In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-1160

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MELVIN D. VAN ALLEN, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 CR 914—David H. Coar, Judge.

____________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 26, 2007—DECIDED APRIL 29, 2008

____________

Before BAUER, ROVNER and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Melvin Van Allen was convicted

of a series of financial crimes involving the structuring

of currency transactions and the concealment of assets in

a bankruptcy proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152(1)

and (2) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3) and (d)(2). On appeal,

Van Allen challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the convictions on several counts, an evidentiary ruling by the district court, and two of the jury

instructions. For the following reasons, we affirm Van

Allen’s conviction.
2 No. 07-1160

I. Background

Van Allen, erstwhile mayor of the Village of Justice,

Illinois, made a living in the used auto parts business,

purchasing parts from junkyards and reselling then to

auto rebuilders. Van Allen ran the unincorporated operation with the help of his three sons, Melvin III, Zachary,

and Joshua. In running the business, Van Allen maintained several bank accounts. The primary account used

in Van Allen’s transactions was with Archer Bank in

Chicago, and was in the name of Van Allen and his wife

“doing business as Treyzack Trailers.” The Van Allens

also had joint accounts at TCF National Bank and

Bridgeview Bank and Trust.

Between 2002 and 2004, Van Allen wrote more than 3,000

checks on the Archer account. Most of the checks were

made out to himself, though several were made out to

his wife or one of his three sons. All of the checks

were cashed, mostly at a currency exchange which would

charge a processing fee. This business practice stemmed

(or so Van Allen claimed) from the nature of the used

auto parts business: Van Allen‘s suppliers dealt exclusively in cash, and Van Allen would write checks that

he expected to be sufficient to cover each day’s purchase

of parts. Van Allen’s customers, on the other hand, paid

primarily by check. Instead of depositing these checks

directly into the Archer account, the Van Allens would

cash the checks at the currency exchange and then deposit

the cash into the account, so that the cash would be

immediately available. As Van Allen would explain to an

F.B.I. agent, he engaged in these somewhat circuitous

practices in order to “avoid the aggravation” of filing

extra paperwork.

Notably, though checks written by Van Allen between

2002 and 2004 totaled over $5.8 million, none of the 3,000
No. 07-1160 3

checks exceeded $10,000. At the same time that Van Allen

wrote and cashed these checks, he made hundreds of

cash deposits into the Archer account, also conspicuously

under the $10,000 amount. In 2003 and the first half of

2004, the Van Allen family made 1,148 separate cash

deposits totaling over $5.5 million into the Archer account,

and all but three of these deposits were in amounts under

$10,000. The amount of money involved in these transactions tracked the federal law that requires banks and

currency exchanges to report currency transactions over

$10,000 to the IRS; structuring transactions to evade

this requirement violates federal law.

Though the Van Allens moved millions of dollars in cash

through the auto parts business, by mid-2003, the Van

Allens encountered significant financial difficulties. On

August 9, 2003, the Van Allens met with Christine

Piesiecki, an attorney, to discuss the possibility of one or

both of the Van Allens entering into bankruptcy. The Van

Allens presented several documents to Piesiecki and

disclosed information regarding their business troubles

and financial instability—though Piesiecki and the Van

Allens disagree as to the nature and extent of those disclosures.

On January 10, 2004, Van Allen informed Piesiecki that

he had decided to file for bankruptcy. Piesiecki prepared

the bankruptcy petition and schedules, which Van Allen

reviewed, certified, and signed. Piesiecki filed the petition and schedules on January 28, 2004.

Van Allen’s bankruptcy petition omitted some key

facts about his financial status. The bankruptcy schedules

failed to disclose several of his assets, including his

ownership interest in his home, the Bridgeview account,

and the TCF account. He also failed to disclose that he
4 No. 07-1160

operated the auto parts business in the two years leading

up to the bankruptcy filing, or that he obtained any

income from the business.

After filing for bankruptcy, Van Allen attended a

statutorily-required meeting of the creditors on May 10,

2004. With the bankruptcy trustee presiding, Van Allen

stated under oath that he did not own his home and that

he had listed all of his assets in his bankruptcy petition.

Both statements were false. In reliance on these statements and the bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy trustee

filed a report that allowed Van Allen to discharge all of

his credit card debt.

