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MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II

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MAJOR GENERAL SILAS B. HAYS

THE SURGEON GENERAL

1955-1959
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Prepared and published under the direction of

Lieutenant General LEONARD D. HEATON

The Surgeon General, United States Army

Editor in Chief

Colonel ROBERT S. ANDERSON, MC, USA

Editor for Medical Supply

CHARLES M. WILTSE, Ph. D., Litt. D.

OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1968
MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Advisory Editorial Board on the History of Medical Supply

Major General PAUL I. EOBINSON, USA (Ret.), Chairman

Major General SILAS B. HAYS, USA (Ret), (dec.)

Brigadier General BRYAN O. T. FENTON, USA (Ret.)

Colonel ALFRED R. CANNON, MSC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel THEODORE M. CAROW, MC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel JOHN E. HAUGHET, MSC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel JOHN M. HUNT, Jr., MSC, USA

Colonel JENNER G. JONES, MC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel JOHN L. OWENS, VC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel R. L. PARKER, MSC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel BERNARD N. RIORDAN, MSC, USA (Ret.)

Colonel CHARLES F. SHOOK, MC, USA (dec.)

AGNES C. ADAM

HERMAN C. HANGEN

KENNETH E. RICHARDS

Colonel ROBERT S. ANDERSON, MC, USA (ex officio)

The Historical Unit, United States Army Medical Service

Colonel ROBERT S. ANDERSON, MC, USA, Director

CHARLES J. SIMPSON, Executive Officer

HAZEL G. HINE, Chief, Administrative Branch

ERNEST ELLIOTT, Jr., Chief, Editorial Branch

RODERICK M. ENGERT, Chief, General Reference and Research Branch

ROSE C. ENGELMAN, Ph. D., Chief, Historians Branch

GERALDINE B. SITES, Acting Chief, Information Activities Branch

Lieutenant Colonel JOSEPH ISRAELOFP, MSC, USA, Chief, Special Projects Branch

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 68-61753

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $8.25 (Buckram)
MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY

The volumes comprising the official history of the Medical Department

of the U.S. Army in World War II are prepared by The Historical Unit, U.S.

Army Medical Service, and published under the direction of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army. These volumes are divided into two series: (1) The

administrative or operational series; and (2) the professional, or clinical and

technical, series. This is one of the volumes published in the former series.

VOLUMES PUBLISHED

ADMINISTRATIVE SERIES

Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior

Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters

Organization and Administration in World War II

Personnel in World War II

CLINICAL SERIES

Internal Medicine in World War II:

Vol. I. Activities of Medical Consultants

Vol. II. Infectious Diseases

Vol. III. Infectious Diseases and General Medicine

Neuropsychiatry in World War II:

Vol. I. Zone of Interior

Preventive Medicine in World War II:

Vol. II. Environmental Hygiene

Vol. III. Personal Health Measures and Immunisation

Vol. IV. Communicable Diseases Transmitted Chiefly Through Respiratory and Alimentary Tracts

Vol. V. Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact Or By

Unknown Means
vjü MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Preventive Medicine in World War II—Continued

Vol. VI. Communicable Diseases: Malaria

Vol. VII. Communicable Diseases: Arthropodborne Diseases Other

Than Malaria

Surgery in World War II:

Activities of Surgical Consultants, vol. I

Activities of Surgical Consultants, vol. II

General Surgery, vol. II

Hand Surgery

Neurosurgery, vol. I

Neurosurgery, vol. II

Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology

Orthopedic Surgery in the European Theater of Operations

Orthopedic Surgery in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations

The Physiologic Effects of Wounds

Thoracic Surgery, vol. I

Thoracic Surgery, vol. II

Vascular Surgery

Miscellaneous:

Blood Program in World War II

Cold Injury, Ground Type

Dental Service in World War II

Physical Standards in World War II

Radiology in World War II

Veterinary Service in World War II

Wound Ballistics
Foreword

Imagine if you can the entire population of the city of New York suddenly

dispersed around the world, dependent upon the U.S. Army for medical attention under every conceivable circumstance, and you will begin to comprehend

the magnitude of the medical supply operation in World War II. Then,

remember that the medical materiel used to care for these 8 million people

was only the end-product. The process began with forecasting requirements

for global war, and planning procurement. It included the acquisition of raw

materials in the face of unprecedented competition, the construction of factories, and the creation of entire industries. It included transportation from

mine or farm or forest to processing plants, from plants to depots, and from

depots to the far corners of the earth, wherever American troops were stationed. It included the classification and selection of items and the packaging

of these into an incalculable number of hospital assemblies, dispensaries, medical and dental chests, kits, and packets designed for individual use. It entailed

the continuous flow in enormous quantities of more than 7,000 standard medical

items and many, many more that were not standard: billions of Atabrine

tablets, millions of surgical needles, thousands of X-ray machines. It included

huge storerooms piled high with hospital beds, vaults filled with narcotics,

refrigerators by the tens of thousands filled with antibiotics and vaccines, and

planes carrying penicillin and whole blood packed in Dry Ice. The individual

items ranged from the simple, inexpensive wooden tongue depressor to the

costly and delicate electroencephalograph. In overall terms, more than a billion pounds of medical supplies were purchased between 1 July 1941 and

30 June 1945, at a total cost of a billion dollars. Packed in freight cars, the

items purchased over this 5-year span would fill a train 400 miles long.

The following account of the U.S. Army medical supply system as it

existed during World War II is neither strictly chronological nor wholly

functional, but a combination of both, balanced to show so far as possible how

completely interrelated were the various aspects of the system. The account is

based on hundreds of documents—reports, correspondence, directives, and statistical records—generated as the war progressed; and on the recollections and

personal narratives of scores of individuals who participated in the various

supply activities, at home and in the theaters of operations. If passage of

time has dimmed and softened memories, it has also brought a sense of perspective, expressed in a more considered view of the triumphs and the failures

than would have been possible immediately after the events had taken place.

With all due allowance for the inadequacies of documents hastily prepared in the midst of combat, for memories modified by time, and for the

understandable bias of each Medical Supply Officer in favor of his own operation, it is an impressive and inspiring story. The unstinting labors, unending

sacrifices, and limitless devotion of medical supply personnel around the world

provided the means of treating and caring for some 14 million hospital patients
MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

and of dispensary cases beyond the counting. However fine the doctor or skilled

the surgeon, both were helpless without the drugs and instruments flowing

uninterruptedly through the smoothly organized channels of medical supply.

LEONARD D. HEATON,

Lieutenant General,

The Surgeon General.
Preface

This important volume in the administrative history of the U.S. Army

Medical Department, in "World War II has itself had a long, and somewhat

checkered, history. The work was begun a decade ago under the aegis of

an Advisory Editorial Board, whose members are listed on the flyleaf of this

book. Key figures, both in stimulating and in organizing the study, were Col.

Charles F. Shook, MC, who chaired the Board, Maj. Gen. Silas B. Hays, and

Maj. Gen. Paul I. Eobinson. These three, all retired Medical Corps officers with

wide and distinguished experience in varied aspects of medical supply, comprised a dynamic subcommittee dedicated wholly to the task at hand despite in

each instance a full-time and exacting second career. To spearhead the project,

they selected Lt. Col. (later Col.) B. L. Parker, MSC, who gave to the project

the better part of 5 years before he, too, retired from active service. With the

cooperation, and sometimes the collaboration, of the working subcommittee,

Colonel Parker prepared the detailed outline of a book. Then, with the sure

hand born of intimate knowledge, he selected literally scores of individuals who,

in one way or another, had participated in the medical supply operations of

World War II, and assigned them topics connected with their own expertise

upon which to write or comment. Before his retirement, therefore, Colonel

Parker had not only assembled a manuscript from the many contributions of

former medical supply personnel, but had made great progress in reshaping and

revising the vast amount of material within it to a usable level.

Colonel Parker's retirement and the unfortunate death of General Hays

left The Historical Unit with an incomplete manuscript, which had to be put

aside because staff replacements were not then available. When it became possible to resume activities, Mr. William D. Shaver, formerly of the Historians

Branch, was selected for the assignment. Working under the direction of the

undersigned, and using as guidelines valuable suggestions made by the Office

of the Chief of Military History, he reorganized the study, integrated the various individual contributions, and revised and rewrote as seemed indicated. The

work as it progressed was reviewed by General Robinson and Colonel Shook,

the two surviving members of the working group. Colonel Shook, regrettably,

did not live to see the book in print, but read and commented upon the entire

manuscript. In its present form, it carries the final approval of both men.

If any one individual could be singled out as author, it would have to be

Mr. Shaver, but the contributions of so many others have been so important

that it would be unfair to give preeminent credit to any one of them. The entire

list of contributors and reviewers appears under Acknowledgments. Very special thanks are due, however, to Colonel Shook, General Hays, and General

Robinson, as well as Colonel Parker. Others who labored long and diligently

to make the book a success are Mrs. Claire M. Sorrell of the General Reference

and Research Branch, Mrs. Martha R. Stephens of the Editorial Branch who

did the editing, Mrs. Marjorie G. Shears the index, and on the maps Miss
Xll MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Elizabeth P. Mason and Miss Jean A. Saffran, of the Special Projects Branch.

Thanks are also due to Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, Office of the Chief

of Military History; and to Col. John Boyd Coates, Jr., MC, former Director

of The Historical Unit, USAMEDS, who set the whole project in motion.

CHARLES M. WILTSE.
Acknowledgments

The distinction between "Contributor" and "Eeviewer" is sometimes tenuous, but, generally defined, a contributor actually wrote a draft manuscript

which might vary from a few pages to one or more chapters, while a reviewer

read and commented upon one or more of these drafts. It sometimes happened

that the same man who contributed to one part of the book also reviewed another

part, so that a few names occur in both categories. It should be pointed out,

however, that the majority of the contributors devoted long hours and much

time to the preparation of their contributory manuscripts and, thus, if any

distinction were to be made, it must be in their favor. All names are listed here

in alphabetical order, with grateful thanks to each and every one.

Contributors:

Miss Agnes 0. Adam

Col. James J. Adams, USA (Ret.)

OWO Lawrence M. Albright, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Robert L. Black, USA (Ret.)

Ool. Claude C. Britell, USA (Ret.)

Col. Alfred R. Gannon, USA (Ret.)

Col. Charles W. Carter, AUS (Ret.)

Col. John Boyd Coates, Jr., MC, USA

Col. Eugene G. Cooper, USA (Ret.)

Col. Roscoe T. Crane, MSC, AUS (deceased)

Lt. Col. Mitchell W. Fetherolf, MSC, AUS

Lt. Col. Stanley M. Folkman, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Charles L. Gilbert, USA (Ret.)

Col. Ralph E. Graham, AUS (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Earl A. Grove, MSC, AUS

Col. Augustus J. D. Guenther, USA (Ret.)

Herman C. Hangen

Col. John E. Haughey, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Silas B. Hays, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

Lt. Col. Douglas Hesford, MSC, USA

Col. John M. Hunt, Jr., USA (Ret.)

Col. Roland H. Hand, USA (Ret.)

Col. Howard C. Jones, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Jenner G. Jones, MC, USA (Ret.)

Col. Everett G. King, MC, USA

Russell S. Kribs, formerly Captain, MSC, AUS

Lt. Col. Claud D. LaFors, USA (Ret.)

Col. Alfonso M. Libasci, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Ool. John E. Mathis, MSC, USA

Col. Thomas R. McCarley, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Vincent H. McLaughlin, MSC, AUS

Col. Albert E. Minns, Jr., AUS (Ret.)

Ool. William J. Moreland, USA (Ret.)

Ool. GeorgeT. O'Reilly, USA (Ret.)

Col. John L. Owens, USA (Ret.)

Col. Allen flPappas, USA (Ret.)
xiv MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Contributors—Continued

Col. R. L. Parker, USA (Ret.)

Col. Glenn C. Parmelee, AUS (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Allan W. Phelps, MSC, USAF

Maj. Gen. Laurence A. Potter, MC, USA

Robert E. Pryor, formerly Captain, MAC, AUS

Kenneth E. Richards, formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MAC, AUS

Col. BernardN. Riordan, USA (Ret.)

William R. Rivkin, formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Maj. Gen. Paul I. Robinson, USA (Röt.)

Lt. Col. George W. Schwager, AUS (Ret.)

William D. Shaver

Col. Charles F. Shook, MC, USA (deceased)

Lt. Col. Charles J. Simpson, AUS (Ret.)

Col. BurwellB. Smythe, USAF (Ret.)

Lt. Col. Roger J. Snowdon, MSC, AUS

Lt. Col. Leo P. Solinger, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Thomas B. Stewart, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Paul H. Streit, USA (Ret.)

Col. Joseph J. Strnad, OrdC, USA

Col. Joseph C. Thompson, MSC, USA

Col. John H. Trenholm, USA (Ret.)

William B. Wagner, formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MAC, AUS

Col. Louis F. Williams, USA (Ret.)

Reviewers:

Miss Agnes C. Adam

Col. Stephen G. Asbill, VC, USA

Howard F. Baer, formerly Colonel, MAC, AUS

Ernest C. Baldwin, formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Leonard H. Beers, formerly Colonel, MAC, AUS

J. Herman Belz, formerly 1st Lieutenant, MAC, AUS

Col. Robert L. Black, USA (Ret.)

Col. Stanley W. Bullis, USA (Ret.)

Capt. Herbert J. Burke, MSC, AUS (deceased)

Col. Alfred R. Cannon, USA (Ret.)

Col. Charles W. Carter, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Joe N. Cole, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Martin A. Compton, USA (Ret.)

Col. Roscoe T Crane, MSC, AUS (deceased)

James A. Cunningham, Jr., formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Howard F. Currie, formerly Colonel, MC, AUS

Lt. Col. Warren W. Daboll, MSC, AUS

Mrs. Delia Solomon Danzig

Maj. Gen. Guy B. Denit, USA (Ret.)

Fred D'Oench

Thomas P. Dunn, formerly Captain, SnC, AUS

Lt. Col. James L. Fink, USA (Ret.)

Nephtune Fogelberg, formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Marvin A. Fortner, formerly Captain, MAC, AUS

Abraham Freedman, M.D., formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MC, AUS

Thomas N. Gee, formerly Captain, MAC, AUS

Col. Charles L. Gilbert, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Martin E. Griffin, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

Col. Oscar B. Griggs, USA (Ret.)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XV

Reviewers—Continued

Col. Charles G. Gruber, AUS (Ret.)

Herman C. Hangen

Mace A. Harris, formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Col. Revel E. Hewitt, USA (Ret.) (deceased)

I. Smith Homans, Jr., formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Col. Howard C. Jones, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Gordon S. Kjolsrud, MSC, USAF

Elroy W. LaCross, formerly Captain, MAC, AUS

Lt. Col. Irwin Lee, AUS (Ret.)

Col. George E. Leone, USA (Ret.)

Francis C. Little, formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MAC, AUS

John A. MacCartney, formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Lt. Col. Arthur I. Mahler, AUS (Ret.)

Col. Hubert T. Marshall, USA (Ret.)

Lt. Col. John E. Mathis, MSC, USA

Maj. Gen. Earl Maxwell, USAF (Ret.)

Col. Thomas R. McCarley, USA (Ret.)

Col. John L. Owens, USA (Ret.)

Col. Allen Pappas, USA (Ret.)

Col. Frederick H. Petters,' USA (Ret.)

Ellsworth W. Pohl, formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MAC, AUS

Walter H. Potter, formerly*Lieutenant Colonel, SnC, USA

Richard J. Prentiss, formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Col. Ryle A. Radke, USA (Ret.)

Kenneth E. Richards, formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MAC, AUS

Col. Bernard N. Riordan, USA (Ret.)

Frederic N. Schwartz, formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MAC, AUS

Lt. Col. Roger J. Snowdon, MSC, AUS

Edward J. Sovatkin

Col. Royal K. Stacey, USA (Ret.)

Maj. Gen. Earle G. G. Standlee, USA (Ret.)

Brig. Gen. James B. Stapleton, USA (Ret.)

Col. Thomas B. Stewart, USA (Ret.)

Eric A. Storz, formerly Lieutenant Colonel, MSC, AUS

Col. Alfred C. Strode, MSC, USA

Samuel E. Stuart, M.D., formerly Colonel, MC, AUS

Col. Joseph C. Thompson, MSC, USA

Harold R. Van Blaricon, formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Adolph I. Weil, Jr., formerly Captain, MAC, AUS

A. Turner Wells, formerly Major, MAC, AUS

Col. Louis F. Williams, USA (Ret.)

Mrs. Clara B. Wilson

Robert E. Wilson, formerly Major, MAC, AUS (deceased)
Contents

Page

FOREWORD ix

PREFACE Xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiÜ

Chapter

I The Medical Supply System 1

Medical Supply Between Wars 1

Transition to War, 1939-42 9

Medical Supply for Global War 18

Logistical Support of Combat Areas 27

Parti

PEOCUEEMENT AND DISTEIBUTION OF MEDICAL

SUPPLIES IN THE ZONE OF INTEEIOE

II Central Procurement of Medical Supplies 35

Medical Supply Under the Army Program 35

Placing Purchase Orders 40

Aid to Manufacturers 45

Allocation of Materials 49

Manpower Problems 56

Inspection of Medical Supplies 58

Contract Termination 60

III Procurement of Problem Items 63

Surgical Dressings 63

Blood Plasma 67

Surgical Instruments 68

Penicillin 71

Atabrine 73

Spectacles 75

Artificial Eye Program 87

Hearing Aids 89

Orthopedic Equipment and Supplies 91

Books and Journals 96

Property Exchange Items. 98

IV Maintenance and Repair Parts 101

Evolution of Maintenance Requirements 101

Technical Training 104

Support of Using Organizations 110

Maintenance Shop Operations 111

Catalogs and Technical Manuals 114

Maintenance Achievement 117

295-453 O—68 2 XVÜ
XV111 MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Chapter Page

V Storage and Distribution of Medical Supplies 119

Packing and Packaging Problems 119

Storage of Medical Supplies 127

Distribution of Medical Supplies to Zone of Interior Installations 132

Distribution of Medical Supplies to Theaters of Operations 143

VI Medical Supplies Under Lend-Lease 155

Role of the Medical Department in Lend-Lease 156

Military and Civilian Lend-Lease Requirements 160

Reorganization and Realinement of Responsibilities 162

Problems of Lend-Lei*se Administration 166

Other Relief Activities 170

Part II

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN THE WAR AGAINST THE

EUROPEAN AXIS

VII Outposts and Supply Routes 173

North Atlantic Bases 173

Caribbean Defense Command 185

South Atlantic Theater 191

Africa-Middle East Theater 194

VIII Mediterranean Operations 203

Planning for the Invasion of North Africa 203

Assault on North Africa 205

Establishment of Base Section Medical Supply 209

Tunisia Campaign 214

Formation of Services of Supply 219

Island Campaigns 221

Assault on Italy 227

Rome-Arno Campaign 235

Southern France Campaign 242

North Apennines Operation 249

Po Valley Campaign 253

Some Supply Activities in Review 254

Support of Civilian Populations 260

Redeployment 264

IX Europe: Preinvasion Buildup in the United Kingdom 265

Prelude 265

Medical Supply 265

Medical Supply Depots 270

Early Preparations for Operation OVERLORD 275

Mounting Concern Over Supply 279

Voorhees Mission 280

Reorganization for Invasion 283

Supply in Fixed Installations 297

Supply Points in Marshaling Areas 299

Items Having Special Significance 300

First U.S. Army Scheme of Supply in Combat 305

Approach of D-Day 306
CONTENTS xix

Chapter Page

X Europe: Combat Operations on the Continent 307

Medical Supply Support on Normandy Beaches 307

The Burgeoning Depot System 311

Supply Division on the Continent 313

Expansion of Depot Operations on the Continent 317

Forward Depots 326

Recurring Problems of Medical Supply 337

Medical Maintenance and Spare Parts 342

Innovations in Supply Technique 345

Supply Activities, United Kingdom Base 350

Medical Depot Support of the Advance Into Germany 353

Supply Functions in 1945 369

Civil Affairs Medical Supply 375

XI Redeployment and Occupation 379

Redeployment Planning 379

Medical Supply Actions 380

Supply Activities in the Occupation 383

Civil Affairs 388

Summary 390

Part III

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN THE WAE AGAINST JAPAN

XII Pacific Medical Supply in the Period of Defense 393

Medical Supply in the Middle Pacific 393

Medical Supply in the Defense of the Philippines 399

Medical Supply Activities in Australia—1941-42 402

Buildup in Australia 411

Medical Supply in the South Pacific 420

Medical Supply Activities in Alaska During the Defense Period 427

XIII Offensive Operations: The Solomons to the Palaus 431

South Pacific Area 431

New Guinea Campaigns 438

Southwest Pacific Area 450

Changes in Theater Supply Procedures 455

New Georgia Campaign 456

Aleutian Islands Campaign 459

Alaskan Garrison, 1943-44 464

Bougainville Campaign 467

Central Pacific Area 468

Voorhees Mission to the Pacific 478

XIV The Philippine Islands Campaign 483

Planning and Operation of the Leyte Campaign 483

Supply Operations With X Corps on Leyte 486

Changes in the Combat Situation 490

Medical Supply Support of the Luzon Operation 493

Medical Supply in the Southern Philippines 500
xx MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Chapter Pa9

e

XV The China-Burma-India Theater 507

Beginnings of Medical Supply Activities in 1942 507

Growth of Medical Supply 509

Medical Supply During 1944 515

Impact of the Voorhees Mission 522

Improvement of the Supply System and Its Procedures 524

Major Accomplishments of 1944 526

Progress in 1945 527

XVI Okinawa and the Occupation of Japan and Korea 531

Supplying the Okinawa Operation 531

Planning the Assault on Japan 536

Reorganization of the Medical Supply System 540

Philippine Islands Base Sections 542

Occupation of Japan 549

Medical Supply Operations in Korea 554

Civilian Aid 555

Disposal of Excesses and Surplus Property 556

Unusual Problems of Medical Supply 557

General Considerations and Conclusions Regarding Medical Supply in

World War II 559

APPENDIXES

A Medical Depot Information 563

B Medical Lend-Lease Statistics 569

C Sample Equipment Lists (Evacuation, Station, and General Hospitals) 571

INDEX. 629

Illustrations

Figure

1 Col. Francis C. Tyng, MC 10

2 Maj. Gen. James C. Magee H

3 Building No. 40, St. Louis Medical Depot 16

4 Col. Edward Reynolds, MAC 20

5 Chest, plasma, complete 25

6 Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley 29

7 Sternberg General Hospital 31

8 Steps in the production of surgical steel instruments 48

9 Litter, folding, aluminum 49

10 Manufacturing transformer components for X-ray machines 50

11 Woman operating forklift truck 57

12 Samples of surgical instruments 70

13 Fitting gas mask spectacles in the European theater before D-day 81

14 Mobile optical repair unit 83

15 Interior of mobile optical repair unit 84

16 Portable optical repair unit loaded on jeep 85

17 Portable optical repair unit in use at Oahu 86

18 Fitting a hearing aid 90

19 Artificial limb-fitting laboratory, Lawson General Hospital 92

20 Technicians make artificial limbs, Lawson General Hospital 93

21 Making final adjustment on prosthesis 95
CONTENTS xxi

Figure Page

22 Packing room and book section, Medical Section, Chicago Quartermaster

Depot 97

23 Familiarization of students with 30-ma. Army field X-ray unit 107

24 Medical Department maintenance and repair tool kit 108

25 Fifth echelon repair shop, Arsenal Reservation, St. Louis 112

26 X-ray and electrical shop, Arsenal Reservation, St. Louis 113

27 Providing adequate protection for tubes and gages on sterilizers 122

28 Sample board to identify medical instruments 124

29 Window showing job openings at San Francisco Medical Depot 129

30 Use of pallets in warehouses 133

31 Hospital assembly, ready for overseas shipment 136

32 Portion of New York Port of Embarkation 145

33 Lend-lease medical supplies for China, unloaded at Calcutta 157

34 Planes at Tehran carry supplies and equipment to Russia 167

35 U.S. ship at Khorramshahr ready to discharge supplies 169

36 Panoramic view of Fort Pepperrell across Quidi Vidi Lake 177

37 U.S. Army Hospital, Fort Bell, St. David Island ___ 179

38 Army and Navy area, Greenland Base Command, including the 188th

Station Hospital 181

39 Placing medical supplies under tarpaulin, Langhold Dump, Iceland 183

40 Early, temporary, primitive dispensary in Iceland 184

41 Lt. Col. George E. Leone, MC 192

42 Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams 195

43 Loose issue room, Medical Supply Section, Khorramshahr Depot 199

44 Medical supply issue room, 26th Field Hospital, Khorramabad 201

45 Oran Medical Depot: Supply warehouse, optical shop, and issue section 212

46 Medical maintenance unit 214

47 Indigenous personnel unloading supplies at Casablanca 215

48 Cut-down version of medical maintenance unit 217

49 Col. Charles F. Shook, MC 218

50 U.S. lend-lease supplies for the French Army, Casablanca 220

51 Beach medical maintenance unit 222

52 Box shop in Oran 224

53 Landing craft, infantry, unloading supplies 228

54 Naples Fair Grounds served as a medical depot site 230

55 Medical supply, 300th General Hospital, Naples 232

56 Mortar shell cases used at Anzio 234

57 12th Medical Depot Company, Fifth U.S. Army 236

58 Two general hospital assemblies, stored at Oran, replaced those lost in bombing at Bari 239

59 Walk-in refrigerators at medical depot in Oran 240

60 U.S. Army Medical Depot, Leghorn 241

61 Skate conveyors, Medical Depot M-452, Marseille 244

62 Beach medical supply dump in southern France 246

63 Medics of the 10th Mountain Division pull sled of medical supplies up the

Apennines 255

64 Repair of X-ray generators at depot in Oran 256

65 Improvised wash sink and operating lamp 258

66 Italian personnel at Medical Depot 3L50 sort surplus medical supplies 261

67 Hospital plant at North Mimms, Hertfordshire, included the 1st General

Hospital 268

68 Quartermaster Depot G-50, Taunton, Devonshire, England 271

69 Medical Department chests Nos. 1 and 2 276

70 Brig. Gen. John A. Rogers . 278
XXÜ MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Figure Page

71 Lt. Col. Bryan C. T. Fenton, MC 281

72 Breakage of medical supplies on incoming shipments 290

73 Brig. Gen. William E. Shambora '. 296

74 Whole blood for the "milk run to the Continent" 301

75 Medical care on Omaha Beach, June 1944 308

76 Unloading a medical assembly for the 5th General Hospital at Carentan,

France 314

77 Advance Platoon, 32d Medical Depot Company, receiving supplies in France,

September 1944 319

78 Tank retrievers deliver medical supplies to Depot M-407, at Paris 323

79 Loading prepacked medical supplies into 155-mm. shell for airdrop 324

80 Captured German tractor and heavy-duty skids move materiel at Depot

M-402T, Carentan, France 326

81 Bargeloads of medical supplies on dockside of Medical Depot M-407 327

82 Medical Depot M-409, Liege, Belgium 328

83 Materials-handling equipment at Medical Depot M-413, Charleroi, Belgium. 330

84 The 32d Medical Depot Company mobile optical shop at Metz, France,

December 1944 332

85 Besieged soldiers collect airdropped supplies, Bastogne, Belgium 336

86 Medical supply point at Gare St. Lazare, Paris 340

87 Repairing field autoclaves at the Medical Maintenance and Repair Shop,

Depot M-407 343

88 Fabricating spectacles at the base optical shop, Paris, February 1945 346

89 Mobile repair teams service forward medical installations from their spare

parts truck 347

90 Whole-blood refrigeration unit installed on a wheeled machinegun mount 349

91 Medics of the 4th Infantry Division, Third U.S. Army, on an assault boat

loaded with medical supplies 358

92 Central supply of the 48th Field Hospital, Friedrichsfeld, Germany 361

93 Medical supplies captured at a Nazi hospital, April 1945 371

94 German ammunition boxes were used as packing material 373

95 Assembly of Panniers for Civil Affairs channels at Depot M-412 377

96 Processing line at Depot M-418, Mourmelon-le-petit 381

97 Furth Medical Depot, Nürnberg, operated by 33d Medical Depot Company- 385

98 Sorting captured German medical supplies 389

99 Tripler General Hospital . 394

100 2d Lt. Allan W. Phelps with native workers; and the medical supply warehouse on Christmas Island 398

101 9th Medical Supply Depot, Melbourne, Australia 404

102 Lt. Col. Alfonso M. Libasci, MC 408

103 Wreck of freighter SS Rufus King near Brisbane, Australia 410

104 Transporting supplies and equipment for a portable surgical hospital, Australia, 1942 415

105 Improvised medical jungle kit 416

106 Troops loading on Australian corvette for transfer to New Guinea 419

107 Interior of medical supply warehouse in Brisbane, Australia 420

108 U.S. Army medical supply depot in New Caledonia, 1942 425

109 Individual jungle kit used in the Pacific areas 433

110 Storage of medical supplies, 68th Medical Depot Company, Guadalcanal 435

111 Native-type warehouses, constructed under direction of Corps of Engineers._ 436

112 Interior of 3d Medical Supply Depot, Brisbane 440

113 Hospital ship Maetsuycker . 445

114 Deterioration of medical supplies at Oro Bay, New Guinea 446

115 Local issue office, 29th Medical Depot Company, Finschhafen, New Guinea. 451
CONTENTS xxiü

Figure page

116 Conveyor system used on Morotai Island 452

117 Supplies piled on the beach at Attu, Aleutian Islands 461

118 Tractor bogged down in mud at Massacre Bay, Attu 463

119 Arctic first aid kit 466

120 Surgical team arrived via SCAT plane at Bougainville 468

121 Medical supply dump on Saipan 474

122 Docks at Red Beach, Angaur 477

123 LST headed for invasion of Leyte 484

124 Discharging supplies at the docks at Tacloban 487

125 Japanese medical supplies captured on Leyte 489

126 Eighth U.S. Army headquarters near Telegrafo, Leyte 491

127 Lumber for building at the 34th Medical Depot Company at Tacloban 492

128 Issue warehouse, 49th Medical Depot Company, Manila 499

129 Medical supplies being packed in an 80-inch howitzer canister 500

130 Taking inventory of medical supplies, 41st Infantry Division, Zamboanga 502

131 A tent at the 74th Medical Supply Dump and setting up the 74th Medical

Base Depot Company, Parang, P.I 505

132 Brig. Gen. Robert P. Williams 508

133 Col. John M. Tamraz, MC 509

134 Pack train fording a river near Nasin, Burma 512

135 Native laborers working at the Calcutta Medical Depot 519

136 C-47 transports lined up on the airstrip at Myitkyina, Burma 520

137 Men in a C-47 deliver supplies in the field in Burma 521

138 Distribution of medical supplies by the 14th and 25th Medical Depots 525

139 Col. George E. Armstrong, MC ,. 527

140 Troops head for the beaches in the invasion of Okinawa 532

141 Medical supply dump on Okinawa 534

142 Transferring cargo to smaller craft for delivery to the beach 535

143 General view of docking and incoming ships at Base X port area, Manila 544

144 Receiving section and warehouse, 49th Medical Depot Company, Quezon

City 545

145 Maintenance Section Shop, 49th Medical Depot Company 548

146 Optical Section Shop, 49th Medical Depot Company 549

147 Parachute airdrop pack 550

148 St. Luke's International Hospital, Tokyo 551

149 Civilian relief supplies at Tacloban, Leyte Island 556

Maps

Number

1 Supply routes to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East 174

2 Medical supply installations in Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland 176

3 Medical supply depots in the Caribbean Defense Command, 1941-43 186

4 Medical supply depots in North Africa, 1942-43 206

5 Medical supply depots in Sicily, July-August 1943--- 225

6 Movement of 4th Medical Supply Depot and 12th Medical Depot Company in

Italy, September-December 1943 231

7 Medical supply depots in Italy, January-September 1944 237

8 Seventh U.S. Army depots in southern France, 16-29 August 1944 247

9 Seventh U.S. Army depots, 5-19 September 1944 248

10 Medical supply depots in northern Italy, October 1944-May 1945 254

11 Medical supply depots in the United Kingdom, December 1943 273

12 Supply points in marshaling areas, United Kingdom, May 1944 300
xxiv MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Number Page

13 Medical supply depots on the Normandy Beachhead and the Cotentin Peninsula, June-July 1944 309

14 Medical supply depots operating in France and Belgium, August-November

1944 318

15 First U.S. Army medical supply depots in France and Belgium, October-December 1944- 331

16 Third U.S. Army medical supply depots, October-December 1944 333

17 Seventh U.S. Army medical supply depots in northern France, OctoberDecember 1944 334

18 Ninth U.S. Army depot operations, September-December 1944 335

19 Supply depot movement in the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944 338

20 First U.S. Army medical supply depots in Belgium and Germany, January-May

1945 354

21 Third U.S. Army medical supply depots in Germany, January-May 1915 356

22 Captured enemy supply dumps in Germany, February-April 1945 357

23 Operations of 33d Medical Depot Company, 1945 359

24 Seventh U.S. Army medical supply depots in France and Germany, 1945 360

25 Ninth and Fifteenth U.S. Army depot operations in northern Europe, 1945 363

26 Rear support depots, Belgium, France, and Germany, 1944-45 366

27 Occupation zones and medical depots in postwar Germany and Austria, 1945__ 384

28 Supply routes to the Philippine Islands, 1941-42 405

29 Medical supply depots and base sections in Australia, April 1942 407

30 Bases in Papua, New Guinea, 1942-43 418

31 South Pacific supply points, 1942 423

32 Supply points in Alaska, 1942 429

33 Medical supply support on Guadalcanal 432

34 Medical supply points, Bougainville and the South Pacific Area, 1943-44 434

35 Medical supply depots in Australia, 1943 441

36 Medical supply support for the New Guinea operations, 1944 449

37 Medical supply support for Operation CHRONICLE 453

38 Medical supply in the New Georgia campaign, 5 September 1943 458

39 Medical supply support in the Attu campaign, 4 May 1943 462

40 Medical supply on Kiska 464

41 Medical supply support of the Bougainville campaign, 1943 469

42 Operations in the mid-Pacific, 1943-44 470

43 Medical supply depots on Leyte, 1944-45 488

44 Medical supply facilities on Mindoro, 15 December 1944 494

45 Medical support for the Luzon operation, January-June 1945- 496

46 Medical supply depots at Subic Bay and the Manila Bay area, 1945 497

47 Medical supply depots in southern Luzon, 1945 501

48 Medical supply in the southern Philippines, 1945 503

49 Medical supply depots, CBI theater, 1942-43 510

50 Medical supply depots, CBI theater, 1944 518

51 Medical supply points on Okinawa, 1945^ 533

52 Bases supporting operations in Japan, 1945 539

53 Manila base depot system, 1945 546

54 Postwar medical supply system in Japan and Korea, 29 September 1945 553
CONTENTS XXV

Tables

Number Page

1 Scarce materials saved by Medical Department conservation measures, 1942-43- 47

2 Medical supplies for U.S. forces in the United Kingdom from British and

American sources, 1942-44 w7U

3 Medical depots and medical depot sections in the United Kingdom, 31 December 1943 272

4 Key depot system, United Kingdom, 1944 *

o;>

5 Hospitals serviced by medical depots in the United Kingdom, December 1944- . 352

6 United Kingdom depot status report, 15 January 1945 353

7 Depots on the Continent, 1 November 1944 365

8 Tonnage: Medical supply depots in Manila, April-September 1945- 547
CHAPTER I

The Medical Supply System

MEDICAL SUPPLY BETWEEN WARS

The disruption of the national economy and the delay in delivery of military supplies which developed during World War I convinced Congress of

the wisdom of industrial preparedness. The National Defense Act of 1920

charged the Assistant Secretary of War with the "supervision of the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization

of materiel and industrial organizations essential to war-time needs." The

italicized phrase conveyed authority for the far-reaching procurement planning program which began in 1920 and continued until our entrance into

World War II.

Organization for Procurement Planning

The administrative organization for the accomplishment and supervision

of Medical Department procurement planning was established on three levels:

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, the Surgeon General's Office,

and the depots of the Medical Department. The overall responsibility of the

Secretary was delegated to a Procurement Division established in the War

Department late in 1921. On the second level, a procurement planning section

was set up in the Finance and Supply Division of the Surgeon General's Office,

in June 1922. Designated variously as 'section,' and 'subdivision,' this element of the Finance and Supply Division was charged with "the collection of

information and compilation of data pertaining to sources of [medical] supply." It began its work with only one full-time officer.1

The field organization for procurement planning was determined by the

location of Medical Department depots and was affected to a lesser extent by

the establishment in 1923 of 14 War Department Procurement Districts. These

14 districts were combined into 4, with headquarters at New York, N.Y., Chicago, 111., St. Louis, Mo., and San Francisco, Calif. The choice of cities was

determined largely by the location of depots handling medical supplies and

by the distribution of the industries concerned. Eeorganization of War Depart1

(1) Memorandum Orders No. 1, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 25 Oct. 1921, subject:

Procurement Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, 1922. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922. Series cited hereafter

as Reports of TSG, with appropriate dates. Monthly progress reports on Procurement Planning were

submitted to the Assistant Secretary of War, beginning in 1924. In April 1925 quarterly reports were

substituted, and in 1931 these were replaced by annual reports.

k
2 MEDICAL SUPPLY

ment procurement activities in 1933 had little or no effect upon the procurement planning activities of the Medical Department. Although an additional

center was established at Birmingham, Ala., it remained comparatively inactive and was abolished in 1939. For all practical purposes, procurement planning activities of the Medical Department were confined throughout this period

to the four cities designated in 1923.2

Personnel engaged in procurement planning in the field also handled current procurement. In St. Louis and San Francisco, the procurement officers of

the depots were assigned procurement planning as an additional duty. The

medical supply officer at the Chicago Quartermaster Depot doubled as the procurement planning officer. Only in the medical section of the New York General Depot, which handled the overwhelming bulk of Medical Department procurement, were personnel assigned exclusively to procurement planning, the

number of officers varying from one to six.3

Accomplishments in Procurement Planning

If the difficulties, delays, and embarrassments that had hampered Medical

Department operations in World War I were to be avoided, it was clearly

necessary to determine in advance (1) what supplies and equipment would be

required in the event of war, (2) in what quantity, and (3) from what manufacturing facilities they could be obtained. The preparation of specifications

and tables of equipment, and the computation of requirements, were carried

out in Washington, D.C.; the location and survey of facilities, and the preparation of production schedules, were the responsibility of the field offices.

The determination of requirements involved, first of all, the preparation of

specifications for medical supplies and equipment. The usefulness and military

serviceability of the items to be procured were given primary consideration,

but experience in World War I had made it apparent that exclusive attention

to these aspects would hamper the procurement effort. To describe characteristics which would be ideal might easily result in specifying an item which

could not be manufactured in sufficient quantities. "The best is the enemy of

the good" applies with special force to wartime procurement. It was the policy

of The Surgeon General, therefore, to bear constantly in mind the desirability

of making Medical Department specifications conform to the best commercial

practices in size, quality, and packaging. Close contact was maintained with

national trade associations and the Federal Specifications Board, as well as

with the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy Department.4

In 1928, a total of 3,712 items in the supply catalog required specifications.

By the end of that year, specifications for 1,213 of these items had been prepared and had received the approval of the War Department. This number

2

(1) Memorandum, The Adjutant General to The Surgeon General, 9 Mar. 1933, subject: War

Department Procurement Zones. (2) The Story of Medical Department Procurement Planning, 1920-

1940. [Official record.] (3) Annual Report of Procurement Planning, Medical Department, 1 July 1934.

3 Reports of TSG, 1923-39.

* Reports of TSG, 1925-27.

A
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 6

was increased to 1,494 by 1932. In 1933, however, a new policy was adopted,

which slowed down the process of preparing specifications, but which injected

a large element of realism into those which were approved. All specifications

prepared during 1933 and subsequent years were subjected to the test of purchasing before they could be approved as official U.S. Army specifications.

Until such approval was received, they were described as "Medical Department

tentative specifications." By 1937, the test of purchasing had been applied to

such an extent that 1,062 items of medical supply were covered by Army specifications. This number was increased to 1,137 in 1938 and to 1,570 in 1939.

The Medical Department Supply Catalog in the latter year listed a total of

4,652 items, 3,018 of which comprised the component parts of individual equipment, organizational equipment, and equipment of field hospitals, known collectively as "war items."

Estimating requirements.—In the meantime, the procurement planning

section of the Finance and Supply Division had been steadily engaged in determining the quantities of medical supplies which would be needed in the event

of war. Of all the tasks connected with procurement planning, none was more

tedious, complicated, and uncertain in its accomplishment than the computation

of requirements. Although not primarily guesswork, as the critics of procurement planning occasionally charged, the process did involve considerable

prophecy, which was almost as hazardous. Eequirements figures, moreover,

were subject to frequent change and revision to keep abreast of medical and

pharmacological advances and to reflect changes in mobilization plans. Within

these limitations, requirements figures were a necessary part of procurement

planning. Questionable though they might be, they offered the only comparatively stable goal towards which procurement efforts could be directed.

In the computation of requirements, the first important element to be

determined was the "troop basis"—the size and composition of the Army

which was to be raised if war should come. This information was provided by

general mobilization plans prepared by the General Staff and approved by the

Secretary of War. In the fall of 1921, the first mobilization plan in the Nation's history was prepared, calling for a total of 1.5 million men. This plan

was revised in 1928 and again in 1933, when a considerably larger force was

contemplated. In 1938, the Protective Mobilization Plan was approved. This

included an "Initial Protective Force" of approximately 400,000 and authorized successive augmentations, if the emergency required it, to an aggregate

strength of 4 million men.5

Tables of equipment and allowances constituted the next important element entering into the computation of requirements. These tables indicated the

types and quantities of medical supplies and equipment to be furnished to each

troop unit in the mobilization plan. From 1925, the Surgeon General's Office

intermittently prepared and revised tables of equipment and allowances. By

6

(1) Letter, The Adjutant General to The Surgeon General and others, 13 Oct. 1921, subject:

Computation of War Requirements and the Determination of Surplus. (2) Tyng, Lt. Col. F. C, MC,

"Speech for Advanced Class, Carlisle Industrial Mobilization," 19 Oct. 1938. [Official record.]
4 MEDICAL SUPPLY

1927, tables had been prepared for the most important types of Medical

Department field installations, including general, surgical, convalescent, evacuation, and station hospitals of various sizes; hospital trains, convalescent

camps, and Army dispensaries; expansion equipment for field hospitals; and

medical regiments, which were then the most important troop units for the

evacuation and treatment of battle casualties. In common with other aspects

of procurement planning, these tables were subject to frequent change; a thorough revision, begun in 1930, was practically completed by the end of 1931.6

Mobilization plans and equipment and allowance tables made possible the

computation of initial supplies and equipment which would be needed by various troop units, but they provided little information as to the quantities that

would be consumed in training or in battle. Additional information was necessary before maintenance requirements could be computed. To predict the

future by an examination of the past, the Procurement Planning Section

resorted to the supply and medical statistics of World War I. Maintenance

factors thus developed, indicated probable rates of use for each item of supply

and equipment, both in the Zone of Interior and in the theaters of operations.7

The revised mobilization plan of 1933 made it necessary to recompute all

requirements figures, a task completed for the Medical Department late in

1935. By this time also the cubic volume and the weight of nearly half the

medical items had been determined, thus providing valuable information for

the preparation of shipping schedules. Beginning in 1936, the monthly cost of

medical supplies to be procured in the event of war was estimated for each

item, and the total cost of each month's requirements for mobilization was

computed. The Protective Mobilization Plan of 1938 forced still another

sweeping revision of Medical Department requirements figures, a revision

which had not been completed when German divisions crossed the frontier into

Poland.8

Locating manufacturing facilities.—While the Surgeon General's Office

was estimating the quantities of medical supplies which would be required in

time of war, the procurement planning sections of medical depots were locating

and surveying the manufacturing facilities which could produce these supplies.

Potential producers were located by various means: contacts with trade and

manufacturing associations; references to Thomas' Register; and by use of the

Bidders' List, which was maintained in the purchasing section of all depots and

which contained the names of all manufacturers and dealers who had bidden on

Medical Department contracts. When a summary appraisal of a facility indicated its probable usefulness to the Medical Department, the procurement district informed The Surgeon General, who asked the Assistant Secretary of War

to allocate the facility to him. This device gave the Medical Department a virtual

«Reports of TSG, 1927 and 1931.

7

(1) Strong, Maj. E. R., MC, "Procurement Planning II." [Official record.] (2) Speech, Maj.

Gen. Robert Ü. Patterson to Army Industrial College, September 1931.

8

(1) Reports of TSG, 1931, 1934-36, and 1939. (2) Letter, Col. H. K. Rutherford, Director,

Planning Branch, to The Surgeon General, 27 Mar. 1939, subject: Acceleration of Procurement

Planning.
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 5

monopoly of the military production of the factory affected. By 1928, a total of

1,294 facilities, nearly half of them located in the area extending from Philadelphia, Pa., to Boston, Mass., had been earmarked in this way for the Medical

Department. Numerous changes reduced the number of single allocations to 467

by 1937, a number which remained virtually unchanged through 1939.9

After a manufacturing plant had been allocated to the Medical Department, it was surveyed to determine its capacity and to evaluate its equipment,

its sources of power and raw materials, the adequacy of its transportation, and

the number and quality of its employees. The surveys themselves, however,

were of widely differing reliability. If the procurement planning officer lacked

interest or ability, the survey was hasty and superficial; if the management of

a plant cared little for governmental orders or was skeptical of procurement

planning, not enough information could be obtained.10 In too many instances,

moreover, restrictions upon travel funds forced reliance upon correspondence

instead of on personal inspection.

While the procurement planning officers in the field were making these

surveys, medical supply officers in Washington examined the data collected

and apportioned Medical Department requirements directly to the allocated

facilities. Tentative schedules of production were prepared and presented by

the appropriate district procurement planning officer to each manufacturer

concerned. The schedule, when approved by the manufacturer, was termed an

"accepted schedule of production" " and was filed in the Surgeon General's

Office. While these schedules obligated neither party, they did serve to inform

the manufacturer of the Medical Department's probable needs, and to give

The Surgeon General an estimate of a plant's ability to satisfy the needs. It

was expected that the schedules would enable procurement officers, upon the

outbreak of war, to place contracts promptly for all medical supplies and

equipment required in mobilizing a large army.

Between 1923 and 1939, considerable progress was made in the preparation

of these schedules. By 1930, a total of 1,713 items had been covered; by the

end of 1935, the number had grown to 2,985. In 1938, the task was virtually

completed although numerous revisions were expected as changes in Medical

Department requirements and the capacity of manufacturing plants became

evident. Indeed, the schedules of production, as guides to procurement, could

have little value if they were not constantly revised. No manufacturer could

be sure of producing a stated quantity of items after the outbreak of war

unless he knew that raw materials, tools, and labor would be available, and

» (1) Allocation of Facilities, 1928. [Official record.] (2) Progress Report of Medical Department,

Supply Branch, 30 June 1932. (3) Report of TSG, 1937. In addition to the single allocations, there were

6 joint allocations, 54 allocations for the Army and Navy Munitions Board, and 3 for the Office of the

Assistant Secretary of War.

10 (1) Statement of Col. Earle G. G. Standlee, MC, to Lt. (later Capt.) Richard E. Yates, MAC,

9 Jan. 1945. (2) Letter, Capt. Earle G. G. Standlee, MC, to Medical Supply Officer, New York General Depot, 15 Oct. 1936, subject: Survey of Facilities.

11 Before 1926, the term "war order" was used to describe these schedules. In that year, however, use of the term was discontinued because the schedule was not in fact an "order" in any legitimate sense. It was no more than an estimate of capacity to produce a given item.
8 MEDICAL SUPPLY

result and a storm of criticism would be engendered. Not to provide it is to

neglect the lessons of the Spanish-American and World War and to reverse

the practice of the Medical Department for the last twenty-five years, a policy

which has been successfully defended before and approved by Congress." The

Surgeon General then listed supplies and equipment which should be stored

as unit assemblies for a large number of field hospitals, hospital trains, medical laboratories, medical regiments, and other installations. In addition, he

requested authority to hold in reserve considerable quantities of strategic and

critical drugs, field dressings, and surgical instruments.14

In September 1924, The Surgeon General was authorized to store as war

reserves a portion of the assemblies and items which had been requested. Much

of the material was assembled from World War I surpluses. Some unit assemblies were sharply reduced in number, and others were eliminated entirely; the

strategic and critical drugs were approved without change; all field dressings

were struck from the list, except 1 million first aid packets; and the quantities

of surgical instruments were greatly reduced. "You are further directed," The

Adjutant General concluded, "to initiate a program extending over four years

for building up the existing shortages at the rate of $25,000 a year." 15

The War Reserve thus approved by The Adjutant General was estimated

to be sufficient, when shortages were eliminated, to supply two field armies, or

1 million men, for 2 months. The production lagtime of most items far

exceeded 2 months, but there were other, more serious deficiences in the War

Reserve. The stocks of medical supplies were not in the proper depots, nor

were they suitably assembled. The total value of the authorized War Reserve,

including the Quartermaster items in the unit assemblies, was slightly over

$24 million, but the value of the stocks actually on hand in February 1926

was less than $9 million. Thus, there was a deficiency of some $17 million,16

and the only authorized provision for filling this large gap was the program

to spend $25,000 a year for 4 years. Repeated efforts to obtain additional funds

brought no result. In 1933, a new authorized War Reserve provided a smaller

quantity of medical supplies and equipment, but 2 years later, The Adjutant

General was informed that even the smaller requirements could not be fulfilled.

Among the more serious shortages were hospital assemblies, medical kits, and

veterinary kits.17

In the accumulation of strategic drugs, the Medical Department's efforts

attained a larger measure of success when authority was granted in 1925 to

establish stockpiles containing 113,000 pounds of opium, 13,000 pounds of nux

"Letter, Maj. Gen. M. W. Ireland to The Adjutant General, 18 Apr. 1924. This letter was

examined by Capt. Eichard E. Yates, MAC, in the preparation of the original draft of the Zone of

Interior portion of this TOlume, but has since been lost or destroyed.

15 (1) Letter, Maj. Gen. H. H. Tibbetts to The Surgeon General, 6 Sept. 1924. (2) See footnote

14, above.

18 Includes a surplus of approximately $2 million in two units.

17 (1) See footnote 7 (1), p. 4. (2) Letter, Col. Edwin P. Wolfe, MC, to The Adjutant General, 21 Dec. 1925, subject: Status of War Reserve, and 1st indorsement thereto. (3) War Reserves—

Prepared in Response to Letter of February 11, 1926. [Official record.] (4) Letter, Lt. Col. T. J.

Flynn, MC, to The Adjutant General, 4 Nov. 1935, subject: Revision of Status Reports Required

by AG 381.4.
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 9

vomica, and a quantity of cocaine sufficient for 2 years. This program entailed

very little expense for the supplies of opium and cocaine, seized by the Federal Narcotics Control Board, were transferred to the Medical Department

without cost. By the end of 1938, the stockpile of opium had been increased to

192,000 pounds, and 133,200 pounds of quinine were in the reserve. Largely at

the instigation of the Medical Department, additional supplies of both drugs

were procured over the next 3 years.18

TRANSITION TO WAR, 1939-42

From the outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939 until the

attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States gradually called into being a portion of its great potential military strength and prepared to enter the conflict

if necessity should so dictate. This period of more than 2 years was marked

by a succession of important developments abroad, each of which served as

a warning to the United States and influenced Congress and the President to

increase the pace of military preparations. From the standpoint of the supply

officer, this 2-year period was a difficult one. It was neither peace nor war, but

a frustrating mixture of both. The hypothetical "M-day" on which procurement plans were to be invoked never came. Mobilization took place piecemeal,

but was nevertheless far advanced by the time Japanese bombs struck Pearl

Harbor.

Organizational Changes

Until a major reorganization in the summer of 1942, the supply functions

of the Surgeon General's Office continued to be performed within the Finance

and Supply Division, of which Lt, Col. (later Col.) Francis C. Tyng, MC (fig.

1), became chief in May 1939. Neither was there any significant change in

responsibilities during this period, except for the elimination of the Procurement Planning subdivision late in 1941 and the transfer of the planning activity to current procurement. The period was marked primarily by expansion

to keep pace with the needs of the expanding Army. The 7 officers and 27 civilians who made up the Finance and Supply Division in September 1939 had

grown to 16 officers and 201 civilians by December 1941. The depot system by

the latter date had 125 military and 2,700 civilian employees.

To administer the growing medical supply organization, experienced men

were brought in from civilian life, and Kegular Army officers were given special training. A few days before the German invasion of Poland, a number of

individuals "especially suited to industrial preparedness" were commissioned

and assigned to the Finance and Supply Division. Plans were made for their

training in the offices of the Assistant Secretary of War and The Surgeon Gen18 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. R. D. Harden, MC, to Col. B. E. MacMorland, Ord C, Office of the

Assistant Secretary of War, 21 Nov. 1938. (2) Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War, vol. I, p. 75. (3) Study SR-428-326, "Stockpiles of Strategic and Critical Materials.

Part I. Opium : Probable Source and Cost of a Postwar Stockpile," August 1944. Foreign Economic

Administration, Office of Economic Programs, Supply and Resources.
10 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 1.—Col. Francis C. Tyng, MC, Chief, Finance

and Supply Division, 1939-43.

eral and in Medical Department field installations. The Army Industrial College continued to train a number of Medical Corps officers. Three Regular

Army officers were graduated in 1940. In 1941, 4 Regular Army officers and

8 Reserve officers finished the course, bringing to 56 the number of medical officers who received training at the Army Industrial College during the years

1924-41. In addition, special efforts were made to provide training for Reserve

officers who had not relinquished their civilian occupations. In 1940, 23 of these

officers took a course of instruction in procurement at the Medical Section, New

York General Depot, for which they had been prepared by a correspondence

course given a few months earlier.19

Planning for Procurement

The supply activities of the Surgeon General's Office during this period

were largely of a planning and supervisory nature. The Finance and Supply

Division maintained close contacts with the Office of the Assistant Secretary

19 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. E. E. Murrell, MC, to the Executive Offleer, OTSG, 31 Aug. 1939,

subject: Procurement Planning, SGO. (2) Reports of TSG, 1940. (3) Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. F.

Shook, MC, to Col. Charles Hines, Secretary, Army and Navy Munitions Board, 20 Feb. 1940.
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 11

FIGUBE 2.—Maj. Gen. James C. Magee, The Surgeon

General, U.S. Army, 1939-43.

of War, and later, with the Under Secretary of War. As the rearmament program gained speed, these agencies of the War Department observed the procurement progress made by the technical services and enunciated broad policies

for their guidance. The Finance and Supply Division received these directives,

interpreted them to its field installations, and compiled the many reports required by higher authority. In addition, the division rendered aid to depots,

procurement officers, and manufacturers who needed help in obtaining preference ratings, component parts, labor, machine tools, transportation, and other

essentials in the fabrication of medical supplies.

Closely connected with procurement planning, and of critical importance

in supply preparedness, was the Medical Department War Reserve. Hastily

assembled from unbalanced stocks at the conclusion of World War I, the War

Reserve was inadequate during the 1920's and 1930's; it was still inadequate,

both in quantity and quality, when the United States was precipitated into the

war. The reserve was poorly assembled and packed, contained obsolete items,

and was not large enough to provide for even modest wartime needs. Maj. Gen.

James C. Magee, The Surgeon General (fig. 2), commented bluntly on the matter

to the General Staff in May 1940. "Theoretically," he declared, referring to the
12 MEDICAL SUPPLY

unit assemblies of the War Beserve, "there are available 54,750 fixed beds. But

it must be clearly understood that the supplies and equipment are of 1918 vintage, incomplete in modern operating room equipment, wholly deficient in essential laboratory equipment, totally lacking in X-ray, physical therapy and

hydrotherapy equipment, and stocked with scientific items" already obsolete or

rapidly becoming so. This state of affairs had been caused by lack of money,

for which, in turn, a general indifference to any kind of military expansion

was responsible. "No funds for medical preparedness were allotted the Medical

Department since the close of the World War until 1940 when the sum of

$295,000 was appropriated and used in the replacement of obsolete items and

modernization of combat equipment required for the I.P.F. [Initial Protective

Force]." In November and December 1939, estimates were submitted to the

Budget Officer, War Department, of funds needed to complete the shortages

for the Protective Mobilization Plan ($2,696,685) and to provide essential

items for an enlarged Regular Army and National Guard ($5,327,000). Both

programs, however, were disapproved by higher authority. The Surgeon General then presented a detailed statement of the hospital assemblies urgently

required upon mobilization and which, because of delay in procurement, should

be built up before the war. "I have not," he concluded, "at the War Department's disposal for any emergency one complete, modern 1,000 bed general hospital for instant dispatch." 20

A year later, thanks in part to the limited mobilization inspired by Hitler's success in Europe, but more immediately to General Magee's efforts, there

were more than 30 properly equipped general hospitals in the War Reserve,

together with half as many 750-bed evacuation hospitals and a number of smaller units.21

Procurement of Medical Supplies

Although procurement planning and additions to the War Reserve continued during this period, the most important duty of the Finance and Supply

Division was the procurement of medical supplies and equipment for an

expanding Army and National Guard. On 8 September 1939, the President

authorized the Regular Army to increase its strength to 227,000 enlisted men,

with a proportionate increase in officer personnel. At the same time, authority

was granted to augment the National Guard to 235,000 men. Additional increases in the Regular Army and National Guard were made during 1940, and

in the summer of that year, the National Guard was called into the Federal

service. On 1 July 1940, the Medical Department was procuring supplies and

equipment for a Military Establishment of 800,000 men. The largest peacetime

Army in the Nation's history, 1,650,000 men, was gradually mobilized; but,

20 Letter, Maj. Gen. James C. Magee to The Adjutant General, 10 May 1940, subject: Status of

Medical Department for War.

21 Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 77th Congress, First Session, on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1942, p. 491

(8 May 1941).
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 13

even so, the great increase in Army strength placed severe burdens upon a procurement service which had been geared to a much lower level.

Purchasing officers at the New York General Depot (which procured 90

percent of the medical supplies during this period) and in other depots maintained a Bidders' List including the names of all known manufacturers and

dealers capable of filling Medical Department orders. The names of all contractors who had previously filled Medical Department orders were placed on

the list; others were added as they were able to convince the Medical Department that they could supply the items needed. Manufacturers or dealers who

wished to be included were given lists of standard items purchased by the

Medical Department and were notified of future purchases of those items in

which they expressed an interest. Prospective bidders were also found in other

ways. The Federal Eeserve System, for example, undertook to uncover manufacturing sources in its various districts and suggested many names to the

Finance and Supply Division in Washington. The Office of Production

Management also exerted itself to acquaint manufacturers with the needs of the

Army, and, through its Division of Contract Distribution, obtained the names

of manufacturers who had idle machinery and were thus able to accept either

subcontracts or prime contracts. Prospective subcontractors were referred to

prime contractors, and the latter were brought to the attention of the purchasing officers of the Army.22

Procurement planning, during the 1920's and 1930's, had been conducted

upon the assumption that the technical services would place practically all

their contracts with facilities allocated to them. It was hoped by this device

to avoid the kind of interservice competition that had delayed procurement

and rendered it more costly during World War I. The assumption was quickly

abandoned when the rearmament program of 1940-41 got well underway.

Neither the President nor the Congress established the economic controls

necessary to put the allocations system into effect. The Bidders' List of the

Medical Department was not restricted to allocated facilities; it contained the

names of all manufacturers and dealers who could furnish medical supplies,

regardless of allocation. Of the 253 facilities used, only 172 (or 68 percent)

had been allocated to the Medical Deparment.23

The system of allocations had not kept pace with the needs of the technical services. New factories had been established, old factories had been converted to war production, and the Medical Department, in common with other

technical services, had developed or adopted new items. These changes had not

been matched by a thorough revision of the allocations, and thus the allotted

facilities were not adequate for War Department needs. Neither were the

requirements estimates of the procurement planning days adhered to. Pro22 (1) Letter, Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, to Mr. H. C. Timberlake, 14 Dec. 1940. (2) Letter, Col.

John W. Meehan, MC, to Senator Francis Maloney, 26 Sept. 1941. (3) Letter, Maj. M. E. Griffin,

MC, to 12 District Offices of the Defense Contract Service, Office of Production Management,

20 Oct. 1941.

23Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. F. Shook, MC, to Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, 1 Mar. 1941, subject:

Report Upon Senate Resolution 71.
14 MEDICAL SUPPLY

curement officers distrusted the requirements figures and considered them to be

unrealistic. They had been computed in anticipation of an M-day, when the

Nation would spring to arms and a deluge of war orders would issue from the

Army. But the slow and steady increase in procurement during 1940-41 did

not fit into this pattern. It was very difficult to determine what proportion of

the planned requirements should be procured at any particular time.24 Indeed,

when procurement reached floodtide in 1942 and 1943, it was still difficult to

tell what part of the anticipated requirements had, in fact, been met.

Instead of relying upon computed requirements figures, the Finance and

Supply Division, until 1942, placed its trust in the "depot replenishment system." Each depot submitted to the Surgeon General's Office a stock report

showing the receipts and issues of each Medical Department item. Semiannual

reports were submitted for nondeteriorating items, while deteriorating items

were reported quarterly. These reports, covering approximately 4,500 items,

were posted to consolidated stock cards in the Surgeon General's Office; from

this information, the probable issues during the next reporting period were

calculated. To the probable issues in each item were added the initial supplies

and equipment needed to equip new units which were being formed. Thus were

obtained the "normal" quantities of each item which should be procured.

Although initial equipment could be calculated with fair accuracy, it proved

impossible to evolve a satisfactory formula for determining replacement needs.

The "normal" quantities of each item were simply increased by an amount

deemed sufficient to satisfy needs that were growing at a rapid, but undetermined, rate. It was, in a word, a matter of judgment, but judgment that proved

in the sequel to have been generally sound. This "hit and miss" method, as it

was described by some supply officers, continued to characterize procurement

until July 1942, when the Army Supply Program went into effect.25

Estimated procurement requirements were transmitted to the purchasing

depots in the form of purchase authorizations. Invitations were then issued to

all qualified firms on the Bidders' List, after a lapse of 15 to 60 days, depending upon the urgency of the purchase; the bids were opened, and a contract

was made with the lowest bidder. This system had been employed during the

unhurried times of peace. It had provided sufficient supplies at the time they

were needed and at the lowest possible prices; but it was not adapted to war,

nor to hasty preparation for war. Under these conditions, price becomes a

secondary factor, and time of delivery and quantity of supplies become prime

considerations. This period was marked, therefore, by departures from competitive bidding and by the adoption of negotiated contracts which were

designed quickly to obtain from industry the vast quantities of supplies and

equipment needed. In July 1940, an act of Congress gave the technical services

24 (1) Procurement Planning, 1939-41. [Official record.] (2) Letter, Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC,

to the Assistant Secretary of War, 28 Nov. 1940, subject: Review of Organization, Procedures and

Methods Pertaining to Procurement.

25 (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. John J. Pelosi, MC, to Lt. Richard B. Yates, MAC, 7 Dee. 1944.

(2) Memorandum, Col. Paul I. Robinson, MC, to Chief, Supply Service, 11 Aug. 1944, subject:

Purchasing Policy.
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 15

enlarged authority to make open market purchases, and thus to negotiate contracts without competitive bidding.

One of the first steps was to establish liaison with the manufacturers of

medical supplies. As early as 1939, The Surgeon General established industry

advisory committees on drugs, surgical instruments, and other types of supplies and equipment, and received valuable advice from them on the problems

of large-scale procurement. These advisory committees continued to function

as advisers to The Surgeon General until September 1940, when they were

absorbed by the Army and Navy Munitions Board with a commensurate

broadening of responsibilities.

Although purchase authorizations issued in midsummer of 1939 were two

and one-half times as large as those issued in the previous summer, it was

believed that industry could easily carry the load, except for surgical instruments and a few other items in which trouble had long been expected. For

many years, the United States had been largely dependent upon German manufacturers for surgical instruments. This dependence was interrupted by the

expansion of domestic manufacturers during World War I; but early in the

1920's, Germany once more captured the U.S. market and held it until the

British blockade was established in September 1939. The few surgical instrument factories in the United States were thus presented with an increasing

demand, from both military and civilian hospitals, and for export to France,

England, and Latin America, which they could not satisfy; nor could production be quickly expanded. Machine tools were difficult to procure; forgings

were not available in the large numbers required; and, even more serious, the

skilled labor employed in the manufacturing processes could not be quickly

trained. The conversion of silver and jewelry manufacturers to the production

of surgical instruments offered only limited relief.

It was inevitable that the purchase requirements for the period 1939-41

should be considerably greater than deliveries. This produced a condition of

chronic shortages which constituted the most serious problem with which the

Finance and Supply Division was faced. In this period of unprecedented expansion, the huge requirements were not fully anticipated and procurement was

often initiated too late to produce the supplies when they were needed. The

difficulty was further aggravated by the "procurement lag"—the interval of

time elapsing between the acceptance of a contract and the delivery of the supplies—which became longer as shortages of labor and raw materials became

more acute.

Storage and Distribution

When the Army began its expansion late in 1939, facilities for storage and

distribution of medical supplies were geared to serve a small Military Establishment in the quiet days of peace. The main depot of the Medical Department was located in Brooklyn, N.Y. This was the Medical Section of the New

York General Depot, which was the distribution point for all overseas garrisons and for all states east of the Mississippi River except Tennessee and Mis-
16 MEDICAL SUPPLY

M

FIGURE 3.—Building No. 40, St. Louis Medical Depot.

sissippi, which were supplied from St. Louis. The only branch depot belonging exclusively to the Medical Department was the one in St. Louis (fig. 3),

which served most of the Midwestern and Eocky Mountain States. The medical sections of the San Antonio, Tex., and San Francisco General Depots were

the distributing points respectively for the Southwest and the Pacific coast.

Depots for the storage of the War Eeserve were located at Columbus, Ohio,

New Cumberland, Pa., and Schenectady, N.Y.

Into the active depots of the Medical Department, the supplies and equipment were shipped by manufacturers and dealers, who were informed of the
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 17

proper destination by the contract or purchase order. When received at the

depot, the supplies were physically inspected to determine if the proper quantity had been received and if they conformed with other terms of the contract.

A mere tally-in accomplished the former purpose, but inspections to determine

quality, especially of drugs and biologicals, required laboratory examinations.

Samples were forwarded to the laboratory of the Medical Section, New York

General Depot; and, until results of the examination were received, the shipments being tested were withheld from issue.

Supplies and equipment, after being accepted by the depot, were stored

according to item number, and were issued on the basis of requisitions received

from the medical supply officers of posts, camps, and stations of the depot's

distribution area. These requisitions, normally submitted through Corps Area

Headquarters, were of three types. Semiannual requisitions were received on

31 March and 30 September. Quarterly requisitions, generally confined to deteriorating items such as drugs and rubber goods, were due on the first day of

January, April, July, and October. Emergency requisitions were submitted as

required, but, even these, unless they were based upon dire need, were first

cleared through Corps Area Headquarters. A period of 3 months was required

to process the semiannual requisitions because they were all received at the

same time, and only a limited number of packers were available in the depots.

Posts, camps, and stations maintained sufficient stock levels, however, to last

until the beginning of the next requisitioning period. The emergency requisitions were filled quickly, sometimes in a single day; and the quarterly requisitions for deteriorating items were also processed promptly.26

It will be observed that the storage and distribution functions of the Medical Department, at the beginning of the rearmament program, were conducted

on a small, economical scale. Indeed, economy was a most important feature,

for appropriations were not generous, and it was necessary to effect all possible

savings. The number of civilian employees was kept very low, depot upkeep

expenditures were maintained at a minimum, and shipping methods and routes

were selected with economy as the foremost criterion. But, as the size of the

Army grew during the period 1939-41, and as the procurement of medical supplies markedly increased, it became necessary to expand the depot facilities of

the Medical Department. Although the most important part of this expansion

occurred in 1941, it began in 1940. By the end of 1940, the Medical Department

had a total of 1,203,387 square feet of storage space, of which 575,899 square

feet was used for current operations and 537,428 for storage of the unit assemblies in the "War Eeserve. Aggregate storage space had more than quadrupled

by December 1941, when 5,690,028 square feet was so used.27

The heavy load which the expanding Army placed upon the Medical

Department's storage and distribution facilities brought about other changes

in addition to the increase in depot space and operating personnel. Methods

*> History of the St. Louis Medical Depot, 1936 through 1939. [Official record.]

27 (1) The Depot Facilities Program of the Medical Department. [Official record.] (2) Memorandum, Maj. D. A. Peters, SnC, to Brig. Gen. Albert G. Lore, 23 Nov. 1942.
18 MEDICAL SUPPLY

and procedures which had been adequate for the modest work of the depots

during prior years could not cope with the vastly augmented tasks imposed by

the rearmament program. Electrical accounting machines were installed, both

in the Surgeon General's Office and in the depots, in 1941, although they were

not fully mastered for another year. Materials-handling equipment, which so

greatly added to the speed and economy of storage operations, also originated

before Pearl Harbor. Improvements in the collection and packing of stock, to

fill requisitions, were necessary as soon as the workload increased; and by the

use of the assembly line system, these tasks were better performed. Inventories

were taken more frequently and in a manner which interfered less with current operations.

Helpful though they were, however, these improvements did not fully

solve the immense problem of distribution that confronted the Medical Department during 1941. As the Army expanded through voluntary enlistments and

the action of Selective Service, training camps multiplied throughout the country ; and each camp had its station hospital and its group of regimental dispensaries. In addition, an increasing number of medical troops were being

trained for service with tactical units. These installations and troop units

needed great quantities of medical supplies, and the medical supply officer of

each post looked to his distribution depot to supply the need. In July 1940,

there were 110 station and general hospitals, having a total of 22,000 beds. By

July 1941, the number of hospitals had grown to 180, and the total beds had

increased to 80,000,28 necessitating shipment of large numbers of hospital

assemblies and great quantities of maintenance supplies to posts, camps, and

stations. During this early period, stocks were inadequate to supply the large

number of hospitals then being constructed. Both the procurement lag and the

inadequacy of the War Reserve rendered shortages inevitable. Although the

depots made emergency purchases from local sources, many assemblies shipped

to the hospitals were only 50 to 60 percent complete. Old 1918 hospital assemblies were torn down and rearranged to meet modern needs, but shortages of

medical supplies in the hospitals continued. It is improbable, however, that the

scarcity of medical supplies seriously hampered the professional work of doctors and surgeons, who fortunately did not have to cope with any major

epidemic.

MEDICAL SUPPLY FOR GLOBAL WAR

Organization of the Medical Supply Service

Supply organization in the Surgeon General's Office.—A sweeping War

Department and Army reorganization early in 1942 brought the Medical Department under ASF (Army Service Forces), for a short time called Services

of Supply. The reorganization as it affected the Medical Department as a

» Magee, J. C.: Activities of the Medical Department in Augmentation of the Army. Army M.

Bull. 56: 1-10, April 1941.
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 19

whole need not concern us here.29 So far as medical supply was concerned, the

closer relationship with the Service Forces inevitably meant a streamlining of

the supply organization in the Surgeon General's Office to conform more closely

to the overall pattern. The new organization went into effect on 1 July 1942.

The supply functions were separated entirely from fiscal activities, and a new

Supply Service was created with five divisions under it: Production Planning,

Requirements, Purchases, Distribution, and an International Division. By September 1942, there were 41 officers and 431 civilians on duty in the Supply

Service, compared with the 16 officers and 201 civilians who had operated the

combined Finance and Supply Division when the United States entered the

war. The number had grown to 94 officers and 591 civilian employees by 1 March

1943, when the service was again reorganized.30

The March 1943 reorganization divided the Supply Service into two

branches concerned respectively with Supply Personnel and Office Management, and seven divisions: Requirements, International, Resources, Procurement, Price Analysis and Renegotiation, Specialties, and Distribution. Among

the new organizational units, the Resources Division devoted its attention to

alleviating the raw material shortage which, during this period, was hampering the production of medical supplies and equipment. The Price Analysis and

Renegotiation Division was established to analyze contract prices submitted

by manufacturers and to carry out the terms of the renegotiation statutes

which had been enacted by Congress in 1942 and 1943. The Specialties Division, which included an Optical Branch, Laundry Branch, and X-ray Service

Branch, was not an operating division. Rather, its function was to study the

peculiar problems encountered in the procurement and distribution of certain

specialized items and to make this information available to the other divisions.

It had administrative and coordinating functions almost entirely.

This reorganization had been recommended by Mr. Edward Reynolds,

former president of the Columbia Gas and Electric Corp. of New York, and

then Special Assistant to The Surgeon General. When Maj. Gen. Norman T.

Kirk became The Surgeon General in June 1943, Colonel Tyng, Chief of the

Supply Service, was relieved and Mr. Reynolds became Acting Chief. In the

spring of 1944, he was commissioned a colonel, Medical Administrative Corps,

and was appointed Chief of the Supply Service (fig. 4). A further reorganization, meanwhile, had eliminated the separate branches and reduced the

seven divisions to five: Supply Planning and Specialties, International, Renegotiation, Procurement, and Distribution and Requirements. Thus were

eliminated the Resources and Requirements Divisions, while the functions of

the latter were merged with those of distribution. This trend toward simplification was carried a step further in September 1943, when the Supply Planning and Specialties Division was abolished; but in November 1943, it was

29 For more detailed treatment, see (1) Medical Department, United States Army, Organization

and Administration in World War II. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963, pp. 72-93.

(2) Millett, John D.: U.S. Army in World War II. The Army Ground Forces. The Organization and

Role of the Army Service Forces. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954, pp. 36-42.

30 Memorandum No. 1, Supply Service, OT'SG, 1 Mar. 1943, subject: Organization of Supply Service.
20 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FiGtntE 4.—Col. Edward Reynolds, MAC, Chief, Supply

Service, Surgeon General's Office, 1943-46.

reinstated as the Supply Planning Division with expanded functions. In addition to its administrative and coordinating duties in procurement of optical

equipment and supplies, this division had the responsibility of preparing and

distributing the Medical Department Supply Catalog and Equipment Lists

and with aiding in the development of new items.31

This last reorganization, however, was marked by a far more important

change and by the beginning of a trend which continued until the end of the

war. The Procurement Division was renamed the Purchase Division, and was

transferred to the Army Medical Purchasing Office, successor to the New

York Procurement District. A liaison branch of the Purchase Division was

established in the Supply Service in Washington, which maintained close contacts with the Army Medical Purchasing Office and independently performed

certain functions related to procurement. The movement of the Purchase Division to New York reduced the number of officers assigned to the Supply

Service from 94 to 75. At the same time, the Reports and Eecords Branch was

set up as a separate unit to compile the many reports required by the staff

divisions of Headquarters, ASF, and to keep the Chief of the Supply Service

31 Memorandum No. 1, Supply Service, OTSG, revisions of 16 June and 29 Nov. 1943.
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 21

constantly informed of the progress made in the procurement and distribution

program.

The largest and least cohesive part of the Supply Service, at this date,

was the Distribution and Eequirements Division. Staffed by 33 officers and a

substantial civilian group, this division was composed of five branches: Storage, Eequirements, Issue, Maintenance, and Inventory Control, the latter being

attached to the Army Medical Purchasing Office in New York. When one

considers this division's important duties in computation of purchase requirements, control of stock levels, operation of depots, repair of medical equipment, and distribution of medical supplies, it is apparent that its efforts were

spread over a large area and included many parts of the entire supply program. The largest task which yet remained for administrative reorganization

was to break down this unwieldy division and to assign its duties to separate

divisions on a functional basis.

A slight reorganization in March 1944 reduced the number of divisions

to four by eliminating the Supply Planning Division; and increased the separate branches to three by the addition of the Materiel Demobilization Unit

and the Catalog Branch. These new offices assumed some duties of the abolished Supply Planning Division; the remainder were lodged in the Liaison

Branch, Purchase Division. A more thorough reorganization was effected in

June 1944, when the Distribution and Eequirements Division was abolished.

In its place were established the Stock Control Division, Issue Division, and

Storage and Maintenance Division. The Benegotiation Division was transferred to the Army Medical Purchasing Office, and a liaison unit of that division was established in Washington. The Inventory Control Branch, a part of

the Stock Control Division, remained in New York. At this time, also, the

offices of the Deputy Chief for Supply Control and the Deputy Chief for

Storage Operations were established as consulting agencies for the Chief,

Supply Service, and were staffed by qualified civilians.32

As the war neared its end, the movement of Supply Service units to New

York continued. In November 1944, the remaining branches of the reorganized

and enlarged Stock Control Division were transferred to the Army Medical

Purchasing Office. The single exception was the Eequirements Branch which

retained its Washington location until July 1945. In the meantime, in March

1945, the independent Catalog Branch went to New York. Shortly before the

German surrender in May 1945, plans were made to move other parts of the

Supply Service to the Army Medical Purchasing Office, but these plans were

abandoned when it became apparent that the procurement and distribution

programs would soon be sharply curtailed.

Field organization for medical procurement.—When the United States

entered the war, the actual purchase of medical supplies and equipment was

divided between the Medical Section, New York General Depot, and the St.

Louis depot, an arrangement dictated by fear that sabotage or even enemy

bombing might knock out the New York facility. The St. Louis depot had pur82 OTSG Manual of Organization and Standard Practices, Organization Chart 3.09, 24 June 1944.
22 MEDICAL SUPPLY

chase responsibility for drags, chemicals, and stains (class 1); X-ray equipment

and supplies (class 6); furniture, physiotherapy equipment, mess equipment

and supplies (class 7); veterinary equipment and supplies (class 8); and field

equipment and supplies (class 9). The Medical Section of the New York General Depot purchased the remaining medical items, which included surgical

dressings, surgical instruments, laboratory equipment, and dental supplies and

equipment.

Early in 1942, the New York Medical Depot was established as the successor to the Medical Section, New York General Depot. In August 1942, the

New York Medical Depot was moved to Binghamton, N.Y., but its Purchasing and Contracting Section remained in the city to become the nucleus of a

newly activated New York Medical Department Procurement District. This

purchasing office was divided into four Buying Sections, a Conservation and

Production Control Section, and an Operations Section, which was concerned

with administrative matters.33 Each Buying Section (later called Purchasing

Branch) procured items in a single commodity group, thus permitting procurement officers to specialize on a particular class of items and to become

familiar with the capacities and problems of the producers. As procurement

operations expanded, personnel steadily increased. In December 1942, the New

York office had 58 officers and 338 civilian employees; by June 1943, the number of officers had increased to 74 and civilian employees to 413.34

The St. Louis Medical Department Procurement District, established in

August 1942, had an organization similar to that of the New York office.

Originally there were three Purchasing Branches: Drugs and Chemicals;

X-ray and Physiotherapy Equipment; and Miscellaneous Equipment and

Supplies. To obtain greater clerical efficiency, the second and third branches

were consolidated in April 1943, the new unit being designated the Hospital

Equipment Branch. As the procurement load increased, other departments

were established to perform functions involved in production control, inspection, public relations, renegotiation, and office administration. During calendar

year 1943, personnel increased rapidly. The number of officers rose from 12

to 63, and the number of civilian employees from 161 to 241.35

These two purchasing offices, first as depots and later as procurement districts, contracted for practically all of the medical supplies used by the Army

during the war. The St. Louis depot lasted throughout the war, but the procurement district was abolished in September 1943, when it was considered

safer and more economical to consolidate all Medical Department procurement in New York as the Army Medical Purchasing Office. In the words of

the ASF circular36 which activated the new unit, the office was "responsible

for the actual procurement of medical supplies, including production control,

as Annual Report of Activities, New Xork Medical Department Procurement District, fiscal

year 1943.

M Annual Report of the Supply Service, OTSG, 1943.

35 See footnotes 33 and 34, above.

a« Army Service Forces Circular No. 79, 15 Sept. 1943.
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 23

issuance of priorities, survey of facilities, and inspection of supplies." At this

time, branches were established in Chicago and St. Louis, the main duties of

which were to aid contractors in procuring raw materials, component parts,

and labor. At this point, the Purchase Division of the Supply Service was

transferred to New York, where it became an integral part of the Army Medical Purchasing Office. Thereafter the Supply Service, for all practical purposes, centered in New York rather than in Washington.

Personnel and training.—By mid-1943, the Medical Supply System,

exclusive of the overseas theaters, had expanded its personnel to 800 officers

and 15,050 civilians on duty, both in Washington and in the field. Turnover

of personnel was caused largely by the constant drain upon the Surgeon General's Office and the depots to fill the personnel requirements of a global supply

system. At the same time, however, The Surgeon General was able to draw

upon the service of many keymen from civilian industry. Among those most

helpful were Mr. Herman C. Hangen of J. C. Penney Co., Mr. Mead M. Messick

of Montgomery Ward & Co., Mr. C. W. Harris of Butler Brothers, and Mr.

W. A. Hower of Van Raalte Silk Co.

For training medical supply personnel, various courses were provided

during the war years, both by ASF and by the Surgeon General's Office. The

Medical Supply Officers Orientation Course provided training in military customs, courtesy, procedure, and medical supply for the new officers reporting

to the St. Louis Medical Depot for duty in medical supply work. In early

1943, ASF established a three-phase course for training of commissioned

depot personnel. This was known as the ASF Depot Course. The first period

was conducted at the Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, Va., and covered all

operational phases of Army warehousing, organization of the Army for supply, handling and transporting of supplies, property accounting, packaging

and crating, and open storage. The second period, conducted at the St. Louis

Medical Depot, was identical with the Medical Supply Officers Orientation

Course. For the third phase, student officers were assigned to one of the medical supply distribution depots to gain experience in previously studied supply activities.37

In June 1943, two courses—Phase II of the ASF Depot Course and the

Maintenance Course—which were conducted at the St. Louis Medical Depot,

were designated "The Medical Supply Service School." Training of units

organized under tables of organization and equipment was added to the Medical Supply Service School curriculum during 1944. This training consisted

of functional employment in the St. Louis Medical Depot, orientation as to

overall training in the supply field, and field training. Medical Supply Platoons (Aviation) were trained during 1943^L4 at Savannah Medical Depot to

prepare them for ready use overseas.

37 Annual Report, Training Division, Operations Service, OTSG, fiscal year 1943.

295-453 O—68 4
24 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Role of the American Red Cross

Relationship between AEC (American Red Cross) and the Supply Service

increased in scope during the war period. Major ARC activities in the area of

supply for the Army were the blood program 38 and the surgical dressing

program. The Army, however, furnished or purchased medical supplies required by ARC for various purposes and supported its war relief program

logistically.

Blood program.—Plasma units were compact, and possessed long keeping

qualities not true of whole blood, which was good for use only up to 21 days

after collection (fig. 5). These favorable characteristics of dried plasma permitted ease of use and handling in the combat areas. Through cooperation of

Army, Navy, National Research Council, ARC, and commercial .biological

manufacturers, a blood plasma procurement program calling for the production of a minimum of 700,000 units of dried plasma for the Army was instituted

in fiscal year 1942. The Surgeon General considered the plasma program to

be of such significance by February 1943 that he appointed Col. Charles F.

Shook, MC, as Liaison Officer, OTSG, responsible for contact with ARC, and

for furtherance and proper management of this vital program. When Colonel

Shook was transferred to the Mediterranean theater as Surgeon, Services of

Supply, Maj. Frederic N. Schwartz, MAC, took charge of the program and

remained in that capacity until termination of the war.

Until August 1943, plasma was manufactured in units of 250 cc. At that

time, the size was changed to 500 cc. because this was the normal amount

administered, and this larger unit conserved shipping space and reduced the

total amount of critical materials (rubber, steel, and tin) required. The blood

plasma program progressed to a grand total of 3,070,806 small units, and

3,115,877 large units by 1945.39 Although blood banks were established in overseas combat areas, sufficient quantities of whole blood for treatment of casualties could not be obtained, and by August 1944, supplemental shipments from

the United States became imperative. The Army Medical Department provided for the needs of the European theater for type "O" blood through the

services of ARC via facilities of the Air Transport Command. The Navy used

a similar method in providing for needs in the Pacific. After V-E Day, the

ARC ceased collecting blood for military services from all except the major

cities of the United States. On 10 August 1945, the ARC was advised that

the Army would not require blood for processing into dried plasma as soon

as V-J Day was announced officially.

Surgical dressing program.—During the expansion period before the

entry of the United States into the war, it was discovered that the Army

Medical Department had grossly underestimated its need for surgical dressings. Frustrated because industry was too deeply involved in other forms of

war production to cooperate, The Surgeon General turned to the Red Cross

38 For further details, see Medical Department, United States Army. Blood Program In World

War II. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, pp. 101-137.

38 Hornbacher, Arthur: Blood Plasma. [Official record.]
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 25

RMAL HUMAN PLASMA

FIGURE 5.—Chest, Plasma, Complete, consisted of Medical Department chest, plain, and

20 units of plasma, normal, human, dried, 250 cc.

for help. The response was overwhelming, resulting in the accumulation of

large stockpiles of dressings between 1941 and 1944. The Medical Department

reciprocated by furnishing the Red Cross with needed supplies. Several medical assemblies were furnished as well as stocks, such as blood plasma, drugs,

dressings, and surgical instruments for prisoners of war on both sides, and

supplies for Allied countries.

Following V-E Day, the Army reevaluated its requirements and assets to

release, before V-J Day, as much excess material as possible to civilian channels. Basing action on the Surplus Property Act of 1944, items in excess of

Army requirements, such as blood derivatives and surgical dressings, were

first reported as excess, then obtained in large amounts to be used in civilian
26 MEDICAL SUPPLY

emergencies or for charitable purposes throughout the United States and

overseas areas.

Demobilization Planning

Planning for demobilization began in the Surgeon General's Office in

August 1943. The early stages of the demobilization program were carried out

under several officers progressively: Col. Paul I. Robinson, MC, Col. Stuart

G. Smith, MC, Col. William L. Wilson, MC, then back to Colonel Eobinson.

On 5 February 1944, the Commanding General, ASF, advised the chiefs of

Technical Services that materiel demobilization planning was a command

responsibility at each echelon in the chain of command. The Surgeon General had already established a unit for this purpose directly under the chief

of the Supply Service. By the end of fiscal year 1944, a series of plans for

period I (redeployment, readjustment, and demobilization between the defeat

of Germany and that of Japan) had been developed which reflected current

procedure and policy changes set forth in the ASF Materiel Demobilization

Plan. The Surgeon General's plan directed action regarding inauguration of

the revised procurement program for period I; determination of contracts to

be terminated; methods of receiving, storage, caring for, and disposing of

finished and unfinished products; review of research and development projects ; revision of spare parts lists; and efficient handling of military lend-lease

shipments.

Special studies were made on potential requirements for medical items

sought by outside agencies such as the Red Cross, United Nations Relief and

Rehabilitation Administration, and Civilian Relief in Liberated Areas. Also,

the stockpiling of a peacetime war reserve was essential. Disposal of medical

property needed careful handling. To flood the market with surplus Government stocks at the conclusion of the emergency would have adversely affected

small business. The plan proposed that certain items be distributed to eligible

federal, state, county, and municipal health institutions and sanitary health

agencies on a grant basis under a control system to establish the fact that these

institutions could not afford to purchase health articles required for their

missions.

The objectives of this proposal were to get the maximum number of surplus medical items into worthwhile use and out of Government storage in the

shortest possible time; to cause minimal impact on industry; to cause minimal

tax burden for accomplishment of important health advances; and to effect

improvement in medical care throughout the United States, thus reducing the

number of persons physically ineligible for military service.

Many actions of the Materiel Demobilization Plan were placed in effect,

as operating procedures before V-E Day arrived. Agencies were alerted, and:

on V-E Day, the remaining actions of the plan were placed ih.effect. Atspecific plan was devised to furnish units in the Far East with, medical equipment from stocks available in the European theater. - ::-/. ' ;. ; :, .:.'['-.:
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 27

The plan for readjustment and demobilization after V-J Day was prepared by the Supply Service under Col. Jenner G. Jones, MC, and Maj. Richard J. White, Jr., MAC. Specific activities and responsibilities of the Supply

Service were outlined as follows:

1. Review procurement objectives for the balance of 1945 and 1946 for

all medical items; compute procurement programs to reflect demobilization

phasing; determine War Reserve requirements and a peacetime Army Supply Program based on the appropriate troop basis; cancel and reschedule programed procurement to meet period II procurement objectives; terminate all

contracts approved for termination and expeditiously settle all such contracts;

determine and report quantities which were surplus to the War Reserve and

peacetime army requirements for periods II and III.

2. Discontinue security inspections except at privately operated facilities

having highly classified information which was believed to require continued

personnel security protection against espionage.

3. Redistribute military property excess in overseas theaters and bases

for period II, as well as in the Zone of Interior; initiate and implement policies and procedures for redistribution of all property declared surplus.40

Supplies en route to the Pacific and Asiatic theaters had to be diverted

and disposed of, and all requisitions canceled. Space for storage of these items

had to be provided on a continuous basis. Civilian supplies had to be procured and shipped as scheduled, and surplus property had to be disposed of

or stored.

On V-J Day, these plans were placed in operation.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT AREAS

Because logistics is designed to support the tactical effort, it is not surprising that marked differences developed in different theaters of operations.

The war in the Pacific was largely an island-hopping war with multiple and

repeated naval, air, and amphibious operations. On the other hand, the war

in Europe and Africa was largely ground warfare over more expansive areas.

Naval and amphibious combat operations were preludes to ground warfare

involving large numbers of troops on broad fronts resulting in large numbers

of casualties. Operations in the Mediterranean, a combined British and American theater, were an alternating combination of amphibious and landmass

fronts that began with the landings in North Africa, then shifted north into

the Mediterranean Islands and on to the European Continent. Because of the

widely separated landings and areas of combat, a decentralized type of supply system prevailed until forces were concentrated on the Italian Peninsula.

40 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Edward Reynolds, to Director, Industrial Demobilization, ASF, and

others, 6 Aug. 1945, subject: Supply Service—Interim Plan—Period II (Readjustment and Demobilization).
28 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Medical Supply in Europe

Many factors influenced the evaluation of the medical supply system in

the European theater. One of the early problems was the constant changing

of operational plans and priorities for the theater as the fortunes of war,

worldwide, ebbed and flowed. The operations were mounted in England, a

strong and industrialized ally. There was no language barrier. Even though

the United Kingdom and its industry were already burdened with prosecuting the war against the Axis, our Government believed that the British

could supply U.S. forces with large quantities of material through "reverse

lend-lease" and thus conserve shipping space.

Another important factor was that the war was fought on a large landmass with relatively good rail and road networks, and with existing telephone

and telegraph systems providing a basis of rapid communication. As the war

progressed, more and more hospitals and depots were established on the Continent, although throughout the war hospitals and depots in the United Kingdom continued to support the operations.

Maj. Gen. Paul E. Hawley (fig. 6) was not only chief surgeon of the

theater, but he also headed the medical service of the Communications Zone.

As the war progressed, he had tremendous medical resources—personnel and

material—under his control. General Hawley, a man of great ability and

drive, was strong enough and wise enough to use them effectively. The fact

that the entire medical service for the U.S. forces in the European theater

was under one chief aided immeasurably in the successful medical support of

the war.

From the outset, professional influence was strong. General Hawley surrounded himself with prominent and outstanding specialists in every clinical

field, who actively influenced the techniques and the quality of medical and

surgical care. These consultants were of great value in developing supply policies, advising on requirements, and especially in teaching their professional

colleagues in hospitals some of the rudiments of Army supply. Many medical

officers, most of them fresh from civilian life, had no concept of what was

available, of Army supply terminology, or of how to go about obtaining what

they needed. Frequently the weakest link in the supply chain was between the

hospital or unit medical supply officer and the doctor, both of whom were frequently inexperienced in Army supply. The needed item was in the supply

room or warehouse but the supply officer did not know its use and the doctor

did not know it was there, what it was called, or how to get it.

Identification was often a serious problem. Doctors were familiar with

drugs by their common or trade names whereas the Army carried them under

their official U.S.P. or N.N.K. titles. Likewise, surgical instruments and other

equipment, not infrequently, were known in different sections of the United

States by various names, which were dissimilar to Army nomenclature. General Hawley's consultants were given an orientation and each became familiar

not only with the supply items of his specialty, but also with mechanics of the
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 29

FIGURE 6.—Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, Chief Surgeon,

European theater.

overall medical supply system. Time and again on their visits, they were able

to bridge the gap to medical installations and see that the item was put in the

hands of the professional man.

The long evacuation policy—120 days during most of the war—resulted

in a large patient load and much definitive treatment within the theater. At

the height of the operations, the medical service in the European theater had

192,000 beds41occupied by patients. This was reflected in huge requirements

for medical supplies.

A favorable factor was the availability of prisoner-of-war labor. In the

United Kingdom, both Italians and Germans were utilized, whereas on the

Continent only Germans were available. Many were skilled or semiskilled men,

accustomed to hard work. Usually employed under their own noncommissioned

officers, prisoners proved to be a valuable adjunct to the medical service.

Because of the above-mentioned factors, plus many others, the medical

supply system in the European theater developed along strongly centralized

lines, and was ultimately patterned closely after the Zone of Interior system.

The Supply Division of the Chief Surgeon's Office closely controlled all operaa Monthly Progress Report, Army Service Forces, 28 Feb. 1945, Section 7.
30 MEDICAL SUPPLY

tions. It enunciated policies and procedures, determined theater requirements,

requisitioned supplies from the United States, distributed stock among the

depots, and supervised depot activities. Although the theater, behind Army

boundaries, was divided into advance, intermediate, and base sections, these

geographic commands exercised little influence beyond assistance to the medical supply operation. In other theaters of operations where geographic commands were widely dispersed, the reverse tended to be the situation, resulting

in decentralized systems in which the real authority rested with the geographic

area commanders.

Medical Supply in the Pacific

In the Pacific, in addition to vast distances and small, scattered land areas,

there were extremes of climate ranging from the cold, damp conditions of the

Aleutians to the tropical islands of the central Pacific. Tropical diseases called

for special drugs and the hot, damp atmosphere of the Solomons and other

island groups demanded special equipment. At the same time, shipping space

was at a premium while central depots were necessarily remote from the scenes

of combat. Until the final stages of the war in the Pacific, scarcity was the

rule so far as medical supplies were concerned.

One contributing factor in this situation occurred even before the war

itself. By way of preparation for the emergency that appeared clearly in the

making, a substantial portion of the Medical Department's reserve supplies

had been sent to the Philippines. Equipment for four general hospitals and

quantities of dressings, drugs, and instruments were on hand. Personnel was

inadequate for combat, but commendable progress had been made in training

Filipino physicians and enlisted men to augment U.S. military medical personnel. Plans for deployment were complete. Medical leadership was present

and there is every indication that excellent medical teamwork was exercised

in the preattack period. A medical supply depot was functioning and a medical regiment was available. Additionally, in accordance with plans, the equipment for one general hospital was in storage at Limay, Bataan.

When the Philippines were attacked, Sternberg General Hospital (fig. 7)

became a medical center in a matter of days and accepted evacuees from the

station hospitals at Clark and Nichols Fields. But, on 24 December, according

to plan, movement of troops to the Bataan Peninsula was begun and medical

personnel, supplies, and hospitals had to be moved. These were the experiences

that our troops were to face in other areas of the South Pacific and Southwest

Pacific over the next 4 years: poor roads or none at all, jungle, insectborne

diseases, infectious diseases, scanty foods, ferocious combat, mud, rain, dust,

discomfort, refugees, and the necessary improvisations to cope with all of

these problems.

In December 1941, Maj. O.V. Kemp, MAC, an aggressive medical supply

officer (for Col. Wibb E. Cooper, MC, Department Surgeon) with foresight

and intelligence had purchased many consumable medical supplies from the

merchants in Manila—antimalarial drugs, instruments, gauze, and cotton.
MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 31

FIGURE 7.—Sternberg General Hospital, Manila, Philippine Islands, 1940.

These were stored in Bataan and Corregidor and, without doubt, augmented

the ability of medical troops to carry on. During the combat on Bataan, many

medical chests had to be abandoned during the retreat. One general hospital

was captured by the Japanese and, consequently, available medical supplies

were depleted.

The fall of the Philippines was inevitable because the United States was

unable to reach them with the necessary augmentation force. But this was not

fully realized by our troops, and their performance was exemplary. On 9 April

1942, medical personnel were caring for 7,000 patients in Hospital No. 1 which

was captured on that day. Progressively, quinine and Atabrine (quinacrine

hydrochloride) had been depleted until these drugs were not available for

malaria prophylaxis, and only limited amounts could be used for treatment.

Reinfections were almost immediate to those who obtained temporary cure.

Food became a serious problem, and from 1 April 1942 until surrender, the

allowable calories per man had been reduced to no more than 900. There were

no vitamins and no gas bacillus serum. From 9 April until 10 May 1942, Corregidor (our remaining garrison) carried on. The medical units with the

troops rendered as much medical care as possible and the serious cases were
32 MEDICAL SUPPLY

transported to the Malinta Tunnel Hospital. This tunnel was 1,400 feet long

and at intervals twenty-five 400-foot laterals branched out from the main

tunnel. The tunnel was strengthened with reinforced concrete and equipped

with a ventilation system. It served well in these last days to give such medical

care as could be rendered under the continuous bombardment by the

Japanese.42

In the Visayan Islands and Mindanao, the same shortage of antimalarial

drugs was recorded. Food, however, was plentiful. One well-supplied hospital,

earmarked for storage at Cebu and which was intended to be the nucleus for a

large general hospital, was lost when the U.S.S. öorregidor was sunk. This

was somewhat of a disaster to medical supplies, particularly since the hospital

was stated to be so well stocked.

Nothing but praise can be recorded for the medical supply personnel in

the Philippines during the presurrender days. Requirements had been anticipated. Stocks were on hand and stored in strategic locations. Others had been

requisitioned. Most serious shortages were in antimalarial drugs. But these

were strategic items in world supply and, in situations such as the Bataan

defense, determination of what is enough of these drugs and the discipline to

enforce their proper use present most difficult problems. The civilian Japanese

population and our own troops were afflicted in the same manner, and losses

of vital items at such a time and in such circumstances are almost impossible

to prevent.

After the Philippines, the medical supply story in the Pacific was one of

difficulties and delays, but of ultimate building up of necessary stocks to

sustain the offensive that began in August 1942 with Guadalcanal and slowly

gathered momentum until the abrupt ending of the war by the use of the

newly devised atomic bombs.

13 For a more detailed account of the medical side of the evacuation of the Philippines, see

Daboll, Warren W.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Asiatic Theater, united States

Army in World War II. The Technical Services. [In preparation.]
Parti

PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES

IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR
CHAPTER II

Central Procurement of Medical Supplies

MEDICAL SUPPLY UNDER THE ARMY PROGRAM

When the United States entered the war, procurement of medical supplies

and equipment was still based on the depot replenishment system, modified to

approximate the needs of an expanding army. Quantities purchased were sufficient to replenish depot stocks and to equip new troop units as they were

raised, but the computation of maintenance and replacement needs had supply

officers treading the thin ice of prophecy. There had been no experience to

furnish guidelines for conjecture, and the procurement difficulties of 1940-41

were magnified as more and more men were brought under arms in the early

months of 1942. Purchase authorizations were issued for such enormous quantities of some items that manufacturers were astounded at the size of the

orders. Within a few weeks their judgment would be confirmed by cutbacks

in procurement; but, very frequently, increased purchase authorizations would

send total requirements to a new height. In other items, a hand-to-mouth

policy would be adhered to, and a small purchase authorization would be

issued. This would be followed by another and still another, until as many as

15 separate purchases of a single item had been authorized within a short

period of time.

Role of the Army Supply Program

To remedy the defects which had appeared in the procurement programs

of nearly all the technical services, the Army Supply Program was instituted

in July 1942. Prepared each 6 months, this program for the Medical Department was a computation of quantities required in approximately 4,500 medical

items. It was intended to present an orderly buying program, based upon carefully estimated requirements. Stop-and-go buying, which had so confused procurement in the earlier period, would be eliminated; and contractors would

receive an overall picture of the Army's needs.

The Army Supply Program played a vital role in World War II logistics,

going far to prevent confusion, duplication, and competition between Army

and Navy and among the technical services; it provided a blueprint for military procurement planning. The Medical Department had a heavy stake in

its success because medical supply cataloged a wide range of items common

to one or more of the technical services and, of course, to the Navy. Under the

Army Supply Program, the technical services could determine their respective

requirements on the same troop basis, with a unified strategic plan in view.

The program provided for purchasing on the authority of a single correlated

35
36 MEDICAL SUPPLY

program. From a complete absence of coordination between Army and Navy,

certain specialized items were now procured by one service for both.

Although items of medical supply were regarded as secondary, low in

unit value, and insignificant in relation to total War Department expenditures,

the Army Supply Program still attempted to classify them by order of

importance. In terms of raw materials, facilities, funds, and military necessity,

some 300 Medical Department items were designated as "critical" and 400 as

"essential." Beginning with the program of 1 August 1943, these two categories together became part A, defined as primarily tactical equipment, with

an added part B consisting of "miscellaneous and expendable supplies." The

Army Supply Program for calendar year 1944, as outlined in the 1 August

1943 document, listed Medical Department items aggregating $175,181,922

under part A, and items valued at $118,089,828 under part B.

These figures were somewhat modified in the program of 1 February 1944.

Part A was increased to $179,026,115 while part B was reduced to $75,542,268.

These figures reflect the buildup of the Army and the heavy requirements for

initial supply of the equipment type items that represented the bulk of part A.

The part A items were about 4 percent of the total number of medical supply

items on which some degree of stock control action was exercised. Undoubtedly,

the Army Supply Program was a great improvement over the loose, uncoordinated efforts which preceded it. It infused into procurement an air of stability

and steadiness that was reassuring. But it possessed one important disadvantage, which, within little more than a year and a half, caused the Medical

Department to abandon it as a procurement objective. Since it was prepared

at widely separated intervals (every 6 months), it could not keep step with

changing needs. Moreover, the advance period being contracted for was from

1 year to 18 months. Because of this long lead time, items on which short

supply developed were not given attention until the situation became serious.

Similarly, where the issue rate was not so high as the Army Supply Program

anticipated, excess stocks developed which made contract terminations

necessary.1

The Delivery Needs Plan

To bring purchases more nearly in line with actual stock conditions, the

Delivery Needs Plan was put into effect in the latter part of 1943. A Delivery

Needs report was prepared at 2-month intervals by the Distribution and

Eequirements Division, Supply Service, based upon the requirements figures

included in the Army Supply Program. The figures were adjusted, however,

by subtracting from them the current stock-on-hand and due-in from procurement figures which were obtained from depots. Product of the skill and imagination of Mr. Herman C. Hangen, on loan from J. C. Penney Co., and Mr.

Mead M. Messick, on loan from Montgomery Ward & Co., the Delivery

1

(1) Army Supply Programs, Section I, Equipment, Ground (Medical), 1 Feb. 1943, 1 Aug. 1943,

and 1 Feb. 1944. (2) Annual Report, Army Medical Purchasing Office, fiscal year 1944.
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 37

Needs Report was the first long step toward an integrated central stock control system. Initially, this was prepared manually in Stock Control by one

officer and one clerk. It commenced with an electric accounting machine listing by item number and nomenclature. The source material, abstracted from

the Distribution Work Sheets, consisted of the printed requirements, back

orders on issue requisitions, and ready assets, which included stocks on hand

or due-in by transfer. Dues-in from procurement were not included, but an

effort was made to ascertain that dues-in from transfer were accurate. The

printed requirements reflected 6 months' anticipated consumption, both domestic and overseas, and the level established to support the assembly and Medical

Maintenance Unit programs.

The Delivery Needs Report also became the guide to procurement for

items requiring expeditious action to speed up deliveries if contracts were in

being, and similarly provided a list of items for which purchase action should

be taken in the order of their urgency. A supplemental advantage was provision of a guide for establishment of delivery schedules, as it indicated the

relative stock position of all items. This same feature of the report later provided means of identifying excesses and thus became a basis for procurement

cutbacks.

Of greater importance and for the first time, Requirements, Procurement,

and Stock Control personnel had a common point of reference by item, from

which they could take action. As a byproduct, Resources personnel had available to them an item breakout from which they could better determine raw

material needs. In those days of critical shortages and tight controls, the

Delivery Needs Report provided invaluable detailed data for justification of

Medical Department raw material requirements. The timely availability of

medical supplies in the bitter fighting days of 1911 15 was largely the product of this simple practical device. The system was more successful than the

Army Supply Program, which it closely approximated, except that changes

in stock conditions were considered every 2 months; but, even with this

improvement, it did not reflect changes in needs or stock conditions often

enough to provide a reliable procurement program. The basic problem continued. Procurement was not being coordinated with needs as reflected in current issues.

Stock Level Purchasing

To solve the problem just described, the system of Stock Level Purchasing

was instituted in February 1944, and continued in effect during the remainder

of the war. Since this system depended upon close cooperation between stock

control and procurement, the Inventory Control Branch was moved from

Washington, D. C, to New York, N. Y., in November 1943, and the remainder

of the Stock Control Division was subsequently transferred.

Stock Level Purchasing employed the same rates of call and the same

maintenance factors used in the Army Supply Program, but the purchase

requirements thus obtained were subject to frequent review and revision. The
38 MEDICAL SUPPLY

object of the system was to maintain a predetermined stock level in all depots.

New stocks of any item were ordered by the procurement office whenever it

appeared that stocks on hand and on order, less probable issues during the

period required for delivery (lagtime), would fall below the established level.

The amount of each purchase was determined by a conference between the

buyer and stock control officers, and it depended upon conditions affecting

the manufacture of the item. When raw materials and manufacturing facilities

were readily available, small purchases frequently repeated would be authorized. If the manufacturing process was difficult, a large quantity would be

authorized for delivery scheduled over a longer period of time.

All items were reviewed monthly by an examination of the Consolidated

Stock Eeport, which consisted of semimonthly stock reports of individual

depots. In addition, specific items which were in short supply were reviewed

more frequently. Thus, the shortest practicable time elapsed between development of a need and placing an item in procurement. The system also eliminated peakloads in purchasing activity because a relatively small number of

items was purchased monthly. Since the period contracted for was reduced to

a minimum, contract terminations became less frequent.2

The purchasing plan just described represented a return, in a modified

form, to the Depot Eeplenishment System. Greatly improved recordkeeping

and the more frequent submission of reports helped to make its operation

smoother and its success more nearly complete, but the major difference was

the issue experience that was now available on which to base purchase requirements. When experience was inadequate, serious difficulties still resulted. For

example, during the first 9 months of 1944, the issue of Fraser's Solution—

an iodine preparation used in the treatment of athlete's foot—was relatively

small, approximating 10,000 bottles a month. In October 1944, with the launching of the Philippine campaign and the simultaneous arrival of the rainy

season in the archipelago, requisitions increased so greatly that port shortages

of considerable size began to appear. Purchases of the solution were immediately increased so that, by the end of November, 132,000 bottles were under

contract for immediate delivery and an additional 250,000 bottles were ordered

for delivery during the first 5 months of 1945. But, in the middle of December

1944, very large requisitions from overseas increased port shortages by 650,000

bottles. Since there had been so little previous activity in this item, the Supply

Service was unable to cope with such heavy demands.3 Neither raw materials

nor manufacturing facilities were available to produce the required quantities,

and it was not until February 1945 that the situation was brought under

control.'

The Stock Level Purchasing System was satisfactory so long as there

were no great and sudden fluctuations in issue; but there was always the possibility that unexpectedly large requisitions would deplete depot stocks to a

2

(1) Hornbacher, Arthur: Determination of Purchase Requirements. [Official record.] (2)

Annual Eeport, Inventory Control Branch, Supply Division, OTSG, fiscal year 1944.

3

See footnote 1 (2), p. 36.
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 39

point far below the reorder level, and that months would elapse before

deliveries from contractors would replenish the supply. If a system of computing accurate requirements could have been developed, the problem would have

been solved, but the available maintenance factors were too unreliable to guide

procurement. As the war closed, maintenance factors based directly upon Zone

of Interior and overseas issues were computed, in the hope of providing a

sounder basis for the estimation of requirements during a future war.

< i

F.O.B. Origin Contracts

Until early 1944, virtually all purchases were F.O.B. destination. After

that date, most contracts were based on delivery at the point of origin. This

change, instigated by the Inventory Control Branch, substantially increased

the administrative workload of the Army Medical Purchasing Office because

the cost of transportation from factory to depot varied with the location of

each site.

On the other hand, under terms of F.O.B. destination, cost comparison by

depot was relatively simple. Scheduling and destination, moreover, were part

of the contract and, in general, one document accomplished all that was

required from the buyer's viewpoint. Under F.O.B. origin terms, contracts

specified quantity and shipping schedule in total, which required the buyer

to maintain an open contract file and to contact the Inventory Control office

30 to 60 days before each scheduled shipping phase for the quantity breakout

by specific depot.

Like the earlier modification of the Army Supply Program procedure by

the Delivery Needs Eeport and the later substitution of the Stock Level Purchasing System, the replacement of the F.O.B. destination by the F.O.B. origin

contract was a step closer to the objective of calculating requirements on the

basis of the most recent experience and scheduling deliveries against the latest

stock position. Better distribution of stock by the depot was made in April,

under F.O.B. origin contracts, than could have been made in the preceding

January because 3 months' issue demands could drastically alter the depot

stock position. Furthermore, last minute diversions of F.O.B. origin contracts

could be effected with greater ease, and maximum benefits were gained by the

use of Government bills of lading. Probably the most basic and lasting effect

of F.O.B. origin contracts was involvement of buyers in operations, as part of

the supply team.

Army Service Forces Circular No. 67

The Army Supply Program, which was revised on 1 February and 1

August of each year, was the basic requirements guide. With little or no warning, the Army Supply Program of 1 February 1944 was replaced by procedures contained in Army Service Forces Circular No. 67 as of 7 March 1944.4

* Smith, E. Elberton: The Army and Economic Mobilization. United States Army in World

War II. The War Department. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959, p. 162.

295-453 0—68 5
40 MEDICAL SUPPLY

This circular provided for comprehensive control of procurement inventory,

and disposal of excesses; and established a 30-day cycle of reviews as compared to the semiannual Army Supply Program.

The major components of the Circular No. 67 system were: (1) calculation of 12 months' estimated issues, including anticipated initial supplies and

maintenance for Army and Lend-Lease, plus Civil Affairs and any other

known issue requirements; (2) total authorized stock level, which comprised

depot stock levels in the Zone of Interior and in theaters of operations, contingency reserve, strategic reserve, and production reserve; (3) a supply and

demand status which was determined by application of the 12 months' issues

plus authorized stock levels minus the sum of stock on hand plus quantities

on contracts undelivered; and (4) a determination of excesses where assets in

(3) were greater than calculated requirements from (1) and (2).

Circular No. 67 was a part of the general evolution. It had been recognized

that the slower and more rigid Army Supply Program had outlived its usefulness. The period of the big buildup in forces was nearly over and the shape

of offensive operations that led to victory was in view.

PLACING PURCHASE ORDERS

After determining the quantity of a needed item, the next step in the

procurement process was placing the order, either through competitive bidding

or through negotiation. As in the prewar period, this function was performed

in the field by procurement officers who were given broad authority in the

signing of contracts. In 1941, purchasing and contracting officers were authorized to approve contracts in amounts less than $500,000; during the following

year, the amount was increased to $1 million. Contracts which exceeded those

limits had to receive the approval of The Surgeon General.5

Contract Negotiation

The system of plant allocation in use before the United States entered

the war was quickly outmoded by plant conversions and by the enormously

expanded needs of the whole war program. Similarly, the Bidders' List of

prewar days became anachronistic when competitive bidding ceased to be

mandatory. After the middle of 1940, the bulk of Medical Department purchasing was by negotiated contract, in accordance with War Department

policy which authorized the placement of orders without advertising for bids

"in all cases where that method of procurement will expedite the accomplishment of the war effort." During the first quarter of 1942, negotiated purchases

totaled $25 million while contracts signed on the basis of competitive bidding

amounted to less than $1 million.6

6 Report on Administrative Developments, Control Division, OTSG, 1 Dee. 1942. [Official record.]

«(1) Memorandum, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to Chiefs of Services, 17 Dec.

1941 (P. & C. General Directive No. 81), subject: Decentralization of Procurement. (2) Hornbacher,

Arthur: Report of Procurement Operations, 1 Jan.-31 Dec. 1942. [Official record.]
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT £1

Before actual negotiation of a contract, letters of intent were frequently

issued, which carried applicable preference rating and directed that production

be initiated before formal signing of the legal instruments. New forms were

devised in the New York Procurement Office, eliminating much unnecessary

material and speeding the placement of orders by 2 or 3 weeks.7

There was close coordination in the work of the various divisions of the

New York Procurement Office. The Administration Division maintained records of purchase authorizations and contracts; these were made available to

purchasing officers at regular intervals to inform each buyer as to the procurement status of each item for which he was responsible. The Administration

Division also reviewed open contracts to assure itself that shipments were

made as scheduled, and that they were received and acknowledged by the

depots. It was necessary, especially during 1943, to schedule production so

that scarce raw material could be made available for the items most urgently

needed. This involved care in making contracts and in stipulating delivery

dates when the items contracted for were composed of critical raw materials.

Each contract was analyzed, and realistic schedules were prepared to guide the

contractors in establishing their production schedules.8

To meet the war-expanded needs of the Medical Department, new contract forms were devised and put into effect later in 1942. The most important,

War Department Contract Form No. SG 1, was used from September 1942

until the end of the war for "formal contracts" involving procurement of

medical supplies and equipment in amounts not exceeding $1.5 million.

For long-term supply contracts, the Medical Department used War

Department Contract Form No. SG 2, which was put into effect in October

1942. This form was not widely used at first, but it soon demonstrated its value,

especially in the procurement of surgical dressings and penicillin. In the contract, a price was fixed for a certain quantity to be delivered before a stated

date; the balance of the quantity under contract was to be delivered as needs

developed. The unit price of each delivery was to be fixed by agreement

between contracting officer and contractor. In no instance, however, was the

price to increase more than 20 percent.

War Department Purchase Order Form No. SG 3 was used for procurement of supplies, repairs, and services valued at less than $2,000, and subsequently increased to $10,000. Known as an "informal contract" because it

did not require the written acceptance of the contractor, this form expedited

the delivery of small purchases which were needed quickly.

For the peculiar problems involved in processing blood plasma, a special

contract was devised by the legal officers of the Army Medical Purchasing

Office. In addition to the special clauses, this contract contained all standard

7

(1) Letter, Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, to under Secretary of War, 22 Dec. 1941, subject: P. & C.

General Directive No. 81, Office of the Under Secretary of War, December 17, 1941. (2) Hornbacher,

Arthur: Purchasing Methods—Negotiations. [Official record.]

8

See footnote 1(2), p. 36.
42 MEDICAL SUPPLY

provisions of the other contracts designed to protect the Government's

interest.9

In devising these contract forms and in negotiating between buyers and

contractors, the legal officers of the procurement districts and, later, of the

Army Medical Purchasing Office, took a prominent part. Their services were

useful in the interpretation of statutes and procurement regulations, in the

establishment of routines for the scrutiny of contracts, and in the interpretation and modification of contract provisions. One of the most important tasks

was to acquaint the contracting officers with the legal limitations upon their

authority and with the embarrassments and complications that would ensue if

mistakes were made in the obligation of public funds.10

Price Analysis

Closely connected with the negotiation of contracts, price analysis and

renegotiation were used by the Medical Department to control prices. Late

in 1943, the price analysis program began. With few exceptions, purchasing

officers required contractors to include cost data on special forms when submitting bids for orders in excess of $10,000. Most manufacturers vehemently

opposed this method of doing business and, for a while, resisted all efforts of

purchasing officers to obtain cost data. There were numerous telephone calls

and visits from contractors, who sought advice on how to fill in the forms.

Some declared that they did not know their costs. Others submitted bids without cost information. A few simply refused to .bid. After much argument and

persuasion, purchasing officers succeeded in convincing the contractors that

the new system did not aim to eliminate profits or to disseminate trade secrets,

that its only object was to keep profits within reasonable limits and thus avoid

renegotiation. By spring of 1944, most Medical Department manufacturers

were cooperating, and price analysis was in successful operation.11

As the cost data were examined by purchasing officers, proof was available that considerable overpricing existed and that excessively large prices

were resulting. Only one item was analyzed in November 1943, but that analysis made possible a reduction of 1.2 percent in the quoted price and a saving

of $1,036. During 1944, the number of items analyzed each month varied

between 17 and 115 and showed a steady upward trend. Price reductions varied

between 1.5 percent and 69 percent and totaled $1,657,027.30 for the year. During the first half of 1945, savings amounted to approximately $1.4 million.

This is scarcely more than an indication, however, of the total savings effected

by price analysis. When a quoted price was reduced through analysis of cost

figures, subsequent purchases were effected at the lowered figure. Thus, the

savings were cumulative and were much larger than the foregoing figures indicated. It was observed, also, that price analysis effected economies in another

way. For example, when a manufacturer submitted a quotation on one occa8 Hornbacher, Arthur: Purchasing Methods—Contracts, 1941-45. [Official record.]

10 See footnote 1(2), p. 36.

11 See footnote 1(2), p. 36.
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 43

sion, he was requested to forward cost data. He complied and, at the same

time, lowered his price. An analysis of the cost data resulted in a further

reduction. It is significant that the contract prices of Medical Department

items declined 24.4 percent during the period 1 July 1944 to 30 June 1945.12

Renegotiation of Contracts

Renegotiation of contracts was another and more vigorous method of

reducing the cost of medical supplies and equipment. Unlike price analysis,

this was a remedy, not a preventive; it recouped excessive profits after completion of the contract and delivery of the supplies. Eenegotiation was based

upon the assumption that manufacturers, when producing new items or tremendously increased quantities of old items, could not foresee their costs and

thus charged prices that resulted in excessive profits. But after the supplies

had been manufactured and delivered, cost data were available; then, it was

possible to determine the prices which should have been charged. Consequently,

a literal renegotiation of contracts, with full information was at the disposal

of both the contractors and representatives of the Renegotiation Division,

Supply Service. It should not be assumed, however, that hard-and-fast rules

were applied in these proceedings and that each contractor's profits were

reduced to the same percentage figure. If a contractor's costs were high and if

he had made no sincere efforts to reduce them, the percentage of profit allowed

was correspondingly reduced. But if he had kept down his costs, the percentage

allowed was higher. Contractors who had sustained losses or had made very

small profits on other governmental orders, might be permitted a larger profit

on the contract being renegotiated.

All pertinent circumstances and conditions were considered and each case

was settled on its own merits. The work required a thorough study of a contractor's business with the Medical Department, including his costs, prices,

profits, promptness in making deliveries, and corporate structure. Some contractors showed a pronounced tendency to inflate their costs, and thus reduce

their percentage of profit, by including expenses having no direct relation to

the fulfillment of the contract. It was necessary, therefore, to exercise great

care in determining the true costs.

The Renegotiation Division was established in July 1942 and continued

in operation during the remainder of the war. During fiscal year 1943, it

initiated renegotiation proceedings on 229 Medical Department contracts, of

which 82 were completed before the end of the fiscal year. These completed

cases resulted in refunds amounting to approximately $4.5 million.

During fiscal year 1944, the number of cases increased considerably, and

refunds recovered amounted to $7.5 million, or 5.8 percent of the total purchases involved. Many companies assigned to the Surgeon General's Office

were found to have realized no excessive profits and were accordingly cleared

12 (1) See footnote 1(2), p. 36. (2) Annual Report, Army Service Forces, fiscal year 1945,

p. 214. The overall decline in prices for the Army Service Forces during the same period was only

3.2 percent.
44 MEDICAL SUPPLY

without refunds or price adjustments. The companies thus cleared realized an

average profit of 5.1 percent. The companies from which refunds were obtained

had an unadjusted profit of 18.8 percent. This was reduced by 11.32 percent,

leaving an adjusted profit of 8.5 percent. This trend continued during fiscal

year 1945, in which more than 400 contracts were renegotiated, with refunds

amounting to nearly $10 million. The unadjusted profit, 20 percent, was

reduced after renegotiation to 10.17 percent. Thus, during the war period,

renegotiation reduced Medical Department expenses more than $20 million.13

No item of medical supply created more interest than blood plasma, and

none was pursued more vigorously by renegotiation officers.14 The original

price for processing the 250-cc. unit of blood plasma ranged from $6.75 to

$7.50. As of 1 September 1942, the price varied between $4.35 and $7.25, the

lower price being that of Eli Lilly and Co. In October 1942, Lilly reduced its

price to $2.50 and voluntarily refunded $25,000 on past deliveries. An additional refund of $186,000 was made in February 1943. Since Lilly had declared

that the price of $2.50 per unit represented its cost of production, exclusive of

general expenses, renegotiation officers had reason to suspect that other processors were making excessive profits. The situation was rendered serious by

the fact that requirements were large and the necessary production depended

upon public donations of blood. If excessive profits were revealed, the entire

blood plasma program would be adversely affected.

The Renegotiation Division rightfully concluded that the blood plasma

program required exceptional treatment to assure that no scandal hit the Medical Department over excessive profits. They proceeded cautiously, acquiring

the help of outsiders to enhance accuracy of findings. Unit prices of blood

plasma declined sharply during the war period, the decline being attributable

to an undeterminable extent to increased volume of production and improvement of techniques of accounting and reporting by the various laboratories, as

well as attention to costs and profits.

Payments to Contractors

It was important in executing a contract to pay contractors promptly

when performance was complete. During the war, this was not always done.

Before 1 January 1943, when a contract was issued, an Army finance officer

was designated to make payment, and a copy of the instrument was forwarded

to that office. After supplies were shipped, the contractor sent his invoices to

that finance office for matching with the receiving report from depots. When

these three documents—contract, invoice, and receiving report—were assemi3 Annual Reports of the Eenegotiatlon Division, Supply Service, OTSG, 1944 and 1945. The

1945 report, used by Capt. Eichard E. Yates, MAC, in the preparation of the first draft of this

study, is no longer available. Closely related to renegotiation was enforcement of the Royalty Adjustment Act which eliminated excessive royalties on patents and resulted in the recovery of approximately $5 million on Medical Department contracts.

« Medical Department, united States Army. Blood Program in World War II. Washington : U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1964.
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 45

bled, the finance office drew a check in favor of the contractor against Medical

Department funds.

During the period of increased procurement in 1942, this system demonstrated flaws. In addition to the increased volume of work hampering prompt

payment, delays were attributable to tardiness of the depots in forwarding

reports to the finance office and to loss of contractors' invoices. The main delay

in payment, however, was caused by differences in quantity actually shipped

by a contractor from that called for in the contract. If an over or short shipment had been made, the finance office would not pay the account until proper

certification was made.

AID TO MANUFACTURERS

During the fiscal year ending 1 July 1942, contracts were placed with Y00

manufacturers. Although this represented a distinct increase over previous

years, it was dwarfed by the great expansion of the following year, when

2,500 Medical Department contractors held a total of 25,000 contracts. This

increase in the number of manufacturers was caused by the conversion of

numerous factories to the production of medical supplies, and by a much

fuller use of small manufacturing establishments—a development resulting, in

part, from pressure exerted by the Smaller War Plants Corp. During fiscal

year 1943—the peak year for procurement—contracts placed with small war

plants totaled $220 million, or 56 percent of all Medical Department procurement. The remaining years of the war witnessed no increase in the number

of contractors nor any considerable expansion of the size of plants, except

those devoted to the production of penicillin, petrolatum dressings, artificial

limbs, and mechanical prophylactics.15

Plant Expansion

Even before the United States entered the war, the expansion of manufacturing facilities required financial aid from the Government—either loans

from the Defense Plant Corp. or certificates of necessity, which allowed the

manufacturer to amortize the cost of expansion over a 5-year period or during

the course of the emergency, whichever was shorter. In 1940, a "very small

percentage" of Medical Department facilities applied for certificates of necessity, but during 1941, a considerably larger number sought to amortize their

expansion in this manner. Working through the Under Secretary of War, the

Medical Department used its influence to obtain the certificates of necessity

from the Treasury Department. By the end of 1943, Medical Department contractors had expanded their plants sufficiently to care for the abnormal needs

of the war, except in the production of litters, artificial limbs, penicillin, gas

gangrene antitoxin, blood plasma, and other medical items which science

15 (1) Annual Report, Supply Service, OTSG, 1943. (2) Annual Report of The Surgeon General

for the Commanding General, ASF, 1943. (3) Annual Report, Liaison Branch, Purchases Division,

Supply Service, OTSG, fiscal year 1945.
46 MEDICAL SUPPLY

developed and which the changing military situation required. Several penicillin plants, for example, were financed with public funds supplied by the

Defense Plant Corp., but the greater number were built by private capital

upon the basis of certificates of necessity. During the period 1 July 1943 to

30 June 1944,136 applications for the certificates were considered by the Supply Service and forwarded to higher authority. On each application, a report

was prepared showing the importance of the medical item to be produced, the

relationship between requirements and existing facilities, and the suitability

of the proposed facility.16

In addition to an increase in the number of contractors and the expansion

of plants, the production of urgently needed medical supplies was augmented

by the establishment of the 24-hour workday and the Y-day week. Within less

than 10 days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, four great chemical companies

which produced raw materials for pharmaceuticals were put on a 24-hour day.

Mills producing gray goods for surgical dressings had been on three shifts

for several months, and the surgical instrument manufacturers had worked two

shifts per day for more than a year. Only lack of skilled personnel prevented

the addition of a third shift. The drug industry and other manufacturers of

commercial-type items did not work to maximum capacity for their production

was more than adequate for all Army requirements.17

Procurement officers of the Medical Department soon discovered, however,

that neither plant expansion nor an increase in the workday could insure the

full production needed by the war effort. In the rapidly tightening economy,

shortages of manpower, machine tools, and raw materials were becoming

increasingly acute. Consequently, an important duty of procurement officers

was to aid manufacturers in obtaining these essential components of

production.

Substitutions for Scarce Materials

The earliest and the most troublesome problem throughout the war period

grew out of the shortages of essential raw materials. Scarcities of drugs and

metals which had previously been imported were anticipated and some provision had beert made for substitutes, but shortages in domestically produced

raw materials were not expected. Mobilization plans did not envision a war

of such magnitude that the huge steel, copper, aluminum, and other material

resources of the United States would be inadequate. Early in 1942, however,

it became clear that the mighty military effort then being developed would

produce severe shortages in the three key metals as well as in many other raw

materials. The remedies were obvious and were quickly applied. They consisted of conservation and centralized control.

« (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col.'c. F. Shook, MC, to Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, 1 Mar. 1941, subject:

Keport upon Senate Kesolution 71. (2) Annual Report, Liaison Branch, Purchase Division, Supply

Service, OTSG, fiscal year 1944.

«Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. F. Shook, MC, to Maj. Charles J. Norman, Inf., 15 Dec. 1941,

subject: Maximum Hours of Work.
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 47

As shortage became apparent, specifications of Medical Department items

were revised wherever practicable to eliminate scarce raw materials. Hospital

equipment and furniture, formerly made of corrosion-resistant steel, were constructed of iron, wood, and other less critical, but shorter-lived, substances.

The laminated paper and lead foil covering of the first aid packet proved

superior to both the brass and steel it replaced, but galvanized iron was less

than satisfactory as a substitute for brass in the manufacture of sterilizers.

The plastics used instead of metals in such items as food trays and bottle tops

wore out faster than the more durable materials originally used, as also did the

enamelware that replaced stainless steel and aluminum in bedpans, cooking

utensils, and other items of hospital equipment. The litter pole, between early

1942 and the end of 1943, ran the full cycle from aluminum to carbon steel to

hardwood to laminated wood and back again to aluminum as productive capacity for that metal caught up with needs.18 Although various items of Medical

Department supply suffered temporary loss in quality by substitution, the war

effort as a whole gained impressive quantities of critical materials (table 1).

TABLE 1.—Scarce materials saved by Medical Department conservation measures, 194S-43

Quantity saved (in pounds)

Material

Quantity saved (in pounds)

Fiscal year

1942

Fiscal year

1943

Fiscal year

1942

Fiscal year

1943

Aluminum _ 186, 333

2,497

148, 482

275

680

339, 152

4,685

34, 244

102, 000

150

0

0

7,000

207, 000

777, 500

0

Lead 8, 142

148

199, 358

372, 787

6,455

1, 006, 612

263, 320

0

o

Antimony.. .... Manganese o

Brass _ __ Nickel 44 000

Bronze, _ 2 985 000

Cadmium Silk .. . ." . 80 000

Chromium Steel 2, 970, 000

Copper Tin 584, 000

Formica. Zinc 6, 000

SOURCE: Annual Reports, Finance and Supply Services, Fiscal Years 1942 and 1943.

In addition to the conservation measures outlined, the Medical Department sought to relieve the raw materials shortages of its contractors by obtaining high preference ratings from the War Production Board and the Army

and Navy Munitions Board. In these endeavors, the Department was confronted by an all-embracing system of raw materials control which, although

it was not inflexible, could not often be changed to aid a single technical service (fig. 8).

It was not until 1944, when steel, aluminum, and copper became more

abundant, that many of the unsatisfactory substitutes could be abandoned. At

that time, the Medical Department launched a program which it described as

"reverse conservation." All specifications which had been amended to permit

the use of substitute materials were carefully revised, and vigorous requests

18 (1) See footnotes 15(2), p.

Services, OTSG, fiscal year 1942.

45; and 16(2), p. 46. (2) Annual Report, Finance and Supply
48 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGUEE 8.—Steps in

the production of surgical steel instruments included forging, milling,

anda number of skilled

benchwork handcraft

operations, such as the

hand polishing operations depicted. (Photographs, courtesy J.

Sklar Manufacturing

Co., Long Island, N.Y.)
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 49

FIGURE 9.—Litter, Folding, Aluminum, was one of eight different kinds of field litters

covered by separate specifications and carried in depot stocks during World War II.

were made for the raw materials of first choice. Within a few months, brass

shell sterilizers, aluminum pole litters, and stainless steel bedpans heralded the

dawn of a more abundant day (fig. 9).19

ALLOCATION OF MATERIALS

The Priorities System

The original priorities system instituted in 1940 by the Army and Navy

Munitions Board established preference ratings based on the relative urgency

of certain military items. The top priority rating of A-l-a was given to tanks.

Airplanes were rated A-l-b, and other items, A-l-c through A-l-h. Medical

supplies for the Army during this early period were rated A-l-d. These eight

priorities ratings, the only ones in existence in 1940, were issued exclusively

to manufacturers by the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The granting of

a rating to a manufacturer gave him the right to place that rating on all

orders for raw materials and component parts needed to complete the end

item. Since this was a small defense program rather than a large war program,

no great difficulty was encountered in filling rated orders. The remainder of

the country's production was not affected, except for some delays in filling

civilian orders.20

19 See footnote 16(2), p. 46.

»This section on Allocation of Materials is based primarily on studies made by two procurement officers: (1) Capt. Devon A. Davis, MAC: Advent of New Procedures. Effect of Priorities on

Procurement. [Official record.]; and (2) Maj. T. M. Salisbury, MAC: Priorities, Allocations and

Materials Control. [Official record.] Also consulted were the annual reports for the war years of

the Supply Service, OTSG, and of the Army Medical Purchasing Office. The definitive study of the

subject is Novick, David, Anshen, Melvin, and Truppner, W. C.: Wartime Production Controls

New York : Columbia University Press, 1949.
50 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 10.—Manufacturing transformer components _ for X-ray machines. Cable insert

wells are being fabricated on the right; transformer coils, in the center.

The Medical Department prepared a critical and essential item list comprising about 1,000 of its 4,500 cataloged items for blanket coverage. As materials became scarcer, this list soon proved to be too restrictive, and special

applications had to be used increasingly. In any event, the mere fact that the

contractor had received the contract and his A-l-d preference rating did not

mean that he could automatically procure the necessary raw materials. He had

no more than a license to buy if and when he found the materials he needed,

uncommitted to higher priority orders (fig. 10).

Another administrative handicap developed shortly after the inauguration of a preference rating system. Before its establishment, to exact prompt

deliveries, most Medical Department contracts carried a liquidated damage

clause affixing a penalty for items not delivered within the time specified.

Potential contractors hesitated to accept preference rated contracts or orders

carrying a higher preference rating than those they were already processing,

if they also contained this liquidated damage clause. To overcome this condition, the Secretary of War issued Procurement Circular No. 36, dated 23

October 1940, so that inclusion of the liquidated damage clause was applied

only to exceptional cases or when no conflict was anticipated. Changes also
CENTEAL PROCUREMENT 51

authorized contracting officers to grant time extensions as warranted by the

facts in the case.

At the beginning of 1941, the Office of Production Management was established, and it soon assumed complete priorities control over certain scarce

materials. Kegulations were issued prohibiting producers from filling civilian

orders until all rated orders had been completed. The preference ratings, in

addition, were greatly expanded. At the top level, two ratings were added:

A-l-i and A-l-k. These were followed by a new level, A-2 through A-10, and

a third level which consisted of two ratings, B-l and B-2. From the very

beginning, however, the last two ratings were largely valueless, for the higher

ratings got the scarce materials and the factory space. Two methods were

used in establishing priority ratings: (1) the "blanket rating" extending a

priority for certain kinds of items, thus rendering individual applications

unnecessary; and (2) the ratings granted for individual orders or contracts.

In January 1942, the WPB (War Production Board) succeeded the Office of

Production Management and gradually assumed the priority functions previously exercised by the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

Aside from frequent changes in organization, responsibility, and personnel, the greatest difficulty faced by the Medical Department in dealing with

the production agencies was the absence of any organizational group familiar

with the needs for health supplies. In dealing directly with the metallurgical

group handling brass, for example, the Medical Department manufacturer was

apt to have his request for brass for use in sterilizers met with a statement

that the request represented so many cartridges. The early establishment of a

Health Supply Section in WPB, however, was a recognition of the special

nature of health supplies and a guarantee that materials needed for them

would not be lightly or ignorantly denied.

The priorities system never attempted to balance the issuance of preference ratings against the available supplies or raw materials. Indeed, the system was an attempt to find a substitute for balancing supply and demand,

based on the theory that the relative urgency of different products was accurately reflected in the priorities. It made no difference, therefore, how many

preference ratings were issued; when the materials and resources were exhausted, orders with a low rating would not be filled. For example, if enough

A-9 or higher ratings were issued to use up the entire available supply, no

orders with ratings below A-9 would be filled; and, since all orders of A-9 or

higher were more urgent than lower orders, the objective of the system would

be accomplished.

This kind of balance was never achieved because of a pronounced lack

of uniformity in appraising urgency, and there was insufficient information

upon which to base the appraisals. Who, in 1942, could declare with certainty

that trench mortars were more important than field X-ray machines? If such

a declaration were made in January 1942, who could believe it would remain

valid throughout the succeeding months? This lack of faith in preference ratings smoothed the way for a priorities race. When it became obvious that an
52 MEDICAL SUPPLY

A-3 contract could not be filled, there was a tendency to rerate the contract.

This, of course, made the plight of low ratings more hopeless than ever. Just

after Pearl Harbor, for example, it appeared that the A-10 rating given to

manufacturers of medical supplies and equipment was losing its effectiveness.

Suppliers, fully occupied with higher ratings, were paying scant attention to

A-10 orders. Before long, any rating below A-l, for steel, copper, or other

critical materials, became valueless.

An attempt was made to solve this preference rating inflation by adding

"superratings"—that is, by more inflation. AA was the first of the new ratings,

added in 1941. By the end of the summer of 1942, many manufacturers had

their mills booked solidly in advance on nothing but A-l orders, and it became

necessary to add a whole series of superratings, beginning with AAA as the

emergency rating and followed by AA-l, AA-2, AA-3, and AA-4. "Within

a few months, some ratings had become the victim of still further inflation,

and it became obvious that priorities alone could not control the flow of

scarce materials.

The Medical Department in particular had fared poorly under the priorities system as then established. Its contractors, generally speaking, had

received A-l-d preference ratings, while medical supply contractors of the

Navy had the advantage of A-l-a ratings. This severe handicap was rendered

still more serious by the fact that the Air Corps, Signal Corps, and Ordnance

Department had A-l-a ratings for critical materials. This rendered it virtually impossible for Medical Department contractors to make deliveries within

reasonable periods of time when critical raw materials were required. This

difficulty was partly solved by the conservation measures described earlier,

but there were limits beyond which conservation could not be pushed. It

became necessary, therefore, to appeal for higher preference ratings on

urgently needed items. In some instances, better "blanket" type ratings were

assigned. In June 1942, an A-l-a rating was granted for all depot freight

handling equipment; at the same time, the Medical Department was authorized

to give a rating of A-l-a to 65 percent of its contracts, the estimated percentage of its purchases which were being shipped overseas. This authorization

also permitted the use of the A-l-b rating for all metal components not rated

A-l-a. This, naturally, was a distinct aid to Medical Department procurement,

but it must be remembered that the superratings added in 1941 and 1942

rendered the A-l-a rating far less valuable than formerly.

The Production Requirements Plan

Late in 1942, the priorities system was supplemented by the Production

Eequirements Plan, which provided that every manufacturer using more than

$5,000 worth of certain scarce metals and metallic materials in a 3-month

period could obtain those metals only through allotments. An attempt was

made to balance those allotments against the available supply by giving a

preference rating to be used in obtaining the materials thus allotted.
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 53

This plan was short-lived. The theory, while simple, seemed extremely

complicated to manufacturers. The plan was not fully operative until 1 October 1942, when it had become generally known that a different plan for controlling the flow of materials was being developed. The fundamental weakness of the system, assuming that it had been given an opportunity to be

thoroughly tested, was that the basis of allotting materials was the manufacturers' own statements of what they felt they needed for war production.

Only at the top could the needs of the war program be translated into allotments of materials to manufacturers, not from the standpoint of what the

manufacturers wanted as permitted under the Production Requirements Plan.

The Controlled Materials Plan

The Production Requirements Plan had scarcely gone into effect before

a new and more effective system was devised. Known as CMP (Controlled

Materials Plan), this system was first announced in November 1942 and was

in full effect by July 1943. Under CMP, three key materials—carbon steel,

copper, and aluminum—were allocated among approved programs submitted

quarterly by seven claimant agencies, including the War and Navy Departments and WPB's Office of Civilian Supply. Each contractor submitted to

the appropriate claimant agency a list of materials needed, with required dates

of delivery. When all claims were in, WPB divided the available supply of

the three controlled materials among the claimant agencies, which in turn

approved deliveries to the contractors. If there were not enough materials to

satisfy all claims, some of them were cut back until supply and demand were

in balance. Under the priorities system, only those with high ratings got anything at all; under CMP, all approved programs got something although it

might be less than requested. Materials other than steel, copper, and aluminum were distributed through the priorities system and by means of conservation orders, but the old difficulties were no longer experienced because the

control of the basic materials served as a limiting factor on the use of others.

End items were divided into two groups, called "A" and "B" products.

"B" products were those items regularly produced for civilian consumption,

commonly called shelf or stock items, such as motors, gages, microscopes,

screws, bolts, and refrigerators. "A" products were classified as all end items

not listed in the "B" products list, and included items not generally produced

in quantity before the war, such as tanks, guns, aircraft, and ships. However,

for convenience, "B" items were sometimes treated as "A" products or vice

versa with special permission from WPB.

Scheduling production.—Since most Medical Department items fabricated from controlled materials were regularly produced for civilian consumption, they were treated as "B" products. However, a few exceptions, such as

X-ray darkroom tents, hospital beds, and gasoline burners, were classified as

"A" items. Classifying Medical Department items as "B" products meant

that responsibility for obtaining controlled materials requirements and passing
54 MEDICAL SUPPLY

allotments to prime contractors rested with the appropriate industry branch

in the Office of Civilian Supply.

The Controlled Materials Plan proved to be far superior to anything

previously devised. Medical Department contractors encountered little difficulty in obtaining allotments of controlled materials, especially if orders were

placed 60 days before the required delivery date. More difficulty was encountered in obtaining electrical components such as motors, starters, transformers,

meters, and high voltage wire; but where great need could be shown, assistance

from WPB was obtained to expedite delivery.

Duties of the procurement officer.—Under CMP and the priorities

system which accompanied it, Medical Department procurement officers had

important duties. It was essential that the required production be scheduled so

that items would be delivered when needed, and that scarce materials and

restricted manufacturing facilities were not devoted to the production of items

until they were needed. Since requirements were never static and since plans

for overseas operations were frequently changed, this involved a continuous

study and control of production schedules. For example, scarce materials

allotted to the production of one item had to be speedily withdrawn when it

was discovered that the production of another item had suddenly become

more urgent. Procurement officers found that their task, in this respect, resembled that of an engineer who sits in a maze of pipes and opens and closes

valves, thus directing the flow of critical materials to the areas that most

needed them and restricting the flow to areas of less urgent need. A similar

task was accomplished with the priorities system. Each contract which involved

the use of scarce materials received a preference rating designed to supply

the materials within the time limits allowed by the contract. Frequent adjustments were necessary, however, as the value of preference ratings fluctuated

and as the comparative urgency of different production programs varied with

the military situation. It was sometimes necessary to apply to WPB for emergency ratings to expedite a contract whose speedy completion had suddenly

become urgent.

Adjustment of contracts.—A considerable improvement in the authorized

preference ratings facilitated operations and lessened the need for individual

pleas to WPB for relief. To counter further inflation of priority ratings, a

priorities directive was issued on 15 December 1942 permitting the Medical

Department to rate 60 percent of its requirements for each quarter AA-1

and 40 percent AA-2X, figured on the total value of all contracts issued during

this period. The procurement office thus determined which contracts were

to receive the higher priority. In general, those contracts which covered items

involving the more critical production materials or urgently needed items

were rated AA-1, while items not urgently needed or involving noncritical

materials were rated AA-2X.

The 15 December 1942 priorities directive permitted all contracts involving the purchase of items for Russian Lend-Lease to be rated AA-1, without
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 55

being charged against the 60 percent AA-1, 40 percent AA-2X pattern. In

addition to buying and shipping direct under the Kussian protocol, some items

were bought for the American Eed Cross to be shipped by that agency to

Eussia. Four blood plasma processing plants, incorporating the best feature

of several of the commercial processors, were examples.

The system put into effect by the December 1942 directive worked

smoothly for the Medical Department until the beginning of 1945, when the

supply situation began to change. Some materials, notably packing supplies,

that could formerly be obtained with an AA-2X rating, required an AA-1

rating. Indeed, many suppliers refused to accept orders; or, if they did accept

them, they could offer no assurance that delivery would be made on time

because of large backlogs of AA-1 orders. As a result, it was necessary to give

the higher rating to contracts previously granted an AA-2X rating; obviously

the 60 percent AA-1, 40 percent AA-2X pattern was no longer adequate for

Medical Department requirements. Since the 60^0 ratio could not be improved,

the alternative was to process through WPB each contract which required

rerating, and to study carefully each new contract before rating it, thus seeking

to conserve the AA-1 ratings.

This sudden tightening of materials was caused by several factors, the

most important probably being the lack of sufficient manpower. In addition, a

general relaxation occurred during the last quarter of 1944 when the war in

Europe appeared to be nearing its end. Contracts were drastically cut back

or canceled, causing mills which produced materials to curtail production. In

this situation, Medical Department contractors consumed their inventories and

refrained from restocking. When it was discovered that the war in Europe

could continue for months, a great procurement rush began. Army and Navy

contracts were released calling for the quickest possible delivery, and contractors sought to restore their inventories. This caused the mills and component manufacturers to be flooded with so many orders that 5 to 6 months'

delivery time was not unusual. To deal with this situation, production directives and emergency preference ratings were obtained from WPB to speed

the completion of the most urgent contracts.

Aid to contractors.—In the meantime, procurement officers of the Medical

Department were aiding contractors by extending other types of assistance.

Through the Production Service Branch of the Army Medical Purchasing Office, contractors received the aid they required to make prompt deliveries. This

aid most frequently took the form of higher preference ratings, but even when

these were granted, many problems remained involving delivery of war materials and machinery, component parts, subcontracting service, and the like.

These were "trouble spots" existing in contractors' plants.

Fortunately, most production problems did not require detailed and painstaking study for their solution. A telephone call to the manufacturer of a component part, the supplier of raw materials, or a governmental agency was often

sufficient to solve a production problem. Sometimes a visit to a plant revealed

295-453 O—68 6
56 MEDICAL SUPPLY

a difficulty and rendered its solution possible.21 What was required in all instances, however, was a system that would keep track of progress and would

inform procurement officers of all delays in production. The "Ten-Day Status

of Procurement Report," developed early in 1943, served this purpose.

Each buyer was given, every 10 days, a complete resume on the status of

all items for which he was responsible. This gave him a clear basis for forecasting, placing additional contracts, scheduling, and expediting the completion of contracts already placed. Many production difficulties were brought

to the attention of the buyer, and thence to the Production Service Branch,

through this report. For example, during fiscal year 1945, approximately 50

manufacturing establishments were visited to determine the status of production and to render aid when completion of contracts was delayed.22

MANPOWER PROBLEMS

Loss of Skilled Workers

Procurement officers exerted themselves, also, to assist manufacturers with

manpower problems, which became increasingly serious as the war progressed.

The operation of the Selective Service law had a constantly disruptive effect

upon Medical Department contractors, for skilled and semiskilled workers,

whose replacement was difficult, were regularly inducted into the Armed

Forces (fig. 11). Whenever the induction of a valuable worker was threatened,

the contractor informed the procurement office, which immediately sought an

occupational deferment for the worker. Contact was made with the local

Selective Service Board by telephone, by mail, and, in some instances, by personal visits. The worker's importance to the Medical Department contractor

was urged upon the board, and representations were made as to the essentiality

of medical supplies. If the request for deferment was rejected by the local

board, the case was followed to the appeal board and, if necessary, to the State

Selective Service Director. When all these efforts failed, the chief of the labor

branch in the appropriate service command was urged to transfer the worker

to the Enlisted Reserve Corps so that he could return to his factory and help

complete the contract, or at least train a replacement.

Early in the war, selective service officials were reluctant to grant occupational deferments, especially at the lower levels, to the workers of Medical

Department contractors, for they understood little of the Department's work

and had even less information on the importance of medical supplies. Pressed

by the necessity of filling their quotas and sensitive to ill-informed public

criticism, the local boards inducted many skilled workers, whose loss delayed

the completion of contracts for vitally needed supplies. This difficulty became

especially troublesome in 1943, when local boards were "scraping the bottom

21 Ingraham, N. K., and Hornbacher, Arthur: Production Control, General Difficulty. [Official

record. ]

^Annual Report, Contractors Service Branch to Public Relations Officer, Army Medical Purchasing Office, fiscal year 1945.
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 57

FIGURE 11.—Woman operating forklift truck stacking boxes on pallets, St. Louis Medical

Depot.

of the barrel" to fill the very heavy quotas demanded in that year. By the

latter part of 1943, however, the general public and the local boards were

becoming more acquainted with the importance of medical supplies—a development caused largely by radio, newspaper, and magazine advertisements.

The attitude of local boards began to change and deferments were granted

in greater numbers. From November 1944 to May 1945, approximately 2,500

deferments had been processed, and more than 1,100 deferments were

granted.23

Labor Disputes

Labor officers also had to deal with strikes and the threat of strikes, and

with their normally attendant cause—wage disputes. Strikes were not actually

prohibited by law, but the right to strike was first hedged with the threat of

public odium, then abridged by what amounted to compulsory arbitration.

The National Defense Mediation Board was created by Executive order in

23 (1) Evans, C. M., and Hornbacher, A.: Manpower. [Official record.] (2) See footnote 22,

p. 56.
58 MEDICAL SUPPLY

March 1941. Although this board had no sanction but public opinion and no

tool but moral suasion, it made an enviable record in its 10 months of existence. It was succeeded in January 1942 by the National War Labor Board,

with authority to "finally determine" labor disputes. The big stick behind the

soft words was the war powers of the President, who could and did seize

plants in which either labor or management was unwilling to abide by the

ruling of the National War Labor Board. The War Labor Disputes Act

(Smith-Connally Act) of 25 June 1943 reaffirmed the President's power to

take over essential plants in which work had been, or was about to be,

interrupted.

No manufacturer holding Medical Department contracts was involved in

such action, but the production of surgical and dental instruments had been

delayed by strikes before the original mediation board was set up. To minimize such delays in the future, supply contracts by the fall of 1941 included

the following paragraph:

"Whenever an actual or potential labor dispute is delaying or threatens

to delay the timely performance of this contract, the Contractor will immediately give notice thereof to the Purchasing and Contracting Office. Such notice

shall include relevant information with respect to such dispute."2i

INSPECTION OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES

Before 1943, medical supplies were inspected after purchase in a manner

which had been followed for many years. When supplies were received at

depots, samples were withdrawn and tested for compliance with specifications.

Samples of sterile solutions and products were forwarded to the Food and

Drug Administration; other supplies which the depot was unable to test were

forwarded to the laboratories of the procurement officers, at either St. Louis,

Mo., or New York. Until a favorable report had been received on samples sent

away for testing, the stocks from which they were drawn were segregated and

made unavailable for issue. This system of inspection was satisfactory during

peacetime. The quantities of supplies purchased were small, and they were

procured from standard manufacturers who maintained adequate testing laboratories and were well acquainted with Medical Department specifications. No

difficulties proceeded from the delay in making supplies available for issue

since the depots maintained adequate stocks to meet all current demands. If

a shipment of supplies failed to pass the tests, it could easily be replaced in

ample time.

As the size of the Army multiplied, the quantities of medical supplies

purchased vastly increased. They were procured from a large number of

manufacturers, some of whom had only recently converted their factories to

war production. These new manufacturers were not thoroughly familiar with

Medical Department specifications, and many did not possess adequate test24 The quoted passage is from War Department Supply Contract Form No. 1, 16 Sept. 1941,

Article 16.
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 59

ing facilities. Eejection of medical supplies led to serious embarrassments, for

such rejections resulted in the loss of critical raw materials and the waste of

valuable manufacturing space, labor, transportation, and packing supplies.

It soon became obvious that the inspection of medical supplies upon delivery,

if not accompanied by inspections during the manufacturing process, was a

luxury that the Medical Department could ill afford during the war.

In January 1943, an inspection section was established in the New York

Medical Department Procurement District. Inspectors who possessed technical training and experience in testing various types of medical supplies were

recruited and given still further training. The country was then divided into

a number of areas, and the inspectors were assigned to the plants of Medical

Department contractors: 33 inspectors entered plants in the Greater New

York City area; 18 were assigned to the Middle Atlantic area (including

upstate New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio, and New Jersey); 9 were

assigned to the New England area; and 11 were assigned to the Western area.

These plant inspectors served a threefold purpose: (1) to check the contractor's inspection methods, (2) to determine compliance with contract specifications, and (3) to prevent shipment of substandard supplies to the depots.25

Occasionally, the inspectors observed inadvertent departures from specifications, which were quickly corrected by grateful contractors. At times, also,

the ambiguous wording of some specifications and purchase descriptions led

to different interpretations by contractors and inspectors. These were soon

settled by reference to chief inspectors and procurement officials. Perhaps

the greatest difficulties arose when plant inspectors approved the shipment of

urgently needed items which did not conform to all technical requirements of

specifications, but which, nevertheless, were usable and suitable for their

intended purpose. Those departures from specifications confused depot inspectors, who, although they had been informed of the new policy, returned a

number of shipments on the grounds that they were too much at variance

with specifications. This friction and disagreement were especially important

in regard to substandard surgical instruments. At length, a conference in New

York, attended by both plant and depot inspectors, established a procedure

which satisfied all. After June 1943, when depot inspectors refused to accept

a shipment approved by plant inspectors, the commanding officer of the Army

Medical Purchasing Office received reports from both inspectors and rendered

a binding decision.

The system of plant inspections appears to have been an unqualified success. In 1943, approximately 800 plants located in 29 states were served by the

inspectors; by the following year, the number of plants increased to more than

a thousand. The cost of the inspection was very modest—.103 percent of the

cost of supplies shipped in 1943, and .157 percent in 1944.

It has been indicated that the plant inspections supplemented rather than

replaced the final inspections at the receiving depots. It should be made clear,

;Pigott, John W., and Hornbacher, Arthur: Inspection. [Official record.]
60 MEDICAL SUPPLY

also, that employment of the testing laboratories of the Food and Drug Administration and the Army Medical Purchasing Office continued throughout the

war. In fact, the laboratory of the procurement office, transferred from Binghamton, N. Y., to New York in February 1943, was enlarged and equipped to

perform examinations for both inspection and the development of specifications. In fiscal year 1944, 5,429 formal examinations were performed by this

laboratory; in fiscal year 1945, the number was increased to 5,572.26

CONTRACT TERMINATION

In the fall of 1943 when it became apparent that there was to be a large

volume of contract terminations, the Legal Section undertook the development

of procedures and policies for processing them. Contract modifications were

a trivial source of potential unpleasantness in comparison with terminations,

and this wholly aside from the work devolving upon contractors and purchasing officers alike. In time and labor, termination of contracts frequently

exceeded the initial contracting effort tenfold.

Terminations continued all during the war, and cancellations at the war's

end were anticipated, but it is questionable that anyone foresaw their magnitude. Every contract for more than $1,000 written by the Medical Department

during the war contained a clause providing that the Government could cancel the contract at its option and, in that event, would pay the contractor on

a fair and equitable basis for costs incurred. Until September 1943, terminations were on a relatively small scale, totaling approximately $22.5 million,

and were handled by the legal staff. Most cancellations stemmed from the

substitution of newly developed items for obsolete items.

In September 1943, terminations had become so extensive that a Contract

Termination Branch became a part of the Army Medical Purchasing Office.

Because of cutbacks in requirements on all classes of medical supplies, two

large waves of terminations occurred in September 1943 and February 1944

amounting to approximately $42.5 million.

It was recognized that the end of the war would automatically cancel the

need for much of the material under contract; the date, of course, was unpredictable. In July 1944, Congress turned its attention to this matter and, to

safeguard the economic welfare of the Nation, passed the Contract Settlement

Act of 1944, establishing as primary objectives: (1) settling of terminations

claims fairly and quickly; (2) prompt clearance of termination inventory

from war plants; and (3) provision of adequate interim financing for war

contractors pending settlements.

Training meetings were held in New York in June 1944 and in Chicago

in August 1944, with large numbers of medical contractors in attendance. In

the Army Medical Purchasing Office, too, preparations moved apace to meet

this anticipated workload, including augmentation of the staff by additional

28 (1) Annual Report, Procurement Division, New York Medical Depot, fiscal year 1943. (2)

Annual Report, Material Standards Division, Army Medical Purchasing Office, fiscal year 1945.
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT 61

accountants as well as plans for transferring personnel from the buying

branches to the Termination Branch on V-E Day.

Other preparations were occurring simultaneously to minimize the termination problem. In late 1944, as stocks accumulated and the War Department

became optimistic about an early conclusion of the war in Europe, procurement shifted from long-term to short-term contracts. Close attention was paid

to estimated future requirements. As a result of this policy, it was necessary

to terminate only $11 million in contracts after V-E Day. When hostilities

ceased in the Pacific, the entire procurement program was cut back according

to plan and more than $54 million of Medical Department contracts were canceled within 24 hours. For the entire war period, approximately 4,000 different

contracts involving $110 million in canceled contracts were processed and

settled. Of this amount, $50 million was settled without cost to the Government.27

One of the more difficult problems of contract termination was disposition of items already completed but not yet delivered. It was at first determined that an attempt should be made to have the contractor keep these items

at a fair valuation. Otherwise, an attempt would be made to dispose of them

to foreign governments or to such organizations as the Russian War Relief

and United Czechoslovakia Relief. Failing in these steps, the supplies were

then to be shipped to depot stocks. Subsequently, The Surgeon General directed

that all sales to the United Nations, including Russian War Relief, should be

handled directly through the International Aid Division. A bulletin of completed items in the hands of contractors was prepared and distributed to business firms, relief societies, and other agencies. Considerable quantities of surgical instruments were sold to the U.S. Navy Department, and articles like kit

pouches were sold to the Boy Scouts of America. Whenever practicable, the

contractor would make the sale, using the proceeds to reduce his termination

claim. The whole problem was bound up with the larger problem of depot

surplus. Contractors and potential purchasers hesitated to retain or buy terminated supplies when the threat of disposition of huge depot surpluses loomed.

Disposal of unfinished supplies also involved many difficult problems.

Frequently, unfinished items such as surgical instruments had no value other

than their scrap value. When critical material was obtained under the priorities system for filling military orders, contractors could not use it for making

items for civilian consumption. To clear up this dilemma, a ruling was

obtained permitting contractors to use priority material for manufacture of

end items of the same type, even though these new items would ultimately be

sold for civilian consumption. If V-Loans were involved or if proceeds of the

contract were assigned to some bank, other complications naturally ensued.

Packing and packaging materials were in constantly short supply. When

contracts were canceled, the packing materials thus made available were

quickly redistributed among those contractors who, because of lack of these

27 Termination of Contracts in the Medical Department. Bull. U.S. Army M. Dept. 6 : 683-686,

December 1946.
62 MEDICAL SUPPLY

materials, were delayed in completing their contracts. Transactions like these,

of course, necessitated an abundance of financial adjusting.

From the foregoing, it can be readily seen that terminations were timeconsuming operations fraught with the possibility of bad public relations. The

Medical Department settled all terminations incidental to the war without a

single contractor's resorting to the contract appeal or dispute machinery of the

War Department, nor was any case invalidated or suspended. Furthermore,

99 percent of these cases were settled within established time limits.
CHAPTER III

Procurement of Problem Items

Procurement of medical supplies in time of war, as discussed in chapter

II, was a complex, ever-changing, and frustrating duty. Among the many

different articles needed desperately by the Medical Department, several were

called "problem items" because of their great importance, the difficulty of

obtaining them, and the large size of the requirement. Surgical dressings, blood

plasma, penicillin, spectacles, and surgical instruments headed the list of

these special problems.

SURGICAL DRESSINGS

The surgical dressings procured by the Medical Department consisted of

approximately 75 items, including bandages, absorbent cotton, gauze, surgical

masks, abdominal packs, adhesive plaster, pads, plaster of paris, first aid dressings, and surgical sponges. With the exception of the first aid packets and a

few other special-type dressings, all these items were manufactured in large

quantities for civilian use before 1939. Consequently, no difficulty was anticipated in obtaining most of them from the usual commercial channels in the

event of war. During World War I, the local chapters of the American Eed

Cross had prepared enormous quantities of bandages, dressings, and sponges

for the Medical Department; but supply officers, as late as 1939, thought that

such outside aid would no longer be necessary, unless for psychological

reasons.

Procurement Problems

This complacency was rudely jolted in the spring of 1940 when industry

spokesmen made it clear that their plant capacity was insufficient for wartime

military needs, and that any large increase in capacity would be impractical.

The alternative was for the Army to purchase the appropriate material in

bolt form and make its own dressings. The Medical Department abruptly

dropped its procurement plans and appealed to the Ked Cross for aid. "Since

it has been definitely established," The Surgeon General wrote, "that machinemade dressings can be produced in quantity only sufficient for peace-time

needs, it is the studied opinion of this office * * * that in time of emergency

full and complete reliance must be had upon the good offices of the Eed

Cross to furnish ready-made dressings."1

1

(1) Letter, Louis H. Nichols, Manager, Hospital Sales, Lewis Manufacturing Co., to George

Smith, Director of Purchasing, American Red Cross, 29 Apr. 1940. (2) Letter, Maj. Gen. James C.

Magee, The Surgeon General, to Col. James D. Fife, American Eed Cross, 20 June 1940.

63
64 MEDICAL SUPPLY

After receiving assurances that the Eed Cross would extend its aid as in

the First World War, the Surgeon General's Office requested and received

authority "to enter into an agreement with the American Eed Cross whereby

the Medical Department of the United States Army may procure the requisite

materials which will be turned over to the American Red Cross and receive in

exchange the equivalent in prepared dressings." These dressings were to constitute "an essential war reserve." 2

Local chapters of the Red Cross quickly prepared to enlist the women of

America in this vital activity. Gauze was purchased from surgical dressing

manufacturers, cut into rectangles or squares of the proper size, and shipped

to Red Cross chapters throughout the country where volunteer workers processed the material into surgical sponges, surgical masks, and abdominal pads.

These supplies were sent to medical depots to be stored until they were shipped

overseas or to Zone of Interior installations. Immediately before use, they

were sterilized in the central supply rooms of the hospitals to which they were

issued.

From August 1942 to the end of 1944, a total of nearly 300 million yards

of gauze was purchased by the Medical Department and sent to the Red Cross

chapters. From this gauze, it was estimated that approximately 5 billion

sponges, masks, and pads were prepared. During the winter and spring of

1945, production of these supplies continued at such a rate that, by April 1945,

sufficient stocks had been built up to warrant the gradual closing of the workrooms, and in July of that year, production ceased altogether.3

It should not be assumed, however, that the aid extended by the Red

Cross, valuable as it was, solved all problems involved in the procurement of

surgical dressings. Labor shortages and the lack of adequate plant capacity

threatened to restrict production of dressings not prepared by the Red Cross

to a quantity far below anticipated requirements. Foreseeing this difficulty,

procurement officers of the Medical Section, New York General Depot, New

York, N.Y., called a meeting in August 1940 which was attended by representatives of all known manufacturers of surgical dressings. These representatives were informed of the procurement program, the mounting requirements

in each item, and the necessity for speedy deliveries. They were told that the

quantities required would be allocated to the several manufacturers on the

basis of delivery time, price, and the production capacity of each firm. In

accordance with these terms, bids were submitted, delivery schedules established, and contracts negotiated. The manufacturers were warned, however,

that requirements were constantly increasing, and that only through an expan-

" (1) Letter, Col. James E. Baylis, MC, to The Adjutant General, 6 Aug. 1940, subject: Surgical

Dressings. (2) Letter, Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, to American Eed Cross, attention : Mr. DeWitt Smith,

4 Sept. 1940. 3

(1) Memorandum, Maj. C. B. G. Reeves, MAC, to the Historical Division, 23 Oct. 1944, subject: American Red Cross Surgical Dressings Program. (2) Annual Report, Liaison Branch, Purchases Division, Supply Service, OTSG, fiscal year 1945.
PROBLEM ITEMS 65

sion of plant capacity could the necessary production be attained. Help was

promised in obtaining new tools, equipment, and labor.4

The requirements for surgical dressings were greatly augmented by entry

of the United States into the war. In addition, lend-lease requirements and

the large quantities of gauze purchased for the Eed Cross placed heavy burdens

upon an industry ill-equipped to bear them. There was not enough factory

space, not enough looms, not enough workers, not enough bleachery capacity.

