Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 34A02-1411-ES-793 |July 20, 2015 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Briane M. House

R. Daniel Faust

House Reynolds & Faust, LLP

Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Scott L. Starr

Jacob M. O’Brien

Starr Austen & Miller, LLP

Logansport, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Charles R. Ferguson,

Appellant,

v.

The Estate of Lera V. Ferguson,

Appellee.

July 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

34A02-1411-ES-793

Interlocutory Appeal from the 

Howard Circuit Court

The Honorable J. David Grund, 

Special Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 34C01-1310-

ES-52

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Lera V. Ferguson passed away intestate in 2013 and was survived by her two 

children and sole heirs, Appellant Charles Ferguson and Nancy Mosson. 

Mosson was appointed personal representative of Lera’s estate (“the Estate”). 
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Charles eventually filed a claim for over one million dollars against the Estate 

for services provided to Lera over her lifetime, a claim that Mosson disallowed. 

[2] Meanwhile, Mosson had petitioned the trial court for authority to sell real 

estate, namely a parcel that was the family farm (“the Farm”). Charles objected 

to Mosson’s petition and requested the trial court to set a bond sufficient to stay 

the sale. After a hearing, the trial court ordered Charles to deliver a surety bond 

of $1,133,833.71, which represented the amount of his claim plus some 

administrative costs, within thirty days in order to stay the sale of the Farm. 

Charles now appeals, contending that the trial court erred in setting his bond. 

The Estate argues that Charles’s interlocutory appeal should be dismissed 

because the trial court’s order did not give him an interlocutory appeal of right 

and he did not follow the procedures for discretionary interlocutory appeals. 

Because we conclude that Charles’s interlocutory appeal was properly taken 

and that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of Charles’s 

bond, we reverse and remand with instructions. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Lera died intestate on June 7, 2013, survived by her two children and sole heirs, 

Mosson and Charles. On October 2, 2013, the trial court appointed Mosson 

personal representative of the Estate, whose sole asset of significance is the 

Farm. On December 23, 2013, Charles filed his claim against the Estate, 

alleging that Lera had entered into a lifetime contract for personal services with 

Charles and that the Estate owed him $1,073,833.71. 
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[4] On March 6, 2014, Mosson petitioned for authority to sell the Farm, which 

motion was granted. On March 12, 2014, Charles moved to vacate the trial 

court’s order granting Mosson authority to sell the Farm, which motion the trial 

court granted. On April 3, 2014, Mosson disallowed Charles’s claim against 

the Estate. 

[5] On April 28, 2014, Mosson filed a memorandum in support of her petition for 

authority to sell the Farm, reasserting her request to sell the Farm. On August 

1, 2014, Charles responded to Mosson’s renewed request to sell the Farm and 

requested that the trial court set a bond sufficient to pay the Estate’s 

administrative expenses and stay the sale of the Farm pursuant to Indiana Code 

section 29-1-15-4. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order (“the 

Order”) on October 14, 2014, that provided, in part, as follows: 

The Court finds that there is an estate claim filed by [Charles] in 

the amount of $1,[073],833.71. [Mosson] further estimating 

approximately $60,000.00 of the expenses in estate existing. The 

Court finds that I.C. 29-1-15-4 specifically requires that the bond 

be “Conditioned to pay all obligations of the estate to the extent 

that the other property of the estate is insufficient therefor[.]” 

The Court finds that the aforementioned claim is a potential 

obligation of the estate, along with other estate administration 

expenses. 

The Court further finds that the parties agree that there are no 

other assets sufficient to satisfy the obligations of the estate. 

Therefore, the Court orders that [Charles] shall deliver to the

Clerk of the Court a surety bond in the amount of $1,133,833.71. 

The Court orders said bond to be posted within thirty (30) days 

of this order. If said bond is not posted within the 

aforementioned time frame, [Mosson], as personal representative 
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of [the Estate], is authorized to sell [the Farm] for not less than 

the appraised value. 

Order pp. 2-3. 