Van Allen was charged with four bankruptcy-related

offenses, including three counts of concealment of assets

under 18 U.S.C. § 152(1) and one count of making

false statements to a trustee during a trustee meeting

under 18 U.S.C. § 152(2). Van Allen was also charged

with twenty-eight counts of illegal structuring, including

twenty-five counts of structuring cash deposits at Archer

Bank (Counts Five through Twenty-Nine) and three

counts of structuring currency transactions at the currency exchanges (Counts Thirty through Thirty-Three),

all in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3) and (d)(2). A

jury convicted Van Allen on all counts, and he was sentenced to thirty-six months’ imprisonment and two

years’ supervised release.

II. Discussion

Van Allen raises several issues on appeal: (1) that the

government failed to present evidence sufficient to convict Van Allen on the structuring counts; (2) that the

government failed to present evidence sufficient to con-
No. 07-1160 5

vict Van Allen on one of the bankruptcy-related counts;

(3) that the district court erred in denying an advice-ofcounsel jury instruction; (4) that the jury was improperly

instructed on what constitutes “concealment” for the

concealment of assets in a bankruptcy proceedings

count; and (5) that the district court erred in excluding

evidence showing that the banks actually filed transaction reports for several of allegedly evasive currency

transactions. We address each issue in turn.

A. Sufficiency of Evidence of Illegal Structuring

Van Allen argues that the government failed to present

sufficient evidence with respect to Counts Five through

Twenty-Nine for illegal structuring. Normally, “when a

defendant challenges his conviction based on the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask only whether, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,

the evidence was sufficient ‘to allow a rational trier of fact

to find all of the essential elements of an offense beyond

a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Whitlow, 381 F.3d

679, 684-85 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Owens,

301 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2002)). However, because Van

Allen did not move for acquittal either at the close of

evidence or in a post-trial motion, he failed to preserve

this issue for review, and we review for plain error. Id. at

685. Under the plain error standard, the party asserting

the error must establish (1) that there was in fact an error;

(2) that the error was plain; and (3) that the error “affects

substantial rights.” United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 868,

875 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). We

will not exercise our discretion to consider the error

unless it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
6 No. 07-1160

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting

Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Under this “most demanding standard,

reversal is warranted only if the record is devoid of

evidence pointing to guilt, or if the evidence on a key

element was so tenuous that a conviction would be

shocking.” United States v. Beaver, 515 F.3d 730, 741-42 (7th

Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Ultimately, Van Allen can prevail only if failing to reverse results in “a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id.

at 741.

Under regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department, banks and currency exchanges must file a

report with the IRS every time a customer makes a “deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer . . . which involves a transaction in

currency of more than $10,000.” 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1).

This report is known as a Currency Transaction Report

(“CTR”). Federal law makes it illegal for any person to “for

the purposes evading the reporting requirements . . .

structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to assist in

structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic

financial institutions.” 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). The Treasury

regulations describe what constitutes “structuring”:

[A] person structures a transaction if that person . . .

conducts or attempts to conduct one or more transactions in currency, in any amount, at one or more

financial institutions, on one or more days, in any

manner, for the purpose of evading the reporting

requirements under section 103.22 of this part. “In any

manner” includes, but is not limited to, the breaking

down of a single sum of currency exceeding $10,000

into smaller sums, including sums at or below $10,000,
No. 07-1160 7

or the conduct of a transaction, or series of currency

transactions, including transactions at or below

$10,000. The transaction or transactions need not

exceed the $10,000 reporting threshold at any single

financial institution on any single day in order to

constitute structuring within the meaning of this

definition.

31 C.F.R. § 103.11(gg). In order to sustain a conviction

under 31 U.S.C. § 5324, we have held that the government must prove “only that a defendant had knowledge

of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them.”

United States v. Cassano, 372 F.3d 868, 878 (7th Cir. 2004)

(quoting United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 767 (7th

Cir. 1993)), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1109,

125 S.Ct. 1018, 160 L.Ed.2d 1037 (2005) (citing United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d

621 (2005)).

