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2d and 4th Marine Divisions land.

15 June.

27th Infantry Division (Corps

reserve) lands; 165th Infantry on

night 16-17 June, 105th Infantry

on 17 June, 106th Infantry on

20 June.

Japanese launch night tankinfantry counterattack against 6th

Marines. 16-17 June.

165th Infantry seizes As1 ito

Airfield. 18 June.

4th Marine Division reaches east

coast. 18 June.

27th Infantry Division committed

between MarineDivisions, encounters

difficulties in Death Valley.

23 June.

Mutcho

Point

Goropon

Tonapag

Seaplane

Base

Marpi Point

Choron-Konoo

MAGIC/CA/NE

BAY

Agmgan

Point

Nafutan Point

Kogmon

Peninsula

0 4th Marine Division seizes Kagman

Peninsula. 25 June.

1st Battalion, 29th Marines,

(i) captures peak of Mt. Tapotchau.

25 June.

2d Marine Division reaches Tanapag

Seaplane Base, pinched from lines.

4 July.

Japanese launch all-out banzai 

attack, hitting the 1st and 2d 0 Battalions, 105th Infantry, and

the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines.

6-7 July.

0 

4th Marine Division pushes to

island's northern end. Saipan

secured. 9 July.

•

PRINCIPAL GROUND EVENTS

BATTLE OF SAIPAN

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SAIPAN:

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HISTORICAL DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS

U. S. MARINE CORPS

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Major Carl W. Hoffman, usmc

1950
Marine Corps Monographs

in This Series

The Defense. of Wake

The Battle for Tarawa

Marines at Midway

Bougainville and the Northern

Solonions

The Guadalcanal Campaign,

The Assault on Peleliu

Saipan: The Beginning of the End

769:369

N1.1.

- Vo

ps2

THE COVER OF THIS NARRATIVE shows Marines pitching grenades at an entrenched

foe. One grenade is in the air, another is smoking and ready to go.
Foreword

SAIPAN was one of the key operations in the Pacific War; key

because it unlocked vast potentialities to the United States in projecting its might against the Japanese homeland; key because it

opened the door of distance which had meant security to the Empire.

Invasion of Saipan provided the supreme challenge in which the

enemy was forced to select one of two alternatives: conserve his naval

resources for a later decision, leaving uncontested this penetration of

his inner defense.; or lash out in a vicious, showdown fight. The, fact

that he chose the latter course, and suffered a resounding defeat, is

now history.

•The conquest of Saipan was, among Pacific operations up to that

time, the most clear-Cut decisive triumph of combined arms of the

United States over the Japanese. By June 1944, U. S. forces, long

superior in quality of personnel and organization, were finally greatly

superior in matOriel with which to fight. Victory at Saipan made this

apparent to all.

C. B. CATES

GENERAL, Ti. S. MARINE CORPS,

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.
Preface

SAIPAN is the sixth in a series of operational monographs being prepared by the Historical

Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, to present for the military student, as well

as the casual reader, a factually accurate narrative of the Marine Corps' World War II operations. When these individual narratives are completed and arranged in chronological order, they

will be integrated into a single operational history of the Marine Corps in World War II.

Grateful acknowledgement is made for the valuable information furnished by the scores of

officers consulted by interview or letter and for the assistance provided by the Historical Division, U. S. Navy; the Office of Naval Records and Library; the Office of the Chief of Military

History, Department of the Army; and the Marine member of the Historical Section, Joint Chiefs

of Staff. Maps and sketches were prepared by the Reproduction Department, Marine Corps

Schools, Quantico, Virginia. All photographs are official Marine Corps, Navy or Army.

CLAYTON C. JEROME

BRIGADIER GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS,

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY.

iv
Contents

Foreword iii

Preface iv

Chapter 1. Plans and Preparations 

Strategic Situation p.

Historical Background p.

Saipan p. 3

Japanese Defenses p. 8

Japanese Organization p. 10

High-Level Planning p. 13

Casablanca Conference p. 13

'Washington and Quebec Conferences 2). . 15

Cairo Conferences p. 17

Campaign Plan Granite .p. 18

JCS Directive of 12 March p. 20

Command Relations p. 22

Logistics and Administration p. 23

Intelligence Information p. 25

Tactical Plans p. 27

Training and Rehearsal p. 30

Movement to the Objective p. 34

Naval Gunfire and Air Bombardment p. 35

Related Covering Actions p. 43

Final Approach of the Northern

Attack Force p. 43

Chapter 11. D-day-15 June 1944 45

Pre-H-Hour Preparations p. 45

Tanapag Demonstration p. 47

The Landing p. 48

Red Beach Action p. 51

Green Beach and Afetna Point p. 54

Yellow Beach and Agingan Point p. 55

Blue Beach and Charon Kanoa p. 58

4th Division Tanks Land p. 60

14th Marines Land p. 62

General Schmidt's Command Post p. 64

2nd Division Tanks p. 64

Minor Enemy Tank Thrusts p. 65

10th Marines' 75mm Pack Howitzers

, Land p. 66

2d and 24th Marines Land p. 66

Darkness D-Day p. 67

A Noisy and Restless Night p. 71

Reports—Impending Naval Action

Chapter III. Expansion of the Beachhead 

D-plus 1-16 June p. 77

Spruance's Decisions p. 77

6th Marines Consolidate; 8th Captures

Afetna Point p. 79

Remainder of 2d Marines Lands p. 80

Artillery Build-Up p. 81

The Push to 0-1 p. 81

27th Division Begins to Land p. 84

Night of 16-17 June—Tank Counterattack

p.86

D-plus 2-17 June p. 92

Through Susupe's Marshes p. 92

The Move to Aslito Airfield p. 94

More Corps Troops Ashore p. 96

Night of 17-18 June p. 99

Japanese Air Strikes p. 100

1)-plus 3-18 June p. 101

Into the Coconut Grove p. 102

Drive to the East p. 102

Seizure of Aslito Airfield p. 104

Japanese Air Activity p. 106 •

Night of 18-19 June p.107

D-plus 4-19 June p. 107

The Approach to Nafutan Point p. 107

The 4th Division Left Progresses p. 108

Active Patrolling p. 108

Artillery Situation p. 109

p. 74

77
Rear Installations p. 110

Night of 19-20 June p. 110

Battle of the Philippine Sea p. 112

D-plus 5-20 June p. 113

Surge to 0-4 p. 114

The Capture of Hill 500 p. 114

Securing the Cliff p. 115

Punches at the Point p. 117

Night of 20-21 June p. 120

D-plus 6-21 June p. 120

The Pause Before the Northern Push

p.,120

Searching the Swamp p. 121

"... Hold Present Front Lines. . ." p 121

Night of 21-22 June p. 123

Summary of Medical Activities to Date

p. 124

Chapter IV. Drive to the North 126

D-plus 7-22 June p. 126

Intermediate Objective 0-4A p. 126

To Tipo Pale's Summit p. 128

Commitment in the Center p. 131

Night of 22-23 June p. 132

Japanese Situation p. 132

Air Activity p. 133

D-plus 8-23 June p. 134

The Introduction to Death Valley p. 134

Operations at Hill 600 p. 136

". . . Focal Points of Combat" p. 137

Night of 23-24 June p. 139

Japanese Plans and Actions p. 140

D-plus 9-24 June p. 141

To Garapan's Outskirts p. 141

The Troublesome Cliff p. 144

To Chacha and Laulau p. 145

General Ralph Smith Relieved p. 146

Night of 24-25 June p. 147

Japanese Thoughts p. 147

D-plus 10-25 June p. 148

Kagman Peninsula p. 148

Failure of a Plan p. 150

Seizure of Mt. Tapotchau p. 151

Stalemate at Nafutan Point p. 155

Night of 25-26 June p. 156

"There Is N9 Hope for Victory . . ." p. 156

D-plus 11-26 June p. 157

Mop-Up on Kagman Peninsula p. 157

Colonel Stebbins Takes Over 106th

Infantry p. 158

VI

By-Passing the Pocket p. 159

"Seven Lives for One's Country" p.161

Progress in Unloading p. 164

Medical Situation p. 165

Related Raids by U. S. Navy p. 166

Chapter V. Swing to Tanapag 167

D-plus 12-27 June 1944 p. 167

Japanese Situation on D-plus 12 p. 167

Rapid Progress on the Right p. 168

Important Localities Seized p. 170

Pinch, Shift, Adjust, Consolidate p. 171

Night of 27-28 June p. 174

D-plus 13-28 June 1944 p. 174

Four "Pimples" p. 175

General Griner Assumes Command of

27th Division p. 177

"Hold Present Positions. . ." p. 179

Night of 28-29 June p. 180

D-plus 14 and D-plus 15 (29-30 June) p. 180

Waiting and Patrolling p. 181

Vertical Gap Reduced p. 181

A Successful Ruse p. 182

Nights of 29 and 30 June p. 185

D-plus 16 and D-plus 17 (1-2 July) p. 186

The Limestone Hill p. 186

Gaining Momentum p. 191

The Surge to 0-6A p. 193

Nights of 1 and 2 July p. 194

Saito Changes His Defense p. 195

D-plus 18 and D-plus 19 (3-4 July) p. 196

Garapan Seized p. 196

The Thrust to Flores Point p. 201

The Struggle for the Hills p. 203

Change of Direction p. 206

Naval Activities from 27 June to 4 July

p. 207

Chapter VI. Saito's Last Battle 208

D-plus 20-5 July p. 208

Tanapag Plain p. 208

From 0-7Z to 0-8A p. 210

Night of 5-6 July p. 212

D-plus 21-6 July p. 212

The Ditch and the Gulch p. 212

Expansion of the Front p. 218

Night of 6-7 July p. 221

The Banzai Attack p. 222

The 2d Division's Mop-Up of 8 and 9 July

p. 230
1)-plus 22, 23 and 24 (7, 8 and 9 July) p. 935

To the Shore at Marpi Point p. 235

Naval Activity p. 243 •

The Crowning Horror p. 245

Maniagassa Island p. 246

Chapter VII. Conclusions 247

Summary p. 247

Naval Gunfire p. 247

Air Support p. 248

Artillery p. 250

Landing Vehicles p. 251

Tanks p. 253

Engineers p. 254

Signal Communications p. 256

Logistics p. 256

Medical p. 256

Japanese Tactical Lessons p. 258

Japanese Strategical Summit ry p. 959

The Assessment p. 261

Appendices 263

V.

VI.

Bibliography p. 263

Chronology p. 266

Casualties p. 268

Command and Staff List of Ala jor Units

p. 270

Kyle's Mission p. 275

Basic Organization HiglIer Echelon

Task Forces facing p. 278

Task Organization p. 279

Japanese Order of Battle p. 281

The Last Days of General Saito p. 283

Navy Unit Commendation p. 285

Distinguished Unit Citation p. 286

VII
CHAPTER I

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Plans and Preparations

STRATEGIC SITUATION

. DURING the first months of 1944, determined

thrusts by the Allies were cracking Japanese

defenses throughout the Pacific. On land,

Japan's hold on Burma was being systematically whittled down; at sea,. the United States

Fleet was spreading destruction far and wide

in preparation for new strategic moves. Submarines were littering the bottom of the Pacific with the wrecks of a large part of Japan's

merchant fleet. Frequent and shattering attacks

from shore and carrier-based aircraft were tormenting the Japanese from many quarters.

In February 1944 the seizure of Kwajalein,

Majuro and Eniwetok in the Marshalls and

Task Force 58's strikes against Truk Atoll

(16-17 February) and the Marianas (22 February) had profoundly affected the strategic

situation in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Seizure of

bases in the Marshalls afforded protected, forward-area anchorages for the entire fleet and

for the assembly of large, amphibious forces,

together with sufficient land area for airstrips

suited to all types of aircraft.

Strikes on Truk had rendered that important

enemy base temporarily useless, had revealed

its relative weakness and, coupled with the

Marshalls' invasion, made the Japanese Navy

realize that its southeastern Pacific bases were

untenable. The withdrawal of Japanese naval

aviation from Rabaul, a process begun in 1944,

Was hastened by the Truk raids. The United

'States "leapfrog" strategy was following a con-

'sistently effective pattern.'

The carrier strike on the Marianas, following

immediately that on Truk, was conceived as a

continuation of pressure which would keep the

Japanese off balance in their dispositions and

planning. Certainly, a major objective of this

particular strike was the desire to gain aerial

photographic coverage of the island. The

United States had never had complete coverage

of the Japanese Marianas and had taken no

photographs of Guam since that island's earlywar capture by the enemy.

Strategically, however, the Marianas strike

had the effect of displaying the capabilities of

fast carrier task forces in long-range operations and emphasizing to the Japanese that

their inner defense line was now seriously

threatened. The stage was set for the next

major operation in the Central Pacific, by

which United States forces . proposed to establish themselves firmly in the inner perimeter of

Japan's defense. This offensive was to be against

the Marianas Islands.

Another carrier raid, one against the Western Carolines (30 March-1 April), though not

1 The basic concept of the "leapfrog" strategy was

to seize those islands essential for our use, bypassing

many strongly held ;intervening ones which were not

necessary for our parPose. The disparity between our

naval power and that of the enemy made it virtually

impossible for the Japanese to support the garrisons

of bypassed islands, and these bases became innocuous. (Though considerable effort was required to keep

them that way.)

1
influencing selection of the Marianas as an

objective or the time of the operation's execution, exerted a vital, direct impact on the entire

strategic picture.2

The Marianas form a vital link in an almost

unbroken chain of islands extending 1,350 miles

southward from Tokyo. Many of these islands

are small, rocky, and valueless from a military

viewpoint, but others are so located as to provide a series of mutually supporting airfields

and bases, like so many stepping stones, affording protected lines of air and sea communications from the home islands of the Japanese ,

Empire to their island fortresses. Capture of

the Marianas by United States forces would

effectively cut these admirably-protected lines

of enemy communication and provide bases

from which we could not only control sea areas

farther west in the Pacific, but also on which

we could base long-range aircraft to bomb

Tokyo and the home islands of the Empire.3

Of the 15 islands which comprise the group,

only Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and Guam—all in

the southern Marianas (150° East longitude,

15° North latitude)—were worthwhile military

objectives. The group's northern islands protrude in precipitous, conical peaks from the

surrounding seas. Anatahan, for example, is

only a fraction the size of Saipan, yet rises over

a thousand feet higher. (See Map 1.)

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When Magellan discovered the islands in

1521, he was impressed by the sailing ability of

the native boys and named the group "Islas de

las Velas Latinas" (Islands of the Lateen

Sails) ; but his officers, angered by the natives'

thieving habits, called them "Islas de los Ladrones" (Islands of Thieves). The latter name

stuck until Queen Maria Anna, second wife of

Philip IV of Spain, sent missionaries and soldiers there and, thus, gave the group the name

Marianas.

2 USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, 204,

hereinafter cited as Campaigns. The War Reports,

Admiral King's Report, 586, hereinafter cited as King.

Ltr from Adm R. K. Turner to CMC, 4Jan50, hereinafter cited as Turner.

3King, 589

The native Marianas' islanders, the Chamorros, were of small stature, brown-skinned with

scanty beards, and had the slanted eyes of the

Malay. Through the years, however, .the appearance changed; the present Chamorros are

ethnically-mixed descendants of the Spanish,

Mexican, and Philippine soldiery who garrisoned the islands. The natives' language was

permanently influenced by the Spanish domination.

The Marianas remained under Spanish control until 1898. The American cruiser Charleston entered the harbor of Guam early in the

Spanish-American War, accepted the island's

surrender, and, thus, provided the United

States with a much-needed coaling station for

ships en route to the Philippines. After the

war, Guam was retained by the United States.

In 1899, Spain sold all the other islands of the

Marianas and Carolines to Germany for four

and a half million dollars. In contrast to the

Spanish regime, which emphasized • missionary

work, the German administration was directed

toward economic development.

Shortly after the outbreak of World War I

in 1914, Japan seized Germany's Pacific dominions. The League of Nations recognized the

seizure and in 1920 mandated the Marianas,

with the exception of Guam, to Japan.

Japan set about the settlement and development of these islands in a vigorous fashion.

Until 1935, she regularly prepared an annual

report for submission at Geneva, in accordance

with the terms of the mandate; but after 1935,

when she withdrew from the League of Nations,

she ceased her reports and let it be known she

would not tolerate any challenge to her sovereignty in this part of the Pacific. Between 1936

and the outbreak of the Pacific War, the territory .was very jealously guarded against visits

by Europeans. It was generally known, however, that by 1938 the Japanese immigrant settlers outnumbered the natives and that, in defiance of the terms of the mandate, Japan was

planning powerful naval and air bases throughout the archipelago. Few of their extensive

plans. reached fruition, however. Japan had

long desired possession of Guam, and one of

her first moves after the outbreak of war was

to seize that island.4
• Farallon De PojarOS

p Moog

• Asuncion.

V Agri hon

• Pagan

Alarnogon •

Guguan .

Sorigon •

Anotohon

Medinilla

if SAIPAN

t Tinion

Aguijon

•Rota

MARIANAS ISLANDS

too 0 100

EZML,pa- 11.1 rri

NAUTICAL MILES

(APPROX)

MAP I

00 7093

The foregoing account of the historical background

is a synthesis of the following sources: Pacific Islands

Under Japanese Mandate, Tadao Yanaihara, 8-28;

The Pacific Islands Handbook, 1944, H. W. Robson,

150-151; Encyclopedia Brittannica, Vol. XVII, 4-5;

,IICP0A Information Bulletin 7-44, "Marianas," 5;

Smithsonian Institution War Background Studies

Number Sixteen, Peoples of the Western Pacific,

Micronesia, and Melanesia, Herbert W. Krieger, 35.

SAIPAN

Saipan, situated some 1,250 nautical miles

south by east of Tokyo, was closer to the Japanese Empire than any other large Mandated

Island. (See Map 2.) Together with the neighboring island of Tinian (three nautical miles

to the southwest), it formed the. key point of

the Marianas defense and was an important

supply base and communication center for the

Central Pacific. Tanapag Harbor, on Saipan's

west coast, was used as a fueling and supply

station for ships en route to and from the

Empire. A part of the naval task force for

the ill-fated attack on Midway was assembled

there in May 1942. Surface patrols for the Marianas shipping routes were based in the harbor.

Two airfields and a seaplane base at Saipan

and two airfields on Tinian served as stopover

and refueling stations for the aircraft ferry

route between Japan and the south. In addition, a large portion of the planes providing air

cover for the Marianas were based on the Saipan-Tinian fields.

Though used extensively as a rest and replacement center and as a training area for

troops, Saipan lacked the natural facilities of a

major naval base. Only a few vessels could find

suitable anchorages at Tanapag Harbor.

Irregularly shaped and with its long axis

running generally north and south, the island

of Saipan is approximately 141/5 miles long

and 61/2 miles wide. Its area is roughly 72 square

miles. The east coast of the island is free of

coral reefs, except within the limits of Magicienne Bay; the west coast, on the other hand,

is almost completely fringed by reefs which

extend in width from one-fourth to two miles

from the shoreline. Generally, the northern

and eastern coasts are clearly defined by Cliffs

along the shoreline (except in Magicienne Bay

and two. small areas on Kagman Peninsula's

northeastern side) ; the western coast is lowerlying and offers relatively few natural obstacles

to movement inland.5

5 G-2 Study of the Southern Marianas, V Amphibious Corps, 21, hereinafter cited as G-2 Study.

JICPOA Information Bulletin 7-44, 50.

3
ASLITO AIRFIELD as seen from the air. Mt. Tapotchau is visible in the background. Magicienne Bay juts from the

right of picture. Black smoke at upper left is coming from the Garapan-Tanapag Harbor area.

Almost in the center of Saipan, Mount Tapotchau humps its back against the sky to a height

of 1,554 feet. It seems higher, so steep are its

sides. This mountain, by all odds the island's

key terrain feature, afforded the Japanese excellent observation of the beachhead for 10

days after the landing.

Much of the eastern and northern part of

the island is a series of hills and rolling plateaus

which tilt sharply down to narrow coastal flats

or end abruptly in high cliffs that drop sheer to

the sea. The southern and western areas, however, are much flatter, and the land levels off

into a coastal plain.

On the southern flatlands, at a point about

one mile from the south coast, the Japanese

built Aslito Airfield. Its main runway, on an

4

east-west axis, was 3,600 feet long and 900 feet

wide. A second, shorter runway, in the form of

an arm, protruded southwestward from the

main strip. The field was hard-surfaced with

crushed coral rock.6

Just north of Charan Kanoa and but a short

distance inland, the Japanese had half completed a small fighter strip, then abandoned

6Unlike other Japanese airfields, Aslito had no

provision for turning circles, but wide runways afforded sufficient space for this function. Jutting to

the north from the center of the main runway was

the larger of two service aprons. This apron, 900 feet

long and 600 feet wide, gave access to the three main

hangars. About 250 yards to the east, a secondary

apron (900 feet by 165 feet) fronted two small

hangars.
esitp444,141

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QMANIAGASSA ISLAND

Flores Pt

Seaplane Base

Tonopog Harbor

Moroi Pt

,C: iSiARPI z) POINT

.s AIRFIELD

AAA

'

Mt Petosukoro

610

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Prudential

Makunsha 

i825

Village F

-Fi,

Hill 650

;•!..,%;:.,:. 4' 767

Mutcho P

Garopon

Tsutsuuron

Charon Kanoa

Agingan Pt

RD 7093

MAGICIENNE BAY

Cope Obiam

Nafutan Pt

Rorogottan

Kaman Peninsula

SAIPAN ISLAND

SCALE

1000 0 1000 5000 Yd s

MAP 2
MARPI POINT AIRFIELD, at Saipan's northern end, was under construction at the time of United States landings.

the project. This strip ran north and south,

perpendicular to the prevailing east-west wind.

Since such an arrangement is highly undesirable from a pilot's point of view, it is odd that

the work was ever begun. This strip was not

unique, however, inasmuch as other Japanese

airfields, on other islands, were similarly positioned.

At Saipan's extreme northern end, amidst a

maze of rocky hills and depressions, there

exists a plateau of sufficient size for the construction of an airfield. Here the Japanese were

building the Marpi Point Airfield when United

States landings interrupted their plans. The

shortage of construction equipment, a factor

that had hampered work all over the island,

slowed progress on this field to snail's pace.

The coastal plain along the western shore

contains most of the settlements of Saipan, including the two largest: Garapan and Charan

Karma. In these two towns were some well-constructed buildings, most of which were made

of wood and tile, although, in some of the better structures, masonry was used. A narrowgauge railroad ran around most of Saipan's

coastal areas.

Just inland and behind the town of Charan

Kanoa is Lake Susupe, fed principally during

the rainy season and becoming very shallow

during dry periods. Surrounding the lake is a

large swamp, which presented a major obstacle

to movement through the area. There are no

rivers on Saipan, but two springs exist near

Tanapag, on the west coast, and others near

5
GARAPAN, neat and trim here, was reduced to rubble by United States bombardment. Picture is of northern part

of town.

the village of Donnay, on the east coast.7

The climate on Saipan is characterized by

two seasons, the dry winter monsoon that begins in November and lasts through March, and

the wet summer monsoon that starts in April

and ends in late October or early November.

These two seasons' temperatures show little

variance, but all other phenomena have marked

differences.

During the winter monsoon there is a great

deal of fair weather, broken occasionally by

storms of short duration, but the summer monsoon brings thunder-showers and the threat of

typhoons.8 An average of one typhoon yearly

originates in the area (August or September),

but in June and July the local weather is subject to the influence of typhoons originating

within 500 miles. Even though Saipan may

escape the storm's direct path, these "near

misses" often take on the proportions of a considerable gale. The corrugated tin roofs on the

7 Northern Troops and Landing Force, G-2 Report,

74, hereinafter cited as NTLF 0-2 Report. 0-2 Study,

23.

JICP0A Information Bulletin 7-44, 51-52.

6

native abodes are sometimes flung recklessly

about the island by the winds, providing a

threat to life and limb.

Annual rainfall at Saipan averages between

120 to 125 inches.° From November to June,

Saipan's monthly rainfall averages from two

and one-half to six inches, but from July to

October, frequent downpours increase the average to a foot per month. Due to the regularity

of its precipitation (275 days per year are

rainy) 1° Saipan depended largely on rain water, collected in tanks placed under the eaves of

buildings, for its domestic water supply. A few

wells existed on the island, but these—and the

9 This is double the amount that annually falls on

New Orleans, our wettest city; is triple that of New

York City, Washington, D. C. and Philadelphia; five

times that of Omaha; six times that of San Francisco;

and dwarfs the fall at Yuma, Arizona by 33 times.

Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, World Weather

Records, Vol. XC, 316-356, hereinafter cited as World

Weather Records.

10 Though this seems like considerable rain, Saipan

gets the least of any island in the region (Carolines,

Marianas, Palaus). Sailing Directions for the Pacific

Island, Vol. I, 566.
O- 11 RIDGELINE

CHARAN KANOA BEFORE the blow fell. 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, after landing north (left) of here, fought along the

coast and seized beach area (Green 3) shown.

already-mentioned springs—furnished only a

small portion of the population with water."

The average monthly temperature is relatively constant throughout the year, with 76°

in January and February and 80° in June. In

the United States, constancy of temperature

similar to Saipan's is experienced only by the

inhabitants of Key West, Florida. Saipan's

hottest days are in June, when the thermometer

occasionally climbs to 95°. February brings the

coolest weather, with periodic drops to 61°.

Relative humidity is high, averaging 78% in

winter and 84% in summer.12

"G-2 Study, 27.

12 JICP0A Information Bulletin 29-44, Weather

Survey for Carol ines and Marianas, 2-3. World

Weather Records, 331.

Saipan's major industry (under Germany

and Japan) was sugar production. The South

Seas Development Company (Japanese) operated three large plantations and two sugar

mills. Each mill had a capacity of 1,200 tons of

sugar cane daily, from which 120 tons of crude

sugar were produced. Several plants produced

alcohol and liquors from the molasses byproduct. Part of this was converted into synthetic Scotch whiskey, port wine, and four or

five other beverage concoctions for Japanese

consumption.12

Other than sugar cane, Saipan's agricultural

18 After D-Day this production stopped, but the flies

did not. Making the most of the situation, these insects embarked on a veritable orgy of feasting and

reproduction.

7
MI. RNA 5USU (0-4 RIDGELINE)

JAPANESE BOATS photographed off Charm Kanoa pier during Task Force 58's strikes of February 1944. 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, landed on beach shown (Blue 1) on D-Day.

products included tapioca, sweet potatoes, papayas, cotton, and vegetables. None of these

was grown in sufficient quantity for export,

however. In 1930, a little less than ten percent

of the copra collected in the Mandated Islands

came from Saipan. This commodity, together

with sugar and alcohol, formed the chief items

for export. A coffee plantation was established

there in 1928, but results were not particularly

gratifying.

Fishing was also an important industry. In

1936, nearly four and a half million pounds of

bonito and tuna were caught in the Marianas

group and shipped to Japan. This, plus small

amounts • of tobacco and tropical fruit, completed the list of secondary articles for export.

The Japanese on Saipan held most of the

"white-collar" jobs in the towns, while the

Chamorros, for the most part, were farmers,

each possessing an average of 15 to 25 acres of

land. Also included on the island, apparently

as part of a Japanese colonization project, were

8

a large number of Koreans and Okinawans.

The latter had been saturated with Japanese

propaganda to the effect that they could expect

only the cruelest handling from the Americans.'4

JAPANESE DEFENSES

Saipan was dependent on Japan for imports

of foodstuffs (mainly rice), manufactured

articles, lumber, building materials, machinery,

petroleum products, dry goods and drugs. With

the advent of war, these imports became secondary to the more important items necessary

for maintenance of the military establishment.

Apparently, however, the shipment of construction material so vitally needed for fortification work was not accorded an early enough

priority. This was due, first, to the rapid pace

of the United States thrust through the Gilberts and Marshalls and the bypassing of the

Central Carolines, which left the Japanese little

14 JICPOA Information Bulletin 7-44, 58-60.
STORAGE VAULT for 120min dual-purpose gun ammunition.

Powerfully constructed positions such as this would

have been more common at Saipan if Japanese had not

been hampered by a shortage of cement and other

materials.

time for shipment of these supplies; second, to

the devastating effectiveness of United States

submarine activity, which was exacting a heavy

toll of enemy shipping intended for Saipan ;15

and, third, to the incorrect assumption by the

Japanese that the next United States objective

would be the Palaus, causing them to assign a

priority of construction material to those islands.

Time and time again, ships loaded with

cement • and steel (as well as personnel) had

been sent from the Empire only to be sunk by

American submarines. The effect of this is indicated in a Japanese document, dated 10 May

1944, entitled "Present State of Supplies and

Materiel in the Southern Marianas:

The current freight shortage, which is caused by

shipping losses, has deprived the area of much needed

materiel. One ship out of three is sunk, and a second ,

damaged, by enemy action.

It was this situation, largely, which caused the

Japanese Chief of Staff, 31st Army, to corn15 Report on Japanese Defense Plan for the Island

of Saipan, Southern Marianas, prepared by the Engineer, Expeditionary Troops (TF 56), July 1944, 1,

hereinafter cited as TP 56 Engineer's Report.

8895900--50 --2

plain to the Chief of Staff, Central Pacific

Fleet, that _

. . . . we can not strengthen the fortifications appreciably now unless we can get materials suitable for

permanent construction. Specifically, cement, barbed

wire, lumber, etc., which can not be obtained in these

islands. No matter how many soldiers there are, they

can do nothing in regard to fortifications but sit

around with their arms folded, and the situation is

unbearable. I would like this matter of supply of

construction materials dealt with immediately.16

That the Japanese defenses were incomplete

at the time of our 15 June landings is partially

explained by the fact that their defensive installation building plan called for completion

about November 1944.17

Another indication that the Japanese time

schedule was not adequately keyed to the situation is found in an enemy document, published

on 20 May 1944 (less than a month before

United States landings), entitled "Outline of

Defensive Plan of Northern Marianas Force :"

The various units will so prepare their defensive

strength, beginning with the immediate construction

of defensive positions, that when they are fully developed they can destroy the enemy landing force on

the beach. We will transform these islands into a

fortess so that we can expect, absolutely, to hold our

airfields. On account of this, although it is tardy,

[author's italics] we will complete our field positions

by the first ten days in June and thereafter we will

rapidly construct permanent defensive positions in

strategic places.

It is interesting to note that no specific mention

was made of the construction of permanent defensive positions inland. The whole Japanese

scheme of defense was committed to "destroying the enemy landing force on the beach."18

As indicated, the Japanese failed to exploit

fully the defensive potentialities of Saipan. The

island's natural features—including excellent

observation, long fields of fire, natural obstacles

that canalized movement, cover and.concealment—made it nearly ideal from a defense

viewpoint.

18 CINCPAC-CINCP0A Item #9652.

17 NTLF 0-2 Report, 6.

18 Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops), 0-2 Report, hereinafter cited as TF 56 0-2 Report, 7.

9
OPEN TRENCHWORKS were employed extensively by the Japanese at Saipan, because they lacked adequate amounts

of construction materiel.

JAPANESE ORGANIZATION

The Japanese organization on Saipan was

extremely complicated; in some cases there were

three possible nomenclatures for a single unit.

Early in the war, Japanese army organizations

were known as "expeditionary forces" and received numerical designations relating to the

islands upon which they belonged; thus, the 1st

Expeditionary Force was on Saipan, the 6th on

Guam, etc. In May 1944, because of numerous

inter-island transfers and the influx of reinforcements, the Japanese changed their system

of nomenclature. Infantry personnel was organized into "independent infantry battalions"

and numbered consecutively. The battalions

then became part of "independent mixed brigades," to which were attached one or more

10

battalions of artillery and an engineering company or antiaircraft unit, or both. These brigades were, in turn, assigned numbers. In addition, there were numbered regiments, variously

composed, to complicate the picture further.

The intricacies of this organization were

either not explained or insufficiently explained

to the individual Japanese soldiers, who habitually identified themselves by their original

unit names. Certainly the mystery caused

United States intelligence agencies more headaches than code names ever could. Thus, with

their flair for making the simple difficult, the

Japanese delayed United States identification

of enemy units and establishment of an accurate

order of battle.

American submarines further abetted the
confusion. Numerous ships were sunk in waters

adjacent to Saipan with the result that many

survivors and stragglers made their way to the

island, arriving without records or equipment.

In addition, a number of units intended for

transfer to more remote • stations were trapped

on the island by our landings. The order of

battle, as now reconstructed, is the result of a

careful cross-check of operation orders and

maps, quartermaster and mess hall records,

tables of organization, field orders, casualty reports, and prisoner of war interrogations.

Saipan's forces were jointly commanded by

.Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo and Lieutenant

General Yoshitsugu Saito. Admiral Nagumo,

Commander Central Pacific Fleet and 5th Base

Force, was an illustrious officer, having established his fame on 7 December 1941, as commander of forces afloat during the Pearl Harbor attack and, later, at Midway and Santa

Cruz. His Central Pacific Fleet command was

a newly-created administrative unit which, as

a practical matter, never progressed beyond the

paper stage.

The senior officer in the area, Lieutenant

General Hideyoshi Obata, commanding general

of the 31st Army and the Army administrative

command for the Marianas-Bonins-MarshallsCarolines, was at Palau on an inspection trip

at the time of the United States landings. The

actual command of Saipan's defense devolved,

therefore, upon Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu

Saito, commanding general of the Northern

Marianas Army Group and the 43d Division

(reinforced).

The two basic army fighting units were the

43d Division (reinforced) and the 47th Mixed

Brigade. The former, directly under Saito's

command, was composed of three infantry regiments (118th, 135th [less 1st Battalion], and

136th) and additional units to perform transportation, medical, ordnance and communication services. The 47th Mixed Brigade," commanded by Colonel Oka, was made up of three

independent infantry battalions (316th, 317th

and 318th), three battalions of artillery, and

an engineer company.

19 Th is unit was the original Saipan garrison force

and prior to the change of its name had been called

"1st Expeditionary Force." In his order of 8 June

Also important to Saipan's defense but not

part of the two major army units were a tank

regiment, an infantry battalion, an antiaircraft

regiment, two regiments of engineers, and two

transportation companies.

In addition to these regularly-assigned army

units, there were numerous straggler units. In

most cases, these were ill-equipped and poorlyorganized and could not participate as efficient fighting organizations. But, certainly, in

sniping and infiltrating roles, these units performed valuable service for the Japanese.

Army forces on Saipan totalled 22,702.

The Japanese Navy was also well represented, the two principal fighting units being

the 55th Naval Guard Force (Maizuru Keibitai) and the 1st Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force. All naval units were commanded

by the combined staff of the Central Pacific

Fleet Headquarters and, the 5th Special Base

Force, both under Vice Admiral Nagumo. In

addition to the two major naval forces, there

were units to handle details of communication,

construction, supply, transportation, pay and

routine administration.

Most of the air personnel originall3 based in

the Marianas had left those islands during May

and early June to provide air support for the

reinforcement of Biak Island, near New

Guinea's north coast. Operational losses, as

well as disease, claimed a large percentage of

these personnel. During the second week in

June, the survivors were ordered back to the

Palaus and Marianas. Few, however, reached •

even the Palaus on the return trip, and, apparently, none ever got back to the Marianas.

Small detachments of several air organizations

remained at Saipan, indicating that the Japanese had planned to send planes back in time

to contest a United States incursion.

Though the totals changed from day to day,

the number of naval (including air) personnel

1944, BtGen Obata had ordered that the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade be transferred to Tinian and

relieve the 50th Infantry Regiment of the task of defending that island. The 50th would then go to, and

defend, Rota. The transfer was to commence about

1.5 June 1944, but United States landings on that date

disrupted Obata's plans. CINCPAC-CINCP0A Item

#9645.

11
THESE JAPANESE 8-INCH GUNS, still loaded on flatcars, are but three of the scores of weapons unemplaced at the

time of United States landings.

on the island on 15 June 1944 was approximately 6,960, bringing the total of Japanese

military forces on Saipan to 29,662.2°

For the defense of Saipan, the Japanese

divided the island into four defense sectors (as

shown in Map 3): the northern sector included

the northern third of the island to Tanapag;

the Navy sector included Tanapag, Garapan

and Mutcho Point; the central sector included

the western beaches upon which the 2d Marine

Division landed on D-Day; the southern sector, by far the largest, included all of the area,

20 NTLP G--2 Report, 66-69 and App. J. For a detailed Order of Battle, with strengths of individual

-units, see Appendix VIII.

12

Charan Kanoa-Agingan Point-Aslito AirfieldNafutan Point-Magicienne Bay-Kagman Peninsula. The unit assignments to sectors were:

Northern sector, 135th Infantry Regiment.

Navy sector, 5th Special Base Force (Navy

unit).

Central sector, 136th Infantry Regiment (less

two companies).

Southern sector, 47th Mixed Brigade.

In addition to those units assigned to specific sectors, a reserve of four infantry companies and two shipping companies was stationed in the Chacha-Tsutsuuran area with

orders to "train principally in seaborne maneuvers." One mountain artillery regiment and
NORTHERN SECTOR

NAVY SECTOR 

5th Special

Base Force

(4,672 men)

CENTRAL SECTOR

136

( less 2 companies )

Afetna Point

Tanapag

Harbor

k

arapan

Donnay.

Marpi Point

Mt Tapotchau

4 Inf Cos

/ 2 Shpg Cos

311. • Chach

/1 Gen Res ( 11.)._

•Laulau

Mt Fina

Susu

Kag man

Peninsula

12±3 1 3 Mt Tsutsuuran

31t110 FA

Cha ran

Kanoa

La 25 ill

AIRFIELD

ASLITO

MAGICIENNE

BAY SOUTHERN

SECTOR 

Agingan Point

Naf utan Point

47

;

(3 Independent Inf Bns,

I Independent Arty Regt,

I Engineer Co)

JAPANESE DEFENSE

SECTORS

1000 0 1000 3000 Yds

iCilId=1011d

MAP 3

RD 7093
one battalion of field artillairy, stationed in the

vicinity of Mt. Fina Susu, were designated as

the "artillery defenses of Saipan." A tank

regiment was located in the Chacha-Laulau

area. Antiaircraft artillery employed the bulk

of its strength to protect Aslito Airfield; a

smaller force covered the air over Tanapag

Harbor. Most of the service elements were

located on the west coast in the Charan KanoaGarapan base area.21

By counterattacks, launched during the night

from specified points, the Japanese hoped to

"demolish the enemy landing units at the

water's edge." These thrusts were to employ

troops in the vicinity of the area to be counterattacked, plus reserves from other parts of

the island if necessary. A plan was prepared

in which assembly lareas, firing positions, and

directions of movement were shown for counterattacks on the most likely areas of United

States penetration.

The same plan designated those areas considered strategically and tactically important.

(See Map 4.) A peculiarity of this terrain

evaluation is that Mr. Tapotchau did not fall

into either category, although that feature

certainly dominates most of the island.22

Even the best informed Japanese commanders

could not fully appreciate the great need for

speed. By 14 June, however, Admiral Nagumo

was forced to the conclusion that "the Marianas are the first line of defense of the homeland," and, "it is a certainty that the Americans

will land in the Marianas Group either this

month or next." The landing on Saipan took

place the next day.

Large numbers of heavy weapons (ranging

from 200mm mortars to 5-inch coastal defense

guns) and literally dozens of searchlights and

antiaircraft guns still remained in naval depots

or loaded on railroad cars or still packed in

cosmoline near partially excavated gun posi21 Ibid., 8-9. It will be noted that the 118th Infantry

Regiment was not assigned a specific mission. This

unit arrived during the first week in June and, therefore, was too late for the defense order. Its presence, however, afforded General Saito a sizeable reserve to use wherever he chose.

22Ibid., 8-9.

tions. The high ground in the island's center

had received little attention in the defensive

preparations; and, indeed, beach defenses themselves were in many cases far from complete.

In this small theater, so suitable for the employment of field artillery, the Japanese had

neither horses nor adequate vehicles to provide

necessary mobility for that arm. Apart from

manpower, the only means for moving field

guns were rear-drive trucks designed for use

on roads, a factor which led to abandonment

of a great number of artillery pieces as the

Japanese withdrew.

In so far as training in defensive warfare is

concerned, Japanese forces displayed a marked

deficiency; there was little evidence of organization of the ground, the principal airfield

(Aslito) was virtually undefended against

ground troops, and their counterattack plans

were poorly conceived.22

Despite the apparent deficiencies of the defensive installations and plans, one vital characteristic of a good defense was present—the

individual defender was determined to hold

the island and was willing to give his life to

realize this end. It was this characteristic which

would present the greatest difficulty to our

forces throughout the battle for Saipan.

HIGH-LEVEL PLANNING

Casablanca Conferences

As already indi ca ted, the ' Japanese were

23 77.' 56 Engineer's Report, 1-2.

UNDAMAGED 75MM FIELD PIECE captured by the 27th Division. Lacking suitable prime-movers, the Japanese

were forced to abandon many artillery pieces.

13
THE ENEMY, possessing fighting characteristics of which

any nation could be proud, generally favored death to

surrender. This superior private, among the 3 percent

of Japanese soldiers taken prisoner, poses in an internment camp.

well aware of the Marianas' importance in the

defense of their homeland. There was almost

Unanimous recognition that a United States

attempt to move into the Marianas area _would

precipitate a struggle which could decide the

war's outcome. Most Japanese felt that, given

enough time, the outcome of such a battle

would be favorable to themselves.

Some United States planners, notably Admiral Ernest J. King, - attached the same importance to the Marianas and, likewise, predicted that an all-out naval engagement would

,be provoked. Many other top-echelon planners,

however, were unconvinced of the necessity for

seizing the Marianas. As will, be seen, . the

selection of the Marianas as an objective was

in no sense inevitable or obvious; the selection

could more accurately be termed a development

in the strategic situation. Because the development was an integral .part of the strategic

14

planning for the entire Pacific, it will be

necessary to discuss the over-all planning which

took place.

Although the Joint United States Strategic

Committee had begun preparation of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan in August

1942, this was not completed by January 1943

when the Combined Chiefs of Staff" met at

CasabAnca. In fact, there was no final, approved plan in existence for the defeat of

Japan at this time. Pre-war strategic plans,

while helpful, could serve only as a general

guide, since many of the assumed conditions

and situations did not obtain. In the absence

of a concrete, detailed, written study, Admiral

King orally presented to the Combined Chiefs

his analysis of the strategic picture. In it he

indicated that Rabaul and the Philippines were

major objectives, while Truk and the Marianas

would constitute vitally important intermediate objectives. The latter islands King considered the "key," because they lay athwart the

Japanese lines of communication in the Centr#1

Pacific.

From the January 1943 Casablanca con=

ferences emerged a strategic outline, similar

in many respects to prewar plans, which was

to serve as a framework for later formal,

written plans. That framework was this:

line of communications through the, Central

Pacific to the Philippines would be opened;

following a route through the northwestern

Marshalls and thence to Truk and the Mari

anas.25

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in

Chief Southwest Pacific, disliked the Central

Pacific route from the outset and made himself

voluble on the subject on many occasions. In

his Reno I (campaign plan for the Southwest

Pacific area), published on 25 February 1943,

MacArthur expressed the opinion that the

Central Pacific route would be "time consuming and expensive in our naval power and

24 These were the American and British Chiefs of

Staff meeting together. It is pertinent to note that,

in the war with the most amphibious characteristics

of any in history, no senior United States Marine Was

included on the high planning level.

25 CCS 56th Meeting, 14Jan43.
Agingan

Point

RD 7093

LEGEND

Expected points of U.S. landings.

Japanese counterattack routes

Areas Japanese considered strategi—

cally important

Areas Japanese considered

tactically important

Mutcho

Point

Garapon

Moral Point

Nofutan Point

Change troop dis—

positions accord—

ing to this plan

as direction of

enemy attack varies.

2. Each unit will con—

solidate strategi—

cally important

points and will

carry out counter—

Kagman attacks with reserve

Peninsula forces and tanks

against the enemy

landing units and

will demolish the

enemy during the

night at the water's

edge.

JAPANESE COUNTERATTACK

PLAN

1000 0 1000 3000 Yds

MAP 4
shipping." In addition, a reorientation of an

established front in the South and Southwest

Pacific areas would be required and the use

of land-based air support would not be possible. On the other hand, MacArthur felt, an

approach through the Southwest Pacific, northwestward along the north coast of New Guinea,

offered much better chances for success.26

MacArthur's objections notwithstanding, the

-United States Joint Chiefs presented a plan

to the Combined Chiefs at Washington in May

of 1943 which concluded that the Central Pacfic route was the better one, since success here

would have more decisive strategic results.

The British representatives agreed and the

Joint Chiefs' proposal was adopted.27

Washington and Quebec Conferences

At the Washington Conference, Admiral

King again discussed the Marianas as a specific

objective. Speaking in much the same tenor as

he had at Casablanca five months before, the admiral described the Marianas as the "key" to

the Pacific situation because of their location

astride the Japanese Central Pacific communication lines. It appears that the admiral's intense interest in the Marianas stemmed from a

realization on his part that the true importance

of this target was not unanimously felt. Significant in this connection is the fact that the

Marianas had not been prescribed as a specific

objective even at this time.28

News of the decisions of the Washington conferences was not happily received in General

MacArthur's headquarters. In protest, MacArthur pointed out that the Central Pacific

route was a return to pre-war plans, which had

not assumed the availability of Australia as a

staging base for offensive operations." On 3

August 1943, Headquarters, Southwest Pacific

Area promulgated Reno II, a revision of Reno._

29 RENO I, 25Feb43.

27 JPS 67/4; JCS 287 and 287/1; Minutes JCS 76th

and 80th Meetings.

28 TRIDENT, 21May43. 92d Meeting.

29 Radio message, CINCSWPA (Gen MacArthur) to

WARCOS (Gen 0. C. Marshall) C-3302, 20Jun43,

CM-IN 13149.

I based upon limitations imposed by the Combined Chiefs' decisions.3°

Further evidence that many officers on the

joint planning level were not whole-heartedly

convinced that the Marianas were a necessary

target is found in the fact that these islands

were not mentioned in the written plans which

the Joint Chief of Staff took with them to the

Quebec conferences in August 1943. Once there,

however, Admiral King again mentioned the

Marianas, and, in addition, the Combined Staff

Planners, a subordinate committee of the Combined Chiefs, listed the Marianas as a possible

objective. The result of this was that the Combined Chiefs approved the Marianas as an

objective, noting that it might be a "necessary

or desirable" campaign. But, in formulating a

time schedule for all operations in the Pacific

and Far East,.the Marianas were again omitted.

Perhaps the most significant decision reached

at the Quebec conference was that Rabaul

would not be occupied. This departure from

previous plans, together with the "approval"

of. the Marianas, constituted the major changes

from the Washington conferences four months

earlier.31

General MacArthur • was very disappointed

by the conclusions reached at the Quebec conferences. The weight of evidence indicated—

to the general—that the Combined Chiefs

planned to give the United States Navy responsibility for the prosecution of the war

against Japan and that Southwest Pacific operations would be terminated at the Vogelkop

Peninsula, New Guinea's western extremity.32

Realizing that General MacArthur was disappointed with the decisions, General George C.

Marshall, a member of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, sent MacArthur a lengthy message explaining the decisions and allaying any fears

that Southwest Pacific forces were assuming a

position of unimportance from the strategic

39 RENO II, 3Aug43.

CCS 31.3, 18Aug43, Appreciation and Plan for

the Defeat of Japan; Minutes CCS 11.0th Meeting,

17Aug43.

32 Radio message, CINCSWPA to WARCOS, C-6131,

28Sep43, CM-IN 19656.

15
THREE. TOP ADMIRALS look at Saipan. From left to right: Admiral Spruance, who commanded the fleet of which the

landing force was a part; Admiral King, who pressed for the operation's execution on the JCS—CCS level;. Admiral Nimitz, who allocated ships and•troops h.oM his Pacific Forces to take Saipan.

point of view.33

Based upon this message and the decisions of

the Quebec conferences, General MacArthur

published another revision of his Reno plans,

this one called Reno 111.34

From what has already been written it may

be seen that the selection of the Marianas as a

target area was far from a random one. By the

autumn of 1943, however, this objective was

receiving more prominent mention, if not

unanimous agreement. On 6 September 1943,

the Joint War Plans Committee, on its OWn

initiative, prepared a study entitled "Outline

Plan For The Seizure Of The Marianas, Including Guam." This study was circulated for

consideration of the Joint Staff Planners; who

33 Radio message, WARCOS (for JCS) to CINCSWPA 8679, 20ct43, CM—OUT 630.

34 RENO III, 200ct43.

16

agreed at .their 99th meeting to inform the

Joint Chiefs that the study had been prepared

and was available. One interesting feature of

this particular study is the prediction that the

Japanese fleet would likely contest the move."

This was not necessarily an original prediction,

however, since Admiral King had made it

earlier.

Unlike General MacArthur, Fleet Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz had, found little to protest

in the Combined 'Chiefs' decisions. As Commander in Chief United States Pacific Fleet

and Pacific Ocean Area, Nimitz would command operations over the Central Pacific route,

designated the main effort. In a letter to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 30 September 1943,

Nimitz _outlined his garrison requirements for

1944, assuming in his letter that all operations

33JPS 264, 6Sep43.
scheduled or approved by the Combined Chiefs

would take place. For planning purposes, operations would advance to the western Carolines

(Palau and Yap) by the end of 1944, the latter

offensives commencing 31 December. In regard

to the Marianas, the letter commented that

these would constitute a satisfactory alternative

for the Palaus. Thus, the axis of advance

through the Central Pacific could follow either

the Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines-Palaus-Philippines axis, or detour northward through the

Marianas-Bonins and thence to the Japanese

home islands.36

Cairo Conferences

In preparation for the next meeting with

their British counterparts, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff discussed two matters which would have,

tremendous weight in the selection of objectives'

in the Central Pacific. These matters, condensed to single terms, were Truk and the B-29.

Truk had long- been recognized as a formidable enemy stronghold, one which would exact

a dear price from attackers. Yet because of its

dominance of Central Pacific sea lanes, it

seemed to demand seizure. During meetings on

15 and 17 November 1943, the Joint Chiefs

probed a possibility which had not before been

officially considered: the feasibility of by-passing Truk. Before arriving at a firm decision in

this respect it was decided the the United States

Navy should launch strong carrier attacks

against Truk as soon as possible to determine

and test the strength of that mysterious position. The results of these attacks would be the

influencing factor in a by-passing decision.37

The Army Air Forces' huge new bomber, the

B-29, now being produced in quantity, was

scheduled to deliver attacks against the Japanese homeland from bases in China at the

earliest possible date. During the November

meetings, General Henry H. Arnold, commander Army Air Forces and a member of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, voiced a doubt that had

been under discussion by Air Force planners for

36 Ltr from Adm C. W. Nimitz to the JCS, 30Sep43,

subject: "Garrison Requirements in the Central Pacific Area."

37 The Truk strikes had the additional purpose of

covering the landings at Eniwetok.

some time: could the Chinese protect the B-29

bases from Japanese ground capture? General

Arnold pointed out that it would be -a normal

enemy reaction, after the first raids against the

homeland, to launch inspired ground offensives

toward the China B-29 bases. Fate of the B-29

plans, then, would rest in the hands of the

Chinese, in whom General Arnold expressed

lack of confidence. Without recommending any

drastic rearrangement of plans in regard to

the use of China bases, Arnold suggested that

these plans be expanded to include use of airfields in the Marianas Islands. These, the general considered, would be next to impossible

for the Japanese to recapture, once United

States forces were in possession. As an important technical matter, General Arnold assured

the other JCS members that the B-29's could

carry their maximum bomb . load from the

southern Marianas to the Japanese home islands.

At last Admiral King was enjoying active

support in his long struggle for recognition of

the Marianas as a "key" objective. With the

added weight thrown behind the project by the

Army Air Forces, the question was no longer

in doubt. The Joint Chiefs decided that, although the first B-29 raids would be launched

from China bases commencing in early June

1944, strikes from the Marianas would start

in December of that year.38

Following these mid-November JCS agreements were the late November–early December

1943 meetings in Cairo, Egypt. While the conference—code named SEXTANT—concerned

itself chiefly with discussions and decisions regarding operations in Europe, some vital agreements pertaining to Pacific operations were

also reached. The Combined Chiefs' "Report

for the President and Prime Minister," a summary of agreements and conclusions of a longrange, global nature, was approved and initialed by Roosevelt and Churchill." Included

38 JCS 123d and 124 Meetings, 15 and 17Nov43.

39 Churchill classified the report as a "masterly survey of the whole military, scene" and gave his opinion

that when military , historians came to adjudge the

decisions of the SEXTANT conference, they would

find them fully in accordance with the "classic articles

of war." SEXTANT, 5th Plenary Meeting.

17
in the report were two documents which were

to serve as a foundation for more detailed

planning: "Specific Operations for the Defeat

of Japan" and "Over-ail Plan for the Defeat

of Japan." 4°

The former paper established a time schedule

for planning purposes in 1944 and included an

operation for the "seizure of Guam and Japanese Marianas" on 1 October 1944 and the

initiation of "very long range bombing of vital

targets in Japanese 'Inner Zone'41 from bases

in Marianas."42 That the time schedule was for

planning purposes and not intended as a hard

and fast calendar of events, was indicated by

an enclosure to the document which pointed

out that certain "developments" might make

possible a speedup. These "developments"

which might permit short-cuts were: first, defeat of the Japanese Fleet at an early date;

second, sudden withdrawal of enemy forces

from certain areas (as from Kiska) ; third, an

earlier defeat of Germany than 1 October 1944,

coupled with an increase in Allied means (such

as by acceleration of the assault ship building

program) ; and, fourth, Russia's early collaboration in the war against Japan."

The other document, "Over-all Plan for the

Defeat of Japan," was approved in principle

and would be the basis for further investigation and preparation.44

The revised plan, circulated to Nimitz and

MacArthur on 23 December 1943, established

the strategic concept within the Pacific. This

concept prescribed "two series of operations"

which would be undertaken concurrently and

would be mutually supporting. One of these

"series" would be MacArthur's route along the

New Guinea-Netherlands East Indies-Philip45"Report to the President and Prime Minister,"

CCS 426/1. CCS 136th and 137th Meetings, 5th

Plenary Meeting.

41 The "Inner Zone" included: Japan proper, Manchuria, Korea, North China, Karafuto (Japanese

Sakhalin) and Formosa.

42 "Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan,"

OCS 397 revised.

4sEnclosure to CCS 397 (revised).

44"Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan,- CCS

417 and 417/1. CCS 130th, 134th and 137th Meetings,

1st and 2d Plenary Meetings.

18

pines axis; the other, Nimitz' route through the

Central Pacific, embracing the Mandated Islands. The latter route would be favored where

conflicts in timing or means developed, since

it promised a "more rapid advance toward

Japan and her vital lines of communication,"

would provide "earlier acquisition of strategic

air bases closer to the Japanese homeland,"

and would be "more likely to precipitate a

decisive engagement with the Japanese Fleet."

The concept envisaged that both series of

operations should progress to a point from

which to launch a "major assault" against the

Formosa-Luzon-China area in the spring of

1945.45

Campaign Plan Granite

Decisions reached at the Cairo Conference,

together with the discussions and deliberations

of the Joint Chiefs prior to those meetings,

provided Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur with considerable detail for the formulation of their own plans. Some changes in

both officers' previous planning was neces-

-sitated by the new decisions. For example, the

Marianas as an objective was no longer a flexible matter; it was now a definite, scheduled

operation. In addition, a carrier strike against

Truk had to be executed at an early date.

Admiral Nimitz' campaign plan GRANITE,

preliminary draft published on 27 December

1943, planned the Central Pacific operations

for 1944. This document tentatively established

the sequence and timing of operations for the

Pacific Ocean Areas and of Southwest Pacific

operations requiring support of major Pacific

Fleet units as follows:

Operation

Tentative

Target Date

Capture of Kwajalein _____31 January 1914.

Capture of Kavieng and

air attack on Truk _20 March 1944.

Capture of Manus _20 April 1944.

Capture of Eniwetok _1 May 1944.

Capture of Mortlock _1 July 1944.

Capture of Truk _15 August 1944.

Capture of Tinian, Saipan,

and Guam 15 November 1944.

45 Ibid., CCS 417/2, 23Dec43.
As may be seen, the Marianas operation was

planned as the final and culminating operation

of 1944. GRANITE emphasized, however, that

the sequence and timing were purely tentative,

that if means became available more rapidly

than could be anticipated, the program would

be accelerated. The plan pointed out, moreover, that a major fleet action, although it

might delay amphibious operations for a brief

period, would greatly accelerate them thereafter. Likewise, a successful action might, by

decreasing the size and strength of forces required to protect lines of communication, justify the omission of an operation even as important as the capture of Truk.46

On 13 January, only 17 days after publication of the preliminary draft, another GRANITE was issued. This one changed certain of

the operation dates of the previous draft:

operations to seize Mortlock and Truk were

moved to 1 August; and, if carrier strikes

against Truk should indicate its capture unnecessary, it could be by-passed and Central

Pacific forces could move direct to the Palaus

(which had not been mentioned in the previous draft) on 1 August. This eventuality

would change the first Marianas' landings to

the first of November. Of particular interest

in this plan is the revelation that, at least for

a short time, Admiral Nimitz was thinking in

terms of seizing the Palaus and then backing

up to take the Marianas.47 This scheme did not

reappear in subsequent documents, however.

Representatives of the South, Southwest and

Central Pacific assembled at Pearl Harbor on

27 and 28 January 1944 to discuss, coordinate

and integrate their planning. In addition to

considering a general speed-up of all Pacific

operations, the conferees discussed two alternative schedules proposed by Admiral Nimitz:

were many present who favored bypassing the

Marianas too, Their reasoning was that the

Marianas, because of an almost complete lack

of good harbors, would . afford poor staging

bases. Moreover, they felt that the proposed

B-29 operations from the Marianas would not

be particularly effective. Further, this group

(a decided majority at this conference) felt

that the Marianas would be a costly operation,

the price of which would not be justified by

results achieved."

'While these discussions of the 27-28 January

Pearl Harbor conference are interesting, it is

apparent that the final decisions in regard to

the Marianas had already been made by the

Joint Chiefs, and the Truk-by-pass decision

would await the results of the carrier strikes.

General MacArthur continued his opposition

to the Central Pacific route as late as, February

1944, when he sent his deputy, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, USA„ to Washington in 'a desperate effort to convince the Joint

Chiefs that both Truk and the Marianas should

be by-passed and that the impetus should be

along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis of advance. General Sutherland had been in Washington but a short time when he found it

necessary to advise MacArthur that the die

was, indeed, cast: the Marianas operation was a

certainty; the Central Pacific route was inevitable."

Also arriving in Washington for conferences

with the Joint Chiefs during the month of

February 1944 was Admiral Nimitz. The latter

pointed out certain factors which had been

under discussion at Pearl Harbor a month before: the Marianas did not offer satisfactory

bases for the fleet and, if Truk were by-passed,

other fleet bases would be required. Nimitz rec48 Radio Message, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA,

(a) Truk, 15 June; Marianas, 1 Septem- 070521/Z 1an44, CM—IN 8330; Radio Message,

her; Palaus, 15 November. CINCSWPA to WARCOS, C-1217, 2Feb44, CM—IN

(b) Truk, bypass; Marianas, 15 June; 1443; Memo from Col W. L. Ritchie to Gen T. T.

Palaus, 10 October. Handy, 4Feb44, subject: Brief of Pacific Conferences,

Pearl Harbor 27-28Jan44 ; General Kenney Reports,

George C. Kenney, 347-349.

49 General Marshall's Incoming-log; telephone conversation between Gen R. K. Sutherland (in Washington) and Gen R. J. Marshall in Brisbane, WD

Telecon 192, 15Feb44.

The second alternative seemed the most favorable to the assembled officers; but, also, there

48 GRANITE, 27Dec43, 7.

47 GRANITE, 13Jan44.

19
ommended Ulithi, 400-odd miles southwest of

Guam,. as an objective, since it would provide

an exceptionally good base for the projected

offensiwe against the Luzon-Formosa-China

coast area,.5°

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, for some time, had

been looking to acceleration of the entire

Pacific offensive, but the Truk imponderable

forbade drastic speed-up alterations in existing plans. When, on 17 and 18 February 1944,

the Truk carrier strikes 51 removed the trappings of mystery surrounding that position,

and it was revealed as considerably weaker

than supposed, the Joint Chiefs agreed that

substantial changes in plans were in order.

Not that the results of the Truk strikes,

which indicated that by-passing would be feasible, were the only consideration. Other developments had their influence: the Marshalls

operation (30 January-20 February) had been

executed with greater speed and less cost than

had been anticipated; General MacArthur's

Southwest Pacific forces had advanced the invasion of the Admiralties from 1 April to 29

February; MacArthur's RENO IV plan (presented to the Joint Chiefs on 5-6 March) contemplated by-passing the Hansa Bay and Wewak areas and advancing directly to Hollandia ; Admiral Nimitz had recommended

launching a major amphibious operation

against either Truk or the Marianas in midJune, followed by an assault on the Palaus

about 1 October; and, in addition, the Army

Air Force was again pressing for early capture, of the Marianas.

5° JCS Memo for Information No, 200, 7Mar44, subject: Sequence and Timing of Operations, Central

Pacific Campaign, a report by CINCPOA. Supplementary minutes, JCS 150th Meeting, 7Mar44.

51- This was the occasion for a message from the

.British Chiefs of Staff: ". . . warm congratulations on

the brilliant success of the operations in the Pacific

which have culminated in the devastating bombardment .of Truk and have led to the dismissal of Field

Marshal Sugiyama and Admiral of the Fleet OSaMi

Nagano... . . May Truk be but the prelude to even

greater successes on the way to final victory in the

days that lie ahead." JCS 148th Meeting 22Feb44.

20

JCS Directive of 12 March

The culmination of these early-1944 developments and the termination of a number of

debates was the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive

of 12 March 1944. This directive ordered General MacArthur to cancel the operation against

Kavieng and to isolate that island and Rabaul.

Hollandia was to be occupied, target date 15

April 1944, using forces originally assigned for

Kavieng-Manus with the exception of Marine

units assigned for those operations, fast carrier groups and old battleships.

The directive further ordered General MacArthur to return all Pacific Fleet transports,

cargo vessels and command ships, which had

been allocated for Kavieng-Marms-Hansa Bay,

as well as Pacific Fleet combatant vessels, to

Admiral Nimitz not later than 5 May. Following seizure of Hollandia, MacArthur was to

conduct operations along the New Guinea

coast and such other operations as were deemed

feasible in preparation for operations against

the Palaus and Mindanao.

The occupation and development of the Admiralties was to be expedited, so that suitable

bases won hl be provided for the neutralization

of Rabaul, Kavieng, Truk and the Palaus. If

additional air base facilities were required.

Emirau 52 and Mussau Were to be occupied and

developed..

The same JCS directive ordered Admiral

Nimitz to "institute and intensify" aerial bombardment of the Carolines and to conduct carrier attacks on the Marianas, Palaus, Carolines

and other profitable targets. The Southern

Marianas were to be seized, target date 15 June

1944, and B-29 bases and secondary naval facilities developed there. Admiral Nimitz was also

to "provide cover" for General MacArthur's

moves against Hollandia and other operations

in the Southwest PaCific.

MacArthur and Nimitz were further ordered

to coordinate their plans to provide for mutual

52 Plans for the seizure of Emirau were well underway before the Joint Chiefs' 12 March directive. The

4th Marines (reinforced) landed on Emirau 20 March

1944. See Marine Corps Historical Monograph "Bougainville and the Northern Solomons."
support of all impending operations.53

It will be noted that the directive did not

include Ulithi, which objective Admiral Nimitz

had recommended in his late February visit to

Washington. This omission would seem to indicate that the joint Chiefs felt that the fleet

could find satisfactory anchorages within the

Palaus.

Immediately after receiving these changes

from the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Nimitz sent a

secret dispatch (13 March) to major subordinate units directing that the Truk planning

cease and that highest priority be assigned to

the preparation for the Marianas operation. At

the V Amphibious Corps Headquarters, tentative plans for the seizure of Truk had been

evolved simultaneously with those for the

Marianas, but with Nimitz' new order, all effort was concentrated on the Marianas.54

On 20 March, the CINCP0A FORAGER

Joint Staff Study was issued. This document

contained a recapitulation of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, directive and set forth the assumptions upon which the Marianas operation was

based. Essentially, these assumptions were:

:first, that Hollandia, the Admiralties, and

Emirau had been seized and were available as

bases; second, that neutralizing attacks were

continuing against enemy air installations at

Nauru, Wake, Ponape and in the Marshalls;

third that Truk had been subjected to both

destructive carrier attacks and sustained bombing from the Marshalls and Bismarcks; and,

fourth, that United States sea and air forces

had been able to prevent effective use of Truk

by major Japanese Fleet units and that United

States air superiority and control of the sea in

the area of operations had been maintained.

The purpose of the operation, as stated in

the study, was to establish bases from which

to attack the enemy's sea-air communications,

support operations for the neutralization of

by-passed Truk, initiate B-29 bombing of the

Japanese home islands, and support further

offensives against the Palaus, Philippines, ForJCS 713/4, 12Mar44.

54 Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops), G-5 Report, 1, hereinafter cited as TIP 56 0-5 Report.

mosa and China. More generally, the purpose

was to "maintain unremitting military pressure against Japan" and to "extend our control over the Western Pacific." 55

The Marianas operation involved the amphibious assault and seizure of three fortified

islands 1,200 miles from the _nearest American

base and from 4,000 to 7,000 miles from the

areas in which troops would be mounted. The

Fifth Fleet, the largest ever assembled in the

Pacific with control over more than 800 ships,

was assigned to transport, land, cover, and

support the landing and garrison forces of.

Task Force 56. The forces of Commander

South Pacific, Admiral William F. Halsey,

USN, and of Commander in Chief Southwest

Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, USA,

were already performing long-range air search

and attack missions against the Carolines and

Palaus to interdict any enemy threats from

55 CINCPOA, FORAGER Joint Staff Study, 20Mar44.

VICE ADMIRAL RICHMOND K. TURNER, commander Joint Expeditionary Force and Northern Attack Force.

21
those areas. Submarines of Task Force 17

would continue to provide their supporting

operations west of the Marianas.

Since the original GRANITE was no longer

in effect, a new campaign plan—GRANITE

II—was issued on 3 June. The sequence and

timing of the projected operations was much

changed; the Marianas operation was listed as

the first of the period, instead of last. GRANITE II established the tentative gchedule of

operations as follows:

Operation

Capture of Saipan,

Guam and Tinian __ 15 June 1944.

Capture of Palau ____ 8 September 1944.

Occupation of

Mindanao 15 November 1944.

Capture of Southern

Formosa and

Amoy 56 15 February 1945.

or

Capture of Luzon 15 February 1945.57

Target Date

Tentative

COMMAND RELATIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had designated

Admiral Nimitz to command the over-all Central Pacific campaign of which the Marianas

was a part. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance,

USN, Commander Fifth Fleet, was, in turn,

designated to direct all forces engaged in the

operation. Charged with command of the Joint

Expeditionary Force, which included all task

organizations employed in the amphibious operations at all Marianas' objectives was Vice

Admiral Richmond K. Turner, USN. The

Joint Expeditionary Force was divided into

five major and several minor (the latter chiefly

garrison) task forces and task groups. The

major task groups and forces were: Support

Aircraft Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops,

58 This operation, never actually executed, would

have employed all of the Marine Divisions except the

3d; the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions would have constituted part Of the Formosa assault force, landing

on 15 February 1945; the 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions

were to seize the port of Amoy, China, on 7 March

1945.

57 GRANITE: II, 3Jun44, 9-13 and 25-26.

22

Northern Attack Force, Southern Attack

Force, and Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve.

Rear Admiral Richard L. Con oily, USN, commanded the Southern Attack Force (Guam),

while Turner, himself, operating in a dual

capacity, commanded the Northern Attack

Force (Saipan). Rear Admiral Harry W.

Hill, USN, second-in-command of the Joint

Expeditionary Force, commanded the Western

Landing Group,58 which actually executed the

Saipan landings.

Embarked in Admiral Turner's flagship or

ashore was the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, Lieutenant General Holland

M. Smith, who commanded the landing force

for the entire Marianas operation. During the

assault phase, Smith also commanded garrison

troops ashore. His command was exercised at

the respective objectives through the Commanding Generals of the Northern and Southern

Troops and Landing Forces. General Smith,

like Admiral Turner, served in a dual capacity

as Commanding General both of Expeditionary Troops and of Northern Troops and Landing Forces. Major General Roy S. Geiger was

Commanding General, Southern Troops and

Landing Force.

All troops ashore would remain under Holland Smith until Admiral Spruance decided

that the capture and occupation phase at a

given objective was completed, whereupon

command ashore would shift to the island commander. Saipan's island commander was Major

General Sanderford Jarman, USA, who, at

such time as Spruance directed, would be responsible for base development, civil affairs.

and other matters of the island's administration.5° (See Appendix VI for basic organization of high echelons.)

Because of General Smith's dual role, it was

necessary to reorganize the headquarters of the

58 The Western Landing Group was composed of the

Northern Troops and Landing Force, Assault Transport Group, LST Flotillas, Control Group, Gunboat

Support Group, Beach Demolition Group, Beachmaster

Group, LST Flotilla, and the Pontoon Barge Unit.

59 Amphibious Operations, Invasion of the Marianas,

Commander in Chief United States Fleet, P-007, 1-9,

hereinafter cited as COMING if P-007.
'7..

PE 1 Et IL

_KAU UM

t oii.J It

titteD

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOLLAND M. SMITH, Commanding General Expeditionary Troops and Northern Troops and

Landing Force. In the Marianas, General Smith had

the largest force commanded by a Marine General up

to that time.

V Amphibious Corps to form two staffs so that

each echelon would be represented." Actually,

60 Col Robert E. Hogaboom, who served as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of the Northern Troops

and Landing Force during the Marianas Campaign,

points out that General Smith actually had a triple

status at the time : "First, he was the administrative

commander for certain designated Marine Forces in

the Pacific; second, he . was Commanding General,

Expeditionary Troops; and third he was Commanding General, Northern Troops and Landing Force.

Accordingly, General Smith initially had three staffs

functioning under his command. One staff under a

deputy commander remained in Pearl Harbor to conduct administrative matters during the campaign. A

second staff, Expeditionary Troops staff, was embarked in the flagship of the Expeditionary Force and

remained aboard that ship throughout the operation.

A third staff, Northern Troops and Landing Force,

initially embarked on the flagship of Rear Admiral

Hill, went ashore on Saipan directly under General

Smith." Ltr from Col R. E. Hogaboom to CMC,

30Apr47.

the preliminary planning was accomplished

prior to the -reorganization on 12 April, but

after that date these staffs became known as

the "Red Staff" and the "Blue Staff." The

former subsequently became the staff for Commander, Northern Troops and Landing Force

and the latter for Commander, Expeditionary

Troops. The two groups operated in separate

office spaces at Pearl Harbor but had identical

sources of information on which to draw as detailed plans were prepared."

In keeping with principles of concurrent

planning, the V Amphibious Corps Staff had

anticipated future actions and initiated planning; a rough operation plan for the Marianas

was completed as early as 14 March. This

served as a basis for the final Expeditionary

Troops Plan.02

Available to the Northern Troops and Landing Force for the Saipan landings were the

2d and 4th Marine Divisions, commanded by

Major Generals Thomas E. Watson 63 and

Harry Schmidt, respectively. General Geiger's

Southern Troops and Landing Force would be

composed of the 3d Marine Division and the 1st

Provisional Marine Brigade. In Expeditionary Troops reserve, prepared to land at either

objective, was the 27th Infantry Division,

United States Army, commanded by Major

General Ralph E. Smith. The 77th Infantry

Division, United States Army, was to be held

in the Hawaiian Islands as strategic reserve

and called into the Marianas area after D-plus

20. This time schedule was demanded because

it would take that long for ships carrying assault echelons to return from Saipan to Oahu.

LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION

The logistical support plan progressed concurrently with operation plans. Early in the

planning phase, close liaison was established

between all major units in order to transmit

61 Northern Troops and Landing Force Report, 2-3,

hereinafter cited as NTLF Report.

62 TF 56 G-5 Report, 1.

63 The 2d Marine Division was commanded by

Major General Julian C. Smith until 10 April 1944

when General Watson assumed command.

23
available information without delay. Conferences between key logistical officers insured

that uniformity and consistency would prevail

throughout the preparation. Experiences in

previous operations, availability of shipping

space, and the tactical situation, determined

initial supply requirements. The Marianas

would be a departure from atoll type operations to a campaign on a limited land mass;

still, important lessons had been learned which

would be invaluable to logistical planning.

Initial supplies to be taken by assault forces

were as follows:

Class I (Rations) ___32 days.

Class II (Organizational and Individual equipment) 20 days.

Class III (Fuels

and Lubricants) 20 days.

Class IV (Miscellaneous supplies) 20 days (except medical supplies which

were 30 days).

Class V (Ammunition) 7 units of fire ground

weapons; 10 units

of fire for antiaircraft weapons.

Resupply shipments were set up in 3,000-men

blocks for 30 days of Class I, II, III, and IV.

Items suitable for the block shipment plan were

shipped separately in "optional loaded ships."

Class V, ammunition, would be loaded in specially designed ammunition ships containing

no other type or class of supply. To offset possible losses of initial or resupply shipments,

mobile reserves were established in the Marshalls area, subject to the call of the Commander, Expeditionary Troops.

All major units were required to submit a

consolidated list of organizational equipment

to Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops for

screening. This was done to assure that the

equipment did not exceed shipping allocations

and, also, for the purpose of coordinating the

24

equipment of assault and garrison units to prevent unnecessary duplication."

Details of hospitalization and evacuation

presented at least one major innovation: civilians would need medical care during and after

the battle. Our own needs would come first,

however. Nineteen APA's, five AP's, six

AKA's, and three LST's were to be available

at Saipan for evacuation of casualties. The

three LST's had been especially equipped with

supplies and personnel to receive casualties

from the beach for further transfer to .the

transports until such time as the tactical situation permitted transports to approach beaches

near enough to warrant transfer of casualties

direct to the transports. The plan would place

one LST off of the beaches upon which the 2d

Marine Division would land and one off the

4th Division's beaches. The third LST would

relieve whichever LST received 100 casualties

first.65

The sequence of building the logistical plan

continued with base development considerations. Great quantities of construction material

would need shipment to the objective area in

order that .the base might develop its necessary facilities. Several preliminary conferences were held at CinCPac Headquarters to

discuss the amounts and types of materiel

needed, shipping required, and related problems. A rear echelon of the Expeditionary

Troops G-4 section remained in Oahu to coordinate all activities.

The Marine Supply Service formed the 5th

and 7th Field Depots to support Marine units

initially and in the ensuing garrison phase. To

afford assistance by augmenting the divisions'

shore parties, representative portions of the

5th and 7th Field Depots were embarked in

assault shipping. Other echelons of the field

depots were scheduled to arrive in early garrison shipping.

64 Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops), G-4 Report, 2-1.1_ hereinafter cited as T./7 56 G-4 Report.

65 Task Force 51, Operation Plan A10-44, Annex H,

Medical, 2. Each of the three LST's had one doctor

and eight hospital corpsmen aboard. Since this number was inadequate to care for the expected number

of casualties, two doctors and 16 corpsmen would be

transferred to each LST after arrival in the transport

area.
The rehabilitation plan was Conceived with

a view to economizing materiel, effort, and

shipping. Since the 4th Marine Division would

leave the Saipan-Tinian area after the operation and the 2d Marine Division would remain,

the 4th would turn its organizational equipment in to the 7th Field Depot for processing,

repair, and reissue to the 2d. A similar plan

was evolved for Guam, from whence the 1st

Provisional Marine Brigade would leave after

the operation, while the 3d Marine Division

would remain. By this plan, shipping space

was conserved and possible damage to equipment enroute eliminated. In addition, manhours were saved because equipment was not

loaded back aboard ships.

To permit coordination and to reduce possibilities of misinterpretation, all major units

submitted advance copies of their administrative orders to Headquarters, Expeditionary

Troops, for checking and comparison."

Requirements for shipping in which to embark the Northern Troops and Landing Force

were submitted to the Commander of the

Northern Attack Force. When the available

shipping was provided, NTLF prepared general loading plans and allocated shipping to

subordinate units. A schedule for loading, prepared in conjunction with the Navy, fitted as

closely as possible the time of availability of

the ships and the time desired by the troops.

This posed a considerable problem in view of

limited harbor facilities from which to mount

such a large force. By careful and complete

planning, however, the entire force was loaded

on time and in the manner necessary to fit the

tactical plans.

About a week prior to commencement of

loading, the Transport Group Commanders

and either the captain or cargo officer of each

ship visited the unit whose troops their ships

were embarking. This early liaison settled

many questions regarding loading arrangements in a most satisfactory manner."

66 TI? 56 G-4 Report, 11.-1.5.

67 NTLIP Report, 7-8. This procedure was not possible in all instances, however; two transports assigned to the 26 Marine Division were on the west

coast of the United States at this time. Ltr from

Col R. J. Straub to .CMC, 13Jan50.

889590° --50 --3

The work of the G-1 Section of the Expeditionary Troops staff during the period of preparation consisted of its normal functions—supplying replacements to units committed to the

operation, attaching reinforcing units to the

divisions, organizing specialized units to be employed, alerting units for embarkation, assigning billeting space for staff officers and men

aboard ship, and furnishing personnel data

required by other sections of the staff.68

INTEWGENCE INFORMATION

The Corps G-2 Section was handicapped

during the planning stage, as no accurate information concerning enemy installations in

the Southern Marianas was available until the

carrier strikes of 22-23 February. On the basis

of these strikes, intelligence studies were begun.

The studies were necessarily incomplete because

of inadequate photographic coverage. The carrier photographs of 22-23 February, partly

covering Saipan, Tinian and Aguijan, were not

supplemented by full coverage until 18 April.

Lack of subsequent photographs prior to departure from Pearl Harbor was a source of

some irritation to the G-2 Section and greatly

complicated its task. Corps had requested

photograph coverages on D-minus 90, D-minus

60, D-minus 30, and D-minus 15 days, but this

schedule, because of many other demands upon

the Navy, could not be completely met. There

was, therefore, a consequent lack of timely intelligence information which would have been

helpful during the planning and assault phases.

At Eniwetok, enroute to the objective, Saipan

photographs of 28 May were delivered to the

attack force. These were interpreted and disseminated to the divisions' headquarters prior

to departure from Eniwetok. The slower

travelling LST groups, carrying the initial assault elements, however, had already departed;

Marines were required to make their 15 June

landings on the basis of 18 April information

of the enemy situation."

68 Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops), G-1 R&

port, 1, hereinafter cited as TP 56 0-1 Report.

69 TF 56 0-2 Report, 1-2. Some fine submarine

photographs (taken by the Greenling) of the target

area were available; but the preferred landing beach

areas on Saipan were not included.

25
These inadequacies in aerial photographic

coverage were due to the prevailing naval situation and not to faulty cooperation between

Navy and Marine higher echelons. In all instances, the Navy made sincere effort to comply with any and all reasonable requests. It is

obvious that Marine planners were desirous of

obtaining as many pictures of the objective as

possible, and that they would tend to base their

requests upon that desire. It is also apparent,

however, that the Navy, was confronted with

a tactical situation which made it virtually impossible to comply with all requests. According

to Admiral R. K. Turner, it was necessary for

"naval fliers to pick and choose among the very

numerous items in Corps requests and then to

obtain what coverage they could while fighting

battles." 70

It is interesting to note that Admiral

•Spruance, commander Fifth Fleet, gave careful consideration to making a second raid on

the Marianas before the actual landings. Aside

from the undesirability of pin-pointing the

Marianas as the nect objective, the scheme was

ruled out because of other demands upon available ships.71

The 1:20,000 battle map of Saipan-TinianAguijan was based on the incomplete photograph coverage of 22-23 February and on

Japanese charts captured during the Marshalls

operation. The contours shown on the map

were actually "logical" contours adapted from

captured charts and partially revised from

existing photographs. Once the map was in use,

it was ascertained that these contours were not

only inaccurate but that they offered a misleading representation of the basic features of

the island. As examples, sheer cliffs sometimes

appeared as slopes and box canyons as ravines

or draws, a condition somewhat relieved after'

the 4th Marine Division captured an excellent

Japanese map of the island.72 The NTLF G-2

75 Turner.

77 Ibid.

72 The exact time and place of this capture are not

indicated in records consulted, but the time is assumed

to be in the period D-Day to D-plus 6, during which

time the advance was toward the east coast.

26

Section made the latter map available to units

in time to be used during operations conducted

north of the Garapan-Mt. Tapotchau-Magicienne Bay line.73

Another Japanese map, captured by the 8th

Marines (2d Marine Division), was found to

be especially helpful in that regiment's operations around Mt. Tapotchau. A great deal of

care had to be exercised in transposing coordinates from Japanese to the United States

maps, however, due to variations in ground

forms.74

Estimates of enemy strength prior to the

landing on Saipan were considerably below the

actual strength encountered. On ' 9 May the

estimate had been 9,000, to 10,000. On 24 May,

G-2 Summary No. 20 had increased the

estimate:

Should the enemy continue his present rate of reinforcement, it seems logical to estimate that by

D-day, combat troops will number 15,000 to 18,000.

This estimate does not include "Home Guard" units.

After the operation the count indicated that

there were approximately 29,662 combatant

Japanese on Saipan on D-Day.75

In all fairness to personnel responsible for

divining enemy strength, it should again be

emphasized that photographic coverage left

much to be desired. Analysis of aerial photographs was one of G-2's best sources; and, since

coverage was inadequate, there was a scarcity

of detailed enemy information. It should be

remembered, however, that a vast expanse of

water separated Saipan from the closest United

States holdings, and the Navy's problems were

many. As the G-2 of the Northern Troops and

Landing Force (Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R.

Yancey, USA) writes:

Usually, photographic planes accompanied attacking

fighter planes on sorties against enemy bases . . .

[and] honest effort was made to obtain adequate

and complete coverage of the target area. However,

during the spring and early summer months in the

Marianas area, there are few days when the sky is

not partially covered with low cumulus clouds, ob72 TIr 56 G-2 Report, 4. These maps were reproduced by the 64th Engineer Topographic Battalion.

74 Ltr from BrigGen C. R. Wallace to CMC, 27Dec40,

hereinafter cited as Wallace

75 NTLF G-2 Report, App. A and B, 7.
scuring some of the most important_installations or

key terrain features. . . . This, of ei)urse, was unfortunate, but clouds handicapping 4 photographer

provided protection for fighter aircraft.

Strikes against enemy bases were mainly for the

purpose of destroying . . . enemy installations, and

photographic coverage,, while important, was usually

reduced to a secondary consideration.76

In addition to difficulties already discussed,

the fact that Saipan was serving as a staging

area furth6r, contributed to the G-2's problems. Many Japanese units were just passing through when the United States blow fell;

others were shipwrecked survivors whom fate

had guided there. Probably even the Japanese

would have found it difficult to determine how

many troops they had on the island.