In some instances, there was probably also insufficient incentive on the part

of the manufacturers to produce the "gray goods" out of which surgical dressings were made, for the available looms could be far more profitably employed

in weaving higher priced material. Manufacturing capacity was increased by

the enlargement of factories and the addition of new equipment, usually aided

by certificates of necessity providing rapid tax amortization, and by the construction with Defense Plant Corp. funds of a new factory in Greenville, S. C.

Known as Convenience, Inc., the new plant produced exclusively for the Medical Department until the latter part of 1944, when a sufficient quantity of

most surgical dressings had been procured.

Camouflage Dressings

Procurement of some items of surgical dressings was attended with considerable and peculiar difficulties, which deserve a more detailed treatment. The

production of camouflage dressings, for example, created problems which

could not be solved routinely. By the summer of 1943, it had been well established that white surgical dressings in the Pacific theaters were attracting the

attention of Japanese snipers and pilots. The decision was made, therefore, to

dye in "field brown" all field dressings used in the Pacific theaters, and in

July 1943, instructions were issued to that effect. This decision presented a

number of problems to the Supply Service and its contractors, including the

toxicity of the dyes, effect on the absorbency of the gauze, the industry's

ability to convert to dyed dressings, and the productive capacity of dyers and

finishers. Outstanding contracts for several items of white dressings were

modified, and work on the field brown dressings was started in September

1943. After several experiments, a nontoxic dye which had only slight effect

on the absorbency of the gauze was produced. By November 1943, more than

13 million individual dyed dressings had been delivered to the depots.

Throughout the remainder of the war, adhesive compresses, 2-inch and 4-inch

gauze compresses, compressed bandages, small first aid dressings, large first

aid dressings, first aid packets, and triangular bandages were supplied either

in field brown or in olive drab No. 7.5

«Hornbacher, Arthur: Negotiations—Surgical Dressings. [Official record.]

6 Davis, Lewis W.: Development of Field Brown (Camouflaged) Surgical Dressings. [Official

record.] The British had been confronted with the same problem during World War I when they

developed a khaki bandage for field use. It appears, however, that officers of the Supply Service were

unacquainted with the British experience and so derived no profit from it. See MacPherson, Maj.

Gen. Sir William G.: History of the Great War. Medical Services General History. London: His

Majesty's Stationery Office, 1921, Vol. I, p. 168.
66 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Petrolatum Dressings

Another production problem was the petrolatum dressing, developed late

in the war. This dressing, consisting of a gauze bandage impregnated with

petrolatum, permitted the application of sterile petrolatum to a burned surface

and thus was a significant medical advance in a war which, more than any

previous one, produced many serious and painful burns. Two technical difficulties confronted the sole supplier of this item—the development of a technique to produce a sterile dressing, and the manufacture of a greaseproof

package which would withstand high sterilization temperatures. Considerable

delay was experienced, also, in building the new plant necessary for the production of this item. The petrolatum and the gauze bandage were sterilized

separately and were then brought together under sterile conditions. The envelope for the individual dressing was a lamination of Vinylite and aluminum

foil, which was heat-sealed after the bandage was impregnated with the sterile

petrolatum. Three of these dressings were then packaged in a Reynolds Metals

envelope. The first shipment, consisting of 6,000 dressings, was delivered to

the Kansas City Medical Depot, Kansas City, Kans., early in June 1945.6

First Aid Packets

The difficulties involved in the procurement of the first aid packet were

more important and continued longer than for the petrolatum dressing. This

packet contained a small, sterile dressing and was carried by each soldier in a

pouch attached to his belt. Approximately 8 million were required for initial

equipment, and the replacement rate was 60 per thousand men per month in

the Zone of Interior and 220 per thousand in the overseas theaters.

A contract had been signed with the two suppliers in 1940 calling for the

production of 2 million first aid packets, but it was estimated that delivery

would not be completed until March 1942. Brass sheeting, needed to manufacture the metal case which enclosed the dressing, could not be obtained in

sufficient quantities. To solve this material shortage, copper was substituted

for brass in contracts negotiated after March 1941, but, by the end of the

year, copper was no more available than brass. Steel was then substituted and

two additional suppliers were obtained who were prevailed upon to provide

themselves with dies. Shortly after contracts had been made with these two

firms, however, the War Production Board refused to allocate any more steel

for the first aid packet. During the early part of 1943, with production steadily

falling behind requirements, a plastic container was developed and put into

production, but under field conditions the package warped and broke open.

The Medical Department then worked out new specifications calling for a

laminated paper and lead foil bag. The new container passed every test applied

by the medical equipment laboratory at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., proving in use

«Annual Report, Buying Branch No. 2, Army Medical Purchasing Office, 1945.
PROBLEM ITEMS gf

to be more satisfactory than even the original brass container. It was, moreover, less expensive to manufacture.7

BLOOD PLASMA

Although the manufacture of dried blood plasma antedates World War II,

this product received such an impetus from wartime needs that it had many

characteristics of a new item. So far as the U.S. Army was concerned, the

procurement of blood plasma began in February 1941, when a small shipment

was received from Sharp and Dohme, Inc., owners of the patent for processing

human blood into dried plasma.8Small additional amounts were procured

during the remainder of 1941, but it was not until after the attack upon Pearl

Harbor that a large-scale procurement program was launched. Blood plasma

was administered to many casualties in that attack, and the beneficial results

obtained in the treatment of shock, burns, and other conditions associated with

the loss of blood and tissue fluids convinced medical officers that this blood

substitute was imperatively demanded.

Through the cooperation of the Army, Navy, National Research Council,

American Eed Cross, and commercial biological manufacturers, a procurement

program was instituted for the production of not less than 700,000 units of

dried plasma for the Army.9 By 1943, the Red Cross had organized 33 bleeding

centers and was receiving blood donations from the public at a rate of 90,000

per week. Through the efforts of the Medical Department, the patents owned

by Sharp and Dohme were made available to eight other commercial laboratories without the payment of royalties. The blood obtained from the public

was immediately placed in special containers, where it was kept cool by Dry

Ice en route to the processors. The "bleeding" program was so planned that

each processor was supplied with all the blood necessary to operate at maximum capacity.

The processing plants received the blood, put it through an intricate manufacturing process, tested the product, and shipped the units of dried plasma

to medical depots in all parts of the country. The problems involved in production were numerous and important. Each laboratory had to construct special buildings for the project or convert existing structures; and had to provide itself with many items of new equipment, including refrigerating units,

centrifuges, freezing units, drying units, distilling apparatus, sterilizers, and

testing equipment. Emergency preference ratings were obtained to expedite

production and delivery of this equipment, and, throughout the war, the Medical Department extended its aid in obtaining for the contractors such supplies

7

(1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, to The Adjutant General, 10 Dec. 1940. (2)

Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. F. Shook, MC, to Col. John B. Hugglns, MC, Army-Navy Munitions Board,

18 Mar. 1941, subject: Purchases Under the 1941 Appropriation Act. (3) Annual Report, Supply

Service, OTSG, 1943. (4) Davis, Lewis W.: Production and Packaging Problems. [Official record.]

The inclusion in 1943 of sulfa drugs in the first aid packet caused some technical difficulties in

manufacturing, but they were soon overcome.

8 Annual Eeport, Renegotiation Division, OTSG, 1944.

»Annual Report, OTSG, fiscal year 1942, p. 27. A portion of the dried plasma was supplied to

the Navy, and the Navy procured dried human albumin for the Army.
68 MEDICAL SUPPLY

as bottles, rubber stoppers, rubber tubing, needles, niters, tin cans, waterproof

packing materials, clamps, cartons, and shipping cases.

SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS

No problem in medical supplies had caused the prewar planners more concern than the procurement of surgical instruments. From 1922 until procurement planning faded into wartime procurement in 1941, it had been clearly

realized that the great quantities of surgical instruments needed could be obtained only with marked difficulty. The main outlines of the problem were

deceptively simple. Before 1939, approximately 85 percent of all surgical

instruments had been imported from abroad, mainly from Germany. When the

British blockade cut off German exports in September 1939, civilian and military users of surgical instruments were forced to turn to the manufacturing

resources of the United States, which were equipped to supply only 15 percent

of the normal peacetime demand. Even had this country remained at peace

and made no preparations for war, the situation would have been serious. As

it was, the very event which stopped the importation of surgical instruments—

the outbreak of the war in Europe—led to an increase in the Armed Forces

of the United States and, in consequence, to an augmented military demand

for surgical instruments. The small quantities on hand which were held by

importers and dealers soon passed through regular trade channels to ultimate

consumers, and within a few months, the supply of instruments was critically

low.

Fortunately, a movement was already afoot, eA'en before the outbreak of

the war in Europe, to increase the productive capacity of American surgical

instrument manufacturers. Some American surgeons who were incensed by the

Nazis' treatment of the Jews refused to use German-made instruments and

purchased those of American manufacture, despite their higher cost. This

provided the first real impetus for domestic manufacturers since World War

I. The industry was expanded still further in 1940 and 1941, when the operation of the Selective Service Act, induction of the National Guard, and calling

up of Reserves added new increments to the Army, producing still higher

requirements for surgical instruments.10

Thus, when Japanese bombs at Pearl Harbor plunged the United States

into the war, the Medical Department of the Army had already provided itself

with expanded facilities. The next 6 months, however, comprised a hectic period in the Supply Service and one which was not conducive to speedy and

orderly procurement procedures. The office was greatly expanded in personnel,

but space continued to be so limited that efficient work was nearly impossible.

io Shea, Elmer A.: History of the Participation of the Surgical Section of Purchasing Branch 2,

A.M.P.O., in the Medical Department Procurement Program. [Official record.] This document has

been used as a source throughout this section. During the prewar period, there was an ad valorem

duty of approximately 55 percent on imported surgical instruments. In spite of this duty, importers

could still sell foreign instruments at prices lower than those charged for the American product.
PROBLEM ITEMS 6g

An inadequate and outmoded system of calculating requirements, aggravated

by the paucity of "due-in" data, made it difficult to determine the quantities

needed. The Supply Service, therefore, did not authorize any large-scale procurement of surgical instruments until August 1942. Over the next 3 months,

the New York General Depot received requisitions for huge quantities of surgical instruments—quantities so large that purchasing officers and industry

officials alike were baffled. After changing specifications for some obsolete patterns, contracts were nevertheless negotiated for the bulk of the requisitions.11

Although bids were solicited, the main emphasis was placed upon delivery

time rather than low bids. Low-cost producers were paid less, and high-cost

producers were paid more. The renegotiation of contracts was expected to capture excessive profits when high-cost producers overestimated their expenses.

Thus, all parts of the industry which could produce acceptable surgical instruments were given Government contracts. Later, a cost analysis on all contracts

for more than $10,000 was required, but in the summer and fall of 1942, this

would not have been practicable. During this rush period, the entire program

would have been imperiled if cost figures had been demanded. Indeed, as late

as October 1944, the country's largest manufacturer of surgical instruments

declared that he was still unable to furnish, in advance, reliable cost statistics.

In accordance with procurement plans prepared in the 1920's, several silverware manufacturers partially converted their plants to the fabrication of

surgical instruments. By the end of 1941, five of these manufacturers had

received contracts for many thousands of forceps, and, during the heavy procurement of 1942 and 1943, additional contracts were negotiated. Difficult

problems developed. Experience in manufacturing surgical instruments was,

of course, totally lacking. The necessary machine tools were not readily available. Workers did not possess the requisite skills. Through the cooperation of

standard instrument manufacturers, these problems were solved. Skilled

craftsmen were loaned to the new manufacturers to train the workers, supervise production, and establish assembly line techniques. In many ways, the

standard manufacturers placed their experience and technical resources at the

disposal of the erstwhile silverware makers.

The first instruments produced by the new plants did not always meet the

specifications, but within a few months, the newcomers were making an acceptable product. By concentrating their energies on a few relatively simple patterns which were needed in great quantities, they ably supplemented the

efforts of the regular manufacturers, making it possible for the Medical Department to satisfy its huge requirements for these items.

The lack of an approved line of samples was another obstacle to the rapid

completion of the contracts, and was partly responsible for the delivery of

some substandard instruments. Eepresentatives of contractors visited medical

u

Recollections of Col. Paul I. Robinson, MC, conveyed to Capt. Richard E. Yates, MAC,

January 1946. The heaviest buying in World War I occurred in the period 1 July-11 Nov. 1918—

16 months after the declaration of war.
Yo MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 12.—Samples of surgical instruments.

depots and searched the open markets to see the patterns they had been engaged

to produce. Some of them later reported that they were shown samples of Japanese instruments from World War I. Finally, in the early part of 1944, a

sampleroom was established at the Army Medical Purchasing Office, New

York, where a display of all acceptable patterns was maintained (fig. 12).

Inadequate specifications on newer type instruments constituted another

difficulty. For a number of instruments, none had been written; and when

specifications were available, they frequently afforded meager data. In 1944,

a program was inaugurated to bring all specifications up to date and to include

specific dimensions as well as drawings.

These problems delayed production and detracted somewhat from the

quality of the finished product, but the tremendous program launched in the

fall of 1942 was successfully completed. Estimated deliveries of surgical

instruments amounted to $25 million in 1943 and $15.5 million in 1944. In

some instances, patterns were too far below the standard to be acceptable; in

others, instruments that were satisfactory for their intended purpose were

accepted even though they did not meet the specifications. There were a few

complaints from the field, but most of these related to instruments which had

been produced during World War I.12

By the spring of 1943, there was reason to believe that the incoming supply of surgical instruments was badly balanced, that many types of forceps,

for example, were in "short supply," and that a surplus of other instruments

was being piled up. A stock survey was promptly made which definitely

proved that the patterns were ill-balanced. Drastic cutbacks were made in some

contracts, and quantities were increased in others. By the end of September

1944, surpluses were fast disappearing, and additional orders were placed for

many items which had been canceled in 1943.

^Annual Report, Army Medical Purchasing Office, fiscal year 1944.
PROBLEM ITEMS 71

PENICILLIN

No new item of medical supplies attracted as much attention, or grew so

rapidly in importance, as did penicillin. "Widely hailed as a "miracle drug" in

magazines and newspapers, this curative agent was first used in the Army

early in 1943, when small quantities were obtained for experimental purposes. "Within a few months, it was produced in tremendous quantities and

was made available to Army installations all over the world. In no other drug

was the gap between experimentation and Avidespread use bridged with such

amazing speed.

The Army program of penicillin experimentation began at Bushnell General Hospital, Brigham City, Utah, in April 1943. In June of the same year,

studies were started at Halloran General Hospital, Staten Island, N. Y. The

supply of the drug was still so limited, however, that it was doled out with

the strictest economy and solely to ascertain its usefulness, to determine its

indications and contraindications, and to standardize therapeutic procedures

associated with its use.13 In the meantime, penicillin was first purchased in

May 1943, when two contracts were placed for 1,200 vials, each containing

100,000 Oxford units. These were special experimental contracts, for the manufacturing processes were so unsettled at the time, and the purity and potency

of the product were so uncertain, that the standard contract forms did not

apply. In July, contracts were placed with seven commercial laboratories, also

on an experimental basis. Close contact was maintained with the suppliers,

and many types of aid were extended to them while they assembled the plant

facilities, materials, and labor required for production. During the summer

and early fall of 1943, sufficient quantities of the drug were procured to continue the experiments in Army hospitals, to determine its effectiveness, and to

supply a small portion of the current needs. This period of experimental manufacture and procurement was also invaluable in providing a wealth of experience in production and packaging techniques. The period of experimental purchase ended on 1 October 1943 when standard Army contracts were awarded

to eight contractors.14

This marked the beginning of the real "penicillin program" which engrossed the efforts of many purchasing officers and which was granted the

highest priority accorded to any military item except the atomic bomb. Nearly

every piece of equipment needed to expand production was scarce, including

stainless steel piping and tanks, centrifuges, vacuum pumps, and refrigeration

equipment. Building material for new production was difficult to obtain. The

necessary labor in the "tight labor areas" created serious problems. In these

13 Annual Eeport of The Surgeon General of the Army for the Commanding General, Army

Service Forces, fiscal year 1944.

" (1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Robert J. Carpenter, MC, Executive Offleer, OTSG, to Commanding

General, Army Service Forces, 11 Oct. 1944, subject: Checklist for Reports by Government Agencies

on Technical Research and Development Work. (2) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Roger G. Prentlss, Jr.. MC,

Chief, Research Coordination Branch, Operations Service, OTSG, to Director, Procurement Division,

Supply Service, OTSG, 19 Aug. 1943, subject: Penicillin Procurement and Delivery Schedule for

September 1943.

295-453 O—68 7
72 MEDICAL SUPPLY

difficulties, the Medical Department rendered all types of effective aid within

its power. Quite naturally, however, the most critical problems—production,

testing, and packaging—could be solved only by the efforts of the contractors

themselves.

At first, the "surface culture" method of production was universally

employed, but late in 1943, experiments with the "deep vat method," similar

to a process employed by brewers and probably suggested by that industry,

proved successful. Most contractors made the changes in equipment necessary

to use this improved technique, which resulted in a far greater production.

The problem of packaging was serious. Since penicillin was administered by

injection, it was necessary to produce and package it under sterile conditions.

In the new plants, the walls were constructed of glass so they could easily be

scrubbed with an antiseptic solution. Ultraviolet lamps were used to kill

microbes in the atmosphere, for germ-free air was required. The rooms were

under a slight pressure so that sterile air would leak out and contaminated air

would not leak in. Finally, all workers in the packaging rooms took many precautions that a surgeon takes in the operating room, such as scrubdowns and

sterile clothing.15

One of the greatest handicaps in the beginning was the refusal of the

Food and Drug Administration to approve penicillin in rubber-capped vials,

for sufficient experience had not accumulated to determine that the product

would maintain its potency and sterility in this type of container. For many

months, therefore, it was necessary for the manufacturer to package penicillin

in sealed glass vials. Early in 1944, the rubber-capped vial was accepted, and

it greatly speeded production. Another improvement, which came in 1945 and

which appreciably lessened packaging problems, was the change to the 200,000

Oxford-unit vial. This vial, although the same size and sealed in the same

manner, held twice as much penicillin powder and reduced packaging time

and materials by virtually 50 percent.

As the manufacture of penicillin progressed, improvements were made in

the product itself. Originally, the product contained less than 20 units per

milligram; by 1945, the drug contained nearly 1,000 units per milligram. The

absolutely pure product, a white crystalline powder, would contain about 1,666

units per milligram. Early in 1943, all penicillin was given a "dating period"

of 3 months; later in the year, this period was increased to 6 months; in 1944,

it was placed at 9 months; and in 1945, seven producers were furnishing penicillin with a dating period of 18 months. These increased dating periods were

a great advantage, for they made packaging problems less acute, and they permitted shipment of the product to distant theaters of war.16

The proper distribution of penicillin required the shortest possible time

lapse between date of manufacture and date of actual use. It was impracti-

» Address, Brig. Gen. Edward Reynolds to Medical Department officers assembled at Walter Keed

General Hospital, 19 Sept. 1945, subject: Medical Supply Problems of World War II. [Official

record.]

18 (1) See footnotes 3(2), p. 64; and 15, above. (2) Hornbacher, Arthur: Production Problem:

Penicillin. [Official record.]
PROBLEM ITEMS 73

cable, therefore, for the depots and camps to carry stocks of the item. Penicillin was shipped by the manufacturers to the Kansas City Medical Depot;

from there, it was given automatic and immediate distribution to the various

theaters of operations and to Army hospitals within the United States. The

Surgeon General's Penicillin Board was established to divide the drug among

the various theaters and Zone of Interior installations needing it; monthly

meetings were held for this purpose.

Until May 1945, penicillin production was rigidly controlled and allocated

by the War Production Board. Each month, the Medical Department received

its allocation, the remainder of the product going to the Navy and to civilian

hospitals. In July 1943, the Medical Department received 4,290 vials of penicillin. The quantity each month slowly climbed until it reached 52,729 vials

in December 1943. It was in 1944 that real quantity production began.

Keceipts climbed from 75,700 vials in January to 200,000 in April, to

1,628,000 in October, and to 1.9 million in December. Steady, but less spectacular, increases continued during the first 3 months of 1945, the March

receipts being approximately 2 million vials. Substantially the same quantity

was received each month until August, when the end of hostilities led to sizable contract cancellations. During the 2-year period from June 1943 to June

1945, a reduction in price approximated 97 percent of the original price—

the most remarkable price decline of any item »procured by the Medical

Department.17

ATABRINE

So far as medical supplies are concerned, the most important effect of the

early Japanese successes in the Far East was the loss of the Dutch East Indies.

With a few sharp military strokes early in 1942, the Japanese monopolized 90

percent of the world's supply of quinine. Even if the United States had

remained at peace, this would have been a serious development, for quinine

was used in great quantities to treat malaria in the Southern States. Since it

was virtually certain that long campaigns would be fought in the most malarious part of the world—the South Pacific—the problem attained grave proportions. Stockpiles of quinine held by the United States and her allies were

low, and there was no reasonable hope that they could be appreciably increased.

The growing of cinchona trees in South America was promising as a longrange project; but, since the process required 10 years, it offered no hope of

immediate relief.

A synthetic substitute for quinine which could be produced quickly and

in large quantities was vitally needed. Such a drug had been developed by

German scientists. With the use of that drug—Atabrine (quinacrine hydrochloride)—American soldiers were able to wage successful campaigns against

Germany and her allies in the Pacific and in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.

" (1) See footnote 15, p. 72. (2) Annual Report, Buying Branch No. 1, Army Medical Purchasing Office, fiscal year 1945.
74 MEDICAL SUPPLY

American experience with this drug was not advanced in 1942, but a substantial beginning had been made. In 1931, the Winthrop Chemical Co. started the

clinical investigation of Atabrine in the United States. One year later, the

commercial synthesis was begun by a process for which some intermediate

chemicals had to be imported. Under these circumstances, Winthrop's production between 1933 and 1940 averaged 5 million tablets per year; which was

sufficient to satisfy peacetime demands.

In September 1939, the chemical staff of the Winthrop Co. initiated a

research program designed to free the United States completely from dependence on foreign sources. The chemists found that a raw material obtainable

in the United States could be converted, by two processing steps, into the intermediate which formerly had been imported. At the same time, procedures

were developed for synthesizing the side-chain intermediates from domestic

materials. All eight individual steps in the complete Atabrine synthesis were

perfected on a laboratory scale within a few months. In March 1940, construction was begun on a plant for the production of Atabrine from American

materials; in September, the first factory batches of intermediates were produced; in October, the first Atabrine of entirely domestic origin was manufactured. By the end of 1941, the annual production rate was 160 million

tablets. During this year, moreover, additional equipment was installed to

increase the annual capacity to 227 million tablets—a quantity which, then,

was considered sufficient to treat 15 million cases of malaria.

In the meantime, the Medical Department, the Air Surgeon, and the

National Research Council were experimenting to determine the usefulness

and toxicity of Atabrine. Although the test results were favorable, less than

9 million tablets were purchased for military purposes before 30 March 1942.

By that time, a stockpile of approximately 35 million tablets had been accumulated by the Winthrop Co., and the stockpile was constantly increasing for

production was steadily rising.18

During 1942, Army requirements for Atabrine increased tremendously,

but the expansion of the Winthrop plant enabled that firm to fill all orders. A

total of 146,987,300 tablets was procured by the Medical Department during

that year. The campaign in the Solomon Islands, which revealed a heavy incidence of malaria, made the Medical Department thoroughly aware of the

increased demands for Atabrine. Accordingly, an Atabrine program was

launched in 1943, which dwarfed the production of prior years. The sole patent

holder, the Winthrop Chemical Co., was unable to meet the heavy requirements. The War Production Board, which assumed responsibility for the program, made a survey and found six additional firms that could manufacture

the two intermediates of the product. The Winthrop Co. licensed these companies and shared with them its manufacturing knowledge. The principal

problem was to increase the production of powder which, in a final step, was

18Hornbacher, Arthur: Production of Atabrine. [Official record.] The length and complexity of

the manufacturing process is indicated by the fact that 1% tons of chemicals were required to make

100 pounds of Atabrine—a ratio of 30 to 1. See footnote 15, p. 72.
PROBLEM ITEMS 75

pressed into tablet form. Some of the new sources produced the complete

Atabrine powder. Others manufactured one or both intermediates. Still others

manufactured one of the intermediates, received the other from another manufacturer, and then combined the two into the complete Atabrine powder. In

addition to the firms developed by the War Production Board to produce the

powder, five plants were given contracts to manufacture the tablets. Three of

these tabletmakers established units to combine the two intermediates into the

complete powder.

From April to June 1943, production increased 60 percent, and by the

latter month, the program outlined above was well underway. In December

1943, approximately 85 percent of the scheduled capacity was producing with

regularity. Early in the following year, all projected facilities were operating

100 percent of planned capacity, with the result that all requirements (civilian,

military, and lend-lease) were being fully supplied. Monthly production of

Atabrine was thus increased from 100 million tablets in 1943 to more than 300

million in June 1944. In 1943, a total of 1,758,444,858 tablets were delivered to

the Medical Department; this was increased to 2,544,135,000 tablets in 1944. If

necessary, 1944's total could have been far exceeded in 1945, but requirements

were so fully met that no increase in production was needed during the

remainder of the war.19

SPECTACLES

Commercial-Type Spectacles

Although spectacles had been furnished to U.S. soldiers in World War I,

it was not anticipated that this service would again be required. Indeed, the

official belief of the Surgeon General's Office as late as March 1939 was that

the American Eed Cross could be persuaded to provide any needed spectacles.

The Eed Cross proved obdurate, but more than a year later, in May 1940, the

Army still had not come to grips with the problem. Augmented by the National

Guard and by the first increment of draftees under the Selective Service Act,

the number of erstwhile civilians in the Army continued to increase throughout the year. But the only provisions for furnishing spectacles to military personnel remained those contained in Army Kegulations No. 40-1705, which

authorized procurement of spectacles only when they were necessary to correct

visual defects resulting from violence suffered in the performance of duty. In

all other cases, Army doctors were authorized to make examinations and write

prescriptions, but it was the responsibility of the soldier to have the prescription filled at his own expense if he desired spectacles.20

However effective this system may have been for Begular Army volunteers, who received an exacting physical examination upon enlistment, it was

19 See footnotes 13, p. 71; and 18, p. 74.

»Kybak, Stanley W.: History of the Optical Program. [Official record.] This valuable essay was

written by a civilian employee of the Supply Service, OTSG, who was engaged in the optical program for 4 years. Except as otherwise noted, Rybak's account of the optical program has been

followed here.
76 MEDICAL SUPPLY

inappropriate for selective service inductees, many of whom were accepted

with faulty eyesight. The problem became clear in the first 6 months of compulsory military service. The Medical Department was alerted in May 1941

by the commanding officer of the post hospital at Fort McClellan, Ala., who

reported 75 enlisted men with glasses broken in line of duty who could not

afford replacements, and others for whom glasses had been prescribed but who

had no money to buy them. In less than a month, on recommendation of The

Surgeon General, the Medical Department was directed to provide spectacles,

repairs, and replacements to all military personnel needing them. In the meantime, a plan had been developed to obtain spectacles by letting contracts with

optical suppliers in each of the nine corps areas. Since this would have involved nine separate contracts with widely separated contractors, some of

whom were unable to fill the requirements, this plan was abandoned; and a

strongly centralized procurement program was adopted.21

Requirements.—Neither the official history of the Medical Department's

participation in World War I, nor any other available records, contained information as to probable requirements for spectacles. There was, therefore, no

basis in experience for the estimate by medical supply officers that 10 percent of

military personnel would have defective vision, that one-half of those would

enter the Army with their own spectacles, and that the remaining half would

have to be supplied with new spectacles or with replacements during the course

of a year. In terms of this formula, it was estimated that during 1942 a total of

200,000 pairs of spectacles would be required. Each individual needing spectacles for the efficient performance of his military duties was to receive one pair

as soon as possible after induction and a second pair when he embarked for

overseas.22

After determining requirements and basis of issue, the next step was the

selection of the most suitable spectacle frame for military personnel. By a

process of elimination, the choice was a metal of 10 percent nickel silver, with

reinforced bridge constructed to withstand rough usage. It was discovered

later that this frame, in warm climates, corroded easily where it came into

contact with the skin, in some instances causing discoloration of the skin and

dermatitis. This was corrected by increasing the nickel silver content to 18

percent and by constructing the pad arm, pad arm assembly, endpieces, and

cable windings of pure nickel.23

When it became known that the Medical Department was launching a

large program to supply the troops with spectacles, numerous bids were

received from optical companies in all parts of the Nation, but only the American Optical Co. and the Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. had dispensing facilities

throughout the country. Of the two, the American Optical Co. was the low

21 Letter, Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, to The Adjutant General, 5 June 1941, subject: Spectacles

for Military Personnel.

22 (1) Recollections of Col. Paul I. Robinson, MC, conveyed to Capt. Richard E. Yates, MAC,

September 1944. (2) See footnote 9, p. 75.

23 See footnote 20, p. 75. In a few cases, it was necessary to furnish Xylonite frames to individuals who were extremely susceptible to dermatitis caused by contact with metal. These requirements, however, were small, and no special provisions were necessary to supply the frames.
PROBLEM ITEMS 11

bidder and received the contract. It was clear within a few months, however,

that the American Optical Co. could supply neither the frames nor the lenses

in sufficient quantity. A contract for lenses (called a prescription contract

because the product was made to fill individual prescriptions) was then given

to the Bausch & Lomb Co., and contracts for spectacle frames were apportioned among nine manufacturers on the basis of their production. These

manufacturers constructed the frames and shipped them to the two prescription companies, which then divided them among their branch offices.

This spectacle program was soon beset with many troubles. The original

unsubstantiated estimate, that 10 percent of the troops would have defective

vision and that one-half of these would enter the Army with their own spectacles, proved to be seriously in error. In fact, 18 to 20 percent of all military

personnel required visual correction, and only a very small portion of these

entered the service with spectacles sturdy enough to withstand field usage.

The need for replacements was scarcely considered in the first estimates; the

original requirement figures were thought to be large enough to absorb

replacements. But the experience of 1942^3 indicated that a replacement

factor of 30 percent annually was necessary.

Delivery problems.—The arrangement under which the soldier received

one pair of spectacles while in training and ä second pair when he embarked

for an overseas station created a heavy burden at the staging areas and ports

of embarkation. The optical companies were unable to meet the 3-day deadline,

with the result that most spectacles were mailed to APO (Army Post Office)

addresses and, in many instances, were never received by those needing them.

To solve this problem, orders were issued in 1943 directing the issuance of

both pairs of spectacles early in the training period. This change resulted in

an ultimate improvement in delivery, but its most immediate effect was to

deluge the branch offices with far more prescriptions than they could fill.

The original erroneous estimates of requirements, the changes in the basis

of issue, and the increased rate of inductions greatly impeded the spectacle

program during 1942-43. It had been estimated that 250,000 pairs would be

required in 1943. Actually, 2,250,000 pairs were issued. Since, on the average,

5 months were required to allocate materials, process the frames and lenses,

and ship them to branch offices, it is evident that the sudden increase in

requirements could not promptly be translated into increased production.

The results were soon apparent. Although the contracts stipulated that the

spectacles would be delivered not later than 3 days after receipt of an order,

it was not unusual for deliveries to be delayed as much as 3 or 4 months. In

some instances, men completed their training and were shipped overseas before

they received spectacles which had been ordered during basic training. In

numerous other instances, spectacles were delivered after the soldier had left

the camp in which he had been examined. Eventually, the spectacles were

forwarded to his next post, only to arrive once more after the soldier had

departed. Thus, spectacles followed soldiers through many posts in the Zone

of Interior, and then repeated the process overseas. Some men never received
78 MEDICAL SUPPLY

their spectacles; some had spectacles delivered to them at a place and time so

far removed from the eye examination that all memory of the refraction and

the prescription had been erased from their minds.24

Most delivery problems arose because production could not keep pace with

rising requirements, but some were due to other causes. The Bausch & Lomb

Optical Co. established 12 shops, strategically located throughout the country,

which concentrated their attention exclusively upon military orders. Since

the total capacity of these shops exceeded by 10 percent the quantity of spectacles under contract, slow deliveries were not numerous after requirements

had been stabilized. The American Optical Co., on the other hand, depended

upon a network of 250 branches and affiliated companies, each with a daily

capacity ranging from 30 to 300 jobs. A portion of this capacity, however,

was necessarily devoted to civilian needs. The larger branches, moreover, were

located in the larger cities while Army camps tended to be remote from centers

of population. An early attempt was made to hasten deliveries by the establishment of "farm-out points." When prescriptions received by a branch

exceeded the capacity allocated to military orders, the surplus was reported

to the zone headquarters, which farmed out the work to another branch office.

This system was satisfactory, except that much time was consumed in transmitting surplus prescriptions to a zone headquarters and then to another

branch. At the insistence of the Medical Department, the procedure was

changed so that any overflow of work was immediately and directly farmed

out to the nearest branch office, and the latter delivered the spectacles to the

Army installation which placed the orders. This change produced some improvement; but when the war ended, medical supply officers were convinced

that the American Optical Co. could have given better service had it emulated

the system of Bausch & Lomb.

Some delays in delivery were caused by the medical installations which

performed the eye examinations. They frequently kept prescriptions on hand

until 7-10 days had elapsed, and then mailed the accumulated total to the

branch office of the optical company. Usually this represented several times

the capacity of the branch office, and thus it was impossible for that office to

allocate its work to provide the 3-day service for which the contracts called.

Many letters were written to the service command headquarters of the negligent installations, inspecting officers of the Surgeon General's Office protested

vigorously, and crisply worded directives were issued on the subject. But failure attended all these efforts to persuade the eye clinics to mail their prescriptions daily. When the war ended, a large number of the clinics, in quiet defiance of the directives, continued to accumulate the prescriptions and to send

them en masse to overworked branch offices.25

24 Spectacles that could not be delivered were shipped to the central stockpile at Binghamton

Medical Depot. Their salvage value was small, for only the fronts and temples could again be utilized.

The lenses, which constituted two-thirds of the cost, were scrapped. Only an expensive and elaborate

salvage system could have made it possible to use them.

25 (1) War Department Pamphlet No. 8-5, 20 June 1944, subject: Procurement of Spectacles

for Military and Other Authorized Personnel. (2) See footnote 20, p. 75.
PROBLEM ITEMS 79

Payment techniques.—Even after the spectacles had been delivered and

the soldier was pursuing his training duties with corrected vision, there still

remained a serious and troublesome problem—auditing the optical company's

invoice and certifying it for payment. At the beginning of the spectacle program, all invoices were forwarded to the Finance Branch, Finance and Supply

Service, and there were audited and sent to the Finance Office for payment.

This function was soon decentralized to 12 fiscal branch offices throughout

the country, and eventually was concentrated in the regional fiscal office at

St. Louis, Mo. But the auditing of spectacle invoices, wherever it was accomplished, involved a unique problem and a prodigious amount of work. For

each pair of spectacles, unless two pairs were ordered for the same individual

at the same time, there was a separate invoice which carried an individual

price. The uniqueness of the problem lay in the fact that the accuracy of

each price had to be determined by interpreting the prescription and by

comparing the invoice price with the contract price stipulated for that particular correction. The prodigious amount of work arose from the factthatthousands of these invoices poured in each month. In the original contracts, a price

was indicated for almost every conceivable visual correction. Since the ophthalmological profession did not subscribe to the view that prescriptions should

be written in a uniform manner, the interpretation and transposition of

prescriptions became necessary.

At first, the officers and civilian employees of the Finance Branch attempted to audit these invoices by following traditional methods. But when

the documents had piled up in such quantities that their sheer bulk seriously

restricted the amount of space left for typewriters, adding machines, and other

office equipment, it became necessary to improvise speedier and more effective

procedures. This was accomplished by the adoption of an "assembly line"

method, in which each clerk performed a single auditing function on each

invoice and then passed it on to the next clerk. The advantages derived from

this division of labor enabled the fiscal officers to reduce the -huge backlog, but

the enormous amount of work involved convinced them that invoices for spectacles should be audited in the fiscal branch offices established early in 1943.

"When the work was decentralized to the field offices, the assembly line method

was retained; and, after the auditing of all spectacle invoices was concentrated

in St. Louis, a high degree of speed and efficiency was obtained.

Even after these improvements, the optical companies complained that

payments were being delayed, sometimes for as long as 5 or 6 months after

an order had been filled. An investigation revealed that many medical installations retained the order form 26 until a large number had accumulated before

they were forwarded to the fiscal branch office. This was caused, in part, by

allowing the order forms to accumulate for weeks, and in some instances for

20 The order form was a combined delivery order, contractor's invoice, and receiving report. The

delivery order was signed when the spectacles were prescribed, the contractor's invoice was signed

when the spectacles were shipped, and the receiving report was signed when the spectacles arrived at

the medical installation that had ordered them. This three-part form and the appropriate contract

constituted all the documents needed to audit the account and certify it for payment.
80 MEDICAL SUPPLY

months, before the medical supply officer took a day off to sign the receiving

reports. Some improvement was effected by directing the medical supply officers to sign each receiving report on the day the spectacles arrived, and by

instructing the installations to forward order forms to the fiscal branch offices

in groups of 100, or at least once weekly if this number had not been

accumulated.

No figures are available which show the total cost of the spectacle program, but prices stipulated in contracts indicate that the spectacles were procured at a moderate cost. The metal frames, throughout the war years, cost

about $1 per pair. For simple visual corrections, lenses cost as little as 75 cents;

for the more complex corrections, the cost rose to as high as $6. Considering

all types of corrections, however, the Army procured complete spectacles at an

average price of approximately $2.50 per pair.

Gas Mask Spectacles and Inserts

The visual defects in soldiers which led the Army to furnish commercialtype spectacles made it necessary to provide for spectacles to be worn beneath

the gas mask. The most important problem involved in this program was the

design of the spectacle frames. The British attacked the problem by producing

all-purpose spectacles, practical for ordinary wear and for wear beneath the

gas mask. This was a round-eye frame with the endpiece flush against the eye

wire and with flat temples. The Germans and Japanese, on the other hand,

provided spectacles of the goggle variety which were held to the face by an

elastic band encircling the head.27

In the design of gas mask spectacles for U.S. military personnel, both

types were considered. The German and Japanese type was rejected as unsuitable, for the elastic band forced the bridge of the goggle frame too severely

against the nose, causing great discomfort. In addition, this elastic band

caused a leakage at the temples. The British-type spectacle was finally adopted

after changes were made which, it was believed, rendered it suitable for wear

beneath the Army gas mask. After some tests were made, the spectacles were

procured and issued in the manner already described for commercial-type spectacles. At first, it was directed that all individuals requiring visual correction

be furnished gas mask spectacles when they moved to a staging area or a port.

On this basis of issue, the requirements were very high, while the period of

time for issue was so short that many men were shipped overseas without the

spectacles. Eegulations were soon changed to provide that only those individuals with a binocular visual acuity of 20/70 or worse would be furnished gas

mask spectacles; these men were to be fitted when their unit was alerted, which

allowed 4 to 12 weeks for prescription and issue. This proved to be ample.

Difficulty was also encountered in fitting the spectacles (fig. 13), and in

keeping them in adjustment; but there was another and far more serious defect.

When the gas mask spectacles were worn, closure of the mask was not com27 See footnote 20, p. 75.
PROBLEM ITEMS 81

FIGURE 13.—Fitting gas mask spectacles in the European theater before D-day.

plete, and a leakage at the temples was produced. Why this was not discovered

when the spectacles were first tested has not been satisfactorily determined;

but obviously upon the basis of inadequate and misleading tests, an unsuitable

type of gas mask spectacles was adopted, and at least 100,000 pairs were procured and issued. Not until complaints had been received from the field did

the Medical Department become aware of this serious defect. Exhaustive tests

were then instituted, which proved that the spectacles were entirely unsuitable

because they induced discomfort and caused the gas mask to leak. A directive

was immediately issued, prohibiting their use with the gas mask and directing

that they be employed as an auxiliary pair for ordinary wear.

This development left the U.S. Army, in 1943, without any type of visual

correction to be worn beneath the gas mask. Very promptly, however, the

"gas mask insert" (officially designated as the M-l Gas Mask Eyeglass) was

designed and accepted as standard.28 This consisted of an eye wire supported

by three brackets and attached to a frame inserted beneath the gas mask next

to the lens. The fitting problems were far more complex than those encountered

28 Although procured and distributed in large numbers, the gas mask insert was never considered

to be more than a satisfactory makeshift. There is no record, however, of any efforts to develop a

more satisfactory device. Instead, supply officers of the Medical Department appeared hopeful that

the Chemical Warfare Service would ultimately design and adopt a gas mask with which the

commercial-type spectacles could be worn. This hope never received any encouragement.
82 MEDICAL SUPPLY

in commercial-type spectacles. Each individual appeared with his gas mask,

and the position he required was then determined. Later in the program, this

was simplified by the adoption of a plastic guide which was marked with the

standard positions.

The basis of issue of the gas mask inserts was the same as that finally

adopted for the gas mask spectacles. Military personnel alerted for overseas

movement and who had a binocular visual, acuity of 20/70 or worse were supplied with the inserts. Procurement requirements were rather moderate—

approximately 7 percent of all military personnel, with an annual maintenance

or replacement factor of 30 percent.

Prescribing and fitting gas mask inserts in Zone of Interior installations

involved no important difficulties other than those mentioned above, but overseas distribution was far more complicated. By the time the insert was developed (summer of 1943), large numbers of troops were overseas, none of whom

had any suitable visual correction for use with the gas mask. Queries were

addressed to the various theaters of operations, which in reply sent requirements figures to the Surgeon General's Office, Stocks of fitting cases, frame

inserts, and pre-edged lenses of all conceivable foci were shipped to the

theaters, but there were many delays before military personnel overseas were

equipped with this type of visual correction. If gas warfare had been employed

in 1942 and 1943, uncorrected visual defects clearly would have appreciably

weakened American fighting forces.

Optical Repair Units

For the repair and replacement of commercial-type spectacles and gas

mask inserts in overseas installations, the Medical Department developed a

number of repair units and, in addition, established a stockpile at the Binghamton Medical Depot, N.Y., which furnished these units with frames, lenses,

and other ophthalmic supplies.

In 1942, the Mobile Optical Repair Unit was developed (fig. 14). This

consisted of edging equipment, miscellaneous optical machinery (without surfacing equipment), and a large assortment of lenses, screws, and frames. The

entire unit was carried in a 21/9-ton truck, but was designed to be removed

easily and operated in a building. Eight units were purchased and shipped to

overseas installations, but the need was soon felt for a self-contained unit that

could be operated in the truck body. This led to the development of a second

mobile unit in which the optical equipment was permanently housed in a

214-ton truck. The unit was heated, had water and lights, and could be operated under all weather conditions. In designing this unit, it was decided that

all equipment should be permanently mounted on benches and that these

benches should be securely attached to the floor of the body (fig. 15). Later

experience suggested, however, that it would have been wiser to make the
PROBLEM ITEMS 83

\V^\#r^''

FIGUEE 14.—Mobile optical repair unit which enabled repair of spectacles closer to

frontlines.

equipment removable, for occasionally a unit operated far behind the lines

and could have done better work in a building.29

In addition to these two units, a third was devised in 1943. Called the

Portable Optical Eepair Unit, it was operated by two men and was transported by jeep and %-ton trailer (fig. 16). It consisted of two Medical Department chests containing a moderate assortment of lenses and frames, a handoperated edging machine, a cutter, and miscellaneous optical tools. Experience

in the field indicated that this unit did not carry a sufficiently wide range of

foci and that the edging machine was difficult to operate. Accordingly, a third

chest was recommended for standardization, which would include additional

lenses, fronts, temples, and an electric motor to be used with the edging equipment. Before the third chest could be placed in procurement, the war ended

and the plan was abandoned.

When the repair units were first distributed to overseas troops, the basis

of issue was one mobile unit and two portable units to each medical supply

depot,30 The mobile unit, operating with the depot, could perform about 100

29 See footnotes 9, p. 67 ; and 20, p. 75.

*> It was soon discovered that this basis of issue produced a waste of optical repair facilities;

and in April 1944, a new Table of Organization and Equipment 8-500 provided a mobile unit for

each 150,000 troops, to be augmented by one portable unit when troops were scattered over a large

area.
84 MEDICAL SUPPLY

*.'Ts. ' . • \.S

FIGUKE 15.—Interior of mobile optical repair unit.

jobs a day; each portable unit, moving with depot sections, furnished optical

repairs and replacements to troops in forward areas, its capacity being 15 to

20 prescription jobs a day. So far as maintaining the efficiency of combat

troops was concerned, these units were valuable adjuncts to the medical service. Before they were used, soldiers who damaged or lost their spectacles

were sent far to the rear for replacements, resulting in much lost time and a

drain upon transportation facilities. There is reason to believe that many spectacles were deliberately damaged or thrown away by soldiers who were eager

to move back from the fighting lines. When mobile and portable units accompanied field armies, repairs and replacements were made in forward positions
PROBLEM ITEMS 85

ÜK

FißUKE 16.—Portable optical repair unit loaded on jeep (%-ton vehicle).

with a minimum loss of time (fig. 17). Line officers noted with pleasure, but

with little astonishment, that the need for spectacle repairs diminished when

the repair units began to operate near the fronts. During the fiscal year ending

30 June 1945, approximately 500,000 pairs of spectacles were repaired or

replaced in all theaters of operations. This was accomplished by 50 mobile

units and 100 portable units.31

Continuous support from the Zone of Interior in both personnel and supplies was required to operate the repair facilities overseas. To each mobile unit,

one officer and six enlisted men were assigned, while two enlisted men operated

the portable unit. These skilled personnel were provided by a training school

at the St. Louis Medical Depot, where officer and enlisted personnel having

optical experience in civilian life were given an orientation course and were

instructed in the use of Army equipment. The graduates of this 6-week course

were assigned to medical depot companies, which, in turn, formed a part of

field armies.

To supply the optical repair units with stocks of frames, lenses, tools, and

equipment, an optical stockpile was established at the Binghamton Medical

31 (1) See footnote 3(2), p. 64. (2) The extent to which these units preserved the fighting

efficiency of the troops is indicated by a report of optical activity in the European theater during

the first half of 1945. The author of that report estimated that it would have been necessary to

evacuate approximately 10,000 per month if repair facilities had not been available on the spot.

See Greear, Lt. Col. James N., Jr., MC : Semi-Annual Report for Ophthalmology, 1 Jan. to 30 June

1945, European Theater.
86 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 17.—Portable optical repair unit in use at Oahu, Hawaii.

Depot.This stockpile contained large quantities of lenses, fronts, temples, nosepads, screws, surfacing machines, edgers, lensometers, lens cutters, and other

supplies and equipment. The active theaters of operations established stockpiles of their own, maintained by requisitioning from the Binghamton Medical

Depot, to supply the needs of the repair units. All requisitions from theaters

were first edited by the Supply Service of the Surgeon General's Office, and

then transmitted to Binghamton. This editing served the twofold purpose of

consolidating issue experience and maintaining control over the distribution of

scarce items.32

32 See footnote 20, p. 75.
PROBLEM ITEMS 87

ARTIFICIAL EYE PROGRAM

Before World War II, glass used in the manufacture of artificial eyes, as

well as the glass eyes themselves, were imported from Germany and other

foreign sources. As early as 1917, an interest was evidenced in domestic production of artificial eyes for the Army. To further this end, a series of experiments were conducted; although adequate glass eyes were ultimately produced,

they were not equal in quality to those of foreign manufacture. These experiments were discontinued before World War II when a survey indicated that

domestic dealer stocks would probably be adequate to meet Army demands.33

This judgment appears to have been sustained by the course of events for a

long time. Artificial eyes were procured on an individual basis by local purchase from the nearest civilian shop dealing in these items. Even the requirement that purchase requests be submitted to the Surgeon General's Office for

approval before procurement action was dropped in August 1942.

Not until July 1943 was there any need for an overall supply program. At

that time, the New York Medical Department Procurement District was directed to purchase 30,000 artificial eyes for use in overseas theaters. They were to

be stocked at the Binghamton Medical Depot, for export and distribution.

Since there were then no stocks of U.S. artificial eyes in the European theater,

supply to members of the U.S. Army in that theater was accomplished by procurement through British channels. Demands for artificial eyes continued to

increase during the latter part of 1943 as a result of battle casualties and induction of personnel with one sightless eye. It has been estimated that between

8,000 and 10,000 men with only one eye were inducted into the service.34

These developments forced the establishment of an artificial eye program

late in 1943. The Medical Department employed an expert technician and purchased a large assortment of glass eyes from the country's depleted stocks.

Each eye purchased was handpicked by this technician. The best quality eyes

thus obtained were hurriedly shipped to the theaters of operations, where the

need was rapidly becoming acute. Each Army hospital in the Zone of Interior

received a quantity of eyes, and the remainder were placed in the optical stockpile at Binghamton. In addition, a number of expert artificial eyemakers were

employed to visit Army hospitals and to furnish custom-made artificial eyes

to patients who could not be properly fitted with stock eyes.35

These measures proved to be effective for only a few months. Following

the Normandy landings, casualties needing artificial eyes threatened to exhaust

the available resources. It was becoming clear, also, that glass artificial eyes

possessed certain characteristics that rendered them unsatisfactory for military

personnel. The glass eye, either stock or custom-made, became discolored and

33 Medical Department, United States Army. Surgery in World War II. Ophthalmology and

Otolaryngology. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957, pp. 33-35.

34 Randolph, M. B.: History of the Artificial Eye Program (Glass and Plastic), 2 Jan. 1946.

[Official record.]

^Annual Report, Optical Section, Army Medical Purchasing Office, 1945.

295-453 O—68 8
88 MEDICAL SUPPLY

roughened after 18 to 24 months, thus creating a large and continuous replacement problem. In addition, the glass eye was subject to accidental and intentional destruction; of the latter, there appears to have been a considerable

amount, especially among the one-eyed inductees. Many individuals considered

their induction to be unnecessary for the Army and unduly burdensome to

themselves. They retaliated by dropping or breaking their glass eyes while

inserting or washing them. This led to their hospitalization for several weeks,

awaiting the arrival of stock eyes. When the replacements were received, the

patients asserted that the new eyes did not fit and that they could not bear the

resultant discomfort. Whereupon they were sent to one of the general hospitals,

and there waited 1 or 2 months while custom-made eyes were prepared for

them. Under these circumstances, many individuals were issued three or four

artificial eyes during a single year, with a consequent hospitalization of 6 or

8 months.36

Still another disadvantage was attached to the procurement and issue of

glass artificial eyes. They were manufactured in the United States by a few

highly skilled craftsmen. Under ordinary circumstances, it would have been

difficult to recruit and train additional eyemakers, and thus increase production. But the circumstances were not ordinary. The craftsmen who manufactured glass eyes looked upon themselves as the possessors of lucrative trade

secrets, which they had no intention of imparting to others. They possessed a

monopoly, and they were determined to maintain it. Consequently, the production of this item could not be appreciably increased.

The foregoing disadvantages of the glass eye led the Medical Department

to seek a substitute. While on a trip to the European theater early in 1944, The

Surgeon General learned that Capt. (later Maj.) Stanley F. Erpf, DC, and

Capt. Sidney J. Karash, MC, had been experimenting with the fabrication of

plastic artificial eyes since July 1943. Captain Erpf was recalled to the United

States and, with two other dental officers—Majors Victor H. Dietz, DC, and

Milton S. Wirtz, DC—was transferred to Valley Forge General Hospital,

Phoenixville, Pa., to develop a plastic eye. By the end of September 1944, the

developmental process was complete. An acrylic artificial eye was produced

which was superior to any type of prosthesis previously used. The iris was

more closely duplicated; the fit was more nearly exact; the eye would not

break; it could be worn for long periods of time without cleaning; and, most

important of all, it could be fabricated from domestic raw materials by technicians of modest training and experience.

The manufacturing process was comparatively simple and required only

about 40 man-hours for each eye. After 100 patients had been satisfactorily

36 See footnote 34, p. 87. There is no direct evidence tending to prove that the glass eyes were

intentionally broken; but the widespread incidence of breakage, so much higher than in civilian life,

and the resentful attitude of the men together offer a strong presumption that many alleged accidents were in fact intentional.
PROBLEM ITEMS 89

fitted with the new eye, it was decided that only the plastic artificial eye would

be issued in the future. A training program was instituted at Valley Forge

General Hospital; and the co-inventors taught 12 dental officers, Avho were then

ordered to 12 general hospitals strategically located throughout the country.

To these general hospitals, all patients needing artificial eyes were transferred.

As the number of eye casualties increased, additional officers were trained, so

that by July 1945, 32 general hospitals had established laboratories for the

fabrication of plastic artificial eyes. During the period December 1944 to

December 1945, these general hospitals fitted 7,500 patients with the plastic

eye.37

In the meantime, the theaters of operations were affected by these developments. As a part of the program in the United States, several dental officers

were trained and sent to the Pacific theaters to introduce the new prosthesis.

The European theater opened its own school and trained dental officers in eye

fabrication. These officers were then dispatched to general hospitals in France

and Germany, where they produced plastic eyes for battle casualties. No figures

are available which show the number of eyes fabricated in overseas installations, but it is known that the speedy production and fitting of this prosthesis

made a significant contribution to the medical service in combat areas.

HEARING AIDS

Early in the war, The Surgeon General established the policy that hearing

aids would be furnished to military personnel suffering from hearing defects

incurred in line of duty and in certain other special cases. Aural rehabilitation

centers were established at Deshon General Hospital, Butler, Pa.; Hoff General

Hospital, Santa Barbara, Calif.; and Borden General Hospital, Chickasha,

Okla. These centers were furnished special personnel and equipment and were

authorized to purchase the appropriate hearing aids from local distributors.

The purchase price, which included servicing, ranged from approximately $135

to $160 each.

The Medical Supply Service during mid-1944, in, consultation with the

Surgical Division of the Surgeon General's Office and upon advice of the

National Eesearch Council and Harvard University, developed a list of satisfactory commercial hearing aids. It was determined that a considerable saving

in cost could be effected by centralized procurement directly from the manufacturers. Open-end contracts were accordingly let with several hearing aid

firms for approximately 1,000 instruments. These contracts permitted the three

aural rehabilitation centers to order prescribed hearing aids directly from the

manufacturer, at a cost approximating $50 each.

37 (1) See footnote 34, p. 87. (2) Plastic Artificial Eye Program, Valley Forge General Hospital,

1945. [Official record.] (3) War Department Circular No. 398, 10 Oct. 1944. Section I: Artificial

Eye Program.
90 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 18.—Fitting a hearing aid.

Concurrently with the establishment of central procurement, a program

was developed to furnish each new user with a listing of repair parts peculiar

to his type of instrument and with a letter of authorization to obtain ä "loaner"

hearing aid through medical supply channels if his personal instrument became

defective (fig. 18). He was also furnished with a 3-month supply of batteries

and cords. Eeplacements could be obtained from his nearest aural rehabilitation

center. Medical supply within the centers was responsible for returning all

defective hearing aids to the appropriate manufacturer for repair.

The method of central procurement remained in effect until 1 June 1945

when aural rehabilitation centers were directed to submit requisitions for

hearing aids and accessories directly to the Chief, Inventory Control Branch,

Army Medical Purchasing Office.38

38 (1) War Department Circular No. 192, 27 Aug. 1943. Section VI: Hearing Aids for Military

Personnel. (2) War Department Circular No. 235, 12 June 1944, subject: General Hospitals for

Specialized Treatment. (3) See footnote 3(2), p. 64.
PROBLEM ITEMS 91

ORTHOPEDIC EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

Orthopedic Shops

At the beginning of World War II, certain prewar named general hospitals were authorized orthopedic shop equipment, but the capability of each

varied. All of these hospitals were directed to meet individual requirements

beyond their capability through local procurement of commercial items. With

the mushrooming of hospitals throughout the country, many in isolated areas,

and with troops being mustered in by the thousands, accidents increased proportionately ; hence, the Medical Supply Service was suddenly besieged with

requests for orthopedic facilities. Many hospitals at posts, camps, and stations,

however, needed only limited facilities to prepare patients for evacuation to

designated hospitals for definitive treatment.

At the outset, there was no standard list of equipment and supplies for

authorized shops. Furthermore, some steel items being supplied to existing

shops by medical depots from World War I stocks were found to be unsatisfactory. Attempts to effect local procurement of steel were hampered by War

Production Board controls. The situation was reviewed in June 1943, when it

was decided that all named general hospitals (eventually 65) and 6 specific

station hospitals should have orthopedic shops (fig. 19). The only exception

was Darnall General Hospital, Danville, Ky., which had mostly neuropsychiatric patients. By mid-September, equipment lists for an orthopedic shop

(equipment and supplies) and occupational therapy equipment had been updated including addition of new items. The St. Louis Medical Depot was

designated as the key depot for orthopedic supplies, but station requisitions

were to be submitted to designated distribution depots for editing before being

transmitted to St. Louis for supply action.

The number of named general hospitals meanwhile increased steadily.

Convalescent and additional station hospitals were added to the list of those

authorized to operate shops, while other hospitals, already on the list, were

expanded to the extent that their shop facilities were inadequate. Also, new

items were added to the equipment list for shops, and additional tools were

required for training technicians (fig. 20). Certain items were procured by The

Quartermaster General and delivered to medical depots, but virtually every

item of orthopedic equipment and supply, such as machines, steel, and leather,

encountered a low priority rating from the War Production Board.

Delays ensued, and constant and aggressive action by the Medical Supply

Service was imperative to obtain material and spread the meager available

stocks to the best advantage in the face of valid demands from the hospital. In

January 1944, the situation was again reviewed by Col. (later Brig. Gen.)

Edward Keynolds, MAC, Chief of the Supply Service, and Col. Leonard T.

Peterson, MC, Orthopedic Consultant to The Surgeon General. Colonels

Reynolds and Peterson concluded that availability of trained orthopedic technicians was a better guideline for establishing and enlarging orthopedic shops
92 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 19.—Artificial limb fitting laboratory, Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga.
PROBLEM ITEMS 93

FIGURE 20.—Technicians make artificial limbs in the Processing and Fitting Shop,

Lawson General Hospital, Atlanta, Ga.

than was the patient load. Long-range planning, assuming an adequate supply

of technicians, was to be based on 40 percent orthopedic patients in general

hospitals and 66 percent in convalescent hospitals. To meet this load, orthopedic shop equipment would have to be increased by 30 percent.39

Shoes

Requirements for orthopedic shoes for severely deformed feet surpassed

the capability of the shops, and eventually the volume was so great that local

procurement became impractical. In January 1945, The Quartermaster General

38 (1) Memorandum, MaJ. Frederick Fink, MC, Chief, Procurement Advisory Branch, to Chief,

Supply Service, 15 June 1943, subject: Orthopedic Shops. (2) Supply Service Code Letter IX-31,

22 Sept. 1943, subject: Station Stock Control—Orthopedic Shops. (3) Supply Service Code Letter

IX-33, 29 Sept. 1943, subject: Station Stock Control—Orthopedic Shop Equipment. (4) Memorandum, Col. S. B. Hays, MC, Director, Distribution and Requirements Division, to Mr. [Edward]

Reynolds, Acting Chief, Supply' Service, 4 Oct. 1943, subject: Orthopedic Shop and Occupational

Therapy Equipment. (5) Memorandum, Col. Edward Reynolds, MAC, to Lt. Col. [Oscar B.] Griggs,

MC, Issue Div., and Maj. [Alvin F.] Schultz, MAC, Requirements Branch, 6 Jan. 1944, subject:

Preliminary Orthopedic Shop Requirements for Expanding General and Convalescent Hospitals.
94 MEDICAL SUPPLY

accepted responsibility for the item on a reimbursable basis. At that time,

instructions were published to the field on the source of supply and method of

acquiring orthopedic shoes. Prescriptions were prepared by medical officers;

in severe cases, a cast of the foot was furnished to the Boston Quartermaster

Depot, Boston, Mass. Less serious requirements were supplied by the nearest

quartermaster shop or through local procurement.40

Prostheses

General hospitals designated as amputation centers were directed to furnish prostheses for amputees. Such centers obtained components under contracts established by the Supply Service of the Surgeon General's Office. Shops

for each center fabricated the stump sockets and assembled the components,

adjusting and fitting each prosthesis to the patient (fig. 21). Upon discharge

from the Army, in addition to the prostheses, each amputee was issued one

pair of shoes and three light woolen stump socks for each amputation. He was

advised that replacements of stump socks would be furnished by facilities of

the Veterans' Administration.

By 1944, production was not keeping abreast of requirements and there

was a desire to improve the prostheses. After considerable experience and

study, it was estimated that 500 artificial hands would be required by the Army

during fiscal year 1945. One firm was located which produced a satisfactory

item. Each hand was fabricated manually, however, with a maximum monthly

production of 8 to 10. Efforts by the Surgeon General's Office to place a contract with this firm for 200 hands were fruitless because the output was already

committed for the Navy and Veterans' Administration. The best that could be

done was an agreement among representatives of the armed services, the War

Production Board, and the manufacturer that the latter should be assisted in

obtaining the necessary machine tools and jigs to increase production. It was

expected that such assistance would permit an output of 50 to 60 hands per

month for the Army. Further study and experience suggested combined

requirements for Army, Navy, and Veterans' Administration would total 2,000

artificial hands for calendar year 1945. Hence, in October 1944, The Surgeon

General was authorized to contract for that quantity at a price sufficiently high

to permit the company to amortize the cost of necessary equipment. Under this

arrangement the Navy Department and the Veterans' Administration requisitioned their requirements from the Surgeon General's Office. In early December, the contract was canceled because of the contractor's failure to cooperate,

and a new contract was awarded to another firm at a lower cost.

40 (1) War Department Circular No. 152, 3 July 1943, Section IV: Minor Orthopedic Shoe

Adjustments and Repairs. (2) Letter, Maj. W. J. Tobin, MC, Chief, Orthopedic Section, Cushing

General Hospital, to Col. Leonard T. Peterson [MC], OTSG, 22 Nov. 1944, subject: Keport of Meeting Relative to the Construction of Specially-built Shoes. (3) OTSG Code Letter IX-206, 12 Feb.

1945, subject: Station Stock Control—1. Requisitions for Special Measurement Shoes. (4) Letter,

Col. Leonard T. Peterson, MC, to The Surgeon General, 26 Mar. 1945, subject: Special Built Shoes.

(5) Letter, Brig. Gen. Raymond W. Bliss, Chief, Operations Services, OTSG, to Office of The Quartermaster General, attention: Maj. D. W. Black, QMC, 2 Apr. 1945, subject: Special Built Shoes. (6)

War Department Circular No. 346, 16 Nov. 1945, Section IV : Footwear.
PROBLEM ITEMS 95

FIGURE 21.—Making the final adjustment on a prosthesis.

Concurrently with this action on artificial hands, in the fourth quarter of

1944 the Soviet Purchasing Commission requested information regarding

availability of artificial limbs for the Russian Government. Although no firm

requirements were given, it was indicated that probably 50,000 to 100,000 limbs

would be required. Anticipating firm requirements from the Russians, and

because the Medical Department had encountered considerable difficulty in

obtaining deliveries of artificial limbs in the quantities required by the Army's

amputation centers, a review of artificial limb production was initiated.

Artificial limbs also had been produced in this country by several small

firms and, here again, interchangeability of parts was virtually nil. To meet
96 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Eussia's potential demands and U.S. Army requirements, a program was initiated to develop improved limbs with standard interchangeable parts which

could be manufactured on a volume basis. Furthermore, it was agreed that

limbs should be of such design that competitive bids could be obtained.

During the first quarter of 1945, the National Bureau of Standards and

several representatives of limb manufacturers were consulted to resolve the

problem. The best features of limbs submitted by the various manufacturers

were adopted and specifications were written to incorporate the selected

features. Specifications for the composite limb were written so that the fiber,

metal, or plastic shin sections and thigh sections could be furnished, and the

limbs could be assembled from a standard scale of sizes by orthopedic shops at

amputation centers. Although this program gained some ground in standardization, it did not attain the anticipated perfection on interchangeability.41

BOOKS AND JOURNALS

Books

Before World War II, a monetary credit was established at the New York

General Depot for professional books required by stations worldwide. Bequisitions were submitted by these activities to the New York General Depot where

annual procurement was made and distribution effected.

By the latter part of 1942, selected books had become standard items of

supply, having been added to the Medical Supply catalog and to Medical

Department equipment lists. Medical units were authorized to submit requisitions, using standard equipment lists or other tables of authorization as a basis

for completing their libraries.

In November 1942, the Medical Section of the Chicago Quartermaster

Depot, Chicago, 111., was designated as the key depot for procurement, storage,

and issue of professional books (fig. 22). Stations, however, submitted requisitions to their regular distribution depot for editing, approval, and forwarding

to Chicago.

The Surgeon General's Office prepared requisitions for furnishing books

for unit assembly programs assigned to individual depots. Books were not

packed in Zone of Interior assemblies; instead, when the requisition was prepared, a simultaneous requisition was sent to the Chicago Quartermaster Depot

for direct shipment of the appropriate books to the station.

Beginning with fiscal year 1944, a specified monetary allowance was also

granted each Zone of Interior station, against which it could select and purchase professional books not included in authorization lists. This action further

« (1) War Department Circular No. 347, 25 Aug. 1944. Section I: General Hospital. (2) War

Department Circular No. 367, 9 Sept. 1944. Section II: Amputation Center. (3) Supply Service

Notes For The Surgeon Generals Notebook (8 September to 22 September), 22 Sept. 1944. (4)

Supply Service Notes For The Surgeon General's Notebook (23 October to 8 November), 8 Nov.

1944. (5) Supply Service Notes For The Surgeon General's Notebook (8 December to 26 December),

26 Dec. 1944. (6) See footnote 3(2), p. 64.
PROBLEM ITEMS 97

FIGURE 22.—Packing room and book section, Medical Section,

Chicago Quartermaster Depot.

decentralized control of book purchasing and distribution and proved to be

most satisfactory.

Until the latter part of 1943, books were purchased mostly from dealers,

since their price quotations were practically identical with those of the publishers, with the advantage of cutting down materially on the number of contracts to be written. Because most publishers were having difficulty in obtaining sufficient paper stocks under the War Production Board priority system,

a meeting was held in November 1943 attended by publishers, dealers, and

Medical Department procurement personnel. It was decided that future quantity purchases would be placed directly with the publishers. Only if the quantity of books purchased was small would the Medical Department buy from

dealers as in the past.

In March 1944, procurement of books was assigned to the Army Medical

Purchasing Office, excepting emergency shipments for overseas, which could

be purchased by the St. Louis Medical Depot if necessary. In the meantime,

storage and issue of all professional books was assigned to that depot.42

Accordingly, all books in stock at the Chicago Quartermaster Depot were

shipped to St. Louis.

«War Department Supply Bulletin 'SB 8-3, 21 Mar. 1944, subject: Medical Department Professional Books.
98 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Due to the publication of new editions of professional books which resulted

in stocks becoming obsolete, it was decided shortly after the war to abandon

the practice of purchasing books for stock.

Journals

Before World War II, the Surgeon General's Office placed subscriptions

for professional journals determined to be required by medical units throughout the Army. This system continued until mid-1943, when a monetary allowance was provided against which stations could purchase journals of their own

selection which did not appear in the allowance list.43

Purchasing or placing of subscriptions for Medical Department professional journals was transferred from the Surgeon General's Office to the Army

Medical Purchasing Office at the same time that book purchasing was transferred, in March 1944.44

One of the main difficulties with journals was that of late receipt or nonreceipt by units in the overseas theaters. During the early part of the war,

journals were sent to the headquarters of the various theaters for subsequent

redistribution or circulation to Medical Department units within their commands. Complaints of late receipt were continually received in the Surgeon

General's Office until the practice was discontinued in late 1943. From that

time, journals were mailed by publishers or dealers directly to the APO for

individual medical units. This system also soon came under fire as it was next

to impossible to keep current addresses for continually moving units. Further,

the Internal Security Division maintained that changing APO numbers constituted a security breach, and directed that the first APO number assigned

to a unit should be used in all future mailings of journals. Activation and

deactivation of units brought forth a perpetual flow of correspondence relative to procedures for supply of journals, a problem that remained until the

end of the war.

PROPERTY EXCHANGE ITEMS

The Medical Service had a peculiar problem relating to those items of

supply and equipment which were evacuated with patients. Commonly called

"property exchange items," these comprised blankets, litters, pajamas, splints,

tracheotomy tubes, and Levin tubes, which had to be conserved and used again.

In the classical system of property exchange, each element in the evacuation

chain was stocked with these items. When a vehicle of whatever sort discharged its patients, it received an exact replacement for those items that

accompanied the patient. The vehicle then returned to its forward point of

origin and similarly replaced the items in that element. The system could be

«SGO Circular Letter No. 126 (Supply No. 36), 16 July 1943, subject: Medical Books and

Journals, Including Authorization for Limited Local Procurement.

«War Department Supply Bulletin SB 8-4, 21 Mar. 1944, subject: Medical Department Professional Journals.
PROBLEM ITEMS 99

operated, at least in theory, from the frontlines back through the communications zone to the Zone of Interior and to the hospital of final destination.45

Wherever the classical system of property exchange could be used, the

forward elements in the chain of evacuation were automatically restocked and

problems were minimal. Where it could not be used, the forward elements were

rapidly depleted of these items and problems of resupply developed.

The system works more smoothly when motor ambulances, hospital trains,

and hospital ships, all under medical control, are the vehicles used. When

vehicles serve a dual purpose of evacuating patients to the rear and of carrying personnel or general supplies on their trips forward, the system breaks

down and other means must be used to replace losses in the forward elements.

In World War II, evacuation of patients by air, whenever practicable, soon

became the method of choice. Almost all cargo planes were equipped with

brackets and straps to hold litter patients. Karely, however, on their trips forward did these planes carry medical property exchange items. Other cargo,

either personnel or supplies, usually had a higher priority. The consequent

inability to utilize the classical property exchange system, except on a small

scale, resulted in huge requirements for these items to keep the slow-moving

supply pipeline full and assure replenishment in forward units. Blankets and

litters, for example, were under constant procurement throughout the war, and

reserve stocks were positioned in the Zone of Interior and at many points

overseas.

«Based on recollections of Maj. Gen. Silas B. Hays, formerly Chief, Supply Service, European

theater, and later The Surgeon General.
CHAPTER IV

Maintenance and Repair Parts

EVOLUTION OF MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS

Although medical equipment maintenance in the Army came into being

with acquisition of the first technical instrument, it did not gain the status of

an organized program until World War II when the influx of technical equipment into the supply system became a flood. Each incoming wave of more

varied and complex equipment imposed problems and maintenance requirements which surpassed the existing or planned capability of the Medical

Department.

Medical Maintenance in Hospitals

Medical installations and activities before World War II were virtually

autonomous from a medical equipment maintenance viewpoint. Some central

direction and guidance were provided, mainly in the form of monitoring and

approving expenditures for commercial contract maintenance, or procuring

and installing new equipment. Station maintenance, however, was generally

left to the discretion of the post surgeon.

In the typical post or station hospital of 1939^0, medical maintenance

was a function of medical supply, but there was no medical maintenance shop

in the supply organization. On-post ordnance, engineer, and signal shops

were used to perform most common maintenance chores. This encompassed

repairing or replacing valves, thermostats, and gaskets on sterilizers; repairing or overhauling small electric motors; overhauling motor armatures; repairing heat lamps and other physiotherapy electromechanical apparatus.

Eepair of such highly technical items of equipment as X-ray, electrocardiograph, and other machines was accomplished either on manufacturer's guarantee contract or by separate service call of the manufacturer's representatives.

Hospitals located in large metropolitan areas enjoyed particular advantages

in satisfying this aspect of the maintenance requirement. Because of the delicate nature of the machinery then in use, frequent repair and adjustment

were necessary.

This organization was, for the most part, satisfactory for types of maintenance described. There was a decided gap, however, in the support structure

involving the area falling between those simple maintenance operations that

the user might perform for himself and those amenable to common shopwork.

Included were such chores as replacing knobs and gages on sterilizers, replacing elements in heat lamps, replacing sockets and plugs on bedlamps, replacing knobs on bedside tables, and a host of other tasks outside the area of user

101
102 MEDICAL SUPPLY

maintenance, but not sufficiently technical to arouse a ready response from the

post shops or manufacturers' maintenance facilities. The medical supply activities in prewar Army hospitals solved this problem in various and sundry ways.

At Fort Banks, Mass., for example, a handyman was assigned to the medical

supply activity. If nothing else, the handyman could determine which items

required the more skilled services of the post shops or manufacturers' facilities. He could also do many jobs that required nothing more than a screwdriver, a wrench, or a pair of pliers.

Thus, the medical maintenance problem was kept within manageable

limits. User maintenance was not identified, defined, or promoted; it was practiced only when the individual user was motivated to do so by his superiors.

Preventive maintenance was not part of the structure. Even the handyman,

although perhaps serving the purpose of preventive maintenance to a limited

extent, was not utilized with this object in mind.

As war approached, maintenance problems were swiftly inflated. The

draft took its toll of commercial medical equipment servicemen while existing

medical installations were expanding and new ones were being rapidly established across the country. Pending a centralized program complemented by a

source of trained medical repairmen, each medical installation continued

largely on its own to establish and expand shop capabilities, staffing and equipping from local resources. Because of the paucity of medical supplies and

equipment during 1942, many hospital commanders pointed with pride to

their maintenance programs. These programs often included replating and

resharpening surgical instruments, sharpening dental burs, and repairing and

maintaining equipment. A substantial portion of the program was being

effected within the hospital medical supply operation. The ability to accomplish it depended upon the presence of skilled personnel. Otherwise, it was

accomplished under local contracts.

Development of the Maintenance Shop

The location of major medical equipment repair facilities in selected supply depots was a natural development that facilitated serving maintenance

needs of Army hospitals. Such a shop was located at the New York Zone Intermediate Depot at the close of World War I. Concern was expressed over who

was to control the repair facility. In response to an inquiry on the matter, The

Surgeon General, in a letter to The Quartermaster General on 11 July 1919,

wrote, "It is believed to be better policy (than having another service like

Quartermaster or Ordnance responsible) to have a central repair establishment in the Medical Department to which surgical instruments and delicate

laboratory equipment can be sent for repairs."1

Amidst this uncertainty of control, the procedure was established that all

repair and return requests from military infirmaries and hospitals would be

i Letter. The Surgeon General to Chief, Storage and Issue Branch, Storage and Traffic Division

[Office of The Quartermaster General] (attention: Col. R. B. McBride), 11 July 1919, subject:

Repair and Salvage of Equipment.
MAINTENANCE AND KEPAIR. 103

processed through the Surgeon General's Office and, in turn, through the

Quartermaster General's Office before action by the repair facility of the New

York Depot. About this time (the early 1920's), officers on field visits reported

observing "deplorable conditions" insofar as hospital furniture and equipment

were concerned. These combined factors undoubtedly influenced the decision

to establish a maintenance shop at the St. Louis Medical Depot, St. Louis, Mo.,

under control of The Surgeon General.

The St. Louis shop was established in July 1922 on one floor of a building

on the old Arsenal Reservation. Both wooden and metal equipment were

repaired, and by the shop's fourth year of operation, the value of processed

equipment totaled about $14,000 yearly. Although significant at the time, this

approximated the value of one 200-ma. X-ray unit processed in the shop during World War II.

Personnel of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Public Works

Administration were added to the shop in 1938. By January 1942, the facility

had been moved to what was known as the Indian Warehouse in the business

district of St. Louis and had a staff of 26 persons.

Program and Organization

By the end of 1942, the need for an organized maintenance program for

the Medical Department was becoming increasingly evident. Creation of a

program virtually overnight was not looked upon by anyone as an easy task.

Nevertheless, in April 1943, following the lead of the ASF (Army Service

Forces), The Surgeon General promulgated a policy concerning maintenance

of medical equipment overseas.2Sixteen end items originally had been envisioned as constituting the range of equipment requiring such support, although

the actual need turned out to be several times that number.

The maintenance plan followed a definite outline. Spare parts would be

purchased in the United States and stored in the medical section of the Columbus Quartermaster Depot, Columbus, Ohio, where the initial issue for overseas would originate. Manuals indicating the use of spare parts and the methods by which these parts should be replaced would be compiled and used in a

program of training enlisted repairmen who would be assigned to tactical

medical depots upon graduation. In overseas areas, tools and spare parts would

be furnished to effect proper maintenance and repair of end items. These

parts would be requisitioned as required from depot installations, and repairmen would be ordered to technical installations in the combat zone. Certain items worthy of repair yet beyond the capability of local facilities would

be returned through reverse supply channels to medical depots for replace2

(1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. G. Gruber, SnC, to Acting Director, Distribution and Requirements Division, 1 June 1944, subject: Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1944, Maintenance Branch.

(2) Memorandum, Col. S. B. Hays, MC, Director, Distribution and Requirements Division, to Mr.

[Edward] Reynolds, 26 Jan. 1944, subject: Distribution and Requirements Division, Supply Service,

Fiscal Tear 1944.

295^53 O—68 9
104 MEDICAL SUPPLY

ment or repairs as indicated, and unrepairable items of a critical nature

would be returned to the Zone of Interior for reclamation.

By early 1943, the Commanding General, ASF, had established a Maintenance Branch, and maintenance first emerged as an organizational entity

within the Surgeon General's Office.3 A new organization chart titled the element "Maintenance (Kepair) Branch" and placed it alongside the Storage,

Requirements, Issue, and Stock Control Branches, all within the Distribution

and Requirements Division of the Supply Service. According to the chart,

the new branch supervised "the maintenance and repair of medical equipment

including the operation of repair shops under the jurisdiction of The Surgeon

General" and prepared "spare parts and repair manuals." Maj. (later Lt. Col.)

Louis F. Williams, PhC, was designated to serve as the first chief of the Maintenance Branch. Also, early in the medical maintenance program, Lt. Col.

Charles Baumann, SnC, was assigned on temporary duty to the Maintenance

Division, ASF, to effect liaison on the implementation of policies affecting

medical equipment maintenance.

Following several minor organizational changes made to cope with the

expanding medical maintenance activities, the Maintenance Branch was

shifted on 26 July 1944 to the newly organized Storage and Maintenance Division, Supply Service, of the Surgeon General's Office. The Maintenance Branch

was responsible for maintenance and repair of Medical Department equipment, including supervision of the operation of repair shops under the jurisdiction of The Surgeon General; and for preparation of spare parts lists, technical manuals, supply bulletins, and other publications relative to maintenance.4

At its peak in mid-1945, the Maintenance Branch had 3 officers and 8

civilians in the Surgeon General's Office, 14 officers and 16 civilians in the St,

Louis field office, and 1 officer and 1 civilian in the New York field office. In

late 1945, the Washington, D. C, and St. Louis elements of the Maintenance

Branch were merged in St. Louis and allocated 7 officers and 10 civilians, with

supervision of these activities being retained by the Chief of the Supply

Service.

This organization continued until its functions either were gradually dissolved in postwar reorganization or were merged into other staff and operational elements, particularly into the Medical Technical Maintenance Division

of the joint Army-Navy Medical Procurement Office.

TECHNICAL TRAINING

Success of the Medical Department maintenance program hinged on the

availability of adequately trained personnel. The most demanding duty that

faced Capt. Thomas P. Dunn, MAC, when he assumed directorship of the

3 Organization Chart, Office of The Surgeon General (Distribution and Requirements Division),

11 June 1943.

4 Annual Report, Storage and Maintenance Division, OTSG, fiscal year 1945.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 105

Maintenance Shop, St. Louis Medical Depot, in 1943, was probably that of

training a staff. Equipment technology had outdistanced the training and

experience of shop personnel. Thinking first centered around using the facilities of medical equipment manufacturers to satisfy training requirements. This

may have started out as a valid consideration, but it was soon doomed as

impracticable. Early in 1942, quotas were obtained to place 20 enlisted men

with Ritter Dental Manufacturing Co., Inc., Rochester, N. Y., for 2 weeks,

but this was too limited for Medical Department needs. Factories had not the

capacity, the organization, or the understanding of the Army's great variety

of requirements to meet the task. Equipment density of any one manufacturer's products, at any one location in the Army, was so small that the military

could ill afford to have a so-called "factory trained man" for each make of

equipment in any given hospital, or supporting depot shop. Moreover, to attempt to train military personnel in selected factories in a roundrobin-type

affair would have been costly, inconsistent, ineffective, and particularly timeconsuming when time, most of all, was of the essence.

During the war, hospitals were equipped more extensively, and medical

equipment became more complex and often of poorer quality. This poorer

quality was attributed to scarcity of critical raw materials and to waivers on

specifications to expedite delivery of items during the early days. These factors imposed increased maintenance demands at a time when commercial

maintenance service was dwindling because of the selective service impact.

Personnel Requirements

Medical equipment manufacturers were extremely cooperative and willing

to assist The Surgeon General in any way possible to establish an effective

maintenance training facility. In addition to establishing courses in dental

equipment maintenance, which were attended by military personnel in late

1941 and early 1942, various manufacturers furnished suggestions and advice

regarding technical aspects of their particular line of equipment. Moreover,

they gratuitously assigned qualified personnel from their sales and service

organizations to act as civilian instructors.

The real seed was planted on 10 January 1942, when The Surgeon General authorized a 3-month maintenance training course and requested The Adjutant General to publish quotas for a school to be conducted at the St. Louis

Medical Depot.5 A quota was established of 14 students each for classes starting on 16 February, 18 May, and 17 August. Quotas were oversubscribed, and

the class began with 24 students from the Corps Areas, the Army Air Forces,

and War Department overhead personnel.

Opening the first class did not by any means signal full establishment of

the school. Manufacturers' representatives, acting as instructors, taught sub5

(1) Memorandum, Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, to Commanding Officer, St. Louis Medical Depot,

10 Jan. 1942, subject: Training of Enlisted Maintenance Men. (2) Annual Report, Medical Supply

Services School, St. Louis Medical Depot, fiscal year 1943.
106 MEDICAL SUPPLY

jects pertaining to items manufactured by their 'firms. Textbooks were lacking

and available instructional aids, in many instances, were the personal property

of factory representatives. Nevertheless, during these early days of maintenance training, visiting Medical Department officers and the Deputy Director

of Training, ASF, impressed with the program and its essentiality, made

favorable reports upon their return to Washington. In August 1942, the school

was established on a permanent basis. Mr. John J. Russell, who as a civilian

instructor from one of the manufacturers had participated in the X-ray phase

of training, was commissioned Captain, MAC, and assigned to direct the

training operation.

Maintenance and Repair Course

Factory-furnished instructors with generally good practical backgrounds

had filled an immediate need, but a permanent staff of officer-instructors, some

with engineering training, was required. All needed the "field viewpoint" as

well as training in "how to teach" for few had had previous field or training

experience. The problem was solved by commissioning five factory-loaned

teachers, who, together with noncommissioned officers and enlisted men retained from the graduating classes, formed the nucleus of the school staff,

which was eventually rounded out to an academically balanced faculty in 1943

(% 28).

Since no existing textbook covered the range of equipment in the training

curriculum, the staff had to compile texts. To compress time to a minimum,

various manufacturers were asked to furnish data on their respective items.

The response was generally magnificent, and the information was compiled

and printed locally in a three-volume series.

High school graduation was the primary announced prerequisite, and

completion of training or substantial experience in X-ray technicianship became a Sought for, but infrequently obtained, prerequisite. Information on the

quotas for the course was made available to service commands and medical

replacement training centers. Limited-service personnel were included in training quotas to replace general-service personnel on duty in fixed installations.

Except those attending from medical replacement training centers on an unassigned basis, graduates were usually returned to their stations upon completion of the course. All other graduates were assigned to priority vacancies.

Upon graduation, each man was to receive a complete tool kit (fig. 24),

which had been carefully designed for use in the field. Until these were ready,

an ordnance ignition mechanics' kit was used as an interim item. Even after

the prescribed kit became available, the supply was limited, and procurement

difficulties on components necessitated sending the item to the graduate's duty

station after he completed the course. Some kits never caught up with the

men. Ultimately, to effect distribution where the planned system had failed

and to compensate for it in transit losses, requisitions, based on the number

of course graduates who had arrived without kits, were honored.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 107

It t\

FIGURE 23.—Familiarization of students with 30-ma. Army field X-ray unit.

With continued technological developments, including more complicated

circuitry and an increasing range of equipment in the supply system, the desirability of lengthening the course soon came under study. For the time being,

however, The Surgeon General chose to stress quantity rather than quality to

meet, to some degree, the growing need for maintenance in the field. He recommended, accordingly, that the school be enlarged to permit the training of 300

enlisted students at one time.6 ASF approval was granted on 4 May 1943, but

less than a month later, following an inspection by the Director of Training

in the Surgeon General's Office, the need for lengthening the course was reconsidered. A short time later, the course was reprogramed on a 16-week schedule,

which included a staggered class input at 9-week intervals.7

0

(1) AG Memorandum No. W615-37-43, 6 Apr. 1943, subject: Training of Enlisted Technicians

at St. Louis Medical Depot. (2) Memorandum, Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, to Director of Training,

ASF, 23 Apr. 1943, subject: Expansion of School Facilities.

7 Memorandum, Col. F. B. Wakeman, MC, Director, Training Division, for The Surgeon General,

28 June 1943, subject: Training Inspection of the Medical Supply Services School (Class IV),

Medical Supply Depot, St. Louis, Missouri, and 2d indorsement thereto.
108 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 24.—Medical Department maintenance and repair tool kit.

About the same time, all courses at the St. Louis Medical Depot were

grouped under one head, and the Maintenance and Kepair Course became

identified as part of the Medical Supply Services School. Better organization

and administration resulted from this consolidation. Meanwhile, the original

teaching equipment, some of which had been obtained on a special fund allocation and some from the field and classified as unfit for further use, was supplemented from depot stock to meet the expanded student loads.

An unanticipated requirement soon canceled the gain in curriculum time.

In July 1943, ASF Headquarters directed that standards of military training

and physical conditioning be sustained at all schools. The seventh class, starting on 10 August 1943, accordingly gave up much of its lengthened time to

courses in basic military training and physical reconditioning.8

Officer Training

Faced with a conspicuous absence of technical know-how at the officer

level, The Surgeon General in August 1943 directed that a class of 10 Medical

8 Memorandum, Maj. N. R. Walker, AGD, Assistant Executive Officer, Military Training Division,

ASF, to Chiefs of Services, 6 July 1943, subject: Concurrent Basic Military Training and Physical

Conditioning in Army Service Forces Schools.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 109

Administrative Corps second lieutenants be selected to attend the Maintenance

and Repair Course. Officers, upon graduation, were assigned to MOS (military

occupational specialty) 4890, Medical Equipment Maintenance Officer, and,

for the most part, filled assignments in the Surgeon General's Office, staffed

depot shops and liaison billets, and eventually were deployed overseas with

field medical depots. Some few went directly to medical sections of theater

headquarters or to other special-type assignments.

In the meantime, before the 10 officers graduated from the course, an additional 5 officers with some previous training as equipment servicemen in

civilian life were assigned as medical equipment maintenance officers to the

medical depots at Chicago, 111., and St. Louis, and to the medical sections of

the ASF depots at San Antonio, Tex., Savannah, Ga., and Seattle, Wash.

Until officers could be made available through graduation from the course,

these five officers constituted the complement of medical equipment maintenance officers in the field. Their duties included liaison with posts, camps, and

stations; inspection trips; and coordination with the medical supply officers

at hospitals.

With few exceptions, one common phenomenon characterized medical

equipment maintenance officers. Because of the extreme shortage of enlisted

maintenance personnel and of the prevailing concept of using officers as

troubleshooting equipment servicemen on a regional basis, they were generally

seen in fatigue uniforms inspecting, installing, repairing, or dismantling

items. Commanding officers and other executives usually considered them

technicians rather than supervisory directors, as compared with other officers

assigned to more "dignified," although none to more important, duties.

By the end of 1943, 360 students had been enrolled for maintenance training : 210 had been graduated, 42 had failed academically, and 108 were still

in training. By the end of the following year, 830 enlisted men and 56 officers

had been graduated.9Equipped with the necessary know-how and tools, an

excellent esprit de corps was evidenced among maintenance school graduates.

Letters and other reports from alumni stationed in practically every area of

the world usually carried some technical message relating to the maintenance

situation. This information was carefully analyzed by the staff, and class

schedules were revised to stress the most commonly noted phenomena. Such

correspondence was encouraged by the course director, who advised graduating

students of the continuing availability of the faculty to assist by correspondence when unusually perplexing service problems were encountered or when

the graduate experienced any apprehension about a task at hand.

o (1) History of the St. Louis Medical Depot, 7 Dec. 1942-7 Dec. 1943. (2) A Summary of tlie

Training of Army Service Forces Medical Department Personnel, 1 July 1939-31 December 1944.

[Official record.] (3) History of Maintenance of Medical Department Equipment, 14 Feb. 1946 [official record], gives 835 enlisted through 5 January 1945, and 98 officers through 29 December 1945.
110 MEDICAL SUPPLY

SUPPORT OF USING ORGANIZATIONS

The sudden growth in station maintenance requirements while commercial support was dwindling is explained in part by the 65 percent increase in

number of station and general hospitals from July 1940 to July 1941. More

concretely still, in the 15 months between September 1940 and December 1941,

the number of normal beds in Zone of Interior general hospitals increased

from 4,925 to 15,533, and in station hospitals from 7,391 to 58,736.10 Concurrently, medical technical items began to spread around the world. It is of

little wonder that existing facilities, civilian or military, could not cope with

the staggering requirements for technical medical equipment installation and

maintenance.

The maintenance training program was oriented to the performance of

maintenance and repair in hospitals, of both the fixed and the mobile types. Despite any backlog of items at depot shops, or the urgency of issue requirements, maintenance at the using level was of paramount and transcending importance. It was there that patients' lives could be directly jeopardized by inadequate maintenance.

Combined technical services maintenance shops being established at most

stations were of little benefit to hospital commanders for anything other than

maintenance of nonmedical hospital equipment. Except for the X-ray technicians' course where relatively good operator maintenance was emphasized,

equipment servicing techniques were generally absent from courses for enlisted

technician operators.

During the war, medical maintenance support of the operating units was

derived from three sources: that inherent in the unit, in the shop, and from

commercial resources. With commercial capability diminishing in the face of

bounding requirements, The Surgeon General had no alternative but to become

self-sustaining in the field of medical maintenance. Units were directed to make

repairs within the scope of their assigned capability and local resources and to

effect other repairs by shipping items to designated depot shops. In an emergency, the depot was notified, and either a replacement item was furnished

immediately or depot maintenance personnel were dispatched to the unit for

on-the-spot repair. The latter alternative was used more extensively as trained

shop personnel became more plentiful. Scheduled periodic visits to units also

proved beneficial by providing preventive maintenance as well as timely repairs, but most of these refinements became full-fledged only toward the close

of the war.

Because of their complexity, items such as X-ray tubes, X-ray tube inserts, stopwatches, microscope objectives and oculars, certain electrical instruments and meters were keyed to the St. Louis Medical Depot for replacement

and repair. These instructions were applicable to overseas commands only for

10 Smith, Clarence McKlttricfc: The Medical Department. Hospltalization and Evacuation, Zone

of Interior. U.S. Army In World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1956, p. 24.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR HI

X-ray tubes. Where required repairs were beyond the capabilities or economical use of depot facilities, the items were shipped to the manufacturer for

repair.

As maintenance requirements mounted, this total system of handling repairs and returns evolved. To illustrate, until exacting instructions were well

disseminated, confusion and delay attended the repair and return method because shipping units would often fail to identify the item as "repair and return" or to indicate its defect. As a result, the item would be processed erroneously as an excess return and then placed in depot stock. Also, improper packaging resulted in breakage in transit, with resultant problems regarding responsibility occurring.

MAINTENANCE SHOP OPERATIONS

Some confusion existed as to the maintenance responsibility for items,

such as electric fans and typewriters, which were not exclusively stocked by

the Medical Department. On 12 May 1943, ASF assigned the maintenance of

certain Medical Department items to Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineer, and

Signal Corps under provisions of a previously published ASF memorandum.11

However, on 28 July 1943, following protests from the Surgeon General's

Office, Army Service Forces withdrew the designations indicating that "no

specific Medical Department equipment will be assigned to other technical

services for maintenance" but that "the Medical Department, as required, could

obtain services needed and available from the shops of the respective technical

services" in accordance with the latest edition of the basic maintenance manual.

Final disposition and replacement, in any event, would be through depot

channels.

War Department Supply Bulletin 38-1-8, dated 13 May 1944, "Repair of

Critical and Nonessential Items," became the "Bible" for fifth echelon repair

shops in directing, from an inventory control standpoint, what to repair and

what not to repair. Additionally, machine listings were compiled monthly by

the Inventory Control Branch and furnished to fifth echelon repair shops.12

Items indicated as being in short supply were given priority in shop processing as were items received from stations for "repair and return." Also, as the

medical stock position improved and the backlog of maintenance requirements

pyramided, the Supply Service directed that cost of repairs for the listed items

would not exceed 50 percent of the value of the item after it was repaired.

" (1) ASF Memorandum S850-23-43, 5 Apr. 1943, subject: Maintenance of Army Equipment.

(2) War Department Technical Manual TM38-250, August 1943, Basic Maintenance Manual.

12 Maintenance categories were denned as follows : First echelon, that degree of maintenance prescribed and performed by the user or operator of the equipment; second echelon, that degree of maintenance performed by specially trained personnel in the using organization beyond the capabilities

and facilities of the first echelon ; third echelon, that degree of maintenance prescribed and performed

by specially trained personnel in direct support of using organizations; fourth echelon, that degree

of maintenance performed by units organized as semifixed or permanent shops to serve lower echelons;

fifth echelon, that degree of maintenance authorized for rebuilding major items, assemblies, parts,

accessories, tools, and test equipment, usually located at a depot.
112 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 25.—Section of fifth echelon repair shop after relocating in Building No. 18 on

the Arsenal Reservation, St. Louis, Mo.

The first formal maintenance report submitted by the St. Louis shop on

1 February 1943 indicated that equipment valued at $34,465 had been repaired

and returned to the supply system in 1 month. This was about 30 times the

production rate of the prewar shop. Techniques of repair which steadily improved processing time and standards were instituted. Production reached a

point at which equipment worth almost $5 million was being repaired and returned to the medical supply system in a single year.

Meanwhile, because of crowded conditions and the need to place the shop

in proximity to the maintenance and repair school, the decision was made in

July 1943 to relocate the shop from the Indian Warehouse to Building No. 18

on the St. Louis Arsenal Reservation. By September, the move was completed.

The activity operated first as the Maintenance Division repair shop and later

(February 1945) as the fifth echelon repair shop, St. Louis Medical Depot

(fig. 25).

As a flourishing repair activity, the shop employed 124 civilians and was

administratively organized into branches and sections to delineate functional

responsibilities and to facilitate equipment processing and internal coordina-
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR

k

113

FIGURE 26.—X-ray and electrical shop in 1945 when the shop was located in Building

No. 36 on the Arsenal Reservation, St. Louis, Mo.

tion. Eapidly filling its 125,000 square feet of floor space, the shop expanded

beyond the physical limitations of its facilities within 2 years. In the fall of

1945, it was relocated in modern, spacious quarters on the fifth floor of the

same building (fig. 26) in which two men with a handful of tools had begun

to repair medical equipment in 1922.

In January 1945, a fifth echelon repair shop was opened at the Denver

Medical Depot, Denver, Colo., but it was short lived. In its only full year of

operation, 1945, the Denver shop,, in addition to a vigorous station liaison

program, repaired items with a dollar value of $1,664,816, thus relieving the

St. Louis shop of a tremendous load. During the planning stages of the Denver shop, serious consideration was given to opening shops at other Zone of

Interior depot locations, although it was generally accepted that the St. Louis

facility could handle any foreseeable additional load.13

In any event, the time was right for a reappraisal, if one were to be made

at all, in terms of a small-scale shop that had been organized at the Bingham13 (1) Annual Report, Denver Medical Depot, 1945. (2) Memorandum, Lt. Col. R. L. Black, MSC,

Director, Storage and Maintenance Division, OTSG, to Col. [Edward] Reynolds, 19 Aug. 1944, subject : Medical Department Repair Shop—St. Louis Medical Depot.
114 MEDICAL SUPPLY

ton Medical Depot, Binghamton, N.Y., in January 1944. The problem was

whether a facility, essentially the duplicate of the St. Louis shop, should

blossom from the small Binghamton establishment. After further study and

coordination, it was decided that the Binghamton shop should remain relatively small, and a similarly small shop should be established at the San

Francisco Medical Depot, San Francisco, Calif. These two shops were phased

in slowly; not until fall 1946, when some equipment was transferred from

the shop then being dissolved at Denver, did they finally become fully operative. Another small shop, equipped to repair only field items and assemblage

components, was established in June 1945 at the Louisville Medical Depot,

Louisville, Ky. From August until the end of the year, this shop repaired

more than 10,000 items valued at almost $100,000."

CATALOGS AND TECHNICAL MANUALS

From the very beginning of the emergency period before World War II,

spare parts—or rather, the lack of them—had plagued the maintenance program. Spare parts were regarded by some as strictly a supply problem, by

others as a maintenance responsibility, with no one taking a strong position

either way. In time, a semblance of a spare parts catalog emerged, and the

spare parts themselves became relatively abundant, but not until relatively

late in the war.

By the end of 1942, the need for spare parts was becoming more evident

to The Surgeon General. In January 1943, preliminary estimates indicated

that more than 200 types of medical end items were in use in theaters of

operations which should have spare parts support. By March 1943, most essentials of a spare parts program were under consideration in the Surgeon General's Office.

On 5 May 1943, an Army spare parts policy was announced by The Adjutant General.15 The policy provided that end items intended for use overseas

would include specified "high mortality" parts packaged with each item, together with the concurrent procurement of 1 year's supply of spare parts, plus

an additional procurement where availability would not otherwise be assured

of parts for the expected life of the equipment. At least 6 months' supply of

spare parts was to be shipped with the equipment. The remainder was to be

requisitioned on the basis of usage rather than that of anticipated failures.

Packaging was to be stressed to insure safe arrival at destination and to prevent deterioration from climatic conditions.

These were logical and well-conceived policy objectives, but they never

fully materialized. Again, although this decision probably did more to foster

spare parts support than any other single factor, it was too late in coming for

optimum benefit in the war. Too much equipment was already in the system

and too much slack had to be taken up from the 3 years of equipment influx

14 See footnote 9(3), p. 109.

" AG Memorandum No. W700-23-43, 5 May 1943, subject: Procurement and Oversea Distribution

of Spare Parts for Medical Equipment.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 115

which had passed with inadequate spare parts support. Nevertheless, to make

these policies effective for the time remaining, the machinery had to be put

together and set into motion.

To assist in developing this portion of the growing maintenance program,

Capt. (later Maj.) Eric A. Storz, MAC, was ordered to "Washington on temporary duty from the Kansas City Medical Depot, Kansas City, Kans., on 17

June 1943. Numerous conferences were held, trips were made to the Army

Medical Purchasing Office in New York, N. Y., for coordination, and, as a

result, the Supply Service of the Surgeon General's Office issued Memorandum No. 8 on 25 May 1943. This directive focused attention of the spare

parts aspects of the plan and delineated internal functional responsibilities.

By autumn 1943, planning for the maintenance program was well underway. Much had been accomplished in coordination with the Army Service

Forces and the Government Printing Office as well as with other staff elements

of the Surgeon General's Office, all of which inevitably became involved in

the printing of any maintenance and spare parts publications. It soon became

apparent that the equipment analysis essential to determining spare parts

requirements could not be effected without direct access to the particular equipment involved. Thus, in September 1943, Captain Storz was ordered to St.

Louis to set up the spare parts and manual program directly under The Surgeon General as well as to monitor the establishment and designation of the

fifth echelon repair shops under the St. Louis Medical Depot.

Locating the maintenance publications and spare parts group at the depots

adjacent to the shop and school proved to be an ideal arrangement. The school

used shop facilities for some practical training, and instructors of the school

were available to facilitate training of the initial shop personnel.

Assigned as a Maintenance Branch responsibility first and fundamentally

was the task of reviewing Medical Department end items to identify, describe,

and list the spare parts which should be cataloged in support of each item

requiring maintenance in the field. Included in the program were development

and revision of spare parts lists, determination of initial requirements, and

establishment of distribution schedules. Primary emphasis was naturally

placed on end items subject to overseas shipment.

By the time the spare parts program really got underway, an ASF catalog had been established.16 Relating this new publication to the medical spare

parts program, it was decided that the MED (Medical Supply) 7 section

(organizational and higher echelon spare parts) would be issued as a series

of pamphlets listing spare parts, replacement parts, special tools, and accessories, requiring frequent replacement. Further, it was desired that no publication would be made under the MED 8 section (higher echelon spare parts)

since MED 7 would contain information adequate for the Medical Department.

MED 9 section (list of all parts) would consist of a series of pamphlets listing

all component parts of the end items. This concept contemplated that all spare

16 ASF Circular No. 121, 17 Nov. 1943, subject: Establishment of Army Service Forces Catalogs.
116 MEDICAL SUPPLY

parts listed in MED 7 would be stocked. Seldom used and not normally stocked

spare parts, plus those included in MED 7, would be contained in MED 9.

Work previously done in preparation for spare parts cataloging was thus

integrated into the MED 7 program. By November 1944, some 1,600 separate

parts had been identified, and it was expected that the figure would reach

nearly 4,000 when the MED 7 program was completed.

By V-J Day when publication of such documents ceased, 54 MED 7

pamphlets covering 64 end items had been prepared, of which 41 had been

published and distributed. Some seven additional pamphlets were in various

stages of development. No MED 9's had been published although some had

been developed. To make optimum use of the work that had been done on

these suspended pamphlets, The Surgeon General permitted the data to be

mimeographed and issued on an informal basis as the "Spare Parts and Tool

Listing."

Near the end of the war, the President's Committee on Commodity Cataloging17 reported its findings. One major proposal was that commodity classification criteria and a uniform numbering system be adopted with central

monitorship. Meanwhile, a joint medical spare parts catalog with a unique

joint parts numbering system was already under active consideration by the

Surgeons General of the Army and the Navy. Actually, this effort was actively

implemented before final determination of action on the proposals of the

President's committee. Thus, the World War II MED 7 spare parts program

and the joint Army-Navy effort immediately following became springboards

from which to derive a new and better postwar medical spare parts cataloging

system under the auspices of the Army-Navy Medical Procurement Office.

As a corollary to the spare parts effort, certain other maintenance publications were required to promulgate technical instructions and other maintenance data to the field. A project was established to publish technical manuals

covering operational aspects and maintenance requirements at the several echelons for selected technical medical items. By V-J Day, 39 such manuals had

been published, and several others were in process of development. Other type

publications used for dissemination of maintenance data included modification

work orders, lubrication orders, supply bulletins, technical bulletins, Surgeon

General's Office code letters, and port medical supply information letters. The

last two items were Surgeon General administrative directives, which would

be quickly published and which were convenient to distribute.

To overcome the negative pressure existing in the spare parts supply

pipeline, automatic supply was carried out according to allowance lists prepared by the Maintenance Branch. As fast as procurement could be effected

and delivery realized, action was initiated to distribute the initial allowance

of spare parts to the several active theaters of operations. Approximately 60

17 Established on 18 January 1945 by letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Hon. Harold

D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget, requesting development of a U.S. standard commodity

catalog.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 117

percent of the total purchase quantities were distributed according to this

scheme.

Early in the spare parts planning period, it appeared that some distinct

advantages would accrue if certain spare parts were grouped and identified

collectively for procurement, storage, and issue. As an example, a small assemblage of spare parts for gasoline stoves and burners was cataloged as a "kit."

Such kits, normally issued with the end item for which they were designed,

constituted the initial issue of high mortality spares. Kits were also available

for replacement issue to the field.

Use of the kit concept for appropriate spare parts groupings had the advantage of identifying several related spare parts under a single stock number,

thus facilitating recognition and handling at all levels. While kits had considerable merit, this usage admittedly resulted in some degree of waste. Often

the assortment of parts in the kit did not represent a balanced supply, and

one or two parts would become depleted leaving others unused. When individual parts were not readily available for issue, as was often the case, new

kits were requisitioned merely to obtain the one or two needed components.

This imbalance, continually corrected with experience, did not invalidate the

wisdom of the kit concept for the supply of selected spare parts.

As experience with the spare parts program grew, packaging of parts

became increasingly important, and attention was focused on this problem by

the Army Medical Purchasing Office. Not only was packaging the critical consideration relating to protection of spare parts during storage and shipment,

but it served as the primary means of identification. Faulty packaging, including illegible or poor markings by the manufacturer, was experienced. It was

not until early 1945 that the Army Medical Purchasing Office could report

that processing, packing, and marking problems had been worked out with the

various contractors, and that spare parts were being delivered according to

specifications.

MAINTENANCE ACHIEVEMENT

Proponents, planners, and others responsible for the maintenance program

did not have to wait long for comments from the field. Informal reports, received by almost all conceivable means—personal contacts, telephone, personal

letters, word of mouth, and informal visits—indicated more clearly than formal

reports could do that the program was effective and had gained enthusiastic

acceptance at all levels of Medical Department activity. The only noteworthy

complaints concerned shortages of trained maintenance personnel, lack of

spare parts and spare parts information, and the need for more technical

publications.

The training course output never seemed to meet the demands of the field

for technical personnel, and inevitably some course graduates were misassigned. Zone of Interior hospital staffs were, at first, hesitant about utilizing Army-trained enlisted men to service and repair expensive and elaborate
118 MEDICAL SUPPLY

diagnostic and therapeutic equipment. At the outset, the fatigue uniform

worn by the military repairman did not instill the same degree of confidence

as did the coveralls or shop coat of a commercial representative with the

name of a prominent equipment manufacturer emblazoned across the back.

Similar complaints, however, were not voiced by professional and other supervisory personnel of medical units deployed in combat support operations. For

them, the Army-trained maintenance personnel were vital to the success of

their missions. As they became accepted, demands for course graduates

steadily increased, thus compounding the shortage which was never entirely

eliminated throughout the wartime period.

Spare parts and spare parts listings (MED 7's) were in great demand.

Although some maldistribution of spare parts did occur, and overzealous or

inexperienced planners often requisitioned more than they needed, there was

a genuine shortage throughout the war at the consuming level. This was

caused primarily by inadequate usage factors, by incomplete knowledge of end

item density to be supported, and by the long supply pipelines which were

entirely dry at the beginning. It is not surprising, therefore, that personnel

in the field complained of having to use rope to replace worn out invalid chair

tires, steel wool to replace brass screens in gasoline burner vaporizers, frayed

web belts to fabricate kerosene refrigerator wicks, or of having to grind delicate needle valves from welding rod stock.

The most frequent complaint about the MED 7 parts lists was that they

did not cover enough end items in their range. Technical manuals and other

maintenance publications Avere generally well received, but had started too

late and were too slow in coming. Probably the most frequently heard complaint about technical manuals was that those which did become available for

the most part, were received only when the recipient unit unpacked an end

item and found therein the manual, which usually began with instructions on

how to unpack the item.

Demobilization served to underline the need for a balanced and effective

permanent maintenance program in the Medical Department. Before the end

of September 1945, shop production had been cut to a 40-hour week, and personnel reductions were being experienced. Technically qualified maintenance

officers and enlisted men were released from the service, and the military hospitals and depots were quickly depleted of skilled personnel. All this came

during the pressure of demobilization when demands were being placed on

the maintenance shops for personnel to visit and assist in closing stations.

Also, demands on depots for emergency repairs were increasing at permanent

stations because of the exodus of maintenance personnel from the service.

A postwar evaluation of the wartime maintenance and repair of technical

medical equipment by the Medical Department showed the program as a

whole to have been so successful that its peacetime continuance was recommended by The Surgeon General.18

i« Letter, Col. Robert J. Carpenter, MC, Executive Offleer, OTSG, to Director of Supply, Headquarters, ÄSE, 7 Jan. 1946, subject: Medical Department Peace Time Maintenance Program.
CHAPTER V

Storage and Distribution of Medical Supplies

PACKING AND PACKAGING PROBLEMS

When the United States entered World War II and began to ship great

quantities of medical supplies to overseas theaters, no preparations had been

made to meet the packing problems which soon developed. The sturdy wooden

boxes which had been used in peacetime became scarce because of acute lumber

shortages. Packing specifications continued to call for containers designed "in

accordance with good commercial practices" or provided that the supplies

"shall be packed in a manner to withstand shipment and reshipment," but interpretation of these specifications soon became more lenient. In 1942, the

customary shipping containers were flimsy, open-slatted crates, thin plywood

boxes for heavier items, and corrugated paper cartons and boxes for bottles,

textiles, and miscellaneous items. No special efforts were made to prevent corrosion, rust, insect damage, or other ill effects of exposure to dampness, heat,

and rough treatment in handling.1

The circumstances under which the Medical Department dispatched its

supplies to overseas stations had unfortunate effects upon the weak, illdesigned packing containers. Large quantities of supplies, hurriedly assembled

at overloaded ports, were stored in the holds of crowded vessels, often by inexperienced and poorly supervised stevedores. Lack of adequate harbor facilities and the exigencies of amphibious assaults frequently subjected supplies

to sea water when they were unloaded on rafts or were thrown overboard and

floated ashore. They might also be dropped on loading platforms, rolled,

squeezed, and jostled before being jounced on trucks over shell-scarred roads.

Even when delivered to the depots, there was no assurance that the supplies

would be protected from further inroads of the elements, for covered storage

space in the theaters of operations was far from sufficient.2

These storage and handling conditions which prevailed in the overseas

theaters had prompt and disastrous effects upon the shipping containers which

the Medical Department used throughout 1942 and part of 1943. The medical

supplies and equipment were subjected to every type of damage that can be

caused by rough treatment and exposure to the elements.

1 Record of the Processing and Packaging Conference-Exhibit, Toledo Medical Depot, 4-5 January

1945.

2 Odenhelmer, Robert K.: Report of Inspection and Investigation, Medical Department, Packing

and Packaging, Southwest Pacific Area, March-April 1945.

295-453 0—68 10 119
120 MEDICAL SUPPLY

New Packaging Techniques

Reports from the South Pacific and from North Africa resulted in

prompt action. U.S. Army Specification No. 100-14A, issued late in 1942,

described requirements for all types of containers, both interior and exterior,

including waterproof papers, and the meager knowledge then available regarding methods of corrosion prevention. This specification corrected the

most obvious and the most serious errors in export packing. During 1943,

specifications were issued which eliminated fiberboard cartons as export shipping containers, standardized box construction, reduced the weight of individual boxes, and provided for the general use of waterproof case liners.

These improved packing methods were adopted by manufacturers slowly and

with great difficulty. By summer 1943, however, most contracts for later

delivery of supplies included packing specifications which reflected Medical

Department experience during the preceding 18 months. In 1944, additional

and stricter specifications sought to correct packing deficiencies .which still

existed, particularly in the field of corrosion prevention. ASF (Army Service

Forces) Manual 406, published in December 1943, was instrumental in the

development and widespread use of specifications designed to protect all types

of equipment subject to corrosion. A Packaging and Packing Section was

established at the Army Medical Purchasing Office. This section, in addition

to drafting packing specifications, maintained close contact with the manufacturers and aided in the practical application of the specifications.3

From the end of 1942 until the close of the war, depots assumed the main

burden of the packaging problem, the repacking of supplies. Each depot relied

initially upon experimentation and improvisation, but considerable progress

was made in late 1943 when a Packing and Crating Unit was established in

the Office of the Assistant Chief, Supply Service.4 The unit was charged with

two jobs: the writing of packing specifications and the institution of approved

methods of repacking in the depots.

The manufacturers of medical supplies encountered many problems in

adhering to packing specifications. In the summer of 1943, for example, the

lumber shortage became more acute, adversely affecting all packing and

forcing resort to substitute materials. V-board, made of superstrength all-kraft

fibers, was then adopted as a substitute for wooden boxes and as a successor to

corrugated fiberboard of the non-water-resistant type. This V-board made a

waterproof box which was satisfactory when packed with light, closely fitting

items, such as blood plasma. It was widely used, however, to contain a number

of items which could not be shipped safely in such a flimsy box. Consequently,

there were numerous reports from overseas, describing unsatisfactory results

Obtained with V-board—crushed, torn, and perforated boxes, which caused

3

Pile, Benjamin D.: Development of Packaging and Packing in the Medical Department During

the Present Emergency, 16 Oct. 1945. [Official record.]

4 Supply Service Memorandum No. 6, 8 Mar. 1943, subject: Packing and Crating Organization.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 121

the ruin of valuable supplies. Finally, in spring 1945, V-board was abandoned

by the Medical Department, except for a restricted group of items.5

Serious shortages were encountered in many other types of packing materials, including steel strapping, staples, strapping equipment, waterproof case

liners, waterproof cement, cellophane bags, chipboard, and foil barrier materials. Some shortages, caused by ineptly worded specifications, should have

been corrected promptly, but most were caused by scarcities in basic materials

and manpower. Often, the Medical Department hastened the completion of a

contract by using its influence to obtain higher preference ratings for the

required packing materials.

The two problems which appeared to be the most serious and immediate

were breakage in overseas shipments and damage by water. Supply officers in

the depots applied themselves to the solution of these problems. Considerable

progress was made in solving the breakage problem by the construction of

sawed-board, nailed, metal-strapped boxes; the use of adequate bracing and

blocks in packing equipment such as X-ray machines, sterilizers, and operating lamps; placing a maximum load-limit on the contents of shipping containers; and the lavish use of ground cork, excelsior, and other cushioning

materials.

Shortages of packing materials and the press of work were attacked by

preference ratings to the suppliers of packing materials, the employment of

additional civilian personnel, and the introduction of assembly line procedures

in the packing rooms.6

In devising methods of waterproof packing, the depots soon made distinguished progress. • "Waterproof case liners, made of asphalt-base laminated

materials, were adopted for all boxes intended for export shipping. The case

liner was first arranged in the box; then, the supplies were carefully packed

in the liner; and, finally, the liner was sealed, and the box was nailed and

strapped. This produced a shipping container that admitted no water, even

when immersed. However, additional precautions were frequently taken.

Cement-coated, rustproof nails were used in the construction of the boxes.

Waterproof labels and markings were used on the exterior. In packing electrical equipment, a vaporproof barrier and a desiccant included within the package were used to exclude moisture from delicate contact points (fig. 27.).7

For

expendable supplies, this method was satisfactory. Overseas installations received the boxes and opened them as the supplies were needed. When the tactical situation required a move, only a small quantity of unpacked supplies

had to be dealt with. Nonexpendable supplies and equipment, on the other

hand, had to be repacked, and few mobile units had either skilled labor or

packing materials to provide waterproof containers. The Supply Service

5 See footnote 3, p. 120.

6 See footnote 1, p. 119.

7 Memorandum, Capt. Paul Lipman, MAC, Asst. Purchasing and Contract Officer, to Lt. Col. E.

A. Shea, MAC, Chief, Purchasing Division No. 4, AMPO, 31 May 1945, subject: Annual Report for

Fiscal Year 1945.
122 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 27.—One of many packaging problems of the Medical Department

was to provide adequate protection for tubes and gages on sterilizers. Toledo

Medical Depot, Toledo, Ohio, December 1943.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 123

developed the "amphibious box" to meet this particular need. The box, when

fully packed, could sustain a drop of 15 feet without loosening the watertight

gaskets. This container proved to be invaluable in the functional packing of

field installations for supplies and equipment could be quickly repacked when

the unit moved. While the unit was in operation, the tops were removed and

the boxes stacked on their sides, thus providing tiers of shelves for the storage and issue of supplies. The amphibious box was a relatively expensive

item, costing the Medical Department $16 each, but its usefulness was so

great that more than 72,000 were purchased.8

Scarcity of material forced depots to procure high grade lumber for overpacking; for example, shipments processed by the depot at San Francisco,

Calif., contained high grade redwood. Although this was inconsistent with

the prevailing policy, recipients of medical supplies in the Pacific were highly

pleased, as shipments were received intact and the lumber was used to good

advantage in fabricating hospital furniture, floors, and similar items not

otherwise available.

Preservation of Instruments

Soon after heavy overseas shipments began in 1942, it became apparent

that one of the most serious problems would be the protection of surgical instruments (fig. 28) from corrosion. Numerous reports from theaters of operations called attention to instruments which had corroded so badly that they

were useless. At first, transportation and storage conditions overseas were

blamed for this deterioration in the instruments, and efforts were redoubled to

pack them in moistureproof containers; but depot inspections revealed that

surgical instruments in stock were imperfectly protected. Moisture in the air

industrial fumes, dirt, and even perspiration traces left by handlers caused

corrosion. It was discovered, also, that many box-lock instruments were corroding in the locks, a condition caused by a scale formation.9

One solution of this corrosion problem involved a thorough processing of

the instruments in the following manner: The instruments were placed in a

metal basket and lowered into a tank filled with stoddard solvent, which

removed dirt, grease, and other organic residue. A second tank, filled with

the same solvent, provided a rinse. Next, the instruments were immersed in a

third tank which was filled with specialized solvent, a fingerprint neutralizer.

After draining, the instruments were placed in a drying oven heated by

infrared lamps. The dry instruments were removed from the oven, allowed to

cool for 2 or 3 minutes, and dipped into a preserving tank containing an oil

or grease which was especially adapted to the items being processed. Finally,

they were sealed in laminated foil bags, and were then ready for storage. Zone

of Interior issue, or overseas shipment.10

a The Amphibious Box. Bull. U.S. Army M. Dept. 4 : 424, October 1945.

' Shea, Elmer A.: Surgical Instruments. [Official record.]

10 See footnote 9, above.
m MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 28.—Sample board used as guide to identify medical instruments processed

and packed in assemblies. Medical Section, Atlanta Quartermaster Depot, Atlanta, Ga.,

January 1943.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 125

In 1943, orders were issued to process all surgical, dental, and veterinary

instruments, but precise specifications as to how this was to be done were not

laid down. The results were so generally unsatisfactory as to demonstrate the

need for a technique that would be at once simple and effective. After considerable experimentation, an electrochemical process was devised and made

standard in time to be widely used during the latter part of 1944. The instruments were thoroughly cleaned, immersed in a light oil, wrapped tightly in

nearly pure aluminum foil, and finally were packaged in metal-lined, heatsealed envelopes. The process gave adequate protection against all the wellknown causes of corrosion and the little-known cause of scale formation.

Instruments thus processed and packaged were safe from corrosion for

extended periods of time and under all conditions. In addition, they were

ready for use after the envelope was opened, the foil wrapper removed, and

the instruments sterilized. This ended the time-consuming removal of heavy

greases, wax, and resin coatings, with which instruments formerly had been

protected.11

It was intended that all processing of instruments would be done at the

medical depots at St. Louis, Mo., and Kansas City, Kans., but the shortage of

personnel made it expedient to engage a private contractor in St. Louis. The

purchasing office in New York prepared lists of instruments to be processed,

grouping them according to patterns. Instructions were then issued to the

various Medical Department depots, requiring them to ship approximately

100.000 per week to the St, Louis depot. This depot released the instruments

to the contractor on an established schedule; and after the instruments were

processed, they were placed in the St. Louis depot stock. This program began

in the fall of 1944. By 30 November 1944, approximately 1,250,000 instruments had been processed, and during succeeding months, nearly 2 million

more were given this protection against corrosion.12

Unfortunately, this new process was developed too late to be of great

practical benefit in World War II. The heaviest shipments of surgical instruments to overseas installations were made during 1943 and 1944; consequently,

only small quantities of instruments protected by the new process were sent

abroad before the end of the war.

Results of Research and Development

The Medical Department's experience with the protection of surgical

instruments clearly demonstrated that the entire packing and packaging program in the depots should be subjected to central control. At the beginning of

the war, the depot commanders were allowed to operate without interference

in the handling of outgoing shipments. This encouraged ingenuity and local

initiative, which produced many important advances in packing techniques.

u Hornbacher, Arthur: Surgical Instruments : Difficulties Due to Corrosion and Methods Taken

to Combat Them. [Official record.]

12 See footnote 11, abore.
126 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Unfortunately, this system also had the disadvantages usually associated with

local independence. Some depot commanders, possessing imagination and

energy, applied themselves to the task of adapting their packing methods to

wartime conditions; but others were slow to change their methods even though

the need for haste was the theme of all reports received from overseas. Depot

inspections could not correct these deficiencies; by the time the inspections

were made, much of the damage had been done, and poorly packed supplies

were deteriorating in every theater.

Packing methods which were developed in the depots, and the advances

which research produced, were standardized by the Medical Department for

use in all depots. Precise packing specifications were prepared, which described

the materials and methods to use in packing the more important and easily

damaged medical items. Manuals were published and directives were issued.

Training films were made and exhibited to the appropriate personnel of all

depots. At packing and packaging conferences (at Toledo, Ohio, St. Louis,

and New York, N. Y.), attended by supply officers from the various depots,

new processes were explained and enthusiasm for better work was generated.

In other words, strong and continuous efforts were made to develop and maintain an "export consciousness," to instill the belief that supplies must be so

packed that they would be usable to combat areas. The extent to which this

attitude was built up is indicated by the remark of a depot commander in

1945, who declared that he "would not quibble about spending $50 to insure

the arrival of a single package of blood plasma to the battle front in good

condition." To enforce the directives and to assess the value of this widespread

training program, inspecting officers from ASF Headquarters and from the

Supply Service of the Surgeon General's Office, made frequent visits to the

packing rooms of the depots. These manifold efforts bore a rich harvest. By

spring 1945, the Medical Department was reported to have climbed from the

bottom rung of the ladder to a place near the top, in comparison with other

technical services, in the protection and packing of supplies.13

This judgment, rendered by inspecting officials in the the Zone of Interior,

was confirmed by reports from overseas. Supply officers in the Southwest Pacific declared that the supplies received during the period from 1 July 1944 to

1 April 1945 showed a "100 per cent improvement" in packing. The waterproof case liners and the nailed wooden boxes were hailed as the most satisfactory packing materials used. The only persistent and important complaints

received from this area in 1945 were that fragile items should be more carefully cushioned and that large pieces of equipment with projecting parts

should be disassembled before shipment.14

By the spring of 1945, all the more serious packing and packaging problems had been solved. The early and laborious efforts of the depots, the research

and experimentation in the laboratories, and the developments in manufacturers' plants culminated in a series of joint Army-Navy packing specifica13 See footnotes 1 and 2, p. 119.

11 See footnote 2, p. 119.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 127

tions, which replaced the ASF Manual 406 and a multitude of tentative specifications. The Joint Army-Navy Packaging Board, established in 1945, coordinated the work of subsidiary groups and issued specifications to all branches

of the Armed Forces. The work of the Packaging and Packing Section, Army

Medical Purchasing Office, resulted in the preparation of a "Master Preservation Packaging and Packing Listing," which described in detail a method of

processing and packing for every item of the Medical Department catalog.15

If an invasion of Japan had been necessary, the medical supplies thrown

upon the shores of that country would have shown the great improvements in

packing techniques which had been achieved since the landings on Guadalcanal.

STORAGE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES

The functions of storage and distribution are closely linked in many

ways. For a large part of the war, they were supervised by a single division

of the Supply Service, and throughout the conflict both were carried out by

the Medical Department's farflung depot system. But, however linked they

were, the functions of storage and distribution were essentially different. In

the purposes they were intended to accomplish and in the problems encountered, they found little in common.

Increased Depot Activities

At the outset of World War II, the Medical Department was responsible

for procurement, storage, and issue of approximately 4,500 items. By 1942,

the number of items under medical cognizance had jumped to 6,000, and

another 1,000 items were added by 1943. During mid-1942, some 700 contractors were serving the Medical Department, but within a year's time, this had

jumped to 2,500 contractors and the number of contracts had reached 25,000.16

Furthermore, until early 1944, contracts were F.O.B. destination, which

meant that items received from contractors could not be picked up on stock

records and made available for issue until they were formally accepted. Some

deliveries from procurement to depots were piecemeal, delayed, lost, or damaged in transit. Often, stocks arrived before receipt of specifications or copies

of the contracts. These documents were necessary to permit identification,

inspection, and acceptance. In the event of deficiencies, stocks upon arrival

had to be segregated and withheld from issue pending acceptance, or refusal

and disposition instructions.

Aggregating more than 5.4 million square feet by July 1941, medical supply depot space continued to expand after entry of the United States into the

war. A new branch depot was established in Kansas City, with Lt. Col. Revel

E. Hewitt, MC, as commanding officer; and medical sections were added in

general depots at Seattle, Wash., Atlanta, Ga., and Eichmond, Va., so that in

15 See footnote 3, p. 120.

16 (1) Annual Report, Finance and Supply Services, OTSG, fiscal year 1942, and attachment

"Office diary." (2) Annual Report, Supply Service, OTSG, fiscal year 1943.
128 MEDICAL SUPPLY

July 1942, the space available amounted to 7 million square feet. Additional

space acquisitions increased storage facilities still further during the next 6

months; in July 1943, the peak of 13 million square feet was reached. From

this time until the end of the war, the trend was reversed. Space in depots

and medical sections was sharply reduced, and a number of installations were

inactivated as the demand for storage area was diminished. Twenty depots

and medical sections had been occupied in July 1943. This number dropped to

17 in July 1944, and to 14 in July 1945. During the same period, the number

of square feet occupied fell to 10,348,000 in 1944, and to 9,127,000 in 1945."

The number of military and civilian personnel employed in the depots

showed a steady climb to the middle of 1943 and a similar reduction after that

year. A few months before Pearl Harbor, fewer than a score of trained supply

officers were available for depot operations. This meager pool of military personnel was supplemented by granting commissions to individuals with appropriate civilian experience, calling to active duty a number who held Keserve

commissions in the Medical Administrative Corps and the Sanitary Corps,

and by training newly commissioned graduates of the Medical Administrative

Corps officer candidate schools. These young officers, directly after receiving

their commissions, entered upon a period of supply training. The number of

officers on duty in the depots increased from 171 in December 1941 to 465 in

December 1942, and to 511 in June 1943.18

Despite difficult problems in recruitment, including a relatively low salary

scale, the number of civilian employees increased at an impressive rate (fig.

29). When the United States entered the war, there were approximately 2,600

civilian employees in medical depots. This number was increased to 5,700 in

July 1942, and to 14,100 in July 1943. As in storage space, this was the peak

period. Employment declined to approximately 9,400 in July 1944, and 6,800

in July 1945.19 It should not be assumed, however, that this decrease in civilian

personnel indicated a diminution of activity in the depots. Quite the contrary

is true, for the workload of the depots showed a distinct increase during the

latter part of the war. This striking conservation of manpower was made

possible by the decrease in storage space, by the increased use of materialshandling equipment, by work simplification, and by better training and control of employees.

Operation of the Depot System

Medical depots were able to survive the onslaught of work and confusion

that flashed into being during the first years of the emergency and war. By

June 1943, they were beginning to reap the gains of experience. From then

17 (1) See footnote 16, p. 127. (2) Annual Report, Storage and Maintenance Division, OTSG,

fiscal year 1945. M

(1) See footnote 16(2), p. 127. (2) Report on Administrative Developments, Office of The

Surgeon General, 1 Dec. 1942. [Official record.]

"(1) See footnotes 16(1), p. 127, and 17(2), above. (2) Memorandum, The Surgeon General

for the Commanding General, ASF, 29 June 1945, subject: Report, Pursuant to Directive of 1 June

1945, Submitting Additional Material for Annual Report of ASF.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 129

FIGURE 29.—Window showing job openings at San Francisco Medical Depot,

San Francisco, Calif.

on, even increased demands placed on depots seemed more reasonable in view

of their extended capabilities, thus swelling their production without an

increase in manpower.

In December 1941, however, the depot system itself was rudimentary, with

specialization only just begun. The medical sections at New York, San

Antonio, Tex., and San Francisco, Calif., distributed stocks to their respective distribution areas and to ports of embarkation, while the branch depots

at St. Louis and Savannah, Ga., performed similar functions. The medical

sections at Schenectady, N.Y, Columbus, Ohio, and New Cumberland, Pa.,

were used for storage of the War Reserve. The branch depot at Toledo constructed hospital assemblies. This was the full extent of specialization, but

wartime demands soon proved too heavy for the existing framework.

One of the earliest difficulties arose from the scarcity of certain items. The

old system under which stocks had been divided more or less impartially

among the depots left no facility with sufficient scarce items to satisfy its

needs. The solution was the "key depot system" set up in 1942. In each of three
m MEDICAL SUPPLY

main geographical regions, one depot was designated to receive and store

stocks of these items.20

By summer 1943, the depot system was substantially in final form. Storage facilities were divided then into five categories, each with its specialized

function—distribution depots, assembly depots, port filler depots, reserve

depots, and holding and reconsignment points. In each category, the depot type

determined to considerable degree the variety and quantity of medical supplies

sent to it.

Depot administrative organization, originally conditioned by local needs

and the wishes of individual commanders, was brought into conformity with a

general pattern in 1943, the pattern being laid down by the Storage Division,

ASF. The basic divisions were Administration, Transportation, Stock Control, Personnel, and Storage.21 The storage divisions were usually composed

of Inventory, Storekeeping, and Labor and Equipment Pool Branches, and

required the largest number of military and civilian supervisors because of

the variety of functions for which they were responsible. Eeceiving and inspection were the first duties of the Storage Division. Inspection extended to quantity, condition, and packaging, but not to actual testing for conformity to

specifications of drugs, chemicals, and biologicals. This latter function was

performed by the Army Medical Purchasing Office and the U.S. Food and

Drug Administration.

Movement of supplies within the individual depots was often severely

handicapped by poor elevators. The construction of single floor warehouses

by the Army helped solve this problem.

Before the war, medical supplies were stored, to a great extent, in "item

sequence"—that is, all quantities of each item were stored in one place and,

so far as practicable, all item numbers were stored adjacently and in sequence.

The huge procurement program of 1942-43 forced expansion in depots, and

item sequence storage could be maintained only by building bigger warehouses

and rewarehousing. Because of this complication, most depots which were

activated in 1941 and 1942 never employed the item sequence method, and

those which antedated the war were compelled to abandon this method. Under

the new system, the location of each medical item was determined by the

amount of storage space it required, appropriate storage conditions (such as

load limits on floors), and the speed with which the item was used or requisitioned. The experience of the Toledo Medical Depot suggested that fast-moving

items, such as beds and mattresses, should be stored on the first floor. Slowermoving items and bulky hospital equipment and supplies should be placed on

the top floors, while surgical dressings, instruments, laboratory equipment,

dental equipment, and X-ray equipment should be stored near the packing

20 (1) See footnotes 16(1), p. 127; and 18(2), p. 128. (2) Hangen, Herman C.: Key Depot System, in Program of Port and Assembly Depot Conference, SGO, 22 Jan. 1943.

21 History and Procedure Manual, Toledo Medical Depot, 1941-1945. [Official record.] Some of

the larger depots (for example, the St. Louis Medical Depot) established additional divisions.

22 See footnote 21, above.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 131

When the item sequence method of storage was abandoned, or when a

new depot was established which did not employ it, a card locator system was

absolutely essential. At first, in most depots, the cards for all items were assembled at one place, so that through an examination of the cards in one centralized unit, the selectors could determine the location of the stock on every floor

of all warehouses. In the early summer of 1944, a decentralized stock locator

system was established in all depots, remaining in effect until the end of the

war. This system established a small locator unit on each warehouse floor. A

locator card for each item stored on that floor showed: (1) the location, (2)

number of original packages, (3) number of units in each original package,

and (4) the condition of the packing. This new method increased the efficiency

of the stock selectors and, at the same time, provided sufficient information

for depot stock records.23

Need for Periodic Inventories

In October 1942, the Surgeon General's Office directed the medical depots

to make a physical inventory of all stock in storage and to reconcile the balances on the stock records with the actual physical count. In addition, this

directive required that each accountable item be inventoried at least every 6

months. Thus originated the "cycle inventory," which continued throughout

the war and which acted as a continuous corrective of the stock records. A

Cycle Inventory Branch was established in each depot, and an inventory

schedule was developed which made possible the count of each item every 6

months. Additional inventories were made upon special requests. These regular

and special inventories provided valuable information for both the storage

and stock control officers.

At the same time, a simplified inventory adjustment procedure giving

greater latitude to post, camp, and station commanders was substituted for

the rigid property accountability of the peacetime army.24

Another matter, more directly connected with storage functions of depots,

was the layout of storage areas in the warehouses. All floors were divided into

sections and designated by letter of the alphabet. Many factors, such as local

conditions, floor space, and volume of supplies, determined the size of the

sections. These sections, in turn divided into bays by supporting columns, were

numbered consecutively. The number of aisles varied and the height to which

supplies were stacked depended upon the load limit of the floor, the location

of the sprinkler system, and the type of supplies stored.

Use of Materials-Handling Equipment

When the heavy procurement program of 1942 and 1943 began to fill the

depots with unprecedented quantities of supplies and equipment, the increased

23 (1) History of the St. Louis Medical Depot, 7 Dec. 1943-7 Dec. 1944. [Official record.] (2)

See footnote 21, p. 130. 24 (1) See footnote 23, above. (2) War Department Circular No. 101, 12 Apr. 1943, Section IV:

Simplified Inventory Adjustment Procedure (AR 35-6640).
132 MEDICAL SUPPLY

workload rendered materials-handling equipment' necessary, and the abundance

of funds made its acquisition possible. Forklift trucks, tractors, and trailers

became standard equipment in the depots for moving and storing nearly all

supplies. The widespread use of this equipment was rendered more practicable

by the adoption of a simple but ingenious aid—the wooden pallet. Supplies

were unloaded on pallets at the receiving platforms and were then moved by

trailers or forklift trucks to the inspection area. Still remaining on the pallets,

the supplies were tallied-in, inspected, and conveyed to the storage area, where

they were stacked by forklift trucks. Under the new system, the fork of the

forklift trucks was inserted into the pallet, and a large number of original

boxes were thus moved and stacked by a single operation. Stacks in the warehouses could be erected to greater heights, with a consequent saving of space,

because the pallets provided both secure platforms upon which to store the

supplies and open spaces for free circulation of air. After supplies were

unloaded from freight cars and placed on pallets, they received no more manual handling until they were withdrawn for shipment (fig. 30) .

25

Work Measurement System

During the last 18 months of the war, another factor made important

contributions to the efficient operation of the Medical Department depot. Early

in 1944, a "work measurement system" was installed, which involved a close

study of each piece of work performed in a depot. Eecords were maintained

on the methods employed in performing each task and on the amount of time

and personnel required. By comparing records of the various depots, supervising officers of the Surgeon General's Office could discover weak spots in the

operation of a depot and could point out, with great particularity, the specific

tasks which were being inefficiently performed. Better methods which had been

devised and adopted by other depots could be introduced wherever they were

needed, with a consequent saving in time, personnel, and materials. At regular

intervals, the records of the work measurement system were brought to the

attention of all depots, so that each could determine its efficiency in comparison with the others. This produced a spirit of competition and rivalry among

the depots which still further increased their efficiency.26

DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO ZONE OF

INTERIOR INSTALLATIONS

The nature of the war which the United States entered in 1941 made it

clear that in the Zone of Interior there would be two major requirements for

large quantities of medical supplies. One concerned the training of more than

25 The extent to which materials-handling equipment was used is indicated by the fact that at

the St. Louis Medical Depot, the number of forklift trucks increased from 7 in 1942 to 29 in 1943

and to 40 in 1944. Pallets, which were not used in 1942, increased to 23,390 in 1943 and to 51,250

in 1944. See History of the St. Louis Medical Depot, 1941-1944. [Official record.] See also footnote

21, p. 130.

26 See footnote 17(2), p. 128.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 133

FIGURE 30.—Use of pallets in warehouses.

10 million men and women of the Army. The great variety of medical care and

the large number of troops involved made inevitable the need for immense

quantities of supplies. The second requirement was the provision of supplies

for the named general hospitals, which provided definitive treatment for all

American soldiers and especially for those evacuated from theaters of operations. These general hospitals were the fifth and final echelon of medical support; and, as such, they required the most elaborate equipment and a steady

stream of supplies.

On each major Army installation, a medical supply officer was responsible

for receipt, storage, and issue of all medical supplies. This officer sent periodic

requisitions to his distribution depot, stored the supplies as they arrived, and

filled the requisitions of the station hospitals, dispensaries, and other medical

units on the post. Before January 1942, all requisitions from posts, camps, and

hospitals were first edited by the corps area surgeons, who compared the

requisitions with appropriate allowance tables and stock levels. If supplies in

excess of the allowances were requisitioned or if nonstandard medical equipment was required, the corps area surgeon obtained the approval of The Sur-
134 MEDICAL SUPPLY

geon General before forwarding the requisition to the distribution depot. The

final step in this supply chain was the medical depot which handled the inspection, storage, and distribution by requisition of medical supplies to the training camps and general hospitals.

Use of Medical Unit Assemblies

Large quantities of medical supplies were issued in the form of unit

assemblies. All the supplies and equipment needed to establish a medical unit

(whether a 50-bed station hospital or a 1,000-bed general hospital) were assembled, packed together, and clearly labeled. When supplies for a particular

medical unit were requisitioned, the depot simply added the deteriorating

items and shipped a unit which had been previously assembled and packed.

Although there were unanticipated difficulties, the advantages of the unit

assembly as a vehicle for issuing supplies were so pronounced that it continued to be used throughout World War II. The assemblies were especially

valuable in the activation of station hospitals in Zone of Interior posts. As

new training camps sprang up all over the country, station hospitals opened

rapidly. Many hospitals were commanded and manned by Keserve officers and

Army of the United States officers who were unacquainted with tables of

equipment and could not anticipate their supply needs. Time was saved and

efficiency was advanced by the system which made it possible for them to

requisition a station hospital, a regimental dispensary, or any other appropriate unit. When the depot system expanded with mobilization, the St.

Louis Medical Depot, commanded by Col. Eoyal K. Stacey, MC, was responsible for construction of assemblies; and until 1943, this depot devoted a

large part of its space and personnel to the assembly program. Assembly

depots were also located at Toledo (hospitals); Atlanta (hospitals); Kansas

City (kits and chests) ; and Columbus (civilian aid program).27

In the construction of a hospital assembly, much "paperwork" was required. The basic equipment list, of the items and the quantities of each to be

included in the assembly, was reproduced on punched cards in the electrioail

accounting machine section, and then run through the machine to determine if

sufficient stock was on hand to construct the assembly. In 1941^2, while the

procurement program was getting underway, stock was extremely short. Consequently, the first "run" of the cards usually accounted for only 60 to 70 percent of the items needed. When speed was essential, the assemblies were

shipped incomplete, and the receiving agencies were authorized to requisition

the missing items at a later time. During this early period, the shortage of

"housekeeping" items created an especially difficult problem in Zone of

Interior medical installations.28

27 (1) History of the St. Louis Medical Depot, 7 Dec. 1941-7 Dec. 1942. (2) 'See footnote 16(2),

p. 127.

s

8 Memorandum, Lt. Col. K. L. Black, MSC, to The Historical Division, SGO, 16 Nov. 1944,

subject: Supply Depot Historical Highlights.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 135

Many medical items were in chronically short supply until summer 1943,

necessitating back orders and extracts to other depots. The delays thus occasioned in constructing the assemblies still further aggravated the scarcities;

supplies available when the first accounting machine run was made were

obligated and, consequently, could not be used for any other purpose. The

result was that, for periods as long as 6 months, scarce supplies lay unused

in the depots, because they were being held to build assemblies. Eequisitions

to other services were necessary, and these requisitions also frequently resulted

in an almost interminable process of back orders and extracts. For example,

the Medical Department was dependent upon other technical services for procurement of web equipment, electric motors, mattresses, and other nonmedical

supplies. Sometimes, the supplies were not placed in procurement until shortages were revealed by the effort to build a unit assembly. Even after the supplies were procured and shipped by the other services, there still remained the

problem of combining them with the medical items in the assemblies. If the

assembly was to be shipped complete, this process was accomplished at the

medical depot; but frequently, to save time and to prevent crosshauling, the

"marrying-up" process was performed at the Zone of Interior installation

which received the assembly or at the port of embarkation to which it was

shipped.29 Assemblies were held for weeks and sometimes months, awaiting

the arrival of missing items, and many units were shipped incomplete. The

mere process of packing and storing hospital assemblies, pending requisitions

for them, also resulted in immobilizing large quantities of critically needed

medical supplies.

Another problem arose when basic equipment lists were changed or when

packing instructions were altered after an assembly was packed, labeled, and

stored. Such changes made it necessary that depot personnel remove the assembly for storage, make the indicated alterations, and repack it—work which

involved large quantities of packing supplies and many hours of labor. Some

depots tried to solve this problem by building only a limited number of assemblies, which were held for emergency requisitions, and by maintaining a sufficient quantity of stock to build any additional assemblies that might be

required. When medical supplies became comparatively plentiful, this solution

was quite practicable, for a large assembly could be constructed within 2

weeks.30

While the assembly concept had definite advantages, execution of the concept caused many serious problems for the Medical Supply Service during

World War II. Tremendous major assembly requirements were relatively predictable, unlike those for minor assemblies. The lateral transfer of kits and

chests among units was necessary because of volume, movement, and changes

in priority of tactical units; this made it impossible to determine total assets

as they pertained to material in the hands of troops. Major assemblies when

issued were more stable and controllable, but had an irrepressible tendency to

29 See footnote 27(1), p. 134.

30 See footnote 21, p. 130.

295^53 O—68 11
136 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 31.—Hospital assembly, ready for overseas shipment.

fly apart in transit because of their size. For example, complete table-of-organization equipment for a 1,000-bed general hospital comprised one assembly of

more than 3,000 items. It weighed over 600,000 pounds and required approximately 20 freight cars for shipment. When one of these assemblies was shipped

to a Zone of Interior hospital, it was relatively unimportant if the 20 freight

cars arrived at different days provided the last one arrived on time. For an

assembly destined for use in a general hospital overseas, the situation was

entirely different. If the whole assembly did not arrive as a unit, the port was

faced with the almost impossible job of reassembling it (fig. 31).

Regular and Emergency Requisitions

The building and shipment of hospital assemblies was only one method

by which medical supplies were distributed to Zone of Interior installations.

The other, and more important, method of accomplishing the task was the filling of regular and emergency requisitions initiated by the medical supply

officers.

After Pearl Harbor, speed became more essential. In February 1942, the

medical supply officers began to send their requisitions directly to the distribution depot, which was empowered to approve all requisitions except for controlled items and quantities in excess of authorized allowances. Any requisition

on which the depot lacked authority to approve and fill was forwarded to the

Supply Service for a final decision.

These forwarded requisitions called for quantities in excess of allowance,

for nonstandard supplies, or for unauthorized equipment. As the war progressed, the number of requisitions forwarded for the approval of the Surgeon
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 137

General's Office steadily mounted; before the conflict ended, disposition of

these requisitions became the most time-consuming duty of the Issue Division,

Supply Service. This work grew in volume, despite the many efforts to decentralize, so far as possible, all phases of the distribution process. It was quite

necessary, however, for the Surgeon General's Office to exert firm supervision

over the issue of controlled items and quantities of supplies in excess of authorized allowances, for only in this manner could procurement and distribution

be coordinated.

The depots' work in the distribution of medical supplies may be divided

into three parts: receiving and editing the requisition; accomplishing the preliminary paperwork; and selecting, packing, and shipping the supplies. The

editing process determined that the items were properly identified, were authorized for the station which had requisitioned them, and were- not requested

in quantities exceeding allowances. International Business Machines were used

to ascertain if the items were in stock, to obligate the stock, and to print shipping tickets. The tickets were transmitted to the issue room, the stock was

withdrawn by the selectors, and the items were packed and made ready for

shipment. After "tally-outs" and inspection, the papers were transmitted to

the transportation department and the supplies were shipped.31

The unpreparedness of industry, the production timelag, the scarcity of

certain raw materials, and the administrative friction of a great buying

machine all contributed to delays in placing orders and to delays in the manufacture of medical supplies and their shipment to depots. The simple result

was the inability of the depots to fill many of the requisitions they received.

When stock was not available, but was due in from procurement, the requisition was placed on "back order," a procedure which obligated the soon-to-bereceived supplies to the filling of these requisitions. The number of items on

back order, therefore, is some indication of the extent of shortages. In May

1942, on back order at the St. Louis depot were approximately 3,700 medical

items, the most important of which were sterilizers, rubber goods, generators,

anesthesia apparatus, litters, and X-ray machines. This large number of back

orders was gradually reduced, but it is significant that, as late as May 1945,

a total of 1,250 items were on back order at this depot.32

In the emergency and early war period, a depot unable to fill a requisition

for urgently needed supplies extracted the requisition to the Surgeon General's

Office. After consulting the consolidated stock report, supply officers in Washington, D. O, sent the requisition to the depot which had a supply of the

required items. The system broke down when shortages of many items became

nationwide. The consolidated stock report, moreover, was not an accurate

record of stock location during most of 1942 and the early months of 1943.

So many requisitions were received and filled after the depots' "cutoff date"

and before the stock report could be compiled that the report was out of date,

m

See footnote 27(1), p. 134.

32 (1) History of the St. Louis Medical Depot, 7 Dec. 1942-7 Dec. 1943. (2) See footnote 27(1),

p. 134. (3) History of the St. Louis Medical Depot, 7 Dec. 1944-8 May 1945.
138 MEDICAL SUPPLY

for many items, on the day it was printed. The practice of extracting requisitions from one depot to Washington and thence to another depot nevertheless

continued unchanged throughout 1942, with most unhappy results for the

posts needing the supplies. Extracts of requisitions moved futilely from one

depot to another, via Washington, to a third, fourth, or even a fifth depot.

Before the procurement program could be expected to make up all deficiencies, partial remedies were developed. The most outstanding and successful

of these remedies was the establishment of the key depot system late in 1942.

The distribution depots were "keyed" to receive, store, and issue certain classes

of items in short supply. When a depot received a requisition for key items

which were not assigned to it, an extract was forwarded to the key depot which

stocked the items. Important advantages resulted from this system. During

the first 6 months of 1943, the time required to process requisitions through

depots was reduced by 50 percent. Many man-hours were saved by the elimination of fruitless extracts, and the small stocks of scarce items were less dispersed and their issue more strictly controlled.33

Central Stock Control

The establishment of a more efficient central stock control system produced

distinct improvements in the distribution of medical supplies. The installation

of electric accounting machines in the depots and in the Surgeon General's

Office in 1941 was followed by the establishment of a new system of stock

records, which by 1943 was in successful operation. Under this system, each

depot submitted periodic reports to the central stock control point, located at

first in Washington and later in New York. The principal information carried

on these cards, for each item of medical supply, was the quantity on hand,

quantity on back order, quantity due in from procurement and transfers, and

the quantity issued. The central stock control point sorted the punched cards

and printed periodic stock reports, which showed the information of each

depot and a total for all depots.

The preparation of a consolidated report a few days after the cutoff date

made possible an efficient system of centralized stock control. Using the consolidated stock report, the Surgeon General's Office controlled procurement

and distribution which was impossible in peacetime. It became practicable to

compute short-term procurement requirements and to direct shipments from

manufacturers to the proper depots. More important for distribution, the central stock control point was able to transfer stock between depots and to send

requisitions or extracts to the depots which had the needed stock.34

The technique of ordering medical supplies was also changed in the interest of conservation. Throughout 1942, medical supply officers of training camps

and general hospitals submitted to their distribution depots three types of

requisitions: Semiannual, quarterly (for deteriorating items), and emergency

33 See footnote 16(2), p. 127.

34 Material submitted Informally by Col. S. B. Hays, MC, Supply Service, 13 May 1946.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 139

requisitions. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, special requisitions were

added, differing from the emergency type in that they were produced by the

activation and expansion of training camps, and thus were intended to fill

urgent needs which could be anticipated. In January 1943, a thoroughgoing

change was made. From that date, all requisitions were submitted monthly

and were divided into three new categories according to the type of supplies

required: standard expendable supplies, standard nonexpendable supplies, and

nonstandard supplies. In addition, a staggered schedule was arranged by each

distribution depot, so that the flow of requisitions from the posts would be

evenly spaced over all the days of the month. This was a pronounced improvement over the system which it succeeded. Serious shortages of medical supplies

had been aggravated by allowing the posts to hold a quantity sufficient for 6

months. The institution of monthly requisitions was an attempt to get the

greatest use possible from the insufficient supplies then available.35

Although this change in requisitioning procedure produced good results,

it was soon obvious that more heroic measures were necessary. As the number

of training camps and general hospitals increased during 1942-43, the quantity

of medical supplies held in storage at these posts proportionately increased.

And as shortages became more acute, medical supply officers were tempted to

hoard against possible future needs. Even under normal circumstances, a large

quantity of medical supplies were, from necessity, unavailable for immediate

use. The distribution "pipeline" remained full, and a considerable quantity was

in storage. This meant, specifically, that large amounts of medical supplies

were always in transit and that another quantity remained in storage at the

factory, medical depot, and the warehouses of the post. It became essential,

therefore, to reduce these idle supplies to the smallest amount commensurate

with efficient operations. Immediate shipment by the manufacturer, elimination of delays in transit, and speedy filling of requisitions submitted to depots

offered a partial solution to the problem.

These factors made a tight stock control system absolutely essential to

accomplish a fair and economical distribution of medical supplies. For many

years, the control of stocks at posts and general hospitals had been inadequately administered. Hospitals were allowed to carry a year's stock of nondeteriorating items and a 6-month supply of deteriorating items. In addition,

no accurate due-in records were kept. As hospitals grew in number and size

and as requisitions were submitted with increasing frequency, it became impossible for supply officers to maintain an accurate knowledge of what was on

order. In the fall of 1942, therefore, the Surgeon General's Office devised a

new stock record card for posts and general hospitals which showed a stock

level for each item, receipts, issues, transfers, stock on hand, and stock due in.

The stock level, as originally established, was sufficient to care for a post's

needs for 60 days, calculated from actual issues made during the previous 90-

day period. In the spring of 1944, when the demand for supplies in theaters

35 See footnotes 18(2), p. 128; and 27(1), p. 134.
140 MEDICAL SUPPLY

of operations had mounted to unanticipated heights, the level of stock authorized for posts was reduced to a 45-day period. The stock level for nonexpendable Medical Department items was reduced to the actual amount of the items

on memorandum receipt at the posts, plus the necessary quantity on hand for

the replacement of damaged or wornout equipment. At the same time, the Medical Department depots were authorized to maintain a stock level of only 90

days of anticipated issues. In September 1944, the stock level of depots was

reduced to 60 days. This resulted in such a serious increase in out-of-stock

items that, in February 1945, medical depots were authorized to return to

the 90-day level for expendable items.36

Hoarding in Zone of Interior Installations

Post medical supply officers were expected to abide by authorized stock

levels, to requisition no more than they needed, and to return to the distribution depot any excesses that developed. Each month, they submitted, to the

distribution depot, reports which were supposed to reveal any excess supplies

on hand. However, the experience of 1942 indicated rather clearly that stock

levels must be policed by the distribution depot. Accordingly, in 1943, liaison

sections were established in medical depots and staffed with personnel trained

in stock control procedures. These liaison officers made quarterly visits to posts

and general hospitals, examined the stocks on hand, and declared excess all

supplies above the authorized levels. These excess supplies were returned to

the distribution depot. At many training camps, the liaison officers discovered

tremendous excesses in many items.

By summer 1944, liaison officers had reduced the more easily discovered

excesses to such a point that their operations became routine in nature. Time

was available, also, for the officers to discuss and offer suggestions on major

supply problems which troubled post medical supply officers. During this

period, moreover, substandard and obsolete surgical instruments were removed

from the posts, and the inspection of these instruments became a duty of the

liaison officers.37

These efforts to police stock levels were not altogether successful. Medical

supply officers of training camps and general hospitals naturally considered

that their primary job was to maintain sufficient supplies for their installations. If the medical supply officer hoarded his excesses, his immediate superiors were not inclined to censure him. But, if he promptly returned all excess

stocks and then, at a later period, was unable to supply the needs of his units,

his reputation as a prudent and foresighted supply officer would suffer. In

fact, a division of power and responsibility, and a divergence of interests

between the service commands and the Medical Department depot system

30 (1) See footnotes 16(2), p. 127; 27(1), p. 134; and 34, p. 138. (2) Annual Report, Station

Section, Issue Branch, Distribution and Eequirements Division, Supply Service, OTSG, fiscal year

1944. (3) Notes on Supply Service Staff Meeting, 14 Dec. 1944. (4) Annual Eeport, Stock Control

Division, Supply Service, fiscal year 1945.

* See footnote 23(1), p. 131.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 141

made it difficult to police the stock levels. These two authorities, it is true,

were subject to the same overall command in the ASF Headquarters; but the

actual work of stock control was not done at this high level. It was done in

the field, where divided responsibilities and clashing interests were most

evident.38

From the viewpoint of post medical supply officers, some circumstances

justified exceeding authorized stock levels. These levels, it will be recalled, were

based upon previous consumption. Yet, when there had been no stocks of certain scarce items for many months, there was no issue experience upon which

a stock level could be based. In many other instances, previous issues had been

small because the stock was chronically low. The real need for an item, therefore, was not always indicated by the authorized stock level. Delays in the filling of requisitions created shortages at the posts and (because these shortages

reduced issues) led to lower authorized levels in the future. In addition, some

medical supply officers wished to retain excess supplies for they had good

reason to believe that the patient census of their hospitals would soon increase.

The service command surgeons were unwilling to declare any supplies as

surplus for they feared a large influx of patients would result from the bitter

fighting then in progress in Germany. These fears were well founded. In the

late winter of 1944 and the early spring of 1945, Zone of Interior hospitals

became crowded with overseas casualties.39

It became clear, during the last year of the war, that large quantities of

excess supplies had been issued to, and were being held by, hospital pharmacies, operating rooms, and dental clinics. No surpluses appeared on the books

of the medical supply officers or in the warehouses; for all practical purposes,

the excesses were hidden away in the using installations. In January and February 1945, approximately 1,250,000 artificial teeth were recovered from dental

clinics—a windfall which, together with quantities already on hand, was estimated to be sufficient for all needs during 1945 and 1946 and made possible

the cancellation of several procurement contracts. In a survey of general hospitals by the chief of the Issue Division, Supply Service, excessively large

quantities of quinine and dental burs were discovered and returned to distribution depots. In the summer of 1945, when medical installations began to close

all over the country, even larger excesses were unearthed. In one general hospital an entire year's supply of Pentothal sodium (thiopental sodium) was

located in the surgical service. Quite obviously, therefore, this type of hoarding not only created scarcities in less fortunate hospitals, but also led the Medical Department to purchase great quantities of unneeded supplies. Procure38 During October and November 1944, when heavy fighting In Europe caused shortages In the

Zone of Interior, service command surgeons were taking action contradictory to Medical Department policies by holding on to medical supplies above authorized stock levels. At least a part of this

was caused by failure of the Surgeon General's Office properly to inform the service command surgeons, some of whom were not familiar with Medical Department policies. See Notes on Supply Service Staff Meeting, 5 Dec. 1944.

39 (1) Annual Report, Station Hospital, Laredo Army Air Field, Laredo, Tex., 1944. (2) Notes

on Supply Service Staff Meeting, 28 Nov. 1944. (3) Notes on Supply Service Staff Meeting, 23 Feb.

1945.
142 MEDICAL SUPPLY

ment was based upon issues, and purchasing officers were unable to distinguish

between issues for hoarding and issues for use.40

To wipe out the scarcities caused by hoarding, inspecting officers visited

dental clinics, station hospitals, and general hospitals; but this was a remedy

which took effect only after the disease had caused much damage. A revision

of the Stock Control Manual for Stations sought to prevent the evil by extending stock control to hospital pharmacies, dental clinics, and other using agencies.41 This, also, came too late for, by the time these new orders were issued

(May 1945), Germany had collapsed and the entire world conflict was drawing to a close. Quite probably, many scarcities of medical supplies, which were

so serious in 1942^i3, were caused not by overall shortages, but by maldistribution of the quantities procured. And the large excesses recovered in 1944-45

clearly indicate that hoarding was partly responsible for this maldistribution.

From 1943 until the end of the war, an unremitting effort was made to

operate medical depots more efficiently. Training programs for employees,

work measurement studies, improved methods of packing and labeling, and

use of materials-handling equipment were only the most outstanding methods

employed in the pursuit of efficiency. The results were closely connected with

the speedier distribution of medical supplies to training camps and general

hospitals. During 1942-43, many requisitions remained in the depots for 4 to

6 weeks before they were filled; by the early summer of 1944, the usual period

required was 10 to 14 days. The increasing abundance of medical supplies during the third year of the war was very influential, but administrative improvements within the depots had a considerable share, in producing this result.42

Central Service System

In the station and general hospitals, a noteworthy economy in the use of

equipment was obtained through the establishment and operation of the

central service system. During 1943, a number of hospitals inaugurated this

system which centralized the storage, care, and issue of supplies and equipment used in certain diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. These items were

highly specialized and could be used for any patient, but only as the occasion

demanded. Their constant presence in each ward was unnecessary and entailed

the expenditure of unreasonably large quantities of scarce medical equipment.

The establishment of a central agency permitted a greater utilization of available equipment and also assured better care and longer life to critical materials. This innovation produced such good results during the latter part of

1943 that, early in the following year, a directive was issued, requiring all

station hospitals of 750 beds or larger and all named general hospitals to

« (1) Notes on Supply Service Staff Meeting, 6 Mar. 1945. (2) Address, Brig. Gen. Edward

Reynolds to Medical Department officers assembled at Walter Eeed General Hospital, 19 Sept. 1945,

subject: Medical Supply Problems of World War II. [Official record.]

«War Department Technical Manual (TM) 38-220, Stock Control Manual for Stations, May

1945.

ö See footnote 36(2), p. 140.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 143

establish the central service system.43 Obviously, the widespread adoption

of this procedure relieved the shortages in essential equipment and aided the

Supply Service in solving its procurement and distribution problems.

War Department Shipping Documents

Possibly the most extensive standardization in the supply system during

the war was the "War Department Shipping Document. First introduced on a

trial basis in the summer of 1943, it became a permanent fixture in January

1944." From the master copy, four variations were reproduced: order copy,

property copy, overseas copy, and price copy.

The order copy was used by the consignor as a shipping order to the

Storage Division which prepared the freight for shipment; as a packing list;

as a basis for preparing bills of lading; as a basis for completing the property, overseas, and price copies of the shipping document; as a notice of availability to ports, when required; and, as a back order or extract form. Property

copies were used by the consignor for domestic shipments to stations, depots,

ports, holding and reconsignment points, and similar recipients; and, by the

consignee, to tally-in shipments and as a basis for the stock record account.

The overseas copies were used for shipments passing through water and aerial

ports of embarkation and debarkation, holding and reconsignment points, and

air in-transit depots. Price copies were used in instances where reimbursement

or pricing in terms of unit cost was involved, such as lend-lease shipments.

The Army Service Forces extended the principles of the War Department

shipping document to procurement activities with the publication in May 1944

of a vendor's shipping document—a combination form that standardized and

simplified procedures for accepting, shipping, receiving, and invoicing shipments from vendors. This document expedited supply action and satisfied

back orders before filling current requisitions with newly arrived stock. Its

uniformity also was an outstanding factor in its use. However, its intrinsic

value was never fully realized because the size of the unit assembled required

a giant-sized shipping document to move it. The volume and length of the

shipping document invited errors and misinterpretation, and much training

of depot personnel in its use was necessary.45

DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THEATERS OF

OPERATIONS

Responsibility for Distribution of Supplies

The responsibility of the Medical Department for distribution of its supplies to overseas commands was limited. The ports of embarkation through

which the supplies moved and the vessels and aircraft which conveyed them

43 War Department Memorandum No. W40-44, 12 Apr. 1944, subject: Central Service System

in Army Hospitals.

«Army Service Forces Manual M401, War Department Shipping Document, 25 Jan. 1944.

«Army Service Forces Manual M410, Vendor's Shipping Document, 5 May 1944.
144 MEDICAL SUPPLY

abroad were not under the Medical Department's jurisdiction. Once overseas,

the supplies were transported, stored, and issued under the supervision of the

theater commanders, who were completely independent of the technical services. Yet, in the first stages of overseas distribution, the Medical Department

had important responsibilities, the discharge of which placed the supplies on

board the ships and consigned them to using installations.

The depot system was employed for both Zone of Interior and overseas

distribution. Port filler depots were the most important installations for the

supply of overseas commands. Located at strategic spots some distance from

the seaboard, these depots had, as one of their most important missions, the

responsibility of receiving medical supplies of all classes, storing these supplies in warehouses, and shipping them to ports of embarkation. At Toledo

and Atlanta, assembly depots packed the hospital assemblies, and shipped

them to the ports when needed. In addition, many depots of the Medical

Department were keyed to receive and store certain scarce items; and to those

depots, ports of embarkation sent extracts of requisitions. Finally, holding and

reconsignment points, operated by the Transportation Corps, were used to

hold completed hospital assemblies so that requisitions from ports could be

speedily filled. Since these holding and reconsignment points were located close

to the ports, the assemblies could be moved quickly to meet ship sailings OTI

short notice.46

Ports of Embarkation

At the apex of this system stood the ports of embarkation, located at

Boston, Mass., New York (fig. 32), Hampton Koads, Va., Charleston, S. C,

New Orleans, La., Los Angeles, Calif., San Francisco, and Seattle. Through

these ports, troop units and replacements moved to overseas stations, carrying

with them their initial allowances of supplies and equipment; and, through

them, vast quantities of maintenance supplies were funneled to all fighting

fronts. Administered at first by the Quartermaster Corps and during the

greater part of the war by the Transportation Corps, the ports of embarkation

were nonetheless important parts of the Medical Department's supply system.

Each port had a Medical Supply Division which was headed by a port

medical supply officer. This officer was on the staff of the port commander,

functioning directly under him, and was the technical agent of The Surgeon

General in supply matters. The port medical supply officer's duties and responsibilities are difficult to describe for he was both a staff officer and an operating

officer. His duties included advising the port commander on matters pertaining to medical supply, maintaining shipment status reports, following up all

requisitions scheduled for overseas shipment, checking on serviceability of

equipment of all units moving through the port, and purchasing medical supplies needed in emergency to supply outgoing forces. The port medical supply

officer also maintained port stocks of deteriorating items by placing delivery

48 See footnote 16(2), p. 127.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 145

FIGURE 32.—Portion of New York Port of Embarkation, heavily populated with famed

World War II Victory ships and Liberty ships, 1943.

orders against open contracts, furnished medical equipment and supplies to

Army transports and hospital ships, furnished emergency supplies to port

terminals and staging areas, and exercised staff supervision over stock control

in the separate commands of the port.47

Under the plan inaugurated in March 1942, each port of embarkation supplied an assigned overseas area. For example, the New York port, with Lt.