Van Allen was not charged with every currency transaction he made between 2002 and 2004. Each of Counts

Five through Twenty-Nine detailed a group of cash

deposits totaling over $10,000 with no single deposit

exceeding $10,000, all occurring on a single day. For

example, in Count Twenty-Four, Van Allen was

charged with making four separate cash deposits totaling

$25,795, each under $10,000, at three separate bank

branches. The government used the other transactions as

circumstantial evidence supporting the overall theory

that Van Allen engaged in illegal structuring.

The record contains sufficient direct and circumstantial

evidence to support the jury’s finding that Van Allen

structured his business transactions with the intent of

evading the reporting requirements. The evidence

showed that Van Allen withdrew and deposited massive
8 No. 07-1160

sums of money, all under $10,000, all allegedly in furtherance of his auto parts business, and all without reporting

any business income on his tax return or bankruptcy

petition. The sheer volume of the transactions almost

compels the conclusion reached by the jury. See Cassano,

372 F.3d at 879 (“[I]t is unlikely, to the point of absurdity,

that it was pure coincidence that all [of the fifty-one]

checks cashed by [the defendant] were in denominations under $10,000.”). The jury rejected Van Allen’s

argument that the nature of the auto parts business

required him to engage in the pattern of withdrawals

and deposits of sub-$10,000 amounts. The jury most likely

did so by considering the irrational and inefficient nature

of the transactions; Van Allen paid almost $100,000 in

check-cashing fees at one of the currency exchanges. The

fact that Van Allen was willing to sacrifice efficiency and

convenience and paying the exorbitant transaction fees by

going to separate banks in the same day to make almost

identical deposits supports the inference that he knew

of and intended to avoid the reporting requirements. See

United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 191-92 (2d Cir.

2005). Taken as a whole, the evidence supports Van Allen’s

conviction, and certainly does not add up to “a manifest miscarriage of justice.”

Van Allen further argues that the government failed

to meet its burden because the evidence does not amount

to the definition of “structuring.” Primarily relying on

United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991),

Van Allen argues that the only method of proving structuring is to demonstrate that a defendant held a unitary

cash hoard over $10,000 and then broke it up to deposit in

amounts under $10,000. Because the government never

proved that Van Allen specifically split up a $10,000-plus
No. 07-1160 9

cash hoard into smaller amounts, Van Allen argues, his

conviction was in error. Van Allen’s misapplies our

precedent. In Davenport, we upheld a conviction for

structuring where the defendant made ten cash deposits,

each under $10,000. We observed that the intent of the

statute was to prevent individuals from evading the

reporting requirement “by breaking their cash hoard into

enough separate deposits to avoid activating the requirement.” Id. at 1173. We did not hold, as Van Allen intimates,

that this was the only method of proving structuring—

indeed, we further defined “structuring” as “altering the

form of a transaction in order to avoid activating the bank’s

duty to file a currency transaction report.” Id. This definition meshes well with that in the Treasury regulation (31

C.F.R. § 103.11(gg)) and accurately describes Van Allen’s

activities in this case.

We acknowledge the issue raised by Van Allen concerning the implications of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) for certain types of businesses. Small enterprises dealing primarily in cash and seeking to avoid an illegal structuring

charge could theoretically be forced to maintain large

amounts of cash on hand until meeting the $10,000 threshold. We would be more sympathetic to this argument had

Van Allen cashed only a small handful of sub-$10,000

checks, or pointed to the unique nature of the auto parts

business that, for whatever reason, necessitated transactions under $10,000. But Van Allen moved over $5 million

over the course of a year and a half in amounts almost

exclusively under $10,000, and proved nothing specific

about his business that suggested a legitimate business

purpose for those transactions. The fear raised, in this

case at least, rings a bit hollow.
10 No. 07-1160

B. Sufficiency of Evidence of Concealment of Business

Van Allen next argues that his conviction on Count Three

(concealment of business) should be overturned because

the government failed to show that his “interest in his

unincorporated business” was property belonging to

the bankruptcy estate or that his “interest” was not otherwise disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules. As with the

illegal structuring count, because this is an argument

raised for the first time on appeal, we review for plain

error and will reverse only if failing to do so results in

“a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Beaver, 515 F.3d at 741.

