JO

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ILITARY INTELLIGENCE C

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LLEGE

1962

pating Surprise

With a Foreword by

Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA (Ret.)

Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
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ANTICIPATING SURPRISE

Analysis for Strategic Warning

Cynthia M. Grabo

Edited by Jan Goldman

With a Foreword by

Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA (Ret

Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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Strategic Intelligenc

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Joint Military Joint Military

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Intelligence College Intelligence College
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encourages research on intelligence issues that 

distills lessons and improves support to policy-lev

and operational consumers.

Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning

December 2002

This book is a publication of the Joint Military Intelligence College’s Center f

Intelligence Research. The views expressed are those of the author and do not 

reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the Un

Government. U.S. Government officials can obtain additional copies of the bo

or through liaison channels from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Others may 

book through the U.S. Government Printing Office (www.gpo.gov) or th

Technical Information Service (www.ntis.gov).

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) has approved this do

unrestricted public release. 

Russell G. Swenson, Director, Center for Strategic Intelligence 

(Russell.Swenson@dia.mil)

Library of Congress Control Number 2002

ISBN 0-96
iii

At his confirmation hearing the present Director of Central Intelligence, 

defined his job by saying he was hired “not to observe and comment bu

protect.’’ Unfortunately, few members of the Intelligence Community remai

the corps of experts developed during the Cold War to provide warning. Wa

unto itself, requiring an understanding of the attitudes and discipline

adversaries as well as their capabilities, their history, their culture and their 

In an era of asymmetric warfare in which our national security and wel

seriously threatened by hostile groups as well as nations, it is imperative tha

the past not be forgotten but be brought up to date and the disciplin

reinvigorated. Warning intelligence differs significantly from current intelli

preparation of long-range estimates. It accepts the presumption of 

incomplete intelligence and requires exhaustive research upon which to bui

specific warning. Relationships among events or involving the players may 

evident at first and initial signs often consist of fragmentary evidence, confl

or an absence of something. It is not merely a compilation of facts. It is an 

intangible, a perception or a belief.

While a specific methodology for developing warning may have been 

needs of the Cold War, the same principles apply even to asymmetric 

updated and revised edition of an earlier, classified publication is an excell

both intelligence analysts and policymakers. Events have shown that accur

warning has most often been produced by a minority viewpoint brought to t

decisionmakers in some way; it is not the product of a majority consensus.

In the rush to build new intelligence mechanisms to combat terrorist 

provide warning for the homeland as well as for forces deployed, the n

Intelligence Community would be well served by reviewing this boo

understanding of what constitutes warning and how it is arrived at. As the 

out, “warning does not exist until it has been conveyed to the policymaker, 

know that he has been warned.’’

All intelligence professionals and key policymakers must understand 

outlined in this very relevant publication.

LTG James Willia

Former Director, 

Defense Intelligen
v

This book written 30 years ago and its message could not be more releva

World War II, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s main objective was to u

intentions and capabilities of the Communist threat. This meant a focus 

Union and its allies. Data on the number and capabilities of tanks, airplanes 

inventory of the Warsaw Pact were not easy to come by, although some

obtain than insight into the intentions of Communist leaders. A well-p

satellite with a camera could yield some information but far from the whol

of the most knowledgeable analysts who understood the importance of ad

capabilities and intentions as a central part of the intelligence process wa

Cynthia Grabo. Intelligence analysis was dominated by men before, dur

World War II. In this environment, Ms. Grabo stood out.

Cynthia Grabo worked as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. governmen

1980. After graduating from the University of Chicago with undergraduate 

degrees, she was recruited by Army Intelligence shortly after Pearl Harbor

served in various capacities during the war, from 1949 for the remainder of 

specialized in strategic warning. Assigned to the interagency staff called 

Indications Center, she served as a senior researcher and writer for th

Committee throughout its existence (1950 to 1975), and for its successor or

Strategic Warning Staff. It was during this time that Ms. Grabo recognize

capture the institutional memory associated with strategic warning. 

At the time, she already had three decades of experience in th

Community, having witnessed perceived U.S. intelligence and warning fail

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Cuba. In the summer of 1972, the Defens

Agency published her Handbook of Warning Intelligence as a classifi

followed by two additional classified volumes, one in the fall of 1972 and th

These recently declassified books have been condensed from the original 

into this one. The Joint Military Intelligence College proudly offers to th

Community and to the public Ms. Grabo’s authoritative interpretation of 

analytic strategy for intelligence-based warning. 

Ms. Grabo’s awards include: the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Excep

Service Medal, The Central Intelligence Agency’s Sherman Kent award f

contribution to the literature of intelligence, and the National Intellige

Achievement. Since her retirement, she has served on the Board of Di

Association of Former Intelligence Officers and has authored several a

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the Internat

and Defense Encyclopedia and the Central Intelligence Agency’s Studies in 

The viability of the U.S. intelligence system depends on analys

humanists and technologists, all of whom must be willing in their ass

creative work to share risks with appropriate intelligence consumers. Com
vi

to fail, yet to continue their work. 

As Ms Grabo points out, the Intelligence Community must avoid treatin

function as only a by-product of other intelligence production. To “wor

problem is to anticipate events in their fullest political, military, economic, d

cultural context. If the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentag

surprise because “nothing like that had ever happened before in the U.S.,’’ t

truly echo those of December 1941. Now, the U.S. itself is highly subj

indications analysis practiced against it. The historical experience of 

interpreting indications of conflict, as they are brought to light in this wor

make us more aware of the messages we may be conveying to potential adv

international environment, and therefore preserve an element of surprise 

The 21st century brings a different world in many respects, but the principl

warning analysis remain the same.

Jan Goldman, Faculty Member,

Course Manager for Strategic Warning & Threat 

Joint Military Intelligence College

Washington, DC
vii

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Editor’s Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 

1 The Role of Warning Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

General Nature of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

What Is Warning? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Intentions versus Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 Introduction to the Analytical Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Indicator Lists: Compiling Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Fundamentals of Indications Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Specifics of the Analytical Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3 Military Indications and Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Nature of Military Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Order-of-Battle Analysis in Crisis Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Logistics is the Queen of Battles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Other Factors In Combat Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4 Political Factors for Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Ambiguity of Political Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A Problem of Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Considerations in Political Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 Warning from the Totality of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Relative Weight of Political and Military Factors . . . . . 

Isolating the Critical Facts and Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Some Guidelines for Assessing the Meaning of Evidence . . 

Reconstructing the Adversary's Decisionmaking Process . . 

6 Surprise and Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Principal Factors in Timing and Surprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Examples of Assessing Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Warning is Not a Forecast of Imminence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
viii

Infrequency and Neglect of Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Principles, Techniques and Effectiveness of Deception . . . . . . 

Types of Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

What Can We Do About It? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8 Judgments and Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Facts Don't “Speak For Themselves’’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

What Do Top Consumers Need, and Want, to Know?. . . . . . . . 

Intelligence in Support of Policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Assessing Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

9 Improving Warning Assessments: Some Conclusions. . . . . . . . 

Factors Influencing Judgments and Reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

General Warning Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Most Frequent Impediments to Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Photo of the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ix

Some years ago, a group from several intelligence agencies was d

question of indications analysis and strategic warning. Reminded by an indi

that analysts who used indications methodology had correctly forecast b

Korean attack on South Korea in 1950 and the Chinese intervention, a relat

to the intelligence business said, “Yes, but you couldn't have done a v

because no one believed you.’’ This bit of unintentional humor aptly desc

the problem of warning intelligence. Why is it that “no one’’—a slight 

exaggeration—believes in the indications method, despite its demonstrabl

in these and other crises which have threatened our security interests? Can 

to believe be in part from the lack of understanding of the nature of indicatio

the lack of experience with “real’’ warning problems?

This work was originally written in the early 1970s as a classified 

intelligence analysts and their supervisors and for use in intelligence cour

product of some twenty-five years experience with indications and warnin

from the analytic standpoint. So far as I know, it was the first and perhap

effort by an intelligence analyst to bring together a body of experience o

problem and to set forth some guidelines to assist analysts and others in

warning process. The examples used in the text were drawn largely from 

and the Cold War.

Within little more than the past decade, major and dramatic devel

significantly altered the nature of the warning problem. The first was th

communism in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, the 

been the primary focus of collection and indications analysis for over fo

second was the emergence of terrorism—dramatically brought home on 

2001—as a major, if not the major threat to our security. Obviously

developments have significantly altered the targets of collection and focus 

the Intelligence Community.

A casual observer might conclude that these changes would render 

lessons of history, and particularly of the Cold War. But a more percep

allow that the analytic problems of warning, and the nature of errors, a

changed. Thus we continue to see the same types of problems:

■ Inadequate perception of emerging threats, particularly those of lo

but potential great danger;

■ A consequent inadequate collection against such threats;

■ Breakdown of communication between collectors, analysts and age

■ Failure to heed the views of the minority;

■ Vulnerability to deception.
x

an understanding of warning intelligence, both within and outside the I

Community.

I wish to express thanks to the Defense Intelligence Agency for pr

distributing the original and much longer version of this work; to the Joi

Intelligence College for sponsoring this shorter unclassified version; and abov

Goldman, professor in strategic warning and threat management at the JM

enthusiastic support and hours of voluntary work in preparing this text. W

efforts, this work would never have seen the light of day.

Cynthia M. Gra

January 2002
1

THE ROLE OF WARNING INTELLIGENC

GENERAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Function of Warning Intelligence

Warning intelligence at the strategic level, or as it is sometimes calle

tions intelligence,’’ is largely a post-World War II development. Mo

cally, it was a product of the early days of the Cold War, when we 

perceive that the Soviet Union and other communist states were em

courses inimical to the interests and security of the Free World and wh

lead to surprise actions or open aggression. Enemy actions in World W

as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, had dispelled many o

ventional or historical concepts of how wars begin. The fear that Amer

mies once again might undertake devastating, surprise military act

without prior declaration of war or other conventional warning—ha

very real. The advent of modern weapons and long-range delivery sy

ther increased the need for warning to avoid surprise attack.

Surprise military actions and undeclared initiation of wars are not, 

exclusively a modern phenomenon. History has recorded many suc

going back at least to the introduction of the wooden horse into the anci

Troy. The military intelligence services of all major powers during Wo

devoted much of their time to collection and analysis of information c

the military plans and intentions of their enemies in an effort to anticip

enemy actions. Many of the problems and techniques associated with w

indications analysis were recognized and practiced during World War I

tory of the war records some brilliant intelligence successes in an

enemy actions as well as such conspicuous failures as the attack on Pe

and the Battle of the Bulge.1

A coup in Bolivia, the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon, the kidnap

diplomat or member of the Embassy staff in Iran, terrorist attacks on U

lations in Guatemala, conflict between Pakistan and India, or the assass

a chief of state anywhere—all these and other military and politica

1

Editor’s note: Although strategic warning is not a new concept, it has only recently 

ognized as a distinct function of intelligence, in war and in peace, rather than a definable 

ligence product. Warning intelligence—although sometimes expressed in current, estim

basic (database-related) intelligence production—is distinguished by its purpose or funct

tion is to anticipate, insofar as collection and analysis will permit, what potentially hostil

likely to do, and particularly whether they are preparing to initiate adverse action. Genera

sumer of strategic warning is a national-level policymaker. The warning function at the ope

el typically centers around two individuals—a commander and his senior intelligence o

tactical level, a “warfighter’’ is the consumer. Warning intelligence responsibilities are m

among intelligence producers and consumers at the strategic level, creating a challenging 

for the successful performance of this most important function. 
2

far as possible, to anticipate such developments and to alert the polic

them. In this sense, “warning’’ could be said to be an almost unlimited 

bility of the intelligence system and to involve potentially almost any 

ment anywhere in the world. The current intelligence process is invo

with this kind of problem. At both the national level and overseas, o

centers, alert centers and watch offices are concerned with problems and 

crises of this type.

 The term “warning intelligence’’ as it has been used since World W

as it will be used throughout this book, generally is restricted to: (a) dir

by hostile states against the U.S. or its allies, involving the commitme

regular or irregular armed forces; (b) other developments, particularly 

affecting U.S. security interests in which such hostile states are or migh

involved; (c) significant military action between other nations not allie

U.S., and (d) the threat of terrorist action.

Obviously, no absolute guidelines or directives can be laid down in a

to when, or under what circumstances, any particular situation or area 

becomes a subject for warning analysis or judgments. Some events ar

strably warning problems that gravely threaten U.S. forces or security 

such as the Chinese intervention in Korea or the Cuban missile crisis. O

ations, although not involving such direct threats of confrontation for 

pose grave risks of escalation or the involvement of other powers, such 

of Middle East conflicts and crises. For many years Berlin and South

were considered long-term, almost chronic, warning problems; whi

such as the Taiwan Strait, have occasionally become critical subjects fo

intelligence. Conflicts or potential conflicts between communist states

the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt (1956), the threat o

Soviet military actions against Poland, and the invasion of Czech

(1968)—also have been subjects for warning analysis and judgments.

Whether or not an immediate crisis or threat exists, however, the fu

warning intelligence also is to examine continually—and to report pe

or daily if necessary—any developments which could indicate that a ho

or group is preparing, or could be preparing, some new action wh

endanger U.S. security interests. It examines developments, actions, or 

military, political or economic events or plans by our adversaries throu

world which could provide a clue to possible changes in policy or pr

for some future hostile action. It renders a judgment—positive, ne

qualified—that there is or is not a threat of new military action, or an i

change in the nature of ongoing military actions, of which the po

should be warned. This will usually include some analytical discussion 

dence to support the conclusion or warning judgment.
3

exceptional crisis function. A daily or weekly routine report may say lit

final judgment may be negative. Yet it serves as a kind of insurance tha

cations or possible indications are being examined, discussed and evalu

that significant potential indications have not been overlooked. In time o

potential crisis, it serves (or should serve) the function for which 

exists—to provide warning, as clear and unequivocally as possible, o

adversary is probably preparing to do.

 Indicators and Indications

Dictionary definitions of the word “indicate’’ refer to something les

tainty; an “indication’’ could be a sign, a symptom, a suggestion, or gr

inferring or a basis for believing. Thus, the choice of this term in warni

gence is a realistic recognition that warning is likely to be less than cert

be based on information which is incomplete, of uncertain evaluation o

to interpret.

An indication can be a development of almost any kind. Specifically

a confirmed fact, a possible fact, an absence of something, a fragment o

tion, an observation, a photograph, a propaganda broadcast, a diploma

call-up of reservists, a deployment of forces, a military alert, an agent 

anything else. The sole provision is that it provide some insight, or see

vide some insight, into the enemy’s likely course of action. An indicati

positive, negative or ambiguous (uncertain). Uncertainty concerning th

of a confirmed development is usually conveyed by such phrases as: “it 

ble indication,’’ “it may indicate’’ or “it suggests.’’ Uncertainty as to th

of the information itself may also be phrased this way, or more accurat

true, this indicates.’’

An indicator is a known or theoretical step which the adversary 

may take in preparation for hostilities. It is something which we antic

occur, and which we therefore usually incorporate into a list of thi

watched which is known as an “indicator list.’’ Information that an

actually being implemented constitutes an indication. The distinction 

expectation and actuality, or between theory and a current developm

useful one, and those in the warning trade have tried to insure that th

tion between indicators and indications is maintained. Many non-s

fail to make this careful distinction. 

Strategic versus Tactical Warning

The term strategic warning somewhat regrettably has no single, acce

nition. To those in the field of warning intelligence, strategic warning is 

viewed as relatively long-term, or synonymous with the “earliest poss

ing’’ which the warning system is supposed to provide. Thus, strategi
4

forces is under way, or the adversary has made known his political com

to some course of action entailing the use of force. This judgment—of 

ability of military action at some time in the future—is unrelated to 

nence of action. The judgment may be possible only when enemy 

imminent, but it may also be possible long before that. 

Tactical warning is much more easily defined, although there is som

in meaning. Strictly defined, tactical warning is not a function of intell

least not at the national level) but is an operational concern. It is wa

would be available to the commander on the front line, or through the 

tem or other sensors, which would indicate that the attacking forces we

in motion toward the target. In practice, the line between strategic an

warning may not be so precise. Many observers would consider that t

gence Community had issued tactical warning if it were to issue a judg

an attack was imminent, particularly if this followed a series of earlier j

that an attack was likely. When would warning of the Tet Offensive of 

become tactical? Would a warning issued in the early afternoon of 2

1968 of a Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia have been strategic or tact

WHAT IS WARNING?

Warning Is Not a Commodity 

Warning is not s

which the analyst, th

gence Community, th

maker or the nation h

not have. This frequ

conception is expr

casual questions such 

we have warning of t

invasion of Czechoslovakia?’’ Particularly when taken out of context, 

conception has also appeared in high-level official documents, in such s

as “it cannot be concluded that the U.S. surely will, or surely will not, 

tegic warning.’’

Warning is not a fact, a tangible substance, a certainty, or a refutable 

sis. It is not something which the finest collection system should be ex

produce full-blown or something which can be delivered to the policym

the statement, “Here it is. We have it now.’’

Warning is an intangible, an abstraction, a theory, a deduction, a per

belief. It is the product of reasoning or of logic, a hypothesis whose va

be neither confirmed nor refuted until it is too late. Like other ideas, pa

new or complex ideas, it will be perceived with varying degrees of unde

or certitude by each individual, depending on a host of variable 

“Warning is an intangible, an abstraction, a

theory, a deduction, a perception, a belief. It

is the product of reasoning or of logic, a

hypothesis whose validity can be neither

confirmed nor refuted until it is too late.’’
5

to try to understand, preconceptions of what is a likely course of acti

adversary, cognizance of that state’s objectives and its military and pol

trine, knowledge of history or precedent, objectivity, imagination, a w

to take risks, time constraints, confidence in the person giving the b

even the individual’s health or what he had for breakfast. These and oth

may influence the receptivity to the message or idea.

There are times, of course, when the volume of evidence, the shee

of facts pointing to the likelihood of war is so overwhelming and so w

ognized that the conclusion is almost inescapable. This was the situat

prevailed before the outbreak of World War II and particularly in 

immediately preceding it, when the man on the street if he had read 

papers probably was as qualified to judge that war was imminent as 

heads of state. In such a case, everybody, in the strategic if not th

sense, “has warning.’’

On the other hand, it is readily apparent that virtually no one—an

larly not the people who mattered—“had warning’’ of the Japanese 

Pearl Harbor, although the buildup of Japanese military power and 

aggressive designs in the Pacific were almost as well recognized as we

designs in Europe. In a series of lesser conflicts and crises since Wo

warning rarely has been as evident as in August 1939. The odds therefo

warning will remain an uncertainty in the years to come.

Warning Intelligence Is Not the Same As Current Intelligen

This opinion will no doubt surprise a lot of people who have come 

warning as a natural byproduct or handmaiden of current analysis. Wh

qualified to detect and report indications of possible impending hosti

the military and political analysts whose function is to keep on top of 

development and fast-breaking event? Is it not the latest information th

needed to “have warning’’?

The answer is both “yes’’ and “no.’’ It is imperative that the analy

and track timely information which may be an indication of hostilities

lysts who are to produce the intelligence needed for warning cannot aff

behind the flood of incoming information lest they miss some critically 

item. Both the collection and the processing of information must be as 

possible. There have been instances in which even a brief delay in the 

information contributed to the failure to draw correct conclusions.

Nonetheless, the best warning analysis does not flow inevitably or 

ally from the most methodical and diligent review of current inform

best warning analysis is the product of a detailed and continuing rev

information, going back for weeks and months which may be relevant 
6

tives, doctrines, practices and organization.

The latest information, however necessary it may be to examine it, 

not be the most useful or pertinent to the warning assessment. Or, if it 

only be because it can be related to a piece of information received wee

or because it may serve to confirm a hitherto uncertain but vital fragmen

ligence which the analyst has been holding for months. Only in rare 

where events erupt very suddenly (such as the Hungarian revolt in 

indications or warning analysis be considered more or less synonymous 

rent analysis. Most crises have roots going deep into the past, much fa

we usually realize until after they erupt. Preparation for war or possible 

can be traced back for months once it becomes clear that a real threat e

pieces of information which appeared questionable, unreliable or even 

when received will suddenly have great relevance to the present situa

vided the analyst has saved them and can fit them into the current pa

ther, information which is months old when it is received (and therefor

current intelligence) may be immensely valuable. An indication is not 

invalid because it occurred months ago but you just found out about i

may help to demonstrate that the preparations for conflict have been 

extensive and significant than you had believed.

In normal times, the current analyst must cope with a large volume 

rial. In times of crisis, he may be overwhelmed, not only with lots of in

but with increased demands from his superiors for briefings, analyses, 

and the like. It is no wonder in these circumstances that he can rarely 

attention on the information which he received last month or find th

reexamine a host of half-forgotten items which might be useful to h

assessment. The night duty officer who may be the most “current’’ o

likely as not never even have seen many of the items from the precedin

which might be important now.

In addition, it may be noted that the weeks or days immediately pre

deliberate or “surprise’’ initiation of hostilities may be marked by few

tions of such action than was the earlier period. Or, as it is sometimes e

“warning ran out for us’’ ten days or two weeks before the attack occurr

this circumstance, the strictly current intelligence approach to the probl

misleading or even dangerous. Since there are not many new indi

report, the current intelligence publication may convey the impression 

analyst may actually come to believe) that the threat is somehow lesse

in fact it is being maintained and may be increasing.

In time of approaching crisis when many abnormal developments 

to be occurring, the current intelligence analysts more than ever wil

assistance of those with detailed expertise in basic military subject

mobilization, unit histories, logistics, doctrine, a variety of technica
7

ever noted before may be of vital importance. It is a time when cu

basic intelligence must be closely integrated lest some significant in

be overlooked or incorrectly evaluated.

There is still another difference to be noted between the current in

and warning processes, and that is the nature and content of the report

the primary function of the current analyst is not to write warning intell

to produce good current items, he will necessarily have to omit from 

reporting a large number of indications or potential indications. There 

variety of reasons for this, such as: the indications are individually too t

contradictory, some of them are not current, there are just too many 

them all, they don’t make a good current story, and a number of them (s

the most important), are too highly classified for the usual current in

publication or the analyst is otherwise restricted from using them. Som

looking into the warning process or attempting to reconstruct what hap

crisis have initially believed that the best place to look is in current in

publications. While there is nothing wrong with this approach to a poin

viding the situation which prevailed at the time is understood, no o

expect to find the whole story or the real story of what was happenin

publications. To pick an extreme example, in the week between the dis

Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba on 15 October 1962 and President K

speech announcing their discovery on 22 October, the Intelligence C

was precluded in all its usual publications from alluding to the discov

and for obvious reasons.

The foregoing are some of the ways in which warning and curren

and reporting are distinguished from one another or should be. It is i

these reasons that it has been deemed prudent and desirable to hav

tions or warning specialists who, hopefully, will not be burdened or 

by the competing demands placed on current analysts and will b

focus their attention solely on potential indications and their an

depth. To accomplish this, these analysts must also recognize the 

basic intelligence and the importance of understanding how the 

goes about preparing for action. 

Warning Does Not Emerge from a Compilation of “Facts’’

Warning does not arise from a compilation of possible or potentia

indications, however useful these may be. It is not the intention of thi

downplay the importance of a diligent and imaginative pursuit of in

They are the foundation on which warning is built. The more hard evide

able, the more valid and significant the indications, the more likely it is

in theory—that there will be warning or that we shall come to the rig

sions. It all sounds so simple, until we are confronted with a condition 

theory. In retrospect, it all looks so clear.
8

one step in the warning process, occupying somewhat the same place th

sentation of testimony in the courtroom does to the decision of the jury 

of the judge. Just as the seemingly most solid cases that are backed by 

evidence do not necessarily lead to convictions, neither do the most vo

and best documented lists of indications necessarily lead to warning. On 

hand, a few facts or indications in some cases have been sufficient to 

enough people (or more importantly the right people) of impending ho

other critical actions. Some facts obviously will carry a lot more w

other facts. The total number of different facts or possible facts will 

important as the interpretations attached to them. Too many facts or i

may even be suspect—why should it be so obvious? There must be 

more (or less) than meets the eye. A major portion of this treatise is de

discussion of the relationship of facts and indications to warning, so th

lems will not be elaborated here. Using the analogy with the courtr

however, there are several possible reasons why the mere presentation 

evidence or statements of eyewitnesses may not produce a convincin

the jury or the presiding judge:

■ The statements of the prosecution’s key witness are disputed 

witnesses.

■ An eyewitness is demonstrated to be of uncertain reliability or 

wise questionable reporter of the “facts.’’

■ Several other important witnesses have not been located and 

cannot be interrogated.

■ The evidence, although considerable, is largely circumstantial.

■ The defendant has a pretty good reputation, particularly in rec

and has not done such a thing before.

■ There appears to be no clear motive for the crime.

■ The jury, despite careful screening, has been influenced by pr

age of the case in the newspapers.

■ The judge, a strict constructionist, rules that certain important m

inadmissible as evidence.

Warning Does Not Flow from a Majority Consensus 

Both because of the importance of warning and because the process 

ally involve analysts (and their supervisors) in a variety of fields, a larg

of people are likely to participate in some aspect of the production o

intelligence. Insofar as various specialists are called upon to present th

opinions or knowledge on various problems of fact and interpretation 

“what is the maximum capacity of this railroad?’’ or “what is the 

TO&E of the Soviet tank division?’’) this is obviously all to the good.
9

advice, since no one would get along without such assistance. It does 

sarily follow, however, that the more people introduced into the warnin

the better the judgment will be. Experience has shown that consensus 

individuals who contribute to the analysis of the problem, together 

supervisors, those responsible for making estimates, and others who ma

interest is not more likely to be correct than the judgments of analysts 

had experience with other warning problems and are knowledgeable 

available current information on the situation. Quite often the effect o

more people into the process is to dilute a judgment in the interests o

mise and unanimity.

Lamentable as it may be, the fact is that the most nearly correct jud

crisis situations over a period of years often have been reached by a m

individuals. This does not usually mean that one agency is right and 

wrong—it is not that political analysts will come to right conclusions 

tary analysts to wrong conclusions, or vice versa. What usually happen

majority in all agencies will likely be wrong. Thus the situation is not 

of by the usual device of a dissenting agency footnote, since it will be 

in each agency (not a majority in one) which will be in dissent.

Obviously, no one should say that because this situation has preva

many cases that it will always be so. (It is the hope that this treatise in s

measure will help to remedy this and bring more persons in the In

Community to an understanding of the warning process and the pr

analysis and interpretation.) It is important that those involved (and p

policymakers) understand that this has been the case in the past. It is en

important to the warning process that the views of the qualified and ex

minority be given an adequate hearing. 

Warning Depends on an Exhaustive Research Effort

It is imperative to the process that the facts, including potential o

facts, and other indications be most diligently and meticulously com

analyzed. It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of e

research for warning. It is the history of every great warning crisis tha

mortems have turned up numerous relevant facts or pieces of informat

were available but which, for one reason or another, were not con

making assessments at the time. This is separate and apart from the in

in nearly every crisis which arrives just a little too late and which in s

could have been available in time provided the substantive analysts, th

visors, or their counterparts in the collection system had recognized a 

lier the importance of following up certain facts or leads.

All those associated with the warning business—from the lowes

analyst to the policymaker—should beware first and foremost of th
10

than the most detailed review of the available evidence which may b

or indirectly related. Although this advice may seem so elementa

may be taken for granted, the fact is that it cannot be taken for gran

sis situations. Experience has shown that a large number of individu

often including those whose judgments or statements will carry 

weight—are rendering opinions in critical situations either in ign

important facts or without recognizing the relevance or significance 

information which they may know. Indications and current analysts h

simply appalled, usually after the start of a crisis, to discover how m

sons only slightly higher in the intelligence hierarchy were totally u

some of the most critical information from a warning standpoint. In

analysts have been almost equally chagrined and remorseful to loo

the information which they themselves had available or could have 

but which they just did not make use of or fit into the picture correc

How does this happen? How can the great machinery of U.S. int

which is capable of spectacular collection and comprehensive analysis 

subjects, fail to carry out the necessary research in a warning situa

answers are complex and some of the factors which contribute to this pr

dealt with in succeeding chapters. However, there are two obvious d

which arise and which may impede the research effort and the surfac

relevant facts.

The intelligence research system is set up primarily to analyze certai

information known as intelligence “disciplines’’ and on which there is 

less continuing flow of material, to include order-of-battle, economic p

weapons developments, and foreign policy to name a few. In crisis 

great volumes of new material may suddenly be poured into the system

to cope, agencies often set up special task forces, and analysts work o

an attempt to cover every aspect of the problem. Nevertheless, it is ver

in such circumstances to insure that some items are not overlooked, e

their relevance or significance is readily recognizable. It is not surpr

some items of potential interest may be set aside. As a develop

progresses, a geared-up collection system produces volumes of mater

analyst. A tenfold increase in items which the analyst should do somet

and that might be important, is by no means unusual. Analysts, ofte

exhaustion, may recall items which they know are related to their curr

or they may be acutely aware of some urgent research, or papers which 

written, but they literally cannot find the time or energy to do it. Even 

analyst may not have the time to contact or even learn of the existenc

analysts or collectors who might have some additional information or w

already have done some research which would assist him. When 

needed, communication may break down for sheer lack of time.
11

interrelationship of developments is not readily apparent, and particula

two or more major geographic areas may be involved. In such cases, th

ties of conducting research are greatly compounded when items from t

ent areas, particularly if they seem relatively obscure or questionable a

may not be brought together at all. Their interrelationship is not dete

well along in the crisis, if at all, and only retrospective analyses will bri

relevant information.

The foregoing generalities are well demonstrated in two major c

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Cuban missile crisis 

In the Czechoslovak situation, the Intelligence Community had 

dous wealth of information, much of it highly reliable and valid, on 

political and military developments which led up to the invasion. Yet 

of important pieces of information that were extremely relevant to 

Soviet intentions apparently were never reported to the higher offici

Intelligence Community, let alone the policymaker. One reason 

(although fundamental errors in judgment were probably a more impo

son) was the sheer volume of material which was received. It was imp

report everything, and in the selection process some critical indicatio

make the grade.

In the Cuban missile crisis, on the other hand, the Intelligence Co

was confronted with a series of anomalies in Soviet behavior beginnin

1962 which raised tantalizing questions in the minds of perceptive an

whose relationship to Cuba was only to become apparent months late

to the time that the strategic missiles were finally detected in Cuba, 

rate groups of analysts (a Soviet-Berlin group and a Latin Americ

were conducting largely independent analysis, which for the most par

recognize that the apparent Soviet expectation of a settlement of t

problem that year might in some way be related to forthcoming deve

in Cuba. Thus much of the basic research which might have connec

developments was not done until after the resolution of the crisis. Onl

spect was it apparent that the USSR’s announcement of the extraordi

ing of combat readiness of Soviet forces in September probably was t

the arrival of the first strategic missiles in Cuba. Much of the resear

likely areas and possible nature of Soviet military activity in Cuba wa

the Latin American group on a crash basis in the week between the dis

the missiles and the President’s announcement of their discovery.

It is impossible, in a brief discussion such as this, to develop exam

sufficiently stress the importance of research to the warning process. 

many reasons why warning fails, or is inadequate, and it would be unf

gle out the failure by analysts to initiate and produce the requisite re

the major cause. In many cases, it may not be the analyst but rather hi
12

causes or extenuating circumstances, insufficient research or the failur

together into a meaningful and coherent pattern all the relevant in

must rate as a major cause of inadequate warning. The indications an

others associated with the warning procedure, should never take it fo

that others know all the information available or have truly understood 

and their implications. 

The greatest single justification for the existence of separate i

offices or the employment of warning analysts is that they are devoting 

time to research in depth without the distraction of having to fulfill a n

other duties. The warning analyst should never lose sight of the fact t

his raison d’être. It is difficult enough to come to a sound warning 

when all the facts have been considered; it may be impossible without i

Warning Is an Assessment of Probabilities 

Rarely are impending hostilities so evident, or the intentions of a

sor so unmistakable, that timely warning is a virtual certainty or that 

“has warning.’’ It is likely that there will be some degree of uncerta

cerning the plans or intentions of the adversary even when a great a

information is available and the collection effort has functioned 

well. The amount of uncertainty will be considerably increased when 

tion is limited, questionable (as to its validity or interpretation), or if 

significant delays in the receipt of material. At worst, there may be in

factual data even to raise serious questions about whether some a

action may be planned.

Although the foregoing is probably generally accepted in theory—a

on the warning problem have repeatedly cautioned intelligence officials 

cymakers alike not to expect certainty in warning—there is often a te

forget this important point when the situation arises. Particularly becau

important to make the right decision or right response in the face of t

aggression, the military commander or policy level official more than ev

a judgment of certainty from the intelligence system—yes, the adver

no, he is not planning to attack. The official may press the intelligence 

come to a positive judgment despite the inherent uncertainties in the si

on the other hand, demand a degree of “proof’’ which is absolutely uno

Now it is, of course, impossible to prove in advance that something i

happen, when that something is dependent on the decisions and actions 

rather than the laws of nature. It could not have been “proved’’ in the la

August 1939 that war was imminent in Europe, even though nearly eve

ognized this to be so, but it could be described as a development with a 

probability, or near certainty.
13

bor, that North Korea would attack South Korea in June 1950, that the 

mans would close the Berlin sector borders (and subsequently erect 

wall) in August 1961? The probability of course was actually very hi

just that we did not know this. History shows that these occurrences 

were considered by us to be relatively low probabilities at the time—

evidenced by the lack of preparation against these contingencies, n

intelligence system nor the policymakers considered it very likely 

would occur. We were “surprised,’’ and, at least in the first instance, di

so. Yet, in retrospect, it can be demonstrated at least to the satisfactio

that none of these events was all that improbable; they were at least go

bilities, or contingencies which should have been given more consider

they were.

Some of the factors in assessing probabilities and the related pr

intentions versus capabilities are discussed in this book. Here 

guidelines for this important problem:

■ In any potential warning or crisis situation, it is desirable, if not 

that the intelligence system attempt to come to as realistic an a

as possible of the probabilities of hostile action. Not only i

assessment of value but the mere exercise of attempting to jud

bilities will bring out many useful facts, possibilities, prece

viewpoints which might otherwise be ignored or overlooked.

■ A knowledge of history, precedent and doctrine is extremely 

assessing probabilities; and the citing of such precedents not 

bolster a case but also may tend to make the timid more willin

to positive judgments. It is very important in reaching judgme

ognize the limits of our knowledge and collection capabilities 

expect the impossible.

■ Policymakers must recognize

that warning cannot be issued

with absolute certainty, even

under the best of circumstances, but will always be an

assessment of probabilities.

They must realize that they

will usually have to accept judgments that are less firm, or bas

hard evidence than they would wish, but that such types of as

should be encouraged rather than discouraged.

“Policymakers must recogn

warning cannot be issued w

lute certainty, even under the 

circumstances.’’
14

It is an axiom of wa

warning does not ex

has been conveyed to 

cymaker, and that 

know that he has bee

Warning that exists o

mind of the analyst is useless. He must find the means to convey what h

to those who need to know it. From the policy level, it is this factor 

more than any other that distinguishes warning intelligence from all oth

gence. The policymaker can and does get along without a vast amoun

mation which is compiled by the Intelligence Community. Some offic

than others will be receptive to intelligence information and will see

details on such subjects as order-of-battle, weapons, internal politica

ments, economic plans and so forth. By and large, considering their 

responsibilities, most policy officials are surprisingly well informed on 

of many subjects. For the most part, however, that which they are show

fairly carefully screened and condensed to the essentials which they mo

know, unless there is some particularly critical subject of national prior

Not so in the event of an impending crisis which may involve th

interests of the country or our allies or which could entail a commitme

forces. It is essential that the possibility of such a development be cl

often repeatedly, brought to the attention of the policy official as the 

develops and that he be left in no doubt as to the potential gravity of th

or what it might entail for national policy. In these circumstances, m

than fewer facts, specific rather than generalized assessments, clear an

descriptions of the various alternatives rather than vague possibilities

and unequivocal statements of the adversary’s capabilities and possible 

ble intentions are required.

Intelligence writers and briefers must remember that policy of

extremely busy, and that assessments which carry no clear or explicit w

what the adversary is likely to do may fail to convey the writer’s belief

ments which state that the adversary can do such-and-such if he c

decides to do so, can convey a sense of uncertainty or even reassuran

decisions have yet been reached, when in fact the bulk of evidence 

adversary probably has already decided to do it. Phrases suggesting om

sibilities which are buried in the texts of long factual discussions do n

much warning to the policymaker who may have had time only to rea

paragraph. It is not unusual for an agency seeking to demonstrate in 

what a fine job of reporting it did on some subject to cull such phrase

publications for a period of weeks. Taken in isolation or out of context, 

indeed present an ominous picture, but their impact will have been l

“Warning does not exist until it has been conveyed to the policymaker, and he must know

that he has been warned.’’
15

cials could not have failed to get the message.

A distinguished supervisor in the field of political intelligence obser

years ago that, no matter what went wrong, it was always the fault of in

When disaster struck, the analyst might remind the policy official th

been warned of the possibility or that it had been mentioned this might 

several briefings in the past month. And he would reply, “Well, you did 

often enough, or loud enough.’’

Where warning is concerned, intelligence must be sure that it is sayi

enough and loud enough. It cannot assume that, because it issued a 

warning last week, it is unnecessary to repeat it this week. Warning 

more than once simply because what the analysts really thought, and w

to one another, never was put into print. Or, if it was, it was so caveated 

dination’’ or by a series of editors that what the analyst meant to convey 

When military action is threatened, it is not time to mince words. If t

maker has not gotten the message, it is quite likely not his fault that it 

made clear in the first place.

Warning Produces a Conviction That Results in Action 

We will assume now that the intelligence system has performed c

ably; it has collected the data, it has done the exhaustive research requi

come to a judgment that a military attack is probable, and it has conv

judgment to the policymaker in both its estimative and warning publica

what is the purpose of all this? The purpose is to enable the policymake

the best possible decisions in the light of the facts and judgments sent to 

if needed to take military and political actions to counter the threatened 

he is not convinced, or for some reason cannot or does not take the 

action, the intelligence effort will have been in vain. Troops caught in 

sive which was predicted by intelligence but ignored by the command

as dead as if the warning had never been issued. In these circumstance

ter how brilliant the intelligence performance, the nation will have fa

action has been taken. This is the ultimate function of warning.

It would be rare, although perhaps not unheard of, for intelligence t

unequivocal warning which would go totally unheeded by a commande

official. A more likely circumstance is that the warning is not explic

enough (see preceding sections) or that there is a serious misjudgmen

the timing, location or nature of the attack. In any case, assuming ac

have been taken to avert disaster and was not, there has been a combin

of intelligence and command or policy. A more frequent situation in re

has been that the policymaker makes his own intelligence, perhaps bec

dissatisfied with or distrustful of the impersonal machinery of intell

perhaps simply because intellectual curiosity drives him to want to k
16

immediately responsive to policy needs, although it is clear that there 

be dangers in this. It does appear that actions have been taken at the po

to which intelligence contributed little directly, or that policymakers 

ahead of the formal processes of intelligence in taking action to foresta

threatened actions of adversary or potentially hostile states.

Now, not all threatened military actions are a potential threat to U.S

interests. Neither the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 19

invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 posed any military threat to th

NATO, and no military actions were required or even desirable on our p

ically, however, it would have been nice to have had a little wider unde

of the likelihood of these actions, particularly the invasion of Czech

which caused a fair amount of concern in NATO.

Regardless of how intelligence and policy function in relation to on

or how dependent or independent the policy level may be, the importan

the end is that appropriate action is taken, when needed, to protect the i

national security and the security of our allies. Without this, the warnin

of intelligence will have failed no matter how brilliant the collection an

cal effort may have been.

Illustration of the Foregoing Principles

Some of the foregoing principles may be illustrated by the Chin

vention in Korea in October-November 1950. This event is a classic 

of the nature of the warning problem. Chinese Communist forces 

detected in Korea on about 26 October. They launched their massive 

on 26 November. 

American military officers and analysts in Korea in the fateful 

November have said, “Why of course we had warning. Our forces were 

with the Chinese. We had prisoners. We had identified the units.’’ Th

analyst will look back at the voluminous reporting on the buildup o

forces in Manchuria and on the numerous reports and indications of pr

for war throughout the Chinese mainland. The analyst will recogniz

Intelligence Community was slow in accepting the buildup and that the 

nese strength was underestimated. Nonetheless, a substantial bui

accepted both in Washington and by General MacArthur’s headqu

would likely say, “Of course we had military warning.’’ Political ana

recall that Chinese officials summoned the Indian Ambassador in Be

October and told him that Chinese forces would enter Korea if U.S

forces crossed the 38th Parallel in Korea. The analyst will look at 

change in the Chinese and international Communist propaganda lin

November to an all-out support of the North Korean cause. And the an

say, “What more political warning could we have expected?’’
17

at their meeting on Wake Island on 15 October both brought incorre

ments (that is, that Chinese intervention in Korea was unlikely.) But t

also will reexamine the judgment reached on 15 November by the in

intelligence committee then responsible for reaching an assessment 

intentions. And the analyst will conclude that the judgment reached by 

(or 10 days before the Chinese onslaught) did provide substantial warn

likelihood of major Chinese intervention—a warning perhaps not as cle

or unequivocal as it might have been but still a substantial warning.

The analyst will ask, “What happened to this? Who read it? Who b

Was most of the Intelligence Community in accord with this judgment? 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President convinced?’’ No one, then or 

really be able to say who read it, how many believed it, or what weight 

But they will concur that “a warning’’ at least was issued.

Why then, is the Chinese intervention in Korea universally rega

great intelligence failure which contributed to a near military disa

because no action was taken on any of this intelligence or judgments

no orders were issued to halt the precipitate advance of U.S. and All

toward the Yalu. No measures were initiated to prepare military 

against even the possibility of a major Chinese onslaught. It did not 

must be emphasized, how much intelligence was available or who 

warning judgment unless it resulted in such positive action. A si

officer, if his warning had carried conviction at the right time and to 

person (in this case, to General MacArthur), could have significantly 

the course of events regardless of any other judgments which might 

made by the Intelligence Community in Washington. 

INTENTIONS VERSUS CAPABILITIES

A time-honored military precept, still quoted with some frequency, 

intelligence should not estimate the intentions of the adversary, but only 

bilities. Sometimes this has been extended to mean that we can judge h

ities but that we cannot judge his intentions.

The precept that intelligence properly deals only with, or should on

capabilities derives, of course, from the requirements of the field co

Confronted with military forces which may attack him or which he is 

to attack, it is essential that the commander have the most accurate 

assessment of the capabilities of enemy forces and that he prepare his d

plan his offense against what the enemy is capable of doing rather tha

ing to guess what he might do. There is no doubt that battles and prob

wars have been lost for failure to have followed this principle and that 

mander who permits his judgment of what the adversary intends to do o

assessment of what he can do is on a path to potential disaster. (The ne
18

November 1950 was directly attributable to the failure to follow this 

The Allied campaign proceeded without regard to the capability of the C

intervene and there were no defensive preparations against this co

since it was presumed, erroneously, that the Chinese did not intend to in

The validity of this concept, however, does not mean that intellige

national and strategic level should be confined to the assessment of ca

For the fact is that intelligence at all levels, but particularly that which i

for the guidance of policy officials, is expected also to deal with the q

intentions. Not only the executive branch of the government, but also 

gress and the public at large, believe that the function of intelligence i

tain what our enemies and even our friends are going to do, not only 

can do or might do. And, considering the cost of intelligence today in m

personnel and the potential consequences of misjudgment of intentions

to argue that the nation is not entitled to expect this.