Col. Theodore M. Carow, MC, as medical supply officer, was responsible for

supply in the European theater, the Mediterranean theater, and the Azores;

the Boston port, of which Maj. William A. Bell, MAC, was medical supply

officer, served U.S. garrisons in Greenland and Newfoundland; and the Seattle

port, whose medical supply officer was Maj. Joseph B. Kingsley, SnC, furnished supplies to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. Close liaison was maintained between the port and its overseas area by survey trips, cable, and

ordinary correspondence.

As overseas commands and combat areas developed and port activities

surged beyond capacity, supplies were moved from ports as rapidly as possible. Additionally, because primary ports were not physically capable of

" (1) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. C. P. Gross, Chief of Transportation Service, to Commanding

General, New York Port of Embarkation, 2 May 1942, subject: Port Medical Supply Officers. (2)

Training Kit of the Port Medical Supply Division, New York Port of Embarkation, 22 July 1944.
146 MEDICAL SUPPLY

transshipping all supplies required by the larger and more active theaters,

and for economy reasons, primary ports could direct that some cargo be loaded

at other ports known as outports. Primary ports, however, retained the responsibility for control and timely delivery of material to their designated consignees. In practice, a part of the port medical supply officer's mission was

absorbed by the Oversea Supply Division of his port, which was staffed with

representatives of all technical services and served as a clearing house and

control center for overseas supply actions.

The port medical supply officer carried stocks of biologicals, antimalarial

drugs, and other items needed to fill last minute shortages of outgoing troops,

and emergency requisitions from overseas. To meet such requirements, it was

often necessary to resort to local off-the-shelf procurement. Port stockage was

contrary to basic ASF policy and was a subject of controversy between ASF

and The Surgeon General's staff, but was condoned because of the urgency

of the need. Early in 1945, the medical local procurement function was

absorbed by a newly established Port Control Procurement Division.

Medical Maintenance Units

Shortly after the United States entered the War, the acute need for a

uniform method of automatic supply of medical items to overseas commands

became apparent. Directives of the War Department originating with the

Assistant Chief of Staff, GM, called for immediate action. As a result of concerted effort by Mr. Mead M. Messick, civilian consultant to the chief of the

Storage and Distribution Division of the Surgeon General's Office, a medical

maintenance unit was developed, which provided great quantities of medical

supplies for U.S. soldiers in all parts of the world. Each unit consisted of 700

to 900 medical items and was designed to supply 10,000 men for 30 days. The

entire unit weighed 15 tons, occupied 1,500 cubic feet of space, and was valued

at approximately $10,000.48 To each major troop unit stationed overseas, a

number of medical maintenance units was shipped which was sufficient to

provide the prescribed level of supply. This level varied from time to time

during the war, but it never fell below 60 days as a minimum nor rose above

180 days as a maximum. As additional troop units moved overseas, they were

provided with the requisite number of maintenance units; and, after the

arrival of the troops, other units were shipped to maintain the level of supply.

Instructions governing the medical units made the port medical supply

officers responsible for insuring timely delivery. This included recommending

to the Surgeon General's Office the number of such units to be placed to the

port's credit in the designated filler depot. Originally, the port filler depots

established credits upon which the ports of embarkation drew whenever it

became necessary to ship maintenance units overseas; but, beginning in 1943,

they were shipped from port stocks. During a large part of the war, however,

«Letter, Lt. Col. S. B. Hays, MC, to Medical Supply Officer, New York Port of Embarkation,

19 Mar. 1942, subject: Medical Maintenance tffilt.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION I47

the port medical supply officers were responsible for requisitioning or shipping

sufficient medical maintenance units to maintain the supply in the overseas

theaters at the prescribed level.

Supply officers in the Zone of Interior looked upon the medical maintenance unit as a temporary expedient, designed to provide medical supplies to

overseas bases only until the bases accumulated the issue experience to guide

them in requisitioning the items needed. Before going on a requisitioning

basis, each base was authorized to inform its port of deficiencies in the automatic supply system. It could, for example, request that certain items be

deleted from subsequent shipments, that other items be added, or that the

prescribed quantities be reduced or increased. This flexibility, it was thought,

would enable the port to adapt the maintenance units to the needs of the

various troop units and would provide information leading to revision of the

standard medical maintenance unit. Numerous valuable suggestions were

indeed received, but some overseas supply officers were content to take these

units just as they were sent. They were inclined, moreover, to remain on this

automatic basis of supply for protracted periods. The resulting imbalance was

a natural one and could have been predicted by any supply officer familiar

with the variety of conditions under which American soldiers lived and

fought. For example, the quantities of quinine in the maintenance unit resulted

in large surpluses in Alaska and in acute shortages in the South Pacific. The

consumption of many other items varied from place to place, with the result

that enormous excesses were built up in some parts of the world while soldiers

in other areas did not receive their minimum needs.

To overcome this problem, a Balanced Medical Depot Stock listing was

developed early in 1943. The new listing was formulated by supplementing

most items on the 1,000-bed general hospital list with an estimated 90 days'

supply of all items not found in the 1,000-bed assembly, but included in other

selected Medical Department standard unit assembly lists, plus 30 medical

maintenance units. Certain items were added or deleted by professional personnel to conform to possible needs and to complement the peculiarities of

the geographic area.49

Final Reserve Units

American experience in the Bataan campaign seems to indicate that

troops should be provided with a quantity of medical supplies to be used only

when they were besieged. To satisfy this presumed need, a Final Keserve Unit

was devised, which consisted of 200 highly necessary medical items in quantities sufficient for 10,000 men for 30 days. This unit was approximately onethird the size of the medical maintenance unit and had a monetary value of

$5,000. Each overseas base was required to have on hand a 90-day supply of

final reserve units—three units for each 10,000 men—to be provided by the

43 (1) See footnotes 16(2), p. 127; and 48, p. 146. (2) Freedman, Abraham: Overseas Supply,

22 Nov. 1944. [Official record.]
148 MEDICAL SUPPLY

port medical supply officer when the troops embarked. Deteriorating items

were to be rotated, and each box in the unit was marked: Final ReservedMedical Supplies—Not for Routine Use. When and if these supplies were

consumed, the overseas base was expected to notify its port, so that additional

units could be shipped.50

Several factors tarnished the repute of this final reserve. Instructions

governing its use were issued under a classification of Secret so that, in many

instances, the personnel actually receiving and handling the supplies were

never told how they were to be handled. This resulted in considerable confusion and disturbed the morale of the forces concerned. Keeping these supplies separate from other stocks, even though the items were the same as those

on hand, created a variety of problems in areas where mobility was of the

essence and adequate storage facilities were scarce or nonexistent.

Transportation Problems

Eequisitions were prepared by medical supply officers of the theater surgeon's staff and were transmitted by radio, cable, or airmail to the appropriate

port of embarkation. Here, they were received by the Oversea Supply Division, and then submitted to the port medical supply officer for editing. All

controlled items, all items in excess of allowances, and all nonstandard items

were referred to the Distribution Division, ASF, for approval, the latter

agency basing its decision upon information received from the Surgeon General's Office. Early requisitions called for amounts far in excess of those

authorized by consumption tables because of the use of a projected troop

strength of which the ports were unaware. Later, theater troop strengths were

announced in tables published by the Oversea Supply Divisions of the ports,

and thus requisitions came to be submitted and edited on the same basis. After

editing, the requisitions were returned to the Oversea Supply Division, where

extracts were prepared and sent to the appropriate port filler depot. The port

medical supply officer maintained close liaison with the port filler depot, to

assure that the supplies were available within the convoy period for which

they were planned.

To get the supplies to the theater in the required time, a Cargo Priority

System was inaugurated in 1944. Upon request of the theater, the Oversea

Supply Division was authorized to apply priority 1 to any item on a requisition, priority 2 on any special requisition, or priority 3 to all other requisitions. The port medical supply officer was responsible for expediting priority 1

items into the port for loading as soon as possible. Priority 2 items were given

attention to insure shipment within the scheduled convoy period. Priority 3

items were not expedited, but were followed up routinely to see that shipments were made. When the depot made a shipment to the port, advance copies

of the War Department Shipping Document were sent for the use of the

Port Transportation Division and the port medical supply officer. Upon receipt

50 See footnote 49, p. 147.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION I49

of shipments at the port, tally-in copies of the shipping document were furnished to the port medical supply officer. And, when the supplies were loaded

aboard the ship, he received "floated" copies of the hatch tally. Thus, the port

medical supply officer received and maintained records on the progress made

with each requisition, and was able to check on, and expedite the filling of,

requisitions.51

Considerable delay and difficulty were caused by the failure of overseas

commands to prepare and submit requisitions as authorized. Sometimes

requisitions for badly needed supplies were sent directly to the Surgeon General's Office. Instead of hastening the arrival of the supplies, this procedure

delayed them; such requisitions were routinely referred to the ports of embarkation, to which they should have been addressed in the first instance. Frequently, the requisitions did not give sufficient information. These omissions

occasioned serious delays in filling the requisitions for editing authorities

were compelled to query the theater and obtain the missing data.52

Equipping Tactical Units

In addition to providing for automatic supply and the filling of itemized

requisitions, the Medical Department supply system had important responsibilities in equipping all tactical units of the Army with organizational equipment before overseas movement. In 1942, a Field Equipment Subdivision was

established in the Finance and Supply Division of the Surgeon General's

Office to discharge this duty. Tactical units customarily received their organizational equipment through the port medical supply officer, who drew upon

his distribution depot. During most of the war, however, and because of

shortages, this equipment could be supplied only through the aid of the Surgeon General's Office. Eeports of shortages were transmitted to the Field

Equipment Subdivision, which consulted stock reports from depots and

ordered shipment of the needed equipment. So far as possible, during 1942-

43, the tactical units were completely equipped at their home stations, and

any remaining shortages were supplied by shipment to the port of embarkation from which the unit was scheduled to depart. Occasionally, units left for

overseas stations before their equipment could be furnished; in such instances,

the equipment was shipped to the port and followed the units overseas. These

belated shipments became so numerous, and in so many instances never reached

the troop unit to which they were directed, that in the spring of 1945 a new

procedure was adopted. Thereafter, when the equipment could not reach the

home station by the required date, the unit was so informed and the requisi61 For full discussion of procedures employed in filling requisitions at the New York port, see

footnote 49(2), p. 147.

62 (1) The original source for this paragraph was "Charleston Port of Embarkation, Overseas

Medical Supply," an official record used by Capt. Kiehard E. Tates, MAC, in preparing the first

draft of this chapter. The document has since disappeared, but the practice of sending requisitions

directly to the Surgeon General's Office .is verified by (2) Circular Letter No. 36 [(Supply No. 6),

OTSG, 5 Feb. 1943, subject: Overseas Supply], which officially terminates it.
150 MEDICAL SUPPLY

tions were canceled. The missing items were supplied from port stocks or, if

not available at the port, were issued at the overseas destination.53

Priority System for Medical Supplies

In the meantime, the available organizational equipment was too limited

in quantity to supply all units moving overseas in 1944. To equip the units

scheduled to participate in the European campaign, the Ked List procedure

was initiated in June of that year. It was stipulated that all units on the list

must be fully equipped before overseas movement and that the troops and

their equipment were to be combat loaded. This plan required special procedures by the Supply Service, the medical depots, and the units themselves.

The units on the list were notified early of the pending movement so that local

supply officers could make a final effort to complete their equipment. Shortages

were promptly reported to the Surgeon General's Office, which issued top

priority requisitions to the depots. When time was not available for this direct

shipment, the equipment was sent to the holding and reconsignment point at

Elmira, N.Y., where shortages for each unit were segregated and assembled.

Then, equipment was shipped to the proper port of embarkation and thus

was available when the troops arrived.

In the execution of Eed List procedures, several problems developed. Frequent transfers of units within the Zone of Interior resulted in much crosshauling, lost shipments, and duplicate shipments. The misinterpretation of

directives regarding equipment which should be sent to the home station and

that which should go to Elmira resulted in duplicate shipments and excesses

at Elmira. At length, the holding and reconsignment point became so swamped

with freight that it was impossible, within the time available, to sort and

mark the equipment. This produced numerous shortages, especially in hospital assemblies, that had to be filled from port stocks.

Despite these difficulties, the achievements produced by the Red List procedure were impressive. The list included 100 separate movement orders, directing the overseas movement of approximately 725,000 men and their equipment.

In discharging its supply responsibility, the Medical Department provided

the appropriate organizational equipment for 20 infantry divisions; 8 armored

divisions; 1 airborne division; 42 general hospitals; 14 field hospitals; 22

evacuation hospitals (400-bed) ; 1 evacuation hospital (750-bed); 17 hospital

trains; and 2 medical laboratories.54 3

j

Preshipment of Supplies

In 1943, large quantities of medical items were shipped to the British Isles

in anticipation of heavy troop movements to follow. This preshipment plan

63 (1) See footnote 16(1), p. 127. (2) Memorandum, Maj. R. L. Parker, MAC, to The Historical

Division (attention: Capt. E. E. Yates), 6 Mar. 1946, subject: Supplementary Material on History

of Supply Service Not Previously Covered.

» (1) See footnote 53(2), above. (2) Annual Report, Equipment Branch, Issue Division, Supply Service, OTSG, fiscal year 1945.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 151

was based on the knowledge that the excess shipping space then available

would be transformed into a deficit when the movement of troops reached its

peak. The decision was made, therefore, to take advantage of the available

shipping space and to build up a stock of medical equipment and supplies

which would partially support the large scale campaigns in prospect.

The first shipments under this plan, made in April 1943, contained specific

organizational equipment for the troops plus 45 days of maintenance supplies.

Units included in the preshipment plan returned their organizational equipment to local supply officers. All outstanding requisitions were canceled, and

any subsequent ones were returned without action. The troops carried a minimum of essential equipment, referred to as TAT (To Accompany Troops),

including individual medical kits and Medical Department chests Nos. 1 and

2. The kits proved to be readily available and very practical in providing medical care en route, but the chests, packed in the hold of the ship, were not

accessible to the using organization during the entire trip.

Before the troops left their home stations, the Supply Service studied the

appropriate tables of organization and equipment and calculated the quantities

which would be required for the units. Shipping orders for these quantities

were then sent to the appropriate depots. All shipments of this equipment

moved through the New York and Boston ports: 75 percent through New

York and 25 percent through Boston. The packing cases were marked "ADV"

to identify them as advance supplies and additional markings ("SOXO" and

"GLUE") represented the destination ports in the United Kingdom. Having

arrived in the British Isles, the supplies were conveyed to a designated key

depot and then were transported to a depot near the troop unit's permanent

camp. Poor transportation facilities and pilfering caused the last movement

to be accompanied by considerable losses, and in March 1944, Medical Department units were authorized to move into the key depot and pick up their equipment with their own transportation.

The advantages of preshipment were numerous and important. It allowed

the shipment of supplies in bulk and eliminated the losses and damage experienced when organizational equipment accompanied troops. It permitted the

distribution of critical items within the theater according to the tactical priority of units. And it made possible the modification of equipment in bulk.

There were, however, two distinct disadvantages to the plan. Throughout

the period, troop lifts were subject to frequent amendments, making it difficult

for the Medical Department to plan its shipments. In addition, numerous

changes in tables of organization and equipment lists were made after the

publication of a troop lift and before the movement of troops. This caused

units to requisition new items before the items were available in the theater,

and necessitated the cancellation of requisitions and the augmentation of previously calculated requirements and shipments. This latter disadvantage very

probably is inseparably connected with all supply operations in a lengthy war,

295^53 0—68 12
152 MEDICAL SUPPLY

and can be eliminated only by foregoing the advantages which accrue from

the improvement of equipment lists.55

Shipment of Penicillin and Blood

Throughout the war, special procedures were adopted in the shipment of

medical supplies whenever the tactical situation or the nature of particular

supplies required a departure from routine operations. The bulk of the supplies, of course, moved through ports of embarkation and was conveyed overseas by surface ships; but, from 1943 until the end of the war, two important

medical items—penicillin and whole blood—used facilities of the Air Transport Command for speedy distribution to theaters of operations. Air shipment was rendered necessary by the perishability of the items and by the

pressing needs of overseas installations.

Koutine air priorities were established, the commercial laboratories which

produced penicillin rushed the drug to aerial ports of embarkation, and planes

of the Air Transport Command carried increasing quantities of the item to

American troops on all continents. Penicillin ceased to be an allocated item in

1945, and the quantities shipped depended upon the expressed needs of overseas commands. In addition, surface vessels began to carry a portion of this

cargo late in the war. Despite these changes, however, the distribution of penicillin was never characterized by the routine procedures which were used in

shipping more stable and more plentiful medical supplies.56

Experience gained in the air shipment of penicillin proved to be valuable

in the distribution of whole blood, an even more perishable item. Fortunately,

the need for whole blood, first demonstrated by the North African campaign,

had been anticipated by the Supply Service and most essential items of equipment had already been developed, such as anticoagulant solutions, donor sets,

and recipient sets. The farflung service of the Red Cross, established to procure donations for blood plasma, was available to furnish the type "O" whole

blood whidh was needed at the battlefronts. Using the facilities of the Air

Transport Command, whole-blood shipments to Europe were started on 21

August 1944, within a few days after the request for them was received by

The Surgeon General.

In the beginning, the shipments were not refrigerated for it was assumed

that the relatively high altitudes maintained by the planes would keep the

blood sufficiently cool. The bottles were chilled before and after the blood was

drawn; and, when ready for shipment, they were packed in cardboard boxes

wrapped in heavy paper. It was discovered, however, that refrigeration of the

blood en route was desirable. In the spring of 1945, the Technical Division of

the Surgeon General's Office developed a special shipping container, which consisted of an insulated refrigerator holding a can of wet ice. The refrigerator

weighed 35 pounds empty and 104 pounds when fully packed; it held 24 botK

See footnote 53(2), p. 150.

66 See footnotes 3©(2), p. 140; and 40(2), p. 142.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 153

ties of 600 cc. capacity, a can with 19 pounds of ice, and 24 recipient sets. Temperature of the whole blood was maintained at less than 5° C. during 24 hours

of summer weather. The plan for shipping blood to the Pacific theaters was

similar to the procedures established for Europe, except that it was Navyoperated.57

Editing Requisitions

As the war progressed, the problems of overseas distribution were rendered more acute by the excessively large requisitions transmitted to the ports

of embarkation. Supply officers in the theaters were authorized to maintain

levels of supply sufficient for a designated number of days. The quantity of

each item stocked depended upon the days of supply authorized, the number

of troops in the theater, and the maintenance or replenishment rates. It was

expected that the maintenance factor would be largely based upon issue experience, but the uncertainties of war rendered it necessary that allowance be

made for unexpected and unprecedented needs which only the future could

fully disclose.

The elasticity of this maintenance factor produced requisitions for excessively large quantities of medical supplies; and these requisitions, in turn,

created serious problems in the ports of embarkation and in the Surgeon General's Office. Eequisitions for unusually large quantities were edited by these

agencies, but there was a disposition to be lenient in the editing and thus allow

the theaters to have what they wanted, so far as the availability of the supplies and equipment permitted.58 As an inevitable result, inequities and maldistribution resulted.

By December 1944, Supply Service officers concluded that the policy of

lenient editing must be abandoned. So many large requisitions had been received recently from the Pacific that strict editing would be necessary if other

theaters were to have their minimum needs supplied.59 A large part of this

difficulty apparently was caused by poor stock control procedures in the theaters, the natural tendency to hoard, and by failure to base requisitions upon

issue experience. Continued use of medical maintenance units also perpetuated

the basic error of automatic supply which produced some shortages and great

surpluses.

Extremely large requisitions from the European theater placed a burden

upon ports of embarkation and medical depots. A 90-day stock level for depots, based upon previous issues, was adopted on 1 July 1944. During the 3

months which followed, the Medical Department learned that this stock level

was unequal to the huge quantities of medical supplies used in mechanized

warfare. After beachheads were established on the Normandy coast and requisitions were received for direct shipment to the Continent, it became apparent

BT Medical Department, United States Army. Blood Program in World War II. Washington : U.S.

GoTernment Printing Office, 1964, pp. 206-215.

68 Notes on Supply Service Staff Meeting, 13 Oct. 1944.

«Notes on Supply Service Staff Meeting, 22 Dec. 1944.
154 MEDICAL SUPPLY

that a quantity of many items sufficient to last 90 days before the invasion was

insufficient to meet a single overseas requisition. Stocks at Binghamton, the

port filler depot which served New York, were soon exhausted; and extracts

were rushed to the eastern and central depots in a frantic effort to fill the

requisitions. Despite new procurement and heavy interdepot transfers, the

port filler depot continued to be burdened beyond its capacity until V-E Day,

in May 1945, brought relief.60

The foregoing experience clearly indicated the necessity for accurate,

up-to-date maintenance rates. In April 1945, a special board was established

by the Stock Control Division, Supply Service, to review maintenance issue

experience for the period 1 January 1944 to 31 March 1945, and to compute

maintenance rates on the basis of that experience. Near the end of the war,

therefore, the Medical Department developed and put into use maintenance

rates which reflected its experience in preparing for combat, stockpiling in

theaters, and actual expenditures of supplies and equipment under combat

conditions.61

80 See footnote 36(4), p. 140.

« See footnote 36(4), p. 140.
CHAPTER VI

Medical Supplies Under Lend-Lease

While it was furnishing medical supplies to U.S. Army troops in all parts

of the world, the Medical Department had the additional responsibility of providing for the supply needs of numerous countries actively warring against

the Axis or in a state of friendly neutrality. The Lend-Lease Act, approved

on 11 March 1941, granted authority to sell, exchange, lease, or lend supplies

and equipment to any government whose defense the President deemed vital

to the defense of the United States. Under this authority, medical supplies valued in excess of $140 million were distributed among more than 30 nations. Although these supplies represented only three-tenths of one percent of the value

of all lend-lease shipments, they constituted more than 15 percent of the total

value of Medical Department procurement during the same period.1

Accepting War Department responsibility for the administration of the

Lend-Lease Act, the Secretary of War authorized the establishment of a Defense Aid Division in the Office of the Under Secretary of War to coordinate

War Department activities, to route requests for lend-lease aid to technical

committees for screening and recommendations, and to authorize procurement

and transfer of the supplies and equipment.2The technical committees were

known as Defense Aid Eequirements committees, whose principal function

was the determination of material requirements by type, quantity, and destination. Such committees were established late in April or early in May for

Ordnance, Chemical Warfare, Signal, Engineers, and Quartermaster Corps.

The first medical supplies distributed under lend-lease were procured by the

Treasury, and so a Medical Defense Aid Requirements committee was not set

up until June. On the level above the War Department, responsibility for

administering the act was assigned to the newly-created Division of Defense

Aid Reports, Office for Emergency Management, which was superseded in

October 1941 by OLLA (Office of Lend-Lease Administration).3

To carry out the determinations of the Defense Aid Medical Requirements

Sub-Committee, a Defense Aid subsection, staffed by one officer and four

civilian employees, was established in the Finance and Supply Division, SGO

(the Surgeon General's Office) to procure and transfer all medical supplies

furnished by the War Department under lend-lease.4

1

(1) House Document No. 41, 80th Congress, 1st Session, Twenty-Third Report [of the President] to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations, January 1947. (2) See appendix B, p. 569.

2 Letter, The Adjutant General to the Chiefs of Arms and Services and the Divisions of the War

Department General Staff, 10 Apr. 1941, subject: Procedure Under the Lend-Lease Act.

3

(1) Executive Order No. 8751, 2 May 1941. (2) Executive Order No. 8926, 28 Oct. 1941.

1 This subsection seems to have been established in July or August 1941. Before that time, the

very small lend-lease operations required about 20 percent of the time of one officer. Memorandum,

Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, to Budget Officer for the War Department, 15 July 1941.

155
156 MEDICAL SUPPLY

ROLE OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT IN LEND-LEASE

The first implementation of the Lend-Lease Act by the Medical Department involved the supply of 2,000 standard litters, as directed in a memorandum from the Secretary of War to The Surgeon General on 9 April 1941.

These litters were transferred from regular depot stocks to the United Kingdom for probable retransfer to Yugoslavia, and the cost was to be charged

against the initial lend-lease appropriation. No further demands were made

on the Medical Department until July 1941, when Chinese requisitions. were

received for medical supplies worth $1.2 million during construction of the

Burma-Yunnan Railway (fig. 33). At about the same time, the United Kingdom presented requisitions for field equipment valued at $950,000. These two

requirements put the Surgeon General's Office in "the Lend-Lease business."5

Development of Procedures

During this early period, storage and issue activities for medical lendlease were conducted in depot space provided at Shamokin, Pa., Voorheesville,

NY., and Marietta, Pa. Between July and December 1942, such activities were

centered in the Marietta depot. In the latter month, the Sharonville Engineer

Depot, Ohio, provided space for lend-lease operations. This installation was

succeeded, in August 1943, by the Louisville Medical Depot, Louisville, Ky.,

which continued until the end of the war as the only depot engaged in international aid activities. The many preliminary activities were, of course, conducted by OLLA, by the Defense Air Division of the Office of the Under Secretary of War, and by the Defense Aid Sub-Section, SGO.6

One difficulty, however, was soon apparent. Since a specific allotment of

funds was made to cover each requisition, it was necessary to make numerous

suballotments within the Surgeon General's Office and to extend suballotments

to each participating procurement and receiving depot so that all costs occurring with each requisition could be charged against the specific allotment. In

addition, materials available in regular depot stocks could not be used and subsequently replaced, for the allotments contained a clause declaring that "None

of the funds herein allocated may be used to reimburse appropriations of the

War Department for the value of materials on hand and used for work herein

authorized * * *." It was necessary, also, to maintain the identity of each

requisition throughout all stages of procurement, storage, and transfer. On

procurement operations alone, this entailed placing as many contracts for the

same item as there were requisitions calling for that item. Thus, quantities of

an item could not be "lumped" for the efficiency and economy of bulk purchasing. In storage operations, this requirement made it necessary that depot employees segregate, on the basis of requisitions, all supplies received for defense

6

(1) Memorandum, The Secretary of War to The Surgeon General, 9 Apr. 1941, subject: Transfer of Defense Articles to the United Kingdom (Lend-Lease Act). (2) Unless otherwise noted, the

material in the remainder of this chapter is based on the following April 1946 report: Wilson, E. E.:

History of Medical Department Lend-Lease Activities. [Official record.]

(1) Annual Report, Finance and Supply Services, OTSG, 1942. (2) See appendix B, p. 569.
LEND-LEASE 157

FIGURE 33.—Lend-lease medical supplies destined for China are unloaded from

an American freighter at Calcutta, India, 1944.
158 MEDICAL SUPPLY

aid. Aspirin tablets procured to alleviate headaches in the United Kingdom

could not mingle with aspirin tablets purchased to achieve the same end iii

Eussia, lest funds allocated to relieve the suffering of an English soldier should

be accidentally diverted to the soothing of migraine beyond the Volga.

Another cumbersome feature of early operating, procedure was the type

of records it was necessary to establish and maintain, based upon those from

defense aid depots, to comply with accounting requirements and to prepare

the 14 reports prescribed by the Office for Emergency Management. These reports dealt with distribution of appropriations, allotments, and expenditures;

analysis of expenditures; schedule of obligations; statement of defense articles

transferred; property, rights, and privileges received from foreign governments ; and related matters. The authority requiring these reports, apparently,

had not contemplated or recognized the tremendous variety of medical items

sooner or later to become involved in lend-lease operations.

Although current information was compiled on International Business

Machines, preparation of the required reports became complex and time-consuming as the volume of individual requisitions grew, and quantities of individual items became so large that it was necessary to place several contracts to

procure the full quantity. Moreover, since a given item appeared on many

requisitions undergoing action simultaneously, extensive analysis was required

to supply information on total quantities of that item or groups of related

items involved in lend-lease activities at a stated time. To speed the compilation of these reports, a supplementary record was established, the material for

which was accumulated by item rather than by requisition. By fall 1942, when

it became possible to discontinue this record, approximately 12 full-size file

drawers of 12- by 16-inch cards had been accumulated.

Only two countries, the United Kingdom and China, received aid in the

form of medical supplies during 1941, and the dollar value of those transferred

was small, amounting to only $276,000.7

The entry of the United States into the war had no immediate effect upon

lend-lease operations, except that shipments were suspended briefly. This suspension lasted only 2 days for nonstandard items and 4 days for standard

items. The first few months of 1942 produced no major changes in procedure;

but, as the volume of transfers increased, the methods used to present and

establish requirements were elaborated.

Wartime Changes

Lend-lease beneficiary governments, at the beginning of each year, submitted to the Defense Aid Sub-Division, SGO, through the International Division, ASF (Army Service Forces), estimates of total requirements for the

forthcoming calendar year; and, from time to time, they filed specifically

numbered "spot requisitions" for requirements which were unforeseen and

therefore not included in the yearly programs. Both types of requirements

' See appendix B, p. 569.
LEND-LEASE 159

were first subjected to a process of "coordination," which involved the identification of each item by reference to the Medical Supply catalog, International

Aid nonstandard catalog, and other lists of medical supplies and equipment.

After this coordination, the yearly programs were forwarded to the Eequirements Division, SGO, for incorporation into the Army Supply Program. Although specific War Production Board clearance on the yearly programs was

not required, representatives of that agency were frequently consulted for advice as to availability.

Spot requisitions were subjected to a detailed analysis upon receipt to

determine the cost, the delivery schedule, and the exact quantities of critical

raw materials required. The Medical Sub-Committee of the International Supply Committee discussed the requisitions and made its recommendations to

the parent committee. When a requisition was thus approved, the International

Division, ASF, forwarded to the Medical Department the authority to procure

and transfer the medical supplies and equipment. Purchase authorizations

were then prepared and sent to the appropriate procurement office, which made

contracts for the required supplies. Deliveries from the contractors were made

to the defense aid depot and, there, were warehoused by requisition numbers so

that the identity of materials procured against each requisition could be maintained throughout the successive stages of procurement, storage, and issue.

When all the material for a given requisition had been delivered, or a sufficient

portion thereof to warrant a shipment, the depot notified the Surgeon General's Office, and, upon receipt of the shipping instructions requested from the

foreign government, the depot was directed to proceed with the shipment.8

During the spring of 1942, because of the increasing volume and urgency

of lend-lease requirements, efforts were begun to simplify procedures throughout the War Department. One notable result was a gradual liberalization of

accounting requirements. The specific fund allocation, which required the

segregation of requisitions, was eliminated; in its place, Master Procurement

Authorities were substituted which were applicable to the requirements of all

foreign governments approved at one time. Eesidues of previous fund allotments were converted into Undistributed Allocation Balance and applied to

new defense aid needs. Use of surplus Army stocks was permitted, and provision was made to reimburse War Department funds. In addition, the Medical

Department was authorized to include lend-lease requirements in its budget

estimates, thus permitting the economic and efficient lumping and scheduling

of procurement.

As the year 1942 progressed, the Medical Department was presented with

spot requisitions involving large quantities of urgently needed supplies, but

it was receiving few long-range programs from foreign governments on which

to plan and procure against future needs. In the meantime, the Burma Koad

had fallen, and transport into the interior of China was at a virtual standstill. As a result, supplies procured for the Chinese account were "backing up"

8

In 1942, the International Supply Committee superseded the Defense Aid Requirements

committees.
160 MEDICAL SUPPLY

in the defense aid depot to such an extent that warehousing by individual

requisitions became physically impossible. At this point, authority was obtained to adopt more feasible methods of procedure.

In August 1942, the International Division, SGO, successor to the Defense

Aid Sub-Division, recommended to the International Division, ASF, a new

procedure for lend-lease medical operations. The Medical Department desired

authority to establish a large stockpile of miscellaneous medical supplies, upon

which it could draw in filling the spot requisitions of foreign governments.

The proposal was approved in September 1942, and the procurement of approximately $60 million worth of medical supplies was promptly initiated. In

compiling a list of materials for this stockpile, Medical Department officers

were guided by requisitions previously received from foreign governments and

by qualified technical opinion as to what would be required in the future.9In

addition to new procurement, all materials previously procured against individual requisitions, but not yet shipped, were consolidated and placed in the

unobligated stockpile, withdrawals from which were effected only by assignments receiving the approval of the Munitions Assignment Committee

(Ground). This new procedure produced an important change in procurement

procedure. In the future, it became possible to accumulate requisitions and to

negotiate bulk contracts for the total quantities of all items needed. The new

stockpile, moreover, introduced a large measure of flexibility into all Medical

Department supply operations, for numerous urgent and unforeseen needs of

U.S. troops were met by drawing upon this accumulation of supplies.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEND-LEASE REQUIREMENTS

As early as the fall of 1942, efforts were made to distinguish between

civilian and military lend-lease requirements. From the inception of the program, all requests for medical supplies had been accepted for action by the

"War Department and treated as military requirements, without regard to the

eventual military or civilian use. This permitted the application of military

priority ratings to the procurement of materials for civilian use abroad, while

civilian needs in the United States received a much lower priority. After

lengthy discussions between the War Department and OLLA, the latter issued

an order directing that, after 1 January 1943, the two types of requirements

be distinguished and treated separately. To implement this directive, the

International Division, SGO, supplied figures on all unfilled requirements

for medical supplies (except British requirements) and also reported stocks

on hand and quantities due in from outstanding contracts.

9 One of the supply officers later declared that the list was based on "sheer guess as to what

was likely to be called for in the future." Such uninhibited frankness in official reports is rare enough

to merit serious and thoughtful consideration. In the present instance, however, it appears that an

excess of candor has performed a disservice to truth. Possessing more than a year's experience in

supplying the needs of foreign governments, defense aid officers could base their estimates on something far more substantial than guesses. See memorandum, Lt. Col. F. C. Little, MAC, Director,

International Division, to Administrative Assistant to the Chief, Supply Service, 28 July 1945,

subject: Request for Specific Instances of Surplus.
LEND-LEASE 161

In the meantime, the foreign governments filed all new requirements for

calendar year 1943 with OLLA, through the International Division, ASF, and

all requirements thus filed were separated into civilian and military categories.

OLLA considered as 100 percent military all unfilled 1942 requirements and

the 1943 requirements for Russia, China, Latin American nations, and the

British forces in the field. Other British programs, as submitted by various

parts of the Empire, were divided on a percentage basis. All other requirements were classified as 100 percent civilian. Stocks on hand and quantities

due in from procurement were to be applied first against military requirements, with the residues to be used to satisfy civilian requirements. This

comprehensive statement of requirements and assets, known as the "OLLA

Control Books," was finally presented to the International Division, SGO, in

March 1943. A detailed review of these books revealed some 1943 programs

had not been carefully screened and that quantities obviously designed for

civilian use were included as military requirements. In addition, procurement

authorizations, so frequently departed from programed requirements, were

forwarded at such sporadic intervals and were amended so often that, by

summer 1943, not more than 25 percent of that year's requirements for medical supplies had been placed under contract. Had it not been for the stockpile

authorized during the previous year, only a thin trickle of lend-lease medical

supplies could have been shipped during 1943.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs provoked renewed discussions between

the War Department and OLLA, and culminated in a new agreement, defining

in detail the functions and responsibilities of the various lend-lease agencies.10

In effect, OLLA was eliminated from the processing of military requirements.

Its responsibility was confined to presenting civilian requirements and ordering shipment of the supplies as they became available. The International Division, SGO, was to procure military requirements and maintain any records

needed to exercise this control. This change produced a distinct improvement,

but important difficulties still remained. OLLA continued to issue procurement

authorizations sporadically and, in some instances, for only a small part of

the total civilian requirements for which approved programs had been received. The Inventory Control Branch had to deduct lend-lease civilian requirements which came up in a "buy position" under the automatic stock control procedures in effect. This cumbersome extra step was eliminated in November 1943, when the Surgeon General's Office received from the International Division, ASF, a "blanket" procurement authorization applicable to

all programed civilian requirements not previously authorized for procurement.11

In the meantime, the OLLA Control Books had become obsolete, and a

strong need was felt for a reliable and current record of total lend-lease re10 Procedure for Handling Lend-Lease Medical Supplies, 11 Aug. 1943. [Official record.]

11 Memorandum, Col. George Olmsted, GSC, Chief, Requirements and Assignment Branch, International Division, to Office of The Surgeon General (attention: Lt. Col. [Charles] Garside), OTSG,

23 NOT. 1943, subject: Lend-Lease Civilian Requirements for 1943 and 1944.
162 MEDICAL SUPPLY

quirements. Accordingly, all known requirements, including spot requisitions

and yearly programs, were submitted to the Machine Records Branch, SGO,

for tabulation. The result was a consolidated listing by item, divided into 1943

and 1944 requirements, subdivided into military and civilian accounts, and

coded to indicate the unfilled requirements for each item by each foreign government. This listing was then subjected to a comprehensive and detailed review by OLLA, by the International Division, ASF, and by the British Ministry of Supply Mission to eliminate any unjustified requirements. By fall

1943, the electric accounting machine listing had been thoroughly screened;

and, with subsequent additions, it provided a reliable guide to lend-lease requirements during the remainder of the war.

REORGANIZATION AND REALINEMENT OF

RESPONSIBILITIES

During 1943, a general reorganization of the Supply Service, SGO, eliminated duplication of functions pertaining to lend-lease and realined the International Division in its relationship with other divisions and branches.

Procedure relating to lend-lease procurement was developed in May 1943.

Foreign government spot requisitions were received, analyzed, and processed

by the Coordination and Analysis Branch, with assistance of the Distribution

and Procurement Divisions. Availability of critical raw material and the effect

on the Army Supply Program were determined by the Production Scheduling

Branch of the Materiel Office, ASF. After coordination with the Distribution

Division regarding the availability of surplus stock, purchase requisitions

were prepared by the Procurement Division, and issue requisitions were prepared by the Distribution Division.

Electric accounting machines installed in the medical lend-lease depot

eliminated the necessity for sending copies of receiving reports from the lendlease depot to the International Division for maintaining stock records.

As the procurement districts assumed responsibility for compiling statistics for the monthly progress reports, the International Division was able to

eliminate processing of procurement authorizations to the Machine Records

Section as well as copies of contracts.

Responsibility for preparation of fiscal reports (DDA Forms) was transferred to the Fiscal Division, and preparation of notices of availability pertaining to shipping instructions and maintaining liaison with foreign government shipping agencies were decentralized to the lend-lease depot.12

By fall 1943, the Supply Service had formulated and adopted a new system of inventory control which was extended to apply to all lend-lease requirements. Under this routine, total lend-lease requirements for a 6-month period

were reflected in the monthly Delivery Needs report. Where indicated, the

u

Supply Service Memorandum No. 30, 18 May 1943, subject: Procedure Relating to Lend-Lease

Procurement.
LEND-LEASE 163

Inventory Control Branch initiated interdepot transfers into segregated military and civilian stock accounts in the lend-lease medical depot. Also, new

procurement was initiated in the event of an overall stock shortage against

total requirements.

Efficient operation of this system apparently was incompatible with

OLLA's practice of issuing procurement authorizations sporadically and in

some instances, for only partial quantities of total programed requirements.

For a time, therefore, the Inventory Control Branch had to make special provision for the deduction of any lend-lease civilian requirements which came

up in a "buy" position under the otherwise automatic procedures in effect.

Since lend-lease civilian requirements involved the entire range of items procured by the Medical Department, this cumbersome extra step imposed a real

burden on the International Division and on the procurement offices because

special procurement authorization had to be initiated for the nonstandard civilian requirements.

The situation was corrected in part in December 1943, with a "blanket"

procurement authorization applicable to all programed civilian requirements

not previously authorized for procurement. This blanket authorization was

issued by the International Division, ASF,13 upon authorization in turn from

FEA (Foreign Economic Administration), which superseded OLLA in September 1943.

Two problems in civilian lend-lease procurement still remained to be corrected. The first of these involved the fact that numerous civilian requirements

for items previously allocated under the bid system, and items in short supply,

had been authorized for procurement under the blanket authorization which,

as it developed, had never been cleared through the War Production Board.

Thus, the Army Medical Purchasing Office often was unable to place contracts for full quantities of certain items programed by FEA and, more seriously, in some instances was criticized and held accountable by the War Production Board for exceeding War Department allocations. No satisfactory

solution to this problem was ever reached through discussion or agreement

with FEA.

The second problem remaining to be corrected involved accountability

for materials procured and delivered against requirements presented, but subsequently canceled, by FEA. This occurred frequently and introduced surpluses. Therefore, the "Procedure for Handling Lend-Lease Medical Supplies,"

dated 11 August 1943, was amended on 29 March 1944. Following this amendment, an allotment of FEA funds to the War Department for $68.5 million

was effected to cover the entire civilian lend-lease program. Funds were made

available to The Surgeon General for reimbursement on shipments made for

the FEA account. Such other expenses or losses as might be incurred in the

handling of procurement, storage, and issue on their behalf, including overshipments, were adjusted periodically against the allotment.

13 See footnote 11, p. 161.
164 MEDICAL SUPPLY

These many changes and developments gradually formed an operating

procedure, within the framework of which the obligations of medical lendlease could be discharged. By spring 1944, this procedure had been so developed that only minor changes were made during the remainder of the war.

The first important duty of the Analysis Branch of the International Division, SGO, was the identification of items requested, the insertion of proper

nomenclature and stock number, and the recommendation of substitutes. After

this preliminary "screening," the lists were returned to the foreign governments, which then submitted them to the International Division, ASF, as

formal programs. Draft requisitions were returned directly to the International Division, ASF, for submission as formal requisitions.

Formal programs and requisitions were screened against "excesses chargeable to Lend-Lease governments" and, if appropriate excesses were not found,

were submitted to the Inventory Control Branch, SGO, to determine which

items would require new procurement. Items requiring procurement were submitted to the Production Division, ASF, to ascertain the availability of the

quantities requested and to provide for allocation if necessary. After total

costs were computed and the quantities of controlled materials estimated, the

programs and requisitions were returned to the International Division, ASF,

with recommendations as to the procurability and suitability of the items requested. When approved by the International Division, ASF, the quantities

were added to the Army Supply Program and thus were authorized for

purchase.

The final important duty of the Analysis Branch was the maintenance of

the International Eequirements Record. Compiled monthly by the Machine

Records Branch, this record provided current information on gross requirements approved within the calendar year, by item and country, together with

cumulative assignments made against these requirements. In addition, it

showed a net balance due and the stocks on hand in the lend-lease military and

lend-lease civilian accounts. It furnished currently adjusted lend-lease requirements to the Stock Control Division for inclusion in the Consolidated

Stock Report and the Army Supply Program; and it afforded a simplified

means for recording requested reductions in requirements.

The first duty of the Assignments Branch was registry of requisitions

and programs to identify them in the process of assignment and shipment. An

SGO shipping order number was given to each new requisition or program,

and the number thus given became the permanent file reference for the

requirement.

This branch also determined and presented bids for available stock before

the medical subcommittee of the Munitions Assignment Committee (Ground).

A monthly military International Requirements Record was compiled, which

showed the bids of each beneficiary government. At the subcommittee meeting,

these bids were routinely approved when stock was available to satisfy all

claimants; but, when the supplies were inadequate to meet all unfilled require-
LEND-LEASE 165

ments, the subcommittee allocated the available stock on the basis of urgency of

need. A copy of the International Kequirements Record was transmitted to

the Munitions Assignment Committee (Ground), which authorized the transfer of the supplies to the foreign governments.

The Assignments Branch then prepared the necessary shipping orders,

posted them to sequence records for permanent cross-reference, and transmitted

them to the appropriate depots for action. At every stage of the shipping process, the Assignments Branch received information on the shipments and maintained comprehensive records on them. It was possible, therefore, to respond

to inquiries from beneficiary governments without frequent reference to depots

and ports.

The foregoing procedure was confined to military lend-lease shipments.

The Medical Department had ceased to have any responsibility for civilian

lend-lease, except to act as a purchasing agent for FEA. Early in 1944, it

became apparent that even this limited responsibility was interfering with

duties which were more closely related to the winning of the war. The Foreign

Economic Administration had presented to the Medical Department a program involving the purchase of $66 million worth of medical supplies, which

were pouring into the depots from contractors' plants with little likelihood

that the bulk of it would move out before the end of the war. There was, moreover, reason to believe that relief requirements would grow with the passage

of time, that they would continue beyond the war period and would burden

the Military Establishment while it was undergoing demobilization. The War

Department proposed, therefore, that all responsibility for the procurement,

storage, and issue of medical supplies programed by FEA be transferred from

The Surgeon General to appropriate civilian agencies not later than 31 December 1944. The general terms of this proposal were promptly accepted by

FEA, with reservations as to the time limit, and representatives were named

by the agencies involved to formulate plans for the transfer." Protracted delays by FEA then ensued, which were finally ended in the fall of 1944. At

that time, the War Department forced the issue by announcing that additional

civilian requirements necessitating new procurement would not be accepted,

and proposing to release one of its medical depots to FEA.

Negotiations were begun promptly, and basic agreements were soon

reached. Commencing on 15 October 1944, the shipment of all medical supplies

programed by FEA for civilian rehabilitation would be called forward

through the Procurement Division, U.S. Treasury Department. Shipments to

actual participants in the civilian lend-lease program would be handled, as in

the past, on FEA shipping orders. New civilian requirements of any type

would be referred to the Treasury Department for procurement although the

War Department would screen the requirements and would accept any portion

" (1) Letter, Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, GSC, Director of Materiel, ASF, to the Hon. Leo [T.]

Crowley, Foreign Economic Administration, 11 Mar. 1944. (2) Letter, Mr. Leo T. Crowley, Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration, to Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, 23 Mar. 1944.
166 MEDICAL SUPPLY

that could be filled from excess stocks. The Medical Department would release

a suitable depot, complete with equipment and civilian operating personnel, to

the Treasury Department as operating agent for FEA.

PROBLEMS OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION

After extensive negotiations, the Toledo Medical Depot, Toledo, Ohio,

was declared surplus and was transferred to the Treasury Department, effective on 1 May 1945.15 During the interim from November 1944 to May 1945,

the Medical Department continued to operate the depot, but Treasury Department representatives were assigned to participate in its administration, pending the actual transfer of accountability and title. An extensive assembly program for civilian rehabilitation was continued at Toledo until the end of December 1944. Since the depot was to be transferred to the Treasury Department

in May 1945, it became necessary to clear Medical Department stocks from

the warehouse areas and to replace them with FEA stocks then in the Louisville Medical Depot. This transfer was first estimated to involve the movement

of 1,200 to 1,500 carloads, but a "paper transfer" of stocks greatly reduced the

size of the contemplated movement. FEA supplies at Louisville were credited

to the Army or military lend-lease accounts while Medical Department supplies at Toledo were transferred to Treasury Department accountability. After

these paper transfers were made, the movement of only 800 carloads of supplies completed the transfer and relieved the Medical Department of all responsibility for civilian lend-lease just a few days before the end of hostilities

in. Europe.16

The administration of lend-lease was a "war baby" without antecedents

and, so far as anyone could tell, without hope of posterity. It was born and

grew to maturity within the short space of 4 years. For the expansion of the

Army and the waging of a war beyond the seas, precedent and experience

offered some guide. But lend-lease was without precedent. It was constructed

by inexperienced hands to meet pressing and changing needs. The result was

an almost continuous establishment, revision, rescission, and reestablishment

of offices and policies, in and out of the War Department, which appeared

frivolously inconsistent to those at the lower operating levels.

Excessive Foreign Requirements

There is reason to believe that some countries looked upon medical lendlease as a grab-bag filled with gifts for the needy. In the early days before any

distinction between military and civilian requirements was recognized, all lendlease materials were procured under a military priority. This created in beneficiary governments a strong temptation to fill civilian needs which were uni5 Army Service Forces Circular No. 164, section VI, Installation, 8 May 1945.

16 It should be noted, however, that a large quantity of supplies was held at Louisville to maintain an uninterrupted flow of civilian lend-lease shipments. FEA had given assurances that these

supplies would be "called forward" before 31 December 1944, but as late as September 1945, approximately 500 tons still remained in the FEA stock account at Louisville.
LEND-LEASE 167

JV'.-

FIGURE 34.—Planes at Gali Morgheh Airport, Tehran, Iran, used for air shipment of

supplies and equipment from the United States to Russia, 11 April 1944.

connected with military operations. Even after the division of military and

civilian requirements, occasional abuses occurred which left the impression

that the United States was looked upon as a lush source of material wealth.

For example, the U.S.S.R. continued throughout the war to enjoy a 100 percent

military classification on all her requirements, receiving tremendous quantities

of many items which were designed primarily for civilian use (fig. 34). Objections by the International Division were promptly overridden by higher

authority. During 1943, Australia was allowed to classify her artificial teeth

requirements as 100 percent military. She asked for, and received, a quantity

in excess of total U.S. Army issues for that year. When it is considered that

the total population of Australia was somewhat smaller than the U.S. Army,

it is probable that the 1943 shipments amply supplied the Australian forces

with artificial teeth. However, that country promptly submitted another requisition for the following year's needs, which were estimated at 75 percent of

the quantity received in 1943. The second requisition was disapproved on the

recommendation of the International Division, SGO.17 The British had a 100

percent military classification for all requirements of X-ray equipment until

late in 1944 on the strength of the argument that their distribution system

did not permit segregation for military and civilian use. Since much of this

equipment was of an elaborate type not essential for military use, the International Division interposed vigorous objections and was finally able, in July

1944, to distinguish civilian from military requirements. At this time, the

American X-ray industry had on its books domestic civilian orders 16 months

17 Memorandum, Lt. Col. Charles Garside, Director, International Division, OTSG, to Director,

International Division, ASF (attention: Col. George Olmsted, GSC), 8 Dec. 1943, subject: "Adjustments" in UK Programs.

295-453 O—6S- -13
168 MEDICAL SUPPLY

old and commercial export orders antedating Pearl Harbor, while British

civilians were enjoying an AA-1 military priority for their X-ray needs.

In seeking to obtain lend-lease medical supplies in excess of military requirements, the Republic of Ecuador proved that small nations can nourish

large hopes. That country presented a 1943 military program requiring medical supplies and equipment for 50 infantry and 20 cavalry divisions. This

ambitious program was disapproved, and plans were made to provide a quantity of medical supplies more directly related to the size of Ecuador's Army—

five divisions.18

Differences in Terminology

Another major problem in early lend-lease operations resulted from wide

variations in medical practices, customs, and terminology throughout the

world. The identification of some items required by the beneficiary governments was extremely difficult because of language barriers, inadequate specifications, and inability of representatives of foreign governments to discuss

and agree upon technical interpretations of stated requirements. This was

especially troublesome in screening Russian requirements; the Soviet Mission

usually insisted upon materials being furnished exactly as requested although

the technical description of the desired item was meaningless to American

officers and the Russian officials were unable to furnish clarification (fig. 35).

When additional information was received which suggested the advisability

of substitutes, the Soviet Mission was reluctant to approve the changes. During the last 18 months of lend-lease operations, several competent Russian physicians were assigned to the Soviet Mission. This change produced a distinct

improvement although relations were far from perfect at the war's end.

After the items were identified, other difficulties which were related to

the variety of medical practices, developed. There were requirements for large

quantities of medicines and equipment which were difficult to procure, either

because such supplies were obsolete in the United States or because they had

never been produced and used in great volume. Very little calomel was used

by American troops, but tremendous quantities were procured and shipped to

foreign governments. Although widely used in the United States, insulin was

employed in far greater quantities abroad. In X-ray equipment, the same problem was encountered. On one occasion, the Russian Government requested

3,000 X-ray tubes of a type which had not been manufactured in the United

States for 25 years. Since it was obviously impractical to tool up a factory to

18 Memorandum, Lt. Col. Charles Garside, Director, International Division, OTSG, to Director,

International Division, ASF (attention: Col. George Olmsted, GSC), 30 Sept. 1943, subject: Ecuador

1943 Military Program. In discussing the abuses of medical lend-lease, the author has been aware

that the maintenance of civilian health and well-being is related to military operations and that it is

sometimes difficult to distinguish between military and civilian use. But even after the fullest allowances are made, it is apparent that large quantities of lend-lease medical supplies were diverted to

uses which were only faintly connected with military operations.
LEND-LEASE 169

FIGURE 35.—U.S. ship lined up at Khorramshahr docks in the Persian Gulf Command ready to discharge supplies and equipment. Although such convoys carried supplies

for U.S. forces in the command, the bulk of cargo was lend-lease material for Russia.

produce these obsolete tubes, a new type was shipped which, it was thought,

could be used in the Russian machines.19

In the Medical Department supply catalog, approximately 7,000 standard

items were listed, but even this collection of medical supplies and equipment

was inadequate to cover the needs of lend-lease governments. It became necessary to compile an "International Aid Non-standard Catalog," consisting of

items employed for medical purposes but not standard with, and not used by,

the Medical Department.

The whole problem was pointedly summarized by Lt. Col. Francis C.

Tyng, MC, in October 1942. "After all," he wrote to Brig. Gen. Paul E. Hawley, "the United States is the last remaining bastion of medical supply and it

must supply all the Allies in the world, but it cannot continue to fill the unconscionable demands of the Allies and at the same time leave anything for

19 Address, Brig. Gen. Edward Reynolds to Medical Department officers assembled at Walter Reed

General Hospital, 19 Sept. 1945, subject: Medical Supply Problems of World War II. [Official record.]
170 MEDICAL SUPPLY

our own armed forces, to say nothing of our civilians. You can easily see that

we are heading into a catastrophic situation." 20

OTHER RELIEF ACTIVITIES

In addition to the administration of lend-lease medical supply activities,

the International Aid Division also handled medical supply activities for the

Eussian War Eelief Society and for the American Red Cross. In August 1944,

the latter function was transferred to the Liaison Branch, Purchases Division.

Activities on behalf of Russian War Relief and the American Red Cross

involved accounting of special funds provided for the purpose, with the consequent necessity of maintaining the identity of separate requisitions throughout the stages of procurement, storage, and issue. Medical supplies in the common lend-lease stockpile were not authorized to fill these two agencies' requirements. Use of Army stocks excess to current requirements, however, was provided ; specifically, requisitions in these categories were forwarded through the

Liaison Branch to the Stock Control Division for stock transfers or procurement

as necessary. Reimbursement from funds allocated to the War Department

(for Red Cross shipments) or from funds on special deposit with the War

Department Finance Officer (for Russian War Relief shipments) was obtained

by the Fiscal Division, SGO, on the basis of actual shipping documents.

»Letter, Lt. Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, to Brig. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, 18 Oct. 1942.
Part II

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN THE WAR AGAINST

THE EUROPEAN AXIS
CHAPTER VII

Outposts and Supply Routes

By the time the United States entered World "War II, specific theaters of

operations, commands, and lines of communication already had been established in the interest of national defense, and to implement the program of

aid to Britain (map 1). From the point of view of medical supply, these commands came at an inopportune time because their activation, coinciding as it

did with the mushrooming of military installations in the United States,

widened the gap between availability and requirements for both personnel and

materiel.

NORTH ATLANTIC BASES

In September 1940, the United States obtained base sites at several British

possessions in the Atlantic (map 2) and Caribbean areas. Although the LendLease Act was not signed until 27 March 1941, U.S. troops began occupying

these bases in January of that year.1 Medical service for the arriving troops

was initially under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers, who was also

responsible for the health of civilian construction workers. Preliminary surveys to determine medical needs were made under the direction of Col. (later

Brig. Gen.) Leon A. Fox, MC.

Newfoundland Base Command

The station hospital, Newfoundland Base Command, was activated on

15 January 1941, aboard U.S. Army Transport Edmund B. Alexander. Before

sailing from the Brooklyn Port of Embarkation, medical supplies were carefully examined, segregated from nonmedical supplies, and made readily accessible for use upon arrival in Newfoundland.2

Shortly after arrival of the transport at the port of St. John's on 29 January 1941, it was discovered that no

cassettes for chest X-rays were available. This situation was quickly remedied

by the loan of two such cassettes from health authorities of St. John's.

When the USAT Edmund B. Alexander, which had been serving as the

station hospital, Newfoundland Base Command, was ordered back to its base

in Brooklyn, N.Y., it became necessary to find temporary accommodations un1

(1) Conn, Stetson, and Fairchild, Byron : The Framework of Hemisphere Defense. United States

Army in World War II. The Western Hemisphere. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office,

1960, pp. 51-62. (2) Wlltse, Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical Service In the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965, p. 9.

2This section, unless otherwise stated, is based on the following documents: (1) Annual Keport,

Station Hospital, Newfoundland Base Command, 1941. (2) Annual Keport, Newfoundland Base Command, Part II: Fort Pepperrell, 1942. (3) Annual Reports, 308th Station Hospital, 1943 and 1944.

173
174 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 175

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176 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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MAP. 2.—Medical supply installations in Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland.

til a permanent hospital could be erected. Accordingly, a large country estate,

Northbank, was rented and remodeled to serve as a temporary hospital.

The assembly for a 50-bed hospital, which had arrived before the move

to Northbank, remained stacked high on the pier at St. John's because of lack

of storage space. Some remodeling of the estate was accomplished by construction of a temporary 25-bed ward, and by 5 June 1941, the station hospital,

Newfoundland Base Command, had completed its move into the Northbank

estate. Supplies were stored in outhouses and other temporary storage spaces.

The hospital moved in December to newly completed barracks at Fort Pepperrell, where it remained until its own building was ready in June 1943. It had

been redesignated the 308th Station Hospital in April of that year.

The medical supply unit of the 308th Station Hospital was established as

the medical supply depot for the entire Newfoundland Base Command, and

eventually supplied four hospitals totaling 450 beds. This supply operation con-
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 177

" — «43'?-,.

FIGURE 36.—Panoramic view of Fort Pepperrell, Newfoundland, across Quidi Vidi Lake,

April 1942.

tinued in a dual capacity until 12 August 1942, when it was separated from the

hospital and designated the Medical Supply Office, Newfoundland Base Command. This office, which had the function of coordinating the medical supply

activities for the entire base command as well as furnishing medical supplies

for the station hospital at Fort Pepperrell, was organized into an administrative

section, a receiving section, and an issue and shipping section. The inadequate

storage facilities at Northbank were replaced in December 1942 with better

facilities located at Fort Pepperrell (fig. 36) in the basement of the detachment

barracks in the new hospital, and in a permanent warehouse.

Although medical supplies were adequate for most of the Newfoundland

Base Command, the system of automatic supply in some instances produced

more or less than enough. For example, the surgeon of the station hospital,

Newfoundland Air Base (Gander Field), reported overstocking of drug items.

On the other hand, shortages soon developed in such vital supplies as utensil

sterilizers, water sterilizers, distillation apparatus, and field X-ray equipment,

none of which were on automatic supply.3

Because it was originally planned to use Eskimo dogs in tactical training

in Newfoundland, great quantities of veterinary supplies and equipment were

received and suddenly became surplus when the project was abandoned. The

excess supplies were eventually returned to the Zone of Interior when it was

realized that they would not be used and were occupying needed storage space.

Base medical supply levels were set at 75 days maximum, plus order and

shipping time of 75 days, and levels for each of the other three posts within

3 Annual Report, Station Hospital, Newfoundland Air Base, 1942.
178 MEDICAL SUPPLY

the command were 40 days maximum, plus the 75 days' shipping time. Most

excesses which had accumulated in the command were occasioned by automatic

supply of medical maintenance units, which system was not displaced by requisitioning until 1 December 1943. The ill effects of automatic supply were compounded by the fact that medical maintenance units were designed for combat

operations and contained quantities of items that far exceeded the needs of

the command. Excesses were periodically reported and consolidated for return

to the Zone of Interior.

Initially, all medical supplies were received and distributed by the base

medical supply depot, but this was changed later when all requisitions were

filled to the extent of available stocks by the depot, and remaining items were

extracted to the Boston Port of Embarkation for direct shipment to requisitioning units. The command considered this the most practical method of

supply as it eliminated double handling and overstocking. Obversely, the "War

Department viewed the method as fostering overstockage, particularly at outlying stations, and precluding central control. The command was directed to

revise its goals. The new system, inaugurated on 1 January 1945, resulted in

requisitions to the port sufficing for stockage of the base depot and for issue

to using units.

The command resisted the change to a centralized requisitioning system

because it had been able to curtail its medical supply activity to a greater degree than the reduced command strength indicated, dropping from 13 civilian

employees in January 1944 to 0 by December of that year when the base depot

was inactivated. Moreover, the military personnel assigned to supply had been

released, and a substantial portion of the medical warehouse space had been

closed out. With the inauguration of central requisitioning, it was necessary

to revise the curtailment of supply operations despite the progress that had

been made in reduction of forces.

Bermuda Base Command

Contrasted to the bleakness and cold climate of the Newfoundland Base

Command, the Bermuda Base Command, located in a more temperate area,

also served as a link in overseas communication and as a defensive post for the

hemisphere. Established in April 1941, the Bermuda Base Command experienced problems of supply because of its crowded facilities. Medical supplies

were stored in two rooms on the ground floor of the 221st Station Hospital,

which occupied the Castle Harbour Hotel.4

In May 1943, the hospital was transferred to a partially completed building at Fort Bell (fig. 37), and supply facilities, similar to those in the previous

location, were established.

J

This section Is based on the Annual Reports of Bermuda Base Command for 1941, 1943,

and 1945.
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 179

FIGURE 37.—U.S. Army Hospital, Fort Bell, St. David Island, the storage facility for

medical supplies in Bermuda.

During 1944, 24 long tons of excess medical supplies were returned to the

States. Air-conditioning units were installed in operating rooms, X-ray rooms,

and in one recovery room.

The common complaint of the Bermuda Base Command concerning medical supply was that intervals between freight transports prevented prompt

filling of their requisitions made to the New York Port of Embarkation. However, as with the other bases and stations servicing the various air routes of

communication, emergency medical requirements, supplies, and patients were

air delivered to their destination rapidly.

Eastern and Central Canada

Bases located in eastern and central Canada were important links in the

North Atlantic Ferry Eoute. Traffic over this route reached a peak in 1944,

when 8,641 aircraft were ferried to Europe.5 Medical facilities in eastern and

central Canada ranged from dispensaries at tiny weather stations, such as

6 Dziuban, Stanley W.: Military Relations Between the united States and Canada, 1939-1945.

United States Army in World War II. Special Studies. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office,

1959, p. 191.
180 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Southampton Island, Padloping Island, and Kiver Clyde, to station hospitals

at the key ferrying points of The Pas, Fort Churchill, Frobisher Bay, and

Goose Bay.

Because of the extreme isolation of most posts in eastern Canada, supplies

were shipped by water during the few summer weeks that the shipping lanes

were open, or by air in an emergency. Ships sailing from the Boston Port of

Embarkation to Goose Bay, Frobisher Bay, and other points carried a 360-day

level of expendable supplies as well as a 450-day level for maintenance items

found in the 30-day unit for 10,000 men.6In central Canada, distribution of

medical supplies to the isolated weather stations during the summer months

was necessary because of the extremely bad weather during the rest of the

year. Items contained in these shipments were limited to first aid and emergency treatment essentials and certain drugs needed to treat common

ailments.7

The most serious supply problem encountered in eastern and central

Canada was that of dealing with surpluses. By March 1944, the 4th Station

Hospital at Churchill and the 131st Station Hospital at The Pas were transferred from the theater and replaced by dispensaries. Thus, a surplus of supplies existed for some time.8

During 1945, the anticipated inactivation of the U.S. forces in central

Canada caused a flurry of inventorying and adjustment as well as reorganization. The supply policies, despite this hindrance, worked particularly well

on Southampton Island, where the post surgeon performed a successful emergency appendectomy only 15 days before the arrival of the ship which was

to evacuate supplies and equipment.9

Greenland Base Command

Following an agreement with the recognized Danish Minister in Washington, D.C., U.S. troops landed at the head of Tunugdliarfik Fjord in southern

Greenland on 6 July 1941. Included in the first contingent of troops were 2

medical officers and 14 enlisted men of the Medical Department.10

The first medical facility, located at Bluie West No. 1, was a first aid

tent. In the interval between the arrival of this group and the completion of

the original hospital building in October 1941, the 10-bed, field-type hospital

moved from place to place. Upon completion of the building, facilities rose to

20 beds.

The second Greenland post, known as Bluie West No. 8, was established at

the head of Sondre Strain Fjord about 15 miles north of the Arctic Circle

«Annual Report, U.S. Army Forces in Eastern Canada, 1943.

* Essential Technical Medical Data, Air Transport Command, North Atlantic Wing, for May 1944,

dated 31 May 1944.

»Essential Technical Medical Data, U.S. Army Forces in Central Canada, for February 1944,

dated 6 Mar. 1944.

»Essential Technical Medical Data, U.S. Army Forces in Central Canada, for August 1945,

dated 18 Sept. 1945.

i» This section is based on Annual Reports of the Greenland Base Command, 1941-44.
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 181
182 MEDICAL SUPPLY

(maps 1 and 2). Dispensaries were set up under tentage and, by summer 1942,

had grown into overcrowded, improvised hospitals. In September, the War

Department authorized activation of four numbered station hospitals and constructure was begun. Equipment arrived more quickly than the building materials. By the end of 1942, approximately 85 percent of the needed supplies

were on hand, but the buildings were not completed for another year.

Medical supplies for the Greenland Base Command came by way of the

Boston Port of Embarkation. The supply officer of the 188th Station Hospital

(fig. 38) acted informally as the base medical supply officer, supplying outlying

posts, absorbing excess stocks, and redistributing stocks as needed at other

installations. Equipment and supplies were generally adequate. The automatic

shipment of medical maintenance units actually resulted in a surplus of many

items, but little or no corrective action was taken by medical supply officers,

who lacked time to handle this particular problem. These surpluses had accumulated from the original 6-month supply and resupply items, which had been

shipped to each hospital. Not until after discontinuance of automatic shipment

in December 1943 did Medical Administrative Corps officers, available only

since May 1943, set up the stock records and systematic procedures that enabled the command to institute a monthly requisitioning system and to dispose of excesses.

Few medical supply difficulties were reported during the war despite

hardships of the climate and the long winter nights. There was some indication, in fact, that the Surgeon General's Office became overzealous in catering

to the needs of this isolated command. It was reported in mid-1943 that 50 to

75 packages per month were being received by airmail parcel post, while

freight shipment would have sufficed for the majority.

As a result of excessive requisitioning, and a change in the table of organization of the hospital, a total of 314,600 pounds of surplus medical supplies

was returned to. the United States in 1944.

Iceland Base Command

In the middle of September 1941, the first contingent of Army troops

arrived in Iceland (figs. 39 and 40), reinforcing a Marine task force that had

itself reinforced a British garrison in July. Medical supplies, initially, were

handled by 2 officers and 25 enlisted men, who set up a depot in two warehouses in Eeykjavik. Adequate space (8,000 square feet) was available, but the

lack of elevators and the distance from the docks made normal depot operations difficult. Although 6 officers and 75 enlisted men were authorized for

supply duty, that number was never reached.

By the end of 1942, the supply system was being effectively operated by

4 officers and 50 enlisted men.11

u This section is based on the Annual Reports of the Iceland Base Command for 1941, 1942, and

1944.
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 183

FIGUEE 39.—Placing medical supplies and equipment under tarpaulin at Langhold Dump,

Iceland, October 1941.

Besides the main supply depot in Eeykjavik (map 2), some supplies were

located in an original package storage depot at Yeomanry Camp and in a

subdepot at Camp Ontario in the Alafoss subsector. The latter consisted of

three 20- by 48-ft. huts, with a total floor space of 2,880 square feet; the package storage warehouse had a floor space of 4,000 square feet. The medical supply was separated into main depot and subdepots to facilitate dispersal of supplies more easily and conveniently.

All medical units maintained a minimum of 90 days' level of supplies,

and certain isolated units maintained a level of 120 to 180 days. From the

beginning, replacement supplies were acquired by automatic supply of medical maintenance units supplemented by command requisitions. Controlled

items were supplied automatically against the command's monthly material

reports to the Zone of Interior. By early April 1943, the automatic supply

medical maintenance units led to an unbalanced stock position. Supplies such

295^53 0—68- -14
184 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 40.—An early, temporary, and rather primitive dispensary in Iceland.

as quinine and mosquito bars particularly were received in excess, and were

returned to the Boston Supply Depot.

The Iceland Base Command reached a peak strength of more than 40,000

troops in May 1943, but the threat to the Western Hemisphere that had led

to the occupation had already passed. Troop strength was cut back by 25 percent in August and continued to decline thereafter, with corresponding decreases in the number of hospital beds. The medical supply system was also

reorganized, passing to a base depot section of the 20th Medical Depot Com-
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 185

pany in August 1943, and in December of the same year, the 300th Medical

Composite Platoon.

Medical supply levels did not fall as rapidly as troop strength, in spite

of the shipment of almost 2.5 million pounds of surplus items to the United

Kingdom during 1943. Further reductions the following year were necessary

to achieve the 30 days' operating and 30 days' maintenance supply levels. By

the middle- of 1944, depots and issue points remained only in Keykjavik and

at Keflavik, adjacent to Meeks Field, principal Iceland base of ATC (Air

Transport Command).

CARIBBEAN DEFENSE COMMAND

In early December 1941, a total of 66,000 U.S. troops were deployed in

the Caribbean area to protect the vital lines of communication from a German

submarine threat, and to repel any possible Japanese attempt to attack the

Panama Canal. Expansion was rapid during 1942, when the Panama Canal

Department alone had more than 68,000 troops. The Puerto Kican and Panama

Canal Departments were the major elements for supply until May 1943, when

the Antilles Department was formed. The latter's aggregate strength at that

time was approximately 55,000, but strength in the Panama Canal Department

was then declining.12

Organization for Medical Supply

The medical supply functions of the Caribbean Defense Command (map

3) were carried out primarily at departmental level until May 1943. One reason for this was the need for relatively independent sources of medical supply

for each, in view of the possible isolation that might attend sea surface and

submarine warfare against shipping. Another factor was implicit in the expansion of the Caribbean Defense Command, which assumed an active role

neither department had been equipped in the prewar years to carry out.

It is noteworthy that the problems of medical supply were comparatively

greater in the Antilles Department than in the Panama Canal Department.

Among others, two primary factors conditioned the difference: first, the Panama Canal Department was much better established in 1939, and second, the

extreme dispersion within the Antilles Department was a definite handicap.

Panama Canal Department

In late 1940, the medical supply depot for the Panama Canal Department

consisted of 19,000 square feet of storage space at Fort William D. Davis. This

space had been adequate for prewar years, but the possibility of the disruption of transportation by air attacks on the Canal Zone necessitated larger

facilities. Freight movement within the Panama Canal Zone was best handled

M A History of Medical Department Activities in the Caribbean Defense Command in World

War II, vol. I. [Official record.]
186 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 187

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jgg MEDICAL SUPPLY

by a single-track railroad or by ship via the canal. Both routes were considered

attractive targets. Because of this potential danger, it was decided to disperse

stocks for safety and to provide sources of medical supply on both the Pacific

and Atlantic sides of the Canal Zone.13

Early in 1942, although there was an acute shortage of nearly all classes

of medical supplies, the establishment of the automatic issue of supplies worked out especially well. A few items were found to be in excess, and some were

issued in amounts slightly below requirements, but adjustments were made

with the medical supply officer at the New Orleans Port of Embarkation.14

On 1 April 1943, a new medical supply warehouse, measuring 40,000

square feet, was completed at Corozal. Thus, two medical supply sections—

the Atlantic and Pacific—were functioning simultaneously until 1944, when

stock control was transferred from the Atlantic Branch Medical Depot, and

the Corozal General Depot became the dominant installation. The Fort Davis

Depot simply became a medical warehouse section of the Corozal General

Depot.

The outstanding accomplishment of medical supply activities for 1944 was

the establishment of rigid stock control procedure, effective on 1 July 1944;

all station medical supply functions were placed on a formal accountability

basis. After a complete inventory was taken, new stock record cards were

initiated, and a requisitioning objective of 165 days was established for the

entire department, with a 46-day level set up for the stations. All excesses

were returned to the medical sections of the general depots, and all items not

required for depot stocks were returned to the Zone of Interior. A total of

124,480 cubic feet of excess material was returned during the period 1 January-11 December 1944. The established stock levels worked ideally and distribution was without interruption.

Well-trained X-ray and dental repair technicians in the department

rendered invaluable assistance in the repair of appliances and equipment even

though spare parts were not always available.

The most serious problem in Panama was the deterioration of equipment.

The struggle against termites, rust, chemical decomposition, and corrosion was

continuous because of the high humidity of the area. X-ray films were received

improperly packed and, as a result, cloudiness developed on the film. This condition was corrected by the development and use of a "tropical pack film."

Metal instruments had to be specially processed, and certain biologicals had to

be refrigerated under controlled conditions. Items that were particularly susceptible to the effects of humidity were stored in a "dryroom" constructed for

the purpose at the Corozal depot.

Preplanning in the closing days of World War II produced two outstanding accomplishments: 24-hour-a-day emergency supply service to redeployment

*

3A History of Medical Department Activities in the Caribbean Defense Command in World

War II, TOI. III. [Official record.]

«This section is based on the following documents: (1) Annual Reports of Panama Canal

Department for 1942, 1944, and 1945. (2) Annual Report, 262d General Hospital, Fort Clayton,

Canal Zone, 1944.
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 189

troops passing through the canal, en route to Pacific theaters; and complete

and prompt delivery of all such emergency requisitions to the ship by medical

section transportation and personnel through use of advanced requisitions on

the States.

The closing of the Atlantic Branch Medical Depot at Fort William D.

Davis on 5 September 1945 caused the transfer of the supplies and equipment

to the Corozal General Depot. This move released 40,800 square feet of warehouse space located in two buildings. Equipment and certain personnel were

released as well. During 1945,13,286 cubic feet of excess supplies were returned

to the Zone of Interior, and 1,819 cubic feet were disposed of through lendlease.

Puerto Rico

The medical section of the Puerto Kican General Depot was activated on

1 September 1940 and functioned through the Medical Supply Office, port of

San Juan, P.E., until 2 October 1940, when it was moved to Fort Buchanan

and assigned 50,000 square feet of storage space. From a staff of 1 officer, 5

enlisted men, and 6 civilians in 1940, the organization expanded by 1943 to

include 3 officers and 13 enlisted men.15

Trinidad Base Command

The Medical Supply Section of the Trinidad Base Command was first

established in May 1941. As the sector grew and other bases were established,

this became a large facility.

By December 1942, a medical section was established in the Trinidad General Depot, from which medical supplies for the whole sector were handled.

Housed in new warehouses in the Fort Eead area, the depot reached its peak

of requisitioning in mid-1943, and by fall of that year, excess stocks were being

returned to the United States.16

Reorganization of the Medical Supply System

After the Antilles Department17 was created in 1943, the medical supply

system underwent a complete reorganization, brought about by the changing

tactical situation and the improvement of shipping schedules. There were several major changes in supply organization and procedure. Eequisitions for

medical installations in Jamaica and Cuba were submitted directly to the New

Orleans Port of Embarkation. All classes of medical supplies were ordered on

a monthly basis instead of periodically as needed. The supply organization

was divided into the Trinidad Sector and Base Command, and the Puerto

Eican Sector.

15 See footnote 13, p. 188.

M Annual Report, Medical Department Activities, Trinidad Sector and Base Command, 1943.

17 This section is based on Annual Reports of the Antilles Department for 1943, 1944, and 1945.
190 MEDICAL SUPPLY

The stock record system for all stations in the Antilles Department was

changed in 1943 by the incorporation of a department surgeon's office memorandum with the stock control manual. New practices for maintaining a stock

level were also introduced.

Disposal of excess stock was handled well by circulating a list of items

throughout the department. Extracted items were shipped without reimbursement. A total of 232 tons of excess items was shipped out in November 1943,

and 86 more tons were reported ready for shipment in December. In January

1944, new stock levels were established for the Trinidad Sector and Base Command and for the Puerto Eican Sector, and arrangements were made to transfer surplus material to the Navy or to the Public Health Service.

The Optical Eepair Team Type No. 1, formerly located at Waller Field,

Trinidad, was moved to the Antilles General Depot in May 1944. This unit

began handling requests for lenses which had previously been referred to the

Zone of Interior. In addition, the facilities and services of the optical repair

team were made available to the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard. In 1944, more

than 1,700 requests were handled by the team.

The main responsibility for supplying the island outposts of the Antilles

Department rested with the Trinidad General Depot, which was redesignated

Sub-Depot, Antilles General Depot, in April 1944. This depot supplied the St.

Lucia Base Command, British Guiana Base Command, French Guiana, the

Trinidad Base Command, and Surinam (including Zanderij Field). The use

of this subdepot greatly reduced time in filling requisitions.

As of 31 December 1944, 2,164 tons of excess medical supplies were

returned to the Zone of Interior.

Eepair facilities for Medical Department equipment in the Antilles

Department were not satisfactory before 1945. The medical section of Antilles

General Depot No. 1, Puerto Eico, had been using civilian personnel, but low

civilian ratings hampered the hiring of adequate personnel. The situation was

similar in the area served by the medical section of Antilles General Depot No.

2, Trinidad. Eepair could be accomplished only on minor items; often, complete replacement was necessary on units and assemblies which became unserviceable and could not be repaired locally.

An effort was made in late 1944 to establish a medical repair section which

would accomplish third and fourth echelon maintenance. Enlisted men were

sent to the St. Louis Medical Maintenance School, St. Louis, Mo., for training.

As a result, the repair situation improved in 1945 when four enlisted men

returned from the course and began putting their newly acquired knowledge

to work.

The inception of the Green Project necessitated the following: air redeployment of combat troops from the European and Mediterranean theaters to

the United States for transshipment to the Pacific during May 1945, and the

attendant necessity for immediate additional supplies and equipment for Trinidad and British Guiana to meet the influx of new personnel of ATC and the

Antilles Department. To cooperate with other services in conserving airlift
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 191

space for supplies required from the Zone of Interior, medical stocks in Puerto

Eico were used to meet shipping requirements for the initial phase, this to

the point of depleting many items of depot stock.

Subsequently, requisitions were transmitted to the New Orleans Port of

Embarkation for later phases of supply for the Green Project, and supplies

were sent to the medical sections of Puerto Eico and Trinidad. As a result of

advance shipping from the port, and because newly arrived personnel transported with them additional expendable supplies, an overstockage resulted in

both depots. To readjust this situation, a requisitioning procedure was established between both depots, obviating the necessity for requisitioning on the

New Orleans Port of Embarkation and reducing overages to a balanced level.

SOUTH ATLANTIC THEATER

Early in June 1942, a Special Headquarters Staff of the South Atlantic

Wing, ATC, was established at Georgetown, British Guiana. This unit was the

forerunner of U.S. Army Forces, South Atlantic, which was activated on 24

November 1942 (map 1).

The principal mission of U.S. Army Forces, South Atlantic, was to establish, operate, maintain, and support all ATC activities, to cooperate with the

Brazilian Armed Forces in the defense of north and northeast Brazil, and to

defend Ascension Island where U.S. Force Composite 8012 had been deployed

in March 1942.18

Between July and December 1942, medical supplies were obtained by

requisitions submitted directly to the Surgeon, ATC, in Washington, D.C.,

filled by the Medical Supply Section at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, and airshipped to the station where the requisition originated. Authority had been

granted to obtain supplementary supplies by requisition from the Trinidad

Sector and Base Command; however, supplies available at Trinidad were limited and delays of 4 to 5 months occurred when requisitions had to be extracted

by the Trinidad Supply Section to the New Orleans Port of Embarkation.19

Until supply personnel were assigned to the theater in late December 1942,

Lt. Col. George E. Leone, MC, Theater Surgeon (fig. 41), personally prepared

requisitions, and in anticipation of an expanding command, medical maintenance units were ordered. To supplement the requisitions coming through regular channels, permission was granted to purchase medical supplies locally.

Although no major items of technical equipment were available in Eecife, a

fair quantity of drugs, chemicals, small sterilizers, and minor equipment was

purchased there.

Preliminary plans were made to establish a medical supply section within

the Eecife General Depot, with the proposed hospitals at Natal and Belem

serving as subdistribution points for supplies which would be requisitioned

from the New Orleans Port of Embarkation.

18 Annual Report, Medical Department Activities, U.S. Army Forces In the South Atlantic, 1»42.

18 This section is based on Medical History, World War II, U.S. Army Forces, South Atlantic.

[Official record.]
192 MEDICAL SUPPLY

IÜ«&':

FIGURE 41.—Lt. Col. George E. Leone, MC, Surgeon,

South Atlantic theater.

By 1 February 1943, medical depot personnel had arrived and had set up

a small general depot at Belem, staffed by one officer and one enlisted man.

The medical section of the general depot at Kecife, was manned by two officers

and two enlisted men.

The Belem depot was originally intended to function also as the supply

point for medical activities at Amapä and Säo Luiz. However, because the

actual volume of traffic with these base dispensaries was so small, it was clearly

more efficient to supply them from the 193d Station Hospital at Belem. In

November 1943, the medical section of the Belem depot was inactivated.

In contrast, the medical section of the Recife General Depot was assigned

200 square feet in warehouse No. 14, in the Eecife dock area. With expanding

activities and increasing responsibilities, the allotted space proved inadequate.

The medical section moved first to an adjoining warehouse and, by early 1944,

to a garage in downtown Recife. By late 1944, more space again was needed,

and the section was expanded an additional 7,500 square feet, including a builtin bank vault for alcohol and narcotics. This enabled the entire medical supply

section to be under one roof.

The mission of the medical section of the Recife General Depot, after

November 1943 when the Belem depot closed, was to furnish medical supplies

and equipment to all U.S. Army installations in Brazil. This included station
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 193

hospitals at Eecife, Natal, Belem, and Ascension Island (assumed in February

1944), and base dispensaries at Amapa, Säo Luiz, Fortaleza, Fernando de

Noronha, Bahia, and Bio de Janeiro. The Eecife depot was also responsible

for supplying U.S. Army transports which docked at ports of the command,

and for supplying U.S. military commissions in Paraguay and Uruguay. A

close liaison was maintained between the depot medical supply officer, Maj.

John J. Eyder, MAC, and the officer in charge of the U.S. naval medical storehouse in Eecife.

The Eecife depot furnished the Brazilian Army with a limited amount of

material under lend-lease according to the availability of requested items in

excess stocks.

Development of penicillin resulted in a flood of requests from various

sources. A policy was adopted to furnish penicillin only to military patients

except in extreme emergency with the approval by the Commanding General

or Chief of Staff necessary. When more penicillin became available to the civilian population in 1945, the Surgeon's Office published information regarding

the purchase of penicillin from commercial sources.

Early in the war, there was no command system of accountability for supplies and equipment; however, depot supply officers kept accurate property

records, and stock record accounts were kept in all stations. Formal accountability was established in October 1943. Because of the accuracy of the medical

supply officers, or base surgeons who served as supply officers in some instances,

the problem of initiating stock record accounts according to instructions was

minimal.

Although a formal directive establishing inventory stock control procedures for all supply services was not published by theater headquarters until

late 1944, these procedures had been followed before that date. The medical

supply section at Eecife maintained a 45-day minimum level of supplies, plus

a 30-day operating level. Some difficulties were encountered in establishing a

proper requisitioning objective for the depot, but by raising the objective

slightly, adequate stocks were maintained despite shipping delays.

Before February 1944, routine supplies were requisitioned from the Trinidad Sector and Base Command, and nonroutine items were obtained from the

New Orleans Port of Embarkation. As of 1 February 1944, Trinidad was eliminated as an intermediate supply point. Vaccines, biologicals, and emergency

supplies were shipped by airfreight from Miami, while other supplies and

equipment were shipped by water from New Orleans. Air shipments were

received within 2 to 4 weeks after requisitioning while shipments by water

were received within 110 days. In an emergency, supplies could be received in

as few as 5 to 8 days.

Until mid-1944, procurement of sufficient supplies and equipment to meet

the needs of a rapidly expanding command was a major problem. Until initial

stocks were supplemented by medical maintenance units, reliance was placed

on the local market. Biweekly rounds of the local drug companies and surgical

and dental supply houses were made by a medical officer of the Eecife depot.
194 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Despite a language barrier and a lack of extensive knowledge of drugs, a considerable quantity of X-ray, dental, and laboratory equipment was purchased

in Rio de Janeiro and, in March 1943, a general purchasing agency was established there.

Inexpensive spectacles of good quality were readily available in Eecife

and, as requirements increased, procurement time lapsed. Therefore, arrangements were made to obtain spectacles from a large optical company in Eio de

Janeiro. However, because of delay in delivery and poor workmanship, arrangements were made for forwarding spectacle orders to a branch of the

American Optical Co. through the medical supply officer at Camp Blanding,

Fla.

The problems that occurred in the South Atlantic theater were typical of

the type of climate and situation which prevailed. The heat and humidity of

Brazil made equipment maintenance difficult. Instruments rusted, and X-ray

film often deteriorated beyond use. Cargo received rough handling, and breakage was exceptionally high until packaging methods improved. Despite these

difficulties, the medical supply situation improved rapidly because of the efforts

of medical supply officers who learned to anticipate problems and to overcome

them.

AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST THEATER

The long thread of air communications from Florida to India had its genesis in the route established by the Pan American Airways. Near the end of

June 1941, Pan American Airways, in complying with a request from the U.S.

Government, had accepted the responsibility of ferrying lend-lease planes to

British forces in the Mediterranean and points further east.

In September 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, indicating that arrangements

were to be made at the earliest practicable time to establish and operate depots

in the Middle East. These depots were for the maintenance and supply of

American aircraft and ordnance material furnished to the British in that area.

Such arrangements were made, and these establishments became the embryo

of USAFIME (U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East). The Persian Gulf

Command was born of the U.S. Military Iranian Mission, activated late in

1941 to provide aid to Russia and Great Britain.20

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East

On 16 October 1941, Maj. (later Col.) Crawford F. Sams, MC (fig. 42),

joined the newly created U.S. Military North African Mission as Surgeon. On

29 October, Major Sams presented plans which he had been developing before

his departure from Washington; after his arrival in the theater on 22 Novem20 A Narrative History of Medical Activities in the Persian Gulf Command. [Official record.]

For a more detailed account of the formation of the Persian Gulf Command, see Wiltse, Charles M.:

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters. United States

Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965,

pp. 56-60.
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 195

W&*'h

-*8-

FIGURE 42.—Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams.

ber 1941, he modified these plans substantially, based on firsthand information.

As additional medical personnel arrived, dispensaries and a 250-bed station hospital were established. Concurrently, arrangements were made to hospitalize civilians employed by American contractors, as well as U.S. military

personnel, in British military hospitals until U.S. facilities were completed.

Absence of an organized medical service in the African portion of the aircraft ferrying route presented a serious problem in Malaya and Australia. A

medical plan to establish regular medical service along the ferrying routes was

prepared by the mission surgeon after consultation with the Chief Medical

Officer, Pan American Airways. By 19 June 1942, militarization of the North

African Mission was accomplished and American military activities in that

region were consolidated into a theater of operations, the U.S. Army Forces

in the Middle East.21

This command was considered an active theater of operations, as well as

a Service and Supply Command (map 1), reaching its peak strength of more

than 66,000 troops in July 1943. The departure of the Ninth Air Force in

August 1943 left the residual mission of supply and service. Further decline

occurred in December 1943, when the Persian Gulf Command became autono21 General Orders No. 1, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, 17 June 1942.
196 MEDICAL SUPPLY

mous, having been on a separate requisitioning basis for some time because of

its independent mission of supplying Kussia.

Medical supply.—The medical supply requirements and activities were

determined by such factors as hospital bed strength, patient load, and

various ancillary medical facilities. On these were based the number of medical

unit assemblies required, the resupply and general logistical aspects of a distant command overlapping portions of two continents. Supplies and equipment

for dispensaries established in early 1942 were drawn from a 50-bed hospital

assembly which had been made available to the command. Maximum hospital

bed strength coincided with the peak troop strength in July 1943, with 6,250

fixed beds scattered from Liberia to Tehran.22

On 17 June 1942, civilian personnel arrived in the command to operate

the Douglas Aircraft Corp. hospital in Gura, Eritrea. The bulk of medical

items to equip this 250-bed hospital, which was to accommodate all American

citizens in the area, was furnished by the Medical Department. Shortly thereafter, many hospitals, dispensaries, and other medical units began to move

into the command from the United States. Because of the delay in shipping

and of shortages of medical material in general, however, several items were

either borrowed or obtained from the British on reverse lend-lease to expedite

the opening of these U.S. medical care installations. Some local procurement

was effected to advantage, also.

Upon arrival of the Advance Depot Platoon, 4th Medical Depot Company, on 1 November 1942, two advance depots were established at Darb El

Hagg, Egypt, and Tel Litwinsky, Palestine, with the base depot being at

Decamere, Eritrea. Due to the change in the military situation in North

Africa at that time, depots in Palestine and Eritrea were consolidated with

the advance depot at Darb El Hagg by February 1943. In March, this unit

became the Medical Section, Heliopolis Quartermaster Depot, Camp Russell

B. Huckstep, Egypt. This medical section included an optical shop for fabrication and repair of spectacles and a medical maintenance and repair shop.

Maintenance shop facilities were adequate for the needs of the command as

was the optical shop, which had a manufacturing capacity of 1,000 pairs of

spectacles per month. During the most active portion of the buildup period,

the Ninth Air Service Command operated a medical section in the Advance

General Depot at Benghasi, closely supporting combat missions of the Ninth

Air Force.

Until October 1943, all items of resupply were shipped automatically in

the form of medical maintenance units, and requisitions were submitted to the

Charleston Port of Embarkation for supplemental items and emergency

requirements. From the beginning of the theater, medical maintenance units

representing an estimated 6-month supply for the existing and contemplated

force were set up for shipment as a means of establishing the base depot

stocks. These medical maintenance units were far from complete, and back2aThis section is based on Essential Technical Medical Data From Overseas Forces, U.S. Army

Forces in the Middle East, for January 1944, dated 1 Feb. 1944.
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 197

ordered items followed the original shipments for several months. Available

6-month supplies were initially distributed as follows: Mobile dispensaries

received 10 days' supply; Air Force service squadrons, 30 days' supply; and

hospitals, 90 days' supply.

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, while favoring the use of medical

maintenance units during the buildup period, made these several recommendations to the Surgeon General's Office in view of the overages and shortages

ascribed to their use: (1) the simultaneous arrival of the first troops with

their initial maintenance, subsequent troop shipments to be preceded by their

initial maintenance; (2) the nonestablishment of back orders for items short

in the medical maintenance units shipped overseas; and (3) shipment of medical maintenance units at regular intervals, with the theater supply officer

constantly checking and advising the port medical supply officer of all inadequacies and overages.

Simultaneous shipments were tried in every instance. Initial maintenance

preceding the arrival of troops was accomplished occasionally when troop

movements could be anticipated with any degree of certainty and supplies

could be made available in advance of a movement.

By early 1943, back orders were discontinued on initial maintenance

shipped with the units. Monthly shipments of medical maintenance units were

considered as basic stocks for the theater and an interim substitute for theater

requisitioning. These items, although many were constantly shifting from

availability to nonavailability and back again, constituted a cross section of

the essential items of supply.

Thus, failure to backorder items for the maintenance units could deprive

the theater of many essential items for protracted periods without detection

or correction. This was particularly true in the Middle East where the first 6

months' supply of units was shipped as rapidly as shipping space permitted.

The theater policy was recognized as having some merit, especially when

accumulated back orders arrived 6 months after the original shipment and

accompanied the succeeding periods' shipments of maintenance units which

included authorized quantities of the items by reason of their sudden availability. This virtually transposed the status of some items from a shortage to

an excess position.

There was never discord within the medical supply system on this matter.

The paucity of shipping space during the early days and the relatively low

priority of nonemergency medical supplies permitted accumulation of medical

maintenance units on U.S. docks for prolonged periods, provoking hardships

despite the protests of the Surgeon General's Office.

Levels of supply.—Because of distances involved between supply points

and the limited means of transporting bulk stocks, it was highly desirable that

stations carry at least 90 days' stock. This was attempted at the outset, but

theater stocks would not permit such an extravagant distribution, and stations

necessarily reverted to a 30-day level, with monthly requisitions. As command

stocks became more abundant in mid-1943, all stations were authorized to in-
198 MEDICAL SUPPLY

crease levels to 120 days (not to exceed 6 months), and to requisition quarterly.

Dispensing with the medical maintenance unit as the primary means of supply,

quarterly command requisitions were instituted on the port, based on 210 days

of supply including 110 days' shipping time. Commencing with the March 1944

requisition, the War Department directed that command levels would be reduced to 45 days' minimum plus 30 days' operating, or a total of 75 days' maximum level plus shipping time. Stations again reverted to a 30-day level and

monthly requisitions. This War Department action provided the Zone of Interior with a better means of meeting accelerated demands in the scattered

combat areas.

With unit personnel frequently arriving months ahead of their unit

assembly, and with unit assemblies invariably split in transit, all assemblies

were shipped to the depot for reprocessing before issue to units. At the outset,

unit assemblies had to be improvised by using the limited U.S. stocks available, augmented with British equipment and the limited, but more expensive,

locally procured items. The command found that this processing of unit assemblies through the depot had a dual benefit. Initial requirements were met with

limited stocks, and a reserve stock was accumulated for reprocessing and

reconstructing assemblies, which would conform to actual needs with a saving

in material. Despite these benefits, shortages persisted and unit improvisation

was necessary.

Persian Gulf Command

Having originated with the Military Iranian Mission in October 1941, and

become the Persian Gulf Service Command in August 1942, the Persian

Gulf Command was designated a separate theater on 10 December 1943

(map 1).

The first American hospital in the Persian Gulf Areas was the 2d Station

Hospital, which began operations on 6 June 1942. This hospital acquired its

initial supplies and equipment from various sources.

The Advance Depot Platoon, 7th Medical Supply Depot, arrived at

Khorramshahr, Iran, on 25 January 1943 and, 2 weeks later, opened a depot

at Ahwaz.23 While the platoon was at Ahwaz, a fire broke out on 21 June

1943, destroying medical supplies valued at $350,000. However, large quantities of medical supplies had just arrived from the United States and these

were in Khorramshahr at the time of the fire. The losses at Ahwaz were thus

minimized and fortunately did not hinder the flow of supplies to various

units and hospitals.24

By September 1943, the depot was preparing to be moved to Khorramshahr, where a subdepot was established as part of the general depot (fig. 43).

The move was made in November 1943, after which the unit was redesignated

the 22d Medical Depot Company. A 6-month supply of initial maintenance,

33 (1) Report, Section I, Advance Depot Platoon, 21st Medical Supply Depot, to Commanding

General, Persian Gulf Service Command, 30 June 1943, subject: Initial Historical Report. (2) Annual

Report, Section I, Advance Depot Platoon, 22d Medical Depot Company, 1943.

84 Annual Report, Persian Gulf Command, 1943.
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 199

FIGURE 43.—Loose issue room, Medical Supply Section, General Depot, Khorramshahr,

Iran, December 1944.

comprised of medical maintenance units, was shipped to the Persian Gulf

Command. Units retained 3 months' stock and the depot took custody of the

other half. As in USAFIME shipments, these medical maintenance units

were far from 100 percent complete on the initial shipments and back-ordered

shortages followed for several weeks. Additional shortages resulted from poor

packaging and rough handling in transit.25

Paralleling the USAFIME experiences, hospital unit assemblies shipped

to the Persian Gulf Command were frequently fragmented. In one instance,

a field hospital unit which had arrived in December 1942 received the bulk of

its unit assembly in periodic shipments and not until 1 May 1943 had sufficient

portions been received to set up operations. These imperfections were occasioned by shortages of stocks in the United States and by failure to load all

available components of the unit assembly on one vessel. As a result, hospital

personnel were either immobilized or placed with British or U.S. functioning

hospitals. A hospital was often temporarily improvised by drawing on local

25 (1) Essential Technical Medical Data, Persian Gulf Command, for August 1943, dated 11 Sept.

1943. (2) Essential Technical Medical Data, Persian Gulf Command, for September 1943, dated

15 Oct. 1943.

295-453 O—6 -15
200 MEDICAL SUPPLY

civilian facilities or U.S. and British sources. Materials obtained from the

British in the area, under reverse lend-lease, from 1 January 1943 through

April 1945 were valued at more than $23,000. A significant portion of these

materials were dental supplies and equipment, which were extremely short in

the U.S. Army medical supply system.26

During the period of scarcity of equipment and facilities, the ingenuity

of the unit personnel was equal to the situation.

To combat spoilage among vaccines and serums, a satisfactory Dry Ice

was manufactured from cylinders of carbon dioxide. Approximately 17

pounds of ice could be produced in 30 minutes from the contents of one 15-

gallon cylinder of the gas.

Medical treatment facilities were equally adaptable. As interim measures,

operating lamps were made from large metal kitchen mixing bowls; a bicycle

pump served to maintain pressure in a steam autoclave; and a French fryer

mounted over a plumber's blowtorch made an excellent instrument sterilizer.

This becomes more significant when it is realized that the Persian Gulf Command improvisations were without the benefits of a medical maintenance shop.

In time, improvised material was largely displaced with standard equipment.

A survey was conducted early in 1943 to determine high mortality of

repair parts, and requisitions based on the results of that survey were submitted to the Charleston port. Although at that time hospitals were without

assigned repair technicians, many units had personnel who could make

repairs. In the Persian Gulf Command, the local engineer and ordnance

shops were used freely by personnel in repairing and fabricating medical

equipment. Repairable equipment beyond the capability of the Persian Gulf

Command was returned to the United States as replacements were requisitioned.27

The shortage of medical supply catalogs in the Persian Gulf Command

was alleviated in April 1943 when an overseas medical supply catalog, which

provided guidance for requisitioning supplies, was compiled in the Zone of

Interior and was made available to all units. The manual included lists of

items that comprised the medical maintenance units, final reserve units, and

similar lists with identifying catalog numbers, nomenclature, and unit of

issue. These were duplicated and distributed to all units in the Persian Gulf

Command.

In January 1944, the level of supply for the command was reduced from

210 days to 105 days. Automatic requisitioning was discontinued at this time

and thereafter medical supplies and equipment were requisitioned on the basis

of table-of-organization-and-equipment authorization and consumption. The

reduction of the days' level of supply created overages in certain items, which

were augmented by the abolishment of our final medical reserve. Excesses

beyond a 6-month supply were declared and properly disposed of.28

28 See footnote 20, p. 194.

27 (1) Annual Report, Persian Gulf Command, 1944. (2) Essential Technical Medical Data, Persian Gulf Command, for January 1944, dated 13 Feb. 1944.

28 See footnote 27(1), above.
OUTPOSTS AND SUPPLY ROUTES 201

FIGURE 44.—Medical supply issue room, Third Platoon, 26th Field Hospital, Khorramabad

Iran, November 1944.

The only interruption to the continuous flow of medical supplies to the

theater occurred in April 1944, when two vessels loaded with medical equipment were damaged during enemy action. Eepairable equipment damaged

beyond the capabilities of the repair facilities at hand was returned to the

Zone of Interior while unrepairable equipment was disposed of by report of

survey.

During April and May 1944, Eastern Command, a tactical command for

which the Persian Gulf Command had supply responsibility, was established

in Russia. A considerable quantity of supplies and equipment was supplied

from Persian Gulf Command stocks. Eequisitions for items which could not

be furnished were extracted to the Zone of Interior and the equipment was

forwarded on receipt in the Persian Gulf Command. When the Eastern Command (fig. 44) was reduced some months later, the equipment was absorbed

back into the command stock or declared excess.

An optical repair unit was attached to the Khorramshahr General Depot

in June 1944. Before that time, all spectacle prescriptions had been forwarded

to USAFIME for processing.

As medical units were transferred from the command in 1944 and 1945,

excess items were recovered by the depot and reissued from time to time.
202 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Other Commands

While the Persian Gulf Command was a key supply link to Russia and

the Far East, the U.S. Army Forces in Central Africa with headquarters at

Accra, Gold Coast, had the primary mission of the construction, operation,

and defense of Ferry Command and Air Transport Command installations in

Central Africa. Established on 16 June 1942, this command was merged with

the U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East on 15 September 1943 and redesignated the West African Service Command (map 1).

The medical supply depot for the entire area was established originally

at Accra, but when the command changed, it was placed under the control of

the 67th Station Hospital. The second depot, established at Dakar was placed

under the control of the 93d Station Hospital.

As in the Caribbean and Persian Gulf Areas, heat and moisture caused

many problems. Many surgical instruments, unless coated with grease or

stored in dry closets, rusted. Most surgical knife blades and needles packed in

glassine paper and cellophane were rusty when opened. No rust was noted on

those packed in wax paper.

Emergency lights shorted out within 2 weeks and batteries also deteriorated rapidly. Deterioration also occurred with hydrogen peroxide and X-ray

film. Provision for the repair and replacement of parts was limited. To assure

the availability of mechanical parts of motors, X-ray tubes, batteries, and oxygen, requisitions were placed well in advance of actual needs.29

Throughout 1944, the medical supply functions of the 93d Station Hospital were normal and receipt of supplies and equipment was satisfactory. Effective on 1 March, supplies were requisitioned monthly on the basis of a 45-day

minimum level plus 30-day operating level, or a total of 75 days' maximum

level. This, plus the 110-day order and shipping time, constituted the requisitioning objective of 185 days.

The Medical Supply Depot, 67th Station Hospital, also functioned as a

base medical supply depot for the West African Service Command, U. S.

Army Forces in Liberia, and ATC stations in Nigeria, Gold Coast, and Senegal. A stock record system, maintained since January 1943, was revised in

March 1944. Stock levels based on actual consumption were established and the

monthly submission of requisitions was put into effect.

38 Essential Technical Medical Data, West African Sendee Command, U.S. Army Forces in the

Middle East, for August 1943, dated 11 Oct. 1943.
CHAPTER VIII

Mediterranean Operations

PLANNING FOR THE INVASION OF NORTH AFRICA

After preliminary discussions held in the Arcadia Conference of December 1941 to January 1942, the Allied leaders decided to begin formulating

definitive plans by late July for Operation TORCH, designed to gain complete control of northern Africa. These plans, which were completed in August

and September 1942, provided that task forces of the United Kingdom and

the United States should strike simultaneously at Algiers and Oran on the

Mediterranean coast and at Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, in

coordination with a planned offensive of the British Eighth Army from the

El Alamein line in the East.1

Western Task Force

Despite the fact that medical supplies were limited, supply planning was

adequate. The medical troops were to land with unit equipment and combat

supplies, minus special items which would follow in later convoys. A 30-day

maintenance of supplies, including blood plasma, special drugs, and biologicals, was to be unloaded on the beaches, and a 60-day maintenance was to be

unloaded at the main port of entry. A 45-day supply level was to be maintained, and medical supply points were to be established on the beaches for

each combat group after the landing of assault troops. Also, a medical supply

depot was to be established at the main port of entry as soon as possible after

D+5 to provide support for the entire task force.

To minimize disturbing the wounded and to maintain an even distribution

of equipment, arrangements were to be made for the exchange of litters, blankets, splints, and similar items at transfer points.

The Western Task Force of 34,000 American troops was to land along

the western coast of Morocco after sailing from the United States. In the

assault on Safi, a company of the 9th Medical Battalion was to handle the

medical supplies for Subtask Force Blackstone, a medical supply depot was

to be established which would be responsible for obtaining supplies and hav1 For a more definitive discussion of strategic planning for Operation TOECH, see Howe, George

F.: Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. United States Army in World War II.

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957,

pp. 13-31.

203
204. MEDICAL SUPPLY

ing them available for use by the collecting station, and property exchange

with the battalion medical section and the naval shore party was to be controlled. The unit was also responsible for furnishing medical supplies for the

battalion medical sections.

Medical support for Subtask Force Goalpost, which was to land in the

Mehdia-Port Lyautey area, and for Subtask Force Brushwood, which was to

land at Fedala and swing south to capture Casablanca, was to be furnished

by detachments from the medical battalions organic to the divisions involved,

augmented by a detachment from the 56th Medical Battalion.2

Center Task Force

The Center Task Force of 40,800 American and British troops of the II

Corps was to land in the vicinity of Oran, Algeria. Its supply planning was

conducted on a joint British-American level from 3 September to 20 October

1942.

Because of a shortage of medical supplies in the United States and limited

shipping space, needed material had not been arriving in England. The British, therefore, were to furnish medical material whenever possible. To further

satisfy supply shortages, assemblies not needed elsewhere were applied to the

task force requirements. Additional supplies were sent to the United Kingdom

from New York for initial depot stocks and to fill out hospital equipment

assemblies turned over to the U.S. forces by the British.

Processing of requisitions for initial issue, and for replacement of medical supplies for the task force while it was in the United Kingdom, was

accomplished by the 1st Medical Supply Depot. This depot, while operating 5

separate depots, accomplished the overwhelming task of equipping combat

troops with 15 days of medical supplies, packing and shipping 27 medical

maintenance units, reprocessing 3 surgical hospitals, 3 evacuation hospitals, 5

station hospitals, and 2 general hospitals.3

Eastern Task Force

The Eastern Task Force of 23,000 British troops and 10,000 Americans

was to land in the vicinity of Algiers. For political reasons, the American elements, two regimental combat teams, were to withdraw and let the British

have full control after the initial assault. Responsibility for logistical support

s (1) Headquarters, Task Force A, Washington, D.C., Annex No. 2 to Administrative Order

No 1 10 Oct 1942 (2) Annual Report, 9th Medical Battalion, 9th Infantry Division, 1942. (3)

Journal, 56th Medical Battalion, 7 December 1941-1 May 1942 and 26 November 1942-17 January

1943 (4) Wiltse Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and

Minor Theaters. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington : U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1965.

3 (1) Annual Report of the Surgeon, II Corps, 1942. (2) Letter, Col. F. C. Tyng, MC, Chief,

Finance and Supply Service, OTSG, to Lt. Col. Earle Q. Q. Standlee, MC [Chief, Finance and Supply

Division], Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 1 Aug. 1942. (3) Annual Report, 1st Medical Supply Depot, ETOUSA, 1942.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 205

fell primarily on the British First Army, which was to be supplied from the

United Kingdom.4

ASSAULT ON NORTH AFRICA

Western Task Force

The leading elements of the Western Task Force landed at three points—

Safi, Fedala, and Port Lyautey—on the western coast of Morocco during the

early morning hours of 8 November 1942.

To protect the 30-day stock of medical supplies, they were evenly distributed in the convoy. The inadequate number of available vehicles was accentuated by the commandeering of some of them for other combat duties. Only

8 cross-country, and 12 armored, ambulances were available for medical support necessary between the beaches.5

The bulk of the supplies for Subtask Force Blackstone was unloaded at

the Safi docks where a large warehouse was converted into a regimental aid

and collecting station. However, because of the great confusion which was

caused by sniper fire, landing of equipment was hindered considerably. The

novel idea of stenciling exchangeable equipment did not work out in practice.

Equipment which went back to the ships with casualties was seldom returned.

A serious shortage of blankets was averted, however, because the 56th Medical

Battalion had carried an extra supply.

As there was no equipment available other than that brought in by company B, cots and other needed equipment were borrowed from the Navy. An

operating table was obtained, X-rays and sterilization were handled by the

French hospital, and a much needed refrigerator was obtained from a local

merchant.

Approximately 40 surgical operations were performed at night with three

flashlights providing the illumination.6

Despite delays caused by heavy enemy fire, supply dumps were established

on the main beaches near Fedala by the afternoon of D-day. Forward movement of these supplies was held to a minimum because of the serious lack of

transportation. Shortages of essential medical supplies and equipment resulted

because ships were behind schedule in unloading.

Encountering perhaps the stiffest resistance, Subtask Force Goalpost was

forced to advance its H-hour, and only a few waves were landed by daylight.

Contrary to the expected practice, morphine tablets were issued and used.

Syrettes, requisitioned by the medical depot of the command before embar4

(1) Davidson, William L. : Medical Supply in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S.

Army. [Official record.] (2) Letter, Col. C. R. Landon, AGD, Headquarters, SOS, ETOUSA, to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, and others, 18 Jan. 1943, subject: Supply of TORCH from U.K.

5 Kenner, Albert W.: Medical Service in the North African Campaign. Bull. U.S. Army M. Dept.

76: 76-84, May 1944.

6

(1) Clift, Glenn G.: Field Operations of the Medical Department in the Mediterranean Theater

of Operations, United States Army. [Official record.] (2) See footnote 2(2), p. 204.
206 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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MAP 4.—Medical supply depots

kation, were mistakenly held for base hospitals which did not arrive until

later convoys.7

Center Task Force

Favored by the element of surprise, the initial assault on three beaches in

the Oran area was successful. Arzew was secured at 0300 hours and the 48th

Surgical [later redesignated 128th Evacuation] Hospital came ashore and

began operating. Much of the necessary medical equipment was not available

until 1800 hours, but a makeshift hospital nevertheless was set up in a French

barracks. Emergency supplies and supplies obtained from transports were

used until the morning of D+2, when the equipment of the 38th Evacuation

Hospital arrived and was turned over to the 48th Surgical Hospital. Among

these supplies were 480 units of plasma and 100 morphine Syrettes.

7

(1) Final Report of Western Task Force, Operation TOECH, 7-11 Nov. 1942, Annex No. 2,

Headquarters, Subtask Force Brushwood, 3d Infantry Division (Eeinf.), F6dala, Morocco, Casablanca Operation. (2) Letter, Brig. Gen. L. K. Truscott, Jr., to Commanding General, Western Task

Force, 18 Dec. 1942, subject: Report of Operations [Goalpost], in Final Report of Western Task

Force, Operation TORCH, 7-11 Nov. 1942, Annex 3. (3) Camardella, Ralph A.: Medical Aspects of

Landing Operations, Subtask Force Goalpost, 8-11 Nov. 1942. [Official record.]
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 207

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in North Africa, 1942-43.

By December 1942, the 38th Evacuation Hospital had the bulk of its

equipment and was operating under tentage near Oran.

The 51st Medical Battalion, which arrived on the D-)-3 convoy, was responsible for setting up a medical supply depot after a detachment had distributed medical supplies to the beachhead troops. Some difficulty occurred in

coordinating activities between the port regulating officer and the medical supply officer of the task force. The first medical supplies received at the port rarely reached the dump, or arrived in bad condition. Boxes were not properly

tagged and packing lists were practically nonexistent.

After the fall of Oran on 10 November, the 1st Advance Section of the

2d Medical Supply Depot landed and relieved the 51st Medical Battalion of

the supply dump operation. Unfortunately, many desperately needed vehicles

were lost at sea. On Christmas Day 1942, the balance of the 2d Medical Supply

Depot, commanded by Lt. Col. Elmer B. M. Casey, MC, arrived in Oran,

where it joined its advance section in the operation of the depot (map 4).

Because of the critical shortage of drugs, surgical instruments, dental supplies and equipment, and some basic hospital and medical field items of equipment, subsequent issues were made on a priority basis according to the role
208 MEDICAL SUPPLY

that a given organization was playing in the operation. As troops moved forward, it was necessary to build medical maintenance for their support. This

caused a tightening of issues to local troops and caused an avalanche of complaints. This situation, however, was remedied rapidly, and by 21 November,

practically all required items could be provided.

Perhaps the most serious problem of medical supply during the early

stages of the Center Task Force was the lack of proper communication between

principal medical supply personnel, probably because of the extreme secrecy

of the operation.8

Eastern Task Force

The Eastern Task Force landed on the beaches near Algiers on schedule

and was initially unopposed, but firm resistance was encountered as the troops

began to move inland.

Medical support rendered during the operation came from company C

and the 2d Platoon of company D, 109th Medical Battalion, and company A

and the 2d Platoon of company D, 9th Medical Battalion, organic respectively

to the 34th and 9th Divisions; and from four teams of the 2d Auxiliary Surgical Group. The first detachment of company C, 109th Medical Battalion,

landed at 0730 hours on D-day (8 November), carrying its medical supplies

and equipment on six heavily laden litters. A clearing station with one ambulance, six litters, and other medical supplies was established. Because of the

delay in unloading the medical supplies and equipment, U.S. medical units

had to obtain emergency supplies from the British, who hand-carried them

from the beach. In several cases, rough seas prevented the rapid unloading

of material.

It was not until D+6 that, by using borrowed vehicles, all supplies from

the ship were unloaded and transported to a schoolhouse where the hospital

was sited.

Lessons Learned From Operation TORCH

One of the paramount medical problems of the entire TORCH operation

was that personnel did not have in their possession sufficient medical equipment to permit their proper functioning upon landing. To provide an initial

supply dump, it was suggested that each medical soldier be issued a haversack or carrier containing vitally essential dressings, instruments, drugs, and

blood.

It was also suggested that medical maintenance units be packed in 100-

pound waterproof boxes, designed for hand-carrying during landings.

In addition, it was proven that the 4- by 4-ft. ambulance was inadequately

s (1) Annual Keport, 128th Evacuation Hospital, 1943. (2) Annual Report, 38th Evacuation

Hospital, 1942. (3) Annual Reports, 2d Medical Supply Depot, 1942 and 1943. (4) See footnotes

4(1), p. 205; and 6(1), p. 205.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 209

powered and had too high a silhouette. A half-track or six-wheeled vehicle

was suggested as a substitute.9

ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE SECTION MEDICAL SUPPLY

With the formation of Headquarters, Mediterranean Base Section, on

7 December, followed closely by the opening of Headquarters, Atlantic Base

Section, on 30 December 1942, there began what might be considered the outstanding logistical agency in the war against the Axis. Activation and employment of the base section in the wake of the conquering Army became standing

operating procedure.

Atlantic Base Section

The Surgeon's Office, Atlantic Base Section,10 with Col. (later Maj. Gen.)

Guy B. Denit, MC, as Surgeon, was originally established in September 1942

as the Surgeon's Office, Headquarters, SOS (Services of Supply), Task Force

A, located at Fort George G. Meade, Md. The medical supply section of this

office was under the command of Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Theodore L. Finley,

MC, the Medical Supply Officer, who coordinated the preparation and shipment of 6 tons of medical supplies by 13 December.

Upon arriving in Casablanca on 24 December 1942, the medical supply

officer of Western Task Force, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Marcel H. Mial, SnC,

discovered that some medical supplies were already stored in warehouses

situated in five widely separated locations. Need for additional storage space

was evident, and sufficient additional space was gradually acquired.

During the early days in North Africa, all medical supply activities

were under the control of Western Task Force; however, in the meantime, an

agreement was reached whereby the supply officer of Headquarters, SOS, working closely with the task force medical supply officer, would familiarize himself with the supply operation. As only one officer among the supply personnel

was experienced, this handicapped operations to some extent.

Despite numerous difficulties involved in obtaining, transporting, and

properly storing medical supplies and maintaining a stable work force, subdepot issue points were established at Casablanca and Kabat by December

1942. Personnel of hospital ship platoons began the first physical inventory

of medical supplies at these points. Under the direction of Colonel Finley and

Lt. Col. (later Col.) Karl H. Metz, DC, the assistant supply officer, necessary

requisitioning was initiated. Colonel Metz undertook the establishment of

9

(1) Platt, Edward V.: Record of Events, Company C, 109th Medical Battalion, October 15, 1942

to November 9, 1942. [Official record.] There are similar reports by Capt. Thomas E. Corcoran, MC,

commanding officer of company C, and by Capt. Francis Gallo, MC (2) Weiss, William A.: Record

of Events [2d Auxiliary Surgical Group, Headquarters, Special Troops (Prov.), EAP], October 19,

1942 to November 20, 1942, 9 Dec. 1942. [Official record.] (3) Memorandum, Col. John F. Corby,

MC, Deputy Surgeon, AFHQ, to Chief of Staff, AFHQ, 30 Jan. 1943.

10 This part of the chapter, unless otherwise stated, is based on the Annual Report of the

Atlantic Base Section, 1943.
210 MEDICAL SUPPLY

necessary depot routine and organization of records. During this time, one

issue point and four warehouses were opened.

On 26 February 1943, Maj. Frederick Schneider, MAC, arrived and was

designated assistant supply officer. At this time, the 4th Medical Supply Depot

[later 4th Medical Depot Company],11 commanded by Maj. (later Lt. Col.)

Walter Smit, VC, arrived to assume the operation of the Atlantic Base Section

Medical Depot. Supply points were immediately opened at Eabat and Meknes,

and a final reserve warehouse was set up at Safi.

Before the acquisition of several warehouses in Casablanca, it became

necessary to store valuable supplies out of doors in a bivouac area. In Casablanca alone, there were 14 small warehouses; consolidation was impossible

because of the nonavailability of larger buildings and the competition for

space which came from hospitals and the other technical services.

Emphasis abruptly shifted to the assembling of medical maintenance

units needed in other areas of North Africa in support of combat troops. An

effort was made to balance requirements in the entire theater. In April, a 25-

bed station hospital was shipped to Marrakech (map 4), and two medical

maintenance units were sent to Kabat for storage to facilitate forward movement of balanced medical stocks. Much equipment was moved by train to the

Mediterranean and Eastern Base Sections at the request of the medical supply

officer of the North African theater.

Despite many handicaps, more than 700 requisitions a month were filled

by the Atlantic Base Section medical supply depot during the first months

of operation, including a pressing demand for smallpox vaccine.

By June 1943, the level of supply had reached 141 days, and the problem

of adequate warehouse space recurred. In July, the space problem was eased

somewhat when 100 tons of medical supplies were turned over to the French,

and additional warehouse space was obtained. The shipment of 400 tons of

additional supplies to the Eastern Base Section to use in support of combat

troops also helped considerably.

Mediterranean Base Section

Beginning with the cessation of hostilities in the Oran area on 10 November 1942, space, which was acquired where it could be found, was sufficient only

to satisfy immediate needs. The principal storage and issue site consisted of

22,000 square feet, located in the outskirts of Oran proper. The buildings

where all medical supplies were first delivered were new, two-story, permanent

type. Here, both issue and warehousing functions took place. Practically all

stocks during this early period were medical maintenance unit items shipped

with the initial convoys.

A former wine storage warehouse of some 22,000 square feet was

acquired subsequently in Oran proper, and all incoming supplies were first

processed through this point, broken down into general groups, and stored

"History, 4th Medical Depot Company (formerly 4th Medical Supply Depot), 1940-45.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 211

or redistributed to other locations. No absolute checking or "tally-in" was

effected.

Another building, 2,250 square feet, was used exclusively for storing

three medical maintenance units which were regarded as the final reserve

units. Other lesser storage locations were acquired in the greater Oran area

(fig. 45 A, B, and C) to accommodate the overflow of supplies received.12

The first depot of the Center Task Force, operated by the 51st Medical

Battalion, had a depot and issue section under one officer, and a receiving and

warehouse section under a second officer; the third officer, along with the port

medical supply officer, undertook the considerable task of locating medical

supplies and directing them to the receiving warehouse in Oran. During this

period, identification and location of medical supplies at the port unloading

points were made extremely difficult by the lack of personnel and by inaccurate

ship manifests. Because information on berth locations of unloading ships

was withheld as a security measure, a prolonged search for the supplies forestalled preplanning for the movement of supplies to the warehouses.

Competition with the French Army for storage space was more keenly

felt in the Oran area than in the Casablanca area. The French Army had

priority and, as a result, the U.S. Army medical supply requirements were

placed low on the list. For these reasons, numerous small medical warehouse

locations were scattered over a wide area.

Because of lack of proper warehousing and inequitable distribution of

supplies, complete records of depot stock could not be maintained. All hands

worked around the clock to accomplish an inventory, but it was not until

after 8 December 1942, when the Mediterranean Base Section assumed control

from Center Task Force, that physical inventory was ordered and accomplished, and a semimonthly stock status reporting system was established.

The medical supply personnel of the Mediterranean Base Section were

inexperienced and were only hastily briefed on the supply situation. Their

immediate problem was the location and consolidation of scattered medical

supplies. Indigenous labor was employed to unload and load the scarce

vehicles. Numerous incidents of loss of supplies resulted from exposure, pilferage, or accident in the port area, owing to lack of immediate transportation.

In the beginning, medical supplies were received automatically from the

United States and the United Kingdom in the form of medical maintenance

units (fig. 46), supplemented by items required for the geographical location

and the type of operation involved. Automatic shipments from the United

States ceased soon after the invasion.

During the first few months of the North African campaign, the need for

balancing medical stocks with adequate stock control measures, for requirements determination by item, and for separate requisitioning on the Zone of

Interior was apparent. Automatic supply served its purpose well during the

initial stages, but even the first requisitions submitted by Mediterranean Base

13 This section is based on the Annual Report, Mediterranean Base Section, 1943.
212 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 45.—A. Exterior view of a medical supply warehouse in Oran. B. Oran depot

optical shop.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 213

FIGURE 45.—Continued. C. Issue section of the Oran Medical Depot.

Section on about D+30 had to be prepared on a man-days of supply basis by

item, rather than by a calculation based on actual item demand experience.13

In North Africa, where indigenous personnel provided most of the stevedore service (fig. 47), color markings appropriate to each technical service

were placed on the corners of the boxes. This proved to be a great boon to the

unloading and sorting process as natives, who were unable to comprehend the

instructions on shipping documents or stenciled on the sides of the boxes,

sorted the supplies on the docks and beaches by color, thus enabling faster and

less confusing removal of supplies to warehouses.14

By February 1943, the problem of medical warehouse space in Oran

became so severe that an unprecedented appeal was made to G-4 of that headquarters by the Surgeon. A tour of all depots impressed G-4 so much that a

crash construction program was begun, and an excellent shed-type depot was

established on the outskirts of the city.15

13 Medical Supply History, Mediterranean Base Section, 27 Sept. 1943. [Official record.]

« Letter, The Adjutant General, Headquarters, ETOUSA, to Commanding General, SOS, ETOTJSA,

and others, dated 9 Sept. 1942, subject: Information and Markings Eequired for Overseas Shipment.

15 See footnote 13, above.
214 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 46.—Medical maintenance unit, the primary means of automatic supply from

the Zone of Interior, underwent its first projected test of combat support in the North

African campaign.

TUNISIA CAMPAIGN

Supply Buildup

From the beginning of the Tunisia Campaign, launched when the Eastern

Task Force turned east from Algiers on 11 November 1942, it was obvious that

supporting medical units had to be highly mobile. The fluid front, the lack of

a secondary road network, and the poor condition of the main road from

Algiers were sizable obstacles. Inadequate single track, narrow gage railways

were the main links from the Mediterranean Base Section to the Tunisian

front.

As fighting developed into a seesaw battle in Tunisia, American medical

units and their supplies were building up in the Mediterranean Base Section

in preparation for their concentration in the Tebessa-Kasserine area. They

were to join in support of the II Corps, which was preparing to drive to the

eastern coast of Tunisia to prevent the uniting of the Afrika Korps and the
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 215

FIGURE 47.—Indigenous personnel unloading supplies at Casablanca. After color

markings were introduced which identified the material for each technical service,

natives were able to sort as well as unload despite the fact that they were unable to

read English.

German forces in Tunisia. The 1st Advanced Section of the 2d Medical Supply

Depot was detached to furnish medical supply support for this operation.16

Resupply of the advancing units was effected automatically by shipment

of 18 medical maintenance units from Oran and the United States. This was

later augmented by a balanced stock of supplies, shipped directly from the

United States on requisition initiated by the Surgeon's Office, NATOUSA

(North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army).

In coordination with the II Corps offensive of 26 January, medical units

were concentrated in the Constantine-Tebessa area and, 10 miles south of

Tebessa, the 1st Advanced Section of the 2d Medical Supply Depot went into

operation. As part of the buildup, a heavy forward movement of medical supplies and equipment took place from Oran by way of the single rail line

"See footnote 8(3), p. 208.

295-453 O—68- -16
216 MEDICAL SUPPLY

through Algiers to Constantine and the narrow gage link from there to

Tebessa. An initial stockage of four medical maintenance units, consisting of

70 tons of medical supplies, was set up and subsequent resupply for the corps

was carried out with medical maintenance units and special requisitions. Because of the various problems of transportation and communication, timely

coordination and shipment of required supplies and equipment were extremely

difficult. Activation of the Eastern Base Section and establishment of their

medical depot at Constantine (map 4) greatly improved this situation."

Eastern Base Section

On 22 February 1943, during the most critical point in the Tunisian struggle, Headquarters, Eastern Base Section (map 4) was activated. Consistent

with the pattern of base section employment, personnel were drawn from the

previously established Atlantic and Mediterranean Base Sections. The first

medical depot in the new base section was established at Ain M'Lila and went

into operation with 40 tons of U.S. supplies and supplies from the British

depot near Bone. By May, the original 40 tons had been increased to 383 tons.

To accommodate this rapid supply buildup, medical sections were opened in

two general depots at Bone and Philippeville. However, the main concentration of supplies remained at the Ain M'Lila depot, which, along with the two

medical sections, was operated by the 4th Medical Supply Depot. Belief from

this heavy burden was forthcoming with the assignment of a section of the

2d Medical Supply Depot to Ain M'Lila on 3 April 1943, and the arrival of

the 7th Medical Supply Depot at Mateur, where they established a medical section in General Depot No. 6 on 26 May 1943.

The 7th Medical Supply Depot, commanded by Maj. (later Col.) Clark

B. Williams, MC, had practically no warehouse space allotted to it and, therefore, obtained additional warehouse space by repairing several buildings. In

spite of this, incoming supplies were received in quantities too great to place

under cover and, in August and September, about 1,000 tons of supplies were

in open storage. Fortunately, before the rainy season, a large warehouse in

Bizerte was assigned to the medical depot and the situation was relieved somewhat. Proper warehousing was still difficult because of the scattering of supplies through some 26 warehouses of varied size. By 15 October, all medical

supplies were consolidated into the 7th Medical Supply Depot [later 7th Medical Depot Company] at Mateur.18

Because of certain surpluses reported by Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Henry T.

Lapp, MC, the Mediterranean Base Section medical supply officer, a revision

of the medical maintenance unit (fig. 48) was proposed. In a conference held

in Oran, which included representatives from all echelons of supply, a combat

medical maintenance unit—a modification of the current unit—was created.

17 See footnote 12, p. 211.

18 (1) General Order No. 5, NATODSA, 13 Feb. 1943. (2) Annual Report, Eastern Base Section,

1943. (3) Annual Report, 7th Medical Supply Depot [later 7th Medical Depot Company], 1943.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 217

FIGURE 48.—While the standard medical maintenance unit served as a means of

support to a theater, with emphasis on desert and tank warfare casualties, it was found

that specific combat operations could be more proficiently served by a modified cut-down

Items and quantities included were tailored to the Tunisian combat requirements. Unessentials were eliminated or reduced while items in greater demand

were added or existing quantities increased. The result was a compact 30-day

supply for 10,000 troops, with a weight of 12 to 14 tons compared to the standard weight of 20 tons. This proved to be highly satisfactory, and information

was cabled to the Surgeon General's Office for appropriate action. Subsequent

modifications were made by NATOUSA as experience dictated. From this

experience, the beach medical maintenance unit was designed for use in the

Sicilian operation.19

Drive Through Tunisia

Preparations began for an anticipated offensive after the withdrawal of

the German forces at Kasserine Pass on 22 February.

Medical units were hard-pressed during the subsequent action, which

began on rugged terrain which somewhat handicapped movement of supplies.

19 (1) See footnote 12, p. 211. (2) Report, Maj. Gen. A. W. Kenner, Chief Medical Officer,

SHAEF, to Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, and others, 13 Apr. 1944, subject: Report of Visit to AFHQ.
218 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 49.—Col. Charles F. Shook, MC, Surgeon,

Services of Supply, North African theater.

However, in one area a modified ammunition cart proved invaluable in carrying medical supplies to battalion aid stations, which as a result were able to

function closer to the front than would have otherwise been possible.20

After redeployment of 100,000 men and equipment of the II Corps as the

enemy withdrew toward Bizerte, various problems of medical supply came to

the attention of Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Ervin H. Markus, MC, Medical Supply

Officer of the Eastern Base Section. As of 1 May 1943, II Corps was supplied

with one combat medical maintenance unit every 5 days; this was augmented

by TBA (table of basic allowance) shortage replacements that were requisitioned every 2 weeks. Many items were critically short, the most serious being

dental items, because of shortages in the United States, limitation in medical

maintenance units, and severe combat losses experienced in the Tunisia

Campaign.

It was apparent in such an operation that initial depot stocks should

include provision for replacement of combat losses of all basic medical equipment. Losses were also attributed to fair wear and tear, deliberate destructions

to prevent enemy seizure, losses at sea, and theft. Losses at sea were made up

automatically by the U.S. port, but delays necessarily ensued, thus slowing

down the reequipping of arriving units. Adding to all these problems was the

20 Recollections of Lt. Col. Douglas Hesford, MSC, included in an early draft of this chapter.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 219

further task of supplying units arriving with shortages in basic equipment. It

was not until June 1943, after the Tunisia Campaign had ended, that units

began receiving their full authorization of equipment. By August 1943, more

than 1,400 tons of medical supplies were on hand in the Eastern Base Section,

units were well equipped, and critical shortages were virtually nonexistent.

Consolidation of equipment was accomplished and, by the close of 1943, all

medical supplies were received, stored, and issued at one location, the Mateur

depot operated by the 7th Medical Depot Company.21

FORMATION OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY

A high point in the logistical effort to support the Mediterranean campaigns was the activation of SOS, NATOUSA, on 15 February 1943 in Oran.22

Lack of coordination between the base sections made this move necessary. The

Medical Section of SOS, NATOUSA, was organized by Colonel Finley, medical supply officer of the Atlantic Base Section, who was followed in May by

Col. Benjamin Norris, MO In August, Col. Charles F. Shook, MC (fig. 49),

became SOS Surgeon. The new organization assumed the function of centralized stock control and made all requisitions on the port of embarkation while

maintaining necessary stock levels in the various supply depots of the theater.

Centralized Operations

The strength of the Medical Section, SOS, soon began to make itself felt

in medical supply operations of the theater. By operating with base section

medical supply officers, theater medical supply activities took on coordinated

order and purpose. Conferences were held with hospital commanders, chiefs

of professional services, and medical supply officers to reassure them in matters

of medical supply.

Perhaps the most significant contribution made to medical supply by the

Services of Supply was the establishment of a theaterwide central stock control

system, which was inaugurated when SOS assumed responsibility for editing

requisitions sent to the Zone of Interior.

Coincident with this was the development of item replacement rates for

the theater, based on 90 days, in lieu of those developed by the War Department. Control of incoming shipments and intertheater shipments was also a

significant feature. In the meantime, the theater had notified the Surgeon General's Office of the imbalanced stock position resulting from medical maintenance units and requested a one-time shipment of a balanced depot stock. The

shipment arrived in late 1943 and helped to balance theater stocks of medical

supplies and to fill any quick requisition for these supplies in any part of the

theater.23

21 See footnote 18(2), p. 216.

^General Order No. 6, NATOUSA, 14 Feb. 1943.

23 Annual Report, Medical Section, SOS, NATOUSA, 1943.
MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 50.—U.S. lend-lease equipment and supplies, turned over to the French Army

and warehoused in Casablanca, April 1943.

Medical Supply and Aid to the French

As soon as the North African landings had been completed and the French

surrender was made final, the Allies wasted no time in gaining complete

French support. Under the direction of the Joint Eearmament Committee,

the reequipment of the French was accomplished in three phases, the first having as its goal the supply of forces for the defense of North and West Africa.

Supplies for the French began arriving in early April 1943, and the U.S.

bases were then instructed to assist with the reception, storage, assembly, and

issue of serviceable equipment (fig. 50). French technical personnel, attached

to those base section service units which handled equipment for delivery to

French units undergoing resupply, were instructed in supply procedure by

2d Lt. (later Capt.) Douglas Hesford, MSC, of the Mediterranean Base Section, and 1st Lt. (later Maj.) Alexander F. Striker, SnC, of the SOS medical

section. Several warehouses were occupied by the French, but followed U.S.

procedures. All tricolor marked supplies were turned over to them. By the

time responsibility for resupply of the French was turned over to the Fifth

U.S. Army, supplies for 1 month for 100,000 men had been built up in the

Oran warehouse.24

24 (1) See footnote 4(1), p. 205. (2) Notes on Conference Concerning Supply of French Expeditionary Corps, held at Headquarters, SOS, NATOTJSA, 29 Sept. 1943.
MEDITERRANEAN1 OPERATIONS 221

ISLAND CAMPAIGNS

Preliminary Planning

Contrasting sharply with the lack of detailed planning and poor communications of the North African campaign, planning for the invasion of Sicily,

begun as a result of the British and American conference held at the Anfa

Hotel near Casablanca in January 1943, was thorough and centralized. Plans

which were approved on 13 May 1943 established the reconstituted 1st Armored Corps, designated "Force 343," as the American element of the invasion

force.

Under the direction of Col. L. Holmes Ginn, Jr., MC, who left the 1st

Armored Division to become Surgeon, 15th Army Group, and Col. Richard T.

Arnest, MC, II Corps Surgeon, results of Operation TORCH were closely

scrutinized, and issue and maintenance requirements were established. Maj.

(later Lt. Col.) Howard C. Jones, SnC, of the SOS medical section, and Major

Lapp, of the Mediterranean Base Section, were the officers principally responsible for medical supply planning and coordination with the preinvasion training which was taking place at Mostaganem, Algeria, in April 1943. Plans had

to provide for supply over the beaches for a period of 30 days because of the

lack of a readily available port. The first supply convoy which was to originate

in the United States was scheduled to arrive at D+14 after a port was secured.

In an AFHQ (Allied Forces Headquarters) communication of 28 March

1943, items estimated to be essential were listed, and those not in stock or on

order were to be requisitioned from the United States. All items requisitioned

by Force 343 that could be furnished from theater stocks were extracted to

base sections for-packing and marking, while the remainder were to be held

in the Zone of Interior under receipt of disposition instructions. Limited shipping space made it necessary to mount the invasion in three separate convoys,

landing at 4-day intervals. If beach resupply should prove inadequate, arrangements were made for the partial use of the port of Syracuse (in the British area) after D+14.

After carefully studying the lessons learned from the North African invasion, planners decided that medical units would land with unit equipment plus

special supply items, such as blood plasma, extra morphine Syrettes, and dressings. A balanced stock of medical supplies for a 7-day maintenance of the

forces (fig. 51) was to be unloaded on the beaches on D-day. Medical supply

dumps were to be established in widely dispersed, yet protected, points on the

beaches immediately after the landing of assault groups.

Under the supervision of the beach surgeon, property exchange was to

be accomplished on the beaches before supplies were moved forward.

The first followup convoy was to carry a 7-day maintenance in addition

to its own 7-day maintenance. The second followup group was to carry a 7-

day maintenance for the assault group and a 7-day maintenance for the first

followup in addition to its own 7-day maintenance, except II Corps, which
MEDIOAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 51.—This beach medical maintenance unit, which derived its stocks from

the standard unit, embraced those items and quantities that would best support an

amphibious operation, such as that in Sicily.

was to carry a 14-day maintenance. Each subsequent followup was to bring in

a 7-day maintenance plus 7 days for troops in, up to five followup convoys previously landed.

Special items, such as sunburn cream and seasick capsules, were to be

drawn and issued before embarkation. Thirty days' combat maintenance of

certain expendable supplies and pest control materials was to be prepared by

SOS, NATOUSA, or the New York Port of Embarkation, and was to be available on call of the Commanding General, Force 343.

An additional 30 to 60 days' maintenance was to be laid down by the Surgeon, SOS, NATOUSA, on call of the Commanding General, Force 343, to

be built up in Sicily. A 10-day supply for troops of subtask forces served by

beaches was to be available by D+32, and a 20-day supply for all troops by

D+90.

The Force 343 surgeon was to requisition special supplies from the Eastern

Base Section, whose surgeon was responsible for preparing supplies for shipment and delivery to ports.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 223

Hospital ships and carriers were authorized to transport medical supplies,

and were used to replenish stocks and to handle property exchange of items

of equipment returned to North Africa with patients evacuated by air. As a

secondary benefit, this procedure helped relieve the shortage of shipping space.

Emergency requisitions were to be placed in the same manner as those

for other supplies. Force 343, however, was to give resulting shipments a priority in their daily requests for air transportation. Moreover, the Eastern Base

Section surgeon was to maintain a small medical supply dump in the vicinity

of Kairouan, Tunisia, to contain a balanced stock of those items typically

required for emergency air shipments.25

Sicily Campaign

With plans completed, the pick-and-shovel work of medical supply support began, the main burden of packing and marking falling on the 2d Medical Supply Depot at Oran (fig. 52), which ran an around-the-clock operation

for 2 months.

The advance detachment of the 4th Medical Supply Depot, which had

been operating at Ain M'Lila, Algeria, was ordered to Ferryville, Tunisia, on

1 June 1943, where it operated around the clock, supplying task force units

destined to make the Sicilian invasion. On 7 July, the dump was closed, and

the unit (3 officers and 42 enlisted men) moved to Sicily, attached to the 3d

Division, and landed at Licata on 12 July 1943.26

The 1st Advance Section of the 2d Medical Supply Depot remained near

Algiers until 8 July, when it was attached to the 1st Division and subsequently

landed near Gela, Sicily, on 13 July.27

After a period of heavy bombardment, the amphibious assault on Sicily

began on 10 July. Despite the destruction of 20 percent of the landing craft

by heavy seas, all beaches on the southern shore were secure by the end of the

first day.

The landing of medical personnel at Gela was unduly delayed because of

heavy opposition and lack of unit equipment on the beach. A clearing station of the 1st Medical Battalion was established, but was hampered by the

lack of necessary equipment. A significant amount of medical equipment, including ambulances, was lost at sea as a result of rough landings and enemy

action. These setbacks handicapped hard-pressed medical units, but did not

seriously hinder supply support in general.28

25 (1) Eeport of Operations of the Seventh U.S. Army in the Sicilian Campaign, 10 July to

17 August 1943. Part I—Summary of Operations. [Official record.] (2) Headquarters, I Armored

Corps (Eeinf.), Annex No. 2 to Administrative Order No. 1, "Medical, Part 3, Supply," 14 June 1943.

28 See footnotes 11, p. 210; and 18(2), p. 216.

27 (1) See footnote 11, p. 210. (2) Irwin, Lawrence J.: Medical Supply Field Operations, 10 Aug.

1945. [Official record.]

28 (1) See footnote 25(1), above. (2) Wiltse, Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical

Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters, united States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965. (3) Eeport, Col. Eichard T.

Arnest, MC, Surgeon, II Corps, to The Surgeon General (through channels), dated 30 Aug. 1943,

subject: Eeport of Medical Activities ; Sicilian Campaign.
224 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 52.—The box shop in Oran was extremely productive, providing boxes for

amphibious operations in Sicily and Italy. Note the saw is powered by a vehicle motor.

The end of the amphibious phase on 16 July was followed by the rapid

advance of the Seventh U.S. Army, which made it very difficult for medical

units to keep pace. However, support never faded as the drive carried forward

until 22 July, when Palermo fell to the Americans. The Sicily Campaign came

to a close with the fall of Messina on 17 August 1943.

In spite of the careful planning and preparation, anticipated shortages

of certain items, such as tincture of opium, glycyrrhiza and opium tablets,

sulfaguanidine tablets, hydrogen peroxide, litters, blankets, mercury, some

surgical and dental instruments, and canvas cots, did occur.

Approximately 110 tons of medical supplies were landed on 16 beaches

between D-day and D+2. These initial supply loads consisted of combat medical maintenance units, heavily augmented by items which experience in North

Africa had shown to be required. Medical supplies and equipment were unloaded on the beaches in haphazard fashion, and were later picked up by the

beach group personnel, who issued them as needed until medical supply depot

personnel came ashore. In the Scoglitti area, medical supplies were so widely

scattered on the beaches that collecting them was a slow and difficult task.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 225

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MAP 5.—Medical supply depots in Sicily, July-August 1943.

About 10 percent of the initial medical supply load in all areas was lost

because of enemy action.

At Gela, the 1st Advance Section of the 2d Medical Supply Depot established its first distribution point, which was stocked with supplies taken over

from the beach group or later taken from the beaches. To accomplish this, the

depot borrowed trucks from the 1st Medical Battalion while waiting for their

own transportation to be unloaded.

The movement of the various supply depots (map 5), which were operated

by sections of the 2d and 4th Medical Supply Depots, was indicative of the

fast pace at which the combat situation developed. All medical supplies unloaded in Sicily were received, segregated, inventoried, and moved to appropriate distribution points, which were each stocked with 15 to 20 tons of balanced

medical supplies and located as near the combat elements as the tactical situation would permit.

During the course of the campaign, several Italian medical supply dumps

and military hospitals were captured. Some material found in these installations was adaptable for treatment of civilians and prisoners of war.

In spite of shortcomings and difficulties, medical supply support for the

Sicily Campaign proved to be satisfactory because of careful preparation.

Requisitioning of medical supplies and equipment estimated to be adequate

for current maintenance plus a 30-day reserve was ultimately phased in on

followup convoys from the United States. Acute shortages were satisfied by
226 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

emergency requisitions on base depots in North Africa, with air delivery of

urgent requirements. The first such emergency requisition was for litters to

replace those lost due to the failure of property exchange with hospital ships

and air transports involved in the evacuation of patients during the first week.

Because this failure occurred along the entire chain of evacuation, these items

were constantly flowing to the rear and piling up. Canvas cots, also among the

first emergency requirements, were needed to support extensive bed expansion

in hospitals.

In preparation for the Sicily Campaign, a 1- by 1- by 3-ft. box was designed to provide uniformity for ease of storing and as a container one man

could handle. A strip of wood was nailed across each end to afford a handle.

Although the objective was practical and realistic, boxes were inadequately

constructed because of the scarcity and poor quality of materials available in

North Africa. Therefore, much of the advantage to be gained was outweighed

by the large number of broken boxes arriving at Sicilian supply points.

To counteract the flagrant rifling of supplies, it was recommended that

cases containing whisky be marked with a code known only to shipping and

receiving depot personnel.29

Lack of coordination between the elements making the beachhead landing

resulted in the breakdown of the property exchange system. Directives had

been issued to leave all unused litters, blankets, and splints on the beaches. The

Seventh U.S. Army medical supply officer was unable to locate many items

which had been handled in this manner. Also, medical supplies scheduled for

loading on LST's (landing ships, tank) before their departure from North

Africa were never loaded. Medical personnel who were assigned to these ships

were also missing. It was all typical of the innumerable, unexplainable aspects

of war as no single cause could be identified at the time.30

The medical maintenance units were found to be generally adequate, but,

again, the quantity of cotton was excessive and out of proportion to the other

items supplied. Conversely, camphorated tincture of opium, plaster of paris

bandage, and crinoline were furnished in quantities far short of requirements.

Also, some "seasonal" items furnished were "out of season" for the time of

year the operation took place.

As with other TOE (table of organization and equipment) medical units,

medical depots and their elements were constantly hampered by the shortage

of organic transportation. Vehicles of the 1st Advance Section of the 2d Medical Supply Depot were late in unloading. In any event, they were insufficient

to transport all necessary unit equipment and personnel. Consequently, vehicles

were borrowed from any available source.31

29 (1) Letter, Capt. Charles D. McDonald, MSC, to Medical Supply Officer, Seventh U.S. Army,

25 Sept. 1943, subject: Medical Supply During Sicilian Campaign. (2) See footnotes 8(3), p. 208;

and 25(1), p. 223.

»Letter, Col. L. Holmes Ginn, Jr., MC, Surgeon, 15th Army Group, to Brig. Gen. A. L. Hamblen, AFHQ, 20 July 1943, subject: Report of Visit to Sicily.

m

See footnote 25(1), p. 223.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 227

Following the successful conclusion of the Sicily Campaign, the Island

Base Section was activated at Palermo on 1 September 1943, thereby perpetuating the process of base section employment.

With the capture of Sicily, the Allies had achieved a springboard to Italy

and the Continent, and no time was lost in using Sicily for this purpose. On

9 September 1943, initial landings took place at Salerno.

ASSAULT ON ITALY

Fifth U.S. Army Plans and Preparations

The Fifth U.S. Army, which was activated on 5 January 1943, at Oujda,

French Morocco, began planning Operation AVALANCHE, the Salerno invasion, in July 1943. A target date of 7 September 1943 was set. The medical

supply planning team of SOS-Mediterranean Base Section, so effective in the

Sicily Campaign, joined with other Army personnel in planning the invasion

of Italy.

Medical units were selected, tonnages were computed and phased, and

requisitions were prepared for convoys through D+24. A supply level of 14

days was scheduled to be achieved by D+12. Supplies consisted of medical

maintenance units, augmented by special items, such as plasma, litters, blankets, Atabrine, plaster of paris, and biologicals.

Experience developed in Sicily and the lessons learned in the Tunisia

Campaign were integrated into Fifth U.S. Army medical supply planning. All

medical units were to carry ashore their full TBA material, with selected units

designated to carry additional special supplies and equipment. A medical supply dump was to be established on the beach and absorbed by medical depot

personnel scheduled for early landing. Initially, no forward delivery of supplies was planned because of the extremely limited number of supply personnel in the assault phase. The depot group was to establish forward supply

points as necessary and, later, to operate a depot to serve the entire force.

Medical units landing with the assault force were to carry extra wheeled litter

carriers, litters, blankets, Medical Department chests No. 2, splint sets, and

other selected medical supplies and equipment. The splint sets, which were to

be taken ashore in specially prepared waterproof containers by unit medical

personnel, consisted of dressings, gauze, bandages, cotton, crystalline sulfanilamide, morphine Syrettes, blood plasma, sulfadiazine ointment and tablets,

halazone tablets, together with specially prepared sterile packets of fine mesh

gauze impregnated with boric acid or Vaseline ointment. The waterproofed

packs containing these items weighed 70 pounds and could float while supporting a man in water. In addition, unit personnel each carried 13 units of

plasma in the bottom extension of the individual medical kit. Contents of the

kit not expended during the assault phase were to be delivered to the beach
MEDICAL SUPPLY

^ i i . 11 wiiiiliiit)

FIGTJEE 53.—Landing craft, infantry, unloading supplies, Italy, September 1943.

medical supply depot, a feature which was an application of a recommendation

made following the initial landing experience in North Africa.32

Salerno Landings

The 4th Medical Supply Depot and the 12th Medical Depot Company

were selected for the Salerno operation, and a detachment of the 4th landed

with the assault force on D-day. Because of heavily mined beaches and intense

enemy artillery fire, depot personnel could do little but dig in until midafternoon when beaches were cleared of mines up to 1,4 mile inland. Portable airstrip landing mats of wire were laid on the sands so that supply vehicles could

operate freely. Because certain medical supplies brought in by invasion barges

were dumped into the water near the shore, depot personnel had difficulty

locating them and fishing them out.

On D-day, more than 100 tons of medical supplies were unloaded, secured,

segregated by class, and stored at one location while an issue point was located

at another spot (fig. 53). A total of 200 tons of unit equipment for the 16th

and 95th Evacuation Hospitals was gathered and held by the depot group

32 (1) Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth U.S. Army, 1943. (2) Wiltse, Charles M.: The Medical

Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters. United States Army in

World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965, pp.

251-252.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 229

pending arrival of unit personnel. This was a rare instance where equipment

of major medical units preceded unit personnel in landing.

By D-f-4, all personnel of the 4th Medical Depot detachment had arrived

and supply tonnages had doubled. During the first month, the depot commendably filled 1,102 requisitions while maintaining a detailed inventory of supplies.

As in most other beach operations up to this time, the unpredictable event

was the chief cause of difficulty. In the Salerno landings, large quantities of

gauze, cotton, adhesive tape, and medications were lost in the water. Transports carrying medical supplies and equipment were sunk while many items

such as fluoroscopic screens, X-ray equipment, darkroom tents, and Coleman

stoves were lost or damaged in transit.33

"With the experience of Sicily behind it, the SOS organization responded

quickly to the urgent requirements of the new beachhead. The Salerno landings

were accomplished with this more fully developed advantage. Requisitions for

shortages were radioed from the beaches to SOS in North Africa where resources of the theater could be employed in support.

It was not until 20 September 1943 that the beachhead was finally secured

and the advance proceeded toward Naples and beyond the Volturno River. On

4 October, the 12th Medical Depot Company, commanded by Maj. (later Lt.

Col.) George P. Wilson, MSC, replaced the 4th Medical Supply Depot detachment as the medical depot of the Fifth U.S. Army and took custody of the 50

tons of medical supplies on hand. The detachment then rejoined its parent

organization, which, by this time, had established a base depot in Naples

(fig. 54) following its arrival from North Africa.

The 12th Medical Depot was based on the Naples depot for support;

however, the latter did not open until 15 October and, because of inadequate

stock, full support of the 12th was not possible. Meanwhile, the 12th operated

a depot first at Avellino on 11 October and, on 25 October, at Caserta. These

locations were advantageous because most medical units being supported were

concentrated in that area, and the tactical situation warranted it. By 17 December 1943 (map 6), the 12th was supporting a troop strength of 225,000

from a depot operated at Riardo and another containing some 120 tons of

supplies and equipment set up in a monastery near Calvi Risorta.34

Peninsular Base Section

Meanwhile, the 4th Medical Supply Depot had established a forward

dump at Secondigliano just north of Naples on 10 October (map 6). On 1

November 1943, the base element of the 4th was assigned to the Peninsular

Base Section at Naples. With a wealth of experience to its credit, this unit

quickly adapted itself to the necessity of running a base depot. During this

period and up to January 1944, it handled a large input of supplies from

33 See footnotes 11, p. 210; and 32(1), p. 228.

34 Annual Report, 12th Medical Depot Company, 1943.
230 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 54.—Naples Fair Grounds served as a medical depot site.

North Africa and the United States and sustained the 12th Medical Depot

Company and surrounding medical units (fig. 55) despite heavy air attacks

which failed to interrupt operations to a damaging extent.

The 4th Medical Depot Company for the first time was forced to hire

civilian laborers when a reorganization stripped it of 16 trained enlisted men.

Meanwhile, crowded conditions caused another dump, called Dump 352, to be

opened in the munitions factory tunnels located in the outskirts of Bagnoli.

This new installation supported combat operations as well as several large

medical treatment complexes.

At this point, it is to be noted that the theater was then operating two

major medical depot systems: one represented by the 4th Medical Supply

Depot in the Peninsular Base Section in Italy and the other by the 2d Medical

Supply Depot in Oran, which was carrying tremendous operating stocks and

reserves for the entire theater.

Adriatic Depot

In addition to the supply depots of the Peninsular Base Section, a depot

was established by a detachment of the 4th Medical Depot Company at Bari,
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 231

ffil2(-)(l7Dec)20'2H(

.. IRiard

(6 Nou)

0

iCalvi Risorta

MAP 6.—Movement of the 4th Medical Supply Depot and the 12th Medical Depot Company

in Italy, 7 September-17 December 1943.

Italy, in October 1943. This depot functioned as support for Air Force and

supporting troops until 20 March 1944, when it was turned over to the Medical Section, Army Air Forces Service Command. Supply responsibility was

then handled by the Air Force in direct contact with the Zone of Interior.35

Anzio Operation

The 1st Advance Platoon of the 12th Medical Depot Company, after a

secret move to Naples, was attached to VI Corps, then preparing for the

Anzio operation. Again, this platoon was scheduled for D-day landings, but

this time it immediately followed shore engineer battalions to keep medical

depot stocks and unit equipment separate from supplies and equipment of

35 See footnote 11, p. 210. (2) Annual Report, Army Air Force Service Command, Mediterranean

Theater of Operations, 1944.

295-453 O—68- -17
232 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 55.—Medical supply, 300th General Hospital, Naples, Italy.

other elements during the early hours on the beach. Again, shipping space

was at a premium and, along with enemy action, the lack of it cut into supply

and equipment levels.

Refinements in packing and loading of supplies were incorporated into

the landing preparations while better features of the more recent Salerno

operation were also adopted. Increased supply levels, improved requisitioning

procedures, special items, and property exchange were adequately provided.

Allied Forces Headquarters arranged for hospital ships to maintain a reserve

of litters, blankets, and splints, while naval landing craft carried equipment

to augment and further insure uninterrupted property exchange in patient

evacuation. As an added feature, combat commanders were directed to establish guards over any enemy medical facilities or supplies encountered in the

advance to prevent looting and preserve their serviceability for use in caring

for prisoners of war. This was no doubt prompted by problems encountered

in North Africa when it became the duty of some U.S. medical units to treat

prisoner-of-war patients at a time when supplies, equipment, and medical

facilities were at a premium.36

Arriving on the beach with the second assault wave on 22 January 1944,

the 1st Advance Platoon of the 12th Medical Depot Company, commanded by

Capt. (later Maj.) Richard P. Gilbert, MSC, had a temporary beach dump

so Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth [U.S.] Army, 1944.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 233

in operation by 0700 hours on D + l. Gathering supplies was no problem then

because all that had arrived were several hundred blankets. On the following

day, the dump was moved to a more permanent site on a hill near the AnzioAlbano road.

Depot facilities consisted of a four-story building, 70- by 40-ft., which

accommodated the headquarters, issue room, shipping section, and living

quarters as well as two storage tents which were arranged so the large red

crosses would be clearly visible to the enemy.

At first, supplies were distributed equally and stacked by class; however,

the constant threat of shelling and bombing made it necessary to distribute

the most important items of supply in several areas to avoid complete destruction of any one particular item. This was a rather complicated arrangement

of stockpiles, but was worth the effort involved.

Despite the absence of unloading facilities on the beachhead during the

first 5 days, medical supply operations were sustained during this period by

the supplies carried in by combat and service units. These supplies were transported on the vehicles organic to the various units or often carried in mortar

shell cases (fig. 56), and either dropped on the beach or carried to the supply

dump.

By D+6, the first shipment of medical maintenance units packed by the

4th Medical Depot Company in Bagnoli was completely unloaded. Because of

difficulty in item identification, the British maintenance units which were included were turned over to a British casualty clearing station.

Once again, despite precautionary efforts, property exchange in patient

evacuation broke down on the beaches because LST's and other ships did not

return with litter and blankets as expected. Unfortunately, large quantities

of such items had been allowed to accumulate in Naples. This problem was

solved by requiring litter bearers unloading patients in Naples to return a

litter and blanket to the LST for each patient removed.37

Because of heavy seas and shallow beaches which prevented proper landing or docking, emergency requisitions were dispatched to Naples where

LST's were loaded, transported to Anzio, and landed directly on the beaches.

With improved weather conditions, ships in the harbor were soon unloaded

and large surpluses began to accumulate in the depot. To handle this unmanageable workload, 20 Italian civilians were hired. All supplies were tallied

and stored by D + 15. To offset the constant turnover of the indigenous work

force, a detachment of Italian soldiers was employed, but with no better results. Finally, the problem was solved by the assignment of 12 U.S. soldiers

to the depot.

Harassed by air raids and shelling, the depot nevertheless processed requisitions in rapid time. Emergency requisitions for such items as distilled

37 (1) Gilbert, Richard P.: Combat Medical Supply Operations—the Anzio Beachhead. [Official

record.] (2) Wiltse, Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and

Minor Theaters. United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1965.
234 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 56.—Mortar shell cases used at Anzio.

water, dextrose, and normal saline solutions, as well as essential items of equipment, were sent to the Peninsular Base Section to make up for hoarding and

heavy losses of hospital equipment on the beaches. These supplies were rigidly

controlled by the depot while items of equipment vitally essential to hospital

operation were maintained in depot stock. Hospital equipment was not stocked

according to usual procedure, but there was no other way to make equipment

immediately available. Kapid delivery of replacement items from Naples was

successfully accomplished.

A steady flow of supplies into Anzio was maintained by use of every conceivable form of transportation ranging from Piper Cub to transports, destroyers, LCT's (landing craft, tank), and LST's. Consequently, by 24 April

1944, a 93-day reserve of supplies was on hand. Again contrary to expectation, the boxes for medical supplies failed to hold up. By this time, the more
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 235

"popular" medical stock numbers stenciled on the boxes were well known to

our troops, and whisky and narcotics again became a prime target of looters.

Looting in Italy, in contrast to that in North Africa, was negligible. Difficulty

was experienced in locating box numbers or the box which carried the master

packing lists of a shipment. The inadequacy of the tables of organization and

equipment for a storage and issue platoon of a medical depot company was a

problem.

Between 23 January and 7 June 1944, the 1st Advance Platoon of the

12th Medical Depot Company, while operating the supply point for the Anzio

beachhead, handled 842 tons of supplies and equipment, of which 610 tons

were issued and 232 tons transferred. In keeping with the superior performance of the medical service as a whole, this was a highly significant accomplishment for a small depot section operating under severest handicaps.

ROME-ARNO CAMPAIGN

Fifth U.S. Army Medical Service

U.S. medical units were regrouping near Carinola to support the Fifth

U.S. Army in the spring offensive which was launched before midnight on

11 May 1944.

While the 1st Platoon of the 12th Medical Depot Company was supporting the Anzio beachhead, its 2d Platoon moved from the base depot at Calvi

Risorta on 20 April to the town of Nocelleto before the Fifth U.S. Army attack. By this date, the unit was supporting a new Fifth U.S. Army area in

which the troop strength had been increased to approximately 201,000. With

the attack, the platoon again moved rapidly; first to Itri, then on to Rome by

9 June and Piombino by 28 June, finally reaching the vicinity of Florence on

31 August 1944.

Meanwhile the 1st Platoon, after reverting to company control when

joined by the base section on 7 June, moved from Anzio to Civitavecchia on

11 June and to Cecina on 9 July. While in the Civitavecchia and Cecina areas,

the 1st Platoon experienced great difficulty in obtaining supplies from its

parent base section which had replaced it at Anzio. The small amount of supplies sent from Anzio, supplies flown in from Naples, and a limited amount

of supplies remaining at Civitavecchia comprised the total stock available for

the Rome-Arno offensive. Consequently, it would seem that were it not for

excesses inadvertently built up during the early days at the Anzio beachhead,

medical units could have experienced serious supply shortages during those

crucial first few weeks of the campaign.38

During the Rome-Arno Campaign, the 12th Medical Depot Company

was reorganized, its three platoons being redesigned storage and issue platoons

(fig. 57 A and B). Throughout the campaign, one platoon supported each of

38 (1) Annual Report, 12th Medical Depot Company, 1944. (2) See footnote 37(1), p. 233.

(3) Mial, Marcel H.: Fifth Army Medical Supply Activities, 1 August 1943-1 August 1944, dated

28 Aug. 1944. [Official .record.]
MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 57.—The 12th Medical Depot Company, Fifth U.S. Army, Volterra area, Italy,

9 August 1944: A. Two storage tents. B. Loose issue tent.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 237

MAP 7.—Medical supply depots in Italy, 6 January-17 September 1944.

the two U.S. corps engaged, while the base element maintained a position

accessible to both (map 7). Problems of delivering supplies over rugged terrain were solved by using every conceivable means of transportation, including pack animals and sleds.

During the period up to 11 September 1944, the 12th had operated entirely under canvas. As a result, supplies and equipment were subjected to the

rigors of wind, dust, rain, and general dampness, which made operations unsatisfactory and costly.39

38 Wiltse, Charles M.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and

Minor Theaters, united States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1965.
MEDICAL SUPPLY

On 17 August 1944, regular requisitioning in the Peninsular Base Section

was established by the Fifth U.S. Army. The use of War Department replacement factors, introduced as a means of determining medical supply requirements relative to troop strengths to be supported, had little effect on Fifth

U.S. Army's medical stock position during the Eome-Arno Campaign. During

the campaign, U.S. medical supply support was furnished to French, Brazilian, and various British units, and on occasion to Italian troops, as well as

Fifth U.S. Army Forces. Where Allied troops were concerned, delicate political questions required equal delicacy in deciding when and what medical

supplies could be spared for Allied troops.

The sensitivity of this situation was recognized by Brig. Gen. Joseph I.

Martin, Surgeon, Fifth U.S. Army, and he manifested this in his policies. Expendable supplies going to U.S. troops were drawn directly from the depot;

however, nonexpendables were processed through the Fifth U.S. Army medical supply officer, Colonel Mial, for control purposes before depot action, as

were all requisitions from Allied units. Approved requisitions for the French

were forwarded to the depot, which in turn transferred the specified material

directly to the French medical supply depot which effected proper distribution.

For the Brazilian units, Colonel Mial forwarded approved requisitions to the

12th Medical Depot Company for issue directly to the Brazilian units

concerned.

It was observed that there was widespread hoarding by all organizations,

which in some instances threatened their mobility. At this point in the war,

units had become familiar with the unreliability of the forward movement of

supplies. Although not to be condoned, their hoarding was not entirely without explanation. To cope with these problems, the Army Surgeon directed that

a vigorous supply discipline program be implemented in the Fifth U.S. Army.

As a device to conserve medical equipment, a novel feature was employed

to provide Allied units with equipment in excess of authorized allowances. In

particular, when a request was found justified, the Army Surgeon authorized

the issue to a nearby U.S. unit, which in turn released it on hand-receipt to

the Allied unit. Emergency issues were always made without question. Such

occasions were frequent, particularly as a result of destruction of supplies and

equipment by the elements.

The Army Surgeon also exercised scrutiny of depot inventories, while

records on the location of all medical equipment used in Fifth U.S. Army

units were kept by his medical supply officer. Such extensive control of material was, perhaps, the most detailed procedure used in a combat area in the

entire Mediterranean theater.40

Services of Supply Support

In February 1944, a realinement converted the year-old SOS, NATOUSA,

into a true communications zone organization. Colonel Shook remained as

40 (1) Administrative Directive No. 49, Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, 17 Aug. 194*4, subject : Basis for Editing Class II Requisitions. (2) See footnote 36, p. 232.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 239

FIGURE 58.—Two general hospital assemblies, stored under tarps at Oran as reserves,

came into ready use as replacement for hospital assemblies lost during the bombing raid

of Bari Harbor in December 1943.

Communications Zone Surgeon, with an enlarged staff to carry out his expanded functions. Lt. Col. (later Col.) Joseph G. Cocke, MC, became Colonel

Shook's deputy in April, and Lt. Col. (later Col.) Jenner G. Jones, MC, was

placed in charge of the medical supply branch. Although the communications

zone medical section took over many activities for which the theater surgeon

had previously been responsible, such as hospitalization and evacuation, working relations between the two groups continued to be harmonious.

Control of the base sections, also, passed to the communications zone early

in 1944, together with base section supply problems. For example, most of the

2,000 tons of stock on hand in the Peninsular Base Section consisted of medical

maintenance unit components. Stocks of hospital equipment, such as would be

specially requisitioned through SOS, NATOUSA, were strictly limited.

On 5 January, Services of Supply assumed responsibility for supplying

the various base sections in the theater and for keeping theater stocks properly

balanced. Due-in records were maintained by Peninsular Base Section, utilizing SOS requisitions as sources of information. These requisitions were themselves based on the semimonthly inventory reports.