Count Three of the indictment charged Van Allen with

violating 18 U.S.C. § 152(1) by “knowingly and fraudulently conceal[ing] from creditors and the United States

Trustee property belonging to the defendant’s bankruptcy

estate, specifically, defendant’s interest in an unincorporated automobile parts business.” Section 152(1) makes

it a crime to “knowingly and fraudulently conceal[ ] . . . in

connection with a case under title 11, from creditors or

the United States Trustee, any property belonging to the

estate of a debtor.” The government presented ample

evidence to convict Van Allen of this charge. In his bankruptcy petition, Van Allen was required to disclose the

description, location, and current market value of his

interest in any “unincorporated business”; to this query,

Van Allen responded, “none.” Van Allen was further

required to disclose regular income and expenses from

the operation of a business; again, Van Allen listed nothing. In the petition’s Statement of Financial Affairs,

Van Allen was required to list the gross amount of income

from the operation of the debtor’s business—defining

“business” as including sole proprietorships—and Van

Allen failed to make any such disclosures.
No. 07-1160 11

Van Allen argues that his automobile parts business

was not “property,” as the business was a “sole proprietorship” that did not have an independent legal status

requiring disclosure. He contends that because federal

courts look to state law to determine what kind of “property” an estate possesses, and that because under Illinois

law “a sole proprietorship has no legal identity separate from that of the individual who owns it,” he did not

technically conceal any property. The logical result of

Van Allen’s argument would be that a sole proprietorship need not disclose any property related to the business

in a bankruptcy proceeding, simply because of the legal

status of the entity. But this cannot be the case, given the

broad scope of the bankruptcy code’s definition of “property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and (a)(6) (stating

that “property” includes “all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property” and “[p]roceeds, product,

offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the

estate”); In re Yonikus, 974 F.2d 901, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1992)

(“The legislative history of § 541(a) in both the House and

Senate provides, “The scope of this paragraph is broad. It

includes all kinds of property, including tangible or

intangible property. . . .”). As a general rule, “[d]ebtors

have an absolute duty to report whatever interests they

hold in property, even if they believe their assets are

worthless or are unavailable to the bankruptcy estate.”

Yonikus, 974 F.2d at 904. Even if Van Allen believed his

interest in his auto parts business was unavailable to the

bankruptcy estate because a sole proprietorship did not

constitute “property” under Illinois or federal law, considering the broad scope of the definition, he nevertheless had a duty to report it.

In any case, we need not delve too deeply into whether

or not the sole proprietorship constituted a separate

corporate form for the purposes of this statute, as the
12 No. 07-1160

evidence overwhelmingly showed that Van Allen did

everything he could in the course of filing bankruptcy to

conceal the fact that he was an auto parts businessman.

Nowhere in the bankruptcy petition did Van Allen come

close to mentioning that he was depositing and withdrawing hundreds of thousands of dollars through the

Archer account in connection with his business. Even the

balance that he reported in the bankruptcy petition for

the Archer account—$100—was understated by thousands

of dollars. Moreover, as the government noted, Van Allen

had previously claimed that Treyzack Trailers was

worth $150,000 on a mortgage loan application. The fact

that Van Allen valued his business when seeking a

loan but chose not to value his business when it was in

his best interest not to do so further points to Van Allen’s

efforts to conceal his operation.

Van Allen also argues that his conviction should be

vacated because any interest in his business was fully

disclosed in other portions of the bankruptcy schedules.

We disagree, and reject Van Allen’s contention that debtors

are allowed to “net out” any value he had in his business.

Van Allen was required to disclose the regular income

and expenses from the operation of his business. In

choosing not to do so, or in choosing to conceal that

income by incorporating it by reference in his other

listed assets, Van Allen violated the law. We find nothing

in the record that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The

record amply supports Van Allen conviction.

C. Advice-of-Counsel Jury Instruction

The first three counts of the indictment charged Van

Allen with concealment of assets in a bankruptcy. Van
No. 07-1160 13

Allen sought an advice-of-counsel instruction, arguing that

he made full disclosures to his bankruptcy attorney,

Piesiecki, and that her failure to list the bank accounts

and the auto parts business constituted legal advice upon

which he relied. The district court declined to give the

instruction, citing the lack of evidence that Piesiecki

actually instructed Van Allen not to list the assets and

the business.