TACTICAL PLANS

As stated before, the CinCPac Joint Staff

Study of 20 March 1944 assumed the capture

of certain bases for the support of the Marianas campaign. By 22 April General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Forces had successfully effected the capture of Hollandia and

the Admiralties, and the 4th Marines had occupied Emirau. The following day Admiral

Nimitz published his Operation Plan 3-44 for

the Marianas. Subsequently, orders were issued

by the Commander, Fifth Fleet (Admiral

Spruance) and by the Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force (Vice Admiral Turner).

The mission of Task Force 56 (Expeditionary

Troops) was to capture, occupy and defend

Saipan, Tinian and Guam, and to be prepared

for further operations.77

That part of the mission pertaining to Saipan

and Tinian was assigned to the Northern

Troops and Landing Force (NTLF) with the

following major units being assigned:

Corps Troops (Administrative and Service Elements).

1st Battalion, 2d Marines.

2d Marine Division (Reinforced) (less 1st

76 Ltr from EtCol T. R. Yancey, USA, to DirPubInfo, SJul49, hereinafter cited as Yancey. This officer was one of several United States Army officers

who served on the Corps staff.

77 Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops), 0-3 Report, hereinafter cited as TF 56 0-3 Report, 2.

Battalionve2d,. Marines) (plls-A,t#, Battalion, 20th Marines). 

78

4th Marine Division (Reinforced).

XXIV Corps Artillery.

Saipan Garrison Force (Task Group

10.13).

Tinian Garrison Force (Task Group

10.12).79

In Expeditionary Troops reserve, prepared

for commitment on Saipan, Tinian, or Guam.,

was the United States Army's 27th Infantry

Division. This diyision prepared 21 separate

plans for possible' employment on any of the

three islands, 16 of these in anticipation of

Saipan landings. As the planning of higher

headquarters progressed, a -few plans were discarded.8°

Concurrent planning was the rule; the day

following issuance of the Expeditionary Troops

plan, NTLF Operation Order 2 44 (Tentative)

was published. This plan and a later one

(Operation Plan 3-44, issued on 1 May 1944)

ordered the two Marine divisions to land on

Saipan's western beaches in the Charan Kanoa

vicinity, 2d Division on the Red and Green

Beaches (north of Charan Kanoa) and 4th

Division on the Blue and Yellow Beaches

(facing the town itself and the area south of

it). After the simultaneous landing, both divisions would advance rapidly inland to objective 0-1, the first dominating ground inland.

Thereafter, the 2d Division would push up and

seize Mts. Tapotchau and Tipo Pale, While the

4th Division would shove across to the island's

east coast, capturing Aslito Airfield on the

78 The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, had been attached to the 2d Marine Division to fill the vacancy

created when the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, was

assigned a special mission under landing force control (see below). Formed from personnel of the 2d

Division, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, was later

to join the 29th Regiment (6th Marine Division) for

the Okinawa campaign. This "orphan" unit remained

with the 2d Division throughout the Saipan operation.

79 Task Force 56, Operation plan 3-44 (26 Apr 44),

Annex Able, Task Organization. For the detailed

Task Organization, see Appendix VII.

89 27th Infantry Division, G-3 Report, 6, hereinafter

cited as 27 Inf Div 0-3 Report.

27
CHARAN

KANOA

BLUE

BEACHES

GREEN

BEACHES

RED

BEACHES

PREFERRED BEACHES ON SAIPAN. Reef demanded that the ship-to-shore movement be executed in amphibian tractors.

way. (See Map 5 for scheme of maneuver.)

As part of the same plan, the 1st Battalion,

2d Marines (Reinforced), was ordered to

"land on the night of D-minus 1—D-Day, on

selected beaches of Magicienne Bay, move

rapidly inland, seize Mt. Tapotcha,u 81 before

daylight, and defend same until relieved."

This mission, intriguing to the imagination,

was later fortunately cancelled. Not, however,

before the battalion had altered its organization to fit assigned shipping (six destroyer

transports), or before its supplies and heavy

weapons were embarked aboard two escort car81 At first glance it may appear that there was duplication in the mission assigned to the 2d Division

and the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, inasmuch as both

were instructed to seize Mt. Tapotchau. It should be

pointed out, however, that the battalion could seize

only the summit of the mountain, leaving the expansive slopes to the division. Elements of the 2d Division were to move up and join the battalion at the

peak.

28

riers (with plans to parachute-drop needed

items from torpedo planes), or before it had

completed considerable specialized training. As

will be seen, these arrangements caused much

inconvenience.82

Even with the cancellation of the mission,

the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, remained as an

immediate subordinate unit of the Northern

Troops and Landing Force with orders to "be

prepared after How-hour [author's italics] to

land on order on selected beaches of Magicienne Bay, or on other beaches-to be designated."83 (For a detailed analysis of the original mission and its subsequent cancellation,

see Appendix V.)

Both divisions, it will be noted, had been

ordered to "seize Objective 0-1" after landing.

This objective embraced the first commanding

82 Ltr from LtCol W. B. Kyle to DirPubInfo, 13Nov48,

hereinafter cited as Kyle.

88 NTLF Operation Plan 3-44, Change No. 1.
r

ground inland from the beaches; a distance

varying from 1,200 to 1,500 yards in the middle

and tapering to the beach on both flanks. It was

essential that this line be occupied rapidly,

since, until then, no relief from the enemy's

direct fire weapons could be expected. Every

man was impressed with the fact that the high

ground was the immediate goal and that this

should be seized as soon as possible. As will be

seen, however, the two divisions, though actuated by the same purpose, chose different means

to achieve this end.

A diversionary demonstration, beginning

shortly before the actual landing and continuing sometime thereafter, was to be conducted

in the area northwest of Tanapag Harbor.84

This effort, for the purpose of diverting enemy

reserves and supporting fires from the area of

the actual landing, would be afforded added

realism by supporting fires from Fire Support

Unit Four (TU 52.17.4), including battleships

Maryland and Colorado, light cruiser Louisville and four destroyers.85

The divisions wasted no time after receipt of

the NTLF Operation Plan. Soon, tentative

plans were submitted for approval. Actually,

the divisions had carried on planning, based

on tentative drafts and conferences, before receipt of the formal NTLF plan. The 2d Division planned to land with the 6th and 8th

Marines" abreast, 6th over the Red Beaches,

8th over the Green Beaches.

The 4th Marine Division would employ the

23d and 25th Marines in the assault, the 23d

landing over the Blue and the 25th over the

Yellow Beaches.

For the demonstration at Tanapag Harbor,

the two divisions would use infantry elements

not committed to the initial assault. These included the 2d Marines and the 1st Battalion,

84 NTLF Operation Plan 3-44.

88 Task Unit 52.17.4 Report, 7.

86 Throughout this monograph, the designation "8th

Marines," "23d Marines," etc., will be used rather than

Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT 8), RCT 23, etc.

Thus, reinforcing troops (which make a regiment an

RCT) are considered included in the 8th Marines (23d

Marines) designation. In like manner, the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, is used rather than BLT 1/2.

29th Marines, from the 2d Division, and the

24th Marines from the 4th Division.87

In the event that later intelligence information indicated that the Charan Kanoa (preferred) beaches were too strongly defended to

permit landings, an alternate plan was conceived. This plan contemplated landings to the

north of Garapan on beaches Black and Scarlet. The 2d Division, in the event this plan

were used, would land on Black Beach at

H-I-Jour, followed three hours later by the 4th

Division, which would land on Scarlet Beaches

in Tanapag Harbor.88 Some excellent submarine photographs made careful study of the

alternate beaches possible, and all hands were

as well briefed on this plan as the preferred

one.

Since the preferred beaches on Saipan were

fringed by a reef and since it would be impossible to negotiate a crossing of the reef in

conventional landing craft, the landing plan

contemplated the use of LVT's (Landing

Vehicles, Tracked, often called "amtracs") as

the principal assault vehicle. LVT's were to

be transported to the objective abroad LST's

(Landing Ships, Tank). Sufficient LITT's were

allocated to allow for the preloading and direct

landing of assault units as well as one reserve

battalion .for each division. By making other

LVT's available after arrival in the transport

area and by executing transfer operations from

landing craft to LVT's, it would be possible

to land the bulk of the two divisions in these

vehicles. LVT battalions were assigned as follows: 2d Marine Division-2d, 5th and 715th

Amphibian Tractor Battalions (the latter an

Army Battalion) ; 4th Marine Division-534th

and 773d Amphibian Tractor Battalions (both

Army) and the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, less its Company A and plus Company

C of the 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

Preceding the first wave of troop-carrying

LVT's would be a wave of armored amphibian

tractors (INT (A)'s), each of which mounted

s't 2d Marine Division Report, Section V, 2-3, hereinafter cited as 2d Mar Div Report. 4th Marine Division Report, Section VI, 13, hereinafter cited as 4th

Mar Div Report.

88 NTLF, Operation Plan 4-44 (3May44).

29
a 75mm howitzer in an armored turret. These

vehicles were to cover the landing and movement of assault waves to 0-1. Preceding the 2d

Marine Division was the 2d 'Armored Amphibian Battalion, while the Army's 708th

Amphibian Tank Battalion would provide a

similar mission for the 4th Division."

The 10th and 14th Marines (artillery regiments of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions,

respectively) were each assigned lour LST's

for the operation. One LST was capable of

lifting the howitzers and about 275 men of one

artillery battalion. The remaining personnel

was carried in transports (APA's). Of this

latter group, some were transhipped from

APA's to LST's at Eniwetok Lagoon for the

final leg of the trip. Organic motor vehicles of

the artillery regiments, with drivers, were carried to the objective in cargo ships (AKA's) .90

The 10th Marines loaded all four of its

organic battalions (two battalions of 75mm

pack howitzers, two battalions of 105mm

howitzers) in LST's. The pack howitzers were

preloaded in LVT's and the 105's in DUK1V's

(amphibious trucks, normally called "ducks").

The 10th Marines had been reinforced with the

2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious

Corps, whose guns; ammunition and equipment

were loaded aboard three AKA's and most of

the personnel aboard APA's.91

The 14th Marine Regiment was organized into five battalions, the 1st and 2d armed with

75mm howitzers; the 3d, 4th and 5th with

105mm howitzers." The 14th Marines used

89 NTLF Opn Order 3-44, Annexes A and K. 2d

Armored Amphibian Battalion Operation Order No. 2.

90 4th Mar Div Report, Annex C, 2. 2d Mar Di?, Report, Section II, I. Ltr from LtCol H. N. Shea to CMC,

13Jan50, hereinafter cited as Shea.

9'. 10th Marines Report, I, hereinafter cites as 10th

Mar Report. The Field Artillery Journal, Mar—Apr

48, "Amphibious Artillery," Maj E. J. Rowse.

92 Technically the 5th Battalion had already been

designated "4th 105mm FIowitzer Battalion, V Amphibious Corps"; but, since it was administratively

and operationally attached to the 14th Marines, it

was most often referred to as the 5th Battalion. After

the Tinian operation the unit received 155mm howitzers,

and its designation was changed to "4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious Corps," under which

30

three LST's to lift the three battalions of

105mm howitzers pre-loaded in ducks. The

fourth LST allotted them carried 75min pack

howitzer ammunition. The two, pack howitzer

battalions of the 14th Marines •were loaded

aboard transports. It was planned that the 75's

would land after transfer from landing craft

(LCVP's) to ducks which would return after

landing the 105mm battalions This part of

the plan was not carried out, however, due to

the slow return of the ducks after debarking

the 105's, and the 75mm battalions were subsequently landed in LVI"s.93

TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

As over-all plans for the Ma ri nas operation • evolved and specific tactical plans developed,

the concurrent assembly and preparation of

forces was being accomplished. Initially, training of units was general in nature; but, as more

detailed information relative to the scheme of

maneuver, the terrain features, and the enemy

forces became available, the program was supplemented to conform to the expected character of the operation.94

For a period of several months prior to the

operation, Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps,

prepared participating elements so that a state

of advanced readiness would exist prior to the

target date. This preparation involved filling

existing personnel shortages, provisions for

supply and logistical support of assault and

garrison elements, and an extensive training

program. The latter involved a period of overall instruction, a period of amphibious training

and, finally, full-dress rehearsals.

The divisions and separate elements were

issued training directives based on Corps

standing operating procedures and experience

gained in past operations, designed to prepare

the units for their assigned missions. Emphasis

was placed on individual and small unit trainname it participated at Iwo Jima. Ltr from LtCol D. E.

Reeve to author, 11Aug49, hereinafter cited as Reeve.

93 4th MarDiv Report, Annex C, 11. Interview with

LtCol F. J. Karch 6Jan49, hereinafter cited as Kara,.

94 TF 56 G-3 Report, 3.
23

25

90 7090

RED I

6 RED 2

RED 3

GREEN 1

GREEN 2

GREEN 3

BLUE 1

BLUE 2

YELLOW I

YELLOW 2

YELLOW 3

Agingon Pt

Cope Obiam

Demonstration

Area

Maniagassa

Island

cl3 0'

Morpi Pt

0-Day 15 June

G

4-

exeo` ec.Ns c. e:.`•

coMutcho Pt

Garapan

Tonopog

Hor bar

li5<2

Night Of

14- 15 June

Nofuton Pt

Kagman

Peninsula

PLANS FOR LANDING

1000 0: 2000 Yds

MAP 5
ing (which had paid such big dividends in

previous campaigns), on the integration of the

infantry-tank-artillery-engineer team, and on

the use of the battalions, regiments and entire

divisions as units. All weapons were fired in

problems involving units the size of a squad to

a division. Exercises were conducted both day

and night in terrain varying from that of

jungle and cane fields to that typical of larger

volcanic land masses.

Several key Japanese phrases, like "T ayoh-ali-gehrtay-deh-tay-koi" (put up your hands)

and the Japanese equivalents of "hurry up,"

"come out and we will give you food and

water," etc., were introduced into the vocabularies of all hands with the hope that some of

the routine conversational exchanges would not

require the services of an interpreter. These

lessons were administered to the Marines at

their most receptive time: before the evening

movie.°5

The phases of general training culminated

for all divisions in a period aboard ship. The

2d Marine Division conducted amphibious

maneuvers during the period 12-31 March on

beaches at Maalaea Bay, Maui, with all of its

elements participating. Similar training was

conducted in the same area by the 23d and 25th

Marines of the 4th Marine Division during the

period 13-26 April. The 24th Marines and 4th

Division Troops participated in several preliminary boat exercises, using the facilities of the

Maui Amphibious Training Center. During the

later part of April, the 27th Infantry Division

executed its shipboard training at Maui. The

elements of the Corps Special Troops were instructed initially by Corps; but once attached

to divisions, these elements participated in

division training to familiarize them with their

roles and to acquaint them with the infantry

units with which they would operate."

96 By the time these expressions had received the

treatment of a Brooklyn accent, with occasional profanity added, the effect was both humorous and conusing. Later, many Marines became quite wrathful

when the Japanese could not understand them.

96 TP 56 G-3 Report, 4-5. 4th MarDiv Report, Section 3, 6.

The divisions did not accomplish their training without difficulty, however; the 2d Division's camp on the. island of Hawaii and the

4th Division's camp on Maui were incomplete

in many respects. Considerable time was necessarily spent making these camps liveable. At

Camp Maui, the ubiquitous red clay caused

much annoyance. In dry weather, everything

was covered with red dust, in wet weather, with

red mud. Camp Tarawa, the 2d Division's

camp at Kamuela, was located near vast,

sprawling lava fields, and movement through

these was dangerous. Many sprained ankles

and bruised knees resulted from marches over

the jagged gray eruption.

On the credit side of the ledger, both divisions had ample room to conduct firing exercises. The artillery regiments of the two divisions, in particular, enjoyed the wide open

spaces which allowed them to spread out and

fire at long ranges. Much attention was devoted to coordination and integration of the

various arms throughout the period of preparation.

One device which proved very fruitful was

that employed by the 2d Marine Division at

the culmination of its training program. This

was a "walk through" rehearsal, executed on

dry land but using the identical scheme of

maneuver to be employed at Saipan. As explained by Major General Thomas E. Watson,

the division commander:

In preparation for the exercise, the Successive phase

lines which had been designed to control the advance

of the Division from the landing beaches to the Force

Beachhead Line were laid out on the ground exactly

to scale. In front of the staked-out beaches were

marked the adjacent water areas over which the shipto-shore movement was to take place off Saipan. Over

this terrain game board the entire division was moved

in accordance with the time schedule calculated for

the actual assault and employing the scheme of

maneuver designed for the attack. In this manner,

every officer and man learned the part he was to play

in the landing and came to appreciate the time and

space factors involved. Yet, only a few commanders

and staff officers of the thousands of men who participated in this rehearsal actually knew the real name

of the target.97

Ltr from LtGen T. E. Watson to DirPubInfo,

9Jun49, hereinafter cited as Watson.

31
Both Marine Divisions had previous amphibious combat experience: the 2d at Guadalcanal and Tarawa, the 4th at Roi-Namur.

Portions of the 27th Division had served with

the V Amphibious Corps before: the 165th

Infantry Regiment during the Gilberts operation at Makin and the 106th in the amphibious

assault against Eniwetok Atoll. The XXIV

Corps Artillery was newly-organized, its

155mm gun battalions being former coast artillery units. All eight amphibian tractor battalions assigned ( four Marine and four Army)

were well trained. Of these, one of the Army

battalions and two of the Marine battalions

had previously experienced combat.

Concurrently with the final training and

preparation for the rehearsal and final embarkation of the assault forces, the garrison forces

were assembled. Major General Sanderford

Jarman, USA, was assigned as Commanding

General, Saipan Garrison Force, and Major

General James L. Underhill, USMC, as Commanding General, Tinian Garrison Force. In

close harmony with the plans of the assault and

naval forces, these units prepared for their missions. The 864th Antiaircraft Artillery Group

under Colonel Kenneth M. Barager, USA, part

of the Saipan Garrison Force, was ordered to

land with the assault forces on Saipan to "furnish antiaircraft protection in the zones of action of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions." 98

On 17 May a full-scale Corps landing was

undertaken at Maalaea Bay, Maui. The 2d and

4th Marine Divisions landed abreast with a

tactical problem ashore to simulate the actual

planned scheme of maneuver to be employed

on Saipan. Owing to the habitation of Maui,

no live ammunition could be fired there. On

19 May, another exercise was undertaken at

Kahoolawe, Hawaiian Islands." Troops boated

98 NTLF Report, 4-5.

99 Kahoolawe, just south of Maui and east of Lanai,

absorbed more rounds than any island in the Pacific

—and looked the part. Under Marine officer supervision, thousands of rounds of naval ammunition

were expended monthly, concurrently providing training for ships and shore fire control personnel. In this

manner, naval gunfire officers participated in firing

exercises with the ships they would control in corn32

in LVT's approached to within 300 yards of

the beach under actual naval gunfire bombardment and aerial support but did not land. Immediately following this rehearsal, shore fire

control parties of the Landing Force landed

on Kahoolawe and conducted fire missions with

their initially assigned fire support ships.100

Similar rehearsals were conducted by the

27th Infantry Division with the naval elements

of the Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve between the 20th and 24th of May. As plans for

a special commitment of the 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, were still under consideration, that

unit with Company A of the Corps Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion conducted a separate final rehearsal at Hanalei Bay, Kauai.

Air drops of supplies, made during this exercise, proved the method employed satisfactory."1

Three unfortunate operational accidents

occurred during the rehearsal phase which resulted in two dead, 17 missing and 16 injured.102 Aboard LST 485, which was transporting a portion of the 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, men were sleeping in a Landing Craft

Tank (LCT 988) which was secured on the

deck of the LS. The weather was rough and

the strain on the cables was too great; at 0230

on the morning of 14 May the craft was pitched

overboard with the sleeping men aboard. Nineteen men were either missing or killed, and

five were injured as the craft was rammed and

sunk by the next LST in column.

Similar accidents occurred aboard LST's 71

and 390, when LCT's 999 and 984 slipped overboard. Losses on these two, however, were not

as great. LCT 999, its ramp door closed, suffered little damage and was towed back to

bat. Ships that were 'available to fire the Kahoolawe

course were unmistakeably superior in shore bombardment technique to those that were not. Courses similar to the one at Kahoolawe were located at San

Clemente and in the Guardalcanal area. Marine Corps

Gazette, "Naval Gunfire Training in the Pacific," Jun

. 48, LtOol R. D. Heinl, Jr. Turner.

199 TP 56 0-3 Report, 5-6. TF 56 Naval Gunfire

Officer's Report, 8,. hereinafter cited as TF 56 NW?

Report.

Ica Kyle, 3. TF 56 0-8 Report, 6.

102 TF 56, 0-1 Journal, 16 May.
Pearl Harbcr. LCT 984, however, had its ramp

and engine doors open when launched and

became so badly waterlogged that it capsized

and sank slowly, assisted at the end by gunfire.

The search for survivors continued throughout

the night, and many were rescued.

An investigation of the accidents revealed

that insufficient and, perhaps, improper securing, plus the fact that at least two of the LCT's

were carrying heavy loads of fresh water, may

have been chiefly responsible for the accident.

The weight of extra ammunition for the LCT's

4.2–inch chemical mortars may also have been

a contributory factor to the mishaps.103

The rehearsals proved particularly valuable

in the training derived from the ship-to-shore

movement—involving over 700 LVT's—and in

the test of the overall communication plan.

Critiques were held following the rehearsal,

and minor defects that had been discovered

were pointed out and corrected in so far as

practicable. Benefit was derived from the experience and familiarization gained by various

elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force

actually working together under circumstances

closely paralleling those expected during the

actual operation.

When the rehearsal was completed on 19

May, the bulk of the force returned to Pearl

Harbor and Honolulu for rehabilitation. Onehalf of the LST's with embarked assault troops,

however, remained at Maalaea Bay, Maui. With

such a large force at Pearl Harbor, sufficient

facilities and space for exercising the troops

were not available. It was possible, however,

to bring small units ashore each day for recreation. At the same time, the remainder of the

loading was accomplished.'"

On 21 May, with ships tightly clustered at

Pearl Harbor readying for the final approach

to the objective, disaster struck.

LST 353, tied up at West Loch unloading

its 4.2–inch mortars and ammunition for those

weapons, suddenly, unaccountably, burst into

103 Joint Expeditionary Force Report, TF 51, Endl

A, 2, hereinafter cited as TP 51 T?eport. Annual Sanitary Report For The 2d Marine Division 1944, 91.

104 TJ? 56 0-3 Report, 6-8. NTLF Report, 5-6.

flames and exploded.105 Black smoke billowed

wildly from the scene, shattering explosions

_rent the air as the fire spread to five more

LST's. Other ships in the vicinity of those

doomed hastily got underway to prevent further spread of the destruction. Marines and

sailors aboard the burning ships dived into

the water, leaving weapons, clothing and equipment behind in their frantic efforts to escape.

Many swam ashore with only a pair of trousers

or shorts left of their possessions.

As the fires continued, small ships equipped

with fire-fighting apparatus moved in close to

LST's and tried to subdue the inferno.

Personnel watching the catastrophe stood with

nervous anticipation, fearing further explosions which would mean almost certain death

for the fire fighters. Their devotion to duty

excited the admiration of all onlookers. Perched

precariously on their tiny red craft, these men

moved closer than safety or common sense

would dictate. Continuous small blasts sprayed

the area with fragments of shells and pieces of

equipment, and there was no assurance that the

entire area might not go up in one gigantic

explosion at any moment. But the fire fighters

remained stubbornly at their posts.

In the end, they could not save the ships that

were burning, but they were successful in preventing a spread of the damage. By dark, six

LST's were lost 106 with heavy resultant casualties in personnel and equipment. By good

fortune, however, most of the amphibian tractors and DUKW's had debarked from the ships

for routine checkups ashore prior to the fire.

105 At the time of the explosion, LST 353 had on

board the only LCT with 4.2-inch mortars that had

not gone overboard on the tragic night of 14-15 May.

An investigation, following the accidental launchings,

had concluded that the excessive weight of 4.2-inch

mortar ammunition was a contributory factor in the

mishaps. This, plus the fact that it was too late to

get more craft fitted with 4.2-inch mortars anyway,

caused Admiral Turner, commander Joint Expeditionary Force, to order the project's abandonment. LST

353 was in the process of complying when the accident occurred. Turner.

1°6 These were LST's 39, 179, 480, 43, 69 and 353.

The latter three had LCT's aboard which were also

lost in the disaster.

33
As the LST's were transporting assault

troops and in view of the imminence of the

operation, the losses were especially critical.

The 2d Marine Division lost a total of 95 men

and the 4th Division 112 in this disaster.

Rumors were rife that sabotage had caused the

disaster, but an investigation failed to reveal

that it was other than an unfortunate accident.'"

Immediately following the explosion, all

agencies concerned were called into action to

assist in caring for the injured and surviving

troops. Clearing stations were organized

through which survivors were directed to the

hospitals or to the Transient Center, V Amphibious Corps. Replacements had to be supplied as soon as possible. This was accomplished promptly from personnel at the Replacement Center."9

The LST's were to have sailed on the morning of 24 May, less than three days after the

costly fire. It was apparent that a delay in

departure would be demanded. But for how

long? The gears of the attack machine were

meshed to an established target date; delays

could upset the smooth timing. Concern along

these lines was soon relieved, however, as efficient staff work paid off. Ships, personnel,

equipment and supplies were replaced in four

short days and LST's sailed only 24 hours late,

with the lost day being made up en route."9

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

The Northern Attack Force departed from

Pearl Harbor in echelon. The slow-moving

LST groups with assault troops, LVT's and

artillery embarked, left on 25 May. Attack

Group One, embarking the remainder of the 4th

Marine Division and Headquarters, Expedi101 TF 51 Report, End l A, 2. 2d Mar Div Report,

Sec. VI, 1. 4th, Mar Div Report, 11. Interview with

Col M. C. Horner, 13Jul49.

108 TF 56 G-1 Report, 2-3. The commanding officer

of the 23d Marines, the regiment that suffered heaviest in this accident, commented that though the replacements were adequate in numbers, they "were not

trained to carry out the functions of those lost." Ltr

from MajGen L. R. Jones to LtCol G. D. Gayle 8Feb50,

hereinafter cited as L. R. Jones.

1°9 NTLF Report, 8.

34

tionary Troops, sailed on 29 May. Attack

Group Two, with the 2d Marine Division and

Headquarters, Northern Troops and Landing

Force embarked, left Pearl Harbor on 30 May.

Other echelons of Garrison Forces and re-supply shipping were scheduled to depart at later

dates.

En route to the objective, every individual

was thoroughly briefed on the plans for the

attack on Saipan. Schools and staff exercises

were conducted, lectures were given; photographs, relief maps, terrain models and charts

had been prepared and furnished all units..

Every individual was completely informed of

the detailed plans for the attack. The force

arrived at Eniwetok Lagoon for final staging

between the 6th and 11th of June.11°

The troop-carrying limitations of LST's precluded the comfortable embarkation of complete

tactical units for the lengthy voyage from

Hawaii to Saipan. Though each of these vessels

carried sufficient amphibian tractors to lift an

entire rifle company, they failed to provide

adequate sleeping spaces for the full complement of troops. It was therefore ordered that

surplus personnel, who could not be thus accommodated, travel from Hawaii in the comparative comfort of AP's and transfer to appropriate LST's at Eniwetok. Tactical advantages of

arrival at Saipan as integrated assault units

warranted the overcrowding during the last

six days of the trip, and despite the fact that

the Marines were packed like sardines during

this period, there is no evidence that fighting

efficiency was impaired.111 At all times crews

and maintenance details for embarked LVT's

and LVT (A) 's were billeted in LST's bearing

their vehicles."1

110 Ibid., 9. Eniwetok was also used as an assembly

and staging point for all shipping moving to and from

the Marianas. A convoy and routing organization was

set up to control ships of all types, and was designed

to prevent an undesirable congestion of ships in the

Marianas, while at the same time making promptly

available in that area such ships as were required.

Fifth Fleet, Final Report on the Operation to Capture

the Marianas Islands, 2, hereinafter cited as 5th Fleet

Final Report.

111 Aggressiveness was perhaps increased. After six

crowded. days aboard an LST, many Marines were

ready to fight anybody.

112 2d Mar Div Report, Sec. II, 2.
NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIR BOMBARDMENT

While LST's and transports carrying assault

forces churned toward Saipan, preparatory

bombardment of targets areas had begun. On

the afternoon of 11 June, Vice Admiral Marc

A. Mitscher's Task Force 58 1" initiated three

and one-half days' intense bombardment of

Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota and Pagan.

Originally, softening of the target was to

have begun to 12 June; but this was changed

when Admiral Spruance approved Mitscher's

recommendatiOn that a fighter sweep be executed on the afternoon of the 11th. Mitscher

gave as the principal reason for this alteration

the desirability of varying the pattern of strikes

and taking advantage of the opportunity for

surprise. "Heretofore," reported Mitscher after

the operation, "all of our carrier attacks had

been made in the early morning. It was believed

that the enemy had become accustomed to this

and would expect us to continue this practice.” 114

While the carriers were still 200 miles east of

the islands, a 225-plane fighter sweep surprised

113 77 58 contained eight large carriers (Hornet,

Yorktown, Franklin, Bunker Hill, Wasp, Enterprise,

Lexington and Essex), eight light carriers (Bataan,

Cabot, Belleau Wood, Monterey, Princeton, San Jacinto, Cowpens, and Langley), seven new (fast) battleships (Alabama, South Dakota, Indiana, New Jersey,

Iowa, Washington and North Carolina), 13 cruisers

(Boston, Baltimore, Canberra, Oakland, San Juan,

Santa Fe, Mobile, Biloxi, Vincennes, Houston, Miami,

San Diego and Reno) and 58 destroyers. From its 16

carriers, TF 58 could provide an air fleet of 900 planes.

Fifth Fleet Operation Plan 10-44, 12-13. The Navy's

Air War, Aviation History Unit OP-519B, DOM.

(Air), edited by Lt A. R. Buchanan, USNR, 204-205,

hereinafter cited as The Navy's Air War.

114 CTF 58 ser. 00388, 11Sep44, 31. Some histories

have mentioned the reason for the speed up was that

a Japanese search plane had spotted the Task Force

as it sortied from Majuro and that Mitscher had decided to move as rapidly as possible. Admiral

Spruance, however, says that this is incorrect. "A

Japanese search plane ... made a high altitude reconnaissance of Majuro a day or two before Task Force

58 sailed and again about three days after it had

gone." This had no effect upon the change in the

fighter sweep, however. Ltr from Adm R. A. Spruance

to CMC, 17Jan50, hereinafter cited as Spruance.

the Japanese in the Marianas and destroyed

150 plans in the air or on the ground. This

crippling blow depleted the local air strength

by about one-third and thereafter prevented the

enemy from reacting in strength. The United

States advantage, once gained, was never lost.

"Control of the air," reported Admiral Nimitz,

"had been effected by the original fighter sweep

on. 11 June." 115 The tactic, of the afternoon

strike had proved feasible and, according to the

commanding officer of one of the participating

air groups, was "an excellent innovation ....

1, 116

On 12 June the serious bombing began; Saipan and sister .islands felt the impact of tons

of high explosives dropped upon airfields and

installations. The 13th brought a resumption

of the rain of bombs. With most of their planes

either burned on the ground or missing in action, the Japanese responded only with sporadic

dusk and night attacks during this preliminary -

phase of the operation.

The inability of the enemy to foresee the imminent danger to the Marianas left two vulnerable convoys in the area when Mitscher's Task

Force entered. The first of these, a formation of

20 ships, fleeing on a northerly course 125 miles

west of Pagan Island, .was attacked on the

afternoon of the 12th by planes of Rear Admiral William K. Harrill's Task Group 58..4

To the south, 135 miles west of Guam, the other

• convoy (six ships) became the target for a

special attack mission sent by Rear Admiral

Joseph .T. Clark, commanding Task Group 58.1.

Between the two attacks 12 cargo ships, three

submarine chasers, and one patrol-torpedo boat

were sunk.117

Surface ships of TF 58 began to bombard

Saipan on 13 June (D-minus 2). The fast battleships fired their main and secondary batteries for nearly seven hours into the western

coast of Saipan and Tinian, turning the im115 CINCPOA Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas,

Jun44, 30.

116 Yorktown, ser. 0020, 29Jun44, 52.

117 The Navy's Air War, 205-206; King, 590; "Japanese Naval and Merchant Ship Losses During World

War II By All Causes," Joint Army-Navy Assessment

Committee (JANAC), 12 and 60-61, hereinafter cited as

JANAC.

35
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UNDAMAGED JAPANESE piaBOX harmonizes with surrounding terrain. Such inconspicuous targets received scant attention from bombarding ships. Only those positions receiving direct hits were silenced. -

spotters should be adept in locating and recognizing important enemy ground installations

and defenses. Spotters, in most cases, lacked the,

vital training necessary to develop this ability

and, consequently, directed fire on obvious

buildings and terrain features which made interesting but unprofitable targets. A case in

point is the sugar mill at Charan Kanoa. This

building, a prominent landmark, easily identified, had been riddled with shot and shell. The

Japanese, however, were not inside, nor were

they using the mill for military purposes.

In addition to those reasons already given,

the effectiveness of TF 58's bombardment wag

further limited because of an overemphasis on

covering all assigned areas, (so-called "areashooting") to the neglect of specific point targets within those areas. Intercepted radio

transmissions indicated that ships often shifted

to new targets without applying the air

spotter's last correction and adjustment.128

A comment by Admiral Spruance in regard

to the employment of the fast battleships for

shore bombardment is pertinent:

The use of the fast battleships . .. was done with a

view to increasing the number of large bombardment

shell that could be carried in the heavy ships . . .

without too great a reduction in the armor piercing

rounds that the [fast battleships] must carry for a

fleet engagement. This served a useful purpose, but it

was never intended to take the place of the close-in

fire of the [old battleships] to which it was a useful

peel iii in a ry.124

On 14 June (D-minus 1) fire support ships of

the Northern and Southern Attack Forces

(TF's 52 and 53), under the command of Rear

Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, arrived off Saipan

and joined TF 58 in a blasting bombardment

123 FORAGER NG? Report, 2-10. NTLF, Naval Gunfire Report, 5, hereinatfer cited as NTL? NGF Report.

124 spruance.,

37
SUGAR MILL IN CHARAN KANOA, an obvious target, received more naval gunfire than it deserved. Smokestack provided one ingenious Japanese an observation post for several days after United State's landings.

of beaches and installations. For the D-minus

1 and D-Day naval gunfire preparation, Admiral Turner divided the islands of Saipan and

Tinian into seven fire support sectors and assigned a fire support unit to each. (For sectors

and shiiis assigned to each, see Map 6.) Fire

Support Unit Eight was not assigned a specific

sector for the D-minus 1 bombardment and was

to "deliver counterbattery fire only as required."

On D-Day, with its ammunition supply virtually intact, Unit Eight would move into the

western portion of Sector 6 and deliver "intense

enfilade fire at the Charan Kanoa beach installations."

Ships firing in critical Sector 1 (which included the preferred landing beaches) would

furnish covering fire for mine sweepers and

underwater demolition teams as well as to

"destroy beach defenses ... particularly including Afetna Pont." These ships were also to

destroy all buildings and installations at

Charan Kanoa except those facilities that might

later be converted to our own use.

The six destroyers of Fire Support Units

38

Two and Three would participate in the D-Day

bombardment only. On D-minus 1, these ships

would afford protection to the advancing LST's

and transports of TF 52. It will be noted that

sectors 2 and 3 were smaller segments of sector

1, with the range very much reduced. The

reason for this preponderance of power off the

western coast was that the Charan Kanoa

beaches had been selected as preferred landing

areas.

Fire Support Unit Four, in addition to covering mine sweepers and underwater demolition

teams operating within its sector, would prepare

the alternate landing areas for possible use and

cover the Demonstration Group.

Fire Support Units Five, Six and Seven

would destroy enemy guns and installations

lying within their sectors.

In addition' to the specific targets assigned,

supports ships were to "fire all unburned cane

fields (using WP projectiles) within their

sectors." 125

125 Task Force 52 Attack Order A11-44, Annexes A

and C.
FIRE SUPPORT

SECTOR 4

FIRE SUPPORT UNIT FOUR

CA Louisville

OBB Maryland

OBB Colorado

DD McDermott

OD McGowan

OD Melvin

OD Mc Nair

FIRE SUPPORT UNIT ONE 

088 Tennessee

OBB California

CA Indianapolis

CL Birmingham

OD Ramey

DD Wadleigh

DO Norman Scott

DD Mertz

FIRE SUPPORT

SECTOR I

FIRE SUPPORT

SECTOR 5

FIRE SUPPORT UNIT FIVE

CL Montpelier

CL Cleveland

DD Yorneli

DD Twining

DD Stocnnorn

FIRE SUPPORT UNIT TWO

DO Robinson

DO Bailey

DO SW Grant

FIRE SUPPORT 0P

SECTOR 2 EFIRE SUPPORT UNIT SEVEN

OBB New Mexico

GA Minneapolis

CA San Francisco

DD Terry

OD Collard

FIRE SUPPORT

SECTOR 7

FIRE SUPPORT UNIT SIX

CL Honolulu

OBB Pennsylvania

OBB Idaho

DD Anthony

DO Wadsworth

FIRE SUPPORT

SECTOR 6

FIRE SUPPORT UNIT EIGHT

GA Wichita

CA New Orleans

CL St Louis

DD Colahon

DD Guest

DD Bennett

VOI"

FIRE SUPPORT SECTORS

2 3 • 5 6 7

NAUTICAL MILES

MAP 6

39
The bombardment of 14 June generally proceeded acording to plan; certain alterations,

however, were demanded by the development of

the situation. Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman's Fire Support Unit One experienced difficulty in destroying Japanese installations on

Afetna Pont; combined fires of Birmingham

and Indianapolis throughout the morning

failed to achieve destruction or, indeed, even

complete neutralization, inasmuch as mortar

fire, apparently emanating from the point, constantly menaced the ships. Because of this

situation, Admiral Kingman issued orders to

Tennessee, California and Birmingham to concentrate on Afetna Point during the afternoon

instead of assigned targets in Charm Kanoa.

In addition, two strafing-bombing strikes were

placed on the point during the afternoon. The

result of all this was that defense positions

appeared to be neutralized but not destroyed.126

Fire Support Unit Four (commanded by

Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, who also

commanded the Task Group) did not experience

the expected opposition from Flores Point or

from Maniagassa Island, and Maryland and

Colorado were therefore directed to concentrate on Japanese batteries in the vicinity of

Mutcho Point. The cruiser Louisville took over

the missions formerly assigned the two battleships.127

Rear Admiral Robert W. Hayler's Fire Support Unit Five covered its assigned sector on

Saipan's east coast, though it experienced difficulty in locating enemy installations. This unit

was assigned to remain off Saipan, delivering

harrassing fires throughout the night of 14-15

June, while the remainder of the task group

retired to the westward?"

Operating in Sector 6 was Rear Admiral

Walden L. Ainsworth's Fire Support Unit

SiX,129 covering its assigned area without special

126 Task Unit 52.17.1 Report, 6-7.

127 Task Group 52.17 and Task Unit 52.17.4 Report, 7.

128 Task Unit 52.17.5 Report, 1-3.

129 Admiral Ainsworth was also in command of Task

Group 52.10, which included Fire Support Units Six,

Seven and Eight. Ships of these three units were from

40

incident. One point of interest, however, is

found in the fact that the battleship Pennsylvania, after firing at Nafutan Point (on the

southeast tip of the island) for approximately

eight hours, failed to achieve complete neutralization. Almost as soon as the Pennsylvania's

fire ceased, a Japanese shore battery impudently

opened fire upon, but failed to hit, the cruiser

Montpelier. This again illustrated that neither

destruction nor neutralization was guaranteed

even by relatively long periods of bombardment?"

Fire Support Unit Seven, commanded by

Rear Admiral George L. Weyler, bombarded

the west coast of Tinian throughout the day in

accordance with its instructions, while Rear

Admiral Charles T. Joy's Fire Support Unit

Eight observed Tinian's east coast to protect

Unit Six from Japanese shore batteries?'3

With the arrival on 14 June of the old battleships, cruisers and destroyers of the Joint Expeditionary Force, the quality of the shore bombardment improved greatly. The reason for

this was no mystery; these ships had devoted

considerable time to shore bombardment, both

in training and battle experience. During the

rehearsals at Kahoolawe, a month prior to the

operation, the old battleships had received valuable experience. They knew the necessity of

slow, painstaking adjustment in shore bombardment, that merely covering an area was not

sufficient. At Tarawa, where the development

of the technique was still suffering, growing

pains, the fallacy of area-shooting was clearly •

revealed. Methodical pin-pointing of targets,

complex bookkeeping, careful weighing of

priorities, and studious damage assessment are

requisites to efficient shore bombardment.132

While the old battleships practiced, TF 58's

new battleships had been far at sea executing

raids, with little or no opportunity to train in

the Southern Attack Force, earmarked for fire support

at Guam.

130 Task Group 52.10 and Task Unit 52.10.6 Report, 1.

181 Task Unit 52.10.7 Report, 2. Task Unit 52.10.8

Report, 2.

182 Marine Corps Gazette, "Naval Gunfire Support in

Landing," Sep45, Maj R. D. Heinl, Jr., 42.
shore bombardment. This, plus the aforementioned range restriction, resulted in areashooting rather than systematic pin-pointing.

Even with the improvement of shore bombardment beginning with the arrival of the old

battleships, however, certain factors limited a

really effective preparation. First and foremost

was the shortage • of time with respect to the

very large number of targets. Since the older

battleships did not arrive until D-minus 1,

allowing them to participate in only one day of

preliminary bombardment (as distinguished

from the D-Day fires), it is apparent that adequate time for these ships did not exist. Second,

was a failing already discussed in relation to

TF 58—lack of training of air spotters in distinguishing important targets ashore. (Here,

again, obvious targets attracted entirely too

much attention.) Third, was the necessity that

support ships of TF 53 (Fire Support Units

Six, Seven and Eight) conserve ammunition

for the bombardment of Guam, expected to take

place within a few days. On D-Day another

restrictive would be added—targets farther

than 1,000 yards inland were to be attacked

only by aircraft until H-Hour. Although done

in the interests of employing both supporting

arms to the maximum without using precious

time coordinating their efforts, it resulted in

some targets escaping the fires of the weapon

best suited for their destruction.133

Operation reports mention a number of

reasons which contributed to prevent satisfactory neutralization or destruction of targets on

Saipan—the size of the island, the large number

of defensive installations, the enemy's excellent

use of camouflage, and the mobility of many of

his weapons.'" These same characteristics,

however, could as well apply to many other

islands (Guam for example), and do not

represent conditions peculiar to Saipan.

• Operating under cover of naval 'gunfire three

underwater demolition team (UDT's) 135

moved close inshore during daylight of 14 June

133 FORAGER NGF Report, 11.

134 Ibid., COMINCH P-007, 3-2.

135 Each team consisted of approximately 16 officers

and SO men, all Navy except for one Army and one

Marine liaison officer per team.

8895900--50 --4

to perform their hazardous tasks. There, with

eyes anxiously searching for signs of enemy

activity, skilled hands prodded the reef floor

for obstacles, mines, and the like. Once found,

such obstacles had to be removed or destroyed.

Teams were assigned as follows: Beaches Red

Two and Three and Green One and Two–UDT

#5; reef at the north side of Tanapag Harbor,

leading to Beaches Scarlet One and Two ( alternate plan beaches)–UDT #6; Beaches Blue

One and Two and Yellow One and Two–UDT

#7.

UDT #5 (covered by California and Birmingham) and UDT #6 (covered by Maryland,

Colorado and Louisville) proceeded according

to plan, neither team suffering casualties. For

the men of UDT #7, however, it was a different

story; heavy fire from Beaches Blue and Yellow

greatly complicated their tasks. To assist them,

Tennessee and Indianapolis laid down an intense 5-inch and 40mm barrage along the

beaches but were unable to neutralize enemy

positions sufficiently for UDT #7 to conduct a

complete reconnaissance. Hostile fire notwithstanding, UDT #7 executed its reconnaisance

to the following distances from beaches: Blue

One—Waterline; Blue Two-75 yards; Yellow

One—Reconnaissance impossible except lip of

reef; Yellow Two-100 yards.

At 0956, Commander UDT #7 requested

smoke to screen rescue of survivors—including

seven wounded. For this soreen, the destroyer

Wadleigh, fired 87 rounds of 5-inch 38 white

phosphorous. The battleship Tennessee also

fired several white phosphorous rounds along

the beach to assist in the evacuation. This constituted the Navy's only use at Saipan of

screening smoke for other than screening transport areas and anchorages.'"

136 A detailed smoke plan had been prepared which

included the screening of the front and flanks of boat

waves; except as stated, however, the plan was not

used. Adm Harry W. Hill, Commander Western Landing Group, stated that smoke was not used in the

ship-to-shore movement because it was unnecessary.

"Smoke is a double-edge weapon. Though it screens

the enemy's observation, it also greatly complicates

control and coordination. We felt that more was to

be lost than gained by the use of smoke in the shipto-shore movement at Saipan." Interview with Adm

41
• No one was disappointed to find that preassault demolitions would be unnecessary at

Saipan. But, despite the lack of obstacles, the

UDT's were able ,to provide some valuable information to the landing force, information

concerning reef conditions, depths of water,

channels, surf, tide, current, and defenses on

the beach.'"

More information in this connection had been

acquired on 13 June (D-minus 2) by Commander William I. Martin, USN. Leading his

torpedo-bomber squadron (VT 10) from the

carrier Enterprise in strikes against beach

defenses, Martin's plane was downed by Japansee antiaircraft fire near the radio station north

of Charan Kanoa. Although his two crewmen

were killed, the commander swam out to the

reef. While awaiting rescue, he noted down a

number of pertinent facts regarding tidal conditions, depth of water over the reef, and nature of the reef floor. This report was transmitted to the landing force prior to D-Day.138

Also jotting down notes was Japanese noncommissioned officer Tokuzo Matsuya. In his

diary entry for 14 June, he reveals bitterness at

the failure of Japanese planes to appear over

Saipan, coupled with very realistic philosophy:

Where are our planes? Are they letting us die without making any effort to save us? If it were for the

security of the Empire, we would not hesitate to lay

down our lives but wouldn't it be a great loss to the

"Land of the Gods" for us all to die on this island?

It would be easy for me to die but for the sake of

Japan's future I feel obligated to stay alive.139

Actually, this NCO saw through the picture

more completely than did most of his superiors,

Hill on 20Sep49. To this, Adm Turner adds: "Actually, at Saipan we had too much smoke during

the landing. The ship bombardment set up a heavy

wall of smoke, due to the light off-shore breeze, that

did not dissipate until after about the second wave

had landed. Turner.

131 Details of UDT operations at Saipan are a synthesis of the following sources: COM INCH P-007,

4-1 and 8-1; Task Force 52 Attack Order A11-44,

Annex G, 1-2; Task Unit 52.17.1 Report, 5-6.

138 Naval Air Operations In the Marianas, Naval

Aviation History Unit OP-501D, C-32, hereinafter

cited as Naval Air Operations In the Marianas.

189 CINCPAC—CINCP0A Item #10,238.

42

who thought that it was just a matter of time

until the mighty Japanese air arm asserted

itself.

The imposing array of sea power off Saipan

might have frightened a less persistent foe to

silence, but the Japanese periodically emerged

from cover to answer the challenge. In most

instances their shells only churned the water,

but twice on 14 June they found their intended

mark. Destroyer Braine (of Fire Support Unit

Seven) and battleship California (of Fire Support Unit One) were hit by one shell each while

engaging in shore bombardment. Though

neither ship suffered critical damage, the shelling had its, effect; Braine's number 2 torpedo

mount and after fireroom were put out of commission by a 6-inch shell from Tinian, and

California's main battery director and forward

radar were rendered inoperative by an exploding missile (estimated 105mm) from Saipan.

The destroyer had three men killed and 15 injured, the battleship one killed and nine

wounded.14°

• It should be noted that preliminary bombardment of Saipan was limited to carrier and

surface strikes. There was no land-based air

support prior to the landing. While land-based

air assisted the operation indirectly by attacks

on other islands, none could be employed

against Saipan itself because of distances involved. Also, there was no possibility of artillery support prior to the landing from lesser

islands within suporting range, as had been

possible at Kwajalein, Roi-,Namur, and Eniwetok. There was no continued preparation of

any sort over an extended period of time, such

as that which was to prove so effective in the

preparation for the Guam and Tinian operations.141 In this connection, General Holland

140 Fifth Fleet, Initial Report on the Operation to

Capture the Marianas Islands, 15-16, hereinafter cited

as 5th Fleet Initial Report. TF 51 Report, End l L, 1.

141 This opinion is not shared by Adm Turner, who

writes: "After a great deal of thought, I have come to

the conclusion that the prolonged bombardments of

Guam and Tinian actually had very little, good effect.

... In any case, it would have been unwise and impracticable, from the standpoint of major tactics, to have

had a longer preparatory period for Saipan. . . ."

Turner.
Smith later wrote: "The initial mistake was

this: we did not soften up the enemy sufficiently

before we landed." 142

Saipan was the most heavily defended of

the three islands, despite the fact that the

Japanese defensive preparations were incomplete at the time of our landing. One may only

speculate on how much more costly the operation would have been if the Japanese defensive

plans had reached fruition. Likewise, we may

only speculate on how much less costly it would

have been if preparatory fires had been adequate.-'48

RELATED COVERING ACTIONS

The scope and extent of the Saipan venture

demanded that many areas in the Pacific be at

least temporarily neutralized, so that the Japanese would have false clues as to the target area

and so that our approach and landing would

not be strongly contested by enemy aircraft.

This build-up was vital to success.

Among the far-removed covering actions

were the operations of the Eleventh Army Air

Force, flying from its bases in Alaska and the

Aleutians against Japanese installations in the

Kurile Islands. This unit's raids, mounted in

the face of harsh Arctic conditions, affected the

Saipan operation in an indirect—yet important—manner: a portion of the Japanese air

force was diverted from the Central Pacific

and sent to defend the icy north.'44

Wake and Marcus, which flanked on the

north our approach to the Marianas, were the

targets for a carrier raid almost a month before the Saipan landings. This raid, under the

142 Coral and Brass, Gen FI. M. Smith, 162, hereinafter cited as Coral and Brass.

143 Analysis of these inadequacies in preparatory

fires is drawn from hindsight, a much easier procedure than determining—before an operation—what,

the needs will be. In this connection, VAdm Harry W.

Hill has written: "It is my recollection that during the

planning period everyone was pretty well agreed that

the naval gunfire, while not greatly in excess of requirements, certainly appeared to be adequate for the

job." Ltr from VAdm Hill to CMC, 12Jan50.

144 The War Reports, Second Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Gen H. H.

Arnold, 388, hereinafter cited as Arnold.

tactical command of Rear Admiral Alfred E.

Montgomery, USN, was designed both to neutralize the threat to the projected supply line

from the Marshalls to the Marianas and to indoctrinate several new air groups. Three carriers participated—Essex, Wasp and San Jacinto.145

Wake and the by-passed atolls were methodically bombed by the land-based Army planes

of Major General Willis H. Hale, USA, acting

under the general direction of Vice Admiral

John H. Hoover, USN. Truk, also, was kept

neutralized by these forces in coordination

with land-based planes from the South and

Southwest Pacific.'"

More intimately keyed to the target date

were the strikes on the Palaus. Executed by

aircraft of MacArthur's Southwest Pacific

Forces, the bombardment began on 3 June;

from 9 June until the Saipan landings these

islands and others in the western Carolines

were harassed daily. This activity minimized

possibilities of trouble from the south and

southwest.

To prevent the Japanese from staging aircraft through the Bonins in the north, two task

groups (Clark's 58.1 and Harrill's 58.4) of TF

58 departed Saipan on 14 June for an attack.

This move was the deepest penetration of Empire waters ever made by a carrier striking

force up to this time. In the teeth of a growing

gale, fighter sweeps and bombing missions

were launched against Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima

and Haha Jima; and, despite airborne opposition and unfavorable flying conditions, the

mission was accomplished and the effectiveness of the Bonins as an aircraft staging area

was greatly reduced.147

FINAL APPROACH OF THE NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE

Details of staging at Eniwetok Lagoon,

meanwhile, had been completed on time, and

the Northern Attack Force departed by echelon on the 8th, 9th and 10th of June. The en145 The Navy's Air War, 204.

146, Arnold, 384-385. A History of the United States

Navy, Dudley W. Knox, 555, hereinafter cited as Knox.

147 The Navy's Air War, 206.

43
• tire movement to the objective was uneventful,

the weather was pleasant, and no portion of

the Northern Attack Force was detected. During the movement of the attack force to Eniwetok, while there, and in the subsequent move

to Saipan, radio silence (except on very high

frequency) prevailed.148

LST's with assault waves embarked and

transports of the Joint Expeditionary Force

arrived at the target area before dawn of 15

June. Strategic surprise appears to have been

gained, but the bombardment which had begun

on 11 June, together with the work of the

Underwater Demolition Teams, denied any

hope of tactical surprise.

148 Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops), Signal

Officer's Report, 8.

The armada now in position off the western

coast of Saipan was tremendous. One hundred

ships were required to transport the Northern

Landing Force, plus four to five times that

number of supporting vessels.149

Personnel aboard those ships had been much

heartened during their approach by an optimistic dispatch from Admiral Mitscher (whose

Task Force 58 had been pummeling Saipan

and sister islands for several days) : "Keep

coming, Marines; they're going to run away."

But, on an island only fourteen and one-fifth

miles long and six and one-half miles wide, there

isn't much room to run—if, indeed, one wished

to run.

149 COMINCH P-007, 1-3 and 5-4. TP 56 C1-8 Report, 13.
CHAPTER II

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

D-Day-15 June 1944

PRE-H-HOUR PREPARATIONS

At about 0400, 15 June 1944, the landing

force, readying itself aboard ships for the

supreme test, received an anxiously awaited

report: that of the underwater demolition

teams. These had accomplished their dangerous mission on D-minus 1 under cover of naval

gunfire. Their report cleared up many points:

the reef itself offered no obstacles, natural or

artificial, to a crossing by our amphibious

vehicles; the depth of the Water in the lagoon 1

was a little greater than had been expected; no

mines had been found on the reef, or in the

lagoon; tanks could be landed on the reef, although a path to the beach was undetermined;

the beach was organized throughout the landing area with an occasional pillbox and many

trenches; and mobile artillery was observed

shifting into position.

Generally the report was not too disappointing. The presence of tetrahedron obstacles and

barbed wire on the reef would have complicated the landing. From the reports received,

there was no cause to alter plans. One factor,

not revealed in reports of underwater demolition teams, which later complicated the shipto-shore movement: mortar and artillery registration flags on the reef and in the lagoon.

1 Lagoon, as here used, refers to the expanse of

water between the reef's edge and the beach.

These markers, which 'enabled the enemy to

place accurate fire on assault waves, could be

plainly seen on the morning of 15 June even

from ships many thousands of yards off shore.

It is possible, since underwater demolition

teams made no mention of them, that the flags

were placed after the teams' 14 June reconnaissance.2

Transport Groups A and B, with portions of

General Watson's 2c1 Marine Division and General Schmidt's 4th Marine Division embarked,3

moved into position in the transport area

18,000 yards offshore of Charan Kamm at 0520.

Aboard the Rocky Mount,4 Admiral Turner's

2 Lieutenant Colonel Wendell H. Best, executive

officer of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, at Saipan,

writes: "One Japanese artillery firing chart which we

captured indicated pre-fired data on the reef, lagoon,

and beaches. . . . It is my opinion that the fire would

have been equally devastating without the flags." Ltr

from LtCol Best to CMC, 8Jan50, hereinafter cited

as Best. •

3 These "portions" included everyone of the two divisions not embarked in LST's.

4 The Rocky Mount, like her sister the Appalachian,

is an especially designed amphibious command ship

(designated "AGC") for the use of the attack force

and landing force staffs. Special features .include: a

teletype screen upon which all incoming messages are

flashed, large conference rooms to facilitate coordination and integration of staff actions, and extra communications to insure an uninterrupted flow of messages.

45
flagship, was General Holland M. Smith and

his Expeditionary Troops staff. With Admiral

Hill (Turner's second-in-command) aboard

the Cambria was General Erskine and the

NTLF Staff.

Silhouetted in the hazy east was Mount

Tapotchau and the rocky hills which form the

island's spiny backbone. As light improved,

the town of Charan Kanoa and the reef channel opposite its pier could be discerned. To the

north was the island capital—Garapan. Farther north at Tanapag Harbor were several

beached, half-sunken, smoking ships—the results of the preparatory air and naval gunfire

bombardment. Also in Tanapag Harbor was

tiny, fortified Maniagassa Island.

Fire support ships were climaxing efforts of

previous days to destroy enemy installations.

Off Tanapag Harbor, Transport Divisions 10

and 30 proceeded to their assigned area'. These

two transport divisions, with the 2d and 24th

Marines and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,

embarked, composed the Demonstration Group

which was to conduct the diversion off, beaches

northeast of Tanapag Harbor.5

At 0542, Admiral Turner ordered, "Land the

Landing Force." H-Hour was set for 0830.

Aboard all ships, everything was ready. A substantial breakfast had been nervously devoured; guns and winches were manned, boats

being lowered, hatches cleared; troops were

alert and keyed to the occasion. The day was

clear—there would be no serious trouble with

the Weather.

Shortly after 0700, the LST Flotilla was in

position in its area about 1,250 yards in rear of

the line of departure. After troops and LVT's

were debarked, most of the LST's (except the

three designated as hospital ships) were to retire to seaward until again needed. There were

34 LST's carrying the assault elements of the

2d and 4th Marine Divisions in position nearest

the line of departure. Slightly behind them

were eight LST's with both divisions' artillery,

two LST's with the antiaircraft artillery, and

two LST's with XXIV Corps Artillery embarked. Two Landing Ships Dock (LSD's),6

5 TF 56 G–S Report, End l B, 2-4.

These ships were originally designed to transport

LCT's from the United States to Europe. When it

46

carrying tanks in Landing Craft Mechanized

(LCM's), were in rear of each division's beach.

Control vessels with Marine and Navy representatives embarked moved to their asigned

positions. All vessels flew flags to designate

the beach approaches over which they would

exercise control. A special control vessel was

designated to handle traffic in the narrow

channel that existed in the reef near Charan

Kanoa (off Green 3).7

Since dawn, naval gunfire support ships had

hurled salvo upon salvo at Saipan. At 0730,

Admiral Hill (Commander Task Group 52.2)

assumed control of Fire Support Unit One

(TU 52.17.1), in order that fires on the selected

beaches would be coordinated by the officer in

command of the landing itself.8 In addition

to the ships of the previous day, the six destroyers of Fire Support Units Two and Three

delivered screening fires on the Charan Kanoa

beaches as they escorted tractor groups into position. (See Map 6.) Tractor Group Able,

which consisted of the LST's carrying assault

elements of the 2d Marine Division, was escorted by Fire Support Unit Three (TU 52.-

17.3, commanded by Captain Harry B. Jarrett,

USN) ; Tractor Group Baker, transporting

assault elements of the 4th Marine Division,

was escorted by Fire Support Unit Two (TU

52.17.2, Commander Phillip H. Fitzgerald,

USN). On bombardment stations by 0800,

these two task units delivered intense fires on

the landing beaches, close to the waterline.°

Fire Support Units One and Four, commencing at dawn, continued their fires against

Saipan's west coast, with particular emphasis

on the points which dominated landing beaches.

was found that LST's could perform this carrying

service, the LSD's were diverted to another purpose

—transporting tanks, embarked in LCM's. The peculiar design of the LSD's allowed water to enter the

shell of the ship, whence LCM's (carrying tanks)

could move under their own power. When debarkation was complete, water could either be expelled or

the ship could stand by to repair damaged craft (up

to and including LCT's).

NTLF G–S Report 13-14.

Task Group 52.17 Report, 8.

Task Unit 52.17.3 Report, 1. Task Unit 52.17.2

Report, 1.
(c/ (—

Pr eo'ed40

ist

— aye)

Poivel A

california

Afetna Point

Charan—Kanoa

soile

7.ennessee

RD 7093

Agingan Point

Garapan

FIRE SUPPORT DISPOSITIONS

IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF

DOG-DAY LANDINGS

MAP 7
Agingan Point felt the impact of Tennessee's

14-inch shells; Afetna Point was shattered

with a variety of shells: 14-inch from California, 8-inch from Louisville and 6-inch from

Birmingham; Mutcho Point and Maniagassa

Island were pounded by 16-inch shells from

Maryland. Affording the enemy positions from

which to direct enfilade fire against our landing waves, these areas rightfully received much

attention. But, even with this volume of fire,

enemy troops and guns remained in action in

these areas.

Fire Support Unit Five concentrated its

efforts on Saipan 's extreme northeastern tip,

while Units Six and Seven fired counterbattery

missions against Tinian.

At H-Hour minus 90 minutes, all naval gunfire lifted and air operations began: first a

bombing strike, then a strafing attack. As

planes retired after pounding the islands for

30 minutes, warships again picked up the preparation.1°

Admiral Joy's Fire Support Unit Eight

(TU 52.10.8), which had bided its time and

protected Unit Six during the 14 June preparation, assumed the starring role from H-minus

60 to H-minus 30 minutes. After exchanging

jobs with Unit Six, Admiral Joy's ships

focused enfilading fire on the Charan Kanoa

beaches and frontal fire into a spur extending

southwestward from Aslito Airfield toward

Cape Obiam. This spur was the site of 11

Japanese installations, ranging from a command post to dual-purpose guns. The pall of

smoke and dust which cloaked the island made

damage assessment impossible."

At H-minus 30 minutes, the Red, Green, Blue

and Yellow Beaches were subjected to renewed

hammering by Fire Support Units One, Two

and Three. (See Map 7 for fire support dispositions in close support of D-Day landings.)

Tennessee pumped 100 high-capacity 14-inch. -

shells into the Blue and Yellow Beaches;

ornia fired the same number into the Red and

Green Beaches; Afetna Point, dangerous because it separated the two divisions' beaches

"Task Force 52, Attack Order A 11-44, Annex C.

11 Task Unit 52.10.8 Report, 2.

and a potential thorn in the sides of both divisions, received 450 high-capacity 6- and 8-inch

shells from Birmingham and Indianapolis.12

Interesting in connection with the dispositions of supporting ships for the landings is

Admiral Turner's comment that "this was the

first time the Close Support firing vessels had

been anchored, or stopped, very close to the

beaches, to shoreward of the Line of Departure. There were eleven Close Support vessels, whose average distance from the beach

was 2,500 yards...." 13

The area near the line of departure showed

greater activity as control vessels, guide boats,

and 24 light gunboats (LCI (G)'s) nosed into

position. These latter craft were scheduled to

precede the first landing waves as far as the

reef, firing their 4.5-inch rockets and 20 and

40mm guns at point-blank range onto the

beach. Armored amphibians, constituting the

first wave, would provide fire support for troopcarrying LVT's from the reef to the beach and

thereafter would execute fire missions as required. Farther out, hundreds of landing vehicles circled dizzily as boat waves organized."

At 0753, Admiral Turner ordered a delay of

H-Hour from 0830 to 0840 to allow boat waves

more time to complete formation.Th

It had been estimated that the 4,000-yard run

from the line of departure to the beach would

take about 27 minutes. Shortly after 0800, the

central control vessel hoisted its signal for the

24 LCI(G)'s to head for the beach with guns

blazing. Excitement mounted at 0812, when

flags were hauled down (or "executed") from

yardarms. This was the signal, like a nod of

confidence, for the first wave of amphibian vehicles to head full-speed for the beach. At short

intervals, the remaining assault waves roared

beachward.

TANAPAG DEMONSTRATION

Off Tanapag Harbor, meanwhile, the Demonstration Group, consisting of the 2d Marines,

12 Task Force 52, Attack Order A 11-44, Annex C.

13 Turner.

14 2d Mar Div Report, Section V, 1.

15 Task Group 52.17 Report, 9.

47
the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, and the 24th

Marines, was executing its feint. The diversion

was afforded realism by supporting naval gunfire from Fire Support Unit Four (TU 52.-

17.4) as landing craft approached the beach to

within 5,000 yards, circled for a few minutes,

wheeled about, and returned to • their ships.

Troops were not embarked in boats for the

feint, although personnel of the 2d Marines'

regimental intelligence section went along as

observers.16 Boats were hoisted in at about

0920, and an hour later the transports arrived

in their assigned area off the Charan Kanoa

beaches. Intelligence reports later indicated

that the Demonstration Group, by remaining

a constant threat from before H-Hour until

sometime thereafter, effectively contained at

least one Japanese regiment—the 135th Infantry—in the northern area. Landing craft drew

no fire during the feint, and no activity was

observed on the shore. There is no indication

that the 135th Infantry suffered more than

16 The 24th Marines used its regimental intelligence

section in a different manner. One lieutenant and

three scouts accompanied each of the assault regiments (23d and 25th). The lieutenant remained with

regiment in each case, while the scouts were portioned one per battalion. By this means, the 24th

Marines received timely enemy information prior to

actually landing. Interview with Maj A. B. Hanson,

16Feb49.

light casualties from the naval gunfire in support of the demonstration."

THE LANDING

Soon after the first wave of the real landing

started for the beach, a few rounds of enemy

artillery fell in the area of the line of departure. Any hope that the • Japanese defenders would be reduced to the status of shellshocked ineffectives was hastily dispelled. As

leading LVT's approached shore, the volume

of naval gunfire decreased—main battery fires

lifted when landing vehicles were 1,000 yards

off the beach, 5-inch fire at 300 yards. At

Afetna, Point, between the two divisions, however, 6- and 8-inch fire of 'Birmingham and

Indianapolis continued until the last possible

moment.

From the time the leading wave approached

to within 800 yards from the shore and lasting until the first craft landed, beach areas

17 TIP 56 G-8 Report, End B, 4. 2d Marines Report,

End A, I, hereinafter cited as 24 Mar Report. 24th

Marines Report, Section II, 18, hereinafter cited as

24th, Mar Report. In an interrogation after the operation, Major Kiyoshi Yoshida, intelligence officer of the

43d Division, stated that the Japanese did not think

that our forces would actually land in the Tanapag

area but that they were not sufficiently sure and,

therefore, retained the 135th Infantry Regiment in

that area.

TROOP-CARRYING Intl, here churning toward the shore. Ability of these vehicles to climb over the reef and move

directly to the beach obviated the necessity of troops wading ashore from the reef.

48
were subjected to intense, almost constant,

strafing attacks. For this mission, Carrier

Support Groups One and Two each furnished

24 fighter aircraft (VF) and 12 torpedo bombers (VT), those of the former group flying

against 2d Division beaches (Red and Green)

and those of the latter against 4th Division

beaches (Blue and Yellow). Direction of these

attacks was west to east, perpendicular to the

beaches, available planes being organized into

divisions of eight fighters and four torpedo

bombers each. The latter, each carrying a full

5-inch rocket load, followed the fighters on the

first pass at the beach, firing all rockets at that

time. In addition to rocket loads, torpedo

bombers of Carrier Support Group One each

carried ten 100-pound bombs. As landing craft

approached to within 100 yards of the beaches,

strafers moved their points of aim inland, so

as to maintain a minimum safety interval of

100 yards at all times.18

Little difficulty was experienced by the as18 TP, 51 Operation Plan A10-44, Addenda to Annex F.

Turner.

sault waves proceeding as far as the reef. But,

beginning there, the enemy commenced placing

automatic weapons, antiboat, artillery and

mortar fire on the approaching LVT's. These

fires increased in intensity with the 2d, 3d, and

4th waves." Terrifying, indeed, was the sound

of enemy shells bursting around the amtracs,

particularly the high-angle shells which

whistled ominously at the bobbing targets. And

the Marines, clustered in these "sitting ducks,"

hoped or prayed that none of the shells would

find its intended matk. Some, however, did.

Those few curious individuals who felt impelled to peer over the ramps of the LVT's on

the way to the beach were greeted with the

uninviting spectacle of parched sand clutching

partially uprooted shrubs and small trees.

Through occasional holes in the 'dirty blanket

of smoke and dust, the battered escarpment

backing the beaches could be seen. Most of the

Marines were content to crouch low in the amtracs, preferring to contemplate Saipan in

18 2d Mar Div Report, Section V, 2. 4th Mar Dir

Report, Section VI, 14.

8,000 TROOPS AND 700 LVT's beached in the first 20 minutes at Saipan. Resulting congestion on certain beaches provided excellent targets for those enemy mortars and artillery pieces not silenced by 'United States naval gunfire and air strikes.

49
terms of brightly colored maps, transparent

overlays, and bold blue arrows.

The first wave, comprised of the 2d Armored

Amphibian Battalion and the Army's 708th

Amphibian Tank Battalion began firing their

weapons about 300 yards from the beach. Some

troop-carrying tractors, because of their superior speed, crossed in front of the armored

amphibians between the reef and the beach,

masking their fire. Of the 68 armored amphibians which preceded the 2d Division, three

were disabled before reaching the beach, and

28 more were disabled between the beach and

the tractor control line,20 200-500 yards inland.21

Though some of the LVT's were hit in the

water, the majority churned slowly onward.

At about 0843, men of the 6th and 8th Marines

of the 2d Division and the 23d and 25th Marines of the 4th Division hit the beach and immediately came under intense mortar and artillery fire. All units suffered heavily. There

was no hesitation, however; the Marines were

well oriented, and the attack moved forward.

Within 20 minutes, 700 LVT's and 8,000 troops

were ashore. Many leaders were hit, but their

responsibilities were rapidly assumed by their

immediate subordinates. Shells showered on

the beach.22

On the left, the 2d Marine Division's landing tended north of its assigned beaches (see

Map 8). This error was partially the fault of

the Navy boat guide officers responsible for

guiding craft to correct beaches.23 Much of the

20 Not to be confused with the transfer control line

which was used as a coordinating point for the transfer of troops from LCVP's to LVT's for the final movement to the beach. The tractor control line is an easily

distinguishable terrain feature (in this ease a railroad

track) where LVT's stop to debark troops.

21 2d Mar Div Report, Section V, 2. Armored Amphibian Battalion, Operation Order No. 2.

22 NTLF Report, 11. In an undated Japanese battle

plan for the Saipan Artillery T.Jnits, standard expenditure of ammunition (expressed in percentage of total

amounts on hand) was established as follows: Destruction of enemy landing craft-15%; Engagement

at beach-15%; Engagements following development

of situation-20%; Reserve-50%. CINCPAC-CING.

POA Item #9604.

28 Although Marine officers and men consulted on

this point unanimously agree that the Navy boat guide

50

difficulty, however, occurred between reef

(where guide boats were forced to stop) and

beach. Extremely heavy fire, registering on the

southern approaches to the Green Beaches,

caused landing vehicles to veer to the north to

escape it. Another reason for the shift in landing was the northern drift of the current

within the lagoon, which markedly affected

the course of the amphibian vehicles. Troop

passengers aboard LVT's did their best to correct the situation by encouraging the drivers

to bear to the right, but their efforts were unsuccessful. ,

The fact that this northerly current was unexpected is worthy of closer examination. At

first glance it would appear that this condition

should have been noted by the underwater

demolition teams in their 14 June reconnaissance. That they did not is explained by the

fact that their observations had been made

under different tidal conditions, at a different

time of day, and with a smooth sea.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe's 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, scheduled to land on

Green 2, landed instead on Green 1. The 3d

Battalion, 8th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel

John C. Miller, Jr.) also landed on Green 1,

with resultant dangerous and unfortunate

massing of troops. The two assault battalions

of the 6th Marines (the 2d, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray, and

the 3d, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John

W. Easley), scheduled to land on Beaches Red

2 and 3, landed about 400 yards north of their

assigned beaches—more nearly on Red 1 and '2.

All four assault battalion commanders of the

2d Marine Division became casualties during

officers were at least partially responsible, the Commander Expeditionary Force, Admiral Turner, does

not agree: "The naval boat guide officers, on both.

flanks of each regimental assault wave, were embarked in LCV(P)'s . .. the first assault wave of each

regiment was guided on each flank by an LCC [landing craft control]. All these boats were in excellent

communication with Transport Group and Transport

Division Control Vessels, in which staff officers of

Division (troop) and Regiments were respectively embarked. The LCC's and LCV(P)'s necessarily had to

turn back at the edge of the reef . . . and thereafter

the LVT's, manned by troops, were on their own."

Turner.
the early hours of the battle. Despite loss of

leaders, confusion, and mixing of units, Marines moved out on their assigned missions.24

The 4th Division, on the right, landed on its

assigned beaches. From right .to left, the assault battalions were: 1st Battalion, 25th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Hollis U. Mustain),

2d Battalion, 25th Marines (Lieutenant

Colonel Lewis C. Hudson), on the Yellow

Beaches; 2d Battalion, 23d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Dillon), 3d Battalion, 23d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John

J. Cosgrove), on the Blue Beaches. (See Map

8.) It had been planned, and hoped, that Marines in the first waves might stay aboard their

LVT's and continue inland to the 0-1 line,

where they would debark and form a beachhead perimeter. Several troop-carrying TNT's,

acting independently or in small groups, carried out this assigned mission.

On the left of the 4th Division, in . the 3d

Battalion, 23d Marines' zone, the armored

LVT's, in some cases, did not proceed inland

but, rather, committed themselves to unnecessary fire fights in, the streets of Charan Kanoa.

This situation caused troop-carrying LVT's of

the 2d and 3d waves some delay, until several

detoured the engaged LVT (A) 's and moved

The problem was altogether different on the

division right. In the zone of the 1st Battalion,

25th Marines, troops were forced by a prohibitory fusillade of frontal and enfilade fire to,

debark at the. water's edge.

The division's two center battalions experienced similarly-varied situations. While nearly

half the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, was carried 500 to 700 yards inland prior to debarkation, most of the 2d Battalion, 23c1 Marifies,

was stopped and forced to debark only 100 to

200 yards inland.

All along the shallow beachhead, enemy artillery fire took a heavy toll. Although impossible to locate the source of this fire or to judge

accurately its caliber, it now appears that it

issued from the, guns of Lieutenant Colonel

Nakashima's 3d Independent Artillery Regiment, firing from positions in the vicinity of

24 2d Mar Div Report, Section V, 2-3.

Tsutsuuran (behind Hill 500 and some 5,000

yards east of Charan Kanoa). In- the words

of the 4th Division action report: ". . . its intensity never varied in the slightest amount." 25

Even as late as arrival of the 6th wave, a

persistent Japanese light machine gun emplaced on the left center of Beach Blue 2 chattered at the men of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, as they landed. The reason that this

weapon remained in action after so many Marines were ashore is that the gunners became

silent and hid when troops actually hit the

beach and remained so until the next wave

came into range. Lieutenant Colonel Dillon,

commanding the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines,

finally observed this weapon firing on one of

his waves and ordered an LVT (A) of the

Arrny's,.708th Amphibian Tank Battalion to

destroy it. The LVT (A) proved equal to the

task, and no more difficulty was experienced

from that particular source.26

RED BEACH ACTION

On the Red Beaches, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 6th Marines encountered stiff resistance and suffered heavy losses in personnel

and equipment. Debarkation at or near the

shore was necessitated by heavy resistance and

unavailability, in some cases, of routes of egress

from the beach. Those few LVT's successful

in running the gantlet of fire and finding a

route from the beaches were soon stopped by

rocks or swamps beyond. As a matter of fact,

the 2d Division had never contemplated movement to 0-1 aboard LVT's (as had the 4th Division), so this represented no variation between plan and execution.27

25 4th Afar Div Report, Section VI, 13-14. 3d Battalion, 23d Marines Report, 1, hereinafter cited as

34 Bn, 234 Mar Report.

26 Interviews with Col E. J. Dillon, 17Feb49 and

5Jul49, hereinafter cited as Dillon.

27 The 2d Marine Division, from the outset, had been

unconvinced of the tactical soundness of the plan to

move aboard LVT's to 0-1. On several occasions,

General Watson had expressed his opinion on this subject to General Holland Smith. Watson was against

the plan for the following reasons: first, the terrain

would not permit it; second, it would mean loss of

control while troops were embarked in LVT's; and

51
ON THE DOUBLE this Marine crosses an open, fire-swept area to join his comrades in expanding the shallow beachhead during early hours of the battle. Dud in foreground is one United States naval shell which did no good

at Saipan.

After landing, the 6th Regiment could force

only a shallow, 75 to 100 yard beachhead across

the coastal road. Company F of the 2d Battalion already had elements on the 0-1 line,

however, because this unit had landed north

third, it would needlessly expose congested groups of

men to enemy fire. General Watson finally secured

General Smith's permission to change the concept

within the 2d Division's zone to the extent that the

armored LVT's would clear the immediate beach areas

and cover the landing by fire. The first wave of troopcarrying LVT's would follow them and discharge

troops beyond the beach. All succeeding waves were to

debark on the beaches, and LVT's carrying them were

to retract and return to their rendezvous area off the

reef as rapidly as possible. The tractor control line

was the MafiaMUM distance any LVT's were to move

inland under any circumstances. Watson.

52

of its assigned beach at a point that coincided

with 0-1. Between Company F (along the

beach) and Company E existed a gap which

was subsequently filled by Company I of the

3d Battalion.

The normal difficulties attendant to the establishment of a beachhead were multiplied

in the 6th Marines' area by shell explosions

from several burning LVT (A) 's nearby. These

crippled vehicles, hit as they crawled onto the

beach, were particularly troublesome to the 2d

Battalion on the left flank and to the wounded

men lying on the. beach awaiting evacuation.

Many of the latter were hit again by the exploding shells.

At 1000, Colonel James P. Riseley, corn-
LAKE

SUSUPE

INITIAL LANDINGS

15 JUNE 1944

moo 0 1000 l'.

MAP 8

Agingon Point
manding the 6th Marines, landed and commenced establishment of his command post

near the center of Beach Red 2. Entrenching

tools were no more than poised for serious digging when 15 to 25 Japanese charged down

the beach‘from the north, striking into the

congested beach area occupied by the regimental command post, rear installations of the

2d Battalion, and the wounded. This enemy

force represented either a group that had been

by-passed or, more likely, a group that had

filtered through the gap between Companies

E and F. The Marines quickly rallied to the

somewhat unexpected outbreak, established a

firing line, and annihilated the Japanese force.

Coincidental with this thrust, an enemy tank

near the water's edge, previously considered

abandoned, suddenly came to life and opened

devastatingly upon the LVI"s carrying the 6th

Marines' reserve, Lieutenant Colonel .William

K. Jones' 1st Battalion. With unerring accuracy the tank gunner scored 371-nm hits upon

several LVT's, including one carrying members

of the battalion staff. The Japanese gunner

could enjoy his choice targets only briefly, however; Marines ashore quickly converged bazooka and antitank grenade fire upon the vehicle and permanently silenced it. Jones' battalion, weathering its warm reception after

losing many key personnel, landed on Beach

Red 2 at about 1040.28

Amid the shells and confusion at Red Beach,

it was difficult for Colonel Riseley to determine

the battle's progress. From reports, it appeared that his right assault battalion (the 3d)

was having difficulty maintaining momentum.

Staff casualties were high; the 3d Battalion

commander (Lieutenant Colonel Easley), Bn2, Bn-3, Bn-4 and Assistant 811nm Mortar

Platoon Leader were all hit early. Colonel

Easley, though wounded, retained command

of the battalion until the following morning,

when he was evacuated. These critical losses,

plus many additional ones incurred from

arazing machine-gun fire as the unit moved

inland, caused Colonel Riseley to order the

1st Battalion to pass through Easley's lines

and continue the attack toward the first

28 Ltr from LtCol L. E. Haffner to CMC, 9Dec49.

high ground inland (designated as 0-1).

Staff casualties were not reserved for the 3d

Battalion alone. At 1400, the 2d Battalion

command post received a direct hit from a

Japanese mortar shell, injuring Major Howard

J. Rice, who had taken over the unit when

Lieutenant Colonel Murray was wounded. An

observer, Lieutenant Colonel William A.

Kenght, took command pending the arrival of

Major Leroy P. Hunt, Jr., at 1600.

The enemy machine guns, so troublesome to

the 3d Battalion, could not be located. The

terrain, flat or gently rolling, was ideal for

long-range grazing fire—and the smoke and

confusion made it difficult to discern the fire's

origin. The enemy's frequent changes 'of position further complicated . the task. Probably

nothing was so frustrating as receiving fire

from an "invisible" foe—yet that was the

normal situation throughout the operation.

When passed through by the 1st Battalion,

the 3d would become regimental reserve. No

sooner had the passage been accomplished,

however, than a potentially dangerous gap was

reported between the 6th Marines' right and

the 8th Marines' left—caused by the incorrect

landing—and Companies K and L of the 3d

Battalion were ordered to fill it. Even with the

advent of these two companies, however, the

gap was not filled, although it was possible to

cover the area by fire. Fortunately, the Japanese had not located this vulnerable point. By

late afternoon, all companies of all three battalions of the 6th Marines were in the lines.

The regiment's advance up the gently-rising

ground towards 0-1 could not proceed at a

rapid pace without presenting contact difficulties with the 8th Marines, since the two regiments were necessarily diverging in their directions of attack.29 Fighting an enemy adept

in infiltration tactics, emphasis constantly had

to be given to the maintenance of contact. A

weak spot located by the enemy might well

have been a weak spot exploited.

29 6th Marines Report, End l A, 1-2, hereinafter cited

as 6th Mar Report. Interview with LtCol J. E. Rentsch,

12Jan49, hereinafter cited as Rentsch. Ltr from Maj

T. H. Fisher to author, 31Jan49, hereinafter cited as

Fisher. Ltr from Maj R. E. North to author, 17Jan49.

hereinafter cited as North.

53
GREEN BEACH AND AFETNA POINT

The landing of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 8th

Marines, on the same beach (Green 1) demanded that the 2d Battalion spend the

greater portion of D-Day fighting to secure

the beach on which it should have landed. The

2d Battalion's difficult scheme of maneuver required Company G to attack south along the

beach toward Afetna Point and the other two

companies (E and F) to fan out to the southeast. This caused a wide dispersion as each

company set out for its assigned objective from

the point of landing.

Company G, moving through the sand dunes

along the beach, met strong resistance in the

form of a series of mutually supporting pillboxes (normally housing 37 or 47mm guns)

covered by riflemen in open trenches. Individual Japanese actually charged from foxholes

with bayonet or sword to contest Company G's

advance. For its task of seizing Afetna Point,

this company had been supplied with weapons

unusual to combat: shotguns. The reason for

this becomes apparent when it is realized that

the unit was attacking straight towards the 4th

Marine Division's left flank, making a shortrange weapon (and one with a wide dispersion

pattern) desirable. (See Map 9.) The entire

8th Marines' supply of shotguns was allotted to

Company G, making available about one shotgun per two Marines. Men thus armed also

carried their normal weapons for later use. The

shotguns, generally, worked well; particularly

against sword-wielding opponents, but some

difficulty was experienced because most of the

cartridge jackets were made of cardboard

rather than metal. The cardboard-jacketed

cartridges often became misshapen in the sea

air, and would not enter shotgun chambers.3°

Every yard of Company G's advance toward

Afetna Point was hotly contested. Since it was

moving with its left flank along the small

" Of interest in this connection: the 6th Marines

had been issued shotguns for the Guadalcanal campaign and had had poor results from the cardboardjacketed shells. It had 'been recommended at that

time that only brass-jacketed cartridges be issued and

used in the future. Comment by LtCol R. M. Tompkins

on rough manuscript, 6Jun49.

