UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

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No. ACM 39270

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UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Barrian J. JAMISON

Airman First Class (E-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

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Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary

Decided 12 October 2018

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Military Judge: James R. Dorman.

Approved sentence: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for one month, 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1. Upon release 

from confinement, the forfeitures are reduced to $1066.00 pay for one 

month. Sentence adjudged 27 March 2017 by GCM convened at Francis 

E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming.

For Appellant: Major Jarett F. Merk, USAF.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Kubler, USAF; Lieutenant 

Colonel Nicole P. Wishart, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.

Before HARDING, HUYGEN, and POSCH, Appellate Military Judges.

Senior Judge HARDING delivered the opinion of the court, in which 

Judges HUYGEN and POSCH joined. 

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This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as 

precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4.

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United States v. Jamison, No. ACM 39270

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HARDING, Senior Judge:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted Appellant, consistent with his plea made pursuant to a pretrial agreement (PTA), of one specification of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920. Specifically, Appellant was convicted of committing a sexual act upon another Airman by penetrating her vulva with his 

finger, with the intent to gratify his sexual desires, when he knew or reasonably should have known that she was asleep. The military judge sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 12 months, forfeiture of 

all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. In accordance with 

the limitation of the PTA, the convening authority approved only one month of 

confinement. He otherwise approved the sentence as adjudged. The convening 

authority also directed that, upon Appellant’s release from confinement, the 

forfeitures would be reduced to $1,066.00 pay for one month.

Appellant asserts two issues on appeal: (1) that Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to fully advise him

of his plea options, the evidence against him, his right to testify, and the meaning of registering as a sex offender1 and (2) that there is a substantial basis to 

question whether Appellant’s plea was provident because the military judge

failed to fulfill the responsibility per United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115 

(C.A.A.F. 2013), to ensure Appellant understood that, as a result of his guilty 

plea, he would be required to register as a sex offender. We find no prejudicial 

error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

After Appellant and A1C AN were at a bar in Cheyenne, Wyoming, A1C

AN was too drunk to drive and stayed at Appellant’s home. Appellant let A1C 

AN have the bed and told her he preferred to sleep on a chair in the living 

room. After A1C AN fell asleep, Appellant made his way into bed with her and 

unbuttoned her shirt and jeans while she slept. Appellant placed his hand 

down the front of A1C AN’s jeans and reached inside her underwear to penetrate her vulva with his finger. When A1C AN woke up, Appellant removed his 

hand and rolled away. Neither said anything, and A1C AN quickly departed 

Appellant’s home.

In a series of text messages between Appellant and A1C AN, Appellant initially denied anything sexual had happened. However, after A1C AN confronted Appellant about his finger penetrating her vulva, Appellant apologized 

 

1 Appellant filed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim pursuant to United States 

v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).
United States v. Jamison, No. ACM 39270

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and acknowledged what he did as the “biggest [mistake] I think I ever made.” 

Later, when he was interviewed by a detective of the Cheyenne Police Department, Appellant initially denied the sexual assault but eventually confessed

that he committed a sexual act on A1C AN while she slept.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Effectiveness of Counsel

Appellant’s affidavit accompanying his brief to this court claims his trial 

defense counsel failed: (1) to apprise him of his choice to plead guilty or not 

guilty; (2) to explain the evidence against him or ask for his side of the story; 

(3) to discuss whether he should testify; and (4) to advise him of the meaning 

of registering as a sex offender. Appellant contends these failures amounted to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.

This court reviews a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. 

United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citation omitted). We 

undertake a two-part inquiry informed by the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): “[T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate both (1) that his 

counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that this deficiency resulted in 

prejudice.” United States v. Green, 68 M.J. 360, 361–62 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J. 470, 474 (C.A.A.F. 

2009)). 

In the context of a guilty plea, the first part of the Strickland test “is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence”—

whether counsel’s performance fell below a standard of objective reasonableness expected of all attorneys. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–58 (1985) (citations omitted). The second prong focuses on whether the “ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Id. at 59; see also Lafler v. 

Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012). It is not necessary to decide the issue of deficient performance when it is apparent that the alleged deficiency has not 

caused prejudice. Loving v. United States, 68 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2009). 

“[T]o satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, [Appellant] must show that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59

(footnote omitted). “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ That requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 

189 (2011) (citations omitted). 

In this case, Appellant asserts that he was harmed or prejudiced by his 

counsel’s deficient performance. Appellant asserts he would have pleaded not 
United States v. Jamison, No. ACM 39270

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guilty and litigated the sexual assault charge but for his counsel’s alleged 

shortcomings. To fully address these claims, we ordered both of Appellant’s 

trial defense counsel to provide declarations. Their declarations, in addition to 

specifically rebutting each of Appellant’s claims, included multiple attachments wherein Appellant was advised in writing of his rights and choices and 

of the requirement for sex offender registration. Appellant placed his initials

next to each advised right and choice and, at a minimum, acknowledged he had 

read what was written on the page. Importantly, Appellant also signed the 

following declaration regarding his rights and choices: “I have carefully read 

the above statement and I am aware that the above decisions were mine alone 

to make. I have knowingly and voluntarily made the choices noted above.” In 

addition to the advisement and decision memoranda, we have also reviewed 

Appellant’s PTA and providence inquiry. We find Appellant’s claims incredible. 

However, we need not decide the issue of deficient performance because it is 

apparent to us that any alleged deficiency caused no prejudice to Appellant.