[6] On November 12, 2014, Charles filed his notice of interlocutory appeal. On 

appeal, Charles contends that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the 

amount of his bond. The Estate counters that Charles failed to employ the 

proper procedures to perfect his allegedly discretionary interlocutory appeal and 

the trial court did not err in determining the amount of Charles’s bond. Charles 

responds to the Estate’s first claim by arguing that his interlocutory appeal is 

one of right, not subject to the rules governing discretionary interlocutory 

appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Whether Charles’s Interlocutory 

Appeal is One of Right 

[7] The Estate contends that Charles’s appeal is not properly before this court 

because the Order is subject to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B), which governs 

discretionary interlocutory appeals, and Charles did not satisfy the section’s 

requirements. Charles responds that his appeal is one of right, governed by 

Appellate Rule 14(A).1 Appellate Rule 14 provides, in part, as follows:

 

1 Charles also argues, essentially, that the Estate’s argument does not make it clear on which grounds it seeks 

dismissal of his appeal. The Estate’s argument is more than clear enough for us to evaluate. 
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A. Interlocutory Appeals of Right. Appeals from the following 

interlocutory orders are taken as a matter of right by filing a 

Notice of Appeal with the Clerk within thirty (30) days after the 

notation of the interlocutory order in the Chronological Case 

Summary:

(1) For the payment of money;

(2) To compel the execution of any document;

(3) To compel the delivery or assignment of any securities, 

evidence of debt, documents or things in action;

(4) For the sale or delivery of the possession of real 

property;

(5) Granting or refusing to grant, dissolving, or refusing to 

dissolve a preliminary injunction;

(6) Appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver, or 

revoking or refusing to revoke the appointment of a 

receiver;

(7) For a writ of habeas corpus not otherwise authorized to 

be taken directly to the Supreme Court;

(8) Transferring or refusing to transfer a case under Trial 

Rule 75; and

(9) Issued by an Administrative Agency that by statute is 

expressly required to be appealed as a mandatory 

interlocutory appeal.

The Notice of Appeal shall be in the form prescribed by Rule 9, 

and served in accordance with Rule 9(F)(10).

B. Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals. An appeal may be 

taken from other interlocutory orders if the trial court certifies its 

order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the 

appeal.

[8] “An appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed unless specifically 

authorized by the Indiana Constitution, statutes, or the rules of court.” Allstate 

Ins. Co. v. Scroghan, 801 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Bayless v. 

Bayless, 580 N.E.2d 962, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied), trans. denied.
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“The authorization is to be strictly construed, and any attempt to perfect an 

appeal without such authorization warrants a dismissal.” Id. (citing Anthrop v. 

Tippecanoe Sch. Corp., 257 Ind. 578, 277 N.E.2d 169, 171 (1972)). “The matters 

which are appealable as of right under Appellate Rule [14(A)] involve trial court 

orders which carry financial and legal consequences akin to those more 

typically found in final judgments: payment of money, issuance of a debt, 

delivery of securities, and so on.” State v. Hogan, 582 N.E.2d 824, 825 (Ind. 

1991). 

[9] Charles contends that Appellate Rule 14(A)(4) applies, arguing that the Order is 

for the sale of real property, namely, the Farm. We disagree with Charles on 

this point. However, keeping in mind our preference for resolving disputes on 

the merits, see, e.g., Coslett v. Weddle Bros. Const. Co., 798 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ind. 

2003), we conclude that the Order falls under subsection (A)(1), an order “[f]or 

the payment of money[.]” The Order specifically orders Charles to deposit a 

bond payment in excess of one million dollars with the trial court clerk, the 

consequences of a failure to do so being the sale of the Farm, an act that could 

not be undone if it occurred. We have little trouble concluding that the Order 

carries legal and financial consequences akin to a final judgment. Moreover, it 

does not matter if some—or even most—of the bond is likely to be returned to 

Charles eventually. As we stated in Schwedland v. Bachman, 512 N.E.2d 445, 

450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), the “purpose of allowing appeals for the payment of 

money is to provide a remedy to parties compelled to part with money which is 

tied up awaiting litigation[.]” Id. at 450 (citing McKnight v. Knisely, 25 Ind. 336, 
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337 (1865)). Even if Charles’s claim against the Estate is valid, it will do him 

little good if he cannot afford to pursue the litigation further because of the 

bond he has been ordered to post. We conclude that Charles’s interlocutory 

appeal is one of right pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(A)(1), and we therefore 

have jurisdiction to hear it. 