54

Charan Kanoa airstrip, Japanese riflemen assumed positions on the eastern side of the strip

and fired into that flank, making the most of

the flat, open terrain. These remained in position until knocked out by the Marines' 60mm

mortars or machine guns.

Attached combat engineers, with their flamethrowers, bazookas and demolitions, were invaluable in destroying enemy pillboxes. In several instances, Marines of Company G came

upon Japanese in pillboxes firing to seaward

at boats carrying in reserves and supporting

weapons. Despite imminent danger to themselves, the Japanese often continued these fires

rather than turn their weapons upon the Marines. This Japanese devotion to their assigned mission made it possible for Company

G to work around to the rear or blind side of

the pillbox, move in, and destroy. But progress was slow and costly. Almost every sand

dune on the point turned out to be an enemy installation, with very-much-alive Japanese inside, this in spite of the tremendous tonnage of

shells thrown into the area by naval supporting vessels.

Seizure of Afetna Point was important for

another reason than denying the enemy excellent positions for enfilading our landing craft;

possession of the point would make Beach

Green 3 available for landing of the tanks of

both divisions. Because of an open channel off

Green 3, LCM's carrying tanks could proceed

directly to the beach without crossing the

troublesome reef that fenced all other beaches.

Once through the channel the craft could either

move straight in to Green 3 or fan out to the

north or south and put the tanks ashore

wherever it was desired. The same channel

could also be used for logistical purposes after

tanks were ashore. As will be seen, however,

Afetna Point proved more of a headache than

expected; and the tanks had to land by a much

more difficult method.

While Company G struggled southward

through the sand dunes, Companies E and F,

8th Marines, pushed inland, the latter unit

roving across Susupe swamp. Upon discovering that no friendly forces were anywhere

near, however, Company F pulled back to the

western side of the swamp. An interesting in-
THE CAPTURE OF AFETNA POINT

1000 0 MO 0 Ft.

Approximate scale in feet

MAP 9

RD 1093

2 8

reen I

. 6

II

4

vvvvv 8

Radio Station

-XL

Enemy

Anti-Boat

Positions

Afetna Point

4,1 40

D-LUS

LAKE

SUSUPE

Green 3

0950

0-PLUS ii

Charon

Kanoa

<23

Sugar Refinery
cident arose from this minor excursion: an enterprising Japanese soldier somehow correctly

identified the Marine company and its location;

but, after plotting his information on a rough

but readable sketch, he robbed himself of almost-earned glory by losing the sketch (and

probably his life). The sketch was picked up, or

off, by an equally-enterprising Marine from

Company F and turned in for intelligence

processing.31

Since the 3d Battalion landed on its correct

beach, no change in the unit's attack plans was

necessitated, and its objective was reached on

time. Colonel Clarence R. Wallace, commanding the 8th Marines, landed between Beaches

Green 1 and 2 at about 0945. This placed him

and his regimental command post in the front

lines for a period of a few minutes as Company

G struggled southward toward Afetna Point.

At 0950, the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant

Colonel Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.), in regimental

reserve, was ordered to land. Once ashore,

Company B was attached to the 2d Battalion

and immediately committed on Company G's

left flank, relieving that unit of further flank

worries as it battled 'toward Afetna Point. The

other two companies (A and C), committed

between the 2d and 3d Battalions, attacked to

the eastward into the swamp which ran from

Lake Susupe to the vicinity of the radio station.

Before they were halfway through the thighdeep muck, lengthening shadows of late afternoon forced an abandonment of the swamp

crossing. Colonel Hays then pulled his battalion back to better defensive (and more comfortable) terrain on the west edge of the

swamp.32

Early in the afternoon, the division reserve,

1st Battalion, 29th Marines33 (Lieutenant

Colonel Guy E. Tannyhill), which had participated in the Tanapag demonstration, landed

"Interview with Maj W. C. Chamberlin, 17Jan50,

hereinafter cited as Chamberlin:

32 Interview with Maj H. G. Gunter on 4Feb49, hereinafter cited as Gunter. 8th Marines Report, 1, hereinafter cited as 8th Mar Report. 1st Battalion, 8th

Marines Report, 1, hereinafter cited as 1st Bn, 8th

Mar Report. Wallace.

and was attached to the 8th Marines. Company

B of this battalion was ordered to fill a gap

which had developed in the zone of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines. Owing to lack of knowledge of the terrain and the absence of guides,

however, Company B ended up in the wrong

area.

It remained, then, for Company A, 29th

Marines, to fill the gap. Darkness was falling

by the time the unit got started, and the Marines experienced difficulty maintaining direction. About halfway to its assigned sector,

Company A was immobilized by a thundering

barrage of Japanese artillery fire. By this time,

however, Company B had located its originallyassigned position, and it was discovered that

Company A would not be needed. The latter,

therefore, holed up for the night as a reserve,

along with other uncommitted units of the

battalion.

That units could sustain casualties without

actually participating in more than "gapfilling" operations is evideneed by the fact that

the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, suffered about,

30—mainly from Japanese artillery fire—

during the day.34

YELLOW BEACH AND AGINGAN POINT

In the meanwhile, the 4th Marine Division

had its own share of trouble. The situation on

both flanks was causing great concern. At the

end of the first hour, the 1st Battalion, 25th

Marines, on the right flank, had clawed but 12

yards of beach depth in a situation differing

little from Tarawa. Because many LVT's of

the 773d Amphibian Tractor Battalion left the

beach before the unloading of anything but

personnel could be accomplished, the battalion

was desperately short of communication equipment for three days. The dependable SCR

300's, however, filled the bill until replacement

gear arrived. The hasty departure of the LVT's

was apparently occasioned by enemy artillery

and mortar fire which hammered the congested

beach areas. This was no comfort to the fighting men on the beach. Not only was the shortage of communications gear felt, but some

34 8th Mar Report, 1. 1st Battalion, 29th Marines

33 See footnote 78, page 27, Chapter I. Report, 1, hereinafter cited as 1st Bn, 29th Mar Report.

55
mortars and machine guns, together with ammunition for them, were still aboard when the

LVT's pulled out.

• Heavy flank resistance from Agingan Point

and the sparsely-wooded beach area to the

south, coupled with frontal fighting, produced

extremely heavy casualties on the 1st Battalion,

25th Marines. Agingan Point was a honeycomb

of Japanese installations, originally constructed

to fire to sea but capable of bringing flanking

fire to bear against troops on shore. At 0930, the

enemy attempted a counterattack from the direction of Agingan Point, and small groups of

Japanese were observed moving over the ridge

on the right flank of the 0-1 line. Lieutenant

Colonel Mustain, the 1st Battalion's commander, immediately called for an air strike on

these targets. Within five minutes, a bombing

and strafing attack was delivered, achieving

good coverage of the area although it was impossible to judge results. Fires of the battleship

Tennessee were invaluable in keeping the Jap- anese off balance in their efforts to push the 1st

Battalion into the water. Mustain requested

that tank support be provided his battalion as

soon as possible, as well as an additional rifle

company from the reserve battalion (the 3d).

Playing havoc with the 1st Battalion efforts

to get reorganized into an effective fighting

body were at least four direct fire artillery

pieces (about 75mm) emplaced on the high

ground 800 yards inland. For these Japanese

gunners a movement by three or four Marines

was a sufficient target; and they made the most

of their excellent observation. It was apparent

to all hands that the situation would not be

relieved until the high ground had been seized,

although naval gunfire and air were proving

helpful.35

On Mustain's left, the 2d Battalion fared

somewhat better, although mortar and artillery

fire rained mercilessly upon them. The terrain

in the 2d Battalion's sector afforded very little

cover or concealment, and the unit sought the

best solution to the problem by moving inland

35 25th Marines Report, 3, hereinafter cited as 25th

Mar Report. 1st Battalion, 25th Marines Report, 2-7,

hereinafter cited as 1st Bnr, 25th Mar Report. Interview with Maj F. J. Mee, 151'0)49, hereinafter cited

as Mee.

56

as rapidly as possible. About half the assault

Marines of this battalion were carried to a railroad embankment (500-700 yards inland) prior

to debarkation from LVT's. Until it reached

there, the battalion was subjected to frontal

small-arms fire from Japanese behind the embankment. There the small-arms fire ceased,

but mortar and artillery fire continued. From

the direction of Nafutan Point came shells

-Which burst overhead, apparently from antiaircraft guns depressed to fire at ground target's.

And, as if troubles to the front and flanks were

not enough, two enemy mortars began firing on

the Marines from positions 500 yards to the

rear. Before a request for assistance could be

made, friendly planes spotted the mortars,

attacked, and silenced them.36

Much credit for the 2d, Battalion's success

in pushing inland goes to the LVT (A) 's of the

Army's 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion,

which, according to the Marine battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel FIudson, took

"more than their share of punishment" and

"diverted enemy attention from the amphibious

tractors carrying troops ... I shall always remember the excellent support given to my

battalion by the Army LVT (A) 's.37

Shortly after Lieutenant Colonel Justice M.

Chambers' 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, crossed

the line of departure on its way to the beach,

an order from regiment directed that one company be attached to the 1st Battalion upon

landing. Chambers selected Company K, his

battalion reserve, for this mission. Upon arrival

at the beach, however, Chambers learned that

guides from the 1st Battalion had met his

leading units, including two platoons from

Company I, and one platoon from Company

L, and had led them to the 1st Battalion's zone

where they were immediately committed to action. Chief disadvantage of this rearrangement,

was that a complete tactical unit was not provided, but in the normal confusion of an amphibious landing, miscarriages of this type

were neither unusual nor inordinately serious.

36 Interview (undated) with Maj V. J. Barringer,.

hereinafter .cited as Barringer. Interview with Maj

H. V. Joslin, 15Feb49, hereinafter cited as Joslin.

37 Ltr from Col L. C. Hudson to CMC, 1.2Jan50.
BARELY ON THE BEACH, these 4th Division Marines lie flat and try to spot the source of the tire which has them

inonohilized.

With the remainder of his unit, Chambers

moved about 700 yards inland to the scanty

protection afforded by the railroad embankment. Here the battalion halted, dug in, and

awaited orders.

At 1300, Company K was detached from the

3d Battalion and attached to the 1st Battalion.

Later in the afternoon, with the right flank situation still dangerous, the remainder of Company I-was sent to assist Mustain's busy unit in

cleaning out the Agingan Point pocket of resistance. Company I subsequently reported

killing approximately 150 Japanese on Agin.gan

Point. Locating the enemy there was a difficult

job ; the usual Japanese tactic was to remain

concealed in their "spider holes" 38 until the

38 This type of position is a hole dug into the ground

with a camouflaged lid fitting snugly over it. A carefully constructed spider lade is next to impossible to

locate as long as the lid is down, since it is flush with

889590°-50--5

Marines had passed by them; then the lids of

the holes would be opened and rifle or light

machine-gun fire directed at the Marines' rear.

Colonel Merton J. Batchelder, commanding

the 25th Marines, came ashore about noon and

established his command post against the west

side of the railroad fill. This choice was a

fortunate one; the embankment provided

shield against flat trajectory fire and the installation functioned without excessive trouble

from the Japanese. All personnel, including

supporting elements of the combat. team, were

ashore by 1800.39

the ground and consonant with surrounding vegetation.

" 2,5th Mar Report, 3. 3d. Battalion, 25th Marines

Report, 3-4, hereinafter cited as 3d Rn, 25th Mar Report. Ltr from Col J. M. Chambers to CMC, I.Dec49,

hereinafter cited as Chambers.

57
KAGMAN PENINSULA

MAGICIENNE BAY

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH of Charm Kanoa area had led 4th Division planners to believe that Mt Irina Susu could be

reached without debarking troops from LVT's. Difficult terrain, including a swamp extending south from Lake

Susupe, foiled the plan.

BLUE BEACH AND CHARAN KANOA

The 23d Marines' advanced through Charan

Kanoa was hindered only by sporadic rifle fire,

and the 3d Battalion, on the left flank, pushed

through the town without encountering serious

difficulty. Eight troop-carrying and three

armored LVT's actually travelled to 0-1 as

called for in the plans. These LVT's, restricted

by the terrain from moving abreast, were forced

to proceed in column along the road south of

Lake Susupe until Mt. Fina Susu (0-1) was

reached. Minor opposition en route was offered

by Japanese riflemen lying in drainage ditches

perpendicular to the road. Fire from the LVT

machine guns (manned by personnel of the 3d

Battalion, 23d Marines) accounted for most of

these trouble-makers.

Once the Marines reached 0-1, however, the

58

situation changed for the worse. Direct Japanese artillery fire (probably fired by the 3d

Mountain Artillery Regiment) , coming from

positions 500 to 700 yards to the north and east,

plus mortar and machine-gun fire, kept the unit

constantly pinned down. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the armored

amphibs refused to move to the top of Mt. Fina

Susu and provide the neceSsary support and by

the absence of any friendly forces on either

flank.

A short 100 yards east of the high ground of

the 0-1 line, small groups (squads or smaller)

of Japanese darted about a coconut palm grove.

Throughout the day these made periodic attempts to infiltrate the left of the 3d Battalion's slender salient. Alert to these movements, the Marines discouraged the Japanese
with well-aimed small-arms fire.4°

Lieutenant Colonel Dillon's 2d Battalion experienced some difficulty after landing owing

to the fact that some tractors stopped after

advancing a short distance while others continued somewhat farther. The reasons for these

variations were not only the intense mortar and

artillery fire hammering the beach (and finding

the LVT's a favorite target), or the action of

individual Japanese riflemen and machine gunners, but also the nature of the terrain. Tractors landing in the center of Blue 2, for

example, found themselves confronted with an

incline rising almost vertically to a height of

four to five feet—sufficient obstacle to stop

movement from the beach. Farther inland,

near the southeastern edge of Charm _Kanoa,

was a swampy area, which canalized vehicles

to the one good route in the area—Aslito Road.

In view of the terrain difficulties and the

character of enemy resistance, the 4th Division's plan to move aboard LVT's to the high

ground (0-1) some 1,200 to 1,500 yards inland

was impractical from the outset. It is not surprising that. planners had been too optimistic

in this respect, when it is remembered that the

aerial photograph coverage of Saipan had left

much to be desired. From available information, it had appeared feasible; in actual

practice, it was not.

Only three LVT's and five LVT (A)'s operating with the 2d Battalion reached 0-1 as

planned. Because of the difference in debarkation points, the battle developed into a series of

actions by separated tractor groups. Confusion

was at a minimum, however, as good training

paid off; leaders organized whatever men were

nearby, regardless of unit affiliation, and

pressed the attack. By the middle of the afternoon, control had been regained.

Shortly afternoon, the battalion commander

requested tanks in his zone. The type of enemy -

resistance encountered—rifle and machine-gun

fire—was well suited to the employment of

tanks, even though they would have to remain

40 23d Marines Report, 30-33, hereinafter cited as

23d Mar Report. 3d Mt, 23d Mar Report, 1. Ltrs from

Maj P. S. • Treitel to author, 21 Feb49 and to CMC,

30Dec49, hereinafter cited as Treitel.

on the road until the swamp was passed. Relief

from the almost constant shelling would be

obtained only by destruction of the Japanese

weapons. Dillon requested that aircraft try to

spot the enemy guns, but the pall of smoke over

the island hindered the planes and helped the

Japanese. The latter knew where they wanted

to fire, the Americans could not be sure.

Only two tanks (M-4's from Company C, 4th

Tank Battalion) had been landed on Blue

Beach at this time, but the 23d's commander,

Colonel Louis R. Jones, acting on Dillon's

request, ordered them to report to the 2d

Battalion.41

Since the 2d Marine Division had not planned

to use Beach Green 3 in its initial landings, it

was apparent that a gap between the two divisions would exist for some time. (The 2d

Division's shift in landing further delayed the

juncture.) This situation, which would leave

the 4th Division's left flank exposed, indicated

the desirability of landing the reserve battalion

of the 23d Marines at an 'early hour. Also, the

plan of moving to the 0-1 line prior to debarkation from LVT's demanded that by-passed

rear areas be mopped up by a reserve unit.

Accordingly, the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant

Colonel Ralph Haas) landed at 1055 and moved

to an assembly area about 300 yards inland of

Beach Blue 1. This move, hampered only by

the ubiquitous artillery and mortar fire and an

occasional exchange with Japanese riflemen in

the ruins of Charan Kanoa, placed the battalion

in position tO protect the left flank. Until later

in the day when it was committed into the front,

this unit spent its time mopping up by-passed

Japanese and stopping minor infiltration

thrusts.

The advance command group of the 23d

Marines, under the executive officer, Lieutenant

Colonel John R. Lanigan, landed about noon,

followed at mid-afternoon by the regimental

commander, Colonel Jones. Established in a

small depression, between Beaches Blue 1 and

2 and, subsequently, between two artillery battalions, the command post received almost con41 Dillon. 23d Mar Report, 33. 2d Battalion, 23d

Marines Report, 1-2, hereinafter cited as 2d Biz, 23d

Mar Report.

59
stant pounding from Japanese mortars and

artillery."

A great portion of the 4th Division's difficulties on D-Day (and, subsequently, on D-plus

1) originated from a capably-prepared series

of positions in the vicinity of the 0-1 ridgeline.

About these, Lieutenant Colonel Gooderham L.

McCormick, the division intelligence officer

(D-2) , has written:

On the forward and reverse slopes of the edge of

the saucer which followed our 0-1 line the enemy had

placed batteries of 75mm and 105mm field pieces.

They were all well placed, with excellent fields of

fire and artful concealment. Crew's quarters and ammunition were all below ground. . . . Entrances were

invariably well back on the reverse slope.

Wall diagrams in observation posts marked registration points on the reefs, the channels, the beach

lines, roads and intersections adjacent to the beach.

These points were interdicted long after the 0.P.'s had

been rendered inoperative.43

4TH DIVISION TANKS LAND

The tank situation in the 4th Division was

not good. Based on the early morning reports

of the underwater demolition teams, two methods of getting tanks ashore were planned.

First, and most desirable, was by means of the

channel off Beach Blue 1, through which LCM's

could proceed directly to the beach and debark

tanks. The other was by beaching LCM's on the

reef and allowing tanks to move ashore under

their power.

Two complicating details which UDT personnel could not foresee, however, made the

landing of tanks a serious problem. First, the

channel was intermittently interdictedt;y heavy

mortar and artillery fire, making movement

through it hazardous. And second, in regard

to the reef landings, heavy swells had built up

by early afternoon, making it difficult to beach

LCM's. Yellow Beach, with the best reef surface for tank landings, was the scene of the

heaviest swells.

Difficulties notwithstanding, the 4th Tank

Battalion endeavored to land throughout the

afternoon. It was a costly operation.

42 28 Mar Report, 33. 4th Mar Div Report, Annex C,

4-5. L. R. Jones.

43 Ltr from LtCol G. H. McCormick to CMC, 21Feb50,

hereinafter cited as McCormick.

60

Company A, which advanced 600 to 700 yards

across the coral reef to land on Beach Blue 2,

lost two medium tanks in the movement to the

beach when salt water drowned out their electrical systems. A third was damaged while

attempting to tow a tank from another company ashore. After landing, Company A, immediately moved out to assist the 1st Battalion,

25th Marines, in the fight around Agingan

Point.

Of Company B's 14 medium tanks, only four

reached the beach in working condition. While

departing from the LSD upon which the company was embarked, one LCM (with its medium

tank loaded on board) sank. Another tank

had its fording equipment smashed in an unexpected shift of weight on board the LCM

upon which it was embarked. As chance would

have it, this LCM later received a direct hit

from a Japanese artillery shell, setting it afire.44

Three tanks were sent through the Charm

Kanoa channel, arriving ashore safely, but

under so much artillery fire that the control

vessel ordered the next three tanks to move

across the reef to Blue 1. Of these three, one

nosed into a "pot-hole" .( a large depression in

the reef ) , and another was temporarily out of

commission because of the effect of water on the

electrical system.

Six of the company's tanks had yet to make

the trip to the beach. These received orders at

the control vessel to land on Beach Green 2, a

2d Division beach some 1,100 yards away from

their parent division. The cause for this radical

misdirection, which was made in spite of the

tanks platoon leader's protests, its not indicated; and, in view of the subsequent fate of

these tanks, no one can be expected to assume

the blame voluntarily. Perhaps this was

ordered in the hope that a Green Beach landing

would be less costly or, perhaps, it was a matter

of misunderstanding The order was issued,

however, and the six tanks made the effort.

Only one of the six reached the beach, the rest

falling into a span of quite deep water about

halfway in. The one tank that did get ashore

was immediately pressed into service by the 2d

44 The tank, oddly enough, was retrieved on D-plus 1

and moved ashore.
AMMUNITION, dumped on the beach by the leading waves of LVT's is readily available to Marines cluStered behind

a medium tank nearby. Though uneven, this method solved many early supply problems.

Tank Battalion and did not return to the 4th

Division until several days later. So, for all

intents and purposes, Company B had only four

tanks of its original 14 available for the support

of the 4th Marine Division.45

Company C fared much better. Landing on

Beach Yellow 2 after an 800 yard trip across

the reef, the unit moved, intact, to an assembly

area just inland from Beach Blue 2. Shortly

after arrival there, orders were received from

the commander, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines (to

which the unit was attached), to attack to the

high ground designated 0-1. The tanks of

Company C immediately moved out. It was

soon discovered, however, that those machines

not actually on the road bogged down and had

45 Later, however, most of the disabled vehicles of

Company B were retrieved and restored to parent control. The unit, thereafter, rendered effective support

to the 4th Division's operations. It is important to

note that, since Company B had not been assigned to

support an assault regiment after landing, its shortage

of vehicles did not have critical implications.

to be abandoned. After these experiences, the

tanks stayed on the road, attacking in a column

towards 0-1.

Spraying their machine guns at enemy riflemen and machine gunners and directing their

75's against specific enemy strong points, the

tanks lumbered to the east towards the high

ground. With their advent, the men of the 2d

Battalion, 23d Marines, felt some of the pressure lift, and the advance resumed. Aside from

the fact that the tanks knocked out pockets of

enemy resistance, their arrival had a heartening

effect upon the infantrymen.

Company D, the light (flame-thrower) tank

company of the 4th Tank Battalion, landed 10

of its 18 tanks safely on the Blue Beaches

throughout the afternoon of D-Day. Those

landed were not employed in the D-Day fight,

however, but instead were ordered into an assembly area 150 yards inland from Beach Blue

2 for the night. The remaining eight light

tanks of the company, unable to get sufficient

LCM's for a D-Day landing, came ashore on the

61
afternoon of D-plus 1 and joined the fight."

The most decisive action executed by any unit

of the 4th Tank Battalion on D-Day was that

of the 1st Platoon, Company A (later joined

by the 3d Platoon and one tank of the 2d Platoon). Following its landing on Beach Blue 2,

the 1st Platoon, Company A, moved off to the

support of Mustain's 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, on the extreme right flank. The platoon

arrived just as two companies of Japanese attacked from Agingan Point. This was the

strongest effort of the day, following a series of

smaller actions which had harrassed the battalion since the landing. The Japanese counterattack, designed to push Mustain's right flank

into the water, was an ideal target for the

newly-landed medium tanks. With the aid of

the 1st Battalion, the tanks vigorously drove

against the enemy attackers. Nearly the entire

Japanese force was massacred in the shortlived melee.

After checking the hostile surge, the tanks

ranged out upon the point, crushing and destroying Japanese installations. All this was

accomplished without the loss of a single tank.

In the withdrawal, however, one tank lost a

track in a shell hole and had to be abandoned

until the next day, when it was retrieved. The

tank action improved the situation of the 1st

Battalion, enabling it to resume the infantry

advance.47

14TH MARINES LAND

As a result of Colonel Jones' noon recommendation that artillery be landed, the 14th

Marines (Colonel Louis G. DeHaven) commenced landing at 1315 and the entire regiment

was ashore by dark. The 3d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. MacFarlane), after

losing one of its 105mm howitzers during the

ship-to-shore movement (due to a mechanical

" The foregoing account of the landing of the 4th

Tank Battalion is a synthesis of the following sources:

4th Tank Battalion Report, 3; Company A, 4th Tk

Bn Report, 1-2; Company B, 4th Tk Bn Report, 1-2;

Company C, 4th Tk Bn Report, 1; Company D, 4th

Tk Bn Report, 1; Dillon; Ltr from Lteol R. K. Schmidt

to CMC, 5Dec49, hereinafter cited as 1?. K. Schmidt.

47 Mee. Company A, 4th Tk Bn Report, 1-2.

62

failure and subsequent sinking of the DUKW

transporting the howitzer), landed on Beach

Yellow 2 and went into a firing position about

50 yards inland, on the east side of the coast

road. The battalion fired its first rounds (in

support of the 25th Marines) about an hour

and a half after landing.

For the 5th Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel

Douglas E. Reeve), the ship-to-shore movement

was made without loss of any of its 105mm

howitzers. One "A" frame DUKW, not carrying a howitzer but moving with the 5th Battalion, was hit by a shell from a dual-purpose

5- or 6-inch Japanese gun during the trip into

Blue 2. Although this did not entail a loss to

the battalion, it did have the effect of slowing

up the unloading: by congesting the beach area

and making one less "A" frame DUKW available to lift 105's from DUKW's in which they

were embarked. The 5th Battalion went into a

position area about 40 yards inland from Beach

Blue 2 at about 1400. After registration, the

battalion undertook the destruction of the previously-mentioned 5- or 6-inch gun, which was

firing from the high ground 1,500 yards inland.

Although the weapon was silenced for the

night—and everyone hoped permanently—it

was quite intact and firing the following

morning.

Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Youngdale's 4th

Battalion landed on Beach Blue 2 at approximately 1700. One 105mm howitzer was lost

prior to landing when the DUKW upon which

it was embarked sank. The DUKW had run out

of fuel and was in the process of moving aboard

an LST for refueling when it slipped off the

ramp and sank. Once ashore on Blue 2, four

howitzers were knocked out by Japanese artillery and mortar fire. All were subsequently

returned to action, however. Youngdale's battalion moved inland about 350 yards and set up

along the coast road. In spite of continuous

enemy artillery fire which complicated its work,

the battalion was laid and ready to fire at 1812,

about one hour and 12 minutes after landing.

The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Harry

J. Zimmer), scheduled to land in the returning

DUKW's of the 4th Battalion, was landed

instead in LVT's when the DUKW's failed to

become available. This involved disassembling
the 75mm pack howitzers and transferring them

from LCVP's to LVT's by hand. After landing

on Yellow 1 at about 1700 (the battery commanders had been ashore on reconnaissance

since 1430) , the battalion moved to a position

about 100 yards off the beach. This placed the

unit only about 50 yards forward of the 3d

Battalion, not a desirable arrangement but

necessitated by the shallow beachhead and the

congestion in the area.

For the 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel

George B. Wilson, Jr., the difficulties of landing and getting established ashore were a magnification of those of the other battalions. During the transfer operations, in which LVT's became available singly and at irregular intervals,

some sections of the battalion became separated

from the others and landed on different beaches.

Part of the battalion, still in LCVP's, was

ordered to move through the channel and land

on Blue 1, but heavy fire chased the craft back

to sea. Later, in a second attempt, the channel

route was successfully used. Another group

landed on Blue 1 in LVT's, another on Blue 2,

still another on Yellow 1. Two pack howitzers

of the latter group were not unloaded, as the

LVT's carrying them were ordered out to sea

by the shore party commander who claimed that

the vehicles were drawing fire to the beach.

Later, when these LVT's attempted to negotiate

the Yellow 1 reef, the two howitzers were

pitched overboard by an especially vicious

surf.48 Two more howitzers were hit by Japanese shelling of the beach areas, although it was

48 This did not constitute a permanent loss, however; pieces were retrieved and the howitzers were

back in action by D-plus 2.

75mm PACK HOWITZER blasts away during the early hours of the battle. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 10th and

14th Marines were armed with these versatile pieces. Tapotchau massif may be seen in background as this

crew trains its weapon toward the east coast.

63
possible, by exchanging parts, to salvage one

howitzer out of the two. Losses in personnel

and equipment necessitated reducing the firing

batteries from three to two. The battalion went

into firing position just inland of Beach Blue 2

and was firing by about 1700.

The executive officer of the 14th Marines,

Colonel Randall M. Victory, landed with the

regimental command group at 1300 on Beach

Blue 2. From there the command post moved

about 500 yards inland into a grove of trees

containing a series of abandoned Japanese

trenchworks. The choice proved a wise one; the

14th Marines' command post endured only an

occasional artillery round and the harrassing

activities of few snipers located to the rear.

During the afternoon two of these were killed

within 40 yards of the command post, and a

Japanese machine-gun nest in a clump of bushes

only 50 yards to the left rear was destroyed."

GENERAL SCHMIDT'S COMMAND POST

The 4th Marine Division advance command

post was established ashore on Yellow 2 at

1630 by Colonel Walter W. Wensinger, the

D-3 (operations officer of the division). General Schmidt arrived there and • opened the

division command post at about 1930. The location had little to commend it, but there was

no alternative on the shallow beachhead. The

palm grove which looked somewhat inviting on

the map had been shattered into a group of

skeleton trunks and stumps; the terrain was

like a pool table—flat and open; there were no

abandoned Japanese installations to occupy,

although digging was easy in the dirty sand;

a stockpile of partially buried gasoline drums

was located nearby, providing a constant source

of worry: In addition to the command post's

other weakness, there was the matter of the

14th Marines' firing batteries nearby. These

not only drew Japanese counterbattery fire

49 14th Marines Report, 1, hereinafter cited as 14th

Mar Report. Maj J. F. Ryan, Observer from 5th

Marine Division, Report of Saipan Operation (Arty),

7-8, hereinafter cited as J. F. Ryan. Karch. Reeve.

Ltr from Maj W. McReynolds to CMC, 14Jan50, hereinafter cited as McReynolds. Ltr from LtCol G. B.

Wilson to CMC, 8Feb50, hereinafter cited as Wilson.

64

into the area, but their presence greatly limited dispersal room; and the command post was

congested into a small space (about 50 yards

wide and 100 yards deep). A search for a better location, undertaken by the division intelligence officer (D-2), Lieutenant Colonel

Gooderham L. McCormick, proved unfruitful,

and it was decided that nothing would be

gained by moving.

With all of the command post's bad features,

however, the 4th Division headquarters carried on all its functions. Later, when assault

troops progressed farther inland and it was

possible to move about more easily, the command post was spread out and the congested

condition relieved. Brigadier General Samuel

C. Cumming, Assistant Division Commander,

remained on board ship on D-Day. He and his

staff, reported ashore shortly before noon on

D-plus 1.5°

2D DIVISION TANKS

Shortly after 0900 on D-Day, the 2d Marine

Division commenced efforts to land tanks. A

pilot tank made the trip from the reef to

Beach Green 1 under extremely heavy fire,

marking a route as it moved. On reaching the

beach, it was disabled by direct 37mm and

47mm fire from Afetna Point, and the crew

was forced to abandon it. The route had been

marked, however, and beginning at 1300 tanks

started crossing the reef in groups of two and

three under almost continuous Japanese artillery fire. Here, again, it was impossible to determine the exact source or caliber of the

enemy fire, except the antiboat-antitank fire

which came from Afetna Point. It is assumed

that the long-range, high-angle fire emanated

from the eastern slopes of the island's spiny

backbone, where the guns of Lieutenant Colonel

Nakashima's 3d independent Mountain Artillery Regiment as well as numerous heavy mortars were emplaced.

By 1530, all LSD-embarked tanks of the

division had groped their tortuous way to the

beach. Tank liaison teams had been furnished

50 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 15-16. Interview

with Col 0. H. Wheeler, 21Feb49, hereinafter cited

as Wheeler. McCormick.
each combat team headquarters; tanks were

met by a guide at the beach, commanders

briefed, and tanks tactically employed at once.

Barging into the fight With all the confidence

that a few inches of armor plate can instill,

the tanks injected a fresh drive into the late

afternoon attack. With these machines ashore,

infantry commanders could breathe a little

easier; another powerful weapon was available

to meet the expected enemy counterattack.

Eight tanks of the 2d Tank Battalion were

damaged on D-Day, but of this number only

one was permanently lost. Others were repaired

and later played an importn it, part in the operation."

MINOR ENEMY TANK THRUSTS

Some of the enemy tanks were also moving

on the early afternoon of D-Day. These were

from the 4th Company of Colonel Goto's 9th

Tank Regiment. The 4th Company's 14 tanks

(11 mediums, three lights) had been ordered to

defend the. western beaches on either side of

Charm' Icanoa. To do this, they had taken

position on the beach itself, with plans to execute an antiboat mission during the landing

phase. The sheer weight of naval shelling and

the momentum of the assault drove the company inland before it could perform its

planned function, however. Had this unit remained on the beaches, it might have had the

satisfaction of achieving considerable destruction of U. S. landing craft. From its withdrawn positions, the enemy tank company

lashed out in a series of prods against the

Marines' beachhead.

About noon, two Japanese tanks moved from

covered positions to the north, along the beach

road, and through the lines of Company F,

6th Marines. Apparently not realizing where

they were, they stopped to have a look around,

the leading tank even "unbuttoning" its turret. At this point, bazookas and AT grenades

from Company F converged on the surprised

visitors and destroyed them.52

51 2d Mar Div Report, Section V, 3.

52 An amusing anecdote in connection with the incident: Lieutenant James R. Ray, leader of the 1st

Platoon, Company F, had carefully briefed his unit

prior to the landing on the fact that the Japanese

At 1300, in another of their uncoordinated

thrusts, three tanks of the 4th Company struck

Companies A and G, 6th Marines. (adjacent

flank companies-of the 1st and 2d Battalions),

and caused a flurry of excitement. The terrain in the area was open and flat enough for

tank movement, but occasional low, marshy

spots somewhat restricted maneuver. The

bazookamen of the two Marine companies went

to work: two tanks were destroyed before they

could penetrate the front lines; the remaining

one penetrated to within 75 yards of the 6th

Marines' command post where it, too, was

destroyed.53

In the zone of the 8th Marines, the situation

on the left was still progressing satisfactorily,

and good contact existed with the 6th Marines.

On the right, however, the 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, was still encountering tough resistance in its move toward Afetna Point. By late

afternoon, 14 medium tanks of Company A,

2d Tank Battalion, had added their bulk and

firepower to the push toward Afetna Point.

The area was a maze of pillboxes, open

trenches, and antiboat-antitank installations

which had to be systematically neutralized—

and at a great cost in personnel. Slow as the

movement was, it was all forward."

Brigadier General Merritt A. Edson,55 aswould likely throw everything—"including the kitchen

sink"—at the Marines. Ray stressed the importance

of establishing a good defensive position after seizure

of the 0-1 line so that an enemy thrust from Garapan

could be stopped. When the . peculiarly-designed

Japanese tanks actually appeared—looking, indeed,

like an overgrown piece of plumbing—PFC Nestor

Sotelo of the 1st Platoon raised his head and shouted:

"Pass the word to Mr. Ray that the Japs have arrived from Garapan with, the kitchen sink." Fisher.

53 6th Mar Report, 2. Marine Corps Gazette, Oct44,

"Saipan Tank Battle," Maj J. A. Donovan, Jr., hereinafter cited as Saipan Tank Battle. Interview with

Maj Donovan on 11Jan49. Fisher.

54 2d Mar Div Report, Section V, 4.

55 General Edson, Congressional Medal of Honor

winner at Guadalcanal and one of the most eminent

Marines in World War II, established a pattern on

D-Day which he faithfully followed throughout the

operation: get to that part of the division front where

the action was most critical and offer advice, inspiration or even active leadership as required.

65
_

sistant commander of the 2d Division, came

ashore in the early afternoon and established

the advance command post on the right of

Beach Green 1. This site, nothing more than

an abandoned Japanese trenchwork, had been

occupied by the 8th Marines' headquarters,

which moved farther forward after the arrival

of Edson's group. General Watson followed

at about 1800 with a detachment from division

headquarters, landing on Beach Red 2. The

command post was then established on the

extreme south flank of Beach Red 2 with local

security provided by the Division Reconnaissance Company.

Soon after the staff settled in this installation, however, heavy mortar and artillery fire

rained down, interfering with efficient functioning. General Watson then decided to move

northward and inland across the coastal road

into a grove of trees behind the juncture of

Beaches Red 1 and 2. In General Watson's

words:

"When I had arrived at the decision to move, the

sun had already set; the distant night was alive with

fires, and shelling from enemy artillery and mortars

was unremitting. I directed Brigadier General Edson

and his small control group to remain behind until our

new command post could be established. The rest of our

headquarters group moved northward along the beach,

then struck inland across the open beach road and,

moving in the shadows of the road, finally reached

the wooded area which had been selected for the new

command post. My staff immediately set about establishing our command post. We were delighted to find

trenches and shelters already dug in the woods by

the Japanese. Our joy was soon dispelled, however,

when we discovered these trenches and shelters not

only contained dead Japanese who had to be moved,

• but dynamite and other high explosives. The dangerous materials were moved out during the night

and early morning and the area served as an excellent

divisional command post for several days thereafter,

although, initially, it was located only a few yards

behind our own front lines.56

One other minor disadvantage of the installation, initially, was the presence of the firing

batteries of the 10th Marines nearby. This was

a disadvantage which could not be avoided on

the shallow beachhead of D-Day, but, nevertheless, one which did not lend to the comfort of

the division staff.

56 Watson.

10TH MARINES' 75MM PACK HOWITZERS LAND

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 10th Marines

(75mm pack howitzers), landed late in the day

and assumed positions prior to darkness: Lieutenant Colonel Presley M. Rixey's 1st Battalion

on the eastern edge of a small wood 50 to 150

yards inland from Beach Red 2, and Lieutenant

Colonel George R. E. Shell's 2d Battalion about

400 yards inland from Green 1 near the northern end of the Charm Kama airstrip. After

executing the ship-to-shore movement without

loss of weapons and few casualties (2 killed,

5 wounded), Rixey's battalion moved on foot

through a small wooded area, apparently unobserved. No Japanese artillery fire was received while going into position or immediately

thereafter. The battalion had its 75's firing in

support of the 6th Marines at about dark and

maintained this support throughout the night.

Shell's battalion crossed the naked Charan

Kanoa airstrip enroute to firing position, and,

unfortunately, the movement did not go unnoticed. A Japanese observer, located on one of

the heights which backed all western beaches,

carefully chartered the position. After dark,

soon after the unit fired its first rounds in support of the 8th Marines, Japanese counterbattery fire thundered down, Battery F bearing

the brunt. Despite the excellent coverage

achieved by the Japanese, however, no .howitzers were destroyed.

Colonel Raphael Griffin, regimental commander of the 10th Marines, landed with the

2d Division command group at 1730 and established his command post just inland from

Beach Red 2, in proximity to the 2d Division

command post. No other elements of the 10th

Marines were landed during D-Day.57

2D AND 24TH MARINES LAND

After participating in the Tanapag demonstration, the 2d and 24th Marines awaited the

word to land. Orders came at 1104 for Colonel

Franklin A. Hart's 24th Marines, and by late

afternoon the regiment had completed landing

and proceeded to assembly areas. The 1st and

2d Battalions beached on Blue 1 after, coming

through Charan Kanoa channel in LCVP's ;

5710th Marines Report, 2-3. Interview with Col P. M.

Rixey, 23Feb49, hereinafter cited as Rixey.
the 3d Battalion used LVT's to cross the reef

and land on Yellow 1.

On reaching shore, Lieutenant Colonel Maynard C. Schultz' 1st Battalion moved to an

assembly area about 400 yards south of Charan

Kanoa. Some cover from flat trajectory fire

was afforded by the railroad embankment, but

otherwise the open terrain was devoid of cover

or concealment. Companies A and B were committed on the right of the 2d Battalion, 23d

Marines, to strengthen the tenuous connection

between that unit and the 2d Battalion, 25th

Marines, rapid progress of which had carried

it from 600 to 800 yards ahead.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Rothwell's 2d

Battalion, 24th Marines, moved from its point

of landing on Beach Blue 1 to an assembly area

southwest of Charan Kamm. During the move

along the beach and after arrival in the partlyconcealed assembly area, the battalion suffered

75 casualties from Japanese artillery fire. Intermittent harassing fires continued upon the

unit throughout the night.

Two of the LVT's carrying the 3d Battalion

overturned in the heavy surf, causing heavy

casualties. Orders to the battalion had directed

that it move to an assembly area in LVT's

prior to debarkation. Once the unit reached

the beach, however, the deluge of hostile artillery fire made the scheme unfeasible. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandergrift, Jr.,

therefore, deployed his battalion and moved it

on foot to an assembly area some 700 yards inland from Yellow 1, near a fork in the railroad tracks. The men had no more than taken

entrenching tools in hand when a barrage of

well-directed Japanese artillery fire engulfed

them. After the day's casualties were totalled,

it was discovered that the unit had suffered

heavily, though it had yet to enter the front

line fighting: 25 killed, 72 wounded, 39 missing (mostly those lost on board the overturned

LVT's). Other battalions had suffered more

heavily, but the real significance of these

figures lies in the fact that the 3d Battalion did

not arrive on the beach until 1727.58

58 The foregoing account of the 24th Marines' landing is a synthesis of the following sources: 24th Mar

Report, 18; Reports of 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions, 24th

Marines (page 1 of all reports).

Colonel Walter J. Stuart's 2d Marines boated

and proceeded to the control vessel at about

1400; two hours later came orders to land in

column of battalions on Beach Red 2. Lieutenant Colonel Arnold F. Johnston's 3d Battalion, and a portion of Lieutenant Colonel

Richard C. Nutting's 2d Battalion (Company

F and a headquarters echelon) were ashore by

1900, when orders were issued that no more

LCVP-LVT transfers would be made and no

more troops landed that night. Men of the 2d

Marines ashore were attached to the 6th Marines, with Johnston's 3d Battalion taking positions on the division left flank in support of

the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, and Nutting's

2d Battalion elements digging-in just north of

Charan Kanoa airstrip.59

It had been planned to land troops and supplies throughout the night, but this became impossible due to the heavy seas in the transfer

area. As early as 1730, one of the LVT's carrying part of the 2d Division headquarters almost swamped in the huge waves which had

commenced to run inland across the reef."

DARKNESS D-DAY

Because of the concentrated mortar and artillery fire which had struck his troops throughout the day, the commander of the 23d Marines

(Colonel Jones) estimated that the light forces

on the 0-1 line (consisting of about one-half of

Companies K and L of the 34 Battalion and

only about one composite platoon from the 2d

Battalion) would be incapable of holding there

for the night without being virtually annihilated. In addition, the regimental commander

felt that "pulling back would allow our artillery and air to bring fire on the Jap batteries

a short distance inland, better contact could be

obtained on the right, and the exposed left

flank could be better protected."

Dillon's 2d Battalion and Cosgrove's 3d Battalion were therefore ordered to establish a defense line generally 800 yards west of 0-1 for

the night. This involved a withdrawal under

cover of darkness of the meager forces on 0-1.

59 2d Mar Report, 1-2. Interview with MO M. P.

Ryan, 3Mar49, hereinafter cited as M. P. Ryan.

60 Watson.

67
2D MARINES, after returning from a demonstration at Tanapag, wait in LCVP's for transfer to amphibian tractors

in which to move ashore. Only about one-half of the regiment got ashore on D-Day, the rest being held up by

heavy seas which developed in the late afternoon.

The decision to pull back after nightfall, rather

than in the daytime, was a wise one; no casualties were incurred during this phase of the operation. The 81mm mortar platoon of the 3d

Battalion, 23d Marines, undergoing a particularly severe shelling at the time of withdrawal,

abandoned its mortars near Mt. Fina Susu.

Peculiarly enough, these mortars were found

intact and undamaged when the 23d Marines

returned to the area several days later.

Terrain for the 23d Marines' night defense

was flat, open and possessing few features

which would hide infiltrating Japanese. "The

fields of fire were excellent," the 2d Battalion

commander later pointed out, "but there was

nothing to fire at."

Haas' 1st Battalion was ordered to relieve

the 3d Battalion, the latter reverting to reserve

with the mission of protecting the exposed left

flank. The 2d Battalion patrolled Charan

68

Kanoa throughout the night to protect against

Japanese attack or infiltration from the left

(north) rear. Concern about the 23d Marines'

left flank was natural enough, since it was apparent that the "no man's land" between divisions could easily become a direct, nonstop

chute to the beach for the Japanese.61

Colonel Batchelder's 25th Marines, after a

discouraging start, inched forward. By 1400,

some elements of the 2d Battalion had reached

the 0-1 line; but it was not until 1700 that the

entire regiment was on the objective. The extreme right flank of the 0-1 line, which included a portion of Agingan Point, remained

in Japanese hands and was not secured until

the following morning, but in the remainder of

the sector the objective had been seized. At this

point, units were ordered to prepare defenses

61 23d Mar Report, 84. 2d Bn, 28 Mar Report, 1-2.

Ba, 28d Mar Report, 1. Treitel. Dillon. L. R. Jones.
and gird themselves for whatever might come.°

D-Day had been expensive, both in personnel

and in materiel. Scores of minor wounds were

never reported (and, therefore, escape the statistics) ; however, deaths and wounds serious

enough to warrant more than "on-the-spot" attention brought the total casualties to over

2,000.63' Of these, the bulk had resulted from

Japanese artillery and mortar fire, the remainder .from machine-gun and rifle fire or

close-in bayonet and saber fighting on the

beaches.

Evacuation of casualties on D-Day was by

means of LVT's as far as the reef's edge, where

wounded were transferred to LCVP's or

LCM's; thereafter, about 60 per cent were

taken directly to transports and about 40 per

cent to the three hospital LST's. This latter

method proved very unsatisfactory, inasmuch

as the LST's, after receiving casualties, had to

transfer them to transports. This proved a

hardship on the injured." Considerable difficulty was experienced on D-Day and D-plus 1

owing to a moderate ground swell. Casualties

could not be loaded or unloaded at the ramp of

LST's as planned but had to be hoisted over

the side. On one LST, Seabees (Naval Construction Battalion personnel) rendered valuable service by hoisting stretchers with "cherry

pickers" 65 loaded on the deck. The first casualties were received on board the LST's about

1040; and, in less than two hours, two LST's

had over 200 casualties on board, and the third

62 25th Mar Report, 3.

63 The exact number is as elusive to the historian as

it was to personnel officers at the time. Units busy

fighting for their lives had no opportunity to keep

accurate casualty statistics. Keeping records in the

early stages of an amphibious attack was rendered

even more difficult by the fact that many men, because

of the confusion and excitement, found themselves

fighting with organizations other than their own. Also,

there was the added problem of determining how

many men were wounded on D-Day but who remained

in the tight for a day, or several days, before turning

in for treatment or hospitalization.

64 TF 56 G-4 Report, 26.

68 The "cherry-picker," often used to lift heavy objects from the ground onto a truck, is a tractor

equipped with an overhead crane.

was filled with its maximum load soon after.66

Initial supply was accomplished by LVT's

and ducks moving over the reef. Requests for

these deliveries came from commanders on the

beach directly to their representatives on board

control vessels. Helpful in solving the critical

problems of early supply was the preloading

of LVT's of the second, third, and fourth waves

with standard loads of water, grenades, mortar

and small arms ammunition. These "pre-loads"

were dumped at convenient points inland.

Further, two LVT's per battalion were carried

on transports or cargo ships, loaded with water,

food, ammunition and critical medical items to

assist in solving supply problems.67 -

In the early afternoon of D-Day, shore party

teams began to function ashore and initial supplies began flowing over the beaches. Throughout the planning and execution of the operation, close coordination was maintained between Beach and Shore Parties. This excellent spirit of cooperation paid dividends.

During D-Day and D-plus 1, very little

cargo-handling equipment was landed owing

to the nature of the beaches and the character

of the resistance. The Shore Party was handicapped during the early stages by the heavy

mortar and artillery fire on the. beaches and,

later, by the need for transporting supplies

relatively long distances inland to Marines at

the front."

As on D-minus 1, when California and

Braine were hit, fire support ships were receiving occasional answering rounds from the

enemy ashore. Battleship Tennessee was hit by

four 4.7-inch projectiles from a battery located

on Tinian, which killed six and wounded 26

men. Tennessee, in addition to minor structural damage, had a 5-inch 38 mount disabled

by the rounds.°

At dusk, while retiring to the westward of

Saipan for the night, Carrier Support Group

One (TG 52.14) was unsuccessfully attacked

66 COMINCH P-007, 5-19.

67 2d Mar Div Report, Section II, 2; Section V, 4.

NTLIP G-4 Report, Part II, 1.

68 COMINCH P-007, 4-24.

69 TF 51 Report, 5. Task Unit 52.17.1 Report, 24.

69
DEBRIS ON THE BEACH. Picture shows several LVT(A)'s knocked out in the early stages of the battle, testifying to

the strength of enemy defense even after naval bombardment.

by a "large formation" of Japanese aircraft.

While the U. S. task group suffered no damage,

carrier-based U. S. fighters accounted for three

sure kills and one probable (types not known),

while ships' gunfire knocked down two light

bombers."

Serving as eyes for the Northern Troops and

Landing Force and both Marine divisions were

air observers, operating in carrier-based planes

(TBM's). On station from dawn to dusk, these

planes constantly performed missions of observation and, on at least one occasion, participated in a ground strike against a critical target. Air observers assisted the Commander Support Aircraft by reporting front line positions,

70 ill' 51 Report, 6 and Annex 1.

70

discovery of new targets and evaluation of air

strikes."

By darkness of D-Day, two facts were clear:

first, the landing had been successful; and second, a long hard fight was in prospect.

The two divisions were established ashore on

a 10,000 yard front about 1,500 yards deep,

with almost half of the planned beachhead secured. Everywhere the main problem was to

organize scattered units, •tie in flanks, and

await the expected counterattacks. Since contact had not been established between divisions,

it was necessary for both to give careful attention to their respective flanks.

The 2d Division anchored both flanks on the

COMINCH P-007, 2-4.
Agingan

Point

RD 7093

X X

2

Afetna

Point

511, Special

Bose Force

; Mt

Tapotchau

Mt Tipo

Pole

Hill

410

2

XX

Mt , "--„4

—

\

, Find l is 13 mi,

Sulu

`31111110

i

FA

■. 

4

25,/

ASLITO

AIRFIELD

Not utan

Point

( GEN \

RES /

9

Kagmon

Peninsula

MAGICIENNE BAY

POSITIONS AT CLOSE

OF D-DAY

2000 4000 Yds

MAP 10
beach itself, left near a coral excavation pit

about one mile south of Garapan, right near

the middle of Afetna Point. The 4th Division

had tied its right into the beach just south of

Agingan Point (although a portion of the

point remained in Japanese hands) and disposed the 3i1 Battalion, 23d Marines, to protect

the exposed left flank. The southern half of

Afetna Point, between the two divisions, remained unconquered. (See Map 10.)

The Marines' positions were—all things considered—quite good, but the enemy's were much

• better. The dominating ridgeline, which ran

parallel to the western beaches, allowed the

Japanese to observe the Marines digging in and

to place fires where they pleased. That these

fires did not exact even heavier casualties than

they did is directly attributatale to the inability

of the enemy to mass artillery fires. Further,

the Marines, convinced of the need for deep

foxholes, lost no time burrowing into the

4 sandy loam or occupying empty Japanese positions and antitank ditches."

A NOISY AND RESTLESS NIGHT

As expected, the enemy launched a number

of counterattacks at various points throughout

the night. In the center of the 8th Marines'

zone, several small attacks were repulsed with

no great difficulty. These enemy thrusts, occurring at about hourly intervals, came from

the swamp and struck the 1st and 3d Battalions, 8th Marines. These two battalions, enjoying excellent fields of fire from their positions on the west edge of the swamp, stopped

each Japanese incursion with small-arms and

mortar fire. Also helpful were the 75mm pack

howitzer fires of the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines.

At no time was there more than a platoon of

Japanese infantry committed to a single counterattack, and at no time was there a question

of the outcome. These Japanese swamp inhabitants, probably members of Colonel

Ogawa's 136th Infantry Regiment, were not in

the swamp by choice; the impetus of the Marine landings had driven them there from their

beach positions. Theirs was an attempt to

comply with General Saito's policy to counter72 NTLF Report, 14.

attack during the night and "demolish the

enemy landing units at the water's edge." 73

Shortly before dusk, men of Companies F

and I, along the left of the 6th Marines' lines,

observed large groups of Japanese streaming

down from the hills onto the coastal flats well

to the north of the regiment's lines. This activity, portending a sleepless night, was an

ideal target for artillery or naval gunfire. Here,

however, complicating factors were presented;

the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines (assigned to

support the 6th Marines), was firing another

mission ;74 the two naval gunfire spotters who

should have been situated in the area were

both casualties, and no replacements were

present; the unit's organic mortars, though

available, were not well suited to firing on an

area target of this nature. Eventually, after

the Marines relayed the request through the 2d

Battalion command post and after the Japanese had completed their descent to .the coastal

plain, the California fired several salvos along

the beach in front of the left flank. The ominous significance of the movement from the

hills had prompted this fire.

A precaution, taken by the 2d Battalion, 6th

Marines, later proved wise: a strongpoint was

established on a small hummock about 75 yards

forward of the lines, covering an area masked

to front line fires and, therefore, a favorable

route of approach for the enemy. When the

Japanese did, in fact, attempt to use this area,

they met withering fire from the Marine

strongpoint.

The first attack against the left flank took

place at about 2200. Striking along the coast

road against Companies F and I, this effort

was in the nature of a probing, or "feeler," attack—designed to locate a weak spot for future

exploitation. None was located, however, and

the Japanese withdrew. Probably no more than

a company was committed to this initial thrust.

The action for the remainder of the night was

almost continuous, with only occasional and

73 Gunter.

74It is pertinent to note that all of the missions

fired by the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, during the

first four days were classified by the calling observers

as "urgent." Best.

71
welcome lulls in the fighting; all hands were

aware that Japanese lurked in the shadows,

preparing for further attempts. A small wood,

north of the Marine lines, became the enemy assembly area and "nerve center" for the night's

activities. Unfortunately, this fact was not

known by the Marines until later. It is regrettable that fires of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, were not directed into this point.

At 0300, after a series of reconnaissance-inforce actions by the enemy, the final sustained

effort of the night began. A Japanese bugler 75

sounded a loud, clear call on the tense night air,

and with a waving of flags, loud screams, and a

brandishing of swords, the attack was launched:

Added to the din were the shouts of the 6th Marines for "flares." Illumination shells, fired

by the three destroyers, Halsey Powell, GoghZan and Monssen of Task Unit 52.17.3 began

to burst over the area, clearly revealing the

Japanese attackers. Men of Companies F and

I opened with accurate, devastating fire. California joined with a tornado of salvos in front

of the Marine lines. The Japanese, stripped

by the illumination of the advantage afforded

by their superior knowledge of the terrain (so

helpful in night fighting), dropped before the

Marines' fusillade. As Japanese fell, others

replaced them in the determined onslaught.

At one point in the fighting (shortly after

0300), it was feared that the enemy had effected

a penetration of Company I, along the coastal

road. To contain this Japanese prong, Colonel

Riseley shifted one company of the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines (Company L), into the area.

The light of morning, however, revealed that no

penetration had been made and that Company

L had, in effect, formed a secondary line.

By 0545, the Japanese pressure reached a

peak; two Marine 37mm guns near the beach

were knocked out and their crews forced back.

Although the main positions held, a false report reached the 6th Marines' command post to

the effect that Company F's lines along the

beach had been forced back about 50 yards.

This erroneous report, probably fostered by

the withdrawal of the two 37mm crews and the

infiltration of small enemy groups to the regimental command post, had no basis in fact.

Five medium tanks from Company B, 2d Tank

Battalion, proved decisive at this juncture.

These machines announced their arrival by

concentrating their cannon and machine guns

against the Japanese. Under the fusillade, the

enemy effort withered and died. As remnants

of the battered force fell back, a blanket of

fires from battleship • California, destroyers

Phelps and Monssen, and Lieutenant Colonel

Rixey's 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, covered

them.

Welcome daylight of 16 June revealed a

battlefield littered with about 700 enemy dead.

Total Japanese troops committed to the night's

action was approximately one battalion. Although unit identification of these dead is not

indicated in existing records, elements of

Colonel Suzuki's 135th Infantry were located

on the 6th Marines' front on the following day,

and it is therefore deduced that the battalion

in question was from this regiment.

The drain on the supply of ships' star shells

had been considerable; yet the Marines desired

even more. As long as the enemy could be seen,

he could be stopped. Captain Harry B. Jarrett, USN, the commander of the task unit

which supplied the night's illumination, later

commented on the situation:

Definitely, destroyers were not originally supplied

with enough star shells. The first counterattack below'

GaraPan found the Marines asking for star shells

rather steadily, and it was depressing to hear them

begging fqr more stars when there were none available.

The Japanese counterattack had failed, and

most of the evidence of that failure lay

crumpled on the plain north of the Marines'

lines. Not all, however; with the coming of

daylight, it was discovered that several small

harassing and infiltrating groups had penetrated to rear areas. Here the intruders set

about a program of causing as much trouble

as possible. Mopping-up patrols from the 6th

Marines' scout-sniper platoon immediately set

about the task of finding and eliminating the

enemy groups."

76 The bugle, riddled with bullet holes, was found 76 Fisher. North. 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 1.

by Marines the following day. Task Unit 52.17.3 Report, 3. 6th Mar eport, 3-4.

72
The pattern was similar in the 4th Marine

Division zone. Local attacks were unsuccessfully launched against the 25th Marines' center

at 0330 and again at 0430, the latter attack

more determined than the first and preceded by

an artillery and mortar preparation. Whether

by coincidence or plan, the 0430 thrust followed

on the heels of the last round of preparatory

fires. This was the principal hint that the attack was 'coordinated and not merely the result

of aggressive resourcefulness on the part of

subordinate Japanese commanders. In addition, however, an old—yet effective—ruse was

employed in the second attack: Japanese soldiers used a large body of civilians, including

women and children, to shield their approach

to the Marine lines. Because of this trick, Marines held their fire until an almost criticallylate moment.

From this episode emerged an interesting

story regarding the use of artillery. A forward

observer, 1st Lieutenant James V. Walker, of

the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines, was with Company C, 25th Marines, at the time of the action.

Like other Marines in the vicinity, Walker

thought that the people advancing towards the

lines were only civilians who desired to surrender. When the true status of the advancing

body was determined, Walker called in the

75mm fires of the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines.

At the very crisis of the battle, as the enemy

pressed virtually into the Marine lines, the 1st

Battalion, 14th Marines, notified Walker that

it was out of ammunition and that it was turning the mission over to the 3d Battalion, 14th

Marines. The latter unit had tracked every

shift of the 1st Battalion and, without adjustment, hesitation or lull, brought its fire crashing into the heart of the enemy force. The

extra punch of the 3d Battalion's 105mm

howitzers, as compared to the 1st Battalion's

75mm pack howitzers, broke the Japanese attack, and the fight was won.77

Another circumstance complicating the situation: just before the 0430 attack, an enemy

artillery shell hit one of the 75mm half-tracks

(in position near Company C, 25th Marines),

causing the vehicle to burst into flames. The

77 Ka rch.

8895900—50-6

brightness of the fire silhouetted the Marines

to Japanese observers who quickly directed artillery fire into the area. To escape this situation and also to dodge the burning half-track's

exploding shells, Company C withdrew about

200 yards. At dawn of 16 June, the original positions were regained.

In addition to the support rendered by artillery, 37mm guns and 75mm half-tracks of the

25th Marines' Regimental Weapons Company

figured prominently in the repulse. Captain

Thomas E. Clarke, commander of Company C,

gave the opinion that, had the half-tracks not

been present, the Japanese would have penetrated the lines."

Throughout the night, Japanese artillery

fire swept and raked ,the beach from one end to

the other. The 23d Marines, while not experiencing a concentrated counterattack until early

morning, had to contend with unceasing infiltration attempts by the Japanese. Utilizing

the unoccupied slot between divisions, small

enemy groups prodded unsuccessfully at the

left flank throughout the night. Patrols sent

out by the 23d Marines failed to establish contact with the 8th Marines to the north. Scattered individual Japanese who did pierce the

tight security of the left flank were mopped

up by units in the rear, principally Company

K, and elements of the Beach and Shore

Parties.

In regard to the latter's activities, the 23d

Marines' commander has written: "The left

side of these [Blue] beaches was a hot bed, but

these troops fought and worked and did a good

job. Credit must be given here to the colored

Army units forming part of the Shore

Party. . . ." 79

At approximately 0530, about 200 Japanese

moved from Lake Susupe through the "noman's land" between divisions and struck for

the Charan Kanoa pier. Lieutenant Colonel

Cosgrove's 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, charged

with the mission of preventing just such a

move, proved equal to its assignment by stop78 j st Battalion, 25th Marines Report, 7, hereinafter

cited as 1st Bn, 25th Mar Report. Mee.

°L. R. Jones.

73
ping and destroying nearly the entire enemy

force. Again, personnel of the Beach and Shore

Parties in the vicinity of Beach Blue 1 joined

in the defense of the pier and beach. Those

Japanese successful in infiltrating the flank

were mopped up in the morning by the same

units that had dealt with them during the

night."

It was not a night of rest and relaxation.

REPORTS—IMPENDING NAVAL ACTION

Throughout the day, higher echelons—including the staffs of General Holland Smith

and Admiral Turner—had kept abreast of the

situation ashore. Their conception of the attack's progress was necessarily drawn from reports of the divisions on the ground and the

air observers overhead. From a ship thousands

of yards offshore, it was impossible to get more

than a remote picture of what was taking place

—like attempting to judge the temperature of

a, wintry day from inside a heated house.

Shining through the miasma of early, incomplete reports, however, was the indisputable fact that both Marine divisions had

carved out shallow beachheads which, in each

case, bulged in the center and receded on either

flank. A difficult ship-to-shore problem had

been solved, causing Admiral Turner later to

observe: "The Saipan landing . . . was much

the most difficult of any I personally witnessed

during the war. The men who made it, Navy

or Marines, were, on the whole, better organized and better trained than for any other landing. They did magnificently.,/ 81

By the close of D-Day, all three infantry

regiments of the 4th Division were ashore, as

well as the artillery and a large portion of the

division's tanks. The 2d Division had about

two and a half infantry regiments, two of its

five artillery battalions, and the majority of its

tanks ashore. A disconcerting gap between the

two divisions existed, but both had taken positive action to cover it. The flow of supplies

ashore was somewhat less than normal owing

to a moderate ground swell which arose in the

afternoon and later prevented night unloading.

8023d Mar Report, 35. Treitel.

81 Turner.

74

In addition, handling of supplies on the

beaches was materially hampered by enemy

mortar and artillery fire. While the advance

had not proceeded as rapidly as hoped, sufficient space had been seized for the efficient employment of supporting weapons. In •short,

there was no cause to doubt the eventual outcome.

Many important gains had been made which

were not visible at the moment. For example,

the Marines, as yet, could not fully appreciate

how much damage had been done to the

enemy's communications (principally by naval

shelling) and how much difficulty Japanese

commanders were experiencing in controlling

their troops.

On the night of D-Day, Admiral Spruance

received two submarine reports which added

up to the disturbing indication that the Japanese Fleet, for the first time since Guadalcanal,

was coming out to do battle. Spruance's eyesunder-the-sea had obtained two fixes on a large

force of enemy carriers, battleships, cruisers

and destroyers moving from their anchorage

at Tawi Tawi (Southern Philippines) in the

direction of the Marianas and at such speed

that they could attack by D-plus 2. Startling

news, pregnant with possibilities. Should the

attack on Guam, which had been scheduled for

18 June (D-plus 3), be delayed on the basis of

these reports? Spruance would "sleep" on the

situation (loose term—he would be awake all

night) and hold a conference with principal

commanders the following morning.82

Actually, this development was no surprise.

Since the initiation of planning, the possibility

—even probability—of the Japanese Fleet

coming out to do battle had been frequently

discussed. So, while the situation was serious,

it in no sense caught the U. S. Navy unprepared. In regard to this, Admiral Turner has

written:

Before Spruance and I left Pearl Harbor, we had

thoroughly canvassed • the possible situations that

might occur in case the Japanese Fleet should attack.

It was, of course, impracticable and unwise to try to

provide for all of the various situations by many

separate plans. Therefore, both of us issued schematic,

flexible general plans that could be implemented as

825th Fleet Initial Report, 3.
desired by a few simple dispatches. We were in full

agreement as to what to do. Fortunately, when the

time came, the easiest situation of all developed (early

attack from one direction while we were still committed to a single landing).83

Characteristically, Japanese commanders at

Saipan were sending optimistic reports to

Tokyo. They had observed the activities on Dminus 1 and judged correctly that the Americans would land on the Charan Kanoa beaches.

At 2030 on 14 June, an unidentified Japanese

commander sent a message to "all units concerned" which said:

The units are prepared for the enemy landing;

morale' is high and we are in complete readiness.

Although losses, etc. (from American bombardment),

are being investigated, it is expected that they are

very slight.

At 0430 the morning of D-Day, Major General Keiji Iketa (chief of staff, 31st Japanese

Army) reported that over 100 enemy ships

could be observed in the area west of Saipan,

but "Morale is high. We are waiting." Later,

in a document titled "Lessons derived from the

situation before and after opening of enemy

landings," he indicated a low regard for our HHour preparation:

They did not carry out a large scale shelling and

bombing against the positions on the landing beach

just prior to landing. When they came to the landing . . . our basic positions were completely sound."

General Iketa's evaluation of U. S. preparatory

fires is of interest principally because it was

contradicted time and again by the testimony

of other Japanese on Saipan (see page 248).

Even though Japanase commanders may

have been peering through rose-colored glasses,

the defenders' morale was high, and they were

far from giving up their original plans to "demolish the enemy during the night at the

waters' edge."

Prior to 12 June, wishful thinking had

caused the Japanese to prophesy that the next

U. S. move would be against the Palaus or an

objective farther south, an area well suited to

defense by the coordinated effolts of the Combined Fleet. Even Mitscher's Task Force 58

strike against the Marianas on 11 June shed

83 Turner.

84 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 1-4.

little light on U. S. intentions; the move could

conceivably have been nothing more than a diversion for another operation. At any rate,

until the fog of mystery had lifted, there was

no cause to alter dispositions. Continuing raids

by Mitscher's force, plus the 14 June advent of

mine sweepers and underwater demolition

teams, finally convinced the Japanese of the

- true U. S. intentions.

News of the Saipan landing was stunning,

indeed. But, then, it was thought to be only a

matter of time until powerful Japanese forces

would destroy the intruders by coordinated activities of the base air forces (from Two Jima,

Guam, Palau, Yap and Woleai) and the fleet

(moving from Tawi Tawi anchorage). Admiral Toyoda, commander in chief of the Combined' Fleet, had no illusions about the effect

that U. S. seizure of the Marianas would produce on the home islands. His was the responsibility of decisively defeating the U. S.

Task Force; and, if he had doubts as to the

eventual outcome, these were not revealed by

the strenuous line of action which he pursued.85

Chafing at the bit on Guam was Second

Lieutenant Rai Imanishi, who said in his diary

of 15 June :

The Combined Fleet is about to engage the enemy

in decisive combat . . . in the Marianas sector. The

enemy has already begun landing on Saipan. Truly,

we are on the threshold of momentous occurrences.

Now is the time for me to offer my life for the great

cause and be a barrier against the enemy advancing

in the Pacific Ocean.88

The lieutenant would have to wait awhile, but

the opportunity was not to be denied him.

Elsewhere on Guam, an unidentified Japanese soldier of lesser rank, but equal perception,

wrote:

15 June, 1944--. . . the enemy landed on Saipan and

a heavy battle is in progress. The situation of our

forces does not look favorable.87

On Tinian, individual Japanese recognized

that momentous happenings were in the offing.

Disgust and disappointment at the poor showing of their aircraft is evidenced in most of the

diaries. This resentment extended beyond the

85 Campaigns, 210-213.

86 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #10,410.

87Ibid.

75
fact that naval aviators were not fighting the

U. S. planes to the satisfaction of the ground

personnel. An unidentified Japanese noncommissioned officer wrote:

15 June—The naval aviators are robbers.. .. When

they ran off to the mountains, they stole Army provisions, robbed people of their fruits and took cars.88

To a noncommissioned officer (Tokuzo Matsuya) of the 9th Tank Regiment—still in an

assembly area in the Chacha-La,ulau area on

Saipan—things were not so grim:

15 June— . . . one enemy division landed . . . but

was surrounded by our troops. Our plan would seem

to be to annihilate the enemy by morning.89

88 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #11,405. 89 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #10,238;

76
CHAPTER III

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Expansion of the Beachhead

D-PLUS 1-16 JUNE

Dawn of 16 June produced mixed reactions,

depending upon which camp one was in. The

Japanese were sorry to see it because it would

mean that observed air, naval gunfire and artillery would again spread havoc among them;

the Marines were glad to see it—and for precisely the same reason.

The golden opportunity to counterattack the

beachhead in sufficient strength to drive the

Marines into the water had not materialized.

Several efforts had been made, but in all cases

they had been foiled with heavy losses to the

enemy. The night of D-Day was not to see the

last of the Japanese counterattacks, but certainly no more favorable opportunity normally

accrues to the defender than on the first night,

when the attacker is still somewhat disorganized.

Persistent enemy movements along the coast

road from the north throughout the night had

indicated convincingly that Garapan was being used as an assembly area for further counterattacks against our positions. The town had

remained unmolested because of a desire to

conserve the buildings and other facilities for

our later use. Since such a policy was obviously

very helpful to the Japanese, General Watson,

commanding the 2d Division, requested that the

town be bombed, shelled and burned by our

naval forces. This, as will be seen, was later

accomplished.'

1 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 1.

Spruance's Decisions

The previous night had brought Admiral

Spruance news of a movement of the Japanese

Fleet from Philippine waters. On the morning of 16 June, after conferences and careful

consideration of the problem, he reached the

following decisions:

(a) The tentative date for the Guam landing

(18 June) would be cancelled, and the designation of a new date would await a clarification

of the situation. Transports of the Southern

Attack Force would oscillate well to the eastward of Guam.

(b) Certain previously warned cruiser and

destroyer units attached to Admiral Turner's

Joint Expeditionary Force wOuld replenish

ammunition and fuel and join the Fast Carrier

Forces on the 17th.

(c) Unloading at Saipan 'would continue

through daylight of the 17th, and at dark all

transports and LST's not required for immediate unloading would withdraw to the eastward of Saipan and not return the next day.

(d) Transports and LST's needed for immediate unloading, plus small craft and screen,

would remain at Saipan. As required, other

transports and LST's from the group which

retired to the eastward would be returned.

(e) The old battleships, part of the cruisers

and some destroyers of the Joint Expeditionary

Force would cover Saipan from about 25 miles

to the westward during darkness to guard

against the possibility that hostile surface yes77
"MARINER" SEAPLANES afloat off Saipan's west coast. Searches by these planes, to provide warning of Japanese

naval incursions, commenced on 17 June and continued throughout the operation.

sels might evade our fleet. In addition, ships

from this covering group would provide troop

gunfire support as required.

(f) Escort carriers nearby to the eastward

of Saipan would continue to provide air cover

for all ships in the vicinity and to furnish troop

support aircraft; but no support or cover could

be expected from Fast Carrier Task Forces

after 16 June.

(g) Six patrol seaplanes (PBM—"Mariner") would be ordered to arrive at Saipan on

17 June, prepared to make night radar

searches to 600 miles west of the island. This

six-plane squadron (VP-16) would fly out from

Eniwetok and be mothered by the seaplane

tender Ballard.2

Admiral Spruance announced these farreaching decisions at a conference aboard Ad2 Later, this number of seaplanes was gradually increased until five squadrons, based on six seaplane

tenders, were present. The night of 17 June marked

the beginning of such searches from Saipan. TF 51

Report, End A, 6.

78

1

miral Turner's flagship Rocky Mount. As

Spruance prepared to leave the ship to return to his own flagship Indianapolis, General

Holland Smith, who was also embarked in

Rocky Mount, asked him • "Do you think the

Japs will turn tail and run?" "No," Spruance

replied, "not now. They are out after big game.

If they had wanted an easy victory, they would

have disposed of the relatively small force covering MacArthur's operation at Biak (New

Guinea). But the attack on the Marianas is

too great a challenge for the Japanese Navy to

ignore." 3

It is interesting to note that the approach of

the Japanese Fleet did not seriously affect the

supply situation on Saipan, since even the

transports and LST's that retired eastward

were close enough so that they could be sent

back to Saipan as required. Some shortages

did develop, however, as will be seen.4

3 Coral and Brass, 165.

4 TF 51 Report, 6. Interview with Adm H. W. Hill,

20Sep49.
One disappointing result of the transports'

withdrawal was that few cargo vehicles came

ashore during the period. This caused inland

supply and evacuation to be performed- primarily by LVT's, which did a good job but, in

the process, chopped the existing roads into

nearly impassable condition. In addition, the

LVT's themselves suffered considerable deterioration, thereby reducing the combat effectiveness of LVT battalions.5

Though the amount of air support for the

landing force was drastically reduced from 17

to 22 June because of the necessity for redisposing available' forces, naval gunfire support was

reduced very little. Nearly the full number of

fire support vessels requested by the landing

force were supplied day or night.6

It is not the purpose of this narrative to recount the numerous small naval actions in the

waters surrounding Saipan. Suffice it to say

that the surprise thrust into Marianas' waters

had trapped many vulnerable Japanese cargo

ships. Many of these got underway as soon as

the truth was known, hoping to reach a safe

port. Few were successful; U. S. submarines,

aircraft and surface vessels were alert and intercepted and sank most of them. This happy

state of affairs caused Rear Admiral Charles

A. Pownall, USN, Commander Air Pacific, to

comment: "The Marianas operation flushed

more shipping than it had been our fortune

•to contact for a number of months." 7

Even as Spruance implemented his monumental decisions, Marines of the two divisions

were engaged in cementing their toehold. For

the entire landing force this meant pouring

more troops and weapons ashore and pressing

the attack inland. The principal thrust would

be made on the landing force right, in the 4th

Marine Division's zone, while the left of the 2d

Division would hold the pivot and wait for the

outer arc to swing abreast. Further, the 2d

Division left, during its wait, could gird itself

for expected Japanese attacks from the north.

5 Ltr from Col R. J. Straub to CMC, 18Jan50.

• 6 Turner.

ComAirPac Ser 00888, 27Jul44, Analysis of Pacific

Air Operations, Jun44, 12.

Before the 4th Division could throw its roundhouse hook in earnest, it would have to push

farther inland, toward the east coast. .

Enemy artillery and mortars, emplaced on or

behind the spiny ridge line which divides the

island, continued. destructive fires throughout

the day, particularly in the congested beach

areas. Even though numerous artillery and

naval gunfire concentrations and air strikes

were directed against their suspected positions, the Japanese clung persistently to favorable terrain which overlooked the entire beachhead. Time and time again after being

"silenced," enemy shelling would begin anew.8

In both Marine divisions, shore party activities continued. On Beach Red 2, the shore

party team which had landed there on D-Day

had received so many casualties that it was

necessary to send in another team to supplement.it; Generally, however, the supply situation was quite good.5

6th Marines Consolidate;

8th Captures Afetna Point

During 16 June, the 6th Marines (on the

left, pivot flank) held the same general position, consolidating and reorganizing front

lines. In the afternoon, remaining elements of

the regimental weapons company (75mm halftracks and 37rnm guns) came ashore and were

incorporated into defensive plans. Only

sporadic activity (mostly mopping-up of Japanese infiltrators and by-passed groups) occurred in the 6th Marines' zone during the day

and early evening.

Major LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr., now commanded

the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, having replaced

Lieutenant Colonel Murray, who, along with

the executive officer, Major Howard L. Rice,

had been wounded. The 3d Battalion had

changed commanders too: Lieutenant Colonel

Easley, wounded on D-Day, was finally evacuated on the morning of 16 June and replaced

by his executive officer, Major John E.

Rentsch.1°

82d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 1-2.

Ibid. 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 16.

156th Mar Report, 4. Rentsch.

79
Colonel Wallace's 8th Marines, meanwhile,

continued its original mission of clearing

Afetna Point, Beach Green 3, and the area

west of Lake Susupe. This task fell principally

to the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, and, to a

lesser extent, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines

(attached to the 8th Marines). The 1st and 3d

Battalions held their positions of the previous

day and made minor adjustments in their

lines.

Afetna Point, the D-Day headache, proved

much easier on 16 June; most of the point's defenders had either retired from the area during

the night or had expended themselves in the

unsuccessful attack against the 23d Marines'

left flank. The few scattered die hards who remained were mopped up by the 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, or flushed into the flank of the

23d Marines, where they met with a quick end.

By 0950, men of Company G, 8th Marines, had

advanced to the Charan Kanoa pier, marking

the boundary between divisions. The unit then

pushed inland, caught up and established contact with the 4th Division at about 1140. By

early afternoon the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,

had secured its area as far inland as Lake

Susupe. (See Map 11.)

Mopping-up of rear areas continued throughout the day, mainly hampered by well-directed

Japanese mortar and artillery fire. Company

G, ordered into 2d Battalion reserve after completion of its Afetna, Point mission, became a

popular enemy target despite several moves to

avoid the shelling. Since the rounds seemed to

emanate from positions east of Lake Susupe

and since Company G was well concealed from

enemy observers located in that direction, the

conclusion was drawn that the observer must

be behind, and close by, the company. He

could not be found, however. Many days later

a Japanese, proud of his accomplishments, was

dragged from one of the Charan Kanoa sugar

mill smokestacks where he had remained to

direct fire long after Marines had secured the

area.

Suffering the same ratio of losses in battalion

commanders as the 6th Marines, the 8th Marines had effected two changes: Major William

C. Chamberlin now commanded the 2d Battalion, Major Stanley E. Larsen the 3d Bat80

talion. These two former executive officers had

replaced Lieutenant Colonels Crowe and

Miller, both casualties early on D-Day.11

Remainder of 2d Marines Lands

On D-Day, slightly less than half the elements of the 2d Marines (the 3d Battalion, a

2d Battalion headquarters detachment, and

Company F) had arrived ashore. These had

been attached to the 6th Marines. The remainder of the 2d Battalion and the 2d Marines' headquarters group commenced transferring to LVT's at daylight of D-plus 1 and

were completely landed by 1000. Colonel

Walter J. Stuart, commanding the 2d Marines,

assumed command—on General Watson's

order—of a composite group including the 2d

Battalion, 6th Marines, and the 3d Battalion,

2d Marines. These two units were located

along the beach on the division left: the former

on the front lines, the latter just behind in reserve. After taking over command at 1400,

Colonel Stuart ordered the two battalions to

switch positions (because of the fact that the

• 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, had endured the .

brunt of the previous night's counterattacks).

This exchange was accomplished prior to

dark.12

Lieutenant Colonel Wood B. Kyle's 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (still under Northern

Troops and Landing Force control even though

plans to land the unit at Magicienne Buy had

been abandoned), was ordered about noon to

land and report to the 2d Marine Division.

While Kyle was en route to the control vessel, a

message was sent changing his orders to the

effect that he was to land his battalion in the

4th Division zone and pass to the command

of that division. This change had been ordered

because the 4th Division's beaches were receiving less fire and, also, because there was more

room for commitment in that zone of action.

Kyle, however, had no inkling of this change

until he reported to the control vessel. There

he learned of the change regarding beaches

but not of that relative to attachment. (It is

likely that the control vessel received only that

11 8th Mar Report, 1-2.

122d Mar Report, End A, 2.
part of the message dealing with the place of

landing.)

Once ashore, Colonel Kyle reported to General Schmidt, the 4th Division's commander.

The general, also unaware of the NTLF

change, directed Kyle to move his unit to the

north and report to the 2d Division. About

1600, the battalion arrived at the 2d Division

command post and was placed in division reserve. It was not until the 2d Division conveyed the report of Kyle's arrival that the

NTLF staff realized that its change had not

been accomplished. It was decided, however,

that any further movement would be undesirable, and the battalion remained with the 2d

Kyle immediately set about the task of reorganizing and reequipping the unit. The provisional organization of five companies for the

Magicienne Bay landings was no longer justified, and the battalion resumed its conventional

entity.13 As the unit's heavy weapons (81mm

mortars and .30-caliber heavy machine guns)

were still loaded aboard CVE's in accordance

with the original plans, it remained for these

weapons to be parachuted from carrier torpedo

planes (TBF's). The drop, made on the small

strip just inland from the 2d Division beaches,

proved very unsatisfactory because of the low

altitude from which it was made. The result:

almost 100 per cent damage to the equipment.14

• Kyle's unit was placed under a definite

handicap by this turn of events but, in spite of

the difficulties attendant to changing its organization and obtaining heavy weapons, comported itself like the well-trained battalion that

it was.

Artillery Build Up

Since coming ashore on D-Day, the two pack

howitzer battalions of the 10th Marines (1st

and 2d Battalions) had performed excellently

in support of the 6th and 8th Marines. At

13 Three rifle companies and a headquarters company.

14 Kyle. MajGen T. E. Watson's endorsement on lir

from LtCol W. B. Kyle to DirPubInfo, 20Nov48. Interview with Col It. E. Hogaboom, LtCol J. L. Stewart and

LtCol E. W. Durant, Jr., 3Dec48.

about noon on 16 June, Lieutenant Colonel

Kenneth A. Jorgensen, commanding the 4th

Battalion, 10th Marines, landed with his advance party to reconnoiter position areas. Because of heavy surf on the reef, Jorgensen decided to have the DUKW's (carrying 105mm

howitzers) use the Charan Kanoa channel, even

though it was under intermittent artillery and.

mortar fire. At about 1600, the 4th Battalion

successfully made the transit of the channel,

moved laterally to the north within the lagoon,

and landed on Beach Green 3.

This move was followed closely by the 3d

Battalion, 10th Marines (Major William L.

Crouch), which used the same route at 1700.

The 4th Battalion went into position in the

vicinity of the radio station, about 600 yards

inland from the northern end of Green 1, while

the 3d Battalion established itself about 200

yards inland from the southern end of Green 2.