The Government’s case against Appellant, consisting of A1C AN’s account 

and Appellant’s text message admissions and confession to the police, was 

overwhelming. Appellant’s trial defense counsel quite reasonably explored and 

successfully obtained a favorable PTA for Appellant. Appellant faced the possibility, if convicted, of 30 years of confinement. The PTA limited the period of 

confinement to 30 days. As the military judge sentenced Appellant to 12 

months of confinement, Appellant received a significant benefit from the PTA. 

Even assuming that Appellant’s allegations that his trial defense counsel were 

deficient in their performance are true, we find no reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, Appellant would have pleaded not guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial. We find no prejudice and thus no ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

B. Providency of Plea 

Appellant asserts “there is a substantial question regarding whether his 

plea was [provident]” because the military judge failed to fulfill the responsibility to ensure that Appellant “made his plea decision knowingly, consciously, 

and intelligently with knowledge that sex offender registration would be an 

‘automatic result’ of his plea and a ‘severe penalty.’” We disagree.

“A military judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse 

of discretion.” United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008)

(quoting United States v. Eberle, 44 M.J. 374, 375 (C.A.A.F. 1996)) (additional 

citations omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when there is “something in 

the record of trial, with regard to the factual basis or the law, that would raise 

a substantial question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea.” Id. In United 

States v. Miller, where the appellant asserted he was unaware of sex offender 

registration requirements, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF)
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found the military judge did not abuse his discretion in accepting the guilty 

plea, but provided a “prospective rule . . . to address the importance of trial 

defense counsel explaining the sex offender registration requirement to an accused.” 63 M.J. 452, 459 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

For all cases tried later than ninety days after the date of this 

opinion, trial defense counsel should inform an accused prior to 

trial as to any charged offense listed on the DoD Instr. 1325.7 

Enclosure 27: Listing of Offenses Requiring Sex Offender Processing. Trial defense counsel should also state on the record of 

the court-martial that counsel has complied with this advice requirement. While failure to so advise an accused is not per se 

ineffective assistance of counsel, it will be one circumstance this 

Court will carefully consider in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Id. (footnote omitted).

As the CAAF later explained in Riley, defense counsel must inform the accused of any sex offender registration requirements that are a consequence of 

a guilty plea, “but it is the military judge who bears the ultimate burden of 

ensuring that the accused’s guilty plea is knowing and voluntary.” 72 M.J. at

122. In Riley, the CAAF found “that the military judge abused his discretion 

when he accepted [the appellant’s] guilty plea without questioning defense 

counsel to ensure [the appellant’s] knowledge of the sex offender registration 

consequences of her guilty plea to kidnapping a minor.” Id.

In this case, both trial defense counsel and the military judge fulfilled their 

respective obligations to ensure Appellant knew the sex offender registration 

consequences of his guilty plea. In accordance with Miller, Appellant was informed of the requirement for sex offender registration prior to pleading guilty. 

In preparation for trial, Appellant’s trial defense counsel advised Appellant in 

writing of sex offender registration requirements in the event Appellant was 

convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sex offense. Appellant acknowledged by his 

signature that he had read and understood the rights and obligations covered 

in the written advisement.

Prior to the acceptance of Appellant’s guilty plea, in accordance with Riley,

the military judge inquired as to whether Appellant had been advised by trial

defense counsel with regard to sex offender registration requirements:

MJ [Military Judge]: Defense counsel, have you advised [Appellant] prior to trial of the sex offender reporting registration requirements resulting from a finding of guilty to the Charge and 

Specification? 

ADC [Trial Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. 
United States v. Jamison, No. ACM 39270

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MJ: Do [sic] have this documented in a document and did you 

want that entered into the appellate record? 

ADC: Your Honor, we have it documented, but no we don't want 

to put it in the appellate record.2

Moments later, the military judge addressed Appellant to ensure Appellant, having been advised of the consequences of pleading guilty, still desired 

to plead guilty. After conferring with his trial defense counsel, Appellant informed the military judge that he still wanted to plead guilty. The military 

judge subsequently found Appellant’s guilty plea provident and accepted it. 

The issue of sex offender registration requirements did not come up again 

until the post-trial processing of Appellant’s case. In the clemency request submitted by Appellant’s counsel, the convening authority was requested to 

“[p]lease consider that [Appellant] took responsibility for his actions knowing 

full well that the consequences would include both a dishonorable discharge 

and sex offender registration.” (Emphasis added).

Having reviewed the record, we find nothing with regard to the factual basis or the law that would raise a substantial question regarding Appellant’s 

guilty plea. Nonetheless, Appellant invites this court to impose a strict obligation on a military judge before accepting a guilty plea to conduct a colloquy 

with the accused regarding sex offender registration—similar to inquiries that 

ensure an accused understands the consequences of entering a stipulation of 

fact, the terms of a PTA, or, for a non-United States citizen accused, the potential for deportation. We decline the invitation. While such a colloquy would 

certainly buttress a conclusion that an accused’s guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary, we refuse to strictly require any such colloquy beyond what is compelled by Riley. Instead, we will continue to hold military judges to their burden of ensuring that an accused’s guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. The 

military judge did so in this case. Appellant’s guilty plea was provident.

III. CONCLUSION

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c). 

 

2 As a result of Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, trial defense counsel

submitted responsive declarations and attached several written advisements which 

were subsequently attached to the record; thus the record now contains a three-page 

Miller advisement entitled “Sex Offender Registration Requirement” signed by Appellant.
United States v. Jamison, No. ACM 39270

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Accordingly, the findings and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court