Nearly all inquiries into the presumed failures of intelligence or cri

its competence are focused on why forewarning was not provided that 

was going to happen. Rarely does the policymaker or the congressiona

tee complain that intelligence failed to make an adequate assessment 

capabilities, even when this in fact may have been the case. The critici

invariably is: “You did not tell me this was going to happen. We were 

expect this and were surprised.’’ Or, “You mean for all the millions 

spent on collection, you were not able to tell us that this was likely t

Protests that officials had been warned of the possibility or that the capa

been recognized are not likely to be very satisfactory in these circumsta

it or not, intelligence is seized with the problem of intentions. Howeve

its successes may be in other ways, the Intelligence Community’s co

often will be judged in the end by the accuracy of its forecasts of what i

happen. And indeed this is what the warning business is all about.

Let us now examine the validity of the idea that we can judge militar

ities with a high degree of accuracy, but that intentions can never be for

any degree of certainty and that it is therefore unreasonable to expect t

gence process to come to judgments of intent. How can the analyst tell t

thing is going to occur before it happens? Is this not demanding the im

On the other hand, the analyst can easily tell how many troops there are 

in a specific area and what they are capable of doing against the opposi

Just how such concepts have gained prevalence or are seemingly 

believed is a mystery. For in practice, as most experienced military an

testify, it may be very difficult to come to accurate assessments of th

capabilities of any state, even when information is readily obtainable. A

the analyst is dealing with denied areas, where elementary military 

never publicly revealed and the most rigid military security is mainta
19

as orderofbattle or the strength of the armed forces. Given enough t

this often has been measured in years, not months or weeks—intelli

usually been able to come to fairly accurate assessments of the order-o

most foreign countries. Total strength figures have proved extremely el

the seeming certainty on such matters reflected in estimates over a perio

is of course no guarantee whatever that the estimate was accurate. A

speaking here of situations where military strengths and disposit

remained relatively static. Given a situation where changes are occu

particularly when mobilization of several units is occurring or large dep

are under way in secrecy, estimates of capabilities as measured in term

force available may be very wide of the mark.

As a general rule, although not always, intelligence will underes

strength of forces, particularly ground forces, involved in a buildup a

times will greatly underestimate the scale of mobilization and deploy

nearly all cases of recent years where subsequent proof was obtainabl

been the case. The scale of the North Korean buildup for the attack 

Korea in June 1950, although recognized as formidable, was under

Chinese Communist deployments to Manchuria prior to the offensive in 

late November 1950 were probably at least double that of most estim

time. The extent of North Vietnamese mobilization in 1965-66 was con

underestimated. The Soviet response to the Hungarian revolt in late Oct

was a precipitate deployment of units into that country which defied ord

tle or numerical analysis at the time, and even today the total So

employed never has been completely established. Similarly, we do not k

many Soviet troops were moved into Czechoslovakia in June 1968, oste

Warsaw Pact exercise “Sumava,’’ but it is highly likely that estimates ar

Despite good order-of-battle information on the buildup for the in

Czechoslovakia, several units were not identified until afterward. 

Logistic capabilities, as measured in terms of ammunition, petro

other supplies immediately available for the offensive, are even more d

establish. In fact, many logistic estimates are based not on any reliable 

concerning the scale of the supply buildup but on an assumption that th

supplies will be moved forward with the units. Since the availability o

of course is vital to the conduct of warfare and indeed may constitute 

ence between a high capability and no capability whatever, the movem

or two items of supply may be absolutely critical. Yet it is unlikely that t

tion system will provide much specific information on the movement 

ous important items. Few estimates have proved to be more slip

assessing when a logistic buildup may be completed and hence when 

sary’s forces may actually have the capability given them on paper.

Consider further the problem of assessing the presence or absence o

weapons, and particularly new or advanced weapons, capable of inflic
20

was an intelligence gap; the U.S. was unable to make an accurate estim

strength of Soviet missile forces and in fact considerably overestima

capabilities in this field. It may be certain that Japanese assessments of U

bilities were revolutionized with the dropping of the first atomic 

Hiroshima. Did the USSR have nuclear weapons in Cuba in October 

the time, we thought so but could not be sure. 

Add to these supposedly measurable factors the intangible factors so 

the performance of armies and nations—such as the quality of trainin

ship and morale—and it is still more apparent why estimates of capabi

be so wrong. Nearly all Western countries at some time or another have 

tims of gross misjudgment not only of the intentions but of the capa

other powers. In short, it is not a simple problem. 

If capabilities may thus be so difficult to establish, does it follow t

tainment of intentions is virtually impossible? I have sometimes as

wedded to this belief to put themselves in the position of the German H

mand in the spring of 1944 as it looked across the English Channel to 

mous buildup of Allied combat power in the United Kingdom. W

assessment have been, “Yes, there is a tremendous capability here, b

really judge their intent? Perhaps this is only a bluff and they will launc

invasion through southern France, or perhaps they have not yet mad

minds what they will do.’’ Merely to pose the question reveals the falla

suming that it is not possible to come to reasonable judgments of inte

course the Nazis could tell that the invasion was coming and that it 

made across the Channel. It is ridiculous to presume that such a buildu

tary force would have been undertaken with no intention of using it 

decisions had yet been made.

Now this is an extreme example and one should not make gener

from this. In other cases it has not been that easy or clear-cut, and the p

assessing intentions rarely is this simple. But neither is it necessarily a

as many believe, particularly if one tries to look at it in terms of pro

precedents, national objectives and the options available rather than 

either-or terms. As this treatise has already noted and will emphasize 

warning we are dealing with probabilities, not certainties, and judgme

be made and worded accordingly. Nothing involving human behavio

lutely certain before it occurs, and even a nation which has firmly dec

given action may change its mind. But judgments can be made th

courses of action are more or less probable in given circumstances, 

appears that the adversary now plans (or intends) to do such and such. 

predictions of the behavior of individuals and states may be difficult

impossible to make reasonable assessments and often with a quite hig

age of accuracy.
21

day is making judgments concerning the intentions of others, not only 

saries but many other states as well. Nor are these judgments confin

national estimative or warning process. All analysts are making judgme

time about the information they receive and are assessing whether or n

gests that a particular actor may be getting ready to do something unus

ferent from what it has been doing. Now most of the time countries are 

and will continue to pursue the same general courses of action which 

been following for some time; that is, their attitudes and intentions wil

changed significantly and there is no requirement to be coming to c

new assessments or to be constantly reiterating what is widely reco

accepted. Even though judgments about intentions are continually rev

judgments are generally implicit rather than explicit. To cite an exam

may be no need for months or even years to reaffirm in print that it i

that China will attack the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait when th

indications that it is getting ready to do so. The Intelligence Commun

ment of intentions on this, as on many other subjects or areas, has been 

quite likely will continue to be right unless there is some discernible 

the situation. But it is essentially a negative judgment that there is no

that needs to be said because nothing new is going to happen.

The idea that intelligence either cannot or should not be making jud

intentions usually arises only when there are sudden or major changes 

tion requiring a new judgment, and particularly a positive judgm

whether aggressive action may be planned. Analysts who hitherto had b

willing to make negative judgments that nothing was going to happ

things will continue as they have will suddenly realize that they cannot 

judgment any more with confidence but also will be unwilling to com

new positive judgments. They may thus take the position that intelligen

(or should not) make judgments of intentions, although they have in the 

doing just this, and will quite likely be willing to do so again in othe

stances. (The various factors which contribute to unwillingness to com

ments in new situations are addressed later in this work.)

Not only is it true that the intelligence process continually comes to j

on intentions and that its errors are the exception rather than the rule; 

be demonstrated that in some circumstances it is actually easier to re

ments concerning intentions than it is to assess capabilities. This was 

for example, of the wars in both Vietnam and Laos. There was little 

North Vietnam for years intended to move sufficient supplies through th

Panhandle to sustain the combat capabilities of its units in South Vietn

proved very difficult to estimate the actual so-called throughput to the 

alone the supplies which might reach any given unit. Similarly, it was of

ble to forecast at least several days in advance that a new Communist 

effort was coming, that is, was intended, but the capabilities of Commu
22

ject to considerable error. Captured documents and prisoners in both Vi

Laos sometimes accurately described planned operations for a whole s

intentions of the Communists to carry them out might be relatively 

other factors, most notably friendly counteractions, could be so effectiv

capability to carry out the action was seriously disrupted. 

It would be misleading to leave the impression that the writer be

assessment of intentions is somehow more important than capabilities o

cating that military precepts on assessing capabilities are outmoded or 

scrapped. Nothing could be further from the truth. If there is one les

learned from the history of warning intelligence—both its successe

failures—it is that there is nothing more important to warning than th

and realistic description of capabilities. It is not only the field comm

also the policy official who first and foremost needs to understand the c

of the adversary. Assessments of intentions without due recognition fi

capability can be as dangerous, perhaps even more dangerous, at the n

strategic level as in the field. The greatest contribution that a military a

make to warning often may be to explain in clear and realistic language

who may not have his detailed knowledge, exactly how great a capa

been built up, how great the preponderance of force actually is, how m

tic effort has been required, or how unusual the military activity really 

makers, and those at lower levels as well, more than once have 

appreciate the likelihood of military action in part because no one r

made it clear in basic English how great the capability was.

It is the history of warfa

warning, that the extr

buildup of military force 

bility is often the sin

important and valid ind

intent. It is not a question 

tions versus capabilitie

coming to logical judgments of intentions in the light of capabilities. T

that states do not ordinarily undertake great and expensive buildups 

power without the expectation or intention of using it. Large and sud

ployments of forces, with accompanying mobilization of reserves an

forward movements of logistic support, are usually pretty solid evide

intention to attack unless there is some really valid or convincing evide

contrary. The greater the buildup of offensive capability versus that of 

sary, the greater the deviation from normal military behavior, the more 

it is that military action is planned—not certain, but probable. As som

“The race may not be to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, but it 

best way to place your bets.’’

“It is the history of warfare, and of warning,

that the extraordinary buildup of military

force or capability is often the single most

important and valid indication of intent.’’
23

progress. Once it has been accepted that a nation is committed to the 

war, analysts nearly always are able to come to realistic and general

judgments of intentions on the basis of an extraordinary buildup o

forces in some particular area. It is when war has not yet broken out or 

mitment to resort to force has not become clear or generally accepted, 

may be great reluctance to draw conclusions from the same type of mi

dence which would be readily accepted in wartime. This psychologica

a serious problem in reaching warning assessments. In some circum

surprising number of individuals will prove unable to reach straightf

obvious conclusions from the massive buildup of military power and w

variety of other explanations, sometimes quite implausible or illogical, 

all this combat force is being assembled.

There is one important factor to be considered in the buildup of 

force prior to the outbreak of hostilities, which differs from the wart

tion. Even if the potential aggressor has decided to carry out military 

secure its objectives, it is always possible that an accommodation will 

military operation unnecessary. There may be a negotiated political s

perhaps through mediation, or the other country may simply capitul

face of the threatened attack. Such an occurrence, however, does not 

a conclusion that the nation in question was determined to obtain its 

force if needed, or that it had intended to attack unless a solution satis

it was reached. 

Obviously, states will not usually undertake costly and dangerou

operations if they can obtain the same objectives without them. It 

argued that, because the U.S. did not attack the Soviet missile bases i

October 1962, no conclusions could have been drawn as to U.S. intenti

that the foregoing discussion concerning intentions is therefore invalid

of reasoning avoids the issue. The U.S. did not attack the bases because 

have to; the USSR agreed to remove the missiles because it consider

attack was likely—as indeed it was.

Another pitfall to be avoided is the tendency to give inadequate em

the capability when its logical implications may be alarming or unpopu

crisis or potential crisis situation, the military analyst should be particu

ful that he is in fact making and conveying to his superiors an accurate 

quate assessment of the military situation. He has the same responsibi

field commander to judge capabilities first without regard to his perso

lections as to intentions. The analyst must not let his preconceptions o

course of action for the adversary influence his analysis and reporting o

itary evidence. It is regrettable but true that some analysts who have rej

itary action by the adversary as unlikely or inconsistent with their preco

have also been known to downplay or even fail to report at all some 

which indicated that a massive buildup of capability was in progress.
24

convey a better sense of the likelihood of action than will a series of 

judgments which fail to include the military details or reasons on 

assessment is based. To understand the capability, and to be able to view 

tively, is a prerequisite to the understanding of intent.
25

INTRODUCTION TO THE 

ANALYTICAL METHOD

INDICATOR LISTS: COMPILING INDICATIO

Indicator lists are believed to be a post-World War II development, a

is not unlikely that similar techniques had been used in the past. In ab

the intelligence agencies began developing lists of actions or possib

which might be undertaken by an adversary (specifically the Soviet Un

to the initiation of hostilities. From this beginning, the intelligence serv

U.S. (and its Allies) have gradually developed a series of indicator lists

The earlier lists, reflecting the then-apparent monolithic structure of 

munist world, generally were intended to apply to the “Sino-Soviet B

was then called) as a whole. Little effort was made to differentiate ac

might be taken by the USSR from those which might be taken by C

China, North Korea or the Communist Vietnamese (Viet Minh). In reco

the differing nature of conflicts and preparations for conflicts in variou

the world, however, numerous special lists evolved in the 1950’s de

such topics or areas as Southeast Asia, the Taiwan Strait and Berlin. T

lists had varying degrees of coordination, formality and stature in the co

but most were prepared at the working level as tools for the analysts o

agencies or commands, primarily for their own use, Since the late fi

Intelligence Community has attempted to reduce this proliferation of l

use the resources of the community as a whole to prepare single, coord

formally issued lists. In recognition both of the Sino-Soviet split and the 

nature of the Soviet and Chinese Communist states and military estab

separate lists were developed for these areas.

Content and Preparation of Indicator Lists

The philosophy behind indicator lists is that any nation in preparatio

(either general or localized) will or may undertake certain measures 

political and possibly economic), and that it is useful for analysts and 

to determine in advance what these are or might be, and to identify the

cifically as possible. Because of the large variety of actions which a m

try will or may undertake prior to initiating hostilities or during period

tensions, indicator lists have tended to become quite long and detai

instead of referring simply to “mobilization of manpower,’’ the list m

dozen or more items identifying specific actions which may be taken 

mobilization process. While some of these specifics are intended prim

collectors, they may also be very useful to the analysts. Because of the 

lists, however, it has sometimes been found useful to issue brief lists o
26

ate importance, if they should occur.

In compiling indicator lists, analysts will draw on three major s

knowledge: logic or longtime historical precedent; specific knowled

military doctrine or practices of the state or states concerned; and th

learned from the behavior of that state or those states during a rece

international crisis. The first of these (logic or longtime precedent) is 

essential. Regardless of what we may know about the doctrine or rece

mance of any country, history tells us that all countries either must or 

will do certain types of things before they initiate hostilities. They 

minimum, provide the necessary combat supplies for their forces, 

them or at least alert them to varying degrees, and issue the order 

Depending on the scale and geographic area of the attack and on 

resulting scope of the hostilities, they may undertake a large variety 

tional military measures, both offensive and defensive. Most states w

bly take some measures to prepare their own populace and perha

opinion for their action. And, if the conflict is to be of major proport

likely to last for a prolonged period, they may also begin major econo

locations before hostilities are under way. 

Both analyst and collector, however, will wish more specific guides 

general precepts. For this, a knowledge of military and political do

practice of the nation in question will be of invaluable assistance. Ind

refinements in indicator lists are based primarily on our growing know

understanding of the military organization, doctrine and practices of ou

adversaries, as derived from a variety of sources.

Equally valuable to the compilers of indicator lists, although usuall

quently available, will be the actual performance of a country in a “live

situation. No amount of theory replaces the observance of actual per

Preferably for the analyst, the crisis should have resulted in actual wa

mitment of forces, since there will then have been no doubt that it was 

A crisis which abates or is adjudicated before an outbreak of hostile 

never quite as useful since there will always be some doubt how ma

observed developments were actually preparations for hostilities. Th

and/or riskier the crisis and the greater the preparedness measures un

the more useful for future indications purposes it is likely to be. In ad

more recent the crisis, the more likely it is to reflect current doctrine an

Because of changes in Chinese Communist military forces and proc

well as other factors, a study of the Chinese military intervention 

invaluable as it is, cannot be considered an absolute guide to how th

political leadership and armed forces might perform were such a si

occur again. Some of the most useful intelligence we had since World 

Soviet mobilization and logistic practice came from the preparations tak

invasion of Czechoslovakia. A number of refinements in Soviet/ Wa
27

that the carefully researched and wellprepared indicator list will conta

variety of items, some theoretical, some well documented from recent p

doctrine, and covering a whole spectrum of possible actions that the 

adversary may undertake. No list, however, purports to be complete o

every possible contingency. Each crisis or conflict, potential or actu

forth actions or developments that had not been anticipated on an ind

and which in fact may be unique to the particular situation and might 

another time.

Still more important, it must be understood that even a major crisis in

great national mobilization and commitment of forces and many obviou

and propaganda developments may involve only a relatively small frac

actions set forth on a comprehensive indicator list. And, of these action

intelligence collection system can reasonably be expected to obser

smaller fraction. Some of the most important developments, particul

immediately preceding the initiation of hostilities, are unlikely under t

circumstances to be detected, or at least to be detected in time. A judgm

specific indicator is unlikely to be detected, however, should never pr

inclusion on an indicator list, since there is always a chance that the 

system, perhaps fortuitously, will learn of it. As someone once said, an 

list is a desideratum, not an absolute guide to what may occur, still le

ment of what we are likely to know.

At one time, it was considered desirable to divide indicator lists, no

various subject categories (military, political, economic) and sub-cat

these, but also into time phases—usually long-range, intermediate-

short-range. This procedure rested on the hypothesis, which is not inva

ory, that some preparations for hostilities are of a much longer term n

others and require much longer to implement, whereas others could r

be expected to occur very shortly before the initiation of the attack. E

however, has shown that such pre-judgments of likely time phases of a

of doubtful practical use, and can be misleading or even dangerous. So

rations may be so long term (the start of a program to build large numb

submarines, for example) that their relevance to the initiation of ho

some date in the future is questionable, at best.

Similarly, dependent on circumstances, an action that would usuall

sidered very short-term in nature may occur weeks or even months b

military attack or action is finally carried out. (Some of the Soviet 

finally invaded Czechoslovakia on 20-21 August 1968 were mobi

deployed to the border on 7-8 May and were held in readiness for oper

over three months. One regiment reportedly was actually issued the bas

ammunition on 9 May, but it was then withdrawn.) On the other hand, in 

developing crisis calling for immediate military action, all preparation

telescoped into a few days, as in the Soviet suppression of the Hungaria
28

a given action may run days or weeks after the occurrence, so that ac

may appear to be recent have actually been in progress for some time.

Thus, for these and other reasons, most indicator lists today have 

distinction between long and short-term preparations for hostilities. At 

time, some preparations judged to be so long term in nature that th

doubtful validity as indicators have been dropped altogether. The focu

on the collection and evaluation of all indicators, regardless of timing, w

point to a likelihood or possibility that a nation has begun preparations f

tiation of hostilities. 

Uses of Indicator Lists

Any analyst who has participated in the preparation of a detailed ind

and its coordination with other agencies will have learned a great deal i

cess. In fact, the most useful aspect of these lists may be that the ana

work on them must examine in detail the steps that a prospective ad

most likely to take before initiating hostilities. For beginners, such exp

invaluable, and even analysts with long experience always learn some

in the process of preparing or revising such lists. The process ser

extremely useful medium for an exchange of expertise between basi

(with their invaluable knowledge of the nuts and bolts) and current i

analysts who may be very knowledgeable on the theory of warning an

eral types of things to be looking for but rather ignorant on the specific

nothing further were done with indicator lists, the time spent in prepa

would probably not have been wasted.

The usual reason for preparing such lists, however, is to give them 

semination to other analysts, supervisors, collectors and field agencie

to guide them on what it is we want to know. At least in theory, every 

lector is armed with an indicator list (together of course with all his o

ance and directives on what to look for), and each current analyst f

consults his list to see how many indicators are showing up “positive’

his collection gaps may be. It is not uncommon for those new to t

gence process to expect the indicator list to be a kind of bible or a

master guide on what to be watching for. “Let me see your indicato

not an unusual query.

Of course, it is not this simple. To field collectors, the indicator li

they have received it which sometimes they have not) is one more piece 

tion guidance and one more document to keep in the safe. Practically 

the collector receive a query specifically pegged to an item on the ind

He may receive a query on a subject on the indicator list, and quite likel

it will not be related to the list and there will be no reason to consult it

field collector needs when something begins to happen that has potent
29

have specific guidance on exactly what to look for in his area (and whe

be relieved of a lot of routine requests when he should be concentratin

is of immediate importance. 

In the interests of more specific guidance and of not burdening the fi

with a detailed list, some attempts have been made to compile very sp

of things to took for in specific cities or areas in event of possible prepa

major hostilities. Obviously, such lists can only be prepared by those 

most detailed knowledge of the area. Much more remains to be done in 

but it is one which might prove to be quite fruitful. By reducing the gen

specific and for a specific area, indicator lists in the future may prove 

greater usefulness for the field than has heretofore been the case.

And what use is the indicator list to the analyst back at headquart

is he doing with it? The chances are that he also has it somewhere in 

but has not looked at it very often. If he has helped to prepare it i

place, he will probably have very little need to consult it since he w

almost automatically that a given report does or does not fit some ca

the indicator list. Hopefully, he will from time to time consult his lis

larly if he begins to note a number of developments which could in

impending outbreak of conflict or some other crisis. If he does not e

much, and remembers that at best he may hope to see only a fraction 

indicators on the list, he may find that the list is a useful guide to give 

spective on his present crisis.

In normal times, when the situation is reasonably quiet and no distu

itary or political developments are evident, an indicator list is not goin

much use unless one needs to be reassured periodically that things are p

mal. An indicator list is really not for all the time; it is a sometime t

even when that “some time’’ occurs, that twice a decade perhaps wh

confronted with a real warning crisis, no one should look on the indicat

solution to the warning problem. The mere ticking off of items on an ind

has never produced warning, and it never will. It is a tool but not a pana

Compiling Indications

As all analysts know, it is possible to collect an enormous amount o

tion in an extremely short time on almost any current intelligence pro

the greater the current interest in the subject, the greater will be the a

verbiage. In no time at all, the analyst can collect drawers full of raw in

items, current intelligence items and special studies on an ongoing situ

the war in Vietnam. The measure of the importance of a crisis is som

amount of reporting it engenders. The Cuban missile crisis or the Sovie

Pact military buildup for the invasion of Czechoslovakia will result i

lanche of reporting. Unfortunately, not all of these are original reports
30

lyst who is hard put to read everything, let alone put it into a filing syst

information can be easily recovered.

There are no panaceas to this problem, at least none have been foun

the following suggestions may not necessarily be the best method in 

even from day to day when things are relatively quiet. Nothing yet 

found to replace a retentive memory, a recognition of what is important 

is not, and a sense of how things fit together. There are perhaps four b

or compiling problems that the indications analyst should be prepare

with. They are: (1) extracting raw data or information of potential indic

nificance; (2) compiling the highlights of such data into a readily usabl

topic or area; (3) coping with the sudden but short-term crisis; and (4) 

ing long-term warning or indications files.

Extracting Indications Data

The indications analyst must have the basic raw data, extracted ve

competently summarized if the item is very long, with the original so

tions and evaluation and the date of the information (not just wh

acquired). The analyst can, if necessary, dispense with all current in

summaries, all special situation reports (unless they contain new data), a

ety of other reports, but the analyst cannot do without the basic inform

basic data may be filed in a computer system and recovered under v

headings. Obviously, discrimination is needed to retain what is of som

indications interest and to pitch out a lot of current information which 

no interest next week. When in doubt, however, it is better to retain m

than less.

For indications purposes, the material should be filed under the date 

the development occurred, not when it was reported or received. You 

ested in the interrelationship of events in time, not when the informatio

available.

The general headings of indicator lists may be good headings for 

tions of the file, but specific items from the indicator list usually shou

used as file headings. Above all, however, the analyst should maintain 

system, in which new headings are created, titles are revised, or some 

are broken down into subheadings.

The researcher should take care not to be trapped in a rigid system w

not be readily expanded or modified as new developments occur. T

should be designed to serve the analyst, not to have the analyst serve th

The indexing of such files by country and key words has also prov

in recovering specific items. The analyst should remember, however, 

he keeps his own subject files he is doing much of his research a
31

item separately and really do the research from scratch. Where large 

of items may be involved, this can be very time-consuming. 

Compiling Highlights: the Indications Chronology

No indications methodology yet devised is as useful or meaning

properly prepared indications chronology. The method is applicable bo

tively normal situations, for recording the highlights, and to budding cr

tions in which large volumes of material are being received. While its a

are numerous, it must also be observed that it is a very time-consu

requiring the most conscientious effort, which is probably the chief reas

few are prepared. 

The purpose of the indications chronology is to record briefly 

sequence (by date of occurrence, not date of reporting) all known 

ments, reported facts, alleged actions or plans, rumors, or anything e

might be an indication of impending aggressive action or other abnor

ity. For the initial chronology, it is not necessary to prove any inter-re

of the various items, but merely to note them (obviously, there mus

possible connection, even if remote, to include an item). Some nota

the validity of the information is desirable (particularly unconfirmed o

items), and it is often helpful to note the source as well, but the items 

as brief as possible. The chronology should also include significant a

our side (or allies) that might cause some reaction or help explain so

sarial activity.

In a slow-building crisis of many months (which is the usual, not th

crisis) the relationship of old and new material may become immedi

dent once the information is approached chronologically. Decision t

be isolated, or the likely reason for some action may become appare

serious military preparations are under way, it will quite likely app

number of actions were initiated at about the same time. Even

appeared to have no relationship at the time they were reported may 

assume a meaningful pattern. Moreover, the method provides an alm

proof way that the analyst will not fail to note something, perhaps b

did not understand it when received or did not know where to file it. A 

ogy is a catch-all for anomalies, and while not all anomalies lead to 

crises are made up of anomalies.

In addition to insuring that research is done and items not ignored

chronology can rapidly be edited in final form for distribution on a cr

and the analyst also can readily produce a written analysis or summ

evidence from the chronology. Where a great deal of material is com

page for each day can be maintained and new items added as received

those pages need be rerun to insure that it is current.
32

developments in some area or country. Further, once an item has be

recorded, a large amount of paper can be thrown away. It is a tremendou

file space. Good chronologies of major crises can be kept indefinitely, m

other data can be destroyed, and the document will remain the most use

of the crisis which you could have.

Long-term Warning Files

Unlike current intellige

which rapidly become ou

good warning files imp

age. Some of the most 

files in intelligence are t

tions files maintained on major crises, since most analysts’ research 

have been destroyed and anyone seeking to review the basic data from 

nal raw material would have an almost insurmountable task.

One of the most useful things which an indications office can do 

files of crisis situations and warning problems. This may include extra

original material as described above, and also the chronologies and spe

ies. Postmortems of what happened and how it was analyzed and repo

time are extremely useful for future study of indications and warning 

ogy. If such files are well compiled, virtually all other current informat

problem can usually be destroyed. Don’t throw out crisis files and st

because they are old and there has been no demand for them in years. T

little demand for ten years for studies on the Soviet reaction to the H

revolt of 1956, but interest perked up noticeably in the summer of 19

larly, studies of Soviet reaction in the Suez crisis of 1956 were su

demand at the time of the six-day war in June 1967.

Another type of file which the indications analyst or office should 

is the basic data on how a nation goes to war: alert and combat readin

dures, mobilization laws, studies of major war games or exercises, civ

doctrine and practice, and a host of other similar material which 

needed but of absolutely vital importance when there is a threat of em

of military force. 

FUNDAMENTALS OF INDICATIONS ANALYS

There is seemingly very little difference between indications analys

process of developing intelligence judgments in any other field of int

so, why study indications analysis? What’s different about it? The 

between warning analysis and other intelligence analysis is largely one 

or, one might say, of intensity. The analytical factors and techniques m

or essential for warning also are required in varying degrees in othe

“Unlike current intelligence files, good

warning files improve with age.’’
33

unique individually, pose a complexity of difficulties in combination 

certainly exceptional and would seem to warrant some special cons

There are some fundamentals of indications research which analysts 

supervisors and higher level officials) should understand.

Recognition of the Inadequacy of Our Knowledge

Warning analysis must begin with a realistic understanding of how m

more accurately, how little—we know about what is going on in the ar

world controlled by our enemies or potential enemies on a current d

basis. Large numbers of people, in fact probably most people wh

actively engaged in collection or research on these areas, often have 

torted ideas about what we know about the situation right now or wha

rent collection capabilities really are.

For the most part, people with a superficial rather than a detailed k

will tend to believe that we know more about the current situation than 

do. This tendency to exaggerate our current knowledge or collection c

is the product of several factors. Most important perhaps is that our ove

term, basic intelligence on other countries is often quite good, or even 

We may really know a good deal about the Chinese transportation sy

locations and strengths of Syrian units, military production in Poland 

merable other subjects all pertinent in some degree to the capabilities 

tions of these states. What the inexperienced observer may not reali

long it has taken to obtain such information, or that our knowledge is th

of literally years of painstaking collection and meticulous analysis. H

understand that some of our best information may be months or even 

before we obtain it, and that it is rare that information of such quality is 

on a current basis. 

It cannot be denied also that the managers of certain collection sys

tend to create the impression that they really know far more—or hav

far more—on a current situation than is actually the case. Post-mortem 

spective analyses are notorious vehicles for setting forth all sorts of det

tary facts and interpretations as if all this had really been available a

hands of the intelligence users at the time the event occurred. Such se

reporting may be useful for budgetary purposes (indeed, this may be the 

quent reason for this type of distorted reporting) but it does a real dis

the rest of the Intelligence Community. Small wonder that outside inv

(and congressional committees) may have an altogether erroneous imp

our current collection capabilities—and thus may tend to blame the 

process for errors which were only in part its fault.

Some finished reporting of intelligence agencies also contribut

impression that our knowledge is more current than is actually the case. 
34

times even years after it has occurredbut often without mentioning 

date of the event. Similar time lags in the acquisition and reporting 

important basic data may be well understood by the analysts immedi

cerned but not by most readers.

The Intelligence Community is expected to make daily judgments 

current situation, such as the state of military preparedness or combat 

in a variety of countries which habitually conceal or attempt to conceal 

strategic information. Nonetheless, the community—looking at the ove

tion insofar as it can perceive it and seeing nothing obviously abnorm

conclude that the situation is generally normal and that all forces ar

usual locations and in a relatively low state of combat readiness. In 

judgments if made on a daily or weekly basis, may be based on the mo

cial knowledge of what is actually happening at the time and can be qu

ous. However, the chances are high that such judgments are right, but th

necessarily be because we know what is happening but rather because 

percent of the time things really are pretty normal. Thus, even if no cur

mation were being received, the odds are that the statement would be co

impression nonetheless is left, probably in the minds of most readers, 

judgments are the product of considerable evidence. And if we know w

are “normal,’’ then clearly we should also know when something is “ab

Now, there are some types of developments—both military and p

which we have a fair chance of detecting on a current basis in many cou

which, if they occur, can often be regarded as abnormal. In the case o

activities, these will most often be major deployments of large military 

ticularly in open terrain, along major transportation routes, or in forw

where detection capabilities are usually the best. Certain very obviou

anomalies—such as cancellations of planned trips by the leadership, or 

nary diplomatic or propaganda developments—also can often be de

abnormal even though their purpose may not be clear. But these obviou

ments may be only the smallest fraction of what is really going on, and 

ity could well include the initial preparations for future hostile actio

could be totally concealed.

What we observe from day-to-day of what goes on in foreign states

those areas in which our collection and basic intelligence is the best—

something less than the tip of the iceberg. Disasters—natural and ma

insurrections, major internal struggles even including the ouster of key 

mobilization of thousands of men and a host of other military prepara

been successfully concealed from us and almost certainly will be a

capabilities of our adversaries for concealment are probably fully appr

recognized only by a relatively small percentage of those associated 

dependent upon, the intelligence process. It may take a really surpri

action by our adversaries right under our noses for us to realize that fac
35

of the strategic missiles in Cuba have tended to overshadow the impor

tion of what was going on in the Soviet Union in the spring and summ

as the USSR was making its preparations for the deployment of the mi

the accompanying military forces to Cuba. We tend to overlook the fa

appreciation of what was happening was almost entirely dependent on 

observed on the high seas and in Cuba.

Thousands of combat troops were moved from the USSR to Cuba

with the equipment for entire SAM battalions and MRBM regiments, 

tanks, short-range missiles and quantities of air, naval and 

equipment—all without a discernible ripple in the USSR itself, withou

of the movement ever reaching the West. Only the fact that this small e

ary force was then moved by ship permitted us to recognize that anythin

was under way. Even by Soviet standards this was perhaps an extr

accomplishment in security. 

A second example of a very well-concealed move was the closure o

lin sector borders in the early morning hours of 13 August 1961. Th

analyst who often complains that the available indications were overloo

appreciated is hard put to find the evidence that was ignored in this cas

the available indications were carefully analyzed and did not in thems

port a likelihood that the Soviets and East Germans would move to clo

tor borders. Such evidence as was available tended rather to indicate 

would seek to cut down the enormous flow of refugees to the West by c

zonal borders (access to Berlin from East Germany itself), a less drasti

less effective move which would not have violated the four-power agre

the status of Berlin. The preparations for the closure of the sector bor

actually carried out almost under the eyes of Western patrols and yet 

almost total surprise. This success was the more remarkable in that our 

capabilities in East Berlin and through it into East Germany were then c

superior to those in any other area of the communist world. At all levels

munity suffered from a misplaced confidence that this collection wou

insight into what the communists were most likely to do, that there w

leak of some kind as to their plans.

The lessons that the analyst should derive from such experience are:

a. The observed anomalies—those which are apparent—will likely 

small fraction of the total, and it must be presumed that far more is u

than is discernible to us; 

b. Even in areas or circumstances where collection is very good an

have much information, our seeming knowledge may be deceptive and 

sary may be capable of far greater concealment than we would normall
36

Closely related to the recognition of the inadequacy of our knowl

fundamental to the indications method, is the presumption that the 

usually will attempt to surprise us. If he cannot or does not attempt t

completely what he is getting ready to do, he will of least attempt to d

on some aspects of his plans and preparations.

It follows that the warning analyst must be inherently skeptical, if 

right suspicious, of what the adversary may be up to from day to da

or not there is any great cause at the moment to be particularly worr

his intentions. The indications analyst will examine each piece o

information or report for the possibility that it may be a prelude 

action or some other surprise move, even though the situation at th

gives no special cause for alarm. He will not discard information of 

warning significance until he can be sure, or at least reasonably sure

erroneous or that there is some really satisfactory “other explanation

anomaly. He will not accept the most reassuring (or least worrisome

tion for some unusual development which could prove to be ominou

endeavor consciously to go through this analytical process and to ma

alertness for unexplained anomalies, and he will hold on to those fra

information that are potentially of indications significance. 

This approach is th

what different—

cases markedly d

from that of the 

basic analyst, or e

that of the estimat

all are using the s

information. It is the function of the warning or indications analyst to b

the possibility—however remote it may seem now—that some other 

begun preparations for hostile action. At least in theory, the indicatio

will be running ahead of the rest of the analytical community in his per

this possibility. It is his function, if the system operates as it should, to 

ually raising questions concerning the adversary’s possible motiv

reminding others of pieces of information which they may have overloo

urging more collection on items of possible warning significance. 

devil’s advocate, the thorn in the side of the rest of the community. Th

is sometimes also described as assuming “the worst case.’’

There has been much misunderstanding about this, and many hav

indications analysts for their presumed proclivity for crying “wolf! wol

ing intelligence is held in ill repute by some—often those with the lea

“It is the function of the warning or indications

analyst to be alert for the possibility—however

remote it may seem now—that some other nation

has begun preparations for hostile action.’’

“He is the devil’s advocate, of the Intelligence Commu
37

forth the most alarmist interpretations, in part to justify their existence o

that is what they feel they must do in order to earn their pay. Thus the i

analyst proposes, but fortunately wiser heads prevail and the current in

or estimative process disposes and puts those scaremongers in their pla

It is necessary emphatically to dispel the idea that the perceptive a

enced warning analyst is continually rushing to his superiors with 

alarmist interpretations or is an irrational and undependable char

responsible indications analyst takes the “worst possible’’ view of e

grade rumor or is continually searching for the worst possible expla

every anomaly. Rarely if ever will he regard a single report or indic

cause for alerting the community. To maintain an open and skeptical m

be diligent and imaginative in the collection and analysis of evidence a

possibility of the unexpected does not require that one go off halfcocke

Indeed, experience has shown that qualified warning analysts, well

their facts, often have been able to play the opposite role; they have s

been able to dampen down potential flaps engendered by a few alarm

or unconfirmed reports, particularly when the international situation is 

general crisis atmosphere prevails. One product of the diligent collectio

is that the analyst is able to make a reasoned and hopefully more object

sis than he would otherwise be able to do.

The Scope of Relevant Information

As a product of the diligent 

of facts, and possible facts, t

tions analyst hopefully shou

to assemble and analyze all 

able information which ma

the problem and not just tha

most recently or that which is most apparent or readily acceptable. War

ligence must deal not only with that which is obvious but with that 

obscure. It must consider all the information which may be relevant to 

lem at hand. If one accepts the premise of surprise, it will follow tha

adversary is preparing to do will not necessarily be that which is most o

seemingly plausible.

We earlier discussed the importance for warning of the exhaustiv

effort and the requirement that the analyst have available the basic raw 

preparation of chronologies is one very useful method whereby the a

assemble in readily usable form a variety of reports and fragments of in

which may relate to the problem even though their relevance cannot ye

tively established.

“Warning intelligence must deal not

only with that which is obvious but with

that which is obscure.’’
38

sions and extraordinary preparations that there are likely to be a large n

unusual developments and often a still larger number of unconfirm

plained and otherwise puzzling reports or rumors. Some of these will b

unimportant. Some will be false but—had they been true—potentia

tant. Some will be true, or partly true, and very important. But a lo

reports simply cannot be determined with any certainty to be either im

unimportant. It cannot be demonstrated with any certitude whether they 

not relevant. And, interestingly enough, this may never be established. 

neither prove nor disprove the relevance of some information. This is o

that postmortems, even with all the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, often do 

agreements either.

The problem of what facts, what known occurrences, what reported 

ments, which rumors, and how much of what is happening in general 

ally pertinent to what the adversary may be getting ready to do is o

most difficult problems for warning intelligence. It is probably safe t

no two people are likely to reach complete agreement on what is relev

really complicated situation. One of the most frequent criticisms levi

the indications method is that it tends to see all unusual or unexplain

opments not only as potentially ominous but also as related to one ano

same criticism is often made against chronologies on the grounds that 

to pull together a lot of developments or reports simply because they 

at the same time when there is actually no such demonstrable causa

ship between them. Obviously, such criticisms can have much validity 

the indications analyst has been tossing in everything but the kitchen 

effort to demonstrate ominous connections between a variety of re

developments of uncertain validity and/or significance.

Nonetheless, in justice to the indications method, it must also be s

retrospect—when the crisis is over—more rather than less infor

nearly always judged to have been relevant than was appreciated by m

at the time. The imaginative rather than restricted or literal approach h

invariably proved to be the correct one. The ability to perceive connect

least possible connections, between events and reports which on th

may not seem to be directly related is a very important ingredient in th

process, and one which has probably been given too little attention. T

process of intelligence and the emphasis on coordination and “agr

tions’’ have tended increasingly to suppress the independent and o

imaginative analysis. “Think pieces’’ and speculative analyses ne

encouraged rather than discouraged. Information which may be relev

problem, whether or not it can be “proved’’ to be, must be considered 

to warning assessments. It was the inability to see the relevance and 

nections of events in the Soviet Union, Germany and Cuba which cont
39

strategic adventure in the summer of 1962 . 

When we are attempting to assess what may and may not be rel

given situation, it may be well to be guided by an important and usu

precept. As a general rule, the greater the military venture on which a

is preparing to embark, and the greater the risks, the more importan

come, the more crucial the decisions—the wider the ramifications ar

be. And the wider the ramifications, the more likely it is that we will se

lies in widely varying fields of activity as the nation prepares for 

impending showdown. In these circumstances, many seemingly unrela

really do have relevance to the situation—if not directly, then indire

are part of an atmosphere; they contribute to the sense of unease that t

are not right or normal, and that something big is brewing. To discard 

such fragments as irrelevant or unrelated is to lose that atmosphere. T

gence system will usually come out ahead if it is prepared in thes

stances to consider as relevant a broader field of information than it 

other circumstances. It will be better prepared to accept the great 

impending event if it has already perceived a series of anomalies as po

evant to such a development. In the words of Louis Pasteur, “Chance 

prepared mind.’’

Objectivity and Realism

No factor is more important for warning than objectivity in the anal

data and a realistic appreciation of the situation as it actually is. The ab

objective, to set aside one’s own preconceptions of what another countr

do or how it should behave, to look of all the evidence as realis

possible—these are crucial to indications analysis and the ultimate is

the warning judgment at every stage of the process. The greater exper

individual has in the warning field the more likely he is to believe that o

and the accompanying ability to look at the situation as the other fellow 

the single most crucial factor in warning. There have been too many wa

ures which seemed attributable above all to the failure of people—both 

ally and collectively—to examine their evidence realistically and 

conclusions from it rather than from their subjective feelings about the 

One of the foremost authorities on warning in the U.S. Government, 

by this writer that she was planning this book, said, “So what have y

write about? It is the same thing every time. People just will not be

indications.’’

The rejection of evidence incompatible with one’s own hypotheses 

ceptions, the refusal to accept or to believe that which is unpleasant or 

or which might upset one’s superiors—these are far more common fai

most people suspect. One of the most frequent, and maddening, obstac
40

know you have all these indications, but I just do not believe hell 

Korea, 1950; Suez, 1956; Hungary, 1956, Czechoslovakia, 1968, and 

tian attack on Israel, 1973: In none of these cases did we lack indica

some of them, there was a wealth of positive indications—it was that 

people could not or would not believe them.

Now, the reaction of most people to the mere suggestion that they m

thinking objectively is one of high indignation, it is an insult both to th

gence and their character to imply such a thing. Of course, they are 

objectively; it’s you or the other fellow who is not, or it is you who is 

conclusions on the basis of wholly inadequate evidence while they are 

ing an open mind. In these circumstances, the atmosphere often becom

charged emotionally. Positions tend to harden, and with each side taki

adamant position, reconciliation of views becomes less likely, and o

more difficult to obtain.