We review a district court’s “decision not to instruct

on a theory of defense de novo.” United States v. Millet,

510 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 2007). A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the jury consider any theory

of defense that is supported by the law and that has

some foundation in the evidence, however tenuous. United

States v. Al-Shahin, 474 F.3d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1512 (7th Cir.

1990)). An instruction on a defendant’s theory of defense

may only be given to the jury if: (1) the instruction provides a correct statement of the law; (2) the theory

of defense is supported by the evidence; (3) the theory of

the defense is not part of the government’s charge; and

(4) the failure to include the instruction would deprive

the defendant of a fair trial. Millet, 510 F.3d at 675 (quoting

Al-Shahin, 474 F.3d at 947).

“Advice of counsel is not a free-standing defense, though

a lawyer’s fully informed opinion that certain conduct

is lawful (followed by conduct strictly in compliance

with that opinion) can negate the mental state required

for some crimes, including fraud.” United States v. Roti,

484 F.3d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 2007). In order for this theory

to be supported by the evidence, a defendant must establish the following elements:
14 No. 07-1160

(1) before taking action, (2) he in good faith sought the

advice of an attorney whom he considered competent,

(3) for the purpose of securing advice on the lawfulness of his possible future conduct, (4) and made a

full and accurate report to his attorney of all material

facts which the defendant knew, (5) and acted strictly

in accordance with the advice of his attorney who

had been given a full report.

Al-Shahin, 474 F.3d at 947-48.

At trial, Van Allen produced evidence suggesting that

Piesiecki knew of (or should have known of) his business

and the bank accounts at issue. Mrs. Van Allen testified

that at the August 9, 2003 meeting, Van Allen told

Piesiecki that he was operating his auto parts business,

though it was not profitable enough to stave off the

creditors. She further testified that Van Allen gave

Piesiecki documents referencing all of their bank accounts,

including those ultimately omitted from Van Allen’s

bankruptcy petition. Piesiecki contradicted this testimony.

She testified that Van Allen told her that he had ceased

operating his auto parts business after September 11,

2001, and that his only current source of income was

from the Village of Justice. Piesiecki also testified that the

Van Allens represented that of the two disputed accounts,

one account was in Mrs. Van Allen’s name only, and the

other account was in the name of Mrs. Van Allen and her

daughter.

In either version of the facts, a key piece of evidence is

missing. Van Allen did not show that Piesiecki advised

him to omit assets or his business from the bankruptcy

petition. More to the point, Piesiecki specifically testified

that she never advised Van Allen to do so. Van Allen

could not have “acted strictly in accordance with the
No. 07-1160 15

advice of his attorney” because Van Allen did not produce

evidence suggesting that his attorney advised him to act

in any particular way. The district court correctly concluded that the core of the advice-of-counsel instruction—

advice of counsel—was lacking, and that therefore the

evidence did not support Van Allen’s theory of the case.

Without evidence supporting Van Allen’s theory on

advice of counsel, no instruction was warranted.

D. Concealment of Home Jury Instruction

Van Allen argues that his conviction on Count One

(concealment of his interest in his home) should be overturned because it was based on an inadequate theory of

concealment. At trial, the government introduced evidence that Van Allen concealed his home by, among

other things, failing to disclose his interest in a trust that

held title to the house. The government also introduced,

through a representative of the Bridgeview Bank & Trust

company, evidence regarding the trust itself, including

an incident that occurred after Van Allen was indicted.

In January or February of 2006, Van Allen apparently

contacted a Bridgeview official and attempted to correct

a “mistake” in the trust—namely, that the trust should

have been set up in the name of his wife, and not him. The

government used this evidence as further support of the

concealment charge.

The district court instructed the jury regarding the

elements of the crime of concealment. The court defined

“concealment” as “means to withhold information required by law to be made known.” The court elaborated on

the meaning: “[s]ince the offense of concealment is a

continuing one, the acts of concealing may have begun
16 No. 07-1160

before as well as after the bankruptcy offense.” This

definition followed that outlined in the Seventh Circuit

Pattern Criminal Federal Jury Instructions for 18 U.S.C.

§ 152 (defining “concealment”).