Extremes and urgency of support that SOS encountered were exemplified by the German attack on ships anchored off Bari, in December 1943, causing the loss of one general hospital assembly, two station hospital assemblies,

and two field hospital assemblies. This would have been a catastrophe if SOS

had not previously chosen to disregard instructions from the Zone of Interior

to dismantle two general hospital assemblies stored under tarps at the Oran

Medical Depot (fig. 58). Components of these assemblies comprised the bulk

of immediate replacements.
240 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGTJBE 59.—Walk-in refrigerators (with generators) at the medical depot in Oran

were used as shipping containers from the United States for a large shipment of medical

refrigerated items, and delivered to the depot site intact to serve as theater refrigerated

storage.

During the summer of 1944, the Peninsular Base Section found itself not

only supporting the Rome-Arno offensive of the Fifth U.S. Army, but equipping and reequipping units of the VI Corps in addition to providing resupply

requirements for the southern France beachhead forces. During July and

August, the latter requirements amounted to 184 tons of medical supplies and

equipment.

The peak of activity for SOS, NATO-USA, and other major headquarters

was the summer of 1944. An infinite variety of relatively unpublicized supply

problems were arising and being solved. For example, shipment of dated items

requiring refrigeration en route to, and while stored in, theater depots had

been a problem from the beginning. Refrigerated space on ships was always

overcrowded and inadequate. To solve both problems, SOS arranged with the

New York Port of Embarkation to have appropriate shipments packed into

Engineer Corps knocked-down, walk-in type refrigerators, which in turn were

loaded aboard ship, intact. On arrival, the loaded refrigerators were delivered

intact to depots (fig. 59). Thus, adequate storage in transit plus continued storage on arrival at the depot were assured, while uniform expansion of the theater refrigerated storage capacity was achieved concurrently.41

Support through Leghorn.—Tonnage of medical supplies in the Peninsular Base Section grew from 2,000 tons in January to 6,000 tons by August

41 (1) Annual Report, Peninsular Base Section, 1944. (2) For a more detailed description of

the organization of the medical service in the Mediterranean theater, see The Medical Department,

United States Army. Organization and Administration in World War II. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 241

Ifi

hii"

>4 4

FIGURE 60.—U.S. Army Medical Depot, Leghorn, Italy, bounded by buildings marked with

the Geneva Cross on the right and left.

1944. With Leghorn captured, this base section acquired a supply base fully

capable of filling all Fifth U.S. Army needs. Stocks were rapidly built up so

that by the year's end, tonnages of medical materiel in Leghorn were equal to

those carried in Naples (fig. 60). This was accomplished not without considerable difficulty as the actual point of receipt of individual items could not be

predicted more than 10 days in advance of unloading. Problems arising out of

necessity for transshipment were substantial.

The 4th Medical Depot Company, base depot for the Peninsular Base

Section, continued operation at Bagnoli. By April 1944, tonnage had increased

to 4,000 tons and issues reached an aggregate of 1,000 tons a month. During the

Eome-Arno Campaign, the activity of the 4th increased markedly to a peak in

May, when 2,228 requisitions were filled.

Preparations to move North African bases.—Characteristic of operations in the theater as the war moved closer to the enemy heartland, base section

operations of earlier campaigns gradually consolidated and phased out of operation. Consequently, excess stocks in North Africa were shipped to the Peninsular Base Section. A large shipment from the Eastern Base Section arrived

simultaneously with an 8,000-package shipment from the Mediterranean Base

Section. This deluge was a backbreaking task to handle, but in 6 days, the 4th

Medical Depot Company had it all recorded and warehoused.
242 MEDICAL SUPPLY

This and other depot workloads could not have been accomplished with the

136 men authorized under new TOE 8-667. Depot personnel who were rendered

excess under the earlier reorganization were retained on temporary duty.42

Shifting of supply depots in rear areas.—On departure of the base element of the 12th Medical Depot Company from Anzio, it was replaced by the

7th Medical Depot Company, which was atthe time assigned to Peninsular Base

Section. It operated the Anzio issue point from 11 to 21 June 1944, when it

was directed to operate the depot at Civitavecchia, Being relieved by a detachment of the 4th Medical Depot Company, the 7th returned to Naples and, by 1

July, had begun preparations for the forthcoming invasion of southern France.

The supply of troops in the Kome area presented particular problems to

the Peninsular Base Section. After considerable delay, a plan was evolved to

institute service to these units directly from the Naples depot while the 4th

Medical Depot Company detachment at Civitavecchia supplied only units in

that immediate vicinity. In addition, the 12th General Hospital in Eome was

stocked to distribute supplies to those units in the Kome area.

On 7 July 1944, a group from the Civitavecchia detachment established a

small issue point at Piombino. Coincident with this, all medical depots south

of the Volturno Kiver were consolidated by 17 July. Operations were thereby

centered in Bagnoli while all medical depot operations between the Volturno

and Civitavecchia had been eliminated. Meanwhile, the 4th Medical Depot

Company had been augmented by the 684th Quartermaster Base Depot Company, which previously had been attached to the 7th Medical Depot Company

(map 7) and was further attached to the 4th on relief of the 7th from the

Civitavecchia assignment.43

SOUTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN

Following the capture of Eome on 5 June 1944 and the establishment of

Headquarters, SOS, NATOUSA, at Caserta, on 4 July, the Coastal Base Section, with the specific mission to support the invasion of France, was organized.

When the invading VI Corps struck the coast of southern France on 15 August

1944, it was accompanied by personnel of the section, now called Continental

Base Section, who opened its headquarters at Marseille. To compensate for

the long supply line, CONAD (Continental Advance Section), which was established close to the Armies at Dijon, replaced the deactivated Continental

Base Section. Delta Base Section was activated simultaneously with headquarters at Marseille. Together CONAD and Delta Base Section constituted

SOLOC (Southern Line of Communications), of which Colonel Shook was

Surgeon.

42 (1) See footnote 41(1), p. 240. (2) Annual Report, 232d Medical Service Battalion, 1944.

«(1) Annual Report, 7th Medical Depot Company, 1944. (2) See footnote 42(2), above. (3)

Annual Report, 684th Quartermaster Base Depot Company, 1944.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 243

Base Section Medical Supply

During their brief tenure in Marseille, Continental Base Section personnel

located an excellent depot site near port and rail facilities, and unloaded and

warehoused over 200 tons of medical supplies before the arrival of the 231st

Medical Composite Battalion (formerly 2d Medical Supply Depot) on 10

September 1944. At the outset, the base surgeon, who had been supervising

beach dump operations, was advised that several ships would unload 200 tons

of medical supplies in the near future. Without depot personnel, warehousing,

or transportation, the assistant base section medical supply officer took immediate action and, after scouring the city, found a suitable building which he

claimed for use as a medical depot. Despite some difficulty unloading the supplies and rounding up needed personnel, all 200 tons of equipment were stored

within 15 hours. Under these circumstances, the first medical supplies for base

section operation were received, stored by catalog class, and readied for issue

within 72 hours of arrival.44

With the arrival of the veteran 231st Medical Composite Battalion, commanded by Major Markus, base section depot operations began with vigor.

Originally designated Medical Depot 356 (later European theater Depot

M-152), it grew to be one of the largest and most ideally operated depots in

the theater, with over 255,000 square feet of closed shed and open warehouse

space (fig. 61 A and B).

To alleviate the manpower shortage, elements of the 46th and 81st Medical

Base Depot Companies and the 320th Medical Service Detachment were attached to the 231st at various times. A mobile optical unit of the 7th Medical

Depot Company was attached to the Marseille depot on 10 September to handle

optical repair for the base section.

Early Depot Operations

On 16 August 1944, an advance section of the 7th Medical Depot Company,

which had been attached to the Seventh U.S. Army for the Southern France

Campaign on 13 July, came ashore at Sainte-Maxime, and took over the operation of the three medical supply dumps at Sainte-Maxime, Le Muy, and SaintEaphael (fig. 62).

By 25 August, this section, after operating an issue point at Le Cannet,

had moved to Saint-Maximin, where it was joined by the main body of the

7th Medical Depot Company (map 8).

Moving rapidly up the Ehone Valley in support of the Seventh U.S.

Army offensive, units of the 7th Medical Depot Company briefly operated

supply points at Meyrargues, Aspremont (map 8), Voreppe, Sellieres, and

Baume before the entire company reunited on 20 September at Vesoul (map

9). Here the first permanent depot in southern France was establishd in a

44 See footnote 41(1), p. 240.
244 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 61.—A. Unique inclined ramp with fixed skate conveyor set up to facilitate

unloading at Medical Depot M.-A52, Marseille, France.

large tobacco warehouse, which provided adequate space for storage, issue

offices, mess facilities, and billets.45

Through the efforts of the 46th Medical Depot Company and Maj. (later

Lt. Col.) Oliver A. Parssinen, MAC, modern palletized storage methods and

maximum materials-handling equipment were introduced, thus enabling the

depot to better support the 6th Army Group.

By 31 October, 444,715 tons of general cargo and 147,231 vehicles had been

disembarked in southern France. Because of the improved port, rail, and road

facilities, supplies were handled and moved rapidly. Eventually the medical

depot developed and maintained a 15-day level of supplies for the Combat

Zone and a 15-day level for CONAD.46

« (1) Report, 231st Medical Composite Battalion, dated 28 Oct. 1944, subject: Medical Historical Data. (2) See footnote 43(1), p. 242.

49 (1) Annual Report, 46th Medical Depot Company, 1944. (2) Headquarters, Communications Zone, NATOUSA, Circular Number 113, 6 Oct. 1944. (3) Wiltse, Charles M.: The Medical

Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters. United States Army in

World War II. The Technical Services. Washington: UjS. Government Printing Office, 1965. (4)

See footnote 45(1), above.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 245

FIGURE 61.—Continued. B. Skate conveyor placed in a truck bed facilitated transfer

to rail cars or unloading of other local movements of stock.

On 26 October, the 7lst Medical Base Depot Company was assigned to

CONAD at Dijon, where it joined in operating the depot there with the 70th

which had arrived several days previously. That depot site, although it had

satisfactory billeting for personnel, lacked adequate covered warehouse space.

Consequently, large amounts of stock were in open storage.47

Later Depot Operations

As of 1 November 1944, both CONAD and the Delta Base Section were

absorbed by SOLOC. The original staff of this group was drawn from the

Communications Zone, NATOUSA, organization, including its surgeon, Colonel Shook. Indeed, the personnel shifts were so extensive that Communications

Zone, MTOUSA (as it was formally known after 1 November 1944), went out

of existence in less than a month. Its functions, including medical supply,

were resumed by the theater medical section. In southern France, meanwhile,

11 Narrative Summary, 71st Medical Base Depot Company, November 1944.
246 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGUBE 62.—Beach medical supply dump in southern France.

in a radical departure from earlier policy, a Medical Administrative Corps

officer, Lt. Col. Allen Pappas, became medical supply officer of SOLOC.

At first, both the Delta Base Section and CONAD were supplied by

Communications Zone, NATOUSA, but all supplies for CONAD passed

through the Delta Base Section. They were often transferred by DUKW's

(amphibious trucks, 2i/2-ton cargo) from ships directly to waiting freight

cars, bound for forward areas without ever entering the Delta Base Depot.

Keceipts at the depot were very small for the first 2 months. In fact, adequate

stock levels could not be achieved in either base section because ship arrivals

were uncertain. Also, because the Marseille port was only partially restored,

unloading was relatively slow, and transportation from port to depot was

tightly scheduled. In spite of this, the 231st Medical Composite Battalion

managed to fill 60 percent of the requisitions received from the Seventh U.S.

Army, the French Army, CONAD, and Delta Base units. No serious shortage

developed within Delta Base medical units, fortunately, because they had

arrived in France with a 90-day supply. Stocks up to the authorized levels

were finally on hand in the Delta Base Depot by mid-November. During the

preceding 3 months, the 231st had received 3,329 tons and issued 1,894.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 247

7(-)!l8Aug)

'y.^->pLSt.-/Raphael

Le Adu2ffiK7(-)(l6Aug]

S-P^l8* /^Ste.Maxime

25 Aug

25 KILOMETERS <3 -o'

JAS

MAP 8.—Seventh U.S. Army depots in southern France, 16-29 August 1944.

At this point in the war in southern France, stress on conservation was

growing. Inducements were offered for return of salvage to depots, and emphasis was placed on repair. For some time, CONAD was without medical

repair facilities of its own and was forced to farm out work to other military

units in its area, but many items had to be returned to the 231st Medical Composite Battalion in Marseille.

Packaging of supplies received by the 231st was generally excellent, and

breakage was minimal. In November, blankets were scarce and the shortage of

certain immunizing biologicals was a cause for concern. By January 1945, the

general stock picture was very good, with steady improvement in item balance

and with no items in critically short supply.

Efforts made by the depot to institute modern warehouse and stock-handling practices were completely successful by March 1945, resulting in a com295-453 O—68- -18
248 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

7(19 Sept °

I70ct) ro

Vesoul

25 KILOMETERS

)7(-)(l3-l9Sept)'

*Bqume-les-Dames

Besaneon" - ;'".'" -; ;/

Dole

)7(-)((2-20Sept)

,! .'' Sellieresi

: Chalon-sur-Saone

j Lons-le-Saunier

Lausanne

AmourMa con'

Bourg' Geneva

iA'mberieu

Lyon

^

Ghambery1

ffi>H'(5-l2-Sept)'

Voreppe//'

v Grenoble

Valence

BERN

JAS

MAP 9.—Seventh U.S. Army depots, 5-19 September 1944.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 249

mendation from G-4, Headquarters, Delta Base Section, as well as Army

Service Forces representatives from Washington. During April, a substantial

increase in tonnage received brought considerable pressure to bear upon the

storage section of the depot. A special pallet-building crew was employed to

avoid a growing backpile of stock. From this experience, a unique inclined

plane, skate conveyor, receiving platform was devised which permitted simultaneous receipt, sorting, palletizing, and delivery of boxes to bay locations for

immediate forklift stacking. Thus, sporadic receipts of large quantities of

operating supplies no longer disrupted normal operations.48

Compared to previous base section operations, Delta Base Section operations were extremely smooth. This was due primarily to the confidence and

experience with which the headquarters, staff section, units, and individuals

performed their tasks.

In December 1944, the depot opened a large pharmacy to prepare bulk

quantities of 31 standard stock preparations—such as tincture of green soap,

cough mixtures, and ointments—for issue to small unit dispensaries of the

area, thereby relieving overburdened hospital pharmacies of this considerable

workload. During the first 6 months of operation, the depot pharmacy issued

more than 13,000 units of these preparations.49

NORTH APENNINES OPERATION

By the middle of August 1944, when the swift thrust into southern France

was being launched, the Allied armies in Italy were slowed to a halt on the

south bank of the Arno Kiver and along the Metauro Kiver on the Adriatic.

Both the Fifth U.S. Army and the British Eighth Army had outrun their

supplies.

When it became apparent toward the middle of November 1944 that

a hoped-for breakthrough into the Po Valley would not materialize and that

Fifth U.S. Army operations for some time would be limited to patrol actions,

the Army dug in for the winter.50 The next few months were used to regroup,

reequip, and bring the Armies up to strength for the final drive.

The 12th Medical Depot Company at this time attempted to adapt local

civilian help to its operations to offset the reduction in strength from 166 to 136

in the reorganization under the new TOE. This proved unsatisfactory because,

with each move, a new group of civilian workers had to be hired and trained.

In late 1944, some relief was provided by the attachment of a company of

Italian service troops which remained with the depot as it moved.

Another remarkable feature of TOE 8-667 was the inclusion of dental

teams, which were described by one depot commander as so much "dead wood"

because of their chronic absence on detached service. A further analysis of

TOE showed that, after discounting these—and allowing for personnel as48 See footnote 46(1), p. 244.

*> See footnote 46(1), p. 244.

B0 See footnote 36, p. 232.
250 MEDICAL SUPPLY

signed to the two storage and issue platoons operating remote from depot headquarters, to the optical team, to maintenance duty, and to Headquarters overhead—only 19 enlisted men remained at the base element to procure, store, and

issue supplies and equipment, which usually amounted to an issue workload

of 5 tons daily.

On this aspect of depot operations, the commanding officer of the 12th

Medical Depot Company, Major Wilson, commented as follows:51

It is understood that the present table was inaugurated in order to conserve manpower. It does just that, but to the detriment of efficiency in an organization in which

efficiency should be foremost.

It is neither practical nor possible to train civilians speaking only a foreign language

to fill requisitions nor to properly warehouse supplies within such a short period of time

as must be done in order for them to be of value to a field medical depot. An organization of this type may mean a matter of life and death to a soldier in the front lines.

Also, it is suggested by War Department assignment that a Medical Depot Company be

employed for each 75,000 troops. In reality this depot is servicing three times that

number.

Changes in Theater Supply Organization

During the lull in fighting in the winter of 1944-45, theater medical supply responsibilities were being assumed by the Mediterranean theater surgeon's

office. On 20 November 1944, a reorganization occurred in which the Communications Zone of the Mediterranean theater was dissolved and its responsibility in southern France was passed to SOLOC, which in turn became a subordinate command of the European theater. In this move, Colonel Shook, appointed SOLOC Surgeon, took most of his staff with him, thus causing a

severe personnel problem in the Mediterranean theater. This deficiency at one

point placed in jeopardy the timely submission of the theater medical supply

requisition to the United States and of the supply consumption report until

some relief was forthcoming.

Studies were undertaken to fix order times and shipping times for a more

accurate theater requisitioning objective. Material status report items were

found to have an order and shipping time of 45 days while other items took

about 150 days. Further studies involving costs of transportation, storage, and

issue of medical supplies were also undertaken.52

The role of the Peninsular Base Section as the intermediary in the chain

of supply between the Fifth U.S. Army and the Mediterranean theater was

being circumvented during this winter period. On several occasions, the Fifth

U.S. Army went directly to the Mediterranean theater for supplies; in one

instance, this resulted in a duplication when the 12th Medical Depot Company

requisitioned on the depot at Leghorn at the same time the latter was acting

on a cable request from the theater to satisfy the same requirement. ^ During the winter, the back-order system was improved within Fifth

U.S. Army medical depot operations and with the Peninsular Base Section

si See footnotes 4(1), p. 205 ; and 38(1), p. 235. 5MD Annual Report, Surgeon, MTOUSA, 1944. (2) See footnote 41 (2), p. 240.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 251

depot. Previously, back-orders were held until many became invalid before

they could be filled, and the volume became so great that all were ultimately

canceled. After 60 days elapsed, back-orders were canceled to prevent such

accumulations and, at the same time, to realize a more efficient reorder

process.53

Changes in North African Operations

The Mediterranean Base Section transferred its headquarters from Oran

to Casablanca in November 1944. In addition to its normal mission, the 56th

Station Hospital became a depot in the Atlantic Base Section on movement

of the 60th Medical Base Depot Company to the Peninsular Base Section

from Oran. The 56th Station Hospital received 100 tons of supplies from

Oran, plus subsequent shipments diverted from their original Mediterranean

Base Section destination.

Previously, as operations contracted in North Africa, about 1,000 tons of

medical stock were transferred to the Mediterranean Base Section, from which

point they were redistributed to southern France, Italy, the Zone of Interior,

and to Allied and cobelligerent forces. Eventually, however, the center of

gravity for supply in North Africa moved westward from Oran to Casablanca,

owing to the concentration of U.S. forces, mostly Air Corps, in that area.

Thus, by 10 December 1944, medical supply operations in the Eastern, Mediterranean, and Atlantic Base Sections, once a substantial part of a vast and

unprecedented logistical machine, were relegated to the 57th Station Hospital

in the Eastern Base Section area, to the 54th Station Hospital in the Mediterranean Base Section area, and to the 56th Station Hospital in the Atlantic

Base Section area as an additional responsibility.54

Other Theater Changes

Peninsular Base Section headquarters moved from Naples to Leghorn on

25 November 1944, where it joined its advance headquarters section. "With

this move, the base section medical supply officer and his staff were permanently located in Leghorn while medical supply activities in Naples became

the part-time responsibility of one officer. Stocks in Leghorn and Naples were

fairly equally divided for a time, but the rapid increase at Leghorn was

eventually matched by a similar decrease in Naples. A large portion of stocks

on hand in Naples, however, was theater excess concentrated there as a result

of shipments from the Mediterranean and Island Base Sections. The task of

balancing stocks between Naples and Leghorn presented some extremely

knotty problems. Meanwhile, emphasis was placed on the buildup of balanced

stocks at Leghorn and avoiding the accumulation of any excess there.

63 See footnote 4(1), p. 205.

« (1) Annual Report, 56th Station Hospital, 1944. (2) Annual Report, 60th Medical Base Depot

Company, 1944. (3) Annual Report, 54th Station Hospital, 1944. (4) Annual Report, 57th Station

Hospital, 1944.
m MEDIOAL SUPPLY

Inspection of hospital supply activities in January 1945 by the medical

supply officer of the Peninsular Base Section revealed that, after 2 years of

virtually unrestricted activity, many glaring deficiencies existed in stock accounting, storage, requisitioning, and housekeeping. Accordingly, a series of

medical supply conferences were held which served to revise the standards

and to improve operations.55

The two Northern Base Section depots operated on Corsica since February 1944, by an advance section of the 7th Medical Depot Company, were

consolidated in October 1944 into one depot operated by a detachment of the

684th Quartermaster Base Depot Company. By the end of March 1945, and

before deactivation of Headquarters, Northern Base Section, on 25 May,

medical supplies there had been reduced to only 75 tons; by 6 April 1945, the

depot had closed and personnel departed for Italy. Units remaining in Corsica

were supplied by the 40th Station Hospital, which carried a 120-day supply

for 1,000 beds.56

In January 1945, a medical supply conference was held at Fifth U.S.

Army headquarters. This conference improved inventory reporting, and

clarified requirements determination and maintenance of stock levels, in addition to establishing policy for continuous review of stocks for determination

and disposition of excesses.57

The increase in tonnage at the Leghorn depot, which had accelerated during November and December, abruptly halted in January 1945, prompted by

an anticipated German offensive which had the port of Leghorn as its objective. Previously scheduled shipments were diverted to Naples and, in anticipation of attack, redistribution of large quantities of stock to the 12th Medical

Depot Company at Florence was planned. The Fifth U.S. Army supply level

was increased from 10 to 20 days, with tonnages jumping from 150 to 205

tons. However, plans and preparations were never brought into action because the German offensive did not materialize. Normal operations were resumed at Leghorn, and during February and March 1945, tonnage rose to

almost 4,500 tons.58

Meanwhile, the 4th Medical Depot Company was redesignated and reorganized as the 232d Medical Composite Battalion. The 72d Base Depot

Company assisted it in the storage and issue of supplies in the Naples area,

while the 73d Medical Base Depot Company operated the Leghorn depot from

October through December 1944.

The 232d was again reorganized into a medical service battalion of the

same number, which improved its authorized strength and maintenance eleK Hansen, William L.: [Peninsular] Base Section Medical Supply Activities, 10 Aug. 1945.

[Official record.]

58 Annual Report, Northern Base Section. 1944 and 1945.

07 Report of Supply Conference at Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, 2-3 January 1945, dated

4 Jan. 1945.

63 See footnote 55, above.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 253

ment. The 60th. and 80th Medical Base Depot Companies, and the 684th

Quartermaster Base Depot Company, all attached or assigned to the battalion,

successively operated the depot at Leghorn which served seven station hospitals, five general hospitals, the 12th Medical Depot Company, various port

battalions, Quartermaster detachments, Air Force units, and a variety of

other elements in the area.

The Leghorn depot became the main medical supply point for the theater

during February 1945, and maintained theater reserves for the Northern and

Mediterranean Base Sections, and the Adriatic Depot. The fifth echelon maintenance shop, spare parts, stock of teeth, and optical repair shop had been

previously transferred from Naples to Leghorn during January.59

PO VALLEY CAMPAIGN

Preparations for the final drive into the Po Valley were thorough and

extensive. The Fifth U.S. Army was brought to full strength—almost 270,000

on 1 April 1945, as compared to the 170,000, 6 months earlier. However, resources available to the Fifth U.S. Army Surgeon were increased by only one

400-bed evacuation hospital over the inadequate number of facilities for the

lesser strength supported in the North Apennines Campaign. Additional

medical battalions, ambulance companies, or supply units were not added.

Hospital bed capacity was less than enough to keep pace with the increase in

troop strength. Close general hospital support of the Army medical facilities

was necessary to absorb the overflow.60

Moving from their respective locations in Filigare and Lucca as the campaign advanced, the two forward storage and issue platoons of the 12th Medical Depot Company established depots at Porretta and Bologna. Each left

behind a small detachment in its former location to operate dumps which

supported units remaining in the vicinity.

By 30 April 1945, the 2d Storage and Issue Platoon had progressed to

Verona by way of Mirandola, and shortly thereafter, the depot headquarters,

maintenance section, and 1st Storage Issue Platoon moved from Florence to

Modena, while the 3d Storage and Issue Platoon remained at Bologna (map

10). The headquarters section had barely completed setting up when hostilities in Italy ceased on 2 May 1945.61

During the final offensive, heavy casualties as well as nonavailability of

trucks and ambulances and subsequent delays caused a great deal of confusion. The confusion was in no way lessened by the fact that medical units,

following on the heels of the retreating enemy, often found themselves operating behind the German lines.

so See footnote 42(2), p. 242.

•»Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth U.S. Army, 1945.

«Monograph, Lt. Col. George P. Wilson, MSC, dated 13 Aug. 1945, subject: Fifth Army Medical

Depot Activities.
254 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Parma

KSai)ffil2(IMay 45)

\g, Modena ...

3(SSI)(^I2(24 Apr 45)

*p Bologna

3(SBi;(-(-J 2115 0c; 44)

F:hgare

2(S8ll(-y l2(7Apr 45)

^."jrre'tc

2(S8l)£n'2(30-;o»44)

LJ'ca V

Florence

0 IÜ 2C 30 .VIILFS

-

c 10 20 30 KILOMETERS

JAS

MAP 10.—Medical supply depots in northern Italy, 15 October 1944-1 May 1945.

SOME SUPPLY ACTIVITIES IN REVIEW

Depot Operations

During the Italian campaign, the 12th Medical Depot Company performed herculean tasks of operation and movement (fig. 63). It received a

total of 2,524 tons of supplies and issued 2,402 tons. Nonrepayable and surplus

equipment and supplies were moved to the rear. New organizations entering

combat for the first time drew heavily on expendable supplies until they
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 255

FIGURE 63.—Medics of the 10th Mountain Division pull sled with litter and bundle

of medical supplies up a steep incline of the Apennines.

learned through experience that it was neither wise nor expedient to be burdened with excessive quantities.62

Changes in depot locations were necessarily governed by changes in the

tactical situation. The pattern of depot movement normally put an advance

detail at the new location to make preparations for receiving the balance of

the depot. When time was not of the essence, the issue room and stock ac62 See footnote 61, p. 253.
256 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 64.—Repair of X-ray generators, being performed by the improvised medical

maintenance shop at the depot in Oran, was a perpetual requirement.

counting section were the last to move. Usually convoys of original-package

stock were moved first. This gave the issue section time in which to pack

loose stock. To facilitate these moves, men of the issue section premarked

cases for the various classes with the medical catalog class number to identify

the contents, thus permitting requisitions to be rilled immediately upon

arrival.

In effecting a move, experience proved that one convoy a day was the

most practical as it permitted unloading at the new location before the next

convoy arrived, and permitted men at the old location to strike tentage while

preparing the next convoy. Fortunately, all moves were possible in daylight

which helped to avoid undue confusion.63

Medical Maintenance

During the first 30 days of operations in North Africa, the need for a

medical maintenance program was quite evident (fig. 64). Almost all field

<« See footnote 61, p. 253.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 257

X-ray equipment, which was irreplaceable, arrived with broken leaded glass

screens. Even such minor items as wicks in the kerosene refrigerators burned

out, and glass tubing on steam sterilizers and plastic knobs on the sterilizers

arrived broken. With no maintenance program, even the simplest parts were

not available for replacement. It is true that many replacement parts were

in the medical supply catalog, but there was only a token number, and they

were primarily of a type such as otoscope and ophthalmoscope light bulbs

normally consumed in the use of the basic item.

The ingenuity of members of various medical units was relied upon to

reconcile numerous maintenance problems. Many "Rube Goldberg" devices

and modifications worked extremely well and were so practical that eventually

a theater program was established wherein all such creations and modifications

were reduced to drawings, gathered together, published, and distributed within the theater for the benefit of all units (fig. 65 A and B).

The parts problem gathered such momentum that, within 60 days from

D-day, a recommendation was forwarded from the Medical Section, Mediterranean Base Section, that, as an interim measure, manufacturers be required

to pack with each item they supplied, a 6-month supply of those component

parts which they considered necessary for frequent replacement. This was

never fully implemented, except for the Coleman stove. Parts provisioning of

this type later became a feature in the Medical Department's maintenance

program.

The first requisition prepared in the Mediterranean Base Section included

many nonstandard items, over half of which were uncataloged repair parts.

In the absence of necessary catalogs and technical skills, identification of the

wide variety of parts for the numerous manufacturers and types of equipment

in use was, in most instances, nothing more than guesswork. Considerable effort was later expended over a 6-month period by the Medical Section, Headquarters, SOS, to establish a firmer basis of requirements, but the size and

complexity of the task severely limited any broad approach to the subject.

Meanwhile, item-for-item exchange and cannibalization caused large quantities

of unserviceable items to accumulate in depots, and the irreducible minimum

resulting from cannibalization was frequently reached. It was in this climate

that a semblance of medical maintenance activitiy developed in medical depots

from a part-time operation of expediency into activities in base depots which

could be called shops.

With the capitulation of Italian and German forces in North Africa,

maintenance shop activity was accelerated. Many skilled and eager electricians,

metal workers, and craftsmen were found among the prisoners. When the invasion of southern France was launched, this type of augmented maintenance

shop activity in base depots was at the peak of its development. The medical

depot at Marseille, operated by the 231st Medical Composite Battalion, boasted

a very active and capable shop supervised by a maintenance trained officer.

This, however, was the exception rather than the rule.
258 MEDICAL SUPPLY

i

FIGURE 65.—Austerity fathered improvisation, and publications distributed to all

medical units in the theater carried descriptions of the more practical devices, such as:

A. Wash sink made from an oildrum. B. Home-made lamp, used in searching the

abdomen for a shell fragment.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 259

In spite of these developments, maintenance of medical equipment in

general and of spare parts in particular remained a painful problem throughout the theater's active period.64

Local Procurement

Early in the Tunisia Campaign, it was directed that the procurement of

supplies, services, and facilities interfere as little as possible with the local

economic situation.

Practically all drugs and chemicals which had been imported into North

Africa before the war began had been consumed at the time of the Allied invasion. However, small amounts of alcohol and mercury were found and subsequently procured for use of U.S. forces.

An important service was performed by a small metal-plating shop which

had sufficient stocks of basic materials to produce a plated finish superior to

the poorly plated knives, forks, and spoons of U.S. issue. A program was instituted wherein all medical units in the Oran area turned in unserviceable

utensils for an item-for-item exchange at the depot. This was later expanded

to some surgical instruments when total production was increased to about 300

pieces per week. What promised to become a thorny problem was partially

solved by this unexpectedly available local service.

In all of the Mediterranean campaigns, the possibilities of local procurement were examined and exploited whenever possible. In Sicily, all that could

be located were 71/2 pairs of spectacle lenses and some lens surface-grinding

equipment. This, of course, had no practical application to the U.S. optical

activities. However, 20,000 liters of 95 percent proof ethyl alcohol at 10 cents

a liter was found as well as usable quantities of hydrochloric, sulfuric, and

picric acids. Also in Sicily, local laboratory services were contracted for during

February 1944, with an expenditure totaling $2,796.35.

A firm in Kome was located, capable of producing a satisfactory artificial

eye for $2.50, which was one-third the prevailing price for this item in the

United States. Artificial eyes were thus procured at a rate of 24 per week. A

source of medicinal oxygen was also located in Italy, and some 350,000 gallons

were procured.65

« (1) Semiannual Report, 231st Medical Composite Battalion, 1 January-30 June 1945. (2) See

footnote 52(1), p. 250.

65 (1) Administrative Memorandum No. 7, Allied Force Headquarters, 15 Oct. 1942. (2) See

footnote 52(1), p. 250. (3) Letter, Commanding Officer, 6th General Hospital, to Surgeon, Peninsular

Base Section, 1 Aug. 1944, subject: Eye Prostheses. (4) Letter, 1st Lt. Peter P. Heinrich, SnC,

7th Medical Supply Depot, to Surgeon, SOS, NATOUSA, 24 Oct. 1943, subject: Report of Findings

Relative to Purchase of Optical Supplies in Palermo, Sicily. (5) Letter, Commanding Officer, Island

Base Section and 10th Port, to Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, 5 Mar. 1944, subject: Monthly

Report of Local Purchases for February 1944. (6) Letter, Commanding Officer, Island Base Section, to Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, 27 Oct. 1943, subject: Local Purchases.
MEDICAL SUPPLY

SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS

Role of Allied Military Government

The management and support by Allied Forces of civilians in occupied

areas of the Mediterranean theater was initially the task of AMGOT (Allied

Military Government of Occupied Territory). Initial medical supply planning

took place in preparation for the Sicily Campaign when the British planning

unit provided for a director of public health, responsible for making available

drugs, dressings, pharmacies,, and hospitals.66

Before this, the use of U.S. medical supplies to treat civilians was accomplished for either political or other purposes which had an immediate

effect on the capability of the United States to prosecute the war. In Oran,

for example, French civilian health authorities established clinics for the

treatment of venereal diseases. These clinics were furnished U.S. medical supply support.

Supply requirements for AMGOT necessarily took lower priority than

those for purely military purposes. Beginning with the Sicilian campaign,

however, AMGOT supplies were allotted space which was included in the task

force quotas. Because the Combined Chiefs of Staff had not yet approved the

items to be made available to AMGOT, U.S. medical supplies for civilian purposes in Sicily were limited to what could be spared by combat and occupation

forces.

In planning for Sicily, AMGOT, in the British plan, was responsible for

estimating and providing medical stores for the civilian population. Arrangements were to be made to issue these supplies through public health centers,

hospitals, drugstores, or direct issue as necessary. Units were made up of biological units, basic medical units, and Engineer and Quartermaster Corps sanitary supplies designed for specific purposes.

The Italian medical depot captured in Caltanissetta, Sicily, used as a

U.S. Army medical depot and later turned over to AMGOT, was the first

supplying depot to AMGOT regions I (Sicily) and II (toe-and-heel provinces of Italy). Later, AFHQ arranged to stockpile Civil Affairs Division

units in regions I and II with a buildup covering 9 months beginning September 1943. Over 1,100 Civil Affairs Division units of various types were

the estimated requirements to service the population of 8,862,000 in regions

I and II for 90 days (fig. 66).

Responsibility for the distribution and storage of civilian medical supplies was originally based on a coordinated effort between the Medical Section, NATOUSA, and the Military Government Section, AFHQ. This responsibility later was given entirely to the Medical Section, NATOUSA, to

68 For a detailed study of civil affairs and public health in Italy, see Medical Department, U.S.

Army. Preventive Medicine in World War II. Volume VIII. Civil Affairs and Military Government.

Public Health Activities. [In preparation.]
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 261

FIGURE 66.—Italian personnel at Medical Depot 3L50 sort surplus medical supplies,

most of which were eventually acquired by the Italian Government.
262 MEDICAL SUPPLY

improve control. "Wkhin the medical section, this responsibility fell to the

medical supply officer.67

Medical Supply Branch, AMGOT

In November 1943, a medical supply branch was formally incorporated

into the newly reorganized Public Health Subcommission of the Allied Control Commission, AMGOT, which ultimately relieved the 15th Army Group

of its civilian medical supply functions. Col. Martin E. Griffin, MC, Chief,

Medical Supply Depots, Allied Control Commission, was appointed its chief

medical supply officer on 1 January 1944.68

Region III military government headquarters set up a central medical

supply depot in a Eed Cross warehouse in Naples in November 1943, and in

January 1944, the Allied Control Commission took it over. Supplies from the

United Kingdom, United States, or North Africa were stored and distributed

to all regions of Italy. The NATOUSA policy for distributing supplies provided that, except for an initial 30-day period, medical supplies should not

be issued automatically on a Civil Affairs Division unit basis to civilians in

a conquered area. Supplies for the initial 30-day period consisted of a balanced

stock of lifesaving supplies, warehoused in strategic supply areas, and issued

on requisition to meet actual relief needs. These supplies could be replaced

from theater stocks as required. After the initial period, medical supplies

furnished to civilians in an occupied country were either medical supplies

for restoration of health, or lifesaving supplies. Supplies were thus requisitioned by regional public health officers on the medical depot by line item

rather than by Civil Affairs Division units.

Augmented by additional personnel, the central medical supply depot

operated, under detailed accounting procedures, a price list, together with

procurement, storage, and issue instructions. Supplies were received from

North Africa, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and distributed

to the warehouses established in each region under the supervision of the

regional public health officer. All supplies ceased to be the property of the

Allied Control Commission when they were sold and shipped to the Italian

agency, Medici Provenciali, established to distribute medical supplies to the

population of each province.69

In addition to computing requirements, requisitioning, and accounting

for supplies, together with their sale, distribution, and control, regional public health officers in Italy also assisted reputable manufacturers in resuming

production of essential drugs and biologicals. Free issues from Italian warehouses were permitted only in emergencies. Fair prices to hospitals and

67 See footnote 4(1), p. 240.

08 See footnote 4(1), p. 240.

M

(l) See footnote 4(1), p. 240. (2) Memorandum, Surgeon. NATOUSA, to Military Government Section, AFHQ, 17 Dec. 1943, subject: Requirements of Medical Supplies for ÄMG.
MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 263

clinics, doctors and midwives, pharmacies and other retail channels were established, controlled, and issued in that priority.70

Growth of Medical Supply Support

By March 1944, the Naples depot possessed complete facilities. Regions

I to VI, inclusive, had supply depots in operation and a subdepot -was established in Bari concurrent with the move of region II headquarters to that

city. Except for a few items which had been covered by special requisitions,

there were adequate stocks of medical supplies in occupied Italy for civilian

medical care.

From March to July 1944, the medical supply branch of the control commission operated depots at Reggio, Bari, and Rome for variable periods.

Personnel was shifted from depot to depot, as the occasion demanded, to set

up distribution in new areas. With the advent of cobelligerent status accorded

the Italian Government, distribution of medical supplies in region II was

turned over to Italian civilian organizations, such as wholesale drug houses.

This arrangement proved highly satisfactory and helped to overcome the

existing problem of shortages of military personnel.

The general policy in administering civilian medical supply support in

occupied areas of the Mediterranean theater, as developed from experience

by the Medical Supply Branch, provided that items and quantities must be

the minimums essential for the area concerned, and luxury items were not to

be supplied. Medical supplies and equipment in an area at the time of occupation were to be preserved with the cooperation of combat commanders.

Drugs for the prevention and cure of veneral diseases and preventive biologicals for other communicable diseases were to be emphasized, and public

health officers would be familiarized with the types of medical items available

for the care of civilian populations. The supply organization, as well as procedures for supply, procurement, accounting, and control, was to be established as early as possible with maximum use of existing normal distribution

channels within the civilian community. Finally, it was emphasized that

issues would be on an item basis rather than a Civil Affairs Division unit

basis.71

Use of Local Resources

Civilian supplies requisitioned for the period July to December 1944 did

not arrive in the theater as scheduled, chiefly because of transportation problems. Insufficient transportation also aggravated the supply of northern regions from the Naples depot. However, during this period, as more and more

local supplies were uncovered, it appeared that the theater stockpile would

suffice for a much longer period than originally anticipated.

See footnote 4(1), p. 240.

71 See footnote 4(1), p. 240.

295-453 O—68 10
264 MEDICAL SUPPLY

In 1944, the G-5 section was established in AFHQ to carry out the Supreme Allied Commander's responsibilities in civil affairs. Ultimately, the

section assumed control of civilian supplies in the theater, and the central

Civilian Medical Depot, Mediterranean theater, was established in lieu of the

Central Medical Depot, and dealt directly with AFHQ.

During 25-28 September 1944, approximately 600 tons of supplies were

unloaded at Naples, and many shortages of long standing were thereby relieved. On 1 November 1944, responsibility for distributing medical supplies

in northern Italy, except Army areas under AMGOT control, passed to the

Italian Government.

Beginning with the end of hostilities in Italy on 2 May 1945, AFHQ

directed that military responsibility for civilian medical supplies in Italy was

to be terminated as rapidly as possible. Effective 15 August 1945, the Italian

Government accepted all shipments of medical supplies at boatside and assumed responsibility for their distribution throughout Italy.72

REDEPLOYMENT

In the late spring of 1944, plans were being developed by SOS,

NATOUSA, for the redeployment of U.S. troops and supplies when hostilities ceased. As a corollary, the Atlantic and Eastern Base Sections closed in

November 1944, and the Mediterranean Base Section, once the supply giant

of the theater, was reduced to a small role in North Africa. All medical materiel coming into the theater was received at either Leghorn or Naples, with the

Peninsular Base Section having the responsibility for intrabase distribution.

Eventually, the bulk of the theater reserves was also transferred to the latter

base section, which assumed all medical supply functions of the Mediterranean

theater on 1 October 1945. A month later, the Medical Section of the Mediterranean theater was also discontinued, leaving the Peninsular Base Section responsible for medical support of all U.S. forces remaining in the theater.73

72 (1) See footnote 4(1), p. 240. (2) Letter, Surgeon, NATOUSA, to Col. George M. Powell, MC,

SGO, 30 Dec. 1944. (3) Letter, Col. M. E. Griffin, MC, to Lt. Col. Eyle A. Eadke, MC, Surgeon's

Office, NATOUSA, 14 Oct. 1944.

Final Report, Medical Supply Officer, Office of the Surgeon, MTOUSA, 30 Sept. 1945.
CHAPTER IX

Europe: Preinvasion Buildup in the United

Kingdom

PRELUDE

Beginning in May 1941, the U.S. Military Mission to London, called the

Special Observer Group, had been quietly and carefully planning the disposition in the United Kingdom of a tentative U.S. troop strength of 87,000 men

and their accompanying equipment.

Following Pearl Harbor, the observer group rapidly began to put their

formerly secret plans into operation. The projected troop strength rose to

105,000 men with the plan, MAGNET, which called for a much larger U.S.

force in northern Ireland to defend against Axis attack. Early in January

1942, U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles replaced the Special Observer

Group, thus establishing the first U.S. Army command in the United Kingdom. Shortly thereafter on 26 January, the first contingent of 4,000 U.S. troops

debarked at Belfast, northern Ireland. The buildup of a U.S. Air Force in the

British Isles began in late February with the establishment of a bomber command (VIII Bomber Command); by mid-June, plans were made for the direct participation of U.S. air units in the war against Germany.

To supply the planned assault, Headquarters, Services of Supply, under

the command of Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee, was activated on 24 May 1942.1

MEDICAL SUPPLY

Early Organization of the Supply Division

The Finance and Supply Division (later the Supply Division), Chief

Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army),

was established by verbal order of the Chief Surgeon, Col. (later Maj. Gen.)

Paul E. Hawley, MC, on 13 June 1942 at 9 North Audley St., London. Lt. Col.

(later Col.) Earle G. G. Standlee, MC, was designated chief and purchasing

and contracting officer.

Shortly after the Finance and Supply Division was created, it was moved

to Ben Hall Farm at Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, about 100 miles west of

London, where it shared facilities with several other divisions of the Chief

1

For further details on the background and operations of the Special Observer Group, see:

(1) Ruppenthal, Roland G.: Logistical Support of the Armies. United States Army in World War II.

The European Theater of Operations. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953, vol. I,

pp. 13-51. (2) Potter, Hubert E.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European

Theater of Operations. United States Army in World War II. Ch. I. [In preparation.]

265
Qßß MdlCAL SUPPLY

Surgeon's Office and the other technical services of the Army. Facilities consisted of a group of temporary camouflaged buildings that had been constructed originally to house parts of the British Ministry of War in the event of

invasion or the destruction of the London headquarters. The move to Cheltenham hindered operations of the division because most of its transactions with

the British War Office were conducted in London; hence, it became necessary

to appoint a London liaison officer. The fact that a Chemical Warfare Service

officer served as the liaison officer until a Medical Department officer became

available was an early symptom of medical supply's basic weakness of inadequate personnel. Originally, the Supply Division consisted of two Medical

Corps officers and one enlisted man, but it was later augmented by a few additional officers, of whom several were untrained in medical supply work.

Within 10 months, there was a succession of four division chiefs. After

Colonel Standlee was relieved to go to North Africa in the latter part of

August 1942, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Clarence E. Higbee, SnC, was chief for a

short period before being replaced by Lt. Col. Howard Hogan, MC. In July

1943, Colonel Hogan was replaced by Col. Walter L. Perry, MO These frequent changes were not conducive to increasing effectiveness.

Early Functions and Purposes

The first task of the Finance and Supply Division was to compute the

requirements for Operation BOLEEO, the initial plan for the invasion of

Europe; this involved considering material available from British and U.S.

sources, and acquiring the necessary depot space for storage and issue of medical supplies and equipment. Plans for medical care under BOLERO included

a requisition of supplies and equipment needed to build up the United Kingdom as a base, and acquisition of supplies and equipment required for the assault on the Continent. Accordingly, material in the form of bulk stocks

(resupply) and unit assemblies to match troop lists, plus reserve stocks, began

to arrive in the United Kingdom by mid-1942.2

Operation TORCH

The Supply Division had barely started the development of BOLERO

when it was assigned the difficult task of furnishing medical supplies and

equipment for Operation TORCH, the assault on North Africa. This assignment began in August 1942 and lasted until early 1943, when the Zone of Interior absorbed full resupply responsibility. During this period, all combat

units, including medical units, embarking for the United Kingdom were furnished basic TOE (table of organization and equipment) equipment and a 15-

day initial supply of medical items.

Medical units equipped to meet the sailing schedules for the convoys moving from England to Africa consisted of four 250-bed station hospitals, one

^ History of Medical Service, SOS, ETOUSA, From Inception to 31 December 1943. [Official

record.]
PKEINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 267

400-bed surgical hospital, three 750-bed evacuation hospitals, one 750-bed station hospital, two 1,000-bed general hospitals, one medical depot company, and

22 medical maintenance units for resupply. To insure accomplishment of this

task, the Chief Surgeon established a special Medical Planning Group, consisting of Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) James B. Mason, MC, Lt. Col. (later

Col.) Clark B. Meador, MC, and Lt. Col. John Douglas, ADMS (British).

In fulfilling TORCH supply requirements, it was necessary to strip many

units, including operating hospitals, of major items of medical equipment and

vehicles. In addition, 30 incomplete medical assemblies in depot stocks were

disassembled to build the hospitals required to support TORCH. This task

was complicated by the fact that the personnel of the only medical depot company (the 1st) in the United Kingdom were dispersed to five different locations; also, the assembly of materiel for TORCH requirements had to be accomplished concurrently with attempts to provide newly arrived hospitals and

other medical units with their basic operating equipment. Inexperienced personnel and a scarcity of stock and packing materials magnified supply problems beyond their normal dimensions, and preparations for TORCH were

barely completed as the task force embarked.3

Procurement in the European Theater, 1942-43

Procurement of medical materiel from the British was a burden on the

economy of Great Britain, whose industrial sections were severely damaged

after 3 years of war. The available labor force was predominately older men

and women, who, in addition to their jobs in industry, were engaged during

off-duty hours in civilian defense activities as ambulance drivers, wardens,

policemen, and firemen. Industry was necessarily closely controlled by the

government, with the Ministry of Supply responsible for allocation of manufacturing facilities, manpower, and materials.

The Procurement Section, Medical Supply Division, was located in

London within the office of the General Purchasing Agent, ETOUSA, which

had supervisory responsibility for all procurement from British sources.

While this location had some advantages, it hindered close liaison with the

Requirements and Requisitions Branch in Cheltenham.

In the first year of American participation in the war, 1942, serious

shortages of military supplies, including medical items, persisted in the European theater. Transatlantic shipping facilities were inadequate, and German

submarines were taking a heavy toll. As a means of compensating for those

serious handicaps, the British agreed to supply U.S. forces in the United

Kingdom, wherever possible, through a reciprocal aid program, commonly

called Reverse Lend-Lease.

The medical portion of this program was substantial and important.

Through construction or use of existing buildings, the British not only made

available many hospitals (fig. 67), but also supplied a predetermined list of

3 See footnote 2, p. 266.
268 MEDICAL SVPPLY

ur\

FIGURE 67.—Hospital plant at North Mimms, Hertfordshire, England, where the 1st

General Hospital, U.S. Army, commenced operation in January 1944.

basic housekeeping equipment, including such items as beds, bedside tables,

and mess equipment. Technical medical equipment for hospitals, furnished

partly by the British and partly from the United States, was to be assembled

within the ETOUSA medical depot system. Requirements for medical materiel, over and above the initial establishment of fixed hospitals, were computed by the Supply Division, and an additional demand was placed on the

Ministry of Supply for those items which could be furnished from British

resources. Otherwise, a requisition was sent to the United States. In doubtful

items, the demand was duplicated in the U.S. requisition, but was subject

to cancellation if the British agreed to accept the demand. This added proviso

was a manifestation of the prevailing uncertainty. Since acceptance at either

source frequently required several months, prolonged confusion and duplication were common.

Problems in Procurement

Although English was the common language, it was learned gradually

through experience that there were essential differences in nomenclature of

like items: GI cans were "dustbins" to the British; excelsior was "wood

wool"; requisitions were "indents." For almost every item of medical mate-
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 269

riel, British and American specifications were at variance. The same drugs

often had different names and different unit packaging. Surgical instruments proved to be a problem as the design, weight, and balance were unfamiliar to American surgeons and frequently were unacceptable. Some items were

similar enough that they could be carried under the U.S. nomenclature and catalog item number, but the majority had to be specifically identified as British. It was necessary to publish a British-American catalog of

equivalents and a list of acceptable British substitutes. These publications

were prepared and published by the Supply Division under the guidance of

the professional consultants to the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA.

U.S. materiel requirements often represented fantastic quantities by

British standards. As an example, initial U.S. demands for dental burs were

greater than the total annual British requirements for civil and military needs.

Conversely, some quantities were small compared to British allowances. Furthermore, requirements fluctuated with the continual alteration of plans,

which was inevitable in a buildup of BOLEEO's magnitude.

In July 1942, large requirements were placed on the British, to be delivered in increments from 1 August 1942 to 1 April 1943. In September and

October, further demands were made, with deliveries to be phased from December 1942 to September 1943. Each new demand injected changes into previous ones, creating much confusion. These requirements included not only

supplies for hospitals and troops in the United Kingdom, but also many

supplies for the North African assault.

In early 1943, the general policy provided that items requiring extensive labor in their production but a small amount of tonnage were to come

from the United States, whereas items with little labor and large tonnage

were to be procured in the United Kingdom. By mid-1943, U.S. production

was in high gear; shipping had increased, submarine sinkings were declining,

and a number of items were excess to needs in the United States; hence, lists

of these items were sent to the European theater so that United Kingdom

procurement could be curtailed. In several instances, it was discovered that

the British were securing items from the United States under lend-lease procedures while U.S. forces in the United Kingdom were placing demands on

the British for the same items.

Late in 1943, deliveries of technical medical materiel from British sources

dropped off appreciably because of increased labor shortages and increasing

British needs to equip their own forces for D-day. Fortunately, shipments

from the United States were constantly increasing during the latter part of

the year.4

4

(1) Letter, Lt. Col. Howard Hogan, MC, to Deputy Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 14 Jan. 1943,

subject: Data for Consolidated Annual Report of the Chief Surgeon's Office, SOS, ETOUSA. (2) Circular Letter No. 30 (Supply No. 5), Office of the Chief Surgeon, Headquarters, SOS, ETOUSA, 17

Sept. 1942, subject: Medical Supplies and Services Procured Under Reciprocal Aid (Reverse LendLease). (3) Circular No. 1, Headquarters, ETOUSA, 4 Jan. 1943, section II, subject: Policy to Govern the Procurement of Supplies in the United Kingdom. (4) Annual Report, Supply Division, Office

of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 1943.
270 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Approximately 75 percent of the total tonnage of medical supplies received by U.S. forces in the United Kingdom came from British sources in

1942, with only 25 percent from the United States. During 1943, almost 56

percent of total tonnage received, including program C (housekeeping) items,

came from the British (table 2).

TABLE 2.—Medical supplies for U.S. forces in the United Kingdom from British and American

sources, 194&-44

Date From the

United States

From the

United Kingdom

(Ships tons)

28, 000

56, 000

40, 000

(Ships tons)

84, 000

71, 000

13, 000

124, 000 168, 000

In retrospect, procurement of British medical materiel served a useful

purpose in 1942 and 1943 when U.S. production was slowly getting underway

and shipping was scarce. Moreover, it was helpful in supplying housekeeping

equipment before D-day for fixed hospitals in the United Kingdom. Program

C items, which were nontechnical, remained fairly stable, so that detailed specifications were relatively unimportant. Deliveries were usually made directly

to hospital sites, thus avoiding depot workload; and the items were bulky,

which resulted in the saving of ocean cargo space.

Because requirements and specifications changed frequently and deliveries

made to depots came in all sizes of containers, production delays were frequent,

and recordkeeping was difficult. Lack of personnel in the procurement section

of the Supply Division also added to the problems.5

MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOTS

Organization

With relatively few exceptions, U.S. depots in the United Kingdom were

general depots, designated by the letter G, followed by a number, 1 to 100,

and jointly occupied by more than one technical service. The commander of

each general depot was a Quartermaster Corps officer, and the officer in charge

of the medical section was known as the medical supply officer. Medical depots

were designated by the letter M, followed by a number from 400 to 499.

Depots in the United Kingdom were located generally in existing buildings made available by the British. The medical section of Depot G-20 was

5 (1) Cable, BTOUSA (Lee) to AGWAR, 22 Apr. 1944, subject: Medical Supplies Obtained by

Medical Service'as Reciprocal Aid. Program C items, also called accommodation stores, included such

articles as beds, mattresses, blankets, and sheets for the hospitals, and kitchen and eating utensils,

as well as furniture for the use of the hospital staffs. (2) See footnote 4(4), p. 269.
PRBINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 271

FIöUKE 68.—Quartermaster Depot G-50, Taunton, Devonshire, England.

located in a brewery while Depot M-401 at Witney was located in a barnlike

structure on the grounds of a blanket-weaving mill. Adaptation of the TOE

depot company with a fixed allowance of officer and enlisted personnel to these

depots of varying capacities presented a serious problem. The only type of

unit available in the European theater for this purpose was the medical depot

company, organized under TOE 8-661 of 1 April 1942, consisting of 16 officers

and 227 enlisted men.

Depot Units and Operational Sites

The first medical supply installation in the United Kingdom was established in May 1942 at Belfast by a section of the 8th Medical Depot Company.

In December 1942, this unit became the medical section of Depot G-10.

The first complete TOE medical supply unit in the United Kingdom was

the 1st Medical Depot Company, which arrived in England on 13 July 1942.

Additional depot companies did not arrive in the theater for more than a year.

During the interim, the scattered medical depots in England were operated by

cadres of personnel from the 1st Medical Depot Company, augmented by attached officers and enlisted men. This situation was not conducive to good

morale. As promotions for officers and enlisted men were based primarily on

TOE authorizations, only a few were awarded. During this period, some depots

had as many as 100 officers and enlisted men in a casual status attached for

duty.

During 1942, five medical sections of general depots (fig. 68) were established in England (table 3), with emphasis on dispersion because of the danger from air attacks.
m MEDICAL SUPPLY

TABLE 3.'—Medical depots and medical depot sections in the United Kingdom, 31 December 1943

Depot Location Date established

Storage space (square feet)

Covered Open

G-45

G-20

G-35

G-14

G-50

M-400...

G-40

G-16

M-402__.

G-30

M-401...

G-22

G-15

G-23

M-403...

M-410M.

Thatcham

Burton upon Trent

Bristol

Liverpool

Taunton

Reading

Barry

Wem

Nottingham

London

Witney

Moreton on Lugg

Boughton

Histon

Launceston

Moneymore, N. Ireland

13 July

2 Aug.

12 Aug.

1 Sept.

1 Sept.

12 Feb.

24 May

27 May

21 June

1 July

10 July

20 Aug.

5 Nov.

5 Nov.

2 Dec.

23 Dec.

1942

1942

1942

1942

1942

1943

1943

1943

1943

1943

1943

1943

1943

1943

1943

1943 »

87, 840

83, 213

171, 000

127, 791

110, 680

25, 201

52, 275

70, 560

46, 045

117, 692

84, 833

67, 200

20, 344

84, 000

87, 000

61, 600

28, 500

35, 000

0

15, 000

25, 000

0

15, 000

15, 000

14, 500

31, 072

0

48, 600

25, 000

20, 000

0

15, 000

" Redesignated M-410M on 23 December 1943, originally G-10-1 established on 18 May 1942.

SOURCES: (1) Annual Report, Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Offlee, ETOUSA, 1943. (2) Annual Report, Medical

Section, General Depot G-35, 1944.

Immediately following their activation, the sections were saddled with the

mounting of Operation TOECH. Depot G-45 at Thatcham had the major

responsibility, functioning as the primary assembly and distribution depot

for medical supplies. The other four depots assisted by building unit assemblies and 22 medical maintenance units for Operation TOECH. The workload

for the issue of 15 days' accompanying supplies to each unit was distributed

among the five depots. Despite the extremely heavy workload, the task was

completed in the allotted time.

Until the summer of 1943, the North African theater, as the more active

combat theater, had a priority on shipments from the United States. However,

establishment of depots in the United Kingdom (map 11) in preparation for

Operation OVEELOAD continued. During 1943, 10 new depots were established and their medical sections were set up by five new medical depot companies—the 6th, 11th, 13th, 15th, and 16th (table 3). The 1st Medical Depot

Company, which had borne the brunt of operating the depots, was gradually

relieved by the newly arrived units, and was withdrawn early in 1944 to prepare for its role in support of the First U.S. Army.

With the exception of Depot M-400 at Eeading, which was a repair and

spare parts depot, and Depot G-45 at Thatcham, which had an assembly mission, all depots during 1942 and 1943 were responsible for distributing supplies to units in assigned geographic areas. Many had, in addition, other missions, such as receiving shipments directly from ports of entry and from
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 273

,.x

/

\

I R E L A N D jfl

I R E LA N D

}G-I4

^Liverpool ...

^0S-,ST ^M-402

^ Nottingham

Burton upon Trent

E N G-.L A.. N D

\ Wem

WALES (^ ^ H-JG-,5

G-22

. Moreton

\on Lugg

"ffl<

P0M-4O3

G-23

Boughton "Histon

...

M-401 «•

Witney ffiM-400,

"Bristol Thotcham Reading

,. <t tf

MAP 11.—Medical supply depots in the United Kingdom, December 1943.

British procurement, manufacturing unit assemblies, and storing reserve

stocks.6

Depot Operations

Inadequacy of storage space, inexperienced personnel, and the general

lack of knowledge of medical supply operations in the early days in the

United Kingdom can be illustrated by describing the operations of the medical section of Depot G-35 at Bristol. The depot was established on 12 August

1942 in a five-story chocolate factory with about 63,000 square feet of space

and two antiquated elevators, which were frequently out of service. The railhead was about 4 miles from the depot, necessitating movement of stocks by

6

See footnote 4(4), p. 269.
274 MEDICAL SUPPLY

truck through the crowded city streets of Bristol. The depot reworked unit

assemblies (fig. 31, p. 136) received from the United States, filling shortages

with items received from British procurement. In October and November

1942, a 750-bed evacuation hospital, a 1,000-bed general hospital, and a 250-

bed station hospital were assembled and shipped in support of Operation

TORCH. WO (jg.) Lewis H. Williams wrote in 1944 of his earlier experiences:

Lt. Stohl placed me in charge of assembling this unit and the only things I had to

help me was one Basic Equipment List and a prayer. Believe me, I needed both of them,

as no one in the Medical Section at that time had any idea of the procedure used in

assembling a Hospital, and no one even knew what an assembled Hospital looked like.

In February 1943, the depot's mission was to supply units in the area.

About the same time, it acquired 90,000 square feet of space in a nearby fourstory building (with a single elevator), which necessitated the physical movement of considerable stock. Early in February 1943, the first depot inventory

was taken and a stock record system was inaugurated.

By June 1943, the depot was supplying 40 units in its area in addition

to packing unit assemblies. During the year, it built, to varying degrees of

completion, several medical maintenance units and final reserve units, one

1,000-bed general hospital, and two 750-bed evacuation hospitals. During

October and November 1943, the depot was receiving and processing from

700 to 800 requisitions a month. Before November 1943, if a requisition could

not be filled, the requesting unit was instructed to requisition again at a later

date. In November 1943, a system of back orders was established and by

February 1944, more than 5,000 back orders had accumulated.

Personnel were assigned as casuals to the depot from various units.

Changes were frequent, as evidenced by the seven medical supply officers

assigned from July 1942 until March 1944. With each change came new

methods and procedures. Although the strength fluctuated, there was a gradual buildup; by 31 December 1943, 5 officers, 94 enlisted men, and 91 British

civilians were on duty. Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Charles I. Winegard, MSC, on

becoming medical supply officer in March 1944, wrote:

* * * It was organized confusion * * * There was no depot organization—it seemed

as everyone was doing what he chose to do. Responsibilities were not defined. The stock

record section was undermanned and thru lack of knowledge of procedures were causing

themselves a great amount of confusion and overwork. The Shipping Section was located

on the top or 4th floor * * * requiring all shipments to be moved to the top floor,

assembled, and held there until shipped or called for, when they had to be taken to the

ground floor.

In spite of all its difficulties, Depot G-35 performed valuable work in

supporting Operation TORCH, in equipping units, in furnishing supplies in

operating hospitals, and in manufacturing assemblies. Basically, its difficulties, like those of the system as a whole before March 1944, stemmed from

the necessity of operating with inexperienced and, for the most part, inadequately trained personnel.7

T

(1) Annual Report, Medical Section, General Depot G-35, 1943. The quotations are from

(2) Annual Eeport, Medical Section, General Depot G-35, 1944.
PREINV'ASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 275

EARLY PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION OVERLORD

Preshipment Plan

During 1942 and early 1943, plans for invasion of the Continent from

the United Kingdom base were rather nebulous. By the summer of 1943, with

the North African and Italian campaigns well under way, the plans for the

invasion of the European Continent—code name OVEELOED—acquired a

noticeable firmness. Medical plans called for the use of the U.K. base not only

for mounting the operation and for supply during the first few months, but

also for considerable fixed hospital support throughout the campaign.

As mentioned previously, the British were to furnish U.S. forces with

105 fixed hospital plants to house 94,000 beds, complete with housekeeping

equipment and some technical equipment. The Supply Division was responsible for equipping these installations and the medical units arriving from

the United States and for maintenance support of all fixed and mobile units.

During the last half of 1943, OVEELOED buildup gained momentum

as supplies and equipment were being shipped in increasing quantities from

the Zone of Interior to the United Kingdom. Under the preshipment plan,

medical units deployed from the United States arrived with only basic equipment, which consisted of just that equipment necessary for unit housekeeping

and local sick call; for example, mess equipment, some office equipment and

medical kits, and one Medical Department chest No. 2.

The intent and theory behind this supply procedure were logical, but the

method of execution left much to be desired. Upon debarkation, units were

immediately shuttled from the U.K. port to their destinations before their

basic equipment could be unloaded. To circumvent this problem of delay,

port assemblies, consisting of one Medical Department chest No. 1, one Medical Department chest No. 2 (fig. 69), one small blanket set, one splint set, and

two litters, were stocked as assemblies at ports of debarkation for issue to each

medical treatment unit. These assemblies enabled medical units to provide

emergency medical care for their own personnel and for personnel of surrounding units upon reaching their destination. The original equipment of

the units was forwarded by the port medical supply representative as soon as

it was discharged from the ship, and upon delivery and issue of full TOE,

recipients turned in their port assemblies. This procedure was frequently complicated, however, when all or portions of the equipment became lost in transit, particularly if units had included personal items.8

Shipment of Unit Assemblies

Unit assemblies for many units were to be shipped from the United

States under the preshipment plan. Because most assemblies shipped from the

8

(1) Larkey, Sanford V.: Administrative and Logistical History of the Medical Service, Communications Zone, ETOUSA. Ch. VIII, Annex 8: Medical Plans, Mounting the Operation [OVERLORD], 1944. [Official record.] (2) See footnote 4(4), p. 269.
w MEDICAL SUPPLY

a Ik

FIGUKE 69.—Medical Department chests Nos. 1 and 2, packed for shipment as part of a

port assembly.

United States before 1944 were incomplete in varying degrees, this did not

work out in practice. Many split shipments, in which parts of an assembly

were placed in the holds of different ships, frequently arrived in the United

Kingdom at widely separated ports. Often on arrival, parts of assemblies

were then shipped to different depots. Complete assemblies and split shipments, arriving in the United Kingdom, frequently were not recognized by the

U.K. depots as components of unit assemblies. This led to component items

being picked up on depot stock records and stored as bulk stock. Receipts of

T/E (table of equipment) equipment for tactical units, the components of

X-ray sets, and minor assemblies were treated similarly, meaning that components were placed in depot stock for issue. Stock status records and requirements computations suffered as a consequence. This failure was directly related

to unfamiliarity of supply officers with the marking and composition of unit

assemblies and to the complex shipping documents.

Entreaties to curtail split shipments were made to ZI ports and to the

Surgeon General's Office by cables and letters wherein the causes and problems

were outlined. Reassurances were offered, but improvement was slow and
PREINV'ASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 277

sporadic. Maj. Abraham Freedman, MC, who had spent 5 weeks in the United

Kingdom as liaison officer from the Port Medical Supply Division, New York

Port of Embarkation, recommended in his report of 22 March 1944 that

assemblies and sets should be bulk stowed in one hatch rather than being dispersed throughout the ship. With the approval of the deputy port commander,

as of 31 March 1944, this recommendation was put into effect, thus enabling

the theater to handle each hospital expeditiously at the port of debarkation.9

From the experience of the North African campaign, it was learned that

the use of colored markings on shipping containers led to the mixing of medical hulk stocks with unit assembly components, which resulted in the loss of

assembly identity. This procedure was eliminated on unit assemblies, and a

specific design was imprinted in the assigned color. This exception solved only

one of the many problems concerning the unit assembly. It did not provide

the rigid controls required for a unit assembly to remain intact from point

of origin to eventual destination.

Documentation for all shipments, including unit assemblies, was supposed to be airmailed from the ZI port of embarkation so as to arrive in the

United Kingdom well in advance of the shipment dissemination to depots

scheduled to receive the shipment. Tardy shipping documents, coupled with

the fact that all component parts of a unit assembly rarely arrived at the

receiving depot at one time, made it difficult to keep an assembly segregated

and intact within the depot, upon receipt. All of these factors allowed loose

controls and led to reassembly of equipment for each medical unit; this was

an unanticipated workload.

Depot stock records, moreover, were grossly inaccurate, not only as to

basic on-hand or inventory figures, but also as to the due-in and due-out

figures. This situation, in turn, meant that the consolidated theater stock records in the Chief Surgeon's Office were also erroneous.10

Equipping First U.S. Army Units

The Commanding General, First U.S. Army, had been designated as

commander of U.S. forces for the Normandy assault. In September 1943, Col.

(later Brig. Gen.) John A. Eogers, MC (fig. 70), Surgeon of the First U.S.

Army, arrived in the United Kingdom with the advance party which included

his deputy, Lt. Col. (later Col.) James Snyder, MC, and the medical supply

officer, Capt. (later Lt. Col.) Kenneth E. Richards, MAC.

Shortly thereafter, the advance section was joined by additional staff

members from the United States and by a small combat-experienced cadre

from North Africa. This cadre included Lt. Col. (later Col.) William H.

Amspacher, MC, who became the Surgeon's operations officer. The Surgeon,

9 Quarterly Report, Port Medical Supply Division, New York Port of Embarkation, to Commanding General, NYPOB, 1 Jan.-31 Mar. 1944.

10 (1) Personal letter, Brig. Gen. Paul K. Hawley, to Col. Francis C. Tyng, MC, OTSG, 8 Mar.

1943. (2) Personal letter, Brig. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, to Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, TSG, 9 Sept

1943. (3) See ch. VIII, p. 203. (4) See footnote 4(4), p. 269.
278 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 70.—Brig. Gen. John A. Rogers.

with his staff, immediately tackled their herculean assignment. Problems

encountered in North Africa were carefully reviewed, and consideration was

given to detailed planning, to adjustments for inexperience, and to the adequacy of requirements estimates.

With this approach, the First U.S. Army Surgeon's point of reference

was anticipated casualties under assault conditions rather than troop strength,

with medical units being assigned greater missions than contemplated under

the unit tables of organization and equipment. From a supply standpoint, this

procedure permitted translation of estimated casualties into materiel requirements. The First U.S. Army developed augmentation lists of items, by types

of units, for incorporation into the organic equipment of First U.S. Army

medical units, including equipment of other technical services; for example,

Engineer generators, Quartermaster tentage, and similar items. Although

these augmentation lists were made final late in 1943, items were constantly

added or deleted as specific units underwent mission or organizational changes.

Changes in assigned missions, changes in commanding officers, or augmentation of professional capabilities greatly influenced materiel requirements.

The original augmentation lists and their justification with materiel

requirements were submitted to appropriate technical services. In those instances where requirements were approved but were not available in the United
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 2

?9

Kingdom, the technical service had to institute a special project to ship the

item requirements from the Zone of Interior. The First U.S. Army, in estimating its needs, solicited the assistance of General Hawley and his consultant

Concurrently, all tactical medical units in the United Kingdom were

furnishing medical service to neighboring units and participating in maneuvers and training exercises which resulted in the consumption, loss, or damage of supplies and equipment. Units, therefore, were constantly submitting

requisitions to maintain their mandatory 100 percent state of readiness.

Although the quantities were unusually small, the requisitions increased the

line-item workload at depots, virtually saturating the budding U.K. medical

depot system. This further diminished the depots' ability to cope with T/E

and augmentation requisitions, with the equipping of hospitals in the United

Kingdom, and with the assembly and reassembly program for OVERLORD.

The inability to obtain firm and reliable information on the status of its

requisitions for organization and maintenance materiel was a great concern

to the First U.S. Army. Confronted with the responsibility of reporting the

state of readiness of medical supply to support an invasion timetable, ^the

Surgeon, First U.S. Army, frequently discussed the contingencies with General Hawley, thus maintaining excellent overall knowledge of ability to support combat.11

MOUNTING CONCERN OVER SUPPLY

The apprehensions of General Hawley regarding the medical supply situation began building in the fall of 1942. In a letter of 3 November to The Surgeon General, the medical supply situation was pronounced critical.12 Because

of the unreliability of British sources and the failure of complete units to

arrive in the United Kingdom, it became necessary to cannibalize more than

30 hospital assemblies to complete the equipment for 11 hospitals embarking

on the North African operation.

Throughout 1943, General Hawley frequently corresponded with The

Surgeon General about the U.K. medical supply operations. The problem of

supplying the First U.S. Army in addition to local units forced General

Hawley in December 1943 to state in a letter to Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk,

The Surgeon General, that the desperate situation was almost beyond hope.

It was certain that correspondence would never reconcile the differences

between the Surgeon General's Office's recapitulation of shipments to the

European theater and the quantities his supply division had recorded as

received in the theater. He had pointed out that if his difficulties were not

rooted in the ZI system, then they had to be in the ports, in his own supply

organizations, or possibly in a combination of the three. Basically, General

u

Annual Report, Medical Section, First U.S. Army, 1943.

"Letter, Brig. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, Chief Surgeon, SOS, ETOUSA, to The Surgeon General,

U.S. Army, 3 Nov. 1942, subject: Medical Supply.

295-453 O—68 20
280 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Hawley's problems stemmed from an insufficiency of qualified supply personnel, lack of stock, and inadequate systems and procedures.13

VOORHEES MISSION

Rapid Survey

In January 1944, The Surgeon General decided that a team should visit

the United Kingdom to survey the medical supply system. Headed by Col.

Tracy S. Voorhees, JAGD, Director, Control Division, the team included Lt.

Col. Bryan C. T. Fenton, MC (fig. 71), Chief, Issue Branch; Lt. Col. (later

Col.) Leonard H. Beers, MAC, Chief, Stock Control Branch, who were

all from the Surgeon General's Office; and Mr. Herman C. Hangen, consultant to The Surgeon General. Major Freedman, of the New York Port of

Embarkation, accompanied the team to survey U.K. port activities. The team,

with orders for temporary duty for 60 days, arrived in London on 27 January

1944, and proceeded to visit the supply division office in Cheltenham the

next day.

After spending 2 days in Cheltenham studying each supply function and

evaluating the personnel handling each operation, the team visited the depots

at Taunton and Bristol and the First U.S. Army Headquarters at Bristol on

the following 2 days. Colonel Voorhees then returned to London for consultations while the others visited depots, hospitals, and ports.

Recommendations

On 6 February, the team reassembled in London to determine a course

of action as it was evident that recommendations for drastic changes had to

be made. The group realized that they could be subject to severe criticism for

making such recommendations after spending only a few days in the theater;

however, it was clear that if more time was spent in verifying conclusions, it

probably would be too late to remedy the situation. Therefore, a meeting was

arranged for the morning of 8 February, when Colonel Voorhees and Mr.

Hangen reported orally, from penciled notes, to General Hawley on the

conclusions made by the team over the weekend. The proposals were not

experimental as the supply condition in the theater closely paralleled those

in the Surgeon General's Office and the U.S. depots 15 months earlier. The

recommendations were patterned on the systems that had proved successful

in the United States.

Depot Workloads

The first of the three recommendations concerned measures to lighten

depot workloads. About 50 percent of depot work was expended in building

assemblies and filling shortages of previously built assemblies, resulting in a

neglected distribution function. Insufficient stocks did not permit a depot to

«Letter, Brig. Gen. Paul E. Hawley to The Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 7 Dec. 1943.
rREINV'ASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 281

FIGURE 71.—Lt. Ool. Bryan O. T. Fenton, MC, Chief,

Issue Branch, Surgeon General's Office.

assemble more than 75 percent of the materiel required for a hospital unit.

Back orders on components for unit assemblies were piling up and units

were unable to obtain essential hospital equipment. Colonel Voorhees recommended that unit assemblies totaling 37,000 beds be shipped complete from

the United States, thus relieving theater depots of a substantial workload

and also providing more completely equipped hospital assemblies. This number of beds, together with those already assembled in the United Kingdom,

would fully equip all hospital installations required in the United Kingdom

by 1 May 1944 and those hospital units scheduled for movement to the Continent shortly after the invasion.

Similar difficulties were experienced in assembling medical maintenance

units. Packing could not be standardized because stocks of components were

not complete in any one depot. Proper packing material for waterproofing

and easy handling was not available, and the units being packed in the

United Kingdom consisted of 70 pounds of packing material and 30 pounds

of supplies. It was recommended that the First U.S. Army and the Chief

Surgeon's Office agree on the number of standard medical maintenance units

needed and have them shipped from the United States. Units shipped from
m MEDICAL SUPPLY

the United States would be complete, amphibiously packed, and with a larger

proportion of the weight in supplies.

A third means of lightening the workload was to relieve depots of the

additional tasks caused by British procurement. Many items of British medical equipment and supplies had proved unsatisfactory as substitutes for

American products and generally were not acceptable to professional personnel. British items were unlike their American counterparts because voltages

differed, units of measure frequently varied, and packing was unsatisfactory.

The mission recommended cancellation or postponement of deliveries on

British procurement except for those items which were in short supply in

the United States. On deliveries of other than shortage items which had to

be accepted, it was recommended that storage space should be obtained to

hold those supplies in reserve rather than as active operational stock.

Changes in Supply System

The major deficiency in the supply system was the lack of an accurate

central stock control system. In numerous instances, one depot was found to

have a surplus of an item while another had many back orders. Each depot

took a monthly inventory, but, as there were no due-in figures and no uniform

cutoff between inventory, issues, and due-ins among the several depots, these

inventories were of little value. A weekly report on critical items, whose preparation by the depots required much work, had insufficient data to be of

much value. A third report, a daily one on items reaching a minimum quantity, was unreliable as there was little relationship between minimum quantities and current issues.

To correct this condition, installation of a stock control system similar to

that used in the Surgeon General's Office was recommended. This recommendation provided for a biweekly stock report from all depots which would be

consolidated in the Chief Surgeon's Office. The consolidated stock report

would form the basis for computation of quantities to be requisitioned from

the United States, to distribute incoming stocks to depots more accurately,

and to control stock levels.

In medical supply, many important items on which quantities issued were

very small had been widely dispersed upon receipt, making it difficult to locate

the item when needed. A key depot system was suggested, whereby certain

depots would be given priority on incoming shipments on one or more classes

of items. It was decided that dispersion of stocks would be lessened with a

maximum of 20 percent of an item stock to be located in one depot.

Another serious deficiency was found in the lack of control of the levels

of supplies and equipment maintained in hospitals and field units. Units, having attempted to obtain an item from one depot only to have it placed on back

order, frequently went to another depot and secured the item while the original depot furnished the back ordered item when it became available. To overcome this system deficiency, it was proposed that an issue branch of the Sup-
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 283

ply Division develop stock levels for hospitals and field units, control requisitioning, and secure returns of excess stock in the hands of units.

All depots needed rewarehousing to save space and to make stock more

accessible. There was no standardization of storage methods. Each depot

packed according to its own design and there was no knowledge of amphibious

packing methods that had been developed in the United States. To correct these

conditions, it was recommended that a depot technical control branch be established in the Supply Division to develop standing operating procedures and

to supervise all depot operations.

Changes in Organization and Personnel

In neither the Supply Division nor in the depots were there sufficient per:

sonnel to handle the workload. Efforts were expended in meeting emergencies

without any time remaining to install proper systems and plans. Personnel

were unfamiliar with the many improvements that had been made in supply

management in the United States during the previous year. To improve the

organization, it was suggested that the Supply Division be patterned on the

organization in the Surgeon General's Office. This organization would require

an additional 15 officers and 44 enlisted men for staffing the Supply Division.14

Approval of Recommendations

General Hawley accepted the proposals in their entirety. A teleprinter conversation with the Surgeon General's Office was arranged for 10 February,

and a summary of the facts and conclusions was furnished, together with a

request for personnel by name to fill important positions in the supply organization. The Surgeon General's Office agreed to send the personnel, including

Col. Silas B. Hays, MC, for Chief of the Supply Division. Colonels Fenton

and Beers and Mr. Hangen went to Cheltenham on 14 February and proceeded

with the reorganization, pending the arrival of Colonel Hays. Colonel Voorhees and Mr. Hangen returned to Washington in March while Colonels Fenton

and Beers remained as permanent members of the Supply Division's staff.15

REORGANIZATION FOR INVASION

Personnel Reorganization

On 3 March 1944, Colonel Hays, formerly of the Surgeon General's Office,

was designated Chief, Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA.

The division had been reorganized into four branches—Administration and

Finance, Stock Control, Issue, and Depot Technical Control. The staff was

« Report, Col. Tracy S. Voorhees, JAGD, and others : Surrey of the Medical Supply Situation in

the European Theater, January-March 1944.

is Report of Teleprinter Conference with Representatives of the Surgeon General's Office and the

Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 10 Feb. 1944.
284 MEDICAL SUPPLY

increased rapidly from 16 to 32 officers while enlisted personnel increased from

47 to 84. Thirteen British civilians also were employed.

In addition to staffing the Supply Division in Cheltenham, two officers—

Maj. W. A. King, SnC, and Capt. (later Maj.) Joseph B. Parks, MAC—with

four enlisted men were attached to Headquarters, Advance Section, Communications Zone, at Bristol. Their function was establishing stock control procedures for operations on the Continent as the Advance Section assumed jurisdiction of rear areas.16

Depot System Realinement

Under the direction of Maj. Kobert R. Kelly, MC, Chief of the Depot

Technical Control Branch, four new depot companies (the 63d, 64th, 65th, and

66th) were organized under TOE 8-661, and five depot companies (the 6th,

11th, 13th, 15th, and 16th) were brought up to TOE strength. One company,

the 8th, was deactivated. Because of wide dispersion of stocks in small medical

depots and medical sections of general depots, it was impossible to employ

an entire depot company at one location. As a result, depot companies did not

operate as a unit in the United Kingdom, but rather were employed as an

administrative headquarters for the assignment and control of their personnel.

Before D-day, there were, in addition to the companies just indicated, the

1st Medical Depot Company which was attached to the First U.S. Army, and

four companies (the 30th, 31st, 32d, and 33d), which arrived in April and

May 1944, for a total of 14 companies in the United Kingdom.

The 30th and 31st Medical Depot Companies were assigned to the Medical

Service, Headquarters, ETOUSA, and designated for Communications Zone

operations on the Continent after the invasion was underway. The 32d and

33d Medical Depot Companies were assigned to Third U.S. Army. The 13th

Medical Depot Company was also designated for subsequent move to the Continent as soon as U.K. operations permitted. A key depot system was established within the distribution depots in the United Kingdom during March

1944 to overcome excessive dispersion of stocks, expedite the handling of requisitions, eliminate the large quantity of back orders, and drastically reduce extracting of requisitions to the Chief Surgeon's Office. The key depot system

effectively accelerated the delivery of available supplies (table 4).

Key depots were given the highest priority for receipt of stocks from the

United States. They were stocked to 100 percent of their stock levels before

incoming receipts were distributed to non-key depots. Where insufficient stocks

were received to fill key depot levels, the items were prorated to each key depot.

Except for assemblies, units and installations requisitioned supplies and

equipment from designated area distribution depots, which virtually eliminated "shopping around" from depot to depot. When non-key depots were

out of stock, the item was extracted automatically to the key depot for the

area. When a key depot was out of stock, a back order was established so that

ie Annual Report, Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 1944.
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE

TABLE 4.—Key depot system; United Kingdom, 1944

285

Depot Location Supplies

Medical Section, G-20 .

Medical Section, G-30 ..

Burton upon Trent

London .

All items except for spare parts,

lamps, batteries, teeth, blank

forms, and veterinary supplies.

Veterinary supplies and blank

forms.

Spare parts, batteries, and lamps.

Drugs, biologicals, surgical dressings, and instruments.

Laboratory supplies; dental,

X-ray, hospital, and field equipment.

TOE assemblies.

M-400 Reading _ _ _

Medical Section, G-35 Bristol . .

Medical Section, G-50 . ...

Medical Section, G-45..

Taunton

Thatcham

shipment would be made upon receipt of stocks. Periodically, the Chief Surgeon's Office directed key depots to extract their back orders to other depots

where the stock status report indicated that stock was available.17

Medical Depot Manual

To establish uniform operations in all medical depots, a medical depot

manual was published by the Chief Surgeon's Office during March 1944. This

manual facilitated storage and issue operations and provided the basis for a

biweekly stock reporting system, which was the feeder report for compiling

the theater consolidated stock status report. Quantities due-in, quantities on

hand, and back orders for each item were recorded on depot stock reports. The

consolidated report was the basis for determining theater requirements and

for preparing and submitting requisitions to the Zone of Interior.18

Stock Control

The authorized theater stock level of 75 days consisted of quantities

required for 45 days of operation plus 30 days' stock as a reserve or safety

level. At the beginning of March 1944, depot stocks were badly unbalanced;

numerous items were on hand on which stock was small or depleted while on

others, the quantities exceeded 12 months' requirements.

One major objective of the Voorhees mission was the establishment of

modern merchandising procedure to control supplies and balance depot stocks.

This requirement was tackled immediately by Colonel Beers, a member of the

Voorhees mission. A new system which included the use of electric accounting

machines was soon installed. Fortunately, machines for compilation of medical

statistics were already in operation at Cheltenham. By being worked extra

« See footnotes 15, p. 283 ; and 16, p. 284.

18Medical Depot Manual (Tentative), Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 21 Mar. 1944.
286 MEDICAL SUPPLY

shifts, these machines were able to assume the additional load of stock control.

An authorized level of supply was established for each item that was to be

stocked in the theater with a reorder point. The reorder point was the authorized level of supply for each item plus lagtime (the length of time from the

date of the requisition to the Zone of Interior until the supplies were received

in a theater depot and available for issue).

A study on the stock position of each item was made each 30 days. When

stocks on hand plus due-ins were below the reorder point, a requisition was

placed on the New York Port of Embarkation for replenishment in an amount

sufficient to bring assets up to the reorder point. Current stock levels, which

would permit flexibility and allow adjustments for changing conditions, were,

established by this method.

The theater stock level for each item was computed by using the authorized War Department replacement factor or, when this factor proved inaccurate, a theater replacement factor was computed on the basis of issue experience. To the authorized 75 days' level of supply was added the lagtime factor,

averaging 105 days, to establish the reorder point. The reorder point was established at 180 days and the quantitative requirements were computed by using

the current troop strength for the requisitioning period. The product of multiplying the average troop strength by the replacement factor was then multiplied by the number of months for which the supplies were being computed

to arrive at the reorder-point quantity. Under this system, theoretically, the

stock on hand of each item would fluctuate between 45 and 75 days of supply.19

Stock Distribution

Stock levels for individual depots were based on the total troop strength

served by the depot. Before the reorganization, there was no stipulated level of

supply for each depot. In March 1944, realinement of stocks within the U.K.

depots to conform with the newly established levels under the key depot system was accomplished virtually overnight. Depots submitted current stock

reports simultaneously, which were reviewed to determine the necessary interdepot transfers. Transfers were effected by trucks organic to medical units

according to an exacting schedule that assured maximum payloads in each

direction with a minimum of trucks and time.

Stock adjustments, sustained by accurate inventories plus improved stock

control and back-order procedures, quickly eliminated major problems in the

inventory control system, except for problems connected with overall stock

imbalances. On 1 April 1944, stock status reports indicated that 3,603 items

were in the ETOUSA medical supply system. Quantities on hand indicated

that 1,473 items (41 percent) were in short supply, 214 items (6 percent) were

in good supply, and 1,916 items (53 percent) were in oversupply.

19 (1) See footnotes 14, p. 283; and 16, p. 284. (2) Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, all theaters, 20 Jan. 1944, subject: Levels of Supply for Overseas Areas, Departments,

Theaters, and Bases.
PREIXVASIOX BUILDUP IX EUROPE 287

Items in short supply were requisitioned from the United States and priorities were requested for prompt and early shipment. By 1 May 1944, the

stock position had changed materially and the buildup of stock levels was

underway. ^Reorganization of the stock control system had provided the Chief

Surgeon's Office with the means to determine the stock on hand and the normal

requisitioning requirements, and to control distribution of items in short supply. During May 1944, medical supply operations approached a near routine

state. In fact, except for a few last minute actions, there was a comparative lull

in the Medical Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, during the 10 days

immediately preceding the invasion, but the depots were still grinding out the

preplanned shipments for the buildup on the Continent.20

Resupply Requirements

Concurrently with the buildup of U.K. stocks in the spring of 1944, planning for maintenance support of continental operations required immediate

attention. The Surgeon of the First U.S. Army was responsible for determining requirements for maintenance and replacement supplies for D-day to

D+14, including Air Forces medical requirements on the Continent. The Surgeon, Advance Section, Communications Zone, was responsible for D+15 to

D+41, with the Surgeon of the Forward Echelon Headquarters, Communications Zone, responsible for D+42 to D + 90. Actually, representatives of the

Surgeon, First U.S. Army, and the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, collaborated in

this total work, inasmuch as neither the Advance Section nor the Forward

Echelon was staffed with sufficient personnel experienced in stock control and

requirements determinations. Computation and requisitioning of maintenance

supplies and equipment were particularly difficult as only limited experience

data were available for an operation of this type. Estimated battle losses, shipping losses, and normal maintenance based on casualty estimates were necessarily considered in computing requirements.

Following D-day, the European theater was to be involved in a dual logistical effort, with operations in the United Kingdom and those on the Continent

being distinctly different in character. Separate maintenance requirements had

to be computed for each area. Those for the United Kingdom were largely for

fixed medical installations, such as general hospitals, while those for the Continent included the mobile units of the Armies as well as fixed installations in

the Communications Zone. It was planned to support operations on the Continent from the United Kingdom for the first 90 days and then to depend

largely on direct supply from the United States to continental ports.

Eeplacement supplies for D-day to D + 14 were to consist of automatic

shipments' on a prescheduled basis from U.K. depots to beaches and ports on

the Continent.

Colonel Eogers, of the First U.S. Army, and his staff examined the items

in the standard medical maintenance unit in light of anticipated casualties

20 See footnote 16, p. 284,
MEDICAL SUPPLY

rather than the supplies required for a stated force strength. It was anticipated

that peak casualties would occur during the period when forces were numerically small. Moreover, it was determined that the type A standard medical

maintenance unit for 10,000 men for 30 days was inadequate and deficient in

various critical items. Additional maintenance lists developed by the First

U.S. Army included a divisional assault maintenance unit type D, which had

two sections—one containing supplies to care for 1,000 medical casualties and

the other having sufficient supplies for 1,000 surgical casualties—and a supplemental D unit containing supplies considered essential but not included, or

insufficient in quantities, in the A and D units, to serve both as a supplement

and a reserve. Divisional assault supplemental units carried additional quantities of material, such as plaster of paris, sheet wadding, cocoa, instant coffee,

and medical gases, as insurance against extreme consumption. Also developed

was a type G unit containing supplies for treating 1,000 gas casualties in the

event that the enemy used poison gases.

In addition, bulk quantities of equipment were phased in which had not

been included in other resupply units. Selection of the items that could possibly benefit the operation through D+30 was made by reviewing medical unit

assembly equipment lists and theater augmentation lists. Quantities, to a large

degree, were governed by availability and by tonnage allocation. Some portion

of each item was scheduled for arrival by D-f5, but no attempt was made

toward uniformity of each day's shipment. Surprisingly, two of the items that

proved most beneficial were washing machines and sewing machines, which

were essential in maintaining the supply of linens, such as the towels and

drapes for the operating rooms.

Eeplacement of equipment lost or damaged by troops going ashore was

also computed as a maintenance requirement. Except for airborne units, it was

estimated that 15 percent of the equipment would be lost on D-day, that troops

going ashore by D+4 would lose 8 percent of their equipment, and that by

D +10, this factor would level off at a 5 percent loss factor. Airborne replacement requirements were estimated at 100 percent. These estimates proved to be

reasonably accurate.

Theater directives placed a responsibility upon the Chief Surgeon to

determine and provide automatic shipment of maintenance supplies, based on

phased tonnage and priority allocations authorized for medical supplies, and

the phased estimate of casualties by type. Requirements for D+15 to D + 90

were computed by the Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office.

Requirements for D-day to D + 90 included 100 type A maintenance units,

114 type D surgical units, and 22 type D medical units. It was intended that

all type A maintenance units were to be assembled and shipped from the

United States to the United Kingdom, but sufficient quantities did not arrive

in time and many had to be built in U.K. depots at the last moment. The D

and the G units were assembled in U.K. depots.21

a

See footnote 16, p. 284.
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 289

Packing and Crating

The Voorhees mission discovered that the quantity and variety of medical

maintenance units included in First U.S. Army requirements for the assault

imposed a significant packing and crating requirement. Also, training in the

United Kingdom made it imperative that unit personnel open, inspect, become

thoroughly familiar with, and repack, the equipment to be used in combat

(fig. 72). Because of the concentration of troops in the United Kingdom,

OVERLORD medical units supplemented fixed medical facilities by providing dispensary-type medical care to troops in the immediate staging or training areas.

For the reasons just stated, medical units, including small detachments

and field and evacuation hospitals, opened their ZI waterproof-packed equipment and supplies. The Voorhees mission realized that an expanded packaging

and crating program had to be generated swiftly in the United Kingdom

under an experienced officer. Consequently, Capt. (later Maj.) William B.

Wagner, MAC, was recommended to The Surgeon General for assignment to

the Medical Supply Division in view of his experience in developing the ZI

depot packing and crating program.

The ETOUSA packing and crating requirement had two separate facets:

first, accomplishment of the workload by depots in packing the maintenance

stocks and unit assemblies constructed in U.K. depots for shipment to the

Continent; and second, instruction to unit personnel on packing their equipment for an amphibious operation. A scarcity of packing material and a narrow margin of time confronted Captain Wagner upon his arrival in the

United Kingdom on 26 February 1944.

Waterproofing Boxes

An adequate supply of sisal paper, waterproof cement, lumber or boxes,

nails, and binding equipment was a prerequisite to waterproofing supplies.

Since sisal paper and cement were not available in the United Kingdom, the

program had to begin with available substitutes pending the arrival of stocks

from the United States. Binding and marking materials and acceptable waterproof paper were available, which, together with hot tar and hot asphalt,

served as alternatives. Careful reclamation of ZI fabricated boxes and insulation material, augmented by box shooks and lumber obtained from the Quartermaster Corps, provided the balance of the required material. Some additional material was obtained on the British market.

Skid Loads

To afford further protection to individual boxes of supplies, to facilitate

handling in transit, and to prevent individual packages from going astray, a

skid-loading plan was developed which was patterned after that used in the

Mediterranean area. The skid consisted of a platform built from 2-inch lum-
290 MEDICAL SUPPLY

*-■■■ • ;5»-

V

C

i

FIGURE 72.—Breakage of medical supplies on incoming shipments.
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 291

ber to dimensions of 4- by 6-feet, mounted on two 6- by 6-inch skids, which

were tapered in sled-runner fashion. A heavy clevis was attached to the front

to aid towing. Skid loads were approximately 5 feet high, completely covered

with canvas, and banded with one horizontal and three vertical 1*4-inch metal

bands. Slots were cut in the top of the skid runners to anchor the vertical

bands and the load.

Processing Unit Equipment

Units anticipated the need for breaking out their equipment, setting up,

dismounting, and repacking for movement during combat. Mobility and the

time factor would be particular problems for field and evacuation hospitals.

Ordinary merchandise boxes would not suffice for repeated packing of equipment ; a reusable container was required. Some units had attempted to improvise by installing hinges and hasps on discarded ammunition cases, rifle cases,

and similar boxes. Generally, the improvised containers were heavy, too small,

and lacked permanent waterproofing features.

One of the first actions growing out of the Voorhees mission was the dispatch of a cable to the Surgeon General's Office in February 1944 for 10,000

Wherry boxes. Captain Wagner, working with the Wherry Luggage Co., had

previously promoted the development of a box that was permanently waterproofed, sturdy, lightweight, and equipped with nonprotruding hand^s,

hasps, and hinges. The container was waterproofed by sealed seams and a combination of hasps and hinges which compressed the lid on four sides against

a fixed sponge, plastic, or rubber gasket.

The boxes, usually filled with supplies to conserve shipping space, were

requisitioned in February and began arriving in the United Kingdom during

March. They were distributed immediately to all medical units for the repacking of their equipment and supplies.22

Assembly for Prescheduled Shipment

By 1 May 1944, the maintenance supplies required for D-day to D + 15

were assembled and packed on skid loads. All maintenance supplies required

for shipment to the Continent before D+60 were amphibiously packed to

withstand wave action and 90 days of open storage. Many of these supplies

were packed in the Wherry boxes.

A total of 955 skid loads, approximately 725 long tons, was assembled

and scheduled for movement from specified depots to designated ports of preloading well in advance of D-day. Included in the skid loads were 30 type A

maintenance units, 92 surgical divisional assault units, 22 medical divisional

assault units, 30 divisional assault supplementary units, and 10 gas casualty

units. An additional 2,400 skid loads of medical supplies were packed by U.K.

depots and shipped to the beaches during the first 60 days of the invasion.

*> See footnotes 14, p. 283 ; and 16, p. 284.
MEDICAL SVPPLY

Skid loads, although unwieldy and requiring a crane for loading and

unloading, provided a means to keep a balanced functional supply unit together during the early days of the invasion. Where there were surgical

needles, there were always sutures; administration sets accompanied solutions.

Instruments for surgical needs were kept together. Sufficient skids were built

for the using units because many loads were eventually broken down, and the

individual items were placed in depot stocks on the Continent.23

Medical Tonnage Allocation

In planning the cross-Channel assault, combat elements and weapons

commanded top priority in tonnage allocations and dictated the total shipping

space that could be assigned to supply support and for the buildup of stock

levels on the Continent. The allocation for medical supplies (not including

unit equipment) was limited to 100 tons per week during the assault phase.

In early April 1944, G-4, Services of Supply, directed each technical

service to submit a schedule showing the weight and cubage to be shipped to

the Continent, based on the tonnage allocation for D-day and for each subsequent day to D+30, and identified with the shipping depot. Such information

was essential for determination of "goods wagon" requirements, rail shipping

routes, traffic control, ship space, berthing of vessels for preloading, and port

of return for reloading of vessels. Unfortunately, the G-4 deadline for the

technical service schedule came before the Medical Department could effect a

final stock check and assign the total assembly skid-loading program to depots.

The skid-loading program had been started by the Medical Department before

the reporting date, however, and the experience offered an excellent basis for

calculating the weight and cubage of daily shipments. The shipping depot was

not so easily determined.

Supplementary Means for Assault

The total calculated medical resupply requirements consisted of an average of .333 pounds per man per day up to D+51. The medical supply tonnage

allocation priority during the assault phase, however, was considered dangerously close to the estimated requirement, leaving little margin for error. Moreover, Major Richards, the First U.S. Army medical supply officer, was reluctant to assume that all allocated tonnage would arrive on the beaches as scheduled. Some alternate method had to be found to phase in auxiliary maintenance supplies to assure support of the anticipated casualty rate during the

first day of the invasion. As a result, new items were developed which greatly

aided early medical support.

Mortar shell cases.—The mortar shell case medical package designed for

the assault troops was comprised of a special waterproofed unit of medical

supply which would float and would serve as a life preserver for an individual.

A unit consisted of seven specially treated mortar shell cases, each of which

*> See footnote 16, p. 284.
PRBINV'ASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 293

contained several items (fig. 56, p. 234). These units were issued as follows: one

unit per infantry battalion, artillery battalion, chemical battalion, engineer battalion, and ranger battalion; two units per divisional collecting company; four

units per divisional clearing company; six units per medical battalion (Engineer special brigade). Additionally, units were loaded aboard every conceivable type of vessel moving to the far shore through D + 5. Personnel on board

were instructed to drop the units on the far shore or overboard close to the shoreline and to rely on the tide to carry them ashore.

Assault vest and maintenance units.—The assault vest was merely a

hunter's vest that the medical supply officer of the First U.S. Army had had

fabricated to increase the carrying capacity of the medical aidman during the

initial assault. The many-pocketed vest accommodated small medical items peculiar to the aidman's kit.

The two-man carry maintenance unit was designed to provide a substantial

quantity of fast-moving items to the medical units that accompanied various

assault forces. The items were packed in boxes that could be carried ashore and

overland for a reasonable distance.

The purpose of these little units was to breach unforeseen weakness of the

medical units' reserve supplies and to assure availability of the selected items

through the first few days of the anticipated confusion. The units proved extremely valuable in the early hours of the assault because of the delay in unloading medical supplies. Many floating mortar cases were found by the advance

detachment of the 1st Medical Depot Company in establishing its medical supply dump on D + 3.24

Army-Navy exchange units.—Designed primarily as automatic resupply

of the property exchange items dissipated during the early stages of evacuation

to the United Kingdom, each unit consisted of 100 litters, 320 blankets, 4 splint

sets, 3 boxes of surgical dressings, and 96 units of normal human plasma. The

proposed number of units precluded their movement within the space allotted

to Medical Supply, so arrangements were made with the U.S. Navy to place

one unit aboard each of the first 100 LST's (landing ships, tank) moving to the

Continent. The Medical Supply Division was to find ways and means for delivering the remaining 200 units, which were moved as rapidly as possible on

hospital ships and other vessels embarking for the Continent.

Equipping First U.S. Army units with their authorized equipment was

the first major task during the buildup period. In February 1944, orders were

issued by First U.S. Army Headquarters for a showdown inspection by all

units to determine if any shortages of items were authorized by appropriate

tables of equipment, tables of basic allowances, or by theater directives. Issue

of equipment against unit shortages presented some problems. The heavy telephone traffic, the lack of transportation, and the continued movement of units

from the campsite to another in the United Kingdom made it difficult to place

available items in the hands of units within a reasonable period of time. To

2)(1) Annual Keport of Medical Activities, First U.S. Army, 1944. (2) Annual Reports, 32d and

33d Medical Depot Companies, 1944.
294 MEDICAL SUPPLY

alleviate this condition, Major Richards arranged for the 1st Medical Depot

Company to consolidate the shortage requisitions from all units for presentation to depots and to pick up and deliver the items to the units.

The same method was used by Third U.S. Army's 32d and 33d Medical

Depot Companies during April and May 1944. These companies, used as distributing units in southern and central England, received and consolidated

requisitions from units within their areas, presented the consolidated requisitions to depots, and picked up and distributed the supplies to the units. This

procedure was eminently satisfactory as it reduced the pressure on U.K.

depots and eliminated many distribution problems.

Problems Under the Preshipment Plan

The most serious problem on the preshipment plan was the short period

between the discharge of the cargo in the theater and the arrival of the unit.

The plan was predicated upon the arrival of the equipment at least 30 days

in advance of the unit, but changes in tables of equipment, frequent delays in

transit, and losses and damage to equipment caused many difficulties. Deficiencies in packing major items of equipment, such as X-ray, were frequently

experienced.

Constant reorganization of tables of organization and equipment of units

by the War Department was a major problem. Frequently, the equipment was

shipped under an old table of equipment while the personnel were organized

under a new table. At times, the theater was not aware of the change until

the movement order for the unit was received identifying a new table of

equipment. This difficulty was eventually corrected by the establishment, with

"War Department approval, of a list of T/E's, which were applicable in the

theater regardless of those listed in the War Department movement order.

The Medical Department promoted this method through G-4, Services of

Supply.

Another difficulty during this period pertained to War Department publications, including the Army Medical Bulletin, which often listed and highly

recommended various new items long before their availability in the theater.

The Supply Division and depots were constantly besieged with requisitions

for such items, and professional personnel could not understand the reasons

for nonavailability of the item in view of the official publication.25

Augmentation Equipment for Units

Issue of field equipment to units was not complete, however, with the

furnishing of initial equipment authorized by tables of equipment or tables

of basic allowances. Supplementary lists of material for units and provisional

units had to be dealt with immediately. For the most part, medical items so

authorized were filled from stocks available in the theater.

25 (1) See footnote 16, p. 284. (2) Standing Operating Procedure for the Issue of Initial Organizational Equipment to U.S. Forces in the U.K., 28 Mar. 1944.
PKEINY'ASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 295

An authorization for equipment in excess of tables of equipment was

established for such units as evacuation and field hospitals, infantry, airborne

and armored divisions, convalescent hospitals, engineer combat groups, auxiliary surgical groups, and medical depot companies. As an example, the

medical battalion of the Engineer special brigade was authorized X-ray and

fluoroscopy units, oxygen therapy apparatus, anesthesia apparatus, and accompanying auxiliary items. As this organization was to be the first medical

unit ashore in the assault phase, it needed the essential equipment to provide

more definitive medical service.

During a similar landing operation in the Sicily Campaign, a critical

need existed for X-ray equipment to determine the presence of shell fragments in wounds, and for inhalation anesthesia. The anticipated isolation of

airborne units from the main invasion body was another consideration in

furnishing items in excess of allowances to those troops. Hence, mission

requirements became a determining factor in augmentation issues and in establishing the need for additional quantities of medical supplies and equipment.26

Arrival of Third and Ninth U.S. Armies

When additional Army headquarters arrived in 1944, the tactical units

were reallocated and each Army proceeded to determine its own T/E augmentations according to its mission and the Surgeon's estimate of the situation.

To some degree, this was equivalent to designing separate T/E's for the

medical units of each Army. Some complications resulted when units were

shifted between Armies before D-day, and a transfer of augmentation material

was necessary. The three different standards for T/E supplementation supplies necessitated an increased line item stockage in Communications Zone

depots.

The difficulties experienced in furnishing augmentation equipment to

First U.S. Army medical units had some repercussions. Col. (later Brig.

Gen.) Thomas D. Hurley, MC, Surgeon, Third U.S. Army, contacted the

Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, immediately after his arrival in the

United Kingdom with the advance party, on 23 March 1944, expressing anxiety over medical supply. Before his departure from the United States, Colonel

Hurley had learned of the Voorhees mission and the heavy supplementation

program for First U.S. Army units, which caused him to question the capability of General Hawley's Supply Division to render adequate medical supply support to Third U.S. Army units. It was necessary to assure the Third

U.S. Army Surgeon that assets were available and that the Supply Division

was ready to support initial issue and supplementary requirements. The same

task was performed when Col. William E. Shambora, MC (fig. 73), Surgeon,

» Letter, Col. W. L. Perry, MC, Chief, Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA,

to The Adjutant General (attention: Operations Division, War Department General Staff), 26 Oct.

1943, subject: Project No. 2, "Surg," Requisition A.287, 20 October 1943, for Auxiliary Mobile

X-ray Units.

295-453 O—-68 21
296 MEDICAL SVPPLY

FIGURE 73.—Brig. Gen. William E. Shambora.

Ninth U.S. Army, arrived in the United Kingdom with similar apprehensions.27

Supply of Units Reaches Peak

As preparations continued, all units became supersensitive to supply

problems and the Chief Surgeon's Office was flooded with requisitions for

shortages. Eequisitions were to be funneled through parent organizations in

accordance with theater directives. Despite these directives, the requisitions

of many units came directly to the Chief Surgeon's Office. Unfortunately,

many requisitions were submitted before the units were alerted; then, upon

being alerted, units were instructed to hold showdown inspections and submit requisitions for all items not on hand. Duplicate requisitioning resulted

when units had not picked up the items at depots before submitting the second requisition. Furthermore, virtually every unit, regardless of size, submitted a number of showdown requisitions before its departure from the

United Kingdom. One division submitted 15 showdown requisitions within

18 days.

27 (1) Annual Report, Medical Section, Third U.S. Army, 1944. (2) Annual Report, Medical Section, Ninth U.S. Army, 1944.
FREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 297

The significance of these actions can best be exemplified by the fact that

U.K. depots were carrying hundreds of items on their shipping floor awaiting

pickup. Major Winegard, at Depot G-35, first brought this situation to the

attention of the Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, in late March 1944 by

reporting that he had more than 2,000 items awaiting pickup. A policy of

early cancellation of all such shipments permitted recovery of many items in

short supply.28

Availability of stocks ceased to be a major problem toward the end of

May 1944. It was necessary at times, however, to pick up equipment from discharging vessels to fill shortages in organizational equipment for high-priority

units. Also, it was necessary occasionally to divert equipment from lowpriority units to others of higher priority. The perpetual problem throughout

this period was transportation. Kail transport of less than carload lots was

impractical. As a consequence, all U.K. depots were instructed to ship to field

units by truck and, wherever possible, to have the items picked up by the

organization. The First U.S. Army organized trucking companies into distributing units for pickup and delivery of supplies to units after unit transportation had been processed for shipment to the Continent and was not available for this purpose.29

SUPPLY IN FIXED INSTALLATIONS

In fulfilling the supply requirement for new hospitals and bed expansion to meet the anticipated casualty load, it was necessary to resolve two

major problems concerning the proper distribution of equipment.

Split shipment of unit equipment when it was loaded on' two or more

ships in ZI ports and discharged at separate U.K. ports was the first problem.

This dilemma had been the subject of much correspondence between the

Chief Surgeon, The Surgeon General, and the New York Port of Embarkation. A representative of the port visited the theater with the Voorhees mission to study the problem, which apparently was resolved by the New York

port in April, when shipments of unit assemblies began to arrive in the

theater intact.

A second problem concerned the retention of all components of the unit

assembly in one place for shipment to its destination. This handicap required

action within the theater. A study was made of the availability of hospital

plant sites, and the plausibility of shipping unit assemblies from U.K. ports

directly to operating sites. Except for those assemblies which were to be

stored in depots pending transshipment to the Continent, direct shipment of

assemblies to operating sites would permit bypassing medical depots which

were heavily engaged in preparations for Operation OVERLORD.

Consultations with port commanders at Bristol, Cardiff, Newport,

Swansea, Hull, and Liverpool, and with the Transportation Corps established

28 (1) See footnote 16, p. 284. (2) Administrative Memorandum No. 56 (Supply No. 11), Office

of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 29 Apr. 1944, subject: Supply Policies and Procedures.

29 See footnote 16, p. 284.
298 MEDICAL SUPPLY

the feasibility of the plan, and a standing operating procedure was developed,

placing the plan in effect. The Chief Surgeon's Office was required to notify

port commanders of the identity of the unit assembly and the appropriate

destination so that a timely levy could be made on the Transportation Corps

for rail transportation. Eailroad cars were switched onto quay side so that

the unit assembly was discharged directly from ship to car. Each port was

staffed with a Medical Administrative Corps officer and several enlisted personnel to assist in maintaining the integrity of each unit assembly.

Because construction of the new hospitals was incomplete, unit assemblies

were shipped directly from the ports to the hospital sites and stored there,

pending availability of the buildings.

Medical depots sent representatives to the site to tally-in the equipment,

check it against shipping documents received from the port, arrange for

proper storage and protection of the assembly, and, finally, turn over the

equipment to the unit upon its arrival. This procedure operated effectively

and in no instance was the opening of the hospital delayed because of lack

of medical equipment.

Sixty-eight hospital assemblies were received from the Zone of Interior

between 30 March and 25 May 1944, comprising 53,300 hospital beds. These

shipments included twenty-nine 1,000-bed general hospital assemblies and

eight 750-bed station hospital assemblies required to complete the hospitalization program in the United Kingdom.-30

Supply of Air Forces Units

Supply of Air Forces units differed from ground and service units. Dispensaries at Air Forces bases were operated under the direction of the Air

Surgeon although all hospitalization of Air Forces personnel was provided

by station and general hospitals in Services of Supply. Distribution of medical

field equipment and maintenance supplies to Air Forces units was effected

by aviation medical supply platoons, which drew their supplies from the

U.K. depot system.

Problems between Air Forces authorities and General Hawley over the

equal distribution of supplies was the subject of many letters to The Surgeon

General during 1943. However, after numerous conferences, stocks in the

U.K. depot system reached a reasonable level in mid-April 1944, and there

were few difficulties in furnishing support for Air Forces units.31

Special Supply Projects

Furnishing organizational equipment to units, including items in excess

of allowances, did not completely fulfill the need for essential equipment

*> Memorandum, Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, GSC, Director of Plans and Operations, Army Service

Forces, to Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, 29 Apr. 1944, subject: Medical Supplies ; and 1st Indorsement

thereto, 1 May 1944.

31 Link, Mae Mills, and Coleman, Hubert A.: Medical Support of Army Air Forces in World

War II. Washington : Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Air Force, 1955, pp. 563-565.
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 299

required for the medical care of anticipated casualties on the Continent. The

nature of the assault, a combined amphibious and airborne operation, the

magnitude of the troop strength, and the anticipated resistance by enemy

forces caused planners in the Chief Surgeon's Office and in the First and Third

U.S. Armies to request additional equipment for medical support purposes.

PROCO Projects

A group of projects, established under the direction of G-4 to support

operations, were known as PROCO (Projects for Continental Operations)

projects, which included medical as well as other technical services equipment required by medical units. These projects included the mounting of

X-ray equipment on trucks to provide six mobile X-ray units for support of

the First and Third U.S. Armies, the provision of equipment for establishing

blood banks in the United Kingdom and on the Continent, and the equipping

of vehicles with medical items for mobile surgical units. PEOCO requirements for tentage,32 tent stoves, and other items of hospital equipment rose

steadily as D-day approached.

SUPPLY POINTS IN MARSHALING AREAS

Advance supply points, operated by detachments of the 66th Medical

Depot Company, were established at Dorchester, Totnes, and Plymouth in the

Southern Base Section to support units massing for the assault. Three supply

points were established also in hospitals at Govilon, Carmarthen, and Ehyd

Lafor in the Western Base Section, which played a lesser role in marshaling

troops (map 12).

These supply points furnished initial equipment and supplies to camp dispensaries and first aid stations. They also served as resupply points for field

hosp tals and other medical units in the area. Small quantities of equipment

were made available at these points for units passing through the marshaling

area. All embarking troops were provided with motion sickness preventive

capsules.

The supply points had several postinvasion responsibilities, including storage and issue of penicillin and whole blood to area field hospitals, hospital

carriers, and LST's returning to the Continent after discharge of casualties.

Dumps for issue of exchange items were established in the proximity of ports

and quays.33

32 Letter, The Adjutant General to Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation (attention : Oversea Supply Division) ; The Quartermaster General (attention: Military Planning Division,

Operations Branch) ; Chief of Transportation (attention: Water Division, Ocean Traffic Branch), 14

Apr. 1944, subject: Additional Tentage for Medical Project No. 5 "SU11G" for the European Theater

of Operations.

33 (1) Annual Report, 66th Medical Depot Company, 1944. (2) Medical Department, United States

States Army. Blood Program in World War II. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964,

pp. 531-534.
300

7

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MAP 12.—Supply points in marshaling areas, United Kingdom, May 1944.

ITEMS HAVING SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE

Although the perplexities in equipping units and fixed installations and

in establishing an adequate supply system absorbed the major efforts of the

Chief Surgeon's Office and the depots, some individual items, because of their

characteristics and importance, required special handling or different procedures. As each item required professional and technical guidance from the

consultants to the Chief Surgeon, the procedures varied on the basis of the professional application or item characteristics.

Whole Blood

The Chief Surgeon directed that whole blood for treating casualties would

be available at all evacuation echelons down to, and including, division clearing

stations and that the shipment of this perishable product would be handled

through supply channels.

As a result, the First and Third U.S. Armies were authorized to establish

whole blood sections in their medical depot companies and to requisition the

necessary equipment and personnel.

Plans provided for maintaining a supply of whole blood at the quays and

ports for issue to LST's and hospital carriers for shipment to the Continent

as well as for use during the evacuation of casualties.
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 301

FIGURE 74.—Whole blood on its way—the first day of the "milk run to the

Continent," 14 June 1944.

High priority air shipments of whole blood to the Continent were

arranged by G-4, Services of Supply, and 4,000 pounds of critical medical

supplies were airlifted to the Continent daily (fig. 74). The medical section of

Depot G-45, 3 miles from the airfield at Greenham Common and 38 miles from

the ETOUSA Blood Bank at Salisbury, was the receiving and shipping

agency. 2d Lt. (later Capt.) Eobert E. Pryor, MSC, the officer in charge of

air shipments, demonstrated initiative and ingenuity, a major contribution in

moving many tons of critical medical supplies to forward areas during the

early days of invasion and, later, on the Continent.34

Penicillin

In addition to whole blood, the item that had a dramatic impact on the

care of casualties was penicillin. Early in 1943, the European theater began

receiving small quantities of this antibiotic. A professional controversy ensued

34 (1) Medical Department, United States Army. Blood Program in World War II. Washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 479. (2) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Paul R. Hawley for Commanding General, SOS, 26 Nov. 1943, subject: Provision of Whole Blood for Battle Casualties. (3)

Letter, Lt. Col. Eichard P. Fisk, Asst. Adjutant General, to Commanding General, First U.S. Army

Group, 2 Jan. 1944, subject: Provision of Whole Blood for the Medical Service.
3Q2 MEDICAL SUPPLY

because penicillin had not been tested adequately and its potency period and

prophylactic and therapeutic actions were not fully known. Moreover, the lack

of experience concerning the proper storage and preservation of penicillin

created some problems. During most of the war, it was stored under refrigeration in the belief that this would lengthen its potency period.

Not until April 1944 was the supply of penicillin ample to meet requirements; in June 1944, authority was granted to medical units to obtain the

item through normal requisitioning procedures. General and evacuation hospitals were authorized stock levels of 100 ampules; station and field hospitals,

50 ampules; and dispensaries, 10 ampules. Plans were established for the automatic daily shipment of 3,000 ampules of penicillin to the Continent beginning

on D-day. The daily quantity was increased to 5,000 ampules at D + 17.

As the production of penicillin was accelerated in the United States,

ETOUSA requirements expanded, as evidenced by the quantities received and

requisitioned. A total of 3,500 ampules were received in March 1944, which

increased to 15,000 during April and to 30,000 in May. Kequisitions were submitted to the Zone of Interior for 550,000 ampules for June delivery and

800,000 ampules for July. On D-day requisitions were submitted to the Zone

of Interior for 900,000 ampules for August loading and 1 million vials for

September loading.

Because of the meager production of penicillin in the United States in

its earlier days, close control on its use was necessary. The Chief Surgeon's

Office, on 16 September 1943, issued instructions as to storage, issue, and administration of penicillin, limiting its use to three main groups of cases in

which the antibiotic was of greatest value. The cases indicated were those in

which life was threatened by an overwhelming infection; those which, though

not immediately life-endangering, showed symptoms of acute or chronic infection not curable by usual treatment procedures; and cases of chronic gonorrhea

that were resistant to sulfanilamide. For the latter group and for chronic

diseases not endangering life, outdated penicillin could be used, but should be

so noted on clinical records.

The dramatic effect of penicillin had even diplomatic reverberations. A

stock level of 200 ampules was established at the medical section of Depot G50 for issue to allied embassies and missions. This level was reduced later to

20 ampules as the need was not so great as anticipated.35

35 (1) Informal routing slip, Chief Consultant in Surgery, ETOUSA, to Chief, Professional

Service, ETOUSA, 15 Jan. 1944, subject: Attached Report by 2d Lt. R. S. Kribs ; and attachment

thereto, dated 11 Jan. 1943. (2) Administrative Memorandum No. 97, Office of the Chief Surgeon,

ETOUSA, 21 June 1944, subject: Supply of Penicillin. (3) Letter, Col. S. B. Hays, MC, to Col.

R. E. Hewitt, MC, Executive Officer, Supply Service, OTSG, 13 May 1944. (4) Informal routing slip,

Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, Supply Division, to Chief, Professional Service, 23 June

1944, subject: Increase in Requirements of Penicillin. (5) Letter, Col. S. B. Hays, MC, Office of the

Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, to The Surgeon General (attention: Col. [Edward] Reynolds), 6 June

19441, subject: Request for Penicillin. (6) Informal routing slip, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA,

Supply Division, to Executive Officer, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 7 June 1944, subject:

Penicillin for Diplomatic Demands.
PREINV'ASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 303

Spectacles

Although Army and Air Forces personnel were issued spectacles to correct visual acuity deficiencies before their deployment from the United States,

there remained in the United Kingdom a large and increasing workload for

replacement and repair of spectacles.

Optical units of the medical depot companies were consolidated in 1943

into the ETOUSA Base Optical Shop at Blackpool. As the buildup of the

invasion forces progressed, the spectacle workload increased until June 1944,

when a total of 15,000 pairs of spectacles were fabricated, not including approximately 225 pairs per month of bifocal spectacles procured from Theodore

Hamblin, Ltd., in England. A total of 40,400 pairs of spectacles were fabricated in the first 5 months of 1944.

During this period, plans were developed to establish a base optical shop

on the Continent and one for each medical depot company designated for continental operations. There was to be a mobile optical repair unit in the base

platoon and two portable optical units in each of the advance platoons. Experience by the British in North Africa and Italy and by the Fifth U.S. Army

in Italy indicated that facilities for repair and maintenance of spectacles

should be provided to the Armies as far as possible, preferably in combat division areas.

The 1st, 11th, 13th, 15th, 30th, 31st, 32d, 33d, and 66th Medical Depot

Companies each activated one mobile optical unit, consisting of one officer and

six enlisted men and two portable optical units of two enlisted men each. The

Base Optical Shop was responsible for determining that optical personnel

were adequately trained to function under field conditions and that equipment

was ready for operations.36

Gas Mask Inserts

Gas mask lens insert fitting cases were stocked by the ETOUSA Base

Optical Shop and distributed to station and general hospitals in the United

Kingdom designated by the theater chief consultant on ophthalmology to

function as centers for fitting of inserts. Personnel requiring lens inserts reported to the nearest fixed hospital with their spectacle prescriptions and their

properly fitted lightweight service gas masks for appropriate fittings.37

Artificial Eyes

Supply of artificial eyes was another item that required special procedures. During 1943 and early 1944, artificial glass eyes were procured by sub-

* (1) ETO Base Optical Shop. [Official record.] (2) Letter, Chester E. Rorie to Dr. Derrick T.

Vail, Professor of Ophthalmology, Northwestern university, 3 Apr. 1946. (3) Letter, Capt. C E.

Rorie, SnC, Commanding Officer, ETO Base Optical Shop, to Col. Derrick T. Vail, MC, OTSG, 9 Sept.

1944, with inclosure.

37 Medical Department, united States Army. Surgery in World War II. Ophthalmology and

Otolaryngology. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957, p. 117.
g04 MEDICAL SUPPLY

mitting requisitions to the British Ministry of Pensions, with patient fittings

arranged at the most convenient optical appliance depot.

In 1944, following the development of the acrylic eye, 13 dental officers

were trained in fabrication of the eye and then stationed at 13 general hospitals

in Great!Britain. The material for acrylic eyes was generally procured from

the British through reciprocal aid procedures. The Chief Surgeon issued instructions to all medical facilities that artificial eyes would be available in two

types: the glass eye, and the acrylic or plastic eye. Instructions indicated that

acrylic eyes were preferred and that patients should be transferred as early

as possible after enucleation of the eye to the nearest general hospital that

had dental officers trained in the construction of acrylic eyes. In 1944, the Base

Optical Shop stocked glass eyes and furnished hospitals with an assortment of

eyes from which the medical officer could select the color and size for each

patient.38

Blank Forms

Because the chief of the Medical Supply Division considered it essential

to coordinate all requirements for certain basic nonmedical items from other

supply services, 2d Lt. (later Capt.) Kusseil S. Kribs, MAC, was appointed

to coordinate blank form requirements with The Adjutant General. These

forms, including emergency medical tags which were placed on casualties, clinical records, and laboratory and X-ray report forms, were essential for proper

medical care and evacuation of patients.

Having been informed by Lieutenant Kribs that the stock level of forms

was seriously low, The Adjutant General transferred the responsibility for

these forms to the catalog and equipment list section of the Medical Supply

Division. Those forms not available were sought in the Zone of Interior, and

small air shipments were made to temporarily sustain the U.K. operation.

Local production of forms was imperative although the section's printing

capability was concentrated in two borrowed and badly worn Gestetner Mimeograph machines and a small supply of low grade sulfite Mimeograph paper.

A survey of local procurement sources revealed that neither paper nor

time was available to print the thousands of forms required to support continental operations. Lieutenant Kribs' appeal to friends in the Quartermaster

section elicited four new Gestetners and a limited amount of paper. Through

scrounging efforts and trading of two borrowed Gestetners and other less essential equipment for paper, production rapidly reached the U.K. consumption

rate, but there were countless complaints about the quality of the printing and

the paper.

To improve the quality of the forms and to increase production, a Multilith offset printer was "borrowed" from the Air Forces, and needed plates

a« (1) See footnote 36(1), p. 303, (2) Medical Department, United States Army. Surgery in

World War II. • Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office,

1957, pp. 108-110.
PREINVASION BUILDUP IN EUROPE 305

were obtained on a loan basis from the Multigraph Corp. Paper was also

obtained from AG Publications in exchange for "machine time."

After shifting of personnel and many minor trials, the initial requirements for medical forms were delivered to the First U.S. Army medical supply

officer for distribution 3 days before D-day.39

FIRST U.S. ARMY SCHEME OF SUPPLY IN COMBAT

Increase in Supply Levels

The First U.S. Army Surgeon considered the standard equipment lists

for field and evacuation hospitals and the tables of equipment for divisional

and smaller medical units as insufficient for those units supporting the early

assault because of the chance of temporary isolation. With that in mind, certain hospital expendables were increased from a 10-day to a 15-day level and

all other medical units in the assault were raised from a 3-day to a 5-day level.

Without a counterbalance, the increased weight and cubage would have violated the shipping allocation for tactical hospitals and exceeded the capacity

of organic transportation of all other medical units. Every means to reduce

weight and cubage was exploited.40

Resupply Plans

Kesupply plans indicated that from D-day to D + 14, 2 days' supply of

essential items would be available on the beaches, building up with the various

types of maintenance units to 7 days of supply by D + 20. In addition, there

would be the bulk shipments of critical items on which abnormal consumption

rates were expected—litters, blankets, surgical dressings, and other items to

be laid down in the LST Army-Navy exchange units. Also, gas casualty maintenance units were to be delivered to the far shore and held in reserve by the

1st Medical Depot Company. If not used, they were to be turned over to Communications Zone depots when the depots arrived on the Continent.41

Plans for Operation OVERLORD

All divisional units were to inform the division medical supply officer of

their requirements, and he would consolidate divisional requirements and draw

in bulk from the nearest Army medical supply installation, for breakdown

and reissue to divisional units. Other units were to draw directly from the

nearest medical supply points. Eequisitioning was to be on an informal basis,

and oral requests would be acceptable. During emergencies, units normally

would use their own transportation to pick up medical supplies, but would be

39 See footnote 16, p. 284.

40 Report of Operations, First U.S. Army, 6 June 1944-1 August 1944. [Official record]

41 (1) See footnote 16, p. 284. (2) Larkey, Sanford V.: Administrative and Logistical History

of the Medical Service, Communications Zone, ETODSA, Appendixes 3 and 5. [Official record.]
306 MEDICAL SUPPLY

supported by corps, army, and depot transportation where situations warranted such action.

Medical Department items in need of repair and maintenance were to be

turned into the base section of the depot. All generators would be maintained

by the Engineer maintenance companies.

Captured enemy medical supplies and documents were to be preserved and

reported to the Army medical supply officer, who would receive samples of lots

of biologicals and vaccines, for use in the care of prisoners of war and German

civilians.

Although the blood detachment was attached to the depot company, it

would be based with the major medical unit nearest the servicing airstrip.

Deliveries of blood were to be made daily, upon receipt of the blood, based on

premapped routes, and in quantities commensurate with the casualty load of

each medical unit.42

APPROACH OF D-DAY

Except for those depots scheduled for the rearmost phasings, U.K. medical depots had virtually completed the assembly of automatic supply shipments by May 1944. Many prepackaged units of supplies were on their way

to southern ports, with some already preloaded aboard ships. By 1 June, the

supply points to support embarking troops were established and stocked as

preinvasion actions were virtually completed.

General Hawley, in a letter to General Kirk on 3 June 1944, wrote:

We are all set for the kickoff and I, personally, feel as nervous as players usually

feel just prior to the whistle. I have just completed a tour of inspection of all of our

field hospitals and evacuation hospitals on beaches and hards and all the transit hospitals which will first receive casualties from overseas. The arrangements are everything

that I could desire. You would be very pleased to see the fine mobile units and how

they are set up for business. We have just barely squeaked through on our supply

situation. I shall not, however, breathe really easily about it for another month.

In a relatively short time, the actions taken by the Surgeon General's Office, with

their genesis in the Voorhees mission, had transformed medical supply from an understaffed, floundering system in an untenable position, to a proud and well-integrated

organization that could detect its problems, and take the necessary and swift corrective

action.43

42!Seefootnote 41 (2), p. 305.

"Personal letter, Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, to The Surgeon General, 3 June 1944.
CHAPTER X

Europe: Combat Operations on the Continent

MEDICAL SUPPLY SUPPORT ON NORMANDY BEACHES

First Beach Operations

After months of planning and careful preparation, medical supply operations began on the continent of Europe with the landing on D-day (6 June

1944) of the second squad of the first section, 1st Medical Depot Company, in

support of elements of the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions on Omaha Beach.

The remainder of the section was unable to land until D + l because of intense

enemy action.

Late on the afternoon of D+l, the first medical maintenance units were

laid ashore; however, before these supplies could be relocated, significant portions were lost to the tide. Because of the strong enemy resistance, the first

section, Advance Depot Platoon of the 1st Medical Depot Company, was compelled to set up issue points virtually at the high waterline and to use salvaged

supplies and reserve stocks.

On the morning of D+2, an advance platoon of the 32d Medical Depot

Company, commanded by Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Howard F. White, MSC,

landed, and by the afternoon of D+3, the first Army medical supply dump

in France was established at Saint-Laurent-sur-Mer, less than a mile from

Omaha Beach (fig. 75).

Unlike the situation at Omaha Beach, bulk shipments of medical supplies

did not arrive on Utah Beach until D+2, and the first section of the Advance

Depot Platoon, 31st Medical Depot Company, arrived ashore on the night of

D + 2. By D + 3, the second section of the Advance Depot Platoon, 1st Medical

Depot Company, arrived and took over the beach issue; the remainder of the

platoon of the 31st, meanwhile, was setting up the first medical supply dump

in the Utah sector near Le Grand Chemin (map 13), 3 miles from Utah Beach

in the vicinity of the landing areas for the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions.1

Early Supply Problems

During the first few days, the unloading of medical cargo was irregular,

delayed, and confused. One of the biggest problems was locating and gathering medical supply boxes, which were mingled with the mass of other supplies along the beach areas. Use of supplemental methods of resupply, such

1

(1) Annual Report of Medical Activities, First U.S. Army, 1944. (2) Annual Report, 1st

Medical Depot Company, 1944. (3) Annual Report, 32d Medical Depot Company, 1944. (4) Annual

Report, 31st Medical Depot Company, 1944.

307
308 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 75.—Medical care on Omaha Beach, June 1944. Note the absence of a litter.

as mortar shell cases, assault vest, and two-man carry maintenance units,

averted many emergencies and crises. Block shipments on LST's (landing

ships, tank), discharged on the Continent by the Navy as planned, provided

a sustaining stock of litters and blankets. In the first 14 days, more than

30,000 litters, 96,000 blankets, and other replenishment items were brought

ashore by this means.

Packing lists, which were to be attached to the outside of skid-loaded

medical maintenance units, were frequently lost, necessitating opening numerous boxes to locate sufficient quantities of one item to fill a single requisition.

By doing this, the waterproofed packing was destroyed, leaving the supplies

unprotected from the weather until they could be placed under tentage or

other covered storage.

It was planned that hospital ships would deliver the bulk of whole blood

during the first few days of the assault to augment LST deliveries and build

up a comfortable reserve pending air shipments. It was necessary, however, to

interrupt hospital ship schedules until mines could be cleared away. The delay caused concern, particularly on Utah Beach. The first C-47 planes carrying

blood arrived at Omaha Beach onD+4; shipments to Utah Beach took place a
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 309

111

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June-July 1944.

few days later. During late June, the delivery of penicillin also became a problem. Because stocks were wi&iting to be unloaded from ships immobilized in

the English Channel, emergency air shipments had to be sent from the United

States to ease the situation.

Transshipment of supplies, including blood and penicillin, between the

beaches was virtually impossible.

Hospital assemblies.—One of the most serious problems during the early

days was the inability of hospital units to locate and reassemble components of

their equipment. To avoid this situation, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Kenneth E. Richards, MAC, Medical Supply Officer, First U.S. Army, had attempted to arrange for complete hospital assemblies to be loaded on one vessel, each assembly

to be accompanied by one officer and five enlisted men of the hospital unit. The

decision was that only the initial shipments would receive this kind of protection during transit. As a consequence, hospital personnel spent many futile

days going from dump to dump in search of a few more boxes of supplies and

equipment that might extend the hospital's functional capability. Maximum

functioning of several hospitals was seriously delayed because nearly every

unescorted assembly became fragmented.

Emergency requirements.—Despite the confusion and inherent difficulties

of war, essential supplies and equipment for medical treatment and evacuation
310 MEDICAL SUPPLY

were delivered to the First U.S. Army. Items in short supply were requisitioned

daily from the United Kingdom. The theater Medical Supply Division in

Cheltenham maintained a 24-hour duty force, which provided instant action on

priority air shipments and those on the Bed Ball Coaster system. As early as

D + l, emergency shipments of ether and penicillin were dropped by parachute

to the medical troops on the beaches. After emergency landing strips became

available on D+4, refrigerated whole blood, penicillin, and other critical items

were delivered daily.

By the end of June, landing strips had been improved to stich an extent

that the Combined Air Transport Operations Boom increased the load limit for

a C-47 plane to 5,000 pounds. The Medical Department was allowed two planes

daily, for a total lift of 10,000 pounds. Although this allocation was predicated

primarily on transportation requirements for whole blood, the milk run, as it

was called, was used extensively for other emergency needs as well.2

Visit of the Chief Surgeon.—The Chief Surgeon of the European theater,

Maj. Gen. Paul B. Hawley, first visited the Continent on D + 5 and returned on

subsequent dates to observe the treatment and evacuation of casualties. He

was impressed by the organization of the medical service in the First U.S. Army

and by the morale of the units. In a communication to The Surgeon General,

Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, on 26 June 1944, General Hawley reported:

Supply has been superb! At every medical-unit I visited, from the collecting station to

the holding hospital at the evacuation point in France, I enquired specially as to the status

of supply. I did not get a single answer that was not to the effect that they had everything

they wanted (which is always more than they need) and in ample quantities.3

First U.S. Army Report on Supply Difficulties

On 25 June 1944, Major Bichards reported substantially as follows to General Hawley on supply difficulties experienced to that date:

The use of inferior 2.5 Kilowatt generators which failed to stand around-the-elock

operations hampered operation of field and evacuation hospitals until they were finally

replaced by larger generators.

The use of leaded gasoline caused failure of gasoline burners, autoclaves, and twoburner stoves, but relief finally came when white gasoline became available.

Improper functioning of flow meters for anesthesia apparatus prompted five to six

service calls a day.

X-ray grids and screens were smashed, sterilizer gages were broken, and considerable

glassware and bottled items were lost. (The fault, according to Major Richards, rested

with those responsible for unloading and handling the supplies.)

A greater necessity :for spare parts for X-ray machines, autoclaves, anesthesia

apparatus, and other machinery was evidenced.

Because of excessive losses experienced during the D-day landings, there was a

continuous shortage of blank forms.

Many items, such as power saws, suction apparatus, anesthesia apparatus, oxygen

therapy apparatus, and shock team sets, which were not previously authorized, were

needed in a variety of medical units.

3

(1) See footnote 1(1), p. 307. (2) Report of Operations, First U.S. Army, 6 June 1944-1 August

1944. [Official record.] (3) Annual Eeport, Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 1944.

a Personal Letter, Maj. Gen. Paul E. Hawley, MC, Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, to Maj. Gen. Norman T.

Kirk, The Surgeon General, 26 June 1944.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 311

Major Richards' opinion was that air shipments were more desirable than

the Red Ball Express shipments because the supplies could be more readily

located upon delivery. He also suggested that the one medical depot per Army

should be supplemented with advance platoons as proved by the 31st and 32d

Medical Depot Companies during the assault phase.4

Appearance of More Deficiencies

Despite steps taken in the United Kingdom to augment unit equipment,

more deficiencies emerged. Lack of X-ray film-drying facilities in evacuation

hospitals was serious. Also, there was a general insufficiency in all oxygen

administering equipment. These and similar items were necessarily requisitioned from the United Kingdom.

Planning for resupply of litters, blankets, and splints—the property

exchange items—seemed to be adequate, but suddenly it was found that large

quantities of three additional items—pajamas, Levin tubes, and tracheotomy

tubes—were being evacuated to the United Kingdom along with patients,

without compensating replacements. Heavy air evacuation of casualties caused

a serious problem in replacing litters and blankets at forward airfields.

Attempts to rectify this condition by the inauguration of weekly replenishment, based on casualties evacuated during the previous week, did not prove

entirely satisfactory. The problem at this point was solved largely by furnishing additional aircraft based on specified demands. The shipment of blankets,

litters, and other essential items was as high as 550 tons in 1 day.

Constantly changing bed capacities during June 1944 caused some hospitals to turn in unneeded tentage and other equipment while other units were

inflated to meet sudden, unanticipated needs.5

THE BURGEONING DEPOT SYSTEM

Entrance of Third U.S. Army Units

With the addition of elements of the Third U.S. Army in July 1944, Col.

(later Brig. Gen.) John A. Rogers, MC, the First U.S. Army Surgeon, faced

the problem of supporting an oversized command made more difficult by the

changing tactical situation. To add to the drain upon First U.S. Army stocks,

some Third U.S. Army units had lost much of their equipment in transit.

To complement the increased troop strength and support expanding medical operations, additional medical depot companies were arriving to assist

those which had participated in the beach phase (map 13). The Advance

Depot Platoon of the 32d Medical Depot Company, which had set up storage

tents near Colleville shortly after D-day, was joined in setting up a depot at

Bricquebec, France, by its base depot platoon which had landed on 20 July.

4 Memorandum, Maj. Kenneth E. Richards. MAC, Medical Supply Officer, First U.S. Army, to

Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, 25 June 1944.

5

See footnote 1(1), p. 307.

295-453 O—68 22
312 MEDICAL SUPPLY

The depot was set up in a large open shed which proved adequate despite

heavy rains.

On 23 June, the second advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company landed on Utah Beach, proceeded to Le Grand Chemin, where it assisted

the 1st Medical Depot Company until 12 July, then moved to Chef Du Pont

to open the depot.

After working at Chef Du Pont, the section moved on 17 July to La

Haye-du-Puits, where it set up a medical dump for supplies arriving from

the beaches. A detachment of one officer and 20 enlisted men had been sent to

Cherbourg on 3 July to inspect and sort 40 tons of captured German medical

supplies.

The Advance Platoon of the 30th Medical Depot Company arrived on

Omaha Beach on 30 June 1944; the second advance section established a dump

at L'Etard while the first advance section went to Cherbourg. Approximately

50 skid loads of medical property and 100 tons of miscellaneous medical supplies were received in the first few days of operation. This clump, located in

the vicinity of Omaha Beach, received supplies discharged from vessels in

that area. The dump, taken over by the Advance Platoon of the 31st Medical

Depot Company on 10 July and consolidated into Depot M-3 on 1 August,

consisted of 300,000 square feet of storage space.

Opening of Supply Depots

Closed storage of medical supplies was first opened at Cherbourg by half

of the advance section of the 30th Medical Depot Company in early July, and

was designated Depot M-l. Lack of proper equipment to handle heavy property handicapped the operation of the depot, which had become partially

operational after the port of Cherbourg was opened on 16 July. This depot

was closed on 12 August as the tactical situation warranted a forward move.

Depot M-2 at Chef Du Pont, opened by the recently arrived balance of

the 33d Medical Depot Company on 15 July, occupied approximately a half

million square feet of open storage space, divided by hedgerows. Some 3,000

square feet of covered storage, however, was achieved by using ward tents.

Operation of the dump was taken over by the 13th Medical Depot Company

on 24 July, 5 days after its arrival (map 13). Approximately 2,500 tons of

medical supplies, including assemblies for five general hospitals, had been

handled by the 33d.6

Position of Advance Section

From D-day to the establishment of the Army rear boundaries on

1 August, the First U.S. Army controlled all supplies and dumps. On 18 July,

Ml) See footnotes 1(4), p. 307; and 2(2), p. 310. (2) Annual Report, 30th Medical Depot

Company, 1944. (3) Annual Report, 33d Medical Depot Company, 1944. (4) Annual Report, 13th

Medical Depot Company, 1944.
OOMBAT OPERATION'S IN EUROPE 313

however, following a conference attended by the Surgeon, First U.S. Army,

and his medical supply officer, and by Col. Charles H. Beasley, MC, Surgeon.

ADSEC (Advance Section), Communications Zone, and his medical supply

officer, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Thomas A. Carilia, MSC, it was agreed that the

ADSEC Surgeon would be responsible for receiving medical supplies discharged at the port of Cherbourg and over Utah and Omaha Beaches and for

operating medical dumps. The three dumps (M-l, M-2, M-3) had a total of

2,875 tons of supplies, 25 percent of which were hospital assemblies.

The First U.S. Army's massive attack on Saint-L6 and adjoining areas

started on 11 July. Augmented by attached Third U.S. Army units, a steady

pressure was maintained until the German lines collapsed at the end of the

month. The Third U.S. Army became operational on 1 August, and the entire

front became fluid, the First and Third U.S. Armies advancing rapidly. At

that time, the Third U.S. Army medical units, the 32d and 33d Medical Depot

Companies, which had been attached earlier to the First U.S. Army, reverted

to Third U.S. Army control.7

Establishment of General Hospitals

The 5th and 298th General Hospitals arrived on the Continent on 6 and

17 July, respectively, but the unit assembly for the 5th General Hospital was

delayed; so, the assembly for the 127th General Hospital, which had arrived,

was used to establish the 5th General Hospital at Carentan (fig. 76). The

298th General Hospital was established at Cherbourg. Both units became

operational and were receiving patients on 1 August.

By 31 August, 17 general hospital (1,000-bed) assemblies had reached

the Continent, together with 151 medical maintenance units, type A; 49

division assault maintenance units, type D, for medical requirements; 211

division assault units, type D, for surgical requirements; and 35 supplemental D units, plus many tons of other supplies.8

SUPPLY DIVISION ON THE CONTINENT

With the extension of liberated territory in early August, an advance

section of Headquarters, ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, U.S.

Army), moved to Le Mans, and the forward echelon of ETOUSA Headquarters assumed responsibility for the Normandy area on 14 August. The

Chief Surgeon's Office, including the Supply Division, had moved in increments from the United Kingdom to Normandy during July and August.

Because of its initial locations near Valognes on the Cherbourg Peninsula, the

Supply Division was unable to supervise supply operations closely. The

Armies could contact the rear headquarters in Cheltenham for emergency

'Annual Report, Medical Section, Third U.S. Army, 1944.

8

(1) Annual Report, 5th General Hospital, 1944. (2) Annual Report, 298th General Hospital,

1944. (3) See footnote 2(3), p. 310.
314 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 76.—Unloading the more than 5,000 items that comprised the medical assembly

of the 5th General Hospital at Carentan, France, 24 July 1944.

shipments more easily than they could relay messages through Valognes.

The Supply Division maintained only rudimentary central stock control

records, duplicating to a degree those maintained in the United Kingdom.

Organization

The division was organized into four branches: Administration and

Finance, Depot Technical Control, Stock Control, and an Issue Branch that

included Civil Affairs supplies and captured materiel. Division personnel

included 25 officers, 60 enlisted men, 4 British civilians, and 3 French civilians,

for a total of 92.

Immediately following the liberation of Paris by Allied Forces in early

September, the Chief Surgeon's Office moved to that city as part of Headquarters, ETOUSA. With the establishment of General Hawley's office in

Paris, the Supply Division was augmented by personnel from the United

Kingdom and rapidly assumed close supervision of medical supply operations

on the Continent in a manner similar to that instituted in the United Kingdom

in March 1944.

Stock control*—Stabilization of the depot system after 1 September permitted the institution of the stock control system used in the United Kingdom.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 315

Depots on the Continent (other than those assigned to armies) submitted stock

status reports biweekly to the Supply Division.

Upon receipt, depot reports were rapidly consolidated by the Stock Control Branch on electric accounting machines obtained from the New York

Port of Embarkation or from a French firm. From these reports, the theaterwide status of each medical item could be determined.

Use of civilian personnel.—French civilians performed the key-punching

operation and were able to convert the numerical data into machine language under the direction of an English-speaking French supervisor. By using

couriers to collect depot reports and electric accounting machines to consolidate the data, the Supply Division could maintain a surprisingly current and

accurate consolidated supply record. The records depended, however, upon

depot inventories and reports of quantities on hand, due-in, and due-out, which

were understandably inaccurate during the first few months on the Continent.

Stock Levels

Consolidated stock reports formed the basis for establishing theater levels

for each item of supply. Before D-day, the need had been perceived for two

separate stock levels to support 125,000 hospital beds and other medical units

in the U.K. Base Section and to support the armies and hospitals in the

Communications Zone on the Continent. While stock levels were computed

on actual troop strength for continental operations, U.K. stock levels were

based on bed strength data converted to an artificial troop strength to utilize

War Department replacement factors. Moreover, separate levels were computed on those items peculiar to definitive treatment in general hospitals.

Establishment of these overlapping stocks proved to be a wise decision. Because of the wide dispersion of medical installations between the United

Kingdom and the Continent and the difficulties in discharging cargoes from

ships arriving from the United States and the United Kingdom, timely support of the fast-moving armies as well as the hospitals on the Continent and

those in the United Kingdom would have been highly improbable.

In mounting Operation OVERLORD, stock levels were computed for

the buildup of a 7-day reserve stock on the Continent by D+41 (17 July 1944)

and an increase to a 60-day reserve by D +208 (1 January 1945). The theater

reorder point was established at 180 days' stock for each item: 15 days' operating stock, 60 days' reserve, and 105 days lagtime (defined as the number of

days elapsing from the date a requisition was submitted to the United States

until supplies were received in an ETOUSA depot).

Replenishment requisitions were computed and submitted to the New York

Port of Embarkation every 2 weeks for each item which had an on-hand and

an on-order position below the 180-day level. Theoretically, every item would

indicate a stock level of 165 days at each computation and 15 days' stock would

be requisitioned. Stock replenishment would be received 105 days later so that

the actual stock on hand would fluctuate between 75 and 60 days. In practice,
sl6 MEDICAL SUPPLY

consumption of individual items oscillated widely as did the actual time required to deliver the replenishment stock. The overall system proved exceptionally effective, and medical supply problems on the Continent would have

been minimal had it not been for the transportation difficulties.

As in the United Kingdom before the invasion of France, the Supply

Division established stock levels for each depot, depending upon its mission.

Replenishment stocks were distributed to each depot directly from ships discharging cargoes at ports of debarkation or by interdepot transfers. Balancing

of depot stocks on the Continent was instituted on D + 90 (6 September) as

the depot system reached a degree of stability.9

Local Procurement

Procurement on the Continent differed in policy and procedure from local

purchase in the United Kingdom. Theater policy for continental operations

provided for the maximum use of local resources when such local procurement

would (1) supply items that were in short supply in the United States or in

the theater, (2) conserve essential shipping space, (3) satisfy emergency

requirements, (4) accrue to the benefit of the United States, or (5) aid in the

rehabilitation of the economies of liberated areas.

Because of the scarcity of medical supplies and equipment in liberated

countries, a ban was established by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower on the purchase by cash or the procurement through reciprocal aid arrangements, except

where the indigenous government concurred with a specific request.

Procurement from the French was confined to a few items. Arrangements

were made with LTnstitut Pasteur for the supply of rabies vaccine as required.

The only other items bought in quantity were small cloth bags to hold personal

belongings of patients, self-retaining catheters, sacroiliac belts, and lipstick

which proved most effective for marking casualties in the field. Because intravenous solutions shipped from the United States required much cargo space,

an attempt was made to procure intravenous solutions from the French; lack

of appropriate facilities to manufacture sterile products meeting U.S. standards precluded consummation of contract arrangements.

Early in 1945, arrangements were made to procure dental X-ray film and

X-ray film sizes 8- by 10-inch and 10- by 12-inch from the Gaevert plant in

Belgium. This enabled the theater to return considerable quantities of X-ray

film to the United States for reshipment to other theaters where it was critically needed.

Although procurement of British items had been severely curtailed in

early 1944, the British continued to furnish special items required on "spot"

demands. Insulin, heparin, alkathene tubing, medicinal gases for the U.K.

hospital system, dental burs, and some nonstandard items were thus procured.10

9 See footnote 2(3), p. 310.

10 Semiannual Report, Supply Division, Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 1 January-30 June 1945.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 317

Control of Depot Operations

Depots were operated on the Continent either by single medical depot

companies, sections or elements of depot companies, or by more than one depot

company simultaneously. Leapfrogging of depots was essential in maintaining support for the advancing front. Medical supply operations in the

United Kingdom were conducted primarily in sections of general depots,

whereas, on the Continent, virtually all were medical branch depots. To avoid

traffic congestion, medical depot sites on the Continent were seldom located in

close proximity to other supply service depots. Except in the early days in

Normandy where a limited area was involved and a dearth of facilities made

selection easy, choice of depot sites was a constant problem. Many more sites

were selected than were ever used. Locating suitable plants paralleling the line

of communication was a continuing task, and this was usually in competition

with the other supply services. Furthermore, in France and Belgium, only sites

which had been occupied by the Germans were available for use without long

drawn-out requisitioning procedures.

Dual system of supervision.—Chiefs of the supply services, including

medical, were responsible for distributing stock among depots, and for issuing

supplies under their cognizance.

This system generally prevailed without any difficulties, except for a short

period immediately following the merger of SOLOC (Southern Line of Communications) with ETOUSA. During this interval, the Chief Surgeon was

not authorized to contact Depot M-452 at Marseille to direct the shipment of

stocks except through the base section surgeon. The exception was quickly

eliminated by a directive from the theater G-4.11

Medical depot manual.—Because medical depot operations in Normandy

were necessarily unsophisticated, the Medical Depot Manual was revised to

incorporate the lessons learned from operations in the United Kingdom and

the early days on the Continent. While mandatory only for Communications

Zone depots, the manual was furnished to the armies to encourage their depots

to use such procedures as were considered feasible. With the absorption of

SOLOC, the same procedures were instituted in the Southern Zone depots.

This resulted in a uniform operation among medical depots, which facilitated

shifting of personnel and depots from one point of operation to another and

provided effective technical and operational control.12

EXPANSION OF DEPOT OPERATIONS ON THE CONTINENT

Mobility of Supply Operations

With the entrance of the Third U.S. Army into the conflict, and the

breakout of the Allied armies from the Normandy Beachhead at the beginning of August 1944, depots had to move rapidly to keep up with the combat

troops.

11 See footnote 10, p. 316.

12 Medical Depot Manual, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 7 Dec. 1944.
318 MEDICAL SUPPLY a!>o

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COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 319

FIGURE 77.—Advance Platoon, 32d Medical Depot Company, receiving supplies at

a new location in France, September 1944.

Following a basic pattern, an advance section of a depot would support

the army corps making the main combat effort. The second advance section was

generally retained with the base depot until the corps medical units outdistanced their supply. The second section could then leapfrog the first, often

serving at the same time as an advance party for movement of the base depot.

A second depot company was generally strategically situated with one section

supporting the most distant flank. Advance sections could move quickly, with

trucks shuttling equipment and stocks sufficient for 5 to 10 days' requirements.13

Depot Advance to the Siegfried Line

As the medical depot attached to the First U.S. Army, the base depot

platoon of the 1st Medical Supply Depot followed the movement of the combat situation from Le Molay near the Omaha Beachhead on 28 June 1944,

stopping to set up a base dump at Saint-L6 on 3 August, and advancing its

center of operations to Eupen, Belgium, by 10 September (map 14).

Moving from Bricquebec, where its elements had been united on 20 July,

the 32d Medical Depot Company (fig. 77), in keeping with the tactical situa13 See footnote 7, p. 313.
MEDIOAL SUPPLY

tion, advanced to Fougeres on 8 August, and on 14 August, opened a depot at

Le Mans in support of the XII, XV, and XX Corps. From there, the company

sent out advance sections to Fontainebleau and Dreux before opening an advance medical depot at Verdun on 5 September. This became the Third U.S.

Army medical distributing depot and the location of ETOUSA Blood Bank

until 23 November.

Like the 32d, the 33d Medical Depot Company moved rapidly with the

advance of the Third U.S. Army. After its arrival on Omaha Beach on 11

July, the base section helped its advance section in operating Depot M-2 at

Chef Du Pont, the first Communications Zone medical depot set up on the

Continent in support of the Normandy Campaign. By 29 July, the base section had advanced to Besneville, remaining there until 10 August, then moved

rapidly across France to Toul, where it remained in operation until 17 December. The second advance section of the 33d, which had arrived earlier on

the Continent and had operated at Le Grand Chemin, Chef Du Pont, and

La Haye-du-Puits, moved to Coutances, where it remained until 15 August,

then was transferred to Rostrenen, Brittany, and placed under the command

of the Ninth U.S. Army to aid in the liberation of Brest.

The 30th and 31st Medical Depot Companies, unlike those previously mentioned, were assigned to ADSEC upon their arrival in France.

After the advance sections of the 30th Medical Depot Company had

operated a medical dump at L'Etard and established Depot M-l at Cherbourg

on 9 July, the base section arrived and was assigned to Depot M-2 (later

M-402) at Chef Du Pont to establish and operate that depot. Sending out advance platoons to Eennes, where Depot M-404 was established on 20 August

and to Le Mans where Depot M-405 set up, the 30th began its move from the

Cotentin Peninsula.

By 27 August, it became necessary to establish an advance dump at

Chartres, where, for more than a month, Depot M-406T operated against difficult odds.

The 31st Medical Depot Company, similarly assigned to ADSEC, united

at Trevieres on 1 August after the advance section had operated dumps on

Omaha Beach since D +3. First called Depot M-3 and later designated M-403,

this depot remained under the control of the 31st until 15 September, shipping

as much as 3,500 tons of medical supplies a week.

As the combat forces liberated Paris in early September 1944, the 31st

sent an advance platoon into the city to set up Depot M-407. By 25 September,

the depot was operational.

The 11th Medical Depot Company, which did not arrive on the Continent

until 20 August, opened Depot M-404 at Rennes 4 days later. The depot company remained at this location until October. As part of its duties, a detachment of 15 enlisted men and 1 officer was sent to Brest on 21 September to

salvage captured German medical supplies and equipment.

After the departure of the 33d Medical Depot Company from Chef Du

Pont on 26 July, the 13th Medical Depot Company was made solely responsi-
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 321

ble for the operation of the depot, handling 34,000 tons of maintenance supplies and 800 tons of TOE (table of organization and equipment) equipment.

When the 66th Medical Depot Company arrived on 12 September to assume

command of Depot M-402T, the 13th moved to Reims, where it set up Depot

M-408T."

Early Supply Problems

Two outstanding problems severely handicapped medical supply operations during the first 90 days on the Continent: lack of available transportation

and lack of adequate storage space in the depot areas.

Port facilities.—Among the more difficult problems, the lack of ports was

one of the most serious. Because deepwater ports did not become available as

soon as planned, many ships from the United States which were destined for

continental ports were diverted to the United Kingdom and unloaded; the

supplies were then placed in depot stocks, from which they had to be ordered

forward for movement to the Continent by small cross-Channel coasters. Conversely, some ships scheduled for U.K. discharge were moved, after considerable delay, to the Continent, where they discharged their cargoes over the

beaches. The labor expended in these operations and the delay in arrival of

badly needed supplies were overwhelming.

Availability of the port of Le Havre in late September provided some

additional facilities. That port could handle, however, only a small percentage

of the waterborne volume arriving from the United Kingdom and the United

States. Although Allied troops captured Antwerp with its huge port installation intact early in September, the water approaches to Antwerp were

not cleared until mid-November and it did not become operational until

28 November.

Delay in discharge of cargo was perhaps even more serious. With the

lack of adequate port facilities on the Continent, priority was given to unloading ammunition, fuel, and lubricants. Unfortunately, ships carrying these cargoes rarely carried medical supplies. The 130th General Hospital, for example,

was immobilized for 7 weeks because of difficulties in unloading its equipment

on the Continent. The unit had disembarked in France on 5 September 1944.

Its assembly had been shipped from the U.K. depot on 27 August, but only

94 tons arrived in France in September. The balance of 195 tons was not

unloaded until 25 October.

Trucking problems.—Difficulties in trucking medical supplies from the

port to the medical depot were another drawback to the expansion of the depot

system. As an example, an unusual incident occurred when one truck convoy

from Cherbourg, carrying a 1,000-bed general hospital assembly, and a second

convoy, originating at Le Havre and also carrying a 1,000-bed general hospital

assembly, met each other during the middle of the night at a road junction

in the interior of France. There the two convoys were mingled, with the result

"(1) See footnotes 1(2) and 1(4), p. 307; and 6(2), 6(3), and 6(4), p. 312. (2) Annual

Report, 11th Medical Depot Company, 1944. (3) Annual Report, 66th Medical Depot Company, 1944.
MEDICAL SUPPLY

that all the beds arrived at one operating site, while the other site received

all the mattresses and pillows. The mixup was detected when the two commanding officers called the Supply Division, ETOUSA, within minutes of

each other, to report the discrepancies.

Shipment of unit assemblies was only a part of transportation troubles.

Bulk stock movements were not immune. Before the breakthrough at Avranches,

distances were short and truck transportation presented no problem, but as

armies began to race across France, the situation was reversed.

On 25 August 1944, the famous Eed Ball Express began operation. Transportation Corps truck companies, using 21^-ton trucks and operating day and

night, hauled supplies from the Normandy Beach areas forward to the armies.

The armies submitted daily requisitions, based on tonnage allocations; these

were approved and distributed each night to the various technical services

for supply action. Trucking companies reported to the appropriate depots to

transport the supplies to forward areas. If supplies were not received in a certain number of days, the armies submitted new requisitions. This soon led to

serious duplications of requirements, and within 3 weeks, a back-order system

had to be established to correct these difficulties.

Under this system, nearly all tonnage was allocated to the armies, and

little transportation was available for the buildup of forward Communications

Zone depots.

Although the Eed Ball Express performed a herculean task in moving

supplies, there were many difficulties. Truck drivers were not familiar with

local geography and sometimes became lost. When vehicles broke down, they

were separated from the convoy and the drivers were sometimes unable to

find their destinations.

Transportation expedients.—Difficulties encountered in water and truck

transportation often taxed the ingenuity of medical supply personnel. For

example, while ships were being loaded at ports in southern England during

the assault, alert medical supply officers observed that ordnance replacement

vehicles were being shipped empty from the United Kingdom. Arrangements

were made with Ordnance Department representatives to load medical supplies

on the trucks and jeeps. Arriving on the Continent, drivers proceeded to the

First U.S. Army medical dumps, unloaded their supplies, then delivered the

vehicles to an ordnance depot. The movement of medical supplies under this

improvised arrangement was substantial enough to attract the attention of

G-4 when reports of tonnage moved to the Continent exceeded that allocated

to the Medical Department.

A similar arrangement was effected in Normandy when the Ordnance

Department had difficulty in moving vehicles to forward depots. Maj. William

B. Wagner, MAC, of the Supply Division, was expediting shipments of supplies from the beaches. He arranged to borrow drivers from hospitals and

other units in staging areas when medical supplies could be loaded on the

vehicles for movement to forward depots. During 3 weeks, in late September
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 323

•* "ijwf * _

X>: *

FIGURE 78.—Tank retrievers, borrowed by the commanding officer of the medical

depot at Chartres, France, were used to deliver 3,000 tons of medical supplies to Medical

Depot M-407 at Paris when normal transportation means failed:

and early October, 564 vehicles were so used to haul 800 tons of supplies from

the beaches to forward depots.

Individual arrangements were made with hospitals and other organizations in the Normandy area, which had trucks not being fully utilized, to

haul medical supplies to Depot M-407 in Paris (fig. 78). Needless to say, there

was no problem in recruiting drivers as they were permitted to remain" in

Paris for an overnight visit.

A great deal of reliance was placed on moving medical supplies by air.

From the first airdrop onD+1, the volume of air shipment increased rapidly;

on 17 September, 50 bombers were used to supplement the milk runs which

had started on 14 June. With the liberation of Paris in early September 1944,

a receiving point was established at Le Bourget Airfield, which then became

the terminus of the milk run from the United Kingdom.
324 MEDICAL SUPPLY

\

FIGURE 79.—Loading a roll of prepacked medical supplies into a 155-mm.

shell that was to be fired to isolated American troops when weather conditions

precluded airdrop, October 1944.

At Mortain, France, shortly after the Normandy invasion, the most sensational delivery method was successfully employed. A battalion of the 30th

Infantry Division was temporarily cut off by a German counterthrust; medical

supplies were running low, and enemy antiaircraft fire prevented an accurate

airdrop. Urgent calls for medical supplies prompted the decision to fire replenishment supplies in shells. The explosive head was removed from 155-mm.

shells and the hollow nose was loaded with essential supplies, including

Pentothal sodium (thiopental sodium), ether, and cotton (fig. 79). Some losses

were experienced through breakage, but sufficient quantities were delivered to

meet the requirements for the period of isolation.15

Lack of storage facilities.—Quite as serious as the transportation problem was lack of adequate outdoor storage space, a problem that was accentuated

15(1) Memorandum, Col. S. B. Hays, MC, to Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, 24 Dec. 1944, subject:

Difficulties in Moving Medical Supplies and Equipment. (2) See footnote 2(3), p. 310. (3) Annual

Report, Medical Department Activities, 30th Infantry Division, 1944.
OOMBAT OPERATION'S IN EUROPE 325

by heavy fall rains, which, turned the dry fields of July and August into

muddy quagmires. Particularly bad was the situation at Depot M-^02T at

Chef Du Pont and Carentan.

Late in August, news was received at headquarters of the impending arrival of approximately 9,000 tons of medical supplies on six separate ships.

It was decided that Depot M-402T, which was set up in an open field, would

be the receiving installation for shipments discharged in the Normandy Base

area, but that acquisition of additional space would be necessary. After an

extensive search for a suitable storage site, an abandoned airstrip, surfaced

with steel matting, approximately % of a mile in length and located on the

main highway 2 miles east of Carentan, was chosen. Along with it, a few

small buildings in the town were acquired for loose issue. Plans were made to

warehouse the materiel by medical class on either side of the airstrip; the

Corps of Engineers promised crushed stone for entrance and exit approaches,

but only meager quantities were delivered. A detachment from the 30th Medical Depot Company was retained and approximately 900 prisoners of war

were acquired to augment the 11th Medical Depot Company since materialshandling equipment was not available. Once a vehicle left the road leading

into the depot area, it could no longer operate under its own power and two

captured German caterpillar tractors had to tow immobilized vehicles (fig.

80).

The six ships arrived with the anticipated cargo, and the next 3 weeks

became the most hectic in the history of the 11th Medical Depot Company.

The Transportation Corps pressured the port to unload the ships, the port

pressured the truck companies to keep the quays clear, and the truck companies pressured the depot to unload and return their vehicles. Soon, the approaches to the airstrip would not sustain anything larger than a 21/2 -ton

truck, and the steel matting eventually would not accommodate even these.

For nearly 3 weeks, both sides of the highway were lined with 10-ton trailers

for approximately 1 mile, with all interested agencies clamoring for release

and movement of the vehicles.

As the stacks of boxes lining the airstrip began to sink deeper into the

mud, the strip was abandoned in favor of the fields paralleling the road. A

roller conveyor, manned by many prisoners of war, moved the boxes from the

stacks on the airfield to vehicles on the sides of the highway. One such conveyor stretched nearly % of a mile to the most distant stacks. In some instances, prisoners of war formed bucket brigades to move the boxes. To supplement the roller conveyors, the depot built heavy-duty skids to be towed

by the German tractors. The volume of stock that arrived during this period

precluded an orderly tally, and inventory records suffered for several months.

Despite these handicaps, approximately 700 tons of supplies were handled

daily during the 3 weeks. Shipments averaged 60 requisitions daily for the 25

local hospitals, various hospital trains, Communications Zone depots, and

hospitals in forward areas.16

« See footnote 14(5), p. 321.
m MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 80.—Captured German tractor and heavy-duty skids built by depot personnel

from ships' salvage lumber comprised the standard materials-handling equipment for

intradepot movements at Medical Depot M-402T, at Carentan, France, after the rains

came in the fall of 1944.