By 1800 all the artillery of both the Marine

divisions, with the exception of the 2d 155mm

Howitzer Battalion (a corps battalion attached to the 10th Marines), was ashore.15

Brigadier General Arthur M. Harper, USA,

Commanding General of the XXIV Corps

Artillery, landed at 1515. He had issued orders

before leaving the ship to advance parties of

artillery groups and battalions to meet him on

shore. A tentative command post was established about 100 yards inland from the southern

edge of Beach Blue 2. Advance parties of the

Army's 419th and 420th Field Artillery Groups,

the 225th and 531st Field Artillery Battalions,

and elements of the Corps Artillery staff reported there before dark.16

The Push to 0-1

In the 4th Marine Division zone, General

Schmidt prepared to push the attack inland

with the main effort in the center. The division

reserve, Colonel Hart's 24th Marines, was ordered to detach one battalion (the . 3d) to reinforce the 25th Marines, on the right, and

another battalion (the 2d) to assemble in rear

of the 23d Marines to protect the division left

TF 56 (1-5 Report, 6. 10th Mar Report, 3.

16 NTLF XXIV Corps Artillery, S-3 Report, 5, hereinafter cited as Corps Arty S-3 Report.

81
flank. The remainder of Colonel Hart's regiment was committed in the center between the

23d and 25th Marines. This shifting about

would take time, so the attack hour was set for

1230.

The 24th Marines suffered a serious loss before it could get committed to action; Lieutenant Colonel Maynard C. Schultz, commanding the 1st Battalion, was killed by a fragment

from a Japanese shell while at the regimental

command post receiving instructions for the

day's attack. Major Robert N. Fricke, the battalion executive officer, took over.17

For the 16 June attack, the 1st, 2d and 3d

Battalions, 14th Marines, were in direct support of the 25th, 23d and 24th Marines respectively; the 4th and 5th Battalions furnished general support. This assignment was

altered many times throughout the compaign

so that each of the five battalions of the 14th

Marines, at one time or another or in one combination or another, was in direct support of

each of the infantry regiments.

While no unit on the beach completely escaped the Japanese artillery and mortar shelling, it appears that in point of concentrated,

sustained pounding, the 5th Battalion, 14th

Marines, suffered the most. The box score, provided by the battalion commander, Lieutenant

Colonel Douglas E. Reeve, tells the story:

By 0430 [16 June] all of Baker Battery's guns had

been knocked out-0500: two guns in Able Battery

knocked out-0545: one gun Charlie Battery knocked

out-0630: other two guns Able Battery knocked out0730: one more gun Charlie Battery knocked out. This

left us two guns operative. We fired them.

When I say "knocked out" I mean just that—trails

blown off, sights blown off, recoil mechanism damaged, etc. By 1000, with the help of division ordnance

and by completely replacing one or two weapons, we

were back in business—full strength-12 guns.

Personnel losses to the battalion during this

period included eight killed and over 50

wounded. No one in the battalion had time or

inclination to count the Japanese shells bursting around him, but the battalion commander

estimated "300 rounds in a 21 hour period

(1200 D-day to 0930 D-plus 1).9/ 18

17 24th Mar Report, 18.

12 Reeve.

82

When word of the 5th Battalion's heavy

losses reached the regimental commander, Colonel Louis G. DeHaven, he informed Reeve that

his unit would not be called upon for fires until a reorganization could be effected. As noted

before, the unit was back to full weapons

strength by 1000.19

Meanwhile, the 4th Battalion, 14th Marines,

had had an unique experience. Shortly after

dawn, personnel of this unit observed a Japanese patrol, numbering about 30 men, moving

toward the beach in route column. Sitting on

top of the 4th Battalion Fire Direction Center,

1st Lieutenant Russell F. Schoenbeck, the

assistant operations officer, adjusted fire on the

enemy group, shouting his corrections after

observing the fall of each volley. The "fire for

effect," delivered at a range of 1800 yards,

caught the enemy patrol squarely. This incident provided one of very few examples

throughout the Pacific war in which artillery

personnel, except forward observers, witnessed

a "fire for effect" on other than direct fire

targets.

The boost to morale this incident created was

short-lived; the Japanese quickly retaliated

with counterbattery fire, which scored a direct

hit on the fourth gun section of Battery M,

killing or wounding all the crew except one

man.2°

The 23rd Regiment's 16 June attack would

place the 1st and 2d Battalions in the assault

and the 3d Battalion in reserve. Concern about

the left flank was somewhat relieved by the

presence of Lieutenant Colonel Roth well's 2d

Battalion, 24th Marines, which had moved in

behind the 23d Marines.21

After reporting to the 25th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Vandegrift's 3d Battalion, 24th

Marines, was ordered to relieve Mustain's battalion (on the division right), which had

endured tough fighting on D-Day and was in

need of reorganization. The relief was accomplished at 1130, Mustain's 1st Battalion reverting to 25th Marines' reserve. Since all

1214th Mar Report, End l A, 2.

20 Ltr from LtCol C. A. Youngdale to CMC, 12Jan50.

21 23d Mar Report, 36.
GUNNERY SERGEANT ROBERT H. McCARD, 4th Tank Battalion,

posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for remaining alone at his disabled tank on 16 June 1944 and firing

upon the enemy in order that men of his crew might

make good their withdrawal.

three companies of the 3d Battalion, 24th

Marines, were needed to cover its broad sector,

one company (B) of the 25th Marines was attached to Vandegrift's unit at 1600.22

It will be recalled that a large portion of the

3d Battalion, 25th Marines, (all of Companies

K and I and a platoon of L) had been attached

to Mustain's unit on D-Day. With the shift of

Mustain's battalion into reserve, 3d Battalion

units were returned to parent control. With his

battalion intact once again, Lieutenant Colonel

Chambers moved it to an assembly area just in

rear of the 0-1 line, near the 25th Marines'

left flank. This area proved something less

than quiet. From the left and rear, enemy riflemen and two mountain guns announced themselves with telling bursts. Further harrassment

was felt from the front—just over the 0-1

ridge line—where four dual-purpose antiaircraft guns were located. These weapons had

originally been emplaced as antiaircraft protection for Aslito Airfield, but the more per221st Bn, 25th Mar Report, 7. 8d Bn, 24 Mar Report, 1-2.

sonal danger occasioned by the Marines close

at hand caused the Japanese gunners to shift

their weapons for ground firing.

Chambers assigned.first priority to the enemy

groups to his rear, Company L and six medium

tanks from Company A, 4th Tank Battalion,

assuming the task of elimination. Their efforts

paid off: five machine guns, two mountain guns

and approximately 60 enemy soldiers were destroyed.

After completing its mop-up task to the rear,

Company L joined with the 2d Battalion, 25th

Marines, which was bending every effort to dislodge the four antiaircraft guns on the eastern

slopes of the 0-1 ridge line. In addition to the

previously-heard-from antiaircraft weapons,

three machine guns in bunkers opened on the

Marines as they attempted to move. Despite

a series of well-coordinated tank-infantry

thrusts and the commitment of another company (K) from the 3d Battalion, the lines

could not advance. The Japanese held. (See

Map 11.)

Principal complication in fighting these particular enemy positions was their loCation,

just over the crest of the ridge, making deliverance of supporting fires extremely risky.

During the night, ,however, mortars of the 2d

and 3d Battalions maintained steady fires, with

the result that most of the enemy positions were

permanently silenced.23

Against rifle and machine-gun fire, originating principally from the Mt. Fina Susu area,

the left and center regiments (23d and 24th)

moved up generally abreast of the stymied

25th Marines. Some contact difficulties were

experienced during the day, necessitating the

commitment of a company from the reserve

2d Battalion, 24th Marines; but, by 1730, the

lines were well tied-in generally along the ridge

line designated 0-1. It had not been an afterriOon of spectacular happenings, merely a

costly, tiresome struggle against a determined

foe. Aslito road, the best artery to 0-1, was

almost a solid column of tanks, supply vehicles

and ambulances. Despite the congestion, however, Japanese artillery did not interdict this

23 Chambers.

83
TOWARD 0-1 RIDGELINE move Marines of the 23d Regiment. The 4th Division G-2 described the ridgeline area as

the "one defensive line worthy of note" in the 4th Division zone of action.

route. As darkness fell, the division dug in

for the night; right flank about 1,000 yards

southeast of Agingan Point, anchored on the

beach; left flank bent back towards Lake

Susupe. The right center of the division front

bulged to within a half mile of Aslito Airfield.24 (See Map 11.)

The Northern Troops and Landing Force

staff was already giving thought to a command post displacement from ship to shore.

The advance party and security detachment

landed at 2030, 16 June, and the following day

established an advance command post at

244th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 18. NTLF G-3

Report, Periodic Report No. 2. Dillon.

84

the battered town of Charan Kanoa.25

27th Division Begins to Land

As noted before, the approach of the Japanese Fleet had forced Admiral Spruance to

his decision to withdraw those transports not

needed for immediate unloading. This demanded a decision from the landing force

commander: should the 27th Division remain

with the retiring transports, or should it be

landed? General Holland Smith's decision to

land the unit was 'governed by two factors:

First, a long, vicious fight was in prospect, and

it was already apparent that more troops

25 NTLF CI-1 Report, 7.
0-1 RIDGELINE Susu) looking back toward Charan Kanoa and the transport area. Until Marines seized this

first dominating ground, the Japanese enjoyed this excellent view.

would be required. Second, was the general's

stated policy regarding reserves: ". . . it is

always better to get them on the beach rather

than have them sitting out at sea on ships.

That is why I put in all the Marine reserves

as soon as possible and then ordered the

• Twenty-seventh ashore." As the first step, the

27th Division was released from Expeditionary

Troops reserve to Northern Troops and Landing Force. Orders to land came soon after.26

Since ships carrying the 27th Division were

cruising some distance from Saipan, it remained for these to move to the anchorage and

commence debarkation. Shortly after noon,

Major General Ralph C. Smith, USA, commanding the 27th Division, received a warning order from NTLF : "Be prepared to land

your unit (less RCT 106) on order upon arrival. Report on board USS Cambria for conference. "27

26 Coral and Brass, 164. TP 56 G-3 Report, 6.

27 27th Infantry Division G-3 Journal, 16.Tun44.

Upon reaching the anchorage (about 1630),

Ralph Smith and his key staff members

boarded the Cambria where they conferred

with Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill and Brigadier General Graves B. Erskine (second-incommand, respectively, for Turner and Holland Smith). At the meeting, Ralph Smith was

informed that 27th Division artillery battalions

were to land as soon as possible to support

Marine divisions already ashore. The leading

regiment (the 165th) would land immediately

and move to the 4th Division's right flank so

that it could join the Marines in the next day's

attack. Remaining 27th Division troops were

to land as rapidly as possible with the exception of the 106th Infantry, which was to remain afloat in Joint Expeditionary Troops

Reserve.28

28 Notes on Operations of the 27th Infantry Division

at Saipan, 15-24 June 1944, MajGen R. C. Smith, hereinafter cited as R. C. Smith.

85
The 165th Infantry (Colonel Gerard W.

Kelley, USA) 20 debarked at dusk and, after a

greatly confused (because of the darkness)

ship-to-shore movement, finally reached the

beach. Here its difficulties did not end; because of the extreme dispersion of boats carrying in troops, a severe challenge to leadership

and discipline was presented. Passing this

test, the 165th's leading battalions (1st and

2d) assembled their separated boatloads and

moved to an area in rear of the 3d Battalion,

24th Marines (on the extreme right flank),

with orders to pass through that unit and extend the Marines' flank the following morning.

Brigadier General Ogden J. Ross, USA,

assistant division commander, landed with the

165th Infantry and proceeded to the command

post of the 4th Marine Division. In General

Ross' words:

. . . I met the Chief of Staff, Colonel Rogers, and he

explained that it would be necessary for the 165th

Infantry to attack at 7 : 30 that same morning. By this

time it was 3 : 30. Elements of the 165th Infantry were

corning ashore. They were being collected on the

beaches, from red to yellow a distance of three miles.

After a discussion with the Chief of Staff, 4th Marine

Division, as to the Line of Departure, I instructed

the regimental commander of the 165th Infantry to

assemble the troops as fast as possible and take them

to the extreme right of the line where they were to

extend the flank of the 4th Marine Division.

Due to the shortness of time, the darkness, the unfamiliarity with the ground, and the fact that the units

of the regiment were being unloaded on various beaches,

without regard to organizational integrity, this was an

exceedingly difficult task. .. .39

Also landed during the night (in accordance

with the landing force's expressed priorities)

were three battalions of the 27th Division's

artillery: the 105th, 106th and 249th Field

Artillery Battalions. These were placed under

operational control of the Corps Artillery.31

The remaining battalion, the 104th, did not

29 Throughout this monograph, all Army officers are

designated "USA."

39 Summary of Operations by 27th Infantry Division

from 16 June to 10 July 1944, BrigGen 0. J. Ross,

13Jul44, hereinafter cited as Ross. 165th Infantry

Operation Report, 2, hereinafter cited as 165th Inf Report.

31- 27th Infantry Division, 0-3 Reports, 16-17 June,

hereinafter cited as 27th Div 0-3 Reports.

86

land at Saipan until 19 June (D-plus 4).32

Night of 16-17 June—Tank Counterattack

The night was reasonably quiet in the 4th

Marine Division zOne with the exception of

several unsuccessful infiltration attempts by

the enemy along the 23rd Marines' front and

the now-familiar Japanese artillery and mortar fire which continued unabated.33

The relative quiet enjoyed by the 4th Division was not the rule, however. In the 2d

Division zone, the night produced a fight of

no mean dimensions, the result of an operation order issued by Lieutenant General Saito,

commanding general of the Japanese 43d

Division.

This order was a masterpiece of confusion,

although, admittedly, translation from Japanese to English has not enhanced its clarity.

• Saito based his plan on the reasonable premise •

that U. S. troops should be attacked before a

firm beachhead could be established. It is apparent, however, that the beachhead was

stronger on the 16th than it had been on the

15th; and, therefore, the attack was already

one day late for maximum effectiveness. In

other words, nothing had developed, from the

Japanese point of view, which would make a

D-plus 1 attack more successful than one on

D-Day. On the contrary, Marine positions

were much better organized by 16 June, more

supporting weapons, supplies, and ammunition

were ashore, and generally the Marine situation had improved. The Japanese, although

probably aware of this fact, had been unable

to mount an offensive—because of extensive

damage to communications—on D-Day.

The objective of the Japanese attack was

modest enough: the Saipan radio station, a

short 400 yards behind the 6th Marines' lines.

This objective, in itself, represented a revision

in Saito's pre-D-Day policy to "destroy the

enemy, during the night, at the water's edge."

Seizure of the radio station area would still

leave 500-600 yards distance to the water. On

the other hand, the general was being completely realistic in his selection, for the objec32 27th Infantry Divfsion Field Order 43, 19 June.

33 28d Mar Report, 36.
tive was easily recognizable and was possible

of attainment by the troops and means available. ,

Principal units involved in the attack were

Colonel Ogawit's 136th Infantry Regiment

( which had borne the brunt of the 2d Division's

assault), Lieutenant Commander Karashima's

1st Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force,

and Colonel Goto's 9th Tank Regiment. Karashima's Special Naval Landing Force would

move down the coast road from the Garapan

area and "cooperate with the tanks to annihilate the enemy's front line and advance

towards Oreai (Char= Kanoa) Airfield." Vice

Admiral Nagumo, 'Commander Central Pacific

Fleet and 5th Base Force, was ordered to command the attack personally.34 The vagueness

of the mission set forth in this order would

seem to indicate that Saito had some doubts

that the Navy was capable of accomplishing

much and, therefore, assigned this unit a nebulous task in the hope that some good would be

done—and surely no harm. The ambiguity is

further emphasized .by this sentence: "The

attack will be made whenever possible." .

To Colonel, Ogawa and Colonel Goto the

order was much more specific and much more

confusing:

The center force [136th Infantry Regiment] will

attack the enemy in the direction of Oreai with its

full force. The tank unit [9th Tank Regiment] will

advance SW of Hill 164.6 35 after the attack unit . . .

has commenced the attack. The Tank Unit will charge

the transmitting station and throw the enemy into disorder just before the penetration of the attack unit

into this sector.

If the two colonels read this order with furrowed brows, it is no wonder.

Available to Colonel Goto for the attack were

the 3d, 4th, 5th, and one-half of the 6th CornThere is no indication that he did, however. In

view of the animosity between the Japanese Army and

Navy, Nagumo might very well have ignored Saito's

order. Little is known of this officer's activities after

D-Day ; he is conspicuous by his absence. It is safe to

say, however, that the Admiral, still basking in the

warmth of his Pearl Harbor fame, was not pleased

with Saito's order.

35 Hill 164.6 (meters) is a small peak that rises above

the north-south ridgeline. A road cuts across the

island to the east coaSt at this point.

panies of the 9th Tank Regiment. (Goto's

1st and 2d Companies, plus the remaining half

of the 6th, were on Guam.) The 4th Company

had been virtually eliminated as a fighting

body on D-Day in its close defense of the

beaches, and only three of its 14 tanks remained

operative. Fourteen tanks from the 3d Company, 14 from the 5th, seven from the 6th, six

from headquarters, and three survivors from

the 4th, brings the total to 44 committed to the

attack.3°

It is interesting to note that General Saito

planned the attack to take place at 1700, possibly with the hope of catching the Marines in

the process of digging in for the night. Sunset

was not until 1849 and darkness at 2009, so it

is obvious that a night attack was not the original scheme. Good reconnaissance, however,

would have told him that men of the 6th

Marines had moved but little during the day

and in most cases were well dug in by 1700.

Moreover, the estimate of time required to move

the 9th Tank Regiment into attack position

was grossly inaccurate.37

In addition to the other weaknesses of the

plan, that powerful ally—surprise—was not

present; Marines, alerted to the possibility of a

counterattack supported by tanks, addressed

much attention to the repulse of such an attack. G-2 estimates, prior to the landings, had

emphasized this enemy capability.

The attack began at about 0330, and the

brunt struck Lieutenant Colonel Jones' 1st

Battalion, 6th Marines, (principally Company

B) and to a lesser extent the 2d Battalion, 2d

Marines, (principally the 1st Platoon, Com36 This figure, however, does not count, the possibility

that at least a few of the tanks were not operative or

broke down while en route to attack position. It is

likely, also, that some tanks were retained to the rear,

out of the tight, as mobile command posts. In a table

Of organization for the 9th Tank Regiment, dated 15

May 1944, the 3d, 4th and 5th Companies were organized into 11 medium and three light tanks per company; Headquarters into three medium and three

light tanks. The 6th Company was not shown in this

table, and is assumed to have been organized after

15 May and before 15 June; the exact date is not indicated in documents consudted. CINCPAC—CINCPOA

Item #9304.

37 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #10,531.

87
JAPANESE TANK-INFANTRY COUNTERATTACK on the night of 16-17 June was stopped dold by the 6th Marines. The next

morning, Marines finished off enemy survivors around the burning tanks.

pany F). The tanks advanced in groups of

four or five with Japanese soldiers clinging to

them. Poor and ineffective tactics reflected the

inadequacy of Saito's order; some tanks

cruised about in an aimless fashion, some

bogged down in the swampy ground, some

made an effort to break through the lines, still

others stopped to let off their pugnacious

passengers.

From a psychological point of view, a daylight attack would have been more frightening

to the Marines. For here, in the dark (even

with the supporting destroyers' 5-inch starshells, called in to light the area), it was impossible to estimate the number of tanks employed. No one had reason to suspect the

presence of more than a dozen. But, one dozen

or three, the Marines did not budge from their

foxholes.

The task became one of systematic destruction. Several of Goto's tanks penetrated the

front lines, but the Marines merely shifted

around in their positions and continued their

88

fires. Japanese of Colonel Ogawa's 136th Infantry riding on, or surrounding, the tanks

were slaughtered by the Marines' machine

guns, mortars, bazookas and rifles. The 75mm

pack howitzer fires of the 1st Battalion, 10th

Marines, were also important in stopping the

thrust. The battalion's defensive preparation

#1, located in the precise area of the enemy's

advance, made adjustment unnecessary; it was

simply a matter of pouring in volley after

volley. Between 0300 and 0415, 800 rounds

were fired; 140 more pounded the same area

from 0430 to 0620.

Augmenting the pack howitzers were the

105mm howitzers of Battery M, 10th Marines.

This was the only battery of the 4th Battalion

in condition to fire; the others had been immobilized by Japanese counterbattery fire (see

page 91). Battery M expended all its available ammunition in front of the 6th Marines

during the enemy attack.

The Japanese attack .continued until about

0700, when daylight revealed between 24
JAPANESE MEDIUM TANK of Colonel Goto's 9th Tank Regiment which participated in the night thrust against the

6th Marines. Many enemy vehicles, like this one, were slowed down by muddy terrain. All were vulnerable to

infantry-carried bazookas.

and 31 smoldering or burning enemy tanks.38

Since this action represented the first major

tank attack received by a Marine unit in the

Pacific War, it is of particular interest to read

the narrative account of Major James A. Donovan, Jr., executive officer of the 1st Battalion,

6th Marines :

At 0330 on the 17th, Captain C. G. Rollen, commanding B Company, called the battalion CP to notify Colonel Jones that enemy tanks and troops could be heard

approaching from the bill and valley to their direct

IS Reports on the number of Japanese tanks destroyed in this action vary from a low of 24 in the 6th

Marines report to a high of 31 in the TF 56 report.

Sane some tanks were hit by several weapons, it is

difficult to establish an exact number. The Marine

attack continued shortly after the enemy effort was

repulsed, and it was not possible for any of the participants to make a detailed count. Observers from

higher echelons naturally counted all tanks destroyed

in the area (including those destroyed on D-Day) and

arrived at the figure 31. The account of the tank battle

is derived from a synthesis of: 6th Mar Report, 4;

Ltrs from IitCol. W. K. Jones (the first undated, the

second 24Jan49) Ltrs from Maj Warren Morris (5Jan49

and 17,Tan49) ; Saipan Tank Battle; Interview with

Maj J. A. Donovan, Jr., 31Dec48.

889590°-50-7

front. Rollen requested more illumination. All hands

were alerted, regiment was notified, a nearby medium

tank company was told to man their guns, and Naval

gunfire was directed to keep the sector constantly

illuminated and to get a reserve ship on station.

All prepared concentrations were called down in

front of the forward companies, including 75mm pack

howitzer, 81 mm mortar and the companies' own

weapons. At 0345, the first wave of tanks began to

enter the B Company sector. Their squeak and rattle

could be distinguished above the shell fire and long

bursts of machine gun fire as far back as the regimental command post.... The battle evolved itself into

a madhouse of noise; tracers and flashing lights. As

tanks were hit and set afire, they silhouetted other

tanks coining out of the flickering shadows to the front

or already on top of the squads.

Many of the tanks were 'unbuttoned', [turrets open]

the crew chief directing from the top of his open turret.

Some were being led by a crew member afoot. They

seemed to come in two waves, carrying foot troops on

the long engine compartment or clustered around the

turret, holding on to the hand rail. Some even had

machine guns or grenade throwers set up on the tank.

The bulk of the -infantry followed what appeared to

be the second wave of tanks, but as they came under

the fire of B Company's heavy machine guns, four of

which were in the line of forward combat groups, the

infantry tried to mount the tanks. Those following

afoot were badly cut up.

89
The Japanese tanks . . . appeared confused. As their

guides and crew chiefs were hit by Marine rifle and

machine gun fire, what little control they had was lost.

They ambled on in the general direction of the beach,

getting hit again and again until each one burst into

flame or turned in aimless circles only to• stop dead,

stalled in its own ruts or the marshes of the low ground.

Some kept their turrets in action, doing damage until

dawn when the Weapons Company's 75 mm half tracks

entered the fray and quickly silenced any signs of life.

Fortunately, B Company's 'bazooka' teams had been

put in the main line of resistance with the forward

platoons for that night. These teams, with one team

, that came over from A Company, did outstanding work

and verified the 'bazooka' as a superior 'tank buster.'

The 37mm section attached to B Company had positions on each side of the road that entered the center

of the company sector. In addition to the two guns,

this section had one light machine gun, two 'bazookas,'

and two anti-tank grenade dischargers. The right gun

jammed but the squad held its position with the

'bazooka' and other weapons.

Both I and K Companies of the Third Batalion

[K Company had been attached to the 1st Battalion,

6th] had been alerted and by 0400 Captain Bruce

Coburn had been ordered to take his K Company forward and pass through B Company in order that the

latter might reorganize. K Company eventually came

into position between B Company and F "Company,

Second Marines, under Captain W. Morris, whose left

anits were also involved in hitting several tanks. There

they took part in the last stages of the battle. Men from

K Company hit and helped destroy at least seven tanks.

By 0600 they were actually able to effect the relief

of B Company.

Regiment had alerted the Special Weapons Company's half tracks at the first warning and by 0415

they were underway from their position near the

regimental CP. They had rough, slow going over soft

ground and several lines of irrigation ditches. As

dawn broke and the tanks that were not already burning were disclosed, the 75mm guns made short work of

them.

By 0700 the field was quiet except for the small arms

fire of a few Nip snipers and the answers of the Marines

who mopped them up. ... The last Jap tank was spotted

as it climbed the winding road to Hill 790. Its turret

could be seen among a small group of buildings on top

of the hill. The Naval Gunfire officer quickly adjusted

and fired twenty salvos on this target. The tank sent

up an oily smoke and burned the rest of the day.39

As already indicated, the Japanese attack

principally struck Company B, 1st Battalion,

6th Marines, and the left flank platoon (1st,

under Lieutenant Raymond Marion) of Company F, 2d Marines. One of the machine guns

39 Saipan Tank Battle.

90

of the latter company fired 40 belts of .30-

caliber ammunition (10,000 rounds) during the

melee. Also contributing much to the eventual

success were two 3'7mm guns and 'bazookas' of

• the 2d Marines' Regimental Weapons Company. In regard to their work, Major Warren

Morris, commanding Company F, writes:

I have nothing but the highest praise for the two

37 crews. They went so far as to turn their guns

around and fire, practically point blank, at tanks that

broke through the lines.40

In numerous instances the fires of many

weapons converged upon a single enemy tank,

and more than one Marine, from more than one

unit, often claimed its destruction. Just how

many were knocked out by bazookamen and

how many by 37's, 75mm half-tracks and tanks

cannot be accurately determined. The important thing is that the means available were

adequate for the task. The Japanese effort

was a dismal failure; the enemy had lost a

great number of tanks—and these losses

were irreplaceable. Also, the attack had convinced the Marines that they could stop a concentrated enemy tank attack with weapons

organic to the infantry battalion. While this

had been emphasized in training and was no

startling revelation, tangible proof in the form

of smoldering, shattered Japanese tanks had

considerable morale value.

The 2d Division command post and the bulk

of the division's artillery were only about 500

yards in rear of this action, and an enemy

penetration would perhaps have been disastrous. The reader must not get the impression

that the Marines got off s'cot-free during this

critical attack; the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines

(reinforced), suffered 78 casualties and Company F, 2d Marines, 19 (principally in the left

flank platoon) .41

On the night of 16-17 June, as on numerous

occasions throughout the operation, naval illumination fires spelled the difference between

success for U. S. forces and defeat for the

enemy. In describing the reasons for the fail49 Ltr from Maj W. Morris to author, 5Jan49, hereinafter cited as Morris.

41 Ltr from LtCol W. K. Jones (undated to DivPub

Info. Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 44, "Battalion on

Saipan," Robert Sherrod. Morris.
ure of the counterattacks, Colonel Takuji

Suzuki, chief of staff of the 43d Division, commented :

. as soon as the night attack units go forward, the

enemy points out targets by using the large star shells

Which practically turn night into day. Thus the

maneuvering of units is extremely difficult."

The supply of star shells was limited, however, and after the first night it was necessary

to ration their expenditure to six per hour except in cases of emergency. Certain, errors in

the employment of undeniably important night

illumination are worthy of note. First, instead

of conserving the ammunition for times of

urgent need, troops used it for periodic checks.

Second, there were instances of Uncontrolled

illumination in which, during the course of the

night, ships wandered off the target and were

not corrected. And third, the failure to observe safety precautions caused needless casualties among our troops. The empty star shell

case weighs approximately 35 pounds and these

often fell within our own lines. The ominous

"whir" of these cylinders was nearly as terrifying as Japanese artillery."

The shortage of star shells available at

Saipan was largely explained by the fact that

neither the Marines nor the fleet was accustomed to using them in large quantities and,

accordingly, had not fully anticipated the requi rements.44

Although no record exists of the Japanese

sending a detailed report to higher echelons

of the abortive venture of 16-17 June, Colonel

F.:isuke Suzuki," commanding the 135th Infantry Regiment, mentioned it in his field order

of 17 June :

1. The main strength of the Marianas force carried

out a night attack against the enemy that landed at

Oreai [Red and Green Beach area] during the night

of 16 June. Despite the heavy blow we dealt the enemy,

42 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #9983-85,7.

43 NMI', Naval Gunfire Officer's Report, 8-10, hereinafter cited as NTLF NGF Report. FORAG-ER NOW

Report, 13-14.

44 Hill.

" Not to be confused with Colonel Takuji Suzuki,

the 43d Division chief of staff.

he is reinforcing his rear forces in the vicinity of

Oreai, although the process is not yet complete."

Also sleepless on the night of 16-17 June

were men of the 10th Marines (and anyone else

located near them), who received mortar and

artillery counterbattery fire throughout the

night. This resulted in heavy personnel and

materiel casualties, particularly in the regimental headquarters area and in the position

areas of the 2d and 4th Battalions. Since

Japanese observers had carefully charted the

location of Marine artillery throughout the

day, their fire data was unusually accurate.

With less than 21 hours ashore, Lieutenant

Colonel Jorgensen's 4th Battalion had five of

its 105mm howitzers put out of action; the 2d

Battalion (now commanded by Major Kenneth C. Houston, who replaced the wounded

Lieutenant Colonel Shell) lost three of its 12

75mm pack howitzers.47

In connection with the operations of artillery units, it may be said that they faced and

mastered, during the first days at Saipan, one

of the most difficult problems posed by any

campaign in the Pacific war. Here was a contradictory situation in which, on the one hand,

artillery was urgently needed ashore and yet,

on the other, one in which the shallowness of

the beachhead made the employment of artillery a dangerous venture. Probably no one

would question the decisions which sent the

artillery into the midst of the "tooth-and-nail"

struggle, even in light of the savage pounding

endured and the losses suffered; support was

needed, even though it forced the artillery into

the center of a bull's-eye.

At the close of the first two days, U. S.

forces had suffered about 3,500 casualties, or

approximately 20 percent of the total for the

op eration.48

46 NTLI" 0-2 Report, 13.

47 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 3. 10th Mar Report, 3. Ltr from M/Sgt F A Hancock to author,

15Jan50. By exchanging parts, four of the 4th Battalion's five damaged pieces were back in action by

afternoon of 17 June.

48 NTLF Report, 11.

91
UNITED STATES MEDIUM TANK, closely supported by infantry (right foreground), mops 'up survivors of Japanese

counterattack. Note destroyed enemy tank in foreground. Ridgeline in background was objective 0-2, seized

by the 6th Marines soon after this mop-up.

D-PLUS 2-17 JUNE

Through Susupe's Marshes

The 2d Marine Division had planned to attack at 0730, 17 June, with the 2d and 6th

Marines moving northeast to 0-2 and the 8th

Marines east to 0-1. At 0715, with troops

poised to launch their attack, an order came

from NTLF directing that the move be delayed

until 0930. General Watson recognized that

there was insufficient time for this modification

to be circulated to all front line units and the

division attacked as originally scheduled.

It is a tribute to the excellent training of the

6th Marines (plus the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines,

still attached) that an attack could be launched

92

on schedule, less than an hour after the coup

de grace had been administered the last Japanese attackers. A 90-minute preparation, fired

by naval gunfire, air and artillery, preceded the

jump-off.

The 8th Marines' advance was uneven. In

the zones of the 1st and 3d Battalions, the

advance to 0-1 was quite rapid; but, on the

right, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines (attached to the 8th Marines), found the going

much more difficult owing to difficult terrain.

In the marshy land surrounding Lake Susupe,

men carrying machine guns, mortars and ammunition found themselves sinking waist deep

into the muck. The swamp—extending 1,000

yards north and south of Lake Susupe, much
larger than it had appeared on the map—was

infested with snipers.

East of the swamp, directly to the Marines'

front, was a hill (coincident with 0-1) containing a series of enemy positions. South of

the hill, directly on the Marines' right flank,

was a Japanese-infested coconut grove. From

both these areas, small-arms fire contested any

forward movement by the 1st Battalion, 29th

Marines.

By mid-afternoon, no advance had been

made, and in addition, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tannyhill, had

been wounded. By about 1600, a new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Rathvon M. Tompkins ( formerly assistant division operations

officer), arrived on the scene. Almost simultaneous with his arrival, Tompkins spotted

four Marine tanks (of Company A, 2d Tank

Battalion) moving along Laulau Road toward

him. Immediately these were hailed, turned

about, and employed against the enemy on the

hill to the front. With this powerful base of

fire, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, regained

the offensive and pushed rapidly to the hill's

crest. After a quick mop-up, the unit dug in

for the night. The tanks, which had so effectively turned the tide, drove upon the hill also.

There, at point-blank, range, they poured round

after round into a large enemy-occupied cave.

From the coconut grove to the south, meanwhile, Japanese fires continued. Each time the

1st Battalion, 29th Marines, fired its mortars

into the grove, a deluge of small-arms fire

answered back.

Though the coconut grove remained to be

seized the next day, an important objective had

been captured which made the beachhead more

secure. As insurance against Japanese night

recapture, the 8th Marines emplaced three

75mm half-tracks from the regimental weapons

company on the hill.

The 8th Regiment was in contact with the

6th Marines on the left, but physical contact

did not exist with 4th Division on the right. It

was necessary, therefore, to commit the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, to refuse the regiment's

right." (See Map 11.)

49 8th Mar Report, 2. 1st Battalion, 29th Marines

Report, 2-3, hereinafter cited as 1st Bn, 29th Mar ReColonel Riseley's 6th Marines attacked at

0730 and made satisfactory progress against

light resistance. Since the direction of attack

was to the northeast and up into the foothills

of Mount Tipo Pale, the regiment's lines

tended to become over-extended as contact with

the 8th Marines became progressively more

difficult. Upon reaching 0-2, the unit held up

its attack; lines were reorganized and consolidated in anticipation of continuing the advance

when progress of the 8th Marines permitted.

All units of the regiment except the Regimental

Scout Sniper Platoon (reserve) had been committed to the line. To augment this meager

reserve, Company 3 of the 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines,50 was attached to the 6th Marines.51

Colonel Stuart's 2d Marines advanced in a

column of battalions, regulating its rate on the

6th Marines, to its right. By 1800, the 3d Battalion, the leading unit, reached 0-2, coincident

at that point with the Force Beachhead Line

and but a thousand yards from Garapan's outskirts. There, with the left flank anchored on

the beach and the right in •contact with the 6th

Marines, the battalion dug in.52 (See Map 11.)

During the day's operations, the 1st, 2d and

4th Battalions, 10th Marines, were in direct

support of the 6th, 8th and 2d Marines respectively, and the 3d Battalion was in general

support.53

Lieutenant Colonel Marvin H. Floom's 2d

155mm Howitzer Battalion commenced landing at 1700 with orders' to support the 4th

Marine Division. Thus detached from 2d DiliArt. "1st Battalion, 29th Marines, at Saipan," narrative account by LtCol R. M. Tompkins, 2-4, hereinafter cited as Tompkins.

59 The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, originally used a

numerical system of designating its companies at

Saipan. See Appendix V.

51 6th Mar Report, 5.

52 2d Mar Report, 2. The 2d Regiment was composed

of two battalions at this time: its own 3d Battalion

and the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines. Its 2d Battalion was

still attached to the 6th Marines and the let Battalion

was still under 2d Division contr61. One company of

the 1st Battalion was returned to 2d Marines' control

at 1620.

5310th Mar Report, 3.

93
sion control, Floom's battalion was assigned

position areas about 1500 yards south of Charan Kanoa. Prior to darkness, reconnaissance

was completed and communications were established with the 14th Marines. Traffic congestion at Beach Blue 1 delayed into the night the

emplacement of the battalion's howitzers, but

by shortly after daylight the next morning an

air observer was assigned the unit, registration

accomplished, and eight guns were ready to

fire. By noon, the battalion as a complete, 12-

gun unit was delivering concentrations on

enemy targets."

54 2d 155mm Arty Bn, V Amphibious Corps Report, 2,

hereinafter cited as 2d 155m9n Bn Report. Ltr from

LtCol M. H. bloom to CMC, 163-an49, hereinafter

cited as Flown. Though personnel of this battalion had

been in combat previously, their 155mm howitzers had

not. Prior to March 1944, the unit had been the 3d

Battalion, 10th Marines (armed with 75mm pack

howitzers), and had participated in the Guadalcanal

and Tarawa operations. The unit's designation was

changed to 2d 155mm Artillery Battalion, V Amphibious Corps, in March 1944 when the old 75's were exchanged for new 155mm Howitzers. Interview with

Maj E. J. Rowse, 6Jan49.

The Move to Aslito Airfield

In the 4th Marine Division's zone, the 165th

Infantry Regiment, attached on the previous

night, moved through the 3d Battalion, 24th

Marines, and right flank elements of the 25th

Marines and attacked toward Aslito Airfield.

Upon passage of its lines, the 3d Battalion, 24th

Marines, reverted to division reserve. Colonel

Kelley, commanding the 165th Infantry, requested that the Marine battalion remain in

the area until his 3d Battalion had arrived.

General Schmidt concurred.55

Attacking with battalions abreast, 1st on the

right, 2d on the left, the 165th advanced from

800 to 1,200 yards on 17 June against relatively

light opposition. By 1400, the 2d Battalion had

moved to the southwest edge of Aslito Airfield,

while the 1st Battalion had become involved in

a fight for a dominating ridge line extending

from the airfield's southwest corner to the vicin55 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 17. Report of

Action Saipan Island, 16-27 June, .Col Gerard W.

Kelley, hereinafter Cited as Kelley.

SOLDIERS OF 165TH INFANTRY move along south coast on 17 June. The following day the zone along the south coast

was assumed by the 105th Infantry. Tinian may be seen in background as destroyers patrol the stretch of

water between the two islands.

94
ity of Cape Obiam. Infantrymen of the 1st

Battalion (Major James H. Mahoney, USA)

inched slowly up the steep and open slope, so

that, by 1700, a toehold had been gained at the

crest. At this point, however, the Japanese

launched a counterattack and drove the soldiers

back off the hill. Reorganizing and reforming

the lines at the base of the ridge, the battalion

dug in for the night.

As previously noted, the 3d Battalion, 165th

Infantry (Major Dennis D. Claire, USA), had

not landed during the night of 16-17 June

with the other two battalions. This unit came

ashore on the morning of 17 June, first elements arriving on the beach at 0805. By 0945

the entire battalion was ashore and placed in

regimental reserve. In the late afternoon, after

the 1st Battalion had been driven off the ridge,

the 3d Battalion was ordered to move to the

vicinity of the ridge and prepare to attack with

the other two battalions on the following

morning.56 (See Map 11.)

On 165th's left, the 25th Marines attacked

in a column of battalions, Lieutenant Colonel

Hudson's 2d Battalion leading. This unit advanced approximately 1,500 yards, securing the

favorable, dominating terrain along the 0-2

line. A gap developed between the Marines and

the Army—caused by the Marines' faster movement—necessitating the employment of Companies I and L, 25th Marines, to fill the gap.

Company I searched the building area just

north of the airfield and Company L patrolled

the airfield itself, thoroughly checking all installations and dismantling all serviceable

Japanese weapons. Lieutenant Maurice W.

Savage led his platoon from Company L to

contact the Army's left unit, the 2d Battalion,

165th Infantry. There Savage informed Lieutenant Colonel John F. McDonough, USA, the

battalion commander, that all installations in

the airfield area were clear of enemy and requested that the unit move forward and seize

the airfield (and, incidentally, relieve the contact problem). Savage's recommendation, made

during the late afternoon, was not translated

55165 Inf Report, S. Infantry Journal, Sep46,

"The 27th's Battle For Saipan," Capt E. G. Love, hereinafter cited as The 27th's Battle For Saipan,.

L.

into action, however, and the 165th Infantry

remained on the high ground west of the field.

When it wag apparent to the 25th's commander (Colonel Batchelder) that the Army

unit contemplated no further movement for the

day, the 3d Battalion was ordered to shift to

a position on the north side of the airfield,

facing south, denying and protecting the right

flank. Physical contact did not exist between

the 25th Marines and the 165th Infantry as

they dug in for the night.57 (See Map 11.)

In regard to this situation, the 165th Infantry's commander, Colonel Kelley, has written:

... it is probable that the 2d Battalion could have taken

the Air Field on the 17th. However, due to the difficulty encountered by the 1st Battalion on their right

flank any advance would extend the 2d too far for good

defense, plus the fact that from their present positions

they had an excellent field of fire against any possible

enemy counterattack. I decided it wise to maintain

position . . . on the night of the 17th and to take the

Air Field in daylight. This also permitted the 2d Battalion to support progress of the other two battalions

from the high ground on which the Air Field was

located.58

Left of the 4th Division center, the 24th

Marines fought over broken terrain towards

the second ridge line, designated 0-2. The 1st

Battalion, hampered by persistent antiaircraft

guns (muzzles depressed from their usual vertical position) firing from positions east of

Aslito Airfield (probably on Nafutan Point),

moved rapidly toward its objective. About

noon, following a 15-minute artillery preparation fired by the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines,

the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, began the

ascent of the precipitous ridge line. By 1630,

Major Fricke, the commanding officer, reported

the battalion digging in on 0-2.

Lieutenant Colonel Rothwell's 2d Battalion,

moving to the left of the 1st Battalion, was

destined for a difficult day. Starting off rapidly, though weathering fire from a 3-inch

-dual-purpose gun in position 300 yards to the

left front, the battalion soon discovered that it

was not in contact with the 23d Marines, and,

therefore, delayed the attack until this detail

could be resolved.

57 25th Mar Report, 4. 8d Bn, 25th Mar Report, 5.

55Kelley.

95
11 Additional discouragement in the form of

friendly rocket fire falling within the lines

slowed the advance and caused 20 casualties.

Despite these difficulties, however, the battalion had reached the approaches to the 0-2

ridge line by late afternoon, when from the

cliff face a short 300 yards ahead came a vicious

hail of Japanese machine-gun, rifle, and knee

mortar" fire. This fire, completely stopping

forward movement, caused the battalion commander to order a 400 yard withdrawal to dig

in for the night. The new position had little to

commend it. Enemy fire continued almost as

before, and the ground, a hard shell of coral

rock, was very unsatisfactory for digging. Several rounds of mortar fire (of uncertain origin

—but thought to be friendly) fell in the area,

making it even Jess desirable. To escape the

bad terrain and the fire, Rothwell ordered his

unit to pull back another 200 yards for the

night's defense. With the 2d Battalion in its

withdrawn position and the 1st Battalion on

0-2, the 24th Marines dug in for the night.

(See Map 11.)

The 24th Marines' executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Austin R. Brunelli, who had been

with the 1st Battalion during the day, received

orders from the regimental commander to remain with the 1st Battalion for the night and

to coordinate defenses in that area. The following day the orders were expanded to the

extent that Brunelli would assume command

of the 1st Battalion, Major Fricke reverting

to battalion executive officer.°

The 23rd Marines, on the division left, made

but little progress during the day. The big,

partly bald hill southeast of Lake Susupe was

59 The knee mortar, in reality a grenade discharger,

is not actually fired from the knee as its small size and

curved base plate would suggest. But since U. S. soldiers and Marines habitually referred to it by that

name, knee mortar will be used throughout this narrative.

60 24th Mar Report, 19. 1st Battalion, 24th Marines

Report, 1, hereinafter cited as 1st Bn, 211 Mar Report.

2d Battalion, 24th Marines Report, 2, hereinafter cited

as 2d Ba, 24 Mar Report. Ltr. from Col A. R. Brunelli

to CMC, 12Jan50, hereinafter cited as Brunelli. Interview with Maj J. F. Ross, Jr., 28Mar50, hereinafter

cited as Ross.

96

occupied in considerable strength by the enemy

and fire from there played havoc with the regiment's left flank as it tried to negotiate the

swampy ground southeast of the lake. Just

how many Japanese were on the hill is not

known. There were enough, however, to stop

the forward movement of Haas' 1st Battalion.

Existing records make no mention of this particular force, but it is assumed to have been

elements of Colonel Oka's 47th Mixed Brigade.

The 23d Marines had no contact with the 2d

Marine Division, owing to the latter's previously described difficulties north of the lake.

The 23d's right unit, the 2d Battalion, made

substantial gains while the 1st Battalion could

make virtually none, and a gap between the

two was created. Into this went the reserve

battalion (the 3d), with orders to tie in the

flanks. Later, Vandegrift's 3d Battalion, 24th

Marines (passed through by the 165th Infantry earlier in the day), arrived as an attachment to the 23d Marines. Under cover of

darkness, Vandegrift's unit moved into position to relieve the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines.61

As the 4th Division dug in for the night, its

center rested on the dominating terrain along

0-2, but both flanks bent back somewhat. (See

Map 11.)

More Corps Troops Ashore

As the beachhead expanded, more Corps elements landed. At 1350, 17 June, General

Holland Smith debarked from the USS Rooky

Mount and proceeded ashore; the Northern

Troops and Landing Force (NTLF) command

post opened in Charan Kanoa at 1530.62

The site was a good one, affording reasonable

protection from the torrential downpours and

sufficient room for posting maps and charts.

Holland Smith has written of his Charan

Kanoa command post:

. . . This village was laid out in rectangular blocks

with small, bungalow-type houses built of plaster,

wooden slats and concrete, with roofs of corrugated

iron. Except for the broken windows, some of these

houses were habitable. In backyard quadrangles stood

large concrete cisterns for catching rainwater, fed by

pipes from the roofs. Each house had its air raid

61 23d Mar Report, 36-37.

62 NTLF Report, 12.
7-

LOOKING EAST FROM MT. FINA SUSU. High ground 2,000 yards to the front is objective 0-2. Picture shows zone of 23d

Marines on 17 June.

shelter.63

Although this area was subjected to occasional ineffective Japanese bombing, enemy

artillery never directly shelled the command

post itself. This was peculiar; though on more

than one occasion the installation was bracketed with overs and shorts, final adjustment

onto the bull's-eye was never accomplished.

The command post remained at this sanctuary

throughout the entire operation.

Brigadier General Harper and his advance

parties from Corps Artillery reconnoitered for

positions and established his command post in

an unfinished Japanese concrete blockhouse

about 200 yards inland from Beach Yellow 2,

Shortly after dawn, advance parties from the

532d Field Artillery Batallion joined General

Harper and parties that had landed the previous night. Late in the afternoon, a dispatch

was sent to NTLF with a request to commence

63 Coral and Brass, 183.

landing the Corps Artillery as soon as practicable. No firing elements of the XXIV

Corps Artillery were landed on the 17th, but

on the following day the unit's howitzers and

personnel began arriving ashore in a steady

flow."

Following the 3d Battalion, 165th Infantry,

ashore on the morning of 17 June was the 105th

Infantry (Colonel Leonard A. Bishop, USA)

and Major General Ralph C. Smith with 27th

Division headquarters. Once ashore, General

Ralph Smith took command of 27th Division

units, with the exception of the 165th Infantry

which remained under 4th Marine Division

control. By dusk, all three battalions of the

105th were ashore but very little of the regimental headquarters personnel and communication equipment. Colonel Bishop's regiment

thus operated under a distinct handicap inasmuch as the Cavalier, the ship in which the

64 Corps Arty, S-3 Report, 5-6.

97
CHARAN KANOA AIRSTRIP (looking north) was captured on D-Day. Laid out perpendicular to the prevailing eastwest wind, it was unsatisfactory for anything but light observation planes. LVT at left has lowered ramp to

unload supplies.

absent equipment and personnel were embarked,

was not completely unloaded until nearly a

week later."

Though official records do not indicate

whether this unfortunate situation resulted

from poor execution or from poor planning,

Admiral Hill, who assumed command of ships

at Saipan after Admiral Turner's departure

on the late afternoon of 17 June, significantly

comments:

Embarked with me on the Cambria were members of

the Corps G-4, who had loading plans for all ships.

Each day they told me what ships they wanted at the

anchorage for unloading.... The Navy was merely the

operating agency for bringing into port any ship which

the Corps said they wanted.

Elsewhere, the Admiral sheds further light:

I do not remember the exact cause of the mixup in

the Cavalier. Cargo unloaded on the day of her arrival

was dictated by the responsible authorities of the 27th

Division. . . . I remember that when they complained

that this equipment was not ashore, no one was able to

find out where it was so that we could call in the necessary ship and unload it for them.

After the 105th Infantry had landed, NTLF

ordered Colonel Bishop to designate one batLemp, 10-11. R. C. Smith. 105th Infantry Regiment

Report, 4-5, hereinafter cited as 105th In! Report.

66 Hill.

98

talion as a separate reserve. This unit would

assume positions behind the 4th Marine Division so as to provide greater depth in case a

strong_ counterattack developed there. Bishop

selected the 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel

Leslie Jensen, USA) for this mission.

The 864th Antiaircraft Artillery Group,

commanded by Colonel Kenneth M. Barager,

USA, was ordered to commence unloading but

experienced extreme difficulty in getting across

the reef, and another day passed before it was

completely unloaded."

While it is doubtful that individuals lying in

front line foxholes had felt the change, it is

safe to say that there was a great improvement

in our situation on the evening of 17 June.

True, the bulk of supporting ships and planes

had departed to counter the Japanese Fleet

movements, but that was more than balanced

by the numbers of troops and, the amount of

equipment now ashore. The Japanese had lost

their best opportunity to throw us back into

the sea. As the NTLF Periodic Report for 17

June comments: "This period showed the first

signs of weakening enemy resistance." 68

Until now, the enemy's retreat had been

NTLF 0-3 Report, Periodic Reports 3 and 4.

68 Ibid., No. 3, 2.
OY OBSERVATION PLANE readies for the take-off on Charan Kanoa airstrip. The first of these planes landed on this

strip on the evening of 17 June and thereafter performed invaluable reconnaissance and fire direction assistance.

orderly and had followed a definite .pattern.

They had carried away their dead and

wounded so that our troops were unable to see

how great was the damage of our fires. After

17 June, dead and wounded Japanese would

often be found where they were hit, indicating

a deterioration in their system of evacuation.

The divisions now held better ground, although

the summit: of Mount Tapotchau still afforded

the Japanese complete observation of the

beachhead and continued to do so for several

days to come. On the beaches, shore parties

operated with efficienty, though still weathering occasional shellings.

Just before dark, several carrier-embarked

observation planes (0Y-1's) landed ashore,

four at the recently repaired Charan Kanoa

strip and one on the road opposite Beach Yellow 1. From then on, these planes extensively

used the Charan Kanoa strip.69

Night of 17-18 June

Only the 2d Marine Division had noteworthy

action on ' the night of 17-18 June. Intermittently throughout the rainy night, small groups

of Japanese (usually not more than one or two

squads) attempted to penetrate the lines, looking for a weak point through which substantial

forces could be poured. At about midnight, an

attack was directed at the boundary between

69 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 18. 2d Mar Report, Section VI, 5.

99
the 6th and 8th Marines. In the latter's zone,

15 or 20 Japanese overran two machine guns

of Company K, but the attack was repulsed

and the original line restored."

The line of Lieutenant Colonel Nutting's 2d

Battalion, 2d Marines, occupying the right of

the 6th Marines' sector, was breached at about

the same time, and contact with the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, temporarily lost. Nutting

committed a portion of Company F (3d Platoon and a machine-gun section) to fill the gap;

the Japanese were expelled from the area, and

contact reestablished.

The diary of Misao Naito (rank and unit

unknown) mentions this activity as follows:

"Two squads, 15 men, went out for a night attack below Regimental Headquarters at Oreai

equipped with antitank grenades." The return

of these two squads—or the success or failure

which they experienced—is not indicated in the

diary." It should not be assumed from this

account that two squads represented the total

night attack force, but rather that the Japanese were following a faulty technique (of

which they were often guilty) of sending'a few

troops from one unit and a few from another,

without any attempt to preserve tactical unity

or to achieve coordination.

Having landed from the sea, the Marines

were well aware that the enemy could do likewise, using the same beaches. A night thrust

against the landing force rear, if successful,

could create untold confusion among logistical

and command installations and, if executed in

strength, could jeopardize the entire Saipan

venture. To protect against any such activity,

beach defense was coordinated between the

shore party, 2d Marines, and available amphibian vehicles.

The beach defense system almost got an early

test. At about 0430, 18 June, approximately 35

barges, apparently loaded with Japanese soldiers, were spotted off Flores Point, north of

Garapan. The 4th Battalion, 10th Marines,

opened on the vulnerable target, as did IJ. S.

vessels in the vicinity. The latter were in the

701st Bn, 8th Mar Report, 3.

71 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #10,053.

100

best position and inflicted the most damage;

13 barges were destroyed, the remainder turned

back. The threat was over.72

Japanese Air Strikes

Owing to Admiral Spruance's order that

transports not required for immediate unloading be withdrawn from the Saipan area, Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops (TF 56), was

removed from the area for several. days.

Shortly after the convoy got underway on the

early evening of 17 June, it was subjected to an

attack by a "formation" 73 of enemy aircraft.

LST 84 was set afire by a Japanese bomb; but,

after raging furiously for a time, the blaze was

brought under control and extinguished. The

damage was not vital, and the ship remained

operative. Gunfire from ships of the Northern

Attack Force shot down three of the attacker's

dive bombers.

At about the same time (1800-1830), Carrier.

Support Group One (TG 52.14), operating to

the west of Saipan, was attacked by another

enemy formation. A 250-pound bomb, which

hit the escort carrier Fanshatv Bay on the after

elevator, put her out of action for the remainder of the Marianas operation. The ship • retired to Eniwetok for repairs. Because of the

lateness of the attack, interceptor planes had

to land on the carriers after dark, with resultant operational losses of 19 planes. U. S.

fighters claimed they shot down eight Japanese

planes and ships' gunfire accounted for "several" more.

Carrier Support Group Two (TG 52.11) was

next to receive an attack. Here, however,

enemy planes failed to achieve a single hit and

suffered losses in the process. Ships' gunfire

accounted for five planes, while U. S. fighters

destroyed "considerable."

For Fire Support Unit 52.17.6 (part of Fire

Support Group One), ploughing through

waters 12 miles west of Saipan, the air alarm

sounded at 1900. The subsequent Japanese at72 NTLIP G-2 Report, 14. ge 56 G-2 Report, 14.

72In some instances it was impossible to make an

accurate count of participating enemy aircraft. On

these occasions, reports mention "several," "considerable," or a "formation," instead of a definite total.
Afetna Point

Agingan

Point

0-2

0-1

dit Mt

-Tapotchau

?fi

Mt

Tipo Pale

500

MAGICIENNE

AIRFIELD

0-2

--- Indicates Progress of 15 June

RD 7093

Nafutan

Point

BAY

Kag man

Pentnsula

PROGRESS LINES 16 and 17

JUNE 1944

9 2000 4000 Yds

MAP II
tack, however, resulted in no hits by either side.

A busy evening came to an end."

Enemy air attacks were as consistently ineffective as they were annoyingly frequent.

In a recurrence of what happened to the • California and Braine on 14 June and to the

Tennessee on the 15th, the destroyers Philip

and Phelps were fired upon at 0544, 18 June,

by shore batteries on Saipan, one located just

north of Garapan and the other southeast of

that town. The Philip was not hit, but the

Phelps was struck by two 8-inch shells, one exploding in the wardroom with extensive but not

serious damage, the other in Number 3 fireroom, putting Number 3 boiler out of commission and causing minor damage to steam lines

and Number 4 boiler. The two destroyers delivered counterbattery fire and silenced the

enemy guns."

It is doubtful that the message of inspiration received that night from the Chief of Staff

(Hideki Tojo) in Japan was accorded complete circulation to the hard-pressed front line

defenders of Saipan:

Because the fate of the Japanese Empire depends on

the result of your operation, inspire the spirit of the

officers and men and to the very end continue to destroy

the enemy gallantly and persistently; thus alleviate the

anxiety of our Emperor.

The reply from the chief of staff of the beleaguered 43d Division (Colonel Takuji Suzuki) showed that he, at least, had been inspired:

Have received your honorable Imperial words and

we are grateful for boundless magnanimity of Imperial

favor. By becoming the bulwark of the Pacific with

10,000 deaths we hope to requite the Imperial favor.76

D-PLUS 3-18 JUNE

The chief of staff of the 31st Japanese Army,

Major General Keiji Iketa, drafted a message

on the morning of 18 June to the commanding

general at Yap Island and the chief of staff in

Tokyo. In it he summarized the situation as

he saw it and, in the process, revealed how very

little he knew of what was taking place about

74 TF 51 Report, 6, Annex 1, and End L. TF56 C1-8

Report, Periodic Report No. 4.

75 TF 51 Report, End L, 2.

76 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #9983-85,8 and 30.

him. Not that the general was caught in the

bog of apathy, nor was he too frightened or

lazy to find out–what was going on; it was

simply impossible for him to penetrate the

shroud of obscurity resulting from ruptured

communications in the vast area over which

the action was taking place. Moreover, even

the meager information that he did possess

proved in at least one instance (paragraph

four) to be false:

1. The Homare Unit [43d Division] Headquarters is

about 2,500 meters southeast of Oreai [Charan Kanoal.

The forces at its disposal are not over three companies.

2. The situation of the other units is completely unknown.

3. The enemy is gradually advancing under cover

of fierce naval gunfire and bombing and strafing and

the southern half of this island is generally under the

subjugation of the enemy.

4. Homare Unit Headquarters underwent an enemy

attack this a.m. and the division CO died along with

his staff officers.

5. Army Field Headquarters is in the mountains 1,800

meters east of Garapan pier. The enemy in force is

advancing from the south of Garapan and is closing in

on the field headquarters.

In another dispatch later in the day, General

Iketa corrected his error in regard to the division commander's death, reporting that General Saito was "all right," but that his "staff

officers were wounded." Also, in this second

message of 18 June, Iketa gave a more specific

disposition of Japanese forces:

The army is consolidating its battle lines and has

decided to prepare for a showdown fight. It is concentrating the Homare Group in the area east of Tapotchau. The remaining units (two infantry battalions of

135th Infantry, about one composite battalion, one

naval unit), are concentrating in the area east of

Garapan. This is the beginning of our showdown fight.

The high command in Tokyo received a tangible clue of the hopelessness of the Japanese

situation at Saipan when General Iketa reported that "the secret documents in custody

of the 31st Army Headquarters. . . were completely burned at 1830 of 18 June. . . ." 77

The NTLF Operation Order for 18 June

(D-plus 3) called for an attack by all three

divisions; the two Marine divisions at 1000 and

the Army at 1200 (to allow the 27th Division

time to move the 105th Infantry into position

77Ibid., 8-9.

101
on the right flank along the south coast) 78

Into the Coconut Grove

The 2d Marine Division's lines advanced

very little on 18 June because the pivot to the

north had already begun; and, since the division's left was the anchor of the pivot, its movements had to be restricted to prevent overextending lines. Colonel Wallace's 8th Marines,

however, did attack on the right. The previous

day had found the regiment in possession of

the 0-1 ridge line but receiving heavy fire from

a coconut grove to the south.

Because of the proximity of 4th Division

troops to this grove, it was necessary that supporting fires be delivered with a great deal of

caution and finesse, lest errant shells claim Marine casualties. Well equal to this exacting

task were the industrious 75mm pack howitzers

of the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines. Following

a diligent 15-minute preparation, Major Chamberlin's 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, . attacked

and carried the grove. As this move progressed, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, kept

pace by swinging its right flank abreast of

Chamberlin's unit.

Here, for the first time, large numbers of

dead Japanese were found (although no actual

count was made), giving further indication

that the enemy system of evacuation was deteriorating. With the advance to the coconut

grove, contact with the 4th Division was established. As will be seen, however, 4th Division elements pulled back at dusk and a lateral

gap was .again created. This was not serious,

however, inasmuch as Lake Susupe was within

a stone's throw of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines' right flank. The other two regiments of

the 2d Division did not advance their lines but

patrolled areas to their front in preparation

for later moves."

Drive to the East

The 4th Marine Division attacked toward the

east coast with three regiments abreast: 25th

_Marines on the right, 24th Marines in the

center, and 23d Marines on the left. The 3d

18 NTLF Operation Order 6-44.

792d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 5. 8th Mar Report, 3.

102

Battalion, 24th Marines, remained attached to

the 23d Regiment.

Good progress was made by the 24th and

25th Marines, although the former sustained

an attack at 1615 by two Japanese tanks which

surged to within 350 yards of the front lines.

The situation for awhile was alarming: U. S.

tanks had departed for rear areas to refuel and

re-arm so that only bazookas were immediately

available for antitank defense. Though the

24th Marines' Weapons Company was immediately alerted, it arrived too late to participate

in the fight. The enemy tanks were finally

chased by bazookas and artillery, but not before they had sprayed the area (causing 15

casualties) with machine-gun and small cannon

fire.

A portion of the 0-3 line (see Map 13) was

reached by the 24th and 25th Marines during

the day, placing the latter along the coast of

Magicienne Bay. This healthy gain severed

the island's southern portion, including Nafutan -Point, from the remainder of the island.

The NTLF Staff expected no serious trouble

from the foe in the isolated southern area.

To maintain the momentum of the attaCk

and avoid the long delay of a mopping-up

process, the 24th Marines by-passed the southern extremity of a heavily defended cliff line

running north and south through its zone of.

action. However, since the direction of attack

for the division would soon swing north

through the by-passed area, it was necessary

to secure the cliff line. This mission was assigned to the division reserve, 1st Battalion,

25th Marines.

This, the unit's first experience with cleaning

cave positions, proved a slow, unpleasant and

dangerous task. There was no simple method

of cleaning caves. It was a matter of working

into a position from which it demolition charge

or flame thrower could either destroy the caves'

inhabitants or trap them inside by sealing the

entrances. Getting to such a position usually

demanded "mountain goat" tactics. Rather

than a coordinated move, the task took the

form of a, series of small, separated actions,

each employing groups of four Or five. men.

The unpleasantness of crawling over rough,
PLOWED FIELD, devoid of cover and concealment, was in striking contrast to rugged terrain in many other parts of

the island. Here men of the 4th Division are utilizing armored LVT's in assault gun fashion. Although lightly

. armored, these vehicles were effectively employed during the first days of the battle in missions normally assigned to tanks.

jagged rocks plus the peril of receiving a burst

of enemy fire at point-blank range, totalled

"cave-cleaning." 80

Preliminary operations and reorganization

were necessary in the 23d Marines' zone of action prior to the 1000 attack. At 0730, the 3d

Battalion, 24th Marines (attached to the 23d),

relieved Haas' 1st Battalion on the division's

left wing and commenced the move on 0-2,

which would serve as the line of departure. As

will be seen, however, events of the day prevented the regiment from reaching this line.

Organizational readjustments within the 23d

Marines included the attachment of the 3d Battalion's rifle companies and 81mm mortar pla80 Mar Div Report, Section VI, 18-19. 25th Mar

Report, 5. Ltr from LtCol H. Bothwell te CMC, 14Jan50,

hereinafter cited as Rothwell. Ross.

toon to Dillon's 2d Battalion and formation of

a composite battalion from the 1st Battalion

and the 3d Battalion Headquarters (under the

command of the 3d Battalion commander,

Lieutenant Colonel Cosgrove). The latter unit

would support the attack of the other two battalions from positions on Mt. Fina Susu.

Machine-gun fire stopped the 23d Marines'

left elements after an advance of 200 to 250

yards. Most of this fire came from a clump of

trees to their front, but a definite location of

enemy weapons was impossible. Frequent barrages of Japanese mortar fire hampered efforts

to spot the enemy, and the attack faltered. At

this juncture, Cosgrove's composite battalion

was committed on the left of the 3d Battalion,

24th Marines, in an attempt to retain the impetus, and th.e attack again moved forward.

103
But the advance was slow. By 1715, the 23d

Marines had moved to a line about 400 yards

short of 0-2.

Prior to darkness, 23d Marines' patrols were

dispatched to the east. On the right, these

patrols reached 0-2, but on the left machine0-un fire denied movement as far as 0-2. Colonel

:,

Jones, the 23d Marines' commander, requested permission from General Schmidt to

withdraw to more favorable ground for the

night. General Schmidt approved, and the 23d

pulled back to a position about 400 yards east

of Lake Susupe, breaking contact with the 2d

Division.81

During the afternoon a report from the 23d

Marines reached the 4th Division FIeadquarters,

then Corps, that the enemy was using gas. The

alarm was sounded. Gas; the possibility that

the Japanese would at some time resort to this

dread weapon had lurked in the background

of every operation. But, as quickly as it began,

the flurry subsided. An investigation by the

23d Marines, immediately instituted, revealed

that a half-track, operating in the 2d Battalion

zone, had fired into a cave which housed a

picric acid plant. A rolling yellow cloud, containing pungent fumes, emitted from the cave

aperture, causing two casualties (from extreme

nausea) and much excitement.82

This episode illustrated a long-recognized

fact: gas masks were the most useless things in

the world, until (and here was the big "until")

there was a gas attack or threat of gas attack,

at which point they became the most valued of

all items of equipment. The scramble for

masks that followed the gas alarm gave convincing proof, if any were needed, that gas was

indeed a frightening weapon. It appeared to

many officers and men that the moment of retribution was near for all the bad care they had

given their masks. And, for at least a short

time after this scare, the masks were faithfully

carried and cared for.

This gas scare temporarily relieved one in81 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 18-19. 23d Mar

Report, 37738.

82Ibid. Marine Corps Gazette, "Observations on

Saipan," Jan45, LtCol B. A. Hochmuth. Interview with

LtCol Hochmuth, 4Jan49. L. R. Jones.

104

dividual of either his inhibitions or his eyesight: General Schmidt, 4th Division cominander, reports that, without pausing for any

formalities, "a young lieutenant came rushing

into my dugout and asked me if I had a spare

gas tn` mask."

Seizure of Aslito Airfield

For the attack of 18 June, the commanding

officer of the 165th Infantry was somewhat confused as to his regiment's status. Was it still

under 4th Division control? Or had it reverted

to the 27th Division? Of this situation the

165th's commander, Colonel Kelley, has

written:

I was unable to determine (by telephone conversation with Hq 4th Marine Division) whether I was still

attached to the 4th Marine Division or had passed to

the Command of CG 27tlf Div. I had my S-3 call D-3

4th Marine Division to inform that office of the progress

of the attack and what I planned to do. This in view

of the absence of formal orders from 4th Marine Division Headquarters. As I remember the report of my

S-3, the D-3 (or assistant) had stated that I was to

do as I had been ordered (in connection with my proposed action). He later tempered his remarks when

advised that I had received no orders and indicated

that we might be under the direction of CG 27th Division. Shortly after this Major General Ralph Smith

visited my CP and advised me that I should receive

notice of my release from the Marines and revertion

[sic] to the 27th Division. I did receive notice from the

27th Division but never received such orders from 4th

Marine Division Headquarters.84

Attacking ahead of schedule, the 165th Infantry captured Aslito Airfield without opposition at about 1000.85 The field, found in relatively good condition, contained the largest

cache of airplane parts and damaged airplanes

-captured from the Japanese up to this time.

Also discovered and put to good use: an oxygen

plant, a power plant, a million-gallon reservoir,

and a number of shelters and warehouses with

steel-reinforced concrete walls. The runway

had a four degree incline, compared with a

83 Ltr from Gen H. Schmidt to CMC, 8Jan50.

84 Kelley.

83 The 27th Division renamed Aslito Airfield Gardiner Conroy Field. Later, NTLF changed the name to

Isely Airfield, in honor of Commander Robert H. Isely,

a naval aviator, who lost his life while attacking the

field prior to its capture.
grade limit for United States fields of half a

degree. The field became operational for fighters on 22 June, for Liberator bombers on 9 August, and for B-29's on 15 October."

Apparently, Japanese troops had moved out

in such haste that no demolition or destruction

was accomplished. The outer defenses were in

excellent condition, and a safe containing some

confidential documents was found.

The Seabees (personnel of the 18th and 121st

Naval Construction Battalions) soon arrived

at the airfield and commenced repairing it for

our own use. They were joined on 2 July by the

first of five aviation engineer battalions of the

VII Air Service Command.

Southeast of the field the ridge that had

troubled the 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry, on

the previous afternoon was regained without

special difficulty. At this point the formation

was altered. This came as.a result of an order

from General Ralph Smith, narrowing the

" 7'7ic IAF .,11ga4nst ./(tpu II, 189-191.

165th Infantry's broad zone and inserting the

105th infantry into the right of the division's

front. With its zone compressed, the 165th Infantry adopted a formation of 1st and 2d Battalions abreast, 1st on the left, 3d in reserve,

for the push to the east coast.

The 105th Infantry, meanwhile, had moved

in on the 165th's right and launched its attack

along the south coast. Available to this regiment were but two of its battalions, since the

2d was still under NTLF control. Progress

was slow; the right battalion (3d, Lieutenant

Colonel Edward T. Bradt, USA) found the

coast line pitted with caves, all of which had

to be investigated. As noted earlier, cave-cleaning is a tedious process, requiring deliberate,

painstaking effort. The left battalion (1st,

Lieutenant Colonel William J. O'Brien, USA)

found itself confronted with vast canefields.

In these, the intense heat retarded the rate of

advance. Because of the 105th Infantry's slowness, the 165th. could not reach the east coast

without severing contact with its sister regi165TH INFANTRY moving across the fiat near Aslito Airfield on the morning of 18 June.

8895900--50 --8

105
ment.87 (See Map 13 for 18 June front lines.)

At about noon of 18 June, General Holland

Smith and his chief of staff, General Erskine,

arrived for a visit at the 27th Division command post, then located about 1,000 yards inland from Yellow Beach. According to Major

General Ralph Smith, "both these Marine officers again expressed satisfaction over the progress of operations of the 27th Division and the

capture of the airfield." 88

General Harper, Corps Artillery commander, and his advance parties continued

their reconnaissance, being joined at dawn of

the 18th by reconnaissance details from the • 145th Field Artillery Battalion. By late afternoon the 225th Field Artillery Battalion, with

eight 155mm howitzers in position southeast of

Charan Kanoa, began firing. Two Corps Artillery liaison planes also landed during the

day on Charan Kanoa strip and were pressed

87'Amp, 11. R. C. Smith, 3. 165th Inf Report, 3. 27th

Inf Div, G-3 Periodic Report 1800, 17 June to 1800, 18

June 1944.

88 R. C. Smith, 4.

into the immediate task of locating targets.8"

General Holland Smith, concerned that certain supplies were running short, requested

from Admiral Turner that the ships which had

departed on the evening of the 17th be returned for unloading." Rather than returning

all ships as requested, however, Turner held to

the original plan of returning only those vessels needed for, immediate unloading.

The evacuation picture improved greatly on

18 June with the arrival of the two hospital

ships Solace and Bountiful. These ships took

aboard 1,099 casualties, which, together with

the gradual decrease of the casualty rate to 500

per day, helped relieve the overload on medical

facilities of the transports."'

Japanese Air Activity

During the afternoon, the enemy attempted

limited air interference over Saipan, and two

Japanese planes were shot down. One of the

89 Corps Arty 5-3 Report, 6.

99 PP 56 0-3 Report, Periodic Reports, 18-19 June.

91 COMINCH P-007, 5-19.

PLANES FROM ESCORT CARRIERS, like the Kalinin Bay, operated at Saipan on combat air patrol missions and in close

support of ground troops.

106
pilots, captured by the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, near Aslito Airfield, stated that he had

been one of the two remaining pilots on

Guam.92

Against our ships, Japanese aircraft had

been, more active and somewhat more successful. Early in the morning (0540) of 18 June,

"several" enemy aircraft attacked Task Unit

52.17.6, then steaming about 12 miles west of

Saipan anchorage. The raiders achieved no

hits, although the Maryland reported near

misses off her starboard quarter. Ships' gunfire succeeded in downing one Japanese fighter.

In the afternoon, at 1650, three tankers of Task

Unit 16.7.1 were damaged in an attack by 10

enemy planes. The results of this attack were

entirely favorable to the Japanese, since none

of their planes were lost. Two of the damaged

oilers (N e8ltanic and Saugatuck) were able to

remain at Saipan while the third (Saranac)

was more seriously hit, losing all power. After

temporary repairs the latter ship returned to

Eniwetok.

Carrier Support Unit Two (TU 52.11) was

attacked near Saipan by a "formation" of

Japanese aircraft. While achieving no hits, the

Japanese lost five fighters as a result of ships'

gunfire and aircraft from the carriers. The

real naval tragedy of the day occurred when

U. S. planes were forced to land on their carriers after dark. This difficult feat resulted in

the loss of 31 planes. Following these losses,

the CVE (escort carrier) Kalinin Bay was sent

to Eniwetok for replacements."

The Japanese air attacks that struck Saipan

on 18 June were made by scattered remnants

of a large conglomerate force of 120-130 naval

planes which was to hit the landing beaches

and landing ships. To assemble this force, the

Japanese had been obliged to scrape the bottom

of the barrel in both planes and men. The

planes were of various types, ranging from

medium bombers to fighters; two-thirds of the

pilots were experienced, the remainder were

students. En route from Yokosuka to Saipan,

.the force was intercepted by U. S. carrier air92 TF 56 G-2 Report, 14. NTLF G-2 Report, 14.

93 TF 51 Report, End L, 2 and Annex 1 to End A.

craft with the result that most of the enemy

force was knocked down."

Night of 18-19 June

The night was relatively quiet. All divisions

reported only sporadic sniping and minor infiltrations.

Some of the optimism which had characterized previous Japanese reports was absent from

the operation order of Colonel Suzuki, commanding officer of the 135th Infantry Regiment, issued on the night of 18 June:

1. Since Red landings there are ... about 100 tanks

... north of the airfield [undoubtedly referring to our

tanks]. Our forces will reorganize their lines and prepare for decisive battle.95

On Tinian, meanwhile, Japanese were attempting to piece- together the jigsaw puzzle of

vague details and to figure out what was occurring under the smoke and noise on Saipan apd

in the seas around them. Such radio messages

as had been received were obscure in meaning

and only served to heighten the curiosity.

Typical of the wonderment is an entry in the

diary of an unidentified noncommi sioned officer stationed on Tinian: "18 Ju e—

Admiral Toyoda, Ci.nC Combined Fleet, reported 'We have the enemy just ,where we want

him.' Where is the fleet? The enemy continues

to land on Saipan." 96

D-PLUS 4-19 JUNE

The Approach to Nafutan Point

The NTLF Operation Order for 19 June instructed the three divisions to "complete missions assigned" in the previous day's order.

Successful execution of this would place the

landing force lines along Objective line 0-3

(See Map 13).97

The 27th Infantry Division continued its attack at 0730, 19 June, and in the zone of the

165th Infantry reached Magicienne Bay to the

94 USSBS No. 434, Interrogation of Captain Akira

Sasaki, IJN, a member of the Yokosuka Air °orbs

from March to July 1944.

95 NTLF G-2 Report, 15.

96 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #11,405.

97 NTLF Operation Order 7-44.

107
north of Nafutan Point." Contact existed with

the 4th Marine Division on the left. Slower

movement by the 105th Infantry along the

south coast caused a break between the flanks

of the two regiments, and it was necessary for

the 165th to patrol this interval.

In the southern part of the division zone the

advance led straight onto Nafutan Point.

Dominating the approaches to the point itself

is a sheer hill mass, the jagged western face of

which is almost as precipitous as a cliff. It was

against this formidable obstacle that the 1st

Battalion, 105th Infantry, made several unsuccessful ventures. The terrain virtually defied movement from the west. The 3d Battalion, 105th, still investigating caves along the

south coast and urging cave occupants to surrender, lagged behind. Large numbers of

civilians were takes from the caves by this unit.

But by late afternoon, a gap had developed

between it and the 1st Battalion, and it was

necessary to commit the 1st Battalion, 165th

Infantry, in order to tie them in.

The 4th Division Left Progresses

In the 4th Marine Division zone, only local

successes were achieved, but these all added up

to an improvement of the situation and an

integration of forces for the continuation of

the attack. At 0700, a large assemblage of

Japanese troops and tanks, apparently forming

for a counterattack, was observed near Tsu98 It is interesting to note that while 27th DivisionMarine controversies were agitated following the operation, none were brewing on 19 June when Major

General Ralph Smith, the 27th Division commander,

r4aid in a radio recording at Aslito Airfield: ". . . this

is an appropriate point to emphasize the perfect teamwork that has existed between the Navy, Marines, and

the Army. It irritates me a little to read these stories

back home because a soldier and a Marine get in a

fight in a saloon that the relations between services are

at cross purposes. Nothing could be farther from the

truth out here in the field.... I want to stress the very

cordial feeling that exists between the outfits. One of

the 165th's officers remarked to me this morning that

Saipan has sealed the blood brotherhood between the

services." Recording made by Radio Recording Unit,

V Amphibious Corps, Public Relations Section on 19

June 1944.

99 Lemp, 12. R. C. Smith, 44. 105th Inf Report, 5.

165th Inf Report, 4.

108

tsuuran. Immediately, all battalions of the 14th

Marines registered on this area and poured in

massed fires. The Japanese quickly dispersed,

and no more was seen of them.

The 24th and 25th Marines continued mopping-up operations and readjustment of. the

lines throughout the day. The 3d Battalion,

25th Marines, designated as division reserve,

moved to an assembly area in rear of the 23d

Marines as protection for the left flank.

The 23d Marines, with Vandegrift's 3d Battalion, 24th, still attached, attacked following

a preparation fired on 0-2 and the western

slopes of troublesome Hill 500 by the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment (4.5-inch rockets

mounted on trucks) and the 2d and 4th Battalions, 14th Marines. As the attack progressed,

the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines—the center

battalion—was pinched out, Cosgrove's composite battalion and Dillon's 2d Battalion

(reinforced with the 3d Battalion's rifle companies) taking over the assigned regimental

frontage.

The day's gains were considerable, a line 400

yards west of 0-3 being reached. Here again,

however, concern about the area between divisions caused the 23d Marines to pull back about

400 yards where the terrain was more favorable

to the protection of the left flank. Patrol contact was established with the 8th Marines (2d

Marine Division) on the left. Both regiments

exchanged patrols throughout the night. (See

Map 13.)

The 23d Marines suffered a critical loss during the day : Lieutenant Colonel Cosgrove, one

of the division's ablest officers and leader of

the composite battalion, was wounded by an

enemy rifle bullet."°

Active Patrolling

Aggressive patrolling was the principal activity in the 2d Marine Division zone of action.

Patrols from the 2d Marines encountered three

Japanese tanks near the beach road to Garapan

and destroyed two of them. At noon the 2d

Regiment was strengthened by arrival of its•

1st Battalion, which reverted from division

100 lith Mar Div Report, Section VI, 20. 23d Mar Report, 38.
reserve to parent control. Another shift took

one company (F) of the attached 2d Battalion,

6th Marines, from 2d Marines' control and returned it to its own regiment.'°1

Attachments and detachments of companies

and battalions had been demanded by the

normal confusion of the amphibious assault.

As units arrived at the beach, it was often

necessary to feed them into the lines where they

were needed, rather than adhering rigidly to

principles of tactical unity. To well-trained

tactical units these shifts were accomplished

with very little difficulty; loyalty was extended

from subordinate to senior and from senior to

subordinate, regardless of the composition of

the command.

Patrols from the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,

discovered that a dominating hill (790) to the

front, strongly defended previously, was now

abandoned, and the battalion moved forward to

occupy it.102 Why the Japanese chose to evacuate so powerful and thoroughly prepared a

position remains a mystery.

Patrols from the 8th Marines sought, in

addition to enemy information, routes of supply and evacuation for projected moves to the

north and northeast. The 8th Marines' zone,

including the summit of Mt. Tapotchau, presented logistical problems of great magnitude.

No roads ran through the area, and such trails

as existed were impossible of negotiation by

trucks. Along the right flank ran a valley,

ending abruptly in a deep gorge. To the front

there was no apparent break in the cliffs. To

the left was a tortuous nightmare of dead-end

gulleys and blind-alley ravines. There was no

single, simple solution to this problem."3

Artillery Situation

General Harper's Corps Artillery had by

now assumed an important role in the fight.

Twenty-one of its 24 155mm howitzers and 11

of its 24 155mm guns were in position and

firing. Long-range destruction, night harassing, and interdiction fires were begun in general

101 2d Mar Report, 3.

1026th Mar Report, 6.

103 8th Mar Report, 3.

support and reinforcement of the 10th and

14th Marines and, subsequently, of the 27th

Division Artilleq. Observers in liaison planes

made possible registration deep in enemy territory, to prevent movement and assembly of

troops during daylight hours, to place destruction fires on permanent enemy installations, to

seek and search for targets developed and reported by intelligence agencies, and to keep

units informed of the trace of front lines.'"

Cooperation between artillery units at Saipan left little to be desired throughout the

campaign. Instances of faulty coordination

later in the campaign were failures of organization and technique—not of cooperation. As

a case in point, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick

J. Karch, R-3 of the 14th Marines, described

a series of conferences between General Harper

and operations officers of the three divisions'

artillery units. The purpose of these meetings

was to insure coordination and maximum effective employment of artillery resources.

After looking over the fire plans presented by

the various operations officers, the general

would coordinate these, designate corps artillery units that would reinforce the fires of the

divisions' artillery, and explain how and why

it would be done. His manner instilled a feeling of confidence and good will and left no

• doubt that his only concern was to bring the

greatest amount of artillery fire where it would

be needed most."5

Unfortunately, these conferences were discontinued as the operation progressed; thereafter, detailed coordination of field artillery

fires was lacking. Coordination of supporting

arms continued to be exercised at Northern '

Troops and Landing Force command post.106

An artillery fire mission, delivered on 19

June under somewhat makeshift circumstances,

exhibited both cooperation and ingenuity. A

1st Battalion, 14th Marines, forward observer

noted a Japanese field artillery battery in position near Magicienne Bay. Sitting in an aban104 Corps Arty S-3 Report, 6-7.

105 In his book, Holland Smith is loud in praise of

General Harper. Coral and Brass, 167.

100 Kareh.

109
doned Japanese observation post, using captured Japanese 15-power field glasses, the

observer communicated his fire mission to his

battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC) by

means of an SCR 300 Radio. It was necessary

to relay this request through another forward

observer's radio, since the first set would not

reach the FDC. The 1st Battalion already had

a direct support assignment which precluded

its firing the task, so the mission was further

relayed to the regimental FDC by telephone.

As none of the 14th Marines' organic battalions

were unemployed, the mission was sent by

radio to the XXIV Corps Artillery, whose

155mm howitzers fired the mission with very

(rood effect.107

Rear Installations

The ever-mounting number of captives demanded establishment, on 19 June, of a prisoner

of war stockade at the southern edge of Charan Kanoa. Seriously ill or wounded prisoners

of war were hospitalized under guard in a

nearby unit of the hospital maintained by the

Medical Battalion, V Amphibious Corps. Interpreters on duty at the enclosure facilitated

the handling of prisoners, and use was made of

enemy noncommissioned officers to supervise

and control them. Japanese and Koreans were

kept in separate enclosure because of their

characteristic hate for one another. The Cha—

morros, while technically, not prisoners of

war, required handling by civil affairs personnel and added to an already great problem.