Van Allen contends that the government argued, and the

instructions reflect, two separate theories of concealment, the second of which was legally dubious. He

asserts that the jury was lead to believe that they could

have convicted Van Allen by either (1) his failure to list his

home in his bankruptcy schedules; or (2) his attempt to

correct the mistake with Bridgeview Bank & Trust. The

attempt in this second theory, he argues, cannot serve as

an independent basis for a conviction on Count One.

He points to Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59-60,

112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) and Tenner v. Gilmore,

184 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that

a verdict must be set aside if it is impossible to tell which

of two grounds—one sound, one flawed—a jury selected.

See Griffin, 502 U.S. at 52, 112 S.Ct. at 470 (quoting Yates

v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1073,

1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks

v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1

(1978)).

Van Allen misapplies these cases. Assuming arguendo

that Van Allen could not be convicted on the basis of

the conversation with the Bridgeview official alone,

Van Allen does not establish that this theory ever reached

the jury. The district court never instructed the jury that

it could rely on the Bridgeview Bank incident as an independent basis for the conviction, nor did the government

argue that theory to the jury. Rather, the jury was properly

instructed that the offense of concealment was a continuing

offense, meaning that it could consider actions taken by
No. 07-1160 17

Van Allen after he filed for bankruptcy (including the

Bridgeview Bank incident) as further support of the

concealment count. Because the jury was instructed on one

legal theory—and not one adequate and another inadequate theory—we affirm Van Allen’s conviction on Count

One.

E. Relevance of Filing CTRs

Finally, Van Allen argues that the district court erroneously excluded on relevance grounds the fact that Archer

Bank actually filed CTRs. He argues that the structuring counts—Counts Five through Thirty-Two—should

be reversed accordingly. On several occasions, the Archer

Bank filed CTRs on a day in which Van Allen made

several deposits totaling $10,000, even though no single

deposit exceeded $10,000. Prior to trial, the government moved in limine to exclude evidence that Archer

Bank filed the reports as a result of Van Allen’s cash

deposits. The government argued that the filing of CTRs

would have no relevance with regard to Van Allen’s

guilt or innocence of the structuring charges. The district

court agreed, and held that whether or not the bank

actually filed the CTRs had no bearing on Van Allen’s

knowledge and intent.

Van Allen argues that the CTRs were relevant to the

jury’s consideration of both his knowledge of the bank

reporting requirements and his intent to avoid those

requirements. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse

of discretion. United States v. Savage, 505 F.3d 754, 760 (7th

Cir. 2007). “Because we give great deference to the trial

judge’s evidentiary rulings, we will not reverse unless the

record contains no evidence upon which the trial judge
18 No. 07-1160

rationally could have based his decision.” Id. (citing

United States v. Gajo, 290 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2002)).

Evidence is relevant and therefore admissible if it has “any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402.

We fail to see the logical connection between the fact

of Archer Bank’s filing of CTRs and Van Allen’s guilt or

innocence. The actions of Archer Bank following

Van Allen’s various deposits and withdrawals do not

demonstrate anything material about Van Allen’s state

of mind. At most, the filing of CTRs may have indicated

something about the knowledge of officials at Archer

Bank; but such knowledge would not make it more or

less likely that Van Allen knew of the reporting requirements or acted to avoid them. Whether or not Van Allen

actually fooled Archer Bank has no bearing on the substantive violation under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a). See Cassano,

372 F.3d at 878 (holding that the government must show

“only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting

requirements and acted to avoid them”). The multiple

cases cited by Van Allen for the proposition that a jury may

consider the consequences of a defendant’s actions as

circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s intent—see, e.g.,

United States v. Sloan, 492 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 2007);

United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 509 (7th Cir.

2005)—only suggest that a court may allow such evidence

before the jury, and not that the exclusion of such evidence is an abuse of discretion.

The government presented ample evidence that

Van Allen acted to avoid the reporting requirements.

Regarding his intent to do so, the government offered
No. 07-1160 19

adequate circumstantial evidence, primarily in the form

of the inefficiency of Van Allen’s business practices and

the statements made to an FBI agent regarding the

“aggravation” of filing extra paperwork. Accordingly,

we do not find that excluding the CTRs was inconsistent

with substantial justice.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Van Allen’s conviction and sentence.

USCA-02-C-0072—4-29-08