FORWARD DEPOTS

The last 3 months of 1944 saw the opening of additional ports, the closing of Utah and Omaha Beaches, the arrival of shipments on the Continent

directly from the Zone of Interior, the rehabilitation of rail facilities, and the

increasing emphasis on moving stocks to forward depots. These factors, plus

a stabilized front bordering on Germany, permitted a buildup of hospitals in

the Communications Zone. Depots M-407, M-408T, and M-^09, though preceding some of the events, were products of those developments (map 14).

Depots in France

Having established Depot M-407 in Paris in early September, the 31st

Medical Depot Company effectively used its 257,000 square feet of storage

space despite a lack of materials-handling equipment.

Early in October, the 31st was joined by the 15th Medical Depot Company, which was responsible for handling medical supplies arriving by plane
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 327

FIGURE 81.—Bargeloads of medical supplies on the dockside of Medical Depot M-407

being discharged, sorted, and tallied.

from England and for shipping emergency medical supplies to the frontlines.

By the end of October, medical supplies were arriving by every conceivable

means (fig. 81), and issue operations were mounting proportionately. The

second advance section was sent to Rouen on 2 November to operate a distribution point. "With the Battle of the Bulge, which started on 16 December,

the depot was overwhelmed with work; however, by the end of January 1945,

normal operations had resumed.

Depot M-^08T, under the command of Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Harry S.

Green, MAC, was opened at Reims in mid-September by the 13th Medical

Depot Company, and was augmented by a detachment of the 15th Medical

Depot Company.

The depot occupied five one-story, platform-height buildings, totaling

129,805 square feet of storage space and approximately 63,000 square feet of

open space. Its initial mission was to provide an immediate backup for the 1st

Medical Depot Company of the First U.S. Army, the 32d and 33d Medical

Depot Companies supporting the Third U.S. Army, and the 28th Medical

Depot Company of the Ninth U.S. Army, as well as to open and operate Depot

295^53 O—68 23
MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 82.—Medical Depot M-409, Liege, Belgium, showing railroad spurs with track

sidings adjacent to main warehouse.

M-412 in Keims as a Civil Affairs supply depot. The initial receipts at M408T were slow, the first rail shipment arriving on 25 September.

By mid-December, the depot was supplying the needs of the Third U.S.

Army, of 30 general hospitals, 3 station hospitals, 166 miscellaneous units, and

2 airborne divisions. The Battle of the Bulge increased the tempo of activities

significantly, and two provisional supply points were set up on the Meuse

Eiver line. As the tactical situation became extremely critical, emergency

plans were prepared for evacuation of Depot M-408T. In addition to operating Depot M-412, Depot M-408T was stocked with 2,400 separate items comprising 2,215 tons of supplies; hence, it was fortunate that evacuation did not

become a necessity.

Depots in Belgium

After performing a special task of classifying, cataloging, and processing

five warehouses of captured German medical materiel at Ciney, Belgium, the

66th Medical Depot Company, commanded by Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Charles

L. Gilbert, MAC, was assigned to ADSEC to open Depot M-409 at Liege, on

2T October 1944 (fig. 82). The first issues were made on 7 November and, with

help from the 165th Medical Battalion, the depot supported the First and
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 329

Ninth U.S. Armies and medical installations of ADSEC and Channel Base

Section. From 20 November to 31 December, the operational area of Depot

M-409 was constantly harassed by V-l and V-2 bombs launched from

Germany.

During this period, it was imperative that supplies be cleared swiftly

from the Antwerp docks, prime target of the German bombardment. Depot

M^rll was also established at Liege to serve as a sorting point for medical

supplies received from Antwerp. While under the operation of the 66th and a

section of the 15th Medical Depot Company which had arrived in November

from Paris, the depot lost about 100 tons of medical supplies when V-l bombs

twice made direct hits on the sorting points.

Despite the nightly bombardment of V-l and V-2 bombs, depot personnel at Liege continued operations directly supporting First U.S. Army units

during the Battle of the Bulge. To safeguard shipments during the battle,

Depot M-411 was moved on 24 December to Noirhat, 20 miles southeast of

Brussels, and redesignated M-413 (fig. 83). Under the control of the 15th

Medical Depot Company, Depot M^13 operated as a sorting and reconsignment point, with 50,500 square feet of covered storage space and 87,000 square

feet of open storage.17

Combat Operations of Forward Depots

First U.S. Army depots.—While the large medical depots were being

established at Paris, Reims, and Liege, sections of the Advance Depot Platoon,

1st Medical Depot Company, by 6 October, had established advance dumps

at Malmedy, Belgium, and Valkenburg, Netherlands, and the base platoon

had moved to Dolhain, Belgium, where it opened the base medical dump in

a warehouse (map 15).

On 31 October, the advance section at Valkenburg moved forward and

established a dump at Bastogne while the "section at Malmedy joined the

main body at Dolhain.

During the Battle of the Bulge, a detachment of the advance section at

Bastogne was moved to Libin, Belgium, leaving three noncommissioned officers

and one private at Bastogne to issue supplies to the 101st Airborne Division

and attached units during the siege of the city. By 19 December, seven trucks

were secured and medical supplies were removed from Bastogne. On 26 December, the first section of the Advance Depot Platoon rejoined the Base Depot

Platoon at Dolhain, and the second section established an advance medical

dump at Huy, Belgium.

Third U.S. Army depots.—In support of the Third U.S. Army, the 32d

Medical Depot Company, which had operated ,a large depot at Verdun since

8 September, sent an advance section to Aumetz on 7 November to serve XX

"(1) See footnotes 1(4), p. 30T ; 6(4), p. 312; and 14(3), p. 321. (2) Annual Report, 15th

Medical Depot Company, 1944.
330 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 83.—Materials-handling equipment at Medical Depot M^13, Charleroi, Belgium,

January 1945.

Corps. On 24 November, the medical depot at Verdun was closed and a new

depot was opened at Metz (fig. 84) in support of the III, VIII, XII, and XX

Corps. By 3 December, the advance section joined the main group at Metz, but,

on 20 December, reopened the depot at Aumetz to support Third U.S. Army

units thrown in to stop the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes (map 16).

The 33d Medical Depot Company, which had advanced its main body to

Toul by 20 September, remained there until 15 December, but in early October,

the second advance section had established a forward dump at Bastogne after

leaving Kostrenen. By 20 October, this section advanced to Valkenburg, replacing the 1st Medical Depot Company and operating the only dump avail-
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 331

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MAP 15.—First U.S. Army medical supply depots in France and Belgium, OctoberDecember 1944.

able to the Ninth U.S. Army until late in November. This dump was turned

over to an advance section of the 35th Medical Depot Company attached to

the Ninth U.S. Army on 22 December, and the advance section of the 33d

moved first to Esch, Luxembourg, and then to Longuyon, France, by 26

December.

Meanwhile, the base section of the 33d had left Toul on 15 December and

set up a dump at Chäteau-Salins 2 days later. The unit moved on to Longuyon,

where it united with the advance section on 30 December.18

Seventh U.S. Army depots.—The Yth Medical Depot Company, commanded by Lt. Col. A. J. D. Guenther, MSC, was responsible for supplying the

18 See footnotes 1(2) and 1(3), p. 307 ; and 6(3), p. 312.
MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 84.—In December 1944, the 32d Medical Depot Company mobile optical

shop moved its operation to more efficient quarters in a building at Metz, France.

Seventh U.S. Army. After landing in southern France on 16 August, this company advanced rapidly up the Rhone River Valley, and reached Epinal by

mid-October. There the base section remained until 7 December, when it moved

to Sarrebourg, France (maps 8, 9, and 17). On 18 December, the Luneville

depot, no longer in a forward position, was closed and a new depot was opened

the following day at Haguenau, France. The tactical situation compelled withdrawal of the section on 27 December. The next day, the Spinal base was

reopened.

Supply functions of SOLOC.—In early November 1944, the Communications Zone of the Mediterranean theater passed on to ETOUSA its functions

in southern France. On 20 November, SOLOC became responsible for the standard medical services of the Communications Zone and assumed a primary function, the distribution of medical supplies to the Seventh U.S. Army and the

First French Army. Lt. Col. Allen Pappas, MAC, was the medical supply

officer.

Throughout December 1944, SOLOC and Headquarters, Mediterranean

theater, worked closely together to level stocks, to build up a 45-day reserve,

and to transfer complete responsibility to SOLOC.

Because of a sudden influx of German POW's (prisoners of war), the

need for POW hospitals increased greatly. By 31 December, a total of 3,000

beds in four separate units had been set up and adequately equipped.19

M(l)Annual Keport, 7th Medical Depot Company, 1944. For more detail on the activities of the

7th Medical Depot Company in southern France, see chapter VIII. (2), History of the Medical Section,

Headquarters, SOLOC, ETOUSA, 20 November 1944-1 January 1945.
OOMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 333

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MAP 16.—Third U.S. Army medical supply depots, October-December 1944.
334 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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MAP 17.—Seventh U.S. Army medical supply depots in northern France, 17 OctoberDecember 1944.

Ninth U.S. Army depots.—When the Ninth U.S. Army became operational on the Continent on 5 September 1944, it was initially assigned the

mission of clearing enemy troops from the Brest Peninsula. The medical supply support for this operation remained based at Eostrenen, with the second

advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company, temporarily detached

from the Third U.S. Army. Deliveries of medical supplies were extremely

slow because of the emphasis on movements to the east. As a consequence, the

buildup to a 14-day level was never attained during the Brest mission. Brest

Peninsula was cleared of enemy forces by 20 September, after which Headquarters, Ninth U.S. Army, moved first to Arlon, Belgium, and then to

Maastricht, Netherlands. Pending arrival of its own depots, with their hardto-come-by balanced depot stocks, the Ninth U.S. Army was supported by the

second advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company at Bastogne. Be-
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 335

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MAP 18.—Ninth U.S. Army depot operations, September-December 1944.

cause of the delay in delivering stocks during the last part of 1944, the advance

section of the 33d continued to support Ninth U.S. Army combat operations

from its position at Bastogne and later at Valkenburg.

The 28th Medical Depot Company, commanded by Lt. Col. (later Col.)

Lyman J. Clark, MAC, and the 35th Medical Depot Company, under Maj.

Stanley Darling, MAC, were assigned to the Ninth U.S. Army in October

1944. While the 35th did not join the Ninth U.S. Army until December, the

28th began to issue supplies at Maastricht in mid-November. In preparation

for the next phase of the army's operation, the 35th was sited at Heerlen,

Netherlands, but was moved to Melveren, Belgium, with the advent of the

Battle of the Bulge. At this point, the 35th collected and stored equipment

not required by evacuation hospitals to expedite their withdrawal to more

strategic positions.

The newly positioned Ninth U.S. Army on the Belgium-Netherlands front

was served by a detachment of the 33d Medical Depot Company (Third U.S.

Army) at Valkenburg, until 22 December 1944 (map 18). At that time, the

first advance section of the 35th Medical Depot Company took over the

operation.20

2

» (1) See footnote 6(3), p. 312. (2) Annual Report, Medical Section, Ninth U.S. Army, 1944.

(3) Annual Report, 35th Medical Depot Company, 1944.
336 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGUKE 85.—Besieged soldiers collect sorely needed medical supplies which had been.

airdropped near Bastogne, Belgium, December 1944.

Impact of the Battle of the Bulge.—The German counteroffensive in

December 1944 caused two major supply problems: rapid depletion of stocks

through equipment losses and accelerated issues, and removal of depot stocks

from threatened areas and their relocation in strategic sites at a time when

they were most needed.

When the enemy offensive began, the base depot of the 1st Medical Depot

Company was located at Dolhain. The first advance section at Bastogne, and

the second advance section at Malmedy, were threatened immediately and

movement was imperative. The entire stock of the second advance section at

Malmedy was evacuated to Huy by trucks infiltrating the area. Movement of

the first advance section from Bastogne was not quite so simple. One small

contingent necessarily stayed on with a residue of supplies to support combat

troops in Bastogne through the siege (fig. 85). The remainder of the advance

section commandeered empty ambulances returning to the rear to evacuate

as many items of critical supply as possible to Libin. However, even that

position was threatened and the section was forced to withdraw to Carlsbourg,
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 337

Belgium. Shortly thereafter, First U.S. Army G-4 directed that all major

supply installations withdraw to the army rear area. The base section was

moved by rail to Basse-Wavre, Belgium, taking with it the optical and maintenance sections, but leaving the blood bank detachment and the first advance

section to operate the heavily stocked Dolhain site (map 19).

The early German successes in the Battle of the Bulge caused great concern for the vast quantities of U.S. Army supplies in the forward areas. Not

only had advance depots in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands been

stocked by transporting supplies from Normandy, Le Havre, and Eouen, but

the port of Antwerp, for a few weeks, had been the funnel through which

immense quantities of materiel had been poured.

Certain parts of the Geneva Convention agreements were the basis of the

recommendations of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, on 22 December 1944,

that most medical supplies be destroyed in the event of imminent capture by

the enemy. Items such as instruments, penicillin, morphine, microscopes,

needles, and dental gold were to be saved if time permitted. Fortunately, the

tide of battle changed and the German drive collapsed before higher headquarters had to decide irrevocably to destroy any medical depots.

During the Battle of the Bulge, the need for combat replacements was

critical, and physically fit enlisted personnel were reassigned from Communications Zone depot companies as replacements for losses in the line, with

reclassified ex-infantrymen assigned to the depots. Some depots lost almost

80 percent of their personnel. The impact, though serious, affected depot

operations only temporarily.21

RECURRING PROBLEMS OF MEDICAL SUPPLY

During the period from mid-September to 31 December 1944, problems

that had earlier plagued the supply program in the European theater recurred, but, for the most part, were solved.

Split Shipments

During the spring and summer of 1944, split shipments were rare because special efforts were made to load each unit assembly on a single ship,

but in October this problem reappeared. Ships with portions of assemblies

unloaded at different ports, some in the United Kingdom and others on the

Continent. Even when all the ships discharged in the United Kingdom, they

generally were unloaded at different ports, making it necessary to ship the

segments to a depot for reconstitution of the assembly. During October and

21 (1) See footnote 1(2), p. 307. (2) Memorandum, Mai. Gen. Paul E. Hawley, Chief Surgeon,

ETOUSA, for Chief of Staff, ETOUSA, 22 Dec. 1944, subject: Destruction of Medical Supplies to

Prevent Capture by the Enemy. (3) darkey, Sanford V.: Administrative and Logistical History of

the Medical Service, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, chapter X. [Official record.] (4) Solinger, Lt.

Col. Leo P., MSC, Maj. Gen Silas B. Hays (Ret.), and Col. R. L. Parker, MSC: Combat Support on

Continent. A manuscript prepared for a preliminary draft of this volume.
338 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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MAP 19.—Supply depot movement in the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 339

November, assemblies for 13 general hospitals were involved in split shipments to the United Kingdom. By year-end, none of these had arrived on

the Continent.

General Hawley, on 15 December, in a personal letter to General Kirk,

reported that hospital assemblies in November were badly split, with one

assembly coming in on as many as seven ships. The various parts were supposed

to be reunited in a U.K. depot under existing procedure, but this apparently

was not being done. General Hawley also protested to the New York and

Boston Ports of Embarkation, asking vigorous action to assure loading of

each hospital assembly on one ship only. This problem was successfully resolved by corrective action at the ports of embarkation.

The equipment for 44 general hospitals (thirty-eight 1,000-bed, three

1,500-bed, and three 2,000-bed units) and 14 station hospitals (one 750-bed,

seven 500-bed, five 250-bed, and one 150-bed units) had been delivered to the

hospital sites and the units were in operation by year-end. Continental depots had also assembled and issued thirty-five 500-bed expansion units.

At the close of 1944, assemblies for an additional seven 1,000-bed general

hospitals were at the sites, awaiting clearance or completion of plant construction. Of 22 assemblies en route to the Continent from the United States,

11 were in the United Kingdom awaiting shipment across the Channel and

3 were being discharged at continental ports.

Movement of the Unit Assembly

In addition to split shipments, the difficulties experienced in discharging and moving the larger unit assemblies on the Continent were persistent

and tormenting, notwithstanding adherence to an exacting operating procedure, which was modified repeatedly to prevent recurrence of the latest

mishap. A specific instance is a 500-bed hospital assembly which was aboard

ship in the English Channel for several weeks until perseverance by the

Supply Division produced a priority for unloading. Around-the-clock offloading over the Cherbourg area beaches had discharged approximately 60

percent of the assembly when a neighboring vessel hit a mine. The vessel

discharging the medical assembly ceased unloading operations and sailed for

the safety of English ports. Days later, the residue of the assembly was

transferred to another ship which docked for discharge at Le Havre instead

of Cherbourg. Following several weeks' delay, the two parts of the unit assembly were merged at the hospital site in northern France.22

Rail Shipments

By 16 November 1944, the French and Belgian railroads had been rehabilitated, and the Ked Ball Express was discontinued. The theater G-4

23 (1) See footnotes 2(3), p. 310; and 15(1), p. 324. (2) Personal Letter, Maj. Gen. Paul R.

Hawley to Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General, 15 Dec. 1944.
340 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 86.—Medical supply points were operated at certain rail stations by the base

sections concerned to supply and service hospital trains, such as in this operation at Gare

St. Lazare, Paris.

then initiated a system of daily rail tonnage allocations, but because of rail

operating difficulties, the Chief of Transportation decided to move only solid

trainloads from one siding in Normandy to a forward consignee. G-4 had

not allocated to the medical service sufficient tonnage to comprise a solid

trainload. As a result, medical stocks were not moved for 12 days, and the

allocations did not serve their basic purpose. Not until the medical supply

situation became acute was approval given to move solid trainloads of medical stocks from Normany to Depot M-407 in Paris, where individual cars

were reconsigned to the armies and to forward depots (fig. 86). In early

December, medical supplies began to move forward in volume. Eail shipments then acquired frustrating problems similar to those experienced with

Ked Ball shipments. Individual cars broke down and were placed on sidings;

and cars were misrouted, lost, and, in some instances, disconnected from the

rear of the train and the contents pilfered.

Hospital trains were used to move medical supplies forward to the maximum extent possible, but their usefulness was limited since the trains could

not be delayed or diverted from their primary mission of evacuating casu-
OOMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 341

alties. Movement of supplies by hospital train from Depot M-407 in Paris

to Depot M-409 in Liege, where a hospital center was located, proved to be

successful.

Air Shipments

Heavy reliance was placed on the air shipment of medical supplies, and

the importance of this mode of transportation grew as the war progressed.

Obtaining planes to airlift supplies to the forward areas was a problem until

a squadron of 20 C-46's, which nobody wanted, was obtained. In 3 months,

this squadron transported 30,000 pints of whole blood and 463 tons of other

medical supplies, and evacuated 1,168 patients.

The peak of air shipments was reached during the Battle of the Bulge

when 150 planes were loaded by the medical section of Depot G-45 in the

United Kingdom for airdrops to the encircled troops at Bastogne. By the

end of 1944, a total of 61,467 pints of whole blood, approximately 45,000

litters, 426,000 blankets, and innumerable emergency shipments had been

moved to the Continent by air. From D-day to V-E Day, more than 10,000

tons of medical supplies were moved within the European theater; this was

equivalent to the medical equipment for 49 general hospitals.23

Property Exchange Items

In the European theater, as in other theaters, property exchange items

were a matter of serious concern and constant trouble. In the very early days

of the invasion, many casualties were evacuated to England by LST's which

were stocked with exchange items; this meant that the property exchange system could be used and, by exchanging the proper number of items at each end

of the cross-Channel run, stocks in the forward elements could be replenished.

Evacuation of patients by air rapidly replaced the use of LST's. Inasmuch

as the planes were not stocked with property exchange items, separate supply

methods had to be used to move these supplies forward. Difficulties increased

as the front advanced to and beyond the German border and as supply lines

lengthened. It was frequently necessary to resort to various expedients to supplement the normal supply lines and the property exchange system.

The problem of property exchange items not only concerned internal

operation within the European theater, but there was also a constant loss to

the Zone of Interior. This was not so serious because 63 percent of the casualties were returned to duty in the European theater, while many others who

were litter-and-splint cases originally became ambulatory before being returned to the Zone of Interior. When evacuation was by water as contrasted to

air, litters were not necessary and blankets were furnished. To sustain the internal and external pipelines, huge quantities of exchange items were stockpiled in England before the invasion. For example, 300,000 extra blankets

23 See footnotes 2 (3), p. 310; and 15 (1), p. 324.
342 MEDICAL SUPPLY

were distributed to U.K. depots. Moreover, substantial quantities of various

exchange items, far exceeding established factors, were included on routine

requisitions to the Zone of Interior.24

MEDICAL MAINTENANCE AND SPARE PARTS

Early Difficulties

Each medical depot company assigned to continental operations included,

as a part of its organic capability, a maintenance section to repair Medical

Department equipment and an optical section to repair and fabricate spectacles.

These two sections usually accompanied the base section and headquarters

platoon and were placed in operation immediately upon arrival on the Continent. These sections were staffed with specialists from the maintenance and

optical schools of the St. Louis Medical Depot. In addition to a depot company's third and fourth echelon maintenance capability, each hospital was

authorized one or two maintenance technicians for first, second, and third

echelon repairs, depending on the hospital's size and the complexity of its

equipment. Technicians were never sufficiently plentiful to meet all requirements. Each graduate technician was authorized a specialist's repair kit, but

the scarcity of certain essential components until mid-1944 prevented a complete distribution upon graduation from the school in St. Louis. Not only was

there a shortage of technicians, but a number of technicians were temporarily

without kits.

To cope with the dual shortage, available technicians with kits were concentrated in the depot maintenance sections of selected hospitals operating in

the United Kingdom and in hospitals phased onto the Continent. Technicians

and kits, as they became available in the theater, were furnished to the hospitals.

Reports from France during the first few days after D-day indicated that

repair and maintenance was a persistent problem. Principal problems involved

equipment damage suffered in transit or abnormal incidents of mechanical

breakdowns of apparatus used in around-the-clock operation. As a result of

this combination, a more elaborate maintenance and repair setup was needed

than had been contemplated.

Maintenance requirements constantly exceeded the authorized capability

in ETOUSA. The gap was filled mainly by unit personnel with mechanical

aptitude and by skilled POWs. While medical maintenance support within

units was outstanding, the major workload fell on depot maintenance sections.

From the moment depot companies arrived in France, the maintenance

sections were besieged with work. Affording close support, their men attempted

to visit all units to perform periodic checks, to review preventive maintenance

measures, and to furnish needed repairs. That approach proved difficult be21 (1) iSee footnote 21(4), p. 337. (2) Memorandum, Lt. Col. Bryan C. T. Fenton, MC, for Lt.

Col. [Leonard H.]" Beers, 1 May 1944.
OOMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 343

FIGURE 87.—Repairing field autoclaves at the Medical Maintenance and Repair Shop,

Depot M-407.

cause of the constant change in unit locations, the inability to effect repair of

equipment on site which resulted in a large volume of turn-ins of unserviceable

equipment and requisitioning of the necessary replacement item, and the development of a backlog of deadlined material at each depot.

Soon after the invasion, maintenance personnel were faced with repairing

technical equipment of foreign manufacture. Major breakdowns were impossible to repair unless the required parts could be fabricated or cannibalized.

Maintenance personnel were extremely ingenious and capable, and returned

much of this equipment to use.

Except for the high-mortality spare parts packed with unit equipment

and stocked by the depot maintenance sections phased-in during the early landings, prescheduled shipments to the Continent did not include spare parts.

They had to be requisitioned as required.

After Communications Zone stock control had been established on the

Continent, spare parts continued to be a profrem. Many of the less rapidly

moving items were stocked only in one key depot in the United Kingdom, and

one on the Continent. Moreover, units lacked the ability to adequately identify

all of the required spare parts on their requisitions. This situation was improved with the publication of a theater spare parts catalog by the base maintenance shop at Depot M-407 early in 1945 (fig. 87).

295-J53 O—68- -24
344 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Base Maintenance Shop

To increase the maintenance capability, an advance medical maintenance

and repair unit was transported to the Continent on 14 August 1944, and attached to the 13th Medical Depot Company to set up a fourth and fifth echelon

repair section at Depot M-2 (later M-402). The unit consisted of 2 officers and

10 enlisted men, all qualified technicians from Medical Maintenance Depot

M-400 in the United Kingdom. Shortly after the establishment of Depot

M-405 at Le Mans, the maintenance and repair unit was moved to that installation and it became the supply source for repair parts, buttressed by Depot

M-400 in the United Kingdom. Following its relocation with Depot M-407 at

Paris, the unit was redesignated the Medical Maintenance and Repair Shop,

Depot M-407, on 12 October 1944, and became the key depot for spare parts on

the Continent.

The 13th was soon operating a mobile machine shop (truck machine shop

M-4) to repair, weld, install, and service generally all damaged X-ray, anesthesia, and similar medical equipment returned by combat units or other medical depot companies. Additionally, the unit inaugurated a mobile third, fourth,

and fifth echelon spare parts replacement dump (spare parts truck, M-2) to

service forward depot maintenance sections, including Advance Section,

Armies, and Ninth Air Force Service Command. Two maintenance teams of

two men each, with portable maintenance equipment, serviced hospitals in the

vicinity of Depot M-407 and assisted maintenance sections of medical depot

companies in forward areas.25

Fabrication of Spectacles

The two-man team assigned to the Advance Platoon, 31st Medical Depot

Company, set up its portable optical fabrication equipment on D + 3 and began

to repair and fabricate spectacles. On D + 14, a mobile optical unit was set up.

By the end of June 1944, these units had repaired or replaced 1,250 pairs of

glasses. By February 1945, 54 portable optical units were in use throughout

the theater. Furnished with jeeps, they were placed in direct support of combat forces as well as being used, when possible, at general hospitals and medical depots.

From D-day until October 1944, the fabrication of spectacles, which was

beyond the capability of mobile units, was accomplished by the ETOUSA Base

Optical Shop located in Blackpool, England. As depots were moved to forward areas, it was necessary to activate a similar installation on the Continent. In October 1944, a base optical shop, commanded by Capt. Chester E.

Rorie, MAC, was established at the 7th General Dispensary on Rue Helder in

Paris. Personnel were assigned from the 31st Medical Depot Company, aug25 (1) For more detail, see chapter IV. (2) Informal routine slip, Col. [S. B.] Hays to Chief

Surgeon, ETOUSA, 26 June 1944, subject: Shortage of Spare Parts and Maintenance of Medical

Equipment on Far Shore. (3) See footnotes 9(4), p. 312; and 10, p. 316.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 345

merited by the optical section of the 15th Medical Depot Company. The shop

moved in January 1945 to larger quarters, at which time the optical section

of the 11th Medical Depot Company was added to the staff (fig. 88).

The base optical shop supplied mobile optical units on the Continent, established levels of supply for all echelons of optical repair, compiled theater

optical supply requirements, filled prescriptions beyond the capability of mobile units, issued optical equipment, and filled prescriptions for spectacles

needed in the local area (fig. 89).

The value of the optical program in terms of conserving fighting strength

was extremely high. The field armies placed portable units in the division area

so that combat soldiers whose spectacles were lost or damaged usually were

back on duty with a minimum loss of time. The optical program as executed

in the European theater prevented the evacuation of thousands of individuals

each month.26

INNOVATIONS IN SUPPLY TECHNIQUE

Requisitions

Shortly after their arrival on the Continent, many units were traveling

long distances to the medical depots for supplies. Prevailing depot procedures

and workload dictated that units submit requisitions, then return a day or so

later to pick up the supplies. Seeking ways and means to process requisitions

while the customer waited, the 32d Medical Depot Company discovered that

more than 95 percent of the requisitions involved the same 250 fast-moving

items. This led to a procedure that opened with a 10-minute visual edit by a

well-qualified noncommissioned officer, who was fully cognizant of the supply

position of the 250 fast-moving items. When the supply of a fast-moving item

was limited, the noncommissioned officer rationed the available supply to make

certain that equitable distribution would be effected. Following the edit, one

copy of the requisition was immediately sent to the warehouse for selecting

bulk supplies while a second copy was sent to the Loose Issue Section for selecting less than case lots. Upon completion of the selection of stock, the requisitions were compared to make certain that all supply action had been effected

and that information was posted to both copies of the requisition. One copy

was released to the requisitioner for his voucher file, and he returned to his

parent unit with the available materiel. The second copy was forwarded to

the depot stock record account for "post-posting" action. Depot records were

necessarily brought up to date during the late evening hours and no loss of

control was experienced.

This procedure permitted rapid supply action, saved unnecessary trips to

the depot by consuming units, and was widely hailed by command and staff

elements and the using agencies of the Third U.S. Army. It was pointed out

28 (1) See footnote 1(4), p. 307. (2) ETO Base Optical Shop. [Official record.]
346 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGUKE 88.—Fabricating spectacles at the base optical shop, Paris, February 1945.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 347

FIGURE 89.—Mobile repair teams serviced all forward

medical installations, repairing equipment and issuing critical

spare parts from their spare parts truck.

that, in support of a fast-moving field army, few organizations carried more

supplies than they actually required and if the requisition item was in stock

in the depot, it was issued.

Storage of Supplies

The storage sections of the depots were organized under three warehouse

foremen: medical class 1 (drugs) was under one foreman, classes 2 through 6

under a second foreman, and classes 7 through 9, under the third foreman.

This was particularly desirable where storage was scattered through a number

of small buildings, especially during winter months when responsibility for

around-the-clock heating could be placed on one individual. Moreover, this

fixed responsibility enabled the personnel to gain familiarity with the stock

and to derive added benefits from daily visual checks. Stock locator cards were

maintained although the personnel were usually familiar with stock locations.
348 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Prosthetics Laboratories

In addition to dental prosthetic devices, the laboratory attached to the

32d Medical Depot Company fabricated many ear plugs from acrylic resins

for issue to personnel assigned to chemical mortar and artillery battalions.

The plugs contributed substantially to a reduction of ruptured eardrums and

injuries to the inner ear.

Maintenance Sections

Maintenance sections started operation soon after the depots became situated on the Continent. Unserviceable equipment was delivered to the depots

by the using organizations, and repair was performed immediately, if possible,

or a replacement item was issued to the unit and the unserviceable item was

repaired and returned to stock. Where major repair and rebuilding were required, the item was shipped to a Communications Zone depot. Experience soon

indicated that there was a definite advantage in having a depot maintenance

team, consisting of one officer and two enlisted men, visit all hospital units

periodically to inspect preventive maintenance procedures and to make necessary repairs. These visits had the added virtue of permitting maintenance

personnel to observe and instruct the using personnel in the correct use and care

of the equipment, thereby reducing the volume of major repairs that were required in the early days.

Optical Sections

The optical section in the depot base section was equipped with a mobile

optical unit, mounted on a truck. Initially, all operations except mounting and

dispensing were performed in the vehicle. It was found expedient, whenever

space permitted, to remove the equipment from the truck and set it up in a

building. The equipment could be dismantled and set up in the buildings within an hour, and the additional space allowed a more efficient operation. The

most persistent problems confronting the optical sections were the improperly

prepared prescriptions and the omission of frame sizes.

Blood Bank Detachments

Blood bank detachments were frequently attached to medical depot companies. A blood bank detachment consisted of 1 officer and 22 enlisted men

with eight 2^-ton, 6 by 6 trucks, each mounted with a refrigerator, and one

truck mounted with a storage refrigerator having a 600-pint capacity.

An advance Army blood bank detachment was attached to the 33d Medical Depot Company on 20 June 1944 for cross-Channel movement and early

operations on the Continent. In August, two blood distribution trucks were

assigned to the advance section of the 33d Medical Depot Company while it

was located at Ducey, France, to service hospital units on the Brittany Peninsula. At that time, 20 percent of all blood furnished to the Third U.S. Army
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

FIGURE 90.—Whole-blood refrigeration unit installed on a wheeled machinegun mount

gave mobility to blood storage.

was being distributed to the VIII Corps sector, which was engaged in clearing

the German defenses of the Brittany Peninsula.

An effective means of delivering blood was inaugurated in November

1944. Two blood distribution trucks were used to service each corps zone daily,

one carrying blood for evacuation hospitals only, and one for field hospital

platoons. After the loss of a driver and truck, presumably captured, the truck

destined for field hospital platoons reported daily to the corps medical battalion and picked up a guide, thus assuring prompt delivery. Additionally,

each corps medical battalion maintained a level of 30 to 40 pints of blood

(fig. 90).

Depot Pharmacies

Kecognizing early the need to compound certain pharmaceuticals for divisions and smaller units which were not authorized pharmacists, depot officers

unofficially established pharmacies in depots. Eegistered pharmacists among

the assigned personnel welcomed the opportunity to continue their vocation,

and the practice gained momentum. Depots accepted prescriptions prepared

by medical officers from the various units until the Surgeon's Office, Third U.S.

Army, discovered that prescriptions were exceeding the intended capability

of some units. Depot pharmacies were temporarily closed until the necessary
350 MEDICAL SUPPLY

controls could be established. The Third U.S. Army Surgeon published a list

of authorized preparations, such as ointments, cough remedies, and solutions,

which could be drawn from the depots, and on 29 October 1944, the pharmacies

were reopened. All other prescriptions had to be approved by the Third U.S.

Army Surgeon's Office.

Quartermaster Laundry Sections

Quartermaster laundry sections were often attached to depot companies

to launder soiled items, such as pajamas, blankets, surgical drapes, and similar

textile items, for depot stock replenishment and to support smaller army medical units. The need to site laundries within buildings and near available water

supply sometimes led to locations at a distance from the depots.27

SUPPLY ACTIVITIES, UNITED KINGDOM BASE

Base Section Organization

With the movement of Headquarters, ETOUSA, from England to the

Continent in July and August 1944, the administration of Communications

Zone activities that were to remain in the United Kingdom was assigned to

the U.K. Base, which was activated on 1 September 1944. The base section

was subdivided into four districts—Eastern, Western, Southern, and Central—

comprising nearly the same areas previously designated as U.K. Base Sections.

The U.K. Base Section Surgeon, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Charles B.

Spruit, MC, assumed control of 112 hospitals, consisting of 64 general, 43 station, and 5 field hospitals, and 3 hospital center organizations—more than

130,000 beds in all. Maj. Kobert R. Kelly, MC, was designated chief of the

Supply Division, which was responsible for the support of activities in the

United Kingdom and for bulk supply support of continental operations. Major

Kelly wtas succeeded by Lt. Col. Robert L. Black, PhC, on 1 December 1944.

In supply matters, hospital group commanders had broad authority to

control the supply for hospitals (including centers) under their jurisdiction.

Their responsibilities were to insure that the approved system of station stock

control was in operation, to conduct periodic inspections, and to assist the

medical supply officers of each hospital in any supply problems. The organization of these groups assisted considerably in the administration of medical

units in the United Kingdom.

United Kingdom Depot System

On 1 September 1944, 16 depots in the United Kingdom were engaged

in the medical supply mission, 3 medical branch depots and 13 medical sec21 See footnote 1(3), p. 307.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 351

tions of general depots. One storage depot (M-403) had been closed on 7 July

1944.

With the buildup of continental depots and the deployment of increasing

numbers of medical units to the Continent, the mission of U.K. depots

focused mainly on the support of the U.K. hospital system. During the period

from 1 September to 31 December 1944, the missions of four depots were

changed and six medical depot activities were closed. In September, the mission of the medical section of Depot G-22 was changed from distribution to

storage, and the depot was closed in the fall of 1944. During October, Depot

M-401 and the medical sections of Depots G-14, G-15, G-16, G-40, and G-55,

all with storage missions, were closed. In November, the mission of Depot

M-410M was changed from distribution to storage. During December, the

medical section of G-45 became a distribution depot and that of G-50, a

storage depot.

The mission of the medical section of Depot G-30 was to receive British

items that had been procured through reciprocal aid arrangements and to

provide Medical Department blank forms, medical books, teeth, and special

air shipments from the Zone of Interior, and also to receive, store, and issue

all United States of America Typhus Commission stocks in the United Kingdom. The Medical Supply Officer, Lt. Col. George T. O'Eeilly, MAC, Commanding Officer of the 64th Medical Depot Company which provided the

personnel, also served as the medical procurement officer for British procurement. Located in a freight terminal building on Commercial Road in London's East End, Depot G-30 had been subjected to air raids in the early days

and to V-bomb attacks after D-day. Part of the depot roof, windows, and the

railroad cars in the nearby marshaling yards periodically suffered damage.

Depot operations continued in spite of the attacks, with only minor personnel

injuries.

Diversion of shipments from continental to U.K. ports because of split

assemblies and the nonavailability of ports -on the Continent not only delayed their arrival and placed an added workload on the U.K. depots, but

increased the load of already overburdened British transportation facilities

and interfered with moving desperately needed supplies and equipment to

the Continent.

Distribution Mission

Depot closures during the last 4 months of 1944 required a realinement

of the distribution areas for depots remaining open. When depot realinement

was completed at the end of the year, four depots were servicing 103 hospitals

in the United Kingdom (table 5).

In addition to the supply of U.K. hospitals, from 1 September to 31

December 1944, TOE equipment and supplies were distributed to 9 infantry

divisions, 3 armored divisions, and 142 other units. Port assemblies were issued

to 147 units arriving in the United Kingdom. During the same period, 6,744

long tons of maintenance supplies were received from the Zone of Interior,
m MEDICAL SUPPLY

TABLE 5.—Hospitals serviced by medical depots in the United Kingdom, December 1944

Depot

G-18-20-

G-23—-

G-35—.

G-45-—

Total.

Number of

hospitals

37

9

37

20

103

Approximate

number of beds

49,641

9,964

49,967

23,599

133,171

including 1,700 long tons diverted from continental ports. Outgoing shipments

to the Continent during this 4-month period were as follows:

Type of shipment Long tons shipped

Bulk shipments 5>

977

-

04

Red Ball shipments 80L 95

General hospital assemblies 3» 605. 53

Coaster shipments (bids submitted by G-4) 2, 535.17

Coaster shipments (priority A) 320. 30

Air shipments 2,341. 64

Total 15. 581 63

Depots processed nearly 24,000 requisitions during the period, shipping a total

of nearly 894,000 packages while receiving 897,000. Depot stocks on hand

approximated 36,000 long tons.

Operations in 1945

As of 1 January 1945, the staff of the Supply Division, Surgeon's Office,

U.K. Base, consisted of 15 officers, 25 enlisted men, and 1 Wac. The personnel strength of the nine active U.K. depots numbered 1,321—753 military and

568 others, consisting of civilians, POW's, and Italian service troops

(table 6).

During January and February 1945, in addition to supporting U.K.

hospitals, depots shipped sixteen 1,000-bed general hospitals and one 250-

bed station hospital to the Continent. To assure that the assemblies reached

their destination, a security detail of one officer and eight enlisted men from

the hospital unit accompanied each assembly from the U.K. depot to the

hospital site on the Continent.

Stock levels were constantly revised. On 31 January 1945, they were

based on a maximum of 75 days' stock in depots. During the latter part of

April, levels were established at a 60-day stockage after they had been reduced three times since the end of January.28

28 (1) Annual Report, Surgeon's Office, United Kingdom Base, 1944. (2) See footnotes 2(3),

p. 310; and 21(3), p. 337. (3) Monthly Reports, Surgeon's Office, United Kingdom Base, January,

February, and April '1945.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

TABLE 6.—United Kingdom depot status report, IS January 1945

353

Tonnagt on hand (long tons) Personnel

Depot Covered Open Total

Military

Civilians

Prisoners

of war

Italian

service

troops

Total

Officers Enlisted

men

G-18-20 11,137

2,250

4,657

1,913

2,964

2,556

1,794

565

700

663

1,500

3,826

281

386

625

116

3

11, 800

3,750

8,483

2,194

3,350

3, 181

1,910

565

703

7

4

6

7

9

7

6

3

1

105

46

56

105

110

143

90

38

10

28

8

1

23

82

3

22

7

20

0

50

90

0

50

75

23

0

0

86

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

226

G-23... 108

G-24 153

G-30 135

G-35- 251

G-45 228

G-50 141

M-400 ... 48

M-410M. 31

Total . 28, 536 7,400 35, 936 50 703 194 288 86 1,321

SOURCE: Annual Report, Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 1944, section II, exhibit I.

MEDICAL DEPOT SUPPORT OF THE ADVANCE INTO

GERMANY

Depot Support of the Armies

First U.S. Army.—Despite poor weather conditions and the adverse effect

of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, the Allies renewed their offensive early in January 1945. The First U.S. Army, handicapped greatly by

poor roads and a nearly complete destruction of possible storage facilities, was

fortunate to be strongly supported by the 1st Medical Depot Company.

Early in January, the base section moved forward to Basse-Wavre from

Dolhain, where it had been since mid-December. A month later, the base depot

platoon sent out sections to Brand, Germany, and Malmedy, where advance

dumps were set up (map 20).

To give close support at the division level, depot sections moved frequently—so frequently at times that it was necessary to obtain clearance from

corps and division headquarters before a selected depot site was outdistanced.

By early March, the 1st Medical Depot Company had advance sections

moving first into Frenchen, Germany, then Dollendorf, and finally to Honnef,

just across the Rhine. The base platoon, meanwhile, was established at

Mechernich.

A section of the base platoon was deep inside Germany by April when

the supply of exchange items again demanded attention because most casualties leaving the army area were evacuated by air. Normal replenishment

channels were too slow, and routine property exchange was circumvented.

Consequently, arrangements were made with the Medical Supply Division,

Communications Zone, to stock exchange items at the holding units supporting air evacuation points.
354 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 355

Toward the end of April 1945, the first advance section of the 1st Medical Depot Company, attempting to maintain a supporting position, took advantage of available airlift to move from Dollendorf, Germany, to5 Wetzlar.

For the first time, the rapid advance of depot personnel, equipment, and

stock by air was accomplished successfully.

The base platoon of the depot selected a site well forward and moved to

Korbach, leaving 200 long tons of excess and slow-moving items to be taken

over by ADSEC. To support troops on the left flank, the second section advanced to Duderstadt, Germany, and opened for issue on 16 April. At that

time, the supply system appeared to be in a comparatively good position.

Envelopment of the Euhr pocket, however, created a situation that demanded

the employment of another advance section.

The first advance section of the 47th Medical Depot Company had been

assigned earlier to the First U.S. Army and it was decided to position it at

Seigen, Germany, to support the XVIII Corps (map 21). Forty-eight tons

of medical supplies, constituting a balanced stock for an advance section,

were shipped by air from the United Kingdom and Depot M^07 in Paris

to airstrip Y-84, where it was picked up by the section. As the Euhr pocket

was eliminated, the entire stock and the depot section reverted to control of

the Fifteenth U.S. Army.

As the First U.S. Army pushed across Germany, supply of hospitals

and miscellaneous medical installations for the rapidly surrendering prisoners and large numbers of displaced persons constituted an onerous task. For

the most part, captured materiel was sufficient, but quantities of liberated

German medical supplies necessitated the establishment of an organization

capable of collecting, classifying, and distributing them. The First U.S.

Army, operating with only one medical depot company, was compelled to

request, and was successful in acquiring, two additional advance depot sections. The first advance sections of the 33d and 35th Medical Depot Companies were attached to the First U.S. Army to establish and maintain issuing points for captured enemy materiel.

A large captured German medical depot at Ihringshausen presented an

excellent nucleus for a base issuing depot, and stocks from the collecting

points and outlying locations were concentrated there. One hundred long

tons of medical supplies were issued from that point during April. A second

large German medical depot, equaling in tonnage the one at Ihringshausen,

was uncovered at Treuen (map 22). As a result of a conference with representatives of the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, the entire stock was evacuated

by ADSEC to a central depot under the control of the Third U.S. Army.

With the First U.S. Army ceasing all operations on 9 May 1945, medical supply functions were turned over to the Ninth U.S. Army. This action

was preceded by a series of conferences with supply representatives of the
356 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 357

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MAP 22.—Captured enemy supply dumps in Germany, February-April 1945.

Surgeon's Offices, First and Ninth U.S. Armies, to fully acquaint the latter

with the existing situation and plans.29

Third U.S. Army.—While the First U.S. Army was crossing the Ehine

Eiver to the north and plunging into the heart of Germany, the Third U.S.

Army, supported by the 32d Medical Depot Company, which had been at Metz,

crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim and headed northeast (fig. 91). By 21 March,

the base section was situated at Saint-Wendel, where it remained until 13 April.

29 (1) Semiannual Report, 1st Medical Depot Company, 1 January-30 June 1945. (2) Annual

Report, Medical Section, First U.S. Army, 1945.
358 MEDICAL SUPPLY

1

-»&■■■:

FIGUEE 91.—Medics of the 4th Infantry Division, Third U.S. Army, approach a river with

an assault boat loaded with medical supplies.

The first and second advance sections had moved forward in late March to

Wörrstadt and Frankfurt. The second advance section, after crossing the Rhine

and setting up at Hersfeld on 2 April, had advanced by 11 April to Eisenach

where it was joined two days later by the base depot. At Eisenach, the 32d employed 40 Serbians and Yugoslavs who had been German slave laborers. These

workers stayed with the depot for the remainder of the campaign.

By 25 April, the base depot had moved from Eisenach to Weiden, and

finally to Straubing, Germany (map 21), where it remained until its deactivation.30

The 33d Medical Depot Company, operating in support of the Third

U.S. Army's drive to pinch off the Ardennes salient of the German counteroffensive, was located in January 1945 at Longuyon. After operating a storage area and issue section at Longuyon for nearly a month, one advance section was sent to Bastogne on 27 January to afford closer support for troops

in the Ardennes battle. Moving to Ettelbruck, Luxembourg, on 25 February,

30 Semiannual Report, 32d Medical Depot Company, 1 January-30 June 1945.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 359

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MAP 23.—Operations of the 33d Medical Depot Company, 1945.

the advance section was joined by the base section on 27 February. By 4

March, an advance section had moved to Bitburg, Germany, and on 23 March,

the base depot moved into Germany at Kastellaun. Here, a Military Government supply section was set up on 20 April to handle medical supply of

requisitions for displaced persons and civilians. By 30 June, 80 tons of supplies had been received and 477 requisitions were filled.

Making its final move of the war, the depot was moved to Furth, Germany,

on 28 April 1945 (map 23), where it operated 218,541 square feet of open

storage space and 139,623 square feet of closed storage space for 10,952 long

tons of supplies.

During its operations in Germany, the 33d had small detachments supervising operations of several captured enemy supply dumps at Trier, Isaar,

Oberstein, Mainz, Bingen, Lauterbach, Fulda, Kassel, and Treuen (map 22).

Supplies totaling 7,000 tons were consolidated by the 33d.31

Seventh U.S. Army.—Having returned to Sarrebourg from Epinal early

in January 1945, the 7th Medical Depot Company, with help from the Advance

Platoon of the 46th Medical Depot Company, carried the basic medical supply

load of the Seventh U.S. Army.

On 12 February 1945, SOLOC was dissolved and its personnel and functions were absorbed by Communications Zone, ETOUSA. As a result of the

reorganization, the SOLOC medical section's supply personnel were transferred to the Supply Division of the Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA. Col.

Charles F. Shook, MC, was made Deputy Surgeon.

M

Semiannual Report, 33d Medical Depot Company, 1 January-30 June 1945.

295-453 O—68 25
MEDICAL SUPPLY

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MAP 24.—Seventh U.S. Army medical supply depots in France and Germany, 1945.

With the beginning of the Seventh U.S. Army offensive in March 1945,

the 7th Medical Depot Company set up depots at Retschwiller, France, and

Kirchheim, Germany. The Seventh U.S. Army's first supply point east of the

Rhine River was established at Die Burg, Germany, on 31 March. Following

the closing of the main depot at Sarrebourg on 31 March, the base depot was

moved to Walthurn, Germany, where it remained until 2 May. At that time,

all depot stocks were consolidated at Schwäbisch Hall, Germany (map 24).

During the period from 16 August 1944 to 30 June 1945, the 7th Medical

Depot Company had processed 20,356 requisitions and issued more than 2,500

tons of supplies in support of a force which grew to nearly 400,000 men.32

Ninth U.S. Army.—After moving north into the Netherlands in late 1944,

the Ninth U.S. Army had the 28th and 35th Medical Depot Companies for

medical supply support.

33 (1) See footnote 19(1), p. 332. (2) Semiannual Report, 7th Medical Depot Company, 1 January30 June 1945.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 361

FIGURE 92.—Central supply of the 48th Field Hospital, Friedrichsfeld,

Germany, supporting the 30th Division, Ninth U.S. Army, was in turn supported by the 35th Medical Depot Company.

In January 1945, after the collapse of the German counteroffensive, the

Ninth U.S. Army engaged in a holding action along the west bank of the

Roer River with five divisions. The first advance section of the 35th Medical Depot Company at Valkenburg distributed to the 29th and 102d Infantry

Divisions, the 41st and 91st Evacuation Hospitals, and the 1st and 2d Hospitalization Units of the 48th Field Hospital (fig. 92). All other units were

supplied by the 28th Medical Depot Company at Maastricht and through a
362 MEDICAL SUPPLY

supply point established near Brand. Several supply points were also established with supply personnel from medical battalions to facilitate the handling

of fast-moving items to small units and clearing stations, with requisitioning on an informal basis, oral or written.

The first advance section of the 35th Medical Depot Company, which

went to Heerlen in early February 1945, supported XIII Corps units in that

vicinity during that month. The first advance section of the 28th Medical

Depot Company was located in Aachen, Germany, to supply XIX Corps

while its base depot, still at Maastricht, provisioned XVI Corps and the

surrounding units during this same period.

Following the Boer crossing, which occurred in bitter cold weather, the

depots at Maastricht and Aachen were closed, and the sections of the 28th

Medical Depot Company then rejoined to open at Eheydt, Germany, on 5

March, to supply the XIII and XIX Corps units and the Army troops in

the vicinity. Over 500 long tons, 260 truckloads, and 29 trailer loads, were

transported to Eheydt within 8 days. The first advance section of the 35th

Medical Depot Company at Heerlen closed and reopened at Aldekerk, Germany, on 12 March, with part of a blood bank unit to serve XVI Corps and

Army units in that vicinity. Meanwhile, the three corps of the Ninth U.S.

Army began deploying along the west bank in preparation for crossing the

Ehine Eiver.

The crossing of the Ehine Eiver by the Ninth U.S. Army began on 24

March 1945. On 30 March, the first advance section of the 28th Medical Depot was transported in 21 trucks, with 36 tons of supplies, from Eheydt to

Dinslakenerbruch to supply troops of the XVI and XIX Corps. Upon completion of the Ehine crossing, the Ninth U.S. Army moved rapidly across

Germany until the 113th Cavalry met the Eussians at the Elbe Eiver on 30

April 1945. The mopup of German troops was completed rapidly and the

depot companies had difficulty in keeping contact with the rapidly moving

troop units. The 28th Medical Depot' and its sections set up in rapid succession at Dinslakenerbruch, Aldekerk, Bevensen, Drensteinfurt, Helmstedt,

Hameln, and Wiedenbriick. The 35th Medical Depot Company, including its

advance sections, operated at Aldekerk, Hameln, and Wiedenbriick, as well

as in Viersen, Burgdorf, Lüdenscheid, and Ihringshausen. Even with the

succession of locations, the depots were unable to maintain supply points

within the limitations of depot transportation to provide supply impetus

from the rear for some units which were 50 miles distant (map 25).

At the end of April, the 1st Medical Depot Company from the First U.S.

Army had joined the Ninth U.S. Army for operation at Korbach, Jena, and

Duderstadt in support of the VII, VIII, XIII, XVI, and XIX Corps, which

were comprised of 17 infantry and 5 armored divisions, totaling more than

650,000 troops by the end of the war, 9 May 1945.33

33(1) Semiannual Keport, Medical Section, Ninth U.S. Army, 1 January-30 June 1945. (2) See

footnote 20(3) p. 335. (3) Organizational Diary, 35th Medical Depot Company, 26 December 1943-

3 November 1945.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 363

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Fifteenth U.S. Army.—The Fifteenth U.S. Army was the last field army

deployed to the European theater, arriving on the Continent on 28 December

1944. Because of the limited scope of its combat operations, it never faced the

medical supply problems which beset the other armies.

The initial mission of the Fifteenth U.S. Army was the responsibility

for supervising the rehabilitation and reequipping of combat forces withdrawn

from action after, and as a result of, the Ardennes offensive. Since the Fifteenth U.S. Army had no depots operational at the time, this involved merely

the processing of requisitions to supporting Communications Zone medical

depots. During this period, some field and evacuation hospitals arrived from

the United States and were assigned to the Fifteenth U.S. Army for training.

The Army Surgeon, Col. L. Holmes Ginn, Jr., MC, through his medical supply

officer, Maj. Joseph J. Strnad, PhC, took the opportunity to requisition and

obtain special hospital allowances of other technical service equipment, such

as additional generators, tentage, switchboards, and water purification equipment, which proved invaluable to hospitals in later combat support.

On 1 April 1945, the Fifteenth U.S. Army assumed the defense of the

west bank of the Ehine Eiver from Bonn to Neuss and was directed to be prepared to occupy, organize, and govern the Rheinprovinz, Saarland, Pfalz, and

that portion west of the Rhine River as the eastward advance of the Allied

armies uncovered these areas.

To support this mission, the 47th Medical Depot Company was assigned

to the Army and established a base depot at Elsdorf, Germany, during March

1945. With the aid of past experience of other field armies, a balanced stock

was issued to the depot, enabling the 47th to render excellent medical supply

support to Fifteenth U.S. Army units.

In connection with the Fifteenth U.S. Army's responsibility to handle

the delousing of civilians and POW's traveling from east to west, the Chief

Surgeon took over the distribution of the necessary dusters and DDT powder.

In coordination with Civil Affairs/Military Government, requirements were

met for operation of delousing stations along the Rhine.

The immense problem was that of providing medical supply support for

approximately 300,000 displaced persons in the Fifteenth U.S. Army area.

While the German civilian population had primary responsibility for supplying essential commodities to displaced persons camps, frequent demands for

specific medical supply items were met from Civil Affairs/Military Government supply packs issued for this purpose and from captured enemy materiel

which had previously been consolidated into the Army medical depot at Elsdorf. Since medical and nursing personnel in displaced persons' camps were

familiar with drugs and equipment of German manufacture, the latter practice proved highly successful.34

34 Semiannual Report, Medical Section, Fifteenth U.S. Army, 1 January-30 June 1945.
OOMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 365

Operation of Support Depots in the Rear

As the depots supporting the field armies moved into Germany with the

troops, several large depots remained in operation in France and Belgium

(table 7) and one (M-446T) was opened in Germany (map 26).

TABLE 7.—Depots on the Continent, 1 November 1944

Depot

Gross space allocated

(sq. ft.)

Net usable space

(sq. ft.)

Space occupied

(sq. ft.)

Covered Open Covered Open Covered Open

M-402, Carentan, France

M-405, Le Mans, France

M-407, Paris, France . .

M-408T, Reims, France

M-409, Liege, Belgium

12,000

112,694

257,300

129,805

56,978

884,878

243,636

17,500

62,790

12,000

9,500

70,321

157,600

64,902

33,132

532,891

186,074

17,500

31,395

8,182

5,700

31,278

85,000

41,323

4,500

238,667

2,465

10,000

3,500

8,182

SOURCE: Annual Report, Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 1944, section II, exhibit 4a.

Depot M-402 at Carentan, in early January, was being operated by the

11th Medical Depot Company. On 5 January, the 11th was relieved by the

26th Medical Depot Company, assisted by the 16th Medical Depot Company,

which remained until 8 March when it departed for duty at M-407 in Paris.

During the early days of 1945, Depot M-402 was consolidated from three

separate areas, at Carentan, Chef Du Pont, and a nearby airfield, to two by

the closing of the Chef Du Pont open storage area and the redistribution of

its stocks. By April, the airstrip was cleared and closed also. With the decrease

in depot size and the forward movement of thousands of tons of medical supplies, it was possible to send a detachment of the 26th to Le Mans to relieve

the 30th Medical Depot Company in the operation of Depot M-405.

As troop activities in the Le Mans area diminished in February, March,

and April 1945, the necessity of keeping Depot M-405 open also lessened. By

20 May 1945, the depot was closed after all area hospitals had built up a 90-

day supply level, and the remaining depot supplies were sent forward to Depot

M-417 at Elbeuf, France.

Depot M-407 at Paris had rapidly become the largest depot on the Continent—157,600 square feet—and served as a backup point for all forward areas

and the key depot for certain selected items. It was operated by the 11th Medical Depot Company, commanded by Lt. Col. Poland H. Hand, MAC. Despite

pilferage, the depot used indigenous personnel because of their availability and

the problems involved in the control of POW's in a big city.

The large in and out shipments made it necessary to augment the 11th

with the Advance Platoon of the 16th Medical Depot Company on 30 January

and later, on 9 March, the Headquarters and Base Section, making a total of

two medical depot companies serving at Depot M-407. On 25 April, Depot
MEDICAL SUPPLY

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COMBAT OPERATION'S IN EUROPE 367

M-407A was established at Trilport, 20 miles east of Paris, in a former mattress factory.

As the receipts and issues of Depot M-407 declined in early May, the

Headquarters and Base Platoon of the 16th Medical Depot Company were

sent forward to Depot M-418 at Mourmelon-le-Petit, France.

The 13th Medical Depot Company had opened Depot M--408 at Eeims

in September 1944 and, with the help of detachments of the 15th and 48th

Medical Depot Companies, operated this depot until the end of the war.

By 31 January, the effects of having additional ports and improved transportation facilities were evident. In one 10-day period that month, 375 cars

of medical supplies were received and processed by Depot M-408T. Thereafter,

except for a period in February when roads in the area began to thaw and

break up, transportation difficulties subsided and the operation at Depot

M-408T became somewhat routine for the balance of the war.

Because of the large number of Communications Zone troops concentrated

in the Liege area, Depot M-409 was a consistently heavy operation. The depot

was operated exclusively by the 66th Medical Depot Company until 10 March,

when the 48th Medical Depot Company arrived at Liege and helped with the

operation while training in ETOUSA supply operation before leaving on

9 April for the forward area depot at Duisdorf.

The U.S. Armies were preparing to move forward and it was necessary

to establish a depot (M-412) forward of Reims to supply the Third and

Seventh U.S. Armies and to handle captured supplies and stocks for the Civil

Affairs Division.

Eapidly established in late December 1944, after V-l bombs forced the

abandonment of Depot M-411 at Liege, Depot M-413 at Noirhat served as a

sorting and reconsignment point for medical supplies received through the

port of Antwerp. Despite being handicapped by poor buildings and lack of

roads, the depot, operated by elements of the 11th and 15th Medical Depot

Companies, ran smoothly.

Following extensive reconnaissance, a foundry at Foug, France, 4 miles

west of Toul was selected as the site for Depot M-414, and a detachment from

the 31st Medical Depot Company opened at the new location on 4 February

1945. Although the depot was not as forward as was desired, the Third U.S.

Army would not allow Communications Zone depots within its area. This

site, however, did favor a number of Communications Zone hospitals in the

immediate vicinity. Additionally, Depot M-414 assumed the mission of Depot

M-451 at Dijon, which closed on 10 May.

Depot M-417 at Elbeuf came into being unexpectedly. Shipments from

the United States started to arrive on the Continent through the Le Havre and

Rouen areas without warning in October 1944; they included hospital unit

assemblies and bulk medical stocks. With the bulk stocks scheduled for delivery to Depot M-407 and the unit assemblies to be shipped directly to their

operational sites, the workload exceeded the port capabilities to segregate the

stocks for transshipment. A detachment from the 15th Medical Depot Com-
368 MEDICAL SUPPLY

pany was sent to Rouen in early November to accomplish the sorting. By

January 1945, operations had increased to the point that a detachment from

the 30th Medical Depot Company was added. As receipts increased, additional

space was acquired in an old silk factory at Elbeuf. This site was initially

established as the 11th Port Medical Transit Depot on 13 February 1945. With

the port receiving shipments around the clock, it was essential that the medical

section follow suit, operating with a few medical military personnel serving

in a supervisory and administrative capacity while POW's were used extensively. Although this depot originated as a storage and sorting point, G-4 directed that each Supply Service open issue points to serve units in the Rouen

vicinity. To meet this requirement, the 239th Medical Supply Team was assigned to the operation, and on 30 March 1945, Depot M^L17 was activated

with an issue mission area.

The last depot established in France was opened at Mourmelon-le-Petit by

the 16th Medical Depot Company in the spring of 1945 and designated Depot

M-418. With the anticipated ending of hostilities and the planning for redeployment of equipment to the Pacific area, it was advisable to establish facilities for receiving, sorting, disassembling, and reassembling medical equipment

other than hospital assemblies, including all types of kits and chests. None of

the existing depots was suitable for such an operation and a site at Mourmelonle-Petit was selected for the construction of Depot M-418. It was located within

the Assembly Area Command, which was being formed to receive and process

troops withdrawing from Central Europe.

Depots in southern France.—With the consolidation of SOLOC and

Communications Zone, ETOUSA, two medical depots, M-351 at Dijon and

M-352 at Marseille, came under the control of the European theater.

The Dijon depot was operated by the 70th and 7lst Medical Base Depot

Companies in support of the Seventh U.S. Army and the First French Army.

With the consolidation, the depot assumed the parallel position of the advance

section depots and moved along with the advance of the Seventh U.S. and First

French Armies into the Rhine area.

Depot M-352 (later M-452) at Marseille, operated by the 231st Medical

Composite Battalion, served as a port, filler, and reserve depot and, later, as an

assembly depot. Consisting of 250,000 square feet, this depot was one of the

first to use mechanical handling equipment on a large scale.

Depots in Germany.—A site at Weinheim, east of the Rhine River, was

selected for Depot M-416T. Although rail service had been reestablished, the

site was about 10 miles from the rail line. The 30th Medical Depot Company

opened Depot M-416T on 1 May 1945. As the depot was in process of being

organized, units began to turn in equipment for redeployment, and the magnitude of receipts made it necessary to augment the depot with a detachment of

the 30th Medical Depot Company, which had been assigned to Depot M-417 in

Elbeuf since early January 1945.

As the armies drove into Germany, the Medical Department was pressured

to select a depot site on the extreme right flank of the Ruhr area. However, Col.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 369

Silas B. Hays, MC, Chief of Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, believed

that Depot M-409 at Liege was adequate since any relocation would foe temporary because the British were scheduled to take over the area as soon as the

Buhr drive had been completed. A compromise site was selected by ADSEC at

Duisdorf, close to Bonn, and on 9 April, the newly arrived 48th Medical Depot

Company assumed operation of Depot M-415.35

SUPPLY FUNCTIONS IN 1945

Medical Maintenance

By the end of 1944, the medical maintenance program was functioning

effectively, and planning was started on the redeployment of equipment to

the Pacific theater. On 16 March 1945, the Maintenance and Bepair Section

of the Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, was created, and

plans were made to reclaim and salvage medical equipment and to locate redeployment maintenance centers. The 317th Medical Service Detachment was

moved from Normandy Base (Depot M-402T) to establish a maintenance

shop at Depot M-408T at Eeims while the 321st Medical Service Detachment

was moved from Depot M-407 in Paris to Depot M-409 in Liege to meet the

regional redeployment maintenance requirements.

To supplement the 15th Medical Depot Company, medical service detachments were assigned to various depots. The 233d and 235th Medical Service

Detachments were assigned to the medical maintenance and repair shop at

Depot M-407.

Bepair parts were a constant problem until the Chief Surgeon,

ETOUSA, inaugurated the system of having a repair parts truck make

scheduled visits to the army area. More than 3,500 items were repaired by

the army depots' maintenance shops from January to June 1945.

Selected officers and enlisted men from maintenance shops were sent to

the tropicalization and fungusproofing course conducted by the Signal School

at La Jonchere, France. Attendance at the course was supplemented by 2

days of application at the maintenance and repair shop at Depot M-407.

Shortly thereafter, a standing operating procedure for moisture-fungusproofing of Medical Department technical equipment was completed and

distributed to all medical maintenance shops on the Continent and in the

United Kingdom. Concurrently, serviceability standards for Medical Department technical items were developed for daily operations and for redeployment.

35 (1) See footnote 10, p. 316. (2) Annual Report, 15th Medical Depot Company, 1945. (3) Annual

Report, 13th Medical Depot Company, 1945. (4) Semiannual Report, 66th Medical Depot Company,

January-June 1945. (5) Semiannual Report, 31st Medical Depot Company, January-June 1945 (6)

Annual Report, 70th Medical Base Depot Company, 1945. (7) Semiannual Report, 231,st Medical

Composite Battalion, 1 January-30 June 1945. (8) Annual Report, 30th Medical Depot Company, 1945.

(9) Semiannual Report, 48th Medical Depot Company, 1 January-30 June 1945
370 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Airlifts Into Germany

In January 1945, seven C-47 transports replaced the 20 small C-46's

operating out of Paris, and a daily airlift of 11% tons of medical supplies

was established. Frequently, these C-47's were used to pick up supplies in

the United Kingdom and deliver them directly to army depots. After the

armies crossed the Rhine River, far in advance of Communications Zone

depots and in territory where rail transportation had been completely disrupted, C^7's provided the essential means to medical supplies.

Captured German Medical Supplies

Before entering Germany, all captured enemy equipment in the hands

of units was turned in to the army medical depots. Those few items which

were considered suitable substitutes for U.S. items were placed in open

stocks. All other expendable items were turned over to the Civil Affairs Division while nonexpendable items were evacuated to Communications Zone

depots.

Although problems allied with captured enemy medical materiel were

encountered early in France, the quantities uncovered in Germany surpassed

the capacity of the Army depots. Consequently, provisional platoons were

organized to classify, process, and effect proper disposition of the materiel.

Aside from the volume, scarcity of trained personnel, lack of uniformity m

German packing, differences in language, nomenclature, and units of measure

hampered identification, inventory, and stock control procedures.

German medical supplies and equipment were found in many places in

great quantities in the drive to the Elbe River (fig. 93). At the outset, large

quantities were wantonly ransacked and destroyed due to failure to provide

proper guards. This oversight was soon corrected. Nine supply dumps to

segregate, store, and issue the supplies were established in quick succession.

Some supplies, after being sorted and salvaged, were used by U.S. units, and

the remaining stocks were turned over to displaced persons centers, German

hospitals, military governments for civilian use, and similar agencies.38

In Germany, the Third U.S. Army used the personnel of captured medical depots, usually Wehrmacht troops, and German civilian employees to

operate its own depots, under supervision of a limited number of American

military personnel. This staffing was rather significant because POW's, who

had been attached to assist in processing captured medical materiel in France,

could not be taken into Germany. The prohibition of the use of German

prisoners in Germany for augmentation of depot staffs made it necessary to

recruit personnel from displaced persons camps and to employ German

civilians.37

* See footnote 10, p. 316.

w Semiannual Report, Medical Section, Third U.S. Army, 1 January-30 June 1945.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 371

FIGURE 93.—In addition to stores of medical supplies captured in the race across

Germany, many German medical facilities were overrun, such as this Nazi hospital,

April 1945..

Depot Closures in the United Kingdom

Further curtailment of medical depot activities in the United Kingdom

was effected in January 1945. After the 36th Station Hospital in northern

Ireland was closed on 12 January 1945, action was taken to close Depot

M-^tlOM, also in northern Ireland, on 25 March. On 12 February, the 16th

Medical Depot Company closed out the medical section of Depot G-50 in

preparation for early movement to the Continent. Remaining U.K. depots

were operated by four medical depot companies (6th, 63d, 64th, and 65th) and

a non-TOE group of 4 officers and 26 enlisted men. This group also operated

the U.K. Base Optical Shop under the command of Capt. Joseph B. Handley,

MAC.

Increasing pressure to close the depots was exerted on the U.K. Base

Section during February 1945 by theater headquarters. On 18 February, a

report was submitted to Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, Commanding General, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, stating that it would be impossible to contemplate any further reduction of either personnel or installations at that time

because of (1) anticipated workloads in the deactivation of hospitals, (2) re-
312 MEDICAL SUPPLY

assembling, repacking, and redeploying of hospital assemblies and depot

stocks, and (3) servicing the heavy hospital patient load. As a result, there

were no further depot closures until May 1945.

Deactivation of Hospitals

With emphasis on the continental hospital system and the resultant shortening of the evacuation lines, plans were prepared in February 1945 for the

phased transfer of U.K. hospital units to the Continent. In all, 21 hospital

assemblies were shipped to the Continent.

On 20 March, the Surgeon, U.K. Base, directed that hospital units being

closed for movement would turn in equipment to their servicing depot. Unfortunately, when the first few hospitals were closed, distribution depots were

engaged in building hospital assemblies for shipment to the Continent. As the

uncrated and unpacked supplies from closing hospitals were delivered to depot

docks, the resulting confusion necessitated an immediate change of plans; one

depot, G-24, was designated to receive the supplies and equipment turned in

by hospitals.

The magnitude of the receipts of supplies and equipment from hospital

closures required prompt action to establish methods and procedures for sorting, repairing, packing, marking, and shipping the materiel. Approximately

one-half of the officers and enlisted maintenance technicians of Depot M-400

were transferred to Depot G-24 to supervise the sorting and repairing of technical equipment.

In May, 10 hospital locations were closed simultaneously on orders of the

Surgeon, U.K. Base. Large quantities of supplies and equipment, in all degrees

of serviceability, were literally thrown into the depot. Technical equipment was

turned in either without accessories or with accessories in unlabeled boxes.

Serviceability of this equipment was not indicated, British and American

items were not separated, and scrap and salvage were sent to the depot along

with technical services equipment. Articles of clothing were not sorted according to size, and combinations to safes were not furnished. These deficiencies resulted from failure to comply with the provisions of the directive. To prevent

similar recurrences, Colonel Black, Chief of the Supply Division, met with

medical supply officers of approximately 50 hospitals and the various hospital

centers at Depot G-24. There, the officers were oriented in the proper method

of returning medical supplies and equipment as their hospitals closed. They

were conducted through the depot to see at first hand the problems that had

been created, and to impress on them the necessity for complying with the

directives covering turn-in of supplies. The orientation and series of inspections corrected the major deficiencies in the turn-in of hospital assemblies in

May and June 1945. At the same time, additional personnel were secured to

assist in receiving materiel at Depot G-24. Medical, surgical, X-ray, and dental

technician personnel were obtained on temporary duty assignments to help

classify and identify supplies and equipment.
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 3Y3

FIGURE 94.—Scarcity of boxes and packing material caused units to use discarded German

small arms ammunition boxes to transport medical supplies.

A serious operational problem developed within the depots as packaging

and crating lagged behind the sorting process, and large quantities of individual items began to accumulate. Textiles were baled on a 24-hour schedule with

the help of POW's, but the backlog of packing and crating continued to mount.

Military personnel records were screened for qualified carpenters; 15 so located

were put to work promptly, prefabricating boxes and crates. Two sanitary

companies were also attached to Depot G-24 to expand operational capacities.

Shortages of various types of packing materials compounded problems.

Although one officer in London was constantly attempting to purchase packing

and crating material, these items were not available. On one occasion, a planeload of excelsior was flown from France to enable continuation of the packing

operation. Deliveries of packing and crating materials from the Zone of Interior were woefully behind schedule (fig. 94).

Disposition of British Items

As has been mentioned, hospitals in England were equipped with both

American and British items. Housekeeping items, such as beds, mattresses,

and bedside tables, had been furnished by the British and were to be returned
374 MEDICAL SUPPLY

upon deactivation of the units. Many items of equipment which had been procured from British sources through reciprocal aid arrangements were not considered desirable for shipment to other theaters, or to the United States because of parts peculiarity and different electrical voltages. Consequently, supplies in hospitals were segregated into three categories: British reciprocal aid

items which would have to be disposed of as surplus, housekeeping items which

were to be returned to the British, and American items which were further

categorized as to items in excess of overall American requirements and items

which would be required either for redeployment or return to the United

States.

Return of housekeeping items presented a rather complex problem because

adequate records had not been kept on the items furnished by the British. Further complications were caused by the transfer of many items from one installation to another as necessity demanded. The problem was finally resolved by

having the local British barracks officers furnish the U.S. Forces with receipts

for all British accommodation stores which were returned. No attempt was

made to correlate items turned in against the list of items initially issued.

Disposition of unserviceable items was another problem. The British controlled the salvage operations and were reluctant to accept any items unless

they met established salvage criteria. Unserviceable vehicles were not accepted

until all wood and rubber were removed. Ordnance had a number of unserviceable ambulances, which were concentrated in a large field, doused liberally

with gasoline, lighted, and thereby reduced to the desirable state of metal only.

All hospitals had many open packages of laboratory chemicals and drugs

which could not be returned to the depots. Arrangements were made with the

British Ministry of Supply to turn such items over to local charities in exchange for a signed release from liability for any error in label or content.

Closing hospitals were informed to destroy any open packages whose contents

were in doubt.

With the declining distribution and maintenance workload resulting from

hospital closures after 1 May 1945, further adjustments were made in the depot system. The repair workload at Depot M-400 had diminished drastically

so that it was practical to close the depot on 15 May and to transfer the personnel and equipment to Depot G-45 where a medical maintenance and repair

section was established.

On 20 June, Depot G-45 was designated the sole distribution depot in

the United Kingdom, thus allowing the medical sections of Depots G-20 and

G-35 to begin to close and transfer to Depots G-24 and G-45 stock not required for the assembly programs. On 27 June, Depot G-24 was turned over

for the exclusive use of the Medical Department and was redesignated as

Depot M-424. On 30 June, Depot G-30 was officially closed and the procurement office was moved to the U.K. Surgeon's Office.

Planning was completed for closure of Depot G-23 on 21 July, and Depots G-20 and G-35 on 31 July. Depot G-45 continued to operate as a distribution depot, including the medical maintenance and repair shop.
OOMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 375

Depot M-424 continued its mission as a filler depot and repository of

stocks from hospitals and units closing in the United Kingdom, including a

program of sorting, classifying, and repacking supplies and equipment. The

depot also served as a storage point for surplus property awaiting disposition

by the U.K. General Purchasing Agent.38

CIVIL AFFAIRS MEDICAL SUPPLY

Preinvasion Planning

Preinvasion planning for Civil Affairs medical supply, under the direction of GoL Stuart G. Smith, MC, conceived of the Supply Division as responsible only for the distribution of Civil Affairs supplies. Eequirements

were to be determined by SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, based upon the expected

civilian population to be liberated during successive stages of the invasion.

These needs were to be satisfied principally in terms of the BMU (basic

medical unit), and the assembly of 189 cases containing drugs, dressings,

surgical instruments, general practitioner's sets, and layettes. The so-called

BMU was capable theoretically of meeting minimum requirements for 30

days for 100,000 civilians in liberated areas and for 1 million civilians in

conquered territories when supplemented by various other smaller assemblies,

such as basic veterinary units, basic laboratory units, and similar items.

Change in Concept Following Invasion

Although 85 basic units were allocated for distribution during the first

90 days of the invasion, only 5 were actually issued—1 each to Valognes,

Coutances, Avranches, Rennes, and Paris. Civilian requirements were satisfied during that period principally by use of indigenous supplies, captured

enemy medical supplies at Cherbourg and Isigny, and to some extent, by

drawing upon regular U.S. Army stocks.

It became apparent after the breakthrough at Avranches in July 1944

that the whole concept of Civil Affairs medical supply had to be revised because of numerous difficulties. Only in the larger cities, and then only after

the battleline had moved far forward, was civilian authority sufficiently reconstituted to accept and distribute an entire unit of supply of such magnitude. The arrival of basic units in France on seven different ships posed the

difficult problem of marrying-up the component parts into a whole unit.

Transportation was in such short supply that critical items were removed

from the units and moved forward while the depleted remains stayed on or

near the beach. Enemy materiel had been captured in quantity at no fewer

than 14 locations in France, permitting the selection of needed items. Health

*> See footnotes 10, p. 316 ; and 28(3), p. 352.

295-453 O—68 2.6
376 MEDICAL SUPPLY

conditions in France and Belgium, moreover, were better than had been

anticipated.

Confronted with these factors, yet aware that a hard winter and the advance into Germany lay ahead, the Supply Division, in cooperation with

representatives of SHAEF and the 12th Army Group, made a fundamental

revision in the Civil Affairs supply concept: Basic medical units and other

large assemblies would henceforth be issued only to governmental authority

in liberated areas when and as such authority would reassert itself. Captured

materiel would be inventoried and prepared for issue at "retail" to refugee

camps, POW compounds, Civil Affairs teams, and villages in forward areas,

and 10 BMU's would be broken down for issue of component items.

By the end of 1944, French authorities had accepted 23 BMU's for distribution in Paris, Reims, Le Havre, Nantes, Caen, Rennes, Tours, Lille, and

Nancy.

Captured Materiel Program

The captured materiel program, however, adapted itself most efficaciously

to meeting civilian needs.

Establishment of captured materiel depot.—Since seven warehouses

of high quality medical supplies and equipment of French, German, and Italian

origin had been uncovered in Reims, it was determined to set up Depot M-412

in that city, both to classify and distribute the materiel captured there and to

marshal and collect all other materiel captured west of the Rhine.

To staff the depot, 3 officers and 15 enlisted men of the European Civil Affairs Division were detached from headquarters and one platoon of the 13th

Medical Depot Company was placed on temporary duty. From time to time

thereafter, personnel familiar with foreign nomenclature were assigned to Depot M-412 on temporary duty ranging from 5 to 60 days.

Captured materiel teams were formed at Depot M-412 to assay all such

materiel in northwest Europe. Items which were of high quality and in short

supply in regular U.S. Army stocks were transferred to nearby medical depots for issue; items of French or Belgium origin insofar as practicable were

delivered to nearby officials of those countries, and the balance was then

transferred to Depot M-412.

All of the captured items so collected were identified, inventoried, assigned supply numbers, and cross-referenced with their U.S. counterpart.

By mid-winter of 1944, some 3,150 items, including more than 1,000 drugs,

were in stock at Depot M-412.

Such efficient use of captured materiel brought numerous commendations

from higher authority, including visitors from the War Department. But

perhaps the most significant innovation by Depot M-412 in terms of Civil

Affairs supply was the so-called Pannier program (fig. 95).

Medical kits devised.—The early campaign had demonstrated the need

for balanced, compact units of supply to be used in displaced persons camps
OOMBAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 377

FIGURE 95.—Assembly of Panniers for distribution through Civil Affairs channels was

accomplished at Depot M-412.

or in forward areas where distribution of a BMU would have been wasteful

and where there were no personnel capable of requisitioning captured materiel

selectively. Accordingly, in cooperation with U.S. Public Health and French

medical officers, the Supply Division devised separate Civil Affairs drug,

dressing, and surgical instrument kits (referred to as Panniers), containing

46, 43, and 18 items, respectively.

Depot M-412 personnel, with the assistance of available prisoners, assembled the items in captured portable trunks or in wicker baskets. Within 45

days, 5,646 kits were assembled and issued to displaced persons camps and

Civil Affairs teams. The prudent selection of component items and the portability of the chests brought widespread acclaim for the Pannier program.

As the military operation swept across the Rhine and into Germany in

the early months of 1945, French authority was able to accept delivery of 28

additional BMU's, and 400-bed Civil Affairs hospitals were set up in 20 French

cities and towns. With the delivery of these units, responsibility for distribution

of civilian supplies to our Western Europe Allies substantially came to an end.

Distribution of captured materiel.—When the fighting ended, the Supply
378 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Division took over numerous German medical depots, including the Neuhof

salt mine with its 3,200 tons of supplies. Much of the captured materiel was

required to service POW enclosures and hospitals and the balance was used,

in the main, for displaced persons camps.39

Antityphus Supplies in Germany

Although the Quartermaster Corps was nominally in charge of antityphus

supplies, the Medical Supply Division through Depot M-412 issued almost

650,000 pounds of DDT and 4,600 hand-dusters and airlifted 40 power-dusters

from the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus, Depot M-412 became

the nerve center of all antityphus supply activity.

» See footnotes 2(3), p. 310 ; and 10, p. 316.
CHAPTER XI

Redeployment and Occupation

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

Redeployment planning, initiated by War Department directives in 1944

when it seemed that victory in Europe might be a reality by November or

December of that year, lost some of its vigor as winter approached, and it

became obvious that the war would be prolonged. The plan of Maj. Gen. Paul

R. Hawley, Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations,

U.S. Army), for closing and redeploying medical units of the theater was

reviewed in January 1945, and a new plan was submitted in March. War

Department "Troop Basis" manifested the types of units that would be relocated, but selection of the specific medical units was accomplished by the

Chief Surgeon.1

After V-E Day, 8 May 1945, the plan for redeployment—dividing Army

units into occupation troops (category I), transferring troops to another

theater (category II), or demobilizing troops in the United States (category

III)—presented a new set of supply problems. Before V-E Day, all attention

had been focused upon the requisitioning, receipt, storage, and issue of supplies. Redeployment reversed this flow. The changes of function dictated the

development of detailed plans and their execution in a relatively short span

of time. A conference with all medical depot commanding officers in ETOUSA

was held on 6 April 1945. Headquarters, Communications Zone, had promulgated three plans, as follows:

1. The "Basic Plan for Redeployment," covering the general procedures

to be followed in redeployment of troops and equipment.

2. POM-RED (Preparation for Oversea Movement-Redeployment), SOP

(Standing Operating Procedure) No. 61, comprising detailed instructions

for unit commanders whose units were scheduled for redeployment.

3. SPOR (Supplies Preparation for Oversea Redeployment), SOP No.

63, consisting of instructions concerning the movement of supplies and being

designed for use by Supply Services headquarters and depots.

Each document underwent several changes.

The basic plan provided that units going directly to the Pacific area

would pass through the Assembly Area Command near Reims, France, where

1

(1) Letter, Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, Chief Surgeon, Headquarters, European Theater of

Operations, U.S. Army, to The Surgeon General, 6 Sept. 1944, subject: Movement of Hospital Units

and Equipment From the European Theater of Operations to the Pacific Theaters After Cessation

of Hostilities. (2) Period Report, Operations Division (Planning Branch), Office of the Chief Surgeon,

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1 Jan.-30 June 1945.

379
380 MEDICAL SUPPLY

they would draw supplies to eliminate shortages, and pack, mark, document,

and ship their own equipment. The first units were scheduled, however, to

bypass the Assembly Area Command and were to proceed directly to the

staging area at Marseille, France, where the prescribed processing would be

performed. Units sent to the Pacific area indirectly and to the United States

for strategic reserve were directed to turn in all equipment—except that

designated minimal essential equipment—to collecting points stipulated by

Supply Services chiefs. This equipment was then shipped to the Pacific area

and to the United States, but it was not marked for any specific unit.2

MEDICAL SUPPLY ACTIONS

United Kingdom and Northern France

The Supply Division set forth plans to insure that fixed hospitals included the equipment of other services and that all hospital assemblies were

stowed in one hold of a single ship. The Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, sought

and was charged with the responsibility of packing, marking, documenting,

and shipping hospitals and similar assemblies upon port call.

It was decided to confine, insofar as possible, the packing of general and

station hospital assemblies to the United Kingdom because (1) the existing

hospitals could be closed out in the United Kingdom more rapidly, and (2)

the comparatively short distances permitted the designation of one depot to

receive turned-in equipment for reassembling hospitals against the forecast.

General and station hospitals on the Continent were directed to turn in

their equipment to the nearest depot.

Each field and each evacuation hospital scheduled for direct shipment

would pack its own equipment with the help of the medical supply service.

Medical Depots M-^09 and M-414, located at Liege, Belgium, and Foug,

France, respectively, were designated as collecting points for all field and

evacuation hospital assemblies and were responsible for assembling such hospitals destined for direct or reserve shipments.

The units would be directed to turn in all other medical equipment to the

designated collecting point, Medical Depot M-418 at Mourmelon-le-Petit,

France, where the equipment would be inspected, disassembled, and then

completely reprocessed into minor assemblies. Units going directly to the

Pacific area would turn in their equipment and draw completely processed

assemblies. Units going indirectly would turn in their equipment, except for

minimal essential equipment.

While many aspects of the redeployment program followed the prechartered course, a few conditions militated against effective and full execution.

The equipment turned in was generally in somewhat better condition than had

been anticipated. Approximately 90 percent of the hospital-type equipment

2

Semiannual Report, Supply Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, Headquarters, European

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1 Jan.-30 June 1945.
REDEPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION 381

FIGURE 96.—Minor assembly processing line at Medical Depot M^418, Mourmelon-le-Petit,

France. Medical Department chests are being disassembled preparatory to restocking.

and 75 percent of the field-type equipment received by depots was either serviceable or repairable. Considerable confusion attended the initial efforts in the

U.K. hospital program while a heavy flow of field equipment was processed

as planned at Depot M-418 with relative ease. Common to both hospital equipment and field equipment were the factor of urgency, the general shortage of

packing and crating materials, and the difficulties of various kinds with marking and documenting shipments (fig. 96).

Although requisitions for packing and crating materials had been submitted to the Zone of Interior in January, supplies were not sufficiently plentiful until after 1 July for the full-fledged program. In the interim, it was

necessary to proceed with the small quantities of packing material on hand

and, consequently, hospitals assembled during May and June were inadequately packaged and protected.

The varied destinations involved in redeployment made it essential that

marking instructions be explicitly carried out and that old marking be obliterated. Unexpected difficulty was encountered because of a considerable shifting

of, and loss of, depot personnel incident to their own deployment. These same

factors occasioned difficulties in the processing of assemblies and the preparation of accurate documentation. The introduction of a newly designed shipping

document for redeployment (modeled after the existing War Department

shipping document) compounded the problem.
382 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Finally, and fortunately, Japan's surrender on 14 August 1945 instantly

altered redeployment activities in ETOUSA, and energies were directed toward intercepting the movements of materiel that was destined for the Pacific

area. Most of the medical units and the equipment which was on the way, or

had reached the Philippines and the United States by V-J Day, 2 September

1945, had been processed in accordance with the opening phase of the plan

through the huge redeployment processing center at Marseille. Perspectives

changed also—no one seemed particularly disturbed that the cherished stocks

brought into ETOUSA, many as emergency supplies, would not be shipped

against the elaborate plans, but would be disposed of as surplus property.3

Southern France

A complete readjustment in supply handling in southern France came

about with redeployment. Eequisitioning supplies from the Zone of Interior

was adjusted to meet the change. The forward flow to CONAD (Continental

Advance Section) receded and then, with redeployment, reversed its direction.

Stocks in warehouses reached their peak at this time and then began to decrease as supplies were poured out to redeploying units.

Packing and processing of supplies for the Far East had first priority.

Thus, in April 1945, two officers were sent from the medical depot in Marseille

to Paris to attend a course in special procedures for tropical packing and

preservation of supplies to be shipped to the Pacific area. Anticipating the

end of the war in Europe, base section shipping procedures were modified, and

only those materials were sent to the fronts in Europe that would not stand

reshipment to the East. Also, the conservation of packing cases and materials

began before the German surrender. Delta Base Section established a central

boxmaking activity, where various standard-sized boxes and crates were made

for use by all technical services. When shipments started, various port battalions entered into loading competitions which reached their peak when V-J

Day diverted the flow of materiel.

The Delta Base Section personnel-staging program was rapidly developed to provide facilities to accommodate 200,000 troops at one time in three

large areas in southern France—Calais, Saint-Victoret, and Aries. It was a

monumental achievement accomplished on a tight schedule.

In June 1945, the 231st Medical Composite Battalion, Headquarters, Delta

Base Section, was charged with the gigantic task of processing and assembling

complete sets of tropically packed T/E (tables of equipment) medical

equipment for issue to category II medical units redeployed through the staging areas. Storage and operational space became critical as hospital assemblies

and Medical Department kits and chests were processed and held pending

shipment of units. Depot strength rose to more than 500 personnel in June

1945, while it operated at peak capacity—processing requisitions for staging

3

(1) See footnote 2, p. 380. (2) Keport of Operations, Supply Division, Office of the Theater

Chief Surgeon, Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, 8 May-30 Sept. 1945.
REDEPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION 383

units, filling optical prescriptions, receiving and storing unit assemblies shipped from the north of France, marrying-up assembly components shipped

separately from the parent shipment, and concurrently, moving major and

minor assemblies to shipside for loading. During July, the deluge of supplies

and equipment from the north continued. The major activity consisted of receiving carloads of hospital assemblies while continuing to move processed

assemblies from the depot when called for by the port commander. Depot storage space reached the saturation point in July forcing acquisitions of additional space including a large lot, not too distant from the depot, which had been

used as a baseball diamond. Supply points were established in each of the

staging areas to service deploying units and the areas more directly.

During the first 6 months of 1945, the 231st Medical Composite Battalion

received 12,336 tons and distributed 6,116 tons. In addition, it processed or

assembled 11 general hospitals, 10 station hospitals, 3 evacuation hospitals, 4

infirmaries, 6 general dispensaries, and 2 medical laboratories. After V-J Day,

redeployment continued except that the destination became the United States.4

SUPPLY ACTIVITIES IN THE OCCUPATION

Depot Activities

At the end of the war in Europe, the medical depots supporting the

combat armies were located deep in the heartland of Germany, some in areas

soon to be occupied by the forces of other Allied Nations. This led to considerable confusion during May and June of 1945, with the transfer of medical depot sites to the French, British, and Kussian forces and a concurrent

relocation of United States forces into the area designated as the U.S. Occupied Zone of Germany. During this period, U.S. Army medical depot companies performed commendably, transferring not only U.S. Army stocks, but

also the bulk of critical captured medical materiel into dumps in the U.S.

Zone (map 27). These captured supplies were destined to be invaluable in

providing medical care to vast numbers of displaced persons and prisoners

of war who were under U.S. control. By 1 July 1945, transfers of area responsibilities were largely completed, and the medical supply structure to

support the occupation was operational, consisting of a medical depot to support each of the separate major commands, which included Berlin, Bremen,

the subdivisions of the U.S. Zone (Eastern and Western Military Districts of

Germany) and U.S. forces in Austria.

The Weinheim Medical Depot was in operation as a key filler depot in the

Western Military District of Germany, Seventh U.S. Army area. Operated

by the 30th Medical Depot Company, the depot had originally been established

on 1 May 1945 as Medical Depot M-416T with a mission to supply the 6th

Army Group and Continental Advance Section. However, 1 July 1945 found

"(1) See footnotes 2, p. 380; and 3(2), p. 382. (2) Semiannual Report, Headquarters, 231st

Medical Composite Battalion, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1 Jan.-30 June 1945.
384 MEDICAL SUPPLY

MAP 27.—Occupation zones and medical depots in postwar Germany and Austria, 1945.

the company still in the process of getting established and faced with an enormous task of expansion. After V-E Day, units redeploying for the Pacific theater and the United States were turning in their medical equipment and supplies. Again, after V-J Day, the speeding up of redeployment to the United

States brought in an ever-increasing amount of excess equipment that had to

be checked, repacked, and stored. Designation of the 30th Medical Depot Company as a category I occupation force unit meant that many additional problems of supply and storage would have to be met. Other medical depots, not

designated as occupational units, began the process of moving a great portion

of their stocks to Weinheim. Thus, the entire activity of the Weinheim Medical Depot for the final 6 months of 1945 was one of constant expansion, always

with the cry for space and more space.

The original warehousing facilities at the Weinheim Medical Depot were

unsatisfactory and had to be reconstructed to accommodate the storage of
REDEPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION 385

FIGURE 97.—Furth Medical Depot, Nürnberg, Germany, operated by the 33d Medical

Depot Company. The E-shaped building was surrounded by a large open storage area on

which temporary-type buildings were added progressively to accommodate postwar needs.

6,000 tons anticipated under the occupation. All construction required at the

depot was accomplished by medical troops, German civilians, and prisoners of

war, with supervisory personnel and heavy construction equipment furnished

by other services.

The Furth Medical Depot, in operation as the key filler depot in the

Eastern Military District of Germany, Third U.S. Army area, was established

by the 33d Medical Depot Company on 26 April 1945 in the waning days of

combat in what was a former German Medical Sanitats Parke (Medical Point).

Although the structure at this site was not particularly desirable from an issue

viewpoint, it did afford adequate covered storage space for approximately 4,000

tons and an abundance of open storage space. The structure consisted of a

four-story, triple-winged building with 10-foot ceilings which made forklift

operations impracticable. Elevators available in the building made storage more

accessible and easier to handle. Road and rail communications leading to this

depot were excellent, and necessary docking and ramping facilities made shipping, unloading, and handling a minor problem. As a consequence, the depot

was established as a key depot for certain items of medical supply necessary

in the maintenance of U.S. forces in the occupied zone. By 31 December 1945,

total stocks at the Furth Medical Depot had reached a level of approximately

7,015 tons. Ultimately, in 1946, the Furth Medical Depot was to become the

only medical depot supporting the U.S. occupation forces in Germany (fig. 97).

The Bremen Medical Depot, operated by the 70th Medical Base Depot

Company at a site near the port of Bremerhaven, served not only as a filler
m MEDICAL SUPPLY

depot for the Bremen Enclave but also as a base depot for inshipments from

both the United Kingdom and the Zone of Interior. Although the depot was

small, the troop strength supported directly by it was also small. Moreover,

access routes into the depot were excellent. It was decided that, by augmenting

the depot's ramp facilities to expedite off and on loading, the depot could continue to serve as a base depot to handle the receiving and shipping functions

in support of the occupation forces.

The Berlin Medical Depot, operated by a detachment of the 15th Medical

Depot Company, was established in the Berlin Enclave to initially support

approximately 50,000 troops. Its site was near the grounds of the 279th Station Hospital located in a small enclosed tennis court. Due to the reduced

strength of the Enclave, the depot was shortly inactivated and became an issue

point under the 279th Station Hospital.

United States forces in Austria received their medical supply support

from the 226th Medical Supply Detachment located in Glasenbach, Austria.

This detachment, in turn, requisitioned its requirements from the Furth Medical Depot in the U.S. Occupied Zone of Germany.5

Medical Supply Division, Theater Chief Surgeon's Office

Although the medical depot system in the U.S. Occupied Zone of Germany and Austria was under major subordinate commanders, it was technically supervised by the Supply Division, Theater Chief Surgeon's Office, TSFET

(Theater Service Forces, European Theater). From the cessation of hostilities

through 31 December 1945, there was a progressive transfer of responsibilities

from the TSFET (EEAK) office located in Versailles, France, to the TSFET

(MAIN) office in Frankfurt, Germany. As of 1 October 1945, Col. Robert L.

Black, MSC, was chief of the Supply Division with station in Versailles, and

Lt. Col. Louis F. Hubener, MC, Deputy Chief, Supply Division, was acting

chief of the Supply Division in Frankfurt. The move of the Supply Division

from TSFET (REAR) in Versailles to TSFET (MAIN) in Frankfurt was

completed by 7 November 1945.

During the last 3 months of 1945, the Supply Division efforts were directed toward the buildup of (1) a minimum 60-day maintenance level in all

medical depots in Germany and (2) a reserve stockpile in Germany sufficient

to maintain the occupation forces until 30 June 1949. To accomplish this objective, a comprehensive study was made first of issues in Germany, and then,

replacement factors were revised upward on all items on which issues in Germany were higher per 1,000 men per month than the overall theater issues.

Likewise, downward revisions were made where indicated. Based upon the revised replacement factors, 60-day maintenance levels and 30 June 1949 levels

5

(1) See footnotes 2, p. 380; and 3(2), p. 382. (2) Semiannual Report, Headquarters, 30th

Medical Depot Company, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 1 Jan.-30 July 1945. (3)

Annual Report, Headquarters, 33d Medical Depot Company, 1 Jan.-31 Dec. 1945. (4) Annual Report,

Headquarters, 70th Medical Base Depot Company, 1945. (5) Annual Report, 15th Medical Depot

Company, 1 Jan.-31 Dec. 1945. (6) Annual Report, Office of the Surgeon, Headquarters, U.S. Forces

in Austria, 1945. (7) Annual Report, 226th Medical Supply Detachment, U.S. Forces in Austria, 1945.
REDEPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION 387

were computed by using the factors in combination with estimated troop

strength for tllie periods involved.

To maintain a minimum 60-day supply of each item stocked in the theater, monthly maintenance requisitions were placed on the Zone of Interior.

Requisitions were based on a 180-day reorder point to allow for a 120-day

shipping time. Incoming shipments on such requisitions were received through

the port of Bremerhaven by the Bremen Medical Depot, and from this depot,

supplies were transferred as needed to other filler depots in Germany.

Each medical depot in Germany was authorized a proportionate part of

the 60-day maintenance level, computed on the percentage of total troops

served. Based upon information contained in the theater's consolidated stock

status report, transfers among the various depots were effected to insure a

minimum 60-day stock of each item, except key depot items, in each filler depot.

Key depot items were books and blank forms, stocked only by the Furth Medical Depot, and teeth, stocked only by the Weinheim Medical Depot.

The buildup of the 30 June 1949 level from stocks already in the theater

was stressed during the last 3 months of 1945. Approximately 10,000 long tons

of medical supplies from depots in liberated countries and the United Kingdom were moved into Germany. Arrangements were made also to bring to Germany the so-called luxury items for installation in the larger, permanent medical installations in Germany. Many of these items—for example, large fixed

X-ray machines—had been brought to the Continent only in small numbers

during combat operations because of the special handling required. The hospitals established ooi a semi-Zone-of-Interior standard to support occupation

forces in Germany brought about a heavy demand for these items.

During the latter part of 1945, the International Business Machines Section of the Stock Control Branch was moved from Paris to Frankfurt. As a

result of the damage incurred to the equipment in transit and the difficulties

encountered in installing it at the new location, the first consolidated stock status report was not prepared until the middle of December 1945. Among the

problems encountered was the understandable unwillingness of French personnel to move to occupied Germany. It was, therefore, necessary to recruit German nationals with electrical accounting machine experience to staff the new

section in Frankfurt.6

Medical Maintenance and Repair

With the reduction of medical maintenance and rebuild requirements in

liberated areas, transfer was made of necessary equipment and repair parts

to the Furth and Weinheim Medical Depots in the occupied zone. The large

maintenance shop, located at Medical Depot M-407 in Paris, discontinued operations at the end of November and moved to Germany. At both Weinheim and

"(1) See footnotes 2, p. 380; and 3(2), p. 382. (2) Report of Operations, Supply Division,

Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon, Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater,

1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1945. (3) War Department Technical Manual (TM) 38-420, Disposition of Excess

and Surplus Property in Oversea Commands, September 1945.
388 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Furth, the maintenance shops were staffed not only with U.S. military and

civilian personnel, but also with German civilians and prisoners of war.7

Optical Program

The Base Optical Shop in Paris, with small portable units operated at

various medical depots, continued in operation during the entire period. Bifocal corrections were accomplished by French contract and proved very satisfactory. To accomplish optical requirements in the occupied zone, small units

were established at the Furth and Weinheim Medical Depots as well as a portable unit in Berlin to care for emergency cases.8

CIVIL AFFAIRS

In addition to the task of establishing a medical supply system to support

the U.S. forces in occupied Germany, the Theater Chief Surgeon was faced

with an equally difficult task of providing essential medical supplies to displaced persons camps, prisoner-of-war enclosures, and the German civilian

economy. A Civil Affairs Section in the Supply Division had the mission of

coordinating and supervising the execution of this mission.

Medical supplies for the U.S. Military Government mission in Germany

came from two sources: (1) Civil Affairs stocks brought from the Zone of

Interior and the United Kingdom, and (2) captured enemy medical materiel.

In the beginning, all civil affairs stock was stored in Medical Depot M-412 at

Reims. This stock included approximately 175 basic medical items, including

British obstetric kits, British CAD (Civil Affairs Drug) units, and antityphus

supplies. Military government authorities decided that 50 of the basic medical

items should be transferred to the occupied zone and stocked in occupation

depots for military government use in that area. These supplies were issued

only upon approved request of military government authorities.

Over 30,000 tons of captured medical supplies and equipment were consolidated in the U.S. Occupied Zone of Germany into nine major supply dumps

with locations at Heilbronn, Gauting, Ihringshausen, Neuhof, Straubing,

Furth, Heidingsfeld, Treuen, and Bad Mergentheim. This number was reduced

to the first six named locations to provide three dumps in each of the two military districts. A minimum of U.S. military personnel operated each dump,

and former German civilian supply personnel were utilized as the main source

of labor (fig. 98).

Col. Earle D. Quinnell, MC, Director, Medical Department Equipment

Laboratory, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., made a special trip to France in early

1945 to inspect captured German field equipment and to arrange to have it

sent back to the Zone of Interior for further study.

* (1) Period Reports, Medical Depot M-407, October, November, and December 1945. (2) See

footnotes 5(2) and 5(3), p. 386.

8

See footnote 6(2), p. 387.
REDEPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION 389

FIGUKE 98.—Sorting and stacking captured German medical supplies and equipment.

During this period, a medical supply catalog for captured materiel with a

cross-reference in English was prepared, printed, and distributed by the Theater Chief Surgeon to facilitate supply operations. This catalog was compiled

from nomenclatures received from a physical inventory of the dumps, from

nomenclature manuals printed by German manufacturers, and from all commercial German medical supply catalogs that could be located. The medical

supply catalog for captured materiel contained approximately 9,000 items,

most of which were in supply at the beginning of the occupation period. This

catalog received wide distribution to using agencies to include prisoner-of-war

enclosures and hospitals, displaced persons camps, military government supply officers, and German civilian users.

Numerous requests were received through technical channels requesting

emergency shipments of medical supplies to military government detachments,

particularly in Berlin and Austria, for German civilian use. The breakdown

of normal German trade channels had created critical shortages in these remote

areas with the result that the Theater Chief Surgeon's Office found itself serving as a retail agent for German civilian demands. To assure best possible
390 MEDICAL SUPPLY

utilization of retail merchandise available in captured stocks to support the

German economy, a recommendation was made for the transfer of the dumps

and operating personnel, exclusive of military personnel, to the jurisdiction

of U.S. military government authorities. This recommendation was ultimately

approved and implemented.9

SUMMARY

The transition from a dynamic wartime medical supply system to a relatively static peacetime structure to support the occupation forces was accomplished rather expeditiously with minimum waste and confusion. Considering

the vast quantities of medical materiel in liberated areas which had to be disposed of, either as excess for return to the Zone of Interior, surplus sale, or

forwarded to Germany for retention purposes, the task was accomplished in

a comparatively short time. The achievement is even more remarkable when

one considers that the period witnessed not only the redeployment of numerous medical depot units, but also the wholesale return of key, experienced

depot personnel to the United States. As may be expected, pilferage, stock

imbalances, and shortages of sensitive items resulted from a lack of supervision in depth. Yet, the end of the year 1945 in occupied Germany saw the

emergence of a reasonably efficient medical supply system, utilizing modern

business machine methods and Zone of Interior station and depot supply and

accounting procedures. The U.S. Army medical supply system and its personnel once again had met and effectively dealt with a challenging logistical

situation.

» See footnotes 2, p. 380 ; 3(2), p. 382 ; and 6(2), p. 387.
Part III

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN THE WAR AGAINST

JAPAN

295-453 0—68 27
CHAPTER XII

Pacific Medical Supply in the Period of Defense

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN THE MIDDLE PACIFIC

Preparation for War

As international tensions increased in the summer and the fall of 1941,

every effort was made to strengthen U.S. defenses in the Pacific Area. Handicapped by lack of modern material, the War Department, nevertheless, sought

not only to reinforce or establish bases on Midway, Wake, Guam, Christmas

and Canton Islands, and on other islands, but also to assemble 500,000 tons of

supplies and 20,000 troops for use in the Philippines.

In the Hawaiian Department, located at Fort Shafter on the island of

Oahu, T.H., medical preparations for war were coordinated by the department

surgeon, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Edgar King, MC. Honolulu, T.H., was zoned

with 20 aid stations strategically established and supplied, while the Preparedness Committee of the Honolulu County Medical Society set up teams of disaster surgeons who would be ready for call by the U.S. Armed Forces. At the

same time, arrangements were made for ambulance service. A plasma bank,

which was financed with a $4,000 grant from the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, was organized by Dr. Forrest J. Pinkerton. Several collecting stations

were established, and the laboratory work was accomplished at the Queen's

Hospital. Meanwhile, a group of women were making surgical dressings for

the Hawaii Chapter of the American Eed Cross, under the immediate direction of Mrs. A. V. Molyneaux, chairman of the production unit, and supervised

by Mr. John F. Gray, a field director of the American Eed Cross. On 25 November and 4 December 1941, a total of 58,000 Army-type surgical dressings

were sent to the station hospital at Schofield Barracks, T.H., at the request of

Colonel King.

Medical supplies stored at the Hawaiian Medical Supply Depot at Fort

Shafter were considered suitable for the requirements of the Hawaiian Department. A considerable amount of the reserve equipment had been made ready

for any emergency.1

Organization of the Medical Supply System for War

At the outbreak of hostilities, war reserves of the Hawaiian Medical Supply Depot were immediately picked up in depot stocks and utilized to build

1

(1) Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, 1 July 1941 to 30 June

1943, to the Secretary of War. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943', pp. 3-5. (2)

Annual Report, Surgeon, Hawaiian Department, 1941. (3) Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Edgar King, for

Editor, History of the Medical Department, 22 Mar. 1950.

393
394 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 99.—Tripler General Hospital.

provisional hospitals and expand existing facilities. These stocks, in general,

were grossly deficient in many respects. Hospital assemblages stored as units

were found to be only partially complete, and, in some instances, the equipment

was of World War I vintage and of little real value. Available current depot

stocks were utilized to offset these deficiencies wherever possible. Where items

were not immediately available in depot stocks and time precluded requisitioning on the Zone of Interior, procurement of local commercial stocks was

effected to the greatest extent possible. This source was limited, however, as

most commercial stocks were also procured from the Zone of Interior. The

Surgeon General's Office, meanwhile, made an estimate of the requirements

that would be generated by the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In the meantime, shortly after the attack, 18,000 surgical dressings were

furnished to the Tripler General Hospital, Honolulu (fig. 99), and the U.S.

Naval Hospital at Pearl Harbor in response to emergency calls to the Red

Cross. Also, on the same morning of 7 December 1941 and during the next 2

days, 750 units of 250 cc. of plasma were provided to both Army and Navy

hospitals. The major collection stations were bleeding donors at the rate of 50

per hour. During the first 15 days, 3,400 donors were bled.
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 395

Located at Fort Shafter, the Hawaiian Medical Supply Depot had a complement of 6 officers and 32 enlisted men and was responsible for supplying

the Tripler General Hospital, the station hospital at Schofield Barracks, the

provisional hospitals established subsequent to Pearl Harbor, and the dispensaries serving service and tactical units. All requisitions prepared by the

depot were routed through the Surgeon's Office, Headquarters, Hawaiian

Department.

Arrival of the 5th Medical Supply Depot

On 16 April 1942, the 5th Medical Supply Depot, organized under TOE

(table of organization and equipment) 8-661 and under the command of Lt.

Col. James P. Gill, MC, arrived in the Hawaiian Department from the Zone

of Interior with 11 officers and 90 enlisted men. The Hawaiian Medical Supply Depot was inactivated <2X/% months later, and all personnel and equipment

were transferred to the 5th Medical Supply Depot.

To supply the service commands on the islands of Maui, Kauai, and

Hawaii, branch depots were established. The branch depot at Schofield Barracks, designated Post Dispensary No. 2, was further enlarged by the construction of five additional warehouses serving 40,000 troops at its peak of operations. Another warehouse was added at Fort Kuger, T.H., making 11 warehouses in all on the island of Oahu.

Many critical items of supply were dispersed for storage in the various

hospitals on Oahu and outlying islands. This move was considered essential

to minimize the destruction of supplies by enemy bombing. A new warehouse

was constructed on the north shore of Oahu outside Schofield Barracks, and

plans were made to construct a receiving warehouse at Fort Shafter to receive

critical items and stores before dispersal. A subdepot at Hickam Field, Honolulu, was established in July to service Army Air Forces personnel only. This

process reached its peak late in 1942 when the 5th Medical Supply Depot was

spread over 36 storage locations aggregating 185,000 square feet.

War reserve stock carried by the Hawaiian Medical Supply Depot before

7 December 1941 was issued after the Pearl Harbor attack. Stocks in 1942 thus

consisted of 31 units of final reserve for the island of Oahu, 6 units for the

island of Hawaii, and 4 units each for the islands of Maui and Kauai.

At times, the supply of certain items was exhausted, but usually, a substitute item was available or local purchase was made until radioed requisitions

could be furnished from the mainland. Requisitions were generally filled within

7 days after receipt.

Plans for Overseas Action

The first established plan for supply of overseas combat operations was

transmitted on 22 January 1942. Concurrently, the San Francisco Port of

Embarkation was designated as the port to which all supply matters for the
MEDICAL SUPPLY

command would be referred. At that time, the maximum supply level was set

at 70 days, based on requirements for the Army, plus the Navy and the

Marines, civilians, prisoners of war, and Allied Nations personnel, where applicable. In July 1942, the level was raised by the War Department to 90 days.

By this time, the medical maintenance unit and siege unit were being used to

automatically supply the Hawaiian Department while requisitions were submitted to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation as a supplemental means

of supply for noncontrolled items.

Receipts of Supplies

During 1942 and 1943, before the War Department shipping document

was in use or the later strict regulations governing the rapid forwarding of

shipping documents from ports of embarkation to overseas bases had been

issued, it was a rare occurrence for the Medical Department to be advised of

the arrival of its supplies until they were actually discharged and lying on the

piers at Honolulu. As a consequence, it was impossible to furnish the means of

transportation to the dispersed warehouse facilities of the medical supply

depot. To overcome this possible source of confusion, it was necessary to assign

an officer of the depot and a staff of four to eight enlisted men to work at the

piers in close liaison with the port authorities. Informed as to the supplies on

order and proposed storage locations, the detachment provided an invaluable

service in clearing the docks of medical supplies. This pier liaison section also

was responsible for handling similar responsibilities in shipments made by

the 5th Medical Supply Depot to forward areas and to outlying islands.

Requisitioning by Units

All using agencies and supply points obtained replenishment of medical

supplies by monthly requisitions on the 5th Medical Supply Depot through

the office of the base service command surgeon, where they were edited for

authorization and availability. Tactical organizations obtained supplies in a

like manner, except that requisitions from subordinate units of higher echelons

required the approval of their surgeon. Moreover, supply sections were maintained by the various divisions, and issues to subordinate units were made

from the divisional supply points.

Organization Equipment

When tactical units were being staged in the command, a major problem

was encountered in receiving and identifying organizational equipment

shipped from the Zone of Interior. Many tactical units arrived with incomplete medical equipment which had to be supplemented before their departure

for combat missions. Scarcity of stocks at that time inflated the problem. As a

result, all organizational equipment (hospital assemblies excepted) was picked

up in depot stocks, and the units upon arrival were directed to submit requisitions to the depot to cover any shortages in unit equipment. Hospital assem-
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 397

blies that arrived before the unit was deployed were stored intact in the depot

pending issue. If a unit assembly did not arrive before the unit's departure,

components were issued from depot stocks, and all shortages were backordered.

In such instances, the unit assembly upon arrival was dismantled, and the

components were picked up in depot stock.2

Support of Defense Units of the Hawaiian Department

Tripler General Hospital, the center for treatment of many battle casualties of Pearl Harbor, reported a fair supply of sulfanilamide powder on hand

and a sufficient quantity of plasma donated by civilian physicians. The problem

of safe storage of such critical items was resolved by constructing a large,

stormproof warehouse and by using concrete storerooms in the Farrington and

Kamehameha areas of the hospital.

At the 1st Station Hospital, medical supplies were stacked initially in

tents and on platforms in the dock area; then, they were removed to a coconut

grove, 2V2 miles from the hospital, and unpacked and classified. A portable

electrocardiograph machine, received on 15 October 1942, aided a great deal

in diagnostic procedure. The lack of other equipment, however, was a persistent handicap.

The 148th General Hospital, because it had not been provided with a consolidated shipping list of equipment, was unable to account for all items of

the 1,000-bed hospital unit delivered to the port of embarkation in mid-January 1942. It was only by constant checking with the office of the Port Quartermaster that many short items were discovered and supplied before the unit's

shipment to the Hawaiian Department in April. Upon establishment of the

unit near Mountain View, Hawaii, two small warehouses, each 50 by 20 feet,

were used—one, as a utility storeroom and workshop, and the other, as an

issue storeroom. Supplies in closed stock were kept in a larger warehouse

located at Olaa, T.H., 6 miles away.

The 26th Station Hospital experienced similar unloading and storage

problems upon its arrival from the mainland. The supplies, consisting of 1,763

crates, were manhandled mostly by hospital personnel and were stored in and

filled seven hospital tents in the dock area. Because of misleading labels on

the shipping boxes and limited storage space, unpacking was not systematic.

The department surgeon caused the medical supply dump serving both the

26th and the 1st Station Hospitals to be moved to a coconut grove 2V2 miles

away. There, supplies were stored in tents and partially unpacked and classified. By April, tent warehouses were established in the hospital area where

permanent warehouses were being constructed. Kepeated moves had caused unnecessary labor and personnel trouble; however, little loss or waste was

experienced.

3

(1) See footnote 1(2), p. 393. (2) Eonka, Enzio K. F.: History of Professional Experiences,

World War II, in Central Pacific Base Command or Hawaiian Department. [Official record.] (3)

Whltehill, Buell: Administrative History of Medical Activities in the Middle Pacific. [Official

record.] (4) Annual Report, 5th Medical Supply Depot, 1942.
398 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 100.—A. 2d Lt. Allan W. Phelps, MAC, medical supply officer, Task Force 4591, and

native workers. B. Interior view of the medical supply warehouse on Christmas Island.

Because supplies were received directly from both Fort Mason, San Francisco, and the Hawaiian Department, there was some duplication of equipment,

but this situation was soon corrected.

The 24th Infantry Division had its full table of basic allowance of medical

organizational equipment with very few items not available. Nonstandard medical equipment included a treatment and instrument chest, oxygen equipment,

linen chest (towels, pajamas, and bathrobes), and a protective clothing chest.

Emergency medical equipment was stored at the Kahuku Hospital, the Waialua Hospital, and at the two medical dumps. Supplies were stored in 9- by 12-

foot houses at Pupukea Heights and Eucalyptus Forest. Essential nonstandard

items, such as Pentothal sodium (thiopental sodium) for intravenous anesthesia, dry plasma, and normal saline solution, were issued to larger medical

units of the division. Mountain rescue equipment, consisting of a basket litter
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 399

modified by a board bottom and supplemented by ropes, was maintained by

the 24th Medical Battalion.3

Task Force 4591

Almost immediately after the Japanese struck, U.S. forces began to spread

to scattered islands in that area of the Pacific.

Before World War II, most flights over the vast areas of the Pacific had

been in sea-based planes. On 29 January 1942, slightly less than 2 months after

Pearl Harbor, Task Force (movement) 4591 slipped out of the San Francisco

Harbor en route to Christmas and Canton Islands and Bora Bora in the Society Islands—its mission being to help strengthen the bridge of airbases across

the Pacific.

A section of this task force arrived at Christmas Island 10 days later and,

after a rather laborious delivery of the cargo, set up a 100-bed station hospital

which proved functional despite the obsolescence of the medical chests which

had been packed during World War I.

The medical supply officer for this pioneering task force was 2d Lt. (later

Capt.) Allan W. Phelps, MAC, who had been in the Army only 6 weeks when

he departed from San Francisco. His medical resupply point was the Hawaiian Medical Supply Depot at Fort Shafter, and soon the deleterious effects

of outside storage on precious medical stocks was realized. An excellent Polynesian thatched medical supply warehouse was contracted for and built, using

as a medium of exchange unneeded red flannel bandage (fig. 100).

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Prewar Preparations

Before General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was appointed Commander, USAFFE (U.S. Army Forces in the Far East), the war plans for

the Philippine Department were being vigorously revised to meet war needs.

The induction of Philippine Army troops into USAFFE and the possibility

of a prolonged period of resistance to invading forces made it necessary to

modify the war plans by developing a large reserve of hospital beds in

Manila, P.I. Toward this end, a general hospital was issued to the Manila

Hospital Center, part of another was stored and used at Limay on Bataan,

and two others were left in the Manila depot. At the same time, officers and

enlisted men of the Philippine Army were trained in a special school for medical supply officers at the Philippine Medical Supply Depot. Timely requests

for medical equipment for hospitals and field operations resulted in the arrival of two general hospitals 2 weeks before the war began as well as five

3

(1) Letter, Col. A. C. Miller, MC, Commanding Officer, Trlpler General Hospital, to Surgeon,

Hawaiian Department, 15 Apr. 1942, subject: Supplemental Annual Report (attached to Annual

Report, Trlpler General Hospital, 1941). (2) Annual Report, 1st Station Hospital, Hawaiian Department, 1942. (3) Annual Report, 148th General Hospital, 1942. (4) Annual Report, 26th Station

Hospital, 1942. (5) Annual Report, Surgeon, 24th Infantry Division, 1942.
400 MEDICAL SUPPLY

(250-bed) station hospitals. Also, 90 regimental dispensaries either were in

preparation for shipment overseas or were already en route to the Philippines

by that date.*

Medical supply plans called for the enlargement of the medical supply

depot in Manila which was to be relocated on the outskirts of the city to be- less

vulnerable to air attack. Construction of subdepots at Tarlac, Los Banös, and

Cebu had not gone past the planning stage when the Japanese attacked.

Medical Supply Activities on Luzon

The reality of war reached the Philippines on 8 December 1941, with the

bombing of Clark Field. The subsequent bombing of Nichols Field and the

strafing of the McKinley area made it advisable to move medical personnel

and patients to the vicinity of Manila.

All available hospital supplies in Manila were hastily purchased and distributed to all points of Luzon. With the order to evacuate Manila on 23

December 1941, the Philippine Medical Supply Depot was located near General Hospital No. 1 on the Bataan-Mariveles Eoad, and by 29 December, a

subdepot was established at Orion on Bataan, to furnish frontline troops with

supplies. This depot was abandoned on 4 January 1942, when it was bombed.

From 23 December 1941 to 1 January 1942, personnel of the Philippine

Medical Supply Depot worked with very little rest. Every vehicle that left

Manila for Bataan reached its destination. The depot supplied General Hospital No. 2 with necessary supplies which were supplemented by small shipments from Cebu and Iloilo. The demand for quinine, sulfonamides, and vitamins was greater than the supply.

Medical service in the field was greatly handicapped because of having

to rely on improvised 1917-type medical chests. Although new field equipment had been ordered and was on the way, none had yet been made available despite the efforts of the department surgeon. There was practically no

reserve of medical supplies for the Philippine Army units, and there was a

serious lack of laboratory equipment, such as microscopes, needed to help in

the fight against intestinal infections and malaria.

During the Bataan campaign, many Philippine Army units, which had

reached Bataan without adequate organizational or individual equipment or

without training in the conservation of supplies, suffered unduly from various

diseases. During the enemy breakthrough of 20 and 24 January 1942, medical companies lost a large portion of their equipment. As the Japanese cut

supply routes by infiltration, serious shortages of litters and blankets occurred.

Surgical equipment became nonexistent. Because of the severe shortage of

antimalarial drugs, a maximum of 8 gm. of quinine was allowed for each case

1 This section is based on Cooper, Wibb B.: Medical Department Activities in the Philippines

from 1941 to 6 May 1942, and Including Medical Activities in Japanese Prisoner of War Camps.

[Official record.]
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 401

of malaria. Every effort was made to prevent hoarding by unit supply officers.

The problem was somewhat eased by airshipment from Cebu of small amounts

of quinine and Atabrine. Unit supply officers were urged to salvage dressings

and bandages and to practice extreme economy in the use of all types of

medical supplies.

On 30 January 1942, a subdepot was established on Corregidor to hold all

supplies and equipment for Bataan above a 6-week level. Supplies were stored

in trenches to safeguard them from shell and bomb fragments and from strafing. Flammable materials were buried in pits.

On 8 April 1942, all critical supplies on hand at the main Bataan depot

were removed to General Hospital No. 2, located east of General Hospital

No. 1 on the Mariveles-Oabcalben Road. By evening, an attempt was made to

ship supplies from the Cabcaben dock, but it failed. Supplies finally reached

Corregidor on 9 April.

After the capitulation of Bataan, three shipments of quinine, sulfonamides, and vitamins sent from the south were received by plane and submarine. The majority of supplies of the Philippine Medical Supply Depot on

Corregidor were stored in the Malinta Tunnel. On 22 April, the depot was

destroyed by shellfire. Surrender to the Japanese followed on 6 May 1942.

Medical Supply of the Visayan-Mindanao Force

Having established headquarters at Cebu on 27 August 1941, six American officers established a training program for troops of the Philippine Army

in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. The medical service was handled by

the medical detachments of the divisions. Before the war, plans were made

not only to establish a medical base at Cebu with one general hospital, utilizing the facilities and personnel of the Southern Islands Hospital as a

nucleus, but also to establish another general hospital at Talisay. The promised equipment of one general hospital was lost in the sinking of the U.S.S.

Corregidor in Manila Bay.

After combing the islands for medical supplies, it was discovered that

there were some drugs available from three wholesale drug houses in Cebu.

Fortunately, a large amount of food and medical supplies was confiscated

from the SS John Lyhes docked at Cebu. A large quantity of quinine tablets

was located in the Koronadal Valley Project and in the hospital of the North

Negros Sugar Co., which had just received its semiannual requisition.

One or two large consignments of quinine were flown in from Australia,

but were forwarded to Bataan where, at the time, the need was greater.

Before surrender came, it became necessary to ration quinine and to use

it only for treatment rather than as a preventive measure. Medical officers

were ordered to discontinue its use as soon as the patient was able to return to

duty.
402 MEDICAL SUPPLY

MEDICAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES IN AUSTRALIA—1941-42

Early Organization

On 12 December 1941, a convoy led by the cruiser U.S.S. Pensacola was

diverted from its Philippine Islands destination to Brisbane, Australia. Task

Force, South Paciiic, upon arrival in Brisbane became USFIA (U.S. Forces

in Australia) with Maj. Jesse T. Harper, MC, appointed surgeon. However,

2 weeks later, USFIA became USAFIA (U.S. Army Forces in Australia)

with Maj. (later Lt. Col.) George S. Littell, MC, as surgeon.

Changing Mission Concepts

Until the U.S.S. Pensacola convoy was diverted to Australia, the primary mission assigned to its commander was to get the convoy to the Philippines. It was not contemplated nor planned to station large numbers of U.S.

troops in Australia. When USAFIA was established under the command of

Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) George H. Brett, its mission still was to organize

a service of supply to support the Philippines. The plan contemplated establishing bases in Australia for long-range aircraft operations, however, and

General Brett was instructed to make his command predominantly air.

Thus, the early efforts of USAFIA were directed toward the shipment of

critically needed supplies—food, drugs, and ammunition—to the Philippines

and toward the preparation of bases for the reception of planes from the

United States for transshipment to the Philippines.'In addition, the general

and special staff sections of Headquarters, USAFIA, were operating the supply and administrative services for all U.S. Army troops in Australia. By

March 1942, the strategic pattern in the Pacific Area had changed radically,

and the mission of USAFIA changed in consequence. There, were three objectives under the new mission concept: (1) to provide administrative and supply service for the U.S. Army troops already in Australia; (2) to deploy

these troops strategically to meet the threat of enemy invasion; and (3) to

plan for long-range buildup of U.S. Army bases in Australia and for the

reception of combat troops, of which two divisions were en route. These threefold objectives continued to be the concern of USAFIA, and later that of

USASOS (U.S. Army Services of Supply), until early 1943.

Early Medical Department Activities

The activities of medical supply are always inextricably bound to those

of the other activities of the medical service. Before the middle of April 1942,

there was not much in the way of a formal medical supply organization in

Australia. Despite this handicap and the burden of virtually single-handed

operation, the Surgeon (first, Major Littell, and then, Col. (later Brig. Gen.)

Percy J. Carroll), USAFIA, accomplished much.
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 403

Before the fall of the Philippines on 6 May 1942, two main tasks were

facing the surgeon: (1) The medical care, including hospitalization, for the

rapidly increasing number of U.S. Army troops in Australia; and (2) the

procurement of, and shipment of, sorely needed medical supplies to the Philippines. To these was added, later, the planning for a medical service for

the greatly expanded Australian supply base.

There was only one obvious solution to the task of medical care for U.S.

Army troops. On 15 January 1942, as a result of a high-level meeting with

Australian authorities, an agreement was reached for complete medical support, including hospitalization, by the Australians. It was contemplated that

this support would be needed for 3 to 4 months for 25,000 U.S. Army troops.

Based on this agreement, U.S. Army medical units as they began to arrive

and function would be authorized to requisition medical supplies directly

from Australian sources.

Although the immediate problem of hospitalization for U.S. Army troops

had been temporarily solved by using Australian facilities, the surgeon and his

small staff continued to expend their energies trying to find sites for the U.S.

Army medical units already in the theater and for those on the way. Existing facilities in Australia to house hospitals of 100 or 200 beds were just not

available, much less for 500 to 1,000 beds. Later, this had a marked impact

on medical supply activities because all current designs for hospital assemblages had to be modified.

Medical Organization

Meanwhile, the medical service had undergone parallel organizational

and personnel changes in rapid succession. From the arrival of the U.S.S.

Pensacola convoy in Australia in December 1941 until 2 February 1942, Major

Littell, as surgeon, and a few medical officers had operated the entire medical

service of the theater, including the medical supply efforts for relief of the

Philippines. On 2 February, Major Littell was replaced as Surgeon, USAFIA,

by Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) George W. Eice, MC, who had been sent to

Australia for this specific assignment by The Surgeon General. On 7 February, just 5 days after his assignment, Colonel Eice was in turn replaced by

Colonel Carroll. The latter had just arrived in Australia after a medical

Odyssey during which he had accompanied more than 200 seriously wounded

patients from the Philippines on the USAHS Mactan, a creaky Philippine

interisland freighter designated as a hospital ship. Being the ranking medical

officer of the theater, he was appointed surgeon. The medical merry-go-round

came to a standstill, at least temporarily.

After Major Littell, who also served as the surgeon's executive officer, was

appointed medical supply officer, he was also designated commanding officer

of the first medical supply depot established in Australia on 14 February 1942.

The site of the 9th Medical Supply Depot was a former taxicab garage in

Melbourne (fig. 101).
404 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 101.—Site of the 9th Medical Supply Depot Base Section 4, Melbourne, Australia,

was a former taxicab garage.

Major Littell and his cohorts had carried on much medical supply activity before his appointment as medical supply officer. They had succeeded in

rounding up a sizable mass of medical supplies even before the depot was

established. Now, they were finally able to assemble these under one roof

and to properly sort, pack, and inventory them. These supplies came from

the U.S.S. Pensacola convoy, from local procurement, from borrowing from

the Australians, and from other, sometimes unorthodox, means. For example,

an order of the theater commander enabled the medical supply officer to requisition 600 sorely needed mattresses from the U.S.S. West Point which docked

in Melbourne on 6 June 1942. Local requirements were also surveyed, and

requisitions were submitted to the United States blindly because neither medical supply catalog nor trained supply personnel were available.

Relief for the Philippines

During January, February, and early March 1942, the surgeon and his

staff put in many frustrating hours trying to obtain medical supplies for shipment over the long, tenuous supply lines to the Philippines (map 28).

Requisitions for General MacArthur's hard-pressed forces arrived with pitiful regularity. Quantities needed were such as to swamp the capabilities of

a country like Australia with a population of less than 8 million. In addition,

the difficulties of running the blockade either by air or by water were formidable. Nevertheless, some 10 airshipments and 2 water shipments of quinine,
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 405

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MAP 28.—Supply routes to the Philippine Islands, 1941^2.

morphine, anesthetics, antihelminthics, vitamins, and other vital drugs did get

through. Colonel Carroll, a nonsmoker, was infuriated by reports that pilots

in trouble were dumping medical supplies rather than cigarettes.

The efforts by the surgeon and his staff to round up the quantities of

medical supplies that they did were only short of miracles. Colonel Littell

and Maj. (later Col.) John D. Blair, MC, scoured the cities of Melbourne

and Sydney, raided incoming vessels, gathered up distressed cargo, borrowed

from the Australians, and purchased locally every bit of medical supplies

they could find. Then, they personally packed it in boxes, loaded it on trucks,

and drove it to the airfields where they helped transfer it to planes.

In spite of all these efforts, the bottom of the barrel was soon reached.

On 27 February 1942, Colonel Carroll emphasized the severity of the situation

in his diary: "The medical supply officer is having great trouble getting together sufficient supplies to fill the radio requisitions from PLUM [code for

Philippines]. The Australians are short and we will have to replace their
406 MEDICAL SUPPLY

depleted stocks as soon as we can get things on the way." With the fall of

Bataan on 9 April 1942, virtually all organized efforts to aid the Philippines

came to a tragic end.5

Reorganization of Headquarters

With the arrival of General MacArthur in Australia on 17 March 1942,

the entire organizational framework was redesigned by the creation of a

general headquarters with General MacArthur as Supreme Commander,

Southwest Pacific Area. Headquarters, USAFIA, now became the overall

administrative and supply headquarters for all U.S. Army Forces in Australia, being in effect a theater headquarters for U.S. troops.6

Arrival of Medical Supply Depot Personnel

On 6 April 1942, the first organized medical supply depot personnel

arrived in Australia. This consisted of one section of the 4th Medical Supply

Depot (later redesignated the 9th), comprising 3 officers and 42 enlisted men.

The need for trained supply personnel was so acute that this group, pitifully

small though it was, had to be shared. Accordingly, it was split into two

groups. One group, comprising 1 officer and 13 enlisted men, was sent to

staff the depot at Melbourne, and the other, with the remaining personnel,

was assigned to Brisbane where an additional depot was being opened.

Because of the continued shortage of supply personnel, this latter group was

later again split, and an officer and small detachment were sent to open a

depot in Townsville (map 29).

This section of 45 men, constituting the entire medical supply depot

organization for the theater for 6 months, operated three depots efficiently

during the buildup and did a superior job under very adverse circumstances.

The three officers deserve mention as they continued to serve insupply capacities throughout the duration of the war. Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Arnold J.

Woodman, DC, operated the Melbourne depot; Capt. (later Maj.) Leonard

H. Kolb, MC, the Brisbane depot; and Maj. Edward T. Wolf, the Townsville

depot.7

Organization for Medical Supply

On 12 April 1942, a group of 18 officers of the Medical Department

including 2 nurses arrived in Australia after a rugged 30-day trip from San

5 This section on the early developments of medical supply activities in Australia is based on

(1) Annual Report, Chief Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, 1942.

(2) Diary, Col. Percy J. Carroll, MC, December 1941-30 June 1942. (3) Daily Diary, Medical

Service, U.S. Forces in Australia, 10 Dec. 1941-31 July 1942.

6 Matloff, Maurice, and Snell, Edwin M.: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42,

United States Army in World War II. The War Department. Washington : U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1953, pp. 169-171.

7

(1) See footnote 5, above. (2) Quarterly Reports, 9th Medical Supply Depot, Base Section

7, Southwest Pacific Area, 1 June 1942 through September 1943.
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 407

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MAP 29.—Medical supply depots and base sections in Australia, April 1942.

Francisco on an unescorted Dutch freighter. Among this group was Maj.

(later Col.) Alfonso M. Libasci, MC, who was trained in depot operations

but had had no staff experience. Only one other officer of the group, Col. Oscar

P. Snyder, DC, was Regular Army. The others were newly activated Keserve

officers. Major Libasci (fig. 102) was assigned as chief of the Supply and Fiscal Section, relieving Colonel Littell.

Medical supply objectives.—The newly created Supply and Fiscal Section of the surgeon's office consisted of a chief and two Medical Administrative

Corps officers—one of whom served as fiscal officer and the other as procurement

officer; a second lieutenant who served as executive assistant to the chief; and

a few clerks. The new chief of medical supply faced a formidable task. Although

much had been done by his predecessor and done well, there was still much

to be done, little time to do it, and little to work with. Major Libasci brought

into the theater in his personal baggage the only available copy of a medical

supply catalog. It was months before additional copies were received.8

Theater medical supply plan.—On 11 May 1942, just 1 month after

arriving in the theater, Major Libasci submitted his medical supply plan for

the theater to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. The plan Avas approved with-

(Ret.).

1 (1) See footnote 5, p. 406. (2) Personal observations of Col. Alphonso M. Libasci, MC, USA

295-453 0—68 28
408 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 102.—Col. Alfonso M. Libasci, MC, Chief,

Supply and Fiscal Section, U.S. Army Forces in

Australia, 1942.

out delay and soon became the pattern for other supply services. It covered all

phases of supply operations, including depot locations and distribution areas,

storage and issue procedures, classification of medical supplies, requisitioning

procedures, procurement policies, and control of depot stocks.

The depot plan provided for base, intermediate, and advanced depots. Base

depots, planned for the port cities of Sydney, Brisbane, Townsville, and

Adelaide, would ship to intermediate and advanced depots located in remote

areas. All medical supply depots were designated as branch depots under the

technical control of the surgeon. This authority, given by G-4 with extreme

reluctance after a tough battle, was an essential requirement.

The supply plan delineated requisitioning procedures and clarified once

and for all the existing confusion in connection with the classification of medical supplies. There seemed to be universal confusion between the medical

supply catalog classification into classes 1-9 and the G-4 classification into

classes I-IV. As a result, supply personnel had erroneously submitted requisitions for medical class 4 supplies instead of G-4 class IV. This resulted in great

shortages later.

Class I supplies were shipped to Australia from the United States without requisition in the form of medical maintenance units, each unit comprising
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 409

a 30-day supply for 10,000 troops. The plan provided for reception of these

medical maintenance units at the port depots, which, in turn, would automatically feed the intermediate and advanced depots. Medical units, in turn,

could requisition only the items on the medical maintenance unit list initially

until stocks of other items arrived in the theater. The catalog contained a

mimeographed list of medical maintenance unit items.

Class II supplies were obtained by requisition from the United States,

in quantities based on consolidated monthly reports of shortages in unit

assemblages reported by medical organizations as they arrived and were set

up in the theater. These supplies were issued to the medical units reporting

such shortages in unit assemblages without requisition.

Class III supplies were fuels and lubricants.

Class IV supplies were those items that did not fall into any of the other

categories and later constituted the bulk of all medical items. These were to

be obtained from the United States on a requisitioning basis and were issued

to units on a monthly requisitioning basis.

Other provisions of the plan outlined supply and storage procedures in

depots and base sections, inventory control methods, monthly inventory reports

for the medical supply officer, and so on. This basic plan integrated the entire

medical supply effort and laid the foundation for future policies and expansion.9

Medical supply progress.—Great strides were made in medical supply

during the first few months. All assets were inventoried and consolidated, and

central stock records were established for the theater as well as for each depot.

Requirements of all classes were computed, and requisitions based on projected

troop strength were prepared and forwarded to the United States. Procurement

in Australia was thoroughly surveyed and coordinated through the appropriate

Australian departments. Supply depot personnel needs were determined and

requisitions prepared and submitted.

By June 1942, there was a medical supply depot in each active base section and each had at least a 30-day level of class I supplies (medical maintenance unit items). Table of basic allowance items of class II supplies also had

begun to arrive, so that by the end of the month, unit assemblages were 92

percent complete. Stray shipments, coded boxes, distressed cargo, and so forth

were sorted, repacked, inventoried, and placed in stock for issue. Supplies

began to arrive from the United States in quantity, and medical supply

became a going concern. But, at this stage, austerity prevailed because all that

was available for issue were items received to provide for table of basic allowance shortages or medical maintenance unit items.

During late June 1942, the Australians proposed a merger of medical

supply stocks into jointly operated and stocked medical depots, but an alter-

"(1) Letter, Maj. A. M. Libasci, MC, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, 11 May 1942, subject:

Medical Supply Plan for Australia. (2) Letters, Colonel Libasci, to Colonel Tyng, dated 5 and 31 May

and 2 July 1942, respectively. [This summary was presumably made at a later date since Major Libasci

is consistently referred to as Colonel—a rank he did not attain until early in 1944.]
410 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 103.—The wreck of the freighter SS Rufus King on a barrier reef near Brisbane,

Australia, July 1942.

native proposal to permit reciprocal emergency requisitioning upon each

other's depots was accepted. This system worked well throughout the war.

On 20 July 1942, Headquarters, USASOS, was created and USAFIA was

inactivated. This was actually nothing more than a change in name; all existing functions and directives remained the same.

Also, on 8 July 1942, the medical supply service was dealt a bitter and

almost disastrous blow. The freighter SS Rufus King carrying the assemblages for nine station and three general hospitals—totaling 4,000 beds (17,200

boxes)—broke up on the barrier reef just outside of Brisbane Harbor. Early

reports indicated that the ship had broken in half and that, although each

half was afloat, the high seas made salvage operations impossible (fig. 103).

Fortunately, the seas subsided, and an Australian salvage crew of more

than 200 men aided by U.S. Army Medical Department personnel went to

work. Thanks to the skillful and daring efforts of these men more than 85

percent of the supplies aboard were salvaged. Much credit for this feat is

also due to the personnel of the Brisbane medical supply depot who worked

long hours rehabilitating the wet and damaged equipment. Had this salvage

operation failed, it would probably have taken months to get replacements.

Meanwhile, medical care would have been hampered as medical personnel

waited idly in Australia for their assemblages.

During this early period, there was an incessant demand from U.S. troops

for vitamins to supplement the inadequate ration, especially in remote areas.

Eventually, it became impossible to satisfy requests. It was pointed out to the

command that vitamins were not a substitute for food and that efforts must
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 411

be made to improve the ration. After much pressure, this understanding was

finally accepted.10

BUILDUP IN AUSTRALIA

After 5 months of uninterrupted victories, the enemy suffered a severe

blow on 8 May 1942 in the Battle of the Coral Sea. As a result, enemy strategy

was changed from heavy, overwhelming strikes to piecemeal efforts to gain

footholds in New Guinea, the Solomons, and New Hebrides and thus to isolate

Australia.

The U.S. strategy during the first year was purely defensive and consisted

of trying to stop the advances wherever the Japanese attacked. During this

first year, the major effort was directed at buildup of the base in Australia.

Base Section Organization

Because of the rural nature of the Australian mainland, it was decided

early that decentralization of supplies would be necessary. Accordingly, the

continent was divided into base sections roughly corresponding to the six States

of Australia, except for the State of Queensland where two base sections were

established because of its size and importance. At the height of the buildup,

there were seven Australian base sections in all, with headquarters in Melbourne, Sydney, Perth, Adelaide, Darwin, Brisbane, and Townsville (map 29).

The missions of the base sections were as follows: (1) To operate a service

command for the administration of the several base sections, ports, and camps;

(2) to receive and assemble all U.S. Army troops, supplies, and equipment

arriving in Australia; and (3) to perform such services of supply and administrative functions for combat troops as would enable them to move freely and

with a minimum of delay.

Base section commanders were charged with the responsibility for providing administration, quarters,, supplies, hospitalization, and evacuation for all

U.S. Army troops arriving in, or assigned to, their respective areas. To accomplish this, they were provided with complete staffs, including, of course, base

section surgeons.

Early in this organization, a controversy occurred in regard to the degree

of control which the base section commanders exercised over the operations

of the technical sections of their staffs. It was finally agreed that base section

commanders would not interfere with technical operational instuctions issued

by the chiefs of services to their respective staff officers in the base sections.

10 (1) Letter, Col. Lester S. Ostrander, AGD, Adjutant General, Office of the Commanding

General, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in Australia, to Commanding Officer, Base Section No. 1,

30 May 1942, subject: Inventories of Medical Equipment in Base Sections. (2) Letter, Maj. A. M.

Libasci, MC, to Base Section Surgeon, Base Section 4, 22 June 1942, subject: Instructions Reference

Requisitioning of Medical Supplies. (3) Check Sheet, Chief of Medical Supply Section, Office of the

Chief Surgeon, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in Australia, to G-4, Warehousing and Distribution

Section, 19 June 1942, subject: Medical Supply Depots Operating in Australia. (4) See footnote 5,

p. 406.
412 MEDICAL SUPPLY

This assured the surgeon complete control of theater stocks wherever they were

stored.

As the military situation crystallized, the base sections assumed roles of

varying importance. It became obvious that the most ideal sites for staging

of troops, for hospitals, and for depots were near the large port cities of Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, and Townsville on the east coast. Accordingly, base

sections in south and west Australia never reached large size nor importance

and were inactivated early. Similarly, Base Section 1 with headquarters in the

Darwin area, although strategically important, was never built up because of

its extreme inaccessibility over large expanses of waste desert with poor roads.

The surgeon of each base section organized his staff along functional lines.

As the base sections grew in size so did the functions assigned and staff

required. The larger bases in Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane had individual

officers in charge of personnel, supply, hospitalization, evacuation, nursing,

dental, and veterinary activities, in addition to the surgeon and a deputy or

executive officer. Professional consultants were not available at this stage of

organization.11

Medical Supply Organization

The original medical supply plan provided for a base medical supply

depot at each of the six main port cities of Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane,

Townsville, Perth, and Adelaide. These depots were to ship to intermediate

depots farther inland, which in turn were to supply advance depots or dumps.

This decentralization was deemed necessary because of the totally inadequate

rail and road net. It had the further advantage of dispersing stocks so that

loss to the enemy of one or all of these ports would still leave reserves available

elsewhere. Because of later developments, depots were not established in each

base section. During the buildup in Australia, the important medical supply

depots were located in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, and Townsville.

In addition to personnel of the 9th Medical Supply Depot, a medical supply officer was on the staff of each base section surgeon. These were usually

officers of the Medical Corps. Their job was to edit station requisitions, issue

supply instructions, coordinate all medical supply activities, work in liaison

with the medical supply depot, aid the medical units to eliminate shortages,

and render all assistance possible. The base section supply officers worked

directly with the theater medical supply officer and implemented his policies

and directives. Almost without exception, these untrained officers did a superior

job as supply officers.12

Medical Supply Problems During Buildup

The first automatic shipments in the form of medical maintenance units

were most useful. However, 6 months later, they had outlived their usefulness

11 (1) Medical Department, United States Army, Organization and Administration in World

War II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963, pp. 410-431. (2) Memorandum, Col.

William L. Wilson, MC, for General Kirk [TSG], 20 Oct. 1943.

12 See footnote 9(2), p. 409.
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 413

as a sole means of support for theater stocks. The concept of automatic shipments is good (1) if shipments can be complete with no shortages and (2) if

replacement factors are carefully and continuously adjusted so that excesses

and shortages do not develop. In the Southwest Pacific Area, neither of these

two conditions prevailed, and the result was not good.13

In the first 6 months of operation, the average medical maintenance unit

received was rarely more than 50 percent complete. Shortages, obviously, consisted of those items difficult to procure in quantity to meet demands and were

always the same items. Almost as bad were the overages that accrued.

During the first few months of the medical buildup, one of the most frustrating problems was that of table of basic allowance shortages. Medical units

were being sent overseas with their table of basic allowance assemblages only

50 to 65 percent complete. The Zone of Interior medical depots backordered

the shortages to the units, and as the depots received stocks, coded shipments

were made piecemeal to the overseas units. Items were packed in broken-lot

boxes, making distribution cumbersome.

The 41st and 32d Infantry Divisions, the first divisions to arrive in Australia, had medical equipment which was not well suited for use in jungle warfare. The substitutive equipment program involved some modification of the

medical equipment for these divisions so that it could be used in the Tropics.

The experience of Dutch officers who had served many years in the Tropics

was invaluable in this matter.

Division surgeons redesigned their medical units for more effective utilization in the Tropics. Requisitions were submitted to the medical supply officer

who consolidated them and forwarded them to the Zone of Interior for action.

Special drugs and items needed to combat jungle diseases were included. A

few items were procured locally. This program took months for successful

completion. Mainly, the changes made the equipment more easily portable and

waterproof.

Practically all TOE medical units had to be redesigned for use in the

Southwest Pacific Area. Fixed hospitals of more then 200 beds were impossible

to house in any available existing buildings. The 750-bed evacuation hospital

was too large to deploy or transport and had to be broken down into three

units of 250 beds each. The medical regiment of World "War I, designed to

support a square division, had to be completely reorganized.

All this changing of design necessitated much swapping and requisitioning of equipment and supplies. The program was extremely important as units

could not operate in many instances until they were reorganized. In spite of

exploiting all available local resources, in most instances, equipment had to be

obtained from the United States.

In addition to the alteration of existing TOE medical units, new types

were adapted for use in this unusual theater. The first of these was a 100-bed

13 This section is based on a narrative account of medical supply activities in the Southwest

Pacific Area prepared for a preliminary draft of this volume by Col. Alphonso M. Libasci, MC,

USA (Ret.).
414 MEDICAL SUPPLY

mobile station hospital. In early 1942, the enemy was making such rapid

advances in the islands north of Australia that it was feared that the continent

of Australia would be invaded. If so, war would be fought in wide open country where mobility would be of prime importance. The medical service had

nothing to meet this threat. The 750-bed evacuation hospital required 27 Australian freight cars to move, necessitating two trains. Obviously, something

else was needed. Thus, work was begun early in 1942 on a mobile hospital with

van units mounted on truck chasses. The unit was to function as a station hospital, using ward tents, but was capable of moving over open country if necessary. If buildings were available, it could function as a fixed hospital.14

Much time and effort were devoted to this project. However, progress was

slow, and by the time the mobile hospital was ready, the need no longer existed.

Australia was never invaded, and the unit was never used as such. Its use in

New Guinea was out of the question because of the lack of roads. However,

the project was not a total loss as some of the functional vans were later used

in New Guinea as fixed units; for example, laundry, generator, and sterilizing

units, but on a very limited basis.

The other type of hospital specifically designed for the needs of the theater was the portable surgical hospital. This unit, born of necessity, was designed to fill the need for definitive surgery as close to the front as possible.

Hand carries of even less than a mile to airstrip evacuation points over jungle

trails were hazardous, time consuming, and often fatal to the seriously

wounded (fig. 104).

General Carroll fathered the entire idea of the portable surgical hospital.

As originally conceived by him and his professional staff, it would be a hospital that could be carried on the backs of men. When General Carroll first

described his ideas, most of the staff were not ready for such a radical and

hitherto unheard of concept as carrying a hospital on the backs of its operators! Ultimately, it was designed so that the personnel of 3 officers and 25

enlisted men actually carried the entire hospital on their backs or on litters.

The men were handpicked from among the finest and best conditioned in the

theater medical services.

Of these units, 36 were assembled from resources within the theater by

(1) levying on the larger hospitals both for personnel and for equipment and

(2) procuring available items locally. The portable surgical hospitals were

an unqualified success in the New Guinea jungles. Later, the concept of total

portability was modified and more equipment was added. They were used very

effectively in amphibious operations and by the Air Forces to move to remote

areas to provide hospitalization.

During early 1942, it was decided to design a so-called jungle kit to be

issued to each individual soldier. As finally developed, this kit consisted of a

small pouch to be carried on the belt. Components varied from time to time,

14 A more detailed discussion will be found in Daboll, Warren W.: The Medical Department. The

Medical Services in the Asiatic Theater. United States Army in World War II. The Technical

Services. [In preparation.]
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 415

FIGURE 104.—The transportation of supplies and equipment of a portable surgical

hospital, Australia, 1942.

but they basically consisted of antimalarials, water purification tablets, salt

tablets, skin disinfectant, insect repellant, vitamins, and so forth. After the kit

had been designed and tried, specifications were sent to the United States for

its manufacture and procurement in large numbers. The jungle kit was useful

and became a standard item of issue (fig. 105).

Jeep litter brackets were developed to adapt jeeps to carry three litters

to displace long hand carries. These were extremely useful in forward areas

where trails existed. As in all other local procurement endeavors, the Australian military and civilian authorities cooperated fully. Along these same lines
416 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 105.—Improvised medical jungle kit made from available material for use in

rough jungle combat.

when the threat of enemy invasion was real, plans had been made to convert

existing civilian van-type trucks and 'buses to carry litters. Again, special

brackets were designed.

It became obvious quite early in the war that it was poor logic to use glaring white dressings in the jungle where all else was so carefully camouflaged.

Accordingly, recommendations concerning the feasibility of dyeing a certain

percentage of dressings jungle green were forwarded to the United States.

Eventually, the recommendation was accepted. However, the dressings were

dyed olive drab instead of green.

When equipment for the portable surgical hospitals was being designed, it

was found that the U.S. Army forces had nothing that could be used for a

lightweight, portable field sterilizer. The Australians had a small, aluminum,

pressure-cooker-type sterilizer weighing 30 pounds with special 9-inch drums

that just suited the purpose. This was adopted and procured in quantity. In

addition, to obviate the necessity for sterilized dressings in the field in advance

areas, dressings were furnished already sterile and sealed in tinplated disposable drums. Three types were available: Basic operating unit, dressings, and

gowns. The drums once opened were used as containers in the forward areas.

The weight of the standard litters precluded their use in the portable surgical hospitals. The first such hospitals carried lightweight poles and spreader

bars that could be fitted into the loops of cot canvases. This litter weighed 11
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 417

pounds complete. Later, sleeves of light canvas, measuring 24 inches in diameter and 84 inches in length with double seams and mattress covers, narrowed

by a seam to a width of 24 inches, were fitted over cut poles of various sizes.

These were tried and found practical.

The requirements of the theater for lightness, protection against moisture,

and ease of portability were never fully met by the Zone of Interior. Much

repacking was done in the theater for supplies sent to New Guinea. Many

solutions, drugs, and dressings (other than those in waxed containers) were

repacked in salvaged cans obtained from hospital pharmacies. The supply of

good containers with tight-fitting tops was limited in Australia. Kectangular

cans with hinged tops of 1- and 2-quart size and of coated, painted, heavy

steelplate were designed and purchased in quantity. Plastic containers would

have been ideal. The Japanese used plastic extensively.

The standard Zone of Interior medical maintenance unit was not adaptable for use either in Australia or in New Guinea; therefore, extensive modifications were made within the theater. The modified medical maintenance unit

was streamlined to a weight of 7 to 9 tons, instead of the original 15 to 20 tons.

The unit was stripped of most nonmedical items such as housekeeping items—

mops, brooms, kitchenware, wax, and so forth-—of all dental and veterinary

instruments, and of most laboratory glassware. The unit was also modified

quantitatively, using actual theater experience for maintenance factors.

Medical Supply in New Guinea

The establishment of U.S. Army bases in New Guinea, essential because

of its strategic location as a jumping-off place for offensive action against

Japan, was a slow and painful process. At times, the postcombat buildup was

even more frustrating than the acquisition had been. The first U.S. Army

troops arrived on 28 April 1942. Within a year, the organizational structure

included the U.S. Advance Base at Port Moresby, with subbases at Milne Bay,

Oro Bay, and Goodenough Island (map 30).

The medical supply organization in New Guinea paralleled that on the

mainland of Australia. Each base surgeon was provided with a medical supply

officer who had to be an aggressive provider of equipment needed by hospital

units to fill out their table of basic allowance shortages and provide such equipment «as lanterns, generators, and ice cream making machines. For approximately the first year, supply to New Guinea was from Australia. Lateral supply

within New Guinea was nonexistent except by a few fast supply boats (fig.

106). As a result, once supplies were dumped into a base port, they remained

in that base indefinitely if not used. Thus, it was extremely important that the

initial distribution be made accurately and reliably. Needless to say, this idea

was never achieved.

Eegularly scheduled runs from Australia were out of the question.

Medical supplies were loaded on whatever ships became available and whenever space was allotted. On such a catch-as-catch-can basis, things indeed would
418 MEDICAL SUPPLY

MAP 30.—Bases in Papua, New Guinea, 1942-43.

have reached a sorry state had it not been for the two expedients aggressively

followed through: (1) A very liberal interpretation of day level and (2) the

use of regularly scheduled runs of the intratheater hospital ships to carry

cargo forward on return trips to New Guinea.

It became obvious early in the development of the New Guinea bases that

the authorized 30-day levels and later 60-day levels of supply would not be

adequate in the face of the shipping uncertainties. Therefore, it was decided to

raise these levels as it would not involve very large shipping tonnages or warehouse space. Accordingly, more realistic levels were set up, and conditions improved materially.15

Early Medical Supply Facilities in Port Moresby

Storage facilities at Port Moresby were practically nonexistent before

January 1943. The medical supply depot occupied several small buildings on

Ela Beach, the principal dock area 1 mile from the downtown headquarters.

Two of these buildings were used for storage and loose-issue operations. Although there were no space, tonnage, or occupancy reports at that time, it

was estimated that the total gross space was no more than 4,000 square feet

with approximately 80 tons of medical supplies on hand. Any excess amounts

of supplies were covered by tarpaulins in open storage.

15 (1) U.S. Army Services of Supply Bases In New Guinea. [Official record.] (2) Memorandum,

Col. William L. Wilson, MC, Lt. Col. Charles G. Gruber, SnC, and Maj. Tolbert H. Belcher, MAC,

for Commanding General, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, through the

Surgeon, 27 Sept. 1943, subject: Determination of Maintenance Factors and Rates of Consumption

and Expenditures.
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY

f «J

#j^i

419

\: V ~\ .#*. '^

__

u%-,' '" i -"

:iW

FIGURE 106.—Troops loading on an Australian corvette for transfer to New Guinea.

Security storage was, by necessity, improvised. Ethyl alcohol and whisky were stored in a small, detached building of not more than 200 square feet.

Original packs of narcotics and other security-type items were stored in an

old Army field safe. Refrigerated storage consisted of three or four keroseneoperated refrigerators of the regular household type.

The receiving operations were always accomplished in an open area.

Large shipments, if delivered from dockside at a rate which would permit

tally-in as received, had to be stored in the open until the receiving crew

could segregate the items and remove them to storage. Shortage of personnel and lack of adequate facilities often caused supplies to be merely offloaded and stacked to contain the entire shipment within available space.16

Early Medical Supply Depot Operation

The 3d Medical Supply Depot, commanded by Maj. (later Col.) Stephen G. Asbill, VC, with all of its organizational equipment arrived at

Brisbane (p. 406) in December 1942 (fig. 107). Less than 1 month after its

"Quarterly Reports, Headquarters, Office of the Surgeon, U.S. Advanced Base [New Guinea],

1 Oct. 1942-31 Mar. 1943.
420 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 107.—Interior view of a medical supply warehouse in Brisbane, Australia.

arrival in the theater, the 1st Storage and Issue Platoon, comprising 3 officers and 42 enlisted men, sailed for Port Moresby. Upon arriving on 8 January 1943, it relieved a small detachment of the 9th Medical Supply Depot

which had been operating in support of combat elements.

A plan to further deploy the 1st Storage and Issue Platoon by sending

one officer and five enlisted men to set up a supply point at Milne Bay and

another officer and five enlisted men to do the same at Oro Bay caused a

split in the platoon which had been formed to operate as a unit. After a

trial period at both Milne Bay and Oro Bay, it became apparent that more

personnel and equipment were needed to operate effectively.17

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Organization and Purpose

To protect the lines of communication to New Zealand and Australia

and to prepare a counteroffensive against the Japanese forces, Army garrisons were established shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack at Auckland,

New Zealand; New Caledonia; Efate, Espiritu Santo, and Fijis in the New

17 Annual Reports, 3d Medical Depot Company, 1943-44.
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 421

Hebrides Islands; Tongatabu in the Tonga Islands; Bora Bora; and Tongareva and Aitutaki in the Cook Islands. The South Pacific Area was organized in April 1942, and by July, more than 60,000 troops were in the

command.

Estimate of the Situation

Lacking firsthand information on conditions in the area, Maj. Gen.

(later Lt. Gen.) Millard F. Harmon, commanding general of all U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, and several officers had made frequent

trips northward to Espiritu Santo and to Guadalcanal in the Solomons to

inspect at close range the installations there. Everywhere he went, General Harmon was struck with the shortages in materiel and the inadequacy

of facilities. Both General Harmon and Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Eobert

G. Breene, Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply and Evacuation, G-4, realized the many problems in maintaining a steady flow of men and materiel

into the area because of the many widely separated island bases.

One of the most serious problems was the shortage of shipping. Unlike

a continental theater of operations with debarkation facilities, road nets,

and railways, the South Pacific Area, except for New Zealand, had almost

no communications or industrial development. In the entire area, only Auckland and Suva in the Fijis had usable terminal installations, and of these,

only Auckland could be considered adequate.

Before bases could accommodate large shipments of either troops or

supplies, it was necessary to construct harbor and dock facilities. Many

islands possessed only the most primitive facilities, or none at all. Roads,

warehouses, and storage space so necessary to the operation of a large supply

base were nonexistent. To aggravate this situation, there was a notable lack

of service personnel of all branches to handle specialized equipment. The

original task forces that were hurriedly sent to the South Pacific Area contained a disproportionately high percentage of combat troops who had to be

utilized to effect minimum logistical support at each base. This shortage of

service elements prevented the construction of adequate facilities for the

handling and safeguarding of supplies and resulted in a high degree of

waste.

Services of Supply Established

Under normal conditions, the command control of supply of the U.S.

Army Forces in the South Pacific Area probably could have been handled

through the medium of a G-4 section in General Harmon's headquarters. With

the geographic peculiarities of the area and the necessity for close integration

with U.S. Navy and Allied supply agencies, however, it was determined that

a different type of organization would be required. General Harmon believed

that it would have to be large in size, highly executive in character, and headed

by a general officer directly under his own command. After studying many

plans submitted by his staff, General Harmon established, on 10 November
422 MEDIGAL SUPPLY

1942, Headquarters, SOSSPA (Services of Supply, South Pacific Area), with

General Breene commanding. The original intention of the War Department

was to establish the headquarters for the U.S. Army Forces of the South

Pacific Area in Auckland. General Harmon, however, chose to locate his advance echelon at Noumea, New Caledonia, to be close to the scene of operations

and the theater commander.

Initial Problems in Medical Supply

No table of organization medical supply units were sent to the South

Pacific Area during the first year of the war, and no officer trained in medical

supply was assigned to the staff of the Chief Surgeon, Col. (later Brig. Gen.)

Earl Maxwell, MC, USAF. Shortly before Headquarters, SOSSPA, was organized in Auckland, 1st. Lt. (later Lt. Col.) Joseph C. Thompson, MAC,

was transferred from the 43d Infantry Division to Headquarters, USAFISPA

(U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area), and assigned duties as the

theater medical supply officer. At the time that the headquarters moved from

Auckland to Noumea some 45 days later, the medical supply staff in the surgeon's office consisted of Lieutenant Thompson and one sergeant; all files of

this office were carried in one briefcase. Nevertheless, this organization immediately took steps to organize an orderly system. In the absence of table of

organization supply units, provisional units were organized at Noumea, Efate,

and Suva by drawing personnel from medical units at these bases. Smaller provisional supply detachments were established at Espiritu Santo and Auckland

map (31). The first mission of these provisional units was to call in all medical supplies (principally medical maintenance units) in the hands of the various task forces to establish central medical depots.

With the exception of Auckland, Noumea, and Suva, warehouses or other

storage facilities were nonexistent, and storage of supplies was necessarily in

tentage or in open storage covered by salvaged tents or whatever canvas was

available. Because of high humidity and exceedingly heavy rainfall, supplies

at many bases were lost or deteriorated beyond use as a result of this lack of

proper storage facilities. Labels became unreadable or fell off the containers

entirely, leaving no Choice 'but to destroy the contents. Metal components of

equipment became rusted or corroded, and fungus grew on certain optical

items.

Inexperienced supply personnel assembled from other units frequently distorted the supply levels available at each base. All bases received medical maintenance units and, in general, were able to maintain adequate supply levels.

Drugs for the most part were available although false indications of shortages

existed in certain bases due to the personal preferences of many medical officers

who were not accustomed to using substitutes. There were, however, some

items of special benefit in this area which were left out of the medical maintenance units or were included in inadequate quantities. This was especially

noticeable in the many vitamin products and in most of the newer sulfanilamides, but to a lesser degree in the arsenicals. Clinic equipment, such as instru-
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 423

160°

1 o

1

180°

Es;r0iÄ

NEW * m

HEBRIDES EFATE Oi^0(Prüv>

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1

CALEDONIA ^-^<;

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NEW s' ISLAND

40°

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MAP 31.—South Pacific supply points, 1942.

295-453 O—68 29
424 MEDICAL SUPPLY

ments for the eyes, ears, nose, and throat, and replacements of surgical equipment were very short. Special technical equipment such as microscopes and

ophithalmosoopes was not sufficiently plentiful in the early stages.

Few of the medical organizations shipped to the South Pacific Area were

able to function without changes in their organization and equipment. The

very nature of the theater—numerous small islands widely separated from each

other and varying in climate from the Temperate Zone of New Zealand to the

tropical areas of the Solomon Islands—made these changes mandatory. Revisions varying from minor items in some units to almost complete reorganization in others were necessary. In many instances, a hospital would be the only

medical complement in a task force isolated by hundreds of miles. It, therefore, became necessary for this hospital to function as a collecting company, a

clearing company, a general hospital, and, in some instances, as the task force

surgeon's office. The most serious handicap in this situation was the lack of

adequate equipment. Many times, evacuation hospitals were required to function as station or general hospitals, and medical field units such as battalions

or regiments were forced to operate hospitals. This required provisional reorganization and equipping of these units.

To compound these problems, units arrived in the area without parts of

their essential table of basic allowance equipment while many items were lost

on the docks or beaches due to limited control of unloading facilities. If an

item was hauled to the wrong unit, there was little or no chance of subsequently locating it. The small medical depots established on the various islands did

not have sufficient stock or, in many cases, no stock at all of the items necessary

to replace shortages. Other difficulties were encountered when the equipment

was placed on different ships than the personnel. Many times, the personnel

were diverted to one island and the equipment arrived at another; due to lack

of intratheater shipping, the final marrying-up of the unit and its equipment

sometimes was never accomplished.

Among the first medical supply installations to arrive in this theater was

one section of the advance depot platoon of the 10th Medical Supply Depot.

This organization originally arrived in Auckland on 22 November 1942 and

was soon transferred to Espiritu Santo. One section of the advance depot platoon of the 17th Medical Supply Depot was activated on New Caledonia from

personnel available within the command (fig. 108). A small detachment designated as Medical Detachment No. 1 (Supply) was established at Suva. These

were the only officially organized supply units located in this theater in the

initial phase of its operation.

Medical Supply Levels

The supply facilities on Fiji, New Caledonia, and Efate, as well as the

smaller supply points at Espiritu Santo and Auckland, were receiving automatic medical maintenance units and were able to maintain their supply levels

between 100 and 200 days. Frequently, these levels varied because units which
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 425

FIGURE 108.—U.S. Army medical supply depot in New Caledonia, 1942.

had lost all their equipment had to be resupplied. Also, it was hard to calculate

exact supply levels because of certain shortages and excesses.18

Stock Control

The geographic conditions peculiar to the South Pacific Area and the

shortage of supervisory personnel in the headquarters element required that

decentralization be the keynote for medical supply in the area. The advantage

of centrally located issuing points was recognized, but their establishment in this theater was clearly impracticable because of the chronic shortage of personnel and intratheater shipping at the outset. As a result, until

January 1944, most supplies were shipped in the form of medical maintenance units from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation directly to the

island where they would be consumed. Eequisitions were transmitted to the

18 (1) See footnotes 2(3), p. 397; and 14, p. 414. (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, South Pacific

Area, 1942.
426 MEDICAL SUPPLY

port for items not contained in the medical maintenance units or for inadequate quantities in them.