One of the first things which we all must recognize if we are to unde

warning business is that nobody achieves total objectivity. We are all i

in some degree by our preconceptions, our beliefs, our education, early 

and a variety of other factors in our experience. Some people—for reas

be fully understood—are capable of more objectivity than other peopl

more accurately, they are capable of more objectivity on some subje

other people find it difficult to be objective about. But no one is perfect

We must also recognize that the ability to think objectively is not n

correlated with high intelligence, and that objectivity in one field may 

sarily carry over into other fields. The history of both religion and of po

vides ample illustrations of men of great intellectual achievements 

nonetheless totally biased and dogmatic in their outlook. Cases can be 

of brilliant scientists—presumably capable of very objective analys

fields of specialization—who have seemed almost unbelievably naive 

istic when they have attempted to engage in other pursuits. Whole com

and even nations (Salem, Massachusetts, and Nazi Germany) have bee

of mass hysteria or guilty of such irrational conduct that it is difficult fo

sider to comprehend it at all. None of us is immune. We are all emotion

as rational.

It is important, both for the analyst and the Intelligence Commu

whole, to recognize and face this problem. It should not be a forbidde

The rules of the game generally have precluded challenging a colleague 

and certainly not one’s superiors, as to why they will not accept certain 

or why they think as they do. Yet this may be the most crucial facto

assessment. It would help greatly in such cases if people could be i

explain their thought processes as best they can, or what is really behin

they feel. The mere process of discussing the subject, dispassionately o
41

merits, but evaluating it in the light of their preconceptions. Still better

teners less involved in the problem may perceive where the difficulty 

years, experienced indications analysts have maintained, and not faceti

warning was a problem for psychologists. What is it that does not al

people to examine evidence with greater objectivity, even to the point w

will consistently reject indications which seem self-evident to anothe

Why will one analyst view certain information as tremendously impor

problem and another tend to downplay it as of not much importance or 

altogether? How can there be such a wide divergence of views on 

information—not little differences, but 180-degree differences?

The thought that psychological, rather than strictly intellectual, f

involved in warning has support from the academic community. Social 

have inquired into the formation and nature of individual and group b

their relationship to national decisionmaking. Some conclusions from t

ies are that: (1) individuals do not perceive and evaluate all new in

objectively; they may instead fit it into a previously held theory or c

pattern, or they may reject the information entirely as “not relevant’’; 

individual has already ruled out the possibility of an event occurring, or 

it highly unlikely, he will tend also to ignore or reject the incoming d

may contradict that conclusion; (3) a very great deal of unambiguous e

required to overcome such prejudgments or to get the analyst to revers

tion even to the point of admitting that the event is possible, let alone 

(4) if the individual is unable to assimilate this contradictory informatio

existing frame of reference or cannot be brought to modify his op

extreme result may be a closed-minded concept of the situation with a 

tional content. 

All of the foregoing reactions have been observed in warning situ

is unquestionably true that this is precisely what has happened in m

one crisis.

The Need to Reach Immediate Conclusions

The problems of in

analysis, which at best 

plex, are immeasurab

pounded by the requir

reach conclusions or j

long before all the ev

available or can be a

checked, evaluated or analyzed. The warning analyst usually does no

luxury of time, of further collection and analysis, of deferring his 

“until all the evidence is in.’’ In many ways, he must act in defiance 

he has ever been taught about careful research—to be thorough, to 

“The warning analyst usually does not have

the luxury of time, of further collection and

analysis, of deferring his judgment ‘until all

the evidence is in.’ ’’
42

recheck, to take his time, to come to the definitive rather than the h

ment. The more extensive his academic training, the more he may be 

to these principles or habits, and the more difficult it may be for him 

his methods when confronted with the real life of current or indicatio

gence. Some analysts are never able to make this adjustment. They m

good analysts on some long-term aspects of basic intelligence, but th

not be assigned to the indications field.

The tenuousness of it all, the uncertainties, the doubts, the contradi

characteristics of every true warning problem. Only in retrospect can 

vance, meaning and reliability of some information ever be established, 

of it (often a surprising amount) is never established. In retrospect, 

much of the uncertainty is either forgotten, or it seems to disappear. E

who actively worked the problem tend, after the event, to think that 

things more clearly than they really did at the time. And outsiders—

those assigned to do critiques of what went wrong or to investigate t

gence “failure’’—can never truly see how complex and difficult the pro

at the time. 

SPECIFICS OF THE ANALYTICAL METHOD

Inference, Induction and Deduction

The analysis of indications and the reaching of the warning judgme

always will be a process of inference. Also, it will in large part be th

inductive rather than deductive reasoning. Or, to simplify what is a very 

problem, the warning judgment will be derived from a series of “facts

accurately what people think are the facts, and from the inferences or j

which may be drawn from these conceptions of the facts, leading to a 

clusion or series of conclusions which will be expressed as probabili

than absolutes. The process is highly subjective; neither the inferenc

final conclusion necessarily follow directly from the facts, and, as a re

viduals will vary widely in their willingness to reach either specific inf

general conclusions.

This is not a treatise on the nature of logic, and so we may use the s

tionary (Webster’s) definitions:

Inference: the act of passing from one or more propositions, stat

judgments considered as true, to another the truth of which is believed 

from that of the former;

Induction: reasoning from a part to a whole, from particulars to ge

from the individual to the universal;
43

to the individual, from given premises to their necessary conclusion. 

An analyst may have no choice about what evidence is available in 

ing situation. In such a case, he must proceed from fragments of inform

from particulars to general conclusions, and he will not have develop

premises which will lead logically or necessarily to certain conclusion

other hand, if his anticipation of a situation gives sufficient lead time, h

able to influence intelligence information collection, either directly 

rectly.2) He must normally come to his judgments, both as to the facts i

and their meaning, on the basis of very incomplete information, on a m

pling of the “facts,’’ and often without knowing whether he even has a 

of some of the potentially most important data. 

The problem of how much evidence is necessary in order to ma

inferences or to some type of generalized conclusions is peculiarly app

certain types of military information—above all, to order-of-battle and 

tion. There is a fundamental difference in analytical approach betwee

ventional order-of-battle method and the indications method.

The normal order-of-battle approach to assessing the strength and lo

foreign forces is to examine each unit individually. Ideally, the orde

analyst seeks the total sample before he wishes to make a judgmen

strength. He usually requires positive evidence for each individual unit 

is willing to make a judgment (to “accept’’) that the unit has been re

with more modern tanks or higher performance aircraft, or that it has b

lized with additional men and equipment to bring it to wartime strength

ventional military analyst normally will be extremely reluctant to accep

new military units exist or are in process of formation until he has 

located them and identified them—until they meet some type of orde

criteria. This is likely to be the case even if there is a great deal of othe

tion to indicate that a major mobilization of manpower is in fact in proc

The same general precepts apply to movements of units. It is not en

there are numerous reports of movements of ground units and aircraft

order-of-battle analyst wants is evidence that this or that specific unit h

His method is thus essentially restrictive rather than expansive. He wi

mally conclude that more units have moved than he can identify, or th

units have been mobilized because he has evidence that one or two hav

The indications analyst, on the other hand, must consider that what 

can prove may be only a fragment of the whole and that he may have t

2

 In such a case, he would be in a position to adopt a deductive approach to the analys

firming information, as was done hypothetically but convincingly by an Israeli intellig

who looked back at the information available to military analysts prior to the surprise atta

raelis in the 1973 Middle Eastern October War. See Isaac Ben-Israel, “Philosophy and M

of Intelligence: The Logic of Estimate Process.’’ Intelligence and National Security 4, no

1989): 660-718.
44

the evidence. If available informationunspecific though it may be

that large-scale call-ups of men to the armed forces are in progress an

units which he can observe are known to be mobilizing, the indicatio

will consider it a good chance, if not certain, that other units also are be

lized. If one unit in the crisis area has issued the basic load of ammunit

be likely that others have. If some units are known to be deploying t

front or crisis area but the status of others is unknown, the indications an

be inclined to give greater weight to the possibility that additional 

deploying than will the order-of-battle analyst. At least he will consider 

is provable is probably the minimum that is occurring, rather than the m

The warning analyst does not take this approach because he wants to d

judgments from inadequate data or because he is inherently rash an

jump to conclusions. He takes this attitude because this is the nature o

problems. In times of crisis, the more leisurely and conventional analys

a luxury which we cannot afford. Much as we might wish to have al

before we draw our conclusions, we may have to make general judgme

on only a sampling of the potentially available data, or whatever we can 

great a sampling is needed before a general conclusion can be drawn 

with the circumstances and is likely in any case to be a hotly debate

between warning analysts and more conventional military analysts. 

here is that the principle of inductive (or more expansive or generalized

must be recognized as valid in these circumstances, even though judgm

necessarily be tentative and subject to some margin of error. Historica

gence has usually underestimated the scale of mobilization and troop de

in a crisis situation.

The problems of reaching general judgments from limited data are 

applicable to other types of information which are received in a potent

cal situation. Even assessments of the meaning and significance of polit

mation or propaganda trends must be based on a sampling of what i

occurring and are essentially inferential or inductive in nature. Becaus

political planning and preparation may be concealed, however, and bec

political evidence may be so ambiguous or uncertain, political analysis 

situation may be even more complex and subjective than the ascertainm

military facts.

Acceptance of New Data

It is a phenomenon of intelligence, as of many other fields of investig

analysis, that the appearance of new types of information or data of a 

normally received poses difficult problems—and that the reaction is li

extremely conservative. This conservatism, or slowness to accept or ev

with new information, is a product of several factors. One is simply a b

of good research—that judgment should be withheld in such cases until 
45

cance of the information. A related factor often is that there is no accep

odology for dealing with new types of information; since it is new, the 

not sure how to tackle it analytically, and he wants more time to thin

and to confer with other analysts. Still another and often very import

may be that the intelligence organization is not prepared to handle th

information or analysis; there is no one assigned to this type of problem

tends to be set aside or its existence may not even be recognized. A

there is an inherent great reluctance on the part of many individuals and 

most bureaucratic organizations to stick their necks out on problems 

new, controversial, and above all which could be bad news for highe

and the policymaker.

The effect of these factors and possibly others, individually and co

can be to retard the analysis and acceptance of data in the intelligence 

weeks, months and sometimes even years. Few people outside the analy

have probably ever recognized this, but examples can be cited of del

analysis and reporting of data which seem almost incomprehensible in r

Even normally perceptive and imaginative individuals seem to have 

which they are unable to perceive that something new is occurring or t

have changed. They may be reluctant to accept evidence which in othe

stances, particularly when there is adequate precedent, they would acce

question.

Lest the writer be accused of exaggerating all this, a few examples 

order. A very intelligent and sophisticated supervisor of political intell

the Soviet Union resisted for weeks (and finally took a footnote in opp

a judgment that the USSR was preparing in the mid-1950’s to export a

Middle East. His reason—although the evidence was almost overwhe

no one would question it today—was that the USSR had never expor

ments outside the communist world, and therefore never would.

Numerous examples could be cited of delays in the acceptance of in

on troop movements, other order-of-battle changes and mobilization, w

attributable to the fact that the evidence was new rather than insufficien

ria later adopted. Two instances from the Vietnam war may suffice here

It required ten months for order-of-battle analysts to accept the pr

South Vietnam of the first two North Vietnamese regiments which arrive

the winter of 1964-1965 (one other which arrived slightly later in Febr

however, accepted in July). With the acceptance at the same time of sev

regiments which had arrived in 1965, and with it the acceptance of th

North Vietnam was deploying integral regiments to South Vietnam, th

between arrival and acceptance thereafter rarely exceeded two month

often less.
46

a major expansion and mobilization in 1965. Much of the evidence for 

lization was derived from public statements and other indirect evidenc

scale callups to the armed forces, rather than from conventional orde

information. (Confirmation by order-of-battle ran months and in so

years behind what could be deduced from what Hanoi was saying abou

lization effort.) Just why there was so much reluctance to accept Han

parent statements that thousands (sometimes tens of thousands) of 

required to fight at “the front’’ in South Vietnam was then and is now 

cult to understand. Over-reliance on order-of-battle methodology and 

notions that anything said by the adversary should be dismissed as “pro

no doubt contributed. In time, however, the value of Hanoi’s press and r

ments came to be recognized.

A few years later, public statements that callups to the armed fo

being increased were routinely accepted as evidence that this was in 

way, whereas much larger volumes of similar evidence were not c

acceptable in 1965-66.

These examples are cited for purposes of illustration only. M

instances, some probably more serious, could undoubtedly be found 

annals of warfare. The fact is that the reluctance to cope with or accept 

of data is a very serious problem for warning intelligence, and one 

supervisors in particular should be constantly alert. A review of draft i

items, when compared with what was finally accepted for publication, 

sistently show that indications analysis tends to run ahead (sometim

ahead) of what is usually acceptable to the community as a whole, parti

new intelligence. One is happy to note, however, that this gap appe

narrowing—which may reflect somewhat greater willingness to use i

methodology and new types of data than was once the case.

Together with the need for objectivity, the ability to perceive that c

occurred and that new information must be considered even though it m

be fully “provable’’ is a fundamental requirement for successful warn

sis. In warning, delay can be fatal. Both the analyst and the system a

must be receptive to change and the acceptance of that which is new.

Interestingly enough, experi

gests that experts in their fiel

necessarily the most likely 

nize and accept changes or 

of data. The greatest resista

idea that China would int

Korea in 1950 came from “

hands,’’ and by and large it was Soviet experts who were the most un

believe that the Soviet Union would put strategic missiles in Cuba. Th

“Experience suggests that experts in

their fields are not necessarily the

most likely to recognize and accept

changes or new types of data.’’
47

ditional views and, despite their expertise, are less willing to change t

tions than those who are less involved with the matter. 

Understanding How the Adversary Thinks

This heading may be a bit misleading. No one can aspire to total un

ing of how someone else, and particularly the leadership of another a

country, actually thinks. A sophisticated student of the Soviet Union (t

is attributed to Chip Bohlen) once observed that his favorite last wo

“Liquor doesn’t affect me,’’ and “I understand the Russians.’’ To which 

ing analyst should add a fervent, “I understand the Chinese.’’

The path to understanding the objectives, rationale, and decisionma

cesses of foreign powers clearly is fraught with peril. Nonetheless, it is 

to try. The analyst, the Intelligence Community, the policymaker or mil

ner may have to make a conscientious and imaginative effort to see th

or situation from the other side’s point of view. Fantastic errors in judg

the most calamitous misassessments of what the adversary was up to 

attributable to such a lack of perception or understanding. An exam

such errors in perception—both by individuals and groups—which 

made over a period of years in warning situations indicates that this is 

to which we must be particularly alert. The ability to perceive, or to 

perceive, what others are thinking may be the mark of an expert in mor

field. This ability does not seem to come easily to some people, even 

opponent is making no particular effort to conceal how he feels about t

and indeed may be making it quite obvious. Why did so many analy

months of evidence that the Soviet Union was determined to maintain it

hold on Czechoslovakia and in the face of a massive military 

nonetheless bring themselves to believe that the Soviet Union would n

One can only conclude that they had not really tried to understand how 

felt about it, how important the control of Eastern Europe was to Sovi

and that these analysts had somehow deceived themselves into believ

détente with the U.S. was more important to the USSR than its heg

Eastern Europe and the preservation of the Warsaw Pact.

The root causes of such lack of perception—whether it be an in

unwillingness to look at it from the other fellow’s standpoint—are 

Individual, group and national attitudes or images are involved as we

tively more simple questions such as how much education the analyst 

subject, how many facts he has examined, and how much imagination h

problem of objectivity and realism obviously is closely related; misco

based on subjective judgments of how the other nation ought to beh

than objective assessments based on how it is behaving, have much t

this problem.
48

tics of Americans which tend to inhibit our understanding of what our a

may be planning, one is struck by two prevailing attitudes.

Perhaps because of our historic isolation, prosperity and democrac

cans traditionally have been optimistic, and often unduly so, about wor

A reluctance to believe that World War II would come or that we coul

involved lay behind much of the isolationist sentiment of the thirties. W

believe that Japan would be so treacherous as to attack Pearl Harbor, tha

nese would intervene in Korea, or that our close friends the British wo

against Suez in 1956. And so forth. Healthy and admirable as such atti

be in private life, we need to guard against such false optimism in pr

intelligence analysis.

Many Americans also—and this has sometimes been particularly tru

tary men—are so convinced of the superiority of American military f

technology that they cannot bring themselves to believe that ill-prepar

would dare to oppose U.S. military power. Perhaps more than any oth

this lay behind the unwillingness to believe that China would throw 

equipped and ill-educated troops against the armed forces of the U.S. 

Much of the same attitude prevailed in the early days of the Vietnam W

Consideration of Various Hypotheses

The consideration of alternative or multiple hypotheses to expla

data is a fundamental of the scientific method which, curiously enoug

given scant attention in intelligence problems. Various alternative exp

or possibilities may be offered for particular facts or bits of informatio

this photography of new construction activity could be a missile site i

stages but it may be an industrial facility). Often, however, no particu

will be made to itemize all the available pieces of information on any 

current situation with a view to considering their relevance to variou

tive possible courses of action of the adversary. Even special nation

gence estimates (SNIEs), prepared sometimes to address a

possibilities, usually do not attempt to deal with all the facts or poss

before coming to judgments. They are much more apt to be generaliz

sions of alternatives, rather than detailed analyses of the relevant inf

There have been certain exceptions to this—on particularly critica

subjects, for example—but as a general rule estimates do not involve 

examination of a mass of detailed information and a consideration o

hypotheses to explain it. Still less are other forums of the Intelligence 

nity likely to provide an opportunity for detailed consideration of var

native hypotheses unless a special effort is made to do so and the 

opened to all who may have something to contribute.3
49

of analytical effort, but often it does not. The analysts who have 

detailed knowledge should but often do not get together on warning 

with analysts of other agencies. More often, each agency consider

dence and comes to its “position’’ and the various “positions’’ are 

discussed at the interagency forum rather than the detailed evidence i

result is that various alternative hypotheses may not be given adequa

eration, or even sometimes considered at all, and no systematic effor

to insure that some group really goes through all the evidence and con

various alternative explanations in exhaustive detail.

One reason for this, which we have noted before, is that in crises, o

crisis situations, there is likely to be an overwhelming quantity of inf

the mere scanning and preliminary processing of which is consuming m

analysts’ time. There are simply insufficient resources to cope with all 

mation in any manner, let alone go through a time-consuming process o

ing each item of information against several alternative hypotheses.

This is a serious matter. Most of all, in such situations, people nee

think and to really take the time and effort to look at the available in

and to consider what it does mean, or could mean. As we have observ

ceding chapters, facts are lost in crisis situations, and sometimes very 

facts whose adequate evaluation and consideration would have made a 

ference indeed to the final judgment.

The most useful thing which an administrator or committee chai

probably do in such circumstances is to devise some method to insure t

relevant information, or possibly relevant information, is being brough

and that it is really being looked at and considered against various hyp

possible courses of action. Before the validity of various hypotheses ca

sidered, we must insure the examination of the facts.

Assuming that this can be accomplished, an objective considerati

meaning and importance of individual pieces of information in relation 

alternative hypotheses can be a real eye-opener. Almost any method w

require the analyst or analysts collectively to examine the data and eva

piece will help. One does not need for this purpose some mathematica

or other statistical method to insure “reliability’’ or “objectivity.’’ The 

to look at the information and to say yes or no or maybe to each piec

indication) as to whether it is or is not a likely preparation for (a) host

3

 For one of the rare exceptions, see Robert D. Folker, Jr., Intelligence Analysis in T

Intelligence Centers: An Experiment in Applying Structured Methods (Washington, DC: J

Intelligence College, 2000). Folker’s experiment involved the retrospective examination o

hypotheses for two well-documented international scenarios. In these scenarios, strategic 

cisions had to be made by intelligence analysts. Folker’s work indicates that familiarity wi

comparative methods, such as formal “analysis of competing hypotheses,’’ provides an 

analysts, ideally resulting in greater warning accuracy. 
50

course there may be many, or (d) not significant for any of these hypoth

The idea that the analyst should be required to look at each piece 

mation and to come to a judgment on it and its validity or relevance 

hypotheses is the essence of various systems or theories which h

devised for the purpose of helping to improve objectivity in analysis 

mation. The best known of these systems, which enjoys considerable 

ity today in the information-handling field, is “Bayes’ Theorem’’ (Se

The outstanding successes of warning analysts, and of watch co

have usually been those which involved the meticulous and objective 

of each piece of information and its relevance to war or peace. Any syst

requires people individually and collectively to apply some such quasi

method to their data and their analysis is almost certain to be of positive 

warning. A distinguished former chairman of the U.S. Watch Committ

edly observed that what the report included and how it was organized 

nitely less important than that the committee painstakingly exam

potential indication and evaluate it.

The advantage of such methods is not just to insure that facts are no

valuable as that is. An even more important result should be that certain 

ses are not ignored or swept under the rug—particularly those which 

ening, unpopular, or counter to the prevailing mood or “climate of opin

essential for warning that the intelligence system be able objectively to 

the hypothesis which is contrary to the majority opinion or which runs 

hitherto accepted precepts or estimates. In addition to an extraordinary 

effort, this may require an exceptional degree of objectivity and will

consider the unpopular thesis, and the one which might require us to 

positive and difficult or dangerous action.

For warning, we rarely need to be concerned about the “idea whose 

come.’’ It is the fate of the idea whose time has not yet come—the h

which is in its infancy and has yet to gain adherents—that should mo

us. There is indifference to new ideas; long-held opinions are extreme

change except in the face of some extraordinary development or una

evidence. This is true even when the issues are not important. When the 

exceptionally important and the new judgment is unpopular or contrar

national policy, indifference to new ideas or hypotheses may change t

hostility. The warning system must insure that this does not happen and 

hypotheses and ideas are given “equal time’’ on the basis of their merit

ter how unpopular or contrary to prevailing opinion they may be. 
51

MILITARY INDICATIONS AND WARNIN

THE NATURE OF MILITARY INDICATORS

For various reasons, some obvious and some less well-recognized, t

tion and analysis of military data or indications has been the predom

ment in warning. By far the greater number of items on indicator lists 

military, or military-related, activities. By far the greater portion of the 

effort, and particularly the most expensive collection, is devoted to obta

on the military strengths, capabilities and activities of foreign forces. T

tion effort has greatly increased, largely as a result of breakthroughs i

ogy, and the future promises a still greater expansion in the volume o

data. Whether this necessarily results in a great improvement in our 

“warning capabilities’’ is uncertain, although improvement in the tim

our evidence appears unquestionable. What does appear certain is tha

information will continue to consume much of the intelligence eff

future, and hence that military indications may assume an even more 

role, or at least will take more of analysts’ time, than in the past.

Primary Reasons for Importance of Military Indicators

First, and most obvious, military preparations are a necessity for w

would be no warning problem, in the sense we use it in warning intellig

were not that states have armed forces and arsenals of modern weapo

they could commit against us or our allies. The index of our concern 

intentions of other nations is largely how much military damage they 

us, rather than just how politically hostile they may be, and our collec

is usually allocated accordingly.

Secondly, many military preparations, although far from all, are 

discernible or at least potentially discernible to us. They involve mov

troops and weapons, or augmentations of them, which we can observe 

our collection is adequate. As a general rule (at least this has been tru

cally), the greater and more ominous the scale of military preparations

discernible they have been. The advent of weapons of mass destruction 

range delivery systems has potentially altered this. It is now theoreticall

for a nation so equipped to make almost no physically discernible pr

for a devastating nuclear strike. Few analysts now believe, however, 

would not also be other potentially discernible military, and political, i

before any nation undertook so terrible and perilous a course of action

cept of a totally surprise nuclear attack (that is, the attack out of the blu

any prior deterioration in relations or military preparations of various 

longer enjoys much credence. The problem of providing warning that 

tion had deteriorated to the point that nuclear attack might be immin
52

has hardly been to reduce the importance of military indications! The 

been quite the contrary, the community has devoted far more effort to a

to determine what ancillary military indications might be discernib

devising methods to collect such information.

One lesson we have learned is that discernible military preparations—

of preparations that have traditionally preceded the outbreak of hostilit

by no means lost their validity as indicators. The effect of such military 

as the Chinese military intervention in Korea and the Soviet military in

in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia has been to reinforce confiden

value of military indications as less ambiguous and probably more d

gauges of impending action than political indicators. The amount of p

undertaken by the Soviet Union and its allies for the invasion of Czech

probably served to reduce fears—once quite prevalent—that the USS

standing start and without a discernible change in its military post

launch a devastating attack against the West. That portion of intelligen

times defined as “hard military evidence’’ has gained stature for warnin

Another factor which lends importance or credence to military ind

that so many of them are so expensive to undertake—and that this is 

increasingly so. It is one thing to undertake a relatively inexpensive pr

campaign of bombast and threat or to alert forces for possible movemen

deploy several regiments or so. It is quite another to call up a half milli

ists for extended active duty, or to move a number of major ground f

hundreds or thousands of miles, or to initiate a crash program of prod

new combat aircraft or naval landing craft.

Such serious, expensive, and often disruptive military preparations—

ticularly those which take a real bite out of the taxpayer’s income 

involve a commitment of national resources from civilian to military ef

expense of the consumer—these are measures of how a nation or at lea

ership really feels about a problem and how important it is to it. The

hard indications of national priorities. They are rarely undertaken ligh

for political effect or as a “show of force.’’ There are cheaper ways to 

make idle threats one has no intention of carrying out.

This is not to say, of course, that such major military preparations 

cations of national resources are necessarily unequivocal indications 

rations for aggression. They may be defensive, or a recognition 

international situation is deteriorating to a point that the state again

may become involved in conflict. But such preparations are real and 

ful and important—a kind of barometer of what a nation will do an

will fight for. And they are evidence that important decisions have bee

Such major changes in military allocations or posture or priorities ar

substantial or “concrete’’ indications; they may also be particularly v
53

priorities and preparations, not only in intelligence collection and an

more importantly our own military preparations and allocations of 

Provided we have recognized and understood them correctly, they ma

our being strategically surprised even though our short-term or tactica

may fail us.

Understanding the Basics: How a Nation Goes To War

Know your adversary. This basic tenet is nowhere more applicable 

gence than to the problem of strategic military warning. The analyst w

hope to understand what his adversary is up to in time of crisis should 

education with the study of all that he can possibly find on the subject o

adversary will prepare his forces for war.

This principle underlies the preparation of indicator lists. The wel

and well-researched indicator list should incorporate not only theoretic

eral ideas of how the adversary nation will get ready for war; it sh

include, insofar as is practicable, some specifics of what we know of the 

enemy’s doctrine, practice and plans. As our knowledge of these things 

we are likely to prepare better and hopefully more usable indicator lists

It would be virtually impossible, however, to include in any ind

everything which might occur if a major country were preparing its 

war. A list that attempted to incorporate all that we know, or think 

about war plans, missions of specific units, wartime organization and 

ogy, civil defense preparations and any number of other subjects woul

too cumbersome to cope with. Except possibly for very specific pr

areas, indicator lists are likely to remain fairly generalized. The warni

needs far more than this.

Other things being equal, the individual best qualified to recogn

nation has begun serious preparations for possible hostilities should b

lyst who best understands its military doctrine and is best read in its mi

ory and practice. One unfortunate consequence of the separation of 

current intelligence (when they are separated) is that the analyst who m

quick judgments on the significance of current information may no

grounded or up-to-date in such basic material.

The distinguishing cha

of preparations for 

(versus preparations for 

or other relatively norm

time activities) is that 

real—and that they wil

include activities rarel

observed in peacetime. Various exercises or mobilization drills or th

“The distinguishing characteristic of preparations for hostilities is that they are real

and that they will therefore include activities

rarely if ever observed in peacetime.’’
54

exercise, but almost never will the adversary have rehearsed in full fo

preparations that he will undertake when he is actually preparing to c

forces. (Those who doubt this should reexamine the preparations for th

of Czechoslovakia.) An understanding of his doctrine and military 

what he did the last time that he was involved in a real combat situati

what changes there have been in his military practice since then will 

able, indeed indispensable, to an understanding of what he is up to now

The military forces of all nations are slaves in large degree to thei

and theory. What the staff officer has been taught in school that he shou

given situation is likely what he will do. If doctrine calls for the empl

airborne troops in a given tactical situation, the chances are the

employed. If the unit mobilization plan calls for the requisitioning of tr

a local economic enterprise, the chances are very high that they will b

tioned before that unit is committed to combat. If contingency wartim

tion provides for the establishment of a supreme military council (or s

super body), or for the re-designation of military districts as field a

warning analyst and the community should instantly recognize the signi

such developments should they occur. If the national military service 

mally unclassified) provides that reservists should be recalled for no 

three months in peacetime, evidence that they are being held longer c

cate that emergency secret wartime decrees had been passed. And so fo

merable and much less obvious examples could no doubt be cited by e

such topics.

Unfortunately, the experts on such topics are often scattered and e

long-term basic research, even when a crisis is impending. Means mus

lished so that this information is not overlooked or forgotten, or fi

library, when it is most needed.

How many analysts assigned to the current or indications effort 

headquarters or various echelons in the national Intelligence Commu

read or studied much of the basic material that might be so crucial to 

standing of actual preparations for hostilities? How many have it cata

readily available or know where they could immediately obtain the ans

might need?

Some offices and analysts no doubt are much better prepared than o

experience suggests that no intelligence office is really fully prepare

the contingency of real preparation for hostilities by one of our major 

enemies. Every major crisis, at least, has shown this to be true. And th

supervisory or policy levels, for obvious reasons, are quite likely to h

mal knowledge of a great deal of basic information which could be cr

real crisis.
55

greater contribution over the long term than to do their best to review, 

compile the rarely reported and often obscure basic data which might 

be so essential for warning. The scope of potentially relevant military 

tion is vast: doctrine, theory, logistics deficiencies and wartime requ

applicable legislation, mobilization theory and practice, military ter

major military exercises and war games, combat readiness and alert pr

and other similar basic topics. The study of the performance of our pote

mies in relatively recent live crises, as we have noted before, is also 

even though the situation the next time will doubtless not be identica

even too much to suggest that there are still many useful lessons in war

derived from a study of World War II. 

The Soviet buildup for the attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria 

1945 is a useful example of the difference in strategic and tactical war

the campaign itself, as well as earlier operations of Soviet forces in 

area, provides potentially useful lessons in how Russia today might 

conducting operations against Chinese forces.

ORDER-OF-BATTLE ANALYSIS IN 

CRISIS SITUATIONS

It is readily apparent that a determination of the order-of-battle (O

eign forces is of decisive importance for warning intelligence. Indeed, 

warning rests on a determination of the facts—as opposed to the more 

problem of determining what the facts mean and issuing some in

judgment—the order-of-battle facts will often be the single most imp

ment in warning. Whatever other facts may be relevant or significant fo

nothing is likely to be so critical as the locations, strengths and equipm

adversary’s military forces, for these determine what the adversary 

Understanding or a correct assessment of the enemy’s capability is a pr

to the assessment of intentions, and the failure to recognize the cap

fraught with peril. Thus, obviously, at every step in the process, orde

analysis will play a crucial role in the issuance of warning. And orde

analysts will carry a heavy responsibility.

Order-of-Battle Methodology

Since most countries are usually at peace and the strengths and lo

their military forces are relatively static, or at least the changes are fairl

order-of-battle analysis normally tends to be a rather slow and hence co

process. Over a period of time, certain methodologies or criteria are e

(again rather conservative ones) which determine, by and large, wheth

unit can be “accepted’’ in the order-of-battle. While the methodologies 

somewhat from country to country and among various types of forces (
56

a North Korean air unit, still less to a guerrilla unit), the criteria nearly a

relatively rigid. In particular, they call for a relatively high degree of s

tion or “proof’’ that the unit does in fact exist, is of a certain strength o

and is located in some specific area. Also, some unit number (hopefull

rect one, but at any rate some identifying number or designation) 

desired by OB analysts. A unit which must be described as “unidenti

lacks status, as it were, and is a little suspect. There is always a possibi

is already carried elsewhere in the OB as an identified unit and has mo

out detection. The analyst always seeks to “tidy up’’ his order-of-battle 

to have such loose ends. Ideally, all units are firmly identified and loc

current basis, together with their correct designations, commanders a

ment, and their manning levels are consistent with the accepted table of 

tion and equipment (TO&E) for that type of unit. Everything fits. No 

All units have been “accepted’’ and we have confidence in the OB.

Now, this ideal OB situation, of course, is rarely met—and almos

for hostile states which are attempting to conceal such military facts 

For a number of reasons—the difficulties and slowness of collection

servative criteria for acceptance of units, the personal views of ana

requirements for interagency or sometimes international consultation

the slowness of the reporting, editorial and printing process—the 

order-of-battle is almost invariably out-of-date. For some units, it may 

out-of-date. Order-of-battle analysts are normally loath to admit it and 

side their immediate circle probably realize it, but it has by no me

unusual to have delays of two and three years in the acceptance of n

determination that units have been inactivated, or recognition that 

been upgraded or downgraded in strength or relocated, redesignated, r

nated, converted to another type, or split into two or more units. 

numerical designations of units have been carried in OB summaries 

year; only by chance will it sometimes be found that units have be

rectly identified for five or even ten or more years. Quite often, the las

can learn about a unit is its numerical designation.

In short, the “accepted’’ order-of-battle and the real current order-of

adversaries probably never are identical. The most we can hope for i

reasonably close to the facts and that we have made no serious misjud

the enemy’s strengths and capabilities. In time, we will usually obtai

which we need to correct the OB—and we can change the location, d

or what not on the next printing. It is better to be slow or late with a ch

to make a judgment too soon that may be erroneous and which we w

retract later. Such, in general, is the philosophy of OB analysis. T

intended as criticism; it is a statement of fact.

And most of the time, it does not really matter that it is like this

probably the chief reason that this normal lag in OB acceptance is so li
57

tion that a unit has been formed, upgraded or moved. Even egregious 

estimating the strength of foreign forces (or particular components 

forces, like the great overestimate of Soviet missile strength in the la

have not caused us any real harm. Some might even say that the effect

getary purposes have been beneficial. Few care and no lives have been 

Except when there is a warning problem—when we or our allies are 

of being attacked. Then these order-of-battle “details’’ can matter a

decisively. When units are being upgraded or moved or mobilized or 

prepared for combat, then the accuracy and currency of order-of-battle 

and lives can be lost, and many have been, because of incorrect details.

Often, however, sudden changes in the enemy’s military situation, in

redeployment of units for possible commitment to combat, have not bro

imaginative and responsive changes in methodology by order-of-battle 

It is in fact the usual case that the criteria for “acceptance’’ of chang

strengths and locations are not modified—even when it is clear that m

movements are in fact in progress.

Sudden changes in unit locations, particularly large and secret redep

admittedly pose tremendous problems for order-of-battle analysts. 

indeed that the initial evidence will be so good, or accurate or compl

will be possible to determine with any confidence how many troops are 

what types or how many units are deploying, still less their unit desig

where they come from. Time is required to sort out the data, to attemp

coverage of the home stations of the more likely units to see if they ha

departed, and it will probably be weeks or months (even with good c

before some of the needed information can be obtained. It may even b

or never.

Confronted with initial reports, which may include some highl

observations and other good evidence as well as hearsay and un

reports that large numbers of troops of unknown designation are mo

unspecified locations toward undetermined destinations, the reaction o

mal OB analyst not surprisingly is to wait. What units can be moved 

uation map? He has no identifications, no firm evidence precisely wha

troops have come from; he may not be sure whether one or ten divisi

be involved although he usually suspects the lower figure and that m

sources are greatly exaggerating the facts. The whole situation is an

him; it would be in violation of all his criteria to move any unit until 

which units to move.

It may be all right for current or indications analysts to talk vagu

large but unidentified troop movements, but the OB analyst must be sp

precise. He must “accept’’ or decide not to accept the movement of spe
58

Confronted with this dilemma, he moves nothingnot yet.

The Indications Approach to Order-of-Battle

On the other hand is the indications analyst, sometimes but not al

ported by other current analysts, who cares less for the order-of-bat

than that the community and the policymaker recognize, and recognize 

the adversary is deploying major forces and that there is grave dange

buildup is preparatory to their commitment. He implores his colleagues 

riors to see what is happening—and he is driven half frantic when they 

order-of-battle “experts’’ whose reply is that they “cannot accept’’ tha

the indications or current analyst may even be told that he cannot repo

ble increasing threat. How can the threat be increasing when the orde

(OB) map does not show any buildup of forces in that area? Perhaps i

even show any units there. 

This is not a hypothetical fiction or an indications analyst’s nightma

what can happen unless an impartial arbiter in position of authority int

hear both sides. It is unquestionably true that the rigid criteria of orde

acceptance have held back warning for weeks, and that this can be the 

ous single impediment to the issuance of military warning. A few exam

illustrate the point more convincingly.

Not long after U.S. and UN forces intervened in the Korean confli

1950, reports began to be received of northward troop movements on th

mainland. Many of these reports indicated only that large numbers of tr

leaving the southernmost provinces of China (there had been a s

buildup in this area to complete the conquest of the mainland the preced

By late July, it was clear that substantial elements of the Fourth F

had left South China. Meanwhile, there were numerous although some

flicting reports concerning troop movements farther north—while t

many reports which indicated that troops were moving to Manchuria, it 

be confirmed how many of the troops were proceeding that far and h

might have deployed to intermediate locations, including Fukien Prov

possible assault on Taiwan. Even as reports of heavy northward troop m

continued to mount during August (some reports claimed that troop tr

moving northward day and night), there was little evidence on the wher

specific units or sufficient data to make a reliable estimate of the n

troops involved.

Indications and order-of-battle analysts locked horns over the is

warning analysts pleading that the community recognize the likelih

major buildup in Manchuria, while OB claimed that there was “insuffi

dence’’ to move any units to Manchuria. Not until the end of August w

reports (reviewed by OB) permitted to go forth stating that any eleme
59

ments could be there were vetoed). Not until about 1 October did orde

“accept’’ that elements of some six armies of the Fourth Field Arm

Manchuria and make its first increase in estimated strength in that area. 

ria for OB “acceptance’’ actually held back warning of the buildup in M

for at least six weeks, and this discrepancy as to what could be re

“accepted’’ as evidence continued to a lesser degree up to and after 

Chinese offensive in late November. Who can say whether or not 

acceptance of the buildup would have increased the likelihood that U.S

forces would have been better prepared for the Chinese onslaught?

A simpler and less damaging example of the difference between the 

battle and indications approach to troop movements may be derived 

Hungarian revolt in 1956. The Soviet response to this unexpected expl

to pour troops into Hungary over virtually every road and rail connec

adjacent areas of the USSR. There was no reliable information on the to

involved in the buildup; it was only clear that there were a lot. Concu

this heavy troop movement from the Carpathian Military District, an 

nary travel ban was imposed in Romania, prohibiting all official Wester

rail centers north of Bucharest—while several sources reported that So

trains were moving northwestward through Romania during the some p

the criteria of indications analysts—for warning purposes—this was 

evidence to justify a statement that Soviet troops from the Odessa Mi

trict (from unknown units and in unknown strength) were probably de

Hungary.

To order-of-battle analysts, such a conclusion could not be justifi

stated flatly that they could not accept information of this kind. About s

later, a unit number associated with a Soviet division from the Odess

District was identified in Hungary, and the division was immediately a

the order-of-battle.

By the time that Soviet forces were deploying for the invasion of C

vakia in the summer of 1968, our collection and analysis had 

improved, or perhaps because we had more time we were able to do bet

rate, the usual conflict between indications and order-of-battle analysts 

dued, and there were fewer (one cannot say no) complaints from war

lysts that too few units were being accepted by order-of-battle or acc

late. A controversy did arise, however, over the Soviet troop movem

Poland which began in the last few days of July, which illustrates that 

tion of troop movements when unit identifications are not available 

potentially serious problem for warning. The initial sources of inform

these Soviet troop movements into Poland were primarily tourists and o

elers in Poland. Within 48 to 72 hours after the initial movements in

began, there were a half dozen voluntary reports from travelers of si

heavy troop movements at several road crossing points from the USSR
60

forcesone to the north of Warsaw and one to the southto which 

denied access. Indications analysts, and to a lesser degree other curren

were prepared to “accept’’ or at least to report that substantial Soviet fo

entering Poland that were apparently backup forces (not part of the c

buildup directly along the Czechoslovak border). Even indications anal

ever (usually considered alarmist or prone to exaggerate by their more 

tive colleagues), would hardly have been willing to accept in early Au

later proved to be true, that some 11 or 12 Soviet divisions all told we

Poland, as compared with the normal two. Order of battle analysts, u

criteria, were not willing to accept any units which they could not id

whose movement from home stations had not been confirmed, which r

some delay in acceptance of additional Soviet divisions in Poland.

Analysis of Mobilization

Closely related to order-of-battle and usually handled by the same a

mobilization. Traditionally in expectation of war, although sometimes n

has broken out, countries mobilize their forces. Historically, the decl

general mobilization often was the decisive indication of the imminenc

tability of war.

Nearly all nations have mobilization plans to cover a range of cont

Mobilization can range from a partial or selective callup of reservists 

existing units, to a full mobilization of the armed forces and formatio

tional units, to a general or total mobilization of the entire populace 

nomic resources of the entire country.

There is little chance any state would try to conceal a full mobil

would be too obvious. Experience teaches us, however, that in closed 

substantial augmentation of the armed forces often has proved extremel

to quantify or detect. Surprising as it may seem, intelligence often has b

likely to obtain data and report promptly the movement of a single sub

the redeployment of a squadron of aircraft than the call-up to the armed 

a half a million troops. Information which could never be concealed in 

try is routinely held secret in a dictatorship and protected by highly 

security measures.

Estimates of the total strength of the armed forces of foreign st

proved to be extremely elusive and have sometimes been wide of 

While U.S. intelligence was greatly overestimating the strength of t

missile forces in the 1950s, it was greatly underestimating the st

Soviet ground forces, quite likely by a third or more.

In 1968, despite a great improvement in collection, U.S. intelligen

detect the call-up of Soviet reservists to fill out the units deploy
61

sion forces in July largely because of Soviet announcements.

Of still greater importance was the failure to recognize the substan

lization of North Vietnamese forces in 1964-1965. The evidence of 

derived in large part from Hanoi’s public calls for enlistments. While 

battle analysts, lacking specific evidence of the formation of new 

upgrading of existing ones, could accept only a very small increase 

Vietnamese forces, indications analysts argued that a doubling of t

forces was not an unreasonable estimate—an assessment which, a y

was accepted as correct.

It is thus evident that assessments of mobilization—a key indicator 

intent—are subject to the same problems and potential errors as order

When mobilization is in progress, we are almost certain to be running b

facts. Where there is a good reason to believe that mobilization is u

warning cannot wait for “proof’ which may be long in coming.

Needed: a Voice for Warning in the Order-of-Battle Buildup

The differences in approach, in criteria, in analytical techniques betw

cations and order-of-battle analysts are serious, and they are potentiall

aging for warning in the future as they have been in the past. 

dependence on the strict criteria of order-of-battle in a genuine crisis in 

adversary was employing his most sophisticated security and decep

niques could be catastrophic. At the same time, few would presume 

that the normal analytic techniques of order-of-battle (which have 

worked well, if slowly, in peacetime) should be tossed overboard for m

native, less precise and more “indications-oriented’’ techniques.