Captured materiel fulfilled the greater part

of the requirements for food, clothing and

shelter.108

At Aslito Airfield, construction and repair

work continued. To provide some measure of

protection from raids by enemy aircraft, one

gun battery and one automatic weapons battery from the 864th Antiaircraft Artillery

Group were installed at the field during the

day.'"

107 J. P. Ryan, 10.

108 NTLF 0-1 Report, 9.

100 TF 56 0-3 Report, Periodic Reports, 19-20 June.

110

CHAMORRO being questioned by Spanish-speaking Marine.

Since the Chamorros were able to. speak Japanese in

addition to their native tongue, they were helpful in

relaying questions to Japanese prisoners and back to

. United States Spanish-speaking interrogators. Clamorros hated the Japanese soldiers.

Night of 19-20 June

The most vicious action of the night occurred

in the sector occupied by the 2d Battalion, 24th

Marines. Starting at about 0350 and lasting

until daylight, an enemy force of approximately 75 attacked the Marines with grenades

and bayonets. In the close-in fighting that

ensued, 11 Marines were wounded, but, in the

process, the enemy attack was broken. By daylight, many of the attackers were sprawled forward of the Marines' foxholes, the rest had

taken to their heels.110

Elsewhere there was little activity, though

the 6th Marines experienced a brief flurry when

15 Japanese attempted to infiltrate the lines.

In most sectors, it was almost a restful night."'

It is of interest to note that the Japanese

were still worried about a landing at Magicienne Bay. At 1300 on 19 June, General Saito

issued an "order of the Southern Marianas

Force," which said, in part, as follows:

110 Rothivell.

111 2d Mar Div Reports, Section VI, 7.
BABY SITTERS were available at Saipan. Civilians were at first afraid of United States troops but grew to trust

them as time went on. Many civilians, saturated with Japanese propaganda to the effect that the Americans

would torture them; committed suicide rather than surrender.

2. The Division will hold the areas shown on this

map [Map 13] and together with reorganizing its units

will interrupt the plan of the enemy which has previously landed.

3. The 118th Infantry Regiment will hold the area

shown on the amp and particularly it will prevent the

enemy's plan of landing on Magicienne Bay. [Author's

italics.]

6. The main strength of the tank unit will assemble

in the area of their maintenance unit [believed to have

been Chacha Village]. It will cooperate with the 118th

Regiment and together prevent the advance of the

enemy from the beach and prepare a counterattack

plan against enemy landing in Magicienne Bay area.

[Author's italics.]

Why the possibility of a Magicienne Bay

landing should have so captured the Japanese

attention that they actually deployed their

forces in anticipation of it, is one of the unanswered questions relative to the campaign.

It perhaps indicates that their intelligence

officer was over-emphasizing this one capability, or, perhaps, General Saito had projected

himself into the attacker's position and was

countering a move which he would have

favored."2

By perusing the estimate of combat strength

made by General Iketa,, chief of staff, 31st

112 NTLF G-2 Report, 16.

111
Army, on 19 June, we may better appreciate

the effectiveness of the offensive to date:

Division—about 4% infantry battalions (31A already

destroyed) ; 1 battalion artillery (2 battalions already

destroyed).

Mixed Brigade—infantry unknown; no artillery (2

battalions already destroyed).

Other Infantry—about 1 composite battalion (242 battalions destroyed).

Tanks—about 2 companies (3 companies destroyed).

Army Artillery (under Army command—none (2 battalions destroyed).

Anti-Aircraft Artillery—about 1 battery (4 batteries

destroyed).

Independent Engineers—none (3 companies destroyed).

113

Eager to notice any diminution in the vigor

of the U. S. effort, General Iketa wrote on the

evening of 19 June,:

The enemy bombing and shelling is relatively scattered compared to Yesterday. . . . Targets were area

east of Aslito Airfield and gun positions east of Garapan.

Enemy troops have \apparently infiltrated into Aslito

Airport. . .. It is planned to carry out a concentrated

shelling of the three places where the Navy has stored

250 800-kilogram bombs at the airfield.114

Though the airfield was subjected to Japanese

shelling from time to time, the cache of bombs

was never hit.

BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA

On 19 June, while conducting survey operations off Tanapag Harbor, a mine sweeper

(YMS 323) received direct hits from a 4.7-

inch battery on Mutcho Point. The ship was

holed in two places below the waterline and a

fire started forward near the magazine. Fortunately, the Japanese projectiles were armor

piercing and did not explode. With the assistance of salvage tubs, the fire and flooding were

brought under control.

"Several" Japanese aircraft attacked shipping in Saipan anchorage at 1900 with negative

results on both sides; no U. S. ships hit, no

Japanese aircraft down.115

115 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 10. A later

report corrected this estimate in one respect: "Our

previous message that there is no more artillery is a

mistake. We have nine type 95 field pieces." It should

also be noted that this estimate does not include navy

troops on the island.

114 Ibid., 11-12.

115 TF 51 Report, Annex 1 to End A and End L, 2.

112

Farther at sea, meanwhile, Admiral Spruance's forces sought the Japanese Fleet (report

of whose movement toward Saipan on 15 June

had oCcasioned withdrawal of the bulk of the

shipping from nearby waters). In point of air

and surface striking power, the American

naval force was the strongest armada ever

assembled up to that time.'" On 19 June began

the engagement later called the Battle of the

Philippine Sea. (See Map 12.)

The action of the 19th consisted of a largescale, lengthy attack by enemy aircraft on

Spruance's ships and two air battles over

Guam. The results of the day's action were

extremely favorable to us: of 545 Japanese

planes seen by U. S. pilots, 402 were destroyed,117 as against 26 American planes lost

and minor damage to five U. S. ships. This

massacre of enemy planes. has frequently been

referred to as the "Saipan Turkey Shoot." The

South Dakota was the only ship to receive a

direct hit (250 kg. bomb), while near misses

were scored on the Minneapolis, Wasp and

Bunker Hill. One Japanese plane crashed

against the side of the Indiana at the water

line but caused only superficial damage. Fighting efficiency was promptly restored to all

ships.

With decisive air attacks against Saipan unlikely because of heavy carrier plane losses,

Spruance's fleet headed to the westwara at 23

knots, hoping to bring the Japanese fleet to

action. Operating in a related action, U. S.

submarines accounted for two 30,000-ton enemy

aircraft carriers.

June 19th had, indeed, been devastating to

the Japanese. The 402 planes, had they not

been destroyed, might have delivered telling

116 Task Force 58 had been reinforced with units

from TF 51 (Joint Expeditionary Force) to counter

the Japanese threat. On 19 June, the force contained

seven large carriers (Hornet, Yorktown, Bunker Hill,

Wasp, Enterprise, Lexington and Essex), eight light

carriers (Bataan, Belleau Wood, Monterey, Cabot, San

Jacinto, Princeton, Cowpens and Langley), seven fast

battleships (Alabama, South Dakota, Indiana, New

Jersey, Iowa, Washington and North Carolina), 21

cruisers and 67 destroyers.

117 Numbers of planes seen and destroyed probably

includes some duplication.
blows on U. S. shipping and granted a brief

reprieve to the faltering Japanese war machine.

Throughout most of the following day (20

June) the U. S. fleet sought the retreating

enemy. It was not until late afternoon, however, that search planes finally made contact

with enemy ships; and, by the time heavy

strikes (216 planes). were sent out, it was nearly

sunset. The Japanese force was so far to westward that the attacks had to be made at extreme'

range. Despite the heavy barrage of antiaircraft fire' and interception by small groups

of fighters (totaling about 35 planes), the Japanese Fleet was kept under continuous attack

from 1820 to 1900.

Precarious shortage of gasoline and the

coming of darkness cut the attacks short. On

the return our pilots had difficulty in locating

their carriers, and many landed in darkness.

The scene became a nightmare. of feverish confusion as carriers turned on searchlights, white

truck lights, and fired star shells in a desperate

effort to home their planes. This part of the

operation was to be slow and costly; the battle

against darkness and distance was to claim

many more casualties than the enemy. Of the

216 planes that had taken off on the afternoon

strike, only 116 landed safely; of the 100 that

failed, 20 were shot down in combat or unaccounted for, the remaining 80 lost in water

landings because of fuel shortages or in deck

crashes. Over 75 percent of those personnel in

the planes making water landings were picked

up in the dark by destroyers and cruisers. The.

damage inflicted on the Japanese ships and

prevention of enemy interference of operations

at Saipan, however, made our losses a fait, if

tragic, price to pay in return. One enemy carrier and two tankers were sunk; four carriers,

a battleship, a large cruiser and a tanker were

severely damaged. In addition, 22 Japanese

planes were shot down.

•

Because of the disorganization of U. S.

carrier task group screens and the shortage of

fuel in the destroyers, pursuit of the enemy ,

fleet during the night could not be pressed, and

a speed of 16 knots was maintained as the ships

ploughed on to. westward.

Following its crushing defeats on 19-20

June, the Japanese Fleet retreated full speed

toward Okinawa. U. S. search planes located

the enemy ships on the 21st, but planes sent out

to attack failed-. to gain contact. Admiral

Spruance's primary mission precluded getting

out of range of the Marianas, and, by evening

of 21 June, he abandoned the chase. The Battle

of the Philippine Sea had broken Japanese

efforts to reinforce the Marianas; thereafter,

the capture went forward without serious outside interference.118 (See Map 12.)

The death blow had thus been dealt to Japanese carrier-based air power. In attempting

again to rebuild his carrier groups, the enemy

had to start from scratch. This handicap,

heightened by short fuel supply, was too great.

-With their retirement from the Marianas, the

Japanese carriers virtually retired from the

war.119

The reaction of Japanese Corporal Tai

Suzuki, stationed on Guam, to the activities

which were exploding about him is indicated

in his diary entry of 19 June:

Heard that a powerful air unit took part in a battle

out here. Today, I saw the much hoped for air battle.

Our planes shot down some enemy planes in a short

time. I heaved a sigh of relief. Since our planes had attacked enemy ships, fuel was running low and ammunition was exhausted after eleven hours of continual

flight. Just before they landed, enemy planes attacked

them and they made forced landings. I wonder how

they felt. I hear that there are a number of pilots who

are only 17 or 18!!! . I heard that the enemy has 500

ships and 7,500 planes in the Central Pacific Area and

that the climax of this battle will come In about a week.

I am worried as no word has been received since the

landings were made on Saipan.120

D-PLUS 5-20 JUNE

The attack on 20 June was again a pivoting

movement to the north. The two Marine divisions would attack toward Objective line 0-4,

and the 27th Division would "complete the

seizure of objective 0-3" (which included all of

318 Campaigns, 214-215. 5th Fleet Initial Report,

8-13. JANAC. The Navy's Air War, 208-213. King,

110.

1111 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey

(Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The Air Effort

Against Japan, 50-51.

120 CINCPAC—CINCP0A Item #10,802.

113
Na futan Point, the southernmost extremity) .

121

Surge to 0-4

In the 2d Division, the 2d and 6th Marines

confined their activities principally to patrolling, since they were the hinges of the swinginggate movement. Combat-reconnaissance patrols from Lieutenant Colonel Johnston's 3d

Battalion, 2d Marines, moved almost to the

southern outskirts of Garapan. In the foothills,

a short distance southeast of the town, the

Marines found an abandoned Japanese tank in

operating condition with full fuel tanks. They

destroyed the machine with demolitions and

returned to their lines.122

Patrols sent out by the 6th Marines discovered no defensive positions of consequence

within 500 yards to the front. Orders to maintain contact with the 8th Marines, however,

precluded any forward movement of the regiment's lines.123

The 8th Marines, meanwhile, continued the

attack, making its main (and only) effort

on the right, in the 2d Battalion zone. This

battalion, after 4th Marine Division units came

abreast, was required, to swing northward along

the front of the 0-1 ridge line. An unusual

feature of this action was that other battalions

of the 8th Marines, from their positions on top

of the ridge line, could watch the entire attack

of the 2d Battalion (like a military school

demonstration) as it passed below them.

Progress was rapid; by 1300, the 2d Battalion had pushed the 8th Marines' front to

objective 04, having met virtually no resistance. This advance and swinging movement

so reduced the regiment's frontage that it was

possible to withdraw two of its four battalions

from the lines. As the regiment dug in for the

night, the 1st and 2d Battalions were along the

front, while the 3d Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, were in reserve.124

121 NTLF Operation Order 8-44.

122,2d Mar Report, 3.

123 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 5-6. 6th Mar Report, 6.

124 8th Mar Report, 3.

114

The Capture of Hill 500

The 4th Marine Division, on the right of the

swinging gate, completed its change of direction and achieved long gains. General Holland

Smith had ordered the 27th Division to extend

its front and take over the 25th Marines' zone

along the coast of Magi cienne Bay. Since the

25th Marines' combat efficiency was considered

less impaired than the 23d Marines' however,

General Schmidt immediately ordered it to

assume the 23d's frontage on the division left

and continue the attack.

The original jumping-off hour had been

0900, but a delay was necessitated in order that

the 25th might move the entire width of the

division's front to its newly assigned zone. At

1030, the attack was launched, 25th Marines on

the left, 24th on right, and 23d in reserve.

The zone of the 25th Marines, formerly

assigned to the 23d Marines, was sufficiently

narrow to permit it to attack in a column of

battalions, with Lieutenant Colonel Chambers'

3d Battalion leading. The day's objective was

an important one: Hill 500. This dominating

feature had provided the Japanese with excellent observation-post sites, caves for command posts, as well as a natural defensive position. Colonel Oka, commander of the 47th

Mixed Brigade, had at one time used the hill

for his command post, although he had decided

prior to 20 June that other localities (farther

to the rear) were more suitable to his needs.

Colonel Chambers' plan for the attack of

Hill 500 was conventional in most respects.

The formation was two companies forward (I

and L) and one in reserve (K). Preparatory

fires were to be furnished by rockets (1st

Provisional Rocket Detachment), artillery (1st

and 3d Battalions, 14th Marines), 37mm guns

(from the 25th Marines' Regimental Weapons

Company) and the 3d Battalion's own 81mm

mortars. The one unusual feature of the attack plan was that the movement over the flat,

open terrain just south of Hill 500 was to be

screened by smoke. All too often at Saipan

(as elsewhere throughout the Pacific War), this

valuable weapon was neglected.

Because smoke would complicate the 3d Battalion's, problems of control, coordination and
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0 60 120 180

NAUTICAL MILES

MAP 12

,,■.—....--,

SCHEDULE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS — BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA

EVENT TIME JAPANESE ACTIONS U. S. ACTIONS

1. 0900,

13

June

Group One, 3 battleships, 9 cruisers, 9 carriers, and 27

destroyers, departs Tawi Tawi.

Bombarding Saipan.

2. 2100,

13

June

Group Two, 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers,

departs Batjan anchorage.

3. 14

June

Submarine reports that large Japanese naval forces,

present two days earlier, had sortied from Tawi Tawi.

4. 15

June

Submarines report the passage through San Bernadino

Strait of large Japanese naval forces.

_

Morn16 June

Groups One and Two rendezvous and refuel. Admiral Spruance announces plan of action.

6. 1700,

17 June

Fleet departs rendenous area enroute Southern Marianas.

7. Noon,

18 June

Fleet 600 miles west of Saipan. Carrier planes search

for U. S. Fleet.

Task Force 58 rendezvous.

8. After1 r funr; e

Fleet changes course to southeast, continues search. Tender-based patrol planes search 500 miles west from

Saipan. Negative results.

9. Night,

18-19

June

Fleet continues to southeast. Patrol planeskmsgaerveurtearualtr search 600 miles west from

10. 0720,

19

June

0800,

19

June

Naval aircraft rise from Guam fields to engage U. S.

carrier aircraft.

Large number of carrier aircraft arrive at Guam,

expecting to refuel.

Combat air patrol from TF 58 sights enemy planes taking off from Guam fields.

TF 58 rushes additional fighters into the air battle

over Guam and inflicts heavy losses on Japanese.

11. 1004,

19

June

Carrier planes launch all-out attacks on ships of TF

58, continue throughout day, inflict minor damage on

SOUTH DAKOTA and INDIANA.

Fighters over Guam recalled, additional fighters take

off from carriers to intercept enemy planes. Ships'

AA exacts heavy toll from Japanese attackers.

12. Afternoon,

19 June

Carriers TAIHO and SHOKAKU sink as a result of

morning torpedoing by U. S. submarines.

13. Night,

19-20

June

Fleet withdraws to westward, planning to refuel and

return towards Marianas.

TF 58 heads to westward at 23 knots, hoping to catch

the Japanese Fleet. Radar searches by patrol planes

from Saipan give negative results.

14. 0526,

20 June

Fleet unable to pause for refueling because of proximity of U. S. scouting planes, continues westward all

day.

TF 68 launches planes to try to locate enemy fleet,

results negative until about 1515, when enemy fleet

contacted about 250 miles west of U. S. Fleet.

15. 0630,

20 June

216 planes take off from TF 68 carriers to attack

enemy ships.

it. Night,

20-21

June

Carrier HIYO and two tankers sunk and seven ships

damaged by U. S. air attacks.

U. S. planes return and land on carriers in darkness,

suffer heavy losses.

17. 21

June

Fleet retires toward Okinawa. Carrier planes search for Japanese cripples, negative

results.

18. Evening,

21 June

TF 58 retires toward Saipan to protect Attack Force.
maintenance of direction, a road which crossed

the unit's .zone of action (Laulau Road) about

500 yards south of Hill 500 was designated as

a phase line. At this road, a quick reorganization was to be effected, the direction of advance

reoriented (if necessary), and the assault on

Hill 500 begun.

The 3d Battalion's attack was as well-executed as it was well-planned. The principal

resistance (rifles and machine guns) was encountered by Company I, on the right, and this

tom a wood southeast of the hill. After

pausing briefly at the road for a quick reorganization, the assault of Hill 500 was

launched. By this time, the objective had been

subjected to a severe, thundering beating administered by the 4.5-inch rockets. As the

Marines charged up the hill through. the thinning smoke, artillery shells walked ahead -in

sturdy escort. Shortly before noon the hill was

seized, and mopping up of the cave network

began. Compartments at different levels and

angles made it possible for the Japanese occupants to retreat from one cave-room to another,

and the cleaning out process was a slow one.

The price for Hill 500 was- not light. Chambers' battalion suffered 49 casualties, nine of

whom were killed. Counted Japanese dead

numbered 44. Upon examination, it was found

that Hill 500 had been well organized for defense but that the positions were not strongly

manned. As darkness approached, the Marines

dug in to defend their newly won possession.125

(See Map 13.)

To Chambers' right, meanwhile, the 24th

Marines set the pace for the 20 June surge.

Located as it was, on the end of the landing

force swinging-gate, the 24th Regiment was

required to move the greatest distances in order

to reach the day's objective-0-4. Attacking

with two battalions abreast, 1st along the east

coast and 2d in contact with the 25th Marines,

it made excellent progress.

The delay in attack hour, occasioned by the

25th Marines' passage of the 23rd Marines'

lines, allowed time for unusually thorough

rlanning of the day's attack. All commanders

125 8d Bn, 25th Mar Report, 6-7.

made good use of available time, and results

achieved speak well for the adequacy of their

preparations. This was particularly true in the

2d Battalion zone where, because of exceptionally good tank terrain, the regimental commander assigned 12 medium and three flamethrower tanks, as well as four INT ( A) 's. The

battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Rothwell, spent considerable time orienting subordinate commanders and readying for the

jump-off. The ,day's 2,700 yard advance provided a lift to the morale and, according to

the battalion's action report, "proved to be the

best coordinated tank and infantry attack of

the Operation."

By late afternoon, the 24th Marines dug in

on objective 0-4.126 (See Map 13.)

Securing the Cliff

Two days before, the 24th Marines, in order

to maintain the momentum of its attack toward

the east coast, had by-passed a cliff-like ridge

line. Since it would be unwise to leave behind

such a potential source of trouble, Mustain's

1st Battalion, 25th Marines, had been assigned

to clear it. The assignment was not an easy

one. On the 19th, Mustain's attack had struck

the cliff from the west, directly into its face.

This attack, involving a cross-compartment

move, was unsuccessful, since Japanese riflemen, peering from the shelter, of caves, could

bring accurate fire to bear on anyone approaching them. Mustain's battalion made practically

no gains on the 19th, and on the debit side of

the ledger suffered 26 casualties.

With the coming of darkness, Mustain went

to' the division command post (the battalion

was operating under division control at this

time) to get approval of his plan for 20 June:

to attack the cliff line from the south. The plan

approved, and subsequently executed, called

for - the tanks of Company A, 4th Tank Battalion, to move from the south along the lowland at the west edge of the cliff, destroying

any enemy positions located. This move was

to be repeated three times, with the 1st Battalion's company commanders riding along on

126 1st Bn, 24th Mar Report, 3. 2d Bn, 24 Mar Report, 4. Bothwell.

115
MT.

TAPOTCHAU

1. HILL 500

HILL 600

RUGGED COASTAL AREA, zone of the 24th Marines, frequently slowed the advance as much as did the enemy. Hill 500

was the scene of the 25th Marines' bitter 20 June action. On 23 June the Japanese contested hotly the 23d

Marines' seizure of Hill 600.

the first trip to get a good view of the terrain.

On the third trip, men of . the 1st Battalion

would move with the tanks and the cliff would

be cleaned out and secured.

Generally, the scheme worked out as planned.

The first two runs by the tanks, however, were

unremunerative, inasmuch as the wily Japanese

held their fire and did not reveal their positions. When the infantry moved out with the

tanks, it was another story: plunging fire rained

down upon the Marines as they made their way

along the base of the cliff. But all in all, the

attack from the south, which restricted Japanese observation, was infinitely more successful.

than another one from the west would have

been. As with a person looking from a window

of a tall building: it is easier to observe some116

one approaching from some distance off than

someone moving along the sidewalk at the

base of the building.

Slowly—but surely—the caves were cauterized with flame-throwers and sealed with demolitions. Some caves, because of their location

on the sheer cliffside, were inaccessible to the

infantrymen and became the destruction-responsibility of the tanks. Around noon the

proceedings were delayed when a Japanese

bomb-dump exploded in the midst of Company

A. The explosion, caused either by the detonation of a Japanese mortar shell or by a creeping

canefield fire set by tracer bullets, disorganized

the company. Three of its four remaining

officers became casualties, and the lone officer_

unscathed could count but 45 men left in Com-
NAFUTAN POINT as it appeared from UM 500. At such distance, the terrain appears more gentle than it did to the

2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, who fought on the point until 3 July.

pany A.

While Company A struggled along at the

base of the cliff, Company B worked from the

top down, burning and blowing up caves higher

on the cliff. Some Japanese, flushed by Company B's cleaning methods, were found to be

armed with U. S. M-1 rifles and in possession

of type "C" rations and American five-gallon

water cans. How and where the Japanese had

obtained these items was never revealed.

Following Company A's disastrous experience with the exploding bomb-dump, Company

C took over the zone at the base of the cliff,

came abreast of Company B, and the reduction

of the troublesome cliff line continued. After

reducing this by-passed defensive point in the

division rear, the 1st Battalion was released

from division control and returned to the 25th

Marines. It then occupied an assembly area in

regimental reserve.127

Darkness of 20 June found both Marine divisions facing north. The wheeling movement

had been completed. (See Map 13.)

127 1st Bn, 25th Mar Report, 8-12.

Punches at the Point

The 27th Division, meanwhile, continued its

attack to seize Nafutan Point. Because further

attacks from the west might be extremely

costly, the division selected a scheme of maneuver involving attack from the north and

northwest. The 165th Infantry Regiment, from

its sector along Magicienne Bay, would execute the main effort, using its 2d and 3d

Battalions and the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, attached for this maneuver. The 1st

Battalion, 165th, was to remain on the shore of

Magicienne Bay and maintain contact with

the 4th Marine Division.

With the assistance of artillery, 4.2-inch

mortars, tanks, self-propelled mounts,128 naval

gunfire and air support, the attack was

launched. The terrain was rugged and the

advance slow, but by nightfall a foothold On

the high ground at the northwestern end of the

point was seized and the entire line moved

128 Designated AIM, the self-propelled mount has a

turret enclosing four .50-caliber machine guns mounted

on a half-track chassis.

117
about 1,000 yards. During the advance, units

were subjected to artillery fire from across

Magicienne Bay. Naval gunfire and air strikes

knocked out these enemy guns later in the day.

The 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, continued

its movement along the south coast, clearing

caves of Japanese soldiers and civilians as it

went. This type of work was extremely timeconsuming and progress was slow.

In regard to its cave-cleaning task lie 105th

Infantry reported:

The enemy action in this area consisted of individuals and small groups, not only of service personnel,

but also of civilians, taking positions in the crevices,

holes and caves along the seacoast and along the cliff

dividing the coastal plain from the Aslito Plateau

from which they would fire at our units as they advanced. There seemed to be no coordination of the

enemy positions or their fires but they did evidence the

utmost stubborness in the defense of their individual

positions. Because of the presence of an appreciable

number of civilians, it was attempted to convince them,

through the use of loudspeakers mounted on tanks,

and interpreters, to come out from the caves and surrender. In a few cases this technique was successful,

three hundred thirty five civilians—men, women and

children—being rescued in this manner. In the majority

of cases, however, because of the presence of enemy

soldiers, the civilian element ignored our pleas and

continued to fire at our soldiers.129

Colonel Russell G. Ayres' 106th Infantry

Regiment, which had remained afloat in Joint

Expeditionary Troops Reserve, landed on 20

June on Yellow Beaches and assumed the status

of NTLF reserve, 1st Battalion in rear of the

2d Marine Division and the remainder of the

regiment behind the 4th Marine Division.

With the arrival of this unit, the 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry, was released from NTLF reserve and moved to an area near Aslito Airfield

in 27th Division reserve.130

The decision to land the 106th Infantry was

not made without a great deal of thought and

consideration. This move had been first recommended on 16 June by the advance headquarters of the landing force. Admiral Turner,

however, took no action on the request, holding

it in abeyance because it would have a delaying

129 105th htf Report, 6.

139 1?. C. Smith, 5-6. 106th Infantry Report, 2, hereinafter cited as 106th Inf Report. 165th Int Report, 4.

118

effect on the Guam operation, which at that

time was scheduled for 18 June. The latter

landing would require a reserve and it was

hoped that this would be the 106th Infantry.

On the evening of 18 June, General Holland

Smith formally recommended to Turner- that

the regiment be landed "in order to maintain

the continuity of the offensive." The next

morning (0810, 19 June) Turner requested

that Smith give 'further consideration to the

recommendation, since landing the 106th at

Saipan would postpone the Guam attack. In

the same message, Turner also requested advice

as to whether the Guam landing force (Task

Force 53) would any 'longer be required in

the area as a floating reserve for Saipan.

Shortly after noon, Holland Smith sent_ another message to Turner stating that there was,

indeed, urgent need for the 106th Infantry

ashore and renewing his recommendation that

it be landed. In regard to Task Force/53, Smith

recommended that it return to Eniwetok, since

Guam could not be attacked without sufficient

reserves. He also expressed the opinion that,

after the decisive terrain on Saipan had been

captured, it might be possible to spare one regiment to act as the reserve for Guam.

This time Turner concurred, and the 106th

started coming ashore the following day (20

June). He directed, however, that the regiment

land as little material and equipment as possible in order that it could be reembarked on

short notice. Task Force 53 was retained in

the area for the time being, but on 25 June

the ships carrying the 3d Marine Division were

ordered to Eniwetok, followed on the 30th by

those transporting the 1st Provisional Marine

Brigade."1

Late in the evening of 20 June the first

American plane landed on Aslito Airfield.

Many were to follow, and the sanctity of the

Japanese home islands Would soon be violated.

This date also marked the first time the

island of Tinian, some six miles to the south,

would feel the impact of artillery fire originating on Saipan. One battery of 155mm guns of

131 Enclosure (A) to Commander Amphibious Forces

Top •Secret Letter Serial 000156 of 4Sep44.
FIRST AMERICAN PLANE (Navy torpedo bomber) to land at Aslito Airfield brought a wounded gunner in for medical

attention on 20 June.

the Corps Artillery (Battery B, 531st ,Field

Artillery Battalion) emplaced its guns to bear

on this new target. Lateral observation posts

were established along Saipan's southern coast,

and counterbattery and destructive 'fires were

commenced. This single unit provided only a

subtle introduction to the crescendo of fire

which would later shatter the island.132

Reports of the enemy's use of mines and

booby traps were being received by the NTLF

G-2 (Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Yancey,

USA). Prior to the 25th Marines' capture of

Hill 5-00, a Japanese effort to sow a controlled

mine field on the slopes of that hill had been

spotted and dispersed by artillery fire. This

132 Corps Arty S-3 Report, 7.

plan thwarted, the enemy liberally sprinkled

the area with booby traps, using pull-type

friction igniters attached to four pounds of

picric acid. Thirty of this type of booby trap

were later found thereabouts. On White Beach,

on the southern coast, antiboat or antitank

mines were discovered, along with at least five

horned mines. Numerous land mines and booby

traps were found around. Aslito Airfield, and

one road in the southern part .of the island was

found- to be sown with crude booby traps consisting of hand grenades with strings attached

so that a disturbance of the string would pull

the pin and detonate the grenade.133

In regard to the Japanese antitank mine

133 NTLF G-2 Report, 17.

119
supply, Major General Iketa, wrote on 19 June:

A quantity of usable explosive power material

(usable against tanks) was not distributed because of

lack of time and is now being manufactured. The effect of adhesive mines is great. Furthermore Molotov

cocktails 134 (liquid flame bottles) are effective.135

Night of 20-21 June

Principal activity during the night of 20-21

June took place On Hill 500, seized during the

afternoon by the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines.

From caves on all sides .of the hill, small groups

of Japanese armed with grenades and bayonets or knives lashed to the ends of bamboo

poles ("idiot sticks") , crept out to cause as

much trouble as possible. These Japanese, although uncoordinated in their efforts, succeeded

to the extent that Marines on the hill spent a

_tense and anxious nig' ht. When morning came,

31 dead Japanese were found within the 3d

Battalion's lines.136

Elsewhere along the fronts of all three divisions the night was quiet, with only minor

enemy activity, an occasicinal round of Japanese artillery fire, or a star shell fired by our

supporting naval vessels to disturb the silence.

On a quiet night, uncertainty and tension could

sometimes be as insomnia-provoking as a night

full of sound and fury.

Like a broken phonograph record, individual

Japanese repeated their expressions of determined patriotism with unfaltering vehemence.

Tokuzo Matsuya, a member of the 9th Tank

Regiment (rank unknown, presumably a junior

officer) , echoed the usual phrases:

20 :June—The remaining tanks in our regiment now

consist of six Type CHI and six Type 95, making a

total of 12.... Even if there are no tanks, we will fight

hand to hand. . . . I have resolved that, if I see the

enemy, I will take out my sword and slash, slash,

slash at him as long as I last, thus ending my life of

twenty-four years.137

In his summary of the evening of 20 June,

General Iketa showed uncanny prescience in

regard to the 2d Marines at Garapan's outskirts: "The enemy is doing construction work

134 Molotov cocktails, only distantly related to Martinis, are bottles of combustible liquid, which when

thrown against a tank burst into flame.

133 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 11.

136 3d Bn, 25th Mar Report, 7.

137 CINCPAC-CINCP0A Item #10,238.

120

south of Garapan and at present it does not

look as if he will advance. . . ." [author's italics.] 138 The general's estimate was correct. The

2d Marines did not undertake a sustained drive

into Garapan until 2 July, 12 days later.

D-PLUS 6-21 JUNE

The Pause before the Northern Push

With the important pivoting movement to

the north accomplished, General Holland Smith

ordered that 21 June be spent in reorganization,

resupply, mopping up and patrolling, and that

the attack should continue the following day

(22 June). Patrols from the 24th and 25th

Marines moved as far as 1,000-1,500 yards to

their front without discovering any sizeable

enemy force. In the vicinity of Chacha Village

on Kagman Peninsula, however, enemy activity was noted, causing patrol leaders to predict later difficulties.

On Hill 500, men of the 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines, continued their task of cleaning the

caves and surrounding area. Two Japanese

soldiers, taken prisoner, were questioned by an

interpreter and identified as privates first class

and gunners of the 25th Antiaircraft Artillery

Regiment. They had been stationed at Aslito

Airfield, but after the D-Day air strike had

fled to Hill 500. At the suggestion of the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chambers, the Japanese agreed to go into the caves

and try to persuade their comrades to surrender. Supervised by personnel from the battalion intelligence section and some riflemen

from Company I, the endeavor resulted in the

capture of two badly-wounded Japanese. Four

others came out of the caves but were killed

when they tried to resist.139

For the first day since the landing, the 4th

Marine Division had had an opportunity to

catch its breath. General Schmidt displaced

his command post from the beach area to the

high ground along 0-1. The division artillery

regiment (14th Marines) busied itself firing on

targets of opportunity and suspected Japanese

138 CINCPAC-CINCP0A Item #9983-85, 13. The

"construction work" here referred to was the preparation of defenses by the 2d Marines.

'39 3d Bn, 25th Mar Report, 7-8.
positions. Though levels of artillery ammunition were never critically low, some shortages

developed from time to time. Colonel Louis G.

DeHaven, commanding the 14th Marines, later

wrote:

. . My worst head-ache during the operation was the

shortage of artillery ammunition from about the fifth

day until the final arrival of a much delayed replacement, and had it not been that the Army did not seem

to need their reserves, which they left near the beach,

our situation may have been different.140

Patrolling to the 2d Division's front produced only one instance of positive information. A 25-man patrol from the 2d Marines

discovered and thoroughly reconnoitered an

enemy outpost on the rising ground which

overlooks Garapa,n from the southeast. Since

it was apparent that the Japanese position was

too strongly-manned for the Marine patrol to

attack, the latter returned without casualties.'14

During the afternoon, the 8th Marines

juggled its lines in preparation for the next

day's attack. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,

relieved the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, on the

right flank, the latter reverting to regimental

reserve, along with the 3d Battalion.

Patrolling of the rugged terrain forward of

the 6th and 8th Marines failed to reveal any

enemy positions, but no one could feel. that this

promised easy going in the future. A suspicion

existed that perhaps the Japanese had recognized Marine patrols as such and had withheld

fire in expectation of more profitable targets.142

Searching the Swamp

Around Lake Susupe, in the swampy areas,

a large number of Japanese were still in hiding.

Some had been by-passed in the movement

around the lake, others had infiltrated the front

lines and had selected the swamp as their base

of operations. The nuisance effect of these infiltrators was considerable; rear installations

were harassed and the movement of supply

and evacuation vehicles greatly complicated.

A patrol from Headquarters and Service Battery, 4th Battalion, 10th Marines, entered the

swamp on 19 June with a mission of annihi140 Ltr from Col L. C. DeTTaven to CMC, 9.Tan50.

141 2d .11(tr Report, 4.

142 8th liar Report, 4. 6th liar Report, 6.

889590° --50 --9

lilting the Japanese concealed there. After several skirmishes in which about seven Japanese

were killed and two machine guns captured,

the patrol withdrew with the report that more

substantial mopping-up forces would be required.

On 20 June, two platoons of the 2d Division

-.Reconnaissance Company were ordered to. un- .

dertake the task of eliminating the Japanese

from Susupe swamp. Later, when it became

apparent that the two platoons were insufficient

.for the job, 20 artillerymen from the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines, were ordered to form a

secondary skirmish line and follow Reconnaissance Company personnel through the

swamp. Again, the forces were inadequate;

and, after killing seven Japanese and losing

two of their own men., the units withdrew.

From the progress and reports it was apparent that a much larger force would be

needed to complete the mop-up. Accordingly,

NTLF attached the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Winslow Cornett,

USA), to the 2d Marine Division for the job

of sweeping the area from the old radio station

to the high ground east of Lake Susupe.

Throughout the day, the 10th Marines continued furnishing fires on enemy artillery,

troops, tanks and dumps with excellent results.

The 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, which had

operated with the 4th Division since coming

ashore on 17 June, reverted to 2d Division control at noon of the 21st and displaced to new

positions northeast of Lake Susupe.143

"... Hold Present Front Lines

On Nafutan Point the 27th Division made

small gains, proceeding slowly because of

numerous enemy positions in caves.'" One bat143 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 8. 4th Bit, 10t1

Mar Report, 3. Mom,. An indication of the relative

inactivity of the Marine divisions on 21 June is the fact

that action reports of the six infantry regiments for

this date averaged but four and a half sentences per

report.

144 Lieutenant Colonel John Lenip, USA, an Army

observer, writing of the actions of 21 June, felt that a

"certain amount of inertia" was manifested by the

105th Infantry. "In this particular instance the division might be censured for its lack of offensive spirit

in moving forward particularly in view of the fact that

121
WITH FIXED BAYONETS soldiers of the 105th Infantry move in a skirmish line over an open area unusual for Nafutan Point. Note bazookaman at extreme right. Picture taken on 21 June.

tery of 105mm howitzers (B, 104th Field

Artillery Battalion) went into a position from

which it could support the attack with direct

fire onto these caves.

At 1215, while engaged in the Nafutan Point

attack, the 27th Division received a change of

mission and disposition. NTLF Operation

Order 9-44 (a document that was to assume

great importance later) directed the 27th Division, less one battalion and one light tank

platoon, to assemble northwest of Aslito Airfield in NTLF reserve. Control of the division

artillery would pass to the XXIV Corps Artillery. The designated infantry battalion was

ordered in paragraph 3. e. to "operate in the

Garrison Area." It would "mop up remaining

enemy detachments, maintain antisniper patrols

within the Garrison Area and along the coast

line to protect installations within its zone of

action with particular attention to Aslito

Airfield."145

this was a continuation of the attack started by the

105th on the preceding day." Lemp, 14.

145 Since the "designated infantry battalion" had

been assigned a specific mission in a separate, lettered

subparagraph of paragraph 3 (the subordinate units

paragraph), the NTLF Staff considered it clear that

122

At 1700, after consideration of the NTLF

order, Ralph Smith telephoned Holland Smith

and urged that a complete regiment be used to

clean up Nafutan Point, rather than one battalion. He said that he planned to use the

105th Infantry for the job and that he believed

they could finish in a couple of days. Holland

Smith agreed to this but specified that one

battalion of the 105th must be retained in yeserve for possible use elsewhere. This modification was later confirmed in a mailbrief from

NTLF which arrived at the 27th Division command post at 0830, 22 June. It read as follows:

Instructions contained in Opn 0 #9-44 are modified

as follows: (a) 1 RCT will continue mission in-Garrison Area of cleaning up remaining resistance and

patrolling area. (b) 100-1 will be in Corps Res in

assembly area in zone of 2d Mar Div. (c) 27th Div

(less 1 RCT and 1 Ba) await orders in NTLF Res in

area assigned.146

At 2000, 21 June, following his telephonic

conversation with Holland Smith but before

the unit would execute its mop-up task as an immediate

subordinate of NTLF. Unfortunately, as will be seen,

this same interpretation was not made by the 27th

Division Staff.

146 27th Infantry Division G-3 Journal, 22Jun44.
receiving the mailbrief, Ralph Smith issued

an order to his division, paragraph 3. a. of

which follows:

RCT 105 (Reinf ) will hold present front line facing

Nafutan Point, with two battalions on the line and one

battalion in regimental reserve. It will relieve elements

of RCT 1.65 now on the front line by [0630 22 June].

The battalion in reserve will not be committed to

action without authority of the division commander.

Reorganization of the present front line to be effected

not later than [1100, 22 June] and offensive operations

against the enemy continued. Reserve battalion will

maintain- anti-sniper patrols in the vicinity of Aslito

Airtield.147

This single paragraph was to have gigantic

repercussions. General Holland Smith considered it clear that the 105th Infantry had

been removed from 27th Division control and

that orders to it should come from NTLF only.

In this connection Holland Smith has written:

. . . NT&LF Operation Order No. 9-44 placed the 27th

Infantry Division in a reserve status, and removed the

105th Infantry from tactical control of the 27th Infantry Division for independent operations directly

under control of NT&LF. NT&LF order directed the

1.05th Infantry to conduct offensive operations to mop

up enemy units in the NAFTJTAN POINT area. The

27th Infantry Division Field Order No. 45 contravened

the NT&LF Operation Order No. 9-44 by ordering the

105th Infantry to hold its present positions, although

the 1.05th Infantry had been removed from the tactical

control of the Division Commanderd-48

From this it may be seen that Holland Smith

was disturbed by two considerations: he believed, first, that the 27th Division should not

have issued an order to the 105th Infantry,

and, second, having issued it, that the instructions to "hold present positions" countermanded the NTLF order. This counter-order

was to be one of the main reasons later advanced by Holland Smith in support of his

action in relieving Ralph Smith of command

of the 27th Division.

Ralph Smith's stated view on this matter

was that, during the telephone conversation

between himself and the Corps Commander,

"nothing was mentioned . . . about having the

regiment operate under NTLF control. His

written message confirming this change did not

arrive at the CP 27th Division until 0830, 22

147 R. C. Smith„ S. 27th Division Field Order No. 45A.

148 Ltr from CTF 56 to CTF 51, 24Jun44.

June, much too late to have permitted any

instructions for the day's operations." 49

From Holland Smith's point of view, however, Ralph Smith overlooked the fact that

Operation Order 9-44 had established the

status of a "designated infantry battalion"

(by giving it a mission in paragraph 3) and

that merely changing the size of the unit to a

regiment did not remove it from control.

Night of 21-22 June

Enemy activity on the night of 21-22 June

took on varied forms. Just after dark, the

Japanese succeeded in blowing up a 2c1. Division ammunition dump on Beach Green 1.

Whether this was accomplished by an infiltrator armed with a demolition pack or by a

rifleman with an incendiary bullet or by some

other more devious means, no one will ever be

sure.

The evidence seems to indicate that an incendiary bullet was responsible. Persons in the

vicinity of the dump heard a 2c1 Battalion, 10th

Marines, sentry shout a challenge, then a single

shot, then the first of two explosions. Immediately, personnel of the artillery battalion's

supply section moved close to the fire and attempted to extinguish it. The plan at this time

was to isolate the fire where it was then burning

(small arms ammunition) and prevent its

spread to other sections containing mortar and

artillery shells.

At this point, as the Marines fought the

dangerous blaze, a second explosion occurred.

Results were devastating. The officer-in-command of the fire-fighting detail, Captain Carl

A. Nielsen, later wrote: "To the best of my

knowledge, this explosion killed, or was the

cause of the death of, my entire detail, with

the exception of myself and one other. . ."

The fireworks continued throughout the

night, many more men. being hit by fragments

from mortar and artillery shells which caught

fire in the second explosion. Fortunately, the

2d Division had not had all of its eggs in one

basket; a large percentage of ammunition had

already been parceled out to subordinate units,

149 R. C. Smith, 7.

123
so that, while the losses were serious, the ammunition supply situation could not be described as critical.1.50

To prevent any further Japanese infiltration

of beach areas, construction units of the 18th

Marines established a defense line between

Lake Susupe and the 2d Division supply dump

area.151

Elsewhere in the 2d Marine Division, the

night was quiet. .Patrols from the 8th Marines

made no contacts; 6th Marines' patrols encountered a five-man Japanese patrol; the 2d

Marines located an eight-man outpost and a

two-man patrol. One small infiltration attempt

in the 2d Marines' sector was repulsed without

difficulty.152

In the anchorage off Saipan the night was

di,sturbed by 12_ Japanese bombers at about

0112. Bombs dropped by these planes failed to

achieve a single hit, although the transport

Clay was straddled by explosions. Only passive defense was taken against this particular

attack, with ships finding refuge under a sinoke

screen. As part of the same attack, a few bombs

were dropped on Saipan itself. No damage was

caused, however, all bombs falling harmlessly

west of the 4th Marine Division command

post.153

On Hill 500 the 3d Battalion; 25th Marines,

had occasional flurries of excitement, though

nothing to compare with the previous night.

Individual Japanese again emerged from caves

bent on the destruction of as many Marines as

possible. None of these efforts were successful,

and in the process four Japanese were killed.15,4

The summary of the 31st Army chief of staff

for 21 June admits that at least two important

tactical localities had fallen to U. S. forces:

The enemy is constructing positions in the area south

of Garapan to vicinity of Hill 230 and is cognizant of

150 Ltr from Maj C. A. Nielsen to CMC, 13.Tan50.

ill Lt.17 from LtCol A. L. Vogt to CMC, 1.3.Tan50.

112 2d Mar Div Report, 8.

153 Tp' 51 Report, Annex 1 to End A. 4th Mar Div

Report, 22.

154 4th Mar Div Report, 22. M Bn, 25th Mar Report, 8.

124

the barbed wire on Hill 230.1.55

The enemy, occupying Hill 163,156 . . is gradually

approaching the southern foot of Tapotchau.

Only fleeting mention was made of U. S. supporting arms:

One destroyer is in Laulau Bay [Magicienne Bay I

and is shelling Nafutan Mountain and the north of

Kagman Point. . . . Attacking planes are relatively

scattered today. . . .

On 21 June, the first flurries of an eventual

blizzard of Japanese messages pertaining to

reinforcement from ,other islands of the Marianas fell. TO the commanding general at Yap,

the Saipan chief of staff sent the following:

I would like reports concerning the following items

on Rota and Guam:

1. Large motor launches. Collapsible boats.

2. Situation regarding enemy sea and air patrols.

3. Exact count of small boat activity at Guam, Rota.

Tinian and Saipan.

To the commanding officer at Tinian went the

dispatch: "I wish to be informed of number of

large motor craft in your area.". A great deal

more would later be heard on this subject.'57

Summary of Medical Activities to Date

The medical battalions of the divisions had

begun their outstanding work several days

previous and were in full operation by the

night of D-plus 6.

Company A of the .4th Medical Battalion

had arrived ashore on 16 June (D-plus 1),

and by the next afternoon the entire battalion,

except Company D, was ashore. The latter Unit

joined the others on D-plus 5. All companies

brought in equipment to set up field hospitals.' 58

155 This reference is to Hill 790, occupied without

opposition by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, on 19 June.

Heights of hills from Japanese sources are in meters,

whereas U. S. forces figured them in feet. Thus, Hill

230 in the Japanese report is Hill 790 in U. S. reports.

This apparent variation (230 meters equals 754 feet)

is explained by the fact that the Japanese determined

heights on the ground, while the U. S. had to rely upon

estimates from aerial photographs. In most instances

these estimates were remarkably close.

156 Here the reference is to Hill 500, seized after a

vigorous assault on 20 June by the 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines.

157 CINCPAC—CINCP0A Item #9983-85, 14.

158 4th Marine Division Medical Report, 2.
Agingan

Point

RD 7390

.I 1135

ti.,,v/ X

'-'."'!' 1 ,i• Mt Tapotchciu

% i ' ■' Ilr i

X

Mt Tipo Pale i X

X--,x X 1

X

rj(1136

47 Mixed

Afetna

Point

Dk 23

Gharan

Kanoa

0-3

19 JUNE

0-4

MAGICIENNE

— LEGEND —

Indicates Progress Before

18 June

0-3

Nafutan

Point

BAY

Kag man

Peninsula

PROGRESS LINES 18,19,20

AND 21 JUNE 1944

2000 400,0 Yds

MAP 13
Company E of the 2d Medical Battalion

landed in the late afternoon of D-plus 1 and together with Company C, which came ashore

the following morning, was fully equipped to

do definitive surgery by 1800 on D-plus 2. Initially, this was the only medical establishment

on the island so equipped, and a number of operations were performed. These two companies

established themselves in a captured Japanese

hospital in Charan Kanoa. The remainder of

the 2d Medical Battalion, on board the ships

withdrawn from the anchorage, did not arrive

back on the scene until the evening of 21 June,

coming ashore early the next morning. Company C remained in the location for some time,

but Company E was moved on D-plus 4 to the

north end of the Charan Kanoa airstrip to act

as a casualty clearing station.15°

159 Second Marine Division Medical Report, 7.

The Army's 102d Medical Battalion had portions of the unit ashore on D-plus 2 and the

following day established a medical section

headquarters at Yellow Beach. Company D

(Clearing Company) set up a station on 20

June in a small village about 1,000 yards southeast of Charan Kanoa.'"

At all medical installations the rule was the

same: care for the individual regardless of

where he came from or tO what unit he belonged. Red tape in the handling of casualties

was non-existent; the tape was all white.'61-

160 Report of 27th Division Medical Inspector, Saipan

Operation, 1-2.

161 Division Surgeons of the 2d, 4th and 27th Divisions, respectively, were: Commander E. R. Tiering,

(MC) USN: Commander W. C. Baty, Jr., (MC), USN;

Lieutenant Colonel Abraham Norman, (MC), USA.

125
CHAPTER IV

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Drive To The North

D-PLUS 7-22 JUNE

Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith's operation order for 22 June directed the continuation of the attack to the north, with 0-5 as the

day's objective. (See Map 14.) Objective line

0-5 included the village of Laulau (southwestern base of Kagman Peninsula) on the right,

Mt. Tapotchau in the center, and extended

over to the western coast about 1,000 yards

south of Garapan—an optimistic bite to be

sure. Possession of this line would guarantee

observation over the bulk of the island. But it

would also bring up the problem of covering a

wider frontage, for Kagman Peninsula, jutting

from the east coast for a distance of 4,000-odd

yards, expands the island at that point to its

maximum breadth.

In addition to the greater yardage to be covered, the northward drive presented terrain

difficulties; Mt. Tapotchau's aquiline peaks and

Kagman Peninsula's craggy expanses defied

normal attack patterns. Frontages would have

to be reduced and, to effect this, more troops

committed to the attack. With this in mind,

General Holland Smith ordered the 27th Infantry Division (in NTLF reserve) to reconnoiter routes to the zones of the two Marine Divisions for possible commitment. The 105th Infantry would remain on its assigned mission—

directly under NTLF control—of clearing

Nafutan Point of Japanese.

The attack hour was set for 0600, following

126

a 10 minute preparation fired by the two Marine artillery regiments (10th and 14th), plus

reinforcing fires from the 27th Division Artillery and the XXIV Corps Artillery: a total

of 18 battalions.'

Intermediate Objective 0-4A

General Schmidt determined that an intermediate objective would be desirable for his

4th Marine Division. Objective 0-5 was 4,000

yards away across difficult terrain—a long,

hard drive without pausing for reorganization.

Accordingly, objective 0-4A, approximately

2,000 yards to the front (see Map 14), was

designated. From this point, the attack to 0-5

would be launched. Formation for the attack

was: 24th Marines on the right (along the coast

of Magicienne Bay) , 25th Marines on the left,

and 23d Marines in reserve.2

Following the preparatory fires, Colonel

Franklin A. Hart's 24th Marines moved out at

the specified hour (0600). Attacking along the

coast of Magicienne Bay with the 1st and 3d

Battalions abreast, 2d in reserve, the regiment

made steady progress. But soon the broken

terrain presented special problems. Local detours, necessitated by small cavities or declivities which dipped to the jagged rocks of the

coast line, slowed the regiment's movements

NTLF Operation Order 9-44. NTLF G-3 Periodic

Report No. S.

2.4th Mar Div Report, 22-23.
and greatly complicated the task of maintaining contact. At one moment adjacent units

would be firmly tied in. At the next, one flanking unit would disappear from view and a gap

would be created. In spite of these digressions,

however, the 24th Marines reached 0-1A at

1330.3

The 25th Marines' zone of action was sufficiently narrow, initially, to allow for an attack

in a column of battalions, with Chambers' 3d

Battalion leading, followed to the left and

right rear, respectively, by the 1st and 2d - Battalions. Four easily recognizable ridges to the

25th Marines' front were prescribed as intermediate objectives and labeled 0-A, 0-B, 0-C

and 0-D. These were invaluable throughout

the day's action as reference points, plus affording points for checking control and coordination.

Jumping off in the attack at 0600, the battalion forged ahead to 0-A by 0630. While it

paused for a quick reorganization, a force of

Japanese attacked, particularly on the battalion left in the zone of Company K. During

the course of the close-in fight, 90 Japanese

were killed and a Japanese tank destroyed.

Company K lost three company commanders,

the first killed, two successors wounded. When

the skirmish subsided, a new company commander was sent from battalion, reorganization

was effected, and the attack resumed.

Jumping off from. 0-A at 0740, the battalion

met only light scattered resistance in .its move

to 0-B. As a gap had begun to develop between

the 3d Battalion's right and the 24th Marines'

left, the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, was committed between the two. In the face of tightening opposition, provided principally by

Japanese machine guns and rifles, the regiment

reached 0-C by 1400.

As the 3d Battalion moved for 0-D (coincident with division objective 0-4A), an intrabattalion contact problem developed. Company

K, on the left, was tied in with the adjacent

battalion of the 2d Marine Division (1st Battalion, 29th Marines), while Company I clung

to elements of the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines,

on the right. The strain on the center was too

324th Mar Report, 20.

great. The reserve Company (L), therefore.

moved into the middle of the 3d Battalion zone

to strengthen the line. Thus left without a reserve company, Lieutenant Colonel Chambers

requested that an additional company be attached to his unit. In compliance, Company B

was moved up at about 1515 and at 1600 was

ordered into the line on the right flank.

Just south of 0-4A the 25th Marines encountered severe Japanese machine-gun fire, emanating from a thick wood just south of the objective and from caves in the slopes of the ridge

itself. Company L, in the center of the 3d Battalion zone, found itself caught in a deluge of

tire converging from two directions. Forward

movement was temporarily impossible, and the

company withdrew.4

At 1515 a Japanese ammunition dump exploded near the 3d Battalion's observation post

and claimed, among others, Lieutenant Colonel

Chambers as a concussion casualty. The executive officer, Major James Taul, then took over

the unit and, following a reorganization, ordered

a resumption of the attack on 0-4A. Again,

however, well-located enemy positions in the

slopes of the hill stopped the attack as soon as

it began. Lengthening shadows of late afternoon indicated the advisability of digging in

for the night. Although the day's objective had

not been reached, approximately 2,000 yards

had been gained in the 25th Marines' zone.3

Shortly before noon contact between the 24th

and 25th Marines had become increasingly

tenuous, and General Schmidt ordered the di- -

vision reserve (23d Marines) to move into the

front between the two assault regiments. After

marching about 2,500 yards to get into posi4 During the withdrawal an unusual incident occurred : dragging its wounded, Company L pulled back,

only to discover that a wounded radio operator had

been left behind. This casualty, lying in a flat, open,

.- fire-swept area which defied rescue by stretcher bearers,

was in a pitiable plight. But, at this juncture, Lieutenant Robert E. Stevenson, from Company A, 4th Tank

Battalion, ran a medium tank into the area, straddled

the wounded radio operator, and pulled him safely into

the tank through the escape hatch in the tank's deck.

5 25th Mar Report, 6. 31 Bn, 25th Mar Report 8-9.

The 4th Division planning officer, Lieutenant Colonel

Evans F. Carlson, was wounded while observing action

of the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, during the day.

127
tion, the regiment attacked at 1500 in column

of battalions on an 800-yard frontage: Lieutenant Colonel Haas' 1st Battalion leading,

followed at 800-yards by the 2d - Battalion.

The 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, designated

division reserve, was required to move to three

different assembly areas during the course of

the day. At each area, the unit prepared itself

for the night, digging foxholes, planning allaround defense and clearing fields of fire. And.

each time, just as the men finished their positions and started to relax, an order arrived to

move to a new area. Although this was normal

for reserve units, it invariably brought forth

grumbles. To personnel unfamiliar with the

over-all situation (the "big picture"), the frequent moves appeared useless and annoying.

Fighting especially troublesome terrain, the

23d Marines made slow progress. Only light

enemy resistance from riflemen .and machine

gunners was encountered, but contact difficulties and time lost trudging up, down, around

and through the rugged ground formations,

limited the speed of advance. Progress ceased

at a point about 200 yards south of objective

0-1A, where the unit dug in.°

But stopping for the night brought no end

to the 4th Marine Division's problems of contact and coordination. In the 24th Marines'

sector it was necessary to move the reserve 2d

Battalion into a separation between the other

two Lattalions. Even with the advent of this

unit, however, a gap existed throughout the

night. Fortunately, the Japanese did not

exploit the weak point.

In a move designed to facilitate internal contact, the left company of the division (K, 25th

Marines) shifted to its 'right rear to tighten

front lines. This shift broke physical contact

with the right of the 2d Marine Division (1st

Battalion, 29th Marines). Into this hiatus,

Company C, 25th Marines, was moved, and by

dark the two 'divisions were firmly tied in

again. Company A, 25th Marines, occupied a

position in rear of Company C to strengthen

the junction further. In the words of the 4th

Division action report : "Contact [was] well

established and defenses coordinated for the

23d Mar Report, 40. 3d Bp, 28 Mar Report, 3.

128

night." (See Map 11 for progress lines.)

To Tipo Pale's Summit

Meanwhile, General Watson's 2d Marine Division also made important gains. .Attacking

in conjunction with the 4th Division, its, main

-effort was made on the right, in the 8th Marines' zone. All three infantry regiments were

in the lines, from left to right: 2d, 6th and 8th.

Owing to the 2d Marines' advanced position

along the beach, however, it was not possible

for that regiment to move farther to the north

without stretching the division's lines to the

breaking point.

Looking to the north of the 6th and 8th Marines' lines, a nightmare of sheer cliffs and

precipitous hills could be observed, separated

in criss-cross fashion by deep gashes. Excellent

defensive positions were afforded the Japanese

by these ground formations, but more important, since the Japanese did not fully exploit

the defensive potential of this area, was the

challenge to contact and coordination. Dense

foliage which cloaked the region often limited

visibility to a few feet. •

The 8th Marines attacked with two battalions

abreast: ist Battalion on the left and -the 1st

Battalion, 29th Marines, on the right. Initially

the movement was reasonably rapid; but, as

the advance reached rougher terrain on the

lower approaches to Mt. Tapotchau, both battalions were forced to commit reserve companies to maintain contact. About noon it was

necessary to move the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, into the center, between the two assault

battalions. Persistent Japanese mortar fire,

showing no favoritism, hopped from unit to

unit, constantly keeping pace with the advance.

By 1300 the 8th Marines reached a ridge on

Mt. Topatchau's mid-slopes, about 1,200 yards

from the peak. (This yardage was measured

in map-distance—as the crow flies—not as the

Marines would be forced to move.) At this

point enfilading machine-gun fire from a hill

on. the right flank (in the 4th Marine Division

zone of action) stopped the forward movement.

Late in the afternoon a company of the 4th

7 4th Mar Dir Report, 23. 3d Rn, 25th Mar Report, 9.

3d Ba, 24th Mar Report, 4.
SUPPLY in the rugged inland portions of the island was often accomplished by man-handling. Here Marines of

the 8th Regiment commence the long carry from truck-head to front lines around Mt. Tapotchau.

Division (K, 25th Marines) captured the hill,

and Company B, 29th Marines, made contact

with it there.

Because of the previously-described tightening of the 25th Marines' lines, however, Company K pulled to its right rear, leaving Company B, 29th Marines, alone on the hill. Getting supplies to the latter was very difficult,

involving hand-carry over a perilous route. In

addition, the company received almost constant

small-arms fire, principally from the open

flank. After about two. hours Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins, commanding the battalion,

ordered Company B to withdraw and secure

contact with the 4th Division flank. This was

done when Company C, 25th Marines; moved

into the lines in the manner previously related.

As the 8th Marines dug in for the night,

three of its four battalions, with a total of

eight companies forward, were committed to

the line. The 2c1 Battalion remained in regimental reserve near the division right flank.

The 8th Marines' operations around the

Tapotchau massif presented n logistical challenge of no mean proportions. As well as observers and patrols could determine, no road

or trail for supply and evacuation existed

within the regiment's zone of action. Reconnaissance by the regimental-4 Section, however, located a break in the cliff which, after

expansion by a bulldozer, served as a main

(though makeshift) supply route for several

days. Since ground reconnaissance revealed

nothing in the way of a better road leading

into the Mt. Tapotchau area, Colonel Wallace,

commanding the 8th Marines, requested that

an observation plane be made available so that

his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jack

P. Julian, could be flown over the area in question, attempting to locate a suitable supply

route as well as to get a closer look at the terrain. The flight was scheduled for the next day

129
(23 June).8

The 6th Marines' advance was governed by

the necessity of maintaining contact with—and

thus regulating its speed on—the 8th Marines.'

Lieutenant Colonel Niitting's 2d Battalion, 2d

Marines (still •attached to the 6th Marines),

was in position on the right of the regimental

line, in contact with the 8th Marines. By 0700,

advances by the latter unit permitted Nutting's

battalion to move forward, but after a short

time it became apparent that further advances

would overextend the 6th Marines' lines. Colonel Riseley, therefore, ordered the movement

held up until the '8th Regiment ,came •abreast.

By 1230 this had been accomplished, and the

6th Marines moved forward again. During the

morning several isolated, by-passed pockets of

resistance within the regiment's zone were

mopped up by the Scout-Sniper Platoon.

The day's first resistance developed as the

6th Marines' advance moved. upward on Mt.

Tipo Pale's eastern slopes. Tipo Pale, a wooded

eminence of about 1,100 feet, overlooked the

island's western beaches. From its topmost

pinnacle, the mountain slopes gradually to the

west and south, but to the north and east it dips

precipitously to heavily-wooded ravines. There

had been some cause for optimism on the previous clay when patrols had climbed to the crest

without encountering any Japanese. But now,

when the coordinated attack moved into the

area, the hill suddenly came alive and bristled

with defenses. Whether the hill had been deserted of Japanese when U. S. patrols moved

thereon or whether the enemy had lain doggo

awaiting more choice targets is not indicated

in documents consulted.

Company K. 6th Marines, moving along the

road with plans to climb Tipo Pale's southeastern slopes, ran unexpectedly into trouble

when that route entered a small finger ravine

—infested with enemy riflemen and machinegunners—on the hill's lower approaches. Veering to the left, Company K found the going

much easier and swept unopposed to the top.

82d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 9. 8th Mar --Report, 4. 1st Bia, 29th Mar 1?eport, Ltr from Col

J. P. Juhan to CMC; 12:fan50.

130

The Regimental Scout-Sniper Platoon, continuing its mopping-up tasks, endeavored to

clear the cantankerous trouble-spot developed

by Company K. It found more than it could

handle. A series of narrow ravines hemmed

by steep bluffs housed a number of automatic

weapons, making movement into this area

suicidal. Under the fusillade directed at them,

the Scout-Snipers withdrew.

The remainder of the 3d Battalion (including Company F of the 2d Marines and Company F of the 6th Marines) moved to the summit of Tipo Pale, using the route blazed by

Company K, and by 1400 had commenced consolidation and readjustment of the lines. From

the' newly-won positions atop the hill, the Marines could observe a company of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, as it attempted to clear the

same trouble-point that had denied movement

to Company K and the Scout Snipers. As before, the enemy positions were well protected

and so located as to afford covering fire one to

another. After destroying several Japanese

emplacements and making slight progress, the

company was forced to retire under a hail of

cross-fire. Enemy in this area remained active

for another two days, finally pulling out before

being surrounded.

Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion's lines on Tipo

Pale had been consolidated, proper frontage

assumed, and the advances to the north continued. At first, progress was moderately fast,

but when Marines attempted to move down

from Tipo Pale they discovered an almost vertical drop. Using the one trail which existed

within the zone, Company K attempted the

descent but, thus canalized, was stopped by

automatic weapons and rifle fire from its front.

A few further probes into this area revealed

that the Marines were facing an unusually

well-defended strongpoint. By 1800, when the

order to dig in was issued, little progress on the

reduction of this trouble-spot had been made.

To establish contact with the 8th Marines, it

was necessary to bend the 6th Marines' lines

back along the eastern slopes of Tipo Pale.

This expansion demanded commitment of all

three companies of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, facing it more nearly to the east than to
the north. There the unit prepared defenses.°-

The 2d Marines, as mentioned before, already

had occupied 075 for several days. Since the

whole maneuver pivoted on this regiment, no

movement forward other than patrolling could

be initiated. In preparation for the unit's

eventual advance into Garapan, the systematic.

levelling of the town by artillery, air and naval,.

gunfire continued. As a defensive measure, the

2d Marines laid a mine field along the beach

road leading into the left flank. This precaution was taken in respect for the enemy capability of launching a full-scale counterattack

along the coastal road. The value of this obstacle was never tested by a Japanese thrust,

however."

The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry (attached

to the 2d Marine Division), swept the Susupe.

swamp area from north to south. Beginning at

0830 and finishing at 1345, the battalion moved

through the marsh, killing 15 Japanese and

taking two wounded prisoners. Losses to the

battalion itself amounted to two killed and

four wounded. After completing its task, this

unit was released from 2d Division control and

reverted to NTLF reserve." Though the sweep

was well conducted, it neither cleaned out all

of the swamp-dwellers nor prevented other

Japanese from moving to the swamp following

successful infiltration of the front lines. More

was to be heard from the enemy in Susupe

swamp.

Commitment in the Center

Major Genera 1 Ralph Smith's 27th Division

accomplished the shifts of position ordered by

NTLF, the 165th Infantry pulling off Nafutan

Point and moving into the division assembly

area northwest of Asli.to Airfield. Colonel

Bishop commenced adjusting the lines of his

105th Infantry preparatory to seizing the

point. In the afternoon of the 22d, however,

General Holland Smith returned to his origi9 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 9-10. 6th Mar Report, 7. Fisher. M. P. Ryan.

19 2d Mar Div Report, 10. 2d Mar Report, 4.

11 2d Mar Div Report, 10. 106th Int Report, 4. At

0600, 23 June, the 106th Infantry, which had operated

under NTLF control since coming ashore on 20 June,

returned to the 27th Division.

nal plan of leaving One battalion and one light

tank platoon for cleaning out the Nafutan area.

The unit designated for this mission was the

2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, and the mop-up

was to begin at dawn on 23 June." .

The remainder of the 27th Division would

pass "through elements of the 4th Marine Division within its zone of action," and:

attack at King hour [1000, 23 June], making its main

effort initially, on its right. Seize Objective 0-5 kind,

on Division order, advance and seize Objective 0-6. It

will assist the 2d Mar Div by rapid advance and by

fire and maneuver, on call, in the vicinity of the boundary between these divisions. ROT 106 reverts to control of the .27th Inf Div at 0600, 23 June.

The prescribed zone of action of the 27th Division would place it in the center, between

the two Marine divisions, in the process reducing the 4th Marine Division's frontage by passing through the left regiment (25th Marines) .13

The 27th Division's attack plan placed the

165th Infantry on the right of the division

front and the 106th Infantry on the left. In

reserve would be the 105th Infantry (less its

2d Battalion, operating under Northern Troops

and Landing Force control in the Nafutan

Point area). That General. Ralph Smith misunderstood the status of the 2d Battalion, 105thi

Infantry, is indicated by the inclusion of a.

mission for it in paragraph 3. d. of his field

order for the day. Holland Smith considered

that, inasmuch as the battalion had been placed

under NTLF control at this time, there was

neither cause nor justification for the 27th Di-

:vision to assign it a mission.

In this connection, however, it is important

to point out that the mission thus assigned was

not at variance with the order from NTLF.

Both instructed the 2d Battalion . to "continue

12 General Ralph Smith was disappointed by this

change of decision, as he felt that one battalion was insufficient for the job. On 23 June he wrete Holland

Smith on the subject, recommending that personnel in

the vicinity of Aslito Airfied be warned of the possibility of Japanese on Nafutan Point infiltrating the

lines of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, and attacking the field. Ralph Smith asked that Seabees and air

force personnel take steps to provide security against

any such occurrence. The 27th Infantry . Division In

World War II, 1.94. .

.

13 NTLF Operation Order 1.0-44.

131
operations to mop up remaining enemy detachments in Nafutan Point area." As to the time

the "operations" were to begin, the NTLF

order specified "at daylight," while the 27th

Division order failed to mention the time.14

This may have been an inadvertent omission

rather than an intentional change. The fact

that gave the NTLF staff and, particularly,

General Holland Smith the greatest concern

was that a subordinate unit was receiving

orders from two sources. And, where those

orders varied in even the slightest detail, there

was a possibility of confusion.

To forestall any further misunderstanding

on the exact status of the 2d Battalion, 105th

Infantry, the Corps Commander sent a message to the 27th Division Commander at 1411,

23 June: "2d Battalion,, 105th by my op order

10-44 not under your tactical control and

should not be included in your tactical orders.

Please take steps to rectify." 15

Owing to the lateness of the afternoon and

unfamiliar nature of the road network, General Ralph Smith decided to undertake the

movement to the line of departure at dawn of

23 June rather than during darkness. In. the

meanwhile, he ordered the commanding officers

of the 165th and 106th Infantry Regiments to

reconnoiter their zones and positions. The

106th, which had been in an assembly area a

day longer, made a complete reconnaissance,

but the 165th, freshly withdrawn from Nafutan Point, was frustrated by the coming of

darkness.16

Night of 22-23 June

Along the entire front, the sentence from the

8th Marines' report applied: "The night was

unusually quiet." By D-plus 7, a night disturbed by only a few rounds of Japanese

mortar fire or an infrequent blast from an

enemy rifleman, could indeed be classified as

"unusually quiet." And yet, on closer inspection, men got killed and wounded that night.

And for them, there was never a noisier night.

14 27th Inf Div F. 0. #46. NTLF Operation Order

i#10-44.

15 NTLF G-3 Journal, 23June44.

16 Lemp, 14-15. 106 Inf Report, 4.

132

Four pugnacious Japanese leaped into the

foxhole of Sergeant Major Gilbert L. Morton,

acting platoon leader in Company K, 25th Marines. Rather than endanger friendly troops

by firing, Morton used his carbine as a bludgeon. Marines from nearby foxholes joined the

spirited brawl, and killed all of the intruders

in a matter of minutes. During the fracas, one

of the enemy struck the sergeant major over

the head with a rifle butt, but the blow was not

fata1.17

Japanese artillery became suddenly active

during the night. Commencing shortly after

midnight, enemy pieces (estimated as 75mm,

5- and 6-inch) in the vicinity of Mt. Tapotchau,.

opened up on the assembly area of the 106th

Infantry and firing positions of the 14th Marines. The latter retaliated with fires on areas

'suspected of concealing the enemy guns, but

the regiments' flash teams failed to spot the

enemy firing positions.18

Just before midnight Japanese artillery

firing from Tinian shelled Green Beach. 'This

fire ceased when Battery B, 531st Field Artillery Battalion, opened with a vehement rebuttal. (This battery was the only one laid

for firing at Tinian at the time.) Although

damage to beach installations was negligible,

LST 119, which was beached and unloading

supplies, was holed at the waterline. One compartment of the LST was flooded by the shell

hole, and steering gear 'and electrical wiring

were damaged.

Just after the shelling from Tinian had subsided, Japanese aircraft appeared over Saipan

anchorage. Three raids by three to five planes

each developed within the next two and onehalf hours. The only loss was sleep; inaccuracy

of Japanese bombing, as well as of ships' antiaircraft gunfire, made it a bloodless performance.16

Japanese Situation

On the morning of 22 June, Major General

Iketa, chief of staff of the Japanese 31st Army,

sent a situation report to headquarters of the

29th Division located on Yap:

17 3d Bi, 25th Mar Report, 9.

1814th Mar Report, 7. 106th Inf Report, 4.

19 TI? 51 Report, Annex 1 to End A.
1. About two companies of enenty have advanced into

valley west of Hill 285 20 south of foot of Mt. Tapotthan. In the Laulau Bay area about four or five enemy

tanks have appeared in front of our positions. In the

enemy positions south of Garapan there are three lines

of barbed wire. Naval gunfire is as insistent as before.

2. We have finally completed consolidation of all

units. A part of the Homare [43d Division] staged a

night attack on Hill 163 21 west of Tsutsuuran last

night but results are not known. [ See page 124.]

In a message addressed to his assistant chief

of staff, to the vice minister of war, and to the

29th Division's commanding general, Iketa

summarized the situation regarding unit commanders:

Colonel Oka (CO Mixed Brigade) is believed to have

died in breakthrough at Charan Kanoa, dawn of the

18th. Colonel Arima (CO 9th Expeditionary Unit)

wounded in battle, hospitalized. Colonel Goto (CO 9th

Tank Regiment), whereabouts unknown since night of

16th. Believed to have died in battle. Colonel Koganezawa (CO 7th Engineers) missing since morning of

19th, believed to have died in battle. Lieutenant Colonel

Nakajima (CO 3d Independent Mountain Artillery)

wounded, hospitalized.

In a later message, the voluble general estimated Japanese combat strength as follows:

Homare units [43d Division]—four battalions infantry (two battalions have not yet participated in the

battle) ; 13 field artillery pieces; Mixed Brigade—no

combat §trength ; Former Expeditionary Force onehalf infantry battalion; other infantry units—organized strength about one battalion; tanks—two companies; Army Artillery—none; Anti-Aircraft—about

one battery; Machine Guns—about one company; Army

Engineers—organized strength about one company. The

personnel is comparatively strong and the Division

(including attached units) numbers about 9,000. For

other units although they number about 6,000 in personnel, their fighting ability is reduced by lack of

weapons.

To the 50th Infantry Regiment located on

Tinian, General Iketa issued instructions to

shell Aslito Airfield "at a time when the enemy

planes are concentrated there." Plans to rein20 Hill 285 (unnamed and unnumbered on Ti. S. maps)

was located about one mile southwest of Tapotchau's

crest and less than one-half mile southeast of Tipo

Pale. The "enemy here referred to was elements of

the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines (right unit of the 6th

Regiment), and the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (left

unit of the 8th Regiment).

21 Hill 163 was designated Hill 500 on Ti. S. maps. It

had been seized on 20 June by the 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines.

force the beleaguered Saipan garrison are indicated in his message to the 29th Division:

Until we break the enemy air and sea superiority

which he has completely at the moment, transportation of troops from Guam is extremely difficult.

Furthermore we are investigating the possibilities of

transport of small units from Tinian under cover of

darkness.

Keeping other units informed of the Saipan

activities consumed a great portion of Iketa's

time. His report on the evening of 22 June

revealed determination and hope while at the

same time admitting that the enemy had made

substantial advances:.

The enemy [6th Marines] in vicinity of Hill 230 22

has attacked our positions On the east side of the same

hill. This has been repulsed. The enemy [8th Marines]

south of Hill 343 22 is infiltrating through our positions

accompanied by tanks and it is not known at present

whether we can hold this hill. Division contemplates

smashing the aforesaid enemy tonight.23

But the "aforesaid enemy" had other plans.

Air Activity

The 19th Army Fighter Squadron (P:47's)

landed on Aslito Airfield. during the day and

assumed responsibility for the combat air

patrol. This squadron, part of the 318th

Fighter Group of the Seventh Air Force, was

joined on 23 June by the 73d Squadron, bringing the total of rocket-firing P-47's at Saipan

to 111. These squadrons were launched from

the CVE's Natorna Bay and Manila Bay, respectively, 60 miles off Saipan. Admiral Turner

elaborates on the work of the Army P-47's as

follows:

... the P-47's were very extensively used for troop

support ... they could make many more flights per day

from the field than could planes from a carrier; they

were available for extensive personal briefing by

troops; and they could carry more bombs and more

rockets than could carrier planes.24

In addition to the P-47's, two flights of P-61

"Black Widows" of the 6th Night Fighter

Squadron flew to Saipan from Oahu, arriving

in time to take part in an air defense mission

22 Hills 230 and 343 were unnamed and unnumbered

on U. S. maps. The former was the first high ground

west of Tipo Pale and the latter about 1,200 yards

south of Tapotchau's crest.

23 CINCPAC-CINCP0A Item #9983-85, 15-16. All

foregoing Japanese quotes from this source.

24 Turner.

133
MOVING UP on the morning of 23 June are men of the

27th Division. Later in the day these soldiers encountered a stubborn foe in Death Valley.

on 24 June. This was the first appearance of

these planes in the Central Pacific.23

During daylight of 22 June, combat air

patrols from the escort carriers shot down

three Japanese bombers within a 45-mile radius

of Saipan. In the late afternoon, a single

Japanese torpedo plane sneaked undetected

over Saipan anchorage at a very low altitude

and launched a torpedo into the Maryland.

The projectile exploded on the port side, causing serious damage and reducing the battleship's speed to 10 knots. The next day, she proceeded to Pearl Harbor for repairs.26

D-PLUS 8-23 JUNE

The Introduction to Death Valley

The NTLF operation order for 23 June set

1000 as the attack hour. With the arrival of

the 27th Division in the center of the Corps

front, the 4th Division's zone of action would

be narrowed. This would allow the latter to

pull the left regiment (25th Marines) into reserve and to swing the attack out on Kagman

Peninsula.

25 TF 51 Report, End l A, 8. The AAP Against Japan,

189-191. One Damned Island After Another, C. Howard

and J. Whitley, Chapel Hill, University of North

Carolina Press, 1946, 223-224. These were U. S. Army

Air Force night fighters. The first U. S. Marine night

fighter squadron (VMF (N)-532) did not arrive at

Saipan until 12 July 1944.

28 TF 51 Report, End l A, 8; Annex 1 to End l A;

Encl. L.

134

The 27th Division's movement to the line of

departure, an uphill hike of about four miles,

commenced at daylight. The march was complicated, however, by the 165th Infantry's

taking the wrong road and ending up on the

same road as the 106th Infantry.27 This situation caused delay and some confusion; but,

after a conference between Colonels Kelley and

Ayres, commanders of the 165th and 106th,

respectively, the difficulty was ironed out and

the 165th moved cross country to its assigned

route.

The 165th Regiment proceeded to the front

and accomplished the relief of the Marines in

its assigned area at about .1000.28 Lieutenant

Colonel McDonough, commanding the 2d Battalion, recommended to Colonel Kelley that his

unit wait for the 106th to come abreast before

moving out in the attack. Colonel Kelley concurred in this recommendation, directing

McDonough to "await the arrival of the 106th

and to push his attack when contact with the

106th had been made."2°

Finally, at about 1055, the 106th Infantry

jumped off, joined by the 165th when the two

units were abreast. The first-named regiment

complained that the line of departure was held

by the enemy and that the 4th Marine Division

lines (through which it was to pass) were

located approximately 400 to 500 yards short

of the line shown on the NTLF Operation

Overlay.30 One Company (K-, 25th Marines)

had, in fact, been pulled back to its right rear

on the previous evening to tie in the night

defense; but, otherwise, 4th Division troops remained on the most forward ground taken on

22 June.

The nature of the terrain facing the 27th Infantry Division was to have an unusually vital

27 The 106th Infantry Report blames this situation

on an. error by guides furnished from the 4th Marine

Division.

28 Colonel Kelley felt that it was "... of interest to

note here that the Marines we relieved expressed their

happiness at being relieved from this zone of action, as

they considered it the strongest position they had run

up against"

22 165 Inf Report, 5. Kelleg. Lemp.

80106 Inf Report, 4.
Agingan

Point

Afetna

Point

Charon

Kanoo

Garapan

Mt

0-5 Tipo Pale

.4

Donnay •

Mt Tapotchau

Death

Volley 'if Purple Heart Ridge

•Chocha

Hill

600

• Lautau

0-5

OSLIS LAKEUPECk 25

1k 23

Hill

600

0-44

24 MAGICIENNE

BAY

AIRFIELD 22 and 23 June

22 and 23 June

— LEGEND —

— — — — Indicates Progress Before 22 June

RD 70 93

Nofutan Point

Kog man

Peninsula

PROGRESS LINES

22 JUNE 1944

2000 4000 Yds

MAP 14
bearing on the unit's operations for many days

to come. This terrain is well described by the

historian attached to the division at Saipan:

The whole mountain [Tapotchau] was stoutly defended by the enemy, but the situation on the two

flanks of it was somewhat unusual. On the west side

of the peak, the ground sloped sharply to the sea. On

the east, Ragman Point side, it dropped in sheer cliffs

to a bench or plateau, some six hundred feet below the

summit. This plateau, a saddle-shaped piece of land,

was some twelve hundred yards across and bordered on

the east by a low chain of hills covered with heavy

foliage. Beyond them the ground sloped down to Ragman- Point on the east or dropped off abruptly to

Magicienne Bay on the southeast. The cliffs of Mt.

Tapotchau and the chain of hills made a corridor out of

the plateau. In the fighting • which ensued this corridor

was named Death Valley by the men who fought there

and the chain of hills came to be known as Purple

Heart Ridge.31

The 165th Infantry, attacked with two battalions in assault, one in reserve. The 1st Battalion, in contact with the 23d Marines on the

right, moved forward without -serious trouble,

but the 2d Battalion met frontal fire from

Death Valley, and, more seriously, from the

high ground to the left within the 106th Infantry's zone. Because of this, the 165th's 23

June advances averaged only about 400 yards.32

The 106th Infantry, attacking with battalions in column, 3d (Lieutenant Colonel

Harold I. Mizony, USA) leading, experienced

considerable trouble. From the cliff line on the

left flank, Japanese riflemen and machine gunners, hidden in caves, delivered accurate fire on

the soldiers moving below them. A further

slowing factor was a Japanese ammunition

dump which was exploded by weapons of the

3d Battalion's Antitank platoon. The spray

of shell fragmentation continued- for about two

hours, completely immobilizing the left assault

unit (Company L).

Following a sound pummeling of the . cliff

positions by medium, tanks at 1315, the attack

moved out, only to be reversed by the enemy

"cavemen." A second effort on the heels of a

thundering artillery preparation fired by the

105mm howitzers of the 104th Field Artillery

Battalion resulted in similar failure, and at the

31 The 27th's Battle For Saipan, 12.

32 165th Inf Report, 5.

end of the day the 106th Infantry's front remained on the line of departure. No physical

contact existed with the 2d Marine Division,

moving atop the cliff line on the left. Late in

the afternoon, Company F, 106th Infantry, was

dispatched on a mission of gaining physical

contact with the Marines; but, though this unit

'successfully tied. itself to the 2d Division flank,

the situation was not materially improved, inasmuch as by then the company was out of

contact with the remainder of the 27th Division. More detail on this commitment is contained in the narrative of the 8th Marines on

23 June.

At 1715, the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry

(Major Ahnerin C. O'Hara, USA), was ordered into the lines on the left of the 3d Battalion, and in this formation the 106th Infantry

dug in for the night. The day's gains were

negligible.33

The 27th Division's 23 June activities were

extremely disappointing to General Holland

Smith, who, following a mid-afternoon staff

conference, summoned Major General Sanderford Jarman, USA, Saipan Garrison Force

commander, to discuss the situation. Of this

meeting, Jarman writes:

... He [Holland Smith] outlined to me the many

things that had happened with respect to the failure

of the 27th Div to advance. He indicated that this

division had suffered scarcely no casualties and in his

opinion he didn't think they would fight. He asked my

• advice. I could give him none because I didn't feel it

was up to me to make any recommendation or make

any decisions for him. He stated that if it was not an

Army division and there would be a great cry set up

more or less of a political nature, he would immediately

relieve the division commander and assign someone

else. After discussing the matter with me he asked me

to go see General Ralph Smith, the Div Commander

and see what I could do in helping this division to move

forward. I immediately proceeded to the Hq. 27th Div

and waited until General Smith returned at about

1.845. I found that General Smith had been up to the

front lines all afternoon and was thoroughly familiar

with the situation. I talked to General Smith and explained the situation as I saw it and that I felt from

reports from the Corps Commander that his division

was not carrying its full share. He immediately replied

that such was true; that he was in no way satisfied

with what his regimental commanders had done during

33 06th Int Report, 5.