Because of the widely separated island bases and shortage of transportation, frequent inspection trips for supervision by Headquarters, SOSSPA,

were not possible. Therefore, all depots were placed under the administrative control of the island base, and in many cases, each island base had

different ideas concerning the control of these supply installations. On one

of the infrequent inspection trips, however, Captain Thompson noticed

that, in addition to some shortages, excesses were accumulating on certain

items in the medical maintenance unit. For example, on Guadalcanal, the

supplies of blood plasma, intravenous fluids, morphine Syrettes, and antidiarrheal drugs were inadequate while cotton, glycerin, castor oil, ether,

ammoniated mercury, and salicylic acid had built up huge excesses.

Trips to the other island bases in this area confirmed that certain items

supplied in the medical maintenance unit were accumulating large excesses,

but the filing of reports proved an inadequate remedy. After considerable

correspondence between the theater, the San Francisco Port of Embarkation,

and the Surgeon General's Office, only token relief was received, and some

excesses continued to accumulate.

The smaller and more eastern islands of the South Pacific Area (Tongareva, Bora Bora, Aitutaki, and Tongatabu) were placed on a requisition

basis in 1943. This was at the suggestion of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation because these islands were occupied by only one medical installation and usually small task forces, and it was unsatisfactory to supply them

through the medium of fractions of a medical maintenance unit,19

Optical Activities

In the fall of 1942, one of the major medical supply problems of the

South Pacific Area was that of replacement and fabrication of spectacles.

Generally, prescriptions for spectacles were received at the medical supply

section of the surgeon's office, Headquarters, SOSSPA, and forwarded directly to the Joint Purchasing Board in NewT Zealand, where arrangements

had been made for the fabrication of spectacles by civilian facilities. It soon

became evident that the demand far exceeded the New Zealand capability

and that optical-repair sections of medical supply depots were needed in the

South Pacific Area.

The first such unit was the optical-repair section of the incomplete 17th

Medical Supply Depot in New Caledonia. This unit was established late in

1942 from personnel available to the command. 'Through the cooperation of

G-l Division, Personnel, War Department General Staff, records of many

units were screened, and men with optician's background, were located. A

noncommissioned officer who was a bandsman assigned to one of the bands

"Essential Technical Medical Data, South Pacific Area, U.S. Army, initial report, dated 17

Sept. 1943.
PACIFIC MEDICAL SUPPLY 427

in the Americal Division was found by this survey. It was soon discovered

that he possessed an ideal background in optical repair and fabrication and

was subsequently commissioned a second lieutenant in the Medical Administrative Corps, becoming the first optical-repair officer in the South Pacific

Area. The depot, its equipment augmented by a spherical surfacer, was soon

repairing or fabricating an average of 800 pairs of spectacles each month.

The base platoon of the 11th Medical Supply Depot which arrived in

the theater in August 1943 included the personnel but not the equipment of

an optical-repair section. When the platoon rejoined its parent unit in the

European theater, these personnel were utilized to augment the already

existing optical-repair shop, and additional equipment was requisitioned.

When the equipment arrived, however, it was shipped to Guadalcanal, and

personnel were transferred there to operate an optical-repair shop.20

Maintenance and Repair

Before the arrival of the base platoon of the 11th Medical Supply Depot, there were no maintenance and repair facilities within the theater other

than those organized provisionally on various island bases. For the first

time, two trained enlisted instrument repairmen were available for utilization. However, lack of spare parts, particularly for sterilizers and X-ray

equipment, greatly limited their utilization.

The lack of intratheater shipping also limited the ability to return

items to this one source for repair, and many times, it was more practicable

to send repairmen to a forward base than to return the equipment to the

depot.21

MEDICAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES IN ALASKA DURING THE

DEFENSE PERIOD

Prewar Expansion of U.S. Forces

Early in 1940, the strategic significance of Alaska22 was recognized, and

by late June, additional troops were dispatched to Fort Richardson, near

Anchorage. The 1940 augmentation consisted of one battalion of infantry, a

field artillery battery, an engineer company, a quartermaster detachment, and

an ordnance detachment. Medical support came from 10 enlisted men who comprised the medical detachment of the 4th Infantry Division and 20 enlisted

men from Fort Missoula, Mont., and Letterman General Hospital, San

Francisco. Three Medical Corps officers and one Dental Corps officer had been

scheduled to accompany the group, but only the dental officer received orders

20 See footnote 17, p. 420.

21 Essential Technical Medical Data, South Pacific Area, U.S. Army, for February 1944, dated

7 Mar. 1944.

22 This section on medical supply activities in Alaska during the defense period is based on

McNeil, Gordon H.: History of the Medical Department in Alaska in World War II (1946). [Official

record.]
428 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

in time to get to Seattle, Wash., for the embarkation. Consequently, several

hours before personnel boarded ship, a medical officer on duty at the station

hospital at Fort Lewis, Wash., was given verbal orders, later confirmed in

writing, to proceed to Alaska with the movement; after packing a few personal effects, he joined the medical detachment as its surgeon. Medical supplies

and equipment consisted of the following Medical Department chests: Two No.

1, one No. 2, one No, 4, and one No. 60 (dental), together with litters, blankets, and special drugs and supplies.

Organization of Medical Supply Following Pearl Harbor

The medical service of the Alaska Defense Command was organized on

12 December 1941, following the appointment of Lt, Col. (later Col.) Luther

K. Moore, MC, as surgeon. The echelons of medical supply in the Alaskan

theater originally were, as follows: Unit supply officer, post medical supply

officer, and the Overseas Supply Branch, Seattle Port of Embarkation. From

the Seattle Port of Embarkation or the Prince Rupert Sub-Port of Embarkation, Prince Eupert, Alaska, units arriving in the theater usually landed fully

equipped with supplies for the initial period, plus additions for a special tactical situation. At each station, the post medical supply officer also served as the

station hospital medical supply officer. Most items were furnished automatically by the medical maintenance unit. Those authorized items not included

were requisitioned directly from the Seattle Port of Embarkation.

Storage of Medical Supplies

The provision of adequate storage facilities was essential because of the

climatic conditions. Much loss was sustained at Adak (map 32), where large

amounts of supplies were dumped on the wet ground and exposed to the elements because of a lack of storage space. It was often necessary to store medical supplies in tents, which proved unsatisfactory because of wind, rain, and

snow.

Once initial construction was completed at new stations, adequate warehouse space became available. Storehouses were generally constructed of wood,

either as part of the hospital or as separate huts. The quonset hut was also unsatisfactory because of sagging floors, leaky roofs, and lack of perpendicular

walls. Each station hospital was authorized 35 square feet of storage space for

each authorized bed.

Weather conditions made it necessary to store freezable supplies in heated

buildings, thus requiring constant supervision and maintenance. At Naknek,

supplies froze on the shelves despite the fact that the buildings were heated.

Tests were conducted in February 1943 to determine the effects of freezing on

medical supplies. Eesults of the tests, which showed most items were not

affected, were reported to The Surgeon General.

Heavy rainfall and resulting dampness required additional special consideration for medical supplies and equipment, X-ray films, and plaster of
PACIFIC' MEDICAL SUPPLY 429

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paris bandages; other similar items often deteriorated and became mildewed,

thus necessitating that buildings be heated intermittently to reduce dampness.

Dispersion of Supplies

Upon declaration of war, a policy of dispersion of reserve supplies was

invoked. Later, all supplies were dispersed in a uniform manner. This dispersion was conducted in various ways. At Fort Eichardson (map 32), established in June 1940, pyramidal tents, dugouts, basement rooms, and even the

Eklutna Indian School which was located 27 miles from the post, were utilized for storage.

Because of the distance between stations and the lack of dependable transportation, often handicapped by bad weather, the medical maintenance unit

proved valuable in supplying inaccessible spots. Ship sailings were irregular,

and air service was generally unavailable except for special items. These transportation difficulties made it necessary to improvise during 1942 to make up

for the shortage of field equipment.

Lack of a Medical Supply Depot

There was no regularly established medical supply depot in the Alaskan

theater. Fort Eichardson served as an unofficial depot. Stations possessing ex-
430 MEDICAL SUPPLY

cesses of critical items and medical chests shipped them to Fort Eichardson,

where two buildings were designated as warehouses with two officers and eight

enlisted men as depot personnel.

The Optical Program in Alaska

In February 1942, to speed up the procurement of Government-issued

spectacles, a procedure was inaugurated which equipped five of the larger

stations with the necessary equipment and materials. Spectacle order forms

were prepared and forwarded to the American Optical Co., at Seattle, and the

spectacles were returned by the Seattle General Depot.

This system suffered several defects: (1) Excessive length of time required

to fill an order, (2) losses incurred because of movement of personnel, (3) lack

of control for procurement, (4) lack of prompt communication on special

cases, and (5) lack of trained personnel and equipment in the command. To

remedy this problem, traveling optical teams were organized and sent to stations requiring their services. This became a rather complete service in 1942.

The problem of filling prescriptions and providing a prompt supply of

spectacles remained until a fixed-optical unit was assigned to Fort Eichardson

in April 1943. By June, all initial issue, replacement, and repair of spectacles

for the entire command was accomplished by that unit.
CHAPTER XIII

Offensive Operations: The Solomons to the Palaus

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

Halting the Japanese Offensive

Because of the Japanese activities at Lae, New Guinea, and Guadalcanal

in early 1942, it became obvious to the Allied Command that it would be

necessary to launch a counteroffensive to reverse this trend and relieve the

apparent threat to Australia. The U.S. Marines opened the campaign on

Guadalcanal some 8 months after Pearl Harbor on 7 August 1942, and the

16th Infantry Eegiment of the Americal Division entered the scene on 13

October 1942. Other combat elements of the Americal Division, including

the 101st Medical Eegiment, arrived on Guadalcanal on 11-12 November

1942.

The medical supply section of the 101st Medical Regiment assumed responsibility for medical supply on Guadalcanal, including the support of

certain Navy and Marine personnel. Fortunately, the Americal Division, at

the time, carried a 60-day supply, and no serious shortage was caused by

this added burden. The only supplies really low were glucose, plasma, and

sulfaguanidine. The 101st Medical Eegiment was relieved of its supply

responsibility for the base on 4 January 1943 with the arrival of Section 1,

Advance Depot Platoon, 21st Medical Supply Depot (map 33).

Col. Dale G. Friend, MC, Surgeon, 101st Medical Eegiment, made

some significant recommendations concerning medical supply on Guadalcanal. Because it was necessary to supply Navy and Marine personnel as

well as the Army, the 60-day supply level proved to be inadequate. Colonel

Friend recommended that equipment of medical troops assigned to combat

operations be made available in small portable waterproof containers which

would be capable of floating reasonable periods of time in the event that

they would be used in landing operations and river crossings.

Because plasma bottles and other glass containers were being shattered

by mortar and artillery fire as well as bombings, it was recommended that

these items be placed in shock-absorbing containers. It was also recommended that the new Army-issue and the Navy-type litters replace the cumbersome Army-issue oak litter.

Development of Field Equipment

The combat plan to meet and destroy the enemy, wherever found,

meant that units would be sent into difficult jungle country, remote from

431
4SÖ MEDICAL SUPPLY

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MAP 33.—Medical supply support on Guadalcanal.

sources of supply. This problem was solved by combining Navy, Marine,

and Army field equipment. It was found that the Navy and Marine valisetype medical chest was extremely advantageous in that it could be carried

by one man on the foot marches and contained sufficient equipment to provide for treatment. Another important item was the so-called combat dressing chest which was made up of two watertight tin cans containing various

types of dressings. These cans together fitted in a canvas carrying case

which one man could carry. Due to the shortage of this particular item, the

cans were forwarded from the collecting station by litter bearer, emptied

at the aid station, and then returned to the collecting station for refilling.

It is interesting to note that two types of jungle kits (fig. 109) were

added to the medical supply catalog shortly after the battle for Guadalcanal.1

Supply Points and Storage Facilities, 1943

Late in 1943, there were eight medical supply points in USAFISPA

(U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area). These points, each operated by a particular section or detachment of a medical supply depot, were

located on Espiritu Santo, Fiji, Bougainville, New Caledonia, and Guadalcanal Islands. The South Pacific General Depot at Noumea, New Caledonia,

1

(1) Daboll, Warren W.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Asiatic Theater.

United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. [In preparation.] (2) Annual Report,

101st Medical Regiment, South Pacific Area, 1942. (3) Whitehill, Buell B.: Administrative History of

Medical Activities in the Middle Pacific. [Ofllcal record.]
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 433

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was organized in August 1943 and was operated jointly by the base platoon

of the 11th Medical Depot Company and a section of the 17th Medical Depot Company. This depot held a 30-day reserve supply for the entire

theater (map 34).

By December 1943, approximately 128,000 square feet of warehouse space

was available in all depots of the South Pacific. There was also 26,000 square

feet of storage under canvas (fig. 110). The prefabricated wooden warehouses of New Zealand were easily erected, but of the six warehouses constructed, only two had concrete floors. Only a limited amount of materialshandling equipment and only a few forklifts and trucks were available.

The lack of floors created an additional problem, the securing of dunnage.

Approximately 35,000 square feet of dunnage was constructed from scrap

lumber at the South Pacific General Depot. The necessary power equipment

needed to convert boxes and crates to dunnage was not always available and

had to be obtained in the same "informal" way in which the lumber was secured. Depots in forward areas often used coconut tree logs, crushed coral, and

ships' dunnage for flooring.

Prefabricated warehouses were not used on Guadalcanal. The limited

stock available was being held for shipment to more forward areas as combat
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 435

FIGURE 110.—Storage of medical supplies under canvas, 68th Medical Depot Company,

Guadalcanal.

continued to move north and west. Outside storage was, at its best, a poor substitute. Originally, supply of tarpaulins was very short, and many supplies

were lost in open storage in forward areas due to lack of covering. By the end

of 1943, this condition had been corrected, and all storage was under some

type of covering (fig. 111).

Protection of alcohol, narcotics, and precious metals, although not completely adequate, presented no insurmountable problems. Generally, "strong

rooms" in the area consisted of wire mesh enclosures. The shortage of lumber,

cement, and other building materials prevented construction of more adequate

protective storage areas in most depots. In the Guadalcanal Depot, it was

necessary at times to place alcohol in outside storage. When this became necessary, armed guards were posted. Major loss of these supplies was never a serious problem, probably because all personnel were so actively engaged in the

support of combat, coupled with the fact that no civilian market existed for

its disposal.2

2 This section is based on a manuscript covering medical supply In the South Pacific prepared

for a preliminary draft of this volume by Col. Joseph C. Thompson, MSC.
MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 111.—Native-type warehouses, constructed under the direction of the Corps of

Engineers, provided more protection than did canvas.

Automatic Supply Discontinued

The discontinuance of the automatic supply of medical maintenance

units was followed by direct requisitioning in January 1944. Better stock

control, curtailment of overages and shortages, and a system of stock reporting followed.

Kequisitioning of supplies was closely coordinated by Headquarters,

USASOS (United States Army Services of Supply), South Pacific Area. The

current status of a requisition could easily be determined because of the use

of an information copy furnished the base concerned.

Late in 1944, it was required that stock level reports be filed at 10-day

intervals. This gave the theater medical supply officer a system of central stock

control. Lack of personnel in the depots and the headquarters as well somewhat handicapped this system. By May 1945, the theater reverted to a decentralized system.

Levels of Supply

With the discontinuance of the medical maintenance unit shipments,

supply levels had to be reset. A 150 days' supply was to be on hand in depot

stock, and 30 days of reserve stock in the form of medical maintenance units

was to be held by the South Pacific General Depot. This plan gave the theater

a total requisition objective of 300 days.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 437

Reorganization of Supply Units

Early in 1944, following recommendation of the War Department, the

base platoon of the 11th Medical Supply Depot and Section 1, Advance Depot

Platoon, 17th Medical Supply Depot, along with its optical repair section,

were reorganized into the 67th Medical Depot Company. The depot units on

Guadalcanal and the other island areas were also reorganized, leaving the

base platoon of the 68th Medical Depot Company on Guadalcanal, the Storage and Issue Platoon of the 68th on Espiritu Santo, and sections of the 75th

and 56th Medical Depot Companies on Bougainville and Fiji, respectively.

The medical supply situation at the smaller stations on New Georgia and the

Russells was handled by small detachments of one officer and four to eight

enlisted men while the medical supply officers of individual base hospitals at

Auckland, New Zealand, Aitutaki, and Efate handled all local supply problems (map 34).

On 15 June 1944, the islands in the Solomon group, north of the Russells, were designated as part of the Southwest Pacific Area, and on 1 August

1944, Headquarters, USAFISPA, became the South Pacific Base Command.

This reorganization did not change the logistical mission of the command.

The three points of discharge, New Caledonia, Espiritu Santo, and Guadalcanal,

remained the same. All requisitions for the other island bases were filled from

stocks within the area, and supplies not available in the base command were

extracted to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

By the last quarter of the year, the planning for the redeployment of the

troops of the area became paramount. Reduction in strength at bases and the

closing of some bases required constant coordination for the supply of these

units. The area had reached its peak in the last quarter of 1943 and the first

half of 1944. Diversity of climate and distance between islands were still factors

to be considered in supply. Only after the withdrawal of the larger organizations, followed by some of the hospitals, and the closing of some islands in the

eastern part of the area, did thissituation become less complex.

Refrigeration.—Refrigeration in general was lacking in the early days

of the South Pacific Area. By the end of 1943, walk-in-type refrigerators were

available and utilized at all depots. The original refrigerator authorized to

medical supply depots by the TOE's (tables of organization and equipment)

was inadequate, but in emergencies, proved valuable for short periods of time

until the walk-in type could be obtained and erected.

Rehabilitation.—Many combat divisions, when relieved from actual

combat, were rehabilitated in New Zealand and other bases in the theater. In

order not to affect the level of supply at these bases, modified medical maintenance units were assembled and shipped to these divisions by the medical

section of the South Pacific General Depot when necessary.

From time to time, modified medical maintenance units were assembled at

the various depots where they were segregated, marked, and designated for
438 MEDICAL SUPPLY

task forces to be mounted-out at that base. These units were turned over to the

task force atthe time of embarkation.

End of combat.—Early in 1944, the military situation in the South Pacific

Area had well passed its climax. Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and many other

islands were names indelibly written in history. Passage of time had created a

complete change in the picture for the entire South Pacific Area, from a combat

area to an area whose mission was that of logistical support.

NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGNS

While Marine and Army units were driving the Japanese from Guadalcanal, American and Australian forces were involved in a long hard struggle

to eliminate the possible threat to Australia from New Guinea.

Depot Operations

Through most of 1943, the entire load of medical depot operations for

the SWPA (Southwest Pacific Area) was carried by the 9th and the 3d

Medical Supply Depots (map 29). To maintain a supporting position, by

1943, these units were spread along the eastern coast of Australia and New

Guinea. Parent units split off platoons; platoons sliced off sections; and even

sections divided into still smaller detachments. Personnel was augmented, organization and equipment modified, until all resemblance to a table of organization vanished. This fragmentation was necessitated by the number of locations and movements and the fact that the existing TOE for medical supply

depots was totally unsuited for operation under the conditions existing in

New Guinea and Australia.

Port Moresby Depot.—To say that storage facilities in the Southwest

Pacific Area were inadequate would be a gross understatement. The best understanding of conditions as they existed in Australia and New Guinea came from

Lt. Col. Stephen G. Asbill, VC, 9th Medical Depot commander. "Storage facilities in Brisbane, Australia," he wrote, "were much better than in New

Guinea, but still were far from ideal. By early 1944, the depot was operating

from 12 widely separated storage facilities, one 60 miles from Brisbane. These

varied from a basement of a church to college buildings. Very few were real

warehouses able to support heavy loads; none were modern fireproof buildings.

It was not possible to use materials handling equipment (even if it had been

available)."

Storage facilities at Port Moresby were practically nonexistent in January

1943, and there was little improvement for the next 8 months. The medical

depot occupied several small buildings on Ela Beach, the principal dock area,

approximately 1 mile from the downtown headquarters. Two of these buildings

were used for storage and loose-issue operations. Although there were no space,

tonnage, and occupancy reports at this time, it was roughly estimated that the

total gross space was no more than 4,000 square feet, with approximately 80

tons of medical supplies on hand. When the tonnage on hand exceeded the stor-
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 439

age capacity, it was stored in the open and usually covered at night with tarpaulins. A locator system was not used because of the limited and crowded

space. Stock selection under such conditions was not too efficient or systematic.

Security storage in New Guinea was improvised. A small detached building of not more than 200 square feet was used for storage of ethyl alcohol,

original cases of whisky, original packages of narcotics, and other securitytype items. Opened containers of these items were stored in an old Army field

safe. Although security was thus minimal, little difficulty was encountered in

handling these items. Eefrigerated storage consisted of three or four keroseneoperated refrigerators of the regular household type.

The receiving operations were always accomplished in an open area. If

the shipment was small, there was no problem. It could be quickly documented

and placed in storage. Larger shipments, if delivered from dockside at a rate

which would permit tally-in as received, had to be stored in the open until

the same receiving crew could segregate items and remove them to more adequate storage. There were numerous occasions, after shipments began to arrive

directly from the United States, where there was no control over rate of arrival of trucks from dockside. At times, it was necessary to split a handful

of men into two crews so supplies could be received at night as well as in the

daytime. Under such circumstances, because of the shortage of personnel and

lack of adequate facilities, supplies were merely off-loaded and stacked in an

effort to contain the entire shipment within available space, with no attempt

at identification.

As the total tonnage increased, it was imperative that additional storage

space be obtained. Through efforts of the command surgeon, three former

Australian troop barracks, located approximately 3 miles from the main operation, were allocated for medical supply. Each was 20 by 100 feet with a center

walkway approximately 24 inches lower than the main floor running the length

of the building. Depot personnel immediately modified these structures so that

the entire floor would be at one level. To provide additional relief for the storage problem, three hospital ward tents were erected in the same area and used

for about 2 months.

After about 9 months of improvising in every conceivable manner, a suitable central location for the depot was selected and approved. This required

site preparation by Engineer units and then the construction of prefabricated

buildings. The construction was accomplished by depot personnel assisted by

personnel from a nearby medical facility which was not operating at full

capacity at the time.

Brisbane Depot.—From 1 January to 31 October 1943, the Brisbane

Depot (fig. 112) received 4,511 tons of medical supplies and shipped 3,723 tons.

Although the tonnage was relatively small, it required a large number of men

for handling since no equipment, such as forklifts, tractors, warehouse mules,

or pallets, was available. All boxes were manhandled from the time they were

unloaded at the dockside until they were loaded back on board ship, including

stacking to heights of 15 to 20 feet when the ceiling would permit and the floor295-453 0—68^-30
440 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 112.—Interior view of the 3d Medical Supply Depot, Brisbane, Australia.

load would allow. This organization worked 24 hours a day when ships were

unloading medical supplies, which was about 50 percent of the time. The officers

unloaded and manhandled boxes just the same as enlisted men and were authorized just as many sets of fatigues. In addition to the standard medical supply responsibility, the Brisbane Depot organization handled laundry exchange

for hospital ships that put into the port, hospital trains operating along the

coast of Australia, and hospitals located in the Brisbane area. The unit also

handled local purchasing of medical supplies, surgical instruments, and dental

instruments, procuring approximately $15,000 per month during the first 6

months.

Deployment of Supply Units

Having spent a brief trial period at Milne Bay and Oro Bay, New Guinea,

in late 1942 and early 1943 (map 29), the 3d Medical Depot Company realized

the urgent need for additional personnel.

In addition to accomplishing the supply mission, the depot personnel at

Oro Bay were assigned small arms security for 400 yards of the beach area

adjacent to the depot. Several more men were sent from Port Moresby to Oro

Bay and one or two to Milne Bay. This action, together with normal losses,

reduced the Port Moresby force to a low of 23 men at one time.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 441

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With the increase in combat activity in the spring of 1943, the volume

of incoming supplies began to increase and additional units were arriving and

increasing the population to be supported. The problem was presented to the

base surgeon who was successful after a few weeks in getting enough men assigned to bring the strength back up to 32 men. Because of the situation which

prevailed, little thought was given to TOE authorizations. The major consideration was the problem of obtaining the number of personnel and equipment required to support the assigned mission. This was the situation for 9

months, after which the Port Moresby remnant of the original platoon was

replaced by another platoon from the parent unit in Australia. A few weeks

later, the detachment divided between Milne Bay and Oro Bay was also relieved, and all returned to Australia for recuperation and reassignment to the

parent organization.

Augmentation of supply units.—Before the departure of the 1st Storage

and Issue Platoon for Port Moresby, plans were taking shape for assignment

of the entire depot. The headquarters and base section remained at Brisbane,

Australia; one storage and issue platoon was sent to Townsville and one to

Rockhampton. Detachments were located in Toowoomba, Cairns, Charters

Towers, and Darwin (map 35). With the three locations in New Guinea, a

depot organized to operate in four locations was now operating in 10 widely
442 MEDICAL SUPPLY

scattered areas. Authorized personnel and equipment could not begin to cope

with the situation. Consequently, additional personnel were assigned as required, when available, without regard to TOE authorization. On the Australian mainland, military personnel were augmented by civilians recruited

under a joint agreement and administered under a system somewhat similar

to Civil Service procedure, but much less complex.

This situation was particularly true at Brisbane where, at the peak period,

approximately 35 Australian civilians were assisting the headquarters and base

section in all sorts of jobs, such as stenographers, clerks, stock selectors, warehousemen, and ordinary laborers. Practically all of the work of posting to the

stock record account and maintaining voucher files was performed by Australian girls. In the islands between Australia and the Philippines, any indigenous personnel recruited were strictly laborers. Native potential as a labor

force, however, was very limited because the average native of islands like

New Guinea and Biak was small of stature, undernourished, either diseased

or weakened from disease, and unaccustomed to sustained periods of manual

labor. Their habits and living conditions were strictly primitive.

Depot equipment.—Equipment was obtained by each separate unit or

detachment on an issue or loan basis, depending on its assigned mission and

justified by the type and volume of work to be done. Each platoon, detachment, or task group operated almost entirely independently from the parent

unit in this respect since each was supporting different areas separated by a

distance of 50 to 1,000 miles or more.

Two small powersaws were obtained in the United States. One, retained

by the base section, was very valuable as it enabled assigned personnel to make

full use of all salvageable lumber to construct crates, boxes, and shelving, to

fabricate items for various uses in offices, and to improve living conditions in

the field-type bivouac area. The other powersaw was taken to Port Moresby

by the 1st Platoon of the 3d Medical Depot and was put to a similar use. It

was not possible to keep the existence of such a piece of equipment a secret, and

as soon as other units learned of it, there were numerous requests for a loan.

Within a few months, it was worn out and there was no replacement parts.

In the later phases of the operations in Australia, when the base headquarters staff finally had time to require a review of status of equipment in

units, the medical depot was authorized to retain many items of equipment not

on its TOE and twice the quantity of many authorized items. This was based

on a justification, and recognized by the staff, that the depot was operating 100

percent in excess of the mission as contemplated by the TOE. After equipment

became available in the theater, most of the things which were necessary for

the assigned mission were obtained, but there was an initial period when operations suffered for lack of this equipment, special tools, and power tools. Also,

there was practically nothing authorized for operation of a maintenance shop.3

3

(1) Quarterly Reports, 9th Medical Supply Depot, Southwest Pacific Area, 1943. (2) Quarterly

Reports, 3d Medical Supply Depot, Southwest Pacific Area, 1943. (3) Personal recollections of Lt.

Col. Stephen G. Asbill, VC, Commanding Oflicer, 3d Medical Depot Company.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 443

Obtaining Supplies From the United States

Initially, all maintenance supply (class I) from the United States was

on an automatic basis by means of medical maintenance units. Classes II and IV

medical supplies were obtained by requisition based on TBA (table of basic

allowances) shortages for class II and 180 days' level for class IV. In addition, theater levels of certain critical items which were frozen for use only, as

the name implied, were shipped on an automatic basis from the United States

as the Final Medical Reserve. Automatic shipments of medical maintenance

units were discontinued in late 1943 and those of Final Medical Eeserve units

in early 1944. Stocks of the latter were absorbed into ordinary theater stocks.

It must be realized that a comprehensive central stock record system was maintained to compute theater requirements and prepare requisitions. This necessitated monthly postings based on inventory reports received from all depots,

due-in records, maintenance factor cards for each item, troop strength projected at least 6 months in advance, and TBA consolidated shortages. These

centralized stock control records were, of course, also useful for balancing

stocks within the theater and for extracting.

This central stock control system was difficult, time consuming, and an

onerous task using "hand" methods. Electric accounting machines for the Supply Division would have been welcomed.4

An extremely important facet of computation of requirements was the

problem of adjusting replacement or maintenance factors. No resupply system

can be any more efficient or accurate than its maintenance factors. At the beginning of the war, maintenance factors were inadequate and inaccurate for

use in the SWPA. Many examples of gross inadequacies were detected. Certainly, one of the most vital functions was the continuing readjustment of

maintenance factors based on actual consumption.

On the whole, the Zone of Interior did a good job in getting medical supplies to SWPA. There were a few items which plagued the theater from the

beginning to the end of the war. Among the most troublesome and frustrating

shortages throughout the entire war were Atabrine (quinacrine hydrochloride),

foot powder, litters, penicillin, some dental items, especially burrs and handpieces, and spare parts of all types.

The "battle" to keep Atabrine levels up to theater requirements was a

bitterly contested one. It was a hand-to-mouth-type existence. Shortages were

always threatening, but, somehow or other, help always arrived at the last

moment. This was not entirely due to failure of the United States to send

Atabrine in sufficient quantities. Theater shipping, unloading, and distribution

inadequacies caused some of the trouble, as did stowage in ships. It was not

unusual for 50 ships to be backlogged in a New Guinea port. It was almost'

certain that there was Atabrine on many of these ships. Because of the backlog

4

(1) Essential Technical Medical Data, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area,

for March 1944, dated 1 Apr. 1944. (2) Preliminary draft of Medical Supply History, Services of

Supply, Southwest Pacific, by Col. Alfonso M. Libasei, MC.
444 MEDIGAL SUPPLY

and because Atabrine was stowed far down in cargo hatches, it was not possible to get to it. In this situation, an emergency air shipment from the United

States was necessary to prevent a serious shortage. Another paradox was that

the Australians always had enough Atabrine and, on many occasions when

called on, would lend us all we needed. They obtained it on lend-lease from

the United States!

Foot powder, although the allowance per 1,000 men per month was steadily increased from 75 cans at the beginning of the war to 1,000 cans near the

end of hostilities, was never available in the quantities needed. Shortage of

this item seemed to cause more concern and more complaints than any other

in the entire theater. Letters, radiograms, and reports of visitors and inspectors were replete with concern over foot powder. In the Tropics, the constant

moisture caused the skin of the feet to be extremely susceptible to fungus infection. Adequate use of foot powder greatly reduced this most uncomfortable

and often disabling condition.

Litters were in short supply in the later stages of the war. The losses from

bases and from the theater were very high due to faulty property exchange.5

Distribution Within the Theater

As stocks gradually were built up in the theater, standard catalogs were

distributed and replenishment issues of any item became available. Units were

instructed to use maintenance factors and TBA's as a basis for requirements.

Requisitioning was on a monthly basis. Depot stocks were balanced by intratheater movement of stocks at first, later by direct shipments from the United

States to the designated port depots.

All control of depot stocks was centrally vested in the office of the Chief,

Supply Division, Surgeon's Office, USASOS, where the central stock records

were kept. Routine requisitions were cleared at base section level. Items in excess of TBA's or controlled items required the approval of the Chief, Supply

Division.

This was a system based on standard supply practices of industry and

the military. There was a minimum of wasted efforts, centralization was tight

only where needed, and no undue Obstacles were interposed 'between consumer

and supplier.

During 1943, two ships had been converted in the theater for use as intratheater hospital ships. These ships, the Tasman and the Maetsuycher (fig. 113),

were equipped and staffed with supplies and personnel available within the

theater. Their mission was to make scheduled evacuation runs from the New

Guinea ports to the Australian base ports. On their return trips, they would

carry medical supplies and units or personnel from Australia. They were extremely useful because of their regular schedule. The cargo space was con6

(1) Annual Report, Chief Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area,

1944. (2) Check Sheet, G-4, Headquarters, U.S. Army Services of Supply, to Chief Surgeon, 8 Mar.

1945, subject: Joint Supply Survey Board Report of Inspection. (3) Letter, Col. Charles M. Downs,

MC, Surgeon, X Corps, to The Surgeon General, 12 Dec. 1944, subject: Shortage of Foot Powder.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 445

i^^p^^^^^^^^p'i

FIGURE 113—Hospital ship Maetsuyclcer was taken over from the Dutch and used as an

intratheater hospital ship.

siderable—about 1,100 ship tons for both ships—enough for over 30 days'

medical maintenance for 40,000 men. During the first 3 months of its operation, the Tasman alone carried 2,500 ship tons of medical supplies to New

Guinea.6

Special Methods for Automatic Supply

Medical supply officers in advance bases on New Guinea, plagued by heat,

humidity, lack of equipment, enemy nuisance raids, and impossible roads, had

concluded that a system had to be devised that would more efficiently supply

advanced bases. Paperwork needed to be reduced, trained personnel were needed desperately, and overages and shortages had to be eliminated (fig. 114).

Automatic shipment of supplies was not the answer. Shipment on a requisitioning basis would eliminate overages and shortages, but this would put a

load on personnel in the forward bases by asking them to compute requirements.

An effective, yet simple, method of automatic supply to forward areas,

based on actual consumption, was developed. Under this system, the requisitioning depot entered on the "Inventory Report" form the amount on hand,

6

(1) See footnotes 4, p. 443; and 5 (1), p. 444.

Hospital Ship Tasman and 2d Portable Surgical Hospital.

(2) Historical Report, 4th Quarter, 1943,
446 MEDICAL SUPPLY

^^i^^i^j^f*^.-

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FIGURE 114.—A. Medical supplies at Oro Bay, New Guinea, deteriorated when stored

in buildings having leaky roofs, dirt floors, and inadequate storage space. B. Uncovered

medical supplies at a depot in Oro Bay, New Guinea, exposed to the elements, rotted

for lack of protection.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 447

and the issuing depot completed the form indicating supplies known to be en

route but not received, authorized and estimated requirements, and action

taken.

After the computation and completion of the report, it was forwarded to

the appropriate depot for filing. The system worked well as it was simple, reduced paperwork and the need for trained personnel in the forward bases, furnished supplies at a rate approximating actual consumption, thus eliminating

imbalances which occurred with a strictly automatic method, and provided a

periodic stock status report from forward bases.7

Planning Operation DEXTERITY

At the same time that the Japanese were being driven from the Solomons,

the Sixth U.S. Army was establishing its headquarters at Cape Sudest, New

Guinea. Plans were made there for Operation DEXTERITY which involved

attacks on Arawe on 15 December 1943, on Cape Gloucester, New Britain, on

26 December 1943, and on Saidor on 2 January 1944. DEXTEEITY was the

first operation under Sixth U.S. Army control.8

While initial medical supply for these operations consisted of those supplies carried in by the units involved, resupply for the Arawe operation came

from the 15th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) and a platoon of the 9th

Medical Supply Depot while, on 30 January 1944, the 21st Medical Supply

Platoon (Aviation) landed at Cape Gloucester with two medical maintenance

units, each designed to provide medical support to 5,000 troops for 30 days.

This was the first time that a medical supply platoon (aviation) was used in

operational support, and this action proved so successful that it became a frequent procedure in later operations.

Shortly after the task force arrived in the objective area, Headquarters,

Alamo Force, received an urgent request from the Arawe surgeon for sufficient

supplies and equipment to reestablish an operating room. The single operating

room setup on Arawe had received a direct hit, virtually destroying all material. With the aid of medical officers, the essential items were ascertained and

assembled, and within 18 hours after receipt of the message from the Arawe

surgeon, the supplies and equipment had been delivered.

To accomplish this swift delivery, the material was airlifted from Cape

Sudest to Finschhafen, moved to Dreger Harbor by jeep, with the final lap

to the beachhead at Arawe by PT boat. Thus, the pattern was set. The many

medical supply emergencies that were to follow would be met in a similar unorthodox fashion by close coordination of land, sea, and air transportation.

7 Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, U.S. Advanced Base, 1 Oct. 1942 to 31 Mar. 1943.

6

(1) Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, 20 Jan.-30 June 1943. (2) Quarterly

Reports, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, 1944. (3) Manuscript covering medical supply activities of

the Sixth and Eighth U.S. Armies in the Southwest Pacific, prepared for a preliminary draft of this

volume by Lt. Col. John M. Hunt, MSC, and Col. Albert B. Minns, Jr., MSC. (4) For further details,

see footnote 1 (1), p. 432.
448 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Meanwhile, the 27th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) had moved from

Milne Bay to Cape Cretin where it staged for the Saidor operation, and then

had moved to Saidor on 6 January where it operated a medical supply depot

until 20 March.

Medical Supply for the Hollandia-Aitape Operation

Planning for the assault on Hollandia and Aitape accelerated in April

1944. The operation, which was spearheaded by two task forces, "Eeckless"

and "Persecution," began on 22 April with simultaneous assaults. The 163d

Eegimental Combat Team struck at Aitape, 125 miles southeast of Hollandia,

while the 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions landed at Hollandia and marched

immediately to the airfields near Lake Sentani. Each division carried 30 days'

medical supplies and was backed up by the 21st Medical Supply Platoon

which had staged at Oro Bay and Finschhafen since February (map 36) .

9

In addition to being the first full-scale operation in the Southwest Pacific

Area, the Hollandia operation also provided the first real logistical nightmare

despite the fact that enemy resistance at Hollandia was much less than anticipated. To provide dispersion, two beaches were selected, one on Tanahmerah

Bay and one on Humboldt Bay. Although available maps indicated that both

would provide suitable areas for dumps, Tanahmerah Bay soon presented

many serious problems. Offshore coral reefs prevented the LST's (landing

ships, tank) from discharging as planned. The area behind the beach, moreover, was swampy, and there was no connecting road between the beach and

the main supply route which led to Lake Sentani and the airfields. As a consequence, an order was issued to divert those supplies destined for this beach

to the Humboldt Bay area, which by this time was stacked with supplies of

all technical services. To add to the confusion, a lone Japanese bomber, on the

night of D + l, bombed a former Japanese ammunition dump on White Beach.

The explosion started a fire at the gasoline dump which burned for 2 days,

causing extensive damage and jeopardizing the surrounding area.

Fires on the beach resolved the problem of segregating the mixture of

supplies, which in itself had caused shortages of some items very early in the

operation. More seriously, however, with more troops arriving continually, the

fire created a situation in all types of supply from which the base was several

weeks in recovering. This was the first base at which 62- and 112-foot supply

vessels were utilized by the supporting base surgeon, Lt. Col. (later Col.)

Everett G. King, MO They proved to be invaluable, being utilized in the delivery of medical supplies to forward bases, such as Hollandia, and in procuring items from rear bases as well as movement of patients to and from ships.

Meanwhile, supply support at Hollandia was further complicated by heavy

rains and landslides that made existing roads useless and entire areas impassable to troops carrying medical supplies on litters. To compensate for the han9

(1) See footnotes 5(1), p. 444; and 8(2), p. 447. (2) Quarterly Reports, 32d Infantry Division,

2d, 3d, and 4th quarters, 1944.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 449

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450 MEDICAL SUPPLY

dicaps, approximately 50 tons of medical supplies and equipment were airlifted

into the operational area. This, plus the supplies brought in by the reserve

units, promoted a gradual buildup. By the latter part of June 1944, sufficient

supplies were positioned to meet most demands.

The 127th Eegimental Combat Team of the 32d Infantry Division, which

arrived at Aitape on D+l, received its medical supplies through the chain of

evacuation. The supplies forwarded overland were carried inland from the

end of the ambulance trail by returning litter bearers or native carriers. Other

medical supplies were airdropped with the rations, with a good percentage of

recovery. On 1 August, when parachutes were supplied, the airdropping and

recovery of litters and glass-contained medical supplies became perfect, the

parachutes cutting the drop sufficiently to avoid all breaking, as well as furnishing a visible distinguishing marker. Critical items were foot powder and

typhus vaccine.

Movement Toward the Philippines

In mid-May 1944, a reinforced regimental combat team, setting forth

from Hollandia, captured Toem and nearby Wakde Island with supply support provided by the Hollandia Depot. At the end of May, the 41st Infantry

Division embarked from Hollandia for an attack on Biak with medical supply

support coming from a platoon of the 27th Medical Depot Company, and with

resupply coming from the depot at Finschhafen being operated by the base

platoon of the 29th Medical Depot Company, and from Hollandia where the

Storage and Issue Platoon of the 29th had relieved the 21st Medical Supply

Platoon which had begun staging for the Leyte operation (fig. 115).

By mid-September, Noemfoor Island, midway between Biak and the

western end of New Guinea, bases on Vogelkop Peninsula which fell in late

August, and Morotai which fell without major enemy resistance had been

cleared of enemy forces, thus setting the stage for further operations in the

Philippines (fig. 116).

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

Early Supply Activities of the Sixth U.S. Army in Australia

The Sixth U.S. Army, under command of Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Walter

Krueger, arrived at Camp Columbia, near Brisbane, on 17 April 1943. Intensive training for amphibious and jungle warfare followed, accompanied by a

mounting incidence of malaria and a growing shortage of Atabrine.

From 17 April to June 1943, a Sixth U.S. Army medical supply subsection, which consisted of one warrant officer and two enlisted men, was engaged

in planning for the support of the Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands operations

(Alamo Force) which were to be mounted from Milne Bay. Concurrently with

inspections and training activities, the first requisition for medical supplies

was submitted to USASOS to support the operation. Shortly thereafter, the
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 451

FIGURE 115.—Local issue office of the 29th Medical Depot Company, Base F, Finschhafen,

New Guinea.

plans were changed, as were most plans, to stage and mount the task force

from Townsville, and it was necessary to submit another requisition for the

troops in that area.

Combat Supply Lines Begin to Stretch

From June through early September 1943, combined Australian and

American forces executed a plan that was to regain that area of New Guinea

situated between Buna and Finschhafen. The U.S. Army Services of Supply

provided logistical support to the Army and the Navy with 30 to 90 days of

stocks placed at intermediate and advance bases. In addition to the support

of the Alamo Force, which was first designed to conduct operations in Woodlark, Kiriwina, and New Britain under control of General Headquarters,

SWPA, and separate from forces operating in New Guinea, the Sixth U.S.

Army was also responsible for the support of the 503d Parachute Infantry

Eegiment which operated directly under General of the Army Douglas

MacArthur.
45Ö MEDIOAL SUPPLY

reüTOTOKMft- , wSmm

FIGURE 116.—Conveyor system for bringing supplies ashore on Morotai Island,

September 1944.

On 14 June 1943, the forward echelon of the Sixth U.S. Army, then

operating as the Alamo Force, moved to Milne Bay, from which Operation

CHKONICLE, involving the Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, was launched

on 30 June (map 37). Medical supply support for Kiriwina was assigned to a

detachment of the 9th Medical Supply Depot while the medical supply officer

of the 52d Evacuation Hospital was responsible for medical supply on Woodlark. Although both operations were unopposed, participating personnel figuratively and literally got their feet wet by way of introduction to the peculiarities and problems of actual amphibious landings and operations on the Pacific

islands. Steady torrential rains made it difficult to locate, establish, and maintain operational supply points, or to preserve supplies and equipment. Also,

receipt and control of shipments without the necessary documentation became

more difficult as supply lines lengthened and transportation shortages were

added to administrative delays. Unorthodox methods were the rule in overcoming medical supply deficiencies.

Logistical problems were constant companions as the Alamo Force went

on to develop Milne and Oro Bays. During the early phases of these combat
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 453

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MAP 37.—Medical supply support for Operation CHRONICLE.

operations, some delays in acquiring supplies were rooted in the administrative

procedures. As an example, supplies requisitioned by the Sixth U.S. Army

with a request that they be earmarked for Army use in a specific operation

were receipted for and placed in base depots. Units, for which the supplies

were intended, were required to submit formal requisitions through the base

surgeon for editing and approval before supply action. In view of the usual

urgency circumscribing each operation, this added step was frustrating to the

medical units assigned to combat forces.

On 15 August 1943, Services of Supply assumed responsibility for

the buildup of Milne and Oro Bays from the Alamo Force which moved to

Goodenough Island. At about this same time, the Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army,

began augmenting both echelons of his supply staff as the first requisitioned

medical units began to arrive from the Zone of Interior. Warrant Officer (later

Lt.) Leslie C. Scott, MAC, who had been serving as medical supply officer

from the date of Sixth U.S. Army activation, was provided an assistant, Lt.

(later Capt.) Irwin Lee, MAC, who was assigned as the rear echelon liaison

officer. This arrangement ended abruptly on 8 December 1943 when Lieutenant

Scott succumbed to a heart attack, and Lieutenant Lee was quickly detailed to

the Alamo Force as his replacement. A permanent replacement for Lieutenant

Lee was not forthcoming until June when Lt. (later Maj.) John M. Hunt, Jr.,
454 MEDICAL SUPPLY

MSC, was ordered in to assist the stepped-up planning for the invasion of the

Philippines.10

Eighth U.S. Army Supply Activities

Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, was established at Lake Sentani in

September 1944. Col. John F. Bohlender, MC, Surgeon of the Advance Party,

Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, was succeeded by Col. (later Brig. Gen.)

George W Rice, MC, who had been in the Pacific ever since the early days of

the war.

Because the Eighth U.S. Army was scheduled to operate in the wake of

the Sixth U.S. Army in a mopping-up role, Colonel Eice directed his medical

supply officer, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Albert E. Minns, Jr., MAC, to make immediate contact with the Sixth U.S. Army medical supply officers to gain the

advantage of their experience, become acquainted with their modus operandi

and the status of medical supplies, and to assure that a cooperative spirit prevailed from the beginning. The first meeting with the medical supply personnel

of Sixth U.S. Army headquarters resulted in the establishment of the very

finest of working relationships which was to last throughout the war.

The Medical Supply Division, Eighth U.S. Army, consisted of two officers,

one warrant officer, and three enlisted men. Normal methods of obtaining supplies, when a unit was preparing for an operation, were usually sufficient, but

there were always urgent appeals for items that had been lost in shipment,

destroyed by enemy action, broken in normal usage, or forgotten in the preparation to move out. Movements of this kind were followed by immediate resupply action.

Colonel Eice, before being designated Surgeon, Eighth U.S. Army, was

adviser on medical matters in the G-4 section of General Headquarters. He

was thus familiar with the peculiarities and problems of logistics. He had seen

at firsthand how fast action could reduce or, in some instances, eliminate suffering and, in general, was acquainted with the medical supply situation. He

knew that emergencies would arise and expected his supply personnel to go to

almost any extreme to deal with them. This was both medical supply policy

and standing operating procedure for the Eighth U.S. Army.

In practice, when a radio request for medical supplies was received by the

Medical Section, Eighth U.S. Army headquarters, one of the two officers or

the warrant officer would be contacted regardless of the time of day or night.

The procedure from that point was to go to the nearest medical depot, pick up

the requested items immediately, tuck them under the arm of one of the supply

personnel, who would hitchhike by air to the nearest airstrip, then solicit rides

by vehicle or small craft to the final destination, and personally deliver the

items requisitioned. The courier usually would have delivered the material

within a few hours and returned to home base by the means used in making

the delivery.

10 See footnote 8 (1), p. 447.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 455

Trips to supply points were often dangerous. Sometimes, the planes were

not able to land either because of enemy action or because of excessive

mud. On some runs, due to the exigency of the need for the item being

delivered, the pilot would make a pass over the unit and the items would be

dropped in the unit's front yard. Official statistics do not show the tremendous

amounts moved forward in that manner.11

CHANGES IN THEATER SUPPLY PROCEDURES

Distribution Functions

In early 1944, a major change took place in supply procedure in Services

of Supply whereby all distribution functions of all services were lumped

together into two operating field agencies known as Distribution Division,

Headquarters, USASOS, at Sydney, under command of Lt. Col. John D.

Blair, MC, and the Distribution Division, Branch A, at Milne Bay, with Capt.

Leonard H. Kolb, MC, in command. In each of these, a medical section was

assigned under the supervision of well-qualified medical supply officers. As for

the medical supply division, this change was a crippling one, resulting in near

disaster. The establishment of the new system definitely hindered and played

havoc with the medical supply system.

The mission of the Distribution Division was to establish schedules to

assure the movement of supplies and equipment from the United States and

from Australia to New Guinea in accordance with requirements, effect distribution of supplies and equipment to maintain prescribed theater levels and

balanced stocks for the theater as a whole, control receipts and shipments to

assure proper distribution between Australia and New Guinea and between

base sections in Australia, requisition on the United States or Director of Procurement for supplies and equipment to maintain prescribed theater levels, and

prepare status of supply reports required by the Commanding General,

USASOS.

Distribution Branch A had a mission to establish schedules to assure movements of supplies and equipment between bases forward of the Australian

mainland in accordance with requirements; to effect distribution of supplies

and equipment to maintain prescribed levels and balanced stocks in bases forward of the Australian mainland; and to forward requisitions for critical and

controlled items to Headquarters, USASOS, and to the Director of Distribution, for all other supplies and equipment to maintain prescribed levels, provided such requisitions were not filled from bases forward of the Australian

mainland. The concern for strict uniformity in all services resulted in "hitching racehorses to mules." One of the semiannual medical requisitions was

delayed over 2 months lying around or being passed from one to another and

then finally returned for complete retyping to furnish extra copies for each

a

(1) Quarterly Reports, Eighth U.S. Army, June-December 1944. (2) See footnote 8(3),

p. 447. (3) Minns, Albert E., Jr.: Medical Supply, United States Eighth Army: New Guinea to

Japan. [Official record.]

295-453 O—68 31
456 MEDICAL SUPPLY

division. This created very serious and almost disastrous shortages later in

1944.

In New Guinea, the situation was even worse. Distribution Branch A at

Milne Bay was again merely another echelon, another obstacle in the headquarters maze. Bequisitions from units bounced around from subbases, to bases,

to Intersection headquarters, to Distribution Branch A, to the Australian

mainland to the Distribution Division, and back again through the same tortuous cycle. It was a wonder the consumers ever got anything at all.

U.S. Army Services of Supply General Depot

In late 1944, still another agency was created on top of all the others, the

USASOS General Depot, whose mission was to adjust maintenance factors,

control theater stock levels, and prepare requisitions on the United States. All

the technical services were represented in this agency. There were now two

completely independent agencies involved in stock control in the theater, one

for intratheater (Distribution Division) and one for control of theater levels

and requisitioning from the United States (USASOS General Depot). It was

intended that the latter would eventually become a true depot, responsible for

the actual physical handling of supplies.

With the creation of these two agencies, the Chief of Medical Supply,

USASOS, virtually ceased to have operating functions. All phases of stock

control, including control over critical items, were now out of his hands. Even

planning for future operations was done by one or the other of the two supply

agencies.

The USASOS General Depot, an independent agency, did accomplish

one useful purpose. A detailed study was initiated on maintenance factors. By

the end of 1944, approximately 700 items had been studied and factors revised

with very encouraging results later. Replacement factor studies were placed on

a continuing basis to further modify the existing factors as applied to actual

consumption in the Southwest Pacific Area.12

NEW GEORGIA CAMPAIGN

Planning the Assault

The initial medical supply plan for the New Georgia operation, scheduled

to begin in June 1943, was a joint responsibility of the 43d Infantry Division

and the Navy Task Force. The XIV Corps, on Guadalcanal, was charged with

the responsibility for furnishing the necessary medical supplies for the operation, but had no part in the planning.

The original plan provided that complete TBA equipment would be on

hand, plus such additional non-TBA equipment as was deemed necessary for

the operation. Sixty days' medical maintenance supplies were to be available,

30 days' supply to be carried by units, with the remainder in division reserve

M

See footnote 5(1), p. 444.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 457

to be forwarded as soon as practicable. It was also planned that a 60-day level

of medical maintenance supplies be maintained. Certain vital supplies, such as

sulfonamide drugs, dried blood plasma, intravenous saline, glucose solutions,

battle dressings, morphine Syrettes, and other items which were expected to

be expended at an abnormally high rate, were to be supplied in amounts 10

times the normal maintenance allowances. Individual jungle kits were to be

supplied on the basis of one per officer and medical department soldier and

one per four nonmedics. Antimalarial drugs were to be supplied for 60 days

and maintained at that level.

The Surgeon, XIV Corps, reported that duplication of requisitions resulted from an attempt to secure medical supplies in excess of anticipated

needs. Supplies came not only from Guadalcanal, but some were also sent

directly to the 43d Division from the rear. This procedure resulted in last minute confusion because of the all-out effort to fill all reasonable requests for

supplies. Supplies were not issued according to actual needs, but on a basis of

taking all that could be made available.

Problems of Supply Distribution

Because estimates of cubage and tonnage were made on the basis of days

of supplies rather than actual stocks on hand, units arrived on the beaches

with more impedimenta than could be accommodated on assigned water transportation. Many supplies were left on the beaches to follow at a later date.

The bulk of critically needed items did not accompany troops on their initial

move. Only a 10-day medical maintenance supply actually accompanied units

instead of the usual 30-day, and these were hopelessly mixed with rations, fuel,

and ammunition. Eadiographic requests for additional medical supplies took

almost 3 days to reach Guadalcanal. Emergency shipments had to be flown

to New Georgia.

The division medical supply officer, left at the Russell Islands to service

the garrison there and other small garrisons at Wickham, Viru, and Segi,

finally came in on his own initiative, but brought with him none of the 75

tons of supplies stored on the Russells. These were finally sent on 5 August

1943. In the meantime, a 30-day medical maintenance allowance had been sent

from Guadalcanal. Despite the obvious mishandling of supplies, medical service of the 43d Division was not impaired.

It was learned in this operation that a definite supply level must be established and maintained, but without any excess that might hamper movement.

Containers must be properly marked to show quantity and nature of contents

and critical items must be separated and left in the hands of medical department personnel. A medical supply dump had to be established under adequate

supervision with a central location for reserve supplies. Sufficient personnel

to handle supplies properly was also a necessity.13

13 See footnote 1(3), p. 432.
458 MEDICAL SUPPLY

THE

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MAP 38.—Medical supply in the New Georgia campaign, 5 September 1943.

Medical Supply Support in the Field

The 17th Field Hospital, which arrived on New Georgia on 4 September

1943, after the island was secured, found that it was short of litters and biologicals and, upon request, received a medical maintenance unit with allowances

for 5,000 men for 30 days from Guadalcanal. Until the medical depot was

established by an advance section of the 23d Medical Depot on 8 September,

the 17th Field Hospital served as the storage and distribution point for corps

medical supplies (map 38). These supplies, consisting of biologicals, litters,

antimalarial drugs, and various insecticides, were then transferred to the depot

and, along with the 30 days' supply brought by the depot unit, provided the

source of supplies for all Army units at the base. When the 37th Infantry Division moved to the rear, they were instructed by the Surgeon, XIV Corps, to

turn in all surplus medical supplies and unserviceable equipment to the 23d
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 459

Medical Depot. This obviated the possibility that many supplies might be

discarded and scattered. As the units moved out, approximately 30 tons of

supplies, many critical items, were turned in."

ALEUTIAN ISLANDS CAMPAIGN

While the Japanese offensive in the South and Southwest Pacific was

being contained in New Guinea and the Solomons, the Japanese, who had

moved into the Aleutians15in the summer and fall of 1942 and occupied

Kiska and Attu, were posing a threat to the Alaskan mainland.

On 1 April 1943, a joint directive from Commander in Chief, Pacific, and

Commanding General, Western Defense Command, ordered the elimination

of the Japanese and the occupation of Attu. Directives were issued to organize

a joint Army and Navy force, under overall Navy command. The nucleus of

the Army component was to be the 7th Infantry Division.

Planning the Assault on Attu

Late in March 1943, Maj. (later Col.) Laurence A. Potter, MC, Commander, 7th Division Medical Battalion, was recalled from a training exercise

aboard ship off San Diego, and returned to the home station of the division,

Fort Ord, Calif. Upon arrival, he (in private session with the commanding

general of the division) was informed that he was to become Surgeon, 7th

Infantry Division; that the division would form an independent task force

for 'the recapture of Attu from the Japanese; that he, the surgeon, would go

immediately to Headquarters, Fourth U.S. Army, in San Francisco, to plan

the medical support, and prepare and submit requisitions to assure that the

flow of supplies and equipment to the docks would begin in less than 10 days ;

that he could take no one from the medical service of the division with him,

nor could he discuss with any medical service person in the division the mission or any of its requirements. Neither the medical supply officer, Capt. (later

Lt. Col.) Leland H. Barton, MAC, nor his assistant, Capt. Horace D. Worley,

MAC, was to be informed in any way of the mission.

Colonel Potter, Surgeon, 7th Infantry Division, acting as his own medical

supply officer, proceeded to Headquarters, Fourth U.S. Army, and was briefed

further with other division staff officers similarly restricted. After the general

briefing, he was briefed separately by the Surgeon, Fourth U.S. Army. With

the able assistance of members of the Fourth U.S. Army surgeon's office and

in particular of Lt. Col. Bernard N. Kiordan, MAC, 175 separate requisitions

were prepared and submitted to the San Francisco Medical Depot in 36

"(1) Annual Report, 17th Field Hospital, South Pacific Area, 1943. (2) See footnote 1(3).

p. 432.

15 This section on medical support in the Aleutian Islands Campaign and on support of the

Alaskan Garrison is based on the following documents: (1) Annual Report, Medical Department

Activities, 7th Infantry Division, 7 Jan. 1944. (2) McNeil, Gordon H.: History of the Medical

Department in Alaska in World War II. [Official record.] (3) Annual Report, Surgeon, Alaska

Defense Command, 1942. (4) Annual Reports, Surgeon, Alaska Department, 1943 and 1944. (5)

Personal recollections of Lt. Col. Laurence A. Potter, MC, Surgeon, 7th Infantry Division.
4ßÖ MEDICAL SUPPLY

hours. A separate requisition was prepared for each stage of unloading of each

ship carrying Army troops and Army cargo. Each attack transport was combat loaded for sequential discharge of a fighting force and its supporting elements, composed of battalion landing teams.

The medical supplies for the 15,000-man task force were divided into

two 3-month groups. One group of supplies was carried on two cargo ships,

and the other group was carried on the personnel and cargo carriers to supply

units as they landed and progressed inland. They were divided into three elements for progressive discharge, 15 days carried by the units going ashore, 15

days for early unloading, and 60 days for late discharge.

The two field hospitals that provided hospitalization for the task force

were non-TOE outfits, each short on equipment because there had been no time

to supply all needed items before departure. Plans for the proper disposition

of supplies and equipment were not discussed in detail until the task force was

aboard ship and underway.

Supply Support of the Attu Landings

On 4 May 1943, the invasion force left Cold Bay, landing ät two widely

separated points on Attu in a dense fog on 11 May after several days' delay

because of bad weather. For the entire 21-day period required to secure the

island, it was necessary to provide medical supplies separately for each of

these two combat elements. The central supply base was with the headquarters

section of the organic medical battalion, whose supply officer served both the

battalion and the division. All medical supplies received during the 7th Division's 4-month stay on Attu were in the form of medical maintenance units

(fig. 117).

Supply Operations on Attu

In the initial stages of the operation on Attu, all equipment and supplies

had to be hand-carried inland (map 39). Chests and rucksacks were necessarily

left behind, to be brought forward by returning litter bearers as resupply.

Much of the equipment, of course, would have been useless in any event, as

tents drew enemy fire.

Because of the rugged terrain of Attu, rising sharply out of gluey mud,

medical supply of the infantry battalions was extremely difficult and hazardous. Eventually, bulldozers were able to peel tundra down to the volcanic

gravel of the island and provide a trail over which heavy trailers and sleds

could be pulled for the movement of supplies (fig. 118).

Scheduled medical maintenance units arrived soon after the initial assault

and were used to support the 400-bed semipermanent hospital for the garrison

and preparations being made for the Kiska operation.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 461

W'\

MJsaSfcj

FIGURE 117.—Supplies piled on the beach at Attu, Aleutian Islands, 20 May 1943.

Medical Supply for the Kiska Assault

While the Attu operation was still in progress, planning began for the

invasion of the neighboring island of Kiska. In late April 1943, units of the

7th Infantry Division which had not participated in the Attu operation were

joined at Adak with the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the 17th Infantry

Eegiment, and the 53d Infantry Eegiment (Composite) of the Alaska Defense

Command.

One of the important features of the training program, both at Fort Ord

and later at Adak, was the emphasis given to the lessons learned at Attu.

Keports and other material from Attu were made available, and the advice

of those who had participated in that battle was eagerly sought.

To provide support for the battalion landing groups, the medical service

force of 3,000 men was decentralized and divided to make each landing group

medically self-sufficient and self-sustaining. Clearing stations and field hospitals were to be set up initially in the vicinity of the beach, and the initial 3-

day supply for all but field hospital units was to be backpacked ashore in

rucksacks and on packboards, with additional supplies and organizational

equipment combat loaded for early debarkation. Individual medical kits were

expanded, with each officer carrying two pouches, in one of which was a unit

of dried plasma. A 30-day maintenance supply was combat loaded on each
462 MEDICAL SUPPLY

i -

h /

y A T T u

J ^l

I

'je^j:

L

»nlBBe

MAP 39.—Medical supply support in the Attu campaign, 4 May 1943.

transport ship, and, in addition, a 60-day maintenance supply was loaded on

cargo vessels. A medical supply dump was to be established on each beach to

handle these supplies (map 40).

It was considered a possibility that isolated units which might not have

the services of a medical officer would need emergency medical supplies. To

meet such an eventuality, 58 medical parachute packs were prepared, packed

in 5-gallon milk cans, and turned over to the Air Forces for delivery when

necessary. Each pack contained morphine tartrate Syrettes, heat pads and

refills, large and small first aid dressings, gauze bandage, muslin bandage,

adhesive plaster, paregoric tablets, pentobarbital sodium capsules, sulfanilamide crystals, and a brief list of instructions.

Operational plans for the assault called for the unloading of all types of

supplies for the various branches of the Air Forces as rapidly as possible, in

view of the possibility that the ships might suddenly have to leave the island.

Large dumps of supplies, indiscriminately mixed, soon piled up on the narrow, muddy beaches. Segregation of organizational equipment had been

planned, but the system did not work. It became practically impossible to find

much of the necessary equipment for the field hospitals, as all kinds of organizational supplies and equipment had been dumped on the beaches.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 463

FIGURE 118.—Tractor bogged down in mud at Massacre Bay, Attu, 16 May 1943.

In one instance, it took 2 days to locate certain hospital equipment, which

it was then possible to move by Caterpillar tractor only as far as an intervening creek. From that point, it had to be manhandled another 450 or 500 yards

and finally hauled up a 50-foot embankment by rope.

The problems of gathering and properly caring for the widely dispersed

medical supplies were numerous. A large number of medical maintenance units

had been landed at North Beach, Gertrude Cove, and Kiska Harbor in addition to the other beaches. The almost complete lack of transportation had complicated the problem from the beginning, and tons of heavy equipment had

to be moved by hand. The establishment of medical supply dumps in the main

camp and in the Gertrude Cove area was handicapped by a shortage of lumber and cover, as well as a shortage of trained personnel (map 39). The organizational equipment of the field hospitals and of the Canadian and American

medical units had to be retrieved and cared for by the Air Forces medical supply officer. Poorly marked and packed equipment added further complications,

along with the large amount of pilfering which occurred. Further, the medical

supply dump was moved four times on orders from higher authority before

it was permanently located.
m MEDIOAL SUPPLY'

ÄTT'J

NEAR IS.

**<

V0 100 KLMS

f. Little Kiska

'-"^Wll I.

10 KILOMETERS

JAS

MAP 40.—Medical supply on Kiska.

ALASKAN GARRISON, 1943-44

Problems of Supply Organization

The surgeon of the Alaskan theater, who was responsible for medical

supply, was handicapped in his operation because he had to comply with the

policies and procedures of three levels of command in addition to his own:

the War Department, The Surgeon General, and the Overseas Supply Branch,

Seattle Port of Embarkation.16

The necessity to function from one end of the territory of Attu, which

is 3,201 air miles from Seattle by way of Fort Eichardson, to Annette Island,

702 miles from Seattle, was also a distinct handicap. Despite the central location of Fort Richardson, the distance to the more remote posts was formidable.

This isolation of posts made it sometimes impossible to maintain the

required quarterly and weekly reports on medical supply. An inventory of

all medical supplies and equipment on hand as of 31 December 1942 was

ordered by the theater surgeon in an effort to obtain an up-to-date and accu16 See footnote 15, p. 459.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 465

rate picture of the status of supplies in the command, and to provide the

supply agencies in the United States with the required and pertinent information.

Supply Procedures

Initial requisitions for equipping a new station hospital were prepared

and submitted by the Surgeon, Alaska Defense Command, or by a higher

echelon of command which had assumed responsibility for the supply of the

initial troop movement. In most instances, the Overseas Supply Branch,

Seattle Port of Embarkation, acting on the recommendation of the Surgeon

and available information concerning the strength of new stations and the

plans for hospitalization, initiated the necessary requisitions for equipment

and supplies, including medical maintenance units to provide a sufficient margin of maintenance for isolated Alaskan posts. Beginning in 1943, control over

this initial planning passed into the hands of the theater surgeon, who

assumed the responsibility for the medical equipment and supplies for the

new stations established during that year.

In the early period, the function of the theater surgeon in the maintenance of adequate resupply was limited. By means of the medical maintenance unit, automatic shipment was made by the Seattle Port of Embarkation

to each of the stations in Alaska from the summer of 1942 until November

1943. It was then discontinued on the recommendation of the theater surgeon

because operating conditions made a requisition system more desirable and

possible. The surgeon, however, had stated: "Without this Unit it remains

doubtful whether medical supplies would have been on hand at the critical

time."

Requisitions submitted for supplies in excess or not supplied by medical

maintenance units received a preliminary editing in the surgeon's office and

were then forwarded to the Seattle Port of Embarkation for further editing

or submitted to The Surgeon General for a final decision. The theater surgeon

in editing requisitions followed a policy of limiting special requisitions according to existing conditions.

Levels of Supply

On 4 August 1943, new supply levels were authorized. Group I (for

easily accessible stations) was set at 30 days' operating, 60 days' reserve;

group II (the majority of Alaskan stations), 30 days' operating, and 180

days' reserve; and group III (icebound), 270 days' operating and 180 days'

reserve. Subsequent changes were made in these levels to reduce the prescribed figures as supply procedures became more regular. On 30 December

1944, the following levels for classes II and IV supplies were announced: Nome

and Galena (icebound), 300 days; Shemya Island (inadequate harbor facilities), 210 days; and for all other stations, 105 days.
466 MEDICAL SUPPLY

*^mJ

FIGURE 119.—Arctic first aid kit.

Experimenting With Medical Supplies

The Experimental Board, Alaskan Department, which had been established during 1941 to conduct tests during maneuvers, conducted experiments

to determine the appropriate items to be contained in chests and kits needed

by small detachments. These kits when developed were confirmed by their

use in the 1944 maneuvers (fig. 119).

To determine the effects of freezing on common medical supplies, an

extensive test was conducted in February 1943. Eighty-nine items, mostly

Medical Catalog classes 1 and 9, were subjected to a temperature of — 20°F.,

and then thawed and examined for any changes. Many of the items suffered

no ill effects although frozen solid. For example, 50 units of blood plasma

were subjected to freezing temperatures and the distilled water was frozen

solid in the bottles. Only a very few bottles were cracked and, although the

rubber stoppers were raised about y8 inch, no seals were broken. There was

no precipitation or other obvious change in the appearance of the distilled
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 467

water. Another test with medical supply implications showed that the batteries for medical instruments froze and became useless when exposed to

the extremely low temperatures.

The Deemphasis and Closing Down of the Alaskan Theater

After the elimination of the Japanese from the Aleutians, the War

Department ordered a drastic reduction in the command from a peak strength

of 147,000 in 1943 to approximately 50,000 by the end of 1944. Of the 34

posts activated during the period 1940^3, only 11 posts were large enough

to have station hospitals. This introduced the problems peculiar to closing

installations, packing and crating, and disposition of excesses in the wake of

a reduced strength. At the outset, stations shipped surpluses directly to the

Zone of Interior, but it was found more proficient to have the stations report

their surpluses by radio to the surgeon at Fort Kichardson. Thereafter,

reports were screened for lateral distribution before the surgeon reported the

items to the Zone of Interior as surplus.

BOUGAINVILLE CAMPAIGN

Planning the Campaign

While the Japanese were being driven from the Aleutians, thus removing the threat to the Alaskan mainland, American forces moved on Bougainville, the largest and most northerly island of the Solomons group. The invasion was launched on 1 November 1943 by the 3d Marine Division. A week

later, the first elements of the 37th Infantry Division joined the battle, which

became exclusively an Army affair when the Americal Division relieved the

Marines in the latter part of December. Supply support for the 37th Division

was carefully planned on the basis of that unit's own experience in the New

Georgia campaign. Each element was supplied with 10 days' maintenance,

including special items required by local conditions, so that each would be

self-sustaining. Nondivisional units, although they requested many items of

medical supply, received only those that did not interfere with the 37th Division supply needs.

Supply of Replacement Units

The Americal Division arrived on Bougainville in 1943 with a 90-day

supply of medical items (fig. 120). A 30-day supply was carried by each

infantry combat team, and a 30-day supply for the entire division was brought

in with the division medical supply of the medical battalion (map 41).

Since it was generally difficult to obtain emergency medical supplies by

air from Guadalcanal, certain items believed to be most valuable were added

to the equipment of the clearing company. Most important were the autoclaves, anesthesia machines, aspirator, laryngoscopes, X-ray equipment,

demountable fracture table, laboratory incubator, and refrigerator.
468 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 120.—Surgical team that arrived via SCAT plane on Bougainville is loading

its equipment on a jeep for delivery to forward area of operation.

By February 1944, the medical maintenance unit method of supply had

been replaced by the requisition from the service command.

Because of last minute loading, schedule changes resulted in leaving

much equipment and medical supplies at the staging areas. When these supplies were most needed at the time of landing, they were not available. Base

medical supply in the combat area was not set up for 2 or 3 months after the

beginning of the operation.17

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

Early in 1943, following a period of rebuilding and expansion, the

Hawaiian Department became a huge staging area for a number of infantry

divisions which would later participate in numerous assaults on strategic

Pacific islands. On 14 August 1943, the Hawaiian Department, previously

expanded to include Midway, Christmas, and Canton Islands, was redesignated the Central Pacific Area.

17 See footnote 1 (3), p. 432.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 469

30 40 MILES

.L

0 10 20 30 40 KILOMETERS

BOUGAINVILLE

ISLAND

. • ^- Sf

SHORTLAND I^XS^"3

JAS

MAP 41.—Medical supply support of the Bougainville campaign, 1943.

Supply Support of Operation GALVANIC

The Gilbert Islands, located approximately 2,400 miles west of the island

of Oahu, were chosen as the target for the first assault launched in the midPacific.

The 27th Infantry Division, in this joint Army, Navy, and Marine Corps

operation, was given the objective of assaulting Makin Atoll on 15 November

1943. In this amphibious assault, the most essential medical supplies were

removed from Medical Department chests, packed in canvas containers, and
470 MEDICAL SUPPLY

1

140

1

1

160°

I 1 1

0

1

200 400 600

I I I MILES

— 20°— 20°—

»Wake

MARIANAS •'_

.' ffi(l5 Jun 1944)

Saipan' v^

Tinian ° -^

» (44(21 July 1944)

ISLANDS nir-^ 9

17 Feb 1944)

MARSHALL

Eniwetok '

.." ff)(l Feb 1944)

ffi(l5Sept 1944)"" • ,." -^7'"- -:: -.

::, ISLANDS

\ t (]3(2l-22 Sept 1944) ... :,' < :' ;: ;

Angaur Peleliu

•'. PALAU IS. - £R(l5Novl943)

s'Makin

1 „ 1 . GILBERT IS.v

140 160

1 S . JAS

MAP 42.—Operations in the mid-Pacific, 1943-44.

carried on the backs of medical personnel. The battalion aid station operated

for about 5 hours, using the supplies contained in these canvas bags before

more supplies became available in quantity.

Supplies and equipment were also carried in jeeps equipped with litter

frames, which had been priority loaded in the holds of the ships. Equipment

sufficient for a 50-bed clearing station had been loaded for each clearing platoon. Extra instruments, cots, blankets, an electric portable suction apparatus

powered by a small generator, and an 8-cu. ft. kerosene refrigerator, as well

as supplies for 10 days based on a 20-percent casualty rate, made up the

equipment.

This equipment was successfully unloaded on one of the assault beaches.

It was followed by medical maintenance units, divided into 10-day and 20-day

increments packed in special boxes not weighing over 100 pounds, so they

could be easily handled. By D+4, supplies were collected and brought inland

to a central dump at Hen Village. Eesupply was in two sections, each a cross

section of a medical maintenance unit. Three 10-day cross sections, one for

each battalion landing team, were carried on the ships with the troops and

turned over to the battalion supply officers upon landing. Two 15-day cross

sections, loaded on two different ships,, remained in division control upon

landing (map 42).18

18 (1) See footnote 1(3), p. 432. (2) Annual Report, Surgeon, 27th Infantry Division, 1944.

(3) Essential Technical Medical Data, United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area, for

February 1944, dated 5 'Mar. 1944. Inclosure 1, subject: Medical Service in Amphibious Operations.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 471

Support of the Marshalls Campaign

After the successful invasion and capture of Makin and Tarawa in the

Gilbert Islands, attention was focused in January 1944 on the Marshall

Islands. Kwajalein, the largest of 80 islands and islets, was the target for a

combined Army and Marine assault. The 7th Infantry Division, veteran of

the Aleutian Islands Campaign, was assigned the responsibility of capturing

the southern half of Kwajalein Atoll and also Majuro.

As they did in the assault on the Gilbert Islands (Operation GALVANIC), medical personnel carried most of the essential supplies on their

backs. Among the successfully used carrying devices were rucksacks, waterproofed standard packboards, and BAE (battery acquisition radar) belts.

Medical sections were supplied varying amounts of plasma according to

their projected needs. A total number of 1,156 units was carried by the task

force. In addition, 1,000 morphine tartrate Syrettes were issued to medical

personnel with each company aidman carrying 10 (map 42).

Platoons of the clearing company embarked separately, each with a battalion landing team. Each clearing platoon carried 20 litters, 2 blankets, 1 splint

set, and 9 waterproofed boxes containing medical supplies, additional blankets, cots, and an electric portable suction machine. An electric refrigerator

and other valuable pieces of equipment were carried by each clearing platoon to establish an effective surgical unit and, if necessary, a 200-bed hospital.

Medical maintenance for the assault forces consisted of an accompanying shipment of 30 days' supply divided into two lots, one for 10 days and

one for 20 days, both loaded for the assault. These units came ashore in

excellent condition because of the care taken in packing boxes and in using

waterproof paper and pallets. The medical maintenance unit for the resupply

of the assault forces consisted of an accompanying shipment of 30 days' supply which was divided into ten 10-day lots, each of which accompanied a battalion landing team and division artillery. The 20-day lot for medical

detachments and hospital units was subdivided into two units of 10 days each

for 7,500 men. All nonessential items were eliminated from these supplies,

which were packed in 18- and 22- by 30-inch boxes and palletized.

Nine shore parties, assigned to the 7th Infantry Division to handle combat supplies, began functioning on the Kwajalein beaches on 1 February 1944,

D + l. Eesupply of aid stations was successfully accomplished by ambulances

and litter bearers who brought up supplies on their return from the rear. Because of this system, medical maintenance units did not have to be used in

the early stages of the operation.

The addition of blood transfusion equipment in the clearing company

saved many lives. It was noted that advance medical units should carry

L-splints in place of Thomas splints, one jet Coleman gas-burning stove,

tarpaulins, and at least 18 litters and blankets. It was also recommended that

more refined gauze compresses be used in lieu of the smaller Carlisle dressings.

293-453 0—68 32
472 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

Waterproofing was found to be most essential in the preservation of supplies

and equipment.

After the successful elimination of the Japanese from Kwajalein, field

supplies left by tactical units were used for some time. An excess of supplies

was experienced in the 31st Field Hospital and also in the 1st Station Hospital. Supplies were issued regularly every Tuesday except for emergency supplies which were issued as requested. To offset the deterioration of supplies

caused by salt water spray, rain, and high winds, a program of lubrication

and protection of surgical instruments was established. A medical supply

subdepot was established at Provisional Station Hospital No. 2 with direct

support coming from the 5th Medical Supply Depot in Hawaii.19

Medical Supply Activities on Eniwetok

The assault on Eniwetok, essentially a Marine operation, began on 17

February 1944 (map 42). Elements of the 106th Eegimental Combat Team

of the 27th Infantry Division supported the Marines and were instrumental

in the capture of Eniwetok Island itself.

All medical units of the 106th Eegimental Combat Team carried plasma,

battle dressings, morphine Syrettes, and sulfanilamide powder. The provisional portable surgical hospital was equipped with instrument sets, a portable electric suction machine, a portable orthopedic table, operating lamps,

a ll/2-kilowatt electric power unit, and a complete set of blood transfusion

apparatus. Its clearing company carried enough extra equipment to care for

400 patients.

The collecting platoons and battalion medical sections carried their

essential supplies with them when they landed. Eesupply of aid stations was

through the regimental aid station using a battalion landing team medical

maintenance unit, and by property exchange with the collecting platoons and

the naval beach party in the early days of the operation, avoiding embarrassment which might have occurred because of delays in the landing of supplies.

Each battalion landing team carried a 7-day medical maintenance unit

in the assault personnel carrier, and a 30-day unit, all boxed and palletized,

was on the cargo vessel. As a result of this and previous operations, the

medical maintenance unit was streamlined and a standard special list of

equipment was developed by the Central Pacific Base Command consisting

of items in excess of TOE's that would be needed to support a particular

operation. These lists served to standardize authorizations for requisitioning

materials and were subject to modifications as experience dictated.

Modification of the medical pouch by better waterproofing and enlarging

was recommended after the Eniwetok campaign. The subsequent adoption of

this modification made it unnecessary to carry the 3-day medical supply of

plasma, sulfanilamide dressings, and morphine previously required.20

18 (1) See footnote 1(3), p. 432. (2) Report, Surgeon, 7th Infantry Division, to the Surgeon, united

States Army in the Central Pacific Area, 27 Mar. 1944, subject: Medical Report, 7th Infantry Division,

Reinforced, "Flintlock" Operations. (3) Annual Report, Army Garrison Forces, Kwajalein, 1944.

20 See footnote 1(3), p. 432.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 473

Medical Supplies for Operation FORAGER

The strategically placed Marianas Islands were selected as the next U.S.

target in the mid-Pacific. An attack force consisting of the 2d and 4th Marine

Divisions, backed up by the 27th Infantry Division, landed on Saipan Island

on 15 June, covered by units of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The intensity of the

fighting brought the 27th into action earlier than anticipated.

Medical supplies for the assault either were carried in waterproofed bags

on the backs of aid personnel, or were loaded on jeeps with litter frames.

Supplies for the second echelon medical personnel were priority loaded on

14,-ton trucks, which were unloaded first, and 2l/2-ton trucks for the hospitalization units, or palletized in 2- by 2- by 3-foot boxes which had been loaded

as broken stowage (fig. 121).

To facilitate handling, supply items were further divided into groups

"A" and "B." The "A" group consisted of items needed initially by a battalion

surgeon or a collecting station. This group, because it would be rapidly consumed, was given high priority in both loading and unloading. The "B"

group consisted of items needed primarily by hospitalization units and would

probably not be needed for at least 72 hours. This group required only normal unloading. Packing lists were given to each medical officer, and each box

was numbered in the event that the pallets were unloaded on the wrong

beaches.21

Special items to be used in Operation FORAGER were prepared by the

Surgeon's Office, Central Pacific Area. Jungle kits for all Army assault forces

and pack equipment for medical assault elements were approved for use.

All units carried a 10-day medical supply, and the field hospital carried

an additional 20 days' maintenance. Supplies for the 27th Infantry Division

were so packed that 10 days' supply would land with the assault forces and

20 days' supply would be delivered later to service echelons of the divisions

for issue to units in the field. Each first and second echelon medical unit carried organically a 1-day reserve of certain rapidly expendable items, such as

plasma, morphine Syrettes, and first aid dressings. The clearing company carried a 3-day reserve so that resupply would not be necessary immediately

when the division would be operating from dumps along the shore.

Equipment other than the initial combat equipment, which generally

proved to be adequate, was landed between 48 and 72 hours after the hospitalization platoons. Combat-loaded 21^-ton and 1,4-ton trucks, landed a few

hours after the combat troops, in some instances lost 5 to 10 percent of the

major items of equipment either in transit or on the beaches. The late landing

and slow procurement of organizational equipment and supplies created a

heavy initial demand on division maintenance supplies and so depleted the

stock of certain items that they had to be drawn from the garrison forces.

Resupply to the Marianas was placed in action by 20 June and was

accomplished by automatic block shipments consisting of 3,000-men, 30-day

a

See footnote 1 (3), p. 432.
474 MEDIOA.L SUPPLY

FIGURE 121.—Medical supply dump on Saipan.

maintenance units, modified from time to time according to the requests of

the island surgeon for Saipan. Emergency resupply was on air shipment by

emergency requisition.

Medical resupply in first and second echelon units was effected by

request through channels from battalion aid stations to the collecting stations,

to the clearing stations, to the division medical supply dump, or, in some

instances, to the field hospitals. The supplies were then brought forward by

ambulances returning from the rear. Because the activities of the regimental

aid stations were limited, they were able to replenish supplies of battalion aid

stations. The portable surgical hospitals were resupplied by the organization

to which they were attached.

Only once when property exchange between the hospitals ashore and the

hospital ships faltered did this method of resupply break down. Litters and

blankets often remained too long Math the dead at the cemetery, and when a

heavy volume of casualties drained the supply of litters and blankets, these

became the most critical items of supply. Patients had to be evacuated in

makeshift litters. The shortage was corrected several days later when the

volume of casualties decreased and the litters from cemeteries were reissued.

Shortages of intravenous sets, whole blood, X-ray machines, generators,
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 475

and washing machines were notable. Salt water and high humidity rendered

generators and X-ray machines useless.

The organizational equipment of a 400-bed field hospital was not sufficient when it had to be expanded to 900 beds. On the other hand, the clearing

company found itself overburdened with supplies and understaffed with personnel in many instances. Because of this situation, most of its equipment and

supplies had to be left at a beach dump.

The medical supply officer of the Army Garrison Force, Saipan, arrived

on D+10 and set forth with his medical supply sergeant, who had arrived

earlier, to comb the beaches for scattered supplies. By 27 June, supplies had

been accumulated at the temporary dump and were issued to troops.

To alleviate the shortage of personnel, eight men from various detachments were assigned to the Army Garrison Force Depot. Troops of a medical

sanitary company were used as stevedores.

Early in July, the supply dump was moved to its permanent location at

Magicienne Bay where supplies were stacked on dunnage and covered by a

tarpaulin. Some time later, a frame building was constructed for use as a

narcotic vault.

Supply activities of the Army Garrison Force Depot included the salvaging and issue to civilians of captured Japanese medical supplies, the rehabilitation of the 27th Division before departure from Saipan, aiding the 77th

Division before departure from Guam, and processing requisitions from

Guam, Tinian, and later Angaur, Peleliu Island, and Ulithi.

After Saipan, the next target was Guam, where the assault units, the 3d

Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, were supported by

the 77th Infantry Division. In the Guam landings, quantities of medical

equipment and supplies, including a large number of cots, were lost. As a

result, the sick and wounded had to be placed on the ground. Much equipment

was water-soaked and broken in the initial assault which occurred on 21 July

1944, less than 1 week after Saipan. Because of the barrier reef and deep

water, difficulty in landing and unloading supplies was experienced. Despite

initial problems, the type and amount of medical supplies on hand for the

operation was adequate.

The capture of Tinian, the sister island of Saipan, was the third phase

of Operation FOKAGER. The Northern Attack Force, composed of the 2d

and 4th Marine Divisions and elements of the 27th Infantry Division,

launched the attack on 24 July.

As Tinian was close to Saipan, casualties were shipped directly to Saipan

with LST's serving as hospital ships. Approximately 2,400 beds were made

available on Saipan for the Tinian campaign. The only Army units that

actually landed on Tinian were one battery from the 106th Field Artillery

Battalion of the 27th Division Artillery and an engineer battalion. Because of

the limited Army participation in the Tinian campaign, no drastic supply

problems were encountered.
476 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

Support for the Palau Campaign

Capture of the Palau Island Group by American forces was essential to

provide a Western Pacific airstrip for operations against the retreating Japanese. Again, as in previous operations, supplies were priority loaded with

the basic load, a 3-day medical supply, being carried in by medical personnel

or loaded on jeeps. A floating reserve consisted of a 10-day medical supply

per each battalion landing team and a 20-day supply loaded aboard ship as

broken stowage.

During the assault on Angaur Island by the 81st Infantry Division on 17

September, the "weasel" proved impractical as it threw its tracks on the rough

terrain. Jeeps were used successfully in movement of patients and supplies.

The beachmaster directed the unloading of the palletized supplies, which were

brought ashore in LVT's (tracked landing vehicles), DUKW's (amphibious

trucks, 21/2-ton cargo), and other landing vehicles. Supplies were unloaded by

hand until cranes were brought ashore sometime later (fig. 122). Medical battalion personnel collected all medical supplies in a central area and moved

them as rapidly as possible to a medical supply dump. Many containers were

discovered broken open and certain items, such as cots, litters, and alcohol,

were pilfered. A satisfactory property exchange with the naval beach section

made needed dressings, plasma, blankets, and litters available.

Division medical resupply was established on a 30-day basis, palletized,

and located according to size of unit and the length of time the supplies were

to last. One pallet weighing a ton supplied 2,000 men for 10 days. Two additional pallets of this size were set up for division special troops and reserve.

A 20-day resupply for 7,500 men was set up on four pallets. An extra six pallets of medical supplies and one pallet of food were carried by each clearing

platoon. Resupply of litters and blankets worked satisfactorily as did the resupply all down the line.

In this operation, it was evident that there was a need for an additional

2%-ton, 6X6 truck with a 1-ton trailer, one %-ton truck with water trailer,

and one 14-ton truck. There also was evidence that salt tablets needed to be

kept dry in a waterproof container.

In the Peleliu operation, the 321st Regimental Combat Team took only a

small amount of supplies with them on the initial assault. Difficulty in unloading cargo from the ships forced the unit to borrow supplies from the Marines.

Absence of proper laundering and sterilizing equipment handicapped operation

in the clearing station until a field sterilizer was sent from the 17th Field

Hospital.

Owing to the absence of enemy troops on Ulithi Atoll, which was seized

on 21-22 September, no problems of medical supply were encountered.22

22 See footnote 1 (3), p. 432.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 477

FIGURE 122.—Docks at Bed Beach, Angaur, showing unloading of supplies,

September 1944.

Improvements in Medical Supply

As a result of the experience gained in combat operations during 1944,

waterproofing and packaging techniques improved, timely computations of

the total TOE requirements were more thoroughly checked against depot

stocks, and shortages were submitted as a bill of materials to the War Department for approval. The dispatching of separate requisitions which reflected the

date, place, and time that the approved items would be needed expedited delivery of the materials to the using units before their deployment. Recognizing

that the standard medical maintenance unit was not exactly suited for garrison

needs, the Central Pacific Base Command in October 1944 compiled a modified

equipment list, "Annex H Medical Maintenance Unit, Ten Thousand Men, 30

days," which was submitted to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation for

subsequent delivery to advance bases as determined by the command. In addition, a medical maintenance unit was developed by the command to fill the

demand for a streamlined block of medical supplies to accompany small groups

of personnel moving to forward bases. By utilizing these new medical mainte-
478 MBDIOAL SUPPLY

nance units, medical supplies were dispersed more nearly on a per capita

basis.23

Transition to Requisitioning in the Mid-Pacific

Experience resulting from the Marianas and the Palau operations in mid1944 revealed that garrison forces were incapable of predicting and preparing

the necessary requisitions for supply requirements immediately subsequent to

the termination of automatic supply. This stemmed from the fact that resupply requirements had to be initiated at such an early date after the islands

had been secured that the stock records in force were not accurate for requisitioning purposes, nor was the medical supply staff often sufficiently informed

of current conditions to enable it to compile requisitions at such an early date.

To circumvent this condition, a plan was exercised whereby the supply section

of the Surgeon's Office, Central Pacific Base Command, in consultation with

the task force surgeon, prepared initial requisitions and a phasing schedule

before the departure of the garrison force. The items and quantities were based

upon past consumption tables prepared in the medical supply section of the

Central Pacific Base Command as well as the considerations of the task force

surgeon.24

VOORHEES MISSION TO THE PACIFIC

Organization of the Survey Team

In the fall of 1944, a survey team headed by Col. Tracy S. Voorhees,

JAGD, was sent by the Surgeon General's Office to the Pacific to make a survey of medical supply similar to the one performed in the European theater

during February 1944.25

Colonel Voorhees was accompanied by Mr. Charles W. Harris, Deputy

Chief of Supply for Storage, Surgeon General's Office, Lt. Col. Louis F. Williams, MSC, and Maj. Gordon S. Kjolsrud, MAC, of the Medical Branch,

Overseas Supply Division of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

Survey of the Supply Situation in Hawaii

Arriving in Hawaii in early October 1944, the Voorhees team inspected

depots on the islands of Hawaii, Kauai, and Maui and concluded, because of

the excellent steamer service from Oahu, the site of the 5th Medical Supply

Depot, that depots and warehouses were not needed on those outer islands.

Great excesses and much old stock were stored in these depots following the

old principle of dispersion invoked after Pearl Harbor.

23 (1) See footnote 1(3), p. 432. (2) Manuscript, covering medical supply in the Hawaiian

Department, the Central Pacific, and Pacific Ocean Areas, prepared for a preliminary draft of this

volume by Maj. Gen. Paul H. Streit, USA (Ret.), and Lt. Col. Allan W. Phelps, MSC.

24 See footnote 23(2), above.

25 This section is based on Voorhees, Tracy S.: Story of Pacific Trip, Oct.-Dec. 1944. In Colonel

Voorhees' personal file.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 479

To consolidate stocks in the Hawaiian Depot, the Voorhees team recommended that branch depots on the islands of Hawaii, Kauai, and Maui be

closed and all supplies for the hospitals be requisitioned from the main depot

on Oahu.

Two hundred people were engaged in preparing medical supplies for expeditions and assembling medical maintenance units which could be done on

the mainland. By closing down this activity, it was hoped that some of these

people could be used on Saipan, where there was a serious shortage of trained

supply personnel.

The consolidation of the office of the medical supply officer of the Central

Pacific Base Command surgeon with the depot was recommended as it would

save much time and personnel involved in preparing the monthly stock report

which would be unnecessary. It was suggested that one officer be made medical

supply officer and commander of the 5th Medical Depot Company.

Supply Problems of the South Pacific

Upon arrival at New Caledonia on 25 October, a survey team discovered

a great excess of medical supplies stored in two depots that were manned by

an entire medical depot company. Although some excesses had been reported

to the War Department, the depot was using the Surgeon General's Office consumption rates and had failed to develop any of their own.

It appeared that no one from command headquarters had inspected the

depots on Guadalcanal and Espiritu Santo in the past 4 to 6 months and that

excesses similar to those in New Caledonia also existed there.

As a result of the Voorhees survey, it was recommended that surpluses

discovered in the inventory of stocks be reported to the Surgeon General's Office

and nonusable stocks be shipped to the United States. This would reduce the

depot workload.

Survey of New Guinea and the Philippines

In the survey of New Guinea which commenced on 7 November with the

landing at Nadzab, New Guinea, the team found that the harbor at Hollandia

was crowded with ships, many of which were waiting to be unloaded. Delays

in requisitioning, caused by red tape, had created a serious shortage of certain

items. All requisitions from the United States were processed through the

Distribution Division, then located at Oro Bay, near Buna.

Shortages which existed at the depot at Hollandia were caused by the fact

that the depot was not allowed to requisition directly. The requisitions had to

clear through the Distribution Division and G-4 at Brisbane before reaching

the depot at San Francisco. The basic weakness spotted in the supply system

of the Southwest Pacific Area was that requisitioning was still being conducted

on a theaterwide basis although depots were spread over 2,500 miles. No dependable transportation existed between bases, thus handicapping the transfer

of supplies. While the three members of the survey team went on to Saipan,
480 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Colonel Voorhees went to Leyte where the supply situation was "worse than

critical" because of poor planning, excessive red tape in the requisitioning process, and the absence of suitable sites for depots and hospitals.

Because of the discrepancies found in consumption rates in the Southwest

Pacific Area and the South Pacific Base Command, it appeared of prime

importance that the Pacific theaters develop their own specific rates after careful study of actual rates for the more active items based upon issue experience

for 1944. This was expected to result in great dividends in conservation of

warehousing space, man-hours, and stocks.

Medical Supply Problems on Saipan

The supply team discovered that, because of failure to order supplemental items not in the medical maintenance unit in advance, stocks of certain

items were seriously low on Saipan.

It was also noted that only one medical supply team of 2 officers and 20

men was handling the supply situation. At least one medical depot company

was needed. The available personnel, although doing an exceptional job, lacked

training in requisitioning.

To relieve this personnel problem on Saipan, it was recommended that a

medical depot company be sent there to speed up supply functions and implement the necessary consolidation of supplies.

Recommendations for Improved Supply Operations

To avoid the shortage of supplies such as the one which occurred on Saipan, the Voorhees mission recommended that the necessary items not included

in the medical maintenance units always be requisitioned well in advance of

D-day of any operation. The approving office was encouraged to return a copy

of the approved requisition to the ordering unit so that they might know what

to expect before it arrived. The practice of back ordering was to be dropped

to avoid duplicate requisitions and the keeping of a large number of unnecessary records.

It was further recommended that no island depot separate from the base

depot was necessary. Consolidation of depots such as recommended for Hawaii

and the South Pacific Area would save space as well as personnel and also

would eliminate the intermediary step in distribution of supplies.

The survey team reported that the chief of the Supply Service, Central

Pacific Base Command, should have clear-cut supervisory responsibility over

medical depot operations, and the depot commander should report directly to

him rather than to the surgeon.

To help with stock control and storage methods, it was recommended that

an experienced depot officer be brought to the theater for 60 days.
PACIFIC OFFENSE OPERATIONS 481

Major Changes

Close scrutiny of the total Voorhees mission report reveals fundamentally

that the absence of a closely knit medical supply organization had magnified

some of the problems. The 3,700 miles that separated Hawaii, the supply base,

from the Marianas did not permit a close-knit supply system.

Picking up the concern of many and the necessity for change, the Voorhees mission attempted to unscramble the situation and make a more proficient

operation possible. Virtually all of the mission's recommendations were accepted and inaugurated, although gradually, as in the development of better storage facilities on Saipan and the arrival of additional supply personnel.

To offset the lack of a medical supply officer in the Pacific Ocean Areas,

Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Donald E. Eemund, MAC, an expert on warehousing,

was assigned to the Surgeon's Office, Pacific Ocean Areas, as medical supply

officer, but his influences on supply operations were less than expected. Because

his responsibilities were not fully defined, his dealings with base commands

were largely informal.

With the replacement of Brig. Gen. Edgar King by Brig. Gen. John M.

Willis, as Surgeon, Headquarters, Pacific Ocean Areas, it appeared that the

responsibility of the medical supply officer would increase. General Willis requested that Colonel Williams, a member of the Voorhees mission, be assigned

as medical supply officer.
CHAPTER XIV

The Philippine Islands Campaign

PLANNING AND OPERATION OF THE LEYTE CAMPAIGN

In October 1944, 2y% years after the loss of Leyte to the Japanese, U.S.

troops landed on that island in the first engagement of the Philippine Islands

Campaign. Leyte, which constituted the geographic center of the Philippines,

was of strategic importance as an airbase and support center for operations in

the Luzon-Formosa-China coast area.

In planning medical supply support for the operation, past experience in

the Pacific was reviewed, and steps were taken to minimize such common weaknesses as pilferage and breakage, the breakdown of property exchange under

conditions of air evacuation, and the loss of supplies and equipment because

of excessive humidity.

Built around the X and XXIV Corps, the assault on Leyte was to be the

largest amphibious operation of the Pacific war to date (fig. 123). The Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, directed that a typical field army type medical service

would be used to serve all combat and service troops. Fixed medical support

would be furnished by the Army Service Command which would stay in Leyte

and be responsible for the buildup of bases for future operations.1

Medical Supply Planning

All units supporting the landings were advised to bring 30 days' medical

supplies to the objective area, and the assault troops would carry a 5-day supply. All service units carried a 30-day supply at debarkation.

Resupply plans called for nine assault medical maintenance units, each

consisting of 10 days' supply for 10,000 troops, to arrive from A (Assault

Day) +15 to A+30. In addition to these, and scheduled to arrive at the same

time, were 1,000 litters; 2,000 blankets; 10 million Atabrine (quinacrine hydrochloride) tablets; and 100 cylinders of oxygen. From A-day to A+30, 10 preloaded ships from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation were to arrive with

30 days' medical supplies for 20,000 troops on board. Twelve additional preloaded ships were scheduled to arrive from A+30 to A+60.

One hundred tons of selected nonexpendable medical supplies were to be

phased into predetermined points after A+40. Thirteen preloaded ships Connor a more detailed description of the Leyte operation, see: (1) Cannon, M. Hamlln : Leyte:

The Return to the Philippines. United States Army In World War II. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1954. (2) Daboll, Warren W.: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Asiatic

Theater, united States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. [In preparation.]

483
484 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 123.—LST headed for the invasion of Leyte, Philippine Islands, 20 October 1944.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 485

taining 30 days' supply for 60,000 troops were due to arrive from the Central

Pacific Area during the period A-day to A+60.2

Medical Supply Support for the XXIV Corps

The XXIV Corps, which had trained in Hawaii in pieparation for an

assault on Yap Island, left Hawaii on 15 September 1944. When the ultimate

destination of the convoy was changed to the Philippines, it became necessary

to acquire large quantities of Atabrine, which were issued to troops on board

ship. Support of the XXIV Corps was to come from the Central Pacific Area

in a unique situation in which the corps was loaned to the Southwest Pacific

Area.

Equipment for the corps was palletized to permit easy handling and loading into small craft and sledding on the runners to the initial location. The

pallets were waterproofed to facilitate unloading through the surf. Planning

and loading of medical supplies was under the supervision of the corps medical supply officer.

The first section of 10 days' supply landed on 10 pallets, each weighing

1,840 pounds, and was carried in by a battalion landing team and the division

headquarters ship. The second section, 20 days' supply, was carried in three

sections on three attack cargo ships.

In all the XXIV Corps Supply Detachment was divided to increase dispersion and to provide for an easy transition when the corps assumed control of the

division dumps on the 6th day. Once established ashore, the small supply team

supported a corps, which at times consisted of five divisions, and an unanticipated large-scale civilian medical care program during 5 months of combat.

Under the direction of Lt. Clifford C. Long, MAC, and Lt. Harold A. Bates,

MAC, a small field army type depot at Dulag, Leyte, and a port medical receiving yard for initial receipt of supplies unloaded over the beach were

operated by the 2d Medical Supply Team.

Supply Problems of the XXIV Corps

Because of the large number of civilian casualties from aerial and naval

bombardment, more surgical supplies and tetanus antitoxin were needed. Naval

vessels, particularly hospital ships, became a ready source of scarce items, even

whole field hospital assemblies. The occurrence of rabies and diphtheria required emergency delivery of special drugs.

During a time of "supply plenty," scheduled shipments were generally

adequate except for a shortage of calamine lotion.

To support the 11th Airborne Division, which was for a time isolated in

the middle of the island, a portable surgical hospital was airdropped. Later,

a small airstrip was built which aided in supply.

" (1) Operational History, Surgeon's Office, Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army, 1944 (Leyte

Campaign). [Official record.) (2) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, Southwest Pacific

Area, 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1944.
486 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Eesupply of the XXIV Corps was in the form of medical maintenance

units sent from west coast ports, supplemented by supplies from the South

Pacific Area where a surplus existed. One ship from the South Pacific Area

had 10,000 packages of medical material ranging from combat bandages to

operating tables, suitable only for permanent or semipermanent installations.

Many items, such as whirlpool baths, refrigerators, and Balkan frames, which

were considered surplus to combat operations were turned over to the 34th

Medical Depot Company which had arrived on 15 December 1944.

Because of the scarcity of firm ground on which to stack supplies and a

general lack of dunnage, the bottom tier of supplies often sank out of sight

in the deep mud. Despite every effort to recover, clean, and ship these damaged supplies, many of them were lost.

Kefrigeration for blood and other medical items, such as penicillin, was

scarce. Gas refrigerators had to be replaced with electric refrigerators because

the concussion of nearby artillery blew out the gas flame. Since small refrigerators proved to be inadequate, each division medical supply was equipped with

one walk-in model, moved on a 2

1

/&-ton truck. To offset the lack of power, 5-

and 15-kilowatt generators were brought in from the South Pacific Area to

meet the needs of various hospitals and clearing stations.

Shortages of such items as Merthiolate, foot powder, paregoric, bismuth,

sulfaguanadine, cathartics, and laxatives as well as iodine, Fraser's Solution,

and bandages occurred early in the fighting because many of these items were

partially expended on ship even before landing due to the long period afloat.

The inability of the Southwest Pacific Area depots to supply these drugs made

it necessary to have them airshipped from the Pacific Ocean Areas. The combat

medical maintenance units designed for smaller operations lacked some necessary items and had insufficient amounts of others.

With the progress of combat operations across Leyte, the XXIV Corps

medical supply dump was moved in mid-December to Ormoc, where it was

in direct support of action and later supported two divisions operating on

the west coast. A section of the 34th Medical Depot Company had relieved

the 2d Medical Supply Team to give better support for west coast operations.3

SUPPLY OPERATIONS WITH X CORPS ON LEYTE

Initial Landings

The X Corps, composed of the 1st Cavalry and the 24th Infantry Divisions, landed on Leyte with 30 days' medical supplies. Eesupply was to be

handled by the 21st Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation). Because of light

enemy opposition, unloading of supplies was uninterrupted.

By 22 October, however, enemy aircraft had damaged the Liberty ship

Thomas, anchored off White Beach and, as a result, medical supplies in its

s

(l) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, XXIV Corps, 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1944. (2) Bee footnote 2, p. 485.

(3) Medical Report, King II Operation, Appendix "C" to G-4 Report, Headquarters, 7th Infantry

Division, 26 Dec. 1944-10 Feb. 1945. (4) Annual Report, 34th Medical Depot Company, 1944.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 487

ü

FIGURE 124.—Discharging supplies at the docks at Tacloban, Leyte Island,

1 November 1944.

hold were never unloaded. The Alden, another Liberty ship containing emergency medical supplies, reached the area on 24 October, but was not unloaded

until approximately 5 November. Supplies from the Alden even then proved

to be valuable in those critical days.

The 21st Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) moved up to Tacloban

(fig. 124), where it set up its depot and operated until relieved on 1 December

by an advance section of the 34th Medical Depot Company (map 43).4

Early Supply Problems of X Corps Units

During the latter part of October, the flow of supplies and equipment

into Leyte was interrupted by increased Japanese naval activity which

reached its peak at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Transportation was handicapped

by the distance from resupply bases, continuous enemy air attacks,, and the

occurrence of three typhoons, which, with accompanying heavy rainfall,

turned the area into a quagmire.

4 Quarterly Report, X Corps, October-December 1944.

295-453 O—68——33
MEDICAL SUPPLY

(J) 78(17 May 45)

(j) 34(17 May 45)

•••

S>! 034(-)(l Dec44)

2K-K20 0ct44)

S A M A R

2(22 Oct (944)

10 20 MILES

i 0 10 20 KILOMETERS

LEYTE

Homonhon I

GULF X_J>

Panaon I

BOHOL I

MAP 43.—Medical supply depots on Leyte, 1944-45.

The heavy rains also delayed construction of warehouses and, by making

roads impassable, hindered supply support to frontline troops who were

being pressed to defeat the recently reinforced Japanese forces. To add to the

existing confusion, medical units were being unloaded without their equipment. One field hospital had to be left behind because its equipment was not

loaded in the transport assigned to it. In some instances, as much as a month

elapsed before the equipment reached the specific unit.

Through use of captured Japanese medical supplies, the problem of caring for large numbers of civilians was eased. It had become so acute that one

clearing company had to be set up as a hospital to care exclusively for civilians (fig. 125).
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 489

FIGURE 125.—Japanese medical supplies captured on Leyte were distributed to civilian

hospitals and dispensaries.

Some units fared well. Lt. Col. John F. Würz, MC, Surgeon,, 32d Infantry Division, reported that efficient planning and supervision permitted superior routing and transporting of medical supplies. The medical supply dump

was far enough forward so that all returning ambulances could carry supplies

to the front as needed. Supplies were often carried to portable surgical hospitals and aid stations by native litter carriers. Emergency items were

requested by radio or telephone and dropped from artillery and liaison

planes. Very often, units on the frontlines received these emergency supplies

in a matter of minutes.

Property exchange in air evacuation was nonexistent and, to alleviate

the resultant shortages, weekly radio requisitions w

Tere sent to rear bases, requesting that stock of items lost through air evacuation be sent forward by any

available air or water transportation. During this period of an insufficient number of beds, the Army was given much assistance by medical personnel of the

U.S. Seventh Fleet which, in addition to providing the facilities of its floating

hospital-type LST's (landing ships, tank), also furnished bed space in other

types of ships.
490 MEDICAL SUPPLY

During November and December, a total of 33 cases of poliomyelitis were

reported. Three respirators were brought in to assist in the treatment of these

cases, but because of the almost continuous operation of the respirators, repair

part replacement became a major problem. In one instance, a complete respirator was received in lieu of repair parts requisitioned.

In the early stages of combat on Leyte, equipment was often transferred

from one hospital to another. A typical example was the 58th Evacuation

Hospital which, when moving out of an area and being replaced by the 18th

Station Hospital, left all standing tentage, cots, blankets, and certain electrical equipment and, in turn, received replacements either from the 18th

Station Hospital or from the Base K (Leyte) supply agencies. Some X-ray

and surgical equipment was loaned to the 18th until it could unpack its

equipment.5

CHANGES IN THE COMBAT SITUATION

During November 1944, the combat situation on Leyte was at a standstill,

and it was felt necessary to commit more troops, which meant more medical

supplies. To supply three additional infantry divisions, it was contemplated

that eight medical maintenance units would be needed. Supplies of this

amount were not available on Leyte, but it was believed that the necessary

equipment could be obtained from New Guinea and from the San Francisco

Port of Embarkation which supposedly had four ships in the area that could

be diverted to Leyte.6

Support of the 77th Infantry Division

The 77th Infantry Division, veterans of the Guam campaign, had sailed

from Guam early in November 1944 with a 30-day medical maintenance unit

made up from items available in standard resupply blocks and from items

drawn from local naval supply facilities. Tongue depressors, applicator sticks,

atropine sulfate, and other similar items were not available in sufficient quantity to keep up with the daily demand.

After bivouacing near Dulag, the bulk of the division prepared for the

invasion of the west coast of Leyte at Ormoc. Seven tons of the 30 days' medical maintenance unit, loaded at New Guinea, were loaded in the assault convoy in the initial landings. After gathering the components of the maintenance unit from the beaches, a medical dump was established near the division clearing station for resupply of frontline troops. This dump was moved

forward with the clearing station, and facilities for resupply by ambulance

B

(1) Manuscript prepared for a preliminary draft of this volume, covering medical supply

activities of the Sixth and Eighth U.S. Armies, by Lt. Col. John M. Hunt, MSC, and Col. Albert E.

Minns, Jr., MSC. (2) Quarterly Report, 32d Infantry Division, 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1944. (3) Annual

Eeport, 58th Evacuation Hospital, Southwest Pacific Area, 1944.

6

(1) Memorandum, Col. William A. Hagins, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, for G-4, Sixth U.S.

Army, 24 Nov. 1944, subject: Medical Support of Five Additional Divisions in M-l. (2) Memorandum, Lt. John M. Hunt, MSC, Assistant Medical Supply Officer, Sixth U.S. Army, for Col. William

A. Hagins, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, 23 Nov. 1944, subject: Additional Medical Supplies on Leyte.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 491

FIGURE 126.—Eighth U.S. Army headquarters being set up on the beach near Telegrafo,

Leyte, 16 November 1944.

to frontline aid stations were always available. Piper Cub aircraft were frequently used to bring penicillin and other needed medical supplies to troops

fighting in remote areas.

The offensive of the 77th Division as well as the push of the other four

divisions brought an end to the. operations of the Sixth U.S. Army on Leyte.

On 26 December 1944, the responsibility for all future operations on Leyte

passed to the Eighth U.S. Army (fig. 126).7

Operations of the 34th Medical Depot Company

On 1 December 1944, the 34th Medical Depot Company arrived at Leyte,

relieving the 21st Medical Supply Platoon and the 2d Supply Team. With

the action increasing in western Leyte during early 1945, a medical supply

subdepot was established at Ormoc (map 43).

Meanwhile, construction of warehouses began in December 1944 (fig.

127). Eain and mud made both construction and the storage of supplies before

7 Quarterly Report, Surgeon, 77th Infantry Division, October-December 1944.
492 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 127.—Lumber to be used in the building of the 34th Medical Depot Company at

Tacloban, Leyte, 27 December 1944.

the completion of the warehouses nearly impossible. Materials-handling equipment was virtually useless. By the middle of March, however, the depot had

completed two warehouses and had received forklifts and tractors which

greatly reduced the labor involved in handling bulk supplies. Because of the

establishment of air and water priorities, outgoing shipments tripled over

the shipments of January.

The maintenance section of the 34th Medical Depot Company, by March

1945, was maintaining a 3-day deadline in returning repaired items. To offset a lack of spare parts, the ingenuity of the men in manufacturing needed

items was invaluable.

Despite inadequate equipment on hand, the optical section of the depot

managed to repair and replace more than 1,350 pairs of spectacles during

January. By March, the section had eliminated a serious backlog of prescriptions. Many liberated prisoners, both officers and enlisted men, were issued

new spectacles. During March, 4,024 prescriptions were processed.

On 17 May 1945, the 34th and the 78th Medical Base Depot Company,

which had arrived from the United States on 31 January, were combined
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 493

to form the Base K Medical Depot under the command of Maj. (later Lt.

Col.) Eli E. Daman, PhC. The depot supplied approximately 271,000 combat

and service troops located in the Visayan Islands as well as a large number of

Philippine Civil Affairs Units.8

Recommendations of the Voorhees Survey Team

When Col. Tracy S. Voorhees, JAGD, visited Base K in early December

1944 as a part of his survey of Pacific supply facilities, he noted several

serious deficiencies. At that time, no depot construction was going on; therefore, stocks were deteriorating because of the damp weather conditions. Certain items of medical supply were out of stock, and it was impossible to fill

some requisitions. Some of the shortage seemed to be caused by delay in unloading ships, and Colonel Voorhees recommended that hospital ships be

used to bring in supplies. It was also suggested by Voorhees that the medical

supplies be "top loaded" in the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. According to Colonel Voorhees, unbalanced stocks and shortages were caused by

delays in interdepot shipments and the lack of aggressive action by the medical section of the Distribution Division. As a solution to these problems of

distribution, it was suggested that emergency requisitions by air shipments

be initiated for badly needed items.9

Clearing the Way for the Invasion of Luzon

To provide adequate air cover for convoys proceeding to Lingayen Gulf

for the invasion of Luzon, it was necessary to clear the island of Mindoro of

enemy troops and develop airbases. This task fell to the Western Visayan

Task Force which was composed of elements of the 24th and 21st Infantry

Divisions and the 503d Eegimental Combat Team. The assault began on 15

December 1944, and the island was secure by 31 January 1945.

Initial medical supplies, five medical maintenance units, were stored at

San Jose under the control of the 13th Station Hospital. After the initial

phase of the operation, the dump was moved to Gil Airdrome. Kesupply for

Mindoro came from four preloaded ships, each with a 30-day supply, which

came from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation (map 44) .

10

MEDICAL SUPPLY SUPPORT OF THE LUZON OPERATION

The Luzon Campaign, the largest operation in the war against Japan,

was highly significant in that it completed the reconquest of the Philippines.

8

(1) Quarterly Reports, 34th Medical Depot Company, January-October 1945. (2) Historical

Summary, 78th Medical Base Company, 15 Apr. 1946.

8 Memorandum, Col. Tracy S. Voorhees, JAGD, for Commanding General, U.S. Army Services of

Supply, 11 Dee. 1944, subject: Medical Supply Supplementary Report Covering Base K and Plans

for Base M.

10 (1) For a further detailed description of the Mindoro operation, see Smith, Robert R.:

Triumph in the Philippines. United States Army in World War II. U.S. Government Printing Office,

1963, pp. 43-54. (2) See footnote 2 (2), p. 485.
494 MEDICAL SUPPLY

LUZON

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JAS

The confusion and slow development at Leyte had caused a postponement

of this operation from 20 December 1944 to 9 January 1945.

During the planning phases, many complexities were encountered.

Because the Japanese were known to utilize the terrain to the maximum, it

was expected that the enemy would make several strong stands in the mountainous areas, and at Bataan and Corregidor. To support the U.S. operations,

equipment and supplies were brought in from widely scattered areas of the

Pacific as well as from the United States. Very little difficulty was experienced
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 495

in procuring supplies, medical units, and shipping space for this operation.

Supplies were available in noticeably increased quantities.

Early Supply Support

The initial landing at Lingayen Gulf on 9 January 1945 involved the I

and XIV Corps, each with two divisions and supporting troops. The 21st

Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) was designated to operate the Sixth U.S.

Army medical supply point in support of the I Corps. While staging on

Leyte, the 21st was augmented by the addition of 20 men and 4 trucks which

would speed the delivery of medical supplies to corps supply points. Again,

as in Leyte, the medical supply plan called for large quantities of resupplies,

including blankets, litters, splints, plasma, whole blood, and biologicals, to

be brought in during the assault phase and left on the beach where they would

be accessible to initial medical aid personnel; and, when the beaches became

secure, the supply platoons were to collect the remaining supplies.

As a result of the continuous flow of casualties over the beaches, blankets

became a critical item. To alleviate this situation, blankets which had been

set aside for the burial program were utilized, and shelter halves were substituted for blankets in the burying of the dead.

Initially, a detachment of the 21st Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation)

established a medical supply point at Lingayen in a marketplace which provided a good concrete floor, but no overhead protection. To overcome this, tarpaulins and palm leaves were used as a roof. When the supplies were moved to

Dagupan, open storage was all that was available. As a result, loss of supplies

from deterioration was high (map 45). This detachment had four mobile refrigerator units filled with whole blood, penicillin, sera, vaccines, and various

other biologicals to be used by the troops during the early stages of the operation.

On 11 January 1945, the first group of the Medical Section, Base M, landed

on the beach of Lingayen Gulf near San Fabian, 2 days after the main landing force. To take full advantage of his experience in establishing base sections, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Edgar King, MC, was designated surgeon. Accordingly, he had personnel from his group accompanying each load of supplies to assure segregation and to secure a location of the medical dump. In

this instance, the Medical Section had acquired a few buildings in the public

market on the outskirts of town, and supplies were moving to storage before

the day was over.11

Movement Toward Manila

By 13 January, the 21st Medical Supply Platoon had set up a supply point

at San Fabian; but on 23 January, this point was turned over to the 49th

Medical Depot Company and the platoon proceeded to Tarlac, which was idealu

(1) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, January-March 1945. (2) Operational

History, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, 1945 (Luzon Campaign).
496 MEDICAL SUPPLY

30 KILOMETERS

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049(23 Jan)

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JAS

MAP 45.—Medical support for the Luzon operation, January-June 1945.

ly located to support a large number of medical treatment facilities. Medical

supplies reached Tarlac from Lingayen Gulf by truck and rail and were received and distributed by the 21st, assisted by the 55th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) which was in support of the XXIV Corps.

The 49th Medical Depot Company, with its three storage and issue platoons operating separately, had the task of receiving and storing supplies

which had come into San Fabian by water and transshipping them to Tarlac

and Urdaneta, where the 15th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) was operating in support of the I Corps (map 45). The 49th was handicapped somewhat by failure of equipment to arrive. It became necessary to leave behind,

in the depot, mobile refrigerators which were part of the Army Blood Bank

so that whole blood and biologicals could be stored. The lack of maintenance
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 497

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MAP 46.—Medical supply depots at Subic Bay and the Manila Bay area, 1945.

equipment and an optical repair unit resulted in much unserviceable equipment remaining in poor condition.

On 30 January, a medical supply point was established at Subic Bay by

the XI Corps. Operated by the medical supply officer, XI Corps, and a detachment of enlisted men from the 113th Medical Battalion of the 38th Infantry

Division, this supply point was the source of medical supplies for the Corregidor and Bataan operations. Six medical maintenance units arrived on the first

medical supply echelon to that area, and 19 airdrops and shipments of medical

supplies occurred early in the operation (map 46).

By 6 February, the 55th Medical Supply Platoon, which had previously

been supporting the 21st Medical Supply Platoon in the operation of the depot

at Tarlac, entered Manila and unloaded its equipment and five truckloads of

medical supplies on the grounds of Santo Tomas University before moving

to the George Washington School on the next day. For the next 2 weeks, the

55th supplied all troops in the Manila area (map 46). Believed by the 15th

Medical Supply Platoon on 18 February, the 55th proceeded to Urdaneta to

support the I Corps Army Air Forces, and Army Service Command troops in

that area.
498 MEDICAL SUPPLY

The medical supply depot in Manila was more permanently set up under

the stands of the Manila baseball stadium, and medical supplies were trucked

in from the depot at Tarlac. By 29 February, when the city of Manila was

secure, the 49th Medical Depot Company, relieved at San Fabian by the 58th

Medical Base Depot Company, moved to Manila and set up in warehouses in

the vicinity of Manila Harbor (fig. 128). After the harbor had been cleared

of mines, boobytraps, logs, stumps, and other debris, the area was ready to receive supplies from preloaded ships, which were unloaded at the repaired

docks and carefully stored according to type of item.

On 12 March 1945, the 21st Medical Supply Platoon was replaced at Tarlac by the 58th Medical Base Depot Company and the 55th Medical Supply

Platoon (Aviation) which had been at Urdaneta since mid-February. Between

12 and 21 March, 350 requisitions were filled. The 21st moved to Urdaneta

where it maintained a reserve stock of supplies. After closing the depot at

Urdaneta on 24 March, the unit moved to San Jose with a 15-day supply level

to support I Corps troops in that area.12

Problems of Resupply

From D-day, 9 January, to 31 March 1945, 28 block-loaded ships, carrying

56 medical maintenance units, arrived in the Luzon area from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. This represented a 30-day supply for 560,000

troops. As experienced in other operations and in other theaters, many blocks

of supplies were unbalanced with overages in some nonessential items, such as

boric acid, oxygen, dextrose in normal saline solution, prophylactics, sheet

wadding, and plaster of paris bandages. Ironically, an oxygen shortage developed because of the failure to refill empty cylinders. Radio requests to rear

bases for mechanical prophylactics were evidently ignored until 25 February

when 4,000 gross of mechanical prophylactics were received and followed up

by 1,123 gross received by air. Five percent dextrose in normal saline solution

was short because of the increased use of this item in the treatment of hepatitis.

The increased use of sheet wadding and plaster of paris bandages in the

treatment of soft tissue wounds and fractures had caused shortages of these

items.

During January through March 1945, 66 airdrops totaling 27,000 pounds

of supplies were made by the 11th Cargo Supply Group. Forty-six of the airdrops were made for guerrillas (fig. 129).13

Continued Supply Support

Fighting in the southern part of Luzon and in the mountainous regions

was going on while cleanup of Manila was in progress. On 30 March, the 15th

u

(1) Quarterly Reports, 49th Medical Depot Company, 1945. (2) Quarterly Reports, 15th

Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation), 1944-45. (3) Quarterly Reports, 55th Medical Supply Platoon

(Aviation), 1945. (4) See footnote 11(2), p. 495.

u

Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, Sixth U.S. Army, January-June 1945.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 499

FIGURE 128.—Issue warehouse, 49th Medical Depot Company, Manila.

Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) was relieved in Manila and proceeded to

Batangas (Batangas Province) to establish an Army medical supply depot in

that area in support of XIV Corps, Army, and Services of Supply units. The

initial supply of four medical maintenance units was received. The Batangas

supply point closed on 22 May and the unit moved to Lipa where it continued

to support the XIV Corps (map 47).

The responsibility of mopping up on Luzon passed from the Sixth U.S.

Army to the Eighth U.S. Army in June 1945, when the Sixth U.S. Army was

assigned the responsibility of training and reequipping units for the invasion

of Japan.

The 61st Medical Base Depot Company, which had been operating at Base

X (Manila) after arriving on Luzon on 19 March, sent a detachment of one

officer and nine enlisted men on 29 June to San Jose, where it assisted the 55th

Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation) in the operation of a transshipment point.

Another detachment of 2 officers and 20 enlisted men was sent ahead to Bayombong, where it set up the distribution point for troops operating in the

Cagayan Valley. Supplies were received by rail from San Jose and shipped

out to units by truck (map 45). A third detachment of the 61st, consisting of

one officer and six enlisted men, set up a point at Aparri on the north coast of

Luzon. One medical maintenance unit was used to supply troops in the immediate area and as far south as Tuguegarao."

14 (1) See footnote 13, p. 498. (2) Quarterly Reports, 61st Medical Base Depot Company, 1945.
500 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 129.—Medical supplies being packed in an 80-inch

howitzer canister to be dropped to forward units on Luzon,

29 April 1945.

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

While the fighting on Luzon was well underway, operations against the

Japanese in the southern Philippines had begun with invasions of Palawan,

the western-most island in the archipelago, and the Zamboanga Peninsula of

southwestern Mindanao. These areas were of vital importance as potential sites

for airfields.

Supplies for the Palawan Operation

In the Palawan operation, which began on 28 February, the task force,

composed principally of the 186th Regimental Combat Team backed up by

certain nondivisional units, carried in a 15-day level of supplies and set up

a supply point in the 168th Evacuation Hospital near Puerto Princesa city.

A 60-day resupply was further augmented by two block-loaded ships

which arrived in the area on 6 March and 1 April, respectively. All emergency
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 501

'-x p> Lubang Is,

^3

Maricaban I

%P Verde I

MAP 47.—Medical supply depots in southern Luzon, 1945.

radio requisitions were made to Base K and delivery was made in a matter of

hours either by evacuation planes or by an Eighth U.S. Army courier plane.

Support of the Zamboanga Operation

The Zamboanga operation, launched on 10 March 1945, was designed to

push the Japanese from southwestern Mindanao and thus provide additional

airstrips. Troops of the 41st Infantry Division carried 15 days' initial supply. Requisitions prepared for the operation consisted of 30 days' resupply, and further resupply was provided by two block-loaded vessels arriving in

Zamboanga on 18 and 30 March.

A divisional medical supply point was established in prefabricated warehouses at Zamboanga (fig. 130) by the division medical battalion (map 48).

Supply Support for Central Visayan Operations

Even before the Zamboanga-Sulu region had been secured, the Eighth

U.S. Army initiated operations to secure the central Visayan Islands of Panay

and Negros. The reinforced 40th Infantry Division and the 503d Parachute

Regiment were prepared for this assault.
502 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 130.—Taking inventory in the Medical Supply Issue Section of the 41st Infantry

Division, Zamboanga, 30 March 1945.

After launching its assault on Panay on 19 March 1945, the 40th Division

established a medical supply point in an existing building in Iloilo (map 48).

When they arrived in the operational area, the division had 15 days of initial

supplies. Requisitions for 30 days' resupply were prepared and sent to Base K.

Further resupply was furnished by block-loaded ships, one arriving at Iloilo

on 25 March. Emergency radio requisitions for items such as whole blood,

penicillin, biologicals, and other critical items were forwarded by the division

to Base K. Delivery was usually accomplished within a matter of hours by

the use of evacuation planes bound for the operational area or by use of the

Eighth U.S. Army courier plane.

The assault troops of the 40th Division carried 160 pints of whole blood

into the operation. Flown to the division were 1,424 pints, making a total of

1,584 pints of whole blood used.

During the latter phase of the operation, the 52d and 53d Infantry Regiments (Philippine Army) were activated on Panay and Negros Islands. Requisitions for medical supplies and equipment for these units and their attached

service units were prepared by the 40th Division, edited by the Eighth U.S.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 503

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Army, and filled, by Base K. Shipment of the same was made to supply officers

of the regiments concerned.

On 26 March 1945, the Americal Division launched a three-part operation

to clear Cebu Island, Bohol Island, and the southern section of Negros Island.

The initial supply and resupply for the operation was the same as in the

Panay-Negros operation. In the initial landing, Americal Division troops carried in 192 pints of whole blood. Additional amounts required were ordered

from Base K and were delivered by evacuation plane or courier plane. A total

295-453 O—68 34
504 MEDICAL SUPPLY

of 2,648 pints of blood were received by the Americal Division during the

operation. On 15 June 1945, all supply responsibility for Cebu was assumed

by Base S, established on that island.

Supply Support for the Conquest of Eastern Mindanao

Eastern Mindanao, the remaining Japanese-held area of the southern

Philippines, was the target of the 24th and 31st Infantry Divisions of the X

Corps which landed on 17 April at Illana Bay. Troops of the X Corps carried

in a 30-day initial supply of medical items. Kequisitions for automatic resupply

were initiated by the X Corps and delivered by four double-block loaded ships

from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

The Commanding General, X Corps, was responsible for the maintenance

of a 30-day level of medical supplies and for the storage and distribution of

medical supplies and whole blood in the objective area.

The only major supply problem was the procurement of sufficient refrigeration for medical units. Temporarily, an Australian-made mobile refrigeration

unit was used in the 656th Clearing Company.

By 21 April, the 74th Medical Base Depot Company was operating a medical supply point at Parang in squad tents (fig. 131). Prefabricated buildings

allotted to house the depot were never erected at Parang because of plans to

move to Agusan by 11 June (map 48).

Emergency requisitions, mainly for oxygen and biologicals, were sent directly to Base K, and shipments were expedited by use of the 403d Troop Carrier Group evacuation planes which were bound for the particular area where

the supplies were needed.

Units carried 1,064 pints of whole blood into the operation. Automatic

resupply of whole blood to X Corps at Malabang was established at 240 pints

every 3 days. Shipments commenced on 27 April and continued until 19 June

when automatic resupply was diverted to Valencia and Libby airfields.

Following a field inspection held on 7 June, it was recommended that the

99th Evacuation Hospital, which was supporting the advancing 31st Infantry

Division, be supplied with the equipment needed to expand an additional 250

beds. The requisition was initiated by Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, and

the necessary equipment was flown in immediately by evacuation planes.15

Lessons Learned in the Philippine Islands Campaign

In the Philippine Islands Campaign, medical supplies were generally

plentiful. However, it became evident, particularly in Mindanao, that it was

a necessity to have adequate refrigeration for blood, penicillin, and other biologicals made available to all units before embarkation to avoid resulting shortages caused by reallocation.

15 This section is based on (1) Annual Report, Medical Department Activities, Eighth U.S.

Army, 1945, and (2) Quarterly Reports, 74th Medical Base Depot Company, April-December 1945.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CAMPAIGN 505

FIGURE 131.—A. Interior view of a medical supply tent at the 74th Medical Supply

Dump, Parang, Philippine Islands. B. Soldiers set up the 74th Medical Base Depot Company at Parang.
506 MEDICAL SUPPLY

In this campaign, more than in any previous operation, the use of evacuation and courier planes for swift delivery of emergency items of requisition

proved invaluable in the saving of human life. Close coordination between

Base K and troop carrier air groups made this possible.

In the Leyte operation, especially, it was learned that the normal medical

maintenance unit could not be relied on, as there were excessive amounts of

little-used items like X-ray supplies, acetone, Mapharsen, and absorbent cotton in 1-pound rolls while items, such as foot powder, tincture Merthiolate.

aspirin, and hydrogen peroxide, were in scarce supply.16

" See footnotes 2(1), p. 485 ; and 15, p. 504.
CHAPTER XV

The China-Burma-India Theater

BEGINNINGS OF MEDICAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES IN 1942

Theater Background

The CBI (China-Burma-India) theater,1 which evolved from the American Military Mission to China established in October 1941, did not become

fully organized as a theater until 22 June 1942, when the War Department

ordered Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Joseph W. Stilwell to issue orders relieving all

units under his command from assignment to Army Group, Washington, D.C.,

and reassigning them to the American Army Forces, China, Burma, and India.

By 6 July, General Stilwell had set up the command structure for his theater.

From a small task force organized to support China and encourage larger

participation and effort on the part of the Chinese Army, this mission of the

CBI theater developed to include the operation of airbases for actions against

Japan and the organization of various types of American units to wage guerrilla warfare against the Japanese.

Organization of Services of Supply and the Supply System

In the spring of 1942, efforts had been made by the Theater Surgeon, Col.

(later Brig. Gen.) Robert P. Williams, MC (fig. 132), to organize the Chinese

Medical Service, to deploy the small Seagrave medical unit, and to relieve the

inadequacy which existed. Supplies had been stored in depots at Mandalay and

Lashio, Burma; Calcutta and Karachi, India; and in China.

Having reached the theater in late March 1942, Lt. Col. (later Col.) John

M. Tamraz, MC (fig. 133), was designated Surgeon, SOS (Services of Supply),

and his headquarters was established at Karachi. The primary responsibility

for organizing a medical supply program fell on Colonel Tamraz, and on 1

April 1942, he asked for the establishment of a medical supply depot at Karachi

with 2 officers and 10 enlisted men.

Effort was made by Colonel Tamraz to locate a source of supplies which

could be substituted for unavailable shipments from the United States. The

British Army's medical supply depot at Karachi had sufficient stores of many

items to supply the American troops in India through Reverse Lend-Lease. The

surgeon was also allocated $3 million to purchase medical supplies on the

1

(1) Stone, James S.: Organization and Development of Medical Supply In India and Burma,

1942-46. [Official record.] (2) Romanus, Charles I\, and Sunderland, Riley: Stilwell's Mission to

China. United States Army in World War II. The China-Burma-India Theater. Washington : U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1953.

507
508 MEDICAL SUPPLY

4

FIGUKE 132.—Brig. Gen. Robert P. Williams.

local market; yet, during 1942, various supply problems plagued the Medical

Department. The 500 tons of medical supplies reportedly on the way to the

theater were slow in arriving. Six hospital units arrived in May and June

without any equipment and placed a heavy demand on the medical supply

system. Supplies allocated to the U.S. Public Health Service and designated

for the treatment of personnel involved in the construction of the YunnanBurma Kailway, Chinese Defense supplies, and American Red Cross supplies

all had to be used by Services of Supply.

Much material designated for China could not be used in India or Burma

to the regret of Colonel Tamraz who stated that these supplies would often

stay on the Calcutta docks and would gradually deteriorate.

When medical supplies began to arrive in late May 1942, warehouse space

was hard to find, and when found, it had to be cleaned and reconditioned.2

The American Medical Supply System, during 1942 and 1943, was based

on the automatic issue of the 10,000-man, 30-day MMU's (medical maintenance units). In July 1942, Charleston, S.C., was designated as the port of

embarkation for the China-Burma-India Theater, and a theater supply level

was established at 180 days.

3 Diary, Col. John M. Tamraz, MC, Chief Surgeon, Services of Supply, China-Burma-India

Theater. [Official record.]
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 509

FIGURE 133.—Col. John M. Tamraz, MC, SOS Surgeon.

The previously requested medical supply detachment reached the theater

by July, and a Medical Supply Section was established in the general depot

at Karachi (map 49).

Despite the arrival of several shipments of medical supplies, a shortage

of sulfaguanidine, Atabrine (quinacrine hydrochloride), Plasmochin (pamaquine naphthoate), and nicotinic acid was revealed when a request for these

items from a training center at Eämgarh, India, was by necessity turned

down.

A major problem in the CBI theater during the first year of operation

was lack of the medical supply personnel required to plan for and carry out

the distribution of supplies.

Because Chinese medical treatment facilities were relatively limited in

scope, it was initially decided that the medical maintenance units furnished

to the forces in Yunnan (Y-Force) should be modified by eliminating laboratory, dental, X-ray, and elaborate hospital equipment, and special supplementary drugs and chemicals. This modification of the standard unit

established two noninterchangeable MMU's within the system.

The biggest problem of 1942 seemed to be the lack of a supply program

with uniform policies and systems. This problem plagued the theater for the

next year and a half.

GROWTH OF MEDICAL SUPPLY

Early in 1943, Maj. Walter J. Newton, DC, was placed in charge of the

Medical Supply Section, Surgeon's Office, SOS. During January and February 1943, the movement of material into the Ledo area in preparation for
510 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 511

the beginning of road construction in March was the principal medical supply

project. Special MMU's were lined up to supply the Seagrave unit which had

been active in Burma during the first Burma Campaign of 1942 and had been

providing medical care for the Chinese at Eämgarh. The Karachi medical

depot and its subdepot at Chäbua, India, had been ordered to assemble medical maintenance units designed by Lt. Col. Gordon S. Seagrave, MC, and

ship them to Ledo. Supplies were funneled into Ledo, which was to serve as

a receiving area for 30,000 troops being sent from the United States to launch

the construction program. A request for equipment and supply units for hospitals of 250 beds, 100 beds, and 50 beds was approved, but consolidation of

hospital beds was impossible, making it necessary to place small hospital

units at widely scattered points.

The SOS Surgeon, while on an inspection tour during April and May

1943, discovered that most depots were below supply levels. The worst situation was at K'un-ming, China, because of the difficulties in getting supplies

over the Hump by air.

Although the supply depot at Ledo was scattered in several warehouses,

it seemed to be accomplishing its purpose. The depot at Chäbua (map 49), in

contrast, was quite low on surgical supplies, sulfonamides, and dental equipment.

Support of Chinese Forces

According to surveys of Chinese troops in the CBI theater, the Y-Force

had sufficient supplies and equipment on hand for 6 months of combat. Only

a shortage of vehicles for the transportation of equipment and supplies handicapped their supply operations (fig. 134). Action was taken by the Chief

Surgeon, SOS, to provide for automatic replacement of depleted medical

supplies. For the eastern group, the Zebra or Z-Force, the necessary requisition to provide 30 Chinese defense supply medical maintenance units per

month was being prepared. A shift of responsibility for Chinese defense supplies to rear-echelon headquarters at this time relieved the theater surgeon of

an onerous task.

Supply of Antimalarial Drugs

With the approach of summer and the malaria season, shortages of

malaria control supplies and equipment appeared. Delays in requisitioning,

loss of supplies due to sinkings of cargo vessels, and the rapid growth of troop

areas, caused an emergency situation. As late as July 1943, no antimalarial

supplies of U.S. origin had reached Assam. Only British and Indian equipment, generally considered by Americans to be inferior, was available, but

this was also being depleted rapidly.

The large number of Chinese soldiers and Indian coolies employed in

construction and maintenance enlarged the antimalarial supply problem since

they had to be provided for as well. Approval for additional supplies was

received too late to produce the supplies in time for the malaria season. To
512 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 134.—Typical pack train fording a river near Nasin, Burma.

alleviate this situation, all equipment and supplies in the antimalarial category were concentrated in the Medical Supply Section of the Base General

Depot at Calcutta under the supervision of a malaria control supply officer.

Assistant theater malariologists, in cooperation with depot officers, approved

distribution of these supplies. This system of depot control permitted the

most economical supply distribution.

Plans for Increased Support for Chinese Troops

During July 1943, plans were formulated for supplying Chinese troops

in both India and China. Full delivery of table of basic allowances equipment

for medical units of the Y-Force was guaranteed by 30 medical maintenance

units per month beginning in March 1944.

Shipment of Medical Maintenance Units to the CBI Theater

The CBI theater's supply program was set back in midsummer 1943 by

the arrival of broken or partially complete assemblies, which the subdepots

had to reconstitute as MMU's before requisitions could be rilled. This problem
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 513

was aggravated by lack of personnel qualified to handle these incomplete

units. When ships were sunk en route to the theater, MMU components were

lost, thus delaying the schedule several months. Theater stocks remained

unbalanced until repeat shipments could be made.

Army Air Forces Medical Supply

In August 1943, the Army Air Forces proposed a supply system of its

own, which would interpose Air Service Command medical supply points as

"wholesalers" between Services of Supply depots and the using units. The

Air Forces proposed to stock these depots with a 90-day level of common-use

medical supplies and to handle all special items of equipment peculiar to the

Air Forces. Services of Supply would thus act only as a feeder to the Air

Service Command depots and cease issuing directly to AAF (Army Air

Forces) units.

With the Air Forces taking over responsibility for supply to its units,

Services of Supply would be relieved of an extra burden, but Colonel Tamraz

and his medical supply officers agreed that the AAF proposal would establish

a duplicate system of medical supply distribution and further deplete the

already short stocks. By September, a compromise had been worked out

whereby a 30-day supply was to be stocked by air depot groups, a 30-day

supply by Air Service Centers, and a 10-day additional supply by tactical

organizations.

The Medical Depot System in 1943

During the final quarter of 1943, many problems of the medical supply

system were in the process of being solved. There was a mixture of optimism

and misgiving by medical supply authorities. The medical supply officer,

SOS, recorded a 117-day level of supplies in September which was somewhat

below the authorized 180-day level. The antimalarial supply level was

reduced from 60 to 90 days to 30 days because considerably more supplies

were en route to the theater.

By November 1943, general depots with medical sections were located at

Karachi and Calcutta. An intermediate general depot was located at New

Delhi, with the 100th Station Hospital serving as a subdepot for troops in

the vicinity of the theater headquarters.

Advance general depots were located at Gayä, India; Chäbua, the transshipment depot for supplies going by air to China; K'un-ming, the China

depot; and Kuei-lin, China, which served the advance bases of the Fourteenth Air Force. Seven additional depots were operated by the Army Air

Forces in eastern India to serve the Air Transport Command and the Tenth

Air Force bases. Special depots for Chinese defense supplies were located at

Karachi, Sukkur, Calcutta, Chäbua, and K'un-ming. A railhead depot served

the Ledo area with a 45-day stockpile in the Advance General Depot at

Chäbua (map 49).
g14. MEDICAL SUPPLY

Early Supply Procedures

Late in 1943, the Surgeon's Office, SOS, was developing a system of stock

control and inventory for medical supplies in the theater. SOS headquarters

was the final authority for processing all requisitions before they were sent to

a depot. They also controlled hospital equipment assemblies and replacement

items and were the responsible agents for procurement of priority items.

Emphasis on Experienced Personnel

Despite the optimistic outlook of the SOS Surgeon concerning the availability of supplies, general concern was felt over the nonavailability of

trained supply personnel.

At the close of 1943, only two small medical supply units were in operation in the CBI theater. Sections of Medical Supply Detachment No. 2 staffed

the depots at Karachi, Calcutta, and Chäbua, with the help of local personnel.

The Ledo supply point was manned by a section of the Advance Depot Platoon, 7th Medical Supply Depot. A personnel shortage was expected to remain

until sometime in 1944 despite the fact that two depot companies were on

requisition.

Elimination of the Medical Maintenance Units

In October 1943, the War Department announced that automatic shipment of medical maintenance and medical reserve units would be discontinued

by 1 January 1944. Estimates made by the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation

showed that a 160-day supply of MMU's was either in the theater or en route,

and a 178-day supply was on order. It was estimated that a 66-day supply of

medical reserve units was either in the theater or en route, with a 77-day

reserve on order.

Beginning in 1944, requisitions were to be submitted for maintenance to

provide an 80-day supply in the theater as well as a 210-day supply to cover

timelags. The Los Angeles Sub-Port, which became a port of embarkation for

this theater in May 1943, recommended that requisitions be submitted once a

month for a 30-day supply that would be required 210 days later, meaning

that supplies requisitioned in November 1943 would not arrive until June

1944.

Following this change in procedure, the medical supply officer, SOS,

planned to consolidate all theater requisitions each quarter and to submit

special requisitions as necessary. His records were to show the status of all

items stocked in the theater, and his procurement policy would be directed

by a three-phase estimate system which calculated the stocks on hand for the

current quarter, stocks due from the port of embarkation for the following

quarter, and stocks to be requisitioned at the beginning of the first quarter

for use during the third and fourth quarters. It was contemplated that

MMU's would continue to be issued for 2 of the 3 months in each quarter,
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 515

with the quarterly item-by-item requisitioning being used to balance theater

stocks. The first requisition was scheduled for dispatch on 1 January 1944.

The emphasis of the new system on proper accounting procedures resulted

in timidity on the part of SOS medical officers. The medical supply officer,

Major Newton, was relieved of his supply duties in October so that he might

devote full time to dental service. His replacement, Maj. (later Lt. Col.)

Claud D. La Fors, PhC, was experienced in medical supply, but his arrival

was delayed. In the interval, no advance requisition was placed sufficient to

maintain adequate stock levels between the close of automatic supplies and the

date at which requisitioned supplies would be received.

Failure of British Supply

At the end of 1943, one of the major flaws still existing in the CBI supply

system was the failure of Chinese forces in India, the X-Force, to be supported by the British and by the Government of India. Only approximately

25 percent of requested medical support requirements were received, and these

were not up to established standards or familiar to U.S. medical personnel.

To take up the slack, it was necessary to divert MMU's from other forces for

the use of the Chinese Army in India.

MEDICAL SUPPLY DURING 1944

Inspection of the Supply System

When the new theater medical supply officer finally arrived, an inspection

trip of supply facilities was arranged to familiarize him with the existing

situation. Almost complete collapse was discovered at K'un-ming, where only

the bare necessities were available. No reserve existed and many items were

completely out of stock. The medical supply officer had files of requisitions

which had been disapproved by the SOS Surgeon. Bad flying weather also

hindered delivery of requested items over the Hump.

After inspection at one end of the supply line, Major La Fors and the

AAF medical supply officer inspected the depot at Chäbua, the final base for

medical supply points in China and a key link in the chain of supply leading

to Ledo and Burma. There, expendable supplies were nearly depleted and nonexpendable supplies were scarce. Only Chinese defense supplies, not available

for U.S. use, were in quantity, and these were scattered in poorly constructed,

poorly managed warehouses.

At Ledo, special efforts were made to push medical supplies forward into

combat areas. Supplies for American medical units were adequate, but supplies for Chinese combat troops were at a low level. Consumption was 100 percent over estimated requirements because of losses connected with airdropping

of supplies as well as wasteful habits of the Chinese. As a result, supplies were
516 MEDICAL SUPPLY

being depleted rapidly while the replacement system still functioned at the old

standard.

At General Depot No. 2, in Calcutta, the medical supply officer found a

large but unbalanced stockpile of supplies in the Medical Section. It was estimated that if these supplies had been properly distributed to the field, the

theater supply situation would have been nearly adequate. It was ascertained,

however, that the flow of supplies from the Zone of Interior was interrupted

by failure to requisition supplies as soon as automatic shipment of medical

maintenance units was discontinued.

The biggest defect in the theater supply system was maldistribution. The

general depot in Karachi had only a 48-day supply on hand for 25 percent of

the theater personnel; the general depot in Calcutta, which supplied 75 percent of the theater strength, had only a 70-day supply in stock. At the Chäbua

depot, all that was available was 63 days of a 90-day supply for Chinese troops

and a 45-day supply for troops in Burma.

Corrective Action

Faced with the task of reconstructing the medical supply system, the

Medical Supply Section personnel requisitioned needed supplies for immediate

shipment to the theater, requesting at the same time that MMU's sufficient to

maintain supply levels be sent for use until the requisition was received.

The theater medical supply officer directed discontinuance of all unauthorized methods of procuring or issuing supplies and also strict adherence to

theater policies. This policy was designed to eliminate leapfrogging requisitions to the SOS Surgeon or even directly to the port of embarkation in the

Zone of Interior. Supplies were to be procured only from the SOS depot in

the immediate vicinity. Army Air Forces supply officers were directed to put

requisitions through the air depot and Air Service Command, as authorized

by SOS Memorandum No. 187 of 1 November 1943.

To fix responsibility in the field, medical supply officers of the general depots were designated as area supply officers and directed to establish and

maintain authorized levels of supply at all supply points within their respective areas. Stocks on hand were to be surveyed and suitable requisitions sent to

adjust discrepancies. They were also directed to edit and fill requisitions for

units in their areas.

As a result of frequent inspection, these area supply officers were ordered

to eliminate hoarding of supplies and to make certain that excess and unauthorized equipment was returned to depot stocks. The Stock Eecord Card System was adopted, and the standard revised requisition form was put to use.

Despite the unfamiliarity of medical supply officers with the new procedures,

they began at once to institute the new system.

To further invoke the provisions of new theater directives on supply procedures, it was necessary to improve the personnel involved in the program's
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 517

operation. The medical supply officer outlined the staff he wanted to develop

in the Surgeon's Office, SOS, to maintain control of the supply system. It was

recommended that three officers deal with procurement, malaria supply control, and other theater supply matters. It was also recommended that an attached officer from Air Service Command establish liaison between Services

of Supply and Air Service Command on medical supply matters.

None of these recommendations was adopted. Instead, the medical supply

officer had three commissioned assistants, two of whom, being very inexperienced, were poorly qualified for a responsible role. An AAF liaison supply

officer was borrowed from Army Air Forces headquarters.

"With the arrival of new medical supply officers from the States, a new

officer was assigned as assistant to the chief of the section, and he and the

chief handled most of the supply matters. This system lasted until late 1944

when the two officers were replaced by one Medical Administrative Corps officer. The Air Forces liaison officer remained until midsummer.

Medical Depot Companies Organized

Personnel problems evident at the command level were also existing in

the field. Of the two medical depot companies requisitioned in 1943, only one

had reached India by December 1943. After almost a year of basic and unit

training, the 14th Medical Depot Company arrived in India and was assigned

to General Depot No. 2, Calcutta, to relieve the provisional detachment (fig.

135). Plans were made at that time to send advance detachments to K'un-ming,

Ledo, and Chäbua, No separate medical supply units had been functioning in

that area before detachments of the 14th arrived. At Ledo, the 14th detachment, of one officer and six enlisted men, augmented Section 1, Advance Depot

Platoon, Tth Medical Supply Depot, which had been there since the depot was

established in November 1943 (map 50).

Valuable time was lost at the general depot when, because of disagreement

over who was in authority, the depot company was not able to deploy its full

strength and time on the distribution of medical supplies.

Supply Shortages in the Field

To avert serious shortages at Chäbua, 10 medical maintenance units were

planned to be shipped there immediately. Chäbua was the key point for the

supply of the Ledo and K'un-ming depots, and this shipment helped to relieve

a serious shortage. By 10 January, the level of supplies had dropped to 1.5

MMU's. Emergency arrangements provided for the transportation of critical

items to balance the stock level until March.

As the depot at K'un-ming was nearly out of supplies by January, two

MMU's were prepared for air shipment to the depot (fig. 136).

The uncertainty of transportation between Calcutta and Chäbua was a

real handicap, and little could be done about it at that time.
518 MEDICAL SUPPLY

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CHINA-BURMA-INIDIA THEATER 519

FIGURE 135.—Native laborers carry and stack medical supplies at the

Medical Depot, Calcutta, India.

The medical supply officer at Ledo had not been able to build up his

supplies to the authorized 45-day level. Actually, he could not even count on a

10-day level, particularly in class I items. Combat troops were consuming

medical supplies at an unexpectedly rapid rate. Besides losing supplies in the

airdrop procedure, requisitions submitted by Chinese forces or by the Seagrave

unit were not properly screened (fig. 137).

The hospitals in the field had serious supply problems. Shortages of equipment, lack of replacement parts, and scarcity of many drugs and laboratory

293-453 0—68 35
520 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 136.—C-47 transports lined up on the airstrip at Myitkyina, Burma.

supplies occurred. General dissatisfaction with the medical maintenance unit

was common because of its failure to include many drugs used locally in the

treatment of disease.

Supply Support for Chinese Troops in India

To add to the already mounting problems in early 1944, British support

of the Chinese troops in India was dwindling rapidly. Because of the inability

of the British to meet the overwhelming demands for certain critical drugs

and chemicals, these items were diverted from Chinese defense supplies and

already critically short U.S. Army stocks.

The Chinese defense supplies were not complete, and British Army supplies did not coincide with U.S. standards. The procedure under which field

medical units with Chinese troops received Chinese-type medical supplies exclusively, while fixed American hospitals received Chinese-type supplies in

proportion to the number of Chinese who would be occupying hospital beds,

was criticized by American medical officers who found it difficult to use British

medical items, which were of poor quality and scarce in quantity of critical

items.
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 521

FIGURE 137.—Men in a 0^7 shove out supplies to fellow soldiers in the

field in Burma, 1944.

A firm recommendation was made by the theater surgeon in March 1944

to abandon the existing system and pool all medical supplies for the Chinese

obtained through normal U.S. channels with American stocks in the theater,

and issue as required.

Lack of Supplies in Depots

Medical supplies at Chäbua were stored in a poor "basha" construction

without cement floors; therefore, much deterioration occurred as a result of

the climatic conditions. Because supplies were shipped to China in bulk rather

than on an items-needed basis, stocks were enormously unbalanced.

At Ledo, lack of personnel and inadequate and widely dispersed warehouses hampered operations. To support the Chinese Army in India, this depot, commanded by Capt. Warren E. Lee, MAC, relied on air supply. After

holding conferences with the base surgeon, the base medical supply officer, and

the base commander, a new area was secured, with 50 percent more warehouse

space and an adequate refrigeration vault for biologicals. Thus, the Ledo depot was changed and refurbished for more systematic operation.
522 MEDICAL SUPPLY

IMPACT OF THE VOORHEES MISSION

Background

With the numerous problems of medical supply mushrooming into crises

and no immediate solution available, strong voices of concern emanated from

all quarters. At a most opportune time, July 1944, a group of medical supply

specialists, under the direction of Col. Tracy S. Voorhees, JAGD, was dispatched from the Surgeon General's Office to the China-Burma-India theater

to make a comprehensive survey of the entire supply program.3 This trip was

prompted by specific complaints made by the Air Forces regarding medical

supply.

To satisfy the Air Forces, a compilation of its reported needs was included

in a special requisition prepared in July to balance incoming stocks. Fortunately, 50 tons of air cargo space to be used for medical supplies from the United

States was made available at that time. Heavier items were to come by water,

but were given a high priority.

Specific Failures in Medical Supply

Following that action, the Voorhees team conducted a thorough survey of

the depots in all base and advance sections of the theater. Four principal causes

of the breakdown in supply were identified.

Before 1 January 1944, medical supplies had been received in the theater

in the form of medical maintenance units, which consisted of 700 barely minimum items. There was no systematic way to supplement these items and, as a

result, theater stocks were generally unbalanced, with some items badly depleted.

Failure to take action to avoid shortages after the automatic system of

supply terminated also hurt. The SOS Surgeon and his chief medical supply

officer had failed for 90 days to place any substantial requisitions to continue

the flow of supplies.

Because of the inadequacy of automatic supply and the failure to file supplementary requisitions by the spring of 1944, there was a general shortage of

medical supplies in the theater. No adequate stocks of nonexpendable items

existed.

General Depot No. 2, over a long period of time, failed to sort, place in

stock, and make available for issue a large quantity of medical supplies which

were stored in bulk in a 28,000-sq.-ft. warehouse in the Hoboken section of

the depot. Even after the arrival of the 14th Medical Depot Company in

early January 1944, the stock was not moved until March. Failure to properly

utilize the services of the 14th Medical Depot Company caused this problem.

The mishandling of 80 MMU's in Base Section No. 2 (Calcutta) and

Advance Section No. 2 (Chäbua) was the fourth identified reason for the

a Voorhees, Tracy S.: Visit to the China-Burma-India Theater to Survey Medical Supply,

11 Sept. 1944, together with attachments and inclosures thereto. [Official record.]
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 523

supply difficulties of the theater. These units, intended for the Y-Force, were

to be moved forward to Chäbua at the rate of 20 units per month. The entire

80 units were sent in one shipment without advance notice and with no warehouse space available. As a result, the goods were dumped in a field and were

not sorted for 2 months. No proper selection of the items to go forward to the

Y-Force could be made and misshipments ensued. Not until June, when a new

liaison officer for the Y-Force came to Chäbua, was the pile of supplies sorted

out and proper shipments made. This whole problem stemmed from lack of

coordination between the action of the Y-Force authorities in seeking the

shipment and their arrangements for its trip over the Hump. A more clearly

defined authority in the Surgeon's Office, SOS, seemed necessary to prohibit

the recurrence of this condition.

After authorities visited most of the larger station and general hospitals

and studied their needs for extra equipment, requisitions to meet such needs

were placed, specifying the most rapid form of shipment available.

Recommendations of the Voorhees Survey

As a result of the Voorhees survey, constructive steps were taken to alleviate the serious problems that existed. Eecommendations were made to change

the organizational setup in Services of Supply to clarify authority and divide

responsibility between the SOS Surgeon's Medical Supply Section and the

base sections or advance sections.

By the end of August, 40 tons of medical supplies had reached Calcutta

by air, and the flow of supplies to the interior had become continuous as a result of emergency requisitions sent to The Surgeon General by the survey team.

It was anticipated that stock would be balanced by October with the assistance

of the Voorhees mission. The solving of personnel problems also began. The

14th Medical Depot Company was assigned a more experienced depot commander, and Maj. Arthur Gallagher, MAC, an officer experienced in medical

supply stock control, was brought in to establish a centralized system of stock

control and requisitioning.

To strengthen the weak depot system, a second medical depot company,

the 25th, under the command of Lt. Col. Eobert E. Selwyn, MAC, arrived on

27 August 1944 and was assigned to take over the supply operations for all

American and Chinese troops in Upper Assam and Burma.

On 1 August 1944, upon recommendation of the medical supply officer,

SOS, and the Voorhees mission, the Medical Section of General Depot No. 1

was closed, thus releasing personnel for redistribution. The responsibility for

medical supply in the Karachi-Bombay area was assumed by the 181st General

Hospital in Karachi, which served as a subdepot.

Realinement of Depots

As a result of personnel consolidations, the 69th Medical Depot Company

was organized and stationed at Chäbua, and the detachments of the 14th Medi-
524 MEDICAL SUPPLY

cal Depot Company at Chäbua and K'un-ming were reconsolidated at Calcutta

to take on an ever-increasing load of supplies. The 14th, under command of

Major Gallagher, was outstanding in its handling of supplies which poured in at

a tremendous rate. The limited personnel available often worked around the

clock to keep supplies moving during a most critical period. As a consequence,

essential supplies were distributed and an adequate medical supply service was

made possible sooner than expected (fig. 138; map 50).

IMPROVEMENT OF THE SUPPLY SYSTEM AND ITS

PROCEDURES

Personnel Shifts and Changes

During the last half of 1944, it was necessary, as recommended by the

Voorhees mission, to obtain better qualified personnel to handle large-scale

depot operations and to establish and maintain a sound inventory and stock

control system. Medical depot companies had obtained better qualified commanders. Excess officers were absorbed into other medical supply installations,

such as those in the larger hospitals. Within the SOS Surgeon's Medical Supply Section, experienced officers were drawn out to serve in field installations,

and a smoothly running team of well-qualified officers was brought in to replace them.

Inventory and Stock Record Changes

Stock records at the time of the Voorhees mission were kept in General

Depot No. 2 and in SOS Headquarters. As a followup of the survey, the 14th

Medical Depot Company was instructed to develop a system of distribution

to forward depots based on consumption rates. These data were to be translated into the necessary statistics by the Medical Supply Section in the Surgeon's Office. Before 1944, none of these records had been kept and only limited

progress had been made to show the gross needs of the theater and set up a

full-fledged inventory control system.

A new system, based on those being used successfully in the United States

and in the European theater, was recommended by the Voorhees mission. The

first step would eliminate the duplicate set of records in the Surgeon's Office,

and assign all requisitioning to an inventory control officer located in a Calcutta branch office. This officer would be solely responsible for the satisfactory

operation of the new stock control plan. A stock level was to be set for each

item carried in theater stocks. Reorder points were to be calculated on the basis

of stock level plus the amount to be issued during a 6-month period. An accurate due-in record would show the current stock status of each item at all

times. Monthly review of records would follow for adjustment of stock levels

on the basis of actual experience and the picking up of all items which had

fallen below the reorder point. Requisitions would be submitted as necessary

when indicated by stock records and by due-in record cards.
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 525

FIGURE 138.—Distribution of medical supplies. A. Men of the 14th Medical Supply

Depot operate a conveyor belt and check supplies as they are made ready for shipment.

B. Native laborers unload medical supplies at a subdepot of the 25th Medical Depot in

northern Burma.
526 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Together with members of the Voorhees group, the SOS medical supply

officer set up initial stock levels for all items needed in the theater, to be reviewed by the inventory control officer, and integrated with depot stock records

at Calcutta. A comprehensive requisition was prepared by the inventory control officer for submission in September. Chinese, as well as American, supplies

were brought under the system.

As the medical supply situation began to improve, the inventory control

officer reviewed stock levels of forward depots in the light of theater levels.

The plan was gradually put into effect throughout the medical supply system,

and all requisitioning was coordinated and unified.

Changes in the Chinese Supply Program

The Voorhees mission in June had backed up the earlier theater recommendation that supplies for the Chinese Army in India no longer be procured

from the British. Unification of procurement and distribution of Chinese supplies through SOS channels was a basic necessity. This action was approved

by the War Department in August 1944. With the standardization of procedures, Services of Supply received authority to take over all supplies for all

forces in China, except AAF technical equipment and supplies.

Supplies, formerly designated as Y- and Z-Force material, were brought

into the stock and inventory control plan at Calcutta and Chäbua. By October

1944, Chinese procurement was included in the American medical supply program, thus consolidating theater medical supply requisitions. This meant that

there was a single method of procurement, intratheater receiving, storage and

issue, stock control, and accounting under Services of Supply.

The reorganization proved to be even more timely and valuable when, on

24 October 1944, the China sector of the CBI theater was constituted as a separate theater with Col. (later Maj. Gen.) George E. Armstrong, MC, as its

surgeon (fig. 139). The India-Burma theater became the supply and administrative base for the new China theater.

MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF 1944

Improved Organization

At the end of 1944, the whole supply program of the China and IndiaBurma theaters was working smoothly and efficiently. Critical shortages had

been eliminated, both in the depots and in the field. A compact and better functioning supply organization which capably handled requirements for Chinese

and American troops in China, Burma, and India had been established. Stock

and inventory control procedure had been instituted at all levels of medical

supply, thus eliminating many serious imbalances of stock. Automatic supply

had been replaced by a process of continuous requisitioning which maintained

proper supply levels. Personnel problems were almost entirely eliminated despite the split into two theaters. Transportation, particularly air transport,

improved greatly, enabling a much more efficient distribution of supplies.
OHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 527

FIGURE 139.—Col. George E. Armstrong, MC, Surgeon,

China theater.

PROGRESS IN 1945

Support for Two Theaters

The year 1945 was placid in the field of medical supply compared to the

previous year. Despite the planning for peak operations in anticipation of

continued combat in Burma and a combat and logistical program in China

climaxing in the final assault on Japan, seizure of the Burma Road early in

1945 and the sudden surrender of Japan in August reduced the medical supply

operation progressively and hastened its end.

In carrying out the basic program of providing medical supplies for Chinese and American forces, the first phase of operations was the supply program for the China theater. Emphasis was shifted to an area which heretofore

had been only a sector of an entire theater. However, no new burden was imposed on the supply program since the supply of troops in China had already

been a part of the overall responsibility of the entire theater. Included in the

program had been the supply of the Chinese Y- and Z-Forces, and the

Fourteenth Air Force and its subordinate units, as well as a small number of

American troops in support of Chinese training and operations. Supplying the

Chinese sector had been simplified in late 1944, and every effort was made to
528 MEDICAL SUPPLY

extend to China the same principles of supply management which had been

instituted in India and Burma. The fact that the principal consumers were

the Chinese Y- and Z-Forces made it impossible to carry out the refinements

of the system. Despite efforts to advise and develop in the Chinese military

organization the same operational methods which were standardized for American troops, it was impossible to achieve complete uniformity of policy and

procedure.

Planning Precedes Changes

To work out details of the China theater supply program, the Surgeon

of the China theater, Colonel Armstrong, conferred with the staff of the Surgeon, India-Burma theater, in November 1944. During those conferences, a

plan was adopted continuing the system which had developed during the previous months. Maintaining a 90-day level of medical supplies for American and

American-sponsored Chinese forces, Services of Supply was to procure, store,

and issue all commonly used medical supplies and equipment using the intermediate General Depot, Chäbua, as its base. Army Air Forces items, however,

were to be obtained by the Air Service Command through the AAF supply depots in India.

By 1 January 1945, initial organizational equipment for the Chinese

troops was authorized by the International Aid Division, ASF, in Washington,

and stocks for the China theater were divided between Calcutta (90 days),

Chäbua (45 days), and K'un-ming (45 days). By February, in accordance with

the War Department's reduction in supply levels, the level was reduced to 45

days at Calcutta and 30 days at Chäbua. The 45-day level was retained at

K'un-ming.

Development of the Chinese Supply System

In January 1945, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) James S. Morgan, MAC, was assigned as Medical Supply Officer, China theater. Having two medical supply

officers in the China and India-Burma theaters helped to coordinate medical

supply activities.

Many of the old procedures were carried over as still being suitable. In

the China theater, Services of Supply began to take over all supply organizations which provided service to the Chinese components of the Y- and

Z-Forces. Services of Supply became responsible for all the operations necessary to procure material from India for Americans and Chinese in China. During the first few months of 1945, a system of base depots was organized at

the entrance to China and at key points in the China theater. The maintenance

levels of the India-Burma theater were initially accepted and later revised as

experience indicated.