What is the answer to this serious dilemma? The answer is that b

should be given their say, but that order-of-battle analysts should not be 

in the crisis situation to have the last word on what can be “accepted

can even be reported to higher authority. There are things more impor

impending showdown with the adversary than the purity of order-of-b

niques. It is more important that superior authorities know that some en

buildup is under way, even if we cannot be too precise about it, than th

led to believe that there is no such buildup.

The arbitration of such disputes belongs at the supervisory level. T

must not work, as it has sometimes worked in the past, so that the orde

analyst is permitted to review and to veto what indications and curren

in their best judgment, believe to be of warning significance. For the 

order-of-battle analysts are accustomed to a degree of autonomy and 

dence on what they will decide or “accept’’ which is probably unparall

analytical level of intelligence. Often the basis or reasons on which s

ments are made, or not made, goes unquestioned by higher authority
62

insure that the indications of a military buildup are being adequately 

and not just that which has been “accepted,’’ is a constant and most 

responsibility of the supervisor. He must not attempt to resolve the arg

turning it back to the order-of-battle analysts for decision on the gro

they are the “experts.’’ To do so may be fatal to the warning judgmen

period of years, this issue has probably been the single greatest bone 

tion between the indications system and the rest of the community. To 

warning analyst an equal hearing on the all-important issue of th

buildup is to make a mockery of the whole indications system.

It would be misleading not to note that progress has been made on 

lem. Perhaps most important, major improvements in technical collec

greatly increased the accuracy and currency of our information conc

locations, strengths, equipment and movements of military units. This 

larly true of large formations with heavy equipment operating in relati

terrain. Detection is less certain for smaller, poorly equipped units (p

guerrilla forces) and in heavily forested or mountainous areas. In addi

weather can impede collection.

Over a period of years many people have come to recognize that norm

of-battle methods may be inadequate and too slow in crisis situations. 

tems have often confirmed the contentions of indications analysts that t

ods, in these circumstances, are more accurate and responsive to the 

than waiting for all the order-of-battle “proof’’ to come in. The prolif

operations and alert centers and general dispersion of the military 

effort in the community, although probably excessively duplicative 

respects, also has done much to insure that order-of-battle analysts do 

monopoly on reporting military movements, and their techniques h

under increasing scrutiny by other analysts. Nonetheless, this is a p

which the community at all levels needs to be constantly alert. Particul

an abnormal situation is developing, and it becomes evident that unu

movement is or could be in progress, the intelligence system may ne

specific steps to insure that indications of order-of-battle changes, as w

firmed deployments of known units, are being adequately analyzed and 

LOGISTICS IS THE QUEEN OF BATTLES

The extent and variety of logistic preparations for modern war are re

the number of logistic and transportation items carried on indicator li

usually equal or exceed the number for any other topic. If we could 

knowing the extent, level and variety of logistic preparations at any 

would not only have a very accurate grasp of the adversary’s capab

would probably also have very precise insight into his intent.
63

It is easy to gain the impression that states with large and well-equi

itary forces are also in a high state of readiness logistically for hosti

would need to undertake little additional preparation for war. As w

other things, some experience with live crises and improved collec

given us a better appreciation of reality. It was true, of course, that 

did produce large quantities of weapons and equipment and it had s

stocks of many items in reserve depots—some in forward areas and o

ther to the rear—which would be drawn upon in the event of hostiliti

However, the USSR clearly felt its logistic preparations to be inad

the possibility of hostilities. Not only did the Czechoslovak crisis 

requirement to mobilize Soviet combat units, still more striking was th

ment to mobilize rear services support units. In order to support th

movement of combat units, it was necessary to requisition transport ve

their drivers from their normal civilian activities, and this at the height 

vest season when they were most needed. These reserve transport units 

employed in shuttling supplies from the USSR to forward bases both pr

after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and were only demobilized in th

when the situation had stabilized sufficiently to permit a withdrawal fro

oslovakia of a substantial portion of the original invasion force. There 

indications that, even with this effort, supply shortages were en

although there was no active resistance.

These points are made here to emphasize that these activities bore n

ity to an exercise (although in a pro forma deception effort the Sovi

much of their logistic activity an exercise) and were clearly distinguish

the type of activity normally conducted in Eastern Europe. To those ana

were convinced of the likelihood of a Soviet invasion, the logistic p

above all was perhaps the most decisive evidence. Even more persuasiv

deployment of Soviet divisions to positions around Czechoslovakia (w

ceivably, albeit with some difficulty, could have been explained awa

“pressure’’ on Czechoslovakia) was the reality of the logistic buildup. T

no conceivable need for it except for an actual invasion.

This is but one of innumerable examples which could be found to de

the validity of logistic preparations as a barometer of preparations for h

Numerous instances could be cited from the Vietnam war, ranging from 

atively long-term preparations as the construction of new roads in the 

handle to handle the truck movements to the South, to such short-ter

preparations as the commandeering of the local populace to porter s

preparation for an attack on a fortified village. In large part the history 

was a chronicle of ingenious and unrelenting North Vietnamese efforts 

their logistic movements and of our attempts to disrupt them. With f

tions, major new logistic projects or exceptionally heavy movements o
64

operations. In short, the type of logistic preparations undertaken by an

expectation of early hostilities is different in both quantity and quality 

goes on in a time of peace. And we can, if we have enough evidence a

stand our adversary’s methods of operation, usually see the difference.

Key Warning Factors in Logistic Preparations for 

Combat Operations

From the multitude of potential logistic indications of impending h

some of which may be quite specific for particular nations, we may gen

several of the more important aspects of logistic preparations, some o

which will nearly always be undertaken prior to military action. C

extent and variety of such preparations will be dependent on the type 

of expected hostilities, their likely duration, and the degree of cou

which is anticipated. 

Logistic preparations are an integral part of any mobilization pl

the impending military operation requires any degree of mobilization, 

ally will, the mobilization also will involve some type of logistic pre

since the two are inseparably connected. Reserves called up must have 

and ammunition, expanded units must obtain or remove equipment fro

additional transport (rail cars, trucks, aircraft and sometimes ships) is 

move both troops and their supplies and equipment, more fuel is need

move the units and to support them in the impending action, and so fo

the mobilization of a single reserve or under-strength unit in a modern 

require a whole series of logistic support measures if the unit is to m

where or have any combat capability when it gets there. The mo

involved, the more extensive the logistic and transport support whic

needed, and the more disruptive or apparent the fulfilling of this requ

apt to be. Logistic planning for the mobilization and deployment o

forces is enormously complex and, indeed, the greater part of the mo

plan actually comprises the details by which the supply, support and tr

forces is to be accomplished rather than the mere call-up of the reserv

selves to their units. The more carefully the mobilization plan is prepar

more rapidly it is to be implemented, the greater will be the meticulou

to every detail of logistic support, since any shortage or bottleneck can d

whole system.

Impact on civilian life and economy. The mobilization of addition

support on any scale is likely to have an early and sometimes serious 

the life of the ordinary civilian. Certain factors of course will miti

effects: well-placed and large reserves of military supplies and equip

permit a unit to mobilize locally with no seeming impact on the co

some types of foods can be preserved for long periods; fuel depots 

exclusively for a military emergency will reduce the need to requisiti
65

a general abundance that a relatively small mobilization will have li

immediate impact on civilians.

Nonetheless, all countries have some bottlenecks and shortages, 

mobilization of any scope the effect of these will be felt, and often imm

on the life of civilians. Warning analysts should be cognizant of w

potentially critical shortages are and collectors should be prepared in a

concentrate on some of these, since a coincidence of several of them 

either long-term or short-term evidence of mobilization or of unusua

requirements. Some of the types of shortages indicative of military re

ing which have shown up most frequently have been: food (particula

and other choice items which are nearly always diverted to the milita

of need); fuel (despite reserve depots for the military, crises involvin

deployments are usually accompanied by reports of fuel shortages fo

use); and transportation and medical supplies (both of such critical im

that they are further discussed below).

Impact on transportation. One of the most immediate and most 

effects of logistic mobilization measures is likely to be on the transport

tem, and it is also one of the most likely to be detectable. No country h

portation system adequate to take care of any substantial increase i

requirements without either requisitioning from or otherwise having so

on normal civilian transport. The mobilization plans of all states call fo

mandeering in one way or another of civilian transport facilities. These 

may range all the way from simply giving priority to military shipmen

truck, water or air) over civilian shipments up to extensive requisi

trucks from the civilian economy and/or the takeover by the military of 

transportation system.

The most extensive mobilization plans in the world for the takeover 

transport by the military were probably those of the USSR and its Eas

pean allies (which had closely integrated plans). Any significant o

increase in military requirements will usually have an immediate imp

transportation system. Reports of shortages of rail cars for normal us

requisitioning of trucks from the civilian economy have sometimes b

indicator that abnormal military movements were impending, as they w

buildup of forces around Czechoslovakia in the last week of July 1968.

For a major mobilization in expectation of large-scale hostilities, som

plan a virtual total takeover of the transportation systems—ground, air 

However effective or ineffective the implementation of these plans, 

hardly fail to detect some aspects of it, particularly in a drastic and sud

tary takeover accompanied by heavy military use of rail and road tra

other key areas as well, major disruptions of transportation as a result o

movements have been key indications of preparations for hostilities. T
66

extensive disruption of normal freight movementsand there were a n

reports of this. Less extensive troop and supply movements in China 

occasioned sporadic reports that civil transport has been curtailed.

Heavy movements of rear service elements and supplies. Howe

supplies may have been stocked in forward depots or in reserve to th

commander probably ever thought he had enough. The additional build

plies for the forces to be committed in initial operations (whether they 

assault forces, air, naval, air defense or even missile forces) is a virtua

for any country which has time to make such preparations. Unless 

taken by total surprise, some logistic buildup prior to operations 

expected, and usually it will be very heavy. In fact, the logistic buildup 

be as heavy and demanding of resources as the troop buildup, if not mo

moreover, will require a longer time. The problem of the “logistic tai

known, and many a commander has been ready to go before his supp

has been completed, or has been forced to halt his offensive for lack o

items as fuel. A delay in attack after the combat forces are seemingly re

place therefore may not mean any hesitancy or indecision on the p

adversary so long as the supply buildup is continuing. It should not be 

as a negative indication, as it so often has been. Rather, a most close wa

be maintained on the logistic buildup in the hope of determining when 

adversary will be ready to jump off. (This may not be easy to determ

will probably be somewhat better than total guesswork.)

In World War II, the Japanese watched the buildup of Soviet forces 

East for about six months. They had estimated that the facilities of t

Siberian Railroad would have to be concentrated on military shipme

least 100 days before a Soviet attack on the Japanese forces in Manc

late July 1945, their intelligence was reporting that continued heavy m

now consisted almost entirely of supply and rear service troops, which 

rectly interpreted to mean that the buildup of combat forces was comp

concluded that the Soviets could initiate the attack at any time after 1 A

received no further warning of the attack which occurred on 8 August. 

In the Soviet buildup for the attack on Czechoslovakia in the summe

most of the combat forces which participated in the invasion appeare

completed their deployments by 1 August (this excluded the backup for

entered northern Poland whose movement was still in progress well into 

The intelligence judgment was that Soviet forces were in a high state of 

(if not their peak readiness) for invasion on about 1 August. In fact, ho

logistic buildup in Europe was still continuing and the Soviets themselv

announce the completion of their professed rear services “exercise’

August. The invasion began on 20 August. It is likely that Soviet for

were not ready, or at least not as ready as their commanders would hav

at the time that the community judged them to be. Had there been a rea
67

importance and presumably might have required a longer time. In any 

relaxation of concern over a possible invasion of Czechoslovakia whe

occurred in the first few days of August was not warranted by the mi

dence. The threat not only remained but was increasing.

The problem of assessing logistic readiness, and hence actual rea

attack, was a difficult intelligence problem in Vietnam and Laos, where 

lems of estimating supply movements at all were compounded by the 

air strikes, road interdictions, poor weather and jungle terrain . In thes

stances, however, as in more conventional warfare, the continuing effo

up supplies and the evident great importance attached to keeping the r

were indications of impending operations even when their scope or tim

be elusive.

Drawdown on existing depots. Another aspect of the abnormal re

of military units for supplies is likely to be the drawdown on supplies 

both in forward and rear areas. In the forward area, it will be for alloca

troops for combat. In rear areas, a sudden emptying of reserve depot

larly if several are involved, is a likely indication that equipment is be

to reserve or under-strength units.

Medical preparations. One of the most obvious requirements of for

into combat as compared with their needs in peacetime is in medica

Indeed, of all fields of logistic support, this may be the one in which th

greatest difference between war and peace. Not only do combat uni

vastly greater quantities of drugs and medicines, but also different type

The requirements for doctors and medical technicians will multiply, a

need for field hospitals, evacuation facilities, and the like. Even in nati

do not traditionally place a high value on saving the lives of wounde

men (among which have been several important communist nations), th

increased drugs and medical support facilities of all types will skyroc

event of hostilities. As in other logistic preparations, these changes will 

only the military forces themselves, but also are likely to have a serio

on the civilian populace. Shortage of drugs and hospital supplies, sudd

of physicians to the armed forces, and greatly stepped-up blood colle

grams are some of the obvious effects.

In addition, belligerents may have to make very heavy purchases 

abroad (as did North Vietnam, assisted by China, in the early stage

involvement in the Vietnam war). Occasionally, heavy acquisition of 

particular ailments (that is, anti-malarial) may provide a tip-off tha

forces are being readied for movement into particular areas.

Some analysts feel that medical preparations are an aspect of war 

which have been given too little attention, and that this is a field in whic

base and collection planning could well be improved. It is a field in w
68

high specific value for warning.

Logistic preparations for survivability. Another important logisti

tion likely to distinguish war from peace is the stockpiling of equip

other measures to insure the survivability of the logistic system itself. S

sures, particularly if undertaken in any great number or in marked contr

mal practice, carry high validity as indications that a nation is preparing 

action for which it expects retaliation. (Unless, on the other hand, an ad

clearly getting ready to initiate the action.) Rail and road facilities are, 

highly vulnerable to interdiction, and aggressors normally will take s

sures to protect them and to provide for their repair before they embark 

ities. In addition to obvious measures such as increased air defense pro

bridges and rail yards, extraordinary logistic preparedness measures w

gested by the stockpiling along the way of railroad ties and rails, e

bridging equipment, bulldozers, road-building machinery and other m

the rapid repair of damaged transportation routes. Rarely, if ever, d

undertake emergency steps of this nature when they are expecting a 

period of peace. Another measure to insure the survivability of critical t

tion routes is the construction of numerous road bypasses, extra bridge

like at bottlenecks—a procedure at which the North Vietnamese were a

Logistic preparations for specific operations. In addition to the 

logistic preparations as indications in general, certain types of activity 

vide very specific indications of the nature of impending attacks. An 

nary standdown of transport aircraft or their assembly at bases nea

forces is a good indication that airborne operations are impending

buildup of amphibious equipment and landing craft probably signifies i

waterborne attacks, and the detection of large quantities of mobile 

equipment probably indicates major river-crossing operations. These h

cific logistic operations are of great value for warning, provided 

detected, since they give us not only generalized warning but often spec

ing of how and where attacks may be launched. Thus, once again, we ca

strate the value for warning of the identification of the enemy’

preparations.

One final note of guidance can be offered. The analyst should not 

overlook the logistic items in the mass of other indications. In a major 

great deal will be going on—large-scale ground force movements, lots 

aircraft redeployments, dozens of political items and rumors, acc

planted reports of enemy intentions. All these are heady stuff and mak

rent items, and the order-of-battle buildup looks great on the map. B

times in all this, those little logistic fragments get lost which m

confirmed that the military buildup is genuine—that is, involves bona fi

rations for combat and is not an exercise or an idle threat for our benefit
69

invaluable to the assessment of the enemys real intentions.

OTHER FACTORS IN COMBAT PREPARATIO

The preceding sections have addressed some of the major types of ac

precede or accompany the commitment of forces to combat. Preparation

tilities, however, will likely be marked by a number of other anomalies 

unusual activities which will further help to distinguish the situation 

which is normal. In this section, we will consider in general terms so

things that we should watch for, or which have been noted in past crise

characterize true preparations for hostilities.

Preoccupation of the High Command 

War is the business of generals and admirals and, when preparati

progress for war, they will be very deeply involved indeed in the plann

to the consideration of the most minute details of the impending operat

staffs will be putting in long hours of planning and paper work, and mo

will likely be needed to cope with it. For reasons of security and secre

officers as possible may be informed of the full plans, but it is inevitab

preparations will affect the activities of many, if not all, components o

tary establishment in one way or another. This will be true, although 

degrees, whether a deliberate surprise attack is being planned for som

ahead (as in Japan’s preparations before Pearl Harbor) or whether th

leadership is preparing to respond to a relatively sudden and unexpe

(such as the U.S. when the strategic missiles were discovered in Cuba).

One of the great myt

trated by some analys

times in the name of w

that our enemies have 

contingency plans read

great hostilities could s

drop of the hat withou

ther planning or consideration of the details by their general staffs. This 

lous. No state can be ready for every contingency, and even if it do

specific plan for the particular crisis at hand, the high command or ge

assuredly will want to review it and to be sure that all the subordinate c

are fully prepared to play their roles and there are no bottlenecks. M

they will have to modify the plan or prepare a whole new one, since th

almost inevitably will be a little different, or someone questions part of 

forth. In any case, the result is a virtual certainty: the military establishm

highest levels will be extraordinarily involved and preoccupied with pla

staff work, intensive activity will be under way, the command and contr

It is a myth “That our enemies have all their

contingency plans ready and that great hostilities could start at the drop of the hat without any further planning or consideration.’’
70

reflected in high volumes of communications and a general atmospher

in the military establishment. We have learned from experience that e

exercises are likely to require the attention and presence of top militar

Where the preparations are real, the requirement for their participatio

infinitely greater. A knowledge of their whereabouts and some inform

their activities may be invaluable. From a variety of sources, both mi

political, we hopefully will gain some sense, however inadequate, tha

tary establishment is immersed in great and extraordinary activity, or i

an inordinate amount of attention to a particular area or subject.

Alerts and Combat Readiness

The declaration of the real (not practice) alert and the raising of forc

high (or the highest) levels of combat readiness is a major indication of 

ness for combat or possible combat. Like mobilization or major redeplo

units, the true combat alert will be reserved only for the extraordinary s

which hostilities are either planned or there is reason to fear that det

international conditions entail a risk of hostilities in the near future.

Forces of major countries usually have prescribed degrees or con

readiness ranging upward from their normal day-to-day condition to th

degree of readiness which is full readiness for imminent hostilities. In 

forces, these stages are known as DEFCONs (Defense Conditions) wh

from 5 (lowest) to 1 (highest).

The raising of DEFCON status is a serious matter and involves sp

scribed steps which materially increase the readiness of men and m

combat. Imposition of the highest DEFCON status would indicate 

emergency.

These steps entail a series of specific measures by the various comp

the armed forces which, when fully accomplished (that is, when full re

implemented), will have brought both combat and supporting units to 

for immediate commitment to combat. These readiness conditions are 

tinguished from routine alerts or exercises, which are frequently carr

test the ability of units to respond quickly. As in the U.S. forces, the 

readiness conditions is a serious step, undertaken rarely. Indeed, there is 

believe that the imposition of full readiness conditions throughout t

forces, with all the steps that would presumably be entailed, is a step 

DEFCON 1) which would be undertaken only in expectation of h

Although aspects of the combat alert plan are undoubtedly tested frequ

widespread implementation of full readiness is reserved for the genuin

situation, or expectation of such a situation. 

The declaration of full combat readiness is thus a matter of highest c

warning intelligence. There is nothing too trivial for us to know about 
71

ordered, or the exact measures which follow from such an order. Because o

with which even increased (as opposed to full) readiness conditions are imp

analysts will have had little experience with such circumstances, and there is 

considerable uncertainty about what we can or cannot detect or about what pr

occur. The warning student, however, should make a study of all available e

this subject, for in the hour of crisis the ability to recognize that full combat rea

being implemented could be of decisive importance.

Exercises versus Combat Deployments

Both compilers and users of indicator lists are frequently puzzled by the 

abnormally high level of exercise activity and a virtual standdown of norm

activity both appear as indicators. This is not a real contradiction provided t

cumstances in which each of these may be valid indicators are understood. An 

ally high level of training, and particularly very realistic or specialized tra

specific type of operation or against a specific target, of course may be a valid 

of preparations for combat operations. Obviously, troops need training, and ver

training, if they are to accomplish their missions effectively, and the scope a

training in the armed forces of any country is a very useful guide indeed to 

operations it expects to conduct. If our collection is adequate, we may also be 

from specific training exercises exactly what combat operations are being pl

North Vietnamese Army traditionally held detailed rehearsals with sand ta

launching attacks on specific targets in South Vietnam and Laos. For larger, mo

tional operations, extensive command post and staff exercises, supplemented 

the troops in their specific roles, are the normal procedure. No commander wo

to launch combat operations until he had satisfied himself that both his officers 

were reasonably well trained in what they were to do, and the more specific t

for the particular type of warfare or target, the better.

Thus, as a general—and sometimes quite specific—guide to the plans of th

adversary, the type of training is an indication not to be ignored. Such traini

however, is often a relatively long-term indication, which may precede the ac

tion of hostilities by weeks, months or even years. It may, in fact, not indicate 

tion of hostilities so much as a desire to be prepared for them if they should oc

Over the shorter term, perhaps a period of some weeks—although it ma

less—extraordinary changes in the pattern of training activity, and particularl

or near standdown of normal training, have usually proved to be a much more 

valid indication of hostilities. The genuine alert of forces in a crisis or for poss

ties is nearly always marked by abrupt curtailment of routine training, usually 

nied by a recall of forces in the field to their home stations in order to pla

readiness. In a real combat alert, missile troops will not be sent to remote range

ing nor antiaircraft units to firing areas; they will be needed either at their ho

or wartime deployment areas. Similarly, much if not all routine ground, air 
72

patrols will probably be stepped up. Such variations in training patterns 

to be evident and they are a distinguishing characteristic of genuine 

true sign that combat readiness of potential enemy forces is indeed bei

The Intelligence Community, based on growing experience, will often 

recognize such situations, but we need constantly to be alert to what i

pening (but ought to be happening) as well as to what is. This is particu

when there are no overt tensions which might alert us—when the ad

preparing in secret.

Statements that “Things look pretty quiet,’’ or “There doesn’t se

much going on,’’ can be dangerously misleading. Intended as reassura

listener, they may in fact mean that normal activity has been curtailed b

an alert.

Once it is under way, an exercise is something of a negative indicat

short term. When troops and logistic resources have been committed t

cise, they are not as ready to respond to a combat situation as they w

they deployed for the exercise. The problem for intelligence is to be su

buildup phase for an “exercise’’ is really for an exercise and not a c

deployment of forces for an attack. In many exercises, this will be li

problem since the exercises probably will not be conducted in the area 

the troops would have to be deployed for an actual attack, but farther 

the line of confrontation or even some distance to the rear.

There are few deception measures so simple to carry out or seem

transparently evident as a series of false statements on the nature or p

military activity. Despite this, such falsehoods have sometimes proved 

and we have no assurance that the Intelligence Community as a whole w

sarily recognize them for what they are. During the summer of 1968, 

announced a whole series of “exercises’’ that Soviet and Warsaw P

were said to be undertaking either in or adjacent to Czechoslovakia. In 

forces conducted no real exercises all summer long, and the alerting an

ments of forces for the Czechoslovak crisis totally disrupted the summ

program. These “exercises’’ were announced solely to provide a prete

introduction of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia in June and, still mo

tantly, as a cover for the major mobilization and deployment of Sov

after mid-July. The USSR even announced an elaborate scenario for its 

“rear services exercise’’ under cover of which combat units and their lo

port were deployed. Yet, despite the circumstances and the obvious fa

this activity was clearly related to Soviet efforts to bring the Czechoslo

tion under control, much current intelligence reporting accepted So

ments on these “exercises’’ as if they were valid descriptions of 

occurring. Even after the invasion, a number of post-mortem studies p

referring to the “exercises’’ without qualification, and even repeated (a

the scenarios which had been carried in the Soviet press.
73

judgment that the Soviets were not engaged in genuine exercises

Soviet tactics all summer long were designed to bring Czechoslovaki

by one means or another. Thus the situation called for exceptional 

sophistication in reporting to insure that the real Soviet purpose and 

were not obscured by rote-like repetition of Soviet statements

Offensive versus Defensive Preparations

In an impending crisis, when war may be about to break out or when 

fear of escalation of hostilities already in progress, the Intelligence C

often is required to come to some judgment as to whether preparations 

considered offensive or defensive in nature—in short, does fear of attac

some other adversary account for the observed military activity, or is it 

ration for offensive action?

This analytical problem is encountered both with respect to buildup

that could be used for offensive action (particularly ground force com

and to activity clearly of a defensive nature (such as increased a

defenses and fighter patrol activity). There are instances in which the 

offensive buildup of ground combat force, and even a considerable on

entirely for defensive purposes because of a valid fear of attack. And 

instances in which the seemingly defensive action, the buildup of for

could never be used in an attack, is in fact part of the offensive pr

undertaken solely in expectation of retaliation for the impending offe

can we tell the difference? When should accelerated military activity

type, be considered a manifestation of offensive preparations, and when 

There can be no categorical answer to this question and each case mu

arately considered. The following, however, are some general guidel

considered:

■ Any large-scale buildup of combat strength, particularly majo

ments of ground force units, which is in excess of a reasonable 

requirement for the area, should be considered a probable prepa

offensive action. Experience, in fact, teaches us that it will of

best single indicator of aggressive intentions.

■ Other extensive military preparations (such as a major mobiliza

and a large-scale buildup of logistic support) will reinforce the 

that the troop deployment is probably for offensive purposes.

■ Preparations which are seemingly “defensive’’ (particularl

civil defense measures) can be accurately evaluated only in th

the buildup of capabilities for offensive action. Where the 

capability is being rapidly or steadily augmented, the probabi

the concurrent acceleration of defensive measures is in fact in 

tion for an expected retaliation for the planned offensive.
74

rations are probably indeed just that.

■ The speed and urgency of both offensive and defensive prepara

also be considered. When an offensive action is imminent, the 

is likely to be most urgently concerned with the security of his 

and its populace, and the defensive measures against possible 

may be truly extraordinary and greatly accelerated (such as 

mainland China shortly prior to the Chinese intervention in Kor

summer in which Beijing had shown no great concern 

defense).

Coping with Extraordinary Military Developments

The military situation which prevails in the course of preparations f

ties is extraordinary. It is not a question of degree alone—not just m

command activity, more communications, more alerts, and so on. It 

involve unprecedented activity that would never occur except in prepa

or expectation of hostilities.

Compilers of indicator lists have devoted much effort to attempting 

and to define accurately those preparations unique to hostilities, or a

highly unusual in time of peace. Heading any such list, of course, 

obtaining by any means the order of attack. Second only to this is th

attack (without the order to implement it). It may be noted that in the 

warfare such intelligence coups have been accomplished more than onc

always recognized as such.

In addition there are indicators of such specificity and value that 

only be interpreted as preparations for offensive action. These actio

never be required for defense or precautionary purposes and are rare

taken in peacetime. In some cases, such information may be even m

able or convincing than the plan or order to attack—since the latter 

be suspect, and with cause, as a plant or deception effort.

Among the types of military indicators of such high specific value a

■ The redesignation of administrative military commands as o

commands, or the change from peacetime to wartime organizat

■ Widespread activation of wartime headquarters or alternate 

posts.

■ Release to control of commanders types of weapons normally h

very strict controls, particularly chemical or nuclear weapons.

■ Minelaying in maritime approaches.

■ Assignment of interpreters or prisoner of war interrogation 

front-line units.
75

security measures.

■ Imposition of extraordinary military security measures—such 

tion of military dependents or removal of border populations.

■ Greatly increased reconnaissance by any means, but particular

likely targets of initial surprise attack.

■ Sudden adoption of extraordinary camouflage or other concealm

measures.

When the intelligence system is so fortunate as to obtain indication

high specificity, it will be most important that they be recognized as 

accorded the weight they deserve, rather than lost in a mass of other 

data. Some seemingly small developments (in the total scope of activit

of the greatest importance. If one is attempting to compute probabilities

rate very high on the scale.

Magnitude and Redundancy of Preparations

No matter how many unusual or highly specific indications may 

assessments in the end will often depend heavily on the sheer magnit

military buildup of the potential aggressor. And rightly so. The massiv

of military power, out of all proportion to anything required in norma

for defensive purposes, has proven time and again to be the most valid 

of military intent. Many have learned to their regret that they had ma

error to write off an overwhelming buildup of military force as “just a b

capabilities’’ from which no conclusion could be drawn.

A manifestation of this phenomenon was the Soviet invasion of Cze

kia. Essentially, the misjudgment was to regard the massive buildup of S

Warsaw Pact forces as equally compatible with an intention to invade a

show of force or attempt to threaten the Czechoslovaks. This was t

buildup of Soviet combat power since World War II, exceeding consid

force which had been brought to bear to suppress the Hungarian revol

Experienced military analysts on the Soviet Union had literally never 

thing like it and could hardly believe the evidence at hand. This w

which met Soviet doctrinal concepts for offensive operations even w

tance might be expected. Sheer logic, not to mention the lessons o

should teach us that a force of this magnitude was never required just to 

pressure on Dubcek.

It is a feature both of the buildup of combat forces and of logistic pr

for war that the aggressor will seek a great superiority of power and abil

tain combat in comparison with that of his adversary—that is, if th

planner has his way. All commanders want an abundance of everythi

they attack. They are practically never satisfied that they have enough. 
76

of their commanders. 

Thus, a redundancy of supplies and a great superiority in equipmen

as massive troop deployments, may be the mark of a true buildup for a

aggressor sometimes may appear to be inordinately long in his buildup 

undertaking seemingly excessive preparations. The intelligence analy

circumstances should take care to avoid the pitfall into which more tha

fallen, which is to conclude that all this buildup does not mean anythin

the adversary already has more than enough on hand to attack. This arg

been seriously advanced and even propounded as a negative indica

would not do all this unless he was bluffing’’). This kind of inverse re

the death of warning.

Massive buildups of military power and logistic support are neve

indications. They may occasionally not be followed by military actio

odds are high that action will follow. As a general rule, the greater th

buildup in relation to that of the opponent, the greater the likelihood o

is fatal to ignore evidence of this kind.
77

POLITICAL FACTORS FOR WARNING

It is easy to demonstrate the importance and relevance of military 

ments for warning. Anyone can recognize that the numerous military 

ness steps identified on indicator lists bear a direct relationship to a 

and hence at least a possible intention, to commit military forces. Man

developments, including some of the most important, are physically m

or quantifiable, assuming, of course, that the collection capability exi

are so many tanks deployed in this area, which represents such-and-s

centage increase over the past two weeks, for example. Such informat

ally speaking, is unambiguous; its interpretation is not dependent on 

judgment.

AMBIGUITY OF POLITICAL INDICATORS

In contrast, the rel

political developm

political indicators t

is often not so read

ent, is not factually 

strable, and interpr

specific developments is likely to be highly subjective. The potential fo

ment of intention in the political field, not to mention for deception

higher than for military preparations. At least in theory, it is possible fo

society to conceal completely its decisions, to fail to take measures to p

own populace psychologically for war, and to handle its diplomacy an

late its propaganda so that there is virtually no discernible outward cha

political atmosphere which might alert the adversary. In practice, of co

virtually never occurs. But, even when there are numerous political 

and significant changes in diplomacy and propaganda, the interpretatio

significance may be difficult and elusive. Short of old-fashioned ultim

declarations of war, or the collection pipeline into the adversary’s dec

ing councils, nearly all political indications are subject to some degree 

guity and uncertainty. It follows, of course, that interpretations o

indications are likely to be much more variable and controversial tha

military developments.

One manifestation of this is that there are usually fewer political 

developments on indicator lists and that they tend to be much va

imprecise in wording. An illustration or two will suffice to make t

Indicator lists usually carry such political items as: “Protracted h

leadership meetings,’’ and “marked intensification of internal po

trols.’’ Such developments are, of course, potentially significant in

“The potential for concealment of intention in

the political field is much higher than for military preparations.’’
78

may also be attributable entirely to domestic developments, such 

unrest. Even political indicators tied directly to foreign affairs, su

general hardening of foreign policy’’ or “Significant increases in pr

broadcast to or about a critical area,’’ are not in themselves necessar

festations of any decision or intention to resort to conflict. Such deve

are significant even as possible indications only in relation to what 

times called “the overall situation.’’ Although not all political indicat

unspecific, it has not been possible to define potential political indic

precision: there is no political “Table of Organization and Eq

(TO&E). Nor is it possible to forecast in advance whether an adve

choose to publicize his objectives and intentions, seek to conceal the

totally, or, as is most probable, take some intermediate course. Thus 

ber of political indications is almost impossible to anticipate for any 

ical future situation. We can forecast with some degree of confid

some specific military preparations will be undertaken, but we canno

or at least cannot agree what manifestations of the political decisio

evident, or how such manifestations should be interpreted.

This ambiguity and non-specificity of political indicators also oft

that our sense of “political warning’’ is likely to be much more subje

hence more difficult to define or explain to others, than is the military 

Sometimes, there is little more than an uneasy sense or intuitive “fee

the adversary is up to something, which of course is not provable or ev

sarily communicable to others who are not thinking on the same wa

The analyst or military commander who attempts to put this sense of u

words may feel almost helpless to explain his “feelings,’’ if not downri

hensive that he is making a fool of himself. Yet, often these “feelings’’ 

generally accurate, if not specific, barometers of impending developme

General Lucius Clay, a few weeks before the start of the Berlin bloc

patched a cable to Army Intelligence in Washington, which said in par

the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude whic

define but which now gives me a feeling that it [war] may come with 

suddenness. I cannot support this change in my own thinking with an

outward evidence in relationships other than to describe it as a feeling 

tenseness in every Soviet individual with whom we have official relati

as General Clay later recalled his feelings at the time: “Somehow I fe

tively that a definite change in the attitude of the Russians in Berlin had 

and that something was about to happen. I pointed out that I had no c

intelligence of a positive nature.’’5

4 The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 387.

5

 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc, 

1950), 354.
79

haunted perceptive intelligence analysts on other occasionssuch as 

of 1950 prior to the North Korean attack on South Korea, and in the ear

of 1962, even before the marked upsurge of Soviet shipments to Cuba w

Even when political warning is less vague and subjective—that is, 

political atmosphere is clearly deteriorating and tensions are rising over 

situation which may lead to war—the political indicators still may be 

and not measurable or quantifiable evidence of a specific course of act

are, of course, exceptions to this, in which the enemy may make no 

conceal his plans, or in which direct warnings are issued to the intend

both privately and publicly. Often, however, political indications can gi

generalized warning, such as a recognition that the dangers of war are 

substantially, or that the adversary is clearly committed to some course 

which entails a grave risk of hostilities.

Critical Role of Political Factors for Warning

In large part because of these uncertainties, there exists a fundamenta

and misunderstanding of the importance of political factors for warning

larly among military officers, although by no means confined to them, 

been a tendency to downplay the significance of “political warning.’

political indications are less precise, less measurable and less predic

military indications, it is an easy step to conclude that they matter less

we can give them only secondary or incidental attention in our assessm

enemy’s intentions. Warning papers and estimates, in some cases, have 

place undue emphasis on the detection of military preparations, with on

reference to the political problem. 

The importance of the political assessment has rarely been so well 

in the following perceptive comments written years ago by one of the 

ing experts in the U.S. Intelligence Community:

We query whether the critical role of the political factors in war

may not warrant somewhat more emphasis or highlighting.

We appreciate that, in the warning process, the political factor—

“posture’’—constitutes one of the most esoteric and elusive fields, 

very term “political posture’’ remains essentially ambiguous. Neve

less, elusive, ambiguous or no, its critical role in warning must be 

weighed. We discern the implication that the political factor some

constitutes a separable category, distinct from that of physical prep

tions; that when joined with the latter at some point well along in 

game, it may, mathematically, add to or subtract from the sum of 

physical holdings. Actually, the political context is determinativ

whether at any and every given point in the process of the enemy’s p

arations, you indeed hold any sum at all in the “preparations’’ categ
80

ing conveyed by a particular pattern or patterns of observed phy

“preparations.’’ It is rather the essential, a priori, context which es

lishes that a particular physical activity may have any possible relev

to a real, live warning issue; it gives or denies to the physical “prep

tions’’ their presumed evidential value as indications. In any discus

of a hypothetical future warning problem, there is, of necessity, pre

an exquisitely subtle subjective assumption. Any discourse on what 

cations or evidence one expects to receive, how one will handle th

etc., assumes the very point at issue—that one is dealing with activ

recognized as “preparations.’’ Now, logically, there cannot be “prep

tions’’ for something that in fact the enemy has no conscious desig

doing; there cannot be a valid “indication’’ of that which does not 

in reality (much less a whole compendium of such “indications’’ 

pled from a cross-section of the attack-bound enemy national ent

Unless and until, and then only to the degree that, the intelligence c

munity’s intellectual assumptions and convictions as to the enem

political posture can rationally accommodate at least the possibility 

the enemy just might really be preparing to attack, there is not like

be acceptance—even contingent and tentative—of any enemy act

whatever—specific or in pattern—as reflecting or indicating “prep

tions’’ to attack. So long as the prevailing political assessment of 

enemy’s foreign policy objectives, motivational factors, etc., confide

holds that the course of action for which alleged “preparations’

being made is inconceivable, or impossible (or even unlikely), there 

not even been a beginning of the cumulative process [of indications i

ligence]. Thus the political factor invariably stands athwart the war

exercise from the very outset, and represents a constant, vital ingred

in the warning process from beginning to end.

Our remarks above derive primarily from our cumulative experi

in the warning process. The same conclusion, however, follows from 

intrinsic logic of the problem itself. The very end to which warning ge

ally addresses itself—enemy intent to attack—is fundamentally a po

cal issue, involving a political decision of the highest order, made by 

political leadership of the enemy state (we are excluding here, of co

the “Failsafe’’ issue of some military nut just arbitrarily pushing a but

The working rationale underlying the exercise discussed throughout 

estimate is simply the presumed existence of: 

(a) an enemy decision to attack;

(b) a plan of measures/preparations to be taken to insure succe

the attack;

(c) implementation of the plan.
81

identify, and place in order fragmentary manifestations of the pro

actually under way in (c), with a view toward reconstructing and aut

ticating the essential outlines of (b), from which we hope to derive 

prove (a) which equals classic warning.We cannot hope to reason e

tively from (c) to (a), without a correct, albeit hypothetical, apprecia

from the outset of (a). Here again, then, we find that in theory as we

in practice the crucial, final link is entirely political. Whether vie

from Moscow or Washington, the political context is the capstone

the enemy—the beginning of that fateful course; for U.S. intelligenc

the end.!6

Political Perception Fundamental To Warning

The perception of the advers

damental goals and priorit

sine qua non of warning. It c

the most significant 

between those who “have 

and those who do not. No a

military evidence will serve to convince those who do not have thi

perception of the adversary’s objectives and national priorities, or t

cannot perceive that military action may be the rational outcome of 

sary’s course of action to date. The validity of this point can be demon

instance after instance; it is the problem of “those who cannot see,’’ 

“facts’’ will have little effect on their ability to see. Just as some cou

that Hitler was bent on conquest in Europe, others later could not see t

would or even might intervene in Korea, or that the USSR would or e

invade Czechoslovakia. All were fundamentally problems in politica

tion, rather than the evaluation of military evidence. An indications 

the Czechoslovak crisis (written after the event) described the analyti

as it existed in mid-July (just prior to the start of Soviet mobilization 

troop deployments) as follows:

It is important to note that, while current intelligence reportin

this time clearly and explicitly recognized the gravity of the crisis and 

nature of Soviet tactics, there was also a fundamental difference of o

ion among analysts. The point at issue was the means which the So

Union could and would use to accomplish its objectives and wheth

would, if faced by continuing Czechoslovak intransigence, ultim

resort to overt intervention in Czechoslovak affairs.

On the one hand, there was a group of analysts who questi

whether there was anything that the Soviet Union really could do, inc

6

Frank Denny, Director of the National Indications Center, early 1960s, unpublished 

“The perception of the adversary’s

fundamental goals and priorities is the

sine qua non of warning.’’
82

This group was also inclined to the view that the USSR, if unab

secure Czech compliance by political means, would not jeopardiz

international image, its relations with western Communist Parties an

progress toward coexistence with the United States by direct mil

action. It believed that the USSR had changed or matured politically s

the days of the Hungarian intervention and was unlikely to take 

action again. For these reasons, direct Soviet action against Czechosl

kia was viewed as somewhat “irrational’’ and therefore unlikely. 

group was thus predisposed, in varying degrees, to regard subseq

major Soviet military moves as more pressure on Czechoslovakia ra

than as bona fide preparations for military action.

On the other hand was a group of analysts who inclined to the b

quite early in the summer that the USSR was deadly serious in its d

mination to maintain control of Czechoslovakia and would ultimately 

any means, including military force, to insure this. They believed tha

USSR, not just for political but also for strategic reasons, could not t

ate the loss of Czechoslovakia and that Soviet security interests were 

paramount consideration. The USSR therefore would decide, if in fa

had not already decided, that military action against Czechoslovakia 

the lesser of the evils which confronted it. These analysts thus did 

regard such a course of action as irrational, and they were predisp

earlier rather than later to regard the Soviet military moves as preparat

for direct intervention. Such judgments or estimates by individuals 

crucial to the warning process, and each person makes his own regard

of whether there is an agreed national estimate. Each analyst is i

enced, perhaps unconsciously, by his preconceived views or his opinio

what is rational or logical behavior on the part of the adversary. His j

ment on this will help to determine, sometimes more than he may rea

not only how he interprets a given piece of information but what he se

to report at all.7

The foregoing discussion should help to explain why some critics ob

terms “military warning’’ and “political warning’’ as if they were sep

cesses. There are indications which are essentially military, and those 

primarily political, but there is only one kind of warning. It is the per

the significance of all these developments in toto. Warning, like beauty, 

eye of the beholder.

It is highly erroneous to presume, as many do, that political analyst

political agencies, such as the Department of State) make political ana

that military analysts (and military agencies, such as the Department of 

make military analyses. The intelligence offices of the Department of 

7

Cynthia Grabo, 1968, unpublished manuscript.
83

tors into account in making political assessments. Still more pertinent, p

the fact that military analysts are constantly making essentially polit

ments about the likely military courses of actions of our potential enem

may not recognize that this is so; it may be entirely unconscious, but as

of political factors underlie virtually all military estimates and other a

enemy courses of action.

It may be extremely important for warning that gratuitous political j

of intent do not creep into military assessments of the enemy’s capabil

least that the political judgment be clearly separated from the statem

military capability. This point was well illustrated in judgments made p

outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. By March, Army Intelligenc

rectly reporting that the steady buildup of North Korean forces gave 

capability to attack South Korea at any time—but then undercut this 

military judgment (a warning in itself) with the judgment that it was no

that North Korea would do it, at least for the time being. The same pos

tary but negative political judgments were being made by General Ma

intelligence in the Far East. Thus, the gratuitous political judgment (the 

argumentation for which was never really set forth) tended in effect to 

even negate a highly important military estimate.