135
the day and that he had been with them and had

pointed out to them the situation. He further indicated

to me that he was going to be present tomorrow, 24

June with this division when it made its jump-off and

he would personally see to it that the division went

forward. I explained my interest in the matter was

that I was senior Army commander present and was

anxious to see that the Army did its job as it should

be done. He appreciated the situation and thanked me

for coming to see him and stated that if he didn't take

his division forward tomorrow he should be relieved.84

Operations at Hill 600

The 4th Division's 23 June plan provided

for an attack with two regiments abreast, 24th

Marines on the right along the beach and 23d

Marines on the left; the 1st Battalion, 23d

Marines, would constitute the division reserve.

Objective 0-5A would be seized initially, followed by the move to 0-6 (including all of

Kagman Peninsula).

The division launched its assault at 1000 as

scheduled.

The 23d Marines, attacking with battalions

in column, Dillon's 2d Battalion leading, advanced rapidly over rough terrain against

machine-gun and rifle fire from Hill 600.

Approached from the south, Hill 600 presented

an extremely steep slope; and, in the words of

the battalion commander, "It was all you could

do to climb it, let alone fight up it." The number of Japanese defending the height was not

great, but the area was admirably suited for

defense and, for about 30 minutes,. the fight

was close and vicious. Hand grenades passed

back and forth as in an overgrown, uncontrolled game of "hot potato."

Despite their struggle against gravity and

an obstinate foe, Dillon's Marines seized the

peak and set up a hasty defense against counterattack. Atop the hill were the bodies of

several men identified as belonging to the 3d

Battalion, 24th Marines. These were probably

casualties from a patrol which had moved

well forward of the front lines on the previous

day. Among them was a radio operator, who

had managed to destroy his SCR 300 before

succumbing.

From its newly-won position, Dillon's battalion had' an unimpaired view of the whole

34 Memo for Record, MajGen S. Jarman, 23Jun44.

136

of Kagman Peninsula. This surge had been

executed without benefit of contact with the

27th Division on the left; and, when it was

apparent that the latter was still some distance

to the rear, General Schmidt ordered the 23d

to hold up its advance until Army elements

had tied in.

Though the peak of the hill was securely in

the hands of the 2d Battalion, the battle continued. The hill's northern slope, cloaked in

thick vegetation, was alive with Japanese soldiers. Dillon endeavored to strip them of their

concealment by burning the area with flamethrowers, but the efforts were largely unsuccessful. Throughout the remainder of the day

and during the night the grenade pitching continued."

While the 23d Regiment worried about its

open left flank and tried to achieve contact

with the 27th Division, Colonel Hart's 24th

Marines drove along the coast of Magicienne

Bay. Rothwell's 2d Battalion, on the right,

made fast progress, hampered only by flanking

fire from the southeastern slopes of Hill 600.

By midafternoon it had pushed a salient to

objective 0-5. The left assault battalion (3d),

however, was retarded by the necessity of

dragging its inland flank to maintain contact

with the 23d Regiment. The 1st Battalion followed the echeloned assault units as regimental

reserve. Results of the day's activities in the

24th Marines' zone were good on the right,

perforce retarded on the left.

All in all, the speed of the 4th Division's 23

June advance was considerably delayed by the

Army unit's late arrival. Contact was finally

established with the right element of the 27th

Division (1st Battalion, 165th Infantry) by

bending the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, back

along the western slopes of Hill 600.36

Colonel Batchelder's 25th Marines, when

passed through by the 27th Division, reverted

to NTLF reserve. The regiment moved to Hill

500, 3,000-odd yards to the rear, and established a perimeter defense around it. This was

35 Dillon. 23d Mar Report, 40-42. 2d Ba, 23d Mar

Report, 3-4.

36 24th Mar Report, 20. 1st, 2d and 8d Bn, 24th Mar

Reports, 5 of all reports.
the first day of several to follow during which

the depleted 25th would remain in general reserve. Lieutenant Colonel Chambers, a concussion casualty on the previous afternoon,

returned to resume command of the 3d Battalion.87

"... Focal Points of Combat."

The 2d Division's 23 June operation order

called for a continuation of the pivoting movement on the 2d Marines, with the 6th and 8th

Marines seizing 0-5.

The 8th Marines began its advance at 1000

except on the right, where the 106th Infantry's

late arrival made forward movement impractical. In response to Colonel Wallace's request

of 22 June, the 8th Regiment was provided

with an observation plane from VMO-2 to

search for routes of supply and evacuation in

the Tapotchau area. The observer, Lieutenant

Colonel Juhan, regimental executive officer,

discovered a road along the mountain's lower

slopes which had not been visible to ground

reconnaissance. News of this was gratefully

received, as the route would be helpful in solving the critical logistical problems that faced

the regiment. Other points disclosed by the

flight were: the only approach to the top of Mt.

Tapotchau appeared to be the ridge along the

division right boundary, and advance along

this ridge would be possible only after seizure

qf a high, rocky cliff formation dominating it

from the northwest.

The 8th Marines' left and center (in the

zones of the 1st and 3d Battalions) advanced

slowly against light resistance but difficult upand-down terrain. By 1130, because of the

inability of the right flank to move, the advance

was held up. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,

on the right of the 8th Marines' front, bent

every effort to locate and contact the 106th

Infantry; but at 1345, when there was still no

sign of that regiment, General Watson ordered

the 8th Marines to continue the attack without

relation to the 106th. Colonel Wallace in turn

ordered the attack forward and moved Chamberlin's 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, into position

behind the 1st Battalion, 29th, to protect the

37 25th Mar Report, 6.

889590°--50 --10

right flank. Major Chamberlin immediately

dispatched a Marine patrol into the 27th Division's zone in yet another attempt to establish

physical contact between the two divisions.

And, again, the patrol returned without being

able to locate units in that zone.

After resumption of the attack, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, moved rapidly and seized

the cliff that dominated the route to Mt. Tapotchau. On the left, however, Hays' 1st

Battalion, 8th Marines, ran into a strong point

of about 30 Japanese riflemen and six heavy

machine guns. The Japanese, dug into the

walls of a ravine overlooking the 1st Battalion's

zone, were well prepared to present a formidable challenge to any advance through the

area. With admirable understatement, the

battalion action report described the reduction

of the strong point as "difficult going."

Throughout the remainder of the day, all

available weapons were concentrated on the

strong point, but the area was still in enemy

hands as darkness fell.

In the late afternoon, Major Chamberlin led

a squad-sized patrol into the 27th Division's

zone in an effort to gain contact. This time at

last he was able to locate the command post of

the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, where he discussed the situation with the battalion commander (Major O'Hara). Pointing out that

it would be desirable for one Army company to

return with him in order to tie in with his

battalion, Chamberlin further reasoned that

it would then be easier for two companies of

the same battalion to establish contact than it

had been for the two divisions. The Army

officer agreed in principle but felt that a

smaller unit would do as well. At this juncture

Major General Ralph Smith, then in the

process of touring his front lines, appeared on

the scene. After listening to Chamberlin's suggestion, General Smith concurred and ordered

that a company return to the Marine lines with

Chamberlin.

At about dusk Chamberlin came trudging

back with a long file of soldiers—Company F,

106th Infantry. Although this company was

inserted in the line on the right flank to assist

in protecting this exposed area, the situation

otherwise was not materially improved, since

137
the company was then out of contact with the

rest of the 27th Division. Company F remained

atop the cliff with the Marines for several

days, performing all assigned missions in an

excellent manner. Because of separation from

its parent command, the company drew upon

the Marine unit for supplies.

As the 8th Marines dug in for the night, the

right boundary rested on the ridge line which

fell abruptly to a deep gorge (called "Death

Valley" by men of the 27th Division). In tying

in the night's defenses, it was necessary to

commit all four battalions of the 8th Marines

to the lines; the three assault battalions faced

generally north, while the 2d Battalion bent

back along the ridge, facing toward the exposed eastern flank. To assist further in the

task of refusing and protecting this wing, a

37mm gun platoon of the Regimental Weapons

Company was used in the ridge line—gorge area

with guns pointed east.

The most practicable route for Japanese

tanks into the 8th Marines' area was a narrow

road entering from the right rear. To prevent

enemy use of this road, a bulldozer was parked,

blade down, at the narrowest point. In this

position, it blocked tank advance down the

road, while the terrain on either side denied

movement around it. A vital (unidentified)

part of the motor was removed to prevent the

Japanese from driving the bulldozer clear of

the area, and the machine remained an effective road block throughout the night. In the

morning it was a simple matter to replace the

motor part and use the bulldozer for its normal

tasks. This ingenious employment was continued during the several days that the 8th

Marines remained in the immediate area.

Regimental patrols operating north and

northeast of the lines destroyed one small

enemy patrol and observed two others. From

this Japanese activity, it was feared that the

enemy was aware of the gap that existed between the 8th Marines and the 106th Infantry.

All hands were alerted to the possibility of

Japanese moves through this area, and preparations were made to stop any thrust.

Late in the day, two platoons of the 2d Division Reconnaissance Company were attached

138

to the 8th Marines. Colonel Wallace, in turn,

sent them to join the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, with which they remained until 5 July.

The 8th Marines' logistical problems were

temporarily lessened when a road, spotted by

Lieutenant Colonel Juhan on his OY flight

earlier in the day, was reached by assault

units. Immediately, a bulldozer began carving

a lane through a rugged ridge to connect with

the newly found supply route. Even with the

improvement, however, supply and evacuation

would remain great problems in the Mt. Tapotchau region for days to come. The logistical

situation would get worse before it got better.38

Soon after the 6th Marines launched its

1000, 23 June, attack, elements of the right

flank battalion (2d Battalion, 2d Marines) were

pinched out by the reduced frontage. At 1100

all of the latter unit had been • relieved from

the lines except Company F, which remained

attached to the 6th Marines and occupied the

extreme right portion of that regiment's lines.

The rest of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines,

moved to an assembly area in division reserve

and in the afternoon reverted to parent control

for the first time since D-Day. In a related

move, the al Battalion, 6th Marines, which had

operated as part of the 2d Regiment since 16

June, returned to the 6th Marines.

The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, on the regiment's left (pivot) flank, did not advance during the day. Like the 2d Marines (farther to

the left), the positions were already forward

to such a point that further movement would

impose a severe contact strain. For this reason,

the day was spent in patrolling the projected

zone of advance. This paid dividends; one

Japanese mountain gun and several machine

guns, together with their crews, were destroyed

in the foothills southeast of Garapan.

The only significant advance by the 6th Marines occurred in the zone of Major Rentsch's

3d Battalion. Here the main difficulty experienced was from the rough terrain which canalized forward movement to a single narrow

38 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 10-11. 8th Mar

Report, 4-5. 1st Bn, 8th Mar Report, 6. Interview with

Maj W. C. Chamberlin, 14Apr49, hereinafter cited as

Chamberlin.
trail. This condition prohibited rapid travel

or even a coordinated attack. The day's advances totalled but 300-400 yards, and the

Japanese strong point north of Tipo Pale

remained aggravatingly intact. But good contact existed on both flanks as the 6th Marines

dug in for the night.39

The constant pressure which the 6th and 8th

Marines exerted against the dominating terrain in Saipan's center caused the Japanese

31st Army chief of staff to write that Tapotchau and the hills to the south and west

were "gradually turning into focal points of

combat."

In preparation for moves forward, the 2d

Marines removed the minefield which it had

placed along the beach road. Other activity

consisted of replacing the 2d Battalion, 6th

Marines, with Kyle's 1st Battalion, 2d Marines.

In the afternoon, when the 2d Battalion (less

Company F) returned to regimental control,

it was placed in reserve. Anticipating subsequent needs upon seizing Garapan, the 2d

Division attached a small group of military

police and an armored bulldozer to the 2d

Marines.

During the afternoon of 23 June some of the

2d Division Shore Party personnel became

available for other missions, as the unloading

of ships neared completion. General Watson

directed that initially a provisional battalion

of two companies (each of five officers and

120 men) be formed from these personnel.. As

additional shore party troops became available, more of such companies would be formed

and employed as division reserve units. Eventually, they would become a replacement pool

to strengthen depleted units.41

General Holland Smith was greatly displeased with the failure of the 27th Division

to attack on time. His disappointment with

the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, was for a

similar reason. This unit, removed from the

27th Division to operate directly under NTLF

39 2c1 Mar Div Report, Section VI, 11. 6th Mar Report,

7-8.

40 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #0983-85, 17.

41 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 11-12.

control, was to attack Nafutan Point "at daylight" of 23 June. The battalion did not commence its attack until 1330, and then only

minor actions were conducted. The day's progress was practically negligible."

Two unfortunate accidents occurred in this

area during the day. At noon a Japanese ammunition dump located near the 2d Battalion's

command post was blown by U. S. Army ordnance personnel, the blast resulting in five

casualties. Then, soon after the attack began,

friendly naval gunfire erroneously fired on the

unit's command post, killing six and wounding

33 men. Among the casualties were several

key headquarters and communications personnel, a loss acutely felt throughout the remainder of the operation."

Night of 23-24 June

At dusk a report was received by the three

divisions that Japanese troops and tanks were

massing in front of the 27th Infantry Division. The expected enemy attack materialized

at about 1830, when Japanese tanks struck near

the boundary between the 165th and 106th Infantry Regiments. The combined efforts .of

37mm guns and bazookas in the areas of the

2d Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion,

106th, destroyed five Japanese tanks, but a

sixth escaped.

This was not enough for the intruders. At

about 1930, in company with infantrymen, five

more Japanese tanks struck the right center of

the 106th Infantry. The 3d Battalion's Antitank Platoon and the 1st Platoon of the Regimental Cannon Company accounted for four

of the tanks while the fifth, though suffering

a hit, broke through the 3d Battalion's lines.

Firing wildly, it sprayed the battalion aid station with machine-gun bullets and set fire to a

large ammunition dump nearby. The resultant exploding shells forced the right of the 3d

Battalion to withdraw about 100 yards, returnIt will be remembered that the 27th Division had

also issued an order to this unit for 23 June, an order

that was similar to the one from NMI' except that it

omitted the time that the move was to begin.

43 Narrative of Events, 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry,

June 22—July 3.

139
ing to its original positions after the fire had

burned itself out.44

Shortly after the attack on the 106th Infantry, the enemy lashed out in another tank

thrust, this time against the left of the 23d

Marines. The enemy machines attempted to

climb Hill 600 by moving along the road on

the western side but were met with bazooka

and 37mm fire from the 23d Marines as well

as the 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry. Of the

five Japanese tanks engaged in the assault,

three were destroyed and the other two retreated. Throughout the remainder of the

night this area remained a beehive of activity

with numerous but unsuccessful attempts at

infiltration by small bands of Japanese."

There is indication that all three tank thrusts

were intended as part of the same attack, with

the Japanese tanks deploying in front of the

lines and assaulting in a more or less uncoordinated,• haphazard manner.

Although the infantry regiments of the 2d

Marine Division experienced only sporadic

local activity, units of the 10th Marines (division artillery regiment) were shelled by about

one battery of Japanese artillery, firing from

north and northeast of Mt. Tapotchau. While

many of the rounds (estimated variously as

75mm, 105mm and 6-inch) fell harmlessly,

many more found their intended mark. At

least one round hit directly in the regimental

fire direction center, located near the northern

end of the Charan Kanoa airstrip, killing the

10th Marines' Executive Officer, Lieutenant

Colonel Ralph E. Forsyth and wounding the

R-2 (Captain Robert W. Sullivan), R-3

(Major Richard Church)46 and several key

noncommissioned officers. In addition, many

communication and control facilities were destroyed, making it necessary for the 1st Battalion to take over direction and coordination

of the regiment's fire.47

" 165th Inf Report, 5. 106th In! Report, 5.

45 234 Mar Report, 41. L. R. Jones.

46 Church had assumed the R-3 duties on D-plus 1

after Lieutenant Colonel Howard V. Hiett was

Wounded.

47 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 12. 10th Mar

Report, 3. Ltr from Maj R. W. Sullivan to CMC,

3Jan50.

140

Captain Russell C. White, R-1 of the 10th

Marines, provides a description of the shelling,

together with an estimate of the fire's density:

Approximately 39 rounds, fired in 13 three-gun

salvos, covered the regimental headquarters positions

in an area 35-45 feet wide and 100 feet long. The Japs

may have been trying to hit four or five OY's which

were parked just north of us. In addition to Colonel

Forsyth, Captain Sullivan, and Major Church, we lost

Sergeant Major Baker and Staff Sergeant Michalski

(Operations Sergeant), both of whom died of wounds

received in this shelling.45

Japanese Plans and Actions

Japanese plans to reinforce Saipan by water

had progressed by 23 June to a point where detailed instructions were transmitted. In a

joint order from the 31st Army and the Central

Pacific Fleet to Army and Navy Units on Rota

and Tinian and the 29th Division on Yap, details of movement to Saipan were prescribed:

1. I would like to have this transmitted to small boat

amphibious units.

a. Although enemy patrolling around Saipan is intense ... it is comparatively light in the southeast,

small boat operations are possible from Tinian in an

easterly direction. Two or three destroyers are always

patrolling Tinian channel and off Laulau Bay.

b. Landing points-1st plan: Coast east of Chacha,

river entrance at Mt. Hanichiru....

c. As far as possible you should navigate deployed

and land at night. Reply regarding expected time of

arrival.

d. I wish to have the Army Navy Units here Cooperate in the complete concealment of aforementioned

units.

A peculiarity of this order is that no exact time

for the move is mentioned, only the direction to

"reply regarding expected time of arrival."

On the evening of 23 June, General Iketa

summarized the situation as follows:

1. The enemy is moving the strong point of his

attack to the east and is advancing gradually under

cover of shelling and bombing. Hill east of Hill 230

[Tipo Pale] and Hill 285 have fallen into enemy

hands.40 Even though Hill 343 is still in our hands the

situation is unknown. Part of the enemy has infiltrated

into area east of Hill 343.50 There is a report of four

tanks and about 200 infantry troops have advanced

48 Interview with Capt R. C. White, 8Dec49.

48 The "enemy" here referred to was the 3d Battalion,

6th Marines, and the 26 Battalion, 2d Marines.

58 The "enemy" here referred to was the 27th Division, and more specifically, the 106th Infantry.
into Laulau area.51 Details unknown. [Author's italics.]

2. The Homare [43d Division] Units with the firm

decision to hold out until the last the hill line in previous paragraph expects to smash the enemy.

3. While there is no great change in the enemy tank

situation, land artillery is increasing daily. Bombings

against our rear supply areas is gradually increasing

in intensity.

4. According to a captured document the enemy is

the 4th Marine Division.

The uncertainty displayed in the first paragraph of the foregoing report indicates the extreme difficulties the Japanese experienced

maintaining communications among themselves. That this situation existed is a tribute

to the volume of artillery, naval gunfire and

air support which battered the Japanese without respite.52

During daylight of 23 June the Japanese

made two feeble efforts at air interference. The

"several" planes that attacked auxiliary ships

(Task Unit 16.1'7.12) at 1205 failed to achieve

any hits but escaped without loss to themselves.

Later, two Japanese torpedo bombers were

intercepted and destroyed near Saipan by a

four-plane combat air patrol from the Midqvay.53

At 2212 a lone Japanese plane (perhaps trying to duplicate the feat of the one that had

hit the Maryland the day before) dropped

three bombs 1,500 yards astern of the Louisville and hastened from the area.

After midnight (at 0052) "several" Japanese bombers made a reasonably successful attack on U. S. shipping. Dropped over Saipan

from a very high altitude, bombs caused minor

damage from fragmentation to LCT 988, PCS

1461, PCS 1402, LST 222, and the. Phaon

(ARB-3) .54 A total of 18 casualties was caused

by bomb fragments. All of the raiders escaped

untouched.55

51- The "200 infantry troops" here referred to were

from the 24th Marines.

52 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 17-18.

53 This was the escort carrier Midway. On 10 October

1944 its name was changed to Saint Lo. A large carrier

was later given the name Midway.

54 This ship, a battle-damage repair vessel, was

formerly LST 15.

55 TF 51 Report, Annex 1 to End A and End l L.

D-PLUS 9-24 JUNE

To Garapan's Outskirts

General Holland Smith's attack order for 24

June directed a continuation of the drive to

objective 0-6. (See Map 17.) Seizure of this

would place Kagman Peninsula in U. S. hands

and greatly narrow the landing force front.

The scheme of maneuver involved a swing to

the east for the 4th Marine Division and a

drive to the north by the 2d and 27th Divisions.

The time of attack was set for 0800. The 2d

Battalion, 105th Infantry, was ordered to continue operations at daylight of 24 June to mop

up remaining detachments on Nafutan Point.

The NTLF reserve, Colonel Batchelder's 25th

Marines, would remain in the vicinity of Hill

500 prepared to defend that hill and to send

out antisniper patrols in the area around and

east of Lake Susupe.56

For the 2d Marine Division the attack had

at last progressed to a point which allowed the

left flank regiment, the 2d Marines, to advance.

Attacking with the 1st and 3d Battalions

abreast, 1st on the right, the advance started

rapidly, the 3d Battalion moving 500 yards

along the beach in the first hour. The 1st Battalion, however, encountered heavy automatic

weapons fire from a ridge southeast of Garapan, which held up its advance. After establishing fire superiority, mainly with organic

mortars and 105mm howitzers of the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines, the battalion moved to

the ridge's crest. This was at 1500.

Almost immediately after the seizure, peculiar activity was observed just forward of

the hill: Japanese officers, brandishing sabers

and shouting strident commands, were attempting to incite about one platoon of enemy soldiers to attack the well-positioned 1st Battalion atop the ridge. From the north, as the

Japanese counterattackers were forced to approach, the ridge presented a formidable obstacle, being virtually a cliff. Difficulties notwithstanding, the Japanese made the effort;

but, with two hands required to scale the slope

and another to throw grenades or wave sabers,

they were one hand short from the outset. The

36 NMI' Operation Order 11-44.

141
INCHING FORWARD AT GARAPAN'S DESOLATE OUTSKIRTS, men of 2d Marines 1:11;:e mIvantage of the cover afforded by a small

rise.

ridge's steepness is revealed in the fact that

front line Marines were forced to lean forward

to depress the muzzles of their rifles sufficiently

to hit their attackers.

Following the repulse the 1st Battalion dug

in on the ridge overlooking "Radio Road,"

which, running at right angles to the direction

of advance, was a convenient stopping point.

Not only did it practically coincide with objective 0-6, but also it -ran along the northern

slopes of a dominating ridge, an important

tactical locality for the defense of the right

half of the regimental sector.

The day's excitement was not over for the 2d

Marines, however. At about 1625; as the left

assault battalion (3d) coMmenced preparations

for its defense of the flatland along the beach,

seven Japanese tanks suddenly moved from

Garapan's southern ruins and attacked. Since

no enemy infantry accompanied this thrust, it

142

is not clear what the tanks hoped to accomplish. "Johnny-on-the-spot" medium tanks

from Company C, 2d Tank Battalion, and four

75mm half-tracks (hastily rushed to the scene)

opened fire accurately on the advancing enemy

machines, destroying six and routing. the

seventh, Thereafter, the day was uneventful

with the 3d Battalion holding up its advance

along Radio Road in contact with the 1st Battalion.

The 1st Provisional Battalion, composed of

two companies formed from shore party per-

-sonnel, was attached' to the 2d Marines in the

late afternoon. Colonel Stuart employed this

unit with the reserve (2d Battalion), now dug

in behind the front - lines, thus providing

greater depth to the regiment's defense: Men

of the 2d Marines were destined to•"remain •

along Radio Road for several days.57

57 2d Mar Report, 4. Kyle. Interview with Maj H. K.
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part of the north-south ridge leading to Mt.

Tapotchau, was within machine-gun range of

the summit.

Moving through this intricate snarl was like

attempting to swim through a fishermen's net,

and Tompkins' battalion became overextended.

At this juncture Colonel Wallace, commanding the 8th Marines, ordered the 2d Battalion

to move in behind Tompkins' right (as it had

the previous night) to protect the open flank.

As the 8th Marines dug in for the night after

an advance of about 700 yards, it again became

essential to commit the 37mm Platoon from the

Regimental Weapons Company to extend south

along the ridge facing the hiatus between the

2d and 27th Divisions."

The Troublesome Cliff

On the morning of 24 June, Lieutenant General Holland Smith sent a dispatch to Major

General Ralph Smith indicating his displeasure over the previous day's actions of the 27th

Infantry Division:

Commanding General is highly displeased with the

failure of the 27th Division on June Twenty Third to

launch its attack as ordered at King Hour and the lack

of offensive action displayed by the division in its failure to advance and seize Objective 0-5 when opposed

only by small arms and mortar fire. The failure of the

27th Division to advance in its zone of action resulted

In the halting of attacks by the 4th and 2d Marine

Divisions on the flanks of the 27th in order to prevent

dangerous exposure of their interior flanks. It is directed that immediate steps be taken to cause the 27th

Division to advance and seize objectives as ordered.°0

As Major General Ralph Smith's 27th Division launched its attack down Death Valley on

24 June, Japanese mortar and machine-gun fire

concentrated on open ground between the 106th

Infantry's right flank and the 165th's left,

denying movement through the area. The terrain was favorable to the enemy and he made

the most of it.

To complicate matters of control, heavy concentrations of Japanese mortar fire struck the

command posts of the 1st and 2d Battalions,

165th Infantry—the 2d Battalion's at 0800 just

as the attack was launched, the 1st Battalion's

at about 1500.

59 8th Mar Report, 5-6. Chamberlin.

oo NTLF Operational Dispatches, Dispatch from CTG

56.1 to CG 27th Inf Div, 24Jun44.

144

Having noticed that the progress of his regiment was being delayed by fire from the enemy

to his left in the 106th Infantry's zone of action, Colonel Kelley ordered the 1st and 2d

Battalions, 165th Infantry, to maneuver to the

right, by-passing local points of resistance.

Soon after the move began, Colonel Kelley assigned the mission of mopping-up within the

regiment's zone of action to the 1st Battalion.

After carefully coordinating the move, he ordered his 3d Battalion to detour to the right

through the area already cleared by the 23c1

Marines and close up on the latter's flank. By

darkness of 24 June the move and subsequent

establishment of contact had been accomplished. Whereas the gains within the 165th

Infantry's zone of action had been relatively

small, the over-all result improved the situation as it affected future action.61

All forward movements in the 106th Infantry's area, meanwhile, were stopped by Japanese occupying positions in the cliff face on the

left flank. Advances of about 100 yards were

made by the 3d Battalion, but these hard-won

yards were relinquished when the positions became untenable, and the battalion returned to

the line of departure. The 2d Battalion, peering constantly at the cliff line in search of

enemy positions, made virtually no progress

during the day. In the words of the 106th Infantry's action report:

These cliff positions were practically invulnerable to

our Artillery and mortar fire. Each position had to be

definitely located and brought under direct fire of selfpropelled mounts or tanks before neutralization could

be effected. In addition, it was necessary to occupy

these positions with Infantry before their extermination was assured.

There was some indication that the 27th

Division's commanding general was not

pleased with the 106th Infantry's progress.

This displeasure was voiced in two dispatches

which arrived at the 106th Infantry during

the morning of 24 June:

Advance of 50 yards in 1,4 hours is most unsatisfactory. Start moving at once.

Your failure to maintain contact with unit on your

left is most embarrassing. Advance on your left at

once.

61 Kelley, 7. 165th Inf Report, 5.
At 11507 Colonel Ayres, the 106th's commander, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Cornett's

1st Battalion, which had been in regimental reserve, to relieve the 3d Battalion. The relief

was effected by 1515, the 3d Battalion moving

to an assembly area as the new reserve.°

While losing two of its machines to enemy

mines, the 762d Tank Battalion, supporting

the 27th Division, knocked out four Japanese

tanks on 24 June.

As the 27th Division dug in for the night,

one- company (F, 106th Infantry) was securely

tied to the right of the 2d Marine Division.

But, between that single company and the remainder of the Army division existed a vertical gap of several hundred yards.

After two days of fighting, Ralph Smith

decided to contain the Japanese forces in the

..troublesome cliff with one battalion and to

move the remainder of the .division around the

pocket: 165th leading, followed by the 106th

until objective 0-5 was reached. This move

was slated for 25 June.°

On Nafutan Point, meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 105th . Infantry, had again failed to

make substantial headway. At 1000 a staff

officer of the NTLF (4-3 section visited the battalion command post, located approximately

1,500 yards from the battalion's lines. The battalion commander reported that he did not

know what the situation was as he had not

heard from his company commanders."

For the attack of 25 June Colonel Geoffrey

M. O'Connell, USA, chief of staff of the Sai62 After the campaign, when appearing before a board

of Army officers inquiring into the circumstances surrounding the relief of Major General Ralph Smith,

Colonel Ayres was asked : "In your opinion, if your

regiment had rapidly pressed its attack and advanced

speedily across the open ground in your front, what

would have been the result?" "My candid opinion,"

answered Ayres, "is that the regiment would have.

disappeared."

63 Lenz, 1.6-17. 106th Inf Report, 6. 27th Division

G-3 Journal, 24 June 1944.

64 Ur from CG NTLF, Ser 0063-3, 27,Tun44, Subject: Conduct of Operations by 2d En, 105th Inf in the

Nafutan Point Area. This letter omitted designation of

addressee who is assumed to have been Admiral Nimitz.

Admirals Spruance and Turner received copies.

pan Garrison Force, was placed in command..

of the Nafutan _Point effort, relieving Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Jensen. To support

. further attempts, Colonel O'Connell brought

in antiaircraft artillery: two batteries of 90mm

guns (A and B, 751st AAA Gun Battalion)

would fire from their regularly assigned posi-

-tions, while four 40mm guns would move forward where direct fire could be delivered

against caves and located enemy strong points.

Control of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry,

passed to the commanding officer, Saipan Garrison Forces at 1800, 24 June, but the battalion's mission was mi chan ged.'6

To Chadic and Lautau

While the 2d Marine Division and the 27th

Infantry Division attacked to the north, the

4th Marine Division would swing eastward on

Ragman Peninsula. The attack was launched

at 0800, but a pocket of resistance on the right

of the 27th Division zone of action held up the

23d Marines' movement from Hill 600. The

24th Marines on the right, however, met little

resistance and progressed rapidly.

About noon the 23d Marines detoured the

pocket and resumed the advance. The 3d Battalion had moved up on the right of the. 2d

Battalion, and the two units attacked abreast.

Against "moderate" resistance from enemy

mortars and small groups of infantry and with

its left flank exposed, the regiment swung

around the arc toward Ragman Peninsula,

pivoting on the 24th Marines. As its outer

perimeter swing accelerated, the gap on the

division left widened. By late afternoon, when

the 23d reached objective OT5A (which inchided Chacha Village), the gap measured 800

to 1,000 yards.

Colonel Hart's 24th Marines met only scattered rifle fire from small isolated Japanese

groups in its push along the coast to Ragman

Peninsula. Contact difficulties, however, demanded commitment of all three battalions of

the regiment before nightfall. Lieutenant Colo65 The 27th's Battle For Saipan, 11. Memorandum For

General Richardson from Col G. M. O'Connell, 12.Tu144.

NTLF General Order 2-44, 24Jun44, file 1990-5-10,

02/247.

145
nel Rothwell's 2d Battalion, moving along the

coast, found an undefended Japanese road

block on the road leading north from Laulau

Village. The obstacle was so located that tanks

and half-tracks were denied passage through

the area, and support of the 24th Marines by

these weapons was delayed for nearly four

hours. Engineers from Company B, 20th Marines, eventually cleared the road block and

traffic was restored.

Beyond the block, however, a turn in the

road, so sharp that it almost constituted an obstacle in itself, further slowed movement of

vehicles through the area. While Company E,

24th Marines, was advancing near the village

of Laulau, a blockhouse exploded, causing 20

casualties. This was an all-too-familiar experience for Company E, which, with the rest of

the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, had been shattered by a similar but more serious explosion

at Roi-Namur. Near the area of the blockhouse

explosion, a flame-thrower tank 66 from Company D, 4th Tank Battalion, ran over a land

mine and was disabled. When the 24th Marines dug in for the night, a gigantic stride

had been taken, amounting to about 1,200

yards. Good contact existed with the 23d Marines on the left, and the right flank was anchored on the beach just east of Laulau village.

The 4th Marine Division reserve (1st Battalion, 23d Marines) moved to the crest of Hill

600 to afford protection to the exposed left

flank.".

General Ralph Smith Relieved

Because he felt that the 27th Division's rate

of progress reflected poor leadership, General

Holland Smith decided that a change of command was indicated. In his own words:

I took my map and went aboard the Rocky Mount

to discuss the situation with Kelly Turner. We both

went on board the Indianapolis to see Spruance, who

was in overall command of the operation. I told him the

66 These were M3A1 light tanks which had had their

turret-mounted 37mm guns and ammunition racks removed and Ronson (Canadian) Flame-Throwers installed in lieu thereof. These improvised flame-throwers

were unsatisfactory, particularly from a mechanical

standpoint.

23c1 Mar Report, 42. 24th Mar Report, 20-21. 4th

afar Div Report, Section VI, 24-25. L. R. Jones.

146

facts and said that the situation demanded a change in

command. He asked Le what should be done.

"Ralph Smith has shown that he lacks aggressive

spirit," I replied, "and his division is slowing our advance. He should be relieved." I suggested that Jarman

take over the Twenty-seventh Division as a supplementary duty until another commanding officer was

appointed. Turner supported me and Spruance agreed.

On June 24, the following message was dispatched

from Spruance as Commander, Fifth Fleet, to me as

Commander, Northern Troops and Landing Force, and

circulated to others concerned for information:

"You are authorized and directed to relieve Major

General Ralph Smith from command of the Twentyseventh Division, United States Army, and place Major

General Jarman in command of this division. This

action is taken in order that the offensive on Saipan

may proceed in accordance with the plans and orders

of the Commander, Northern Troops and Landing

Force." 68

At the same Indianapolis conference, General Holland Smith and the two admirals

reached another vital decision: the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) would

be kept at sea in the Marianas area as additional reserve for possible use at Saipan. As

noted previously, the 3d Marine Division returned to Eniwetok on 25 June while the 1st

Provisional Marine Brigade remained in the

area until 30 June.

About 1530, 24 June, Major General Ralph

Smith received a message from Lieutenant

General Holland Smith directing him to turn

over command of the 27th Division to Major

General Sanderford Jarman and report for

transportation to Pearl Harbor. Later in, the

afternoon, General Jarman appeared at the

27th Division command post where the retiring commander informed him on the situation

as it existed. General Jarman then summoned

the regimental commanders to discuss future

plans.

With the advice of General Ralph Smith and

the recommendation of Colonel Ayres of the

106th Infantry, General Jarman approved the

scheme of leaving one battalion to contain and

mop up the cliff strong point while the remainder of the 106th Infantry detoured east 500 to

800 yards and then advanced north by a defiladed route. In this manner it was hoped that

the regiment could get past the stumbling

68 Coral and Brass, 172.
block, reestablish contact with the 2d Marine

Division, and resume the advance to the north.

Orders were issued to put the plan into effect."

The relief of Major General Ralph Smith

was later the subject of a number of bitter articles and heated arguments and caused much

bad feeling.70 Headquarters, U. S. Army

Forces Central Pacific Area was even moved

to conduct an investigation, headed by Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, USA, into

the circumstances surrounding the relief. This

inquiry concluded that "Lt. Gen. Holland M.

Smith, USMC, had full authority to relieve

Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith, USA,. . ." but, "in

the light of information available to the board,

the relief . . . was not justified by the facts." 71

These findings, as General Holland Smith later

pointed• out, were based on incomplete information, the board having confined itself to examination of Army sources.

Night of 24-25 June

From 1925 to 2208 the transport area and the

Charan Kanoa Beaches were under intermittent air attack. The first three Japanese

planes approached Saipan undetected and

dropped their bombs along the beaches causing

minor damage. Immediately, the smoke plan

was executed, screening the transports to the

attacking planes. Total Japanese planes committed to the attacks was about 10, but no hits

were scored on U. S. shipping anchored off

Saipan. Ships' gunfire and "Black Widow"

P-61 night fighters were equally ineffective,

being unable to down any of the Japanese attackers.72

Principal activity in the 2d Division sector

during the night of 24-25 June occurred in the

2d Marines area. In addition to the efforts of

69 Memo For Record, 30Jun44, MajGen S. Jarman,

hereinafter cited as Jarman.

70 Though five Army generals were relieved in the

Pacific Theater during the war, only in this one instance, in which a Marine officer was the initiating

agent, were there any nonoperational consequences.

Infantry Journal, Nov48, "Smith vs Smith," 3.

° 71 Proceedings of a Board of Officers convened pursuant to Letter Orders, AG 333/3, Headquarters 11. S.

Army Forces Central Pacific Area, 41u144.

72 TF 51 Report, End A, 9; Annex 1 to End A.

Japanese infiltrators to move through the lines

into Marine rear_areas, there were others who

had been by-passed during the day's advance

trying to get through the lines and back to

their own units. This two-way traffic was not

designed to soothe the nerves of the 2d Marines and resulted in an all night, 100 per cent

-alert. The Marines came off well ahead, however, suffering 10 casualties while killing 82

Japanese."

The only other night activity occurred in

the zone of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Here

enemy riflemen heckled the front line Marines,

while Japanese mortar and artillery fire

showered on the battalion command post, in a

small ravine on the south slopes of Tipo Pale.

First, the rounds crept up the draw, then back

down. By the time the enemy fire had walked

four times through the area, communications

were destroyed and the installation was generally upset. Major Rentsch, commanding the

3d Battalion, felt that the Japanese observer

who was directing this accurate enemy fire

must be situated nearby, possibly behind the

position. Further, he believed that the fire

might have been directed by means of flashlight signals. To escape the bull's-eye, the 3d

Battalion moved its command post about 50

yards to the south, after which no more fire

was received. The shelling, however, put the

command post out of operation until daylight

when normal communications were reestablished."

The 27th Division, facing Death Valley, and

the 4th Division on Kagman Peninsula, spent

a reasonably quiet night, with only the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, dug in near Laulau on

the north coast of Magicienne Bay, reporting

activity. There, single Japanese attempted—

unsuccessfully—to infiltrate the Marine lines."

Japanese Thoughts

On Tinian, the Japanese spent most of their

time in shelters to protect themselves from

U. S. aircraft, artillery and ships' guns which

maintained almost constant harassing fires on

73 24 Mar Report, 4.

Rentsch. 6th Mar Report, 8.

752d Bn, 24th Mar Report, 6.

147
them. Since 20 June, the 155mm guns of Battery B, 531st Field Artillery Battalion (XXIV

Corps Artillery), had been emplaced for firing

on Tinian. On 24 June, the other two batteries

of the battalion also turned around to triple the

volume of artillery fire against the island.?" An

unidentified Japanese NCO indicates in his

diary entry of 24 June that the morale was

lowering as a result of this persistent bombing

and shelling:

I heard the Japanese radio-news with stories of

great victories. We haven't heard of any victories

lately. What will we do until the day of our annihilation? I wish my mother could know about the life we

are leading.77

The situation was somewhat obscure on 24

June when Major General Iketa, chief of

staff, 31st Army wrote:

Regarding the situation of the Homare [43d Division] Units, as we are not in wire communications with

them, we do not know, but it is believed that they have

undergone no great change. They are in the midst of

disposing so as to hold Tapotchau firmly.

As wire communications have been cut off since

yesterday by hostile bombardment, analysis of the

situation has become extremely difficult.

Later, when the miasma of incomplete reports

had cleared somewhat, he amplified and corrected his earlier message:

In the sector of the Homare Units, the enemy has

infiltrated and broken through our positions, and one

part of the enemy—about 300-400 troops 78 along with

four or five tanks—have broken through Chacha in the

area of the eastern foot of Tapotchau. The raging battle

is pressing in the area of the CP. The fighting strength

of the Homare Unit has fallen to less than two infantry

battaliOns.

Though our forces have .called on all kinds of

methods to hinder the enemy advance, we are regrettably reduced to the condition where we cannot carry

out this plan with our present fighting strength.

It is recommended that plan [for reinforcements]

be executed with all haste.

In another message, Iketa directed the commanding officer of the 50th Infantry Regiment

(on Tinian) to "prepare to send one company

of Infantry (with two machine guns and two

rapid firing guns attached) by landing boats

76 Corps Arty S-3 Report, 7.

77 CINCPAG-CINCP0A Item #11,405.

78 The "300-400 troops" here referred to were elements of the 23d Marines.

148

to Saipan. Landing point will be on coast area

east of Chacha if possible." The message also

requested that Iketa be notified when the Oku

Unit coming from Guam arrived at Tinian.7°

From the messages originating with Generar

Iketa at this time, it is apparent that the Japanese had no hope of defeating the Americans

with the forces and resources at hand. Reinforcements were needed. But the reliance

placed uPon small boats as a means of transportation represented either wishful thinking

or sublime confidence in their ability to achieve

the utterly impossible. Saipan was virtually

ringed with U. S. naval vessels whose alert

personnel constantly scanned the waters for a

sign of Japanese movement. Unprotected small

boats or barges, crammed with Japanese

troops, were hardly the craft to penetrate the

U. S. blockade. The Japanese plan, therefore,

must be viewed as a pipe dream born of desperation.

It was also on 24 June that General Saito

evacuated his third command post above Chacha Village and set up a fourth in the sheer

white cliffs northeast of Tapotchau's peak.

After the battle, investigation clearly showed

that this command post, an 'elaborate cave dug

into the hard rock, was the best prepared of all

his C.P.'s. The only weakness of the installation and the reason for Saito's subsequent

evacuation of it (after three days), was its

vulnerability to naval guns firing from off

Saipan's eastern coast.8°

D-PLUS 10-25 JUNE

Ragman Peninsula

Two important objectives faced NTLF on

25 June: Mt. Tapotchau and Kagman Peninsula. Seizure of the heights would at last deny

the enemy his excellent observation posts; capture of' Kagman Peninsula would not only

greatly reduce the NTLF frontage but would

provide a vast, plain area suitable for construction of another airfield. Both objectives were

79 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 18-19. The

Oku Unit was scheduled as a reinforcement for Saipan.

The exact strength of this unit is not indicated in

documents consulted.

80NTLF G-2 Report, 29.
now within reach and, if all went well, would

be in U. S. possession by evening of 25 June.

The 4th Marine Division, scheduled to attack at 0730, jumped off 45 minutes late. This

delay was caused by the difficulty of moving

the supporting tanks from their assembly areas

to the front lines. Routes forward were over

extremely rough terrain with few roads or

trails, most of which were in very poor condition for mechanized traffic. The 4th Marine

Division, still composed of but two regiments

(the 25th Regiment was in NTLF reserve),

made its main effort in the center, with each

regiment directed to push the attack along the

boundary between them. The purpose of this

single-pronged effort was to split the peninsula

into two parts which could then be dealt with

separately. The objective was Mount Kagman

and the high ground in the vicinity of Rorogattan on the easternmost tip of Kagman

Peninsula.

Attacking with all three battalions abreast,

2d along the coast, 1st in the center and 3d on

the left, the 24th Marines advanced rapidly

against virtually no resistance. At approximately 1015, Colonel Hart reported that his

regiment was in possession of Kagman Hill on

the east coast of the peninsula (Objective 0-6).

The balance of the day was spent in patrolling

and in investigating numerous caves along the

coast line.'8

Colonel Jones' 23d Marines moved almost as

rapidly as the 24th, being hampered in progress across the flat, low ground by a single

Japanese field piece. or antitank gun located

on the ridge to the rear. This ridge (called

"Purple Heart" ridge by men of the 27th Infantry Division) lay within the Army division's zone, and, since the latter's advance had

not overrun the area, the Japanese gunner

fired freely on the backs of the Marines—a

typical, if unavoidable, consequence of the situation in the center. With the conctirrence of

the 27th Division, the 14th Marines massed the

fires of several battalions on this area, temporarily silencing the gun. Later, however, this

"dead" weapon came to life and caused more

trouble. In addition, the 23d Regiment was

81- 24th Mar Report, 21.

subjected to a small amount of rifle fire from

by-passed Japanese in the vicinity of Chacha

To support the regiment's advance, one battery of the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines, moved

four 75mm pack howitzers to the northeastern

slopes of Hill 600, a position admirably suited

to the delivery of close, direct fire missions for

either of the assault battalions.

About noon the 1st Battalion, 23d Marines,

which had been operating in 4th Division reserve, returned to parent command. Colonel

Jones then ordered it to the vicinity of Chacha

Village to protect the left flank and rear of the

regiment.

Objective 0-6 fell to the 23d Marines at 1533.

The 2d Battalion found the Brown Beaches

(northwestern portion of Kagman Peninsula)

well fortified against an amphibious landing,

but extremely vulnerable to an attack from the

landward side.82

With the assigned objectives seized, General

Schmidt ordered the 23d and 24th Marines to

continue mopping up the peninsula and to

maintain coastal observation within their

sectors. The alacrity with which this phase of

the operation was carried out had a healthy

effect on the morale of the 4th Marine Division.

82 23d Mar Report, 42-43. 2d Rn, 23d Mar Report, 4.

COMBINATION CAVE AND BLOCKHOUSE, housing a 20mm gun,

overlooked Beach Brown 2 on the east coast. The 2d

Battalion, 23d Marines, over-ran this position from the

rear on 25 June. Like burrowing prairie dogs, the Japanese usually had under-ground routes of escape from

such positions.

149
After days of slogging slowly and painfully

ahead, it was encouraging to move in rapid

strides. Kagman Peninsula could have .been

much more difficult had the Japanese chosen

to make it so; but, as with a man putting off

a dental appointment, the show-down would

come later.83

The morning, and evening summaries of the

Japanese 31st Army chief of staff for 25 June

recognized the successes of the 4th Marine Division:

. The enemy in the Chacha area is completing the

seizure of. that sector. . . . An enemy of unknown

strength (estimated to be 10 tanks, about 300 infantry)

is advancing towards Donnay. The sound,. of rifle fire is

deafening. Around Laulau and Donnay some 10 tanks

and about 700-800 infantry are to be seen advancing

-trona Laulau.84

Failure of a Plan

In the 27th Division sector (now under the

command of Major 'General Sanderford Jarman), the plan of by-passing the cliffside

strong point was placed in operation. One battalion (2d Battalion, 106th Infantry) would

remain behind, contain the enemy in the area,

and institute mopping-up activities. The remainder of the 106th would detour east, follow

a covered route behind the 165th Infantry until

the cliff strong point was passed, then swing

back into its regularly assigned zone.

That part of the scheme which pertained to

the 165th Infantry worked generally as

planned, though its move was strongly contested on the left. The regiment's left assault

unit, the 2d Battalion, encountered heavy flanking fire from the northwest which effectively

stopped its efforts to move forward. One sudden blast of machine-gun and rifle fire wounded

the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel

McDonough, who fell in an area exposed to

enemy fire. The problem of reaching and evacuating the colonel was solved when the 4.2-inch

mortars of Company C, 88th Chemical Mortar

Battalion, threw a thick smoke screen over the

area. Major Gregory Brousseau became the

new battalion commander. Recognizing the

futility of further frontal pushes across the

834th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 26.

84 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 20.

exposed ground, the regimental commander

ordered the 2d Battalion to assume the mopping-up mission (formerly assigned to the 1st

Battalion).

The 165th Infantry's right assault unit (3d

Battalion) made better progress and reached

objective 0-5 by the day's end. The 1st Battalion, relieved of its mopping-up task, followed through the zone cleared by the 3d Battalion and moved in on the latter's left flank

for the night.85

For the 106th Infantry, meanwhile, plans

had gone awry. Instead of following behind

the 165th as ordered, the 106th swung too wide,

moving far into the 4th Marine Division zone.

The result was much lost time, some confusion,

and a general contribution to the failure of the

plan. By 1130 one battalion. (1st) of the 106th .

found itself north of Chacha Village. This

unit took many casualties from a. Japanese

strong point on a hill to the west, part of

Purple Heart Ridge (probably the same positions that harassed the. 4th Marine Division's

rear) .86

When the division commander realized that

the unit was hopelessly astray, he ordered Colonel Ayres to bring the regiment back into position and carry out his original mission. During

the afternoon the 106th moved to the approximate area that it should have occupied in the

morning.

Late in the afternoon General Jarman ordered the 2d. Battalion, 106th Infantry, supported by tanks, to attack down Death Valley

past the cliffs. Two artillery batteries occupied

positions from which to support the effort by

direct fire. Moving out at 1630, the soldiers encountered little opposition and quickly seized

their objective.87

Considerable firing by the battalion along

the route, however, resulted in its stopping for

the night virtually out of ammunition with no

resupply immediately available. Major O'Hara,

commanding the 2d Battalion, stated that he

arrived at the objective so late that he was un85 Kelley, 7. Letnp, 17. 165th Inf Report, 6.

66 The 27th?s Battle For Saipan, 13. Lentp, 17.

87 Jarman.
able to set up a circular defense and added that

battalions must have at least two hours of daylight to establish positions.88 The .ammunition

shortage and the incomplete nature of the battalion's defense would have serious consequences.

When General Jarman observed the satisfactory progress of the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, he ordered Colonel Ayres to execute—

on 26 June—the original plan of detouring to

the right. To General Jarman's questions of

why he had got his regiment lost, Colonel

Ayres could give no answer but stated that he

would carry out the mission the next day. General Jarman warned Ayres that this was, indeed, his last chance: that, if he again failed

to handle his regiment properly, he would be

relieved."

A.s noted before, O'Hara's 24 Battalion,

106th Infantry, had successfully passed the

troublesome cliff area and was dug in on its

assigned objective. The Japanese, operating

as if they were well aware of the unit's ammunition shortage, counterattacked during the

night, forcing O'Hara's men to withdraw down

the valley to a line about 200 yards north of

where the day's advance had begun.9°

That the 27th Division's pressure was having

its effect on the Japanese is indicated by General Iketa's summary of the activities of 25

June:

The enemy in the Tapotchau area have moved in

about 1,500 meters on the east of that high point. . . .

The Division Field Command Post ... is surrounded

by fire from artillery and t:mks which executed an

enveloping attack.91

Seizure of Mt. Tapotchau

The most significant advance in the 2d Marine Division zone of action was that of the 8th

Marines; for it was upon this date (25 June)

that Mt. Tapotchau was captured. The zone of

the regiment included the dominant height of

the mountain, with the 1st and 3d Battalions

on the western slopes, the 2d just east of the

88 Low), 17.

S9 Jarman.

99 Jarman. Lemp, 17.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 20.

FIGHTING UP-HILL was the normal condition during the

first 10 days at Saipan. Here Marines struggle up Mt.

Tapotchau's rugged slopes. Supplying troops in such

terrain required a disproportionate percentage of the

attacker's total effort.

peak, and the 1st Battalion, 29th- Marines, over

the peak itself. The actual -seizure of the crest

was a joint undertaking, with the 1st Battalion,

29th Marines, attacking 'frontally up a valley

which led to the top and the 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, striking along a ridge line on the

right flank. Two routes—and, until the attack

was launched, no one could be sure which would

prove the better.

By 0930 there was no longer any doubt on

this point. In the two hours since the attack

had begun, Tompkins' unit had made little

progress through the wooded valley because of

rough terrain and well situated enemy riflemen,

while Chamberlin's 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,

had driven several hundred yards along the

ridge line against practically no resistance.

This advance placed the 2d Battalion's lines at

the base of a sheer 50-foot cliff just beyond

151
Tapotchau's soaring peak. Marines of the 2d

Battalion felt more than the discomfort of

having someone reading over their shoulders as

they glanced apprehensively toward the mountain top. Exposed as it was, with a precipitous

drop on the two sides (north and east) and the

crest of the mountains on a third, the battalion

could enjoy little security.

To find out if the feeling of being watched

was caused by imagination or reality, Major

Chamberlin ordered one platoon (1st Platoon,

Company E) to scale the cliff and investigate.

The platoon, led by Lieutenant Walter E. Rimmer, moved to the top of the cliff and found no

enemy there. Thus encouraged, Rimmer dispatched a smaller patrol which climbed nearly

to the crest of the mountain and returned to

report that the small tableland on the summit

was also unoccupied. (See Map 15.)

Difficulties of moving up the wooded valley,

meanwhile, had convinced Tompkins that this

was a poor route. Why not exploit the gains

of the Marines already half way up the right

shoulder? The only reserve available to him

at this time was a 22-man platoon from the Division Reconnaissance Company, since all three

of his rifle companies were in the lines, engaged with the enemy. Leading this small body,

Tompkins moved up to the 1st Platoon, Company E, in its position on Tapotchau's right

shoulder, paused for a quick check with Rimmer, and continued on to the top.

The tiny plateau at the mountain's peak contained an abandoned square, 12-man dugout,

which the Marines immediately put to their

own use. Leaving the Reconnaissance Platoon

leader, Lieutenant Marion M. Drake, in command, Colonel Tompkins went back down the

right shoulder to lead up more substantial

forces.

By the time he returned to his battalion, it

was early afternoon. The difficult task then

remained of disengaging units in close contact

with the enemy, withdrawing them a short

distance and swinging them single file to the

right through the 2d. Battalion, 8th Marines'

zone and finally up the right shoulder to Tapotchau's crest. Tompkins determined that one

of his companies (B) should remain in the

152

lines and maintain contact with the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, on the left. The other two

companies (A and C) would move up and reinforce the Reconnaissance Platoon.

On Tapotchau's west slopes, meanwhile, Marines of Major Larsen's 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, fought a determined enemy that begrudged every foot of terrain. The constant

pressure exerted by this unit aided Tompkins

in the difficult task of disengaging two-thirds

of his rifle strength. Had there been a less

persistent surge on the western slopes, the

Japanese might have foiled Tompkin's plans.

There was little time for Marines of the

Reconnaissance Platoon to enjoy the scenery

from Tapotchau's lofty heights. Japanese in

the area at last realized that their prized observation post was now inhabited by the Americans and immediately launched a series of

small counterattacks to regain it. During the

course of the afternoon three Marines and 40

Japanese fell from these heated exchanges.

The Marines held.

As the afternoon wore on, Japanese mortars

became more active, particularly against Company E, 8th Marines. The 1st Platoon, still

perched half way up the right shoulder, became the special target for much of this fire.

To get off the bull's-eye, the platoon pulled

down to the shelf and joined the rest of its

company.

The task of disengaging the two companies

of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, had consumed the afternoon, so that it was not until

just before sundown that Tompkins began the

final ascent to the peak..

The 81mm mortars of the 1st Battalion, 29th

Marines, laid screening smoke on the mountain's northern slopes, while all available mortars of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, plus the

105mm howitzers of the 3d Battalion, 10th

Marines, joined in support of the cTimb. As

dusk fell, the Marines moved single file up the

steep route to the top. During the climb and

in the subsequent establishment of defensive

positions, not a -single man was lost.

Digging into the rocky terrain at the summit was a real challenge. Only occasionally

was there a patch of dirt. Most of the fox-
II Pet/

1300 Feet 81328

'-'110.••••■•••

CEt129 ACX:129

LEGEND

— — Tompkins' Route To Peak

RD 7093

%

0

io

1 

Pzoto

iQ)

aC):

ECI) te.-9

4:0

te)

THE SEIZURE OF

MT TAPOTCHAU

HASTY SKETCH

NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

MAP 15
AT TAPOTCHAU'S CREST men of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, prepare positions. In such rocky formations,

Marines built foxholes from the ground up rather than digging in.

holes were built up from the ground rather

than dug into it. These small fortresses proved

adequate when, at a few minutes before midnight, a force of Japanese struck Company A

from the west side of the mountain. Most of

the enemy threw grenades, some were armed

with rifles, others had "idiot sticks" ( wooden

practice rifles with bayonets or knives tied to

the end). The size of the Japanese force could

not accurately be determined, but 18 Japanese

bodies were lying in the area the following

morning. .

Saipan's key terrain feature had been captured at last. From this point forward, the

Marines would look down on the Japanese,

who heretofore had enjoyed the advantages of

superior ground observation. And in addition,

the Marines could now fight downhill for

1 88959V-50-11

awhile. The change would be appreciated.92

Company F, 106th Infantry, remained with

the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, but with this

one exception units of the 27th Infantry Division still were some distance to the rear and

contact had not as yet been attained.

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 8th Marines, made

little progress during the day. Fighting along

the tortuous terrain on Tapotchau's western

slopes, the 3d Battalion ran into a jumble of

crevasses and narrow ravines which often provided positions for Japanese riflemen and ma92 The foregoing is a synthesis of the following: 8th

Mar Report, Unit Report 25Jun44 ; 1st Bn, 29th Mar

Report, 6-7; Follow Me, Richard W. Johnston, 203-204;

Marine Corps Gazette, Jul 46, "The Taking of Mt.

Tapotchau," Capt J. It. Stockman; Chamberlin; Tompkins.

153
JAP'S EYE VIEW of Red and Green Beaches and surrounding areas. Here a bedraggled Marine, munching a "c"

ration biscuit, appears to be wondering how United States forces ever got ashore under such ideal enemy

observation.

chine gunners. Movement through this terrain

was necessarily slow and tedious. Farther down

Tapotchau's western slopes, the 1st Battalion

could not push forward without breaking contact with the units on its flanks: the 3d Battalion of its own regiment on the right and on

the left, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, still

punching unsuccessfully at the Tipo Pale

strong point.

Since 23 June men of the latter unit—and

Company K in particular—had been butting

their heads against the pocket on Tipo Pale's

northern slopes. This nuisance had retarded

the advance of the entire regiment, if not the

entire division; and Colonel Riseley, the 6th

Marines' commander, determined upon a new

scheme to get past the area. The 2d Battalion

would pass through the 3d, leaving one company to contain and mop up the pocket while

the remainder by-passed it and moved into the

attack again.

In compliance with Colonel Riseley's order,

Company E began the difficult task of clearing

154

the pocket. To avoid moving down the sheer

cliff from Tipo Pale's summit, Company E

passed around the right (east) of the hill and

attacked to the west up the ravine's longer

axis. Support was rendered extremely difficult

because of the proximity of friendly troops;

and, without the necessary support, the company's progress was negligible. While standing

on Mt. Tipo Pale directing the operations in

this area, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth F. McLeod, the 6th Marines' executive officer, was

killed by a Japanese rifleman. Colonel McLeod

was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Russell

Lloyd, who had previously commanded the

2d Division Shore Party.

Darkness found the 6th Marines' lines only

slightly advanced and another failure recorded

in the "battle of the pocket." As the 2d Battalion had not succeeded in passing through the

3d, the day's operations only had the effect of

engaging more troops. In addition to the

three rifle companies of the 3d Battalion, Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion had been
committed. Company F, 2d Marines, attached

to the 6th Marines since landing on D-Day, also

remained in the lines.

On the left of the 6th Marines' front, the 1st

Battalion could not move forward without

breaking contact with the other units. Thus,

the troublesome strong point on the right flank

still crippled the advance. As previously indicated, however, plans to by-pass the area had

been undone by the enemy's refusal to be bypassed. While a wider swing around the position might have been more successful, the hour

was too late to permit further efforts, and the

regiment dug in for the night."

On and near the western shore the 2d Marines viewed Garapan from commanding positions at the town's southern edge. Further

advance could only carry to less favorable terrain. General Watson, therefore, ordered the

regiment to hold its positions along Radio

Road until units to the right had seized the

high ground on that flank. Meanwhile, security

patrols moved out to the front. One 10-man

patrol from the Scout-Sniper Platoon departed on a reconnaisance mission into Garapan at 2100, returning two hours and a half

later. It received fire from a machine gun

located in the rubble, but otherwise observed

no enemy activity. No casualties were suffered

on this mission."

Of the 2d Marines' operations during 25

June, the Japanese chief of staff of the 31st

Army wrote:

The enemy has broken into our line ... at the southernmost edge of Garapan and are reinforcing continually their troops (20 odd tanks; 20 odd artillery pieces;

about 700 infantry troops have been observed) .°

The Division Shore Party, no longer engaged in unloading supplies or equipment, furnished 200 replacements to the 6th and 8th

Marines: 110 to the former, 90 to the latter."

The 25th Marines, assigned as NTLF reserve

on 23 June, remained in its assigned assembly

93 6th Mar Report, 8-9.

94 2d Mar Report, 4.

95 CINCPAC–CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 20.

962d Mar Div Report, 14.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS HAROLD G. EPPERSON, 1st Battalion, 6th

Marines, posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor

for intentionally smothering a grenade's explosion

with his own body and thereby protecting several

comrades nearby (25 June 1944).

area in the vicinity of Hill 500. At 1855 the

regiment's 2d Battalion was attached to the 2d

Marine Division and further to the 8th Regiment, which could well use any available troops

to assist in watching over the exposed right.

With this attachment, Colonel' Wallace commanded five battalions: three from the 8th

Marines, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, and

the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines.97

Stalemate at Nafutan Point

On Nafutan Point the virtual stalemate continued. The narrative account of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry,- says that:

Enemy resistance on the ridges was stubborn. The

terrain consisted of steep ridges, deep gulches with

cliffs, ground broken with coral pinnacles and thick

jungles type underbrush which impeded progress and

made observation inlpossible.9s

97 NTLF G-3 Journal, 25-26 .Tun44. 2d Mar Div

Report, 14-15, 25th .gar Report, 6.

gs Narrative of Events, 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry,

June 22—July 3.

155
SAIPAN CHOO CHOO was an important supply means,

particularly in the Aslito Airfield—Charan KanoaGarapan area. Whistle stop at rear is Charan Kanoa.

The only artillery (excepting naval gunfire)

directly available to the Garrison Force (which

now had the mission of securing Nafutan

Point) was the antiaircraft artillery. In view

of the nature of the terrain, it was considered

that air bursts in the tree tops, approximately

12 feet above ground level, would be particularly effective. Accordingly, registration fire

was conducted during the afternoon of 25 June

in order to have antiaircraft batteries registered

for preparation fires on 26 June.99

On 25 June, Island Command, an organization which would administer Saipan after its

capture, assumed responsibility for the southern part of the island. The only infantry unit

available to it at this time was the 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry, still engaged in the Nafutan

Point mop-up. Improvement and development

of facilities at, and around, Aslito Airfield

would hereafter be conducted under Island

Command supervision. The little narrowgauge railroad that ran from Charan Kanoa

up to Aslito Airfield was put to good use, gasoline and bombs being carried on its tiny cars,

pulled by a hastily repaired steam locomotive.

Ltr from Col G. M. O'Connell to CG, TJSAFICPA,

2Jul44, Subject: Operations in Nafutan Point Area,

Saipan, 1, hereinafter cited as O'Connell Letter.

156

Night of 25-26 June

From Sunharon Harbor on the west coast of

Tinian, 11 personnel barges moved out during

darkness of 25-26 June apparently bent upon

reinforcing Saipan. Spotted by the destroyer

Bancroft and the destroyer escort Elden, the

barges were fired upon and dispersed. One was

reported sunk, while the remainder scurried

back to Tinian Town. Later, at about 0225,

LCI(G)'s 438 and 456 observed several barges

moving out of Tamtpag Harbor on Saipan's

west coast. Immediately opening fire, the

LCI (G)'s accounted for one sunk and a second

damaged; the remainder returned to Tan apag.

Both LCI (G) 's received some damage during this repulse, however. The 438 received 12

holes in her hull from one of the barges' 37mm

guns, damaging the fire main, starting batteries

and radar. The 456 suffered less, with only

slight damage to her winch and refrigerator.

The 438 suffered one man killed and two

wounded and the 456 two wounded. A report

from one of the LCI's that the Japanese barges

had unleashed torpedoes during this action

was later substantiated by a prisoner of war

who stated that there were at least three torpedoes fired at U. S. ships at this time.1°°

With the exception of barge activity, the

withdrawal of the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, down Death Valley, and the abortive Japanese effort to push the 1st Battalion, 29th

Marines, off Tapotchau's summit, the night of

25-26 June was quiet.

"There Is No Hope for Victory..."

In two dispatches sent to the commanding

general on Yap, General Iketa estimated that

Japanese front line strength had been cut to

less than 20 percent, leaving major Army units

at the following levels:

118th Infantry Regiment—about 300

135th Infantry Regiment—about 350

136th Infantry Regiment—about 300

47th Independent Mixed Brigade—about 100

7th Independent Engineers—about 70

3d. Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment—no weapons

9th Tank Regiment-3 tanks

100 TF 51 Report, End A, 9; End L, 3.
There is every indication that Iketa underestimated the actual figures. But, on the other

hand, it is believable that commanders of the

various units listed had no more men available

than shown in Iketa's message, as many Japanese, separated from their parent commands,

were fighting alone or in small groups. As the

Japanese were pushed back and compressed into

the northern end of the island, these totals

probably were raised. Moreover, no figures for

Japanese Navy units were included in the

message.

In the same message, Iketa, conveyed information that the 47th Brigade was now under

command of a 1st Lieutenant and the 7th Engineers under a sergeant. Japanese reserve

units (companies and platoons), hospital units,

equipment, maintenance and supply units were

either "completely wiped out or reduced to the

point where no fighting strength [could] be

expected of them." 101

Elderly General Saito had spent 11 discouraging days. He had found that the Americans

continued to move forward despite the best

efforts of his troops. Such counterattacks as he

had been able to mount had been repulsed with

heavy losses. The bulk of his artillery had been

knocked out or overrun by the American onslaught. He had suffered critical losses in his

principal subordinate commanders, and many

of those that remained were not satisfactory

from his point of view. Functioning of his

command post had been seriously retarded by

the insistent probing fires of American naval

vessels. And, perhaps most serious, communications were so unsatisfactory that it was virtually impossible for him to make his decisions

known. The avalanche of disappointing details

had drained Saito of all optimism by 25 June,

causing him to send the following message to

the Chief of Staff in Tokyo:

Having lost the influence of the Emperor due to the

weakness of our representatives, we are not able to

work at at our best here. please apologize deeply to the

Emperor that we cannot.do better than we are doing.

However, the right hand men of the Emporiu. are

rejoicing because they are not in places of death (luring

the fight. The Governor General of the South Seas—a

non-comb:1 tant, will retreat to the north end of Saipan

Jill CINCRAC–CINCP0A Item #9983-85, 22.

Island and the army will defend its positions to the

very end, though that be death, to guard the Treasure.

However, because-of the units sunk at sea, the various

forces have no fighting strength, though they do have

large numbers; it is regrettable that there has been

considerable disturbance in time of battle from the

points of view of control and of code books and other

secret documents.

There is no hope for victory in places where we do not

have control of the air and we are still honing here for

aerial reinforcements.

Biggest obstacle to our forces, according to one unit

.commander, is lack of care in the selection of battalion

commanders and above.

Praying for the good health of the Emperor, we all

cry, `Banzai' 102

Thus the handwriting on the wall had been

transposed to paper.

D-PLUS 11-26 JUNE

Mop-Up on Kagman Peninsula

Tin i an, only three nautical miles south of

Saipan, had never had reason to feel left out of

the battle. Task Force 58's pre-D--Day strikes

against targets in the Marianas had included

Tinian, and since the Saipan landings naval

guns and aircraft had pounded Tinian with

daily regularity. Neither had General Harper's Corps Artillery forgotten Tinian; one battery of 155mm guns had turned toward that

island on 20 June, and an entire 155mm battalion assumed the mission on 24 June. After

26 June, Tinian's defenders would have even.

less reason to feel neglected by the Americans.

This date marked the beginning of heavier

and more systematic blows. The new plan,

carefully coordinated between artillery, ships,

and air, divided the island into a north and a

south half. Air and naval gunfire alternated

daily, working first in one half and then in the

other, while artillery fired on any targets escaping other attention. A target map was maintained, information exchanged and new targets

posted. Cruisers Birmingham, Montpelier and

Indianapoli8, using both air and direct (shipboard) spot,-were assigned to execute the naval

gunfire portion of the plan, while planes would

be provided by Carrier Support Groups One

and TWo.'°3

102 CINCPAC–CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 19.

103 TF 51 Report, End l F, 22.

157
Along the front of the three divisions there

was little forward movement on 26 June. Haygin completed its mission of seizing Kagman

Peninsula, the 4th Division, pinched from the

Corps' front, was designated as NTLF reserve.

Mopping-up was still essential, however, and

the 23d and 24th Marines set about patrolling

assigned sectors and outposting the coast line.

In their roles as NTLF reserve, the 23d and

24th Marines reconnoitered routes to the 27th

and 2d Divisions' zones respectively.

Throughout the day Japanese field pieces

emplaced on the high ground (Purple Heart

Ridge) in the Army division's zone continued

to fire at the Marines on Kagman Peninsula.

While relatively few casualties resulted from

this fire, its harrassing effects were considerable. Efforts of the 4th Division to get permission from the 27th Division to fire on these

targets were hampered by discouraging delays.

Though permission was eventually gained, the

loss of time allowed the Japanese to move their

weapons to new locations and the lengthy cycle

was repeated. These delays, not indicative of

uncooperativeness, stemmed from the necessity

for all units :checking twice before permitting

other units to fire into their area. Precautions

were necessary.

The 4th Division's assignment as NTLF reserve was short-lived. Before the division

could be completely assembled, a warning order

directed it to move back into the lines the following morning and take over the right of the

Corps' front. The 25th Marines would remain

at Hill 500 in NTLF reserve.'"

With Kagman Peninsula secured, movement

of equipment began for construction of an airfield there. Work on Aslito Airfield, commenced almost at the moment the field was

captured, had succeeded by 26 June in lengthening the strip to 4,500 feet and widening it to

300 feet."5

Colonel Stebbins Takes Over 106th Infantry

Progress of the 27th Division was slow. General Jarman's disappointment with Colonel

104 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 27; 23d Mar

Report, 43; 24th Mar Report, 21; 25th Mar Report, 6.

106 TF 51 Report, End A, 9.

158

Ayres had been magnified by the 2d Battalion's

withdrawal during the night; and, when the

106th Infantry failed to launch its attack by

1000 on the morning of 26 June, he took

drastic action. In his words:

I immediately sent forward General Kernan, the

Artillery Commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Sheldon,

G-3 of the Division, to look over the situation and see

how the artillery could help them move forward. They

both came back and stated that the battalions were

standing still and there was no reason why they should

not move forward and any artillery fire needed at any

point would be brought to bear. They indicated that the

regiment was somewhat demoralized and they didn't

know whether it would ever move. I immediately relieved the Chief of Staff, Colonel Stebbins (26 June)

and sent him forward to relieve Coloned Ayres, and

brought Colonel Ayres back to my headquarters and

returned him to Pearl Harbor.106

Brigadier General Ross, the assistant division

commander, was then assigned additional duty

as chief of staff.'"

At 1409, 26 June, General Jarman sent a

message of encouragement to all 27th Division

units:

This division is advancing against a determined

enemy that must be destroyed. Upon capturing a position, never give it up; hold and send reinforcements.

I know I can depend on every member of the 27th to

get into this fight with everything he has. Good hunting

to every man.108

After assuming command of the 106th Infantry, Colonel Stebbins spent the remainder

of the day organizing the unit and moving the

battalions into position for the attack of 27

June. Such action as was attempted on 26 June

was unsuccessful "due to fatigue on the part of

the men." 109

Major O'Hara, commanding the 2d Battalion, advised General Jarman as to where he

encountered his greatest resistance on the preceding night. Fires of the 27th Division artillery were placed on the designated points.

In addition, the Cannon Company, 106th In106 Jarman. Colonel Ayres was ordered to report to

USAFICPA (United States Army Forces In Central

Pacific Area). TF 56, G-1 Journal, 1800, 25 June to

1800, 26 June 1944.

107 Ross.

108 27th Division G-3 Journal, 26Jun44.

109 Narrative Account of Operations of 27th Infantry

Division During the Period 16 June-26 June, Colonel

Albert K. Stebbins, 14Jul44, hereinafter cited as Stebbins:
TROUBLESOME CLIFF on the 106th Infantry's left flank was pounded by all available weapons. Here, on 26 Jtine,

tank destroyers deploy to fire into the cliff. Ultimately, 27th Division soldiers reduced the enemy positions

by working from the top of cliffs downward.

fantry, continued to fire 105mm howitzer shells

point-blank into the troublesome cliff face.

On the right of the 27th Division zone the

165th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion, 105th

Infantry, attached, succeeded in by-passing the

valley strong point, and attaining poSitions

from which to move northward in cOnjunction

with the 4th Marine Division. On the evening

of 26 June Colonel Kelley, commanding the

165th, was informed that his regiment was detached from the 27th Division and attached to

the 4th Marine Division.

At about 2100, after reporting to the 4th Division command post, Colonel Kelley received

Orders for the next day's attack.' The 4th Di,

vision would. advance with the 165th Infantry

on the left and the. 23d Marines on the right

and seize Objective 0-6. Colonel Kelley thereupon conferred with Colonel Jones of the 23d

Marines and Colonel Hart of the 24th Marines

to coordinate plans for the next day's attack.ii°

110 Jarman,. Lemp, 18. Kelley, 7-8. 165th Inf Report, 6.

By-Passing the Pocket

Important to the future action of the 2d Marine Division was the successful by-passing of

the north Tipo Pale pocket. The tactics were

basically the same as those used the previous

day except that the detour was wider and the

execution successful. Company E, 6th Marines

(which had spent the previous day battering

at the pocket), passed around to the right

while Company F swung left of the irksome

draw.' By inserting a .platoon of Company Gbetween Companies E and F on the pocket's

north side, contact was regained and the 2d

Battalion's proper frontage assumed. Company K, by now familiar with the difficulties

of cleaning the draw, remained behind to contain and, eventually, obliterate this stumbling

block.

By 1400, the 6th Marines had gained contact

with the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, on the

right, and the move to the north was resumed.

With improvement of the situation on the right

of the 6th Marines' lines, it was possible for

159
Lieutenant Colonel Jones' 1st Battalion to

move forward. No advance, save for patrolling

of its zone of action, had been feasible for the

1st Battalion since 21 June. Advances on 26

June carried it to positions from which to deliver fires in support of the other two battalions

of the regiment.

To the north, the 2d Battalion faced an open

flat field, covered only with the scraggly stubble

of what had once been sugar cane. Since the

objective, a dominating ridge line, lay some 500

to 600 yards away on the far side of the open

expanse, it fell to the 2d Battalion to cross the

flat and seize the high ground. The Marines

had advanced only a short distance when Japanese automatic weapons, emplaced at the base

of the ridge line on the north side of the field,

opened with grazing fire. Company E, on the

right, was particularly hard hit and stopped.

Supporting fires, adjusted upon the suspected

enemy firing positions, were effective and some

progress was made, but darkness found the

objective well out of reach.

As the 2d Battalion dug in for the night,

several gaps were discovered in the lines. To

fill these, rifle platoons of Company G were

inserted at various points along the front.

Used thus as piecemeal reinforcements, Company G lost its unit identity and was not reformed as a company until the next day.ln

In the 8th Marines zone the day's advances

were small. On the left the 1st Battalion regulated its progress on that of the 6th Marines.

On the right the 2d Battalion's advance was

restrained because of the lack of contact with

27th Division elements (except Company F,

106th Infantry). In the 8th Marines' center,

the 3d Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 29th

Marines, made only small gains. The attached

2d Battalion, 25th Marines, remained with the

regiment during the greater portion of the day,

Company E being used in the lines, while the

remainder of the battalion was employed in

mopping-up operations. At 1500, the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, reverted to NTLF reserve. This reversion was only temporary,

however, as the unit was reattached the next

day.

111 6th Mar Report, 9. Fisher Interview.

140

As already noted, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, could move only as fast as the 6th

Marines to its left if it were to retain contact.

The deeply-gashed ground, more than enemy

opposition, governed the rate of advance. One

unusual enemy tactic employed against the battalion at this time is worthy of note: bundles

of picric acid blocks were catapulted upon the

Marines by Japanese soldiers located in the

craggy rocks along the route. This device

showed originality but little else; no casualties

were inflicted upon the Marines.

Higher on Tapotchau's western slopes, the

3d Battalion also fought through difficult terrain. A statement from the 8th Marines' action

report gives an indication of the problems in

that zone: "To go froth the left flank of 3/8 to

the right flank of 3/8 required a two hour and

40 minute march over rough terrain."

At some points the Japanese threw; or rolled

grenades and demolition charges down upon

the Marines as they struggled through the hilly

thickets. And as if that were not enough, Japanese positioned above directed plunging

machine-gun fire upon the advancing men. The

3d Battalion's left flank kept pace with the 1st

Battalion, but the right flank lagged behind.

By nightfall the 3d Battalion's lines stretched

almost north and south along the base of a

steep slope.

On 25 June the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,

less one company, had secured a foothold on

the summit of Mt. Tapotchau. It remained on

26 June, then, for Company B to move up the

mountain's western slope and join the battalion. While waiting for this unit, Lieutenant

Colonel Tompkins sent a 25-man combat

patrol from Company A to seize the northernmost rise of Tapotchau's crest. This patrol was

repulsed after some hard fighting, and it became apparent that this area would have to be

thoroughly battered before a successful effort

could be made. In the meantime Company B

reached the mountain top, combing the area on

the way.

From the 2d Battalion position (on the extreme right), the Marines observed men of the

2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, attempting to

move up on the division flank. By the close of
ASLITO

AIRFIELD

HILL 500

NAFUTAN POINT: Pre-D-Day view of, Saipan's southernmost tip. Japanese defenders slipped through lines of the

2d Battalion, 105 Infantry, on the night of 26-27 and struck Aslito Airfield and Hill 500.

the day, however, a gap of 600 yards still existed. To protect the exposed flank, the 2d Battalion bent its lines to the shape of a horseshoe

with one company. facing north, one east, and

one south.

To sum up, the most important developments

in the 8th Marines' sector during the day were

the straightening of several small bulges in

the lines and consolidation of the dominating

heights won on 25 June."2

On the left of the division, Colonel Stuart's

2d Marines confined its activities to sending

patrols 400 yards to the front. Those from the

1st Battalion came back with a report of no

enemy contacts, but a 3d Battalion patrol encountered and destroyed a Japanese 37mm gun

and its entire crew. Otherwise, 26 June was

uneventful in the 2d Marines area."3

"Seven Lives for One's Country"

In preparation for the day's attack on Nafutan Point, the 81mm mortars of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, commenced softeningup fires at 0645. The 90mm guns of Batteries A

112 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 15. 8th Afar Report, 15. 1st Bn, 29th Mar Report, 7.

1122d Mar Report, 4-5.

and B, 751st AAA Gun Battalion joined in the

preparation from 0750 to 0800., then stood by

for all call fires. Further fire support was provided by three destroyers (Patterson, McNair,

Selfridge) whose fires were used against possible targets along the west side of the peninsula's cliff line. Two 40mm guns and an SPM

(self-propelled mount) were brought up to fire

into cave entrances along the cliff line.

In regard to the employment of antiaircraft

guns for support of the attack on Nalutan

Point, Colonel O'Connell, commanding operations in that area, reported that:

the high muzzle velocity of these weapons, their

rapid rate of fire and the flexibility obtainable by

raising and lowering height of burst made them particularly effective. . . . There was scarcely a tree that

had not been scarred and more than half of the enemy

dead observed were badly mangled.114

The infantry attacked at 0800, spearheaded

by the light tanks. of Company D, 762d Tank

Battalion. Although progress was slow and

the day's advance slight, an enemy strong

point, containing a 75mm field gun and seven

machine guns, was reduced. Also, it was felt

that the objective area had been considerably

114 O'Connell, 3.

161
softened as a result of the supporting fires."5

The attack on the strong point had. demanded the concentration of all three rifle companies of the 2d Battalion in one area of Nafutan Point. Since the day's activities had not

ended until late in the afternoon, it was considered that insufficient time existed to redeploy the battalion over its broad front. In

addition, it was felt that too much time would

be wasted fm the following morning reassembling the battalion for the continuation of the

attack. This situation all added up to the fact

that vast expanses of the front were left uncovered or only under observation by small

outposts. It had been hoped that these outposts

could give warning of any enemy movement in

time for the battalion to shift its strength.118

(See Map 16.)

Life had not been pleasant for the Japanese

Nafutan Point defenders. From seaward, destroyers pounded the rocks and caves unmercifully; from land, a monotonously heavy volume

of fire was maintained by 40 mm and 90mm

antiaircraft guns, and 81mm and 60mm mortars, as well as fires of the light tank platoon,

the self-propelled mount, and small arms of the

2d Battalion, 105th Infantry. Movement on

the point was rendered very difficult, and the

shortage of food and water became acute. Captain Sasaki, commanding the 317th Independent Infantry Battalion of the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, determined to move his

battalion from the Nafutan Point trap and

join other Japanese forces which he believed to

be in the vicinity of Hill 500. On 26 June Sasaki issued the following battalion order:

1. The enemy situation is the same as you have been

informed.

2. The Battalion will carry out an attack at midnight

tonight. After causing confusion at the airfield, we will

advance to Brigade Headquarters in the Field.

3. C. 0. of the Ikeda Company will command the first

attack unit. Under his command will be: #3 Company,

the Hira Company, and the Murone Platoon. C. 0. of

the Koshiro Company will be C. 0. of the second attack

unit and will have under his command the Inoue unit,

the Engineers, the remaining Naval units. Units will

assemble at 1930 in areas to be designated separately.

115 Ibid., 2.

116 The 27th Infantry Division in World War II,

Capt E. G. Love, 219-222, hereinafter cited as Love.

162

You must carry out the attack from the designated

places.

4. Casualties will remain in their present positions

and defend Nafutan Mount. Those who cannot participate in combat must commit suicide.

• 5. We will carry the maximum of weapons and supplies.

6. The password for tonight will be "Shichi Sei

Hokoku" (Seven lives for one's country).

7. I will follow after the second attack unit.

Bn C. O.

Capt. SAsAxi.11.7

Moving undiscovered through the thinlyspread outposts of the 2d Battalion, 105th

Infantry, Sasaki's force headed for Aslito

Airfield. The only indication that men of the

2d Battalion had that the enemy was on the

move came at about 0200 when "an extremely

large group" stumbled into the command post,

about 1,500 yards in rear of the front lines.

After a lively skirmish, in which the soldiers

suffered 24 casualties, the intruders disappeared. The next morning the bodies of 27

Japanese were found in the immediate command post area.118

At about 0230 Sasaki's force struck Aslito

Airfield. All U. S. personnel in that area were

alerted after the enemy succeeded in setting

fire to one P-47 and damaging three others.