The inability to set levels and stabilize the rate of stockage, issue, and

requisitioning prevented an even requisition of supplies from the India-Burma

base. Periodically, larger than usual demands for medical supplies in the

India-Burma theater necessitated air priority shipment from the United
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER 529

States. Humps in the flow of medical supplies from the India-Burma theater to

China were caused by unexpected changes in operational situations in China,

the need to stock adequately newly established depots, and the modification of

usage tables based on actual experience. Improvement in the supply program

resulted from the mutual exchange of correspondence, roundtable discussions

at the Second Medical Supply Conference in May, and the loan of the IndiaBurma theater inventory control officer to the China theater for a brief

period.

End-of-the-War Curtailment

As the end of the war approached, it became necessary to curtail the supply program for the China theater. The India-Burma supply line could be shut

off when China's ports were opened for more direct supply to the theater. The

supply level for the China theater was reduced to 60 days with medical supplies distributed equally between the Calcutta, Chäbua, and China depots. The

discontinuance of lend-lease brought no change in the policy of providing

maintenance, supplies, and equipment for U.S.-approved Chinese forces. Tonnage allocations for shipment of medical supplies from Chäbua to China were

canceled for October 1945, and only emergency shipments by air were

made thereafter as the bulk of the supplies went over the Stilwell Road or by

water from Calcutta. On 31 December 1945, the supply responsibility for

China was transferred from the India-Burma theater to the Pacific Area Command.

Disposal of Medical Supplies

With the end of the war, immediate steps were taken to set aside sufficient

medical supplies to support the terminal theater activities and to declare excesses and surpluses. Agreements were reached with the Government of India

for the disposition of a number of hospitals, and certain other equipment was

sold to foreign governments.

By 31 December 1945, great progress had been made in the disposal of

supplies:

Tonnage determined excess long tons.. 11,887. 00

Tonnage shipped to date long tons__ 3,074. 51

Tonnage declared surplus to F.L.C. (Foreign Liquidation Commission) long tons.. 5,209. 00

Value of surplus tonnage dollars-- $7,319,093. 35

Tonnage disposed of by F.L.C long tons_. 843. 00

Value of tonnage disposed of by F.L.C dollars.- $1,010,897. 45

Because of the considerable labor entailed in disposal activities, both the

25th and the 14th Medical Depot Companies remained in the theater until

January 1946.
CHAPTER XVI

Okinawa and the Occupation of Japan and Korea

SUPPLYING THE OKINAWA OPERATION

Preparation for the Assault

Even though the fighting continued in the Philippine Islands until late

June 1945, plans were concurrently being formulated for an assault on the

Eyukyu Islands which guarded the entrance to the home islands of Japan.

The experience gained in previous Pacific operations helped to augment

the tables of organization and equipment of units which would be participating in the assault. A listing of medical units and the authorized equipment,

although approved, was not perfect, and it became necessary to request additional equipment. These items often did not arrive on schedule. A critical

supply problem developed 2 weeks before the Okinawa operation began, when

a ship carrying 48,000 requested jungle kits did not appear at Leyte.

Lt. Col. (later Col.) Stephen G. Asbill, VC, Medical Supply Officer,

Base K (Leyte), having no alternative but to provide the necessary kits from

the 34th Medical Depot at Tacloban, was caught short by requirements for

the landing forces going to Lingayen Gulf ahead of schedule. To cover the

deficit, Colonel Asbill arranged for a stock of 70,000 jungle kits to be sent

from Hollandia to Leyte on a hospital ship.

To support the early landings on Kerema and Okinawa, the bays of six

landing ships were equipped with surgical facilities and were staffed with U.S.

Navy surgical teams.1

On 27 March 1945, the XXIV Corps, consisting of the 7th and 96th Divisions, and the 77th Division operating separately, left Leyte en route to the

Eyukyus. The 77th seized the Kerema Islands group on 30 and 31 March, after

which the 7th and 96th, augmented by the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, assaulted the western shores of Okinawa on 1 April (fig. 140).2

Medical Supply Functions

Because of adequate planning and preparation by Maj. Stanley W. Bullis,

MAC, Medical Supply Officer, XXIV Corps, sufficient tonnage space and sup1

(1) Action Reports, Eyukyus, Tenth U.S. Army, 26 March-30 June 1945, Vol. 1. (2) Potter,

Laurence A.: Preliminary draft manuscript, XXIV Corps. [Official record.]

2

(1) See footnote 1 (1), above. (2) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, 7th Division, 1945. (3)

Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, 96th Division, 1945. (4) For further details on the tactical phases

of the Okinawa Campaign, see Appleman, Roy B., Burns, James M., Gugeler, Russell A., and Stevens,

John : Okinawa: The Last Battle. United States Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific.

Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948, pp. 249-264.

531
532

r '

MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGURE 140.—Invasion of Okinawa. Beserve wave of troops heads for the beaches in

landing craft, 1 April 1945.

plies from Leyte were made available to support the medical supply aspect

of the operation. Four landing ships, medium, assigned to the Corps Surgeon,

Col. Laurence A. Potter, MC, were sufficient to move the corps medical battalion and corps medical detachments. Adequate tonnage space for medical

supplies was set aside on troop transports and on the cargo ships carrying the

hospital elements so necessary for the success of the operation. As a result,

selected medical units in the assault were able to carry 30 days of supplies

instead of the usual 10.

The 726th Medical Supply Team, which accompanied the assault units on

L-day (landing day), took over approximately one-half of each unit's 30-day

supply, and added it to scheduled resupply increments made up of medical

maintenance blocks which had been loaded in the allotted medical cargo space.

These two groups of supplies made up the initial stocks of the corps medical

dump on the beach (map 51).

The 726th, with separate supply detachments supporting the 7th and 96th

Divisions, remained under XXIV Corps control until 16 April (L+15), when

its duties were assumed by the 843d Medical Supply Team. The 726th then set

up an Army medical supply dump (fig. 141), in support of the Tenth U.S.

Army in its toughest fighting. In the midst of this fighting, the unit was able

not only to render effective service, but also to construct enough canvas-covered

shelters to protect about 25 percent of its stock.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 533

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When the 53d Medical Depot Company, consisting of 12 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 120 enlisted men, arrived on Okinawa on 8 May (L+38), the

unit proceeded to take over the major task of supplying the XXIV Corps

from a depot established in the village of Kadena near the airport. Here they

remained until 20 July when they moved to Naha, Okinawa, and established

a more permanent depot (map 51).

After the 77th Division successfully drove the Japanese from the nearby

island of Ie Shima, a medical supply detachment of one warrant officer and

three enlisted men went ashore on 17 April and set up a supply dump on one

of the landing beaches. This dump served all personnel of the division on the

island. This detachment remained on the island with the garrison force keeping the dump in operation to serve the 77th Division troops (map 51) .

3

3

(1) See footnote 1 (1), p. 531. (2) History, 53d Medical Depot Company, 1944-45. (3)

Quarterly Reports, Surgeon, 77th Division, 1945.
534 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGUEE 141.—Medical supply dump on Okinawa. The shed was constructed by unit

personnel during the heaviest fighting.

Hospital Assemblies on Okinawa

Hospital unit assemblies for the Okinawa assault were carefully packed,

uniformly marked, and included packing lists which facilitated both loading

and unpacking. Each unit of the supporting field hospitals was furnished with

one 21/^-ton and one %-ton truck in which to carry prepacked surgical instruments and supplies that could be made available immediately upon landing.

Each hospital unit was stored on a separate vessel to provide proper dispersal.

Typical of the movement of unit assemblies during the Okinawa assault

was the experience of the 69th Field Hospital. Personnel and six surgical

trucks were unloaded on L+l, and the remainder of its equipment and supplies, which had been carefully packed and crated for the operation, was unloaded during the following 7 days. Having learned much from the Leyte

campaign, supply organizations preparing unit assemblies packed plenty of

plaster of paris, sheet wadding, and all types of sutures. Some difficulty was

encountered in getting equipment off the beaches as sufficient transportation

was not available (fig. 142). Other than cots, blankets, and tentage, no other

major items of equipment were lost. For the first few weeks, the 69th had a

serious shortage of blankets as 300 of the 1,200 blankets packed were lost on

the beach and in property exchange. To make up for the lack of pillows, blankets were substituted, and sometimes a shock patient needed as many as six or

seven blankets.

To have a reserve of equipment for another hospital in an emergency, an

effort was made to keep the equipment of one hospital unit intact.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 535

FIGURE 142.—Transferring cargo to smaller craft for delivery to the beach.

With the exception of plaster of paris bandages and sheet wadding, few

other items of supply were scarce.4

Followup Supply

Tenth U.S. Army resupply consisted of four different types of medical

maintenance units. The Medical Maintenance Unit, Block 1, was designed to

supply 3,000 men for 30 days and was landed in the early assault phase. It

supplied units providing first- and second-echelon medical service. Fifty of

these blocks were originally scheduled to land on L+ 5, but actually the first

ones were unloaded 10 days later, on L+ 15.

Block 2 consisted of nonexpendable replacement equipment based on SGO

(Surgeon General's Office) replacement factors. One block was to be unloaded

between L + 15 and L+25, but was finally unloaded at L+50. A second Block

2 was scheduled for the eighth resupply.

Block 3, composed of biologicals, supplemented Block 1. Two of these

were scheduled for the first resupply, one for the second, and one for the third.

However, these blocks landed approximately 10 days later than scheduled.

Block 4, the standard medical maintenance unit—10,000 men for 30 days—

4

(1) Medical Report, XXIV Corps, Operation ICEBERG. [Official record.] (2) Action Report,

XXIV Corps, Ryukyus, Preliminary Planning, April-June 1945. (3) Semiannual Reports, 69th Field

Hospital, 1945. (4) See footnote 1 (2), p. 531.

295-453 0—68- -36
536 MEDICAL SUPPLY

was not unloaded until the fourth resupply and occurred 10 days later than

scheduled. Each resupply subsequent to the fourth for the remainder of the

automatic resupply period of 210 days contained eight or more Block 4's, depending on troop strength ashore. By L+180, a sufficient number of these

blocks were ordered to build up a 90-day reserve stock.5

Blood Supply

Specially equipped LST's (landing ships, tank) acted as floating depots

for whole blood, thus assuring timely and adequate delivery.

Ashore, a blood bank was operated by a blood bank detachment under

the supervision of the medical supply officer, XXIV Corps. Blood was available as far forward as the collecting stations which supported the infantry

regiments. Because of the availability of whole blood in the 7th Division Clearing Station, a soldier who lost portions of all four of his limbs when his vehicle

was struck by a landmine was saved.6

Analysis of Supply Operations

Although no critical shortage of medical supplies occurred on Okinawa

for any extended period, a number of shortages arose because of increased

consumption and inability to unload supplies selectively. When a critical situation seemed imminent, air shipments were used with timely results. Interchange of supplies between Army and Marine supply dumps also helped. Excessive administrative delay did occur, but this was minimized by aggressive

action on the part of the medical supply officer.

The general success of medical supply on Okinawa was remarkable, considering that the American casualties on Okinawa were the highest of any

Pacific campaign. Also, a significant amount of medical care was rendered to

the natives.

Even before the fighting ended on Okinawa, the XXIV Corps was planning for its assignment in the assault on Japan. The corps was busily reequipping and retraining when the war ended. Okinawa was the last ground campaign of World War II.7

PLANNING THE ASSAULT ON JAPAN

Development of Strategy

By June 1945, the recapture of Luzon, the last important large island objective, was assured, and the way to Tokyo had been opened by seizing Okinawa and its neighbor islands.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, designated Commander in Chief, U.S. Army

Forces in the Pacific, in April 1945, was given the responsibility of preparing

the final operations against Japan.

5

See footnote 1 (1), p. 531.

8

See footnote 1 (2), p. 531.

* (1) See footnote 1 (1), p. 531. (2) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, XXIV Corps, 3d quarter, 1945.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 537

Under the code name, Operation OLYMPIC, an invasion of southern

Kyushu Island by the Sixth U.S. Army was to begin on 1 November 1945;

and 4 months later, Operation CORONET, an assault on the main island of

Honshu by the Eighth U.S. Army from the Philippine Islands, the Tenth

U.S. Army from Okinawa, and three Marine divisions, was to be followed by

the redeployment of the First U.S. Army from Europe.

Early in the spring of 1945, planning began for the occupation of Japan

and Korea, control of the Armed Forces and civilian population, and enforcement of the prescribed terms of surrender. It was assumed that Japan might

request a cessation of hostilities early in the invasion operations.8

Medical Supply Planning

Medical supply planning for the invasion of Japan began in April 1945,

under the direction of Lt. Col. (later Col.) Ryle A. Eadke, MC, Surgeon's

Office, General Headquarters, Manila, a recent arrival from the Mediterranean

by way of Washington.

Two factors complicated planning for medical supply: The prospect of

field service in a colder climate and the desire to improve the service of medical units by adding certain items of equipment which had been proved invaluable. After careful study, lists of additional equipment were prepared, submitted, and approved as special changes to supplement the War Department

tables of organization and equipment. Complete reequipment of all units on

the troop list was initiated.

To insure delivery of adequate supplies to the invasion beaches early in

the operation, all units were required to carry supplies for 30 days. An additional balanced stock of 15 days was carried in division dumps and by separate medical supply units. Stocks were held in reserve on Okinawa and at

Manila to be drawn upon for emergency airdrops or for movement to any

beachhead by water. Balanced stocks were loaded on ships to be used for later

resupply.

An adequate supply of whole blood on the beaches of Japan was to be

guaranteed by providing a mobile refrigerator holding 200 pints of blood for

each corps to be landed on D-day. In addition, each field and evacuation hospital was instructed to carry an initial stock of 100 pints of blood. For fast

resupply, the Navy was to provide four mobile distribution units on LST's

which would accompany the assault echelons. Further supply of blood was to

be airshipped daily from the Navy whole-blood distribution center on Guam.

Medical supply plans were based largely on previous operations, especially Leyte and Luzon. Although the medical maintenance unit would provide

essentials during combat, many sorely needed items had been omitted. Using

block-loaded ships from the Zone of Interior and new medical maintenance

8

(1) Medical Supply Plan, Operation OLYMPIC. [Official record.] (2) Basic Outline Plan for

Operation BLACKLIST to occupy Japan and Korea. [Official record.]
538 MEDICAL SUPPLY

units based on theater experience and consumption studies made by the Supply

Division, medical supply blocks were designed.

Medical Supply Block 1 was designed to supply 25,000 men for 30 days

during combat operations. Block 2 consisted of 6,800 items, including spare

parts and optical supplies, and was computed on the basis of War Department

table of organization replacement factors. Block 2 was designed to supply

100,000 men for 30 days for fixed-hospital maintenance, and to provide a balanced stock which would permit organizations to requisition items either lost

or damaged in combat. These requisitions were submitted by the Medical Supply Division, Office of the Surgeon, U.S. Army Services of Supply, to the

Zone of Interior in May 1945.

Medical supplies for Operation OLYMPIC were to be moved into the

target areas in three blocks loaded on standard cargo ships. Twenty-eight

ships, coded as BOOM, were to carry Block 1 medical supplies. Thirty-five

ships, coded as CEOW, were to carry Block 2 supplies. Eesupply ships were

coded as PLUM, with each vessel scheduled to carry supplies for 40,000 men

for 30 days. Because of Japan's early surrender, these plans were never put

to a test. However, after careful evaluation of the supply plan for OLYMPIC,

the Stock Control Division, SGO, found that Block 2 greatly exceeded any

known or anticipated requirements, while Block 1 was reasonable and realistic.

Kevisions and recommendations of the Stock Control Division were accepted

by the theater. The quantities of approximately half of the items in Block 2

were revised, with 70 percent of the revisions being downward. Theoretically,

these supplies were to cover Operations OLYMPIC and CORONET until

the theater could be established on a requisitioning basis. The theater was to

requisition for the blocks desired on a prearranged plan. Of the original 35

for Block 2, 16 were canceled, leaving a balance of 19.9

Support for Operations in Japan

Logistical support for operations against the Japanese home islands were

to be carried out by Base X (Manila), Base M (San Fernando), Base R

(Batangas), Base K (Leyte), and Base S (Cebu). The major reserve of medical supplies and equipment was to be held at Base X (map 52).

By August 1945, Base K was handling only from 25 to 30 percent of the

theater supplies while Base X was handling 40 to 50 percent. Estimated medical depot storage requirements for each base were computed in June 1945,

based on 17 pounds of medical supplies per square foot. Calculations for storage included some space for unit assemblies as well as for bulk stocks. Base X

was the largest depot, 630,000 square feet of hardstand and 365,000 square feet

of covered storage; Base S was the smallest, with 110,000 square feet closed

and 50,000 feet open.10

" (1) Semiannual Reports, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, 1945. (2) Owens, J. L.: Preliminary draft manuscript, Closing Months of the War Against Japan. [Official record.] (3) Quarterly

Reports, Sixth U.S. Army, 1945. (4) See footnote 8 (1), p. 537.

10 See footnote 9(1), above.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOEEA 539

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540 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Redeployment of Medical Supply Units

After the successful conclusion of the war in Europe on 8 May 1945, the

tempo of the Pacific war increased. Staging of redeployed units in the Philippines was planned at newly expanded bases. Over 50,000 hospital beds were

programed for the Philippines. Thus, various types of hospital assemblies and

other unit supplies for these redeployed units were received and stored in dispersed locations. Earlier lack of sound packing, crating, and documentation

of supplies was resolved in later shipments.11

Plans were made in early 1945 for the redeployment of eight medical depot companies from the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army.

REORGANIZATION OF THE MEDICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM

Organization and Change

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, which supplanted and absorbed U.S. Army

Forces in the Far East in April 1945, was without a medical supply division

until 21 August, after the war was over. Before that date, policy direction at

headquarters on supply matters was exercised by Col. Paul I. Robinson, MC,

deputy to Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Guy B. Denit, the Theater Surgeon.

During the period of island-to-island warfare, the Theater Surgeon's

Office had been limited in size to meet the requirements of a mobile and flexible

organization and to better coordinate supervision of medical components of the

various echelons. On 7 June 1945, a logistical command, AFWESPAC (Army

Forces, Western Pacific), was organized and thereafter assumed all supply

responsibilities in the Pacific. The new command, which replaced the older

Services of Supply organization, was also responsible for supplying the Sixth

and the Eighth U.S. Armies, and the U.S. Far East Air Forces.

The medical supply units in the Pacific were widely dispersed and were

staffed by veterans of the Pacific campaigns who were long overdue for rotation to the United States. A few keymen were retained in the theater, but,

overall, experienced medical supply personnel were in critical demand during

the last months of 1945. When plans were being made for Operations

OLYMPIC and CORONET, it had been obvious that staff personnel would

have to be provided from existing Pacific supply depots which were already

understaffed. To prevent loss of key depot personnel through misassignment,

liaison was established with replacement depots.

The establishment of Army Forces, Western Pacific, did nothing to enlarge the Medical Supply Division, which was already inadequate for its

growing responsibilities. The 17th Medical Supply Depot on New Caledonia

continued to provide the manpower for the theater stock control mission as

11 (1) See footnote 9 (1), p. 538. (2) Memorandum, Capt. Charles C. Clark, AGD, Asst. to the

Adjutant General, Hqs., ÜSAFWESPAC, for the Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army, 31 July

1945, subject: Packing and Crating. (3) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, Philippine Base Section, AprilJune 1945.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 54:1

a component of the Technical Services. Under the direction of Maj. (later Lt.

Col.) John W. Fieting, MAC, effective stock control practices were established

which had been tested and proved in the Zone of Interior. A theater stock control applicable to all technical services was developed later by Major Fieting

while he was on loan to G-4 (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Logistics) Section,

AFWESPAC.12

Stock Control

The computation and recomputation of statistics and reports by manual

means was a trying task, alleviated only when electric accounting machines

were installed in the Stock Control Division of the Theater Surgeon's Office.

These machines proved invaluable in determining theater levels upon which

to base surplus property disposal actions.

The study of replacement factors on selected items, begun in November

1944, was continued. On the basis of this experience, revised factors were submitted to the San Francisco, Calif., Port of Embarkation for approval. Used

thereafter in computing requisitioning factors, a definite improvement in theater stock levels was brought about.

By mid-1945, the limited transportation facilities from New Guinea had

improved. Shipments of stocks were made to the Philippines, thus reducing

the necessity for requisitioning on the United States, except for future operational requirements.

Col. John A. Worrell, MC, formerly commanding officer of the Toledo

Medical Depot, was sent on a tour of New Guinea bases in May 1945 to insure

that priority items were shipped from New Guinea according to need, and that

approved packing, crating, and documentation practices were being followed.

The job of moving material forward accomplished by the depots was commendable despite limited facilities and materials. The packing and crating

job, however, was done by hospital personnel and was far from adequate. To

avoid resupplying and reequipping hospital units moving forward, depot personnel supervised and assisted in packing and crating.

By June 1945, with the stabilization of military operations, it became advisable to place Army supply points on a requisitioning basis. This policy curtailed many of the shortages and excesses at the consuming level which had

resulted under the automatic supply procedure.

Establishment of the Depot Operations Branch

In the summer of 1945, the Depot Operations Branch was established in

the Medical Supply Division, with the mission of preparing plans and policies for the storage and issue of medical supplies and equipment; computing

storage requirements; allocating personnel; and inspecting packing, crating,

and marking methods, and depot stock control and inventory procedures. By

u

(1) Annual Report, Surgeon, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, 1945. (2) See footnotes 9 (1) and

9 (2), p. 538.
542 MEDICAL SUPPLY

September 1945, an inspection team was sent out from the branch to check

the accuracy of current stock status reports. This team was invaluable in improving the overall efficiency and economy of the supply service within the

Western Pacific theater.

An Equipment, Maintenance, and Kepair Section was also established

within the Depot Operations Branch during the period. There had been considerable deterioration of combat equipment, and although emphasis was

placed on the importance of first- and second-echelon maintenance, numerous

items of unserviceable equipment needed care because spare parts were not

available. To alleviate this problem, Base X was designated as the key depot

for storage of spare parts and of replacement parts which were rapidly supplied by air. Bases K and X were designated as the central fourth- and fifthechelon repair shops, which made possible the successful completion of the

rehabilitation and reequipment program for projected operations. The subsequent conversion from combat to occupation needs under Operation BLACKLIST and the readjustment of personnel to the United States made the shortage of trained maintenance personnel even more critical.13

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS BASE SECTIONS

Organizational Changes and Problems

All Philippine Islands bases encountered the same general problems in

establishing and operating their respective medical supply systems. Poor storage facilities and insufficient depot personnel were common. Indigenous personnel were not suitable for stock control and stock selection. Depots had to

borrow personnel from neighboring medical units to operate around the clock

at peak efficiency during the periods of receiving supplies and outfitting units

for Operation BLACKLIST. At the same time, large quantities of stocks were

being received, exceeding assigned storage space and forcing relocation. In the

early days of 1945, replacement supplies were mainly medical maintenance

units, but they were gradually replaced by line-item requisitions to balance

stocks. When shipments from the United States arrived before the receipt

of shipping documents, tallying-in of the incoming property was delayed. This

was particularly irritating as stocks had to be stored according to ships' deliveries pending receipt of the shipping documents.

Refrigeration was also a problem, and improvisation or reliance on other

sources for refrigerator space were the common alternatives in most bases.

As of 1 July 1945, strict accountability was placed in effect within the

Philippines, necessitating the initiation of prescribed inventory and accounting procedures. The large exodus of units in August under Operation BLACKLIST required the preparation and issue of substantial amounts of equipment

and replacement supplies. As strengths in the bases receded, hospitals and

other medical units began turning in their excess supplies, equipment, and unit

13 See footnote 9 (1), p. 538.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 543

assemblies to the depots, which were caught in a squeeze between the increased

workload and the postwar personnel reductions.14

Manila Base Depot Systems

By August 1945, the Greater Manila area contained one of the largest

medical depot systems developed in the Pacific area during the war. As part

of the base development plan, 365,000 square feet of covered storage and

635,000 square feet of hardstand for medical supplies and equipment was being

constructed in five separate areas during June, July, and August.

From the time that Manila was occupied until the assumption of logistical

support by Base X, the medical depot, located in a Manila schoolhouse, was

operated by the 15th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation), a Sixth U.S. Army

unit. When the 49th Medical Depot Company arrived in Manila, it took over

the issue point from the 15th which returned to combat duties.

With the increase of receiving and shipping activities, additional storage

facilities of a variety of conditions and locations were allocated as well as desirable hardstand located at the North Harbor Beach area and the South Beach

area of Manila. DUKW's (amphibious trucks, 2l/2-ton cargo) were used to

haul supplies from the ships backlogged in Manila Bay, to the supply storage

areas faster than the depot crews could tally in and stock them (fig. 143).

Fortunately, the use of abundant civilian labor and the dry season facilitated

this operation. In the meantime, a former Philippines customs warehouse in

the port area replaced the schoolhouse. This new warehouse, with 90,000 square

feet of covered space, became the nucleus for local storage and issue, relieving

added storage problems which had stemmed from the poor packaging of material shipped from New Guinea bases.

As soon as pierside unloading was available, the North Harbor Beach

dump was reduced to use as dead storage space for bulky, slow-moving items.

Additional bulk-storage space was acquired on North Bay Boulevard; however, lack of materials for handling equipment hampered operations.

During June 1945, the depot was expanded by constructing a 26,000-sq.-ft.

prefabricated warehouse adjacent to the issue depot, and six warehouses, totaling 200,000 square feet, at Quezon City (fig. 144). Adjacent to the Quezon City

warehouses was 104,000 square feet of hardstand, and an additional 140,000

square feet of hardstand was acquired when one-half of the Zablan airstrip

was taken over. The widely scattered locations of warehouse and storage areas

presented problems which would not have been encountered if the depot had

all been under one roof (map 53).

Depot Operations

All issues were made from an issue warehouse where the master locator

and stock records systems were maintained. Paperwork in the outlying agencies was kept to a minimum to control and expedite movement of stocks.

" See footnote 9 (2), p. 538.
544 MEDICAL SUPPLY

* *i ^ pUUCSf

«*•

■■*-i-

* *

-u»*<=3gC^

FIGTTBE 143.—General view of docking and incoming ships at Base X port area,

Manila, September 1945.

A medical supply liaison section of the depot directed delivery of medical

supplies from the ships to the proper dump or to the warehouse furnishing

the depot with advance notice of supplies to be received. A locator service on

stray medical shipments was also maintained by the medical supply liaison

section.

Additional personnel from various other medical depot companies were

used by the 49th because its own were insufficiently trained. Soon the policy

was established to have the outlying area units operated by separate detachments. The depot system of Manila was utilized to train new units on their

arrival in the theater. To permit the administrative operation of these many

groups, the 5261st Medical Depot Group (Provisional) was organized. This

resulted in more effective administrative control of the numerous depot companies which were operating the medical depots and assured a continuity of

effort in supporting the numerous hospitals and equipping the units mounting

for Japan.

As of 15 October 1945, the issue depot was operated by the 49th Medical

Depot Company; the bulk-storage warehouse in the Quezon City area was
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 545

FIGURE 144.—Receiving section and warehouse, 49th Medical Depot

Company, Quezon City (near Manila).

operated by a detachment of the 61st Medical Depot Company; the South

Beach dump, Depot No. 4, was operated by the 67th Medical Depot Company;

and the Zablan Bulk Storage Depot, Depot No. 6, was run by the 48th Medical

Depot Company which had been redeployed from Germany (map 53).

Until the responsibility reverted to the Philippines Commonwealth Government, medical supplies for civilian relief of the Philippine Islands were

received, stored, and issued by the 77th Medical Base Depot Company which

used the 36,000-sq.-ft. Studebaker automobile distributing agency building.
546 MEDICAL SUPPLY

to

$

a

es

"a

a!

S!
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 547

The tonnage received and shipped by the medical supply depots in Manila

from the beginning of operation is given in table 8.

TABLE 8.—Tonnage: Medical supply depots in Manila, Aprü-September 1945

Month

April

May.

June.

Received

(measurement

tons)

9,000

14, 000

9,000

Shipped

(measurement

tons)

221

360

Month

July

August

September

Received

(measurement

tons)

11, 600

8,372

7,565

Shipped

(measurement

tons)

675

462

290

Amounts of supplies shipped do not include the innumerable issues to

organizations drawing their supplies locally. While the first 3 months of operation consisted of receipt, storage, and routine issue, June, July, and August

found the depots with the additional load of reequipping units for a forthcoming operation.

Following V-J Day, additional problems emerged, such as receipt, reconditioning, and storage of equipment being turned in by inactivating organizations ; supply of occupation forces by shipments from Base X and other bases ;

and determination and disposal of excesses.

Maintenance and Repair

To meet the need for repair, a maintenance section of the 49th Medical

Depot Company was established in the issue depot (fig. 145). At the beginning

of its operation, repairs had to be accomplished by cannibalization of items

because of an inadequate stock of spare parts. Fortunately, the workload was

light until redeployed units began to arrive in the area. Consequently, maintenance sections of the other depot companies were combined to pool their

supplies, equipment, and personnel, and Manila was designated the key depot

for spare parts. While spare parts continued to arrive automatically, many

parts could not be used because they were of a different manufacture than the

end-item for which they were required.

Optical Service of Manila Depots

The optical service in Manila began with the operation of the optical

section shop, run by the 49th Medical Depot Company (fig. 146). Although

the workload was light, difficulty was encountered because of the lack of lenses

and of spectacle repair parts, a situation resulting from the procedure established by the Surgeon General's Office. This procedure required that requisitions for lenses and spectacle repair parts be placed for direct delivery to each

individual optical unit. Because of the distances between ports and the shipping backlog, optical units were often short of various supplies. The shortage

of stock during the early stages of operation was partly overcome by requisi-
548 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGTJBE 145.—Maintenance Section Shop, 49th Medical Depot Company.

tioning repair supplies from portable optical repair units. To prevent continuation of such shortages, a key depot, responsible for establishment of theater

levels of optical supplies, and for requisition, storage, and issue to various

optical units, was established in Manila. Because of the minimal weight of

spectacle repair parts, unit stocks were easily restored by either mail or air

shipments. As additional medical depot companies arrived in Manila, their

optical repair sections, set up in the issue depot, pooled equipment, supplies,

and personnel.

Whole-Blood Distribution

One important aspect of the medical depot was the supply of whole blood

to units in the Manila area. The first issue was made on 11 March 1945 by the

15th Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation). There was an average daily issue of

125 pints during March, 160 to 175 pints during April, and 175 pints during

the succeeding 3 months. With the cessation of hostilities, the issue of blood

dropped to a minimum. Shipments of whole blood from the United States

ceased on 15 September 1945.15

» (1) See footnote 9(1), p. 538. (2) Essential Technical Medical Data, U.S. Army Forces in

the Pacific for September 1945.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 549

FIGURE 146.—Optical Section Shop, 49th Medical Depot Company.

Airdrops to American Prisoners of War

On 4 July 1945, in anticipation of the collapse of Japan, plans were made

to airdrop essential medical supplies to all American prisoner-of-war camps

in Japan and Korea. The Surgeon's Office, AFWESPAC, developed a list of

components, and the depot supply service experimented with and developed

suitable packaging (fig. 147 A). The project involved 180 drops, each of

which contained 42 essential items including concentrated vitamin products,

antimalarial drugs, parenteral dextrose solutions, diarrheal remedies, analgesics, and narcotics. The package, limited to 125 pounds, was required to fit

into a canvas drop package 14 inches in diameter and 6 feet long. The drops

were made on each prisoner-of-war camp together with appropriate medical

personnel shortly after V-J Day (fig. 147 B). Because the liberated American

prisoners were evacuated so rapidly, the drops were not so beneficial as had

been anticipated.16

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Operation BLACKLIST Executed

With the sudden and unexpected surrender in August 1945, the block

resupply set up for Operations OLYMPIC and COEONET was no longer

M

See footnote 9(2), p. 538.
550 MEDICAL SUPPLY

• ' r

FIGITKE 147.—A. Parachute airdrop pack opened to show how each item was

wrapped in cotton. B. Medical supplies that constituted an airdrop package for

American prisoner-of-war camps in Japan and Korea.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 551

THWllMiMlilMlffJI HS9

FIGURE 148.—St. Luke's International Hospital, Tokyo, Japan,

42d General Hospital, 12 October 1945.

operated by the

needed. Operation OLYMPIC was hastily converted to Operation BLACKLIST, which provided that occupation units would carry medical supplies for

30 days.

In numerous supply conferences held between Colonel Eobinson, of

AFPAC (United States Army Forces in the Pacific), and the medical supply

officers of key bases and armies, it was decided that resupply would be provided by the block-loaded ship. Army Forces, "Western Pacific, hastily developed an automatic resupply block consisting of 2,680 items based upon ZI

(Zone of Interior) replacement factors for 100,000 men for 30 days. A 500-bed

hospital assembly was shipped to Yokohama as an emergency source of equipment and for other unpredictable needs. Upon arrival, this assembly was

diverted for utilization by the 42d General Hospital, which was established at

St. Luke's International Hospital, Tokyo (fig. 148). An unplanned and welcome source of supplies came from the U.S. Army Hospital Ship Marigold,

without the knowledge or requisition of the theater. Apparently, requisitions

had been placed in the Zone of Interior by the Surgeon General's Office and

loaded out of San Francisco.

By 27 September 1945, 30 days' supply for 100,000 men was stored in the

Yokohama Depot which was operated by the 29th Medical Depot Company.

Tremendous quantities of litters, blood plasma, plaster of paris bandages, and

similar bulky combat type items arriving in block-loaded ships from the Zone

of Interior became a disposition problem. When the 43d Infantry Division

295-453 0—68- -37
552 MEDICAL SUPPLY

and the 1st Cavalry Division departed for the United States, they complicated

depot operations further by turning in field equipment.17

Problems of Supply in Japan

Despite the haste with which occupation plans were formulated and executed, medical supply problems were initially minor.

Winter items, such as pajamas and convalescent suits, not required in

either New Guinea or the Philippines, were in short supply as the block-loaded

ships provided quantities based on replacement factors only. The shortage of

temperate-zone items required the supply by emergency requisitions from the

United States.18

Avoiding Excesses

Considerable pressure was placed on all supply echelons to prevent the

buildup of excesses in Japan.

All OLYMPIC requisitions which had not been shipped from the Zone of

Interior before Japan surrendered were immediately canceled. It was recommended to the "War Department that fully loaded ships awaiting discharge in

Japanese waters be returned to the States unless they were carrying essential

equipment and supplies required in the occupation area. As this complicated

supply computation, it was requested that emergency requisitions be submitted

to the Philippines for any supplies not received because of ship diversion.

Beginning on 1 October 1945, replacement factors were computed on ZI

rates upon instructions from U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific. Numerous ship

diversions occurred from the Philippines to Japan, with many ships containing hospital assemblies from the European and Mediterranean theaters of

operation. If these assemblies were delivered to the Philippines, they were

unloaded; if received in Japan, they were returned to the United States.19

Postwar Supply System

By 1 January 1946, the medical supply system in Japan was well established. Col. Stephen G. Asbill, VC, was Chief, Medical Supply Division, U.S.

Army Service Command, with Capt. Albert Simms, MAC, serving as chief of

the Administrative Division. The stock control mission was performed by a

separate unit headed by Maj. Cornelius J. Curran, MAC, and was attached to

the 29th Medical Depot at Yokohama, the key depot in Japan. The 9th Medical Depot Company, commanded by 1st Lt. Milton A. Kaplan, MAC, arrived

at Wakayama (Southern Honshu Island), on 29 September 1945, from Base

" (1) Logistics Instructions for the BLACKLIST Operations, Hqs., U.S. Army Forces, Western

Pacific, 15 Aug. 1945. [Official record.] (2) Minutes of Agencies Interested in BLACKLIST, 17 Aug.

1945. [Official record.] (3) Annual Report, Planning Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, AFPAC,

28 Mar. 1945. (4) Quarterly Eeport, 42d General Hospital, July-September 1945. (5) Quarterly Reports, 29th Medical Depot Company, 1945.

18 See footnote 9(2), p. 538.

18 See footnotes 9 (1) and 9(2), p. 538.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 558

M A N C H U R I

O 100 200

JAS

MAP 54.—Postwar medical supply system in Japan and Korea, 29 September 1945.

M. It was initially assigned to Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army, and later to

I Corps, and it operated depots at Nagoya, Wakayama, and Kobe (map 54).

The 78th Medical Base Depot Company, commanded by Capt. (later Maj.)

Leroy M. Martine, MAC, arrived at Otaru, Hokkaido, on 5 October 1945, with

180 measurement tons of medical maintenance units to supply 20,000 troops in

that area. This unit experienced difficulty in protecting its supplies from the

freezing temperatures of that location. An improvised structure of approximately 10,500 cubic feet was built from framing and tarpaulins and was heated

with gasoline tent stoves.

On 20 October 1945, the 80th Medical Base Depot Company, commanded

by Capt. F. E. Grlascock, MAC, arrived in Yokohama and was attached to the

29th Medical Depot Company.
554 MEDICAL SUPPLY

During October 1945, the Medical Supply Division, AFWESPAC, requested inventories from the various command levels to establish accurate theater on-hand figures. At the same time, medical supply procedures were furnished these commands, since AFWESPAC was to provide logistical support

until 1 March 1946, when the Eighth U.S. Army was scheduled to assume

responsibility.20

MEDICAL SUPPLY OPERATIONS IN KOREA

Organization

Japan's sudden surrender found the staff of the XXIV Corps still planning for the invasion of Japan. The corps was furnished with medical support

units necessary to perform its independent operation as an occupation force

in Korea, and was designed to support a force of 100,000 men and a military

government organization. An initial mission of the corps was recovery, processing, initial care, and evacuation of U.S. prisoners of the Japanese in mainland prison camps.

Medical Supply Responsibilities

Kesponsibilities of the medical supply officer, XXIV Corps, ranged from

supervising medical-supply manufacturing installations which Japan had established in Korea to reestablishing production in a variety of factories in

Korea.

Another peculiarity of the supply program was the arrival of assigned

hospital units less all personnel except one lieutenant and one corporal. These

units were completely equipped, but because of the rotation policies, they had

lost all personnel at their points of origin, either in Okinawa, Tinian, or

Luzon, or back in Australia or Hawaii. Soon a mountain of unprocessed supplies, equipment assemblages, and paper piled up beside the inadequately staffed 58th Medical Base Depot Company. It was not surprising that it took many

months to work out this backlog. Unmanned units were never manned because

the planned strength of the occupation force was reduced to 40,000, and so the

disparity between supplies and personnel continued to grow.21

Rehabilitation Activities

Medical supply personnel were called upon to make significant contributions to the medical service in Korea by a number of activities. They outfitted

and put into service a hospital train, established supply stores in Korean hospitals, reestablished medical schools, and set up a previously dismantled smallpox vaccine manufacturing laboratory and distributed its product to the civilian population, thereby combating a full-scale epidemic.

20 (1) See footnotes 9(1) and 9(2), p. 538; and (5), p. 536. (2) Quarterly Report, 9th Medical

Depot Company, July-September 1945. (3) Quarterly Report, 78th Medical Base Depot Company,

October-December 1945.

m

(1) Quarterly Report, Surgeon, XXIV Corps, October-December 1945. (2) Quarterly Reports,

58th Medical Base Depot Company, 1945.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 5,55

The medical supply system was also instrumental in establishing standards for drug purity by promulgating codes of conduct for the drug manufacturing industry.

Early in October, a classical smallpox epidemic began to crop up in the

civilian population which had not been vaccinated for 5 years, as the vaccine

laboratory near Taegu had been diverted to meet the needs of the Japanese

Forces. Through the efforts of Capt. Ernest E. Tinkham, MAC, the laboratory

at Seoul was reestablished, and vaccine became available.

In early November, with the recognition of the first U.S. case of smallpox

and a serious outbreak of smallpox among civilians, all personnel of the command were ordered revaccinated. A new consignment of vaccine was obtained

from Philippine Islands laboratories. Because some cases of smallpox among

U.S. personnel remained in evidence, the medical supply officer required highpotency vaccine to be airshipped from California. All members of the command were given this vaccine. From then on, all personnel arriving in Korea

were vaccinated aboard ship before debarking.22

CIVILIAN AID

Civilian Medical Supply in the Philippines

Supplies for Philippine Islands civil affairs units were received, stored,

and distributed by Army medical supply personnel. Eelief stocks were distributed proportionately under the operational control of the Sixth and Eighth

U.S. Armies. On 1 July 1945, full responsibility for civil affairs supply was

transferred to the Eighth U.S. Army to release the Sixth for future operations.

The Eighth was responsible for maintaining necessary records to insure that

supplies were not over-requisitioned. Issues from Army stocks were made in

emergency only if Army stocks were in a favorable position.

"With the cessation of hostilities, the supplies for Philippine Islands civil

affairs units, which were stored in civil affairs medical depots in Manila and

Leyte (fig. 149), were inventoried to determine supplies ready for issue to the

civilians of Japan and the Philippines. These supplies were transferred to the

Foreign Economic Administration, which turned them over to the Commonwealth of the Philippines Government on 9 October 1945, thus releasing the

Army from further responsibility for civilian supply in the Philippines.23

Civil Affairs Supplies in Japan

Late in August 1945, plans for the supply of the civilian population of

Japan were begun by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Crawford F. Sams, MC, surgeon

of the Japanese Allied Military Government group and his medical supply

staff, in coordination with the AFWESPAC Medical Supply Division. Colo-

's (1) Essential Technical Medical Data, XXIV Corps, for November 1945. (2) Essential Technical Medical Data, XXIV Corps, for December 1945. (3) For further details on the smallpox epidemic In Korea, see Medical Department, United States Army. Preventive Medicine in World War II.

Volume IV. Communicable Diseases. Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958, pp. 156-161.

23 See footnote 9 (1), p. 538.
556 MEDICAL SUPPLY

FIGUBE 149.—Civilian relief supplies at Tacloban, Leyte Island.

nel Sam's group took the position that, because the war was over, civilian requirements should be given priority over military requirements. The Supply

Division, on the other hand, believed that, because medical supplies in the theater were Army stocks, only excesses could be applied to civilian requirements

and then only after SGO approval. Failure to establish delineation of responsibility between the Allied Military Government and the Eighth U.S. Army

was another confusing factor. Since neither group had sufficient personnel, the

task fell on the 29th Medical Depot Company at Yokohama.

On 22 September, a medical maintenance unit was shipped to the Hiroshima area, along with as much penicillin and other essentials as could be

spared. In response to a request of the Eighth U.S. Army, a full medical depot

company was provided to operate the Civilian Aid Program for the Allied

Military Government group. Late in September, the SS Tuscon was diverted

from the Philippines to Japan. Eleven hundred cases of supplies and a large

quantity of relief supplies for the Philippines were segregated in 35,000 square

feet of covered storage by the 29th Medical Depot Company. At a later date,

Japanese Army stocks were diverted for civilian requirements, and a program

to build civil affairs units from excess U.S. Army stocks was started by Army

Forces, Western Pacific.24

DISPOSAL OF EXCESSES AND SURPLUS PROPERTY

Organization and Early Work

After V-J Day, advantageous disposition of the huge excesses of medical

supplies and equipment became one of the prime missions of the Army Forces,

Western Pacific. Early in September 1945, Maj. Eaymond F. Linn, MAC, was

2i See footnote 9 (2), p. 538,
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 557

designated as the medical member of an AFWESPAC surplus property disposal team which visited New Guinea bases with the objective of delivering

all supplies in excess of a 6-month maintenance requirement to the Dutch Government. After inventorying and pricing stocks at these bases, the value was

set at $4.8 million.

On 25 October 1945, disposition of surplus property was assigned the

highest priority by G-4, AFWESPAC. Despite clearly refined relationships

between G-4, G-5 (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Civil Affairs), Technical

Services, and the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commission, disposition of

surpluses was hampered by the computation of requirements for a War Eeserve Stock to be maintained in the Philippines. However, by 2 November,

declarations of surpluses had been initiated.25

Closeout of Philippine Islands Bases

Closeout of the Philippine Islands bases came next in the rollup of the

rear. The 34th Medical Depot Company experienced typical problems in closing Base K. With only a few experienced officers remaining assigned to the

depot and only an inexperienced combination of inexperienced depot enlisted

men, enlisted men from a tank destroyer battalion, Filipino civilians, and 325

Japanese prisoners of war, 29,431 measurement tons of supplies were processed

for shipment to either Manila, Japan, Korea, or the United States. Packing

and crating materials were adequate. However, certain essential items such as

stencil machines were not available, and packages had to be marked in freehand.

The disposition of surplus property in the Philippines was a race against

time since the tools for accomplishment—manpower and shipping space—were

rapidly diminishing. The Supply Division was fortunate to have Maj. (later

Lt. Col.) Clarence Eetzky, MAC, as stock control officer. Electric accounting

machines were used in the repeated computing of levels and the issuing of

appropriate disposition instructions.26

UNUSUAL PROBLEMS OF MEDICAL SUPPLY

Loss of Drugs

The loss of biological products as a result of passing expiration dates in the

theater was of considerable concern to the AFWESPAC supply service, and

plans were developed to provide biologicals within the optimum use to units.

Smallpox vaccine with a 3-month expiration date under routine supply processing would be outdated before it was received in the theater. As a result, key

depots at Hollandia and Manila were established with stock levels based on

consumption studies. All stocks of vaccine were shipped from the United

States on class I priority, and shipments within the area were made by air to

z

See footnote & (2), p. 538.

26 See footnote 9 (2), p. 538.
558 MEDICAL SUPPLY

insure use before expiration dates. Undoubtedly, a high percentage of "outdated" biologicals were potent and suitable for use. Development of potency

determination facilities by theater medical laboratories appeared feasible to

permit the salvaging of a large quantity of these products.

The shortage of biological and pharmaceutical sets at medical depots presented a problem which was solved by designating the 19th Medical General

Laboratory at Luzon as the central storage and issue agency for these products. Requisitions went directly from hospitals and consuming units to the

laboratory. Items not manufactured by the laboratory were requisitioned from

the United States for direct delivery to the 19th Medical General Laboratory.

Another factor in efficiency of storage operations and deterioration of

supply packaging was the low priority given warehouse construction. The use

of newly developed plastic sheeting as an interim measure seemed desirable as

canvas tarpaulins were not available for depot use in the quantities required.

Because of the studies of the Schistosomiasis Commission and other laboratory requirements, an unusually large requirement for laboratory animals

developed. Australian sources were becoming exhausted, and transportation

from the United States was an important consideration. It was decided to

establish a breeding colony at the 19th Medical General Laboratory. Four airplane loads of breeding stock were obtained from the United States for direct

delivery to Manila; The final shipment of 10,000 white mice, 600 guinea pigs,

and 200 hamsters was received on 29 September 1945. Losses en route were

negligible. Food pellets were requisitioned from the United States until

sources were developed in the Philippines.

Probably the most acute problem of the medical service in the Philippines was the loss of medical supplies by pilferage. Depot areas were not

fenced until late 1945, and truck convoys en route from the port area to the

numerous depot locations were frequently hijacked. Medical supplies brought

fantastic prices on the black market. Pilferage was not confined to the shoplifting tactics experienced in U.S. depots, but consisted of organized armed

raids by day and night. As a result of this problem, penicillin was actually

in short supply status early in 1946.27

Supply for Other Services

The Army Medical Supply System provided essential medical supplies to

the Navy, Army Air Forces, Marines, Eoyal Australian Air Force, and other

services toward the end of the war. In June 1945, 70 tons of supplies were

provided the naval station at Subic Bay. In routine procedure, Army medical

depots supplied Navy ships in their areas. In November 1945, issues were

restricted to requisitions authenticated by appropriate Navy commands. Typical daily-diary entries showed unanticipated requirements for U.S.O. shows, a

hearing aid for General Yamashita to enable him to hear his interpreter during the War Trials, and requests for equipment for a Coast Guard dispensary

« See footnote 9 (2), p. 538.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 559

and for 100,000 Atabrine (quinacrine hydrochloride) tablets for the Eoyal

Australian Air Force.28

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

REGARDING MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Introduction

The story of medical supply in World War II was one of frequent frustration and confusion which evolved into success.

After the Japanese severely crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and followed up by driving U.S. forces from the Philippines, the supply

service in the Pacific had to start on a shoestring. The hard lessons learned in

those early weeks and months furnished the experience and taught the lessons

put to good use in later campaigns, particularly in the invasion of the European Continent.

Prewar Planning

Numerous errors of judgment made in the period of austerity between

World Wars I and II prevented adequate supply planning. Based on the false

assumption that the outbreak of the war would be preceded by a formal

mobilization day and the equally false assumption that there would be a manpower ceiling of 4 million men, the supply posture was much too rigid, and

planning was totally inadequate, Lack of funds and a woefully inadequate

reserve of medical supplies and equipment were responsible for the use of obsolete medical kits, chests, and hospital assemblies.

Personnel Problems

In September 1939, 4 officers and 27 civilians were on duty in the Finance

and Supply Division, Office of The Surgeon General. By the time of Pearl

Harbor, the division had become one of the 12 major divisions of the Surgeon

General's Office with a complement of 16 officers and 201 civilians. As a result

of expanding supply needs after Pearl Harbor, many willing but inexperienced supply officers came into the system overnight. It was not until 1943,

when formal training for medical supply officers became a part of the course

at the St. Louis Medical Depot Maintenance School, that the supply of trained

officers began to meet the demand. By bringing in leading businessmen, such

as Herman C. Hangen, J. C. Penney Co.; Edward Reynolds, Columbia Gas

and Electric Corp., who became chief of Supply Services; and many others

from civilian life, adequate leadership for the supply program became a

reality.

Depot Organization

To eliminate the merry-go-round procedure used to requisition items, the

key depot system was established. Certain depots were responsible for certain

28 See footnote 9 (2), p. 538.
560 MEDICAL SUPPLY

types of supplies and equipment. Efficient depot operations in the United

States eliminated hoarding and rushed the requisitioned supplies to their

assigned destinations. Storage space expanded from 1 million to 13 million

square feet in the course of a year amid a mad rush for depot space. New

depots or medical sections were established in Kansas City, Kans., Seattle,

Wash., Atlanta, Ga., and Eichmond, Va., to handle the expanding need for

medical supplies.

Automatic Supply

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the MMU (medical maintenance unit), a

standard assemblage, comprising about 700 items and weighing 15 tons and

intended for automatic supply of 10,000 men for 30 days, was developed.

Designed primarily for use in overseas theaters and forward bases for the

initial phases of development, the medical maintenance unit had a primary

weakness of inflexibility. Forward echelons often relied on these units for a

longer period of time than was intended, with a resulting serious shortage of

some items and an oversupply of others.

An even more serious weakness of the medical maintenance unit, particularly in the European theater, was its inability to ship complete units. Split

shipments occurred most frequently in the days preceding D-day in Europe.

To compensate for these weaknesses, other types of MMU's with a smaller number of items of less tonnage were developed and used successfully in

Sicily and in Italy, as well as in the Pacific.

Maintenance, Repairs, and Spare Parts

The maintenance program of the Supply Division, SGO, was born of

necessity. Virtually nonexistent at the beginning of World War II, it became a

fully functioning program in all theaters by the end of the war. The servicing

of medical equipment was strictly a wartime policy. Maintenance of medical

equipment before the war was handled at on-post shops by other technical

services or by local manufacturers of the specific equipment. Poor planning

for repairs in North Africa precipitated numerous problems with broken

X-ray screens, as well as shattered glass tubing and damaged knobs on steam

sterilizers. Without an established maintenance program, the repair of broken

items was almost nil, and only superb and ingenious Rube Goldberg techniques

saved a catastrophe. By the time of the invasion of Europe, some provision

for maintenance had been made and, gradually, full operation was reached

with the maintenance section's being attached to the base platoons of the

medical depots. Well-trained graduates of the St. Louis Medical Depot Maintenance School filled the need for trained technicians.

In the Pacific theaters, medical equipment repair was more difficult

because of the lack of trained technicians and the distance between island

bases. Late in the war, it was found practical to send two barges outfitted with

equipment and staffed with trained personnel on a scheduled round of the various bases to make repairs and dispense spare parts.
OKINAWA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 561

During World War II, it was learned that the Medical Department

should not depend on manufacturers' shops to maintain equipment in an emergency. Cannibalization of parts or exchange was not a satisfactory solution

because of the huge backlog of unserviceable items which developed.

Development of Special Items of Equipment

Perhaps one of the most outstanding contributions of the medical supply

service in World War II was the development of artificial (acrylic) eyes, camouflage dressings, jungle kits, aluminum litters, arch supports, and orthopedic

braces.

The optical program itself became an important part of operations in the

European theater. More specifically, a mobile optical repair unit was on the

beaches of Normandy as early as 3 days after D-day.

More than 180,000 pairs of spectacles were repaired from D-day to June

1945, and more than 120,000 pairs of glasses were issued.

Until early 1944, when the new acrylic eye was developed by European

theater dental officers, large numbers of artificial (glass) eyes had to be purchased in Italy. The development of the acrylic eye eliminated the problem of

source of supply and the necessarily wide assortment of sizes, shapes, and

colors which would be required.

To protect the wounded soldier from sniper fire, particularly in the jungleinfested areas of China, Burma, India, and the Pacific, olive-drab camouflage

dressing was created and used with care to avoid any probable toxicity which

might occur because of the dyes involved.

Another item used successfully in the Pacific was the jungle kit which

was adopted after the Guadalcanal Campaign. Varying in size from a small

pouch, which was carried on the individual soldier's belt, to a much larger

unit carried on the back, the jungle kit contained antimalarial water-purification tablets, salt tablets, skin disinfectants, insect repellants, and vitamins.

Early in the war, it became obvious that in a fluid type of fighting such

as in the Pacific and in Italy, it would be necessary to transport both medical

equipment and patients over rough terrain in an expeditious yet comfortable

manner. Jeep brackets were developed so that a jeep could carry three litters

easily from the forward area to the rear. When available, aluminum litters

were widely used because of their light weight.

The development of the blood bank and blood plasma made blood a standard item of supply, as it was handled in the European theater and the Pacific

as part of the Medical Supply System.

Development of Packaging and Packing

At the beginning of World War II, some of the first shipments sent overseas fell apart, and glass containers shattered. It became necessary to develop

better packaging specifications. The handling of loose or mixed issues was par-
562 MEDICAL SUPPLY

ticularly poor at the beginning of the war, and because of the lack of standardization, packing in a variety of containers was in use.

After much experimentation in the North African and Sicilian campaigns, waterproof medical packs weighing 70 pounds were developed and used

in the invasion of Italy and led to the use of waterproof boxes in both Europe

and the Pacific. As a result of the Voorhees mission to the European theater,

an expanded packing and crating program was swiftly and successfully carried out.

With the development of a skid-loading program which had been introduced in the Attu Campaign of April 1943, supplies were moved rapidly from

the depot to the field. By using this method, surgical instruments were packed

together as were other special items.

One of the greatest boons to unloading of supplies was first used on the

beaches of North Africa. The marking of packages and boxes with the color

appropriate to the technical service allowed for effective sorting of boxes by

natives who could not read the accompanying shipping documents.

Overcoming Weaknesses

Numerous shortcomings, tragedies, handicaps, and errors hindered supply

operations. Despite losses which resulted from sinking of ships, poor handling

of supplies on the beaches, enemy destruction of depots and medical installations, lack of control of transportation, nonmedical use of medical items, pilferage, and ineffective property exchange, medical supplies were delivered and

used in sufficient quality and quantity to allow the effective treatment of the

wounded and the noncombatant disabled casualty. The effective use of missions

to the various overseas commands helped straighten out some very intolerable

and seemingly impossible situations.

As the war came to a close, careful planning, new innovations, and sheer

industriousness had made the supply of the Philippines and Okinawa campaigns much more efficient. The massive movement of units and supplies from

Europe to the Pacific never was necessary because of the sudden surrender of

Japan.
APPENDIX A

Medical Depot Information

TABLE 1.—Medical sections, general depots and medical depots, 1939-46

Warehouse

Name or location Date of activation storage space

(square leet)

Missions

Atlanta ASF Depot, 1 Nov. 1941 681, 000 1. Receive and store all supplies

Medical Section, for theater-of-operations

Conley, Ga. type hospitals.

2. Assembly of theater-ofoperations type hospitals.

3. In 1945, was changed to

distribution to area served

by Savannah.

4. Record repository in July

1945.

5. Key depot to receive and

store trucks in August 1945.

6. Receive and store excess

medical depot items in

December 1945.

Columbus Medical Before 1939 282, 000 1. Assembly of medical mainDepot, Medical tenance units for lend-lease.

Section, Columbus, 2. Assembly of civilian aid

Ohio. defense supply (CAD).

Marietta General December 1941; 175, 400 International Aid Depot.

Depot, Medical closed March

Section, Marietta, Pa. 1942.

New Cumberland ASF Before 1939 138, 000 1. Storage and distribution of

Depot, Medical general supplies for First and

Section, New Cumber- Second Service Commands

land, Pa. and State of Pennsylvania.

2. Filler depot and general

supply for Brooklyn and New

York Ports of Embarkation.

New York General Before 1939 623, 700 1. Procured major portion of

Depot, Medical medical supplies and equipSection, New York ment before World War II

Port of Embarka- and during early part of war.

tion, Brooklyn, NY. 2. Distribution depot for eastern

seaboard.

3. Moved to Bush Terminal in

January 1941 and redesignated New York Medical

Depot on 1 July 1941.

563
564 MEDICAL SUPPLY

TABLE 1.—Medical sections, general depots and medical depots, 1939-46—Continued

Warehouse

Name or location Date of activation storage space

(square feet)

Missions

Pueblo Ordnance Depot, 15 Apr. 1943, 400, 000 Storage depot for reserve medical

Medical Section, and as sub- supplies.

Pueblo, Colo. depot of

Denver,

20 Sept. 1945.

Richmond General 1 June 1941 350, 000 1. Port filler depot for Hampton

Depot, Medical Roads and Charleston Ports

Section, Richmond, of Embarkation.

Va. 2. Port filler depot for New

York Port of Embarkation

for all items, for shipments

passing through Philadelphia

and all ports south.

San Antonio ASF Before 1939 306, 000 Distribution depot for Texas,

Depot, Medical excluding area by Denver.

Section, San Antonio,

Tex. (was a quartermaster depot in 1942).

Savannah General De- 15 Jan. 1941 670,000 1. Distribution depot for Virpot, Medical Section; (subdepot of ginia, North Carolina, South

ASF in 1943, general Atlanta Med- Carolina, Georgia, and

depot 16 May 1946. ical Section, Florida.

1945). 2. Supervising operation of, and

furnishing supplies for, Miami

Medical Supply Point

(Florida).

Schenectady ASF De- Before 1939 227,000 Port filler depot for Brooklyn

pot, Medical Section, and New York Ports of EmSchenectady, N.Y. barkation for drugs, chemicals, biologicals, surgical

dressings, and supplies for

field equipment and special

kits.

Seattle ASF Depot, August 1941 300,000 1. Distribution depot for WashMedical Section, ington, Oregon, and Alaska.

Seattle, Wash, (was a 2. Also became a key depot for

quartermaster depot classes IV and V.

with Medical Section 3. Built hospital assemblies,

established in May 1942 to April 1944.

1941). 4. 1944—Supply to troops in

the Pacific.
APPENDIX A 565

TABLE 1.—Medical sections, general depots and medical depots, 1939-46—Continued

Warehouse

Name or location Date of activation storage space

(square feet)

Missions

Shamokin General De- 19 July 1941; 35,000 International Aid Depot.

pot, Medical Section, closed

Shamokin, Pa. February

1942.

Sharonville Engineer 22 Dec. 1942.... 345,600 International Aid Depot.

Depot, Medical Section, Sharonville,

Ohio.

Utah General Depot, 15 Sept. 1941... 294,000 1. 1942—Assembly, storage, or

Medical Section, issue of medical maintenance

Ogden, Utah. units for troops of Western

Defense Command of various

Pacific theaters.

2. A backup depot for San

Francisco and Los Angeles

Medical Depots.

3. To act as a collecting point

for medical supplies and

numbered shipments which,

due to shortages, made it

necessary to ship from other

depots.

4. 1944—changed to initial issue

to Communications Zone of

tactical and hospital assemblies and backup for port

filler depots.

Voorheesville General December 1941; 43,500 International Aid Depot.

Depot, Medical Sec- closed

tion, Voorheesville, March 1942.

N.Y.

Binghamton Medical 9 Jan. 1943 618,000 1. Key depot for special items

Depot, Binghamton, (teeth, optical) for all depots

N.Y. (see also New and ports.

York Medical Depot). 2. Filler depot for Brooklyn

and New York Ports of Embarkation.

Chicago Medical Depot, April 1942; 576,000 1. Distribution depot for Fifth,

Chicago, 111. (Medical Chicago Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth

Section, Chicago Medical Service Commands.

Quartermaster Depot (10 2. Key depot for special items.

Depot). Dec. 1940).
566 MEDICAL SUPPLY

TABLE 1.—Medical sections, general depots and medical depots, 1939-46—Continued

Name or location Date of activation

Warehouse

storage space

(square feet)

Missions

Denver Medical Depot,

Denver, Colo, (in

1945 was an ASF,

Branch Medical

Depot, class IV, for

Rocky Mountain

Area).

Kansas City Medical

Depot, Kansas City,

Kans.

Los Angeles Medical

Depot, Los Angeles,

Calif.

New York Medical

Depot, New York,

N.Y. (Brooklyn).

Louisville Medical

Depot, Louisville,

Ky. (holding and

reconsignment point,

1942; war aid depot,

1942; quartermaster

depot, September

1942; ordnance

depot, 10 Oct. 1942).

1 June 1942- 535,000

1 Feb. 1942.

1 June 942.

1 July 1941.

24 July 1943

446,000

225,000

1,964,000

1,713,000

1. Distribution depot for Rocky

Mountain Area.

2. Key depot for drugs, chemicals, biological products,

surgical supplies; laboratory,

X-ray, dental, pharmacy,

hospital and field equipment

and supplies, special kits or

assemblies for San Francisco

and Los Angeles Medical

Depots and Seattle Medical

Section.

3. Assembly of Zone of Interior

hospitals for western United

States, j

4. Depot for returned material;

depot to operate a Medical

Depot fifth-echelon shop for

reclamation or repair of

unserviceable medical depot

property.

1. Assembly of field equipment

for tactical supplies for Zone

of Interior or theaters of

operations.

2. Key depot for selected biologicals; unit assemblies for

all depots and ports.

1. Distribution depot for

southern California and

California-Arizona Maneuver

Area.

2. Filler depot for Los Angeles

Port of Embarkation.

To receive, warehouse, and ship

medical depot supplies (see

Binghamton Medical Depot

for changes).

1. Storage depot for reserve

medical supplies.

2. Storage and issue of medical

supplies for International Aid

(lend-lease).
APPENDIX A 567

TABLE 1.—Medical sections, general depots and medical depots, 1939-46—Continued

Warehouse

Name or location Date of activation storage space

(square leet)

Missions

St. Louis Medical 9 Mar. 1943 (in 1,766,000 1. Distribution depot for KenDepot, St. Louis, existence in tucky, Tennessee, Alabama,

Mo. 1918 or Mississippi, Missouri, Kansas,

before). Oklahoma, and Scott Field.

2. Key depot for medical depot

supplies, drugs, chemicals,

biologicals; surgical, laboratory, pharmacy, dental,

X-ray, hospital, veterinary,

and field equipment and

supplies, special kits and

assemblies, serving Binghamton and Chicago Medical

Depots and San Antonio and

Savannah ASF Depots of

Zone of Interior.

3. Key depot for catalog-selected

items, veterinary equipment

and supplies, serving all

depots and ports.

4. Port filler depot, New

Orleans Port of Embarkation.

5. Operated training schools

(officers and enlisted men).

6. Operated medical depot

repair shop.

San Francisco Medical 1 July 1942 (in 714,800 1. Distribution depot, key

Depot, Oakland, existence be- depot for west coast ports

Calif, (was medical fore World and filler depot.

section of San Fran- War I, about 2. Distribution depot for

cisco General Depot). 1917). northern California.

3. Key depot for medical

shortages on port requisitions

received by Los Angeles

Medical Depot and Medical

Section of Seattle ASF

Depot.

4. Port filler depot for San

Francisco Port of Embarkation.

Toledo Medical Depot, Before June 854,000 1. Receipt, inspection, and

Toledo, Ohio. 1941 (lease storage of medical depot

executed 10 supplies and equipment from

Dec. 1940). industrial plants and other

depots.

2. Export packing, assembling,

and shipment of theater-ofoperations type hospitals.

295-453 0—68 38
APPENDIX B

Medical Lend-Lease Statistics

TABLE 1.—Military lend-lease (medical shipments), 11 March 1941-3 September 1945

Country 1941' 1942 1 1943 1944 1945 Total

Belgian Congo _. $115,000 $51,000 $166,000

Bolivia $115

180,000

30,000

115

Brazil 248,000

84,000

54,000

3,920,000

152,000

143,000

23,000

7,000

2,468,000

109,000

200

300

2,600

40,000

449,000

571,000

$12,000 149,000

Chile 61,000

China $220,000 3,107,000 1,706,000 11,421,000

261,000

200

Cuba 200 44,500

15,500

287,000

1,960,000

1,400

48,750

160

139,000

59,000

20,000

15,000

19,000

203,000

16,396,000

300

13,764,000

2,000

120,000

45,000

18,000

Ecuador i 1,000 110,000

2,769,000

438,000

French Africa 5,168,000

Greece 1,400

Haiti 260 1,000 60,000

160

8,000 3,000

91,000

13,000

4,000

76,000

28,000

12,821,000

360

10,401,000

10,000

14,000

150,000

150,000

49,000 82,000

19,000

23,000

74,000

16,286,000

118,000

4,000

4,007,000

309,000

United Kingdom and dominions 66,000 49,566,000

650

U.S.S.E 4,624,000 9,284,000 38,073,000

12,000

134,000

Total $276,000 $11,755,260 $30,620,315 $37,657,610 $26,754,350 $106,963,625

1 There was no distinction between military and civilian lend-lease shipments before 1943. These columns, therefore,

include indeterminate quantities of civilian medical supplies.

TABLE 2.—Civilian lend-lease (medical) shipments, 1 January 1943-3 September 1946

Country 1943 1944 1945 Total

Belgian Congo

Ethiopia

French Africa

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Turkey

United Kingdom and dominions.

Miscellaneous

$61,000 1

1,000

127,000

7,000

$87,000

34,000

210,000

1,250

6,000

6,000

7,000

180,000

5,057,000

1,292,000

$1,940,000

3,000

370

2,407,000

$87,000

34,000

3,211,000

1,250

6,000

9,000

7,370

181,000

7,591,000

1,299,000

Total... \ $196,000 $7,880,250 $4,350,370 $12,426,620

569
570 MEDICAL SUPPLY

TABLE 3.—Foreign shipments of medical supplies other than lend-lease, 19J/.2-45

Agency 1942 1943 1944 1945

Russian War Relief Society.-

Procurement Division, U.S.

Treasury

$1,770,448 $3,241,253 $1,648,463

22,190

45,189

3,955

69,669

$834,264

20,435,709

American Red Cross:

To U.S.S.R 3,553,330 431,348

36,534

136,428

To Greece - _ __ ._ __ 136

To Ireland 25,961

Total $5,349,739 $3,845,563 $1,789,466 $21,270,109
APPENDIX C

Sample Equipment Lists (Evacuation, Station, and General

Hospitals)

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital i

(400-bed)

Station

hospital2

(500-bed)

General

hospital3

(1,000-bed)

10025

10030

10050

10070

10090

10100

10102

10105

10120

10122

10123

10155

10157

10160

10190

10200

10240

10255

10260

10270

10278

10280

10300

10320

10328

10340

10360

10400

10410

10418

10420

Class 1

Acetic Anhydride, CP Analyzed,

ACS.

Acetone, ACS

Acetophenetidin, USP

Acid, Acetic, Glacial, USP

Acid, Acetylsalicylic, USP

Acid, Acetylsalicylic, USP 5 Gr.

Tab.

Acid, 1 Amino-2 Naphthol-4 Sulfonic.

Acid, Benzoic, USP

Acid, Boric, USP

Acid, Boric, Ointment, USP

Acid, Boric, Ointment, USP

Acid, Formic, CP Analyzed, ACS

Acid, Hydrobromic, Purified, 34%...

Acid, Hydrochloric, ACS

Acid, Molybdic, Anhydride, ACS

Acid, Nitric, ACS

Acid, Oxalic, ACS

Acid, Para-Aminobenzoic -.

Acid, Phosphoric, ACS

Acid, Phosphotungstic, Crystals,

Reagent.

Acid, Picric, CP

Acid, Picric, USP...

Acid, Salicylic, USP

Acid, Sulfanilic, ACS

Acid, Sulfosalicylic, CP Analyzed

Acid, Sulfuric, ACS

Acid, Sulfuric, Commercial

Acid, Tannic, USP —

Acid, Tartaric, USP, Powder

Acid, Trichloracetic, CP Analyzed- _.

Acid, Trichloracetic, USP

«lblb

lb

lb

lb

1,000.

25 gm.

lb

5 lb—.

4 oz...

lb

«lb—

H lblb

tf lblb

«lb._

25 gm.

lb

OZ5 gm.

oz

«lb.

oz

«lb..

lb...

5 gal.

« lblb...

«lb.

oz

' Medical Department Equipment List, Evacuation Hospital, 400-bed, 1 June 1943.

' Medical Department Equipment List, Station Hospital, 500-bed, 12 July 1942.

3 Medical Department Equipment List, General Hospital, 1,000-bed, 1 May 1943.

8

1

2

2

40

2

20

20

12

6

1

10

4

1

2

18

2

4

5

75

5

40

40

25

1

1

10

2

6

5

1

1

2

2

1

10

2

1

12

1

20

6

2

3

571
572 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No.

Amount

Item Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

10460

10480

10490

10497

10570

10585

10590

10600

10650

10660

10665

10670

10675

10680

10685

10690

10700

10710

10730

10835

10840

10845

10846

10850

10860

10880

10900

10970

10980

10984

10990

11040

11063

11080

11087

11105

Glass 1—Continued

Agar, Bacteriologic...

Alcohol, USP r

Alcohol, USP --

Alcohol, Amyl, ACS

Aloin Compound, Pill or Tablet

Aluminum Chloride, CP Analyzed...

Aluminum Potassium Sulphate,

Reagent.

Ammonia, Aromatic Spirit, USP

Ammonium Chloride, USP ...

Ammonium Chloride, Troches, USP

X.

Ammonium Molybdate, CP Analyzed

Ammonium Oxalate, ACS

Ammonium Sulfamate, Technical

Ammonium Sulfate, ACS

Ammonium, Thiocyanate, CP

Analyzed.

Amyl Nitrate, USP, 5 minim, Amp..

Aniline for Microscopic Use, ACS

Antimony and Potassium Tartrate,

USP.

Apomorphine Hydrochloride, Ko

gr., Hypo, Tab, USP.

Ascorbic Acid, USP, 25 Mgm tab

(Vitamin C).

Aspidium, USP

Atabrine Tablets, 100 Mgm

Atabrine Tablets, 100 Mgm

Atropine Sulphate, USP

Atropine Sulphate, USP, Mso Gr.

Hypo Tab.

Azochloramid

Balsam Canada Turpentine, USP

Reagent, 70% in Xylene, ACS

Standard, Paper Filtered.

Barium Sulfate, USP—

Beef Extract, NF VI

Bentonite, USP

Benzidine, USP, Reagent

Bismuth Subcarbonate, USP

Bismuth Subsalicylate, USP, for

Parenteral Injection.

Bromine, ACS

Caffeine, Citrated, USP

Caffeine with Sodium Benzoate,

7.5 Gr. Amp.

lb

qt___.

5 gal..

Mpt-.

1,000.

Klb..

pt.-..

lb

1,000.

J41b_.

^lb_.

lb

YiVo..

Klb--

PkgM'lb.

oz

20-

100.

oz

100. ..

1,000.

%oz_.

20-...

qtOZ101b.

K lblb-.-

oz

lb__.

ea

oz

}i\b.

doz-.

24

10

66

6

1

25

10

1

10

5

20

16

15

1

3

1

25

50

1

9

6

5

1

8

15

10

2

15

10

1

20

1

1

10

20

25

1

2

1

1

1

8

4

1

30

2

6

1

50

100

7

20

12

10

1

15

30

1

5

25
APPENDIX 0 573

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

11110

11140

11150

11160

11170

11175

11177

11180

11187

11270

11300

11310

11330

11370

11380

11390

11395

11400

11430

11443

11450

11490

11500

11505

11520

11560

11600

11615

11620

11630

11640

11645

11650

11665

11675

Class 1—Continued

Calamine, Prepared, NF VI

Calcium Carbonate, Precipitated,

USP.

Calcium Carbonate (Marble chips)..

Calcium Chloride, USP

Calcium Chloride, Technical, Lumps.

Calcium Gluconate (10 cc. Amp,

10%).

Calcium Gluconate, USP

Calcium Hydroxide, USP

Calcium Oxide, NF VI

Carbon Tetrachloride, USP

Cedarwood Oil (Clearing), USP

Reagent.

Cedarwood Oil (Immersion), USP

Reagent.

Chalk, Prepared, USP

Chloral Hydrate, USP

Chloroform (for anesthesia)

Chloroform (not for anesthesia),

USP.

Cholesterol :

Chromium Trioxide, USP

Coal Tar, Crude (Pix carbonis), NF.

Cobalt (OUS) Sulfate, CP Analyzed..

Cocaine Hydrochloride, USP

Codeine Sulfate, USP J£ gm. tab

Collodion, USP

Compound Cathartic, pill or tablet,

NFVI.

Copper Foil, USP Reagent

Creatinine and Zinc Chloride,

reagent.

Cresol, Saponated Solution

Cupric Sulfate, USP

Dextrin, Bacteriologic

Dextrose, USP

Dextrose, Bacteriologic (Glucose),

Anhydrous, Powder.

Dextrose, 10% in Sterile Distilled

Water.

Dextrose, 5% in Physiological

Sodium Chloride Solution.

Digitalis, tab or capsule, 1 USP XII

Unit.

Digitalis Hypo Solution, 1 Ampule

Equals 1 USP XII Unit.

lb.

lblb...

K lblb...

doz..

Jilb.

tflb.

KlbJi lb_

K lblb...

Klb-

% lblb...

10 gm.

oz

lb

oz

K oz--

500.1.

oz

1,000..

oz

0.5 gm.

5 gal...

lb

100 gm.

lb

Jilb.„.

1

30

2

7

25

1,000 cc.

1,000 cc.

100

doz .

30

120

3

3

8

6

1

3

1

3

6

3

1

2

4

5

12

3

1

1

1

1

50

4

1

1

24

5

1

25

2

48

96

15

20

15

12

1

6

1

6

12

6

1

2

2

8

10

12

5

1

1

2

2

48

8

1

1

38

10

1

25

4

96

180

25

40
574 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No.

Amount

Item Unit Evacuation hospital

(MO-bed)

Station

hospital

(600-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

11680

11685

11690

11700

11720

11738

11739

11747

11749

11750

11760

11790

11793

11840

11890

11900

11905

11933

11935

11980

12030

12050

12070

12135

12180

12190

12210

12230

12250

12280

12300

12310

12315

12320

12325

12335

12350

12387

Class 1—Continued

Dimethylaminoazobenzene, Reagent.

Dimethyl-A-Naphthylamine

Diphenylamine, Reagent

Dulcitol

Emetine Hydrochloride, USP )£ Gr.

Hypo Tab.

Emulsion Base, No. 1 (Medium)

Emulsion Base, No. 2 (Thin)

Ephedrine Sulfate, NF VI, 1 cc

Amp., % Gr.

Ephedrine Sulfate, USP

Epinephrine Hydrochloride, USP

Solution.

Epinephrine Soluble Salt, ^oo Gr.

Hypo Tab.

Ether (for Anesthesia)

Ether, Petroleum, CP Analyzed

Eugenol, USP.

Ferric Ammonium Sulfate, ACS

Ferric Chloride, ACS

Ferric Chloride, USP, Solution

Ferrous Sulfate, USP, 5 Gr. tab

Ferrous Sulfide, Sticks

Fl Ex Ergot, USP .

Fluorescein, Soluble, USP

Formaldehyde Solution, USP

Formaldehyde Solution for Colloidal

Gold, Neutral, Reagent.

Gentian Violet Powder, Medicinal..

Glycerin, USP .

Glycerin, USP

Glyceryl Trinitrate, Moo Gr. Hypo

Tab.

Glycyrrhiza and Opium Compound

Mixture, USP Tab.

Gold Chloride, Reagent Grade

Homatropine Hydrobromide, USP..

Hydroquinone

(Ichthyol) Bitumen Sulfonatum, NF

VI.

Indigo Carmine

Inosite (Meat Sugar)

Insulin, Protamine Zinc

Insulin, U-40

Iodine, USP

Iodophthalein, Soluble, USP, for

Oral Use.

10gm_

25 gm.

oz

10 gm.

20

Ptpt_.

doz.

OZoz.

20.

Klb..

lb

oz

Klb_.

Yi\b..

pt_._.

1,000.

lb

oz

oz

qt_...

lb....

lb...

lb...

10 1b.

20...

1,000.

gram.

15 gr.

Jilb..

Htt>-.

10

gram...

10 cc...

10 ce...

Klb.-

100 gm.

80

10

10

2,000

1

2

1

2

15

6

6

48

12

25

1,000

12

1

12

5

5

15

30

10

3

1

2

2

4

30

12

12

100

3

24

50

1,000

6

10

2

2

3

12

1

24

1

25

3

10

5

10

10

1

10

10

10

30

50

20

5
APPENDIX O 575

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(50O-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

12420

12450

12452

12470

12480

12485

12490

12527

12533

12535

12537

12565

12610

12620

12640

12650

12670

12690

12700

12740

12750

12820

12830

12840

12850

12852

12854

12859

12870

12890

12900

12955

12987

13015

13070

13100

13120

13200

Class 1—Continued

Iron Wire, Reagent, Standard

Jack Bean Meal -

Jelly, Lubricating

Lactose, USP

Lactose, Bacteriologic

Lard, Benzoinated, USP

Lead Acetate, ACS

Liquor Carbonis Detergens, NF

(Solution of Coal Tar).

Lithium Carbonate, CP Analyzed

Lithium Citrate, NF VI

Lithium Oxalate, CP

Liver, Purified Extract, USP, 50

Units.

Magnesium Carbonate, USP

Magnesium Oxide, Heavy, USP

Magnesium Sulfate, USP

Magnesium Sulfate, USP

d-Mannite, CP

Menthol, USP

Mercurial Ointment, Mild, USP

Mercuric Oxide, Red, Reagent

Mercuric Oxide, Yellow, Ointment,

USP.

Mercurous Chloride Ointment, Mild,

lib.

Mercury, USP.

Mercury, USP

Mercury, Ammoniated Ointment,

USP.

Mercury Bichloride, USP. .. .

Mercury Bichloride, Large Poison

Tab, USP.

Methanol, ACS

Methenamine, USP, 5 gm. tab

Methyl Red, USP, Indicator

Methyl Salicylate, USP

Morphine Sulfate, USP }i gm. Hypo

tab.

N (1-Naphthyl) Ethylenediamine

Dihydrochloride.

Nicotinic Acid Amide, NNR, 50

MGM tab.

Oil, Castor, USP

Oil, Cod Liver, USP

Oil, Cottonseed, USP

Oil, Theobroma, USP

oz

K lbtubelb._-

lb.

lb.

PtYiVo..

oz

Mlb-.

10 cc.

lb

lb

4 1b

50 lb...

100 gm.

02

lb

}i oz.

lb.

}i lb.

5 lblb...

Mlb250..

lb....

1,000.

oz

}ilb..

20_-_.

10 gm.

100...

gal.,

pt—

gal.,

^lb.

10

12

1

10

400

1

1

12

7

2

6

2.

1

1

2

1

20

5

10

5

2

5

15

1

12

9

10

12

8

3

1

25

5

10

5

5

1

1

25

15

6

12

4

2

1

2

2

20

10

15

10

2

10

30

1

25

10

1

20

1

5

15

2

50

15

10

24

10

10
576 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No. Item

Amount

Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

13220

13250

13255

13257

13260

13270

13275

13280

13300

13310

13320

13330

13335

13350

13370

13390

13396

13398

13400

13420

13480

13500

13530

13550

13590

13600

13610

13630

13640

13650

13660

13667

13670

13715

Class 1—Continued

Oil, Turpentine, USP

Orthotolidine, Recrystallized Reagent.

Para-Aminodimethylaniline Monohydrochloride.

Para-Dimethylaminobenzaldehyde ..

Paper, pH Indicator, Strips

Paraffin, Refined, for Histological

and Pharmaceutical use, MP

54.4°-56.1° C.

Paraffin, Refined, for Histological

and Pharmaceutical use, MP.

51.6°-52.8° C.

Paraffin, Refined, for Histological

use, MP. 48.9°-50.6° C.

Paraldehyde, USP

Peptone, Proteose, Bacteriologic

Peptone, Dried, USP Reagent

Peruvian Balsam, USP

Permutit

Petrolatum, USP

Petrolatum, Liquid, Heavy, USP—

Phenol, USP

Phenobarbital, USP Y% Gr. Tab

Phenol Red (Phenosulfonphthalein).

Phenophthalein, ACS

Phenosulfonphthalein, USP

Physostigmine Salicylate, USP,

}io Gr. Hypo Tab.

Physostigmine Salicylate, USP,

}iooo Gr. Ophthalmic Disk.

Pituitary Solution, Posterior Lobe,

USP.

Potassium Acetate, USP, Granular..

Potassium Carbonate, ACS

Potassium Chlorate, USP

Potassium Chloride, ACS

Potassium Dichromate, ACS

Potassium Ferrocyanide (Red

Prussiate), ACS.

Potassium Ferrocyanide (Yellow

Prussiate), ACS, Crystals.

Potassium Hydroxide, USP

Potassium Iodate, CP Analyzed,

ACS.

Potassium Iodide, USP

Potassium Oxalate, CP Analyzed

qt.

oz.

10 gm.

10 gm.

100--_

lb

lb.

lb.

}i pt.

lb...

lb...

lb._.

lb...

10 lbgal. ..

lb-_-

100.-

5 gm.

oz

10--.

20-..

50-

lb...

>ab.

lb...

oz

Mlb.

oz

}Ub_

2

15

1

20

3

5

3

10

1

1

6

15

2

1

20

10

20

1

2

10

1

15

10

5

50

1

1

12

4

10

1

5

1

1

2

10

1
APPENDIX O 577

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

13720

13730

13740

13750

13768

13770

13790

13790

13800

13800

13802

13803

13806

13810

13820

13835

13842

13845

13850

13860

13870

13890

13910

13930

13950

13980

14020

14030

14050

14060

14070

14120

14130

14136

14138

14140

Glass 1—Continued

Potassium Permanganate, USP

Potassium Permanganate, USP,

5 gm. Tab.

Potassium Phosphate Dipotassium,

Anhydrous Reagent.

Potassium Phosphate Monopotassium, ACS, Anhydrous.

Potassium Tellurite, CP

Potassium Thiocyanate, Reagent

Powder, Developing, X-ray, 5 gal

Powder, Developing, Photographic..

Powder, Fixing, Photographic

Powder, Fixing, X-ray

Procaine Hydrochloride, USP, 100

MGM Amp.

Powder, Fixing, X-ray, 1 gal

Procaine Hydrochloride, USP, 150

MGM Amp.

Procaine, Hydrochloride, USP

Procaine, Hydrochloride, USP, %

Gr. Hypo Tab.

Procaine Hydrochloride, Cartridge,

2% 2.4 CC.

Protein, Silver, Mild, USP

Protein, Silver, Strong, USP

Pumice, Fine, Powder

Pumice, Medium, Powder

Quinidine Sulfate, USP

Quinine Dihydrochloride, USP, 5

Gr. Amp.

Quinine Sulfate, USP, 5 Gr. Tab

Resorcinol, USP

Riboflavin, NNR, 1 Mgm Tab

Saccharose

Saponin, Purified Powder

Scopolamine Hydrobromide, USP,

Moo Gr. Hypo Tab.

Silver Nitrate, USPSilver Nitrate, Toughened, USP,

Pencils.

Silver Nitrate and Formaldehyde,

USP.

Soap, soft

Soap, soft..

Sodium Acetate, CP Analyzed, ACS.

Sodium Barbital, CP

Sodium Benzoate, USP

lb..

100.

tflb.

%Vo.

Vi oz-

%Vo.

pkg„

pkgpkgpkg„

10...

Pkg10--

oz.

20.

box.

tflbX lblb...

lb...

oz

doz..

1,000.

tflb-.

100...

Klb..

Mlb..

20....

oz.

OZbox.

lb...

251b.

lb...

tflb..

Mlb..

6

50

10

3

2

48

15

8

12

18

25

15

10

100

40

24

2

1

1

1

2

10

1

1

5

18

2

10

30

30

25

50

20

20

150

75

40

2

2

2

2

1

4

20

1

1

10

36

5

20

1

1

20
578 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No. Item

Amount

Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

14145

14150

14160

14170

14190

14120

14220

14250-10

14260

14270

14280

14290

14295

14300

14305

14310

14320

14343

14355

14370

14380

14393

14400

14405

14408

14450

14460

14482

14490

14510

14530

14550

14580

14620

14621

14622

14623

Class 1—Continued

Sodium Beta-Glycerophosphate

Sodium Bicarbonate, USP

Sodium Bicarbonate, USP

Sodium Bicarbonate, USP, 5 Gr.

Tab.

Sodium Borate, USP

Sodium Bromide, USP

Sodium Bromide, USP, 5 Gr. Tab...

Sodium Calcium Hydrate, No. 8

Medium, 8-14.

Sodium Carbonate, Anhydrous, ACS

Sodium Carbonate, Monohydrated,

USP.

Sodium Carbonate, Monohydrated,

USP.

Sodium Chloride, ACS

Sodium Chloride, Physiological

Solution.

Sodium Citrate, USP

Sodium Citrate, 4% Sterile Solution,

50 cc. Amp.

Sodium Cyanide, ACS

Sodium Dichromate, Technical

Sodium Hydroxide, USP

Sodium Molybdate, CP Analyzed—

Sodium Nitrite, ACS

Sodium Nitroferricyanide, ACS

Sodium Perborate, USP

Sodium Phosphate (Dibasic)

Sodium Phosphate Crystals, CP

(Monobasic).

Sodium Phosphate Crystals, CP

Analyzed (Tribasic).

Sodium Salicylate, USP, 5 Gr. Tab..

Sodium Sulfate, USP

Sodium Sulfite, CP Analyzed

Sodium Thiosulfate, USP

Sodium Tungstate, Reagent

Starch, Corn, Commercial

Strophanthin, USP, Moo Gr. Hypo

Tab.

Strychnine Sulfate, USP Ko Gr.

Hypo Tab.

Sulfadiazine, Ointment 5%

Sulfadiazine, CP, Powder

Sulfadiazine, 0.5 gm. (7.7 Gr) Tab...

Sulfadiazine, Sodium, USP, 5 gm

Vial.

100 gm.

lb

10 lb

1,000.-.

lb

lb

500

1.85 lb.

J4 lblb--.

10 lblb

1,000 cc. 120

lb.

6_. 10

Klb.

lb.--

ViVoy* lboz

oz

}Ub.

^lb1 lblb.

1,000.

lb

lb

^lb-.

Klb-.

lb

20.--.

20.

lb

25 gm.

1,000..

6

25

6

15

10

6

5

6

4

25

48

5

15

1

10

20

1

2

1

6

1

1

2

30

20

12

8

12

10

6

10

48

96

10

30

1

10

30

1

4

1

24

1

3

12

10

1

4

4

16

5

10

4

60

15
APPENDIX C 579

Item No. Item

Amount

Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

14625

14635

14636

14637

14641

14643

14644

14670

14700

14710

14720

14725

14730

14760

14775

14790

14840

14860

14883

14891

14892

14897

14898

14903

14910

14917

14920

14930

14940

14950

14970

14980

15000

15005

15010

15020

15025

15030

15040

15200

Class 1—Continued

Sulfaguanidine, Powder

Sulfanilamide, USP, Powder

Sulfanilamide, Crystalline, USP, 5

grams in sterile individual doublewrapped envelope.

Sulfanilamide, USP 5 Gr. Tab

Sulfathiazole, USP, 7.7 Gr. Tab....

Sulfathiazole, CP, Powder

Sulfathiazole, Sodium, 5 Gm. vial

Sulfur, USP

Talc, Purified, USP..

Terpin Hydrate, USP

Tetrachloroethylene, Capsule, 1 cc,

NFVI.

Thiamine Hydrochloride, USP, 1

Mgm Tab.

Thymol, USP

Thyroid, USP, 1 Gr. Tab....

Tincture Belladonna, USP

Tincture, Cardamon Compound,

USP.

Tincture, Nux Vomica, USP

Tincture Opium, Camphorated, USP.

Toluene, ACS

Tryparsamide, USP, 2 gm. Amp...

Tryptone, Bacteriologic

i-Tyrosine, CP, for Standard

Uranium Nitrate, CP Analyzed,

Special Crystal, ACS.

Vitamins A and D, Concentrated. _

Water, Distilled, Sterile, PyrogenFree.

Water, Distilled, Sterile, PyrogenFree.

Wax, Bone, Sterile

Wax, White, USP

Whisky, USP

Wool, Flat, Hydrous, USP

Xylene, ACS

Xylose, CP, Bacteriologic

Zinc Chloride, USP

Zinc Metal, Mossy, ACS

Zinc Oxide, USP

Zinc Oxide Ointment, USP

Zinc Oxide Paste, Lassar's, NF VI.

Zinc Stearate, USP

Zinc Sulphate, USP.

Alizarin Red "S"

lb.,

lb..

Pkg1,000.

1,000.

oz

6

lb

lb

oz

100...

500.

oz..

100.

pt„

Ptpt...

pt_„

oz

10....

lb....

gram.

oz

100

1,000 cc.

25

2 gm„

Mlb--

qt_ —

lb

lb

lOgm.

Mlb.-

lb

lb

lb

lb

%\b..

lb

10 gm.

12

500

12

15

10

10

5

10

48

4

1

24

35

4

100

20

20

3

10

20

50

30

3

10

24

10

4

1

1

24

12

5

1

50

8

200

20

60

5

20

24

50

50

5

6

10

2

9

1

2

1

20

48

12

10

20

30

1

1

1

24

48

24

10

1

1
580 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

15210

15215

15220

15225

15230

15287

15290

15310

15320

15330

15360

15370

15393

15395

15397

15400

15440

16089

17315

1K01075

1K02405

1K02625

1K06000

1K07625

1K08100

1K08550

1K12900

1K12910

1K12960

1K16400

1K17205

1K17250

1K23315

1K23800

1K00600

1K24602

Class 1—Continued

Aniline Blue, Water Soluble

Azocarmine "B"

Bismark Brown "Y"

Biebrieh Scarlet

Brilliant Cresyl Blue

Fast Green

Fuchsin, Acid

Giemsa Stain ,_.

Hematoxylin, Light

Janus Green "B"

Methyl Orange

Methyl Violet (Gentian VioletHistological).

Nigrosin

Oil Red "O"

Orange "G"

Safranin "O"

Wright's Stain, Powder

Serum, Normal Human Plasma,

Dried.

Dextrose, 50% Solution, 50 cc__.

Supplemental Items

Adherent, for Skin Traction

Aminophylline, NNR

Aminophylline, NNR, 0.1 Gm Tab

Ascorbic Acid (Vitamin C parenteral).

Avertin Solution, NNR

Azochloramid, Saline Mixture,

Powder.

Benzedrine Sulfate, NNR, 10 Mgm

Tab.

Bile Salts, NNR, 5 Gr Tab

Burrow's Solution Tabs, 2.27 Gm

(Domeboro Improved).

Butyn Sulfate Powder, NNR, 5 Gm

Calcium Mandelate, 0.5 Gm, 7% Gr

Tab.

Carbarsone, NNR, 0.25 Gm, 3% Gr

Tab.

Carbarsone, NNR, 0.25 Gm, 3% Gr

Tab.

Diodoquin, 3.2 GrTab

Diodrast, NNR

Epinephrine (Adrenalin) Hydrochloride, NNR, 1:1,000 Solution.

Ephedrine Sulfate, NNR, 0.025 Gm, %

Gr in Capsule.

10 gm.

10 gm.

10 gm,

10 gm.

10 gm.

10 gm.

10 gm.

gram..

10 gm.

10 gm.

10 gm.

10 gm.

10 gm..

10 gm..

10 gm..

10 gm_.

0.2 gm.

pkg

bottle.

4 oz

25

100-...

100....

100 cc.

oz

250.

100.

500.

bottle.

200...

20..

500.

500...

30 cc.

doz__.

500.

400

30

6

10

2

12

500

250

6

1

2

2

3

20

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

10

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

4

24

,000

500

12

2

4

10

6

40

10

2

3

2

4

4

10

5
APPENDIX C 581

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

1K24605

1K24812

1K28500

1K31315

1K32340

1K32350

1K34710

1K34800

1K35500

1K39220

1K39700

1K20615

1K40112

1K40120

1K46600

1K46115

1K56700

1K56703

1K59103

1K59105

1K62100

1K67320

1K67340

1K74825

1K74850

1K75300

1K75625

1K75755

1K75825

1K75900

Supplemental Items—Continued

Ephedrine Sulfate, NNR, 0.05 Gm,

% Gr, in Capsule.

Foille, 1 gal

Hexylresorcinol, 0.2 Gm Pill

Iodochlorol (Iodized and Chlorinated

Oil).

Lipiodol-Lafay, NNR, Diagnostic,

40% Iodine, 20 cc.

Lipiodol-Lafay, NNR Diagnostic,

40% Iodine, 5 cc.

Mapharsen, NNR, 0.06 Gm Amp

Mapharsen, NNR, 0.6 Gm Amp

Mercuric Oxide, Yellow, USP, Powder.

Mercury Oxycyanide

Metaphen Ophthalmic Ointment,

NNR.

Mikethamide (Coramine)

Metycaine Solution, NNR

Metycaine Solution, NNR

Nupercainal Ointment

Pentobarbital Sodium, NNR

(Nembutal).

Pentothal Sodium with Sterile Distilled Water, 1 Gm Amp, 50 cc.

Pentothal Sodium with Sterile Distilled Water, 0.5 Gm Amp, 20 cc.

Pitressin Solution, NNR 1 cc Amp

(20 Pressor units).

Pitressin Solution, NNR, 0.5 cc Amp

(10 Pressor units).

Pontocaine Hydrochloride Solution,

NNR.

Prostigmine, Prophylactic Solution

1:4,000.

Prostigmine, Regular Solution 1:2,000.

Seconal, 0.1 Gm (l}i Gr) Pulvule

500-

bottle.

5

'A '

Shell Natron (Carbon Dioxide

Absorbent).

Skiodan Sterile Solution, NNR, 40%

(by Volume).

Skiodan, 1.0 Gm Tab, NNR

Sodium Alurate, NNR, 0.24 Gm

(3K Gr Tab.)

Sodium Amytal, NNR, 0.2 Gm (3 Gr)

Tab.

Sodium Amytal, NNR, 0.5 Gm (7K

Gr) in Amp.

20 cc.

flask,

box...

10..

10..

oz_.

lb..

doz.

100.

100.

25..

lb..

500.

25.-

25--

100-

100.

10-.

100.

50-.

500.

can.

50 cc.

100-

500-

500-.

amp.

2

10

72

22

9

2

2

3

1

1

1

4

18

10

2

2

2

6

7

3

48

10

6

3

3

100

2

5

6

10

10

45

18

2

4

15

2

2

2

8

25

25

4

4

4

15

5

72

20

12

5

5

200
582 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

1K76405

1K76410

1K80400

1K80605

1K80610

1K86800

1K29600

1K61500

1K9000

1K90030

1K90040

1K90045

1K90060

1K90070

1K90095

1K91108

1K91115

1K91125

1K91130

1K91145

1K9U55

1K91160

1K91170

1K91180

1K91200

1K91210

1K92000

1K92015

1K92025

1K92035

1K92045

1K92050

1K92060

1K92070

1K92080

1K93100

1K93115

1K93130

1K93200

1K93220

1K93250

Supplemental Items—Continued

Sodium Morrhuate Solution, NNR,

5%, in Rubber-Capped Bottle.

Sodium Morrhuate Solution, NNR,

5%, 5 cc in Amp.

Theobromine Calcium Salicylate,

NNR, 0.5 Gm Tab.

Thiamin, Hydrochloride Solution,

NNR, 10 Mgm in 1 cc Amp.

Thiamin Hydrochloride Solution,

NNR, 50 Mgm per cc.

Vitamin K, Water Soluble, Tab or

Capsule.

Vitamin K, Water Soluble, in 1 cc

Amp.

Vitamins, Multivitamin Capsule

Zinc Peroxide (Medicinal Grade)

Beef,'Bacto

Blood Agar Base

Blood Serum, Loeffler's

Brain Heart Infusion

Brilliant Green, Bacto

Citrate Agär, Simmon's

Crystal Violet, Bacto

Desoxycholate, Citrate Media

Dextrose Agar, Sabouraud's

Dextrose Proteose No. 3, Agar, Bacto

Double Sugar, Russell's

Eosin Methylene, Blue Agar, Bacto.

Eosin Y, Bacto

Fuchsin, Basic, Bacto

Gelatin (Granular), Bacto

Hemoglobin, Bacto

Iron Agar, Kliger's, Bacto

Lactose Broth, Bacto

Maltose, Bacto

Methylene Blue, Bacto

Nitrate, Agar

Nutrient Agar, Bacto

Nutrient Broth, Bacto

Ox-Gall, Bacto

Peptone, Bacto

Phenol Red Tartrate Agar, Bacto

Selenite-F (Enrichment)

Skim Milk, Bacto

SS Agar, Bacto

Thionin, Bacto

Tryptose, Bacto

Veal, Bacto

30 cc.

25....

500. ..

6

vial..

50-..

25

bottle...

15 gm_.

lb

lb

lb

lb

10 gm...

lb

10 gm..

#lb—.

1/4 lb.-.

lb

lb

lb

10 gm„

10 gm—

lb

lb

lb

lb

100 gm.

10 gm—

lb

lb

lb

}Ub...

lb

K lblb

lb

lb

10 gm...

lb

lb

20

25

6

2

5

25

50

20

2

24

50

100

1

2
APPENDIX C 583

Item No.

Amount

Item Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

10480

10490

10495

10500

10730

11450

11480

11490

11495

11810

12955

14850

14860

14940

91155

20020

20022

20024

20030

20040

20050

20060

20080

20090

20110

20120

20140

20150

20160

20210

20220

20230

20252

20270

20325

20350

20370

20372

20380

20390

20400

20410

20420

Alcohol and Narcotics

Alcohol, USP

Alcohol, USP

Alcohol, USP

Alcohol, Dehydrated, USP..

Apomorphine Hydrochloride, J4o Gr

Hypo Tab, USP.

Cocaine Hydrochloride, USP

Codeine Sulfate, USP

Codeine Sulfate, USP, % Gr Tab

Codeine Sulfate, USP, % Gr Hypo

Tab.

Ethylmorphine Hydrochloride, USP..

Morphine Sulfate, USP, }i Gr Hypo

Tab.

Tincture Opium, USP...

Tincture Opium, Camphorated, USP.

Whisky, USP ......

Morphine Tartrate, }i Gr Solution...

Class 2

Bandage, Canton, Flannel 5-inch

Bandage, Elastic, All Cotton

Bandage, Elastic, All Cotton

Bandage, Flannel, 3-inch

Bandage, Gauze, Roller, 2-inch

Bandage, Gauze,

Bandage, Gauze,

Bandage, Muslin,

Bandage, Muslin,

Bandage, Suspensory

Bandage, Triangular

Cotton, Absorbent, RollCotton Batting

Crinolin, 6 yd

Gauze, Plain, 5 yd

Gauze, Plain, 25 yd

Gauze, Plain, 100 yd

Mask, Face, Surgical

M uslin

Paper, Impervious, 5 yd.

Plaster, Adhesive, 3-inch.

Plaster of Paris, 4 lb

Plaster of Paris, 25 lb

Silk, Impervious

Stockinet, 3-inch

Stockinet, 6-inch

Stockinet, 9-inch

Wadding Sheet

Roller, 3-inch.

Roller, 4-inch.

3-inch

5-inch

qt.„.

5 gal..

54 gal.

pt—.

20

Yi oz.

oz

500. .

20.. .

%oz.

20...

>ipt.

pt...

qt...

box..

doz__

doz_.

doz._

doz_.

doz..

doz...

doz...

doz...

doz...

doz...

doz...

lb

lb

pkg—

roll...

roll...

roll...

bag...

yd...

roll...

spool.

tin

drum,

yd....

roll...

roll...

roll...

roll...

24

10

400

10

24

100

4

3

3

24

150

50

175

5

150

50

36

25

5

2

1,500

25

500

12

10

5

5

5

200

10

2

5

10

20

20

1

150

30

48

8

8

8

8

500

500

250

30

25

32

10

250

50

100

50

20

50

6

500

750

60

12

8

8

100

6

24

2

10

20

40

40

2

300

8

60

72

12

12

12

12

1,000

1,000

500

60

40

60

20

500

100

200

40

150

12

1,000

1,500

72

10

100

24

16

16

200

295-153 O—68- -39
584 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item Unit

Amount

Item No. Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(600-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

30010

Class S

ea 1

1

8

4

1

1

2

2

30015 ea 2

30030 ea 12

30050 ea 6

30065 ea 1

30090 Block, Bite, Adult ea 2

30115 Bolt, Tibia ea 6

30535 Bronchoscope, 5 MM by 30 CM,

Child's ea 1

30545 Bronchoscope, 8 MM by 40 CM,

Adult's.

Cannula, Antrum, Killian's

ea 1

1

2

2

2

30605 ea 1

30610 ea 2

30640 Cannula, Frontal Sinus ea 3

30643 Cannula, Frontal Sinus, Full Curved.

Cannula, Frontal Sinus, Lesser

ea 1

30644

ea 1

30650 Cannula, Intravenous ea 24 18 36

30705 ea 8

30730-08 Case, Bone, Operating, 110 Volt, 60

cycle, AC ea 1

30770 Case, Diagnostic, Eye, Ear, Nose

and Throat ea 1

1

1

2

1

4

4

4

4

6

12

12

6

5

2

4

3

2

3

2

2

30900 ea 1

30920 Catheter, Eustachian, Size 1

Catheter, Eustachian, Size 2

Catheter, Eustachian, Size 3

Catheter, Urethral, X-ray, 5F,

Olivary

ea . 2

30930 ea 3

30940 ea 2

30990

ea 6 8

31000 Catheter, Urethral, X-ray, 6F,

Olivary ea 8

31010 Catheter, Urethral, X-ray, 5F,

Whistle

Catheter, Urethral, X-ray, 6F,

Whistle

Catheter, Urethral, Rubber, 14F

Catheter, Urethral, Rubber, 16F

Catheter, Urethral, Rubber, 18F

Catheter, Urethral, Rubber, 22F

Catheter, Urethral, Rubber, 26F

Catheter, Urethral, Rubber, Guide...

Catheter, Urethral, Rubber, Selfretaining .

ea 6 4

31020

ea 4

31070 ea 6

34

6

12

31080 ea 24

31090 ea 24

31100 ea 12

31110 ea 10

31120 ea 6

6

6

2

31130

ea 6

31133 Catheter, Urethral, Rubber, Selfretaining, 4-Wing, Malecot, 32F

Catheter, Urethral, Woven, 14F

Catheter. Urethral. Woven. 18F

ea 6

31140 ea 2

31160 ea 3

311701 Catheter, Urethral, Woven, 20F ea 2
APPENDIX C 585

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

31190

31200

31210

31220

31230

31240

31260

31270

31277

31280

31287

31295

31330

31340

31380

31410

31420

31430

31440

31450

31460

31470

31483

31510

31515

31560

31570-11

31575

31577

31580

31590

31600

31602

31604

31606

31620

31630

31640

31650

31660

31670

31680

31690

31710

31720

Glass 3—Continued

Chisel, Bone, Bevel, 6 MM

Chisel, Bone, Bevel, 12 MM

Chisel, Bone, Bevel, 18 MM

Chisel, Bone, Osteotome, 6 MM

Chisel, Bone, Osteotome, 12 MM...

Chisel, Bone, Osteotome, 18 MM...

Chisel, Nasal, Straight

Clamp, Bone-Plating, Large

Clamp, Harelip, Ivy

Clamp, Hemorrhoidal

Clamp, Intestinal, Anastomosis,

3-Blade

Clamp, Pylorus, 8-inch

Curette, Chalazion, Medium

Curette, Ear

Curette, Ethmoid

Curette, Mastoid, Buck, Size 1

Curette, Mastoid, Buck, Size 3

Curette, Mastoid, Richard, Size 1...

Curette, Mastoid, Richard, Size 3

Curette, Mastoid, Richard, Size 5...

Curette, Mastoid, Whiting, Size 2...

Curette, Mastoid, Whiting,- Size 4___

Curette, Sinus

Curette, Uterine, Sharp, Size 2

Curette, Uterine, Sharp, Size 4

Cystoscope, 24F

Cystoscope, Lamp-51: For Use

with item 31560

Cysto- Urethroscope

Cysto-Urethroscope Lamp: For use

with item 31575

Cystotome, Eye

Depressor, Tongue, Bosworth

Dermatome Set, Complete

Dermatome Set, Blade For

Dermatome Set, Brush

Dermatome Set, Special Cement

Dilator, Lachrymal

Dilator, Trachea

Dilator, Urethral, 12F

Dilator, Urethral, 14F

Dilator, Urethral, 16F

Dilator, Urethral, 18F

Dilator, Urethral, 22F

Dilator, Urethral, 26F

Dilator, Uterine

Dilator, Uterine, 6 in set

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

pr_

ea_

ea.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

set.

ea..

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

set.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_.

ea_.

set.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

2

2

2

2

1

2

2

2

3

2

1

2

1

1

1

12

1

12

2

4

ea..

ea_.

set.

4

4

4

4

2

8

2

1

1

2

2

4

3

1

8

3

3

5

2

2

3

1

1

1

24

1

12

3

6
586 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No.

Amount

Item Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

31730

31735

31760

31790

31800

31820

31822

31826

31827

31828

31831

31832

31840

31850

31860

31870

31880

31910

31930

31933

31955

31958-05

31958-07

31958-09

31958-11

31958-13

31958-15

31959-05

31959-06

31960

31960-10

Class 3—Continued

Director, Grooved

Director, Grooved, with Myrtle leaf..

Dissector, Tonsil

Drill, Bone

Drill, Bone, Extra Drills

Drill, Cranial, Brace For

Drill, Cranial,' Burr, Enlarging,

Adson-Rogers.

Drill, Cranial, Burr, Perforating,

Adson-Rogers.

Electrode, Fulgurating, Bugbee,

Flexible, 6F.

Electrode, Fulgurating, McCarthy,

Flexible, Set 9F.

Electrode, Coagulation, McCarthy

Type, Rigid, 9F.

Electrode, Cutting Loop, 28F

Elevator, Nasal, Blunt

Elevator, Nasal, Sharp

Elevator, Periosteal, Blunt-.

Elevator, Periosteal, Double-Ended.

Elevator, Periosteal, Sharp

Esophagoscope, 9 MM by 45 CM,

Adult's.

Evacuator, Cystoscopic, Ellick Type.

Evacuator, Cystoscopic, Toomey

Type.

Extension Apparatus, Kirschner,

Hand Drill'Type.

Extension Apparatus, Drills, Wire,

9-inch by .063-inch diameter.

Extension Apparatus, Drills, Wire,

9-inch by .045-inch diameter.

Extension Apparatus, Drills, Wire,

9-inch by .037-inch diameter.

Extension Apparatus, Drills, Wire,

12-inch by .063-inch diameter.

Extension Apparatus, Drills, Wire,

12-inch by .045-inch diameter.

Extension Apparatus, Drills, Wire,

12-inch by .037-inch diameter.

Extension Apparatus, Traction Bow,

No. 121B, Medium.

Extension Apparatus Traction Bow,

No. 121A, Large.

Extension Apparatus, Steinmann

Extension Apparatus, Steinmann,

New Type.

ea..

ea_.

ea_.

setset.

ea..

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

eaea.

ea_

doz.

dozdoz.

dozdoz_

dozea_

ea.

12

12

5

13

4

4

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

16

16

26

8

6

4

4

2

4

4

1

1

1

1

4

4

2

2

14

1

1

1

2

2

4

2

1

2

1

32

32

20
APPENDIX 0 587

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

31965-04

31965-06

31965-08

31970

31980

31990

32010

32020

32030

32035

32036

32037

32040

32045

32060

32070

32075

32076

32080

32172

32180

32183

32185

32186

32187

32189

32191

32193

32194

32196

32197

Class 3—Continued

Extension Apparatus, Steinmann,

New Type.

Extension Apparatus, Steinmann,

Pin, 6K-inch by 34-inch.

Extension Apparatus, Steinmann,

Pin, 8-inch by %2-inch.

Filiform, 4F

Filiform, 5F._

Filiform, Whalebone, Size 6

Forceps, Bone-Cutting, Straight...

Forceps, Bone-Cutting, Straight,

Heavy.

Forceps, Bone-Holding, 10-inch

Forceps, Bone-Holding, 12-inch

Forceps, Bone-Holding, 10^-inch,

Lambotte.

Forceps, Bone-Holding, 8H-inch,

Ferguson.

Forceps, Bone, Rongeur, 7-inch

Forceps, Bone, Rongeur, 8%-inch,

Angular, Bacon.

Forceps, Bone, Rongeur, 10^-inch.

Forceps, Bone, Rongeur, Cranial,

Devilbiss.

Forceps, Bone, Rongeur, Cranial,

Devilbiss, Blade, Long Bite.

Forceps, Bone, Rongeur, Cranial,

Devilbiss, Blade, Short Bite.

Forceps, Bone, Rongeur, Cranial,

Horsley.

Forceps, Capsule, Arruga

Forceps, Chalazion

Forceps, Cilia

Forceps, Clip Introducing, McKenzie.

Forceps, Cystic Duct

Forceps, Cystoscopic, Alligator,

Rigid.

Forceps, Cystoscopic, Ureteral,

Stone Removing.

Forceps, Cystoscopic, Utility

Forceps, Cystoscopic, Visual,

Hemostatic.

Forceps, Cystoscopic, Handle

Forceps, Cystoscopic, Rongeur,

Flexible, 7F, Stem.

Forceps, Cystoscopic, Rongeur,

Flexible, 11F, Stem.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

10

15

10

12

12

12

ea.

15

15

15

30

30

30

12

12

12

3

6

4

4

4
588 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

32198

32199

32200

32210

32230

32250

32270

32280

32286

32288

32290

32300

32310

32330

32350

32370

32380

32385

32400

32420

32430

32448

32454

32500

32520

32535

32540

32550

32580

32590

32625

32648

32657

32670

32678

Class 3—Continued

Forceps, Cystoscopic, Foreign Body,

Flexible, 7F, Stem..

Forceps, Cystoscopic, Foreign Body,

Flexible, 11F, Stem.

Forceps, Dressing, 5}£-inch

Forceps, Dressing, 10-inch

Forceps, Dressing, Bozeman,

Straight.

Forceps, Ear, Bayonet

Forceps, Fixation

Forceps, Fixation, without catch

Forceps, Gallstone, Rochester

Forceps, Hemostatic, Abbey

Forceps, Hemostatic, Halstead,

Mosquito, Straight.

Forceps, Hemostatic, RankinKelley, Straight.

Forceps, Hemostatic, RochesterPean, Curved.

Forceps, Hemostatic, RochesterOchsner, 6%-inch, Straight.

Forceps, Hysterectomy, Pean,

Curved.

Forceps, Intestinal, Doyen, CurvedForceps, Intestinal, Doyen,

Straight.

Forceps, Intestinal, Judd-Allis,

7&-inch.

Forceps, Iris, Angular _....

Forceps, Iris, Straight

Forceps, Kidney, Curved..

Forceps, Laryngeal, Grasping

Forceps, Laryngeal, Tissue Specimen

Forceps, Mastoid, Rongeur, Bane—

Forceps, Mastoid, Rongeur,

Kerrison, Large.

Forceps, Meat

Forceps, Nasal, Asch

Forceps, Nasal, Bruening Type,

Large.

Forceps, Nasal, Jansen-Middleton...

Forceps, Nasal, Polypus

Forceps, Pituitary, BayonetShaped, Adson.

Forceps, Screw-Holding

Forceps, Side-Curved, Regular

Forceps, Sponge

Forceps, Tack & Pin

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

72

108

12

4

1

24

240

216

96

24

8

8

12

2

2

2

2

3

3

1

2

1

24

1

1

26

14

3

4

4

48

480

444

194

48

16

16

24

3

3

16

1

1

9

3

1

3

3

5

5

2

4

2

48

1
APPENDIX O 589

Item Unit

Amount

Item No. Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

32691

Class 3—Continued

Forceps, Throat ea . . . 1 2

32693 Forceps, Tissue, Specimen, Light

(Bronchial).

Forceps, Tissue, Spring, 4J4-inch J

Forceps, Tissue, Spring, 5^-inch

Forceps, Tissue, Spring, 6-inch .

Forceps, Tissue, Allis

ea 1

32695 ea. 8

16

1

. 24

4

4

2

72

16

32700 ea 32

32702 ea. 2

32710 ea 48

32712 Forceps, Tissue, 10-inch __ _ ea. __ __ 8

32725 Forceps, Tonsil, Hemostatic .. . ea__ 6

32740 Forceps, Tonsil, Angular ea. 2

32760 Forceps, Towel, 5J4-inch -- - -- ea_. _ 144

32770 Forceps, Trachoma, Knapp .. ea . -_ 1

32810 Forceps, Vulsellum, Curved. ea_. 1 1

1

]

32850 Fork, Tuning, 5 in set . set .. _. 1

32855 Fraction Reduction Apparatus,

Anatomic.

Gag, Mouth... . .. ...

set 1

32860 ea 2

2

2

2

5

2

2

1

3

32870 Gag, Mouth, Jennings, adult's .

Gorget _ __

ea . 6

32890 ea ._ . 1

32900 Gouge, 6 MM ... .. ea _. 3

32910 Gouge, 10 MM . .. ea 8

32924 Gouge, Mastoid, Schwartz, Size 1

Gouge, Mastoid, Schwartz, Size 2

Gouge, Mastoid, Andrews, Size 2

Hip Fracture Apparatus

ea 3

32925 ea 3

32926 ea 2

32945 set . 1

32965 Holder, Needle, Collier. ea _ __ _ 2

24

2

2

2

2

2

3

4

32967 Holder, Needle, Hegar-Mayo ..

Hook, Dissecting, Adson, Blunt .

Hook, Dura, Frazier

ea. __ 54 48

33010 ea 4

33020 ea 4

33030 Hook, Iris . . ea. ... 3

33050 Hook, Strabismus, Medium _ ea. _ _ _ . 4

33060 Hook, Strabismus, Small. _ ea ._ . . 4

33070 Introducer, Needle. ea 6

33080 Intubation Set ea 1

33090 Irrigator, Anterior Chamber. . ea. _ __ __ 2

2

2

2

2

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

3

33100 Keratome, Angular, Large. . . 3

33110 Keratome, Angular, Medium ..

Keratome, Angular, Small. _

ea . . 3

33120 ea _ . . 3

33140 Knife, Amputating, 6-inch Blade.. ..

Knife, Brain, 6%-inch Blade

Knife, Canaliculus.

ea 4

33160 ea _ _ .. . 1

33170 ea 3

33180 Knife, Cartilage _ _. ._ ea 2

33200 Knife, Cataract, Graefe, Size 1

Knife, Cataract, Graefe, Size 2

Knife, Cataract, Graefe, Size 3

Knife, Ear, Myringotome

ea 3

33210 ea 3

33220 ea 3

33250 ea ._ 3

33252 Knife, Ear, Curved Blade ... .. ea __ 2

33290 Knife, Eye, Needle, Medium 2 4
590 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No.

33300

33320

33330

33340

33350

33362

33365

33369

33370

33371

33373

33377

33381

33385

33400

33407

33408

33420

33430

33440

33450

33470

33500

33530

33550

33560

33575

33600

33620

33622

33624

33631

33641

33725

33735

33741

33751

Item

Class 3—Continued

Knife, Eye, Needle, Small

Knife, Nasal, Septum

Knife, Nasal, Septum, Swivel

Knife, Nasal, Submucous, HalfRound.

Knife, Nasal, Submucous, Round—

Knife, Operating, 2-inch Blade

Knife, Operating, Handle No. 3

Knife, Operating, Detachable Blade

No. 10.

Knife, Operating, Detachable Blade

No. 11.

Knife, Operating, Detachable Blade

No. 12.

Knife, Operating, Detachable Blade

No. 15.

Knife, Operating, Handle No. 4

Knife, Operating, Detachable Blade

No. 20.

Knife, Operating, Detachable Blade

No. 21.

Knife, Plaster

Knife, Skin Grafting, Large

Knife, Skin Grafting, Blades for

Knife, Tonsil

Knife, Tonsil Abscess

Lamp, Bronchoscopic

Laryngoscope, Adult

Lens, Eye Condensing

Mallet, Hardwood, with Seamless

Metal Rings.

Mirror, Laryngeal, Size 1

Mirror, Laryngeal, Size 5

Needle, Aneurism, Cooper

Needle, Aneurism, Little

Needle, Post Mortem

Needle, Spinal Puncture, Corrosion

Resisting Steel, 20 Gage.

Needle, Spinal Puncture, Corrosion

Resisting Steel, 22 Gage.

Needle, Abdominal, 2% inches,

Straight.

Needle, Catgut, Size 2, Half-Circle..

Needle, Catgut, Size 4, Half-Circle. _

Needle, Eye, Size 2, Half-Circle

Needle, Eye, Size 4, Half-Circle

Needle, Eye, Size 1, Half-Circle

Needle, Eye, Size 3, Half-Circle

Amount

Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea__

pkgpkgpkgpkgea..

pkgpkgea._

set.,

box.

ea__

ea_.

ea__

ea_.

ea__

ea..

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

pkgpkgpkgPkgpkgPkgPkgStation

hospital

(500-bed)

2

1

1

1

1

2

36

36

18

4

18

48

250

250

24

1

1

2

2

12

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

3

12

12

24

10

4

8

4

12

4

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

4

1

1

1

1

2

72

72

36

36

96

500

500

48

2

2

2

3

24

2

2

3

3

3

4

2

3

24

24

48

20

60

15

6

25

6
APPENDIX O 5»1

Item No.

33765

33775

33791

33796

33802

33821

33840

33865

33931

33950

33961

34021

34029

34033

34040

34110-05

34120-05

34130-05

34140-05

34150-05

34160-05

34170-05

34180-05

34190-05

34220

34240

34260

34270

34280

34320

34330

34340

34342

34345

34347

34360

34362

34363

34370

34372

Item

Class 3—Continued

Needle, Eye, Size 2, %-Circle

Needle, Eye, Size 4, %-Circle

Needle, Intestinal, Size 2, HalfCircle.

Needle, Intestinal, Size 3, HalfCircle.

Needle, Intestinal, Size 4, HalfCircle.

Needle, Intestinal, Size V/i inches,

Straight.

Needle, Pedicle, Large, Ivy

Needle, Skin Suture, 2H inches

Needle, Surgeon's Regular, Size 4,

^-Circle.

Needle, Surgeon's Regular, Size 12,

%-Circle.

Needle, Surgeon's Regular, Size ,16,

%-Circle.

Needle, Uterine, Size 7, Half-Circle..

Ophthalmoscope, Electric

Ophthalmoscope, Electric, Lamp

Otoscope, Electric

Plate, Bone, Size 0, Molybdenum. -.

Plate, Bone, Size 1, Molybdenum...

Plate, Bone, Size 2, Molybdenum...

Plate, Bone, Size 3, Molybdenum. ..

Plate, Bone, Size 4, Molybdenum. ..

Plate, Bone, Size 5, Molybdenum...

Plate, Bone, Size 6& Molybdenum...

Plate, Bone, Size 7, Molybdenum.

Plate, Bone, Size 8, Molybdenum.

Plate, Lid

Probe, 8-insh

Probe, Bullet

Probe, Lachrymal

Probe, Salivary Duct

Procto-Sigmoidoscope, Electric—

Procto-Sigmoidoscope, Electric, Lamp

Rachiotome

Rasp, Antrum, Cutting

Rasp, Bone, Coarse

Rasp, Bone, Fine

Rasp, Frontal Sinus, or Antrum...

Rasp and Trocar, Antrum, WienerPierce.

Rasp, Nasal

Raspatory, Mastoid and Sinus

Raspatory, Rib, Left

Unit

pkgpkgpkgpkgpkgpkgea_.

pkgpkgpkgpkgPkgea_.

ea..

ea_.

ea_.

ea..

ea_.

ea..

ea..

ea_.

ea..

ea_.

ea..

ea_.

set.

ea_.

ea.

ea..

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

5

2

4

12

4

12

4

4

12

3

1

6

1

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

1

6

12

2

1

1

3

1

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

7

3

6

24

6

24

6

8

24

6

2

12

2

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

2

11

24

3

2

2

6

1

3

2

2

3

3

2

2

2
592 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No.

Amount

Item Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

34374

34380

34390

34405

34410

34430

34434

34435

34436

34437

34440

34450

34455

34457

34470

34480

34490

34500

34505

34525

34530

34540

34550

34560

34570

34580

34590

34600

34610

34623

34630

34640

34647

34648

34650

34680

34695

34697

34705

34720

34750

Class 3—-Continued

Raspatory, Rib, Right

Repositor, Iris

Repositor and Probe, Iris

Retinoscope, Electric

Retractor, Abdominal, Double-ended

Retractor, Abdominal, SelfRetaining.

Retractor, Abdominal, Single-ended,

1J4 by 12% inches.

Retractor, Abdominal, Single-ended,

1 by 12^ inches.

Retractor, Abdominal, Single-ended,

2 by 12H inches.

Retractor, Abdominal, Single-ended,

Mayo.

Retractor, Abdominal, Suprapubic...

Retractor, Brain -.

Retractor, Brain, Frazier, Set of 3...

Retractor, Brain, Self-Retaining,

Weitlaner, 6}Hnch, 3 by 4 Prongs.

Retractor, Eye, Desmarres, Medium.

Retractor, Eye, Fisher

Retractor, Laminectomy

Retractor, Mastoid

Retractor, Muscle, 4 Blunt Prongs..

Retractor, Tibia, Large

Retractor, Tissue, 4 Sharp Prongs

Retractor, Tissue, Nested

Retractor, Tonsil

Retractor, Trachea, 1-Prong

Retractor, Trachea, 3-Prong

Retractor, Vein

Saw, Amputating

Saw, Stille-Gigli, Wire, 12-inch

Saw, Stille-Gigli, Wire, 20-inch

Saw, Gigli, Bailey Conductor

Saw, Gigli, Handle

Saw, Metacarpal

Saw, Nasal, Bayonet Shaped, Left—

Saw, Nasal, Bayonet Shaped, Right..

Saw, Plaster

Scissors, Bandage

Scissors, Dissecting, Curved, 6%-inch_

Scissors, Dissecting, Curved, 9-inch..

Scissors, Dissecting, Straight, 6jiinch.

Scissors, Double-Blunt, 6J^-inch

Scissors, 1 point Sharp, 53^-inch

ea

ea

ea

ea

nest.

ea...

ea.

ea.

ea.

set.

ea_.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

12

2

3

1

1

1

4

2

3

4

4

10

4

2

2

4

4

3

12

12

2

2

2

1

1

2

32

30

4

30

16

48

2

6

2

4

3

6

4

6

20

8

20

8

2

4

8

8

5

24

24

2

4

4

2

2

4

66

60

8

60

32

100
APPENDIX C 593

Item No. Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

Cl 3—Continued

34755

34760

34780

34790

34800

34813

34820

34830

34850

34860-05

34862-05

34864-05

34866-05

34868-05

34870-05

34872-05

34874-05

34876-05

34878-05

34880-05

34890

34900

34920

34932

34935

34940

34955

34960

34970

34980

34990

35000

35010

35020

35030

35040

35110

35130

35150

35165

35180

35200

35210

35230

35250

35260

35280

35320

Scissors, Enterotomy

Scissors, Enucleation

Scissors, Iris, Angular

Scissors, Iris, Full-Curved

Scissors, Nasal, Angular

Scissors, Surgical, Dean, No. 9:

Scissors, Tenotomy

Scissors, Tonsil

Scoop, Gall Bladder

Screw, Bone, %-inch, Molybdenum _

Screw, Bone, J^-inch, Molybdenum..

Screw, Bone, %-inch, Molybdenum. _

Screw, Bone, %-inch, Molybdenum..

Screw, Bone, %-inch, Molybdenum..

Screw, Bone, 1-inch, Molybdenum. _

Screw, Bone, l}£-inch, MolybdenumScrew, Bone, l)4-inch, Molybdenum.

Screw, Bone, 1%-inch, Molybdenum.

Screw, Bone, l}^-inch, Molybdenum.

Screw, Bone, 1%-inch, Molybdenum.

Screw Driver, Lane

Screw Driver, Bone

Shears, Plaster Paris

Shears, Rib, 13}<rinch

Skid, Bone (Lever) 1

Snare, Nasal

Snare, Tonsil

Snare, Wire, No. 28 Stubs Gage

Snare, Wire, No. 27 Stubs Gage

Snare, Wire, No. 24 Stubs Gage

Sound, 18F

Sound, 20F

Sound, 22F

Sound, 24F

Sound, 26F

Sound, 28F

Spatula, Brain, 7-inch

Spatula, Eye, 5%-inch

Speculum, Ear

Speculum, Esophageal

Speculum, Eye, Nonmagnetic

Speculum, Eye

Speculum, Nasal

Speculum, Nasal, Killian

Speculum, Nasal, Myles

Speculum, Nasal, Septal

Speculum, Vaginal, Bivalve, Graves.

Speculum, Vaginal, Weighted

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea

spool. _.

spooL..

bundle.

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

set

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

1

2

2

9

2

3

2

2

2

24

24

24

24

36

36

36

36

36

36

36

2

2

2

1

2

2

1

1

2

8

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

3

3

14

3

4

4

3

4

48

48

48

48

72

72

72

72

72

72

72

4

4

42

2

4

3

1

1

3

12

2

2

2

2

2

2

4

3

4

1

2

3

8

5

1

2

2

1
594 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No.

Amount

Item Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

35330

35340

35350

35360

35395

35396

35400

35405

35440

35467

35470

35477

35485

35508

35510

35515

35520

35538

35560

35580

35585

36030

36032

36034

36036

36094

36099

36106

36110

36120

36160

36163

36165

36170

36195

36215

36260-10

Class S—Continued

Spoon, Lens, Daviel

Spoon, Lens, Wire Loop

Spreader, Rib

Spud, Eye

Tongs, Skull Traction

Tongs, Skull Traction, Drill Points

For.

Tonometer

Tourniquet, Lobectomy

Trocar, Antrum

Trocar, Emmett, 24F

Trocar, Gall Bladder

Tube, Abdominal, Suction

Tube, Aspirating, 50 CM

Tube, Aspirating, Open-End, Warning Stop at 40 CM.

Tube, Breathing, Large

Tube, Breathing, Small

Tube, Miller-Abbot, Double Lumen,

Complete.

Tube, Suction, with Obturator,

Adson.

Tube, Trachea, Size 3

Tube, Trachea, Size 5

Tube, Trachea, Size 6

Adapter, for Tubing

Anesthesia Apparatus, Endotracheal,

Complete.

Anesthesia Apparatus, Endotracheal,

Catheter, Magill, 32F.

Anesthesia Apparatus, Endotracheal,

Catheter, Magill, 38F.

Apparatus, Blood Transfusion,

Indirect, Needle, Donor.

Apparatus, Blood Transfusion,

Indirect, Filtering, Device.

Apparatus, Drainage and Suction,

Wangensteen Type, Modified.

Applicator, Wood

Atomizer, Set of 4

Bag, Politzer

Bag, Wet Dressing, Arm

Bag, Wet Dressing, Leg

Balkan Frame

Balkan Frame, Rope, %2-inch

Battery Box

Cardiograph, Portable, BatteryElectric.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

pr.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

6

15

carton.

set

ea

ea

ea

ea

yd.....

ea

ea

6

12

100

6

2

1

1

4

1

1

11

3

5

1

4

1

20

1

25

1

1

15

15

30

150

3

1

2

3

2

2

8

2

2

25

4

10

1

6

2

48

4

1

1

6

22

12

50

2

1

25

25

60

250

6

1
APPENDIX O 595

Amount

Item No. Item Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

36266

36267

36275

36277

36280

36285

36290

36300

36310

36320

36330

36340

36350

36380

36432-08

36440

36460

36510

36520

36614

36617-10

36620

36622

36624

36626

36627

36630

36640

36670

36680

36690

36703

36710

36720

36722

36740

36810

36820

36830

36840

36850

36870

36890

Class 3—Continued

Cardiograph, Galvanometer Lamp..

Cardiograph Paper

Case, Spectacle Fitting and Repair. _

Case, Spectacle Fitting and Repair,

for Glasses worn under Gas Mask.

Cautery Cord, Heavy

Cautery Cord', Regular

Cautery, Eye, Burner No. 51

Cautery, Eye, Burner No. 52

Cautery, Eye, Burner No. 53

Cautery, Eye, Burner No. 54

Cautery, Eye, Burner No. 55

Cautery, Eye, Handle

Cautery, Handle

Cautery, Large Burner, Knifepoint...

Cautery, Transformer, Hospital

Size, 110V, 60 Cycle, AC.

Cement, Rubber, 1 oz

Chimney

Clamp, Tubing

Clipper, Hair

Cord, Elastic; For Traction

Cord, Electric, For Diagnostic

Appliances, ESI, Boehm-Pilling.

Cot, Finger

Cotton, Thread, No. 120

Cotton, Thread, No. 80

Cotton, Thread, No. 40

Cotton, Thread, Quilting

Crutches

Crutch, Rubber Tip for, Nonskid

Type, %-inch.

Cushion, Surgical

Depressor, Tongue

Drum, Test

Electrosurgical Unit, Portable

Eye Shade, Double

Eye Shade, Single.

Eye Spheres (Prosthesis Balls), 16

MM.

Gloves, Autopsy

Gloves, Medium, Size 6K

Gloves, Medium, Size 7

Gloves, Medium, Size 8...

GloveSj Medium, Size 8^.

Hammer, Percussion

Headband, Leather Strap.

ea_.

roll.

ea__

ea__

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ydea.

doz_.

spool.

spool,

spool,

spool.

pr

ea

ea

carton.

ea

ea

ea.

ea.

pr.

pr.

pr_

pr.

pr.

pr.

ea.

ea.

25

2

25

1

3

100

60

200

60

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

4

1

6

4

2

24

24

24

12

40

80

3

144

2

24

12

12

6

48

48

84

84

20

2

3

12

25

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

6

1

12

8

4

48

48

48

24

100

200

5

250

3

1

48

24

24

10

132

132

212

212

36

3

5
596 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No.

Amount

Item Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

36910

36940

36950

36960

36990

37040

37050

37055

37090

37110-15

37115

37120

37127

37128

37162

37165

37166

37167

37168

37175

37200

37210

37230

37265

37275-08

37355-08

37370

37380

37381

37382

37383

37384

37388

37390

37455

37480

37500

Class 3—Continued

Headband, Mirror

Headlight

Headlight, Lamp To Fit Item 36940.

Inhaler, Yankauer

Intravenous Solutions, Reservoir

Irrigator Tips

Irrigator Tubing

Kit, Suction

Loupe, Binocular

Magnet, Eye, Small AC-DC, 110V,

60 Cycle, AC.

Mandible Fracture Kit

Manometer, Spinal

Mask Type Oxygen Therapy Outfit,

Mask, Nasal.

Mask Type Oxygen Therapy Outfit,

Mask, Oronasal.

Pneumothorax Apparatus

Pneumothorax Apparatus, Holder,

Needle.

Pneumothorax Apparatus, Needle,

Aspirating.

Pneumothorax Apparatus, Needle,

Initial Puncture.

Pneumothorax Apparatus, Needle,

Refill.

Rack, Clip Holding, with Cover,

McKenzie.

Razor, Safety

Razor, Safety, Blades

Reflector

Resuscitator and Inhalator

Rheostat, Lamp Socket Type, 110

Volt, 60 Cycle, AC.

Sharpener, Needle, Electric, 110

Volt, 60 Cycle, AC.

Sphygmomanometer, Aneroid

Sphygmomanometer, Mercurial

Sphygmomanometer Bulb

Sphygmomanometer Compression

Sphygmomanometer, Sleeve for.

Sphygmomanometer, Valve for..

Splint, Basswood, in lengths

Splint, Cabot

Splint Strap

Splint, Thomas, Arm, Hinged..

Splint, Army, Leg, Half-Ring...

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

pr.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

doz.

ea_.

Pkgea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ft..

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

6

6

10

6 .

16

600

40

100

65

65

3

3

3

12

8

36

2

12

72

8

4

2

2

1

2

75

12

15

20

20

5

6

6

24

18

48

4

1

2

2

6

12

2

24

144

1

1

5

1

24

8

4

4

2

4

150

25

24

25

40
APPENDIX O 597

Item Unit

Amount

Item No. Evacu- Station General

ation hos- hospital hospital

pital (500-bed) (1,000-bed)

(400-bed)

Class 3—Continued

37505 Splint, Army, Leg, Half-Ring, ea 12 25

Pierson's Attachment.

37515 Splint Support and Foot Rest . . ea . 130 40 80

37540 Splint, Wire Ladder ea. 50

15

25

12

40

37545 Splint, Wrist, Cook-Up ea _ __ 25

37580 Splint Accessory-Buckle for 1^-inch ea _. 50 72

Webbing.

37590 Splint Accessory-Buckle for 2-inch ea . 50 15 20

Webbing.

37600 Splint Accessory-Felt, Firm Wool, lin. ft 6 12

White.

37610 Splint Accessory, Felt, Saddle, Gray. yd 5

37615 Splint Accessory, Asbestos-Felt, Soft, yd 5 20 30

Gray.

37690 Splint Accessory, Webbing, 1-inch yd 15 20

37700 Splint Accessory, Webbing, l^-inch.. yd 50 100

37710 Splint Accessory, Webbing, 2-inch yd 24 15 20

37715 Sprayer, Hand, Continuous ea. _ 3

12

6

18

12

37730 Stethoscope 36

37735 Stethoscope, Blood Pressure, Bracelet Type.

ea 8 2 4

37740 Stethoscope, Tubing ft.. . . 36 18 36

37747 Stopcock, 1-way ea _ _ 1 2

37750-08 Suction Apparatus, Portable, Elec- ea 2 2 3

tric 110 Volt, 60 Cycle, AC.

37760 ea 1 1 2

37762 Suture, Catgut, Chromic, Size 00

with 1%-inch Straight NonTraumatic Needle Affixed.

Pkg- 5 6 10

37764 Suture, Catgut, Chromic, Size 00

with l}£-inch Half-Circle, NonTraumatic Needle Affixed.

pkg 5 6 10

37770 Suture, Catgut, Chromic, Size 00 tube 25 80 160

37780 Suture, Catgut, Chromic, Size 0 . tube. 1,200 380 760

37790 Suture, Catgut, Chromic, Size 1 tube . 1,200 400 800

37800 Suture, Catgut, Chromic, Size 2 tube 600 30 60

37840 Suture, Catgut, Plain, Size 00 ... tube 25 130 260

37850 Suture, Catgut, Plain, Size 0. ._ ... tube 1,200 165 330

37860 Suture, Catgut, Plain, Size 1 ... tube.. . -. 1,200 300 600

37870 Suture, Catgut, Plain, Size 2 tube.. 600 40 80

37881 Suture, Eye, Catgut, Plain, Size 4-0,

Single-Armed, with Size 3, %-

Circle, Cutting Edge, NonTraumatic Needle Affixed.

pkg 5 6 10

37882 Suture, Eye, Catgut, Plain, Size 000,

Single-Armed with Size 4, %-

Circle, Cutting Edge, NonTraumatic Needle Affixed.

Pkg- 5 6 10
598 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

Item No. Item

37883

37884

37885

37886

37887

37888

37889

37890

37891

37963

37969

37971

37973

37975

37978

37988

37995

37996

38050

Class 3—Continued

Suture, Eye, Catgut, Mild Chromic,

Size 4-0, Single-Armed, with

Size 3, %-Circle, Cutting Edge

Non-Traumatic Needle Affixed.

Suture, Eye, Catgut, Plain, Size 000,

Double-Armed with Size 4, %-

Circle, Cutting Edge, NonTraumatic Needle Affixed.

Suture, Eye, Catgut, Mild Chromic,

Size 4-0, Double-Armed, with Size

3, ^-Circle, Cutting Edge, NonTraumatic Needle Affixed.

Suture, Eye, Silk, Size 6-0, SingleArmed, with Size 3, Half-Circle,

Cutting Edge, Non-Traumatic

Needle Affixed.

Suture, Eye, Silk, Size 6-0, SingleArmed with Size 3, ^-Circle,

Cutting Edge, Non-Traumatic

Needle Affixed.

Suture, Eye, Silk, Size 6-0, DoubleArmed with Size 3, ^-Circle

Cutting Edge, Non-Traumatic

Needle Affixed.

Suture, Eye, Silk, Size 4-0, DoubleArmed, with Size 3, %-Circle,

Cutting Edge, Non-Traumatic

Needle Affixed.

Suture, Eye, Silk, Braided, NonCapillary, Size 6-0.

Suture, Eye, Silk, Braided, NonCapillary, Size 4-0.

Suture, Nylon, Braided, Size 5-0

Suture, Silk, Braided, NonCapillary, Size 000.

Suture, Silk, Braided, NonCapillary, Size 00.

Suture, Silk, Braided, NonCapillary, Size 0.

Suture, Silk, Braided, NonCapillary, Size 1.

Suture, Silk, Braided, NonCapillary, Size 2.

Suture, Silk, Braided, NonCapillary, Size 4.

Suture, Silk, Dermal, Coarse

Suture, Silk, Dermal, Medium

Suture, Silkworm Gut, Coarse

Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

pkgpkgpkgpkgpkgStation

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

pkgpkgspool.

spoolspoolspooL

spooL

spoolspooL

spool.

spooL

pkgPkgcoil.

30

60

60

60

60

60

15

30

3

3

3

12

24

24

24

24

12

60

72

12

10

10

6

6

6

24

48

48

48

48

24

110

160

25
APPENDIX C

Item Unit

Amount

Item No. Evacu- Station General

ation hos- hospital hospital

pital (600-bed) (1,000-bed)

(400-bed)

Class 3—Continued

38057 Suture, Silkworm Gut, Medium

Syringe, Ear, 2 oz _ . __

coil 4

4

12

40

10

38130 ea_ 6

25

65

210

210

58

8

38170 Syringe, Glass, 1 oz ea

38430 Syringe, Luer, 1 cc __ _. ea __ 10

38440 Syringe, Luer, 2 cc . ea 50 106

38450 Syringe, Luer, 10 cc ._ . ea 30 106

38460 Syringe, Luer, 30 cc ... ea 15 24

38462 Syringe, Luer, 30 cc, Adapter

Syringe, Luer-Lok, 5cc._ .. ..

ea

38465 ea 24

38470 Syringe, Luer, Needle, 25-Gage, %-

inch Cannula.

doz. .. 2

38480 Syringe, Luer, Needle, 25-Gage, %-

inch Cannula.

doz. . 12 24 37

38490 Syringe, Luer, Needle, 23-Gage, Jörnen Cannula.

doz 4 15 25

38500 Syringe, Luer, Needle, 22-Gage, 1-

inch Cannula.

doz.. . ... 4 18 36

38503 Syringe, Luer, Needle, 22-Gage, 3-

inch Cannula.

doz 6 12

38505 Syringe, Luer, Needle, 20-Gage,

1^-inch Cannula.

doz 2 15 24

38510 Syringe, Luer, Needle, 19-Gage,

1%-inch Cannula.

doz . .. 6 25 35

38520 Syringe, Luer, Needle, 17-Gage, 3-

inch Cannula

doz.. .. . 2 10 19

38530 Syringe, Luer, Needle, 15-Gage, 3-

inch Cannula.

doz ... 2 5 8

38550-10 Syringe, Luer, Needle, Wire, 33-

Gage, 2-inch.

bundle. ... 25 8 16

38550-15 Syringe, Luer, Needle, Wire, 30-

Gage, 4-inch.

bundle 25 6 11

38550-20 Syringe, Luer, Needle, Wire, 28-

Gage, 2%-inch.

bundle 3 5

38602 Syringe, Tonsil, Laryngeal and ea 11 11

Dental.

38603 Syringe, Tonsil, Laryngeal and ea. 12 18

Dental Needle for, Straight.

38604 Syringe, Tonsil, Laryngeal and ea . 4 6

Dental, Needle for, Curved.

38605 Syringe, Laryngeal, Curved ea. 2 3

Cannula.

38606 Syringe, Lachrymal, Cannulae set . 2 3

38610 Syringe, Urethral Prophylaxis .. ea . 20 50 100

38630 Tape, Cotton roll. 9 12 20

38670 Transluminator (Lamp, Diagnostic) . ea . 1 1

38f80 Transluminator Lamp ea 4 6

38685 Tube, Colon... .. ea 12 15

2

24

38690 Tube, Diagnostic, Ear ea 3
600 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No. Item

38705-05

38705-07

38705-09

38710

38720

38730

38750

38753

38755

38760

38780

38790

38792

38793

38800

38890

38900

38910

38930

40020

40090

40110-28

40130

40160

40170

40175

40200-08

40210

40300

40310

40315

40330

40340

40350

40420

40450

40460

40480

40485

40540

Class 3—Continued

Tube, Duodenal, Levin's, Size 12

Tube, Duodenal, Levin's, Size 14—

Tube, Duodenal, Levin's, Size 16—

Tube, Duodenal, Rehfuss

Tube, Murphy Drip

Tube, Nasal, Feeding, 22F

Tube, Stomach

Tubing, Drainage, %-inch

Tubing, Drainage, %-inch

Tubing, Rubber, %-inch

Tubing, Rubber, %-inch

Tubing, Rubber, J^-inch

Tubing, Rubber, Latex, K6-inch

Tubing, Rubber, Latex, jKs-inch

Vision Test Set

Wire, Corrosion-Resisting Steel,

0.009-inch.

Wire, Corrosion-Resisting Steel,

0.014-inch.

Wire, Corrosion-Resisting Steel,

0.028-inch.

Wire, Silver, Preformed Clips.

Class 4

Adapter (Y-Tube)..

Asbestos Mat

Autoclave, Laboratory, Horizontal:

For use with Leaded Gasoline.

Balance, Analytical

Balance, Analytical, Rest

Balance, Analytical, Weights

Balance Pans

Basal Metabolism Apparatus, 110V,

60 cycle, AC.

Basal Metabolism Apparatus,

Charts: for Use with Item

40200-08.

Basket, Culture Tube

Beads, Glass

Beaker, 50 cc

Beaker, 250 cc

Beaker, 600 cc

Beaker, 1,000 cc

Block, Embedding

Bottle, Aspirator

Bottle, Balsam, 45 cc

Bottle, Dropping, 60 cc

Bottle, Infusion, Kelly

Bottle, Narrow Mouth, 4 liter

Unit

Amount

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ft

ft

ft

ft

ft

ea

spool.

spool.

coil..

Pkgea.

ea.

ea.

ea..

ea..

set.

pr.

set.

box.

ea.

lb.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

10

15

6

10

10

10

200

20

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

3

6

3

2

10

6

4

15

10

100

232

40

25

25

1

4

4

2

10

6

2

1

1

2

1

4

30

1

8

12

6

24

8

4

6

12

6

4

24

12

8

15

15

200

464

100

50

50

1

7

4

24

6

2

1

1

2

1

4

1

30

1

8

12

10

5

6

3

36

15

6
APPENDIX C 601

Item No. Item Unit

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

40560

40562

40563

40564

40565

40566

40567

40610

40900

40920

40930

40940

40950

40955

40980

41000

41010

41012

41210

41220

41240

41250

41260

41270

41390-08

41400

41420

41430

41440

41750

41760

41770

41780

41800

41804

41806

Class 4—Continued

Bottle, Narrow Mouth, 5-gal.

Carboy.

Bottle, Screw Neck with Cap, Vial

Type, 9 cc.

Bottle, Screw Neck, with Cap, Vial

Type, 22 cc.

Bottle, Screw Neck, with Cap, Vial

Type, 120 cc.

Bottle, Screw Neck, with Cap, Vial

Type, 240 cc.

Bottle, Screw Neck, with Cap, Wide

Mouth, 60 cc.

Bottle, Screw Neck, with Cap, Wide

Mouth, 240 cc.

Bottle, Reagent, Complete Set

Box, Paraffin Embedding

Brush, Burette

Brush, Camel Hair, 1-inch ...

Brush, Flask

Brush, Test Tube, 1%-inch

Brush, Test Tube, K-inch

Bulb, Rubber, 1^-inch

Burette, 50 cc

Burette, Automatic, 50 cc

Burette, Micro

Carbon Dioxide Apparatus

Carbon Dioxide Cylinder

(Laboratory), Filled.

Case, Mailing, Culture

Case, Mailing, Typhoid

Case, Mailing, Wassermann

Case, Mailing, Water

Centrifuge, Electric, Small, 110 V.,

60 Cycle, AC.

Centrifuge, Hand, Single-Speed

Centrifuge, Tube, Graduated, 15 cc.

Centrifuge, Tube, Ungraduated,

15 cc.

Centrifuge, Tube, Ungraduated,

50 cc.

Clamp, Adjustable

Clamp, Extension, 8-inch.

Clamp, Extension, 11-inch

Clamp, Extension, Holder

Clamp, Mohr's Pinchcock

Clamp, Pinchcock, Heavy

Clamp, Pinchcock, Regular

ea.

ea.

set.

set.

ea..

ea.

ea..

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea..

ea.

ea..

ea..

ea..

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

20

6

6

2

4

1

1,200

400

100

8

60

10

1

4

2

2

12

2

12

12

12

12

1

1

50

144

36

3

4

6

12

2

2

2,000

650

200

12

120

50

1

10

2

2

4

24

4

6

4

2

2

1

2

12

12

12

12

1

1

50

144

36

8

4

4

8

12

3

3
602 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No.

Amount

Item Unit Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

41808

41810

41820

41840

41850

41852

41870

41890

41900

41920

41930

41970

41990

42000

42030

42060

42080

42100

42120

42130

42139

42140

42150

42160

42200

42222

42230

42240

42250

42260-35

42265

42290

42300

42375

42377

42390

42410

42420

42430

42440

Class 4—Continued

Clamp, Shut-Off, Screw

Adjustment.

Clamp, Test Tube

Clock, Interval Timer

Colorimeter, Duboscq

Colorimeter, Cup

Colorimeter, Plunger

Condenser, Liebig

Cover Glass, 22 MM Square

Cover Glass, 22 by 40 MM

Crucible, Gooch

Crucible Holder, Walter

Cylinder, 10 cc

Cylinder, 50 cc

Cylinder, 100 cc

Cylinder, 1,000 cc

Cylinder, Mixing, 100 cc

Desiccator, Scheibler

Diamond

Dish, Evaporating, Glass, 125 cc

Dish, Evaporating, Glass, 275 cc

Dish, Evaporating, Platinum, 100

cc.

Dish, Evaporating, Porcelain, 70

cc.

Dish, Evaporating, Porcelain, 250

cc.

Dish, Evaporating, Porcelain, 1,285

cc.

Dish, Petri

Dish, Petri, Large

Dish, Petri, Holder

Dish, Stender, 26 MM High^

Dish, Stender, 90 MM High

Distilling Apparatus, 2 gal. per hour,

for use with leaded gasoline.

Distilling Apparatus, with Graham

condenser.

Extraction Apparatus

Extraction Thimble, Double

Thickness.

Filter, Seitz, Manteufel, Size6

Filter Discs, Seitz, Germicide

Flask, Distillation, 250 cc

Flask, Distillation, 1,000 cc

Flask, Erlenmeyer, 50 cc

Flask, Erlenmeyer, 125 cc

Flask, Erlenmeyer, 250 cc

ea_.

ea_-

ea__

ea._

pr._

ea_-

boxbox_

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

pr.

pr.

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea

carton_

pkgea..

ea._

ea..

ea_.

ea..

10

6

4

4

1

2

2

2

12

1

2

1

2

3

4

3

4

1

4

2

400

100

6

2

2

2

2

20

4

5

2

2

2

2

24

1

4

2

2

4

6

4

4

1

2

10

6

1

600

200

6

4

4

2

2

1

2

2

2

2

20

20 40
APPENDIX C 603

Item Unit

Amount

Item No. Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

42460

Class 4—Continued

Flask, Erlenmeyer, 1,000 cc ea 12 24

42480 Flask, Filtering, 500 cc ea._ _ . 2

42490 Flask, Filtering, 1,000 cc ea.. _ 2

42550 Flask, Volumetric, 50 cc ._ ea. __ __ . 1

2

2

2

42560 Flask, Volumetric, lOOcc __ . ea _. _. 2

42580 Flask, Volumetric, 500cc ea 2

42607 Funnel, Fritted, 350 cc ea . _. 2

42608 Funnel, Fritted, 600 cc ea _ _. 2

42610 Funnel, Glass, 50 MM ea. . . 2 4

6

3

2

6

42630 Funnel, Glass, 125 MM . ea 6

42670 Funnel, Glass, Ribbed, 4%-inch

Funnel, Glass, Ribbed, 7}£-inch

Funnel, Separatory, Cylindrical, 60 cc

Funnel, Separatory, Squibb, 250 cc

Funnel, Separatory, Squibb, 500 cc

ea 4

42680 ea 2

42690 ea. 2

42710 ea ._ 2

42720 ea_ . 2

42770 ea 8

24

50

75

12

1

3

2

8

8

42790 Hemacytometer, Cover Glass . . J

Hemacytometer, Pipette, Red

Corpuscle.

Hemacytometer, Pipette, White

Corpuscle.

Hematocrit tube, Wmtrobe

ea . ._ 24

42800 ea _. _. ._ 50

42810 ea ... 100

42811 ea. 12

2

36

42812 Hemoglobinometer __ ea.. _. 2

42840 Hemoglobinometer, Tallqvist. _

Holder, Needle, Dissection

ea. 6

42850 ea 2

42860 Holder, Needle, Kolle ea . 8

42870 Hydrometer, For Liquids Heavier

than Water.

Hydrometer, For Liquids Lighter

than Water.

Incubator, Bacteriological, 37}i° and

50° C, for use with leaded gasoline.

Jar, Coplin

1

42880 1

42923-28 1

12

8

3

4

1

5

1

4

4

12

2

43010 ea 12

43070 Jar, Specimen, 1 pt ea 12

43080 Jar, Specimen, 1 qt ea 6

43120 Label, Micro book 4

43130 Magnifier ea. . . 1

43150 Microscope , ea 6

43170 Microscope, Dark Field Apparatus

Microscope, Dark Field Apparatus,

6-8 volt Lamp.

Microscope Lamp. ._ .

ea 1

43175 ea 4

43275 ea . . 7

43277 Microscope Lamp, 100-watt Bulb

Microtome __ __

ea._ _. 12

43360 ea. 1

43370 Microtome, Clinical ea 1

43390 Microtome, Knife, for Clinical Microtome.

ea 2
604 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No. Item

43400

43410

43420

43450

43570-05

43580

43590

43600

43610

43615

43620

43630

43640

43650

43656

43660

43670

43680

43690

43700

43710

43720

43730

43740

43750

43780

43790

43800

43805

43810

43830

43831

43832

43834

43836

43850

43890

43920

43925

43927-05

43950

Unit

Class 4—Continued

Microtome, Knife, for Minot Microtome.

Microtome, Knife Back

Microtome, Knife Handle

Microtome, Knife Strop, Coarse

Oven, Pathological, 110 V, 60 cycle,

AC.

Paper, Filter, 90 MM

Paper, Filter, 150 MM

Paper, Filter, 180 MM

Paper, Filter, 250 MM

Paper, Filter, 380 MM

Paper, Filter, for Blotting Micro

Slides.

Paper, Filter, No. 40,110 MM

Paper, Filter, No. 42, 90 MM

Paper, Lens

Pipette, Kahn, 0.25 cc

Pipette, Ostwald, 1 cc

Pipette, Ostwald, 2 cc

Pipette, Ostwald, 3 cc

Pipette, Ostwald, 5 cc

Pipette, Ostwald, 10 cc

Pipette, Serological, }i0cc

Pipette, Serological, %„ cc

Pipette, Serological, 1 cc

Pipette, Serological, 5 cc

Pipette, Serological, 10 cc

Pipette, Volumetric, 5 cc

Pipette, Volumetric, 10 cc

Pipette, Volumetric, 25 cc

Pipette, Volumetric, 100 cc

Pipette Box

Pump, Filter

Pump, Filter, Coupling

Pump, Filter, Airejector type, 5}i

inches long.

Pump, Filter, Airejector type, Coupling with Rubber Grip.

Pump, Filter, Airejector Type, Coupling with Threaded Grip.

Ring, Suberite

Rod, Glass, Assorted, 1 lb

Section Lifter

Shaking Apparatus, Kahn

Shaking Apparatus, Kahn, 110 V, 60

cycle, AC.

Slide, Micro, 75 by 25 MM

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

pkg—

pkg—

pkg—

pkg—

pkg—

pkg—

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

pkgpkgPkgea._

ea...

pkgea...

ea_.

ea_.

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

carton.

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

5

10

6

6

12

3

2

6

6

24

12

12

6

12

4

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

200

25

10

1 .

20

2

2

1

1

10

10

6

6

12

4

2

6

6

24

12

18

8

12

6

10

24

300

50

50

12

10

6

2

8

4

4

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

30
APPENDIX C 605

Item Unit

Amount

Item No. Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

43960

Class 4—Continued

Slide, Micro, with one Spherical

Concavity.

Slide, Micro, Box

ea 12

10

1

2

1

1

20

20

12

4

2

2

4

200

125

100

2

24

12

1,200

200

20

43980 ea 35

43990 Slide, Micro, Case, Mailing . doz_ 5

44000 Spoon, Metal.. .. carton 2

44010 . ea .. 1

44030-28 Sterilizer, Hot Air, Medium; for use

with Leaded Gasoline.

Stopper, Rubber, Solid, No. 4 _.

Stopper, Rubber, Solid, No. 6

Stopper, Rubber, Solid, No. 8

Support Stand, 6}i by 9 inches

Support Stand, 6}£ by 11 inches

Support Stand, Ring, 3-inch

Support Stand, Ring, 4-inch

Test Tube, Aeration

ea 2

44160 ea 10

10

10

20

44170 . ea 20

44190 ea ._ 20

44230 . ea__ 4

44240 . ea 4

44250 . ea 4

44260 . ea 6

44300 ea 200

44310 Test Tube, Chemical , ea 200

44330 Test Tube, Fermentation, Large

Test Tube, Filling Shield

ea 100

44345 . ea 2

44350 Test Tube, Folin ea 36

44360 Test Tube, Ignition ._ .. ea 24

44364 Test Tube (Kahn Precipitin)

Test Tube, Screw Cap

ea 2,000

44385 ea _ 300

44390 Test Tube, Wassermann ea . 400

44405 Test Tube Support, (Kahn

Precipitin).

Test Tube Support, Wassermann Rack.

Thermometer, Chemical, Minus 10°

to Plus 110°C.

Thermometer, Chemical, Minus 10°

to Plus 360°C.

Thermometer, Chemical Precision,

Minus 10° to Plus 105°C.

Thermometer, Incubator

ea 10

4

3

3

20

44410 ea 12

44430 ea . 4

44450 ea . 4

44460 ea _. 2

44470 ea 4

2

6

2

1

10

4

44480 Tongs, Crucible ea. . 2

44510 Tripod, Iron _. .. ea 6

44520 Tube, Color Comparison, 50 cc,

Nessler, with 50 cc Mark, 210

MM, 6 in set.

Tube, Color Comparison, Support

Tube, Digestion, Folinwu, NPN

Tube, Drying, 140 MM

set 2

44540 ea _ 1

44545 ea 20

44550 ea . 4

44580 Tubing, Glass, 6 MM ft 20

20

75

40

50

120

44590 Tubing, Glass, 10 MM. ft 80

44610 Tubing, Rubber, for Gas ft 60

44630 Tubing, Rubber, Pressure, jKe-inch...

Tubing, Rubber, Special, ^6-inch

ft 6

446401 ft 30
606 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item No. Item

44700

44710

44740

44770

44790-08

44800-08

44890

44910

Class 4'—Continued

Urinometer

Vial, 2 Dram -

Watch Glass

Water Bath Inoculating

Water Bath, Serological, Inactivating, 110 V, 60 cycle, AC.

Water Bath, Serological, Wassermann, 110 V, 60 cycle, AC.

Wire, Platinum, No. 22

Wire Gauze

Item no.

50020

50025

50080

50090

50110

50130

50140

50160

50180

50190

50220

50240

50260

50300

50350

50360

50370

50390

50430

50440

50450

50520

50550

50570

50590

50610

50630

50640

50650

50670

50710

Item

Class 6*

Alloy, 1 oz

Alloy-Mercury, Measuring Device.

Arbor, Emery

Arbor, Emery, Band..

Articulator, Crown and Bridge

Articulator, Gysi—

Balance, Portable

Base Plate

Blower, Chip

Blower, Chip, Bulb

Blowpipe Outfit

Bottle, Office, Preparation

Bowl, 4%-Inch

Brush, Inlay

Bur, No. 2, Angle Handpiece

Bur, No. 4, Angle Handpiece

6, Angle Handpiece

9, Angle Handpiece

35, Angle Handpiece

37, Angle Handpiece

39, Angle Handpiece

557, Angle Handpiece

Bur, No. 560, Angle Handpiece

Bur, No. 700, Angle Handpiece...

Bur, No. 702, Angle Handpiece...

Bur, No. H, Straight Handpiece..

Bur, No. 2, Straight Handpiece...

Bur, No. 4, Straight Handpiece

Bur, No. 6, Straight Handpiece

Bur, No. 9, Straight Handpiece

Bur, No. 35, Straight Handpiece..

Bur, No.

Bur, No.

Bur, No.

Bur, No.

Bur, No.

Bur, No.

Unit

ea..

ea.

set.

ea.

ea.

inch.

ea_-.

Amount

Evacuation hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

1,000

50

12

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

12

1,000

12

3

1

1

25

12

Unit

bottle.

ea

ea

box

ea

ea

ea

box

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

pkg—

pkg—

pkg—

pkg—

pkg—

Pkg—

pkg—

Pkg—

pkg...

pkg—

Pkg—

Pkg—

Pkg—

Pkg—

Pkg—

Pkg—

pkg...

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

18

2

1

1

1

1

1

6

3

2

1

6

2

2

12

16

24

12

24

24

12

24

24

24

24

12

12

12

12

8

12

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

30

4

1

1

1

1

1

6

5

2

1

10

2

2

18

24

36

18

36

36

18

36

36

36

36

18

18

18

18

12

18

•Note: Evacuation hospitals were not issued any Class 5 Items.
APPENDIX C 607

Item no. Item Unit

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

50720

50820

50830

50870

50890

51070

51127

51185

51220

51230

51240

51250

51265

51275

51285

51295

51305

51315

51385

51390

51410

51422

51425

51460

51487

51495

51505

51540

51550

51580

51585

51587

51660

51680

51710

51790

51810

51885

51966

51967

51968

51969

52060

52070

52072

52160

52295

52300

52360

Class 5—Continued

Bur, No. 37, Straight Handpiece

Bur, No. 557, Straight Handpiece

Bur, No. 558, Straight Handpiece

Bur, No. 700, Straight Handpiece

Bur, No. 702, Straight Handpiece

Burnisher, Stellite, "1-2"

Carrier, Amalgam, No. 5

Cellophane, Sheets

Cement, Permanent, Pearl Gray

Cement, Permanent, Yellow

Cement, Silicate, Case

Cement, Silicate, Liquid, Caulk

Cement, Silicate, Shade 20. .

Cement, Silicate, Shade 21

Cement, Silicate, Shade 22

Cement, Silicate, Shade 23

Cement, Silicate, Shade 24

Cement, Silicate, Shade 25

Cement, Silicate, Measuring Device

Cement, Silicate, Shade Guide, Caulk.

Cement, Silicate, Varnish, 1 oz

Cement, Temporary, Anodyne

Cervical Matrix

Charcoal Block

Chisel, Osseous, Stout, No. 1

Chisel, Osseous, Stout, No. 2

Chisel, Osseous, Stout, No. 3

Chisel, No. 3-..

Chisel, No. 5

Chisel, No. 48...

Chisel, Wedelstaedt, No. 41

Chisel, Wedelstaedt, No. 42

Cleaners, No. 0

Cleaners, No. 2

Compound, Cake, }4-lb

Cone, No. 3

Cotton Rolls, %-Inch

Crown Remover, Simplex

Curette, F. F. Molt, No. 2

Curette, F. F. Molt, No. 4

Curette, F. F. Molt, No. 9L

Curette, F. F. Molt, No. 10R

Dentimeter

Dentimeter, Iron Wire, ji-ox

Denture Base Material, Acrylic, Pink..

Disk, Carborundum, Knife Edge, %-

Inch.

Disk, Metal Abrasive, %-Inch

Disk, Paper

Disk, Vulcarbo, %-Inch

pkg—

pkg—

Pkg—

pkg—

Pkg—

ea

ea

pkg...

box

box

ea

bottle,

bottle,

bottle,

bottle,

bottlebottle,

bottle.

ea

ea

bottle.

pkg—

box

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

pkg...

pkg—

box

ea

box

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

spool,

pkg...

ea

card,

box.,

ea

12

12

12

12

12

1

3

2

4

4

1

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

8

4

15

40

4

80

18

18

18

18

18

2

5

2

6

6

2

12

2

4

4

4

4

2

2

2

12

10

2

2

1

1

1

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

12

4

25

1

2

2

2

2

1

1

2

60

12

6

120
608 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no. Item Unit

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

52465

52497

52498

52500

52510

52560

52570

52590-10

52610-05

52630-05

52670

52695

52697

52720

52730

52774

52775

52785

52790

52800

52810

*52876

52890

52900

52980

53000

53040

53050

53090

53100

53105

53106

53110

53130

53135

53170

53190

53200

53220

53240

53250

53260

53262

53264

53270

53310

53320

53350

Class 5—Continued

Elevator, Stout "A"

Elevator, Winter, No. 1L

Elevator, Winter, No. 1R

Elevator, Winter, No. 122

Elevator, Winter, No. 123..

Engine Oil, 1 oz

Engine, Foot

Engine, Foot, Cord: 17-ft., 3-inch

Engine, Handpiece, Angle: Model P,

Doriot, New.