Warning has failed more 

lack of political percepti

has for lack of military 

When I have pointed this o

itary officers, their reactio

that you really cannot t

political people, and if more heed had been paid to the military people, 

have gone well. In some cases this may be true (it is at least partly true f

oslovakia in 1968), but in other cases it has been the military thems

have permitted their own political misperceptions to override the mi

dence. And there are cases in which political officers have been well ah

military analysts in perception of the likely course of military action. In 

where we have so often been wrong, there is blame to go around. The po

the political judgment, no matter who makes it, will likely be even mo

tant than the military analysis for the assessment of the adversary’s inte

A PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION

Presumably, few persons would take exception to the general thesi

in the preceding section that the perception of another country’s int

essentially a political judgment of developments in given circumstance

this understanding of national priorities and objectives is fundamen

warning judgment. In this section, this problem will be examined in m

“Warning has failed more often for lack of

political perception than it has for lack of

military evidence. ‘’
84

adversarys course of action.

Perceptions of the Likelihood of Conflict

In normal circumstances, the likelihood or improbability of conflic

two or more states is fairly well understood, not only in government c

by the educated public, and these judgments are usually quite accurate

derived from our recognition that the basic conditions for war betwe

more states either do not exist at all, or are present in varying degrees of 

ity ranging from a very small chance that war would occur to the si

which virtually all political signs of ultimate hostilities are positive.

Between these two extremes, there are all sorts of gradations of o

ments of the probabilities of conflict between nations, or of our pe

of whether a given nation is or is not inclined to resort to hostilit

how aggressive or cautious it may be in pursuit of its aims. Our un

ing of these questions are basic not only to our intelligence assessm

ticularly our national intelligence estimates) but also to our nationa

and military policies. 

Such attitudes are crucial to our views as to the nature, and amou

political warning we may perceive and articulate. If the opinion pre

the national leadership of any country is essentially aggressive an

expansion or conquest, then it follows that there need be no basic 

changes in the attitudes or behavior of that country before it attack

case, the casus belli already exists; it is not brought about by some o

change in circumstance.

Priorities and Traditional Behavior

How any country may react in a particular situation will usually be p

at least in part, on its traditional national objectives and past perform

thus essential to understand what the national objectives or priorit

potential adversary have been in the past. This, of course, assumes a 

and consistency of national behavior which have not always been the 

the premise nonetheless is usually valid. It is from such concepts 

national behavior in certain circumstances that we derive our judgmen

a nation will fight for and what it will not. 

It is virtually impossible for any country (or leader) to conceal for 

its basic philosophies and national objectives are. Deception and co

cannot extend this far. All leaders need some popular support for their 

particularly programs that may ultimately lead to war. History shows 

leaders, even those bent on a course of aggression, rarely have made m

to conceal their intentions, and some leaders (for example, Hitler in Me

have provided us with virtual blueprints of what they planned to acco
85

it is often because we did not wish to believe what we were being told

many refused to accept the clear warnings from Hitler’s own writings.

Unfortunately, however, political warning is not this simple. W

essential to understand fundamental objectives and priorities, thos

likely to provide us with specific warning of what another state will d

particular situation. It usually cannot tell us how great a risk it is pr

run to achieve its objectives, how far it may seek them by politic

before it will resort to military action or whether it will, in fact, ever fi

the military course. In short, even when our understanding of the ad

philosophy and objectives is pretty good, we must still have some mor

understanding of his objectives and decisions in the specific situatio

to predict a likely course of action.

Strategic Importance of the Particular Issue

Except in instances of long-planned deliberate aggression, the pos

conflict usually arises over some particular issue or development, and 

tial aggressor may have had very little control of it. Or, if the situation 

of his own making, development of the situation and the reactions of o

be different from what he had expected. There are potentially, and ofte

a vast number of complicating factors which may influence his poli

sions. It will not be enough just to have a general estimate of how he sh

in such circumstances, or how he has reacted in the past. It is important 

stand how he views the situation now and to interpret how he will beh

particular instance. We are confronted now with condition and not a t

thus move from the long-term estimative approach to the specific and m

term indications approach.

How much weight are we going to give, in these circumstances, to 

tional concepts of this country’s objectives and likely courses of action

much to the specific indications of what he is going to do this time? In a 

ber of cases, there is not apt to be a great deal of conflict here—the tra

seemingly logical course of action will in fact prove to be the right o

case, the current political indications will be generally consistent wit

expect this particular country to perform. This will be particularly tr

past behavior and current indications call for an essentially 

assessment—that is, that the state in question will not resort to military 

these circumstances. 

The difficulties in warning are likely to arise when some of these f

not consonant with one another, and particularly when standing est

judgments would dictate that the adversary will not take military acti

situation, but the current indications, both military and political, sugge

will. Which is right, and what validity should be given our current indi
86

to be an oversimplification and subject to rebuttal with examples that w

negate the general conclusion. History nonetheless suggests that th

weight in these cases should be given to the current indications. In othe

is usually more important to understand the strategic importance of the 

issue to the nation than it is to place undue weight on traditional behavio

orities. This is, after all, the fundamental cause of warning failures—

behavior of the aggressor appeared inconsistent with what we would 

have expected him to do, or with our estimate of what he would do. 

were “surprised.’’ He did not do what we thought he would do, or shou

In some instances, a country’s course of action truly does appear irr

is a misjudgment of the situation, in either the long or short term, or bo

the end it is counterproductive. Two conspicuous examples which com

are Pearl Harbor—which was a short-term triumph but long-term mi

on the part of Japan—and the Cuban missile crisis, which was a gross 

lation in the short term. In both, the indications of what the adversary 

were more important to an assessment of his intentions than any intellig

mates, which in fact proved to be wrong. It was later observed that, in 

situation, we had totally misjudged Khrushchev’s sense of priorities (

had misjudged ours) and that there must have been an overriding requ

his mind to achieve some degree of strategic parity with the U.S. wh

have led him to take such a risk.

In lesser degree, this may 

many crises. The perceptio

the adversary is thinking 

important the current issue 

is fundamental to our 

understand what he will do

lack of such perception 

behind much of our misjudgment of North Vietnamese intentions and p

in the Vietnam war. As has subsequently become obvious, both U.S. in

and perhaps to a greater degree policy level officials (there were 

exceptions, of course) vastly underestimated the determination and abi

North Vietnamese leadership to sustain the war effort. No doubt this att

tributed materially to the reluctance to believe in 1965-66 that Hanoi w

lizing its armed forces for the conduct of a prolonged war in the South.

We should note here also that it may require no particular collectio

sophisticated analytic talent to perceive how nations feel about particu

Even our security-conscious adversaries whom we characteristically 

all kinds of chicanery are not necessarily engaged in devious efforts t

how they feel on great problems and issues vital to their national s

objectives. It will often be quite obvious how they feel about something 

important it is to them, if we will only take the time to examine wha

“The perception of what the adversary is

thinking and how important the current

issue is to him is fundamental to our ability to understand what he will do.’’
87

intervention in the Korean war and North Vietnams general program fo

duct of the war in South Vietnam—they have virtually told us what they 

to do. In others—such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—

made no secret whatever of the criticality of the issue and of its overridi

tance to them, and have strongly indicated that force would be used if n

Influences in Political Perception

Objective perception of the adversary’s attitudes and the ability 

things from his point of view are crucial to warning, and above all t

analysis, since this will necessarily be more subjective than the comp

analysis of military data.

The “climate of opinion’’ also strongly influences political perceptio

only very difficult for an individual to maintain an independent viewpo

a widespread contrary view about another state, it may prove almost i

to gain acceptance for such a view, even when there may be conside

dence to support it. Time is needed to change national attitudes.

A somewhat related factor may be the influence of our own nationa

and military plans on our judgments of what the adversary may do

national decision has been made on a certain course of action—

whether a particular country is or is not vital to our defense and henc

we will or will not defend it—there will almost inevitably be some 

our assessments. It is not so obvious as simply saying what the po

would like to hear (or not saying what it would like not to hear); th

also to be a more subtle influence on our thinking and analyses. Vario

ical examples could be cited, Vietnam for one. Our concepts of North 

as an aggressive nation bent on conquering the South almost certa

influenced, or at least reinforced, by the U.S. decisions in 1965 t

forces to defend the South; it then become acceptable to talk of North 

as an aggressor and hence to think in such terms.

Judgments concerning North Korean intentions in the period pr

attack of June 1950 also were materially influenced by U.S. polici

area. For at least three years before that attack, it had been officia

nized that there was grave danger that North Korea would seek to 

the South if U.S. forces were withdrawn. Nonetheless, it was decide

draw U.S. forces, partly on the grounds that South Korea was not es

the U.S. military position in the Far East, and to hand the Korean p

the United Nations. Once having decided to write off South Korea 

military responsibility, the U.S. made no military plans for the d

South Korea against an attack from the North, and seemingly it bec

policy not to defend South Korea. The effect of this on intelligenc

ments, and thus indirectly on warning, was two-fold: as a low pri
88

gence analysts, believing that the U.S. would take no military action 

Korea attacked, tended to downplay both the importance and by im

the likelihood of the attack in their assessments. Even those who exp

attack and predicted that it was coming (not necessarily in June, o

saw the possibility as a relatively unimportant development in co

with other potential Communist military threats in Europe and the 

and hence gave it little attention in their assessments. They saw no u

warning the policymaker about Korea, since nothing was going to 

about it anyway. It was only one of many areas where the so-called 

nist Bloc (meaning the Soviet Union and its obedient satellites) mig

and apparently one of the least important. 

A related factor influencing assessments on Korea in that period wa

cept that only the Soviet Union was a real military threat against which 

itary forces should be prepared to act. The concept of limited “wars of li

or indirect aggression through third parties was vaguely perceived, if at 

Korea, like Communist Europe, was seen only as a pawn of Moscow

came, would be on Soviet instigation and part of a much larger confli

gence assessments, as well as military planning, reflected this view of 

munist threat and scarcely hinted at the possibility of a Communist att

would be confined to the Korean peninsula. General Ridgway has well 

the then prevailing concept as follows:

By 1949, we were completely committed to the theory that the 

war involving the United States would be a global war, in which K

would be of relatively minor importance and, in any event, indefens

All our planning, all our official statements, all our military decis

derived essentially from this belief.8

Finally, we may note that judgments of the likelihood of attack are a

an unwillingness to believe it or to accept it—the tendency to push th

aside as too unpleasant to think about, in the hope that it may just go a

tendency, which all of us have in some degree, may be accentuated by 

hopelessness and inability to do anything about it, or by a desire not t

boat or stir the waters lest the potential aggressor be even more provo

last consideration possibly was a major factor in Stalin’s apparent failu

anticipated the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, and hi

dismissal of the numerous warnings of the coming attack. There is no 

the USSR had ample long-term strategic warning of the German offe

some observers have felt that Stalin was blind to this, suffering from a m

nia almost as great as Hitler’s. But an alternate thesis holds that he did f

attack but, believing that nothing further could be done to prevent it, he 

delay it as long as possible by trying to appease Hitler and thus publicl

8

Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Com

1967), 11.
89

bly never know what Stalin really thoughtthe effect of his polici

decrease the preparedness of the Soviet public and particularly the arm

for the attack when it finally came.

CONSIDERATIONS IN POLITICAL WARNIN

Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

Since war is an expression of political relations by other means 

resort to war only when they have failed to secure their objectives by 

means, foreign policy and diplomacy are highly important indic

national objectives. It is difficult to conceive of hostilities breaking ou

nations today without some prior crisis or at least deterioration in th

matic relations. Indeed, historically, the most obvious early w

approaching hostilities has usually been in the field of foreign poli

tions. The outbreak of both world wars in Europe was preceded b

deterioration in the international political climate, which made the thr

apparent to all, if not “inevitable.’’ Even Japan’s surprise attack on P

bor was preceded by a crisis in U.S.-Japanese political relations, w

greatly raised U.S. fears of war, although specific Japanese intentions 

foreseen. Those who are confident that the coming of future wars al

foreshadowed by international political crises and developments in th

of foreign policy unquestionably have the lessons of history on their s

Nonetheless, there is a substantial body of opinion which questions 

hood that wars of the future will necessarily be preceded by such 

changes in the political atmosphere. Moreover, it is our uncertainty tha

indications of this nature will provide us warning that largely accoun

existence of indications intelligence at all. If we could be confident of h

type of political warning, not to mention direct ultimatums and decla

war, then obviously there would be little need for much indications an

could confine ourselves to assessments of the enemy’s capabilities. Th

stances surrounding the outbreak of some conflicts since World War I

justify this concern. The North Korean attack on South Korea, the most 

ous example, was not preceded by any political crisis or diplomatic w

the near term, although the political atmosphere had long been highly 

and of course the two sections of the country had no diplomatic rela

diplomatic warnings of Chinese intervention in Korea, although they we

fell short of what might have been expected if the Chinese objective w

deter the advance of U.S./UN forces toward the Yalu. The Middle Eas

of 1956 and 1967 were both preceded by international political crises

cific political indications that Israel had decided to attack were largely 
90

will receive specific political warning through developments in forei

and diplomacy than has been true in the past:

■ Modern weapons, even non-nuclear weapons, have given 

advantage to the attacker, thus increasing the value of politica

The Israeli attack of 1967 is a prime example. Probably in pa

of this, it is no longer considered desirable to break political re

to declare war prior to attacking, and few countries today would 

do so.

■ It is the doctrine of our major potential enemies to attack with

matic warning, and they almost certainly would do so, howe

generalized political warning there might be beforehand of th

tions. In the short term, this is one of the easiest and most 

means of deception.

■ The pressures brought by other states, through the United Natio

erwise, to forestall conflicts are such that countries today in

feel compelled to act without diplomatic warnings so that th

tional peacemaking machinery will not be brought to bear b

achieve their objectives. 

Altogether, it is probable that specific warning of impending attac

diplomatic channels is largely a thing of the past. This does not necessa

however, that more generalized indications of intention will not conti

evident through the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy. Indeed, a

gers and costs of war increase, there is considerable reason to believe 

will be ample evidence that international political relations are seriousl

rating before wars break out. In other words, we should still expect g

strategic warning, if not short-term warning of imminent attack, from su

opments. This may, however, require increased sophistication of analy

ognize that war is imminent.

Public Diplomacy, Propaganda and Disinformation

The term “propaganda’’ here is used in its broadest sense, to cover 

mation put forth by any means under national control or direction, 

designed to win over or influence the intended audience. Propagan

either true or false, or somewhere in between, and it can be intended for 

or foreign consumption or both. It can be disseminated through private 

(that is, to the party faithful or non-government organizations in briefin

tives, or “resolutions’’) or through the mass media to the domestic pop

the world at large. The term “public diplomacy’’ can be equated wit

ganda’’ when there is a factual basis for the information. If the infor

based on falsehoods, it may best be labeled “disinformation.’’
91

intentions (that is, for warning) are well recognized. Propaganda analys

recognized as an art, if not a science, during World War II, when speci

were made to analyze Nazi pronouncements for indications of possible 

ing German military moves, as well as for other purposes. 

There are two prevalent misunderstandings about propaganda and it

ship to, and value for, warning. First is the widespread tendency to m

reject almost anything our adversaries say as “mere propaganda’’ and 

regard it as meaningless if not completely false. This tendency to disp

usefulness of propaganda is most unfortunate, for the record shows th

ganda trends, and specific pronouncements, are often very valuable indi

intentions. 

A second tendency, almost the opposite of the above, is to expect 

warning from propaganda, that is, to expect it to be highly specific or 

virtually unequivocal evidence that military action is impending, per

specific warning of the time and place. People who expect this kind o

from propaganda are almost certain to be disappointed, and they may 

conclude that the propaganda provided “no warning’’ when in fact t

ganda provided considerable indirect or less specific evidence of what 

nent might do. 

The following general comments on the usefulness of propaganda a

from experience in many crises. We are here discussing the propagan

by closed societies through controlled media, where both its quantity an

are carefully regulated and designed to achieve specific goals.

Propaganda reflects concern. Propaganda is a very useful barome

concerned the country’s leadership is about particular issues. Marked u

propaganda on a particular subject or area do generally reflect genuine 

pation with it, particularly if sustained over any period of time. Simila

low level of propaganda attention to an issue usually indicates very littl

with it. A drop in meaningful comment however, can signify that the i

important that all comment is being withheld pending guidance from 

Finally, deliberate inattention to an area or an issue can be used for 

generally in the relatively short term.

Most propaganda is “true.’’ Here we are using “truth’’ in a re

absolute, sense. We mean that states cannot continually distort their 

and policies, and particularly not to their own people. To put out to

statements or misleading guidance is self-defeating and will not 

desired response. It is important, when hostilities may be impending, to 

proper degree of hatred or fear of the adversary. The leadership canno

give a wholly false picture of the situation to the populace. 
92

meaning and significance of a heavy barrage of North Vietnamese s

aimed at their own populace, which called for large-scale enlistment in 

forces, longer working hours, greater sacrifices, recruitment of more w

that men by the thousands could be sent “to the front.’’ There was a gr

U.S. Intelligence Community that rejected all this as “mere propagand

benefit and would not credit it as evidence that North Vietnam was pr

send large numbers of troops to South Vietnam. The contrary argument

course proved to be the correct one, maintained that just the reverse wa

this intensive internal indoctrination was the true barometer of Hano

tions, and that the official propaganda line (that there were no North V

troops in South Vietnam) was the false one put out for our benefit. The 

believe this internal propaganda campaign possibly was the single grea

cle to the recognition that Hanoi was mobilizing for a major military 

South Vietnam.

Official, authorized statements are unusually significant. In t

communist states of Europe the press operated under a set of prescr

which proved very consistent over a period of years. Routine, day-to-d

were handled under established guidelines; more important developme

for articles by particular commentators (sometimes pseudonyms for 

cials); major issues evoked authorized or official statements from th

level. These latter statements were important not only for thems

because they set forth the “party line’’ for the rest of the propaganda m

and thus were carefully adhered to by the faithful. These statements al

ranted the most careful study and analysis, and when they bore on wa

were of particular significance for warning. This does not necessarily 

they were easy to interpret. It became clear in retrospect that some o

points in one of these communist classics—the 11 September 1962 TA

ment which unknown to us really ushered in the Cuba crisis—were 

sufficient attention in the community. 

Propaganda warning is usually indirect, rather than specific. 

eral rule, statements such as the foregoing are about as specific pr

warning as we are likely to receive of military action. It will be obser

would be difficult to be much more precise without describing specifi

preparations or directly threatening to intervene with military force

recall an instance after World War II in which a communist country 

stated that it would intervene, invade or attack with its regular for

when such action was imminent. The closest any communist countr

such a direct statement was China’s open calls for “volunteers’’ for Ko

fall of 1950. In most cases, communist nations liked to maintain the 

that their forces were either “invited in’’ or weren’t there at all. China 

acknowledged that anything other than “volunteer’’ units were sent 

North Vietnam never acknowledged the presence of its forces in South 
93

Soviet troops, of course were invited to enter both Hungary in 

Czechoslovakia in 1968. 

Political Warning Through Third Parties

No discussion of the type of developments that can give us politica

would be complete without some attention to the usefulness of interme

third parties. This applies both when they are deliberately used as a c

convey a message and when they serve as leaks, inadvertently or otherw

When deliberately used, it is often for the purpose of arranging di

or negotiations, but it may also be to convey a direct warning. T

Ambassador in Beijing was selected as the first channel to convey w

the U.S. that Chinese forces would intervene in Korea if U.S./U

crossed the 38th Parallel. Most people were inclined to dismiss this 

the time. Still more useful may be the unintended, or at least o

intended, leak through third parties. It is axiomatic that the more pe

particularly the more countries, brought in on a plan, the more diffic

keep it secret.

Because of the very tight security on the introduction of Soviet mi

Cuba, the USSR is believed to have informed very few foreign commu

ers, probably only the heads of the Warsaw Pact countries under rigi

admonitions. This adventure was solely a Soviet show. On the other 

preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia required a high degree 

ation and planning among five states, and numerous people were cogniz

general nature of the plans if not the details.

Internal Factors: Assessing the Views of the Leadership

Few subjects have proved more elusive to us than a true understand

character, attitudes and proclivities of the leaders of foreign countries

be true even for those with whom we have friendly relations and num

tural contacts. When the nations are essentially hostile, or at least no

and their leaders have been educated in entirely different traditions or i

the potential for misunderstanding them rises dramatically. Of the c

leaders since World War II, Khrushchev almost certainly was the most 

garrulous and willing to meet with foreigners. If we thereby felt we u

him, we were disabused by the Cuban missile episode. Brezhnev, on 

hand, had apparently never met with an American other than Gus Ha

preparations for his Summit meeting with President Nixon in May 197

Where the leadership is essentially collective, we often have very li

perception of the lineup on particular issues. Despite several reports o

ject, we really do not know how the Soviet leadership voted with res

invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nor do we know which of the leaders of N
94

sus largescale conventional offensive operations. It is possible to g

varying opinions from professed experts on where General Giap really 

this question at various times. As a general rule, therefore, the attempt t

guess our potential enemies based on any professed insight into their 

or attitudes is likely to be a risky business. 

When sudden changes in leadership occur and relative unknowns 

positions of power, the difficulties are compounded. The death of Stali

about a period of great uncertainty, and there was a brief period of in

alert against the contingency that the new Soviet leaders might under

hostile act. Of course, the reverse proved to be true. Stalin’s succes

somewhat less hostile and aggressive and probably were instrumental i

about the armistice in Korea shortly later. Nonetheless, there are in

which a change in leadership has been of warning significance, and 

indicative of a change toward a more aggressive policy or even of a clea

initiate hostilities. The change of government in Japan in October 1941 

sally recognized as one of the key developments which foreshadowe

aggressive Japanese policy. The formation of a new government under 

rist General Tojo set in motion the chain of events which culminated in 

on Pearl Harbor. 

Coups and Other Political Surprises

Intelligence personnel, particularly the chiefs of intelligence 

become used to being blamed for things for which they were not re

and which they could not conceivably have predicted. (This is partly 

sated by the mistakes made by intelligence which are not recognized o

to light.) Nothing is more exasperating to members of the intelligen

sion than to be charged with failing to predict coups and assassinatio

they rightly consider as “acts of God’’ somewhat less predictable th

does, avalanches and plane hijackings. It is ridiculous and grossly 

expect the intelligence system to anticipate such acts, which are 

secrecy and sometimes by only one individual. Forecasts of this typ

within the province of strategic warning—however serious the con

of such acts may be—and they really are not within the province 

gence at all. The most that can reasonably be expected is that the in

system recognize that, in certain countries or situations, such acts if th

occur might precipitate riots, revolts or other crises inimical to our 

But even this is expecting a good deal, as the police record in this c

attempting to anticipate urban riots should demonstrate.
95

WARNING FROM THE TOTALITY 

OF EVIDENCE

In real life, developments do not occur separately but in conjunction 

taneously. Moreover, they relate to each other in some more or less log

ion if in fact a country is preparing for hostilities.

THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF POLITICAL 

AND MILITARY FACTORS

At the risk of an oversimplification of this problem, we may note ce

erally valid precepts. First, political indications alone—in the absence o

nificant military preparations or without the capability to act—are no

and we will virtually always be correct in dismissing them as so much b

propaganda. For years, The People’s Republic of China had a prop

reserving some of its most violent propaganda for situations half way a

globe in which it had absolutely no capability to act—for example, L

1958. In the years following its decisive defeat by Israel in 1967

repeated calls for the recovery of its former territory carried little wei

absence of a capability to defeat the Israelis in the Sinai. Similarly

American propaganda put out by North Korea over a period of years h

intense and vitriolic that it has been meaningless as an indication of an 

to take military action within any foreseeable time period. We mu

remember, however, that the national attitudes reflected in such propa

significant, and that such bitter hostility will make the military preparat

when they occur) potentially more meaningful and dangerous than mi

wise be the case, as was demonstrated in the Egyptian attack on Israel

the Sinai in 1973. 

At the other extreme, military indications alone—in the absence of 

of political crisis or a deterioration in the international situation—also 

to lose credibility. In such circumstances, we will be inclined to regard 

extensive and unusual military activity as an exercise or test of some k

than a bona fide preparation for early military action. For example

mobilization, which in time of political crisis would cause grave conce

probably be dismissed as only an exercise in a period of political ca

absence of any crisis, even a highly unusual and potentially very omin

opment may not cause much alarm; it will rather be regarded as a m

some kind, or an error in reporting, as in fact it often is. Whereas in a c

a development would likely be assessed as even more ominous than the 

might warrant, it will probably require quite a number of unusual milit

opments to disturb our complacency if we see no positive political in
96

Very few wars have started without some deterioration in the political s

some development which would increase the possibilities that a nat

decide to launch military operations. 

There is, however, some limit to the number of major military pr

which may be undertaken in a period of political calm without arousing 

In real life, we rarely see the situation in which political and military i

are totally out of phase or contradictory. Each will be contributing, i

measure perhaps, to our assessment of the enemy’s likely course of act

been observed that, in normal times, we will usually give somewh

weight to political indications than to military developments; this re

general sense of the attitudes and intentions of our adversaries, usually 

by many years of experience. It is also essentially our national estim

they are not going to go to war without some reason, and that we will h

indication that the situation has changed before they would take such a 

On the other hand, once the situation has changed and the political atm

deteriorating, we will probably give greater weight in the crisis situat

military indications as our best guideline to the enemy’s intentions. Th

reflects two historically valid principles: political indications can be a

or even misleading, particularly if the adversary is seeking to confuse 

us; and the extraordinary buildup of military capability is likely to be th

gle indication of the enemy’s course of action, a point made several tim

ously in this work.

ISOLATING THE CRITICAL FACTS AND INDICA

Individuals lacking 

ence with real warn

tions nearly alwa

considerable misc

about the nature an

ties of information 

likely to be received

problem of interp

Whereas the inex

tend to believe that 

“failures’’ arise from totally inadequate information (“we didn’t ha

ing’’), experienced analysts have learned that the reverse may be the c

is almost too much information, too many reports, too many military 

tions, too much “warning.’’

In any large volume of political and military reports or indications, s

ously will be of far greater importance than others for the judgme

enemy’s intentions. In the preceding sections, a number of such critica

“Whereas the inexperienced tend to believe

that warning ‘failures’ arise from totally inadequate information, experienced analysts have

learned that the reverse may be the case; there

is almost too much information, too many

reports, too many military preparations, too

much ‘warning.’’’
97

ments that can be expected to occur only in preparation for combat. 

These particularly meaningful preparations should be singled 

accorded the attention they deserve. The question should not be simpl

likely preparation for war? There will probably be a great many develo

this category. The crucial question may be, how rare is it? How of

occurred at all in peacetime, including crises which did not lead to confl

likely would it be to occur except in preparation for war? If the answers 

even a few critical or nearly unique indications are showing up, th

course are materially increased that the country in question is preparin

will probably initiate hostilities. The more advanced and sophisticated 

tary forces and the economy of a country, the more such distinctive pr

will be required for war. Preparations for nuclear war would involve an 

dented range of activities, some of which would probably never be seen 

preparation for that contingency. It follows, therefore, that:

All Indicators are Not Ambiguous

A great disservice has been done the community and the warning 

some rather casual statements that “all indicators are ambiguous.’’ S

ments are not dissimilar in lack of perception to the claim that “We can 

enemy’s capabilities but we cannot judge his intentions.’’

It is probably true that there is only one totally reliable, unequivocal 

of an intention to attack and that is instantaneous access to the enemy’

to do so and/or the order to implement it. Even where total preparatio

have been accomplished, where all military indications are “positive,’

when the political decision has already been made in principle to attac

always the possibility that the leaders will change their minds or that 

minute event will cause them to postpone or to call off the operation e

this sense, it may be said that all indications but the one are subject to s

sure of doubt or uncertainty and can never be viewed as absolutely c

evidence of intent. 

But there are a number of military indications which are not in th

ambiguous. That is, they are the steps that are undertaken only in prepa

hostilities, that virtually never occur in peacetime, that are not just “m

same’’ but different from what goes on from day to day. They do not 

exercises, they do not occur (or only to a very limited extent) in practi

zations or other drills. They are the developments which truly distin

from peace. They are the manifestations of the implementation of the 

and they include such developments as: full national mobilization; the 

of full combat readiness in all military forces; the formation of wart

mands; the release of nuclear weapons to the authority of the comman

number of other similar although less dramatic measures. 
98

not necessarily indicative of imminent hostilities, are positive indicatio

combat readiness and capabilities of forces are being raised, or tha

being deployed into positions for attack. To call these measures “ambi

highly misleading, for the military measures themselves are not. The

exercises but bona fide measures to raise the combat capabilities and re

forces for a particular action. 

Negative Indications and Problems of Concealment

In assessing the adversary’s intentions, it is necessary not only to ta

what he has done, but also of what he has not done. If we can determin

that he has not taken certain essential preparations for conflict, or even 

some that might reduce his readiness for combat (such as releasing 

troops), this will materially influence our conclusions. In some cases

what has not occurred can be the most important factor of all. Unfortun

often very difficult to find out that something has not happened. This 

larly true of the whole range of preparations, both military and civil, th

readily discernible or which involve relatively little overt activity. There 

preparations, particularly those involving major deployments or chan

normal patterns of military activity, on which we often can make a judg

some degree of confidence that certain things either have or have not oc

In compiling a list of what is often called “positive’’ and “negativ

tions, therefore, great care should be taken to distinguish true negative i

(things that we expect to happen prior to hostilities but which have not) 

plain lack of information. In some cases, a large portion of the seemin

indications will turn out to be in the “no information’’ category. On 

these, we may be able with sufficient collection to make a determinatio

or the other. On many others, however, our chances of finding out an

poor, and sometimes very poor. We must be careful not to mislead our c

into believing that we know more than we do, and it may be necessar

this out quite explicitly.

The indications or current analyst should avoid phrases such as “w

evidence that’’ when the chances of getting the evidence are poo

should not otherwise imply in any way that the information he is p

represents the sum total of what the adversary is up to. It may be help

compile a list of the things that logically could or might have happen

we cannot tell about one way or the other. The consumer of intellige

turn must have a realistic understanding of indications intelligence an

lection capabilities lest he equate a lack of reporting with lack of oc

Reporting from field collectors also should be geared to insure in a cr

tion that those at headquarters know what the collector has covered or 

cover, when he files his “negative’’ report or fails to send a report at 
99

which we assume that all is well, or even the report which reads: Tro

ments, negative; mobilization, negative.’’ We may need to know wha

the country he and his colleagues have covered, and whether any tro

tion stations or reserve depots have been reconnoitered to be sure wh

tive’’ means. Subject to these provisions, the careful compiling and re

true negative indications can be a most important portion of the total

dence and hence of the final judgment of the adversary’s intentions. 

Urgency 

A distinguishing feature of most crises which result in hostilities a

preparedness measures that accompany them is urgency. There is an at

which surrounds the bona fide prewar situation which differentiates it f

cises, shows of force, or even political pressure tactics. Although it is 

difficult to define this atmosphere, or to explain exactly what make

“real,’’ an important ingredient nearly always is urgency. This sense tha

race against time, that things are being done on an accelerated schedul

pressure is on, is likely to be conveyed to us in a variety of ways. It us

affect both military and political activities and be evident in a number 

lies or indications that plans have been changed, trips cut short, exer

celed, propaganda changed abruptly, and so forth. 

Only in rare instances—and those usually where our collection is 

do we fail to obtain some evidence of this urgency. Where the pace i

and there appears to be no deadline for completion of the activity, we w

be correct in judging that it represents a long-term or gradual buildup o

ties rather than preparation for early hostilities. The general absence o

or hurried preparation was one of the major differences, for example, be

Soviet military buildup along the Chinese border over a period of year

precipitate movement of forces prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia

One note of caution is in order, however. There are instances of 

planned and deliberate attack—the North Korean attack on South Kor

1950 is a prime example—in which evidence of urgency or even any 

sign of crisis at all may be lacking. Where a country has more or less 

time to prepare and is practicing a deliberate political deception 

designed to lull the adversary, it may under favorable circumstances b

ful in concealing or suppressing any signs of urgency. In the case of 

Korean attack, our very limited collection capabilities undoubtedly als

uted heavily to the surprise; we were not even alerted to the possibi

attack when it occurred. 
100

OF THE EVIDENCE

Crises are marked by confusion, by too much raw information and 

time to deal with it, by too many demands on the analyst and so forth. It 

nice to have lots of time for the interested and knowledgeable analysts 

ble and review their evidence, make their arguments, reexamine the 

revise their judgments and conclusions, much in the same laborious 

which national estimates are prepared. In warning, unfortunately, time 

not permit this and it frequently does not even permit some of the less 

suming means of getting analysts together to discuss the material and 

views on what it all means.

In these circumstances, analysts and consumers alike may profit f

relatively simple guidelines designed to assist in evaluating the eviden

intention of the adversary. We begin by assuming that the adversary is 

rationally and that he is following some logical and relatively consiste

of action in achieving his objectives. Although this may not always b

(states as well as individuals have sometimes acted irrationally and 

tently), it is well to start with the logical analysis of the country’s behav

assuming that its leaders are acting irrationally. As a result, we also as

war is not an end in itself for them and that they will not resort to ho

long as there is some reasonable chance of achieving their objectives 

short of war. We therefore start with the five following questions design

ify our own thinking about what the adversary is up to: 

1. Is the national leadership committed to the achievement of the ob

question, whatever it may be? Is it a matter of national priority, som

leadership appears determined to accomplish?

2. Is the objective potentially attainable, or the situation potentially s

military means, at least to some degree? 

3. Does the military capability already exist, or is it being built up 

that military action is now feasible and victory likely to be attainable? 

explicitly, does the scale of the military buildup meet doctrinal criteria 

sive action?

4. Have all reasonable options, other than military, apparently been 

or appear unlikely to have any success in achieving the objective? Or, 

ply, have the political options run out?

5. Is the risk factor low, or at least tolerable?

If the answer to all the questions is a firm “yes,’’ logic would dicta

chances of military action are high. If the answer to any one of them is 

it would appear less likely, or even unlikely, that the nation will resort t

action now, although of course circumstances might change so that 
101

itary action would logically appear to drop drastically to the point 

improbable if four or all answers are negative. 

The application of these guidelines to some real crises yields some i

results:

■ For the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the answer to all 

tions is “yes’’—although some persons might maintain that So

ical options were not entirely exhausted by 20 August 1968, a 

political measures had failed to bring the situation under co

there was little reason to believe that more such pressures would 

■ For the Arab-Israeli conflict of June 1967, the answers fro

standpoint also are yes to all five, although slightly less clearl

gorically perhaps than for the USSR in 1968; that is, the risk f

seemingly a little higher and the exhaustion of political solution

a little less certain.

■ The case of Egypt, in the years preceding the October 1973 wa

an interesting problem. With respect to Egypt’s desire to recov

ritory lost to Israel in the 1967 war, the answer to questions on

was at all times emphatically “yes’’ and to question four a

(from a realistic standpoint). Yet, the likelihood of a major 

attack on Israel appeared to drop drastically because it was 

assumed (particularly by the Israelis) that Egypt lacked the cap

successful military action and that the risks there were high. In 

this Israeli assessment was right, for Egypt did lack the cap

defeat Israel. It averted disaster in the conflict only because 

counterattack was brought to a halt, largely as a result of the d

intervention of the superpowers. What both Israel and the U.S

perceive was that Sadat had estimated (correctly) that the Egyp

even if unsuccessful militarily would achieve the sought-for po

come. Further, the Israeli judgment that Egyptian forces could 

cross the Canal was, of course, erroneous. There was thus a p

very important misjudgment of the Egyptian military capability 

■ In the Sino-Soviet border controversy (which reached its mo

point in 1969), we can come to a firm yes only on question 

Soviet leadership did appear committed to “doing something’’ 

China problem, particularly after the Damanskiy Island in

March. To all other questions on this thorny problem, how

answer is either no or at least uncertain. It was highly doub

Soviet military attack would have “solved’’ or even lessened 

problem. The Soviet Union could not build up sufficient mili

actually to conquer the Chinese people in war, except possibly 

of nuclear weapons. The employment of these, in turn, would 

risk factor very high—both militarily and politically. And fin
102

not run out. 

Because of the different nature of the Soviet actions in Cuba in 19

ously, the Soviet Union never intended to go to war over Cuba), the 

questions cannot all be literally applied to the Cuban missile crisis. 

they are applicable, however, the answers do not yield a positive yes wh

have made the Soviet action logically predictable or consistent with 

Soviet behavior. In particular, the risk factor, from our standpoint and in 

extremely high, and the Soviet action is explainable only as a gross m

tion of what the U.S. reaction was likely to be.

Thus these questions, although useful as a logical starting point for t

nation of the meaning of our evidence, are not a foolproof guide to an a

of intention. For there will also be the cases in which the adversary’s a

not necessarily be logical—where he may resort to military action, ev

the answer to one or even more of the five questions is “no.’’ For a vari

sons—miscalculation of the opponent’s strength or reaction, overesti

one’s own strength, frustration, internal domestic pressures, patriotic 

revenge, a fit of pique, or just plain desperation—a nation’s leader

decide on imprudent or even disastrous courses of military action 

clearly not in its national interest.

Probably most conflicts are final acts of desperation when other 

solution have failed. In many cases, the instigator of the military act

theless has followed a rational and consistent course of action, and, 

deliberation and all other options have failed to yield results, has d

military action as the only method which will achieve the desired re

tary solutions are not inherently irrational acts, particularly if they ar

succeed. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example, was a 

deliberated, meticulously planned, coldly rational, and entirely logic

of action; although there were political (but not military) risks, they 

less from the Soviet standpoint than permitting Czechoslovakia to 

control of the communists. 

Before we conclude that some other nation is acting “irrationally’’ i

war, we should carefully examine our own attitudes and make sure w

rejecting such action as illogical because we either do not fully appre

strongly the other country feels about it, or because we are just opposed 

principle as an instrument of national policy. I believe that the systemati

tion of the method described above will more often than not yield po

correct results. At a minimum, it is a method of helping ourselves to th

tively about the evidence as a whole and to avoid, insofar as possible, su

our own views for those of the other guy.

But there will remain those cases, like Cuba in 1962, that are not lo

do not meet objective criteria for rational action. It is this impond
103

where the risk factor is high or where military action is not likely to 

problem and may even be potentially suicidal. When there is good reas

pect that the leadership of the state in question may be acting irrationall

most important questions are slightly modified versions of one and thre

1. Is the national leadership so committed to the achievement of the 

or so obsessed with the problem, that it may even act illogically in a

achieve its goals?

2. Is the military capability being built up to the maximum possib

action, even though the chance of success is doubtful?

RECONSTRUCTING THE ADVERSARY’S 

DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

If the final objective of warning analysis is the understanding of 

adversary is going to do, then the knowledge or recognition that he has 

do something is the ultimate achievement. The highest goal of every 

service is the penetration of the enemy’s decisionmaking machinery—t

microphone in the conference room, or the agent with access to minu

conference. To have this type of access is to be sure, or nearly su

enemy’s intentions, and will make superfluous a vast amount of inf

however valuable in itself, from lesser or secondary sources. 

Since we are most unlikely to have such access to the highest coun

adversaries—or if it could be obtained, it would be a highly vulnerabl

ishable asset—we must try to do the next best thing. We seek sources 

mation that will best permit us to deduce what may have been decided 

what the adversary’s objectives and plans may be. In practice, in a crisi

ing situation, this will mean that we must examine virtually all the ava

dence in an attempt to perceive what the pieces both individually and co

may tell us about the adversary’s decisions. 

Obviously, this is both a highly sophisticated and very difficult anal

lem. It is also one of the most controversial aspects of the warning pr

which there is apt to be the widest divergence of opinion in a live situati

over, very few guidelines appear to have been devised to assist the ana

policymaker to follow some logical process in reconstructing the a

decisionmaking process. In the pressures of a crisis situation, and la

body of experience or agreed “rules’’ that might be of assistance, there 

some tendency in the Intelligence Community to ignore this probl

should be of highest priority in the analytic process—the attempt to de

the adversary has decided—is often shunted aside in favor of mere factu

ing of what is going on, which is obviously much easier and less con

Too often, the reconstruction of another country’s decisions and p
104

piece of retrospective or historical analysis, rather than something wh

have helped us to foresee what was going to happen. Some brilliant po

have been produced, which have revealed that there is considerable tale

lyzing the decisionmaking process by inferential means. Such studi

invariably also dig up pieces of information which were not conside

time. But they nearly always are produced too late to help analysis in t

crisis and hence to be of any assistance to our own decisionmakers. 

Clearly, it would be very useful to have some type of methodolo

would help us to deal on a current basis with this elusive, but highly c

sometimes decisive, factor in warning. It would be presumptuous to su

the remainder of this section is going to provide the answers, or som

simple and foolproof methodology. Its purpose rather is to assist the 

ask the right questions and to point out some of the more obvious aspe

problem which have often been overlooked. 

Some Elementary Guidelines for Decision Analysis

Actions flow from decisions, not decisions from actions. On th

this appears to be a truism, and almost an insult to the intelligence of t

Yet experience shows that this elementary principle is often not underst

sis situations. In case after case, there has been a tendency to projec

future decisions which must in fact already have been taken. The imp

left that the adversary is highly confused, hasn’t decided anything yet, 

doing things with no plan behind them. Thus, even major deploymen

tary forces may be downplayed or written off in such commonly used p

“The deployment of these units significantly increases the enemy’s cap

attack, if he should decide to do so.’’

The last phrase is not just gratuitous, it can be downright misleadin

gests that the forces are being moved without any plans in mind, that 

sary does not know yet what he is going to do with them, that major ac

been taken without any reason for them and that the adversary is goin

decisions later. Whether the writer of such phrases consciously realize

probably using this device to avoid thinking about the problem or com

decisions himself. This phrase will help him to “be right’’ no matter 

pens later. Whether it will help our own decisionmaker to “be right’’ 

matter, since the effect of this soothing language will probably be to rea

that he has lots of time still and there is nothing to be alarmed about ye

even infer that when the adversary makes his decision, the intelligen

will know it and tell him. 

All non-routine or unusual actions emanating from the national le

from some kind of decisions. They don’t just happen. This is true of bot

and political actions. When something unusual occurs, particularly 
105

potentially ominous, the analyst should ask such questions as: What 

suggest of the adversary’s plans? What prompted him to do this? Wh

decision has been taken which would account for this action? He sho

suggesting that the adversary does not know why he did it or that we a

for him to make his decision. It will often be helpful at this point to try 

backward and see what may have gone before which could account fo

rent development or which may indicate that there is a connection b

number of developments.