II. Whether the Trial Court Abused it Discretion in 

Setting the Amount of Charles’s Bond

[10] Charles contends that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the bond at 

$1,133,833.71, which represents the amount of his claim against the Estate plus 

$60,000.00 in Estate administrative costs. Indiana Code section 29-1-15-4 

provides as follows:

An order authorizing a personal representative to sell, mortgage 

or lease real or personal property for the payment of obligations 

of the estate shall not be granted if any of the persons interested 

in the estate shall execute and file in the court a bond in such 

sum and with such sureties as the court may approve, 

conditioned to pay all obligations of the estate to the extent that 

the other property of the estate is insufficient therefor, within 

such time as the court shall direct. An action may be maintained 

on such bond by the personal representative on behalf of any 

person interested in the estate who is prejudiced by breach of any 

obligation of the bond.

[11] This issue ultimately turns on the interpretation of section 29-1-15-4. “The 

interpretation of a statute is a question of law reserved for the courts.” Scott v. 

Irmeger, 859 N.E.2d 1238, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
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A statute should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to 

the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute. In so 

doing, the objects and purposes of the statute in question must be 

considered as well as the effect and consequences of such 

interpretation. When interpreting the words of a single section of 

a statute, this court must construe them with due regard for all 

other sections of the act and with regard for the legislative intent 

to carry out the spirit and purpose of the act. We presume that 

the legislature intended its language to be applied in a logical 

manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and goals. 

Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari 

materia and should be construed together so as to produce a 

harmonious statutory scheme. Courts are not bound to adopt a 

construction that would lead to manifest absurdity in order that 

the strict letter of the statute may be adhered to. They will rather 

look to the intention of the legislature, as gathered from the 

import of the whole act, and will carry out such intention as thus 

obtained. 

Fuller v. State, 752 N.E.2d 235, 237-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted). 

[12] In arguing that the trial court properly set the amount of Charles’s bond, the 

Estate points out that Indiana Code section 29-1-15-4 requires that the bond be 

set “in such sum and with such sureties as the court may approve, conditioned 

to pay all obligations of the estate to the extent that the other property of the 

estate is insufficient therefor[.]” Essentially, the Estate’s argument seems to be 

that the trial court properly set Charles’s bond in a sum that would cover all 

claims against the Estate, even though Charles is the primary claimant. Charles 

argues that his claim itself is sufficient surety for his claim and contends that 

this cash bond should have been set in the amount of the Estate’s remaining 
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administrative expenses. Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with 

Charles. 

[13] The obvious purpose of Indiana Code section 29-1-15-4 is to protect those who 

have claims against estates while giving “interested persons”2 an avenue to 

preserve real estate that otherwise would have to be liquidated. In practice, an 

interested person must be willing to guarantee the Estate’s debts to claimants if 

he wishes to prevent a sale of real estate which is intended to raise money to 

satisfy those debts. In this case, however, the claimant and the interested 

person are one and the same: Charles. It strikes us as somewhat unjust that 

Charles should, in effect, be forced to post a bond to protect himself if he, 

understandably, does not wish to. This is made plain when one considers what 

would happen down the road if Charles were required to post surety for his own 

claim: if Charles’s claim were determined to be valid, he would receive his 

bond in satisfaction of the claim, and if his claim were denied, his bond would 

be returned to him as no longer required. Ordering Charles to post a bond to 

cover his own claim does not protect him; if anything, it harms him by denying 

him the use of his money. We do not believe that this is what the General 

Assembly had in mind when drafting Indiana Code section 29-1-15-4. We 

 

2

 Indiana Code section 29-1-1-3(13) provides as follows:

“Interested persons” means heirs, devisees, spouses, creditors, or any others having a 

property right in or claim against the estate of a decedent being administered. This 

meaning may vary at different stages and different parts of a proceeding and must be 

determined according to the particular purpose and matter involved. 
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conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in setting Charles’s bond 

pursuant to Indiana Code section 29-1-15-4. 

Conclusion

[14] We conclude that the Order was one “for the payment of money” and therefore 

provided Charles with an interlocutory appeal of right. Moreover, we conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that Charles post a bond as 

surety for his own claim. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and 

remand with instructions to order Charles to post a bond of $60,000.00 (the 

amount of administrative costs to date) in order to stay the sale of the Farm and 

for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

[15] We reverse and remand with instructions. 

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.