Engine, Handpiece, Straight: Doriot...

Excavator, No. 23

Excavator, No. 49

Excavator, No. 50

Excavator, No. 63

Excavator, No. 64

Excavator, No. 79

Excavator, No. 80

Excavator, No. 86

Explorer, No. 5

Explorer, No. 6

Explorer, No. 23

File, Bone, Double-Ended

File, Gold, Half-Round

File, Gold, Round

File, Root, Canal, "B," No. 1

File, Root, Canal, "B," No. 4

File, Vulcanite, Double End

File, Vulcanite, Round

Finisher, No. 2

Finisher, No. 4 ....

Flask, Ejector Type

Flask, Ejector Type, Ejector for..

Floss, 100 Yards

Flux, Reducing

Forceps, Bone, Rongeur, No. 5 S_

Forceps, Rubber Dam, Punch

Forceps, No. 18R

Forceps, Nc*. 18L

Forceps, No. 65

Forceps, No. 150A

Forceps, No. 151A

Forceps, No. 210

Forceps, No. 215

Forceps, No. 217

Frame, Heating

Gold, Casting, % Crown, 2 Dwt..

Gold, Casting, Inlay, 2 Dwt

Gold, Lingual Bar, Long, 2 Dwt..

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

bottle.

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

pkg...

Pkg~-

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

spoolbottle.

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ingot.,

ingot—

ea

2

10

10

10

6

6

8

12

9

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

15

15

15

1

1

1

6

6

1

1

2

2

6

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

20

20

16

•Note: If no stock is available of item 52876, substitute one (1) of either 52874 or 52875.
APPENDIX 0 609

Item no.

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

53360

53370

53380

53390

53400

53410

53430

53460

53490

53580

53590

53600

53610

53625

53628

53660

53665

53667

53668

53730

53800

53810

53820

53830

53880-05

53910

53920-09

53950

53960

53970

53990

54000

54005

54030

54050

54060

54070

54080

54120

54170

54180-05

Class 5—Continued

Gold, Lingual Bar, Medium, 1% Dwt..

Gold Plate, 22K, 5 Dwt

Gold Plate, 24K, 3 Dwt

Gold Solder, 16 K

Gold Solder, 18 K

Gold Solder, 20 K

Gold Wire, 14 Gage, Half-Round

Gold Wire, 18 Gage, Round

Gutta-Percha, Temporary, 1 oz

Holder, Cotton

Holder, Mercury

Holder, Napkin

Holder, Nerve Broach

Impression Compound

Impression Compound, Trays

Investment Compound, Crown and

Bridge, 4 lb.

Investment, Inlay

Investment, Inlay, Control Powder

Investment, Inlay, Scale

Knife, Plaster, SSW-10

Lamp, Alcohol, SSW-1...

Lamp, Alcohol, SSW-1, Wick

Lamp, Alcohol, Large

Lamp, Alcohol, Large, Wick

Lamp, Operating: Wall bracket type

110 V, 60 cycle AC.

Lancet, Volland, No. 2

Lathe, Electric: 110 V, 60 cycle, AC-...

Machine, Casting, Perfection

Machine, Casting, Asbestos Pad

Machine, Casting, Crucible

Machine, Casting, Inlay Flask, lK-inch.

Machine, Casting, Saddle and Bridge

Flask, iy2 Inch.

Mallet, Metal..

Mandrel, No. 303, For Angle Handpiece.

Mandrel, No. 303, For Straight Handpiece.

Mandrel, No. 303% For Straight Handpiece.

Mandrel, Morgan-Maxfield, For Angle

Handpiece.

Mandrel, Morgan-Maxfield, For Straight

Handpiece.

Mechanical Dam

Mirror, Mouth

Mirror, Mouth, Plane Glass: Cone

Socket.

ea

piece.,

piece..

Dwt..

Dwt..

Dwt-,

4 Dwt

4 Dwt

box

ea

ea

ea

ea

carton

set

tin

tin

tin

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

box...

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

10

2

1

4

12

4

4

4

4

3

3

3

3

4

1

2

2

1

1

1

3

6

1

2

3

2

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

12

12

12

12

12

3

12

12

16

2

1

6

20

8

6

6

6

5

5

5

5

6

1

2

4

2

1

1

5

10

1

2

6

2

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

18

18

18

18

18

5

20

20
610 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no. Item unit

Station

hospital

(50O-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

54205

54220

54260

54270

54275

54280

54310

54320

54325

54335

54357

54360

54370

54400

54440

54450

54500

54510

54520

54530

54541

54550

54580

54600

54620

54630

54741

54750

54780

54800

54820

54830

54940

54950

55000

55020

55030

55060

55070

55090

55190

55200

55210

55220

55230

55232

Class 5—Continued

Mortar and Pestle, 3 CM

Paper, Articulating

Pliers, No. 2, Dressing

Pliers, No. 17, Dressing

Pliers, No. 104

Pliers, No. 107, Round-Nose

Pliers, No. 136, Contouring

Pliers, No. 137, Contouring

Pliers, Clasp Bending, Jelenko

Pliers, Laboratory, Parallel Jaws

Pliers, Wire Nippers

Plugger, Black, No. 1

Plugger, Black, No. 3

Plugger, Ladmore, No. 3

Plugger, Root Canal, No. 1

Plugger, Root Canal, No. 3

Plugger, Woodson, No. 1

Plugger, Woodson, No. 2

Plugger, Woodson, No. 3

Point, Aseptic

Point, No. 184, Angle Handpiece

Point, No. 186, Angle Handpiece

Point, No. 211, Angle Handpiece

Point, No. 226, Angle Handpiece

Point, No. 234, Angle Handpiece

Point, No. 241, Angle Handpiece

Point, No. 184, Straight Handpiece.

Point, No. 186, Straight Handpiece.

Point, No. 211, Straight Handpiece.

Point, No. 226, Straight Handpiece.

Point, No. 234, Straight Handpiece.

Point, No. 241, Straight Handpiece.

Point, Root Canal, No. 6

Point, Root Canal, No. 8

Polisher, Rubber Cup

Pot, White

Press

Reamer, B-13

Reamer, B-15

Reamer, B-19

Retainer, Matrix, No. 1

Retainer, Matrix, Bicuspid Band,

Medium.

Retainer, Matrix, Bicuspid Band,

Narrow.

Retainer, Matrix, Molar Band,

Medium.

Retainer, Matrix, Molar Band,

Narrow.

Retainer, Matrix, No. 9

ea

book.

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

box..

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

box..

box__

box..

ea

ea

pkgpkgpkgea

pkgpkgPkgPkgea_

5

10

15

15

5

5

5

2

2

10

10

10

6

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

6

6

12

6

1

4

4

4

5

12

12

12

12
APPENDIX C 611

Item no. Item Unit

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

55234

55236

55280

55350

55410

55420

55440

55450

55515

55520

55525

55570

55593

55595

55620

55680

55690

55700

55710

55720

55760

55770

55780

55810

55820

55825

55930

55934

55936

55938

55940

55970

55980

56125

56130-10

56145

56160

56220

56270

Class 5—Continued

Retainer, Matrix, Bicuspid Band, No.

8.

Retainer, Matrix, Molar Band, No. 8.

Rouge, 1 oz

Sandarac Varnish, 4 oz

Sealer, No. 3

Sealer, No. 6

Sealer, No. 33

Sealer, No. 34

Sealer, Pyorrhea, Younger-Good,

No. 3.

Sealer, Pyorrhea, Younger-Good,

No. 4.

Sealer, Pyorrhea, Younger-Good,

No. 15.

Separator, Elliott

Shears, Crown, Universal

Shears, Laboratory

Slab, Caulk-6

Spatula, Cement

Spatula, Plaster

Spatula, Stellite

Spatula, Wax

Spatula, Wax, SSW-31

Stick

Stone, Artificial, 5 lb

Strip, Celluloid

Strip, Polishing, Fine

Strip, Polishing, Medium

Strip, Polishing, Steel, Fine

Syringe, Hypodermic, Cartridge Type,

Complete.

Syringe, Hypodermic, Cartridge Type,

Long Hub For.

Syringe, Hypodermic, Cartridge Type,

Short Hub For.

Syringe, Hypodermic, Cartridge Type,

Needle, Corrosion Resisting Steel, 25

Gage, 1-inch Cannula.

Syringe, Hypodermic, Cartridge Type,

Needle, Corrosion Resisting Steel, 25

Gage, 1%-inch Cannula.

Syringe, Water

Syringe, Water, Bulb

Teeth, Mold, Guide

Teeth, Shade Guide: Trubyte, New Hue.

Tin Foil, 0.001-Inch

Tongs, Soldering

Tray, Crown, and Bridge

Tray, Lower, BIS-18

pkgpkg—

stick__

bottle.

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea.

ea.

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

bundle.

tin

box

box

box

pkg

ea

ea._

ea__

ea__

ea__

roll.

ea_.

ea_.

ea..

3

2

2

6

6

3

3

3

3

3

1

3

1

5

5

1

1

1

1

4

4

8

8

8

4

4

2

2

60

60

4

2

2

10

10

5

5

5

2

5

1

9

5

1

2

1

1

6

6

12

12

12

6

4

2

80

80
612 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no. Item Unit

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

56280

56290

56300

56310

56320

56330

56360

56370

56380

56390

56400

56410

56420

56430

56450

56460

56520

56525

56530

56615

56640

56655

56710

56720

56730

56740

56760

56770

56780

56790

56800

56810

56830

56850

56870

56880

56890

56900

56910

56920

56940

56957

56960

Class 5—Continued

Tray, Lower, BIS-22

Tray, Lower, BIS-24

Tray, Lower, BIS-26

Tray, Lower, SSW-1

Tray, Lower, SSW-3

Tray, Lower, SSW-5

Tray, Upper, BIS-1

Tray, Upper, BIS-3

Tray, Upper, BIS-5

Tray, Upper, BIS-7

Tray, Upper, BIS-9

Tray, Upper, SSW-1

Tray, Upper, SSW-3

Tray, Upper, SSW-5

Trimmer, No. 26

Trimmer, No. 27

Tweezers, "B"

Tweezers, "K"

Tweezers, "L"

Vise

Vulcanizer, Flask, Compress

Vuleanizer, Flask, Tench-Donham, 22c.

Wax Base Plate, #-lb

Wax, Boxing, 1-lb

Wax, Casting

Wax, Crown

Wax, Inlay

Wheel, Brush, No. 12

Wheel, Brush, No. 26

Wheel, Brush, No. 27

Wheel, Brush, No. 65

Wheel, Brush, No. 66

Wheel, No. 301

Wheel, No. 304

Wheel, No. 307

Wheel, No. 310

Wheel, 2-Inch, Coarse

Wheel, 2-Inch, Medium

Wheel, 3-Inch, Chamois

Wheel, 3-Inch, Cloth

Wheel, Felt, No. 2

Wheel, Flexible, Engine, Abrasive, %-

inch.

Wire, Brass, Ligature

ea__

ea_.

ea_-

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea._

ea__

ea_-

ea_-

ea._

ea__

ea_.

ea__

ea__

ea._

ea_.

ea_.

ea__

ea_.

ea__

ea_.

box.

box.

box.

box.

box.

ea._

ea_.

ea_.

ea..

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea._

ea__

ea._

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea._

box.

box.

12

12

12

12

1

1

1

2

2

24

24

24

24

1

1

1

2

2

7
APPENDIX C 613

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

60020

60030

60040

60079

60080

60090

60100

60110

60117

60150

60170

60180

60190

60300

60310

60330

60340

60370

60380

60390

60400

60405

60420

60450-05

60470

60480

60485

60486

60490

60495-05

60500

60510

60880

60900

61100

61102

61103

61104

61105

61106

61107

61108

61109

Class 6

Apron, Lead

Bag, Sand, 8-Inch

Bag, Sand, 18-Inch

Caliper, Rule Type

Carrier, Dental Films

Cassette, 8-Inch

Cassette, 10-Inch

Cassette, 14-Inch

Cassette Changer, Stereoscopic,

Upright, Magnetically controlled.

Film, X-ray, Dental

Film, X-ray, 8-Inch

Film, X-ray, 10-Inch

Film, X-ray, 14-Inch

Gloves, Opaque

Goggles.

Holder, Film Exposure, 8-inch

Holder, Film Exposure, 10-Inch

Holder, Film Development, 8-Inch. _

Holder, Film Development, 10-Inch_

Holder, Film Development, 14-Inch.

Illuminator, Radiographic , _ _

Illuminator, Radiographic, Fluorescent Tube for.

Ink, White, 2 oz

Lamp, Bulb, Ruby, 110 Volt, 60

cycle, AC.

Lead, Sheet

Letters, Lead

Light, Safe, Ceiling type

Light, Safe, Ceiling type, Bulb

Light, Safe, Wall Type

Light, Safe, Lamp Bulb: 110 Volt,

60 Cycle, AC.

Localization, Eye, Complete with

Headrest.

Localization, Eye, Chart. _•

Machine, X-ray, dental, shockproof,

complete.

Machine, X-ray, Portable

Mount, Dental Film

Numbers, Lead, "0"

Numbers, Lead, "1"

Numbers, Lead, "2"

Numbers, Lead, "3"

Numbers, Lead, "4"

Numbers, Lead, "5"

Numbers, Lead, "6"

Numbers, Lead, "7"

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

Pkgdoz_

doz_

doz.

pr__

pr__

ea__

ea__

ea_.

ea._

ea._

ea__

ea__

bottle,

ea

sq. ft_

set

ea

ea

ea

ea

doz_

set..

ea

doz

envelope.,

envelopeenvelope.,

envelopeenvelope. _

envelope.,

envelope..

envelope.-

2

12

12

2

6

6

6

5

18

60

120

2

3

18

18

18

18

24

3

8

2

4

12

5

3

6

1

6

2

6

8

6

12

1

10

144

120

240

3

4

24

24

24

24

36

3

12

2

4

12

10

3

6

1

6

5

1

1

6

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3
614 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

61111

61112

61120

61200

61240

61275

61360

61580

61670

61679

70000

70001

70002

70003

70004

70005

70006

70007

70008

70009

70010

70430

70460

70603

70604

70740

70810

70950

70980

70992

70994

71005

71020

71030-05

71040-05

71232

Class 6—Continued

Numbers, Lead, "8"

Numbers, Lead, "9"

Oil, Transformer

Pencil, Dermatographio

Preserver, Negative, 14-Inch

Ruler, Transparent

Stereoscope, Complete

Table, Urological

Tank, Developing, Dental Film_

Thermometer, Dark Room

Class 7

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Complete.

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Class 1.

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Class 2.

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Class 3.

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Class 4.

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Class 5.

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Class 6.

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Class 7.

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Class 8.

Medical Department Supply

Catalog, Class 9.

Back Rest

Chair, Invalid

Chair, Specialists :

Holder, Card

Holder, Chart

Safe, Small

Stand, Bowl, Immersion

Table, Instrument, Adjustable

Table, Operating

Table, Operating, Headrest,

Cerebellar.

Table, Orthopedic, Portable

Tray, Card Index

Baker, Electric, Portable

Bath, Arm, 110 Volt, 60 Cycle, AC.

Bath, Leg, 110 Volt, 60 Cycle, AC.

Lamp, Therapeutic, Infra-Red,

Small, Element Type.

envelopeenvelope.

ea__

pkgea__

ea_.

ea_.

ea_-

ea__

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

3

3

1

6

50

3

1

6

6

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

25

10

1

500

500

1

5

6

4

1

1

10

4

1

1

2

3

3

5

12

50

4

1

1

1

6

25

25

25

25

25

25

25

25

25

50

20

1

1,000

1,000

1

8

9

6

2

1

20

6

1

1

3
APPENDIX O 615

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

71234

71260-05

71320-05

71390

71510

71520

71600-05

71600-10

71600-15

71605

71620

71628

*71640-05

*71640-10

*71660-05

*71660-10

71670

71690

71710-05

71710-10

71710-15

71720

71760-05

71760-10

71762-05

71762-10

71770

71780

72010

72030

72170

72240

72300-05

72300-10

72450

72630

72880

72890

72970

Class 7—Continued

Lamp, Therapeutic, Infra-Red,

Small, Element for.

Lamp, Therapeutic, Mercury Arc,

Air-Cooled, Portable: 110 Volt,

60 Cycle, AC.

Sinusoidal Machine, Portable; For

Galvanic Faradic, and rapid

Sinusoidal Currents: 110 Volt, 60

Cycle, AC.

Spectacles, Ultra-Violet

Bag, Laundry, Large

Bag, Laundry, Small

Gown, Operating: Large

Gown, Operating: Medium

Gown, Operating: Small

Mattress, Cotton

Mattress Cover for Felt Mattress

Pad for Operating and Examining

Table.

Pajama Coat, Winter: Large

Pajama Coat, Winter: Medium

Pajama Trousers, Winter: Large

Pajama Trousers, Winter: Medium.

Pillow, Feather

Pillow Case

Robe, Bath: Large

Robe, Bath: Medium

Robe, Bath: Small

Sheet

Suit, Operating, Coat: Large

Suit, Operating, Coat: Medium

Suit, Operating, Trousers: Large

Suit, Operating, Trousers: Medium..

Towel, Bath

Towel, Hand

Apron, Cook's

Beater, Egg, Wire Whip

Bowl, Soup, Enamel Ware

Cap, Cook's

Cart, Food, Drinkwater, Complete,

1 Large Cabinet.

Cart, Food, Drinkwater, Complete,

Two Small Cabinets.

Cleaver, approx. 10-inch

Dipper, 1 pt

Fork, Flesh, 20-inch

Fork, Table

Grater, Large

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea_

1

200

120

200

50

25

50

10

20

10

20

65

2

20

25

50

125

50

525

600

7

500

1,200

500

1,200

500

2,000

100

200

3,500

16

36

16

36

1,800

5,000

120

3

530

50

4

6

10

500

7

4

40

50

100

250

100

1,050

1,260

15

950

2,218

950

2,218

1,000

4,000

200

300

100

7,000

30

70

30

70

3,000

240

6

1,060

100

16

12

32

1,000

12

NOTE: Summer pajamas in identical quantities will be issued to tropical and subtropical theaters.

293-453 0—6 -41
616 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no.

73090

73120

73123

73130

73160

73180

73200

73315

73320

73400

73480

73540

73630

73670

73680

73690

73700

73755-85

73780

73840

73860

73870

73890

73910

73990

74010

74030

74035

74060

74100

74120

74230

74240

74260

74270

74290

74510

74540

74560

74570

74590

74620

74680

74700

74710

74760

74870

Item

Class 7—Continued

Knife, Butcher, approx. 12-inch

Knife, Paring

Knife, Potato Peeler

Knife, Sabatier, Heavy

Knife, Table

Ladle, Small

Masher, Potato

Opener, Can, Large

Opener, Can, Small

Pan, Dish, 36-qt

Pick, Ice

Pitcher, 3-qt

Pot, Coffee, HM-qt

Pot, Stock, 14-qt

Pot, Stock, 24-qt

Pot, Stock, 24-qt., with Faucet and

Strainer.

Pot, Stock, 40-qt

Refrigerator, Mechanical, Kerosene,

8-cu. ft.

Rolling Pin

Scale, Dietetic

Scale, Meat Beam

Scoop, Large

Shaker, Pepper

Shaker, Salt

Sheer, Meat, Small

Spoon, Basting, 20-inch

Spoon, Table

Spoon, Table, Medium (Dessert)

Squeezer, Lemon

Strainer, 3-inch

Strainer, Chinese

Tongs, Ice

Towel, Dish

Tray, Butler's

Tray, Serving

Turner, Cake

Broom, Corn

Brush, Bedpan

Brush, Hand

Brush, Paint, 2-inch

Brush, Scrub

Bucket

Lye

Mop Handle

Mop Head

Pan, Dust

Shovel

Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea_-

ea_-

ea__

ea_-

ea__

ea_-

ea__

ea__

ea_.

ea__

ea._

ea_.

ea__

ea_.

ea_-

ea_-

ea_.

ea._

ea_.

ea_.

ea__

ea_.

ea_.

ea._

can.

ea._

ea__

ea._

ea__

6

10

15

15

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

75

25

20

20

10

20

10

12

15

6

500

18

4

2

8

15

6

32

15

6

3

3

3

2

4

1

1

4

20

20

1

18

120

500

6

10

4

2

120

14

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

18

18

30

12

1,000

36

6

2

12

30

8

60

30

12

6

6

6

3

6

2

1

6

40

40

1

30

240

1,000

12

18

4

3

240

25

150

8

300

12

288

12

100 200

5 10

25 50

50 100

96 144

40 72

120 200

12 20

3 5
APPENDIX C 617

Item no. Item

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

74890

74900

74910

74930

74935

75040

75045

75110

75120

75150

75155

75160

75200

75210

75230

75240

75250

75260

75280

75290

75300

75310

75320

75360

75370

75400-10

75400-10

75495

75550

75560

75580

75590

76600

75620

75625

75630

75720

75725

75727

75728

75730

75750

75760

75780-15

75790-15

75815

75820

Class 7—Continued

Soap, Laundry

Soap, Scouring, Coarse

Soap, Scouring Powder

Soap, White Floating

Steel Wool

Paper, 5-lb

Paper, 3-lb

Binder, 1-inch Ring

Binder, Medical History

Book, Blank, 8 Vo

Book, Memo, 3}i by 6 inches

Book, Blank, Ledger

Book, Stenographer's

Book, Prescription Filing

Brush, Mucilage or Paste, J^-inch.

Brush, Typewriter

Can, Oil, Typewriter

Card, Index, 3 by 5 inches, Ruled.

Card, Index, 5 by 8 inches, Ruled

Card, Guide, 3 by 5 inches, Alphabetical.

Card, Guide, 3 by 5 inches

Card, Guide, 5 by 8 inches, Alphabetical.

Card, Guide, 5 by 8 inches

Clip, Paper, Gem No. 1

Clip, Paper, Ideal

Envelope, No. 189, Ungummed

Envelope No. 93, Ungummed

Fastener, Paper, Acco No. 12

File, Shannon, Large

File, Shannon, Small

Fingerprint Ink

Fingerprint Plate

Fingerprint Roller

Folder, File, Cap Size

Folder, File, Letter Size

Glue, K-Pint

Ink, Stamp Pad, Black

Ink, Stamp Pad, Red

Ink, Writing Fluid, Black

Ink, Writing Fluid, Red

Inkstand

Label, 1^6 by 1% inches

Label, 2% by 1%6 inches

Label, Poison, Small

Label, Veal, Small

Mimeograph, Hand

Mimeograph, Ink, Black

bar.

bar_

can_

bar.

pkgpkgPkgea_

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea_

ea.

pkgpkgset._

set_

set.

set

box

box

25

25

box

ea

ea

tube..

ea

ea

box

box

can

bottle,

bottlebottle,

bottle.

ea

box

box

book.,

book..

ea

lb

100

100

200

5

30

1,200

800

110

1,000

12

12

6

1

45

15

30

24

1

10

10

4

60

35

6

6

4

20

15

125

24

25

12

8

2

1

1

10

15

8

1

1

2

2

24

20

10

3

10

1

3

2,000

1,000

200

2,000

24

24

6

1

90

18

60

36

2

12

12

6

80

48

12

10

6

40

30

250

50

50

25

15

2

1

1

15

30

10

1

1

4

2

30

24

20

5

14

1

4
618 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

75830

75840

75850

75870

75900

75940

75950

75960

75980

76020

76030

76040

76060

76070

76080

76090

76100

76110

76120

76130

76150

76160

76200

76210

76220

76230

76240

76250

76270

76280

76290

76300

76310

76330

76370

76380

76400

76440

76480

76500

76510

76570

76580

Class 7—Continued

Mimeograph Pad

Mimeograph, Stencil

Mimeotype, Correction Fluid

Mucilage, 4 oz

Oil, Typewriter

Pad, Prescription

Pad, Memorandum, 3 by 5 inches,-.

Pad, Memorandum, 6 by 9 inches

Pad, Stamp, Dry

Paper, Blotting, 3 by 9}4 inches

Paper, Carbon, Black, 8 by 13

inches.

Paper, Carbon, Black, 8 by 10J£

inches.

Paper, Mimeograph, 8 by 10J^ inches

Paper, Mimeograph, 8 by 13 inches.

Paper, Typewriter, Bond, 8 by 13

inches.

Paper, Typewriter, Manifold, 8 by

13 inches.

Paper, Typewriter, Bond, 8 by 10J^

inches.

Paper, Typewriter, Manifold, 8 by

10J^ inches.

Paper, Wrapping, Dispensary, Blue..

Paper, Wrapping, Dispensary, White.

Paper, Wrapping, Folded

Paper, Wrapping, Roll

Pen, Steel, Ballpoint

Pen, Steel, Spencerian

Pen, Steel, Falcon.

Pen, Steel, Stub

Pencil

Pencil, Blue

Pencil, Indelible

Pencil, Red

Pencil, Wax, Blue

Pencil, Wax, Red

Penholder

Punch, Paper

Ribbon, Typewriter

Ribbon, Typewriter, Black and Red.

Ruler, 18-inch

Shears, Office

Stamp, Dating

Stamp, Outfit

Stamp, Penalty

Stencil Set

Tack, Thumb

ea

quire..

oz

bottle _

2 oz..

ea

ea

ea

ea

piece..

box

box.

ream.

ream.

ream.

quirequire,

quire,

roll...

gross.

gross.

gross.

gross.

doz...

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

set...

ea

set

box...

10

18

12

5

50

4

25

12

14

2

50

100

50

8

250

4

20

9

2

4

75

175

2

1

1

1

1

25

8

12

8

15

15

30

6

15

3

5

3

3

2

1

1

4

4

48

25

20

4

100

200

100

10

500

6

40

18

3

16

100

250

2

1

1

1

1

50

12

12

12

20

20

60

8

30

6

8

5

6

2

2

1
APPENDIX C 619

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

76600

76610

76620

76630

76640

76650

76680-10

76680-14

76700

77010

77020

77025

77050

77070

77080

77110

77120

77130

77150

77160

77170

77180

77205

77240

77245

77260

77280

77310

77340-10

77340-15

77345

77350

77360

77400

77410

77420

77430

77440

77450

77460

77500

77510

77550-05

77560

77563

77720

77760

Class 7—Continued

Tag, Shipping, Paper

Tape, Gummed Paper, %-mch.

Tape, Office, Red

Twine, Cotton

Twine, Jute, Coarse

Twine, Jute, Fine

Typewriter, 10-inch

Typewriter, 14-inch

Wax, Sealing

Apron, Rubberized

Atomizer, Hand

Atomizer, Hand, Rubber bulb..

Bag, Hot water .

Bag, Ice

Balance, Prescription

Basin, Hand

Basin, Operating Room

Basin, Pus

Basin, Sponge

Battery, Dry Cell; 96 for Item

78018, 36 for Item 99340.

Bedpan

Bell

Box, Cash

Box, Ointment, 3 in Nest

Box Opener

Box, Powder

Box, Tablet, Folding

Bucket, Enamelware

Button, Large

Button, Small

Button, Staple

Can, 5 gal

Can, Approx. 33 gal

Cane, Walking

Capsule, Size 00

Capsule, Size 0

Capsule, Size 1

Capsule, Size 2

Capsule, Size 3

Capsule, Size 4

Chest, Tool, Large

Chest, Tool, Small

Clothesline, Rope

Commode

Condenser, Universal (for use with

78333).

Cork Borer

Corkscrew

bundle.

roll

spool...

ball....

ball....

ball....

ea

ea

stick

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

doz..

ea

doz_.

500..

ea

gross,

gross.

ea_.

box.

box.

box.

box.

box.

box.

ea._

ea._

ft...

ea..

ea..

12

4

60

2

100

12

12

8

132

10

set.

ea_.

100

25

10

10

3

6

12

1

2

18

5

50

25

1

25

24

25

25

75

100

5

25

3

50

5

15

3

2

12

12

15

5

10

10

10

10

5

1

200

30

20

15

4

10

18

1

2

36

10

10

100

50

1

50

36

50

50

150

200

6

50

4

100

10

30

6

6

4

24

24

30

10

20

20

20

20

10

1

1

400

60

4

1

13
620 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no.

77780

77790

77830

77850-20

77855

77870

77890

77910-15

77930

77950

77990

78010

78050

78070

78090

78120

78150

78160

78180

78190

78192

78200-05

78220

78235

78236

78270

78320

78330

78333

78517

78555

78580

78590

78620

78650

78660

78680

78690

78710

78750

78760

78770

78780

Item

Class 7—Continued

Cup, Paper

Cup, Spit, Paper

Cushion, Rubber, Open Center

Cylinder, Nitrous Oxide, 2,000 gal.,

Filled.

Cylinder, Oxygen, 80 gal., Filled

Cylinder, Oxygen, 1,500 gal., Filled-,

Cylinder, Valve Adapter, High

Pressure.

Disinfeetor, Portable, 1942 Model...

Dispensing Set

Dropper, Medicine

File, 5-inch

Flashlight

Funnel, 6-inch

Glass, Medicine

Graduate, 10 cc

Graduate, 250 cc

Graduate, 1,000 cc

Grinder, Tool

Hatchet

Hone, Oil, 8 by 12 inches, Arkansas

stone.

Hone, Oil, 8 by 2 inches,

Carborundum

Hot Plate, Electric, 1-Burner, 110 V,

60 cycle, AC.

Irrigator

Jacket, Camisole

Jacket, Camisole, Small

Jar for Dressings

Lamp, Alcohol

Lamp, Alcohol, Wick

Lamp, Examining and Operating,

Portable.

Machine, Sewing, Foot Treadle Type

Matches, Safety

Mortar and Pestle, 10 CM

Mortar and Pestle, 20 CM

Needle, Common . Padlock, Large

Padlock, Small

Paper, Toilet

Paper, Toilet, Fixture

Percolator

Pill Tile, 10-inch

Pin, Common

Pin, Safety, Large

Pin, Safety, Medium

carton _

pkg—.

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea._

set..

doz_

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea._

ea_.

ea_.

ea..

ea..

ea._

ea_.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea

carton.

ea

ea

pkg—-

ea

ea

roll

ea

ea

ea

paper..

card

card

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

35

15

10

6

24

4

75

2

2

12

6

3

20

20

20

36

3

4

4

350

12

250

50

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

200

300

10

6

15

6

1

1

25

3

30

6

500

10

10

24

3

2

25

15

30

1

100

2

2

8

18

18

4,000

24

1

2

50

100

100

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

400

600

20

12

2

30

12

1

1

50

6

60

9

1,000

15

10

1

16

46

6

3

50

22

40

4

2

200

3

4

12

24

24

,000

48

6

2

100

200

200
APPENDIX C 621

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

78790

Class 7—Continued

Pin, Safety, Small card

ea

50

16

2

2

25

20

50

78800 Pitcher, Approx. 5-Qt . 40

78830 Pliers, Side Cutting ea

78840 Restraint Apparatus ea . _ 2

2

1

1

6

100

2

2

1

6

8

8

1

5

400

30

30

12

6

20

1

4

100

15

50

10

1

4

78905 Scale, Portable ea 3

78910 Scale, Prescription ea 1

78920 Scale, Prescription, Weights set 1

78970 Shears, Common ea 12

79000 Sheeting, Rubber _ yd 100

1

1

200

79020 Spatula, 3-inch Blade ea

79040 Spatula, 8-inch Blade ea 3

79100-05 Sterilizer, Hospital, Steam, 9A,

Complete.

Sterilizer Controls

ea . 2

79110 box 12

79230 Strap and Buckle, 3-ft. ea 12

79240 Strap and Buckle, 6-ft ea 12

79250 Suppository Mold ea 1

79290 Tape Measure, 60 inches . ea 3

200

6

6

10

79320 Thermometer, Clinical ea 864

79340-10 Thread, Cotton, Black spool

spool

ea

60

79340-40 Thread, Cotton, White. 60

79380 Trap, Mouse 24

79390 Trap, Rat _ ea 8

79400 Tray, Instrument, Approx. 15-inch

Truck, Warehouse . . _

ea 25 40

79410 ea 2

79430 Tub, Foot.. 4 8

79440 Urinal, Enamelware .. ea 180

79457 Vial, }i oz 30

79470 Vial, 2 oz . doz ..

doz

3

3

100

79500 Vial, 16 oz 20

79550 Wrench, Pipe 2

91030

Class 9

Bismuth Subcarbonate, USP, 5 Gr.

Tab.

Iodine, 15 Gr, and Potassium Iodide,

22.5 Gr, USP.

Morphine Tartrate, }i Gr. Solution...

Protein Silver, Mild, USP, 4^io Gr.

Tab.

Protein Silver, Strong, USP, 4%o

Gr. Tab.

Bandage, Gauze, Compressed, 3-inch_

Bandage, Plaster of Paris, 6-inch

Bandage, Triangular, Compressed

Dressing, First Aid, Large

bottle

box ..

box

bottle

bottle

box

doz

ea .

4

12

100

2

2

50

150

500

500

500

36

36

36

91110

91155

91190

91200

92010

92030

92040

92050 pkg

pkg

bag

bag

bag

92060 Dressing, First Aid, Small

92115 Pack, Abdominal, 8 by 36 inches, 30.

Pack, Abdominal, 11 by 12 inches, 80.

Pad, Surgical, 8 by 10 inches, 50.

92117

92119
622 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no.

92121

92123

92125

92127

93090

93100

93210

93250

93270

93290

93310

93320

93330

93335

93500

93510

93636

93640

93643

93652

93690

93707

93750

93770

93780

93795

94060

94095

95021

95025

95065

95095

96025

Item

Class 9—Continued

Pad, Surgical, 12 by 16 inches, 20-

Sponge, Surgical, 2 by 2 inches, 200

Sponge, Surgical, 4 by 4 i_ches, 500-_

Sponge, Surgical, 4 by 8 inches, 180-

Case, Post-Mortem, Complete

Case, Ward, Complete

Basic Instrument Set, Complete

(1942 Model).

Supplemental Instrument Set, Chest

Injuries, Complete (1942 Model).

Supplemental Instrument Set, Ear,

Nose and Throat Injuries, Complete (1942 Model).

Supplemental Instrument Set, Eye

Injuries, Complete (1942 Model).

Supplemental Instrument Set, Fractures and Amputations, Orthopedic, Complete (1942 Model).

Supplemental Instrument Set, Genitourinary Injuries, Complete.

Supplemental Instrument Set, Maxillofacial Injuries, Complete (1942

Model).

Supplemental Instrument Set,

Neurosurgical, Brain, and Nerve

Injuries, Complete (1942 Model).

Anesthesia Apparatus, Portable

Anesthesia Set, Complete

Kit, Eye Surgery

Oxygen Therapy Apparatus, Closed

Circuit.

Oxygen Therapy Outfit, with Manifold.

Reactor, Eye, Arruga

Scissors, Double Blunt, First Aid,

4-inch.

Shock Team Set, Complete

Splint, Wire Gauze

Suture, Silk, Braided, Non-Capillary,

3 sizes.

Tourniquet, Field

Tourniquet, Kirk

Burner, Alcohol, Bunsen Type

Chest, Laboratory, Field

Chair, Dental, Field

Chest, MD, No. 60

Kit, Dental, Maxillofacial

Teeth, Combination Set

X-ray Field Unit, Chest, Film,

X-ray.

Unit

bagbagea_.

ea_.

setset.

setset.

set_.

setset.

set.

ea_.

setea.

ea_

ea_

easet_.

roll.

Pkgea_

set.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

set.

ea_.

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

18

75

100

300

1

12

10

2

2

2

3

2

1

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

24

2

24

1

12

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

100
APPENDIX C 623

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

96055

96060

96085

96087

96090

96115

96117

96145

96175

96191

96208

97450

97455

97460

97535

97565

97570

97575

97625

97645

97757

97759

97775

97812

97814

97847

98748

99010

99010-10

99057

99060

99073

99075

99080

99090

99100

99110

99115

99120

99150

99155

99160-05

Class 9—Continued

X-ray Field Unit, Dryer and Loading Bin Combination.

X-ray Field Unit, Generator,

Gasoline, Electrical.

X-ray Field Unit, Machine, X-ray,

Mobile, Complete.

X-ray Field Unit, Tube Unit, Chest

MD X-3.

Chest, MD X-l

X-ray Field Unit, Processing Unit,

for Darkroom.

X-ray Field Unit, Processing Unit,

Auxiliary Wash Tank.

X-ray Field Unit, Table Unit

X-ray Field Unit, Tent, Darkroom..

X-ray Field Unit, Biplane Marker

and Reorientating Device.

X-ray Field Unit, Tube Adapter

Bedpans, Box of

Blanket set, Large .

Blanket set, Large, Case Empty

Chest, Field, Plain

Chest, MD, No. 1

Chest, MD, No. 2

Chest, MD, No. 4

Chest, Mess

Chest, Tableware

Gas Casualty Set, Complete

Gas Casualty Chest

Lantern Set

Pillow Case, Set

Sheet, Set

Towel Set, Bath

Towel Set, Hand

Acetylene Unit Cylinder, Filled

Acetylene Unit, Cylinder Filled,

Type B.

Bar, Insect, Field

Bar, Mosquito, Frame

Basket, Dish Sterilizing

Bed, Folding

Bed Frame, Gatch

Blanket, OD

Boiler, Steam

Book, Note, Manifolding, Binder

Book, Note, Manifolding, Filler

Bowl, Sugar, Enamelware

Cabinet, Instrument, Field

Cabinet, Medicine, Field

Cap, Operating, Large

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea..

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea..

set..

ea_.

ea..

ea..

ea..

ea_.

ea..

ea..

ea_.

ea.

pr.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

6

60

10

2

2

2

4

4

2

2

8

2

15

20

14

400

50

12

500

2

500

25

,500

1

6

12

60

4

6

10

1

24

1,000

1,000

6

1,000

50

3,000

2

12

25

110

6

12

25
624 MEDIOAL SUPPLY

Item no. Item

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

99160-10

99165

99175

99185

99195

99200

99205

99215

99220

99235

99245

99270

99275

99285

99305

99315

99317

99340

99345

99376

99386

99387

99388

99400

99410

99415

99445

99465

99490

99500-28

99523

99535

99540

99550

99555

99560

99565

99570

99575

99580

99600-03

99617

99630

B000010

B000012

Class 9—Continued

Cap, Operating, Medium

Carriage, Dressing, Knocked down..

Carrier, Field, Collapsible

Chair, Common, Folding

Corks, Assorted, 300

Corkscrew, Folding

Cot, Folding, Canvas

Cup, Enamelware

Cup, Feeding, Enamelware

Dish, Meat, Small, Enamelware

Dish, Vegetable, Enamelware

Graduate, 60 cc

Graduate, 550 cc

Hone, Oil, 3}i inch

Irrigation Stand, Folding

Lamp, Operating, Field

Lamp, Operating, Field, Generator,

Gasoline.

Lantern, Electric

Lantern, Electric, Lamp

Litter, Steel Pole

Litter, Securing Strap

Machine, Imprinting

Machine, Imprinting, Ribbon

Mortar and Pestle, 7 CM

Pad, Heat, Complete

Pad, Heat, Refill

Pill Tile, 5-lnch, Bakelite

Plate, Dinner, Enamelware

Saucer, Enamelware

Sterilizer, Dressing and Utensil, for

use with Leaded Gasoline.

Sterilizer, Instrument, 20-inch

Sterilizer, Instrument, 12-inch

Sterilizer, Instrument, 9%-inch

Stove, 1-Burner, Gasoline

Stove, 2-Burner, Gasoline

Table, Bath

Table, Bedside, Folding

Table, Dining, Folding

Table, Instrument, Folding

Table, Operating, Folding

Unit, Power, Electric, 3-Kilowatt

Washing Machine, Wringer Type

Wire, Galvanized Iron, No. 14

Medical Books, Title

Anatomy Text

Manual of Surgical Anatomy

ea_.

ea_.

ea..

ea..

bag.

ea_.

ea_.

ea._

ea__

ea..

ea_-

ea..

ea_.

ea_.

ea_.

ea..

ea..

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ft..

50

3

3

25

2

3

400

100

15

30

60

48

4

2

2

. 50

100

1

ea.

ea.

10

6

6

14

2

12

8

3

50

40

7

6

150

5

500

25

90

150

2

15

10

2

18

25

20

600

500

2

50

20

6

3

2

2

75

14

10

300

10

1,000

50

165

300

6

30

16

2

30

12

50

40

1,200

1,000

2

10

12

12

18

100

40

12

4

3

3
APPENDIX C 625

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

B000020

Medical Books, Title—Continued

Bacteriology Text ea 1 1

1

1

1

B000021 Practical Bacteriology, Hematology,

and Animal Parasitology.

Cardiology Text

ea

B000030 ea

B000032 Nomenclature and Criteria for

Diagnosis of Diseases of the Heart.

Electrocardiology Text

ea

B000033 ea

B000040 Dental Surgery Text ea ._

B000050 Dispensatory Text ea

B000060 Dermatology Text. ea

B000061 Manual of Dermatology. _ ea 1

B000070 Dictionary, Webster, Medium

Ear, Nose, and Throat Text

ea

B000080 ea

B000090 Eye Manual ea .

B000091 Surgical Ophthalmology ea ._

B000100 Genitourinary Text ea

B000110 Internal Medicine Text ea .

B000120 Neurology Text _ ea

B000121 Neuropsychiatry Text _ ea

B000122 Neurosurgery Text. _. . ea.

B000130 Laboratory Manual ea

B000131 Manual of Dehydrated Culture—

Media.

Medical Dictionary, Small..

ea

B000140 ea

B000150 Pathology Text ea

B000160 Pharmacy Text. ea 1

B000161 Useful Drugs ea 1

B000162 U.S. Pharmacopoeia (12th Edition,

1942).

Surgery Text ..

ea

B000170 1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

B000171 Infections of the Hand. ea

B000172 Field Surgery in Total War ea

B000173 Modern Surgical Technic ea

B000174 Amputations . ea .

B000175 Surgery of Modern Warfare set

B000180 Manual on Plastic and Maxillofacial

Surgery.

Manual on Ophthalmology and

Otolaryngology.

Manual on Abdominal and Genitourinary Injuries.

Manual on Orthopedic Subjects

Manual on Burns, Shocks, Wound

Healing, and Vascular Injuries.

Manual on Thoracic Surgery, Neurosurgery and Peripheral Nerve

Injuries. J

Orthopedic Text !

ea

B000181 ea

B000182 ea

B000183 ea

B000184 ea .

B000185 ea

BOO0190 ea

B000191 Handbook of Orthopedic Surgery ;
626 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

1,000-bed)

B000192

B000194

B000200

B000240

B000250

B000260

B000270

B000271

B000290

B000300

B000301

B000310

B000380

B000381

B000382

B000383

B000384

B000385

B000386

B000387

B000388

B000389

B000390

B000391

16 B

16 C

16 D

21

49

51

52

52 A

52 B

52 C

52 D

53

54

55 A

Medical Books, Title—Continued

The Foot and Ankle

Outline of the Treatment of Fractures.

X-Ray Manual —

Military Preventive Medicine

Treatment Text

Nutritional Deficiencies

Anesthesia Text

Clinical Anesthesia

Gonorrhea in the Male and Female.

Tropical Medicine

Diseases, Tropical and Subtropical. .

Medical Manual of Chemical Warfare

Emotional Hygiene

Social Customs

Principles of Ethics

Introduction to the Principles of

Nursing Care.

Nurses' Handbook of Obstetrics

Surgical Nursing

Physiology and Anatomy

Lippincott's Quick Reference Book

for Nurses.

Essentials of Medicine

Materia Medica; Pharmacology and

Therapeutics.

Essentials of Nursing

Emergency Care

Blank Forms

Issue Slip, Nonexpendable Medical

Property.

Credit Slip, Nonexpendable Medical

Property.

Exchange Slip, Nonexpendable

Medical Property.

Hospital Laundry List

Statement of the Hospital Fund

Report Sheet for Report of Sick and

Wounded.

Register Card

Index Record of Patients (Card)

Emergency Medical Book Tab (20 in

duplicate).

Field Medical Card

Field Medical Record Jacket

Clearing Station Tag

Surgeon's Request for Service Record.

Clinical Record, Brief

ea_

ea.

ea_

ea_

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

20

1,000

500

250

100

25

25

4,000

2,000

500

500

100

25

25

12,000

8,000

200

5,000

5,000

5,000

6,000

6,000

12, 000

12, 000

500

6, 000

1,000

12, 000
APPENDIX C 627

Item no. Item

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

hospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

55 B

55 C-l

55 C-2

55 D

55 E-l

55 E-2

55 E-3

55 E-4

55 E-5

55 E-6

55 E-7

55 F

55 G-l

55 H-l

55 H-2

55 J

55 K--1

55 K--2

55 L

55 L--1

55 L--2

55 L--3

55 L--4

55 L--5

55 L--6

55 L--7

55 L--8

55 L--9

55 ][>-]10

55 L-ll

Blank Forms—Continued

Clinical Record, Chief Complaint,

Condition on Admission, Previous

Personal History.

Clinical Record, Physical Examination.

Clinical Record, Special Examination or Additional Data

Clinical Record, Initial Summary,

Working Diagnosis, Contemplated

Laboratory Tests and Consultations.

Clinical Record, Consultation Request and Report.

Clinical Record, Ophthalmologic

Examination.

Clinical Record, Ear, Nose and

Throat Examination.

Clinical Record, Dental Examination

Clinical Record, Dental Record

Clinical Record, Proctoscopic Examination.

Clinical Record, Urologie Examination.

Clinical Record, Progress Notes ..

Clinical Record, Treatment

Clinical Record, Temperature, Treatment Nurse's Notes.

Clinical Record, Temperature

Graphic Chart.

Clinical Record, Electrocardiograph« Report.

Clinical Record, Radiologie Record.

Clinical Record, Radiologie Report..

Clinical Record, Laboratory Reports

Clinical Record, Blood

Clinical Record, Blood (Chemistry).

Clinical Record, Serology

Clinical Record, Spinal Fluid

Clinical Record, Urinalysis

Clinical Record, Urinalysis (Quantitative) .

Clinical Record, Sputum

Clinical Record, Gastric Analysis

Clinical Record, Feces

Clinical Record, Carbohydrate

Tolerance.

Clinical Record, Rental Functions

(Cone, or Dil.).

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

3,000

3,000

1,000

3,000

500

1,000

500

100

1,000

100

500

6,000

5,000

6,000

1,000

1,000

4,000

3,000

3,000

500

3,000

200

6,000

400

400

200

2,000

200

200

6,000

6,000

•2, 000

6,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

200

2,000

200

1,000

12, 000

10, 000

12, 000

2,000

100

2,000

8,000

6,000

6,000

1,000

6,000

400

12, 000

800

800

400

4,000

400

400
628 MEDICAL SUPPLY

Item no. Item Unit

Evacuation

hospital

(400-bed)

Station

1 ospital

(500-bed)

General

hospital

(1,000-bed)

55 L-12

55 L-14

55 L-15

55 M

55 N

55 0-1

55 0-2

55 P

57

64

72

72 A

73

74

75

76

78

79

81

85

85 A

86 AB

86 C

97

Blank Forms—Continued

Clinical Record, Renal Function

(P.S.P.).

Clinical Record, Basal Metabolism

Clinical Record, Miscellaneous

Clinical Record, Pathological Examination of Tissues.

Clinical Record, PhysiotherapyRecord.

Clinical Record, Preoperative Examination and Anesthetic Record.

Clinical Record, Operation Report

Clinical Record, Fracture Record

Report of Dental Service

Morning Report, Army Nurse

Corps.

Morning Report of Ward

Consolidated Morning Report of

Ward.

Diet Slip

Mess Account

Patient's Property Card

Patient's Property Tag

Syphilitic Register

Register of Dental Patients (Card)..

Immunization Register

Vital Statistics Chart

Vital Statistics Chart (Small)

Statistical Report, First and Second

Sections.

Statistical Report, Third Section

(Personnel and Transportation).

Record of Serological Reactions for

Syphilis.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea.

ea.

ea_

ea_

500

100

20

5,000

5,000

100

100

25

25

50

20

200

2,000

100

100

400

400

400

25

100

500

100

500

25

1,500

1,500

250

1,000

1,000

30

30

50

50

500

400

100

4,000

200

200

800

800

800

25

200

2,000

400

1,000

25

3,000

3,000

500

2,000

2,000

60

60

50

50

1,000
INDEX

Aachen, 362

AAF. See Army Air Forces.

Accra, 202

Acrylic eye(s):

dental officers trained in construction of,

304

development of, 561

Adak, 428, 461

Adelaide, 411, 412

Adjutant General, The, 7, 8, 105, 114, 304

Administration Division, New York Procurement Office, 41

Adriatic, 249

Adriatic Depot, 230-231, 253

ADSEC. See Advance Section.

Advance Depot Platoon(s):

of Medical Depot Company(ies):

1st—229, 307

4th—196

31st—307, 312

32d—311

of Medical Supply Depot:

7th—198, 514

Advance General Depot(s):

at Benghasi, 196

at Chäbua, 513

Advance Platoon (s) of Medical Depot

Company(ies):

16th—365

30th—312

31st—344

46th—359

Advance Section, Communications Zone,

ETOUSA, 320, 328, 329, 355, 369

headquarters of, 284

position of, 312-313

surgeon of, 287, 313

Advance Section No. 2 (Chäbua), 522

AFHQ. See Allied Forces Headquarters.

AFPAC. See U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific.

Africa, 27, 266

Africa-Middle East theater, 194-202

levels of supply in, 197-198

medical supply in, 196-197

Afrika Korps, 214

AFWESPAC. See Army Forces, Western

Pacific.

Agusan, 504

Ahwaz, 198

Ain M'Lila, 216, 223

Air Corps, 52, 251

Air Force(s):

Ninth, 195, 196

Fourteenth, 513, 527

Air Service Centers, 513

Air Service Command, 516, 517, 528

Ninth, 196

Air shipments of—

medical supplies, 301

penicillin, 152

whole blood, 152, 341

Air Surgeon, 74, 298

Air Transport Command, 24, 152, 185, 190,

513

Airborne Division (s):

11th—485

82d—307

101st—307, 329

Airlifts into Germany, 370

Aitape, 448, 450

Aitutaki, 421, 426, 437

Alamo Force, 447, 451, 452, 453

Alaska, 145, 147, 465

dispersion of supplies in, 429

medical supply activities in, during defense

period, 427-430

optical program in, 430

prewar expansion of U.S. forces in, 427-

428

storage of medical supplies in, 428-429

Alaskan Defense Command, 461

medical service of, 428

surgeon of, 465

Alaskan garrison, 1943-44—464-467

Alaskan theater:

deemphasis and closing down of, 467

lack of medical supply depot in, 429-430

levels of supply in, 465

supply procedures in, 465

Aldekerk, 362

Alden, 486, 487

Aleutian Islands, 145

Aleutian Islands Campaign, 459-463

Aleutians, 30, 459, 467

Algeria, 204, 221, 223

Algiers, 203, 204, 208, 214, 216, 223

Allied Armies, 317, 364

Allied Command, SPA, 431

Allied Control Commission, AMGOT, 262

629
630 INDEX

Allied Forces Headquarters, 232 Arctic Circle, 180

G-5 section established in, 264 Ardennes, 330, 353

Military Government Section of, 260 Aries, 382

Allied Military Government, 556 Arlon, 334

role of, 260-263 Armed Forces of the United States, 56, 68,

Allied Military Government of Occupied 537

Territory, 260 Armies:

Medical Supply Branch of, 262-263 Brazilian, 193

Allied Nations, 383 British First, 205

Aluminum litters, 561 British Eighth, 203, 249

Amapä, 192, 193 Chinese, 507, 515, 521, 526

American Division, 427, 431, 467, 503, 504 First French, 332, 368

American Medical Supply System, 508 French, 211, 246

American Military Mission to China, 507 See also U.S. Army.

American Optical Co., 76, 77, 78, 194, 430 Armored Corps, 1st—221

American prisoners of war, airdrops to, 549 Armored Division, 1st—221

American Red Cross, 26, 55, 64, 65, 67, 75, ARMSTRONG, Col. GEORGE E., 526, 528

152, 170, 394 Army Air Forces, 105, 231, 414, 462, 522, 588

blood program of, 24 dispensaries at bases of, 298

Hawaii Chapter of, 393 hospitalization of personnel of, 298

in World War 1—63 in eastern India, 513

role of, 24-25 issue of spectacles to personnel of, 303

surgical dressing program of, 24-25 medical supply, 513

AMGOT. See Allied Military Government of medical supply officer, 515

Occupied Territory. supply to units of, 298

"Amphibious box," 123 Army Air Forces Service Command, Medical

Amputees, prostheses for, 94 Section of, 231

AMSPACHER, Lt. Col. WILLIAM H, 277 Army and Navy Munitions Board, 15, 47,

Anchorage, 427 49, 51

Anfa Hotel, 221 Army Blood Bank, 496

Angaur, 475 Army Forces, Western Pacific, 551, 554, 556

Angaur Island, 476 establishment of, 540

Annette Island, 464 Medical Supply Division of, 555

"Annex H Medical Maintenance Unit, Ten Supply Service of, 557

Thousand Men, 30 days," 477 Army Garrison Force, 475

Antilles Department, 185, 189, 190 Army Garrison Force Depot, supply activiAntilles General Depot(s): ties of, 475

No. 1, Puerto Rico, 190 Army Group (s):

No. 2, Trinidad, 190 6th—244, 383

Sub-Depot, 190 12th—376

Antimalarial drugs: 15th—262

shortage of, 400 Army Industrial College, 7, 10

supply of, 511-512 Army Medical Bulletin, 294

See also Atabrine; Quinine. Army Medical Department, 24

Antityphus supplies in Germany, 378 Army Medical Purchasing Office, 20, 21, 22,

Antwerp, 321, 329, 337, 367 23, 39, 41, 42, 59, 60, 70, 90, 97, 98,

Anzio, 233, 234, 235, 242 115, 117, 130, 163

Anzio-Albano road, 233 Packaging and Packing Section of, 120,

Anzio beachhead, 235 127

Anzio operation, 231-235 Production Service Branch of, 55

Aparri, 499 Army Medical Supply System, 558

Arawe, Operation DEXTERITY for at- Army-Navy exchange units, 293-294

tack on, 447 Army-Navy Medical Procurement Office,

ARC. See American Red Cross. 104, 116

Arcadia Conference, 203 Army personnel, issue of spectacles to, 303
INDEX 631

Army Regulations No. 40-1705—75

Army Service Forces, 18, 23, 76, 103, 111,

115, 143

commanding general of, 104

Deputy Director of Training of, 106

headquarters, 126, 141

subordinate elements of:

Distribution Division, 148

International Division, 157, 159, 160,

161, 162, 163, 164

Maintenance Division, 104

Production Division, 164

Production Scheduling Branch of the

Materiel Office, 162

Army Service Forces Circular No. 67—39-40

Army Service Forces Depot Course, 23

Army Service Forces Manual 406, December

1943—120, 127

Army Service Forces Materiel Demobilization Plan, 26

Army Supply Program, 14, 27, 37, 39, 40,

159, 162, 164

role of, 35-36

ARNEST, Col. RICHABD T., 221

Arno River, 249

Arsenal Reservation, 103

Artificial eye program, 87-89

Artificial eyes, 259, 303-304

Artificial limbs, 95, 96

Arzew, 206

ASBILL, Lt. Col. STEPHEN G., 419, 438, 531,

552

Ascension Island, 193

ASF. See Army Service Forces.

Asiatic theater, 27

Aspremont, 243

Assault vest and maintenance units, 293

Assembly Area Command, ETOUSA, 368,

379, 380

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4—146, 407

Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply and

Evacuation, G-4—421

Assistant Secretary of War, 1, 4, 6, 9

Atabrine, 31, 73-75, 227, 401, 483, 485, 559

production of, 74, 75

requirements for, 74, 75

shortage of, 400, 401, 443, 444, 450, 509

ATC. See Air Transport Command.

Atlantic Base Section, 209-210, 216, 219,

251, 264

Atlantic Branch Medical Depot, 186, 189

Attu, 461, 464

planning the assault on, 459-460

supply operations on, 460

Attu Campaign, 562

295-453 0-68—42

Attu landings, supply support of, 460

Attu operation, 461

Auckland, 420, 421, 422, 424, 437

Aumetz, 329, 330

Aural rehabilitation centers, 89, 90

Australia, 167, 195, 401, 431, 439, 441, 442,

444, 554

buildup in, 411-420

base section organization, 411-412

early medical supply depot operations,

419-420

medical supply organization, 412

medical supply problems during, 412-

417

medical supply activities in, 1941-42—

402-411

arrival of medical supply depot personnel, 406

changing mission concepts, 402

early Medical Department activities,

402-403

early organization, 402

medical organization, 403-404

organization for medical supply, 406-

411

medical supply objectives, 407

medical supply progress, 409-411

theater medical supply, 407-409

relief for the Philippines, 404-406

reorganization of headquarters, 406

Austria, 386, 389

AVALANCHE, plan for Salerno invasion,

227

Avellino, 229

Avranches, 322, 375

Axis, the, 155

Azores, 145

Bad Mergentheim, 388

Balanced Medical Depot Stock listing, 147

Bagnoli, 230, 233, 241, 242

Bahia, 193

Bari, 230, 239, 263

BARTON, Capt. LELAND H., 459

Base Depot Company, 72d—252

Base K (Leyte), 490, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506,

531, 538, 557

Base K Medical Depot, 493

Base M (San Fernando), 538, 552

Base Optical Shop. See ETOUSA Base

Optical Shop.

Base R (Batangas), 538

Base S (Cebu), 504, 538

Base X (Manila), 499, 538, 542, 543, 547

Base maintenance shop on the Continent, 344
632 INDEX

Base section medical supply, 243 Blood, 308, 309

establishment of, 209-213 refrigeration of, 152, 486

Base Section No. 2 (Calcutta), 522 shipment of, 152-153

Base section organization for supply supply of, on Okinawa, 536

activities: Blood bank, development of, 561

in Australia, 411-412 Blood bank detachments, 348-349

in U.K. Base, 350 Blood plasma, 41, 44, 46, 63, 67-68, 152, 203,

"Basic Plan for Redeployment," 379 221, 227, 426, 561

Basse-Wavre, 337, 353 Blood plasma processing plants, 55

Bastogne, 329, 330, 335, 336, 341, 358 Blood plasma program, 24, 44

Bataan, 30, 31, 399, 400, 401, 494 Bluie West No. 1—180

defense of, 32 Bluie West No. 8—180

fall of, 406 BOHLENDER, Col. JOHN F., 454

Bataan campaign, 147 Bohol Island, 503

Bataan-Mariveles Road, 400 BOLERO:

Batangas (Batangas Province), 499 development of, 266

BATES, Lt. HAROLD A., 485 plans for medical care under, 266

Battle of Leyte Gulf, 487 Bologna, 253

Battle of the Bulge, 327, 328, 329, 335, 336, Bomber Command, VIII—265

337, 341 Bone, 216

Battle of the Coral Sea, 411 Bonn, 364, 369

BAUMANN, Lt. Col. CHARLES, 104 Books, professional, procurement of, 96-98"

Baume, 243 BOOM, code for ships carrying medical

Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 76, 77, 78 supplies for Operation OLYMPIC, 538

Bayombong, 499 Bora Bora, 399, 421, 426

BEASLEY, Col. CHARLES H., 313 Boston Port of Embarkation, 144, 145, 178,

BEERS, Lt. Col. LEONARD H., 280, 283, 285 180, 182, 339

Belem, 191, 192, 193 Boston Quartermaster Depot, 94

Belfast, 265, 271 Boston Supply Depot, 184

Belgium, 316, 317, 319, 328-329, 334, 335, Bougainville, 432, 437, 467

336, 337, 365, 376, 380 Bougainville campaign, 467-468

Belgium-Netherlands front, 335 planning of, 467

BELL, Maj. WILLIAM A., 145 supply of replacement units in, 467-468

Ben Hall Farm, 265 Boy Scouts of America, 61

Brand, 353, 361 Benghasi, 196 Brazil, 191, 192, 194

Berlin, 383, 388, 389 Brazilian Armed Forces, 191

Berlin Enclave, 386 Brazilian Army, 193

Berlin Medical Depot, 386 BREENE, Brig. Gen. ROBERT G., 421, 422

Bermuda Base Command, 178-179 Bremen, 383

Besneville, 320 Bremen Enclave, 386

Bevenson, 362 Bremen Medical Depot, 385, 387

Biak, 442, 450 Bremerhaven, 385, 387

Bidders' List, 4, 13, 14, 40 Brest, 320, 334

Bingen, 359 Brest mission, 334

BRETT, Maj. Gen. GEORGE H., 402 Binghamton, 87, 153 Bricquebec, 311, 319

Binghamton Medical Depot, 85, 86, 87, 113 Brisbane, 402, 406, 408, 411, 412, 419, 438,

Bitsburg, 358 441, 442, 450, 479

Bizerte, 216, 218 Brisbane Depot, 439

BLACK, Col. ROBERT L., 350, 372, 386 Brisbane Harbor, 410

BLACKLIST, 542 Bristol, 273, 274, 280, 284, 297

in occupation of Japan, 549-554 Britain, 173

Blackpool, 303, 344 British-American catalog, 269

BLAIR, Lt. Col. JOHN D., 405, 455 British CAD (Civil Affairs Drug) units, 388
INDEX 633

British Eighth Army, 203, 249

British First Army, 205

British Guiana, 190, 191

British Guiana Base Command, 190

British Isles, 150, 151

buildup of a U.S. Air Force in, 265

British Ministry of Pensions, 304

British Ministry of Supply, 374

British Ministry of Supply Mission, 162

British Ministry of War, 266

British War Office, 266

Brittany, 320, 348, 349

Brooklyn Port of Embarkation, 173

Brussels, 329

Budget Office, War Department, 12

BULLIS, Maj. STANLEY W., 531

Bulge, Battle of the, 327, 328, 329, 335, 336,

337, 341

Buna, 451, 479

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy

Department, 2

Burgdorf, 362

Burgeoning depot system, in First U.S.

Army, 311-316

Burma, 507, 508, 509, 515, 516, 523, 526,

527, 528, 561

Burma Campaign of 1942—509

Burma Road, 159, 527

Burma-Yunnan Railway, 156

Butler Brothers, 23

Cabcaben dock, 401

Caen, 376

Cagayan Valley, 499

Cairns, 441

Calais, 382

Calcutta, 507, 511, 513, 514, 516, 517, 523,

524, 526, 528, 529

Caltanissetta, 260

Calvi Risorta, 229, 235

Camouflage dressings, 65

Camp(s):

Blanding, 194

Columbia, 450

Ontario, 183

Russell B. Huckstep, 196

Campaign (s):

Aleutian Islands, 459-463, 471

Attu, 562

Bataan, 147, 400

Bougainville, 467-468

Emwetok, 472

European, 150

Guadalcanal, 561

Guam, 490

Italian, 254, 275

Campaign (s)—Continued

Leyte, 534

Luzon, 493

Marshalls, 471-472

New Georgia, 456-458, 467

New Guinea, 438-450

North African, 152, 211, 221, 275, 277, 562

Okinawa, 562

Palau, 476

Philippine Islands, 38, 483-506, 562

Po Valley, 253

Rome-Arno, 235-242

Sicily, 223-227, 260, 295, 562

Southern France, 242-249

Tinian, 475

Tunisia, 214-219, 227, 258

Canada, 179-180

bases located in, 179

medical facilities in, 179

problem of surpluses in, 180

Canadian Infantry Brigade, 13th—461

Canal Zone, 185, 186

Canton Island, 393, 399, 468

Cape Cretin, 448

Cape Gloucester, Operation DEXTERITY

for attack on, 447

Cape Sudest, 447

Captured materiel, distribution of, 377-378

Captured materiel depot, establishment of,

376

Captured materiel program, 376-378

Cardiff, 297

Carentan, 313, 325, 365

Cargo Priority System, 148

Cargo Supply Group, 11th—498

Caribbean Area, 202

Caribbean Defense Command, 185-191

medical supply functions of, 185

organization for medical supply in, 185

CARILIA, Maj. THOMAS A., 313

Carinola, 235

Carlisle Barracks, 66, 388

Carlsbourg, 336

Carmarthen, 299

CAEOW, Lt. Col. THEODORE M., 145

CARROLL, Brig. Gen. PERCY J., 402, 403, 405,

414

Casablanca, 203, 204, 209, 210, 221, 251

Caserta, 229, 242

CASEY, Lt. Col. ELMER B. M., 207

Castle Harbour Hotel, 178

Catalogs, 114-117

Cavalry Division (s):

1st—486, 552

113th—362
634 INDEX

CBI. See China-Burma-India Theater. Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA—Continued

Cebu, 32, 400, 401, 503, 504 plan of, for redeployment of medical units,.

Ceoina, 235 379

Center Task Force, 204, 206-208, 211 recommendations of, on medical supplies,

Central Africa, 202 337

Central Canada. See Canada. responsibility of, for medical supply acCentral Europe, 368 tions, 288, 380

Central Medical Depot, 264 system of equipment maintenance inCentral Pacific Area, 468-478, 485 augurated by, 369

Central Pacific Base Command, 472, 477, visit of, to Continent, 310

478, 480 See also HAWLEY, Maj. Gen. PAUL R.

surgeon of, 479 Chief Surgeon, Fifteenth U.S. Army, 364

Central Service System, 142-143 Chief Surgeon, Services of Supply, 511

Central stock control, 138-140 Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 266, 277,

Central Visayan operations, supply support 281, 284, 285, 287, 296, 297, 298, 299,

for, 501 300, 313

Chäbua, 511, 513, 514, 515, 517, 523, 524, establishment of, in Paris, 314

526, 528, 529 instructions of, on penicillin, 302

medical supplies at, 521 medical depot manual published by, 285

Channel Base Section, 329 stock reports consolidated in, 282

Charleston Port of Embarkation, 144, 196 subordinate elements of:

Charters Towers, 441 Administration and Finance Branch, 283

Chartres, 320 Depot Technical Branch, 283

Chäteau-Salins, 331 Issue Branch, 283

Chef Du Pont, 312, 320, 325, 365 Stock Control Branch, 283

Cheltenham, 265, 266, 267, 280, 283, 284, Supply Division, 265, 266, 283, 284, 288,

285, 310, 313 295

Chemical "Warfare Corps, 155 China, 158, 159, 161, 507, 508, 511, 512, 513,

Cherbourg, 312, 313, 320, 321, 339, 375 515, 521, 526, 527, 528, 529, 561

Chicago Quartermaster Depot, 2, 97 China-Burma-India Theater, 507-529

Medical Section of, 96 background of, 507

Chief(s): beginnings of medical supply activities in,

Depot Technical Control Branch, 284 507-509

Inventory Control Branch, Army Medical failure of British supply in, 515

Purchasing Office, 90 growth of medical supply in, 509-515

Issue Branch, SGO, 280 improved procedures in supply system of,

Medical Supply Depots, Allied Control 524-526

Commission, 262 major accomplishments of 1944 in, 526

Medical Supply Division, U.S. Army Serv- medical supply during 1944 in, 515-521

ice Command, 552 progress in 1945 in, 527-529

Stock Control Branch, SGO, 280 realinement of depots in, 523-524

Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, shipment of medical maintenance units to,

ETOUSA, 369 512-513

Supply Division, Surgeon's Office, USASOS, Voorhees mission in, 522-524

444 China Theater, 526

Supply Service, 19, 20, 21, 91, 104 curtailment of supply program in, 529

stocks for, 528

Chief Medical Officer, Pan American Air- supply program for, 527

ways, 195 surgeon of, 528

Chief of Transportation, 340 Chinese Army, 507

Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 267, 269, 287, 297, in India, 515, 521

300, 317, 355 supplies for, 526

establishes Finance and Supply Division, Chinese Army, 507

265 in India, 515, 521

instructions of, on artificial eyes, 304 supplies for, 526
INDEX 635

Chinese Forces, support of, 511 Committee (s):

Chinese Medical Service, 507 Defense Aid Requirements, 155

Chinese supply program, changes in, 526 Medical Defense Aid Requirements, 155

Chinese supply system, development of, Commonwealth of the Philippines Govern528-529 ment, 555

Chinese troops in India, supply support for, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, 287 315,

520-521 359

Chinese Y-Force, 527, 528 buildup of hospitals in, 326

Chinese Z-Force, 527, 528 chief of medical services for, 28

Christmas Island, 393, 399, 468 commanding general of, 371

CHRONICLE, 452 consolidated with SOLOC, 368

Ciney, 328 Communications Zone, Mediterranean theaCivil Affairs, 388-389 ter, 250, 332

Civil Affairs Division units, 260, 262, 263 Communications Zone, NATOUSA, 245, 246

Civil Affairs medical supply, 375-378 surgeon of, 239

Civil Affairs/Military Government, 364 CONAD. See Continental Advance Section.

Civilian aid, 555-556 Congress, 1, 9, 13, 14, 19, 60

Civilian Air Program for Allied Military Consolidated Stock Report, 38, 164

Government group, 566 Constantine, 216

Civilian Conservation Corps, 103 Constantine-Tebassa area, 215

Civilian Medical Depot, Mediterranean Continent, the, 28, 29, 153, 227, 266, 281,

theater, 264 284, 289, 293, 297, 299, 300, 305, 308,

Civilian Relief in Liberated Areas, 26 313, 314, 341, 342, 343, 350, 351, 364,

Civitavecchia, 235, 242 365, 367, 369, 371, 372, 380, 387

CLARK, Lt. Col. LYMAN J., 335 Air Forces medical requirements on, 287

Clark Field, 400 air shipments of whole blood to, 301

station hospitals at, 30 balancing of depot stocks on, 316

Clearing Company, 656th—504 base maintenance shop on, 344

CMP. See Controlled Materials Plan. control of depot operations on, 317

Coast Guard, 190 critical medical supplies airlifted to, 301

Coastal Base Section, 242 daily shipment of penicillin to, 302

Cocaine, 9 depots on, 315

Cold Bay, 460 early supply problems on, 321-322

Colleville, 311 expansion of depot operations on, 317-325

Columbia Gas and Electric Corp., 19, 559 first medical depot set up on, 320

Columbus Quartermaster Depot, 103 forward depots on, 326-337

Combat areas, logistical support of, 27-32 combat operations of, 329-337

Combat operations in Europe, 307-378 in Belgium, 328-329

Combat Zone, level of supplies for, 244 in France, 326-328

Combined Air Transport Operations Room, lack of storage facilities on, 324

310 maintenance sections on, 348

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 260, 375 medical depot sites on, 317

Commander, 7th Division Medical Battal- medical supply problems on, 316

ion, 459 medical tonnage allocation on, 292

Commander, USAFFE, 399 mobile optical units on, 345

Commander in Chief, Pacific, 459 mobility of supply operations on, 317-319

Commander in Chief, USAFPAC, 536 movement of unit assembly on, 339 Commanding General(s):

ASF, 26, 104 outgoing shipments to, 352

Communications Zone, ETOUSA, 371 plans for base optical shop on, 303

First U.S. Army, 277 plans for invasion of, 275

Force 343-222 port facilities on, 61-63

X Corps, 504 procurement on, 316

USASOS, Pacific, 455 trucking problems on, 63

Western Defense Command, 459 See also European theater.
636 INDEX

Continental Advance Section, 242, 244, 245,

246, 247, 382, 383

Continental Base Section, 242

personnel of, 243

Contract Settlement Act of 1944—60

Contract Termination, Army Medical Purchasing Office, 60

Contractors:

aid to, by Medical Department procurement officers, 55-56

payments to, 44-45

Contracts:

adjustment of, 54

negotiation of, 40-42

renegotiation of, 43-44

termination of, 60-62

Controlled Materials Plan:

aid to contractors, 55

adjustment of contracts, 54-56

duties of procurement officer, 54

key materials allocated among approved

programs, 53

scheduling production, 53, 54

Convenience, Inc., 65

Cook Islands, 421

COOKE, Lt. Col. JOSEPH C, 239

COOPER, Col. WIBB E., 30

Coral Sea, Battle of the, 411

CORONET, 540, 549

medical supplies for, 538

plan for assault on Honshu, 537

Corozal, 186

Corozal General Depot, 186, 189

Corps:

1—495, 496, 497, 552

11—204, 214, 218, 221

III—330

VI—231, 240, 242

VII—368

VIII—330, 362

X—483, 486, 504

XI—497

XII—320, 330

XIII—362

XIV—456, 457, 458, 495, 499

XV—320

XVI—362

XVIII—355

XIX—362

XX—320, 329, 330

XXIV—483, 485, 486, 496, 531, 532, 533,

536, 554

Corps Area Headquarters, 17

Corps Area surgeons, 133

Corps Areas, 105

Corps of Engineers, 173, 325

Corregidor, 31, 32, 401, 494

Corsica, 252

Contentin Peninsula, 320

Coutances, 320, 375

CROW, code for ships carrying medical

supplies for Operation OLYMPIC, 538

Cuba, 189

CURRAN, Maj. CORNELIUS J., 552

Dagupan, 495

Dakar, 202

DAMAN, Maj. ELI E., 493

Darb El Hagg, 196

DARLING, Maj. STANLEY, 335

Darwin, 411, 441

D-day:

in European operations, 269, 270, 284, 287,

288, 295, 299, 302, 305, 306, 312, 341

fabrication of spectacles after, 344

maintenance supplies required for, 291

medical supply support on Normandy

beaches on, 307-311

medical tonnage allocation for, 292

repair and maintenance problems after,

342

stock levels before, 315

V-bomb attacks on general depot after,

351

in Mediterranean operations, 208, 224, 257

medical supplies unloaded on beaches

on, 221, 228

in Philippines operations, 498

for invasion of Japan, 537

DDT, 364, 378

Decamere, 196

Defense Aid Division, Office of the Under

Secretary of War, 155, 156

Defense Aid Medical Requirements SubCommittee, 155

Defense Aid Requirements committees, 155

Defense Aid Sub-Division, SGO, 158, 160

Defense Plant Corp., 45, 46, 65

Delivery Needs Plan, 36-37

Delta Base Depot, 246

Delta Base Section, 242, 245, 246, 382

Delta Base Section operations, 249

Delta Base Section personnel-staging program, 382

Demobilization, planning for, 26-27

DENIT, Brig. Gen. GUY B., 209, 540

Dental officers in development of acrylic eye,

561

Denver Medical Depot, 113
INDEX 637

Deployment of supply units, 440-442

Depot(s):

general:

G-10—271

G-14—351

G-15—351

G-16—351

G-20—270, 374

G-22—351

G-23—374

G-24—372, 374

G-30—351, 374

G-35—273, 274, 297, 374

G-40—351

G-45—272, 301, 341, 351, 374

G-50—302, 351, 371

G-55—351

medical:

M-l—312, 320

M-2—312, 320, 344

M-3—312, 320

M-351—368

M-352—368

M-400—272, 344, 372, 374

M-401—271, 351

M-402—320, 344, 363

M-402T—321, 325, 369

M-403—320

M-404—320

M-405—320, 344, 365

M-406—320

M-407—320, 323, 326, 340, 343, 344,

355, 365, 367, 369, 387

M-407A—367

M-408T—321, 326, 327, 328, 367, 369

M-409—326, 328, 329, 341, 367, 369,

380

M-410M—351, 371

M-411—329, 367

M-412—328, 367, 376, 378, 388

M-413—329, 367

M-414—367, 380

M-415—369

M-416T—365, 368, 383

M-417—365, 367, 368

M-418—637, 368, 380, 381

M-424—374, 375

M-451—367

M-452—317, 368

Depot activities in occupation of Germany,

383-386

Depot base section, optical section in, 348

Depot operations, 254-256

Depot Operations Branch:

Equipment, Maintenance, and Repair

Section of, 542

establishment, of 541-542

Depot pharmacies, 349-350

Depot Replenishment System, 38

Depot system, operation of, 128-131

Development—

of packaging and packing, 561-562

of special items of equipment, 561

DEXTERITY, planning of, 447-448

Die Burg, 360

DIETZ, Maj. VICTOR H., 88

Dijon, 242, 245, 367, 368

Dinslakenerbruch, 362

Diphtheria, emergency delivery of drugs for,

485

Dispensary, general, 7th—344

Disposal of excesses and surplus property,

556-557

Distribution Work Sheets, 37

Division(s). See Airborne Division(s); Infantry Division (s); Marine Division (s).

Division Artillery, 27th—475

Division Clearing Station, 7th—536

Division of Contract Distribution, Office of

Production Management, 13

Division of Defense Aid Reports, Office for

Emergency Management, 155

Dolhain, 329, 336, 353

Dollendorf, 353, 355

Dorchester, 299

DOUGLAS, Lt. Col. JOHN, 267

Douglas Aircraft Corp., 196

Dreger Harbor, 447

Drensteinfurt, 362

Dreux, 320

Drugs:

antimalarial, supply of, 511

emergency delivery of, 485

loss of, 557-558

Dry Ice, 67, 200

Ducey, 348

Duderstadt, 355, 362

Duisdorf, 367, 369

Dulag, 485, 490

DUNN, Capt. THOMAS P., 104

Dutch East Indies, 73

Dutch Government, 557

Eastern Base Section, 210, 216-217, 218,

219, 222, 241, 251, 264

Eastern Canada. See Canada.

Eastern Command, 201

Eastern Military District of Germany,

Third U.S. Army area, 385
638 INDEX

Eastern Task Force, 204-205, 208, 214 ETOUSA Base Optical Shop, 303, 304, 344,

Ecuador's Army, 168 388

Efate, 420, 422, 424, 437 ETOUSA Blood Bank, 301, 320

Egypt, 196 ETOUSA Headquarters, 313

VIII Bomber Command, 265 Ettelbruck, 358

VIII Corps, 330, 349 Eucalyptus Forest, 398

XVIII Corps, 355 Eupen, 319

Eighth U.S. Army, 501, 502-503, 540, 554, Europe, 9, 12, 27, 55, 61, 68, 153, 166, 179,

556 265-306, 382, 383, 537, 560, 562

headquarters of, 454, 504 combat operations in, 307-378

in Operation CORONET, 537 initial plan for invasion of, 266

on Luzon, 499 medical supply in, 28-30

responsibility of: redeployment of medical supply units

for Leyte operations, 491 from, 540

for civil affairs supply, 555 whole blood shipments to, 152

supply activities, 454-455 European campaign, 150

surgeon of, 454 European Civil Affairs Division, 376

Eisenach, 358 European Continent, 27, 559

EISENHOWER, Gen. DWIGHT D., 316 plans for invasion of, 275

Eklutna Indian School, 429 European theater, 24, 26, 88, 145, 153, 250,

El Alamein Line, 203 271, 279, 287, 301, 317, 332, 337, 368,

Ela Beach, 418, 438 382, 427, 478, 524, 540, 552, 560, 561

Elbe River, 362, 370 air redeployment of combat troops from,

Elbeuf, 365, 367, 368 190

XI Corps, 497 artificial eyes in, 87

Eli Lilly and Co., 44 dental officers trained in eye fabrication

Elsdorf, 364 in, 89

Empire, the, 161 maintenance requirements in, 342

Engineer Corps, 111, 155, 240 medical service in, 28, 29

England, 15, 28, 204, 266, 271, 294 303, 327, medical supply system in, 29

341, 344, 350, 373 optical program in, 345

English Channel, 309, 339 packing and crating requirement of, 289

Eniwetok: procurement in, 1942-43—267-268

assault on, 472 property exchange items in, 341-342

medical supply activities in, 472 recurring problems of medical supply in,

Eniwetok campaign, 472 337-342

Eniwetok Island, 472 split shipments, 237-339

Enlisted Reserve Corps, 56 result of Voorhees mission to, 562

Epinal, 332, 359 European theater Depot M-452—243

Equipment: Eye(s), artificial, 259, 303-304

augmentation of, for units, 294-295 acrylic, 88, 304, 561

development of special items of, 561 glass, 87, 88, 303, 304, 561

materials-handling, use of, 131-1L32 plastic, 88, 304

organization of, 396-397

Eritrea, 196 Far East, 26, 202, 382

EKPF, Capt. STANLEY F., 88

Esch, 331

Farrington area, 397

FEA. See Foreign Economic Administration.

Eskimo dogs, 177 Fedala, 204, 205

Federal Government, 6

Espiritu Santo, 420, 421, 422, 424

479

432, 437, Federal Narcotics Control Board, 9

Federal Reserve System, 13

Establishment of base section medical sup- Federal Specifications Board, 2

ply, 209-213 FENTON, Lt. Col. BRYAN C. T., 280, 283

Ether, emergency shipments of, 310 Fernando de Noronha, 193

ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, Ferryville, 223

U.S. Army). See European theater. Field Artillery Battalion, 106th—475
INDEX 639

FIETING, Maj. JOHN W., 541

XV Corps, 320

Fifteenth U.S. Army, 355, 364

Fifth U.S. Army, 220, 240, 250, 303

activation of, 227

limited operations of, 249

medical depot of, 229

medical support for, 235

plans and preparations of, for assault on

Italy, 227-228

requisitioning in Peninsular Base Section

established by, 238

strength of, 253

surgeon of, 238, 253

Fijis, 420, 421, 424, 431, 432

Filagare, 253

Final Medical Reserve, 443

Final Reserve Units, 147-148

Finance and Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office, ETOUSA, 265

early functions and purposes of, 266

Finance and Supply Division, SGO, 1, 3, 13,

14, 15

chief of, 9

Defense Aid subsection in, 155

duty of, 12

Field Equipment Subdivision of, 149

nature of supply activities in, 10

personnel of, 9, 19, 559

FINLEY, Col. THEODORE L., 209, 219

Finschhafen, 447, 448, 450, 451

1st Advance Platoon, 12th Medical Depot

Company, 231, 232, 235

1st Advance Section, 2d Medical Supply

Depot, 207, 215, 223, 225, 226

First aid packets, 66-67

First French Army, 332, 368

1st Platoon, 3d Medical Depot, 442

1st Storage and Issue Platoon, 420

First U.S. Army, 272, 281, 297, 299, 300, 312,

319, 328-329, 357, 362

commanding general of, 277

depot support of, 353-357

equipping units of, 277-279

headquarters of, 280, 293

medical depot company of, 284, 327, 355

medical supply officer of, 309

redeployment of, from Europe, 537

report of, on supply difficulties, 310-311

scheme of supply in combat of, 305-306

surgeon of, 277, 278, 279, 287, 305, 311, 313

First U.S. Army G-4, 337

First World War. See World War I.

Fiscal Division, SGO, 170

Florence, 235, 252, 253

F.O.B. origin contracts, 39

Fontainebleau, 320

Food and Drug Administration, 58, 60, 72

FORAGER, medical supplies for, 473-475

"Force 343"—221, 223

commanding general of, 222

surgeon of, 222

Foreign Economic Administration, 163, 165,

555

operating agent for, 166

Fort(s):

Banks, 102

Bell, 178

Buchanan, 189

Churchill, 180

George G. Meade, 209

Lewis, 427

McClellan, 76

Mason, 398

Missoula, 427

Ord, 459, 461

Pepperrell, 176, 177

Richardson, 427, 429, 430, 464, 467

Ruger, 395

Shatter, 393, 395, 399

William D. Davis, 185, 189

Fort Davis Depot, 186

Fortaleza, 193

Forward depots, combat operations of, 329-

337

Forward Echelon, 287

Foug, 367, 380

Fougeres, 320

403d Troop Carrier Group, shipments expedited by evacuation planes of, 504

XIV Corps, 456, 458

Fourteenth Air Force, 513, 527

Fourth U.S. Army:

headquarters of, 459

surgeon of, 459

Fox, Col. LEON A., 173

France, 15, 89, 2.42, 246, 311, 316, 317, 320,

321, 324, 331, 332, 337, 342, 348, 360,

365, 367, 368, 369, 370, 373, 375, 376,

379, 380, 383, 386, 388

depots in, 326-328

medical supply dump established in, 307

Frankfurt, 358, 386, 387

Fraser's solution, 38

FREEDMAN, Maj. ABRAHAM, 277, 280

French, medical supply and aid to, 220

French Army, 211, 246

French Guiana, 190

French Morocco, 227

Frenchen, 353
640 INDEX

FRIEND, Col. DALE G., 431

Frobisher Bay, 180

Fulda, 359

Furth, 359, 388

Furth Medical Depot, 385, 386, 387, 388

G-l (Personnel), War Department General

Staff, 426

G-4 (Logistics):

AFWESPAC, 541, 557

ETOUSA, 292, 294, 299, 301, 317, 322,

339, 368

Headquarters, Delta Base Section, 249

SWPA, 454, 480

G-5 (Civil Affairs):

AFWESPAC, 557

in AFHQ, Mediterranean theater, 264

Gaevert plant in Belgium, 316

Galena, 465

GALLAGHER, Maj. ARTHUR, 523, 524

GALVANIC, 471

supply support of, 469

Gas mask inserts, 80-82, 303

basis of issue of, 82

fitting of, 82

prescribing for, 82

Gas mask spectacles, 80-82

design of, 80

Gas masks, spectacles for wear with, 80-82

Gauting, 388

Gayä, 513

Gela, 225

landing of medical personnel at, 223

General Depot(s):

No. 1—523

No. 2—516, 517, 522, 524

No. 6—216

General Dispensary, 7th—344

General Headquarters, SWPA, 451

General Hospital No. 1—400, 401

General Hospital No. 2—400, 401

General hospitals, established on the Continent, 313

See also Hospitals, general.

General Purchasing Agent, ETOUSA, 267

General YAMASHITA, 558

Geneva Convention agreements, 337

George Washington School, 497

Georgetown, 191

German Forces, 217

German Medical Sanitats Parke (Medical

Point), 385

Germany, 15, 26, 68, 73, 87, 89, 141, 142,

265, 326, 329, 355, 357, 358, 359, 360,

362, 364, 365, 376, 377, 383, 386, 387,

390, 545

Germany—Continued

airlifts into, 370

antityphus supplies in, 378

depots in, 368-369

medical depot support of advance into,

353-369

Surrender of, 382

Gertrude Cove, 463

Gestetners Mimeograph machine, 304

Gil Airdrome, 493

GILBERT, Maj. CHARLES L., 328

GILBERT, Capt. RICHARD P., 232

Gilbert Islands, 469

Operation GALVANIC for assault on, 471

GILL, Lt. Col. JAMES P., 395

GINN, Col. L. HOLMES, Jr., 221, 364

GLASCOCK, Capt. F. R., 553

Glasenbach, 386

Gloucestershire, 265

Gold Coast, 202

Gonorrhea, chronic, penicillin in treatment

of, 302

Goodenough Island, 417, 453

Goose Bay, 180

Government of India, 515, 529

Government Printing Office, 115

Govilon, 299

GRAY, JOHN F., 393

Great Britain, 194, 267, 304

GREEN, Maj. HARRY S., 327

Green Project, 190, 191

Greenham Common, 301

Greenland, 145, 180

Greenland Base Command, 180-182

medical supplies for, 182

GRIFFIN, Col. MARTIN E., 262

Guadalcanal, 32, 127, 421, 426, 427, 431,

432, 434, 437, 438, 456, 457, 458, 467, 479

Guadalcanal Campaign, 561

Guadalcanal Depot, 435

Guam, 393, 475, 490, 537

Guam campaign, 490

GTJENTHER, Lt. Col. A. J. D., 331

Gura, 196

Haguenau, 332

Hameln, 362

Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, 144

HANDLEY, Capt. JOSEPH B., 371

Hands, artificial, 94, 95

HANGEN, HERMAN C, 23, 36, 280, 283, 559

HARMON, Maj. Gen. MILLARD F., 421, 422

HARPER, Maj. JESSE T., 402

HARRIS, CHARLES W., 23, 478

Harvard University, 89
INDEX 641

Hawaii, 395, 397, 472, 480, 481, 485, 554

survey of supply situation in, 478-479

Hawaiian Department, 393, 395, 396, 468

support of defense units of, 397-399

Hawaiian Medical Supply Depot, 393, 395,

399, 479

HAWLEY, Maj. Gen. PAUL R., 169, 265, 283,

298, 306, 379

comment of, on supply, 310

concerned over medical supply situation,

279-280

consultants to, 28

protests split shipments, 339

HAYS, Col. SILAS B., 283, 369

Health Supply Section, War Production

Board, 51

Hearing aids, 89-90

Heerlen, 335, 362

Heidingsfeld, 388

Heilbronn, 388

Heliopolis Quartermaster Depot, Camp Russell B. Huckstep, 196

Helmstedt, 362

Hen Village, 470

Hersfeld, 358

HESPOHD, Capt. DOUGLAS, 220

HEWITT, Lt. Col. REVEL E., 127

Hickam Field, 395

HIGBEE, Lt. Col. CLARENCE E., 266

HOGAN, Lt. Col. HOWARD, 266

Hokkaido, 553

Hollandia, 448, 450, 479, 531, 557

Hollandia-Aitape operation, medical supply

for, 448-450

Hollandia Depot, 450

Honnef, 353

Honolulu, 393, 394, 395, 396

Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, 393

Honshu, 537

Hospital No. 1, Philippines, 31

Hospital, Surgical, 48th—206

Hospitals, evacuation:

16th—228

38th—206, 207

41st—361

52d—452

58th—490

91st—361

95th—228

99th—504

128th—206

Hospitals, field:

17th—458, 476

31st—472

Hospitals, field—Continued

48th—361

69th—534

Hospitals, general:

named:

Borden, 89

Bushnell, 71

Darnall, 91

Deshon, 89

Holloran, 71

Hoff, 89

Letterman, 427

Sternberg, 30

Tripler, 394, 395, 397

Valley Forge, 88, 89

numbered:

5th—313

12th—242

42d—551

127th—313

130th—321

148th—397

168th—500

181st—523

298th—313

Hospitals, station:

1st—397, 472

2d—198

4th—18

13th—493

18th—490

26th—397

36th—371

40th—252

54th—251

56th—251

57th—251

67th—202

93d—202

100th—513

131st—180

188th—182

193d—192

221st—178

279th—386

308th—176

HOWER, W. A., 23

HUBENER, Lt. Col. Louis F., 386

Hull, 297

Humboldt Bay, 448

Hump, 505, 511, 523

HUNT, Lt. JOHN M., Jr., 453

HURLEY, Col. THOMAS D., 295

Huy, 329, 336
642 INDEX

Iceland, 182 Insulin, 168

Iceland Base Command, 182-185 International Aid Division, 61, 170

Ie Shima, 533 International Aid Division, ASF, 528

Ihringshausen, 355, 362, 388 "International Aid Non-standard Catalog,"

ILAND, Lt. Col. ROLAND H., 365 169

Illana Bay, 504 International Business Machines in supply

Iloilo, 400, 502 operations, 137, 158

India, 194, 507, 508, 509, 511, 512, 561 International Division, ASF, 158, 159, 160,

Chinese Army in, 515, 521 161, 162, 163, 164

supplies for, 526 International Division, SGO, 160, 161, 164,

eastern, Army Air Forces in, 513 167

Government of, 515, 529 International Requirements Record, 164,

lack of supplies in depots in, 521 165, 166

medical depot companies organized in, 517 International Supply Committee. Medical

supply shortages in the field in, 517-519 Sub-Committee of, 159

supply support for Chinese troops in, Invasion Force, 460

520-521 Iran, 198

India-Burma theater, 526, 529 Isaar, 359

surgeon of, 528 Isigny, 375

India Warehouse, 103 Island Base Section, 227, 251

Industry Branch, Office of Civilian Supply, Island campaigns, 221-227

WPB, 54 preliminary planning for, 221-223

Infantry Division (s): Italian campaign, 254, 275

1st—223, 307 Italian Government, 263, 264

3d—223 Italian Peninsula, 27

4th—427 Italy, 73, 230, 231, 251, 252, 253, 263, 264,

7th^459, 460, 461, 471, 531, 532 560, 561

9th—208 Allied armies in, 249

21st—493 artificial eyes produced in, 259

24th—398, 448, 486, 493, 504 assault on, 227-235

27th—469, 472, 473, 475 duties of regional public health officers in,

29th—307, 361 230

30th—324 Fifth U.S. Army in, 303

31st—504 looting in, 235

32d—413, 450, 489 medicinal oxygen procured in, 259

34th—208 use of waterproof medical packs in inva37th—458, 467 sion of, 562

38th—497 Itri, 235

40th—501, 502

41st—413, 448, 450, 501 Jamaica, 189

43d—422, 456, 457, 551 Japan, 26, 126, 127, 417, 493, 499, 507, 527,

77th—475, 490-491, 531, 533 544, 557

81st—476 avoiding excesses in, 552

96th—531, 532 civil affairs supplies in, 555-556

102d—361 medical supply planning for invasion of,

726th—532 537-538

Infantry Regiment(s): occupation of, 531-562

17th—461 planning the assault on, 536-540

52d (Philippine Army), 502 postwar supply system in, 552-554

53d (Philippine Army), 502 problems of supply in, 552

164th—431 support for operations in, 538

Infantry Regiment (Composite), 53d—461

"Initial Protective Force," 3

surrender of, 382

Japanese Allied Military Government group,

555

Instruments, surgical, preservation of, 123- J. C. Penny Co., 23, 36, 559

125 Jeep litter brackets, 415
INDEX 643

Jena, 362

Joint Army-Navy Packaging Board, 127

Joint Purchasing Board, New Zealand, 426

Joint Rearmament Committee, 220

JONES, Maj. HOWARD C, 221

JONES, Col. JENNEB G., 27, 239

Journals, professional, procurement of, 96-98

Jungle kit, 414, 561

Kadena, 533

Kahuku Hospital, 398

Kairouan, 223

Kamehameha area, 397

Kansas City Medical Depot, 66, 73, 115

KAPLAN, 1st Lt. MILTON A., 552

Karachi, 509, 513, 514, 516, 523

British Army's medical supply depot at,

507

medical depot at, 511

Karachi-Bombay area, responsibility for

medical supply in, 523

KARASH, Capt. SIDNEY J., 88

Kassel, 359

Kasserine Pass, 217

Kastellaun, 359

Kauai, 395, 478, 479

Keflavik, 185

KELLY, Maj. ROBERT R., 284, 350

KEMP, Maj. O. V., 30

Kerema, 531

Kerema Islands group, 351

Khorramshahr, 198

Khorramshahr General Depot, optical repair

unit attached to, 201

KING, Brig. Gen. EDGAR, 393, 481, 495

King, Lt. Col. EVERETT G., 448

KING, Maj. W. A., 284

KINGSLEY, Maj. JOSEPH B., 145

Kirchheim, 360

Kiriwina Island, 451, 452

KIRK, Maj. Gen. NORMAN T., 19, 279, 306,

310, 339

Kiska, 459, 461

Kiska assault, medical supply for, 461-463

Kiska Harbor, 463

Kiska operation, 460

KJOLSRITD, Maj. GORDON S., 478

Kobe, 553

KOLB, Capt. LEONARD H., 406, 455

Korbach, 355, 362

Korea, 537, 549

medical supply operations in, 554-555

medical supply responsibilities in, 554

occupation of, 531-562

rehabilitation activities in, 554-555

Koronadal Valley Project, 401

KRIBS, Lt. RUSSELL S., 304

KRUEGER, Lt. Gen. WALTER, 450

Kuei-lin, 513

K'un-ming, 511, 513, 515, 517, 524, 528

Kwajalein, 471, 472

Kyushu Island, 537

Labor disputes, 57-58

Laboratory, 19th Medical General, 558

Lae, 431

LA FORS, Maj. CLAUD D., 505, 514

La Haye-du-Puits, 312, 320

La Jonchere, 369

Lake Sentani, 448, 454

LAPP, Maj. HENRY T., 216, 221

Lashio, 507

Latin America, 15

Lauterbach, 359

Le Bourget Airfield, 323

Le Cannet, 243

Le Grand Chemin, 307, 312, 320

Le Havre, 321, 337, 339, 376

Le Mans, 313, 320, 344, 365

Le Molay, 319

Le Muy, 243

Ledo, 511, 515, 517, 519, 521

LEE, Lt. IRWIN, 453

LEE, Lt. Gen. JOHN C. H., 265, 371

LEE, Capt. WARREN R., 453, 521

Leghorn, 250, 252, 253, 264

stock in, 251

support through, 240-241

Lend-lease, 40

development of procedures for, 156-157

discontinuance of, 529

medical supplies under, 155-170

problems in administration of, 166-170

role of Medical Department in, 156-160

Lend-Lease Act, 155, 156, 173

Lend-lease requirements, military and civilian, 160-162

Lenses, requests for, 49, 190

LEONE, Lt. Col. GEORGE E., 191

L'Etard, 312, 320

Leyte, 480, 483, 485, 491, 494, 495, 531, 537,

555

changes of combat situation on, 490

supply operations with X Corps on, 486-

490

Leyte campaign, 534

planning and operation of, 483-486

Leyte Gulf, Battle of, 487

Leyte operation, 506

LIBASCI, Col. ALFONSO M., 407

Liberia, 196

Libin, 329, 336
644 INDEX

Licata, 223 Maintenance supplies, assembly for preLiege, 328, 329, 341, 367, 369, 380 scheduled shipment of, 291-292

Lüle, 376 Maintenance training program, 110

Limay, 30, 399 Mainz, 359

Limbs, artificial, 45 Majuro, 471

Lingayen Gulf, 493, 495, 496, 531 Makin, 471

LINN, Maj. RAYMOND F., 556 Makin Atoll, 469

L'Institut Pasteur, 316 Malabang, 504

Lipa, 499 Malaria, 74, 401, 450

LITTELL, Lt. Col. GEORGE S., 402, 403, 404, Malaya, 195

405, 407 Malinta Tunnel, 401

Liverpool, 297 Malinta Tunnel Hospital, 32

London, 265, 266, 267, 280, 373 Malmedy, 329, 336, 353

LONG, Lt. CLIPFORD C, 485 Mandalay, 507

Longuyon, 331, 358 Manila, 30, 399, 400, 497, 498, 499, 537, 543,

Loose Issue Section, 345 547, 555, 557, 558

Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, 144, 514 depot system in, 544

Los Angeles Sub-Port, 514 maintenance and repair in, 547

Los Banos, 400 medical supply depots in, 61, 498

Louisville Medical Depot, 114, 156, 166 movement toward, 495-498

Lucca, 253 optical service in, 547

Lüdenscheid, 362 whole blood distribution in, 548

Luxembourg, 331, 358 Manila base depot systems, 543

Luzon, 498, 499, 500, 536, 537, 554, 558 Manila Bay, 543

clearing the way for invasion of, 493 Manila depots, optical service of, 547

medical supply activities on, 400-401 Manila Harbor, 498

Luzon Campaign, 493 Manila Hospital Center, 399

Luzon operation, medical supply support of, Manpower problems, 56-58

493-499 Manufacturers, aid to, 45-46

Marianas Island, 481

Maastricht, 334, 335, 361, 362 Operation FORAGER for attack on, 473

MACARTHUE, Gen. DOUGLAS, 399, 406, 451, Marianas operations, experience resulting

536 from, 478

Machine Records Branch, Surgeon General's Marigold, 551

Office, 162 Marine Division (s):

Machine Records Section, 162 1st—531

Maetsuycker, 444 2d—473, 475

MAGEE, Maj. Gen. JAMES C, 10 3d—467, 475

Magicienne Bay, 475 4th—473, 475

MAGNET, 265 6th—531

Maintenance, repairs, and spare parts, 560- Marines, U.S., 558

561 Mariveles-Cabcaben Road, 401

Maintenance achievement, 117-118 MARKUS, Maj. ERVIN H., 218, 243

Maintenance and repair course, 106-108, 109 Marrakech, 210

Maintenance and repair in Manila, 547 Marseille, 242, 243, 247, 317, 368, 380, 382

Maintenance and repair parts, 101-118 medical depot at, 257

Maintenance Course, 23 Marseille depot, mobile optical unit attached

Maintenance Division, ASF, 104 to, 243

Maintenance requirements, evolution of, Marshall Islands, 471

101-104 Marshalls campaign, support of, 471-472

Maintenance sections on the Continent, 348 MARTIN, Brig. Gen. JOSEPH I., 238, 253

Maintenance shop, development of, 102 MARTINE, Capt. LEROY M., 553

Maintenance Shop, St. Louis Medical De- MASON, Lt. Col. JAMES B., 267

pot, 105 "Master Preservation Packaging and PackMaintenance shop operations, 111-114 ing Listing," 127
INDEX 645

Master Procurement Authorities, 159

Materials, allocation of, 49-56

Materiel Demoblization Plan, 26

Materiel Demoblization Unit, 21

Mateur, 216

Maui, 395, 478, 479

MAXWELL, Col. EABL, 422

McKinley area, strafing of, 400

"M-day," 9

MEADOE, Lt. Col. CLAEK B., 267

Mechernich, 353

Medical Base Depot Company(ies):

46th—243

58th—498, 554

60th—251, 253

61st—449

70th—245, 368, 385

71st—245, 368

73d—252

74th—504

77th—545

78th—492, 553

80th—253, 553

81st—243

Medical Battalion (s):

1st—223, 225

9th—203, 208

24th—399

51st—207, 211

56th—204, 205

109th—208

113th—497

165th—328

Medical Branch, Overseas Supply Division,

478

Medical Composite Battalion(s):

231st—243, 246, 247, 257, 368, 382, 383

232d—252

300th—184

Medical Defense Aid Requirements committee, 155

Medical Department, 9, 13, 16, 17, 18, 25, 36,

41, 42, 43, 47, 51, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65,

66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 81,

82, 87, 88, 95, 111, 115, 118, 119, 121,

126, 135, 141, 143, 144, 150, 151, 153,

154, 155, 163, 165, 166, 169, 180, 196,

292, 294, 310, 322, 368, 374, 396, 406,

508, 561

adjustment of contracts in, 54-55

aid to contractors by procurement officers

of, 55-56

Army Supply Program for, 35

depot activities of, 127

during World War I—2, 6

Medical Department—Continued

duties of procurement officer in, 54

first implementation of Lend-Lease Act

by, 156

main depot of, 15

need for organized maintenance program

in, 12

procurement officers of, 46

reserve supplies of, 30

role of, in lend-lease, 156-160

serviceability standards for technical items

of, 369

work measurement system installed in

depots of, 132

Medical Department chest(s), 83

No. 1—151, 275, 428

No. 2—151, 275, 428

No. 4—428

No. 60—428

Medical Department Equipment Laboratory, director of, 388

Medical Department Supply Catalog, 2, 20,

169

Medical Department War Reserve, 10

Medical Depot(s):

12th—229

23d—458-459

28th—362

29th—552

34th—531

356th—243

Medical Depot Company(ies):

1st—271, 272, 284, 293, 294, 303, 305, 307,

312, 327, 329, 330, 336, 353, 362

3d—440

4th—196, 210, 230, 233, 241, 242, 252

5th—479

6th—272, 371

7th—216, 219, 242, 243, 252, 331, 359, 360

8th—271

9th—552

11th—272, 303, 320, 325, 345, 365, 367, 434

12th—228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235, 237,

238, 242, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254

13th—272, 284, 303, 312, 321, 327, 344,

367, 376

14th—517, 522, 523, 524, 529

15th—272, 303, 326, 327, 329, 345, 367,

369, 386

16th—272, 365, 367, 368, 371

17th—434

20th—184

22d—198

25th—523, 529

26th—365
646 INDEX

Medical Depot Company (ies)—Continued

27th—450

28th—327, 335, 360, 361, 362

29th—450, 551, 553, 556

30th—284, 303, 312, 320, 325, 365, 368,

383, 384

31st—284, 303, 307, 311, 312, 320, 326,

344, 367

32d—284, 294, 303, 307, 311, 313, 319, 320,

327, 329, 345, 348, 357

33d—284, 294, 303, 312, 313, 320, 327, 330,

331, 334, 335, 348, 355, 358, 359, 385

34th—486, 487, 491-493, 557

35th—331, 335, 355, 360, 361, 362

46th—244, 359

47th—355, 364

48th—367, 369, 545

49th—495, 496, 498, 543, 544, 547

53d—533

56th—437

61st—545

63d—371

64th—351, 371

65th—371

66th—299, 303, 321, 328, 329, 367

67th—437, 545

68th—437

69th—523

75th—437

4261st—544

Medical Depot Manual, 285, 317

Medical depot support of the advance into

Germany, 353-369

Medical Depot System in 1943—513

Medical Detachment No. 1 (Supply), 424

Medical Equipment Maintenance Officer,

109

Medical forms, procurement of, 304-305

Medical General Laboratory, 19th—558

Medical kits devised, 376-377

Medical maintenance, 256-258, 369

in hospitals, 101-102

Medical maintenance and repair, 387-388

Medical Maintenance and Repair Shop,

Depot M-407—344

Medical maintenance and spare parts, 342-

345

Medical Maintenance Depot M-400—344

Medical Maintenance Unit(s), 146-147, 208,

508, 509, 512, 514, 516, 517, 522, 560

automatic supply, discontinuance, 436

Block 1—535

Block 2—535

Block 3—535

Block 4—535

Medical Maintenance Unit(s)—Continued

elimination of, 514-515

program of, 37

revision of, 216

Medical Planning Group, established by

Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, 267

Medical procurement, field organization for,

21-23

Medical Regiment, 101st—431

Medical Section(s):

Army Air Forces Service Command, 231

Base M—495

Headquarters, SOS, 257

Heliopolis Quartermaster Depot, Camp

Russell B. Huckstep, 196

Mediterranean Base Section, 257

Mediterranean theater, 264

New York General Depot, 10, 15, 17, 21,

22, 64

Services of Supply, NATOTJSA, 219, 260

Medical Service, Headquarters, ETOUSA,

284

Medical Service Detachment(s):

233d—369

235th—369

317th—369

320th—243

321st—369

Medical Sub-Committee of the International

Supply Committee, 159

Medical Supply, USASOS, 456

Medical supply (ies):

air shipments of, 341

between wars, 1-9

central procurement of, 35-62

depot's work in distribution of, 137

disposal of, 529

distribution of:

to theaters of operations, 143-154

to Zone of Interior installations, 132-143

experimenting with, in Alaskan theater,

466-467

for global war, 18-27

for Hollandia-Aitape operation, 448-450

for Kiska assault, 461-463

improvements in, in Central Pacific Area,

477

improvements in distribution of, 138

in defense of the Philippines, 399-401

in Europe, 28-30, 265-270

in Middle Pacific, 393-399

in New Guinea, 417-418

in Pacific, 30-32

in South Pacific, 420-427

estimate of the situation, 421

organization and purpose, 420
INDEX 647

Medical supply (ies)—Continued

in South Pacific Area, initial problems in,

422-424

in southern Philippines, 500-506

inspection of, 58-o0

lend-lease, 155-170

new packing techniques for, 120-123

of Visayan-Mindanao Force, 401

organization of:

following Pearl Harbor, 428

in Australia, 406-411

packing and crating of, 289

priority system for, 150

procurement of, 12-15

problem items, 63-99

rail shipments of, 339-341

recurring problems of, 337-342

specific failures in, 522

split shipments of, 337-339

storage and distribution of, 15-18, 119-154

packing and packaging problems in,

119-127

storage of, 127-132

in Alaska, 428-429

under the Army program, 35-40

unusual problems of, 557-559

Medical supply actions, 380-383

in Alaska, during the defense period, 427-

430

in Northern France, 380-382

in United Kingdom, 380-382

on Luzon, 400-401

Medical Supply Block 1—538

Medical Supply Branch, AM GOT, 262-263

Medical Supply catalog, 159

Medical supply catalog for captured materiel, 389

Medical Supply Depot(s), 270-274

lst-204, 319

2d—207, 215, 216, 223, 225, 226, 230, 243

3d—419, 438

4th—210, 216, 223, 225, 228, 229, 230, 406

5th—395, 396, 472, 478

7th—198, 216, 514, 517

9th—403, 406, 412, 420, 438, 447, 452

10th—424

11th—427, 437

17th—424, 426, 437, 540

21st—431

Medical Supply Detachment, 226th—386

Medical Supply Detachment No. 2—514

Medical Supply Division(s), 293, 304, 310,

378, 540

Medical Supply Division, AFWESPAC, 554

295-453 0-68—43

Medical Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's

Office, ETOUSA, 287, 289

Medical Supply Division, Communications

Zone, First U.S. Army, 353

Medical Supply Division, Eighth U.S. Army,

454

Medical Supply Division, Office of the Surgeon, USASOS, 538

Medical Supply Division, SGO, 44

Medical Supply Division, Theater Chief

Surgeon's Office, TSFET, 386-387

Medical Supply Office, Newfoundland Base

Command, 176

Medical Supply Office, Port of San Juan,

P.R., 189

Medical Supply Officer, Base K (Leyte), 531

Medical Supply Officer, China theater, 528

Medical Supply Officer, First U.S. Army, 9

Medical Supply Officer, Services of Supply,

513, 514, 523

Medical Supply Officer, XXIV Corps, 531,

554

Medical Supply Officers Orientation Course,

23

Medical supply operations, overcoming

weaknesses in, 562

Medical supply organization, 412

Medical supply personnel, 32

Medical Supply Platoons (Aviation):

15th—447, 496, 497, 499, 543, 548

21st—447, 448, 450, 486, 487, 491, 495,

497, 498

27th—448

55th—496, 497, 498, 499

Medical Supply Section, Base General Depot, Calcutta, 512

Medical Supply Section, Surgeon's Office,

Services of Supply, 509, 524

Medical Supply Section, Trinidad Base

Command, 189

Medical Supply Section, Wright Field, 191

Medical Supply Service, 89, 91, 135

organization of, 18-23

Medical Supply Service School, 23, 108

Medical supply support:

growth of, 263

on Normandy beaches, 307-311

Medical supply system, 1-32, 509, 561

in European theater, 29

in Japan, 552

organization of, for war, 393-395

reorganization of, 189, 540-542

Medical Supply Team(s):

2d—485, 486

239th—368
648 INDEX

Medical Supply Team(s)—Continued

726th—532

843d—532

Medical Supply Training School, 7

Medical Technical Maintenance Division,

104

Medical tonnage allocation on the Continent, 292

Medical unit assemblies, use of, 134-136

Medici Provenciali, 262

Mediterranean, 289, 537

Mediterranean Base Section, 209, 210-213,

214, 216, 220, 221, 241, 251, 253, 264

Medical Section of, 257

medical supply personnel of, 211

Mediterranean campaigns, 219, 259

Mediterranean Islands, 27

Mediterranean operations, 203-264

assault on North Africa in, 205-209

local procurement in, 258-259

other changes in, 251-253

planning for invasion of North Africa in,

203-205

supply activities in review, 254-259

support of civilian populations in, 260-264

Mediterranean theater, 24, 27, 145, 238, 260,

552

air redeployment of combat troops from,

190

Civilian Medical Depot of, 264

Communications Zone of, 250

Medical Section of, 264

use of local resources, 263-264

Meeks Field, 185

Medhia-Port Lyautey area, 204

Meknes, 210

Melbourne, 403, 404, 405, 406, 411, 412

Melveren, 335

MESSICK, MEAD M., 23, 36, 146

Messina, 224

Metauro River, 249

Metz, 330

METZ, Lt. Col. KARL H., 209

Meyrargues, 243

MIAL, Maj. MARCEL H., 209, 238

Middle East, 194, 197

Middle Pacific, medical supply in, 393-399

Midway Islands, 393, 468

Military Establishment, 12, 15, 165

Military Government Section, AFHQ, 260

Military installations. See Camp(s); Fort(s).

Military Iranian Mission, 198

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)

4890—109

Milne Bay, 417, 420, 440, 441, 448, 450, 452,

453, 455, 456

Mimeograph paper, 304

Mindanao, 32, 401, 500, 501, 504

Mindoro, 493

Ministry of Supply, 267, 268

MINNS, Maj. ALBERT E., Jr., 454

Mirandola, 253

MMU's. See Medical Maintenance Units.

Mobile Optical Repair Unit, 82

Mobile optical unit attached to Marseille

depot, 243

Modena, 253

MOLYNEAUX, A. V., 393

M-l Gas Mask Eyeglass, 81

Montgomery Ward and Co., 23, 36

MOORE, Lt. Col. LUTHER R., 428

MORGAN, Maj. JAMES S., 528

Morocco, 203, 205

Morotai, 450

Morphine, 405

Morphine Syrettes, 206

Mortain, 324

Mortar shell cases, 292-293

MOS. See Military Occupational Specialty.

Mostaganem, 221

Mountain View, 397

Mourmelon-le-Petit, 367, 368, 380

Multigraph Corp., 305

Multilith offset printer, 304

Munitions Assignment Committee (Ground),

160, 164, 165

Nadzab, 479

Nagoya, 553

Naha, 533

Naknek, 428

Nancy, 376

Nantes, 376

Naples, 229, 231, 233, 234, 235, 241, 242,

252, 253, 262, 264

medical supply activities in, 251

stock in, 251

Natal, 191, 193

National Bureau of Standards, 96

National Defense Act of 1920—1

National Defense Mediation Board, 57

National Guard, 12, 68, 75

National Research Council, 24, 67, 74, 89

National War Labor Board, 58

NATOUSA (North African Theater of

Operations, U.S. Army). See Mediterranean theater; North African theater.

Navy Department, 53, 94

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of, 2
INDEX 649

Navy Task Force, 456

Negros Island, 501, 502, 503

Netherlands, 329, 332, 334, 335, 360

Neuhof salt mine, 378

Neuss, 364

New Britain, 447, 451

New Caledonia, 420, 422, 424, 426, 432, 437,

479, 540

New Delhi, 513

New Georgia, 437, 438, 457, 458

New Georgia campaign, 456-458, 467

New Georgia operation, initial medical supply plan for, 456

New Guinea, 411, 414, 431, 438, 440, 441,

442, 450, 451, 455, 456, 459, 490, 541,

552

establishment of U.S. Army bases in, 417

medical supply in, 417-418

medical supply organization in, 417

security storage in, 439

special methods for automatic supply to,

445, 447

survey of, 479-480

New Guinea campaigns, 438-450

New Hebrides, 411, 420-421

New Orleans Port of Embarkation, 144, 186,

189, 191, 193

New York General Depot, 2, 6, 7, 13, 69, 96

Medical Section of, 10, 15, 17, 22, 64

New York Medical Department Procurement District, 20, 22, 87

inspection section established in, 59

New York Medical Depot, 22

New York Port of Embarkation, 144, 145,

179, 222, 240, 280, 288, 297, 315, 339

Port Medical Supply Division of, 277

New York Procurement Office, 41

New York Zone Intermediate Depot, 102,103

New Zealand, 420, 421, 424, 434

rehabilitation of combat divisions in, 437

Newfoundland, 145, 173, 177

Newfoundland Air Base (Gander Field), 177

Newfoundland Base Command, 173-178

Newport, 297

NEWTON, Maj. WALTER J., 509, 514

Nichols Field, 400

station hospitals at, 30

Nigeria, 202

XIX Corps, 362

Ninth Air Force, 195, 196

Ninth Air Force Service Command, 344

Ninth Air Service Command, 196

Ninth U.S. Army, 320, 327, 329, 331, 355,

357, 360-362, 376

arrival of, in United Kingdom, 295

Ninth U.S. Army—Continued

depot support of, 360-361

depots of, 334-335

surgeon of, 296

Nocelleto, 235

Noemfoor Island, 450

Noirhat, 329, 367

Nome, 465

Normandy, 313, 317, 322, 337, 340, 561

Normandy assault, 277

Normandy Base, 369

Normandy beaches, 322

early supply problems on, 307-310

emergency requirements on, 309

hospital assemblies on, 309,

medical supply support on 307-311

Normandy Beachhead, 317

Normandy Campaign, 320

Normandy coast, 153

Normandy invasion, 324

NOERIS, Col. BENJAMIN, 219

North Africa, 27, 73, 120, 196, 210, 213, 220,

223, 224, 226, 228, 229, 230, 232, 235,

241, 251, 256, 257, 259, 262, 264, 266,

277, 303, 560, 562

assault on, 205-209

planning for invasion of, 203-205

problems encountered in, 278

North African assault, supplies for, 269

North African bases, preparations to move,

241-242

North African campaign, 152, 211, 221, 275,

277, 562

North African invasion, 221

North African Mission, 195

North African operation, 279

changes in, 251

North African theater, 210, 217, 272

Medical Section of, 260

policy of, for distributing supplies, 262

See also Mediterranean theater.

North Appenines Campaign, 253

North Appenines operation, 249-253

North Atlantic Bases, 173-185

North Atlantic Ferry Route, 179

Northbank, 176

inadequate storage facilities at, 177

North Bay Boulevard, 543

North Beach, 463

North Negros Sugar Co., 401

Northern Attack Force, 475

Northern Base Section, 253

Northern France, medical supply actions in,

380-382

Northern Ireland, 265, 371
650 INDEX

Noumea, 422, 432 Oran—Continued

Nux vomica, 8 problem of medical warehouse, space in,

213

Oahu, 393, 395, 469, 478, 479 Oran area, initial assault on beaches in, 206

Oberstem, 359 Oran Medical Depot, 239

Occupation of Japan, 549-554 Ordnance Corps, 111, 155

Office of Civilian Supply, War Production Ordnance Department, 52, 322

Board, 53 O'REILLY, Lt. Col. GEORGE T., 351

Office of Emergency Management, 158 Organization:

Division of Defense Aid Reports of, 155 for procurement planning, 1-2

Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 155, of medical supply depots, 270-291

156, 160, 162, 163 of medical supply system for war, 393-395

Office of Production Management, 13, 51 Organization equipment, 396-397

Office of the Assistant Chief, Supply Service, Orion, 400

Packing and Crating unit established in, Ormoc, 486, 490, 491

120 Oro Bay, 417, 420, 440, 441, 448, 452, 453,

Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1, 479

6, 7, 10 Orthopedic equipment and supplies, procureOffice of the Foreign Liquidation Commis- ment of, 91-96

sion, 557 Orthopedic shops, 91-93

Office of the Under Secretary of War, 155 Otaru, 553

Defense Aid Division of, 156 OTSG. See Surgeon General's Office.

Officer training, 108-109 Oujda, 227

Okinawa, 531, 562 OVERLORD, 272-297

analysis of supply operations on, 536 assembly and reassembly program for, 279

blood supply on, 536 buildup, 275

followup supply on, 535-536 early preparations for, 275-279

hospital assemblies on, 534, 535 medical ucits, 289

medical supply functions on, 531-533 plans for, 305-306

preparation for the assault on, 531 stock levels for, 315

Okinawa operation, 531-536 Overseas action, plans for, 395-396

Olaa, 397 Overseas Supply Branch, Seattle Port of

Olive-drab camouflage dressing, 561 Embarkation, 428, 464, 465

OLLA. See Office of Lend-Lease Administration. Pacific, 24, 27, 30, 61, 73, 153, 190, 399, 454,

"OLLA Control Books," 161 478, 483, 494, 559, 560, 561, 562

OLYMPIC, 540 medical supply in, 30-32

converted to BLACKLIST, 551 medical supply units in, 540

medical supplies for, 538 recipients of medical supplies in, 123

plan for invasion of Kyushu, 537 Pacific area, 32, 379, 380, 402

Omaha Beach, 307, 308, 312, 313, 319, 320, preparation for war, 393

326 Pacific Area Command, 529

I Corps, 496, 497, 553 Pacific medical supply, in the period of

Opium, 8 defense, 393-430

Oppenheim, 357 Pacific Ocean Areas, 486

Optical activities in South Pacific Area, headquarters of, 481

426-427 Pacific theaters, 27

Optical program, 388, 561 camouflage dressings in, 65

in Alaska, 430 medical equipment repair in, 560

Optical Repair Team Type No. 1—190 plan for shipping blood to, 153

Optical repair units, 82-86 units redeploying for, 384

Optical Section Shop in Manila, 547 Packaging and Packing Section, Army

Optical sections in the depot base section, 348 Medical Purchasing Office, 120, 127

Oran, 203, 204, 207, 210, 211, 215, 216, 219, Padloping Island, 180

223, 230, 251, 260 Palau campaign, support for, 476
INDEX 651

Palau Island Group, capture of, by American

forces, 476

Palau operations, experience resulting from,

478

Palaus, offensive operations in, 431-481

Palawan, 500

Palawan operation, supplies for, 500-501

Palermo, 24, 227

Palestine, 196

Pamaquine naphthoate, 509

Pan American Airways, 194

Chief Medical Officer of, 195

Panama, 188

Panama Canal, 185

Panama Canal Department, 185-189

Panama Canal Zone, 185

Panay, 501, 502

Panay-Negros operation, 503

Pannier program, 376

PAPPAS, Lt. Col. ALLEN, 246, 332

Parachute Infantry Regiment, 503d—451,

501

Paraguay, 193

Parang, 504

Paris, 320, 326, 329, 340, 344, 355, 365, 367,

369, 370, 375, 376, 382, 387

Base Optical Shop in, 388

liberation of, 314, 323

PARKS, Capt. JOSEPH B., 284

PARSSINEN, Maj. OLIVER A., 244

Pearl Harbor, 9, 18, 46, 52, 67, 68, 128, 136,

139, 168, 265, 394, 395, 397, 399, 420,

431, 478, 559, 560

organization of medical supply following

attack on, 428

Peleliu Island, 475

Peleliu operation, 476

Penicillin, 41, 45, 63, 71-73, 93, 152, 299,

301-302, 309, 310, 337, 443, 491, 495,

502, 556, 558

air shipments of, 152

dating period of, 72

development of, 193

distribution of, 72

emergency shipments of, 310

improvements in, 72

in treatment of gonorrhea, 302

refrigeration for, 486

shipment of, 152-153

Peninsular Base Section, 229-230, 234, 238,

239, 240, 241, 250, 251, 252, 264

Peninsular Base Section headquarters, 251

Pentothal sodium, 141, 324, 398

PERRY, Col. WALTER L., 266

"Persecution," 448

Persian Gulf Area, 202

first American hospital in, 198

Persian Gulf Command, 194, 195, 198-201,

202

shortage of medical supply catalogs in, 200

Persian Gulf Service Command, 198

Perth, 411, 412

PETERSON, Col. LEONARD T., 91

Petrolatum dressings, 45, 66

Pfalz, 364

PHELPS, 2d Lt. ALLAN W., 399

Philippeville, 216

Philippine Army, 399, 401

Philippine Civil Affairs Units, 493

Philippine Department, 399

Philippine Islands, 402, 531, 537, 545

depot operations in, 543-547

Philippine Islands base sections, organizational changes and problems in, 542-543

Philippine Islands bases, closeout of, 557

Philippine Islands Campaign, 483-506

lessons learned in, 504-506

medical supply planning, 483-484

Philippine Medical Supply Depot, 399, 400,

401

Philippines, 30, 32, 382, 402, 403, 442, 454,

483, 485, 493, 541, 542, 552, 556, 559

civilian medical supply in, 555

code for, 405

disposition of surplus property in, 557

fall of, 31

loss of medical supplies by pilferage in, 558

medical supply in, 500-506

medical supply in defense of, 399-401

movement toward, 450

prewar preparations, 399-400

relief for, 404-406

staging of redeployed units in, 540

survey of, 479-480

Philippines campaign, 38, 562

Philippines Commonwealth Government,

545

PINKERTON, Dr. FORREST J., 393

Piombino, 235, 242

Piper Cub, 234

Plant expansion, financial aid from the

Government for, 45

Plasma, 206, 227

Plasmochin, 509

PLUM, code for ships carrying supplies for

Operation OLYMPIC, 538

Plymouth, 299

Poland, 4

German invasion of, 9

Poliomyelitis, 490
652 INDEX

POM-RED, SOP No. 61—379 Procurement—Continued

Porretta, 253 of problem items, 63-99

Port Control Procurement Division, 146 Atabrine, 73-75

Port Lyautey, 205 blood plasma, 67-68

Port Medical Supply Division, New York books and journals, 96-98

Port of Embarkation, 277 hearing aids, 89-90

Port Medical Transit Depot, 11th—368 orthopedic equipment and supplies,

Port Moresby, 417, 420, 440, 441, 442 91-96

early medical supply depot operations at, penicillin, 71-73

419-420 spectacles, 75-86

early medical supply facilities in, 418-419 surgical dressings, 63-66

storage facilities at, 418, 438 surgical instruments, 68-70

Port Moresby Depot, 438 of property exchange items, 98-99

Port(s) of Embarkation: planning for, 10-12

Boston, 144, 145, 178, 180, 182, 339 problems in, 268-270

Charleston, 144, 196 Procurement Circular No. 36—50

Hampton Roads, 144 Procurement districts, 22

Los Angeles, 144, 514 Procurement Division, U.S. Treasury DeNew Orleans, 144, 186, 189, 191, 193 partment, 165

New York, 144, 145, 179, 222, 240, 280, Procurement planning:

286, 297, 315, 339 accomplishments in, 2-7

San Francisco, 144, 395, 396, 425, 426, 437, during 1920's and 1930's, 13

477, 478, 483, 490, 493, 498, 504, 541 organization for, 1-2

Seattle, 144, 145, 428, 464, 465 Procurement Section, Medical Supply DiPort Quartermaster, 397 vision, ETOUSA, 267

Port Transportation Division, 148 Production Division, ASF, 164

Portable Optical Repair Unit, 83 Production Requirements Plan, 52-53

Portable surgical hospitals, in New Guinea Production Scheduling Branch of the Majungles, 414 teriel Office, ASF, 162

Post Dispensary No. 2—395 Production Service Branch, Army Medical

Post Surgeon, Southampton Island, 180 Purchasing Office, 55, 56

POTTER, Col. LAURENCE A., 459, 532 Property exchange items, procurement of,

Po Valley, 249, 253 98-99

Po Valley campaign, 253 Prophylactics, mechanical, 45

Preparedness Committee of the Honolulu Prostheses for amputees, 94

County Medical Society, 393 Prosthetics laboratories, 348

Preshipment plan, problems under, 294 Protective Mobilization Plan, 12

President's Committee on Commodity Cata- Protective Mobilization Plan of 1938—3, 4

loging, 116 Provisional Marine Brigade, 1st—475

President, the, 9, 12, 13, 155, 194 Provisional Station Hospital No. 2—472

See also ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D. PRYOR, Capt. ROBERT E., 301

Price analysis, 42-43 Public Health Service, 190

Prince Rupert, Alaska, 428 Public Health Subcommission of the Allied

Prince Rupert Sub-Port of Embarkation, 428 Control Commission, AM GOT, 262

Priorities system, 49-52 Public Works Administration, 103

Problems of resupply, 498 Puerto Princesa city, 500

''Procedure for Handling Lend-Lease MediPuerto Rican Department, 185

Puerto Rican General Depot, 189

cal Supplies," 11 August 1943—163 Puerto Rican Sector, 189, 190

PROCO (Projects for Continental Opera- Puerto Rico, 189, 191

tions) projects, 299 Pupukea Heights, 398

Procurement: Purchase orders, placing of, 40-42

in European theater, 1942-43—267-268

of British medical material 267, 270 Quartermaster Base Depot Company,

of medical supplies, 12-15, 35-62 684th—242, 252, 253
INDEX 653

Quartermaster Corps, 111, 144, 155, 289, 378 Requisitions:

Quartermaster General, 91, 93, 102 editing of, 153-154

Quartermaster General's Office, 103 procedures for, 345-347

Quartermaster laundry sections, 350 regular and emergency, 136-138

Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, Va., 23 Resupply, problems of, 498

Queen's Hospital, 393 Resupply plans, 305

Queensland, State of, 411 Retschwiller, 360

Quezon City, 543 RETZKY, Maj. CLARENCE, 557

Quinacrine hydrochloride. See Atabrine. Reverse Lend-Lease, 267

Quinine, 31, 141, 401, 404 Reykjavik, 182, 183, 185

Japanese monopoly on supply of, 73 REYNOLDS, Col. EDWARD, 19, 91, 104, 559

reserves of, 9 Reynolds Metals envelope, 66

shortages of, 147, 400 Rheinprovinz, 364

substitute for, 73 Rheydt, 362

surpluses of, 147, 184 Rhine River, 353, 357, 358, 360, 362, 364,

QUINNELL, Col. EARLE D., 388 368, 370, 376, 377

Rhone Valley, 243, 332

Rabat, 209, 210 Rhyd Lafor, 299

Rabies, emergency delivery of drugs for, 485 Riardo, 229

Rabies, vaccine, 316 RICE, Col. GEORGE W., 403, 454

RADKE, Lt. Col. RYLE A., 537 RICHARDS, Capt. KENNETH E., 277, 292,

Rämgarh, 509, 511 294, 309, 310

Reading, 272 Rio de Janeiro, 193

Recife, 191, 192, 193, 194 RIORDAN, Lt. Col. BERNARD N., 459

Recife, medical supply section at, 198 Ritter Dental Manufacturing Co., Inc., 105

Recife General Depot, 191, 192 River Clyde, 180

Reciprocal aid program, 267 ROBINSON, Col. PAUL I., 26, 540, 551

"Reckless," 448 Rockhampton, 441

Red Ball Coaster system, 310 Roer River, 361, 362

Red Ball Express, 311, 322, 339 ROGERS, Col. JOHN A., 277, 287, 311

Red Cross. See American Red Cross. Rome, 235, 242, 259, 263

Red List procedure, 150 Rome area, supply of troops in, 242

Redeployment, 264 Rome-Arno Campaign, 235-242

in medical supply units, 540 Fifth U.S. Army medical service in,

Redeployment and occupation, 379-390 235-238

summary, 390 ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D., 194

Redeployment planning, 379-380 RORIE, Capt. CHESTER E., 344

Reggio, 263 Rostrenen, 320, 330, 334

Regimental Combat Team(s): Rouen, 327, 337, 368

106th—472 Royal Australian Air Force, 558

127th—450 RUSSELL, JOHN J., 106

163d—448 Russell Islands, 437, 457

186th—500 Russia, 55, 158, 161, 194, 196, 201, 202

321st—476 Russian Government, 95, 168

503d—493 Russian Lend-Lease, 54

Russian War Relief, 61, 170 Regular Army, 12 Russian War Relief Society, 170

Rehabilitation centers, aural, 89, 90 RYDER, Maj. JOHN., 193

Reims, 321, 327, 328, 329, 367, 369, 376, 379,

388

Ryukyu Islands, 531

REMUND, Maj. DONALD E., 481 Saarland, 364

Rennes, 320, 375, 376 Safi, 203, 205, 210

Republic of Ecuador, 168 Saidor, 447, 448

Requirements Division, SGO, 159 St. John's, 173, 176

Requisitioning by units, 396 Saint Laurent-sur-Mer, 307
654 INDEX

Saint-L6, 313, 319 Seattle General Depot, 430

St. Louis Arsenal Reservation, 111 Seattle Port of Embarkation, 428, 464, 465

St. Louis Medical Department Procurement 2d Advance Platoon, 12th Medical Depot

District: Company, 235

Hospital Equipment Branch, 22 Second Medical Supply Conference, 529

purchasing branches: Secondigliano, 229

Drugs and Chemicals, 22 Secretary of War, 3, 50, 155, 156, 194

Miscellaneous Equipment and Supplies, See also STIMSON, HENRY L.

22 Section 1, Advance Depot Platoon, of—

X-ray and Physiotherapy Equipment, 7th Medical Supply Depot, 517

22 17th Medical Supply Depot, 437

St. Louis Medical Depot, 6, 16, 21, 22, 23, 85, 21st Medical Supply Depot, 431

91, 97, 103, 105, 108, 110, 112, 115, 134, Segi, 457

137, 342 Seigen, 355

St. Louis Medical Maintenance School, 190, Selective Service, 18

559, 560 Selective Service Act, 68, 75

St. Luke's International Hospital, 551 Selective Service Board, 56

Saint-Maximin, 243 Selective Service officials, 56

Saint-Raphael, 243 Sellieres, 243

Saint-Victoret, 382 SELWYN, Lt. Col. ROBERT E., 523

Saint-Wendel, 357 Senegal, 202

Sainte-Maxime, 243 Seoul, 555

Saipan, 473, 474, 475, 479, 481 Service and Supply Command, 195

medical supply problems on, 480 Service Command surgeons, 141

Salerno, 227 Service Commands, 140

Salerno invasion, Operation AVALANCHE Service Forces, 19

for, 227 Service of Supply in—

Salerno landings, 228-229 China-Burma-India, 507-509, 511, 513,

Salerno operation, 232 514, 517, 522, 523, 526

Salisbury, 301 China theater, 528

SAMS, Brig. Gen. CRAWFORD, F., 194, 555 European theater, 265

San Antonio General Depot, 16 North African theater, 219-220, 222, 229,

San Fabian, 495, 496, 498 238, 239, 240, 264

San Francisco General Depot, 16 South Pacific, 421-422

San Francisco Medical Depot, 114, 459 Southwest Pacific, 453, 455

San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 395, Surgeon General's Office, 18, 24, 298

396, 425, 426, 437, 477, 478, 483, 490, 493, Seventh U.S. Army, 224, 243, 246, 367, 368,

498, 504, 541 383

San Jose, 493, 498, 499 depot support of, 359-360

San Juan, P.R., 189 distribution of medical supplies to, 332

Sanitary Corps Reserve, 6 Seventh U.S. Army depots, 331

Santo Thomas University, 497 77th Infantry Division, support of, 490-

Säo Luiz, 192, 193 491

Sarrebourg, 332, 359, 360 SHEAF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied

Savannah Medical Depot, 23 Expeditionary Force.

Schistosomiasis Commission, 558 SHAMBORA, Col. WILLIAM E., 295

SCHNEIDER, Maj. FREDERICK, 210 Sharonville Engineer Depot, 156

Schofleld Barracks, 393 Sharp and Dohme, Inc., 67

station hospital at, 395 Shemya Island, 465

Schwäbisch Hall, 360 Shoes, orthopedic requirements for, 93-94

SHOOK, Col. CHARLES F., 24, 219, 238, 242,

Schwartz, Maj. FREDERIC N., 24 245, 250, 359

Scoglitti area, medical supplies in, 224 Sicilian campaign, 562

SCOTT, Lt. LESLIE C, 453 Sicilian invasion, 223

SEAGRAVE, Lt. Col. GORDON S., 511 Sicilian operation, medical maintenance unit

Seagrave medical unit, 507, 509, 519 designed for use in, 217
INDEX 655

Sicily, 73, 222, 223, 225, 227, 229, 259, 260,

560

planning for invasion of, 221

Sicily Campaign, 223-227, 260, 295

Siegfried Line, depot advance to, 319-321

Signal Corps, 52, 111, 155

Signal School, 369

SIMMS, Capt. ALBERT, 552

XVI Corps, 362

XVI Corps units, 362

VI Corps, 231, 240, 242

Sixth U.S. Army, 447, 452, 453, 454, 491, 499,

537, 540, 553, 555

early supply activities of, 450-451

surgeons of, 453, 483

Skilled workers, loss of, 56-57

Smaller War Plants Corp., 45

Smallpox epidemic, 555

Smallpox vaccine, 210, 557

SMIT, Maj. WALTER, 210

SMITH, Col. STUART G., 26, 375

Smith-Connally Act of 25 June 1943—58

SNYDER, Lt. Col. JAMES, 277

SNYDER, Col. OSCAR P., 407

Society Islands, 399

Solomons, 30, 411, 421, 424, 437, 447, 459

campaign in, 74

offensive operations in, 431-481

S0ndre Sttfrm Fjord, 180

SOS. See Services of Supply.

SOS Memorandum No. 187, 1 Nov. 1943—

516

SOSSPA (Services of Supply, South Pacific

Area), 421-422

South America, 73

South Atlantic theater, 191-194

South Atlantic Wing, ATC, Special Headquarters Staff of, 191

South Beach dump, Depot No. 4—545

Southampton Island, 180

South Pacific, 73, 120, 147, 434, 459

medical supply in, 420-427

estimate of the situation of, 421

organization and purpose, 420-421

supply problems of, 479

South Pacific Area, 30, 424, 425, 426, 431-

438, 480, 486

automatic supply discontinued in, 436

end of combat in, 438

field equipment in, 431

first optical-repair officer in, 427

initial problems in medical supply of,

422-424

Japanese offensive halted in, 431

levels of supply in, 436

South Pacific Area—Continued

maintenance and repair in, 427

medical supply levels in, 424

optical activities in, 426-427

refrigeration in, 437

rehabilitation of combat divisions in, 437

reorganization of supply units in, 437-438

Services of Supply established in, 421-422

stock control in, 425-426

supply points and storage facilities in,

432-434

South Pacific Base Command, 437, 480

South Pacific General Depot, 432, 434, 436,

437

Southern Base Section, 299

Southern France, 247, 249, 250, 251, 257,

382, 383

depots in, 368

early depot operations in, 243-245

first permanent depot in, 243

later depot operations in, 245-249

preparations for invasion of, 242

Southern France Campaign, 242, 243

Southern Islands Hospital, 401

Southern Line of Communications, 242, 245,

246, 250, 317, 359, 368

supply functions of, 332

Southwest Pacific Area, 30, 126, 413, 437,

438, 443, 448, 450-455, 456, 459, 479,

480, 485

deployment of supply units in, 440-442

depots in, 486

depot operations in, 438-440

medical supply problems during buildup

in, 412-417

Soviet Mission, 168

Soviet Purchasing Commission, 95

"Spare Parts and Tool Listing," 116

Special Observer Group, 265

Special supply projects, 298-299

Spectacle program, 77

Spectacles, 63, 75-86, 194, 492, 561

commercial-type, 75-80

delivery problems of, 77

fabrication of, 344-345

for wear with gas masks, 80-82

issue of:

to Air Force personnel, 303

to Army personnel, 303

payment for, 79-80

prescriptions for, 201

replacement and fabrication of, 426

requirements for, 76

SPOR, SOP No. 63—379

SPRUIT, Col. CHARLES B., 350
INDEX

SS John Lykes, 401

SS Rufus King, 410

SS Tucson, 556

STACEY, Col. ROYAL K., 134

STANDLEB, Col. EARLB G. G., 265, 266

State Selective Service Director, 56

Station Hospital, Newfoundland Base Command, 173, 176

STILWELL, Gen. JOSEPH W., 507, 529

Stilwell Road, 529

STIMSON, HENRY L., 194

Stock Control in European theater, 285-286

Stock Control Manual for Stations, revision

of, 142

Stock control system, reorganization of, 287

Stock distribution, 286-287

Stock Level Purchasing, system of, 37-39

Stock levels, 315-316

Stock Record Card System, 516

Storage and distribution of medical supplies,

119-154

Storage and Issue Platoon (s):

1st—253, 441

2d—253

3d—253

29th Medical Depot Company, 450

68th Medical Depot Company, 437

STORZ, Maj. ERIC A., 115

Straubing, 358, 388

STRIKER, Maj. ALEXANDER;, F., 220

STHNAD, Maj. JOSEPH J., 364

Sub-Depot, Antilles General Depot, 190

Subic Bay, 497, 558

Substitutions for scarce materials, 46-48

Subtask Force Blackstone, 205

medical supplies for, 203

Subtask Force Brushwood, medical support

for, 204

Subtask Force Goalpost, 205

medical support for, 204

Sukkur, 513

Sulfaguanidine, 431, 486, 509

Sulfanilamide, 302, 422

Sulfonamides, 400, 401, 511

Supplies:

dispersion of, in Alaska, 429

preshipment of, 150-151

receipts of, 396

responsibility for distribution of, 143-144

storage of, 347

Supply:

automatic, special methods for, 445-447

in fixed installations, 297-298

of Air Forces units, 298

Supply activities:

in the Occupation, 383-388

United Kingdom Base, 350-352

Supply depots:

opening of, 312

shifting of, in rear areas, 242

Supply distribution, problems of, 457

Supply functions in 1945—369-375

Supply levels, increase in, 305

Supply points, in marshaling areas, 299

Supply Division, Chief Surgeon's Office,

ETOUSA, 268, 269, 270, 282-283, 288,

295, 313, 322, 339, 359, 375, 376, 377,

380

activities of, in U.K. Base, 350

chief of, 283, 369, 372

early organization of, 265-266

Maintenance and Repair Section, 369

on the Continent, 313-317

civilian personnel in, 315

organization of, 314-315

personnel of, 283-284

reorganization of, 283-297

responsibilities of, 275

revises Civil Affairs supply concept, 376

role of, in medical supply operation, 29-30

subordinate elements of:

Administration and Finance Branch,

314

Depot Technical Control Branch, 284, 314

Issue Branch, 314

Stock Control Branch, 314, 315

task of:

for Operation BOLERO, 266

for Operation TORCH, 266-267

Supply Division, Theater Chief Surgeon's

Office, TSFET, 386-387, 388

Supply Service, SGO, 20, 21, 26, 46, 65, 68,

69, 94, 111, 121, 126, 127, 136, 143, 150,

151, 152, 368, 559

activities of, 27

chief of, 19

directive of, on maintenance program, 115

realinement of responsibilities of, 162-166

relationship with American Red Cross, 24

reorganization of, 19, 162-166

requisitions edited by, 86

responsibilities of, 27

subordinate elements of:

Control Division, 280

Distribution and Requirements Division, 21, 36, 104

Distribution Division, 19, 162

International Division, 19, 160, 161, 162,

163, 164, 167
INDEX 657

Supply Service, SGO—Continued

subordinate elements of—Continued

Issue Division, 21, 137, 141

Price Analysis and Renegotiation Division, 19

Procurement Division, 19, 20, 162

Production Planning Division, 19

Purchase Division, 19, 20, 21, 23, 170

Renegotiation Division, 21, 43

Resources Division, 19

Specialties Division, 19

Stock Control Division, 154, 164, 170,

538

Storage and Distribution Division, 146

Storage and Maintenance Division, 21,

104

Storage Division, 143

Supply Planning and Specialties Division, 19, 20

Supply Planning Division, 19, 21

waterproof container, "amphibious box,"

developed by, 121-123

Supply system:

changes in, 282-283

inspection of, 515-516

organization of, 507-509

Supply Team, 2d—491

Supply technique, innovations in, 345-350

Supply units:

augmentation of, 441

deployment of, 440-442

Support depots, rear operations of, 365-369

Supreme Allied Commander's responsibilities, for civil affairs, 264

Supreme Commander, SWPA, 406

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary

Force, 375, 376

Surgeon (s):

Advance Section, Communications Zone,

ETOUSA, 287, 313

Air Transport Command, 191

Alaska Defense Command, 465

Alaskan theater, 464

Atlantic Base Section, 209

China theater, 528

Eastern Base Section, 223

Eighth U.S. Army, 454

15th Army Group, 221

Fifteenth U.S. Army, 364

Fifth U.S. Army, 238, 253

First U.S. Army, 18, 277, 278, 279, 287,

305, 313

Force 343—222

Forward Echelon Headquarters, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, 287

Surgeon (s)—Continued

XIV Corps, 457, 458

Fourth U.S. Army, 459

Headquarters, Pacific Ocean Areas, 481

India-Burma theater, 528

Ninth U.S. Army, 296

101st Medical Regiment, 431

Services of Supply, 24, 507, 511, 514, 522

Services of Supply, NATOUSA, 219, 222

7th Infantry Division, 459

Sixth U.S. Army, 453, 483

Southern Line of Communications, 242,

250

Third U.S. Army, 295, 350

32d Infantry Division, 489

XXrV Corps, 532

II Corps, 221

U.K. Base, 372

U.K. Base Section, 350

U.S. Army Forces in Australia, 402, 403

U.S. Military North African Mission, 194

Surgeon General of the Navy, 116

Surgeon General, The, 2, 4, 23, 40, 61, 76,

88, 91, 94, 102, 104, 107, 110, 114, 115,

116, 118, 144, 152, 156, 163, 165, 279,

280, 289, 297, 298, 310, 428, 464, 465,

523

assigns Surgeon, USAFIA, 403

authorizes maintenance training course,

105

directs officer attendance at Maintenance

and Repair Course, 108-109

materiel demobilization plan of, 26-27

on reserves of medical supplies, 7, 11-12

overseas maintenance plan of, 103

policy of, on hearing aids, 89

requests Red Cross aid in production of

surgical dressings, 24-25, 63

See also KIRK, Maj. Gen. NORMAN T.;

MAQEE, Maj. Gen. JAMES C.

Surgeon General's Office, 43, 64, 75, 78, 87,

94, 96, 103, 104, 107, 109, 111, 115, 132,

137, 146, 148, 149, 150, 153, 182, 193,

197, 217, 219, 276, 282, 283, 291, 394,

426, 478, 479, 522, 551

central stock control system in, 138-140

demobilization planning in, 26-27

medical supply training courses provided

by, 23

optical service procedure of, 547

periodic inventories established by, 131

procurement planning in, 1-15

role of, in "the Lend-Lease business,"

156-160

Services of Supply in, 18, 24, 298
658 INDEX

Surgeon General's Office—Continued

subordinate elements of:

Finance and Supply Division, 1, 3, 9, 10,

14, 19, 149, 155, 559

Finance and Supply Service, 79

Fiscal Division, 162, 170

Supply Service. See Supply Service,

SGO.

Surgical Division, 89

Technical Division, 152

supply organization in, 18-21

Surgeon General's Penicillin Board, 73

Surgeon's Office(s):

AFWESPAC, 549

Atlantic Base Section, 209

Central Pacific Area, 473

Central Pacific Base Command, 478

First U.S. Army, 357

General Headquarters, Manila, 537

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 395

Headquarters, SOS, Task Force A, 209

NATOUSA, 215

Ninth U.S. Army, 357

Pacific Ocean Areas, 481

Third U.S. Army, 349

Surgical Division, SGO, 89

Surgical dressings, 24, 25

problems in procurement of, 63-65

Surgical instruments, 63, 68-70

Surinam, 190

Surplus property, disposition of, 557

Surplus Property Act of 1944—25

Suva, 421, 422, 424

Swansea, 297

SWPA. See Southwest Pacific Area.

Sydney, 405, 408, 411, 412, 455

Tacloban, 487, 531

Tactical units, equipping of, 149

Taegu, 555

Talisay, 401

TAMRAZ, Col. JOHN M., 507, 508, 513

Tanahmerah Bay, 448

Tarawa, 471

Tarlac, 400, 495, 496, 497, 498

Task Force, South Pacific, 402

Task Force 4591—399

Tasman, 444, 445

TAT (To Accompany Troops), 151

Taunton, 280

T/E (table of equipment) equipment, receipt

of, 276

Tebessa, 215, 216

Tebessa-Kasserine area, 214

Technical Division, SGO, 152

Technical manuals, 114-117

Technical Services, 26, 541

Technical training, 104-109

Techniques for payment of spectacles, 79-80

Tehran, 196

Tel Litwinsky, 196

X Corps, 483

automatic resupply of whole blood to, 504

commanding general of, 504

early supply problems of units of, 487-490

initial landings of, 486-487

supply operations with, on Leyte, 486-490

"Ten-Day Status of Procurement Report,"

56

Tenth Air Force bases, 513

Tenth U.S. Army, 532, 537

Thatchman, 272

The Pas, 180

Theater Chief Surgeon, TSFET, 388, 389

Theater Chief Surgeon's Office, TSFET, 389

Theater Service Forces, European Theater,

386

Theater supply organization, changes in,

250-251

Theater supply procedures, changes in,

455-458

Theaters of operations, distribution of medical supplies to, 143-154

Theodore Hamblin, Ltd., 303

Thiopental sodium. See Pentothal sodium.

Third U.S. Army, 299, 300, 320, 328, 345,

348, 355, 357-359, 367, 370

arrival of, in Europe, 295

entrance of, into combat operations, 313,

317

in First U.S. Army depot system, 311-312

medical depot companies of, 284, 294, 327,

329-331, 334, 335

surgeon of, 295

XIII Corps units, 362

34th Medical Depot Company, operations

of, 491-493

Thomas, 486

Thomas' Register, 4

THOMPSON, Lt. Col. JOSEPH C, 422, 426

III Corps, 330

Tinian, 475, 554

Tinian campaign, 475

TINKHAM, Capt. ERNEST R., 555

TOE (table of organization and equipment),

266

8-661—271, 284, 395

8-667—242, 249

Toem, 450

Tokyo, 536, 551
INDEX 659

Toledo Medical Depot, 130, 166, 541

Tonga Islands, 421

Tongareva, 421, 426

Tongatabu, 421, 426

Toowoomba, 441

TORCH, 221, 272, 274

for North African invasion, 203

lessons learned from, 208-209

supply requirements for, 266-267

Totnes, 299

Toul, 320, 330, 331, 367

Tours, 376

Townsville, 406, 408, 411, 412, 441, 451

Transportation Corps, 144, 297, 298, 325

Transportation problems, 148-149

Treasury Department, 45, 155, 165, 166

Treuen, 355, 359, 388

Trevieres, 320

Trier, 359

Trilport, 367

Trinidad, 190, 191

Trinidad Base Command, 190

Medical Supply Section of, 189

Trinidad General Depot, 189, 190

Trinidad Sector and Base Command, 189,

190, 191, 193

Trinidad Supply Section, 191

Tropical diseases, 30

TSFET (Theater Service Forces, European

Theater), 386

Tuguegarao, 499

Tunisia, 214, 215, 223

drive through, 217-219

Tunisia Campaign, 214-219, 227, 258

supply buildup for, 214-216

Tunugdliarfik Fjord, 180

XII Corps, 320, 330

12th Medical Depot, 229

XX Corps, 320, 329, 330

XXIV Corps, 483, 496, 531, 533, 536, 554

medical supply support for, 485

resupply of, 486

supply problems of, 485-486

XXIV Corps Supply Detachment, 485

II Corps, 204, 214, 218, 221

TYNG, Col. FRANCIS C, 9, 19, 169

U.K. Base, 350

plans for invasion of Continent from, 275

supply activities in, 142-153

U.K. Base Optical Shop, 371

U.K. Base Section, 315, 350, 371

U.K. General Purchasing Agent, 375

U.K. Surgeon's Office, 374

Ulithi, 475

Ulithi Atoll, 476

Under Secretary of War, 10, 45

Undistributed Allocation Balance, 159

Unit assembly, movement of, on Continent,

339

Unit equipment, processing of, 291

United Czechoslovakia Relief, 61

United Kingdom, 28, 29, 151, 156, 158, 185,

203, 204, 205, 211, 262, 311, 313, 314,

315, 316, 321, 323, 339, 341, 342, 343,

344, 369, 370, 374, 375, 378, 386, 387,

388

air shipment of medical supplies from, 355

closures of, 371-373

depots in, 270

first medical supply installation in, 271

first U.S. Army command in, 265

hospitals serviced by medical depots in,

1944—351

medical depots in, 271

medical supply actions in, 380-382

medical supply operations in, 317

mounting concern over supply in, 279-280

operations of, 273-274

preinvasion buildup in, 265-306

split shipments to, 339

supply points in marshaling areas of, 299

survey of medical supply system in, 280

system of, 350-351

units and operational sites of, 271-272

United Nations, 61

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation

Administration, 26

United States. See Zone of Interior.

United States of America Typhus Commission stocks, 351

Units, augmentation equipment for, 294-295

Upper Assam, 523

Urdaneta, 496, 497, 498

Uruguay, 193

USAFEE (U.S. Army Forces, Far East),

induction of Philippine Army troops into,

399

USAFIA (U.S. Army Forces in Australia),

402, 410

USAFIME (U.S. Army Forces in the Middle

East), 194, 201

USAFISPA (U.S. Army Forces in the South

Pacific Area), 432

USAHS Mactan, 403

USASOS (U.S. Army Services of Supply),

402, 450

USASOS General Depot, 456

USFIA (U.S. Forces in Australia), 402

U.S. Advance Base, 417
660 INDEX

313,

335,

250,

483,

U.S. Air Force, buildup of, in British Isles,

265

U.S. Armed Forces, 393

U.S. Army, 67, 81, 87

First, 272, 277, 279, 281, 284, 287, 288, 293,

297, 299, 300, 309, 310, 312, 313, 319,

327, 328, 353, 355, 357, 362, 537

Third, 284, 294, 295, 299, 300, 311,

317, 320, 327, 328, 329, 330, 334,

345, 348, 355, 357-359, 367, 370

Fourth, 459

Fifth, 220, 229, 235, 238, 240, 249,

253, 303

Sixth, 447, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454,

491, 499, 537, 540, 553, 555

Seventh, 224, 243, 246, 332, 359-360, 367,

368, 383

Eighth, 454, 491, 499, 501, 503, 504, 537,

540, 554, 555, 556

Ninth, 295, 296, 320, 327, 329, 331, 334,

335, 355, 357, 360, 361, 362, 376

Tenth, 532, 537

Fifteenth, 355, 364

U.S. Army Forces, South Atlantic, 191

U.S. Army Forces in Australia, 406

U.S. Army Forces in Central Africa, 202

U.S. Army Forces in Liberia, 202

U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles, 265

U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, 540

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, 194-

198, 202

U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, 540, 552

Commander in Chief of, 536

U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area,

421, 422

U.S. Army Hospital Ship Marigold, 551

U.S. Army Services of Supply, 451

commanding general of, 455

U.S. Army Services of Supply General Depot,

456

U.S. Army Specification No. 100-14A,

1942—120

U.S. Army Transport Edmund B. Alexander,

173

U.S. Far East Air Forces, 540

U.S. Fifth Fleet, 473

U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 130

U.S. Force Composite 8012—191

U.S. Forces:

in Alaska, prewar expansion of, 427-428

in Austria, 383, 386

in central Canada, 180

in occupied Germany, 388

U.S. Marines, 431

U.S. Military Government mission in Germany, medical supplies for, 388

U.S. Military Iranian Mission, 194

U.S. Military Miss'ion to London, 265

U.S. Military North African Mission, 194

U.S. Naval Hospital, 394

U.S. Navy, 24, 35, 36, 52, 67, 94, 190, 205,

293, 308, 421, 537, 558

U.S. Navy Department, 61

U.S. occupation forces in Germany, 385

U.S. Occupied Zone of Germany, 383, 386,

388

U.S. Occupied Zone of Germany and Austria,

386

U.S. Pacific Fleet, 559

U.S. Public Health Service, 508

U.S. Seventh Fleet, 489

U.S. Treasury Department, 165

U.S.S. Corregidor, 32, 401

U.S.S. Edmund. B. Alexander, 173

U.S.S. Pensacola, 402, 403, 404

U.S.S. West Point, 404

U.S.S.R., 167

Utah Beach, 307, 308, 312, 313, 326

Vaccination against smallpox, 555

Vaccine, smallpox, 210, 555, 557

Valkensburg, 329, 330, 335, 361

Valognes, 313, 314, 375

Van Raalte Silk Co., 23

V-E Day, 24, 25, 26, 61, 154, 341, 384

plan for redeployment after, 379

Venereal diseases:

clinics for treatment of, 260

drugs for prevention and cure of, 263

Verdun, 320, 329, 330

Verona, 253

Versailles, 386

Vesoul, 243

Veterans' Administration, 94

Viersen, 362

Vinylite, 66

Viru, 457

Visayan Islands, 32, 401, 493, 501

Visayan-Mindanao Force, medical supply of,

401

V-J Day, 24, 25, 27, 116, 382, 383, 384, 547,

549, 556

V-loans, 61

Vogelkop Peninsula, 450

Volga, 158

Volturno, 242

Volturno River, 229, 242

VOOEHEES, Col. TRACY S., 280, 281, 283, 478,

480, 493, 522
INDEX 661

Voorhees mission: War Production Board, 47, 51, 53, 54, 55, 66,

background, 522 73, 74, 75, 91, 94, 157, 163

impact of, 522-524 War Reserve (s), 27

in China-Burma-India Theater, 522-524 and stockpiles, 7-^9

in Europe, 280-283, 289, 291, 295, 297 depots for storage of, 16, 17

in Pacific, 478-481 general hospitals in, 12

Hawaii, 478 inadequacy of, 18

New Guinea, 479-480 War Reserve Stock, 557

Philippines, 479-480 War Trials, 558

Saipan, 480 Wehrmacht troops, 370

South Pacific, 479 Weiden, 358

objective of, 285 Weinheim, 368, 384

organization of survey team, 478 Weinheim Medical Depot, 383, 384, 387, 388

recommendations of, 280-283, 480, 493, West Africa, 220

523 West African Service Command, 202

Voreppe, 243 Western Base Section, 299

Western Defense Command, Commanding

WAGNER, Maj. WILLIAM B., 289, 291, 322 General of, 459

Wakayama, 552, 553 Western Europe Allies, 377

Wakde Island, 450 Western Hemisphere, 184

Wake Island, 393 Western Military District of Germany, 383

Waller Field, Trinidad, 190 Western Pacific theater, 542

Walthurn, 360 Western Task Force, 203-206, 209

War Department, 2, 11, 12, 53, 61, 62, 159, Western Visayan Task Force, 493

160, 161, 165, 166, 170, 178, 219, 294, Wetzlar, 355

376, 393, 396, 422, 437, 464, 477, 479, Wherry boxes, 291

507, 526, 552 Wherry Luggage Co., 291

action of, on levels of supply, 197-198 WHITE, Lt. Col. HOWARD F., 307

authorizes activation of four numbered WHITE, Maj. RICHARD J., Jr., 27

station hospitals, 182 White Beach, 448, 486

automatic shipment of medical mainte- Whole blood, 299, 300-301, 310, 474, 495,

nance units discontinued by, 514 502, 504

directives of, 146 air shipments of, 301, 341

FEA funds allotted to, 163 distribution of, 152, 548

Procurement Division established in, 1 Wickham, 457

reduces strength in Alaskan theater, 467 Wiedenbrück, 362

responsibility of, for administration of WILLIAMS, Col. CLARK B., 216

Lend-Lease Act, 155 WILLIAMS, WO (jg) LEWIS H., 274

War Department General Staff, 10 WILLIAMS, Lt. Col. Louis F., 104, 478, 481

War Department Shipping Documents, 143, WILLIAMS, Brig. Gen ROBERT P., 507

148, 396 WILLIS, Brig. Gen. JOHN M., 481

War Department Contract Form— WILSON, Lt. Col. GEORGE P., 229, 250

No. SG 1—41 WILSON, Col. WILLIAM L., 26

No. SG 2—41 WINEGARD, Lt. Col. CHARLES I., 274, 297

War Department procurement activities, re- Winthrop Chemical Co., 74

organization of, in 1933—1-2 WIRTZ, Maj. MILTON S., 88

War Department Procurement Districts, 1 Witney, 271

War Department publications, 294 WOLF, Maj. EDWARD T., 406

War Department Purchase Order Form No. Woodlark Island, 451, 452

SG 3—41 WOODMAN, Lt. Col. ARNOLD J., 406

War Department Supply Bulletin 38—1-8, World War I—1, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 64, 68,

13 May 1944, "Repair of Critical and 70, 76, 102, 399

Nonessential Items," 111 American Red Cross in, 63

War Department "Troop Basis," 379 Medical Department during, 6

War Labor Disputes Act of 25 June 1943—58 Medical Department operations in, 2
662

World War I—Continued

medical requirements of, 413

spectacles furnished in, 75

WORLEY, Capt. HORACE D., 459

WORRELL, Col. JOHN A., 541

Wörrstadt, 358

WPB. See War Production Board.

Wright Field, 191

WüRZ, Lt. Col. JOHN F., 489

X-Force, 515

YAMASHITA, General, 558

Yap Island, 485

Yeomanry Camp, 183

Y-Force, 511, 512, 523, 528

Yokohama, 551, 552, 553, 556

Yokohama Depot, 551

Yugoslavia, 156

Yunnan (Y-Force), 509

Yunnan-Burma Railway, 508

Zablan Bulk Storage Depot, Depot No.

6—545

Zamboanga, 501

Zamboanga operation, 501

Zamboanga Peninsula, 500

Zamboanga-Sulu region, 501

Zanderij Field, 190

Zebra, 511

INDEX

Z-Force, 511, 528

Zone of Interior:

antityphus supplies to Germany from, 378

civilian employees in medical depots in,

128

clinical investigation of Atabrine in, 74

distribution of penicillin to hospitals in, 73

emergency air shipments of penicillin

from, 309

excess supplies returned to, 177, 178, 182,

188, 189, 190, 467, 479

hoarding in installations of, 140-142

manufacture of glass eyes in, 88

medical maintenance units shipped from,

281-282

medical units deployed from, 275

OLYMPIC requisitions canceled in, 552

piece of artificial eye in, 259

production of penicillin in, 302

requirements for—

first aid packets in, 66

medical supplies in, 132-133

reserve stocks positioned in, 99

resupply responsibility of, 266

shipment of unit assemblies from, 275-277

shortages of stocks in, 199, 204, 218

special air shipments from, 351

training for fabrication of acrylic eye in,

88-89

units redeploying from, 384

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968 O—295-453
History of the Medical Department, U.S. Army in World War II

DISTRIBUTION LIST

MEDICAL SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR II

Active Army:

OSD (1)

OSA (1)

OUSofA (1)

ASA (FM) (1)

ASA (I&L (1)

ASA (R&D) (1)

USASA (1)

DASA (1)

DCSPER (2)

AOSI (1)

DOSOPS (2)

DCSLOG (2)

ACSFOR (2)

ACSRC (1)

OARROTO (1)

CINFO (1)

ONGB (1)

CLL (1)

CRD (1)

CMH (1)

TAG (1)

TIG (1)

TJAG (1)

TPMG (1)

OofCh (1)

TSG (30)

MedBds (1)

USCONARC (2)

ARADCOM (1)

OS Maj Comd (2) except

USAREUR (4)

SHAPE (2)

Log Comd (2)

MDW (1)

Armies (3)

Corps (1)

Div (2)

Bde (1)

MedGp (2)

MedBn (1)

USATC (1)

USMA (3)

Svc College (2)

Br Svc Sch (1)

MFSS (5)

Med Spec Sch (2)

USAMEDS V Sch (1)

MedDep (OS) (1)

GenHosp (5)

Army Hosp (4)

USA Hosp

25-100 Beds (1)

100-500 Beds (2)

500-750 Beds (4)

Med Cen (1) except

WRAMC (5)

BAMC (5)

WRAIR (5 )

AFIP (5)

DefLogSptCen (1)

Def MedSptCen (1)

USAPERSCEN (1)

USA Trans Tml Comd (1)

Army Terminal (1)

PG(1)

Med Lab (1)

Med Fid Maint Shops (1)

DB (1)

Disp (1)

USA Corps (1)

MAAG (1)

MilMsn (1)

JBUSMC (1)

Units under following TOE's:

8-500 Team AH (1)

8-510 (1) ; 31-106 (1)

8-581 (1) ; 31-107 (1)

Historical Unit, USAMEDS (1000)

NG: State AG (1) ; Div (1).

VSAR: Log Comd (1) ; Div (1) ; TOE's 8-500 Team AH (1) ; 8-510 (1) ; 8-551 (1) ;

8-581 (1) ; MedGp (2) ; Bde (1) ; USA Hosp (1).

Health Director, U.S. Army Element, Canal Zone, Balboa Heights, CZ (2).

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.

Request copies remaining on hand after initial distribution be returned to The Historical Unit, USAMEDS, Forest Glen Section, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington,

D.C. 20012.