Isolating or estimating decision times. Major national decis

sometimes even minor ones, are likely to result in actions in various 

of which flow from the same source or cause and are thus relate

another. They are designed to achieve the same ends or to be compl

Where the decision is concerned with hostilities or preparations fo

hostilities, it will nearly always be followed by a series of both mi

political actions which differ markedly from the norm. In some cas

require only a minor amount of backtracking or retrospective analys

ceive that the actions were probably initiated at a recent publicized m

the national leadership, military leaders, or whatever. This will be pa

true if there is some sudden, unexpected development which precipit

sis, and ensuing developments clearly follow from that event. No o

have much trouble in these circumstances in perceiving that decision

sort are being taken and when. Where there is no sudden and obvi

gency, however, both the nature and timing of major decisions are o

cealed in closed societies, and sometimes in free societies as well. Th

be some time before there will be indications that any new decisions 

taken at all, let alone when they were taken, or what they might have 

analyst may often have to work from very fragmentary data in his 

reconstruct what has been happening up to now and to attempt to 

when the adversary decided to initiate the action. Why bother?

The reason to bother is that the recapitulation of the events or develo

time sequence from the date when the first anomalies become apparen

only help to fix the decision time but also the nature of the decision. Th

lationship of events as part of a plan may begin to become apparent; 

cease to be isolated, unexplained anomalies when they can be traced 

common date. Only as they are assembled by the date they were first ob

have occurred (not date they were reported) will the analyst begin to 

their possible relationships and suspect that some common prior decisio

behind all or many of them. Once again, the value of keeping chronolog

of seeming incidental intelligence is evident. It is only by doing thi

probable times of secret decisions are likely to be suspected at all, or th

lyst can begin to fit the pieces together. Once it becomes apparent (as i

will only after meticulous research) that a shift in the propaganda lin
106

preparations for possible conflict will the possible scope and significa

early decisions begin to emerge. 

Judging that crucial decisions are being made. One of the most 

things to know about what the adversary is up to is whether he is mak

new decisions at all. That is, even if we have no evidence as yet as to the 

the decisions, we may gain considerable understanding of the intenti

adversary if we have some insight into what he is concerned about an

some particular subject is of priority to him at the moment. This is of

difficult to ascertain as it might appear, although clearly it will be 

either on what the adversary chooses to publicize about his concerns, 

ability to collect some information on political developments and the 

and attitudes of the leadership. 

Contrary to what many may think, the preoccupation of the leade

particular problems and decisions may often be no secret at all. To p

spicuous example, it was abundantly evident in the summer of 196

Soviet leadership was obsessed with the problem of what to do about C

vakia, and that it had overriding importance to them. It was eviden

Soviet leadership was making decisions of some kind about Czech

even if analysts could not agree what those decisions were. The percep

crisis thus derived in part from our knowledge that Czechoslovakia, 

Soviet standpoint, was what the whole summer was about.

Contingency, intermediate and final decisions. All analysts shou

the pitfall of oversimplification of the decisionmaking process, which 

the most common of errors. Crucial national decisions usually involve 

steps, which may range from preliminary decisions to take certain mea

contingency basis, subsequent decisions to take further preparations a

the ante’’ in case military action becomes necessary, up to near-final 

decisions to proceed with the action. Or, alternatively, actions may b

only for pressure purposes or in an attempt to dissuade by threat of forc

intention of following through.

It may be noted that a country may make a final or near-final decisio

objective which it firmly intends to obtain, but will also make a serie

sions on the various means which may be tried to obtain that objecti

these will involve both political and military pressure tactics, since pr

all-out force is the means to be employed only if all other measures ha

In this case, a state’s leaders may seem to be indecisive (because a serie

sures is tried) when in fact it has the objective clearly in mind and alwa

to reach it.

In recent years, we have heard much about options, and to “keep h

open’’ has become a popular phrase to describe various preliminary 

contingency preparations which the country may take, presumably w
107

strongly implies decision deferred, and the more options a nation ha

ter off it presumably is and the longer it can defer the crucial decisions

to avoid over-dependence on this idea, which can lead the analyst in

type reasoning where all preparations for military action, no matter 

nous, are written off as inconclusive and indicative of no decisions on 

the adversary. The important questions are: “What options are left?’’ a

this action indicate that the adversary himself now believes that the o

dwindling and that the chances for a political solution are running ou

people seem unable, or unwilling, to carry out this type of analysis, an

back time and again on the argument that it was impossible to come to 

ment of the adversary’s intentions or decisions since he was “only ke

options open.’’

The reader may wish to refer back to the five questions suggested 

basic guidelines to the interpretation of a country’s course of action. 

also the crucial factors in the decisionmaking process. If the first qu

premise, is judged to be positive—that the national leadership is com

the achievement of the objective in question—then this is the operat

behind the decision, or series of decisions. Only if some other factor e

prevents or precludes obtaining that objective, will the nation presu

deterred from a course of action which will fulfill its objective. So

means it may use (which we describe as options) may indeed be conti

preparatory steps initially, in case other more desirable options fail 

prove viable, but they are means to an end, not just steps taken to ha

options’’ and hence to postpone coming to any decisions. Indeed, the n

options which the leaders devise, or try out, to secure their objective

something of a rough measure of how serious they are about obtaining 

applied to Czechoslovakia in 1968, the mere fact that the USSR tried 

means of bringing the situation under control before it invaded was in it

ative of the seriousness of its intent and raised the probability that th

option ultimately would be exercised if all else failed. 

Interplay of political and military decisions. Another simplistic ap

the decisionmaking question, which also occurs surprisingly freque

assume that political and military decisions are taken by different grou

somehow not really related to one another. On the one hand, are politic

making political decisions, and on the other are military leaders undert

itary exercises, carrying out mobilization, deploying troops, and so on, 

their own without relationship to the political situation? This is highly e

at least in countries where the national leadership exerts effective com

control over the military forces, and it is particularly erroneous where 

cal leadership maintains a monopoly on the decisionmaking process an

itary undertakes virtually nothing on its own. 
108

cess, and the military steps are undertaken and insofar as possible 

achieve specific political objectives. They must not be considered in is

as unrelated to the political objective. To consider them in isolation is n

misunderstand the cause of the military actions, but more importantly 

perceive the strategic objective and the interrelationship of the various m

may be used to obtain it. 
109

SURPRISE AND TIMING

One of the most widespread misconceptions about warning is the b

as the hour of attack draws near, there will be more and better evid

enemy action is both probable and imminent. From this, the idea foll

rally that intelligence will be better able to provide warning in the s

and will, in the few hours or at most days prior to the attack, issue its m

itive and positive warning judgments. Moreover—since there is presu

accumulating evidence that the adversary is engaged in his last-minut

tions for the attack—this concept holds that intelligence will likely 

estimate the approximate if not the exact time of the attack. Therefore, 

judge at all that the attack is probable, we can also tell when it is com

concept of warning—as a judgment of imminence of attack—has affe

thinking on the subject for years. 

In many cases experience shows that the reverse will be true, and 

will be fewer indications that the attack is coming and even an appar

enemy preparations. This can be quite deceptive, even for those who k

experience not to relax their vigilance in such circumstances. Those w

understand this principle are likely to be totally surprised by the timing

the occurrence—of the enemy action. They will probably feel aggr

their collection has failed them and they will tend to believe that the r

the intelligence “failure’’ is to speed up the collection and reporting pr

appreciating that the earlier collection and analysis were more importan

a judgment of probability of attack could have been reached much e

should not have been dependent on highly uncertain and last-minute 

breakthroughs.

PRINCIPAL FACTORS IN TIMING AND SURPR

Nearly all countries, except in unfavorable or unusual circumstan

shown themselves able to achieve tactical surprise in warfare. History 

with instances in which the adversary was caught unawares by th

strength or location of the attack, even when the attack itself had been 

or considered a likelihood. Even democracies with their notoriously la

in comparison with closed societies have often had striking success in c

the details (including the timing) of their operations. To cite the most 

ous example, the greatest military operation in history achieved tactica

even though it was fully expected by an adversary who potentially had 

tactical warning that the massive invasion force was approaching. 

played a major role in this, the Normandy invasion.

It is not only by deception, however, that tactical surprise is so often 

and that last-minute preparations for the attack can be concealed. A mo

tant and more usual reason is that the indications of attack which are m
110

logistic preparations which are often begun weeks or even months b

attack itself. Once these are completed, or nearly so, the adversary 

attained a capability for attack more or less at the time of his choosin

additional preparations that must be accomplished just prior to the 

much less likely to be discernible to us or may be ambiguous in nature. 

ferences, inspections, the issuance of basic loads of ammunition and 

plies, and the final orders for the attack all are measures that require l

activity and are not likely to be detected except by extraordinarily fine 

and rapid reporting—such as a well-placed agent in the enemy’s hea

with access to some rapid means of communications, or the fortuitous a

knowledgeable defector. 

Even the final deployments of major ground force units to jumpoff 

for the assault may be successfully concealed by the measures that m

take to ensure tactical surprise, including rigid communications sec

night movements. Thus, unlike the major deployments of troops and e

which almost never can be entirely concealed, the short-term preparatio

good chance of being concealed, and quite often are. And, even if detec

will often be minimal time in which to alert or redeploy forces for the n

nent attack, still less to issue warning judgments at the national level. S

cal warning usually is an operational problem for the commander in the 

minutes or even three hours warning does not allow much time for th

leadership to come to new decisions and implement them.

Another facet of the problem of assessing the timing of attack is the 

of determining when the enemy’s preparations are in fact completed, 

he himself will judge that his military forces are ready. As we have n

where, it is particularly difficult to make this judgment with regard 

preparations. In fact, I can recall no instance in my experience in whic

be clearly determined that the logistic preparations for attack were com

ticularly since heavy supply movements usually continue uninterru

after the attack is launched. There has often been a tendency for intel

believe that all military preparations are completed earlier than in fact i

the discrepancy usually being attributable to the fact that the major 

obvious troop deployments had apparently been completed. Thus, e

intelligence has come to the right judgment on enemy intentions, it h

times been too early in its assessment of the possible timing of the attac

In addition, the enemy command for various reasons may not go thr

an attack as soon as the forces are fully prepared, or may change the d

attack even after it has been set. A student has compiled some data c

the frequency with which D-Days are not met, and the effects of th

adversary’s judgments. Of 162 cases analyzed where D-Days applied, a

(about 44 per cent) were delayed, about five per cent went ahead of sch

only slightly more than half (about 51 per cent) remained on schedule. 
111

ably in completing or synchronizing all preparations. Some attacks ha

be postponed repeatedly. For example, the Germans’ Verdun offensive o

ruary 1916 was postponed no less than nine times by unfavorable weath

Of all aspects of operational planning, the easiest to change and mo

is probably timing. Once troops are in position to go, orders to attac

need be issued no more than a few hours ahead, and the postponeme

major operations rarely presents great difficulties to the commande

have been postponed, or advanced, simply because there was reason 

that the adversary had learned of the scheduled date. Obviously, amon

plest of deception ruses is the planting of false information concerning t

operations with the enemy’s intelligence services. 

In addition to general preparedness, tactical factors and surprise, o

may be delayed for doctrinal reasons or to induce enemy forces to ex

lines of communication or to walk into entrapments in which they c

rounded and annihilated. The delayed counteroffensive, designed to dr

forces into untenable advanced positions, is a tactic that has been empl

devastating effect.

Political factors also may weigh heavily or even decisively in the 

operations. This will be particularly true when (as is often the case) th

question intends to resort to military operations only as a last resort 

that the threat of such action will induce the opponent to capitulate. O

in such cases, the decision of the national leadership that the politic

have run out and that only force will succeed will be the determining 

when the military operation is launched. In this event, operation

deferred for weeks beyond the date when military preparations are c

and the assessment of the timing of the attack may be almost ex

dependent on knowledge of the political situation and insight into th

decisionmaking process. 

Still another political variant which may affect the timing of attac

one nation is attempting to induce the other to strike the first major blow 

appear as the aggressor. In this case, a series of harassments, border 

and various clandestine tactics may be employed as the conflict gradu

lates until one or the other power decides to make an overt attack. C

point at which this may happen will be very difficult to predict.

As is well known, many attacks are initiated near dawn, for two re

nighttime cloaks the final deployments of the attacking units, and the 

daylight are desirable to pursue the operation. Some aggressors have 

marked favoritism for attacks in the dead of night. This was particula

9

Barton Whaley, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, MA: M

Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, April 1969), unpublished 

177-178, A69.
112

adept in night penetration operations and assaults. The USSR a

launched attacks or other operations hours before dawn: the operatio

the Hungarian revolt began between about midnight and 0330 hours; 

sector borders were sealed about 0300; the invasion of Czechoslova

shortly before midnight. 

EXAMPLES OF ASSESSING TIMING

There is considerable coverage of the problems associated with atta

in military historical writing. The following cases are truly representativ

not selected as unusual examples.

The German Attack on Holland, Belgium and France, May 19

War II had been under way for eight months before Hitler finally lau

offensive against Western Europe in May 1940, the long delay in the o

the western front having generated the phrase “phony war.’’ All three 

the final assault had ample and repeated warnings, and indeed it was t

dancy of warnings which in large part induced the reluctance to accep

warnings when they were received. The “ cry-wolf’’ phenomenon has r

more clearly demonstrated—Hitler is said to have postponed the atta

West 29 times, often at the last minute.

Owing to their access to one of the best-placed intelligence sources 

times, the Dutch had been correctly informed of nearly every one of th

to attack them, from the first date selected by Hitler, 12 November 19

last, 10 May 1940. Their source was Colonel Hans Oster, the Deputy 

German Counterintelligence, who regularly apprised the Dutch Militar

in Berlin of Hitler’s plans and of their postponements. Although in the 

provided one week’s warning of the 10 May date, and there was much 

dence as well that the German attack was probably imminent, the Dutc

the warnings and failed even to alert their forces prior to the German a

Belgians, more heedful of the numerous warnings received, did place th

on a general alert. The French, having also experienced several false a

German attack, seem to have ignored the repeated warnings of their ow

gence in early May, including a firm advisory on 9 May that the atta

occur the following day. These instances clearly demonstrate two fun

precepts of warning: “more facts’’ and first-rate sources do not necess

duce warning, and intelligence warnings are useless unless some actio

on them. 

The Soviet Attack on Japanese forces, August 1945. This is one of 

studied World War II examples, but clearly demonstrates the differenc

strategic and tactical warning. The Japanese, who were able to follow 

buildup in the Far East from December 1944 through July 1945, correc

that the USSR would attack the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchu
113

the stage that the USSR would be ready to attack any time after 1 Augus

this expectation which almost certainly must have resulted in a high 

alert of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army had no i

warning of the timing of the attack, which occurred about midnight on 

of 8-9 August. 

The North Korean attack on South Korea, June 1950. This was 

example of both strategic and tactical surprise, and indeed one of the f

tions of the century which truly may be described as a surprise attac

U.S. intelligence, at least by official admission, nor policy and comm

had expected the attack to occur, as a result of which there had been n

preparations for it. The South Koreans, despite many previously expre

of such an attack, also were not prepared and had not alerted their for

strategic warning had been lacking, the short-term final preparations of 

Korean forces (insofar as they were detected) were misinterpreted as “e

rather than bona fide combat deployments. In considerable part, the wa

ure was attributable to inadequate collection on North Korea—but the 

have allocated more collection effort in turn was due primarily to the 

that the attack would occur. In addition, the “cry-wolf’’ phenomenon h

inured the community; for at least a year, there had been about one 

month alleging that North Korea would attack on such-and-such a d

another was received for June, it was given no more credence than the 

ones—nor, in view of the uncertain reliability and source of all these re

there any reason that it should have been given greater weight. Althou

never know, most and perhaps all of these reports may have been plan

North Korean or Soviet intelligence services in the first place. The a

notable example of the importance of correct prior assessments of the 

of attack if the short-term tactical intelligence is to be correctly interpre

Chinese Intervention in the Korean War, October-Novemb

Among the several problems in judging Chinese intentions in the lat

and fall of 1950 was the question of the timing of their intervention. Ba

premise that the less territory one gives up to the adversary, the less 

forces will have to recover, the Chinese can be said to have intervened m

late’’ in the conflict. And this conception of the optimum time for Chin

vention strongly influenced U.S. judgments of their intentions. From th

first direct political warning of the Chinese intention to intervene was is

October (to the Indian Ambassador in Beijing) until the first contact wit

forces in Korea on 26 October, all Communist resistance in Korea w

collapsing as the U.S./UN forces were driving toward the Yalu. As th

failed to react and the communist prospects for recouping their losses 

increasing unfavorable, the Washington Intelligence Community (and 

the Far East Command as well) became increasingly convinced that th

effective Chinese Communist intervention had passed. In the week pr
114

Joint Intelligence Indications Committee) actually went on record as s

there was an increasing probability that a decision against overt interve

been taken.

Once the Chinese forces had actually been engaged, there was an in

month before they became militarily effective and launched their massi

in late November. Thus in this period the intelligence process again 

fronted with the problem of assessing the timing of any future Chine

tions, as well as of their scope. The four-week period produced m

indications, both military and political, that the Chinese in fact were pre

major military action. But there was virtually no available evidence ab

such action might be launched, and even those who believed that th

offensive was a high probability were somewhat perplexed by the delay 

unable to adduce any conclusive indications of when the attack would 

is well known, tactical surprise was indeed achieved.

Even in retrospect, we cannot be sure whether the Chinese delayed t

vention and their subsequent offensive because of political indecision

for more time to complete their military preparations, or as a tactical 

entrap as many UN forces as possible near the Yalu. I believe that milit

than political factors probably delayed the initial intervention and that 

paredness and tactical considerations accounted for the delay in the offe

I cannot prove it. Others may argue—and they cannot be proved wro

the Chinese may not have decided inevitably on intervention by 3 Octob

that negotiations with the USSR and North Korea may have delayed the 

tion as much as military factors.

Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, June 1967. There were many indicati

coming of this conflict. From 22 May, when Nasser closed the Gulf of 

Israeli shipping, tensions had been mounting, and the possibility of wa

versally recognized. Both sides had mobilized and taken numerous othe

preparedness measures. Before 1 June U.S. intelligence was on record 

was capable and ready to launch a preemptive and successful attack wi

no warning, and that there was no indication that the UAR was planni

the military initiative. The Arabs were surprised by the Israeli attack, alt

were not. U.S. intelligence predictions of the likelihood and probable 

an Israeli assault were highly accurate, although the precise timing and 

the operation, of course, were not known to us. 

The Israelis screened their plans from the Arabs by a combinatio

security (there was no leak of their decisions or final military prepara

an exceptionally well-planned and effective deception campaign. T

several facets of the deception plan, one of which was to lead Egypt 

that the attack, if it occurred, would be in the southern Sinai rathe

north. In addition, numerous measures were taken in the several day
115

included 1) public statements by newly appointed Defense Minist

Dayan that Israel would rely on diplomacy for the present, 2) the is

leave to several thousand Israeli soldiers over the weekend of 3-4 Jun

public announcements that concurrent Israeli cabinet meetings were c

only with routine matters, and more.

In addition, the attack was planned for an hour of the morning w

Egyptian officials would be on their way to work and when the ch

Egyptian Air Force usually took his daily morning flight. The greates

in the Israeli operations was not their occurrence, however, or even 

ing, but their devastating effectiveness in virtually wiping out the Egy

Force on the ground. And this success in turn was due on the one ha

excellent planning of the operation and its meticulous execution by 

pilots, and on the other to the ineptitude of the Egyptian military lea

having failed to prepare for the possibility of such a strike or to have 

or otherwise protected at least a portion of the air force. (It is of intere

that the USSR, which was providing at least some intelligence ass

Nasser, was seemingly as surprised as Egypt. One result of this wa

USSR soon began to adopt measures to reduce the vulnerability of i

forces to surprise attack, including the widespread construction of 

hangarettes to protect aircraft.) 

The Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 20-21 August 1968. Obviously

ception of the USSR’s decisionmaking process in this case has majo

on our understanding of why the attack occurred when it did, rather th

or later. And, since our knowledge of the decisions of the Soviet le

although considerable, is still incomplete, we must also remain 

uncertain as to why the invasion began on 20 August rather than some 

lier that month, or alternatively why the USSR did not wait to see the 

of the Czechoslovak party congress scheduled for early September

people believed that it would.

Regardless of one’s views on this point, however, the invasion of C

vakia illustrates some of the pitfalls of trying to assess the timing o

operations. First, we are not sure in retrospect whether the USSR was f

to invade on about 1 August when the deployments appeared largely 

and U.S. intelligence concluded that Soviet forces were in a high state 

ness to invade. We do know that logistic activity continued at a high lev

ter and that the conclusion of the so-called rear services “exercise’

announced until 10 August. Thereafter, other military preparations wer

ing, including inspections of forces in the forward area by the high c

which the meticulous Soviet military planners may well have desired to 

before any invasion. Indeed it is possible, on military evidence alone (

cal evidence is less persuasive), to argue that the invasion was always 
116

ment that the military forces were in high readiness to go on 1 August. 

It can also be argued that military factors may have prompted the 

somewhat earlier than the political leadership might have chosen and t

this which occasioned the leadership meetings and final decisions 

August. If so, the approaching autumn and the problem of housing Sov

in Czechoslovakia into the winter might have been a major factor in de

the timing of invasion.

More important, however, are the lessons to be drawn for our judgm

future concerning the timing of operations. The Czechoslovak case we

strates the psychological effects on intelligence assessments when an 

does not occur as soon as we think it might, and when the communi

ready for such action. When the Soviet Union did not invade in early A

instead reached a tenuous political agreement with Czechoslovakia, 

occurred and intelligence assessments almost immediately began pl

stress on the Soviet capability to invade. In fact, of course, that capa

being maintained and actually was increasing. So long as this was so, 

bility was in no way reduced that the USSR sooner or later would e

military capability.

Above all, the Czechoslovak case provides an outstanding illustrat

critical importance for warning of the judgment of probability of atta

the lesser likelihood that intelligence will be able to assess the timing 

nence of attack. U.S. intelligence in this instance, as in others, placed 

weight on short-term or tactical warning, and too little on the excellen

intelligence which it already had. Moreover, many persons (including s

policy level who were aggrieved that they had not been more specificall

tended to place the blame on the collection system which in fact had p

outstandingly in reporting a truly impressive amount of military and po

dence, much of it of high quality and validity, bearing on the Soviet 

The Intelligence Community, while clearly reporting the USSR’s cap

invade, deferred a judgment of whether or not it would invade in seemi

tation that some more specific or unequivocal evidence would be receiv

sion was imminent. On the basis of historical precedent and the e

derived from numerous warning problems, this was a doubtful expec

invasion remained a grave danger, if not probable, so long as the milita

ments were maintained, while the timing was far less predictable. The 

warfare, and of warning, demonstrates that tactical evidence of impend

is dubious at best, that we cannot have confidence that we will receive 

dence, and that judgments of the probable course of enemy action mus

prior to this or it may be too late to make them at all.

North Vietnamese attacks in Laos and South Vietnam, 1969-

72. As a final example of problems in timing, three instances of N
117

the problems of assessing timing of attacks even when the prepara

are quite evident.

Traditionally, in the seesaw war in northern Laos, the Laotian go

forces made gains in the Plaine des Jarres area during the rainy seaso

communist forces (almost entirely North Vietnamese invaders) launch

sives during the dry season (November to May) to regain most of the lo

and sometimes more. In the fall of 1969, evidence began to be received 

early of North Vietnamese troop movements toward the Plaine des Jarre

ing major elements of a division which had not previously been commi

area. As a result, intelligence assessments beginning the first week o

unequivocally forecast a major communist counteroffensive. After eigh

tive weeks of this conclusion (qualified in later weeks by the proviso 

communists have solved their logistic problems’’), it was decided to d

because it was considered wrong, but because consumers were beg

question repeated forecasts of an enemy offensive which had not ma

yet, and the impact of the warning was beginning to fade. In mid-Jan

dence began to become available that preparations for an attack were be

sified, and a forecast of an impending major offensive was renewed. 

expected offensive finally come off in mid-February, or four months 

troop buildup and the initial prediction of the attacks. The delay was 

prise to experienced students of the area, who had learned that the N

namese meticulously planned and rehearsed in detail each offensive 

and that their attacks almost always were slow in coming.

Two years later, in the fall of 1971, a very similar repetition of 

Vietnamese buildup in northern Laos began, again in October and aga

ing the same division, although this time there were indications (su

introduction of heavy artillery) that an even stronger military effort 

made. Intelligence assessments again forecast major North Vietname

in the Plaine des Jarres but for the most part avoided any firm judg

they were necessarily imminent. There was almost no tactical warn

attacks which this time were launched in mid-December in unpr

strength and intensity. Within a few days, all Laotian government fo

driven from the Plaine, and within three weeks, the North Vietnamese 

an offensive against government bases southwest of the Plaine. Con

the North Vietnamese were preparing for their major offensive agai

Vietnam which finally kicked off on 30 March 1972 after months o

and intelligence predictions that an offensive was coming. Initial exp

however, had been that the attacks most likely would come some 

mid-February, possibly to coincide with President Nixon’s visit to C

that month.

 Once again, timing proved one of the most uncertain aspects of the 

and we remain uncertain whether Hanoi originally intended to launch t
118

come off until the end of March. In retrospect, it appears that the fo

another “Tet offensive’’ in mid-February probably were somewhat p

since the deployments of main force units and other preparations 

through March. Nonetheless, the intelligence forecasts were essentially 

it could have been dangerous in February to suggest that the attacks 

come off for another six weeks.

WARNING IS NOT A FORECAST OF IMMINEN

It is from experiences like this that veteran warning analysts hav

extremely chary of forecasting the timing of attacks. They have lea

repeated instances, in some of which the timing of operations appear

simple or obvious problem, that this was not the case. In most instanc

have come later and sometimes much later than one might have exp

even this cannot be depended on—sometimes they have come sooner. B

in rare cases, any forecast of the precise timing of attack carries a high 

ity of being wrong. There are just too many unpredictable factors—m

political—which may influence the enemy’s decision on the timing an

tude of ways in which he may use deception to obscure his decision.

The lesson is clear. Both analysts and supervisors should keep their 

focused on the key problem of whether the adversary is in fact pre

attack at all, a judgment which they have a good and sometimes 

chance of making with accuracy. Judgments often can be made, with l

dence in most cases, that all necessary preparations have probably b

pleted. A little less confidence still should be placed in forecasts as t

the future all necessary preparations may be completed. At the bo

least reliable of all, will be the prediction of when the adversary ma

strike. As a general rule, analysts will do well to avoid predictions of 

cisely an attack may occur, particularly when some preparedness 

have not yet been completed. If pressed, it will normally be best to o

time range within which the attack appears most likely, rather than at

specific a guess (for that is what it is). And some explanation of the u

ties and perils of forecasting dates, backed up by historical evidenc

helpful from time to time for the benefit of the policymaker as well.

Strategic warning is not a forecast of imminent attack, but rather a f

probable attack and it is this above all which the policy official and co

need to appreciate. If we recognize the uncertainties of timing, we w

less likely to relax our vigilance or alerts just because the adversary h

attacked even as he is seemingly ready to do so.
119

THE PROBLEM OF DECEPTION

Confidence that a study of history and of techniques and principle

cations analysis will enable us to come to the right judgment of the ad

intentions fades as one contemplates the chilling prospect of decepti

is no single facet of the warning problem so unpredictable, and yet 

tially damaging in its effect, as deception. Nor is confidence in our 

penetrate the sophisticated deception effort in any way restored by 

study of examples. On the contrary, such a study will only reinforce 

sion that the most brilliant analysis may founder in the face of dece

that the most expert and experienced among us on occasion may be a

ble as the novice. 

THE INFREQUENCY AND NEGLECT OF DECEP

There can be no question that, at least until quite recently, dece

been one of the least understood, least researched and least studied 

both history and intelligence. Military historians often have not even 

the role which deception has played in the outcome of some majo

operations. Indeed, the revelation in recent years of the part that 

played in World War II has led to a wholly new understanding of the 

that conflict. What accounts for the neglect of such an important subje

One reason for the scant attention to deception almost certainly is it

true warning problems are seldom encountered, useful examples of dec

rarer still, and indeed a number of major crises of recent years seemi

involved relatively little if any deception. A second, and related, factor 

deception effort is likely to be the most secret and tightly held aspect of 

ation and that countries often have been reluctant, even after the fac

security on the deception plan, even when other aspects of the operation 

well known. The exceptions, in which the deception operation has been 

for our benefit and study, usually have been the result of the publicati

cles or memoirs by participants in the plan, or the declassification of wa

usually well after the event. Deception tends to be forgotten and 

between wars because it is usually not an instrument of peace. Few 

have made a practice of extensive or elaborate deception in time of pea

are some exceptions to this, particularly in the field of counterintelli

espionage in which deception is routinely practiced. 

One reason why active deception is reserved for the exceptional 

involving national security interests is that success in deception is heav

dent on its rarity and on the prior establishment of credibility. Any co

constantly or even frequently disseminates falsehoods would rapidly l
120

thing to be highly security conscious and not to reveal much, and quite 

engage in an active deception effort to mislead. The most effective dece

by those whom we have come to trust, or at least who have been relativ

ful in their dealings with us over a period of years. Thus the true decept

tion, at least a major and sophisticated one, usually is reserved onl

critical situation in the life of the nation when it is most essential to con

intent. This will usually be in preparation for or in time of war. 

PRINCIPLES, TECHNIQUES AND EFFECTIVEN

OF DECEPTION

The principle of deception, most simply stated, is to induce the ad

make the wrong choice; or, as General Sherman put it, the trick is to 

victim on the horns of a dilemma and then to impale him on the on

choosing. If this is left entirely to chance, the probability of the enemy

the right or wrong choice will be in direct ratio to the number of a

which he perceives as equally viable. Although surprise can result f

misunderstanding, “the possibility of surprise through misunderstandi

ishes nearly to the vanishing point as one considers the more elaborat

operations.’’10 Therefore, the planner must develop one or more plausib

tives as bait for his victim and then employ a range of stratagems to mi

“The ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, ver

and wrong.’’11 If this ideal cannot be achieved (and this writer belie

would be a rare situation in which such total deception could be achi

mere presenting of alternative solutions nonetheless will serve to co

adversary and lead him to disperse his effort or to make at least a partia

response.

In other words the best stratagem is the one that generates a s

warning signals susceptible to alternative, or better yet, optional inter

tations, where the intended solution is implausible in terms of the vict

prior experience and knowledge while the false solution (or solution

plausible. If the victim does not suspect the possibility that deception 

be operating he will inevitably be gulled. If he suspects deception, he 

only four courses open to him: These are, in summary:

10 Whaley, 133. The most thorough, published exposition on military deception is in

Strategic Military Deception, eds. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New Yor

Press, 1982). 

11 Whaley, 135.
121

2 . To give equal weight to all perceived solutions (in violation o

principle of economy of force).

3 . To engage in random behavior, risking success or failure on b

guesswork.

4. To panic, which paradoxically may offer as good a chance of 

cess as the “rational’’ course in 3.12

Thus, even a primitive deception effort will, by threatening variou

tives, create enough uncertainty to distract the most wily opponent and 

either to disperse his effort or gamble on being right. Further, Whaley c

in a judgment of greatest importance for warning, that even the most 

deceivers have proved to be easy dupes for more primitive efforts. “Inde

a general finding of my study—that is, the deceiver is almost always 

regardless of the sophistication of his victim in the same art. On the face 

seems an intolerable conclusion, one offending common sense. Yet it i

futable conclusion of the historical evidence.’’13

A related, and also unexpected, finding of Whaley’s study is that on

repertoire of stratagems is necessary “to insure surprise after surprise.

that the victim may be familiar with specific ruses “does not necessar

much less destroy their efficacy. This can be predicted from the theo

postulates that it is the misdirection supplied by selective planting of fa

that yields surprise and not the specific communications channels (that 

used.’’14 In other words, the same tricks can be used over and over a

stratagem can be effective with only a small number of basic ruses or s

Whaley goes on to note that, as between security and deception, de

by far the most effective in achieving surprise since the only importan

in this case will be the protection of the deception plan itself, whic

needs to be revealed only to a very small number of individuals. If th

on the deception plan is tight enough, security on the rest of the ope

be outright slovenly, and “the most efficient stratagems calculated

known inefficiencies in general operational security.’’ Whaley cites so

ples of the extreme security maintained on deception plans, which th

analyst should well heed, since it will upset the accepted theory th

plans may be learned from full confessions of high-ranking prisoners 

tors, or from interception of valid communications, authentic war p

the like. Thus, in preparation for the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japan

12 Whaley, 142-143.

13Whaley, 146.

14Whaley, 228.
122

planned attacks on the Philippines and Southeast Asia but which om

reference to the Pearl Harbor missions of the Navy, this portion of 

having been communicated only verbally. In the Suez attack in 1956, 

British military staff from the Allied CinC on down were not inform

collusion of the UK and France with Israel, so tightly was this he

Korean war, the U.S. planned an amphibious feint (the so-called K

which only the most senior commanders knew to be a bluff; even the 

and commanders of the naval bombardment and carrier strike force

the operation was real and behaved accordingly. Thus, the misleadin

own people has been an important feature in many deceptions, with t

ting participants in the plan convincingly carrying out their roles in g

thus contributing materially to the success of the operation. So effe

security been on deception operations, that Whaley concludes that t

been almost no cases in which the deception plan itself was premat

closed to the victim.

TYPES OF DECEPTION

This subject may be approached in a number of ways. Whaley iden

specific varieties of military deception: intention (whether an attack or 

will occur at all), time, place, strength, style (the form the operation tak

ons used, and so forth). 

For strategic warning, the subject of this book, it will be obvious th

of these (intention) is the most important. Indeed, some might say that 

only variety of deception which should properly be defined as strategic

types above being essentially tactical problems. In fact, however, strate

ing or the perception of the adversary’s intention often does fall victim 

more of the other foregoing varieties of deception as well. Thus, in the 

sive of 1968, we were less the victims of misperception of the enemy’s 

as such (it was obvious that attacks of some type and scope were in pr

than of the other factors. We greatly underestimated the strength of th

we were astounded at some of the places (particularly cities) in which t

occurred; we misperceived the style of the offensive in some degree (t

extent of covert infiltration of saboteurs and troop units, again particu

the major cities); and there was something of a misestimate of the tim

attacks in that it was generally assumed that they would be launched 

after the holidays rather than during them (a factor which accounted fo

South Vietnamese troops being on leave and for the lax security). Thus

these misperceptions of the enemy’s planning and intentions which con

the surprise—and initial success—of the Tet offensive. We were the vi

combination of effective security, enemy deception and self-deception. 

The history of warfare is filled with examples of the achievement o

in time, place or strength, or a combination of them. Whaley finds th
123

mode was place (72 percent), followed by time (66 percent), and str

percent). The least frequent type of surprise which he found was style, w

vailed in 25 percent of the cases he analyzed. There are nonetheless s

famous examples, including the dropping of the first atomic w

Hiroshima, and the introduction of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba. 

We may close this very inadequate discussion of this approach to 

surprise and deception by observing that one of the greatest and mos

ful military surprises in history, the Pearl Harbor attack, involved at 

of these modes. The United States had not correctly perceived the 

intention to attack U.S. territory at all and thus to bring the U.S

war—a step which logically appeared to be a gross strategic misca

as indeed it was. The place of attack was not perceived, since the gre

the evidence pointed to Japanese attacks in Southeast Asia (which w

initiated almost simultaneously). The time of the attack contributed 

its success, Sunday morning having been deliberately chosen becaus

of the U.S. warships would then normally be in port. The strength of 

of course was not anticipated (since it was not expected at all 

occurred), security and deception having effectively screened the m

of the Japanese task force.

A second approach to types of surprise and deception, which is 

broader and perhaps more pertinent to strategic warning, is to examin

ous methods or measures which may be used to achieve one or more o

going types of surprise. We may identify roughly five of these: security

deception, cover, active military deception, confusion and disinformatio

1. Security in itself is not strictly speaking a type of deceptio

that it involves no active measures to mislead the adversary to a false 

clusion, but is designed only to conceal preparations for attack. Thu

sophisticated analyst should take care to distinguish normal or rou

security measures from true deception. Nonetheless, the line betw

deception and security is narrow and the two are very often confu

Moreover, an effective security program often can do much to mislea

deceive the intended victim of attack even if no more sophisticated m

sures are undertaken. Although security alone will not normally lead 

adversary to undertake the wrong preparations or to deploy forces in

rectly, it may lead him to undertake very inadequate countermeasure

even to fail to alert his forces at all if security is totally effective.

In general, the greater the number of military measures which must 

taken for the operation, and the larger the mobilization and deploymen

required, the less likely it is that security alone can mislead. Whaley 

views of Clausewitz that the high visibility of large-scale operations m

concealment unlikely, and that true surprise is therefore more lik
124

recent examples. Although it was possible in large measure to concea

tary deployments required for the closure of the Berlin sector borders, 

possible to conceal those for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and i

USSR made no particularly great effort to do so. Some writers have a

modern collection systems and communications will make security 

even less effective in the future—and this would appear likely to be 

Thus, the prospects are that various forms of active or deliberate dece

assume even more importance if surprise is to be achieved. 

2. Preeminent among such methods is political deceptio

probably the easiest of all deception measures and possibly the most c

mon. While political means may be used to promote tactical surprise

method is of particular value as a strategic measure to conceal in

Moreover it is one of the most economical means of deception and on

which the likelihood of disclosure is remote, since so few people nee

involved in the plan. There are a variety of political deception tactic

which we will note a few:

The direct or indirect falsehood may be put forth through diplomatic 

official statements, the press or other media. In its simplest and most cr

the state simply denies that it has any intent whatever of doing what it 

ing to do and asserts that all such charges are false—a method someti

particularly if the stakes are very high. The more subtle method of th

falsehood is often preferred, however, and permits the leadership to 

some degree of credibility after the event, or at least to deny charges o

prevarication. This tactic was used by the USSR in a number of its pu

ments prior to the Cuban missile crisis, for example in the celebrated TA

ment of 11 September 1962 in which the USSR stated that all weapons 

to Cuba were “designed exclusively for defensive purposes,’’ and that 

“no need’’ for the USSR to deploy its missiles to any other country.

Another method of political deception which has often been used

larly to lull suspicions in the relatively short term as final preparatio

attack are being made, is to offer to enter into “negotiations’’ to d

matter at issue when in fact there is no intention of reaching any sort 

ment. This tactic was used by the USSR on the eve of the counteratta

press the Hungarian revolt in November 1956, when Soviet office

negotiations with the Hungarians on Soviet “troop withdrawal.’’ A fo

ruse was also used by the North Koreans for about two weeks before 

on South Korea in 1950 when they issued “peace proposals’’ calling 

gle national election. 

Whaley identifies a slightly different form of this deception tactic, w

lead the adversary to believe that the firm decision to attack is actu

“This is a fairly common type of ruse, one intended to restore the init
125

concealing the full urgency of a crisis and encouraging the intended vic

belief that he has more time and more options than is, in fact, the ca

notes that this ruse was used at Port Arthur, at Pearl Harbor, in the Germ

on the USSR in 1941, by the British in the attack at Alamein in 1942, 

Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967.

A somewhat similar and relatively subtle form of political decep

downplay the seriousness of the situation in diplomacy and in public s

in an effort to create the impression that the nation does not conside

interests at stake, or that its relations with the intended victim are prett

even improving. This may result in a quite sudden shift in propaganda 

conciliatory tone, and friendly gestures to the adversary, after the dec

least contingency decision to attack has already been reached. This 

common tactic, and one in which dictatorships are usually masters, p

since their complete control of the press makes a shift in the propagan

easy. The USSR employed this tactic for weeks and even months p

attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945, when it und

ostensible easing of tensions with Japan and began to be “almost cord

Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, while the buildup of forces for the a

under way in the Far East. The effort to deceive by political means 

entail not only the deception of many of one’s own people, but may 

occasion even to the leadership of allied nations, if the issue is of 

importance. And true practitioners of the art of deception even have be

to deceive their superiors (by failing to inform them of their plans)—

clearly this is a risky business undertaken only in the interests of tactic

for a specific military operation when war already is in progress.

3. Cover (here meaning the “cover plan’’ or “cover story’’) is a 

of military deception which should be distinguished from active mil

deception, although it may often be used in conjunction with it. Cover 

be used when it may be presumed that the military buildup itself canno

concealed from the adversary, and its purpose therefore is to offer s

seemingly plausible explanation (other than planned aggression) fo

observable military activity. It may involve simply the putting out of 

statements about the scale or purpose of the military buildup in ord

conceal the real intention by attributing the military preparations to so

thing else. Throughout history, the most usual explanation offered 

been that the troops are “on maneuvers,’’ although it is possible to thin

other pretexts which might sometimes be used to explain troop m

ments, such as an alleged civil disturbance or disaster in a border 

The likelihood that the pretext of maneuvers would be used by the U

to mask preparations for aggression was long recognized by We

15Whaley, A548.
126

believe that NATO exercises could serve as a cover for attack.

Despite our presumed understanding of this tactic, the USSR achiev

partial success with its several announcements during July and Augus

that its troops were engaged in various “exercises’’ in the western U

Eastern Europe. In fact, there were no bona fide exercises and the so

under way was the mobilization and deployment of Soviet and Wa

forces for the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

4. Active military deception is at once the most difficult form 

deception to carry out, at least on any large scale, and also one of the m

effective and successful. If security and political deception measure

most effective in lulling suspicions as to intent, active military decep

is the primary means whereby the adversary is led to misdeploy his fo

and to prepare for an attack at the wrong place and the wrong time. E

when strategic deception has failed, or was never possible in the 

place, positive military deception has proved enormously effectiv

achieving tactical surprise, and hence in gaining victory and/or gre

reducing the attacker’s casualties in the operation. Whaley in his tre

has compiled some impressive statistics on the effectiveness and rew

of positive deception operations, some of which have been so valu

and successful as literally to affect the course of history (as in the 

mandy invasion). 

The successful military deception operation may range from a relat

ple hoax or feint to a highly complex series of interrelated and mutual

tent measures all designed to create the wrong impression in the m

adversary (or to support his original but false conceptions) as to timin

strength and place of the attack. Among the recognized techniques of a

tary deception are:

■ Camouflage of military movements and of new military installa

■ Maintenance of dummy equipment at vacated installations or i

the front where the attack is not to occur

■ The simulation of a great deal of activity using only a few piec

tary equipment moving about

■ The use of noisemakers or recordings to simulate a lot of activi

■ The planting of seemingly valid, but actually false, military ord

hands of the adversary

■ The sending out of “defectors’’ with seemingly plausible but fa

■ The use of doubled agents for the same purpose

■ The sending of invalid military messages by radio in the c

ciphers which the adversary is known to be reading
127

themselves deploy under radio silence 

■ The establishment of entirely spurious radio nets to simulate the 

of forces which do not exist at all or to convey an impression of 

of forces in some area other than the planned attack 

■ A concentration of reconnaissance, bombing or artillery fire 

other than the area of attack, or at least the equalization of suc

over a wide area so that the actual area of attack is not discern

such preparatory measures

■ False announcements or other deception as to the whereabouts 

commanders

■ Obvious training exercises for a type of attack (such as am

which is not planned

■ False designations for military units

■ Actual deployments or feints by ground or naval units to simu

in the wrong area

■ The use of enemy uniforms and other insignia

■ Announcements that leaves are being granted on the eve of 

even the actual issuance of numerous passes for a day or so ju

attack

The above list does not exhaust the tricks and ruses which have bee

and successfully used in military operations. Such active deception m

course are often supplemented by political and propaganda deception 

cover stories and extremely tight security on the real military operation

effect of the measures collectively can be the total misleading of the ad

to the coming attack, even sometimes when he has accepted its likel

indeed may be well prepared for it in other respects. 

