director), David Alexander, Alana Finley, Eric Hauswirth, Monica Kelly, 

John Mingus, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi, Christine San, Adam Vogt, and 

Tomas Wind made significant contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100988)
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