Seabees and engineers quickly rallied to their

unexpected mission, cleared the field of Japanese and set up a hasty defense. At 0430 the

Commander, Air Defense Command, reported

that enemy .50-caliber machine guns and 20mm

guns were firing on Aslito Airfield.

After causing confusion at the airfield, the

force advanced toward Hill 500, where they expected to find Colonel Oka's 47th Independent

Mixed Brigade Headquarters (which had left

the hill many days before). At about 0520

there were two surprises: the first was to Sasaki's men, who received an unexpected reception from the 25th Marines (still in NTLF reserve) on Hill 500, and the second surprise was

for the 25th Marines, who were not expecting

visitors and, in some cases, found the Japanese

in their midst before they realized that anything was afoot. Both participants quickly re117 NTLF 0-2 Report, 34,

115 Love, 221.
Aslito Airfield

3000 yards (Approx)

Hill 500

6000 yards (Approx)

G;cc°:k

4P-ik• \ tV4=.407'

• t

\

//d

—LEGEND— >frgi

Positions on 25 June

when Colonel G. M.

O'Connell, USA,

assumed command

.1.11111. Positions as of

1600,26 June

Enemy movements

Sketched from Enclosures

I and 2 to letter from

Colonel G M O'Connell

to CG, USAFICPA , 2 July 1944

RD 7093

Nafu tan

Point

POSITIONS OF 2D BATTALION,

105TH 1NFANTRY,ON TWO DAYS

PRECEDING BREAKOUT AND

JAPANESE MOVEMENTS ON

NIGHT OF 26-27 JUNE

1000 Yds (approx)

liwoommens=1

MAP 16
covered from the shock, however, and a lively

small arms and hand grenade battle ensued.

At about the same time, the 14th Marines, in

artillery firing positions between Hill 500 and

Aslito Airfield, was attacked by another portion of Sasaki's force. The brunt of this assault

was borne by the 2d Battalion (Lieutenant

Colonel Wilson), which held its fire until a precariously late moment, mistaking the advancing Japanese column for a large U. S. Army

patrol scheduled to pass through the area at

about this time. A savagely-fought, close-in

battle ensued, virtually annihilating the attacking force. Tot61 14th Marines' casualties in the

skirmish were 33 killed and wounded, while

143 Japanese bodies lay sprawled in the regiment's immediate area.

With the coming of daylight, the 25th Marines were assigned the mission of mopping up

the stragglers from the abortive 'enemy effort

of the previous night. Total Japanese losses

in the fight around Aslito Airfield, at Hill 500,

and in the 14th Marines' area, plus the 27 June

mop-up by the 25th Marines, amounted to approximately 500 dead. The participants, some

of whom wore United States uniforms and

carried M-1 rifles, appeared greatly in need of

water and rations.112

This attack, though better planned than the

average Japanese effort, achieved very little,

and Sasaki's password "seven lives for one's

country" remained only a slogan.

Elsewhere on Saipan there was little activity.

The 2d Marine Division, however, reported

Japanese mortar fire (estimated as 90mm)

which traversed the entire front of the division

and denied the men their much-needed rest.12°

Although unsubstantiated by any of the

three U. S. divisions, •a report by First Lieutenant Otsu, commanding the 6th Company of

the Japanese 135th Infantry Regiment,

proudly detailed the news that on the night of

119 NTLF G-2 Report, 34. TF 51 Report, End A, 10.

25th Mar Report, 6-7. 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI,

27. 14th Mar Report, 10. Ltr from Maj A. E. Buck to

CMC, 26Dec49. Ltr from Maj W. McReynolds to CMC,

14Jan50. Ltr from LtCol G. B. Wilson to LtCol G. D.

Gayle, 81reb50.

120 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 15.

26-27 June he and 15 men broke through "several lines . . . , destroying at least 150 men,"

and wiping out a command post and about one

company on a hill southwest of Mt. Tapotcha,u.

For this imaginary feat of valor Otsu later received mention in a report from Major General °

• Iketa.121 The lieutenant deserved much more.

- In his summary of 26 June Major General

Iketa felt—correctly—that there had been "no

great change in the battle lines." Again, however, mention was made of the fact that communications were , difficult because of heavy

concentrations of mortar fire.

Because the battle conditions are as they are [wrote

Iketa to the 29th Division on Yap] we would like the

following articles shipped by fast air. They are listed

in 'their order of importance and we have listed the

minimum number in brackets ( ).

Type 93 mechanical fuzes-10,000 (3,000)

Type 1 (Mk 1) ignition fuse percussion primers- -

2,000 ea (600)

Fuse Wire-500 meters

B18 dry cells-1,000 (200)

Mark 4 levels-500 (200)

Type 88 instantaneous fuses-5,000 (3,000)

By 26 June the volume of enemy artillery fire

had slackened to a mere sprinkle when compared to the deluge of the first days of the opCration. This &munition had been credited to

the fact that most of the enemy's artillery had

been destroyed. While this, for the most part,

was true, it appears from the foregoing dispatch that at least some of the enemy's artillery

was curtailed owing to a shortage of fuzes and.

other accessories.

Since 22 June the 31st Army staff had attempted to comply with a request, presumably.

from Tokyo, to supply "information on actual

condition of the enemy and our sea and air

supremacy, in. the surrounding sectors of the

Marianas. . . With the U. S. strangle hold'

tightening about its neck, the 31st Army staff

had difficulty furnishing the information. On

26 :Tune, however, an estimate was made which

concluded

In short,, the enemy at present Hide .has complete

control of the sea and air in the Marianas area. Nevertheless we regard it as a great weak -point, on the part

of the enemy that in the Saipan area the local air

superiority consists of two CVE's.122

121 CINCPAC-CINCP0A Item #9983-85, 27.

122Ibid., 22-23.

163
In connection with the latter message, the old

military axiom applied: never underestimate

your enemy. Because only two CVE's could be

seen was no reason to assume that there were

no others available to intercept a Japanese

move into the Marianas area.

Japanese requests for reinforcements were

uniformly frantic. On the evening of 26 June

the commanding officer of the 50th Infantry

Regiment on Tinian received another communication treating the subject:

This is a preparatory order. As rapidly as possible

yOU are to carry out an amphibious operation to Saipan

with two large landing craft. Landing point will be

coast east Of Hanichirn. Reply.,23

Although the reply to this communication is

not 'contained in documents consulted, the

move, for some reason, was delayed until the

2d of July, when it met with disastrous results.

During the night of 26-27 June enemy aircraft again became active against shipping off

Saipan. At 2040 shipboard radar picked up

about 10 Japanese planes heading for the island. Flash Red was immediately ordered and

the smoke plan executed. In an attempt to peer

through the screen, the Japanese dropped parachute flares over the anchorage. At 2130 an

enemy light bomber crashed into the jumbo

boom on the cargo ship (AK) Mercury, unleashing a torpedo as the plane disintegrated.

The torpedo penetrated a living compartment

where the air flask exploded causing superficial

damage. The torpedo's war head, fortunately,

did not arm.

Aslito Airfield was bombed during the same

raid, causing 11 personnel casualties. Otherwise, the attack was uneventful, except for a

collision between one U. S. P-61 night fighter

taking off and another landing. Both were lost.

In a later attack, at about 2300, "several"

Japanese- planes failed to .achieve a single hit

and in the process lost one bomber to ships'

onnfire.'24

Progress in Unloading

Since D-Day (15 .June), supplies and equipment had poured across Saipan's western

beaches in a steady flow. By D-plus 10 (25

123 Ibid., 23.

124 TF 51 Report, Annex 1 to End l A; Enc! . L, 3.

164

June) the assault shipping with the exception

of Transport Division 34 125 was completely

unloaded; approximately 60,000 troops and

75,000 tons of supplies (with a daily average

of 6,563 tons) had been landed. This rate of

unloading was very satisfactory, especially

when considered in relation to the following

hinderances : (1) artillery and mortar fire on

the beaches until D-plus 4; (2) retirement of

transports during the first two nights and then

continuous retirement of the bulk of the transports for the next four days because of the

Battle of the Philippine Sea; (3) shoals and

reefs at low tide which made it necessary to

use "ducks" and LVT's exclusively during

these periods over Red, Green and Yellow

Beaches; and (4) the narrow and shallow channel off Blue Beaches which at low tide would

only accommodate LCM's and LCVP's.

A great problem, in addition to moving supplies to the beach, was the handling of these

supplies once there. Many types of landing

craft became bottlenecked at the beachline (offering the enemy choice targets) and only the

ducks and LVT's could move inland to dump

their loads. Fairly extensive use was made of

pallets (large, flat sleds upon which cargo was

lashed) towed behind a duck. Without pausing

for manhandling, the ducks could pull a pallet

from a ship several thousands yards off shore

to a supply dump well inland. So, besides relieving the beach snarl, pallets and ducks also

reduced the amount of labor required.

The two Marine divisions made only limited

use, while the 27th Infantry Division made extensive use, of palletization. The latter division, which had conducted a number of experiments and devoted considerable training in the

handling the palletized cargo, even requested

permission to palletize beyond the directed

amounts. The Marine divisions were reluctant

to embrace this system whole-heartedly because: (1) pallets were costly in labor, time,

and material, and consumed considerable ships'

space; and (2) pallets were difficult to handle

by inexperienced personnel.

121 Transport Division 34 was composed of four AP's

and one AK from the Joint Expeditionary Force reserve.
Afetna

Point

Mutcho Point

Garopon

Radio Rood

1

2'X<2

0-5 1010:6141011

Mt Tapotchau

I

V

a

mt

Tipo Pale

dt6 Death

v 1 ifer,aPr ite "‘:1.-

t: 

LAKE

SUSUPE

0-6

8

Hill

500X,,

dt 106 oo

eg3165 4,1J- 23 r

12124 0-5

( NTLF Res

MAG/C/ENNE

Charon BAY

Kanoa

— LEGEND —

Indicates progress before 23 June

Advance on 23 June by 2d and 4th Divisions

MEI Advance on 24 June by 2d and 4th Divisions

1 Advance on 25 June by 2d and 4th Divisions

Advance on 26 June by 2d Division

Positions on 23 June of 27th Division

Positions on 24 June of 27th Divi siOn

///./.// Positions on 25 June of 27th Division

Positions on 26 June of 27th Division

(NOTE: All 27th Division lines from

operation maps of 1 06th and

165th Infantry Regiments.)

RD 7093

Kagmon

Peninsula

PROGRESS LINES

23-24-25 AND 26

JUNE 1944

2000 4000 Yds

MAP 17
NAVY HOSPITAL coRpsmAN administers blood plasma to a wounded Marine near the front lines before evacuating him

to rear areas. Other wounded men wait their turn for attention.

General Holland Smith, while acknowledging that there was much discussion pro and

con in regard to palletization, concluded that

"the reasons for palletization overbalance the

negative effects," and, "in the future, consideration should be given to palletizing larger

amounts of assault cargo.1- 26

Medical Situat:on

It appeared on 26 June that the evacuation

situation was rapidly approaching a major

crisis. On 21 June Group A transports had retired from Saipan carrying 1,474 casualties,

followed the next day by Group B transports 127 with 1,400 casualties on board. Hospital ships Relief and Samaritan had departed

with 1,355 casualties on 23 June. Transports

of the reserve group left Saipan on 25 June

with 675 casualties. With this exodus, only the

Cambria, Rocky Mount, two hospital ships

126 COMINCH P-007, 5-7, 5-11. TF 51 Report, Endl

A, 9.

127 Group A transports had lifted the 2d Marine Division while Group B had carried the 4th Division.

(Solace and Bountiful) and assorted merchant

cargo ships remained. The latter ships' capacities were limited due to their lack of medical

personnel, and since the Cambria and Rocky

Mount were to remain in the area, they could

not be used for evacuation purposes. Fortunately, the casualty rate decreased, and no epidemics occurred during the critical period.

Considerable assistance to the over-burdened

medical facilities was provided by the beginning of air .evacuation from Aslito Airfield on

25 June. By the end of the operation, 860 casualties had been evacuated to the Marshalls by

this means. Valuable as this method was, Admiral Turner noted that:

During the early stage of air evacuation, planes were

not supplied with medical attendants, nor was a flight

surgeon available for giving advice as to whether or

not patients could sustain an air flight. Several serious

casualties died enroute or shortly after arrival at destination. A flight surgeon with adequate medical attendants should be provided for air fields at the objective to supervise air evacuation.128

128 coml.-Nat' P-007, 5-19 and 5-20.

165
"Routine" was the word for the activities of

the various medical installations on Saipan:

routine in a heroic way. Their routine duties

often extended well into the marginal combat

functions of the Marines and soldiers for whom

they cared. Daily activities of medical personnel placed them in the most dangerous of

locations; where a man would fall, he would

most often need attention. This help and care,

almost invariably, would be at the hands of

medical personnel who would move into the

very bull's-eye and provide the necessary comfort and assistance. No immunity was accorded them by Japanese, who would fire on a

man with a red cross on his sleeve as on one

without it. And yet, fully aware that they

were moving into an exposed position which

had already claimed one or more casualties, the

"does" (and they were all called that, whether

doctor or corpsmen) unhesitatingly went on

their missions of mercy. A profound sense of

duty transcended whatever fears they may have

felt. In the pursuance of their important functions, these courageous men won the esteem

and respect of all hands.

Related Raids by U. S. Navy

In a move designed principally to keep the

Japanese off balance and never firmly set for

counterpunches, Pagan Island was raided on

23 June by Carrier Task Group One. Nor were

sister islands in the Marianas neglected; almost

166

daily photo reconnaissance migsions were flown

over Guam and Tinian so that any changes in

the situation or dispositions could be taken into

account before the landings. On 25 June Carrier Task Group Three executed powerful

bombing raids against Guam and Rota to

cripple further the airfields and installations

on those islands.129

The first of the post-battle naval raids to

involve more than routine operations was an

attempted strike against the Volcano-Bonin

group which the Japanese turned into an air

battle of impressive proportions. At 0600 on

24 June Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark's Task

Group 58.1 (Hornet, Yorktown and Bataan)

launched a long-range fighter sweep (48 Hellcats) against Iwo Jima which was intercepted

by a large number of enemy fighters. In the resulting action, four U. S. Hellcats were downed

while Japanese losses were estimated at 68

fighters and bombers. This defeat, however,

did not discourage the enemy from attempting

an attack against Clark's task group with the

remnants of his local air strength. This attempt

proved equally disastrous: U. S. interceptors

shot down 46 more aircraft to raise the day's

total to 114. Its mission completed without

bombing the airfields, Task Group 58.1 retired

to Eniwetok without incident's°

129 TP 51 Report, End l A, 8.

129 The Navy's Air War, 214.
i;w eUKCIft"

As,

simi 

o42011141%,

4:7anir*--

tb11114

iir 07

CHAPTER V

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Swing to Tanapag

D-PLUS 12-27 JUNE 1944

Japanese Situation on D-plus 12

Another command post displacement was indicated for General Saito on 27 June. Mounting pressure against his site in the white cliffs

on Tapotchau's east side demanded that the

tired old general move farther to the north. His

fifth command post was located in a small

jungled depression about 2,200 yards north of

the summit of Mt. Tapotchau. The cave selected, smallest of all his command posts,

served him for two days.

Merger of the Central Pacific Fleet Headquarters (Nagumo's command) and the Northern Marianas Group Headquarters (Saito's

command) took place on 27 June. Communications between the two had been extremely difficult—sometimes impossible—to maintain, and

this move would relieve the problem. The complicated Japanese command structure, with its

numerous duplications of responsibility, was

difficult even for Japanese commanders to

understand; and, with the consolidation of the

two in one area, the chances of achieving consistency of orders were improved.

In a brief resume on the morning of 27 June,

Major General Iketa summarized the situation:

The summit of Tapotchau was occupied yesterday

evening.' Front line units tried to retake it with a

1 The general's information was a day late. The 1st

night attack, but did not succeed as planned. In Donnay the enemy broke through with a number of tanks,

but their advance was slow. Thereafter, no great

change in the situation.

The defense force, along with the firmest possible

defense of its present front line and its activities

toward annihilation of the enemy, is at present setting

up with a line between Tanapag—Hill 221 2—Tarahobo ai the final line, of resistance. [For location of

this "final line of resistance" see Map 18.1

General Saito originated two messages during the day which indicate that he was in a

retrospective mood.

The essential points of English and American land

warfare. differ greatly with the common sense considerations of the past. The Pressing need of the

moment is that the mistake be not made of allowing

this important experience in the defense of Saipan to

be put to no practical end, and, the soldiers here to

be robbed of the fruits of victory after having fought

so bravely.

The general is not specific on what he considered the departures from the "common

sense" tactics of the past, so that it is impossible to pursue this interesting thought to its

conclusion. Possibly it is another example of

Saito attempting to outguess and anticipate

U. S. intentions; and, when that guess turned

out to be incorrect, he felt that the Americans

were not using "common sense."

Battalion, 29th Marines, reached Tapotchan's summit

on 25 June.

2 Marines named this bill "Radar Hill."

167
A tribute to the effectiveness of naval gunfire is contained in a second dispatch from

Saito:

The practical experiences of the defense forces of

Saipan . . . have to do with the power of the enemy

naval bombardment. If there just were no naval gunfire, we feel with determination that we could fight it

out with the enemy in a decisive battle.

At the large plateau on the extreme northern

end of Saipan the Japanese continued their efforts to finish the Banadero (Marpi Point)

Airfield. Though hampered by U. S. planes

and naval vessels, the work progressed with

feverish intensity. Toil on the field was spurred

by the groundless belief that it would—by some

miracle—provide the funnel through which air

reinforcement would pour. General Saito's

estimate as to when the work would be completed is significant:

. . . the Banadero airport has not been completed, but

in case the necessity arises, it can be used, and the

Saipan defense forces trust that they can hold out

until the first 10 days of the month (July), awaiting

its completion.

Still obsessed with the opinion that there was

a paucity of U. S. planes over Saipan, General

Saito repeated the familiar refrain on 27 June:

Because the enemy planes which have appeared in

the air are only carrier borne bombers and reconnaissance planes, the situation is such that our large

fighter formations could seize good opportunity for

daylight sinking of enemy destroyers, etc.

Since there is no indication that Saito deliberately attempted to present a false picture, the

conclusion is drawn that he was grossly misinformed as to the status of U. S. air at, and

around, Saipan, and also as to the willingness

and ability of Japanese air to help him.

This, then, was what the Japanese high command did, thought and wrote on 27 J une.3

Rapid Progress on the Right

As noted before, the Northern Troops and

Landing Force attack order for 27 June directed that the three divisions attack abreast

(2d on the left, 27th in the center, 4th on the

right) and seize objective 0-6. Shuffling of

some subordinate units, demanded by the tactical situation, left the divisions somewhat

changed, organically, from their normal struc3 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 24-25.

168

ture. These temporary alterations had developed the major infantry organizations as

follows:

4th Marine Division 27th Infantry Division

23d Marines

24th Marines

165th Infantry Regiment

(less 2d Battalion)

1st Battalion, 105th Infantry

(total : nine battalions) (total: five battalions)

24 Marine Dirision

2d Marines 8th Marines

6th Marines 1st Battalion, 29th

Marines

106th Infantry

105th Infantry (less 1st

and 2d Battalions)

2d Battalion, 165th Infantry

(total : 1.0 battalions) -

NTLF .1?eserve Saipan Garrison Force

25th Marines 2d Battalion, 105th In-

(total: three battalions) fantry

(total : one battalion)4

The Japanese escape from Nafutan Point the

previous night had caused considerable confusion in rear areas of the 4th Marine Division,

particularly in artillery positions of the 14th

Marines. Because of the disturbance, the 4th

Marine Division received permission from

NTLF to delay its appointed attack hour from

0630 to 0730.

Progress in the 4th Marine Division zone on

27 June was rapid. The right assault regiment,

the 23d Marines, advanced against only scattered small arms fire issuing from the villages

of Donnay and Hashigoru. (See .Map 18.)

Underwater mines, which the Japanese had

used as land mines, were found along the road

and railroad in the vicinity of Donnay. Tanks

detoured these mined areas without difficulty,

however. A Japanese supply dump, found near

Hashigoru, contained new clothing, ammunition, and infantry weapons.

Lieutenant Colonel Dillon's 2d Battalion,

moving through the matted vegetation and

ragged cliff line along the coast, experienced

difficulty keeping abreast of the faster-moving

3d Battalion. Since a detailed search of the

gnarled coast line could not be instituted without sacrificing the momentum of the attack,

Colonel Jones ordered the 1st Battalion to follow Dillon's unit at 400 yards, mopping up and.

investigating suspicious areas. By 1640 the

4 NTLF Operation Order 14-44.
RUGGED CLIFFS, typical of much of Saipan's eastern coast line, provided numerous hiding places for Japanese

soldiers. Clearing the enemy from these areas was costly in men and time.

23d Marines had trudged to objective 0-6.

Both battalions immediately dispatched security-reconnaissance patrols to their front but

made no contacts with the enemy.5

Promptly at 0730 the 165th Infantry (less its

2d Battalion, attached to the 106th Infantry)

moved out. Formation for the attack was: 3d

Battalion on the right (in contact with the 23d

Marines) and 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry,

(attached to the 165th Infantry) on the left.

The reserve of the 165th—the 1st Battalion—

would follow the left assault battalion at 600

5 23d Mar Report, 14. 2d Bn, 23d Mar Report, 4.

8895900-50-12

yards, maintaining contact with the right flank

of the 27th Division. The 165th moved rapidly

through the lulls, particularly in the zone of

the right battalion. The left assault unit,

weathering occasional squalls of Japanese

.small-arms fire and traversing rougher terrain,

moved somewhat slower.

IVith the great strides of the 165th Infantry

on 27 June and the relative immobility of units

to the left rear, problems of 'maintaining contact were presented. About noon the 165th's

commander, Colonel Kelley, advised Colonel

Walter W. Rogers, chief of staff of the 4th Ma169
rine Division, that he feared that the 165th Infantry's reserve battalion had stretched to the

breaking point in order to fill the ever-growing

vertical gap. Kelley cautioned that further advances would make it physically impossible for

the 165th Infantry, with the troops at its disposal, to sustain contact with the 27th Division.

The obvious solution to the problem, and the

one recommended by Colonel Kelley, was to

move a battalion of the 4th Marine Division

reserve (24th Marines) into the area to assist

in manning the lengthy connection.6

At about 1730, orders came for the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, to fill the southern portion of the tenuous link between the two divisions. With commitment of this battalion, the

schematic appearance of the 4th Marine Division was peculiar (see Map 18), with a front

of approximately 2,500 yards and a left flank

of about the same length.

No sooner had the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, arrived in position when two enemy

medium tanks were sighted to the northwest.

Although fired upon by 37mm guns and 81mm

mortars, the enemy tanks fired several rounds

and escaped unscathed.

As - the 4th Marine Division dug in for the

night after an advance of approximately 3,000

yards, there was concern in the division logistics section created by the ever-lengthening

supply lines and the paucity of motor transport. This unfavorable circumstance caused

the 4th Division action report to comment:

t‘. . . supply of front line units was not maintained at a desirable level." Fortunately, however, there were no serious consequences of this

situation.7

Important Localities Seized

As already noted, the 27th Division moved

but little on 27 June. Colonel Stebbins, the

106th Infantry's new commander, spent the

greater portion of the day getting the regiment

in position for advances on 28 June. While this

resulted in only minor progress, the situation

6 Kelley, 8-9.

7 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 27-28. 24th Mar

Report, 21. Ltr from Maj A. B. Hanson to CMG,

14Feb50.

170

was much improved from the point of view of

future action. •

On the evening of 27 June General Jarman

talked to Colonel Stebbins to get the latter's observations on the 106th Infantry. According

to General Jarman, "He [Stebbins] stated that

they seemed to lack the will to go forward; he

had to personally get the units in hand and

show them where to go and push the battalions

out." To Jarman it was "apparent that upon

the first firings of any kind by snipers the battalions immediately asked to be allowed to retire." 8

In a narrative account written after the operation, Colonel Stebbins indicated no dissatisfaction with the fighting qualities of his

regiment:

. . . difficulties of terrain and locating the Jap defenses

were the causes for failure to advance. The cliffs

and hillsides were pocketed with small caves and large

caves. The wooded area was rough, filled with boulders,

and excellent for defensive operations. Bands of fire

were laid by the enemy through the underbrush and

in such manner as to make it most difficult to discover

their locations. . . . It was necessary to work forward

taking out each gun in turn, employing tanks to draw

fire so that guns could be located and destroyed. Rush

and die tactics would never have succeeded.9

The most important gain in the 106th Infantry's zone on 27 June was made by the 1st

Battalion, on the left. While one company (C)

remained in Death Valley to contain the enemy

in the cliff by directing fires into the caves from

below, the other two companies (A and B)

skirted to the west, climbed the southern end

of the ridge, and attacked the Japanese positions from above. Since most of the enemy

weapons in the cliff face were sited for enfilade

fire into the valley, the two companids were

able to approach the strong points from the

rear. In this manner they avoided the heavy

volume of fire that had immobilized movements

across the lower ground for so many days.

Clearing the caves was a tedious task, requiring the coordinated activities of 1st Battalion riflemen and flame-thrower—demolition

te'ams from the 102d Engineer Battalion. By

late afternoon a solid toehold in the southern

8Jarm,an.

9Stebbins.
end of the cliff line had been seized, a number

of Japanese positions eliminated, and prospects

for future advance through the area much improved. One strong point destroyed during the

day housed about 20 Japanese soldiers, armed

with rifles, machine guns, and three U. S.

Browning Automatic Rifles. How they had

obtained the latter three weapons was never

revealed.

Movement by the remainder of the 106th Infantry was rendered difficult because of fire

from Japanese located in that portion of the

cliff line not yet reached by the men on top, as

well as fresh opposition from a hill (designated "1-Eli Able") to the right front. This

latter feature lay within the zone of the 2d

Battalion, 165th Infantry (attached to the

106th Infantry) ; and, despite the best efforts

of that unit to seize it on 27 June, the hill remained firmly in enemy hands at the close of

the day. (See Map 18.)

Two platoons of medium tanks from the

762d Tank Battalion were attached to the

106th Infantry for the 27 June attack. These

platoons were to move out before the infantry

assault to neutralize Japanese positions in the

cliff line. But plans, unfortunately, went

- awry. Soon after the tanks moved out on their

mission, it began to rain. Dust on the tanks

turned to mud, vision from within became

blurred, and the machines lost direction. Instead of firing on the planned targets, they

opened upon men of the 3d Battalion, 106th

Infantry.

This miscarriage of plans postponed the attack until 1230, when the 3d Battalion, followed by the 2d Battalion, moved out. Again

the enemy in the cliff line opened up, but this

time the tanks found their targets and neutralized them. Despite fire from Hill Able to the

right front, the 3d Battalion pushed on. By

1342 the unit had reached its objective, a small

knoll west of Hill Able, and commenced digging in for the night. When the advance of

the 3d Battalion permitted, the 2d Battalion,

until then following in reserve, swung to the

right and came abreast of the 3d. There it dug

in for the night. Company F remained some

distance ahead with the 8th Marines atop the

At the conclusion of the day's action, the

commanding general of the 27th Division sent

a message to the 2d and 3d Battalions, 106th

Infantry:.

Congratulations on a day's work well done. I have

the utmost confidence in our continued success in a

vigorous push against the remaining enemy. Keep up

the good work. Jarman.10

The 106th Infantry had not been sparing in

the use of supporting artillery fires. From. 25

to 27 June, the following amounts of artillery

ammunition had been expended in the regimental zone: 2,606 rounds of light high explosive (105mm) ; 117 rounds light smoke; 420

rounds medium high explosive (155mm).

The 27th Division's reserve (105th Infantry,

less 1st and 2d Battalions) remained in an assembly area awaiting orders."

Pinch, Shift, Adjust, Consolidate

Only minor advances were made by the 2d

Marine Division on 27 June. In the first hour

of the attack, the 1st and 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, advanced about 200 yards along

Tapotchau's western slopes. Resistance was

light, but the terrain again provided the deterrent to rapid movement. At Tapotchau's

summit, meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, completed seizure of the main crest and

started the northern descent. The 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, on the division right, conducted

aggressive patrolling in the northeast Tapotchau area. Anxious eyes still peered to the

right rear in search of elements of the 27th Division, which, as yet, had not moved up on the

flank. Though the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, had made important gains during the day,

the action had been too far to the rear for the

Marines to observe. At no time could the 8th

Regiment relax attention to the right flank;

the enemy capability of clambering up the cliff

and striking from the rear was one not to be

ignored or forgotten.

At 1000 the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines

(from the NTLF reserve), was again attached

to the 2d Marine Division. After further attachment to the 8th Marines, the battalion

10106 hif Report, 9-11.

11 27th Inf Div Periodic Report No. 11_, 27Jun44.

171
HIGHWAY, inland Saipan style. Bad as this route appears, it was excellent by comparison with some. others

that were used. Jeeps carried messengers and supplies forward, evacuated casualties rearward.

moved to Colonel Wallace's command post and

again reported for duty with that regiment.

(It had been attached to the 8th Marines on the

previous day but at 1500 had been returned to

NTLF control.) Colonel Wallace ordered the

unit to relieve the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,

of the flank-watching mission so that the latter

could give full attention to the advance. By

late afternoon this relief was accomplished, the

2d Battalion, 25th Marines, being deployed in

an almost north-south line along the 2d Division's right boundary. At 1700 the battalion

made patrol contact with 27th Division troops

in Death Valley.

Perhaps the most important result of the

day's movements in the 8th Marines' zone was

that the unit's normal frontage could be assumed. With the release of the 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, from flank security duties, lines

were straightened with resultant reduction in

frontage."

128th Mar Report, 6-7.

172

Pinch, shift, adjust, consolidate, advance—

these were the 27 June plans of the 6th Marines. The 3d Battalion (in the center), tired

from days of continuous front line action, was

to be pinched out of the front lines and shifted

to i-egimental reserve. The 2d Battalion, on the

right, would adjust itself to its new frontage,

consolidate its contact with adjacent units, and

finally advance. The 1st Battalion would move

forward when units to its right had relieved

the contact strain.

Prior to King-Hour (0630) a small counterattack struck between Companies F and I, 6th

Marines. Supported by knee mortars, about one

Japanese platoon caused a brief flurry of excitement but little else. The Marines of the two

companies converged their fires upon the

meager enemy force and quickly repulsed it.

By 1410 the 3d Battalion, completely relieved

from the lines, assembled in reserve. Upon determining that good - contact existed on both

flanks, the 2d Battalion moved forward. But,

after progressing only a short distance through
a cane field, the unit was struck by a fierce

fusillade of small-arms fire coming, as on the

previous day, from the base of the ridge line

to the north. The short stubble of the cane field

gave the unit little or no protection from the

grazing fire of the Japanese. As darkness of

27 June fell, the ridge line north of Mt. Tipo

Pale remained firmly in enemy hands. With the

short advance of the 2d Battalion, however, the

1st Battalion was permitted to move forward,

seizing more favorable terrain and shortening

its front for future action. Like its sister regiment, the 8th Marines, the 6th had gained but

little during the day."

Eager to finish a job which they knew was

theirs and realizing that the task became no

easier with waiting, men of the 2c1 Marines

bided their time along Radio Road outside of

Garapan. The wait was not their choice. Nor

was it anyone's. To push the regiment—alone

—through Garapan would have demanded that

its former frontage be assumed by another unit.

Since another unit was not available for any

such assignment, it remained for the 2d Marines' front to hold and wait until the outer arc

of the swing had advanced abreast of it.

The time was by no means wasted; daily patrols had thoroughly scouted the town's rubble

and had provided timely information of enemy

activities there. Patrols on 27 June discovered

and routed a small enemy outpost and found an

improvised mined area, employing aerial

bombs, in the streets of the town.14

• During the long wait at Garapan's southern

edge the 2d Marines constantly improved defense positions. The possibility of an all-out

Japanese counterattack along the coastal flats

was never ignored, and all hands were constantly alert to just such a development. Across

the regiment's front, "concertina" wire 15 had

'6th Mar Report, 9-10.

.14 2d Mar Report, 5.

75 "Concertina" is a single strand of barbed wire

wound into a lose doughnut shape. When it is desired to put it to use, the two loose ends are pulled

in opposite directions, stretching the barbed wire into

a long cylindrical obstacle. A concertina can be laid

in a fraction of the time that it takes to prepare a

double apron fence.

been strung, and just forward of that sheets of

corrugated tin had been spread in order that

any movement toward the lines would be loudly

announced. More than one prowling pig met

death by blundering upon this ingenious, if

crude, warning device. Individual foxholes

had been converted to tiny fortresses by the addition of overhead cover and, occasionally, by

placement of steel armor-plate shields. in front.

The latter items were not issued but rather

represented the fruits of a search through an

enemy building. The Japanese had intended

the shields as individual protection from smallarms fire, and the Marines were not ones to misuse acquired property.'6

The seizure of Mt. Tapotchau provided an

excellent observation post. From the mountain's towering heights, nearly the entire island

could be viewed. To provide security for the

2d Marine Division observation post located

there, one company of the 1st Provisional Battalion (formed from Shore Party personnel

whose normal function was completed) was

detached . from the 2d Marines and moved to

form a cordon around the installation.

Division air observers, operating from the

tiny Charan Kanoa strip or from carriers since

15 June, now moved to Aslito Airfield together

with their "grasshoppers." 17 The vulnerable,

little OY planes proved an extremely valuable

means of acquiring enemy information

throughout the operation.

By leaving Nafutan Point on the previous

night, the enemy relieved the 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry, of the worst part of its assignment. On 27 June the soldiers, reporting scattered resistance, swept to the promontory

southernmost tip. It then remained for the

myriad coast line caves and crevasses to be inspected and cleaned of Japanese. This task

consumed several days of effort. The battalion

subsequently reported counting 850 Japanese

bodies on Nafutan Point. These were in addition to those killed in the breakout on the night

of 26-27 June.18

76 Throneson.

17 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI; 16.

18 Memo for Gen Richardson from Col G. M. O'Connell, 12Jul44. O'Connell Letter.

173
Mght of 27-28 June

At 1845 ships in the transport area were

alerted to the approach of Japanese planes, and

the smoke plan was immediately executed. The

radar had not erred; at 2000 and again at 2235,

bombs fell on the transport area: five to eight

in the early attack, 15 in the latter. The number of attacking Japanese planes was described

as "several"; but, aside from a near miss on the

Cambria, all bombs fell without causing damage. Aslito Airfield felt the impact of enemy

bombs at 2352, but, here again, the only loss

was peace and quiet. Equally ineffective was

the retaliatory fire of ships' and shore-installed

antiaircraft guns. Nor did the Army night

fighters which rose from Aslito Airfield achieve

effective contact with the enemy formations."

The fireworks displayed at Aslito Airfield

and in the transport area provided the principal diversion during the night of 27-28 June.

The 2d Marines, however, reported "sporadic

enemy mortar fire falling" within its lines,20

and the command post of the 2d Battalion,

165th Infantry, became the special target of

an enemy 40 or 47mm flat trajectory weapon.

The most serious consequence of the latter

shelling was the wounding of the battalion commander, Major Gregory Brousseau, USA.21

A peculiar bit of activity occurred in the 23d

Marines' sector at about 0200. Lumbering confidently along a road leading into the Marine

lines was a truck carrying 12 Japanese soldiers

and civilians. Whether attempting a bold tactic

or merely lost, the enemy never revealed; vehicle and passengers met a quick end from the

point-blank fires of a 37mm gun.22

19 TF 51 Report, End l A and Annex 1 to End A.

29 2d Mar Report, 5.

21 Major Brousseau had taken command of the battalion on 25 June when Lieutenant Colonel John F.

McDonough had been wounded. Replacing Brousseau

temporarily was Captain James A. Dooley, USA, who

commanded until Major Dennis D. Claire, USA,

(transferred from the 3d Battalion) arrived to take

over. With Major Claire's departure from the 3d

Battalion, Major Martin H. Floery, USA, assumed

command of that unit.

22 23d Mar Report, 44.

174

D–PLUS 13-28 JUNE 1944

Not panic, but an ever-growing concern

(nurtured by a steady diet of reverses) reveals

itself in Iketa's situation report on the morning

of 28 June:

1. Last night all fronts were without great change,

but since dawn, enemy attacks have grown in intensity, particularly against Tapotchau area and the

hill on the northwest side of Chacha, and the hill west

of Donnay where the enemy has laid heavy artillery

fire. On the south foot of Tapotchau, he seems to have

20 odd mortars, and in the southwest area, over 10

mountain guns and mortars.

2. About 50 men of the 118th Infantry are improving

their positions on the east side of Hill. 343,23 and one

company of the 136th Infantry is improving its position on Hill 268,24 and about 50 men of the 118 Infantry

are digging in on the north side of that hill. The

main body of the 9th Expeditionary Force, about 200

men, and about 100 men from the 9th Tank Regiment

are consolidating their positions north and east Of

there in the high ground (Chacha water area).25

Though surrounded by the enemy, and receiving artillery fire, we are prepared to make stiff resistance along

the cliff line.

3. As the battle progresses numbers of bravely fighting officers and men continue to appear, engaging in

hand to hand combat, taking part in raids and scouting

missions, and holding back nothing in the service of

their Emperor.

4. Parts of our forces are in the midst of preparing

positions against the enemy, in order to make the area

north of Donnay and around Tarahoho secure against

his advances.28

The fact that Iketa made no mention of defenses west of Tapotchau, in the 2d Marine Division zone, would indicate that he had received no word from either the 135th Infantry

Regiment or Navy units located in that area.

23 The "east side of hill 343" was the cliff line which

had troubled the 106th Infantry for so many days.

The hill itself was about 1,200 yards south of Mt.

Tapotchau.

24 Hill 268, about one mile southeast of Tapotchau's

peak, lay within the zone of the 165th Infantry. This

hill constituted the southern end of Purple Heart

Ridge.

29 The "Chacha water area," not identified on U. S.

maps, was a large fresh water spring on the high

ground (part of Purple Heart Ridge) west of Chacha

Village. The "water atea" was near the 27th Division's right boundary.

26 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #9983-85, 25.
UP-AND-DOWN FIGHTING was necessary to clear Japanese from jumbled maze of coral rock characteristic of inland Saipan. Evacuating- wounded from this type of terrain was a major problem. ,

Four "Pimples"

In the 2d Marine Division zone the advance

slogged slowly forward. Along the beach the

2d Marines, still unable to advance without

breaking contact with units to the east, conducted monotonous patrolling activities into

Garapan. In preparation for projected moves

through the battered town, artillery, naval

gunfire and air strikes pounded targets located

there. In one air strike three misdirected

rockets fell within the lines of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, causing 27 casualties.27 This

unfortunate accident occurred when a pilot

mistook a puff of white smoke in the Marines'

lines for his strike-marker (the target was to

be marked with a white phosphorous shell.

Major General Watson and Lieutenant General Holland Smith recommended disciplinary

action because of this tragedy; but Admiral

Spruance, commanding the Fifth Fleet, did not

concur. While pointing out that such accidents

should not be "casually condoned," Spruance

felt that disciplinary action would have a

"baneful effect on close air support operations."

In regard to preventing a recurrence of an accident of this nature, Spruance 'wrote, "It can

be taken for granted by all that the air force

will take every possible precaution to avoid accidents of this nature in the future." 28

28 Ltr from Commander Fifth Fleet to Commander

27 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 17. Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, 29Jul44.

175
The length of two football fields or a fairly

long golf drive (200 yards) was the average

forward movement by the 6th Marines on 28

June. The left assault battalion (the 1st), restricted by the movements of units to its right,

could only conduct patrolling. operations. In

this respect, it was more nearly related to the

2d Marines than to its parent unit.

Major Hunt's 2d Battalion continued to fight

across the open canefield toward its objective,

a low ridge line north of Tipo Pale. Japanese

riflemen and machine gunners, secure in their

hillside grotto, raked the clearing with grazing

fire. Light flame-thrower and medium tanks

were available to the 6th Marines, but their use

in this instance was limited because of difficult

routes of approach to enemy positions, and

support had to be delivered from long ranges.

This left the task to the infantrymen. As everywhere demonstrated, reduction of cave positions proved a slow, painful job. By late afternoon the situation had improved slightly and

the volume of Japanese fire had diminished

somewhat, but the 2d Battalion's unceasing

efforts since 0630 found it still short of the

ridge line objective and very tired. A great

store of energy had been burned in moving

across the murderous field, yet . more effort

would be required. It appeared that the Japanese were rooted to the pock-marked ridge line.

The Tipo Pale strong point, at which Company K, 6th Marines, had been whittling for

many days, finally was secured on 28 June, permitting the company to rejoin its battalion.

The tenacious Japanese soldiers in this pocket

had sold their lives but had exacted from the

6th Marines a high price in time, men and effort.29

Here today, gone tomorrow; that was the

rule for the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines. At

0730, 28 ,Tune, the organization was again removed from 8th Marines' control and returned

to NTLF reserve. After this change, the 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, again assumed responsibility for the division right flank.

To the north in the 8th Marines' zone of action, four small hills could be seen. These hills,

rising from relatively flat ground, looked tiny

296th Mar Report, 10. Fisher Interview.

176

from the "crow's nest" at the peak of Mt.

Tapotchau and were nicknamed "the Pimples."

(See Map 18.) Admirably suited for designation as battalion objectives, the blemishes were

assigned by Colonel Wallace from right to left

as follows: 2d Battalion, 8th Marines—Bill's

Pimple; 1st Battalion, 29th Marines—Tommy's

Pimple; 3d Battalion, 8th Marines—Stan's

Pimple; 1st Battalion, 8th Marines—Larry's

Pimple.3°

It was hoped that the advance of the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, would go forward rapidly

since the terrain in this unit's zone afforded

satisfactory routes for the forward movement

of tanks. Jagged e, ground &, in the other battalions' areas was very unsatisfactory for tank

traffic.

The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, on the right,

was ordered to move out on 28 June in spite

of the fact that 27th Division elements had not

come abreast. Normal precautions would be

taken to prevent the Japanese from exploiting

the gap between divisions, but the push to the

north would no longer be delayed.

Facing the 2d Battalion in its assigned zone

was an abrupt drop which virtually prohibited

movement to the north. A crevice, not over

two feet wide at most points, provided the only

route of descent: Movement down this slot as

well as the day's advance over a narrow cliffside path demanded that the battalion move in

a formation of companies in column and, further, individuals in column of files. Numerous

caves had to be investigated as the unit moved

parallel to the cliff; but, rather than halting

the entire procession while these searches were

instituted, small combat patrols were dispatched to do the job while the remainder continued toward Bill's Pimple.

The formation and tactics were sound in this

situation, and during the move past the cliff

the battalion killed about 100 of the enemy.

These 100 were no worry, but the Marines' own

casualties were another matter. The rugged

nature of the terrain required that a single

stretcher be manned by eight bearers. Thus, a

ao These nicknames were for Major William C. Chamberlin (Billy, Lieutenant Colonel Rathyon M. Tompkins (Tommy), Major Stanley E. Larson (Stan), and

Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence C. Hays, Jr. (Larry).
single casualty was, in effect, nine men at least

temporarily out of action. Sad but true: a man

wounded imposed a .greater immediate loss on

the unit than a man dead. Supply and evacuation in the 2d Battalion's area was improved

when a bulldozer carved a lane to the top of

the cliff. Although still not satisfactory for

vehicular traffic, this route was used to manhandle supplies from the top of the cliff down

to the battalion.

All along the 8th Marines' front resistance

stiffened. This, plus the fact that observers

noted many enemy moving on and around the

"Pimples," lent emphasis to the belief that the

main battle positions would be encountered in

that vicinity. By 1600 the 8th Marines had lost

momentum and received orders to hold for the

night. As the regiment halted, it was still short

of the four Pimples. Defensive positions left

something to be desired; a 400-yard gap existed

between the right of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, and the left of the 106th Infantry. Also,

a precipitous cliff separated the 1st Battalion,

29th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines. So as not to imperil the regiment's right

flank, the former unit anchored its flank firmly

on the. top lip of the cliff while the latter pmvided all-around circular defense for itself at

the bottom.31

The result of this pressure in the north Tapotchau area is revealed in General Iketa's situation report on the evening of 28 June:

All our units are consolidating their positions and

fighting hard but personnel has been sharply reduced

by the enemy shelling over a period of many days and

the enemy is gradually infiltrating among our positions. Especially in the vicinity of Mt. Tapotchau four

or five enemy battalions, supported by several tons of

mortars are attacking but our troops are checking

their a dvance.32

General Griner Assumes Command of 27th Division

This date, 28 June, marked the end of General Jarman's command of the 27th Infantry

Division. Jarman, whose primary post was

Saipan Garrison Force Commander, had commanded the division on a temporary basis

awaiting the arrival of Major General George

W. Griner, Jr.,. USA. At 1000 the new corn31 Silt Mar Report, 7.

32 CINCPAC—CINCPOA Item #9953-85, 20.

manding general arrived at the 27th Division

command post and relieved General Jarman.

Then followed the usual orientation to the situation, staff reports, introductions and generally getting the new leader geared to his

command. General Griner instructed Brigadier

General Ross to continue in his dual capacity

as chief of staff and assistant division commander.33

Since moving into the lines on 23 June, the

27th Division had received mortar and machine-gun fire from the enemy in the cliffs on

the left flank. No exception was to be enjoyed

on 28 June. Progress, again, was slow.

The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, which had

made some headway against these same cliffs

on the previous day, found the craggy precipice

dotted with caves. Flushing the Japanese from

their hideouts was a lengthy process. Forward

gains were short, but a number of enemy installations (housing 12 machine guns and several mortars) were destroyed.

A faster pace—initially—was maintained by

the 2d and 3d Battalions. These units, advancing against small-arms fire, progressed about

400 yards before experiencing serious difficulties. Then an enemy field piece, located somewhere to the right front, joined the smaller

weapons in a challenge to forward movement.

In addition, the advance was complicated by

the failure of the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry,

to seize Hill Able (see Map 18). This commanding position, located on the right flank of

the 2d and 3d Battalions, 106th Infantry, was

an uncomfortable thorn in the side of the two

units. Dangerous exposure of this flank caused

the two units to stop their forward movement."

Among the 3d Battalion's casualties on 28

June was the commanding officer, Lieutenant

Colonel Harold I. Mizony, USA, killed in action when two Japanese tanks unexpectedly

appeared just forward of his battalion observation post. By chance, the two enemy vehicles

had found a lucrative target; commanders of

the 2d and 3d Battalions, toether o- with their

33 It will be recalled that Colonel Stebbins, the regularly assigned chief of staff, had taken over command

of the 106th Infantry on 26 June. Certificate of MajGen

G. W. Griner, 12Ju144.

34106th Inf Report, 12-13.

177
FIRE SUPPORT, delivered by a heavy machine gun (foreground) and a 37mm gun (background), assists the

infantry advance on enemy positions. Behind the weapon, two crewmen ready additional belts of machinegun ammunition.

company commanders, were gathered to plan

the next move. Tightly grouped a short distance behind them were the men of the two

battalions, waiting for the orders that would

send them into action. Within a matter of

moments the enemy tankers .reaped an awful

harvest-12 killed, 61 wounded—and disappeared unscathed.35

The 3d Battalion had suffered heavy casualties in its Death Valley fight. By June 28 its

effective strength of riflemen numbered approximately 100, and it was reorganized into a

single rifle company." Plans were made to

move the "company" into reserve when relieved

by the 1st Battalion.37

The 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, on the division right, meanwhile, continued its assigned

35 Love, 324-325.

36 The unit was still referred to as the 3d Battalion,

however.

37 106th In! Report, 12-13. 27th Inf Div Field Order

#52.

178 .

task of clearing Hill Able. This was no easy

job. On 26 June the battalion commander had

reported that his troops occupied the hill, but

morning of 27 June found him in error—the

Japanese were still firmly in possession. Persistent tenants, they refused to budge despite

heavy pressure applied on 27. June. Again on

the 28th, repeated efforts were made, but the

enemy held. One attempt which appeared to

promise certain success inexplicably failed.

This attempt had followed receipt of word that

U. S. stretcher bearers had moved unmolested

along the hill's western base. Maneuvering

. through the zone already cleared by the 106th,

the 2d Battalion, 165th, enveloped Hill Able

from the west. Again the attack was repulsed

and another failure in the struggle for Hill

Able recorded. At 1815 the battalion was detached from the 106th Infantry, with which it

had operated for several days, and attached to

the 105th Infantry, which was taking over the

right of the division zone.
Company F, 106th Infantry, meanwhile,

moved down from atop the cliff and rejoined its

parent battalion. This company had been with

the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, since the evening

of 23 June. The Marines were sorry to see the

unit leave. During its week atop the cliff, Company F had proved itself an aggressive, wellled organization.

As night fell and the division dug in, a short

400 yards had been gained.38

"Hold Present Positions...."

Holland Smith ordered the 4th Marine Division to "hold present positions until further

orders." Its long advance of 27 June made further moves impracticable until the 27th Division had come abreast. To assist the latter in

catching up, the 4th Marine Division was directed to "assist advance of 27th Infantry Division by fire." During the wait, rear areas

would be mopped up, and two battalions of

105mm howitzers from the 14th Marines were

prepared to pass to control of the Corps Artillery.39

In compliance with that part of the order

which directed that fire assistance be provided

the 27th Division, General Schmidt ordered

the 165th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) and the

24t1 Marines to establish one battalion each

along the division boundary. The 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion,

24th Marines, found the extension too great

for them to cover. Even with the commitment

of another battalion from the 24th Marines

(the 1st) and readjustment of the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry's lines, physical contact

still did not exist with the 27th Division. Four

battalions attempted to cover the open flank,

while only three faced the front.

"Hold present positions" was a fluid phrase

as it pertained to a division. It permitted small

changes and shifts (to improve the position

held) while, at the same time, requiring that

the general trace of the front lines remain substantially fixed. In keeping with this logical

interpretation, the 23d Regiment patrolled forward of its lines to a distance of 500 yards, and

3827th Inf Div Periodic Report No. 12, 2S.Tun44.

NTLF Operation Order 15-44.

the 165th Infantry occupied a dominating

feature (Hill 700) a short distance to its front.

With the shifts—and minor advances, objective

0-6 was completely occupied within the 4th

Division zone during the day. Patrols from

the 23d Marines made no contacts in the area

to the front but observed indications of recent

evacuation by enemy groups.4°

A serious blow befell. the 165th Infantry on

28 June: an exploding Japanese mortar shell

wounded the regimental commander, Colonel

Gerard W. Kelley. After Kelley was evacuated,

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T. Hart, the executive officer, assumed command.41

The 4th Division's success in pushing along

the east coast was recognized by the Japanese

chief of staff in his summary of 28 June:

The enemy is steadily increasing his troop strength

opposing our front lines in hill lines west of Donnay

and is closing in on our positions; a few of the enemy

have infiltrated into our positions. The enemy is still

not north of Donnay.

A correction could have been added by the men

of the 4th Marine Division: "We are already

north of Donnay."

Some of the hardships, the Japanese endured

during the battle were indicated by a reference

in General Iketa's report: "In our front line

units, the troops have been three days without

drinking water but are hanging on by chewing

leaves of trees and eating snails." 42

On Nafutan Point the 2d Battalion, 105th

Infantry, spent the day ferreting Japanese

from the many caves and crevasses there.

Among the weapons and equipment found were

four 6-inch guns of British manufacture and

three 14-centimeter guns. When discovered,

only one of the 6-inch guns was in good firing

condition; two were slightly damaged and one

was badly damaged. None of the 14-centimeter

guns was emplaced and one of the three was

slightly damaged.43

404th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 28. 23d Mar Report, 44.

41 165th hif Report, 6.

42 Both Japanese quotes from CINCPAC—CINCPOA

Item #9083-85, 26.

43 O'Connell, Letter.

179
Night of 28-29 June

The night of 28-29 June was similar to many

other nights at Saipan. An enemy probing

patrol explored too close to the muzzles of the

6th Marines' rifles and suffered a loss of ten

men and two machine guns before it could

extricate itself."

Even in the grimmest surroundings and

under the most uncomfortable circumstances,

an occasional incident cropped forth to

brighten the situation, a moment of comic

relief in an otherwise somber drama. Such a

moment was provided in the 23d Marines'

sector. Alert Marines peering into the darkness were astounded, sometime after midnight,

to observe ten enemy vehicles, with headlights

burning brightly, approaching via the east

coast road. Not wishing to disclose their positions, the Marines held their fire, hoping to

blast the enemy at close, final range. The trucks

came on and on. And then—suddenly—as if

awakening from a horrible dream at the brink

of doom, the leading driver realized that he

was on the wrong road, that, in fact, he was on

his last road if he did not immediately reverse

his course. This he did with frantic haste and

strident grinding of gears. The others followed suit. Within a matter of seconds the

convoy had evaporated into the night and the

Marines were left with throbbing pulses and

itchy fingers.45

Enemy planes attacked Saipan again during

the night. From 2040 to 2137 intermittent attacks were delivered on the transport area and

Aslito Airfield. Of the five intruders, two were

shot down by the antiaircraft weapons of the

864th AAA Battalion. One of the downed

planes jettisoned its bombs in Magicienne Bay

before crashing on Kagma,n Peninsula. The

other, bursting into flames, fell north of Aslito

Airfield. As it crashed, a bomb in the plane

exploded, causing several casualties among

U. S. personnel nearby."

"2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 18.

45 NTLF G-2 Report, 39.

46 TF 51 Report, End A, 10-11. NTLF G-2 Report, 39.

180

D—PLUS 14 AND D—PLUS 15 (29-30 JUNE)

With the operation two weeks old, everyone

on the island felt the weight of fatigue settling

down. Like a runner waiting for his "second

wind" the three U. S. divisions limped sluggishly at their tasks. To prevent this weariness

from turning to apathy, the need for outstanding leadership became more pressing.

Everyone is an all-embracing word. Everyone was tired. For while the U. S. troops had

endured much at Saipan, the Japanese had suffered more. It was effort expended positively

against effort spent negatively, and the latter

was more depressing. Then, too, it was easier

to fight forward than backward.

Apart from the psychological implications,

however, the Japanese had suffered more 'from

U. S. supporting arms. This was material, this

produced casualties, and even the best calculated propaganda could not erase its effects.

Despite the difficulties and confusion imposed by U. S. bombardment, Major General

Iketa found time to answer a message from the

Tinian Defense Force (50th Infantry) on 29

June. Still hopeful of receiving reinforcements from Tinian, Iketa admitted that the

waters around Saipan were strongly patrolled

by U. S. vessels, but "it is probably possible for

small boat operations to break through Tinian

channel at night and follow along the east coast

and enter at Hanachiru." The uncertainty displayed by his use of the word probably is repeated in the concluding sentence: "The objective after landing will probably be in vicinity

of wireless station." 47 From the volume of correspondence that had been exchanged on this

subject, the impression is derived that the

Tinian commander was not anxious to undertake these moves and was stalling for time.

Then too, there is the possibility that those few

miles of American-patrolled water separating

him from his Saipan superiors had convinced

the Tinian commander that he should do his

own thinking. In any case, it is small wonder

if he quailed at the prospect.

47 CINCPAC—CINCP0A Item #9983-85, N.
Afetno Point

Choran Kanoa

RD 7093

Maniogassa

Island

Mutcho Point

Tonopog Village

Flores Point

Tanapag

Harbor

Hill 221

(Radar Hill)

Tarahoho

Garapan 0-6

Radio Road

0-6

Pimples

44rP 227 27

•

Has higor

23

I65 •

Dana ay

2

c3LAKE

SUSUPE

/? Mt •

egos 6,*Tipo •

Pole

Mt

To potehou

ttl

7779>

Hill Able

Death

Valley

•Chacho \

Purple 2 Cg3165 \

Heart "...

.,1',:: Ridge -'4., -- .( v H i l l -...

(k Rorogattan los 600 

•Laulau /

LEGEND

--- Indicates Progress Before 27 June

=7777 Positions on 27 June

"""/ Positions on 28 June

es

Kill ,y

500 (NTLF Res)

Mt

Ragman

MAGICIENNE

BAY

Kagman

Peninsula

JAPANESE"Fl NA L LINE

OF RESISTANCE" AND U.S.

PROGRESS LINES FOR

27 AND 28 JUNE 1944

0 2000 4000 Yds

MAP 18
Waiting and Patrolling

Since 27 June, when it had advanced 3,000

yards in a rapid sweep, the 4th Marine Division had been restricted to only consolidation

and readjustment of its lines. Further advance

would merely accentuate an already acute contact problem, inasmuch as the 27th Division

was still a long distance behind.

The 23d Marines, in position along the east

coast, speht 29 and 30 June profitably: daily

patrols scouted the terrain to the front in preparation for subsequent moves. Though valuable for the detailed examination of ground

forms, roads and trails, these patrols made no

large contacts with the enemy. Such few, scattered groups as were located were either captured or destroyed."

Having seized Hill 700 in the previous day's

consolidation move, the 165th Infantry patrolled north and northwest of that feature and

expanded its defenses. To permit the 165th

greater freedom of maneuver in the latter connection, the 23d Regiment was ordered to assume some of the Army regiment's frontage.

Principal complication to relaxed movement

around Hill 700 was Japanese mortar and artillery fire coming from the west and northwest. In rebuttal, the 165th directed long-range

machine-gun and artillery fire into suspected

Japanese positions."

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 24th Marines, remained along the 4th Division left boundary,

though they had been unable to stretch far

enough to contact the 27th Division. Daylight

of 29 June revealed that a number of Japanese

had filtered through the gap between divisions.

Once behind the 4th Division's these infiltrators began an energetic program of harassment. Positive action was demanded, and

the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, in division reserve, set about the elimination of the hostile

groups. Company G, 24th Marines, remained

at Kagman Peninsula, executing a coastal observation mission.

The 24th Marines' situation remained generally unchanged until about 1700, 30 June,

48 23d Mar Report, 44-45.

49 165th Inf Report, 6.

when the 1st Battalion was pinched out by a

shortening of the vertical connection as the

27th Division moved forward.

A shift in commanders was necessary in the

3d Battalion, 24th Marines; Lieutenant Colonel Vandergrift, wounded two days before,

was finally evacuated on 29 June and Lieutenant Colonel Otto Lessing, formerly executive. officer of the 20th Marines, took over.50

The 25th Marines, in NTLF reserve, had hak

little excitement since the Japanese exodus

from Nafutan Point on the night of 26-27

June. The unit's action report for the last three

days in June reads as follows:

D-plus-thirteen (28 June). Regiment continued assign

ment in NTLF reserve.

D-plus-fourteen (29 June). Same as D-plus-thirteen.

D-plus-tifteen (30 June). Same as D-plus-thirteen.51

If the action for this period was as dull as the

report, that was completely to everyone's

liking. Certainly the .25th Marines had been

in the thick of the fight earlier in the operation, and there was' no reason to suspect that

they still would not be in for more.

Vertical Gap Reduced

After days of virtual stalemate, the 27th Di

vision's advances on the last two days of Junk

were indeed gratifying. Lieutenant Colone;

Bradt's 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, ordered

from division reserve into the lines on the right

of the division front, arrived at the line of departure and attacked at 1100, 29 June. Rapid

progress by this unit reduced the size of the

vertical gap on the 27th Division's right flank

by about 800 yards. On 30 June, after another

sizeable surge, good contact was established

with the 24th Marines. This advance cut the

reentrant depth to about 1,200 yards.

Men of the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry

(now attached to the 105th Infantry), con-

' tinned their battle of previous days to oust the

persistent foe from Hill Able. This feature,

erroneously reported captured on 26 June, demanded the unit's full effort and attention until

30 June, when it was finally secured.

5°24th Mar Report, 22.

51- 25th Mar Report, 7.

181
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again. Previously, the artillery had used high

explosive ammunition against the hill; now,

with the enemy exposed, airburst shells were

employed. Flametree Hill seemed to erupt and

split apart under the concentrated shelling.

When, after several minutes of saturation,

fires were lifted, the hill was quiet, with a

heavy cloud of dust and smoke obscuring all

details. Apparently, the ruse had worked; no

estimate of casualties was possible, but several

days later, when.the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

moved into the area, many bodies littered the

The 2d Marine Regiment had more than its

share.of accidents: on 28 June, a plane had misdirected three rockets into the 1st Battalion

causing 27 casualties; again on 30 June, a Navy

torpedo bomber, hit by a Japanese antiaircraft

shell, crashed into the 1st Battalion's lines, resulting in a loss of seven more men. The pilot

parachuted to safety from an unusually low

altitude.55

In the center of the 2d Division zone the 6th

Marines moved but little on 29 and 30 June.

Lieutenant Colonel Jones' 1st. Battalion, on the

left, was still in the same situation as on previous days. Like the 2d Marines, Jones' unit

could not move forward until the dominating

terrain on the right had been seized, or more

specifically, until other units had come abreast.

The time was, therefore, spent in patrolling of

the area to the front and such minor adjustment in the lines as could be undertaken without breaking contact.

The right of the regiment's zone was, and

had been, the scene of the most trouble. The

2d Battalion had punched at the ridge north of

Tipo Pale for two days, and though it had not

carried the objective, it made a substantial improvement, principally in the destruction of

several enemy weapons. But the unit was tired.

The fight had not been cheap. Colonel Riseley

decided to pass the 3d Battalion through the

2d for the continuation of the attack.

The shift was accomplished by about noon.

542d Mar Report, End l C. Thronesen.

55 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 19. Ltr from Capt

C. Schultz, Jr., to CMC, 16Jan50.

The. 3d Battalion, however, met the same determined, if slightly weaker, foe that had

battled the 2d -to a virtual standstill. By dint

of great effort, the 3d Battalion was able, at

1630, to seize a toehold which presented a

favorable forecast 56 of the next day's events.

Off from its starting blocks on 30 June, the

3d Battalion soon hit a minor snag: a previously unlocated automatic weapon opened

brashly against them, cancelling hope for an

easy ascent. Utilizing supporting fires and

close-in grenade fighting, the Marines knocked

out the position. As if by a cue, a second

strong point asserted itself. The process was

repeated: supporting weapons and grenades,

finally the assault. The treatment was effective.

The enemy was- eliminated. After these encounters, the Marines swept rapidly to the high

ground. Slower movement by the 8th Marines

on their right, however, restricted the unit in

its forward moves, and late afternoon found

only a shallow gain. But everyone felt that a

great weight had been removed from the unit's

shoulders. "The day's advance," relates the

2d Marine Division action report, "placed CT

6 on commanding ground in the most favorable

position for continuation of the attack since

D-day." 57

The four Pimples on Tapotchau's northern

face made convenient targets for the fires supporting the 8th Marines, as well as providing

excellent objectives for the battalions. But a

locality worth attacking is also apt to be an

area worth defending. The enemy occupied the

Pimples, during the last days of June, in sufficient strength to make it a fight. No one had

reason to believe that the Japanese would withdraw without a fierce struggle.

. During most of their battle around Tapot- -

chau's rugged heights, men of the 8th Marines

had been without active assistance of tanks.

Though these were available, the .terrain so restricted their movements that their use was

curtailed. On 29 and 30 June, the Marines instituted a search for a route over which to

56 The forecast: Cloudy; probable showers of grenades; scattered Japanese.

57 24 Mar Dtv Report, Section VI, 18-19. 6th Mar

Report, 11.

183
bring tanks into the fight. The possibility of

moving the machines through the 27th Division's zone to the support of the 8th Marines

appeared impracticable because of the time element. Then too, it was hoped that patrols

would discover a more convenient route momentarily. None was found on 29 June, but

the following afternoon a short advance by the

3d Battalion uncovered a route which, after

improvement by bulldozers, served the purpose.

Company A, 2d Tank Battalion, then proceeded to an assembly area in rear of the 8th

Marines' lines in preparation for the attack of

1 July.

The two battalions occupying the right half

of the regiment's front (1st Battalion, 29th

Marines, and 2d Battalion, 8th Marines) , fighting through similar terrain near the division's

right boundary, found it imperative to coordinate their efforts carefully. Likewise, the two

left battalions of the 8th Marines (3d and 1st) ,

because of kindred terrain problems, assumed

a closely-knit harmony of plan and action.

Colonel Wallace, the regimental commander,

quickly recognized the close integration of

these groups and encouraged this attitude.

Thus, Wallace was somewhat eased of the burden of coordinating the efforts of four assault

battalions and was accorded a greater freedom

of decision.

The most significant move by the 8th Marines during the last two days in June was the

seizure of Bill's Pimple, on the division right

flank. (See Map 19.) This hill, so tough to

take had the Japanese chosen to make it so,

was seized by the 2d Battalion on the late afternoon of 30 June without a serious fight. Immediately after the capture and as a result of

an earlier request by the 8th Marines, a medium

tank platoon of the Army's 762d Tank Battalion arrived on Bill's Pimple to render fire

support. Since the 2d Battalion contemplated

no further moves that day, the tanks were employed against Tommy's Pimple to the west.

The latter feature had defied capture on 30

June, all attempts by the 1st Battalion, 29th

Marines, to advance against it being stopped.

The 2d Battalion's advance, plus the availability of more supporting weapons (chiefly

184

tanks) , made prospects for 1 July good, however.

The 8th Marines' picture had clarified and

improved in several respects by the evening of

30 June: tanks were at last in supporting positions; all battalions, except the 1st Battalion,

29th Marines, now had one company in reserve; all, save the 2d Battalion, were now supplied by truck, the open right flank was no

longer such a worry: a company of the Provisional Battalion had moved in behind the 2d

Battalion, and patrols from the Army's 106th

Infantry now operated in the gap between divisions.

A perennial headache, misdirected friendly

artillery fire, made itself felt again on 30 June.

Readying itself for the day's attack, the 3d

Battalion was enveloped in a thundering barrage emanating from deep to the rear. After

16 days of fighting, the effect of a miscalculation of this sort was particularly depressing

and demoralizing. Other battalions had endured similar shellings ; but, in spite of vehement complaints to higher echelons, the accidents continued. The identity of the unit, or

units, responsible was never determined."

The 8th Marines' advance on 29 and 30 June

had been slow but steady, using available supporting weapons to the maximum. In this connection, 75mm half-tracks blasted a number of

positions forward of the 1st Battalion while

rocket trucks released string after string of

4.5-inch projectiles at areas forward of the 1st

Battalion, 29th Marines.59

Though all three of its regiments were committed to the lines, the 2d Marine Division was

not without a reserve, though at times it was

only a provisional or composite group. On 30

June, for example, two companies from the

Provisional Battalion, as well as the 2d Battalion, 18th Marines, whose engineers had been

reorganized into three rifle companies of 175

men each, performed the reserve function."

59 Some conclusions on the reasons for these accidents

will be found on page 250, Chapter VII.

59 8th Mar Report, 7-8. Tompkins. Chamberlin.

692d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 19-20.
Afetna

Point

Charan

Kanoa

RD 7093

0Mania gassa

Island

Mutcho Point

Garapan

Radio Road--,,,

0-6

Tanapag Village

Flores Point

Tanopag

Harbor

Makunsho

Harakiri

Gulch

•

1.,.Paradise Volley

4,,fh4 Hill 767

'l-till 721

Radar 1-till

0-6

Flame tree

db Hill

;Hill

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30

2

[Ale

Mt

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June

Mt IP"'.

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2

29 and 30 June

•

Hashigor

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1700

30 June

Cg) 106,,,..3dt105

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• Ridge

Hill M-(NTLF Rest

LAKE 500

SUSUPE MAG/CIENNE

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Mt

Kagman

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GAY

— LEGEND--

— Indicates Progress Before 29 June

Kagman

Peninsula

PROGRESS LINES FOR

29 AND 30 JUNE

1944

2000 4000 Yds

MAP I 9
ROCKET BARRAGE in the making. 4.2-inch rocket trucks were effectively employed by the 8th Marines north of Mt.

Tapotchau,.and later by the 23d Marines at "4th of July Hill."

Nights of 29 and 30 June

Night activity had seemingly slackened; the

night of 29 and. 30 June remained reasonably

quiet in all zones. Individual instances of

sniping and infiltration were so commonplace

by this time that they often were not even reported.

The usual Japanese air attacks failed to materialize on 29 June, but on 30 June the activities resumed with renewed vigor. Beginning

just after dusk and lasting until after midnight, the air over Saipan was charged with

excitement as "several" Japanese planes made

nine separate raids on the island and the transport area. U. S. ships, hidden by a smoke

screen, escaped damage; ashore, bombs

dropped in the vicinity of Garapan failed to

achieve any important hits. The most significant aspect of this particular incursion was

8895900--50-13

that it marked, the first kill by U. S. night

fighters at Saipan."

Since 27 June General Saito had remained in

a small cave 2,200 yards north of Tapotchau,

but by 30 June this seemingly inconspicuous

feature became the target for a booming mortar barrage. This stripped the tiny command

post of its only advantage: seclusion. Saito felt

that a change was indicated. His sixth and last

refuge was another cave, this one located in a

canyon cutting about 1,000 yards inland from

the village of Makunsha. (See Map 19). The

Japanese named the canyon "Paradise Valley."

It was hardly an appropriate name.62

Retreating Japanese were observed by the

4th Marine Division and the 105th Infantry

during the early evening of 30 June. Generally,

61 TF 51 Report, End A, Annex 1.

62 Men of the 165th Infantry later called it "Valley

of Hell."

185
BAZOOKAMAN (at left) and assistant cautiously search for targets at Garapan's outskirts. After a long wait for

units on the right to come abreast, the 2d Marines finally advanced into Garapan on 2 July.

the withdrawal appeared -quite orderly, the 4th

Division reporting Japanese moving in column

of files along a road to the north. Indications

are that retrogression continued throughout

the night, as moving lights were observed far to

the north. The results of artillery and mortar

fire against these targets could not be judged

because of the long range at which it was delivered.63

The reason for the enemy's general retirement was the desire of General Saito to pull

back and shorten his line, regroup his forces,

and coordinate the 'defense. With his command

scattered through the roughest terrain, at the

island's widest point, he had been unable even

to disseminate his orders in time for integrated

action. He hoped that the withdrawal would

improve the situation and that he could then

63 NTLF 0-2 Report, 42.

186

conduct the type of mobile defense in wh i eh he

believed.

D—PLUS 16 AND D—PLUS 17 (1-2 JULY)

The Limestone Hill

The Northern Troops and Landing Force

achieved important gains on the first two days

in July. The swing to Tanapag began in earnest.

Reports of the general Japanese retreat had

begun arriving at the NTLF command post on

the previous night, and with the coming of

daylight on 1 July, the reports continued.

Along a road to the front of the 27th Division,

the enemy could be observed pulling back to

the north. They were on the run but still capable of turning around and making it a fight.

There was plenty of venom left.

For the 2d Marine Division, 1 and 2 July

marked the greatest forward surge since the , , .
_SUGARLOAF RILL dominated Garapan and surrounding coastal plain. 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, skirted these sheer

south and west slopes and seized this feature from the east on 2 July.

D-Day landings. In a shift calculated to rest

the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, the latter exchanged missions and positions with the 2d

Battalion, 2d Marines."

Along the beach Colonel Stuart's 2d Marines

spent 1 July in routine patrolling, but on 2 July

began the long-delayed movement through

Garapan. Attacking with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast, 1st on the right and the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, in reserve, Stuart's men

made excellent progress. The days and weeks

of pounding paid dividends. Supported by

Company C, 2d Tank Battalion, the 3d Battalion" swept through the rubble-strewn flat64 The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, had done little

fighting with its parent regiment. Attached to the

6th Marines on 15 June, it returned to the 2d Marines

on 23 June and remained until attachment to the' 8th

Marines on 1 July.

65 Now commanded by Major Harold K. Throneson

who took over the 3d Battalion after Lieutenant

Colonel Johnston had been wounded for the second

lands at a steady pace. Encountering rifle and

machine-gun fire, men of the battalion took

grateful advantage of the protection afforded

by the torn hunks of concrete littering the area.

With tanks ricocheting rounds among the shattered ruins, the Marines moved into the very

heart of what had once been Saipan's largest

town. (INT ( A) 's of the 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion provided close fire support

against targets near the beach.

Fighting through foothills overlooking Garapan from the east was Kyle's 1st Battalion.

Here the going was tougher. Movement of supporting tanks was rendered extremely difficult

by the rough terrain, but, surmounting the

difficulties, the machines lumbered clumsily

time on 21 June. Throneson achieved the distinction

of occupying the most unusual observation post during

the operation when he bridged with a plank the top

corner Of a shell-battered, roofless building in Garapan,

climbed into his crow's nest with his radio operator,

and carried on business as usual.

187
into positions from which to bring their shattering fire power to bear.

Within two hours after the jump-off, Company A had enveloped Flametree Hill from

the west, fighting a lively skirmish with a detachment of cave-dwellers there. Then the battalion moved to the north towards the day's

objective, a dominating eminence about 1,000

yards inland from Garapan's center. This

feature, an expansive knob with forested slopes,

had been named "Sugarloaf Hill" by the 2d

Marines. Approached from north, south, or

west, this feature presented steep, challenging

slopes. From the east (inland) flank, however,

the rise was very gradual and Kyle selected this

,approarh. Against fairly heavy machine-gun

fire, the battalion swept to the top of the hill,

mopped-up the Japanese defenders and by 1700

established contact with the 6th Marines on the

right.

Ever conscious of the threat of counterattack

along the coastal road, Colonel Stuart ordered

both assault battalions to send out security patrols to their front during the night. To provide depth to the regiment's defense, the colonel

ordered his reserve (3d Battalion, 8th Marines)

to establish a secondary defense line about

1,000 yards in rear of the forward elements.66

As had been the case on so many previous

days, the right half of the 6th Marines front

gave the most trouble on 1 and 2 July. Emplaced in a ravine 500 yards forward of the 3d

Battalion's lines were three Japanese field

pieces protected by a host of rifles and machine

(Tuns. As the Marines attacked toward this area

on 1 July, rifles and machine guns stuttered

inhospitably, while the field pieces punctuated

the threat with frequent rocking blasts. The

3d Battalion achieved little toward the destruction of this enemy stronghold during 1

July; but, with the support of tanks, 37mm

guns and 75mm half-tracks, the unit finally

moved to commanding ground facing the ravine.

The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, restricted its

advance to conform to the slower movement of

the 3d Battalion. Light resistance on its front

66 24 Mar Report, 5-6. Throneson. Brooks. Kyle.

188

made rapid strides possible, but the difficulties

of maintaining contact deterred Colonel Riseley from ordering the unit to push on. More

open terrain, or an enemy less adept in infiltration, may have justified long thrusts by a single

unit; but neither of these situations prevailed

at Saipan. By dark of 1 July, when it was apparent that the ravine strong point would not

be reduced, the 1st Battalion pulled back a

short distance to achieve better contact.

The 6th Marines were old hands at dealing

with troublesome cores: experience had been

a stern teacher in the north Tipo Pale strong

point. Without hesitation, unit commanders

applied the tactics that had worked previously:

Company B remained behind to contain and

destroy while the rest by-passed the area and

continued the attack.

Once past this "loaded" draw, both battalions swept rapidly forward. By nightfall of

2 July the Japanese had lost another 700 to

1,200 yards, the greatest gains having been

made on the left and center. Just before dark

the 6th Marines lost a jeep and a half-track

when these vehicles ran over land mines which

the Japanese had strewn haphazardly through

the area.

To assist the 6th Marines in maintaining

contact with adjacent units, two companies

from the Provisional Battalion were attached

on 1 July. The presence of these units eased

contact problems, released infantry companies

for the vital task of pressing the attack forward, and permitted Colonel Riseley to retain

his reserve (2d Battalion) intact and in a state

of absolute readiness.67

Although still broken and heavily wooded in

spots, the terrain facing the 8th Marines was

the most favorable that the regiment had seen

for many days. Tanks, which had found Tapotchau terrain awkward, could now move with

dispatch, thus speeding the infantry's advances. This factor, coupled with the enemy's

withdrawal, permitted the 8th Marines to

sweep ahead nearly a mile on 1 and 2 July. And

the welcome sight of the water at Tan apag

spurred the efforts even further.

67 24 Mar Div Report, Section VI, 20-22. 6th Mar

Report, 11-12.
A well-executed tank-infantry thrust on the

morning • of 1 July carried the 1st Battalion,

29th- Marines, • to the top of Tommy's Pimple

without a fight. Then, in conjunction with the

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, the attack continued. The two battalions now faced a series

of relatively open ridges leading down to the

coastal flats in the Tanapag vicinity. The exceptionally good observation facilities were

used to advantage in bringing rocket and artillery fire to bear on any areas that appeared

to offer positions for the enemy.

As the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, pushed its

attack across an open field on the afternoon of

-2 july,..a_small coral limestone hill on the right

flank suddenly came alive. Grazing fire swept

the open field, stopping the Marines' forward

movement. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,

also exposed to some of this fire, was slowed

to a virtual standstill. During the afternoon

this unit suffered the loss of another battalion

commander; Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins fell

wounded from a shell fragment. The 8th Marine' executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jack

P. Juhan, immediately assumed command.

The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, developed a

stubborn, unseen foe of undetermined strength

in the limestone hill. Hidden in the hummock's

crevasses and caves the enemy brought accurate

small-arms fire to bear upon the Marines. The

word "accurate" is not used loosely here; few

rounds were wasted. The battalion and Company G had a joint observation post located in

a small island of trees in the center of the field.

Each time a messenger attempted to run across

the open field and enter the wooded clump, it

was a dash through a gantlet of lead. Often

as not, the messenger could not make the race

to and from the observation post without getting hit. For this reason, this means of communication was not used except in cases of

great emergency.

Major Chamberlin, commanding the 2d Battalion, tried to envelop the point of resistance,

using Company F in a swing to the east. But

the Japanese had not ignored this route of entry

into their position and met Company F with

a prohibitory fusillade. In addition, the Marines' envelopment route (the only one available) was through intertwining, snare-like

underbrush, through which it was virtually impossible to move.

In the meantime, evacuation of casualties had

become a problem: Marines had fallen on the

open field, and all attempts to rescue them only

resulted in more men being hit. The scheme

finally adopted, and the one which brought

success, was for a tank to position itself between the casualty and the limestone hill. By

following directly behind the tanks, hospital

corpsmen could then move safely to the

wounded, apply hasty bandages, give them a

shot of morphine, and place them on stretchers. Then, carefully coordinating their moves

with the tank (by talking to the driver through

the sound-powered phone on the rear sponson),

the stretcher bearers would precede the tank

from the site, all the while shielded from Japanese fire. White phosphorous rounds dropped

on the hill by the 81min mortar platoon plus

frontal blasts from the chaperoning medium

tanks also contributed to the success of this resourceful project. The fact that only small

arms fire spattered against the thick bulls of

the tanks indicated that the Japanese had no

heavier weapons readily available in the limestone hill."

By dark, all wounded had been rescued, but

the task of seizing the hill still remained. Captain Edward L. Bale, Jr., commanding Company A, 2d Tank Battalion,- came up at this

juncture with a suggestion both unique and

• resourceful. He proposed a night tank raid

against the hill using illuminating shells and

medium tank spotlights to brighten the area

while light flame-thrower tanks .(which had

just arrived for, the night mission) moved in

close for the roast. The bizarre plan had one

routine feature: riflemen and machine gunners

of the 2d Battalion would watch the hill and

shoot any Japanese attempting to dash from

cover to place magnetic mines against the

tanks.

-68Credit for suggesting—ancleiw4eing thig...solaaae

of evacuation goes to Pharmacists Mate 1st Class

Frank M. Campbell, USN. On this and many other

occasions, Campbell established himself as one of the

bravest men to wear a uniform.

189
SURRENDER? Japanese soldier stumbles dazedly from a cave following a shattering explosion at the cave entrance.

Marine at left watches, rifle ready.

About an hour after dark the raid was

launched. As planned, the area was bathed in

a lucid, bright light as the little tanks lumbered

toward the hill on their mission. Once there,

they spat at the hill with long streams of flame.

Men of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, with

weapons at the ready, watched the arson

with keen delight. After completing the

searing process and discharging their flamethrower fuel, the tanks returned to the lines.

No one ventured upon the smoldering hill to inspect the results, but all felt that some good

had been accomplished.

The two left battalions of the regiment (2/2

and 1/8), meanwhile, seized their Pimples on

1 July and pushed on to the north. Nutting's

2d Battalion, 2d Marines, which had exchanged

190

jobs with the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, on the

morning of 1 July, quickly adjusted itself to

the new surroundings and drove forward.

Coral limestone cliffs, similar to those troubling Chamberlin's battalion, caused some difficulty, however. Japanese holed up in these

formations invariably fought until they had

either been killed or their cave positions sealed.

Whether these Japanese represented that inevitable percentage that never gets the Word (to

withdraw in this case) or whether they were

carrying out a delaying mission was never determined.

Contact difficulties were experienced at dark

of 1 July between the 6th and 8th Marines. As

already mentioned, the former was stopped by

a strong point and not able to by-pass it until ,
STILL FIGHTING, although covered at point-blank range, this Japanese attempted to throw an explosive charge, but

alert Marines (see picture opposite page), well familiar with such tactics, were quick to .shoot him before he

could pull the pin.

2 July. Progress by the 8th Marines, therefore,

caused a break to develop. To fill this area the

1st Battalion, 8th Marines, committed its reserve company. Just as the latter battalion

prepared to halt for the night of 1-2 July, 30

Japanese, operating in .the best -traditions of a

race that believed in death lunges, charged the

Marines. Outnumbered and outgunned, the

Japanese fell before the fence of bullets thrown

out by the men ,of the 1st Battalion.

On 2 July, the two left battalions of the 8th

Marines forged rapidly ahead, keeping pace

with the surge around them. Misdirected artillery fire again marred the day's successes; just

as the 1st Battalion poised itself to jump off in

the attack, friendly artillery fire thundered

down and killed, or wounded 51 Marines.

Though delayed about 45 minutes because of

the disorganization caused by this mishap, the

battalion quickly caught up with flank Units

and moved about 800 yards during the day."

Gaining Momentum

The 27th Division by 30 June was indeed a

skeletonized unit; only five infantry battalions

were under General Griner's command.

Throughout the series of special missions, at69 8th Mar Report, 8-9. 1Rt Bn, 8th Mar Report, 9.

Gunter. Chamberlin.

191
tachments, and attachments within attachments, only the 106th Infantry remained intact.

The other two infantry battalions under 27th

Division control were the 3d Battalion, 105th

Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, both operating under Colonel Bishop, the

105th's Commander.

Though General Griner's field order for 1

July gave missions to two regiments, the total

assault battalions were only three: 1st and 2d

Battalions, 106th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 105th.

Manning the left and center of the division's

front, Colonel Stebbins' 106th Infantry moved

2,700 yards forward on 1 and 2 July against

sporadic rifle, machine-gun and mortar fire,

and occasional shelling from hostile artillery—

nothing to compare with that experienced in

earlier days of the Death Valley fight. Encountered and destroyed on 2 July were five

Japanese tanks (emplaced as pillboxes) and

numerous ammunition dumps. In connection

with the capture or destruction of Japanese

ammunition was the unescapably cheerful feeling that every round not in Japanese possession

was a round that would never be fired at U. S.

forces.