It is obvious that a number of ruses cited above would be of limite

indeed could be counterproductive, in a strategic deception designed t

that an attack is planned at all, or in any area. In such cases, one does n

stir up a lot of military activity, or plant false documents about i

attacks, which will only arouse suspicions and stir the enemy’s intelli

vices into greater collection efforts. Some measures, such as bombing 

lery fire or even highly obvious and unusual reconnaissance, c

undertaken at all before hostilities have begun. For these reasons, so

time-honored devices of military deception would not be used prior to 

surprise attack which opens a war, the attack with which strategic warn

ticularly concerned. At the same time, the reader can easily see that a s

number of the tactics cited above could be most effectively applied to d

in a period prior to the initial attack. Among the ruses which should p

concern us are: communications deception, especially the maintenance 

communications accompanied by radio silence on deployments; plante

orders and other documents; the use of false defectors and doubled ag
128

concentrating on the preparations for the real attack. For we may be r

certain that the greater and more important the operation, the greater 

sophisticated will be the positive deception effort. The fact that we hav

tered relatively few cases of active military deception since World War 

not reassure us—in fact, it only increases our vulnerability.

5. Confusion and disinformation probably rank second only to p

ical deception in the ease with which they can be used to mislead and 

tract the opposition. Confusion and disinformation tactics do not hav

be highly sophisticated to be successful, although of course they may 

Even an elementary program to flood the market with a mass of con

ing stories and reports can be highly effective in distracting the time 

attention of analysts and their superiors from the reliable intelligenc

which they should be concentrating their efforts. Particularly if a c

atmosphere already exists, as is highly likely, and some of the report

sensational but have some degree of plausibility, they can prove to 

tremendous distraction. If the volume of such planted information is l

enough, the analytical system can literally be overwhelmed to a de

that some important and valid facts become lost in the mill, and other

not accorded their proper weight.

Moreover, such a mass of material compounds immeasurably the p

analyst fatigue, always a factor in crisis situations, and may tend to g

series of “cry wolf’ alarms which will reduce the credibility of the 

warning when or if it is received.

A conspicuous example of the damage that can be done by a large 

false or unevaluated information was in the Chinese intervention in 

October-November 1950. This is not to say that the Chinese themselves 

ily had devised a sophisticated or extensive disinformation program. It 

ble that a high percentage of the mass of spurious and contradicto

which so confused the situation that summer and fall was never plan

communists at all but was rather the product of the several highly p

paper mills in the Far East.

Most of those who have examined the intelligence failure that year h

altogether too little, if indeed any, attention to the adverse effects of th

of this spurious material on the analytical process. Regardless of the 

the material in this case, something of the same problem could surely a

in another crisis should our adversaries choose to exercise their full c

to employ such tactics.
129

All states are vulnerable to deception, including even those whose of

sophisticated practitioners of the art themselves. Logic also sugges

some respects at least, democracies are likely to be more vulnerable to 

than are dictatorships and closed societies and it is undeniably more d

open societies to practice it.

What, if anything, can we do to make ourselves less vulnerable? I

less? Some writers believe that it is, or nearly so. They observe that de

almost always successful in achieving surprise, regardless of the exp

the adversary. Particularly if the victim is seeking to avoid war, ambi

ducing tactics (one of the simplest forms of deception) are virtually al

cessful in producing procrastination—that is, in deferring appropriate 

Or if the victim does recognize that deception is being practiced, he 

make the wrong decision; that is, reject the right rather than the false inf

Moreover, even without significant deception, the initiator of the atta

inherent advantage over his victim. Thus, some maintain, surprise is i

Others have sought to devise counter-deception techniques as the mos

way of avoiding surprise. A variety of methods—from planting false in

in known feedback channels to complex tests of the reliability and cons

the data—have been suggested. Most of these seem either to assume m

to the enemy’s intelligence apparatus than is likely to prevail or to be so 

cal or time-consuming that they would not be very feasible in a real cri

Perhaps the pessimists are correct and there is little if anything we 

detect, let alone counter, a sophisticated strategic deception plan. But t

been many crises in which deception has been far less complex, even tr

One is struck by the fact that even elementary deception tactics, to 

intelligence personnel should be alert, have often been very effective. 

suggestions offered below would, I believe, be of some help in real situ

The first thing that is necessary, if we are to have any hope of co

deception, is to learn something about it, and to study some case histor

we may all be vulnerable in some measure to old ruses, we need to k

some of these ruses are if we are to have much chance of recognizing t

ondly, both the intelligence services and perhaps even more the policy 

mand levels need to understand that deception is likely to be practiced 

situations, not only by our enemies, but sometimes even by our frie

essential to the recognition of deception that the probability or at least 

bility of its occurrence be anticipated or else we will almost inevitably b

victims of even a simple deception plan. And how can we recognize s

tions? It is when great national objectives are at stake, when military 

mobilizing and deploying, when it is clear that the adversary is “up 

thing.’’ In such situations, It is the height of folly to presume that he wi

employ deception. We must be continually alert in such situations for 
130

Rather than wax indignant over the enemys perfidy, as is our usual 

should be indignant at ourselves for failing to perceive in advance suc

bility. Bluntly, we need to be less trusting and more suspicious and real

To recognize that deception is being practiced at all may be half the 

the recognition of this in turn will alert us: 1) that the adversary is very 

paring for some unpleasant surprises—else why bother to deceive us?

to start attempting to figure out what his real plans or intentions may 

the smoke screen of the deception effort. The easiest (or more accur

difficult) of smoke screens to see through should usually be the politi

tion effort, and its accompanying military “cover story,’’ during a perio

sive military buildup. When the political conduct of the adversary 

consonance with his military preparations, when he is talking softly bu

a bigger and bigger stick, beware. This is the simplest and least sophis

deception methods. No country should be so gullible as to fall for su

without at least asking some searching questions. While the recognition 

deception is being practiced, or possibly is, will not in itself necessarily 

clear understanding of what the adversary is going to do, it will at lea

that what he is going to do is probably not the same as what he says. An

tegic as opposed to tactical warning this recognition may be the most 

factor of all.

It is virtually impossible to conceal the preparations for great milit

tions. The adversary, despite the most elaborate security precautions, is 

to be able to build up his forces for a major attack in total secrecy. 

deceived or surprised in such circumstances, it will be because we eith

his cover story or offers to enter into peaceful negotiations, allowed ou

ceptions to override our analysis of the evidence, or because we we

misled as to the time, place or strength of the attack and thus failed t

right military countermeasures at the right time. 

As opposed to strategic warning or the recognition that the adversa

paring to attack at all, tactical warning may be highly dependent on our 

see through the enemy’s active military deception plan. And on thi

which is largely the type of stratagem and deception which Whaley ad

his book—experience teaches us that the chances of successful enemy 

are indeed high. Even when it is recognized that deception is being pr

for example, if camouflaged equipment is detected—this will not n

lead to the right conclusions as to the strength, place or date of attack. 

tary commander, in other words, will still have the problem of penet

specifics of the enemy’s deception plan and preparing his defenses 

even though the likelihood of attack itself has been generally accepted

tactical warning problem will remain even though the strategic warnin

may in large part have been resolved. 
131

present an enormous problem. The prospect that we could, in time 

national emergency, be confronted by such tactics should be a cause 

concern. The releasing of the full disinformation capabilities of the cou

ligence systems of other countries, together with the use of other decep

niques, could place an unprecedented requirement for sophisticated an

reporting on our collection mechanism, on which in turn the substanti

would be heavily dependent for evaluation of the accuracy and potenti

tion for deception by the informant. It is critically important in suc

stances that the collector provide as much information as possible on t

of the report and the channels by which it was received, since the an

receives it will be almost completely dependent on such evaluations 

ments in making his assessment. At best, it will be extremely difficult 

emergency to distinguish even a portion of the reports which have origin

the enemy’s intelligence services from those that have other origins. T

of the origins of rumors, for example, is often virtually impossible, ye

cases rumors are valuable indications of authentic developments whic

lyst cannot afford entirely to ignore. 

Additionally, there are two general guidelines that will usually assis

lyst in perceiving the enemy’s most likely course of action through 

deception:

Separate the wheat from the chaff. Weed out from the mass of 

material all information of doubtful reliability or origin and asse

information which is either known to be true (the “facts’’) or which 

from reliable sources which would have no personal axes to grind or 

deceive. This will allow you to establish your reliable data base whic

though it may be, will serve as the yardstick against which the reli

consistency of other data and sources may be judged. It sounds si

obvious; it is usually not done. 

Keep your eyes on the hardware. In the end, the adversary must laun

tions with his military forces and what they do will be the ultimate deter

his intent. Warning has failed in some cases primarily for lack of this c

tion on the hardware. There are all kinds of ruses and red herrings, bot

and military, which the adversary may devise, and they have often be

successful in distracting attention from the all-important factor of th

capability. So long as that capability is being maintained, or is incre

analyst and military commander who concentrate on it are likely to ha

more accurate perception of the enemy’s intention than are those who 

mitted their judgments to waver with each new piece of propaganda or 

the enemy’s plans.

Finally—more for policymakers and commanders—the best defe

against the enemy’s deception plan may be the alerting and preparednes
132

that may seem, the enemys efforts may be largely foiled even though 

tion itself is really not anticipated. In other words, it is possible to be 

or psychologically surprised, and at the same time be militarily prep

dispersal of the U.S. fleet from Pearl Harbor as a routine readines

against the possibility of attack, however remote that might have appear

have saved the fleet even though all other assessments of Japanese 

were wrong.
133

JUDGMENTS AND POLICY

The ultimate function of warning intelligence is to come to an asse

the enemy’s most probable course of action, to provide a judgment for t

maker of the intentions of the adversary. It is this which distinguishe

intelligence from order-of-battle and military capabilities assessments

mally shun judgments about what may happen; current intelligence, wh

occupied with a vast amount of day-to-day requirements and reportin

portion of which is likely to relate to indications and warning; and 

intelligence, which is probably closest to warning, but which normal

longer term and somewhat more general approach to an adversary’s c

action than does warning intelligence.

 Why is it not enough to give the “facts’’ or a statement of capabilit

stop there? An obvious answer, of course, is that warning intelligen

expected and explicitly directed to come to an assessment of intent. In r

judgment, it is only carrying out its charter and responding to the wish

sumers. It really has no choice in the matter. This, however, does not ex

this state of affairs has come to exist.

FACTS DON’T “SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

 Intelligence is made up of many facets and types of information, s

ple, some complex, some readily understood by non-experts, and 

require detailed research and analysis before they come to have meanin

If the sole function of intelligence was to compile “facts,’’ there woul

need for analysts of any type. The intelligence process would cons

entirely of collection of raw data which would be evaluated for accurac

passed on without further comment or analysis to the policy official.

Of course, intelligence practitioners at all levels are continually c

judgments, acting on these judgments, or reporting judgments in variou

tions or briefings. The collector in the field who elects to forward, or no

some fragment of information to his home office is making a judgment

rent analyst who decides to write up a given piece of information, or no

making a judgment about it. The manner in which he writes it up, the 

he gives to this or that aspect of it, constitutes another judgment. The 

his immediate superior selects to include in a briefing for the senior o

his agency or department are the result of another judgment. 
134

for the intelligence s

function, and it would b

useless to the consume

ments were not an integ

the process at all times. 

volume of material 

today not only makes i

ble for it to function in any other manner, but it also places a greater re

ity for intelligent and perceptive judgments on many relatively low-ra

obscure members of the system—not the least of them the collectors o

in the field.

Value of Judgments for the Intelligence Process Itself

Quite apart from the end result—serving the needs of policy offic

process of coming to judgments is extremely valuable in itself for t

gence system, and particularly its warning elements. This aspect often 

overlooked.

If facts do not speak for themselves to policy officials, neither do th

sarily do so to intelligence analysts and their supervisors. Or, if they s

doing so, it will often be found on further analysis that not all are h

same oracle, not by any means. Those not initiated into the system 

amazed at the variations in interpretation—sometimes almost dia

opposed—that a group of people can draw from the same set of “fa

when the facts are relatively simple and non-controversial in themse

problem of varying interpretations, and its implications for warning, 

considered at length in other portions of this work. It is a most crucial 

the warning problem. 

 In general, the farther one proceeds in the indications process from t

tion of raw data to the final judgment of the adversary’s course of a

greater the spread of opinion or interpretation is likely to be. That is, i

ally be easier to reach agreement that certain pieces of incoming in

constitute indications or possible indications than it will be to reach agr

to what these indications individually signify. And it will be still more d

reach agreement that the facts or indications collectively mean that the 

is about to embark on hostilities or other actions inimical to our intere

cite a specific and rather simple example: 

There will be a large measure of agreement that a high level of mili

ity in the border area of Country X is potentially significant as an indic

should be closely watched and reported by the Intelligence Commun

will probably be a lesser degree of agreement, in the absence of better 

It would be impossible for the intelligence

system to function, and it would be virtually

useless to the consumer, if judgments were

not an integral part of the process. ‘’
135

activity constitutes a bona fide mobilization or buildup of combat for

than an exercise; there will usually be least agreement that this activity

appears to be of a very large scale, indicates an intention by Country X 

its neighbor, Country Y, or whether X is only: putting pressure on Y, ca

an unusually realistic war game, or “keeping its options open.’’ Now

three questions or judgments, the last of course is by far the most impo

is what the policymaker most needs to know.

Let us suppose, however, that the group responsible for warning, 

turns out watch reports, does not go through the analytic process of e

the indications, attempting to determine their significance, and coming 

some judgment of whether hostile action is or is not impending. Instea

through only a portion of this process. It discusses only some of the indi

possible indications without coming to any agreement, or in fact ever 

cussing, whether there is a mobilization or an exercise. By tacit or 

agreement, perhaps because the issue is so “hot,’’ it does not really com

with the crucial question of intent. The end product is a non-controversi

washy statement such as: “A high level of military activity continues alo

Y border, and the situation remains very tense.’’ Naturally, everyone can 

this—it cannot be said to be “wrong.’’ But not only is this unhelpful to 

official, it also means that intelligence has not really gone through th

intellectual process of analyzing the meaning of the available data and a

to interpret its true meaning. Yet agreement might have been reached o

ingful judgment if enough time and effort had been applied. In the proc

ligence personnel would come to a much better understanding of the fac

issues involved, and the policymaker would be given a much more expl

sis of the evidence and the alternative courses of action open to him.

 Value of Judgments for the Policy Official

Another equally 

consequence of t

to reach an in

judgment may be 

policy official wil

to come to judgm

though it may be 

important to do s

absence of some positive intelligence judgment—some warning—t

official can hardly be blamed if he tends to minimize the danger or to b

he will have time later to make decisions, or that the threat is not yet 

There are many reasons why policy officials have been dissatisfied over 

“Another consequence of the failure to reach an

intelligence judgment may be that the policy

official will also fail to come to judgments, or

will make judgments on the basis of inadequate

information.’’
136

plaint has been inadequate warning, which in the end comes down to 

ment of what some other country is going to do.

Moreover, it is this type of intelligence failure which is most like

voke investigations by special boards or even Congress. Intelligence c

to be wrong on many minor matters, some of which will go totally un

fact by the consumer. But it cannot afford to be wrong on great 

national security, including warning of attack. Such errors never go u

In this arena, errors of omission—the failure to come to judgments a

be as serious as errors of commission, coming to wrong judgments. T

gence office which seeks to be “safe’’ by being noncommittal may fi

end that it served the nation as ill as if it had predicted that there was n

One of the most difficult things for analysts to find out is what peo

in the chain of command actually know in the way of facts and how 

interpreted them. As intelligence has evolved from the rather small

shops which prevailed after World War II to a large and highly organize

cracy, these problems have been compounded. It is safe to say that mo

never get to talk with anyone at the policy level, and that their unders

what these officials know, and need to know, is likely to be extremely li

 One result of the failure of intelligence to provide the policymaker 

ments therefore is likely to be that the official will make his own judgm

will make them on the basis of inadequate information—or at least wi

efit of interpretation which might have assisted him16 These difficulties 

are compounded in warning situations when the volume of informati

much greater than normal and its interpretation more complex. 

WHAT DO TOP CONSUMERS NEED, AND WA

TO KNOW?

If what policymakers want to know could be set forth in hard and 

readily understandable terms—and the requirements were more 

immutable—then it is likely that we should all know them. In fact, thi

is very complex, and it is doubtful that even the most experienced polic

could come up with ready answers as to what they would need to know 

ety of hypothetical situations, the most dangerous and important of 

have yet to experience. 

16This is precisely what happened in the case of the shootdown of the Korean Airlines 

1983, as presented in Seymour Hersh, The Target Is Destroyed (New York, Random Hous

accurate, intelligence-based report of the shootdown was presented to the Secretary of St

after he had come to biased conclusions about the intentions of the Soviets. 
137

reveal a considerable amount about how highlevel decisionmakers thin

in real situations. These works often are fascinating as well as educati

as the numerous memoirs and studies of the Cuban missile crisis. The

an insight into policy as it really operates that is more interesting, and 

more valuable, than any amount of theory or pseudo-science on the sub

 Anyone who has been in the intelligence business for any length o

long since learned that the guidance and directives on what the higher le

to receive are likely to be transitory. The requirements levied on intelli

vary from month to month, even sometimes from day to day. And thes

do not derive entirely, or sometimes even primarily, from changes in th

tional situation or from the unpredictability of events; obviously a crit

tion in some area will generate a demand for more intelligence on that 

subject. They derive also from the unpredictability of individuals and 

operate, how much they want to know and how they want it presented

thing that intelligence analysts are likely to learn about policy officials 

tary planners is that:

Policymakers are Highly Individualistic

One does not need to have served in the government to know th

everyone knows that U.S. presidents have varied markedly with resp

amount of information they wished to receive and how they wanted it 

that some (for example, Truman and Kennedy) were ardent readers 

gence, while others (such as Eisenhower) relied heavily on their 

wished to hear only the essentials. Some read three or four newspap

breakfast, others purportedly rarely looked at the press. In recent 

national security advisor to the President has become the principal a

times almost the sole channel through which foreign intelligence and fo

icy matters are conveyed to the chief executive. Thus, intelligence 

tailored to the needs and requirements of that individual rather than dire

President himself.

The National Security Council and the various committees or spec

that are affiliated with it also have numerous intelligence requirements 

of national policy. The attitudes and working habits of individual Sec

State and Defense (and to a lesser extent some other cabinet members)

Chiefs of Staff, the chiefs of the major intelligence organizations an

staffs can also strongly influence what intelligence produces and in w

and how it is presented. A change in administration nearly always bring

rash of requirements for new intelligence and policy studies or for a r

refurbishing of old studies, for changes in scope or format of intellige

ments, and new directives concerning the amount of detail or factual 

that should be presented. 
138

The U.S. and its leaders clearly have continuing requirements for a

intelligence—basic, current, and analytic or estimative—relating to t

activities, policies and objectives of innumerable nations, both frie

potentially hostile, with whom the policymaker needs to deal. There is 

country whose policies and attitudes do not affect us in some way. 

smallest may have a crucial vote in the United Nations or produce some 

material. The potential need of the policymaker for some type of infor

other is thus virtually endless. Of course, not all the information which 

sionmaker may require will be supplied by intelligence. Indeed, 

instances, foreign intelligence may play a relatively small role in provid

the information or influencing the policymaker’s course of action.

As a general rule, foreign intelligence is likely to have its greatest 

policy when it is apparent that a foreign government is adopting a cou

could gravely affect our national security interest in the relatively near 

such situations the Intelligence Community usually is in a strong positi

vide vital information needed for the formulation of policy.

The policymaker and military commander alike will have a great re

for intelligence on matters which may require a military action or re

our side, both in war and peace. In recent years, there has been a gro

dency for the highest authorities to take over supervision of what may 

be the most minor actions or decisions, on both political and militar

Many general officers, as well as lesser ranks, have been known to com

they had more responsibility and decision-making authority as field or 

pany grade officers in World War II than as senior officers in more re

flicts or threatened conflicts. It is no secret that President Kennedy p

reviewed the progress of U.S. convoys on the Berlin Autobahns during 

of 1961, and that even the most minor decisions on the Berlin issue wer

the White House. Similarly, during the Vietnam war, U.S. bombing 

were reviewed in advance at the highest governmental levels—not ju

policy on targeting but the selection of specific targets. Obviously, thi

more detailed military intelligence at the national level than would 

usually be necessary.

 Finally, there is the requirement of the policymaker for intellige

kinds of crisis situations, particularly sudden or fast-moving situations 

reliable and up-to-date intelligence may be vital to the decisionmaker. T

ical situations are likely to place the greatest of all demands on the In

Community at least in the short term. It is probably true that, the greater 

and the more critical and immediate the requirement for decisions, the 

the decisionmaker’s need for information. And the more is the prestige 

tation of intelligence at stake. Fairly or unfairly, the intelligence system 

to be judged in large part by its performance in expectation of and dur
139

(and few will notice it) if it provides the policymaker the kind of s

needs, and if he is satisfied with it, when grave national issues are at sta

Policymakers Need Evidence On Which They Can Act

Sherman Kent has discussed the kinds of intelligence which polic

generally have found most credible and useful. His conclusions derive

from his own long experience as Chairman of the Board of National 

but also from a separate inquiry into this subject made by Roger Hil

later became the director of intelligence for the Department of State. T

clusions concerning the policymaker’s views on three types of intel

basic, current, and estimative—were:

■ Policy officials placed highest credibility in basic intelligence, 

particularly grateful for the breadth and depth of factual in

which intelligence was able to produce on numerous subjects

very short notice.

■ They were somewhat less enthusiastic about current intelligenc

to compare it unfavorably to the daily press.

■ They placed least credibility in estimates, probably because th

nized that estimates are at least in part speculative and there

the authority and reliability of basic intelligence, which is e

factual and deemed to be highly reliable. Also, they were in

feel that they could speculate just as well or better than their c

in intelligence.17 

These gentlemen evidently did not address the question of how ofte

cymaker may have been misled by basic intelligence which proved to 

ous, such as order-of-battle “facts’’ which were inadequate or out-of-

not true that basic intelligence always is more accurate or factual than 

intelligence, although in its form of presentation it may seem to be.

Why should this be the reaction of policy officials, particularly 

Intelligence Community tends to look on the national estimate as i

level creation, and certainly the one on which it lavishes the greates

most extensive coordination by its most expert authorities? Does not e

level basic intelligence analyst look forward to the day when he wi

moted to being an estimator, with the rewards which this brings both 

and prestige? 

This issue cannot be better illustrated than by the Cuban missile cri

rospect, some have been critical of the national intelligence estimate o

tember 1962 which concluded, in effect, that the Soviet Union was u

introduce strategic missiles in Cuba. There is no question that the in

17 Sherman Kent, “Estimates and Influence,’’ in Donald P. Steury, ed., Sherman Kent a

of National Estimates (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 34-3
140

ure (however logical its conclusions may have been) in that it did n

that the USSR would do what in fact it did. But what if intelligence 

“right’’? What if the September estimate had concluded that the intro

strategic missiles into Cuba was a better than even chance, or highly 

nearly certain? Even assuming that the President had believed it also, w

he have done about it in the absence of proof? The fact is, of course, tha

not have acted without hard and convincing evidence that strategic miss

were in Cuba or on their way. It really did not matter what intelligence 

about it. But it did matter, imperatively, that it collect the data which w

mit a firm judgment whether or not the missiles were there, and hence p

basis on which the President could confront the Soviet Union and j

actions to the people of the United States and the rest of the world.18

INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF POLICY

 Strategic intelligence must actively support higher level o

policymakers and military commanders—not just collect and analyze 

tion, however desirable that may be in itself. The U.S. Congress con

requirement. It does not follow, however, that intelligence is the slave 

or that its function is to produce only what policymakers think they nee

they wish to hear. The independence and intellectual integrity of the in

system are essential, both in the long and short term, to the productio

quality information which will truly serve the national interest. M

learned, to their ultimate misfortune, the dangers of tailoring intellige

the views of policy officials. 

Few indeed would probably disagree in theory with the need for an 

dent, unbiased intelligence service, not subject to the whims of higher 

and removed from politics. More subtle and less widely recognized is 

lem of insuring that intelligence is not unintentionally distorted in th

of genuinely seeking to serve the policy official.

It is common practice for officials considering a given course of 

request from intelligence an analysis of the feasibility of this action an

of its possible consequences. Or the military commander reviews his op

asks his intelligence officers to summarize the information they have 

which would support one or another course of action. With no intent p

anyone to distort the picture, intelligence nonetheless finds itself sel

information—from the great mass probably available—that is consi

the proposed course of action or that tends to make it look desirable

because it has not been asked for any negative data or contrary informat

18A thorough review of the Cuban intelligence estimate is presented in Gil Merom

Cuban Intelligence Estimate: A Methodological Perspective,’’ Intelligence and Natio

14, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 48-80.
141

ligence system does not volunteer it. Or, the potential costs of failu

assessed because no one asks for such an estimate. Thus, unintentio

facts are selected in large part to support an already-favored policy and 

tial disadvantages never are really quite conveyed to the policy official.

One historian and student of the intelligence system, Thomas Be

called this process adduction from the verb adduce (the act of offering 

dence, instances, and the like, as proof or in support of something s

regards this type of analysis or reasoning as one of the dangers to which 

ligence process is subject and which can lead both it and the policy 

erroneous conclusions, even though both were honestly seeking to be 

and to select the most desirable policy.19

 Another well-known writer on the problems of warning and decisi

has also reached this conclusion: “For when an official policy or hyp

laid down, it tends to obscure alternative hypotheses, and to lead to ov

sis of the data that support it, particularly in a situation of increasin

when it is important not to ’rock the boat’.’’20

Now clearly the dangers of this type of error are greatest when the 

not simple or easily interpretable, when there is room for genuine d

of opinion, or when the policy level is seeking to justify a course of 

which it is already committed. A prime example has been the contin

troversy over who was right in interpreting the course of the Vietnam 

whether statistics were misused to justify the U.S. course of actio

“prove’’ that we were winning the war. Setting aside what bias the

interpretation, the problem arose in large part from the fact that the “

themselves were too tenuous to be of much value in proving a case e

and that even if North Vietnamese military casualties and supply los

have been accurately known, they were perhaps meaningless in th

Hanoi’s absolute commitment to continue the war despite the most s

losses. Nonetheless, as the data moved on up through the intelligence 

the president, it is probably true that statistics or facts which were c

extremely tenuous at the collection level took on solidity and credibil

portion to the extent to which they confirmed the rightness of U.S. pol

least, a number of observers and critics of the process have claimed. Y

either the intelligence or policy process were probably intentionally 

the evidence. It was a combination of inadequate or irrelevant evidenc

with, oversimplification in its interpretation, and some propensity f

19One of his contributions to the literature of warning intelligence is Thomas G. Be

cations, Warning, and Crisis Operations,’’ International Studies Quarterly 21, no. 1 (M

181-198.

20Roberta Wohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,’’ Foreign Af

4 (July 1965): 701.
142

not want to hear.

One student of the Cuban missile crisis has observed, again aprop

famous September estimate:

What the President least wanted to hear, the CIA was most hes

to say plainly. On August 22 John McCone met privately with 

President and voiced suspicions that the Soviets were preparin

introduce offensive missiles into Cuba. Kennedy heard this as 

it was: the suspicion of a hawk .... USIB’s unanimous approv

the September estimate reflects similar sensitivities. On Septem

13 the President asserted that there were no Soviet offensive 

siles in Cuba and committed his Administration to act if offen

missiles were discovered. Before Congressional commit

Administration officials were denying that there was any evid

whatever of offensive missiles in Cuba. The implications 

National Intelligence Estimate which concluded that the So

were introducing offensive missiles into Cuba were not lost on 

men who constituted America’s highest intelligence assembly.

Reporting the Unpleasant Facts or Judgments

One of the most difficult things for intelligence is to come to judgme

the policymaker does not want to hear, particularly when the judgment 

travene or bring into question the wisdom of some ongoing policy. T

also be grave reluctance, and understandably so, to present evidence 

tions that may require the policy official to make a difficult or dange

sion, particularly so long as there is doubt whether it may be necessar

the decision at all. There is a natural reluctance to cause alarm when 

unnecessary.

One potential result of adequate early warning always may be that t

maker will be able to take action in time to forestall the impending milit

or other threatened action. In this event, intelligence will have perf

greatest service to the nation—it has not only produced accurate inform

been instrumental in forestalling disaster. But, ironically, this will prob

be provable, or at least not in the professional lifetime of participants. T

finest hour, the service rendered by the Intelligence Community no

unrecognized and unrewarded, but some may even say the alarm w

unnecessary and there never was a threat. Such are the hazards, and fa

of intelligence.

21Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,’’ Americ

Science Review 63, no. 3 (September 1969): 712-713.
143

A review of crises over a period of years would probably show that

stantial number of cases, some warning could have been issued earl

was, and in some cases much earlier. The nature of this warning 

instances, however, would of necessity have been tenuous and, at leas

cases, little more than an uneasy feeling of knowledgeable and perce

lysts that all was not right or normal. This sense of unease that the Sov

was up to something certainly was present in the minds of some analy

spring of 1962 before there was any tangible indication that the USSR 

ning anything unusual in Cuba. Such unease perhaps was still more pr

the spring of 1950 in the weeks prior to the outbreak of the Korean w

policymaker or commander interested in this kind of early warning? 

want to know when astute, experienced and imaginative minds in in

begin to feel edgy, but can’t really produce factual documentation to sup

hunches? It is very hard to say, and policy officials possibly would diffe

this question than almost any other. Their individual interests in parti

jects or areas might dictate their answers more than generalities.

On the whole, the Intelligence Community has tended to be chary o

of speculative reporting, for at least two reasons. The first is that tenuo

pieces’’ are often wrong, and there really is not enough information to 

kind of meaningful warning. The second reason is that the Intelligence 

nity knows, or fears, that the policymaker will ask for “proof’’ or at l

kind of supporting evidence other than apprehension or intuitive feeling

Nonetheless, such early and speculative pieces may be very usefu

they do not reach policy officials. They can at least encourage more im

analysis within the Intelligence Community itself, they may generate 

ful collection efforts, and they may lead to the surfacing of relevant in

which would otherwise have been ignored. 

In general—if it is possible to generalize on this—the policy officia

bly most receptive to early, albeit tenuous, warning in cases where he 

some preliminary action, such as some diplomatic initiative, without 

any significant risk or major commitment of resources. He is not likel

responsive if he has to undertake a redeployment of military forces or a 

reservists, particularly if he believes that the threat is not imminent or t

on our part could lead to a military reaction by the adversary and an esc

the situation. And he probably will not wish to be “warned’’ about pote

gers which still appear remote and which might require a major c

recently established national policy.

Unanimity or Footnotes?

 This also has proved to be a controversial subject. In theory, all in

agency chiefs are free to take footnotes, or otherwise to express diffe
144

papers. Also in theory, policy officials generally are said to want the fra

fullest views of the Intelligence Community—including dissenting v

important issues. In actuality, however, the Intelligence Community oft

a strong inclination to seek unanimity on critical warning issues, and 

cases this tendency has been encouraged by the policy level, which has 

an agreed intelligence position.

 The arguments in support of unanimity are not inconsiderable. Th

tion seems to be that, if all the available facts are set forth and t

reviewed by reasonable people, all of them willing to listen to other 

view, then the differences truly can be resolved and a real agreement 

Thus, the unanimous opinion that is finally reached is considered actu

the best and most accurate obtainable, and one to which all can subsc

ther, it is argued, conflicting or unresolved differences of opinion do 

help the policymaker in his hour of need. A split opinion on a critica

which national action is required does not assist the planner to selec

course of action. If the Intelligence Community cannot make up its m

the evidence means, how can the decisionmaker make a meaningful de

he has asked the Intelligence Community for its “best judgment,’’ th

what he is entitled to get. 

These arguments are, of course, both persuasive and valid when i

unanimously agreed position proves to be correct and the chosen course 

action is successful. And this is probably true more often than not, p

more often than not. Rarely is the intelligence judgment totally wrong

when partially wrong, its conclusions may not really greatly affect po

sions or courses of action. Obviously, it is in cases where the agreed o

intelligence position does prove to have been wrong, and it contributed 

errors in policy, that the fallacies or disadvantages of unanimity 

apparent—often to the anguish of those who really did not agree but f

into going along with the majority, and in retrospect gravely regret tha

not argue their positions more forcefully or insist on their rights to disa

in these cases, obviously, the policymaker also will wish that he had 

minority opinions, particularly for dissents and the reasons for them wh

have saved him from an erroneous decision.

Despite the desirability, when possible, of intelligence coming to 

agreed position, the dangers of doing so, where real disagreements exi

certainly outweigh the advantages. Unanimous judgments all too o

served only to paper over real and serious differences of opinion, of 

policymaker might be totally unaware if they are not spelled out. Furt

such compromise unanimous judgments are reached, they tend to b

washy or to use ambiguous or qualified statements which may fail alt

convey how serious the situation may be. Phrases such as,“It is possib

adversary is considering an attack,’’ or “These forces have a high cap
145

language to which both those who regard the attack as unlikely and t

believe it likely can agree. In these cases, the policymaker would have 

ter informed and better served if the real differences of opinion, and th

for them, had been spelled out rather than suppressed.

 Communication is a Two-way Street

This section has looked at this problem almost exclusively from 

point of the Intelligence Community. It has attempted, almost certain

quately, to give the intelligence analyst some understanding of 

policymaker wants and how to serve his interests. But this is only half 

lem. It is equally and perhaps even more important that the polic

understand what it is that the Intelligence Community can and cann

ably be expected to provide him, and that he communicate with intell

a continuing basis. The managerial and policy levels must have a m

exchange with the so-called working levels of the Intelligence Com

there will inevitably be misunderstandings between them. To insure th

receive the fullest and most accurate support from the Intelligence Co

the policymaker should, among other things: 

■ ask for minority and dissenting opinions and for a presentat

facts supporting such dissents;

■ provide, insofar as possible, some explanation of why the info

wanted and for what purposes it will be used; 

■ insure that information, including both intelligence and op

material, is not being unnecessarily compartmentalized or 

from intelligence personnel; 

■ ask the right questions.

ASSESSING PROBABILITES

The Intelligence Community for years has been concerned with m

judgments more precise and meaningful to the policymaker. One metho

received considerable attention is to assess likely courses of action b

states in terms of probabilities, expressed in either verbal or numerical 

Words of Estimative Probability 

This phrase is taken from Sherman Kent, who began an inquiry year

what various words such as possible, probable, conceivable, unlikely, an

actually meant to different people in terms of mathematical probabilit

surprise, and consternation, he found that these and other similar word

ing various embellishments of possible, such as just possible or distin

ble) were interpreted quite differently, even by people who had worke
146

some specific degree of likelihood to a series of words and phrases, g

number of them together as generally synonymous. As he himself h

these initial efforts met with something less than universal approbation

larly from those whom he describes as the “poets,’’ and his proposals 

been formally accepted in national estimates. The following is one inte

in percentages of terms frequently used in estimates:

In this usage, words such as perhaps, may and might would b

describe situations in the lower ranges of likelihood, and the word poss

used without further modification, would generally be used only whe

ment was important but could not be given an order of likelihood with a

of precision. 

The terms most frequently used in warning documents to express 

and lower ranges of likelihood are:

Indications analysts have never shown much partiality to giving odd

50-50 by the use of phrases like “even chance’’ or “odds are about ev

haps in the belief that warning documents are supposed to come to j

and not toss a coin. Finally, indications analysts also make use of poss

and could and also of the conditionals might and would, with little 

defining what degree of likelihood or unlikelihood is intended.

22Sherman Kent, “Words of Estimated Probability,’’ in Sherman Kent and the Board 

Estimates: Collected Essays, ed. Donald P. Steury (Washington, DC: Center for the Stu

gence, 1994), 132-139. These terms were also discussed in Psychology of Intelligence A

Richards J. Heuer, Jr. (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 154-

Estimative Term Percentage Likelih

Near certainty (and equivalent terms) 90– 99

Probable (and equivalent terms) 60– 90

Even chance 40– 60

Improbable (and equivalent terms) 10– 40

Near impossibility (and equivalents) 1– 10

Higher Low 

We believe We believe...will not

We conclude We do not believe tha

 It is probable that It is unlikely

 It probably will It probably will not

 It is likely
147

The attempt to translate verbal statements of probabilities directly 

centages on the basis of what the words really mean to different people 

more widely understood and accepted than the second approach to p

assessments. The second method is considerably more complicated (so

say scientific) and involves specific methodology and the application 

techniques to the analysis of information, with the objective of comin

valid and dependable probability judgments. These techniques, partic

called probabilistic information processing, have been the subject of co

research and experimentation in recent years. At the outset, it is ne

emphasize that this discussion will not be concerned with the mat

aspects of probability theory, even in their most elementary form. Nor 

concerned with constructing probability and decision “trees’’ or othe

methodology. Those interested in this aspect of assessing probabilitie

considerable literature which will provide a much more comprehe

expert description of the techniques than I could attempt to present. W

concerned with a more general explanation of the techniques, and p

their apparent advantages and limitations as applied specifically to war

ligence. Like other techniques, the application of probability theory 

gence analysis is a tool theoretically capable of assisting both the analy

consumer by:

■ Assisting the analyst in coming to more accurate or valid judg

applying certain probabilistic techniques to the information wh

at hand; and 

■ Allowing analysts to convey these judgments to consumers 

which are more precise, less ambiguous and more readily unde

Complexities of Probability Assessments in Intelligence

It is clear that there are many differences between intelligence prob

the types of problems usually subjected to probability analysis. What 

most intelligence problems is even more true of warning problems. 

most of these differences are rather obvious, it may be well to list som

here: 

■ Most estimates of probability are made on relatively simple oc

for which there is, usually, a considerable data base, such a

forecasts, actuarial tables, or even records of race horses. In

forecasts, particularly on topics like warning, are dependent 

types of data, much of it complex, and each occurrence is to so

unique. 

■ Probability estimates based on simple or statistical data are in l

sure objective, or not subject to personal bias, whereas intellige

ments are highly subjective. Although it might be possible t
148

objective basis for making warning judgments, analysts u

dependent on imprecise recollections or subjective feelings abo

cal precedent. 

■ In intelligence, again particularly in warning, judgments mus

on incomplete data and on information of unknown or varying 

reliability. 

■ Intelligence forecasts—again, particularly warning judgm

dependent in large part on our assessment of human decisio

may or may not yet have been taken, and which, in any case, 

mously complex, variable and to some degree unpredictable.

Probability theorists recognize the subjective nature of intelligence j

and they do not attempt to apply the science of objective probabilities 

essentially an opinion as to the likelihood of an occurrence. Rather they 

theory of subjective probabilities, which apparently dates from the beg

probability theory in the early eighteenth century. Subjective probabi

degree of belief which an individual holds about something, or how con

is that something is true. It is in this meaning that probability theo

applied to the judgments made by intelligence analysts.

 Advantages of Probability Assessments

There are several reasons why an attempt to come to a judgment of 

ties is useful to intelligence analysis, regardless of the techniques use

how the result is finally expressed. Some of the benefits of probabili

ments may be obtained whether or not the probability or likelihood of 

rence is ultimately expressed as a numerical or percentage factor or 

terms. Most proponents of the values of probabilistic analysis, however

cates of numerical assessments. Among the advantages which I see, 

proponents have claimed for these methods, are:

■ The analysts, or writers of the intelligence forecast, are require

to some judgment of likelihood—specifically, in the case o

intelligence, to some assessment of intentions. They are thus 

from committing one of the most common of warning “crimes,

to set forth several possible alternatives or courses of action wit

cating which is most likely, or simply to report the “facts’’ o

capabilities of the adversary without any judgment as to what m

■ The policymaker or commander in turn is given some assessme

tive likelihoods to assist him in determining the best course 

Communication between analysts and policy officials is 

because conclusions are less ambiguous.

■ The technique helps to insure that important information is 

looked, or swept under the carpet by someone because it is in

with an hypothesis. It permits analysts to check the consistenc
149

and it produces increased confidence in the validity of conclusi

■ It makes for better and more clearly defined hypotheses, so that 

can debate the same postulated contingencies.

■ Since the analyst must consider the relevance of the informa

hypotheses (not just the one he favors), he is less biased, and 

nique tends to separate the analysis of new data from preconcep

■ Analysts are inclined to consider more data as potentially rele

they otherwise might.

■ Studies have shown that the technique overcomes conservatism 

ing odds or probabilities, and leads analysts to a better revision 

bilities when strong positive or negative (diagnostic) ev

received. They will thus come to higher odds, sometimes mu

odds, than they would directly or intuitively. This is obviously v

cable to warning.

■ The technique will expose those who are logically inconsiste

are giving negative interpretations to data which others conside

or vice versa.

■ The process of coming to judgments of probabilities serves to b

and highlight the differences of opinion that may otherwise not 

ered or recognized at all, or which, if they are discerned, may b

over with imprecise or fuzzy language in the interests of seem

nimity.’’

■ When such differences become apparent, the group will 

attempt to isolate the reasons for the differences, to find out 

individual regards a given course of action as likely (say 60 to 8

probability) while another regards it as a less than even possib

haps 35 to 45 percent probability), and still another regards 

unlikely (10 to 20 percent). Incidentally, such a spread of opin

unusual in indications and warning problems.

■ The process of attempting to reconcile these differences will fo

to try to explain why they think as they do, or on what eviden

dent, preconception or “hunch’’ they have come to their opinion

■ This process of reexamination of the basis of our opinions al

lead to a reexamination of the evidence. As we have also n

meticulous examination of the available information is essentia

ing, and the failure to have examined all the evidence is one 

mary causes of warning failures. It may develop, in the proc

discussion, that some people have reached their judgments in t

rance of certain information which others considered absolutely 

dence (which also is not unusual).
150

 Lest the reader begin to believe that probability assessments are t

to our prayers in intelligence and will provide us the proverbial crys

will be well to note also the limitations or even positive disadvantage

methodology: 

■ No methodology is a substitute for adequate information and it

by competent specialists in the field. The solution is not to tur

information over to experts in probabilistic theory for analysis. 

ysis must be done by individuals who are substantive experts in 

■ Undue attention to the mathematical aspects of probability t

analysis is largely counterproductive. Assessments are not im

more mathematical refinement when the information was inad

imprecise to begin with. The application of statistical techni

makes the data seem more accurate than they really were.

■ It has been shown, as the above would suggest, that the techniq

only when there are enough discrete pieces of evidence.

■ The application of probability theory to intelligence analysis 

remove the subjectivity from the assessment. Although the 

may assist in making assessments less subjective, or more ob

all stages the analyst is making judgments which are not empir

ifiable, but which are the product of his experience, attitudes a

tise in the subject.

■ The adequate selection of data for consideration—or, ideally, 

sion of all available data potentially relevant to the problem—i

to honest and meaningful results. School problems in probabili

or retrospective analyses that fail to incorporate all the data, inc

the spurious or irrelevant data, which the intelligence analyst ac

to consider, can lead to results very wide of the mark, or 

impression radically different from the situation as it actually w

■ The work should be done on a real-time basis and applied to a 

if a valid comparison is to be made with more conventional tech

analysis. The post mortem or retrospective reanalysis of the 

will seem to reach a considerably more accurate assessment of 

ties than was true in the live case. This apparent demonstrat

superiority of the probabilistic method over the intuitive judgm

analyst may be fallacious since the atmosphere, uncertainties 

sures on the analyst never can be truly recaptured. Retrospecti

also are sometimes the product of simplistic rather than sop

understanding of the problem.

■ In live crises, time may not permit analysts to undertake any 

tasks beyond keeping up with the incoming flow of traffic and m

hoc requirements. If time allowed, analysts themselves migh

better results, even without benefit of training in probability tec
151

come the problem of inadequate communication between in

agencies or between different offices in the same agency, whic

mary cause of inadequate or incomplete analysis in crises. Th

may tend to neglect the importance (for warning) of true negati

tions (of the developments which have not happened). Perha

related, it seems uncertain whether the application of probabilis

to intelligence data will reduce our vulnerability to deception, a

it might increase it since the countering of deception involves 

tion of a whole body of seemingly reliable indications as irrelev

problem or as having a diametrically opposite meaning. 

Breaking Down the Problem

It appears that the application of probabilistic techniques to intelli

warning analysis is likely to be most useful when the method breaks 

lem(s) down into the component parts, which are in fact the indications

that what is important here is that the method simply encourages th

analysis; the value does not lie in the application of the statistical te

Moreover, it does not really matter whether the end result shows a prob

75 percent versus 65 percent. What does matter is that there has bee

methodical effort to examine the evidence and to interpret it, a more 

exchange of views concerning the significance of the information, 

understanding of where the real differences lie, and a final conclusi

should be both logical and reliable. It is probably not necessary to know 

any of the modern techniques of probability or decision analysis to g

these processes and to arrive at essentially the same result. The proc

seem to have some merit, however, as a tool for the analysts, and, sin

attention is being devoted to these methods, it is probably desirable fo

to have some understanding of them.

Bayes’ Theorem

One method which has been frequently applied to intelligence pr

Bayes’ Theorem. Most simply stated, this is a procedure whereby th

continually is arriving at new odds or probabilities as to the likelihood o

occurring, based on his assessment of the significance or relevance of 

of information as they are received. The method requires the initial de

two or more hypotheses, such as: Nation X will attack Nation Y in f

conduct a limited attack on Nation Y; will not attack Nation Y. (These 

exactly the contingencies with which warning intelligence has to de

time limit also should be stated (six weeks, six months, a year).

The procedure further requires the assignment of some initial odd

of the hypotheses, such as: will attack in force (20 percent) will cond

ited attack (30 percent); will not attack (50 percent). Presumably, som
152

this may not be the case. If different individuals start with differing in

their later odds will tend to show a corresponding difference, even tho

evaluations of the later evidence are generally similar.

 Thereafter, the method consists of examining individual incoming 

information and assessing (1) their reliability (if the information is 

lished fact) and (2) the relative likelihood that they would or would no

one or another hypothesis is true. The likelihood ratio which the analys

is then applied, using a simple mathematical formula, to the previous p

thereby continually altering the odds as new information comes in. Ac

its advocates, this procedure has two primary advantages over traditi

niques of evaluation: the analyst is better able to assess the significanc

vance of individual pieces of information than he is of making an asse

the overall significance of a large body of information; and the metho

(although it does not eliminate) personal bias by permitting the anal

group to separate the evaluation of new evidence from prior opinion 

hypotheses and to make judgments of relative rather than absolute pro

leaving the final odds to mathematical logic. Presumably, the result 

probability assessment either considerably higher, or lower, than 

reached by other or more direct means. A key step in the method is tha

lyst must evaluate each piece of information in a systematic manner and 

diagnostic or persuasive value—in short, as applied to warning, to 

indications realistically. 

Obviously, the application of Bayes’ Theorem to complicated warn

lems is by no means as simple as the above suggests. First, there are li

major differences of opinion concerning the reliability of given piece

mation and, therefore, the weight, if any, which should be accorded to t

is apt to be the case with respect to crucial order-of-battle information

traditional methods of evaluation are usually far more conservative tha

cations method in a period of mounting tensions and troop moveme

information which a warning analyst would wish to include as rel

important even though not yet “confirmed,’’ might be rejected by an ord

tle analyst as not worth consideration since it does not meet his sta

“acceptance.’’ There are many other problems in the selection and eva

the incoming information which no methodology is going to solve, s

subjective judgments must be introduced. In the end, the application of 

rem independently by two different analysts, or groups of analysts (

tional or conservative in their approach, and the other more imag

“indications-oriented’’) might only confirm statistically what wa

apparent—that there is a wide spread in their opinions. It has been p

that, if the analyst finds he is applying probability ratios to certain dev

which are bringing him to higher odds than he is comfortable with, he 
153

how he really feels about it.

Since the business of warning analysts is to examine and evaluate in

it would seem likely that they will tend to reach odds at least as high by 

methods of indications compilation and analysis as they would by the a

of Bayes’ Theorem, provided they tended to think in numerical proba

all. A retrospective application of Bayes’ techniques to the information 

the Chinese intervention in the Korean war came to a 3:1 probability 

intervention as of mid-November. Since the method was not applied 

situation, nor was any attempt made in 1950 to come to any statement o

cal odds, it is impossible to say what the range of individual opinions 

sensus or “average’’ might have been at the time. It is certain, howeve

range would have been considerable (since many people were convince

Chinese would not intervene), and it is my opinion that the warning ana

had done the most exhaustive indications research would have given od

than 3 to 1—perhaps as high as 5 to 1 in favor of major intervention 

November 1950.

University experiments on non-intelligence problems have shown 

lysts usually will come to higher probabilities of an event occurring, af

ing and assessing a number of pieces of positive information, if they us

Theorem than if they made an intuitive judgment of the new odds. In oth

the use of the method tended to make them less conservative in their ass

Applying the same rationale to intelligence problems, one comes to a l

simple conclusion. The application of Bayes’ Theorem clearly should 

highest probabilities in those cases in which there is the greatest a

highly reliable and positive evidence concerning both a large-scale b

military capabilities and an abundance of positive political and propag

cations. The method thus seemingly favors factual and cumulative i

analysis as opposed to other approaches to warning, which place grea

on such factors as past performance of the nation in question, assessme

views of its leaders and the risks they will take, and the possibilit

numerous “positive indications’’ are only bluff, contingency prepara

show of force.

The Delphi Procedure

 This is another technique designed to promote more objective or 

analysis. It uses a group method but attempts to overcome the ten

nearly all groups for one or more individuals to dominate the discussi

tue of rank, official position, presumed expertise, overbearing pers

tendency to talk too much. Thus, it initially seeks anonymous opinion

participants—an obvious advantage in encouraging independent j

from those who are fearful of their superiors or timid in the expressio

views. The anonymous responses are then fed back to the participan
154

then modify their estimates based on further consideration. The 

probably does bring individual opinions closer together—toward a no

tends to prevent conclusions from being based on the wishes of aut

this extent it may be helpful in indications analysis. At the same tim

not eliminate the tendencies of groups toward conformity, and it ma

age too many people to cast votes on subjects which they have not an

depth. Since off-the-cuff judgments by those who have not examin

evidence are one of our major problems in warning, it is obvious that 

nique should be applied with care in this forum. Often, the independe

an individual warning analyst proves to be more accurate than any a

consensus or examination of others’ views.

Low Probabilities and Critical Dangers

 In warning, we are dealing with a range of potential dangers to 

and our allies, some of which can result in minimal damage to our int

some of which are potentially disastrous. An example of a threat invo

atively little danger to our interests—even though it would be desirab

sible to warn of it—would be the sabotage of a military depot. Obvi

greatest of all potential disasters would be the all-out nuclear attack o

and our allies.

 Viewed in the abstract, the probabilities we estimate for a

occurrence—whether expressed as a percentage figure or in some d

phrase—would seem to carry about the same weight or importance as 

cal probabilities for another occurrence. Thus, if we say that we thin

odds are about even that some country will complete a new road to t

within the next year, it presumably carries the same degree of convi

will have the same impact on the policymaker, as if we said that the 

about even that it would attack in the same time period. Of course, mere

the problem this way is to demonstrate that the two statements of l

although identical, carry far different messages to the policymaker. An

ference obviously derives from the importance and potential dangers o

courses of action. 

In some instances, even to raise the possibility of an occurrence i

terms, however qualified, could constitute a most serious warning. On

intelligence assessment, frowned on by many, is that which sets fort

dence and logic against a hostile action by an adversary, but then adds, 

less, we cannot totally discount that he may attack.’’ Objections 

assessments, which are probably well taken in most cases, often are ba

grounds that the writers are attempting to take out insurance against a

gencies so that they will be able to claim, no matter what happens, tha

dicted it—if only as an outside chance. The statistician would probably 

phraseology because it is imprecise—what probabilities do you mean b

totally discount’’? And many would say that the phrase is valueless 
155

count. But suppose we were to say, A nuclear attack on the United Sta

be totally discounted’’ (within the next month, or six months, or year, o

frame)? The mere reference to such a possibility clearly would carry 

portentous warning that the gravest apprehensions existed in the In

Community. Even during the Cuban missile crisis, no such intelligence 

was ever reached (as “insurance’’ or for any other reason).

In short, it is not the odds in themselves which determine the imp

the warning judgment to the policymaker, but the potential consequen

action if it should occur. There are dangers which, even though remo

scale of probabilities, will still warrant the most serious consideration a

ble action by the policymaker. For these reasons, the Intelligence Com

and correctly so—gives far greater care to weighing evidence and the 

of its warning or conclusions in such circumstances than it does in less 

situations. It usually will also be inclined to be more cautious in thes

stances than when the potential consequences are less serious.

Other Factors Affecting the Warning Odds

 Some of the seeming disadvantages or limitations of probability as

for warning might, it seems to me, be overcome by a combination of t

niques with some other techniques for indications analysis which have 

gested elsewhere in this work. Some guidelines were suggested for ass

meaning of evidence in a warning situation. Somewhat condensed, the 

guidelines were:

1. Is the national leadership committed to the achievement of 

objective in question?

2. Is the objective potentially attainable, or the situation potent

soluble, by military means?

3. Does the military capability exist, and/or does the scale of the 

itary buildup meet doctrinal criteria for offensive action?

4. Have the political options run out?

5. Is the risk factor low, or at least tolerable?

If the leadership of the state in question is following a rational 

action, the answers to the above questions should determine whether 

opts for military action. As noted, if the answer to all the above is yes, 

bilities should be high that military action will be undertaken. Probabili

odology, as applied to decisionmaking problems, takes account of 

losses or risks attendant on various courses of action, as do the above 

tions. Thus, a high risk factor will tend to lower the likelihood that 

course of action will be adopted, even if the answer to all other questio

tive, unless of course the leadership is so desperate for a solution of the 
156

as did Khrushchev in 1962.

It might be useful, at least on an experimental basis, in applying B

other probabilistic methods to specific indications, also to apply the 

questions to each relevant piece of information. That is, each pertinen

indication would be assessed as to whether or not it brought the milit

closer to the strength and deployments required for offensive action. E

vant political development would be evaluated as raising or lowering 

bilities that the leadership a) is committed to attainment of the objecti

believes that its political options have run out.

Conclusion

 The greatest utility of probabilistic techniques is in requiring the 

the group to examine evidence more thoroughly and more objective

assisting them to distinguish more clearly between the evidence that is 

vant or pertinent to various hypotheses and that which is not. It is less 

what precise numerical probabilities are finally reached than that th

process be thorough and as divorced from preconceptions and subjec

ions as possible. The expression of the final judgment in terms of numer

abilities may be helpful, but it is better not to have precise percentage j

if the process of reaching them is slipshod or inexact, or based on too l

mation to be meaningful.

Logic, backed by some post-mortem probability studies, leads to a c

that probabilistic techniques would have improved intelligence jud

cases in which we had large amounts of positive evidence but in whic

judgments of probability were reached. Two conspicuous examples ar

nese intervention in Korea and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is unc

these techniques would improve our odds or judgments when the ev

insufficient and we are lacking specific critical data. One study of the a

of Bayes’ Theorem to the evidence that was available prior to the Cu

found, for example, that the technique did not result in a positive asses

strategic missiles were being introduced into the country. It did, howe

the chances to even money by the end of the first week of October (a we

the missiles were discovered) and furthermore showed steadily moun

during the preceding weeks. The odds in mid-September by this me

more than 3 to 1 against the strategic missile hypothesis (which was 

with the national estimate reached at the time), thus reflecting a drama

in odds in about three weeks. It would seem doubtful that probabil

niques would be of much help to us in assessing the timing of operatio

they would help guard against deception. 
157

IMPROVING WARNING ASSESSMENTS

SOME CONCLUSIONS

FACTORS INFLUENCING JUDGMENTS AN

REPORTING

Warning intelligence of course is not produced in a vacuum, divorce

rest of the intelligence process or from any number of other influenc

other factors, at least in some instances, will determine what is made 

and even sometimes what facts may be reported at all. The following s

cepts, although far from being an exhaustive list, highlight some of 

important factors that influence judgments.

The “Climate of Opinion’’

 By “climate of opinion’’ is meant the prevailing attitudes in any c

any major subject and specifically, for our purposes, attitudes about o

and particular international problems. The climate of opinion on such 

not necessarily the same within the government as in public opin

Although the two over any period of time will tend to run parallel, the p

intelligence elements of the government may on occasion be well ahead 

opinion in their perception of the attitudes or intentions of foreig

whether these intentions be hostile or accommodating. Further, the 

branch of the government of course is in a strong position to influence 

the attitudes of other countries toward us through its conduct of forei

Although the national leadership in the end is responsive to public opin

also do much to shape it, and in the short term may even run counte

international issues. This point is made here only to emphasize that th

ment, and its intelligence services, are not just captives of a prevailin

“climate of opinion’’ as is sometimes implied in discussions of this qu

large measure, they can have an independent “climate of opinion’’ and 

do much to shape the public climate. At the same time, governmental a

opinion on major international issues are not likely in a democracy t

divergent over an extended period. Nor are members of the intelligenc

likely to have a view of other states, and of their leaders’ intentions, t

substantially from that which is expressed by the public media or other 

and informed public opinion. 

It is very difficult, even with the best intentions of maintaining an o

and evaluating the evidence objectively, to set aside such preconceptio

the other fellow will behave. And even the individual who is able to 

probably have the greatest difficulty in persuading others. The atmos

probably be slow to change, and it may require some dramatic even
158

tance. Pending that acceptance, indications of it are likely to have to

even when they are substantial in quantity and quality.

There is no doubt that there was an atmosphere or climate in both in

and policy circles in 1950 which was hostile to acceptance of the idea 

Korea would attack South Korea and that the Chinese would intervene

that it is erroneous, however, to attribute this atmosphere to any illusi

the good intentions or non-hostile attitudes of North Korea, China, or 

Union. The climate was more a product of a number of other things, 

the lack of recognition at that time of the concept of limited war; the lac

rience in U.S. intelligence in indications analysis and the deficiencie

agency collaboration and analysis; widespread preconceptions by 

analysts that the Chinese would attack Taiwan rather than intervene in 

reluctance to believe that the Chinese would take on U.S. forces; an

degree the reluctance of U.S. policy and military leaders to accept in

which might have required a change in policy, and of the intelligence s

tell them so. (The U.S. had a major command and control problem. T

which General MacArthur was held and his unwillingness to listen to 

from Washington were clearly major reasons that the intelligence w

available failed to have an impact on policy.)

Recency of a Major Crisis or Intelligence Failure

 There is nothing that elevates the status of warning intelligen

receptiveness of higher authority to indications analysis as much as a 

sis that intelligence failed to predict or in which the indications we

quately assessed. Almost invariably, postmortems are initiated to 

where we went wrong, special committees are appointed to reexamin

dence, and indications intelligence becomes the method of the hour. E

the indications were not very good, or highly contradictory, or the ad

course of action was truly illogical, investigations or other critique

manage to make much of the various fragments of information wh

given inadequate attention when they came in or which pointed to the 

ity that the adversary would take the course of action which he actua

these circumstances, indications are not necessarily judged on their 

merits or in relation to the total picture, but by the criterion that t

received at all. The warning analyst, particularly if he had predicted th

advance or had compiled an impressive list of indications which wa

basks in his new-found prestige. People come to see him who had ign

before; his think pieces suddenly are in demand; he is asked to con

postmortems or other studies. The indicator list is hauled out and revi

consumers want it. The management is assured that the intelligence 

leaving no stone unturned to insure that such a warning “failure’’ will 
159

take a worst case look at everything from now on.

It is all very heady while it lasts. And it will probably be short-liv

meantime, however, an extraordinary change may be manifest in the in

process. The climate of opinion has altered. There is real apprehensio

perpetrator of the recent surprise may be plotting more evil deeds. N

each indication likely to receive far more attention than before, but i

considered too low-grade before to warrant consideration now receive 

More collection is initiated to insure that we have not missed anythi

countries, suddenly awakened to the crisis, flood us with their raw in

and analyses. Across the board, the attitude is receptive to warning. T

would never have been reported to higher authorities now are deemed 

their attention, lest something be missed.

This discussion is not meant to suggest that intelligence goes off its 

these situations, but only that the changed atmosphere does indeed en

entirely new perception of the values of indications analysis. Much o

perception may come from higher level policy officials. Sometimes, wa

lysts themselves have been astonished by the changed atmosphere 

found themselves playing the role of trying to dampen down flaps. 

occurrence was the revolution in opinion concerning the intentions of 

Union following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Many who had been 

surprised by that action—that is, who had been the least receptive to i

of it—suddenly became the most concerned that the USSR might no

Romania as well. One senior intelligence official observed that we ha

error in not taking the “worst case’’ view of Czechoslovakia, and we mu

so for Romania. Yet, curiously, there was almost no evidence of any So

buildup along the border with Romania, and no indications that the U

moving more forces into Hungary or any troops whatever into Bulgaria

itary situation thus was almost diametrically opposite to the massive b

combat forces that had preceded the invasion of Czechoslovakia and 

warranted anything like the degree of concern accorded the Cze

situation—a fact, however, that did not preclude prolonged concern o

military intentions toward Romania. Had the same atmosphere prevaile

the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there would seem little doubt that mu

judgments of Soviet intentions would have been forthcoming.

This phenomenon is characteristic of crises. At the peak of the Cub

crisis, fragmentary information which would never in normal circumsta

been reported to higher authorities was surfaced for direct reporting to 

House. Even when analysts were at a loss to interpret the significanc

tidbits and would normally have deferred comment for further inf

supervisors were encouraging the reporting of all information of eve

potential significance.
160

to be overlooked. The tendency rather will be the oppositeto impart u

nificance to relatively unimportant or unconfirmed information, and 

warning of possible ominous developments on the basis of less evid

would be the case in normal times. Conclusions in these circumsta

adopt phrases like: “Although we have no evidence (or firm indicatio

will attack Y, it could do so with little warning.’’

The Attitude of Intelligence Chiefs and Policymakers

The attitudes and demands of higher authorities obviously carry hea

in the determination of what intelligence is reported and how it is repo

icy officials, if they have sufficient rank, are in position to request almos

of study, on any subject, within reason, from the Intelligence Comm

they usually are promptly and competently served. Many such studies 

are of a long-term in-depth nature, particularly those intended to as

determination of military policies. Many other requests are fulfilled b

briefings or analytic papers. Requests requiring interagency assessme

analytic nature usually are fulfilled through special national estimates

cial interests of policy officials on a continuing basis may also be re

some degree, in the content of daily intelligence publications. In the spe

of warning, intelligence chiefs and policy officials always can reque

meetings of watch committees or similar analytic groups, or ask that 

consideration to specific problems or areas in their regular reports; th

without regard to what the operative charter nominally calls for.

 One of the most important things that policy officials can do to 

intelligence they need is simply to ask the right questions. No amou

gence or initiative at the working level can do as much to generate i

reporting on a subject as a few judicious questions or requests for specifi

research from the top. Many an analyst has sought in vain to get some 

analysis moved upward through the system, until some policy official 

an interest in the same subject or advanced the same thesis. There is l

tion also that the senior officials in both intelligence and policy who do 

est amount of in-depth reading (“homework’’) are usually in the best p

ask the most penetrating questions. Those who suffer from an inherent 

their own intelligence services (for example, Winston Churchill) have s

done the most to prod those services to their most productive and im

performance. Officials who are responsive to imaginative and percept

ses, and who do not reject such work when it is presented to them, are 

likely to obtain meaningful warning judgments. The official who de

inordinate degree of proof or is contemptuous of anything but establish

will probably discourage the type of analysis or reasoning that is usually 

for meaningful warning. Even if the policy official does not himsel

requests or ask many questions, his general attitude and willingness or u
161

and quality of intelligence reported to him.

The Extent of Public Knowledge or Press Discussion

Any discussion of this subject would be incomplete without some 

tion of the impact on intelligence reporting and policymakers of what 

ing in the newspapers or other media, and the extent to which th

public is aware of, or concerned about, the situation. In some degree

misleading argument, since the press in large part reflects the informa

able to, and the concern of, the government on any particular subjec

the Department of State or the President’s advisors are preoccupied 

possibility of an outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, the chance

that reporters will be briefed on the subject, even if the cause for alar

sified data to which the press would not normally have access on 

Inspired articles and deliberate leaks, as well as the inquiries and re

reporters themselves, constitute a considerable part of what appears in 

in the field of foreign affairs. It is only when the government make

effort to prevent leaks so as not to tip its hand—as in the week preced

ident Kennedy’s announcement of the discovery of the missiles in Cu

revelations to the press normally can be contained at all in this count

fore, if the press is surprised by some unforeseen international dev

including war, the chances are good that the U.S. government also 

prised, the Intelligence Community included. Over the years, there h

trend toward the release (or leaking) of greater and greater amounts 

nally classified intelligence to the press, some of it at considerable je

intelligence sources. In large measure, press reporting does not consti

pendent corroboration of government-held data, but only mirrors it.

Nonetheless, the press often does have independent sources in fore

tries, or undertakes special analyses of critical international proble

contribute substantially to knowledge and interpretation of the sub

also, of course, the primary channel for dissemination of official and 

announcements, documents and the like, as well as current events in 

which constitute a substantial portion of the information with whi

gence deals. Prominent front-page coverage of some international dev

will attract more attention from far more people than any intelligence 

and will probably engender requests from policy officials for comme

ther analysis. Sustained press attention to a critical situation is almost 

raise the level of concern and to influence intelligence reporting on th

It is probably true that if the responsible press is forecasting war, it 

unnecessary for intelligence to alert the policy official. For example, i

ful that classified information added much, other than more specifi

details and some private opinions of statesmen, to the overwhelming 

conveyed in the world press of the coming of World WarII.
162

 Most observers have a vastly oversimplified view of warning intelli

tend to view it as a compilation of facts which should lead to an either-

sion, or as something which we either do or do not have. Warning on th

is a highly complex judgmental process in which the collection and com

the available evidence is only a portion of the problem, and in which ou

ceptions, together with the enemy’s efforts to deceive and mislead us, a

if not more important. 

So-called warning failures usually result primarily from inaccurate 

plete analysis of the available information, rather than from deficienc

lection, although good collection obviously is essential to warning. 

judgments do not necessarily result from bringing more people into t

ment process, and particularly those who are not familiar with all the 

information. The most accurate warning judgments often are made by 

of individuals. The coming of most conflicts is much longer term than 

ple believe, and the first indications of the approaching crisis are often 

(if not discerned) months before the conflict erupts. As a research probl

ing involves an in-depth, cumulative compiling and analysis of these t

developments rather than an excessive concentration on the latest or mo

information, which can be highly misleading. The most difficult dete

often is the timing of attacks, which is flexible and subject to change an

easily concealed than the buildup of the military capability.

Both new analysts and more experienced ones, as well as their super

policy officials, should have an understanding of warning and wher

problems are likely to lie. There is need for a continuous process of ed

this field. But there is no assurance that any educational program or t

will ensure us warning in the future. We will all remain vulnerable and 

varying degrees in each new warning crisis. There is no guarantee tha

“have warning’’ the next time. We can never hope to solve our warning 

but only to make some progress in understanding what they are so th

we will be less likely to make the same errors another time.

Each new warning failure, complete or partial, brings forth its rash o

tem studies and recommendations for changes that will improve our 

capabilities.’’ Rarely, if ever, is there anything new in these recomm

other than slight variations in the proposals for a revamping of the orga

structure. The suggestions for improving our warning almost invariab

some of the points repeatedly made in this book. Just as the mistakes ma

warning failure are old ones, so are the proposals for doing something ab

Nothing is going to remove the uncertainties of the warning probl

is no way, short of being able to read the adversary’s mind, that we ca

fident that our warning judgments, or even many of our “facts,’’ are g
163

accurate insight into the enemys intentions, particularly if he is using 

cated security and deception measures to conceal them. Moreover, it i

certainty that individuals will continue, as they always have, to come 

ent conclusions, even diametrically different conclusions, as to wha

dence means. As we have been surprised in the past, we shall be surpr

in the future.

MOST FREQUENT IMPEDIMENTS TO WARN

The tendencies discussed in each of the following sections frequen

coming to judgments of another country’s intentions or lead to incorre

ments. But as indicated, we can make some intellectual or behavioral re

each area of concern. The result can be a more professional approach to 

ligence warning responsibility.

Inadequate Examination of the Evidence

It is almost impossible to give too much stress to the importance o

meticulous and exhaustive examination of all available information 

reaching warning judgments. It is erroneous to presume that all res

automatically be accomplished in crisis or budding crisis situations, o

organization and distribution of work within the office or offices involv

essarily adequate for the purpose. Much good research or imaginative th

indications and warning problems may not be published or receive muc

unless positive steps are taken to insure that such ideas are surfaced or 

The inadequate examination of available evidence has been a contribu

to nearly every warning failure, and in some cases should probably be c

the major cause of failure. It is essential to warning that enough peopl

right people, be assigned to the research effort; that management at 

encourage this effort; and that judgments be reached in the light of a 

examination of all relevant information and hypotheses.

Inadequate Understanding of Evidence or Precedent

It is possible to examine all available information and still not to u

its significance in relation to intentions. This may be because the info

fragmentary, conflicting, ambiguous, or of uncertain reliability or signi

in which case, of course, it may not be possible to understand it, at lea

further information. But it may also be that there are people who under

can interpret it, or who are knowledgeable about some obscure deta

enemy’s doctrine or procedures, or terminology, or how he has behav

Some relevant information is likely to be from highly classified sources

covertly acquired military documents—and therefore has been 

restricted in distribution. Some developments are likely to be highly 
164

other information can be critical to an understanding of what is really h

The recognition and interpretation of true indications—those acti

are bona fide preparations for hostilities rather than exercises or other 

activities—can be heavily dependent on this type of detailed know

expertise. So can a recognition that the adversary is engaging in a milita

tion effort, a perception which may be absolutely vital to warning. It i

not to lose this kind of expertise when it is most needed. In warning epi

need of the community for expert assistance in a whole range o

subjects—and to a lesser extent, political—skyrockets. 

Excessive Preoccupation with Current Intelligence

 It is possible that the single most prevalent misconception about w

that the latest information is necessarily the most important, or that wa

be insured (or at least made much more likely) if only collection can b

up and information communicated more rapidly to more alert centers. T

of this type of preoccupation with the currency of information are lik

twofold: long-term, basic intelligence and in-depth analysis tend to suff

the allocation of personnel and in prestige; and the cumulative analysis 

tions tends to be forgotten in favor of portraying the latest information 

or display boards in situation rooms. From this, it is but a step to acc

view that what the adversary is doing this minute is the most important 

of his intentions, or that information which is more than 24 hours old is 

or at least of minor value to warning.

But this is not strategic warning—and excessive attention to curren

tion tends to obscure the significance of strategic, long-term actions b

tial adversary. The whole pattern of what the adversary has been do

ready for major military operations over a period of weeks and month

political and diplomatic preparations that he has taken to support th

plans are overshadowed by the seeming lull in activity which so often p

dramatic action. In this atmosphere, it is easy to believe that the adv

changed his mind and called it all off. “The situation is quiet.’’

Warning is cumulative, not merely current. Intelligence reporting a

must take care to insure that the consumer knows the cumulative ba

and understands that the latest indication is but one of many whic

totality give us insight into what may occur. 

Predominance of Preconceptions over Facts

It is now widely recognized by professionals that this is one of the 

ous obstacles to the issuance of warning. Studies by social scientists 

firmed what indications analysts have learned from experien

judgments are often reached on the basis of prior concepts as muc
165

larly true if there is a widespread prevailing climate of opinion that 

different conclusion from the available facts. As a general rule, the m

spread and firmly held an opinion is, the more facts will be required t

strate the inaccuracy of the widely held premise. In warning, we 

pressed for time and we are short on dependable facts. Thus, both tim

nature of our evidence will tend to work against the analytical acce

new courses of behavior by our adversaries, particularly if that cours

to be radically different from what we had come to expect.

Failure to Come to Clear Judgments

This is one of the common inadequacies in the warning process 

involve at least two types of mistakes. The first is the failure to follow 

from the evidence to some logical conclusion as to what it means 

terms. The second is to fail to come to any judgment as to the significa

development in terms of the adversary’s likely course of actions; that i

to no judgment as to intent. A warning judgment is a culmination of a 

lesser judgments, each one of which may be important to the final con

to intent. The first judgment to be made, after the evidence is collected, 

facts being reported have some potential relevance—either po

negative—to the adversary’s ultimate course of action. The failure to 

judgments of enemy intentions at all, and to limit the comments to a sta

capabilities, may arise from just carelessness or inadequate considerat

impact of the text on the reader. But it may be used also to cover up r

ences of opinion as to the intentions of the adversary.

Misjudgments of Timing

One of the greatest hazards in warning is the attempt to predict whe

operations or other hostile action may be initiated. Numerous historical 

demonstrate that, even when predictions of forthcoming action have b

accurate, estimates of timing have often been wide of the mark. This sit

result in false alarms (the “cry wolf’’ syndrome) and an ensuing rel

alertness by the time the attack occurs. Less frequent, perhaps, is the ap

tiation of the attack before it was expected; this misperception may re

deliberate deception from the adversary.

The Reluctance to Believe: the Search for “Other Explanati

Those who have never worked on indications problems might be 

the seeming inability of some people to cope with apparently obvious 

their reluctance to believe what appears to be staring them in the face. T

viduals have an aptitude for finding possible explanations for the fac

other than the obvious one. Indeed, this is the favored method of unde

warning judgment when there are just too many facts to push them a
166

matter how implausible, to account for each and every indicationoth

ominous one that the adversary might be planning some hostile act. 

The proclivity for offering other explanations for potentially omino

opments can be most damaging when a roundup of indications is 

including a number of developments and reports from sources of varyin

ity and whose significance or purpose has often not been firmly establi

often, these cumulative roundups of indications have proved to be 

barometers of impending action, even though they may have been ina

some particular details. To reject this type of analysis out-of-hand b

some other reason for every item can defeat the warning process when 

most important to national security or the security of friendly military f

 Warning assessments are sometimes obvious and offered us on 

which all can perceive, but not often. They are usually subtle, elusive, a

dent on the most imaginative analysis of available information and 

insight into the adversary’s state of mind. There are few indications 

some palliative or non-alarming explanation cannot be found, if one 

hard enough. If we are to have warning when we most need it, we m

that we do not permit those who are the most conservative or most re

believe new information or imaginative interpretations to have the last w

destroy the fabric of indications thread by thread.

The Reluctance to Alarm

Not surprisingly, there is a considerable reluctance—which 

increases the higher one moves in the governmental hierarchy—to bo

superiors with problems that can be solved at a lower level, or to al

unnecessarily. It is much easier for working level analysts, who do 

responsibility for doing anything about potentially nasty situations, t

conclusions that hostile or other surprise action is impending, or may 

is for those higher up who must directly warn the policy official 

action themselves. The more serious or dangerous the action the poli

may have to take, the more proof he is likely to want that it is necessa

other hand, if there is nothing that can or should be done about the 

which is sometimes the case, it can be argued that there is no point in 

senior officials. Thus, the Intelligence Community is restrained in s

sure, both when action may be required and when it may not, fro

warning which it either cannot “prove’’ or which for some reason ma

mature, unnecessary or superfluous. This restraint of course wil

increase if intelligence has issued one or more false warnings (cried 

the policy official has been critical of this action and has made it cle

does not want to hear anything more of that nature.
167

policy in this matter. I have found, in discussing this subject with a n

individuals, mostly outside or new to the intelligence system, that man

that intelligence tends to be alarmist and to issue unnecessary warning

to be on the safe side. Thus, the “warnee,’’ who is expecting this behav

to discount or to play down the import of what he is being told. He feels 

being over-warned. Policy officials generally, in this view, distrust intel

some measure, not because it is incompetent or lacks imagination, but 

is self-serving and seeks to justify its usefulness and importance by s

unnecessary flaps.

 Insofar as this opinion prevails among policy officials, it is gravel

and a potential cause of much misunderstanding. In my considerab

ence with this type of problem, it has been evident that the Intellige

munity tends to be extremely cautious in reaching alarming conclusio

pick its words with great care so as not to appear to be nervous or 

sional. The generally prevailing view is that the sophisticated intellig

lyst should never get excited, never lose his cool, and never use 

adjectives or other strong phrases to convey his meaning. Rather, 

play down the situation, appear calm and detached. The greatest sin o

be alarmist, or to rock the boat. 

Thus, the true professional will under-warn, even to the point that the 

will have to read between the lines or ask for further information to real

is being warned at all. I do not believe that this exaggerates the case. A

of “warnings’’ issued to policy officials over a period of years will show 

have tended to be most conservative and restrained in wording, to avoid 

predictions of impending disaster, and in some cases to warn indirectly 

guity, omission or subtleties—some of which may be lost on the consum

precept of warning that the policymaker must know that he has been wa

he may have an honest difference with the intelligence writer who con

his moderate and qualified warning should have been adequate to get 

across.

 Although intelligence personnel would probably be reluctant to adm

probably are inclined to withhold firm warning when they either believ

policymaker will not take action on the issue, or in their view should 

limited and restrained warnings of possible North Korean attack on So

in the spring of 1950 almost certainly were occasioned in part by o

intelligence that the U.S. would not do anything about such an attac

gence tends to respond strongly and in volume on matters which it know

icy official is interested in and plans to take action on, while it will 

attention to subjects which it believes, rightly or wrongly, will not requ

action. The degree of alarm over developments is directly related to w

may become involved or not.
168

risky or undesirable it also tends to greater restraint in its warning ju

The rationale for this is that no action on our part is called for and th

is unnecessary, or undesirable, to alert the policy official unduly. Th

sion appears almost inescapable that this attitude lay behind som

reluctance to issue firm warning of a Soviet invasion of Czechoslo

which a U.S. or NATO military alert might have been counterproduc

The Fear of Being Wrong

A primary reason for the reluctance to warn appears to be the fea

wrong. This tendency may also be termed “the need to appear to h

right.’’ This is a product of natural human inclination (who wants 

wrong?) and the types of pressures put on intelligence personnel to b

and not to mislead their superiors. It is bad enough to make a mistake 

minor factual matter; even these can reflect adversely on the agency

mance, particularly if some publicity is given the error. It is obviou

worse to be wrong on matters which could have a grave impact on natio

decisions, the security of military forces, or other important issues. The

intelligence questions on which it is probably more important to be righ

the community and the individual agencies, than warning. We think: b

ambiguous, or to phrase warning in terms of capabilities (which we ten

we do have a firm handle on), or to project the idea that the adversary h

come to a decision as to what he is going to do. This way we will b

appear right, or at least we will not be demonstrably wrong, no matter w

it goes.

I can attest that this is an extremely compelling factor in influencing 

ing of warning judgments and probably the principal contributing facto

sive caution. It afflicts even those who tend toward a firm positive 

What they are willing to say in private informal conversations and off-

statements is often considerably tempered when they have to put it in 

formal intelligence opinion. After all, there is a lot we are not sure abou

adversary always could change his mind. Let’s hedge our bets a little an

few “possibly’s’’ into the judgment. I recall a discussion with a very c

intelligence officer who held an important supervisory position during t

oslovak crisis in 1968. After the invasion, I asked him why it was, w

evidence at hand, the Intelligence Community could not come to a firm

judgment that a Soviet invasion was probable (not inevitable, just prob

reply was that it was the fear of being wrong. I agree.

The intelligence analyst is also influenced by the fact that errors of 

sion almost always are considered more reprehensible than errors of om

is usually safer to fail to predict something which does happen than 

positive prediction that something will happen and it does not. In the fi

can always be maintained that there was insufficient evidence to come 
169

analysts, however, take the position that it is better to have alerted polic

and the military command several times in error than to fail to do so 

hostile action actually occurs. They argue that it would have been bett

forecast the Chinese intervention in Korea erroneously than to contri

indirectly to the disaster which resulted at least in part from the failur

Evidence of the value of overcoming the fear of being wrong is rare, 

and tends to be forgotten in the long intervals between crises. The next 

tion may again prevail and those who fail to issue firm warning will lik

no setbacks to their careers. After all, they just did not have enough evi

************** 

As intelligence collection becomes more sophisticated, volumi

expensive, and devices multiply for the rapid reporting and commu

exchange and display of the latest information, we must take care that 

lose sight of what warning really is: the considered judgment of the fi

lytic minds available, based on an exhaustive and objective review of al

indications, which is conveyed to the policy official in sufficiently c

language that he is persuaded of its validity and takes appropriate acti

tect the national interest.
170
171

A

Alerts 70-71

Analysis (see Indications Analysis; Warning Intelligence) 

B

Bayes Theorem 50, 151-153, 156

Belden, Thomas B. 141

Berlin

Blockade 78

Closure of sector borders 35, 124

C

China (see Korean War)

Clay, General Lucius 78

Climate of Opinion 87, 157-158

Combat Readiness 70-71

Cuban Missile Crisis 7, 11, 23, 29-30, 35, 47, 86, 92, 93, 102-103, 124

143, 156, 

Current Intelligence 5-7

Czechoslovakia (crisis of 1968/invasion of) 11, 19, 27-28, 29-30, 47, 

63, 72-73, 75-76, 81-82, 93-94, 101-102, 115-116, 126, 156, 159

D

Deception 72-73

And assessments 151

Infrequency & neglect of 119-120

Principles & Techniques 120-122

Types of 122-128

What can we do about it? 129-132

Decisionmaking 103-108

Defensive Preparations 73-74

Delphi Procedure 153-154

H

High Command 69-70

Hungary (1956 revolt, suppression of) 19, 28, 59, 124
172

Indications/Indicators

Compiling Indications 29-30

Definitions 3

Indicator Lists 25-28

Indications Chronology 31-32

Long-Term Warning Files 32

Uses of Indicator Lists 28-29

Indications Analysis 

Acceptance of New Data 44-47

Consideration of Various Hypotheses 48-50

Effects of a Recent Crisis 158-160

Fundamentals 32-50

Inadequacy of our Knowledge 33-36

Inference, Induction and Deduction 42-44

Isolating the Critical Facts and Indications 96-98

Need to Reach Conclusions 41-42

Negative Indications 98-99

Objectivity and Realism 39-41

Presumption of Surprise 36-37

Scope of Relevant Information 37-39

Understanding How the Adversary Thinks 47-48

Intentions Versus Capabilities 17-24

J

Judgments

Major Factors Influencing 157-161

Value/Importance to Warning 133-136

What Do Consumers Need & Want 136-140

K

Kent, Sherman 139, 145-146

Khrushchev, Nikita 93, 155

Korean War 83, 87-88, 89, 99, 113-114, 122, 124

Chinese Intervention in 16-17, 19, 26, 46-47, 58-59, 74, 92, 

113-114, 128

L

Laos: North Vietnamese Attacks in 117-118

Logistics 19, 62-69
173

Medical Preparations 67-68

Middle East/Arab-Israeli Conflicts 89-90, 95, 101, 114-115

Military Indications and Warning 51-76

Capabilities17-24

Combat Preparations/Deployments 69-76

Nature & Importance of 51-53

Order of Battle (see separate heading)

Understanding How a Nation Goes to War 53-55

Mobilization 60-61, 64

O

Order of Battle (OB) 43-46, 55-60, 61-62, 152

Conventional Methodology 55-58

Indications Analysis of 58-60

Needed: A Voice for Warning 61-62

P

Pearl Harbor Attack 89, 121-122, 123, 132

Poland: Soviet Forces in 59-60

Policy/Policymakers 

Intelligence in Support of 140-145

Requirements of 136-140

Political Factors in Warning 77-94

Ambiguity of 77-79

Critical Role of 79-81

Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 89-90

Importance of Particular Issues 85-87

Likelihood of Conflict 84

Perception Fundamental 81-83, 84-89

Press Coverage of Intelligence 161

Probabilities 12-13, 20

Analytic Procedures 151-154

Assessing 145-146

Low Probabilities and Critical Dangers 154-155

Probabilistic Information Processing 146-151 

Propaganda 90-92, 95

R

Ridgeway, General Matthew 88

Romania 159
174

Soviet Union (see also Cuban Missile Crisis, 25, 27, 66, 88, 101-102, 1

Czechoslovakia

Stalin, Josef 88, 94

Suez Crisis (1956) 32, 122

Surprise Attacks 89, 109-112, 120-122

Surprise, Presumption of 36-37

T

Timing of Attacks 109-112

Examples of Assessing Timing 112-118

V

Vietnam War 21-22, 45-46, 71, 87, 93-94, 117-118, 122, 138

North Vietnamese Mobilizations 61, 86, 92

W

Warning Intelligence

Assessing Timing 109-118

Definition of 2

Function of 1-3

Guidelines for assessing evidence 100-103

How Early is “Early Warning”? 143

Not a Forecast of Imminence 118

Strategic Versus Tactical 3-4

Unanimity or Footnotes 143-145

Warning from the Totality of Evidence 95-96

What is Warning 4-17

Assessment of Probabilities 12-13

Judgment for the Policymaker14-15

Leads to Action 15-16

Not a Commodity 4-5

Not a Compilation of “Facts” 7-8

Not Current Intelligence 5-7

Not a Majority Consensus 8-9

Requires Exhaustive Research 9-12

Whaley, Barton 110-111, 120, 121

World War II (see also Pearl Harbor)

German Attack on Holland, Belgium and France (May 1940) 112

Soviet Attack of Japanese Forces (Aug 1945) 112-113, 125
175

The author with Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., Director of the Defense Intelli

The Pentagon, December 1979

177

Intelligence College

Pickert, Perry L. Intelligence for Multilateral Decision and Action, 1997.

Clift, A. Denis. Clift Notes: Intelligence and the Nation’s Security, 2000.

Ensign, Eric S., LT, USCG. Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea, 1920-1933

Clift, A. Denis. Clift Notes: Intelligence and the Nation’s Security. 2nd ed., 

Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, 2