The 3d Battalion, 106th, remained in regimental reserve and continued its systematic

mop-up of the left flank cliff line. Patrols reported no enemy contacts in this area, the first

time such a report could be made since the 27th

Division first encountered the sore spot on 23

June."

The 105th Infantry, attacking with its 3d

Battalion in the assault and the 2d Battalion,

165th, in reserve, met its principal difficulties

from Japanese flanking fire which issued from

hillside caves in the regiment's zone. Here the

story was an old one: the enemy, hidden in the

deep shadows of natural caverns, funneled fire

on their attackers. The tactic was as familiar

and predictable as were the caves which abound

on the island. And yet, the task of eliminating

these holed-up individuals became only slightly

easier with practice. (This schooling had too

70 27th Div 0-3 Periodic Reports Nos. 15 and 16.

106th. Int Report, 16-18. 27th Div Field Message 3,

30Jun44. 27th Div Field Order 53.

192

few live graduates). Locating these 'cavemen

was difficult since it was usually necessary that

they break silence and fire at least one round.

That first round was apt to come from close by

and would very often claim a casualty. With

luck, then, the lair might be discovered with

only a single loss. The hazardous task of sealing the cave, once located, required placement

of the explosive in the cave entrance. This type

of fighting was the work of individuals or

small groups rather than units; and, while they

executed their heroic tasks, the rest could only

watch and wait and provide what fire assistance was possible.

No wonder, then, that the 3d Battalion,

105th, could gain but 300 yards on 1 July. And

this much yardage was possible only because

one hill strong point was by-passed during the

morning, the 3d Battalion leaving one company behind to contain and destroy it. Later

in the afternoon, elimination of this enemy

pocket became the task of the 1st Battalion,

105th Infantry, which had reverted from its

attachment to the 4th Marine Division at 0900,

1 July. This unit arrived in the 105th Infantry's zone in time to take over and complete

the mopping-up mission. The other battalion

of the 105th (2d) was still operating in the Nafutan Point area under Saipan Garrison Force

control.

The 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, separated

from its parent regiment since 26 June, was

ordered into NTLF reserve on the evening of

1 July, though it would remain in 27th Division rear areas. This assignment did not relieve the present reserve (25th Marines), but,

rather, augmented it.

On 2 July, against much the same type of resistance encountered the previous day, the 3d

Battalion, 105th Infantry, pushed about 700

yards. Though this represented over twice the

previous day's gain, the battalion was far outstripped by the rush of units on either flank.

The difference in speed was caused by a stubborn Japanese strong point near Papako (see

Map 20) which defied frontal movement in the

105th Infantry's zone. From the moment the

3d Battalion nosed into this area, it became apparent that the going would be slow and that
the speed of flank units could not be duplicated. By dark, therefore, both flanks were uncovered and the unit still faced the Japanese

strong point.

Desiring to fill the gaps, Colonel Bishop,

commanding the 105th Infantry, ordered the

regimental reserve (1st Battalion) to pass to

the left (west) of the hornet's nest, swing

across the regiment's front, and tie in with the

165th Infantry on the right and the 106th Infantry on the left. This move, commencing

about 1730, was successfully executed, although it was necessary to attach a company

(I) of the 3d Battalion to help man the wide

front. In effect, then, the 1st Battalion had

taken over the 3d Battalion's zone, with the

latter remaining behind to clean up the strong

point.71

The 165th Infantry (less the 2d Battalion)

had been waiting, as part of the 4th Marine Division, for the 27th Division to come abreast.

This delay followed the 4th Division's rapid

27 June advance which left the 27th Division

a considerable distance behind. To allow the

latter time to knock out the resistance holding

it up and to catch up, the 4th Division had restricted its activities to patrolling, minor adjustment of its lines, and fire assistance to the

27th Division.

• With. the return, on the morning of 1 July,

of the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, to the

27th Division, only two Army battalions remained under 4th Division control. And even

their period of attachment was rapidly drawing to a close. An NTLF order directed the

165th to revert to 27th Division control at 0530,

2 July. Actually, this reversion had no effect

on the unit's position on the front lines; it

rather marked the termination of the period

in which it was more convenient to have it attached to the 4th Division than to the 27th.

Advances by the latter now warranted the return of the regiment to its normal command.

Selecting the same formation as the 105th

Regiment, the 165th attacked on 2 July in a

column of battalions, 3d leading, followed by

the 1st in reserve. To mop up a small pocket

71 105th Int Report, 8.

of resistance in the regiment's rear, Company

C remained behind. The 165th's advance

against virtually no resistance was very rapid,

and by 1445 after a dash of 1,700 yards, General Griner ordered the regiment to hold its

present positions to allow the 105th Infantry

to catch up. A 30-minute concentration laid on

the exposed left flank by the attached platoon

from Company C, 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion contributed to the day's success. Good

contact had existed with the 4th Marine Division throughout the day, and by nightfall the

left was also tied in when the 1st Battalion,

105th Infantry, hooked on to that flank.72

The Surge to 0-6A

Along the east coast the 23d Marines continued vigorous patrolling of the area to the

front. Though penetrating enemy territory to

a distance of 1,500 yards on 1 July, patrols

made no contacts.

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 24th Marines, operating along the boundary between divisions,

made minor movements to conform to the advance of the 27th Division. As the gap narrowed, the battalions kept pace. The regiment's 1st Battalion, pinched out on the previous day, assumed the coastal observation

mission on Kagman Peninsula.73

For the attack of 2 July the 3d Battalion,

25th Marines, returned to the 4th Division. The

rest of the 25th Marines, however, remained in

NTLF reserve, an assignment first received on

23 June.

By 1345, 2 July, the division, attacking with

the 23d and 24th Marines abreast, had advanced practically unopposed from 0-6 to division intermediate objective 0-6A. (See Map

20.) The assault unit of the 24th Marines, the

1st Battalion, suffered but one man wounded,

an indication of the relative ease of the day's

move. The 23d Marines reported mine fields

and road blocks, covered by small detachments

of riflemen and machine gunners, which temporarily impeded the 2d Battalion, but the other

72 165th 1nf Report, 6-7.

73 This disposition represented an exchange of jobs

by the 1st and 2d Battalions 24th Marines. •

193
assault battalion (the 1st) experienced no difficulty whatsoever.

Like the 165th Infantry, the 4th Division

had pushed so far ahead of the 105th Infantry

that further moves would present serious problems of contact. For this reason, the division

was ordered to stop and dig in. Owing to the

uncertainties of the left flank4. the 3d Battalion,

24th Marines, was placed aldrfg 4Wgivi,sicm

boundary facing to the west, rApay.ed,t,O coun

ter any Japanese threat fiVoifi that direction.

As soon as the division halted, patrols were

dispatched toward 0-7. Although continued

throughout the night, patrolling failed to locate any strong enemy installations. This news,

more evidence of the general Japanese withdrawal, was as welcome as sunshine on a

picnic.74

The Corps Artillery Commander, Brigadier

General Harper, had found the rate of progress at Saipan "very disappointing" and was

moved to write a statement which was delivered

to Headquarters, NTLF, on 1 July. It concluded that the reason for the "very disappointing" progress was that the available artillery support was not being exploited by the infantry as it should be. "It is basic," says Harper's statement, "that a terrain feature and its

approaches either merits softening up by the

maximum employment of fire in mass or it

should be assaulted and captured without delay

if the enemy's resistance is weak." 75

General Holland Smith agreed with Harper's opinions and immediately sent a dispatch

to all units directing that massed artillery be

more extensively employed. While this represented neither new doctrine nor new policy, it

came as a timely reminder to those units which

had become overly sparing in the use of this

valuable arm.

Either an interesting coincidence or evidence

of prompt, direct results is revealed in the following statement from the 2d 155mm Howitzer

Battalion's action report for 2 July (the day

74 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 30-31. 324 Mar

Report, 45. 24th Mar Report, 22-23. 1st By, 24th Mar

Report, 9.

75 Utilization Of The Artillery In The Attack, 1Jul44,

BrigGen A. M. Harper, USA.

194

following delivery of Harper's statement) : "2

July was a memorable day. . . . This battalion

fired 1573 rounds of ammunition, its daily high

for this campaign. Most of the fire was coordinated by the Corps and the effect was excellent." 76

The reaction of the 2d Division commander,

General Watson, to the directive regarding

massed artillery fire is of interest:

... I immediately notified Headquarters NTLF (C/S

Brig. Gen. Erskine) that, while I fully appreciated the

value of and wanted to use massed artillery fires,

wherever practicable, the artillery ammunition levels

in the division dumps had never, since D-Day, been

high enough to permit extensive use of this type of fire

by Division artillery. He replied that sufficient ammunition would be made available. On the morning of 2- July

I directed an artillery preparation be fired along the

division front. This preparation lasted only for a few

minutes.

Yet by mid-morning the expenditure of ammunition

occasioned by this preparation coupled with the normal

fires of the day caused NTLF to notify the Division

that it would be impossible to provide sufficient ammunition to maintain minimum artillery dump levels for

massed fires. Massed fires would therefore have to be

restricted accordingly.

Elsewhere, General Watson showed a disagreement with at least a part of General Harper's

opinions:

Without detracting from the important role played

by artillery in the battle for Saipan the rate of progress

was not and could not be primarily determined by the

volume and frequency of delivery of artillery fires. Rate

of progress was determined by the willingness and

ability of the individual front-line Marine and soldier

to dig out and kill the stubborn and skillful Japanese

defenders.77

Nights of 1 and 2 July

There was very little enemy activity during

the nights of 1-2 July and 2-3 July. Apparently, the withdrawal had temporarily ruled

out the possibility of counterattack by more

than token forces. But no one slept well. There

was just enough activity to maintain a state of

perpetual tenseness. Relaxed slumber would

have to wait.

What, exactly, did "little activity" mean on

Saipan during the first two nights in July? On

76 24 155mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious Corps

Report, 3.

77 Watson.
the night of the 1st the 6th Marines captured

70 civilians and three Japanese military personnel through voluntary surrender. Later, a

single Japanese attempting to move through

the lines and return to his own unit met a

quick fate. The same night, men of the 8th

Marines spotted 15 prowlers along their front

and killed them all. When the excitement from

this diversion subsided, three Japanese soldiers carrying land mines were killed as they

tried to move through the lines. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, intercepted and killed

three would-be infiltrators. The 27th Division

experienced sporadic, random firing all along

its front and achieved the satisfaction of killing five Japanese by means of booby traps set

by the 165th Infantry. In the 4th Marine Division it was even quieter. Only one instance

of hostile mortar fire, which fell on the division command post, was reported.

The night of 2 July was similar. Japanese

patrols continuously sneaked along the 2d Marines' front. Of three Japanese endeavoring to

rove through the 6th Marines' lines, one was

killed and the other two routed. Achieving

the distinction of doing the unusual and unexpected during the evening, a Japanese soldier strode into the 6th Marines command post

and signified his desire to surrender. This he

was allowed to do.

The 106th Infantry reported that the enemy

was firing flares intermittently from 2100 to

2400. This served to alert personnel to the possibility of a coordinated attack, but none developed. A number of violent exchanges between the soldiers of the 27th Division and

lurking Japanese occurred throughout the

night, but there was no indication that this

enemy activity was intended as a major thrust.

In the morning when a count was possible, the

105th Infantry found 27 Japanese bodies, while

the 106th and 165th Infantry Regiments

counted 10 and 18, respectively.

To this total for the night the 23d Marines

added 25 more Japanese, caught as they moved

south along the coast on the extreme eastern

flank.78

When the results of these night excursions

78 NTLF G.--2 Report, 45-48.

are balanced against the damage these same

Japanese might have accomplished had they

remained in caves, the futility of these moves is

clearly revealed.

Shortly after midnight 1-2 July about five

Japanese planes executed a small attack on Saipan and the transport area. The intruders, approaching at a low level to escape detection,

were unsuccessful, achieving no damage to

U. S. ships or units. One of the raiders flew too

low and crashed into the water. Survivors

(five) were captured by the destroyer Renshaw. Another plane was shot down by the

Bennion, a ship of the transport screen. The

rest buzzed around the island for a while, then

departed."

The meager strength of enemy air over Saipan could give the beleagured Japanese troops

little comfort. The attacks were a nuisance to

U. S. ships and installations, little more. Japanese planes did not raid Saipan again until 5

July.

Saito Changes His Defense

Since 15 June General Saito had been forced

to stare grim reality in the face. His plans to

drive the Americans into the water had been

discarded in favor of a mobile defense. But

most of the mobility had been backwards. Now

he sought to delay the inevitable decision as

long as possible. By midafternoon of 2 July

mounting pressure along the .entire front indicated the need for another withdrawal, and

Saito issued a formal operation order which

would pull- the defense back from the Garapan

—Tapotchau—Kagman Peninsula line to the

general line: Tanapag—Hill .221—Hill 112.80

The 31st Army chief of staff, Major General

Iketa, had mentioned a withdrawal to this same

general area in his resume of 27 June (see page

167), . but the detailed assignment awaited

Saito's order. This operation order and sketch

fell into U. S. hands on the night of 3-4 July

when one of Saito's principal subordinates

(Colonel Ogawa) was killed in the command

TF 51 Report, End A and Annex 1 to Encl. A.

8° As noted previously, Hill 221 was named "Radar

Hill" by Marines; Hill 112 appeared as "Taroholio" on

U. S. maps.

195
STREET FIGHTING, the first experienced by Marines in

World War II, was hot and heavy in Garapan. A

flame-thrower is used here to roast an enemy hideout in the rubble.

post of the 165th Infantry.81 (Details of this

episode will be covered later in this chapter.)

D—PLUS 18 AND D—PLUS 19 (3-4 JULY)

Garapan Seized

The crumbling Japanese defense assumed

landslide proportions on 3 and 4 July as all

three U. S. divisions swallowed huge hunks of

terrain. It was much like pushing against a

stuck door, then suddenly feeling it yield. The

quick rush was apt to shake one's equilibrium.

But with scarcely a stumble the three divisions

spurted forward. As he encouraged the troops

of the landing force to even greater speed,

General Holland Smith was applying one of

his favorite maxims, written by the great German military thinker and writer, Karl Von

Clausewitz :

For the victor, the engagement can never be decided

too quickly; for the vanquished, it can never last too

long. The speedy victory is a higher degree of victory;

a late decision is on the side of the defeated some

compensation for the loss.

Holland Smith wanted Saito to get as

little "compensation for the loss" as possible.

For the 2d Marine Division the objective for

sl NITA` 0-2 Report, 50-51.

196

3 July was 0-7, which included the town of

Garapan and the seaplane base at Tanapag

Harbor. With half of shattered Garapan behind it, Colonel Stuart's 2d Regiment readied

itself to complete seizure of the town and

Mutcho Point, jutting from Garapan's northwestern outskirts.

Duty in the town had little to commend it:

battered skeletons of what had once been buildings, and humans, and animals, dotted the

area.; the choking smell of death hung about

like a fog. And everywhere were the pieces of

corrugated iron which the Japanese and natives had used as roofing for almost every

structure from the hen house to the bank. To

step on one of these huge rattling sheets was

to inform everyone thereabouts of one's kesence.82 Garapan's trash and garbage dump appearance was further enhanced by odd clothing, shoes, papers, books, and miscellaneous

bric-a-brac strewn through the area. Perhaps

the only bright point was the copious wells,

providing adequate water for the 2d Marines to

bathe away some of the filth on their bodies.

Dodging their way through the rubble, men

of the 2d Marines made good progress: by

noon of 3 July, despite abortive efforts of a few

Japanese who determined to make a street fight

of it, the 3d Battalion (on the left) had swept

nearly 700 yards. In the center of the regiment's zone, several pillboxes were encountered, slowing movement there but allowing

both flanks to advance. Light flame-thrower

tanks and medium tanks seared and plastered

the front of the pillboxes, while assault engineer teams, covered by riflemen and machine

gunners, moved to the flanks or rear and placed

their shattering explosives. Thus, the enemy

positions were systematically reduced.

One position defied neutralization: this was

located on a tiny islet in the center of a

swampy pond near Garapan's northern end.

Here a Japanese machine gunner had posi82 These corrugated sheets served another purpose,

not only at Garapan, but all over the island: U. S.

soldiers and Marines placed them over their foxholes

in an attempt to stay dry during the torrential rains.

Such improvisation was usually frustrated because the

sheets, almost without exception, were riddled with

shell holes.
AERIAL BOMBS were extensively employed as land mines by the Japanese. Buried with noses protruding above

ground, the bombs could be set off by almost any United States vehicle. This 1.23-pound bomb was found in

Garapan.

tioned himself and from there engaged anyone

moving near the swamp's banks. Secure in the

knowledge that he could be approached only

by lizards, ducks, and other Japanese, he

plagued the 2d Marines' efforts to clear the

area. This point target seemed ideal for mortars, but it was soon discovered that the shells

would not detonate in the spongy bog. Direct

fire weapons could not be employed because of

the danger to other Marines moving on the

other bank. In his wet sanctuary the Japanese

maintained his troublesome activity throughout the day. Nothing was heard from this determined individual on the following day, perhaps indicating that he evacuated his position

during the night. Or maybe he is still there.8"

The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, advanced

through the foothills on Garapan's eastern environs. Progress until noon was not great

(400 yards), but in the early afternoon the

unit began to gain momentum. By 1800 it had

pushed to 0-7, at that point on the water's

edge north of the town. This speedy thrust

cut off the Japanese remaining in the Garapan

vicinity. •

During the rapid surge on the right, the

left (3d) battalion was not idle; after clearing

the Japanese from the remainder of the town's

83 Throneson.

197
THE BATTLE WAS INTIMATE, lonely and personal, even though

thousands of troops were present. Here a single

Marine advances `.`on the double" near Tanapag Harbor.

streets, it swung out upon Mutcho Point, a

movement chiefly complicated by annoying air

bursts from a Japanese heavy antiaircraft gun

in position north of Tanapag. By about dusk

the advance halted for the night with only

400 yards of the point unconquered. The noose

was tight and the Japanese who had retreated

to the tip of the point were neatly trapped.

The 4th of July was almost a holiday for the

2d Marines. The 3d Battalion quickly mopped

up the unfortunates on the point and established a coast line defense of the Mutcho Point

—Ga,rapan area. Remaining to be captured by

the 1st Battalion was the boat basin which

appears to hang suspended into Tanapag Harbor (see Map 20). Only one dryland approach

existed: over the open, concrete ramp from

the shore. Since troops moving upon this

would be extremely vulnerable to grazing fires

from any point in the boat basin or in the

breakwater that surrounded it, the battalion

commander decided to execute the move in

amphibian tractors, landing at the end of the

basin. Fire support would be furnished by the

LVT (A) 's of the 2d Armored Amphibian

Battalion.

This landing was complicated by communications failures between the amphibians and

Pis

the troop commander but, nonetheless, was

successful. Only a few Japanese were in. the

basin and these were incapable of more than

token resistance. Only one Marine- was

wounded.

With this conquest the 2d Marines were

pinched out of the attack and briefly, at least,

could enjoy the .prospect of not facing enemyheld terrain. At 1500 came word that the regiment, less 2d Battalion, would stand detached

from the 2d 'Division to assume the role of

NTLF reserve: The unit then entrucked and

moved to an assembly area in rear of the 4th

Marine Division.84

In a repetition of so many previous days, the

6th Marines moved faster on the left than on

the right, Where the Japanese had exploited

the defensible terrain. Keeping pace and acting

in concert with the 2d Marines on 3 July, the

1st 'Battalion swung its left flank to the beach

(0-7) while its right was echeloned far to the

rear to contact the 3d Battalion. The latter

unit moved rapidly at first; but, as . the Marines approached the last high ground overlooking Tanapag Harbor, a heavy volume

of Japanese rifle and machine-gun fire bid

them unwelcome. By now the procedure at

such times was clear: blast the area with all

available supporting weapons, establish fire

superiority, move in for the kill. By late afternoon .the 3d Battalion seized the commanding

ground; but, inasmuch as a distance of 1,000

yards still remained before-the coast could be

reached, Colonel Riseley ordered the unit to

hold for the night.

Although contact between the two battalions

of the 6th Marines was tenuous, nothing save

desultory rifle fire occurred during the night.

The activities of 4 July resembled a mop-up

more than an attack. By shortly after noon the

3d Battalion had completed the descent from

the high ground, Moved across the. Tanapag

flats, and joined the 1st Battalion on the beach.

(See Map 20.) Then began the routine task

of clearing the omnipresent snipers from the

area.

At 1640 the 6th Marines were ordered detached from the 2d Marine Division and as8424 Mar Report, 6. Throneson. Brooks..
TRAPPED JAPANESE, north of Garapan, attempted to gain refuge during the first (lays in July by getting to their

sunken ships in Tanapag Harbor. Artillery and naval gunfire made quick work of the hulks, however. Dead

:Japanese soldier had no opportunity to reach the ships.

signed as NTLF reserve. In the latter function the regiment was to "reconnoiter routes

and positions within the zone of the 27th Infantry Division" and to maintain a single,

battalion on anti sn i per missions Within the

general area: Flores Point—Tanapag Harbor

—Garapan, extending to the high ground well

inland of those areas. Colonel Riseley ordered

his 2d Battalion to carry out this patrolling

mission. The remainder of the regiment moved

to an assembly area about 1,000 yards inland

from Garapan's northern edge.8°

Farther out on the end of the 2d Division's

swinging-gate movement was the 8th Marine

Regiment. Just before launching the day's

attack, the 1st Battalion again became the unfortunate recipient of friendly artillery shells.

Compared to the 51 lost for the same reason

on the previous day, however, the five casu85 6th Mar Report, 13.

alties of 3 July seemed light. Although this

blunder delayed the unit's attack for 45 minutes and had the effect of making the personnel

more "gun-shy" of their own artillery8° than

the enemy's, the battalion quickly caught up

with units on its flanks and enjoyed a rapid

advance against virtually no resistance.

The two center battalions of the 8th Marines

(2/2 and 1/29 from left to right) moved forward rapidly, maintaining contact all the

while. On the extreme right the 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, found the small limestone hill still

a tough nut to crack, despite hundreds of mortar, artillery and tank shells hurled at it and

the thorough roasting administered by the

light flame-thrower tanks the previous night.

Rather than hold up the advance of the entire

86 The term "own artillery" is here used to refer to all

U. S. artillery at Saipan, since the unit, or units, responsible for these miscalculations was never definitely

identified.

199
SEAPLANE

BASE

MANIAGASSA

ISLAND

TANAPAG HARBOR on 4 July had fireworks to spare as Jap inese vessels burned in the harbor. The boat basin was

seized shortly before, and the seaplane base shortly after, this picture was taken.

regiment while neutralizing this strong point,

the battalion commander (Major Chamberlin)

ordered his unit to skirt to the left of the hill,

leaving Company F to contain and destroy it.

Once past this sore spot, the battalion moved

rapidly forward, maintaining contact with

units on both flanks. Company F whittled and

chipped at the limestone hill throughout the

day and tightened the noose about it, but

Japanese hidden in the nooks and crannies

continued to pop up with telling bursts whenever the Marines ventured too close. At dark

of 3 July the 2d Company of the Provisional

Battalion arrived to relieve Company F of its

task. The latter rejoined the 2d Battalion, by

then over 1,000 yards ahead.

Independence Day was nothing more than a

large scale mop-up, or a "rabbit hunt," as one

Marine put it. Men of the 8th Marines moved

rapidly down the hills to the Tanapag flats,

beating the bush as they went, and by early

afternoon reached the coast line in the vicinity

of the seaplane base (see Map 20). There

they ranged through the buildings and bomb

shelters in search of strays but found very few.

200

Like Garapan, the seaplane base was a

weird scene of destruction and desolation.

Grotesque and deformed girders stood as mute

testimony of the effectiveness of U. S. naval

and air bombardment. Several charred planes

lay scattered in the ramp area as a reminder

that this had, indeed, once been an important

installation at Saipan.

After weeks of trudging through the roughest terrain that the island could offer, the 8th

Marines received good news on the afternoon

of the 4th; the regiment would move to a

bivouac-rest area. Under different 1 circumstances; word of setting up a camp area anywhere on the fly-infested island may not have

been exciting, but the conditions and situation

being what they were, the word was as welcome

as a reprieve to a condemned man. The rest

area was located 2,000-odd yards inland from

Beach Red 3, requiring a march of several

miles, But no one complained.

At this time the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, ,

which had operated as part of the 8th Marines

since D-Day, reverted to 2d Division control.

Lieutenant Colonel Jack P. Juhan, who had
commanded the unit since 2 July, resumed his

regular job as 8th Marines' executive officer,

and Major William W. McKinley succeeded

him as battalion commatnder. Two days later

the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, passed to the

Saipan Garrison Force under direction of

which it conducted patrol operations for weeks

to follow.87

The Thrust to Flores Point

The cross-island turn of the 27th Division on

3 and 4 July carried it to the Flores Point

region on Saipan's west coast and objective

0-7 (see Map 20). The point itself lay within

the zone of the 105th Infantry, while the other

two infantry regiments would strike the beach

on either side of it—the 106th to the south, the

165th to the north.

With its formation unchanged (1st and 2d

Battalions abreast), the 106th Infantry swept

• rapidly through its zone. Here, as elsewhere

along the corps' entire front, the Japanese

withdrawal had allowed a swift advance. All

U. S. units capitalized on the situation. A few

Japanese delaying groups remained behind

to slow the U. S. drive, but most of these were

quickly destroyed.

The 106th, Infantry's left battalion (1st) met

an unusually persistent delaying detachment

on the morning of 3 July. This enemy group

focused heavy machine-gun fire into the soldiers as they moved into the attack. Positioned

as it was, near the boundary between the 106th

Infantry and the 8th Marines, the enemy

pocket was ideally situated to cause real

trouble. But not for long, for the tank-infantry combination immediately went to work.

The pattern was simple, yet effective. Tanks,

each sheltering a cluster of infantrymen, advanced on the enemy position, blasting a path

en route. Once the tanks had approached as

close to the installation as terrain would permit, the surrounding infantrymen assumed the

starring role and rushed the position. Even if

the tanks completed the mission without infantry assault being necessary, the latter's presence served to discourage individual Japanese

87 8th Mar Report, 9. Wallace.

8895900_50__14

from attempting to place magnetic mines

against the tanks. The combination worked to

the advantage of both.

In addition to the gain of approximately

1,000 yards on 3 July, the 106th made even

greater headway on the 4th, reaching the beach

just south of Flores Point by 1600. Besides sporadic outbursts from Japanese small arms and

mortars, the unit experienced minor delays

from two well-defended blockhouses. These

ideal artillery targets . were carefully pinpointed and destroyed. "Although there were

considerable numbers of enemy encountered,"

commented the G-3 Periodic Report, "they

appeared to be very much disorganized and

confused."88

The 106th Infantry's reserve (3d Battalion)

spent the two days in mopping up rear areas

as the assault units lunged forward.

The 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, was the

connecting link between the two flank regiments. On the evening of 2 July when the 3d

Battalion had found itself embroiled in a fire

fight with a well-entrenched enemy in the

vicinity of Papako, the 1st Battalion had bypassed the strong point and. tied in with the

faster moving flank units. On 3 July the latter

maintained a steady advance against negligible

opposition, while the 3d Battalion completed

its task of eliminating the stumbling block.

An important development on 3 July was

the return to the 27th Division, at long last, of

the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry. This unit,

detached on 22 June, had been operating under

NTLF and Saipan Garrison Force control.

Upon its reversion, the battalion occupied an

assembly area in division reserve. It remained

in this status until the following evening,

when it returned to the 105th Infantry."

88 27th Div Periodic Reports 18 and 19. 106th In f

Report, 18-20.

89 There was apparently some confusion as to the

exact status of the battalion on 3 and 4 July. The 105th

Infantry believed it to be under regimental control at

1300, 3 July and at 0940, 4 July ordered the unit to

"comb area in Regtl zone...." This is contradicted

by 27th Division Field Message 5 issued at 1800, 3 July:

"2d Bn, 105th Infantry, Division Reserve, will remain

In present position." And in 27th Division G-3 Periodic

Report for 1600, 3 July to 1600, 4 July, mention is made

201

■.■
Maintaining its rapid pace, the 1st Battalion

moved down from the foothills to the coastal

flats and by late afternoon of 4 Ju.lx secured

Flores Point. By dark it was discovered that

a sizeable interval existed between the left of

the 105th and the right of the 106th. The

recently released 2d Battalion was thrown into

this hiatus and the flanks were firmly tied in.

In com plia nce with an order from the 27th

Division at 14.-). the 3d Battalion went into the

front lines on the 1st Battalion's right, taking

over a p011 1.00 of the 165th Infantry's former

area process." (Considerations which

dictated this change will be discussed later in

this chapter.)

The 165th Infantry, ready to move out at

0800, 3 July, discovered that the 4th Marine

Division was directing an air strike and that

any forward movement might be dangerous.

The 4th Division, meanwhile, thought that the

165th was holding up awaiting units farther

to the left. At 1100, however, following this

faltering start, the 165th and the 4th Division

got their signals straight and launched the

attack.

With its battalions in column, 3d leading,

the 165th Infantry moved forward steadily on

3 July, gaining' about 500 yards. Enemy

mortar and machine-gun .fire, issuing mainly

from the left front, plagued the soldiers

throughout the day but failed to accomplish

more than slowing their rate of advance.

During the night of 3-4 July the 165th

Infantry command post became the scene of

violent activity when 27 Japanese advanced

into the installation, apparently by mistake.

All of the Japanese intruders were killed with

no lois to personnel of the 165th. In the

morning, when an identification could be made,

Colonel Ogawa, commander of the Japanese

136th Infantry, was discovered among the

dead. Piecing the story together, it appears

that Ogawa and his headquarters group had

been by-passed by U. S. 'advance and that he

that the battalion had remained "in Div Res at TA 213."

Later, 27th Division Field Order 54, issued at 2200, 4

July, formally returned the 2d Battalion to the 105th

Infantry.

90 27th Div Periodic Reports 18 and 19. 105th Inf

Report, 8-9.

202

was attempting to displace to the northeast

when he blundered into the 165th's command

post. Many papers and documents found on

the Japanese commander were sent to higher

echelons for processing, translation and interpretation. One of these, a Japanese field order,

contained detailed instructions relative to the

establishment of new defensive areas to the

north.

On the morning of the 4th, Lieutenant

Colonel Joseph T. Hart, who had relieved the

wounded Colonel Kelley as the 165th's commander on 28 June, ordered the 1st Battalion

to pass through the 3d and continue toward

the west coast. This shift was accomplished

without difficulty, and at 0730 the attack was

launched. Progress was favorable against virtually no opposition until the unit reached the

high ground overlooking Flores Point. Here

slower movement of the 105th demanded a

short wait. But when the latter came abreast,

the attack regained its momentum and, during

the early afternoon, carried rapidly towards

the coast.

Nearing the coastal flats, the regiment met

the heaviest Japanese automatic weapons fire

experienced during the day. While attempting

to locate and neutralize the source of this

resistance, the 165th received a division order

changing its boundaries and swinging the direction of attack to the northeast. (Considerations which dictated the change of zones will be

discussed later in this chapter.) The new zone

of action included the area occupied by the

two left battalions of the 4th Marine Division,

so that a relief of these was indicated. As part

of the same move, the 2d Battalion, 165th

Infantry, in NTLF reserve since 1 July, returned to parent control. Lieutenant Colonel

Hart, therefore, ordered his 2d and 3d Battalions to relieve the Marines in the new zone.

As the 27th Division accomplished the prescribed shifts, internal gaps developed, one

between the 165th and the 105th, another between the 1st and 3d Battalions, 165th. The

first mentioned break was filled shortly after

dark, but the second remained vacant until

nearly midnight, allowing the Japanese to use

this area as an infiltration route. As a consequence the 3d Battalion, 165th, in the center
of the regiment's sector, spent a lively evening.

A total of about 100 Japanese, in a series of

thrusts, unsuccessfully attacked the unit's left

during the night. With the coming of daylight

the results of the skirmishes lay crumpled forward of the soldiers' lines: about 80 dead Japanese were counted.n

The Struggle for the Hills

Usually, to front line troops, one hill was

like any other hill, even though one might be

tall, another squatty, another wooded, another

bare. It was only when a hill presented something distinctly unique in the way of appearance or—especially—enemy resistance that its

name became familiar to all. In this connection

witness the rash of "Bloody Nose" hills and

ridges which dotted the islands of the Pacific.

Lying within the zone of the 4th Marine

Division were four hills which became all too

familiar during 3 and 4 July. Two of these

were named for their heights in feet: 721 and

776; a third, nothing more than a nose protruding from the southeastern face of Hill 721,

was appropriately designated "4th of July

Hill ;" the fourth, Radar Hill, was so named

because of Japanese radar installations there.

(See Map 20.) While every Marine in - the

division was not compelled to scale each ' of

these, it is safe to say that everyone got into

the act.

As noted previously the 4th Division had not

jumped off promptly on the morning of 3

July because it thought that the 165th infantry

was waiting for other elements to the rear.

The 25th Marines were released to parent

control on 3 July with the proviso that the

2d Battalion could not be committed without

approval of the landing force commander.

With this extra strength the 4th Division

started its advance at 1100.

The formation was unusual: three regiments

abreast and each in column of .battalions. The

reason for this was that the division was cutting across the .island so that each stride uncovered additional yardage on the right flank.

It was conceivable that the right regiment

91 165th Inf Report, 7-8. 27th Div G-3 Reports 17,

18 and 19,

would soon be entirely committed in facing the

ever-widening north flank. This method, General Schmidt considered, would require less coordination and would be simpler of execution.

than to detail a reserve regiment for the job.

The 23d Marines, already on the division right,

would peel off flank protection as the lines

advanced.

The three assault battalions (from right to

left: 3/23, 3/25 and 1/24) moved over the

rugged terrain without difficulty for the first

few hours; but at 1615 when the right battalion ventured toward the lower slopes of "4th

of July Hill" and Hill 721, it encountered a

sudden deluge of rifle, machine-gun and mortar fire. What had appeared . as a series of

contours on the map and as a pair of innocuous

rises on the ground suddenly attained an

ominous significance. Best estimates placed

the enemy strength at about one battalion, with

personnel nestled into every recess, cavity,

cleft and cave. Hill 721 was reasonably open,

while "4th of July Hill" was heavily wooded;

both were well-notched with hiding places.

The 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, made several

attempts .to capture the position, both by

frontal assault and by envelopment. All efforts

were repulsed. Neither tanks, so valuable in

this type of fighting, nor 75inm half-tracks

could move closer than 1,000 yards to the hills

because all approaches were heavily mined.

The assault battalions of the other two regiments, meanwhile, were unable to progress past

the hills without placing themselves at the

mercy of Japanese located there. Progress of

the entire division, then, revolved about the

seizure of Hill 721 and its wooded appendage_

By 1715, after several abortive ventures, it

became obvious that the area would not be carried on 3 July. For this reason, Colonel Jones,

the 23d's commander, ordered, the 3d Battalion to withdraw about 300 yards so that

artillery fire could safely be directed against

the hills. Major Paul S. Treitel, the battalion

commander, then received permission from the

regimental commander to maintain the 3d Battalion command post in its present position so

that evacuation of casualties could be expedited. This placed the command post in a

203
vulnerable location approximately 150 yards

forward of the front lines. Fortunately, no

serious situations developed.

The other two battalions of the 23d Marines,

meanwhile, were employed in protecting the

north flank which now extended from the east

coast about 2,500 yards inland. It was probably at this time, as plans were being made

for continuation of the struggle the next day,

that the apt name "4th of July Hill" was first

applied.

As the 25th Marines dug in for the night, a

single battalion (the 3d) occupied the front

lines, while the 1st was in reserve. Contact

difficulties soon demanded the services of two

companies of the 1st Battalion, however; Company B went into the lines on the right and

Company C on the left of the 3d Battalion.

The 2d Battalion, which had been in NTLF

reserve in rear of the 2d Marine Division,

started the long, tiresome march to rejoin its

parent unit. After its arrival (about midnight, 3 July) the battalion was designated

as division reserve.

Men of Colonel Hart's 24th Marines established themselves on Radar Hill (1,000 yards

southwest of Hill 721) for the night after

shifting the 1st Battalion into reserve and

moving the 2d and 3d Battalions into the lines.

Two command shifts were effected by the

24th Marines during the period 3-4 July.

Lieutenant Colonel Vandegrift, evacuated on

29 June, returned to the 3d Battalion on 3

July and relieved Lieutenant Colonel Lessing.

The following clay, Lessing got a new job:

command of the 1st Battalion. Lieutenant

Colonel Brunelli, who had functioned as 1st

Battalion commander since 18 June, then reverted to his regular assignment as regimental

executive officer.

Throughout the night of 3-4 July the 14th

Marines poured volley after volley into "4th

of July Hill" but otherwise the night was

quiet.

Preliminary to the general advance of 4 July

the 4th Division ordered the 23d Marines to

conduct a local attack to secure the troublesome

heights. This move was to be preceded by a

30-minute artillery softening. Though good

on paper, the plan was thwarted in so far as

204

the artillery was concerned. As soon as fires

began, a blizzard of "cease fire" green star

clusters appeared over the 25th Marines, and

telephones and radios buzzed with the word

that artillery was falling on friendly troops.92

Another attempt was made and again the 4th

of July sky was filled with skyrocket protestations.

Since the artillery preparation had been such

a disappointment and since it was felt that

softening was still necessary, a rocket barrage

was requested and effectively delivered on "4th

of July Hill." Following this the 1st Battalion

passed through the 3d and moved up the slopes.

Against light machine-gun and some mortar

fire, the unit swept to the top of the first hill

and from there continued to the top of Hill

721. The contrast in opposition to that of the

previous day indicated that the bulk of the

defenders had withdrawn.

This substantial advance had been achieved

prior to noon, so that sufficient daylight remained for the attack to continue. Hill 767,

approximately 700 yards to the northeast,

would be next. But here the tactics would be

different: while the main force remained at

Hill 721, a strong combat patrol from the 1st

Battalion would move to the objective and

investigate. Enjoying greater success than

anyone dared to hope, the patrol (led by CaptaM William C. Eisenhardt) found Hill 767

unoccupied and immediately took possession.

To make certain that .the enemy did not reoccupy the hill, Colonel Jones ordered the 2d

Battalion to move out and set up a defense

there. Getting into position was not altogether

painless, however: the unit was harassed by

enemy small arms firing from a palm grove to

the northeast. But the retaliatory rounds of

the 81mm mortar platoon apparently had good

effect and enemy firing slackened. By nightfall it was necessary to bend the battalion's

right flank back in order to contact units of

the 1st Battalion.

The 3d Battalion, meanwhile, patrolled the

area to the northeast for a distance of 1,500

yards. When patrols met no resistance in that

92 The 23d Marines Action Report blamed this situation on the fact that the 25th Marines had "erroneously reported its position."
HILL 767 LOOMS in distance as men of the 27th Division watch United States tanks move along a ridge into firing

positions. Hill 767 was seized by the 4th Division on 4 July. Japanese 20mm dual-purpose automatic cannon

was apparently abandoned during enemy withdrawal. ,

area, the battalion moved out and occupied the

dominating terrain just short of Objective

0-7Z (see Map 20). By darkness the 23d Marines were solidly tied in across their front:

3d Battalion extending from the east coast

inland about 1,000 yards; 2d Battalion ori Hill

767; and the 1st Battalion in the center connecting the two.

While the 23d struggled for the hills, the

other two regiments had kept pace. Nor had

the going all been smooth.

The 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, passed

through the depleted 3d Battalion" and conThe 3d Battalion was reorganized on a two company basis at this time. Company L, which had no

tinued the attack. Though Hill 721 had not

been seized at the time of the unit's jump off,

Lieutenant Colonel Mustain, the battalion

commander, received permission to move out.

By 1130, when it had pushed about 600 yards

west of Hill 721, the direction of attack was

changed. The battalion would execute a right

. turn and strike Hill 767 from the southwest.

(This order was issued prior to the 23d Marines' successful combat patrol).

As it turned out, the 1st Battalion's route

officers left, was dissolved and its personnel assigned to

the other two rifle companies. This move placed three

officers and 151 men in Company I and three officers

and 164 men in Company K.

205
was a difficult one. Between Hill 721 and 776

the ground sloped stair-step fashion toward the

western coastal plain in a series of cliffs and

plateaus. It was necessary, therefore, for the

Marines to move along these plateaus in their

attack toward Hill 776. Shortly after changing

direction, the left of the unit met a fusillade

of enemy rifle and machine-gun fire. In an

endeavor to knock out this resistance, Mustain

ordered the attached tanks to overrun the

Japanese troublemakers. Here, however, there

was a complete miscarriage of plans. The

tanks became lost and wandered 700 yards to

the unit's left front. The imbroglio became

complete when two of the tanks were knocked

out by "something"—the crews could not determine whether it was mines, mortar or artillery fire. One platoon from Company A moved

against heavy opposition to the disabled tanks,

where the crewmen were besieged by Japanese

soldiers eager to toss grenades in upon them.

It was necessary to abandon the tanks, but the

personnel returned safely.

Meanwhile, the battalion had broken through

the resistance that had occasioned the original

employment of the tanks and continued on to

Hill 767. There the unit dug in for the night

in contact with the 23d Marines. The 3d Battalion, 25th which had followed in reserve during the day, moved into the lines on the left,

placing it along the top of the cliffs, overlooking the village of Makunsha. The 165th

Infantry, after relieving most of the 24th Marines during the afternoon, moved up on the

left flank and coordinated defenses with the

Marines.

On the division left, the 24th Marines kept

pace with the flank units as the advance swung

toward the sea. Machine-gun fire which issued

from the right front slowed the advance of the

right battalion (3d), but with the assistance

of tanks the unit forged ahead. Marines of the

left battalion (2d) had an enjoyable day

sniping at retreating Japanese soldiers on the

coastal flats below.

Late in the afternoon when NTLF changed

the direction of attack to the northeast, 27th

Division units relieved the 2d Battalion and

began the relief of the 3d. The latter, since it

had one company (G) of the 2d Battalion

206

attached, was four companies strong at this

time. As the 3d Battalion halted awaiting relief by the 165th Infantry, the formation from

left to right was : K, L and I with Company G

in reserve behind Company I. By 1600, Companies I and G had been relieved, K and L had

not. The latter two units remained in their

positions throughout the night, right flank in

contact with the 165th Infantry, left exposed.

No trouble developed, however. The two Marine companies were finally relieved the following morning (5 July) and returned to their

battalion.*

The 4th Marine Division made substantial

advances during the day, executing a change

in direction of attack, and disposing itself

along favorable ground just short of 0-7Z.

(See Map 20.)°4

Change of Direction

As the 2d and 27th Divisions swept to the

coast in the Tanapag Harbor—Flores Point

region and the 4th Division to the very heart

of the, northern part of Saipan, the necessity

for a change of direction became apparent.

The entire northern part of the island remained to be seized, including the important

Marpi Point area; and this demanded a swing

of the axis of attack to the northeast. Holland

Smith, therefore, split the unconquered portion

in half, assigning the left segment to the 27th

Division and the right to the 4th Division. To

allow sufficient time for the juggling of frontages and zones, the attack hour was delayed

until noon of 5 July. Generals Griner and

Schmidt, of the 27th and 4th Divisions respectively, were to "conduct such adjustment

of their lines or make minor attacks prior to

King-hour as they [deemed] necessary to

launch a coordinated attack...." The 4th Division's 'thrust had pushed well into the newlyassigned zone of the 27th Division, so that the

previously described reliefs and shifts were

• 94 The foregoing is •a synthesis of the following

sources: 4th Mar Div Report, Section VI, 31-32; 28d

Mar Report, 45-47; 24th Mar Report, 23; 25th Mar

Report, 7-8; 2d Bn, 23d Mar Report, 5; 8d Bn, 23d Mar

Report, 7; 2d Bn, 24th Mar Report, 9-10; 3d Bn, 24th

Mar Report, 9-10; 1st Bn, 25th Mar Report, 16-19;

3d Bn, 25th Mar Report, 12; Treitel; L. R. Jones.
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MAG/GIENNE

BAY

— LEGEND —

Indicates Progress Before I July

New Boundary Assigned 4 July

Kagman

Peninsula

PROGRESS LINES FOR

1,2,3 AND 4 JULY

1944

2000 4000 Yds

MAP 20
necessary: Although the formal operation

order outlining the change was not issued until

1800, 4 July, oral warning orders had placed

the plan in motion in midafternoon.95

Mindful of the significance of the day in

American history and pleased with progress

at Saipan, General Holland Smith distributed

the following message to the landing force on

the evening of July 4th:

The Commanding General takes pride on this INDEPENDENCE DAY in sending his best wishes to the

fighting men on Saipan. Your unflagging gallantry and

devotion to duty have been worthy of the highest praise

of our country. It is fitting that on this 4th of July you

should be extremely proud of your achievements. Your

fight is no less important than that waged by our forefathers who gave us the liberty and freedom we have

long enjoyed. Your deeds to maintain these principles

will not be forgotten. To all hands a sincere well done.

ly confidence in your ability is unbounded.

Naval Activities from 27 June to 4 July

Most of what the U. S. Navy did at Saipan

was so closely-related to ground actions that

. to separate the functions would be to present

a false picture. With gunfire and aircraft the

Navy assisted the ground troops directly and

daily. Elsewhere, the constant pressure of

naval power was more apparent to the Japanese than to the Americans ashore at Saipan.

On 27 June Mine Sweeping Squadron Four

swept Magicienne Bay, clearing about 25

square miles in the process. On 28 June net

cargo ship (AKN) Keokule laid 10,000 feet of

antisubmarine net off the entrance to Garapan

anchorage as a positive barrier to Japanese

underwater venturers. On the evening of 2

95 NTLF Operation Order 22-44.

July the destroyer Melvin spotted two Japanese landing craft moving from Marpo Point

on Tinian. Without waiting to determine their

destination, the Melvin sank one and drove the

other aground. Having secured the NTLF sea

flanks in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the

Navy continued to protect those flanks against

amphibious infiltration.

In addition, steady, daily raids were directed

at those islands close enough to mount air

attacks against Saipan. Among these, Rota

was a favorite because it was felt that many

enemy raids originated there. Tinian, although

unable to launch an air attack from its battered fields, was struck with daily regularity.

Here, the thought was towards softening the

islaiad for subsequent amphibious assault.

Guam another convenient and important target.

felt the impact of recurring blows. Both Guam

and Tinian were the subjects of a number of

photographic missions designed to keep higher

echelons informed of latest developments."

If the routine of these raids became monotonous to the Japanese, some variety should

have been provided on 3 July when two carrier task groups (58.1 and 58.2) of Admiral

1VIitscher's Force hit Iwo Jima. A sweep of 63

U. S. planes over the island shot down 50

fighters and destroyed an undetermined number of planes on the ground. On 4 July the

two groups carried out a heavy flight schedule

against Iwo, Chichi and Haha Islands.97

The U. S. Navy's covering operations effectively isolated Saipan from outside Japanese

interference.

96 TF 51 Report, 10-13.

97 Navy's Air War, 214.

207
CHAPTER VI

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Saito's Last Battle

D-PLUS 20-5 JULY

The Japanese were in a trap, the jaws of .

which were ever tightening. But, like cornered

rats, they rivbr 'capable of frenzied reaction.

Every indidation supported the belief that the

enemy reinaining in the island's upper end were

ill-equipped, ill-supplied, and, in many cases,

ill. Communications had suffered almost a complete breakdown, hospital facilities were practically non-existent, and the shortage of food

and water was telling on their moral. Passionate phrases of patriotism, which Japanese commanders erupted on the slightest provocation,

were hard to swallow on an empty stomach.

And yet, to say that the Japanese were demoralized would be stating an untruth. After

all, who had imposed this sorry condition but

the hated American devils? And what better

way is there to vent one's wrath and relieve

one's gnawing hunger than to kill an American?

Though these questions be surmise, the Japanese reaction in the last days of the campaign

points convincingly to their accuracy.

As noted previously, Holland Smith's order

for 5 July had designated 1200 as the attack

hour. In the hours of daylight prior to noon,

however, the two assault divisions were to conduct preliminary moves necessary to initiate a

coordinated attack.

Tanapag Plain

For the 27th Division, assigned the left sector

(see Map 21), these preliminary actions involved moves of approximately 1,600 yards for

208

units along the beach and only minor adjustments for those on the high ground inland.

Terrain was varied in the division zone: the

left half included an 800-yard expanse of

coastal flatland, while the right faced the turbulent maze of hills and ravines that is inner

Saipan; near the center, an abrupt escarpment

divided the extremes. The coastal flat and the

hills which immediately dominate it were assigned the 105th Infantry, while the rugged

interior fell to the 165th. The 106th Infantry

had been pinched#20 out of the attack on the previous day and reverted to division reserve.

In addition to mopping up the Flores Point

area, the 105th Infantry was to push its front

abreast of the 165th Infantry, occupying the

high ground inland from Tanapag. Events of

the day, as will be seen, prevented the regiment

from achieving the desired gains.

The left assault battalion (the 2d) inched

along the beach, investigating extensive defensive installations which the Japanese had

prepared to counter U. S. landings. Although

virtually no resistance was encountered, each

position had to be carefully explored, lest danfferous thorns be left behind. The units moved

steadily along the beach, through the scattered

remains of Tanapag Village, and toward Road

Junction 2. As the battalion neared that junction, the Japanese opened suddenly, fiercely,

with a fusillade of machine-gun fire. The

advance stalled.

As was so often the case, the enemy could not

be located. And the Japanese discouraged curi-
osity with frequent, well-placed bursts of fire.

Finally it was believed that the fire was issuing

from a battered Japanese landing barge

beached off to the left front. Two medium tanks

were - immediately dispatched along the coast

road to destroy this supposed source of the

trouble. After blasting the barge and apparently silencing the Japanese fire, the tanks

swung off the road for the return to U. S. lines.

This proved a bad move : the vehicles had driven

into a Japanese mine field and one was completely wrecked before the truth was known.

As if by signal the Japanese opened fire again,

this time more heavily than before.

The rest of the day was spent in attempting

to locate the enemy positions, all to no avail.

The 2d Battalion dug in for the night just short

Of -Road Junction 2. ( See Map 21.)

The 105th Infantry's right assault battalion

(the 3d) faced a zone that included a portion of

the plain and also the rugged hills that closely

fringed it. To negotiate this sector, it was necessary to advance one company (L) along the

top of the bluffs while another (K) moved below on the flat. To the north of the battalion's

lines, two narrow gorges could be seen, each

cutting deep into the escarpment. Along the

high ground between the two ran the bumpy,

winding cross-island road. The 3d Battalion's

right and the 165th Infantry's left would bisect

the necks Of the draws while the open mouths

yawned toward units on the coastal flat. The

near draw caused no trouble, but the second

(later named "Harakiri Gulch") developed

into a stubborn core of enemy activity.

The 3d Battalion moved well at first, but as

the left company (K) approached a palm grove

about 800 yards east of Tanapag Village a hail

of enemy fire immobilized it. The fire emanated

from the grove itself as well as the choppy

ground to the east. A thrust by machines of the

762d Tank Battalion into the coconut grove

failed to diminish the Japanese resistance and

the company held up for the night. Higher on

the bluffs the right company (L) had traversed

the first draw without difficulty, but in moving

across the road toward Harakiri Gulch, it was

greeted by fire from cliff positions on the far

side. Several battalions of 27th Division artillery were registered there, along with pointblank bursts from a 3d Battalion antitank gun,

but the enenny—was not dislodged and became

less hospitable than ever. In this unenviable

position the battalion dug in for the night:

Company L atop the spur facing Harakiri

Gulch, Company K below and just southeast of

the palm grove.

During the day the 1st Battalion had remained in regimental reserve, occupying an

assembly area south of Tanapag Village.1

The 165th Infantry was not required to conduct as extensive preliminary operations as the

105th. The change in direction and reassignment of zones had placed it well ahead. At 1300,

however, the regiment launched its attack,2 2d

Battalion on the right, 3d on the left. The

former, in contact with the 4th Marine Division,

moved without diffic.ulty, lauti he latter, battling

the upper reaches of the Harakiri Gulch crosscompartment, was stopped after a short 100

yard gain. Like elements of the 105th Infantry

to its left, the 3d Battalion encountered heavy

machine-gun fire from the draw's northern wall

as well as mortar fire, which often made upright

movement suicidal.

With the right extended well ahead in contact

with the 4th Marine Division and the left

checked on the high ground overlooking Harakiri Gulch, the regiment established its night

defense, The 1st Battalion had remained in an

assembly area just northeast of Radar Hill in

reserve.2

The day's advance in the 27th Division zone

had been disappointing, but General Griner

hoped thattliecla,y would see the unit moving rapidly again. In a message issued at 1800,

5 July, the general instructed the 105th Infantry and the left battalion of the 165th to move

out at 0700, 6 July, and advance their lines to

Makunsha, in elongation of the line held by the

right battalion of the 165th Infantry. This was

to be accomplished by 0900, so that the division

could attack with units abreast. Stressing the

1 War Department Historical Division Booklet,

"Small Unit Actions, The Fight on Tanapag Plain,"

66-73, hereinafter cited as The Fight on Tanapag

Plain. 105th Int Report, 9.

2 Originally scheduled for noon, the attack was delayed until 1300 by NTLF order.

8165th In! Report, 8.

209
DOMINATING POSITION, captured by 165th Infantry, flanked Tanapag-Makunsha Plain. For once, the Japanese were

caught in the open, vulnerable to fire such as that being delivered by this heavy machine gun.

importance of the move, Griner's message

stated: "It is imperative that the left of the

Division line be advanced to be abreast of the

other units for the coordinated attack at 0900.

The early advances will be pushed aggressively." 4

From 0-7Z to 0-8A

General Schmidt's order to his 4th Marine

Division on 5 July specified that the 23d Marines conduct preliminary operations for the

seizure of 0-7Z (the regiment had patrolled

just short of this objective on the previous day).

This would provide a favorable line of departure for the day's attack. The move was to be

completed by noon so that the other two regiments could pass through and continue to division objective 0-8A, some 1,400 yards forward of 0-7Z. Included as the principal terrain

feature of intermediate objective 0-8A was the

high ground on the north side of Karaberra

Pass, a deep gouge in Saipan's upper middle.

427th Div Field Message 6, 1800, 5 July.

210

From the pass, the objective line ran in a southeasterly direction to a cove on the east coast,

labelled Inai Fahan (see Map 21).

The scheme was executed with only minor

hitches.

The first of these occurred when the 23d Marines took somewhat longer than expected to

occupy 0-7Z. Moving with three battalions

abreast, the regiment made rapid progress on

both flanks, but the center unit (1st Battalion)

was delayed by the nightmarish terrain through

which it was forced to move. To remedy this

situation the two flank units, already on the

objective, stretched their lines to cover the vacant middle. Colonel Jones reported the objective occupied at 1315,5 and the passage began.

The task of mopping-up its difficult zone of

action took the 1st Battalion until 1500, at

5 Contradictions are found in the 4th Marine Division

report which gives the time as 1155 and in the 25th

Marines report which complained that it was forced to

fight 400 yards before reaching the designated line of

departure.
which time it joined the rest of the regiment in

division reserve.6

Assuming the left half of the division front,

the 24th Marines made good progress. Initially

the regiment had been slowed by the failure of

the 25th Marines to appear on the right flank;

but, subsequently, When Colonel Hart-ordered

his battalions to move out anyway, the sweep

was rapid. By 1600 the unit was in possession

of its portion of 0-8A, having seized the high

ground on both sides of Karaberra Pass and,

to prevent Japanese infiltration, extended its

lines through the pass itself.

The 1st Battalion, moving in contact with the

27th Division, experienced little difficulty. The

speed of its movement was regulated chiefly by

units on its flanks. For the right assault unit,

the 2d Battalion, the going was tougher:

wooded draws and ravines lying within its zone

contained many troublesome caves. The enemy

in these required systematic extermination. As

has been so often indicated, cave cleaning was

a slow process. Ka,raberra Pass brought more

of the same: here grenades and antipersonnel

mines were rolled down upon the Marines as

they trudged the valley floor. This particular

area was extremely defensible and, had the

Japanese chosen to make it so, could have been

much worse than it was. By late afternoon the

24th Marines occupied the high ground on both

sides of the pass as well as the floor itself.

The 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, had remained

in reserve throughout the day. Two of its companies (K and L) had spent the previous night

in the Army division's lines, but by 1100, 5 July,

both had been relieved. With the coming of

darkness the battalion was ordered to establish

a secondary line, one company (K) being attached to the 1st Battalion to bridge a break on

the left flank.

Since the 24th Marines had moved out in the

attack prior to the arrival of the 25th Marines

on the right flank, no contact existed between

the two units until after 1500, when a patrol

from the 25th Marines began operating through

the area. When the advance stopped for the

823d Mar Report, 47. L. R. Jone8.

night a 400-yard separation still existed. To

prevent the Japanese from using this as a funnel

through which to pour substantial forces ( individual infiltrators were next to‘impossible to

stop), the 25th Marines detailed -a strong combat

patrol with orders to rove the interval during

the night. In addition,. heavy machine guns

were eniplaced and mortars and artillery registered to cover the area should the need arise.

The effectiveness of this security was not tested

by the Japanese, however.7

Colonel Batchelder's 25th Marines had a difficult time schedule to meet: it was to pass

through the right half of the 23d Marines, a

maneuver involving a lateral moite-of bout

2,500 yards. This move, moreover, could not

commence until the 1st and 3d Battalions had

been relieved by Army units. By about 1000

the relief took place, and the lengthy hike began.

Delayed in its start, the regiment was late in

effecting the passage, arriving at about 1330:

Batchelder ordered his 1st and 2d Battalions

to attack abreast, 1st on the right. The 3d Battalion would follow the assault battalions at 500

yards, using a route generally in the center of

the regiment's Zone.

The 1st Battalion started the day in an exciting way. In the early morning hours, prior

to relief by Army units, the Japanese had set uP

a machine gun in Company A's thinly-spread

front lines and began spattering bursts through

the battalion command post. The proximity Of

friendly troops precluded the use of mortars

against this target and dictated infantry,: as

sault. Designated to expel these intruders Wei .e'

the men of the attached 1st Platoon, Company

A, 20th Marines, whose normal engineer fumetions were temporarily shelved. At- 0540 the

engineers attacked, killed or routed the •Japanese, and restored the position. This incident

cost a total of 12 Marine casualties:

After passage of the 23d Marines' lines, the

1st Battalion drove forward without encountering resistance: The heat and humidity were

terrific, however, and the long hike resulted in

7 24th Mar Report, 23. 1st Bn, 24th Mar Report, 11-12.

2d Bn, 24th Mar Report, 10-11.3d Bn, 24th Mar Report.

10.

211
many heat exhaustion casualties.° Also proving

a hindrance to swift movement were several

aerial borrilas (250-pound) buried along the

coastal road. These bombs, installed with noses

barely protruding from the ground, were intended to destroy U. S. vehicles moving along

the road. Fortunately, these explosives were

spotted before damage was done. The battalion

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mustain, ordered the attached engineers to begin detonating the inverted bombs; and, since the task

appeared too great for a single platoon to accomplish, he requested services of the -engineers

attached to the 3d Battalion. A bulldozer was

-Fx2e2g,idecil-t444,11-44re-holes left by the explosions,

and by 1700 the road was open for traffic.

The itinerant 2d Battalion, meanwhile, moved

on the left half of the 25th Marines' front. This

well-travelled unit had performed directly

under the control of not only its parent regiment, but 4th Division, Northern Troops and

Landing Force, 2d Division and 8th Marines

as well. Its "Cook's tour" had left little time for

rest. Back with familiar faces once again, the

battalion advanced steadily to its assigned

objective.

By 1700 the 25th Marines dug in on 0-8A.

With the evening rations came the first fresh

socks, and the Marines gratefully replaced their

limp and soggy ones, which were unceremoniously interred.°

In addition to the 14th Marines, the 4th Marine Division had the benefit of reinforcing fires

from the XXIV Corps Artillery during the

afternoon. One small, troublesome plateau forward of the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, had

been effectively pounded by the massed fires of

eight battalions of artillery."

For the 2d Marine Division, in NTLF reserve,

the day was quiet and uneventful.11-

8 These were allowed to rest for a day or two and

returned to their units.

925th Mar Report, 8. 1st Bn, 25th Mar Report, 19-20.

34 Bn, 25th Mar Report, 12.

4:Q.Jith,Mar.1444; -Itivporti .Section VI, 33. This unusual

density of fire, was available for two reasons: first, only

two divisions were now in the assault on a narrowed

front; second, few counterbattery missions remained at

this late stage in the operation.

11 NTLF 0-3 Journal, 1800 4 July to 1800 5 July.

212

Night of 5-6 July

About 2030 the 24th Regiment reported 250

Japanese to its front, apparently organizing

for an attack. Artillery, mortar, 37mm and

machine-gun fire converged upon the area and

the Japanese dispersed. Later, at about 2300,

there were minor attempts at infiltration in the

regiment's zone, but no counterattack materialized.

Patrols from the 27th Division observed approximately two companies of Japanese northwest of Hill 767 as well as scattered smaller

groups in the vicinity of Makunsha and northeast of that village. Here again, artillery fires

kept the enemy stirred up and disorganized,.and

nothing more than desultory rifle fire developed.

Japanese aircraft made a feeble effort during

the night. Just after dark three to five planes

came over Saipan but failed to press anything

resembling an aggressive attack. Two bombs,

dropped near Aslito Airfield, achieved the

rather unspectacular feat of slightly damaging

one U. S. plane and cracking a windshield on

another. While skittering nervously about the

area, one of the raiders was downed by a U. S.

night fighter. From the half-hearted, hesitant

manner in which the raid was executed, the impression was derived that the planes were attempting air evacuation of key personnel. Just

after midnight a single Japanese plane appeared over the island and was shot down by a

night fighter."

D—PLUS 21-6 JULY

The Ditch and the Gulch

NTLF plans for 6 July had prescribed a push

to 0-8 (see Map 21) with the remaining terrain

on the island divided equally between the two

assault divisions. To allow the left elements of

the 27th Division an opportunity to come

abreast, the 4th Marine Division and the right

battalion of the 27th Division would delay their

attack until 0900.

12 Although never proved, it was believed that this

plane had succeeded in landing on the field (Banederu)

on Marpi Point, had loaded whoever or whatever it

had come for, and had taken off again. It was at this

stage of the proceedings that the U. S. night fighter

intercepted the plane and sealed the mystery.
If this scheme had worked out, it is likely

that the two divisions would have moved side

by side to the end of the island. But, as will be

seen, the early morning preliminary attack of

the Army division's left units met stiff resistance, and the plan was thwarted before it could

even begin. When it was apparent to Holland

Smith that the going would be slow and difficult

on the left and rapid on the right, he decided to

change his plan.

The modification, issued shortly after 0900 on

6 July, altered the division boundaries to the

extent that the 4th Marine Division would expand to the northwest, pinch out the 27th Division north of Makunsha, and take over the

entire frontage for the sweep to Marpi Point.

This-move-would not only enable the 27th Division to mop up properly the Tanapag—Makunsha—Harakiri Gulch area, but might also

cut off enemy retirement to the north.

The 105th Infantry, which had launched its

preliminary attack at 0700, was deeply embroiled. in trouble by the time that news of the

change arrived.

The scheme of maneuver for the 2d Battalion

took into account the minefield which had been

discovered on the previous day. To avoid this

area, Major Edward A. McCarthy planned to

swing his companies in column along the beach

until past the minefield, at which time a twocompany front could be assumed.

The battalion moved out under a protective

rolling barrage fired by the 249th Field Artillery Battalion. The first 100 yards' advance was

rapid, carrying the unit almost past the minefield; but, as the artillery lifted to targets farther to the northeast, the soldiers suddenly met

a hail of grazing fire spitting across the coastal

flat. Despite efforts of the battalion commander

to regain momentum, the attack stalled.

,Then began the difficult task of locating the

source of the enemy fire. Though no one could

realize it until much later in the day, the Japanese were well established in a shallow ditch only

150 yards to the front. This natural trenchWork,

a drainage rut running from the base of the

-escarpment . to the sea, was relatively insignificant when contrasted with the cliffs and gulches

on the right flank and had not been credited

with being as strongly occupied as it was. As

long as artillery fire showered on the area the

Japanese had kept their heads down; but, as

soon as it had lifted to the northeast, they had

risen from their shelter and stopped the 2d

Battalion's advance.

Tanks were immediately requested, but a communication failure delayed their arrival. While

waiting, the 2d Battalion improved its position,

broadened its front, and inched about 50 yards

closer to the ditch. Work on the minefield was

also progressing; one platoon from Company A, 102d Engineer Battalion, had undertaken the hazardous task shortly after 1000.

Necessarily working in the prone position, the

platoon made slow progress. The "mines" were

the same type that had worried the 25th Marines on 5 July: buried 250-pound- aerial bombs

with noses fused to explode under the weight of

vehicles.

At about 1000 five medium tanks from the

762d Tank Battalion arrived at Major McCar-i

tliy's command post. How and where should

.the tank thrust be made? (As yet no one had

identified the ditch as the trouble spot.) The

road was a possibility, but this could be conveniently interdicted by Japanese antitank

weapons; and, also, the spindly bridge across

the ditch would likely be mined or wired for -

demolition. The route selected was the railroad

track running through the center of the battalion's zone.

Moving single file along the thin road bed, the

tanks were soon stymied when the lead tank

snarled its tracks on the narrow steel rails.

While work was in progress to clear a path for

the second tank to move around the first, Japanese antitank weapons opened up and achieved

hits on both. Although shells pierced the vehicles, neither was put out of action. The turn of

events had clearly indicated that this route was

.a poor one. By use of a cable both tanks were

hauled clear of the area.

While the tanks were executing their abortive

gesture, a rifleman in the left company (E) .

spotted some movement in the ditch ahead. The

target seemed ideal for the 60mm mortars, but.

these, mifortufffrteiy,-were-ett-t-44- 9narnim Lion.

An effort by an SPM (Self Propelled Mount)

213
VICTIMS OF DOREY'S ATTACK, these Japanese blocked the 6 July advance of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, along

the Tanapag Plain until Dorey's tanks arrived on the scene.

was also disappointing; after moving up the

coast for a short distance the driver, discouraged by near misses from the same antitank

weapon that had hit the two tanks, abandoned

the undertaking.

The next attempt, though boldly conceived,

was also unsuccessful. One rifle squad rushed

the position, but was repulsed after a wild

skirmish.

At last the source of the trouble had been

definitely located. But now what was to be done

about it?

The situation was generally unchanged until

about 1530 (except.for the commitment and

ultimate detachment of the battalion reserve,

Company G, which will be described later). At

this time three Army light tanks, previously

214

operating with the 3d Battalion around Harakiri Gulch, appeared in the 2d Battalion's zone

in search of a mission. This they were not

denied. Upon learning about the situation,

Lieutenant Willis K. Dorey, USA, decided to

roam out and examine the ditch.

Dorey moved to the ditch unhampered by

antitank fire and found a tanker's dream target.

Japanese soldiers were jammed along the ditcli,

almost shoulder to shoulder. One of his tanks

was put out of action when an enemy soldier

placed a magnetic mine against its side; but,

after leaving his third tank to protect the cripple, Dorey ranged on alone. Using machine

guns and cannister on the tightly-packed foe,

Dorey slaughtered from 100 to 150 as he blasted

the ditch. from end to end.
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gained its composure and was ready to move up,

Company G arrived and effected the relief.

The tanks had not escaped excitement either.

While cruising near the mouth of Harakiri

Gulch, the machines were met by two Japanese

soldiers who ran out and attached a magnetic

mine to one and threw a Molotov cocktail at the

other. Both tanks were put out of action. Lieutenant Dorey ordered the surviving vehicles to

depart from the area. The crews of the disabled

tanks made good their escape on foot.

Higher on the bluff, meanwhile, the right

company (L) of the 3d Battalion made unsuccessful ventures into Harakiri Gulch during

the morning. Of the belief that it was imperative to build up suporting fires before attempting to cross the draw, the company commander

attempted to move base of fire units into positions from which to cover the advance of the

rest of the company. As part of the same

scheme, tanks moved up from the gulch's longer

axis into covering positions. Though the efforts

continued throughout the morning, all failed.

In the process, one tank was lost when a Japanese rifleman placed a magnetic mine against

it.'4

While Company L exercised its unsuccessful

stratagems against Harakiri Gulch during the

morning, the change in attack plans had been

made known. For the afternoon attack the 27th

Division would still have four battalions in the

assault, but the emphasis changed from left to

right. The new scheme is well described by an

Army historian:

The basic plan of movement called for the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry to attack across Harakiri Gulch

and up onto the high, almost level plateau that covered

the area between there and Paradise Valley. The companies of these two battalions would then wheel left,

go down the face of the cliffs from above, and sweep out

across the Tanapag Plain to the sea, each arriving on

the plain at a point progressively farther east toward

Makunsha. The 2d Battalion, 165th would proceed

north down Paradise Valley, cleaning out this strongpoint, and reaching the beach just above Makunsha.

While this operation was going on in the hills, the 2d

14 The normal practice of sending infantrymen along

with the tanks as protection had not proved feasible in

the gulch. Once inside the draw, riflemen made easy

targets for the well-hidden Japanese.

216

Battalion, 105th Infantry, on the division's left wing,

was to make a limited attack northeast along the

beach.15

This simple, direct plan was destined to failure,

however.

The 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, failed to

gain during the afternoon. The commander of

the left assault company (L) , decided to undertake no further moves until he had located and

destroyed the enemy positions which had stalled

his morning efforts. The right company (I) ,

after moving about 75 yards down into the

gulch, met rifle fire and was stopped. Later in

the afternoon the company withdrew to its

starting point on top of the hill.

A determined afternoon thrust against Harakiri Gulch was made by the 1st Battalion, 165th

Infantry,16 but here again results were not encouraging. The brunt of the 1st Battalion's

fight fell to Company A.

This company faced the upper part of the

gulch at a point where the 3d Battalion, 165th,

had been stalled on the previous day. Rather

than attempt another cross compartment move,

the change of direction would allow the company to advance down the draw's longer axis.

After descent to the gulch floor, the company

cautiously crept through a series of man-made

ditches that had carved the area to resemble a

huge washboard. All eyes were straining toward the rocky slopes for some sign of the Japanese among the large umbrella-like trees and

little straw shacks that dotted the valley. At

first, all was quiet. Then, unexpectedly, the tiny

shacks rocked with the force of explosion after

explosion. The chain of blasts continued for

about 15 minutes, during which time the soldiers kept under cover in the ditches. When

silence returned and investigation was possible,

the startling truth was discovered: about 60

Japanese, scattered through the small abodes,

had placed grenades against their abdomens

and committed suicide. It was this incident

that gave the gulch its name.

Hopes that these suicides would mark the end

15 The Fight On Tanapag Plain, 89.

le This unit had relieved the 3d Battalion, 165th,

early on the morning of 6 July, the latter reverting to

regimPutal xeserye.
of Japanese resistance in the draw were soon

dispelled; accurate grazing fire stopped the

unit as it resumed the push. In addition, the

shacks were now ablaze. The explosion of the

grenades had turned the combustible huts into

fiery patches, and the heat forced soldiers nearby to pull back. To expose one's body for even

a moment was enough to attract a well-aimed

burst, and casualties mounted. Handling their

fallen comrades proved a difficult task for the

men of the company. The number of men killed

or wounded while attempting to evacuate other

wounded was alarming; loss to would-be rescuers was altogether out of proportion to the

number of personnel being saved. It was a

vicious circle.

When it became apparent that Company A's

attack had stalled, the company commander

ordered the unit to withdraw. Extrication was

not easy, since the soldiers were under heavy

fire; and it was after 1500 when they were finally reassembled at the gulch's upper entrance.

• Probably the greatest contributory factor in

this failure was the fact that the company

had had no assistance on either flank. The 3d

Battalion, 105th Infantry, as mentioned before,

had not advanced during the afternoon. Had

this unit moved, it might have relieved some of

the pressure on Company A's left. On the right,

terrain prevented all but one platoon of Company C, 165th Infantry, from attempting; to

help the gulch attackers, and even this platoon

was slow in starting. By the time it finally got

underway, Company A had recognized the attack as a lost cause and was withdrawing, so

that the platoon's lonely venture onto the slopes

of Harakiri Gulch was violently repulsed.

Farther to the right, the 2d Battalion was

unable to proceed down Paradise Valley in its

assigned zone and had received permission to

maneuver through the 1st Battalion's sector.

This move, of course, was stymied by the 1st

Battalion's failure to make progress.

In an effort to press the assault down to the

Makunsha Plain area, the 3d Battalion, 106th

Infantry, was attached to the 165th with orders

to attack between the two flank units. By the

time this order (issued at 1500) was translated

into action, however, darkness was approaching

and the battalion failed to move into the lines.

88959V-50-15

The unit was ordered, therefore, to remain in

an assembly area southwest of Hill 767.

In midafternoon, with forces at Harakiri

Gulch stalemated and the battalion along the

beach immobilized (prior to Lieutenant Dorey's

eminently successful tank foray against the

ditch), General Griner ordered Colonel Bishop

to commit his reserve (1st Battalion), to swing

past the gulch strong point and continue to the

beach 1,200 yards beyond Road Junction 2. To

throttle the gulch while the 1st Battalion moved

past, Company G would swing into position

facing up the draw. For this mission the company was attached to the 3d Battalion.

The attack proceeded generally according to

plan. Moving out at 1715, the 1st Battalion

advanced rapidly. Enemy fire against the unit

ranged from moderate on the left to heavy on

the right, in direct proportion to the proximity

of the high ground where numerous caves overlooked the coastal flat. With the assistance of

SPM's, men of the 1st Battalion neutralized the

cliff dwellers and continued their surge toward

Makunsha. By dark between 800 and 900 yards

had been gained, the unit having carried to

about 150 yards from the beach.

At this point, however, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel O'Brien, discovered that his front had progressed beyond the

2d Battalion .along the beach and that his

troops had swung partially across the 2d Battalion's front. To improve this situation,

O'Brien ordered his forward companies to pull

back and tie in with the 2d Battalion. By

about dark most of O'Brien's unit had accomplished this, but the reserve (Company C),

which had concentrated its attention and effort

on the caves on the right flank, did not completely assemble in the defense area until

2100. Because of darkness at the time of its

arrival, Company C did not find or occupy its

assigned position in the two-battalion defense

area, but, instead, overlapped a portion of the

2d Battalion. Also, the late adjustment in the

lines masked the fires of several heavy machine guns and one antitank gun positioned in

the 2d Battalion area. O'Brien commented on

this unsatisfactory state of affairs, but it was

considered unwise to make any shifts in the

dark. Later in the night when trouble de217
▪ 

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MT. PETOSUKARA

NORTHERN SAIPAN. Mt. Petosukara was seized by the 25th Marines on 6 July, and Mt. Marpi by the 26 Marines on

9 July. Rocky coastline offered last ditch positions to stubborn Japanese.

Contact was established with the 27th Division

along the cliff top, but none was attained with

the 24th Marines on the right.20

In the division center the 24th Marines

started the day's activities with the 165th

Infantry to its left and the 25th Marines to its

right; but, with the alteration in division

boundaries, the 23d Marines replaced the Army

regiment. The juggling of units took some

time and the 24th had to wait; an independent

move would greatly endanger the unit's left

flank.

About 1400, however, the 24th Regiment was

permitted to push forward again, and the

momentum was maintained until commanding

ground about 400 yards short of Objective

0-8 was reached. During this surge only

sporadic resistance was encountered. The large

lith Mar Div. Report, Section VI, 33-34. 284 Mar

Report, 47. 24 13n, 234 Mar Report, 6. L. R. Jones.

gain (1,400 to 1,800 yards) far outstripped

the 23d Marines on the left and the aforementioned gap developed. To protect this flank

the 24th Marines' reserve (3d Battalion) was

committed, but a physical tie-in was not accomplished.

During the day the left assault battalion

(1st) had encountered an ingeniously-designed

dummy position, containing sham antiaircraft

guns, gunners and radar. The 2d Battalion, on

the other hand, found a very real foe in an

irregular cliff formation to its front. As the

Marines approached, about 200 Japanese began

a hasty retreat to the north, speeded by fire

from 75mm half-tracks, 37mm guns, and

rockets. The infantry then picked up the

pressure, pursuing the Japanese as long as

daylight permitted.

Though the regiment's left had not been tied

in, the right was in firm contact with the 25th

219
Marines, which likewise had enjoyed rapid

movement.21

The 25th Marines' zone on Saipan's east

coast was similar to that of the 105th Infantry

on Tanapag Plain. Here, however, the coastal

flat ended in steep drops to the sea rather than

a gradual merging of beach and water. On the

inland side of the flat there were also cliffs, but

these rose precipitously above the plain to a

second, smaller plateau, in turn fringed by

another slope which rose to a• third plateau.

Along this escalading terrace the 25th Marines

would move until the levels fused and culminated into Mt. Petosukara, the dominating

terrain short of 0-8. (See Map 21.)

To negotiate the hodgepodge, the 1st Battalion would move along the coastal flat, while

the 2d Battalion straddled the cliffs and plateaus inland. The reserve would move along

the second plateau in rear of the assault units.

Off at 0900, the regiment advanced rapidly.

In the 1st Battalion's zone, well suited to vehicular movement, 13 tanks from Company C, 4th

Tank Battalion, preceded the sweep. One of

these was used as a mobile observation post to

spot naval gunfire. Missions and corrections

were relayed from the tank to Shore Fire Control Party 251 and from there to the firing ship.

This device worked very well and a number of

missions were directed in this manner. Principal naval gunfire targets were enemy positions in the cliff lines, both the one at the

water's edge and the one which fringed the

coastal plain.

A glance at the map and a knowledge of the

Japanese system of defense was enough to

convince the 25th Marines that trouble would

come from the cliffs. It did. Men of the 1st

Battalion, particularly, were exposed to plunging fires as they trudged through the hot cane

fields. But, employing coordinated tank-infantry, the Marines systematically destroyed

the troublemakers and pushed on.

More difficult was the problem of the cliff

which dipped from the plain to the water's

edge. Here Japanese soldiers could remain

concealed in the caves until Marines attempted

21 24th Mar Report, 24. 1st Bn, 24th Mar Report, 12.

24 Bn, 24th Mar Report, 11. 8d Bn, 24th Mar Report, 10.

220

to approach; then, suddenly, they would open

with devastating bursts. Usually, the cliffs

were too steep to permit descent from the top,

and an approach along the narrow strip of

beach at the bottom was a sure invitation to

disaster. Naval gunfire was helpful in sealing

some of the cave entrances, but the caves were

many and the job was a slow one.

Among the worst features of the situation

was the fact that most of the caves housed

more noncombatants than soldiers. Interpreters

were unceasing in their efforts to get cave

occupants to surrender, and many of these

efforts proved fruitful. In all too many instances, however, civilians were dissuaded by

Japanese soldiers who threatened or took the

lives of any who would weaken to the Americans' invitations. After several Marines were

killed in sincere efforts to extricate civilians,

patience became somewhat worn. After that,

the occupants were invited to come out; and,

if they hesitated over-long, the caves were

blown.22

Realizing that seizure of the coast line would

demand considerable time, Lieutenant Colonel

Mustain ordered the assault companies of his

1st Battalion to push on, leaving his reserve to

work the caves. With assault units relieved of

this detailed, time-consuming activity, the 1st

Battalion swept rapidly forward. The infantrymen were glad to have the tanks along,

particularly when two enemy vehicles hove

into view shortly after noon. Under the fire

power of the U. S. armor the enemy withdrew.

The tanks were glad to have the infantry along,

too: while firing into the fringing cliff on the

left flank, they were rushed by several Japanese, who were cut down by surrounding Marines before they could attach the magnetic

mines they carried. Incidents like these nurtured a growing mutual respect.

The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, kept pace •

through its nightmarish zone. Pushing a coordinated attack over such terrain was a strain

in itself, even had there been no crafty de22 Although cited in this one specific instance of the

25th Marines' move along the coast, this same procedure prevailed In other units before and after this

particular example.
RD 7093

Maniagassa

Island

Mutcho

Point

Boundary of 5 July 1944

Morpi Point

New boundary assigned on 6 July 1944

Tanapag Village

Flores Point

Tonapog

Harbor

Makunsha

•

Harakiri

Gulch

..2f'■

5 JULY /1-fill

/ 767, ,

N,..., /

721 -;11'-"V

i .. „--,#Rodor k

Hill ‘

CV:1165

5

12125

eSugar Loaf

r•„•(J Hill

Hill

Hill 700

0-9

— LEGEND —

--- Indicates Progress Before

5 July

PROGRESS LINES FOR

5 AND 6 JULY 1944

2000 4000 Yds

Flametree Hill MAP 21
fenders present. By late afternoon, however,

the battalion had moved to Mt. Petosukara.

Establishment of the defensive position for

the night was very difficult, inasmuch as a

vertical gap of about 500 yards existed between

battalions. In the reshuffling process, which

was still underway after dark, the 1st Battalion flushed a covey of Japanese directly

into the 2d Battalion's lines. In an effort to

prevent more Japanese from entering its lines,

the latter called down an emergency artillery

barrage which fell among the approaching

left units of the 1st Battalion. Fortunately,

the fire was lifted before any Marine casualties

resulted. After a brief flurry, the enemy was

repulsed.

The situation regarding the separation between the two battalions was reconciled shortly

and they dug in for the night, 2d Battalion

generally on the west and 1st Battalion on the

east slopes of Mt. Petosukara. The gap was

never filled, although a platoon from Company

C was placed on a dominating point between

them.

Just at dusk, 700 to 800 civilians came

through the 1st Battalion's lines to surrender.

This produced a delicate and dangerous situation, since Japanese soldiers could have followed the civilians with a strong attack.

Though considerable apprehension was caused

by this possibility, no attack developed.

The 3d Battalion, followed in reserve, committed only one company during the day. This

company (K) became embroiled in a sizeable

scrap when one of its platoons searched out

some caves in a by-passed hill and found a

virtual beehive. After a lively skirmish, the

hill was cleared of the enemy and 61 Japanese

bodies were counted.23

Night of 6-7 July

The night of 6-7 July was to be long-remembered. It produced the most devastating

banzai attack of the entire war. Compared

with the stroke that was launched against the

105th Infantry, all other Japanese efforts during the night take on an extremely pale color.

2325th Mar Report, 9. 1st Rn, 25th Mar Report, 20-23.

Sd Rn, 25th Mar Report, 13.

And yet, carrying the comparison further,

these "pale" attacks were more violent than any

that had gone before, and for those individuals

who found themselves in the midst of one of

these, even the smallest conflict may assume

elephantine stature. Ordinarily, the fury of a

battle is judged on its over-all effect, numbers

of troops involved, and casualties but fails to

consider the effect on any one individual.24

The smaller thrusts of this momentous night

will be covered first.

Individuals of the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, spent an unpleasant night on Mt. Petosukara. After a serieS of smaller probing missions the Japanese struck the Marines' right

with about one rifle company. Coming in the

midst of a heavy downpour, the attack, for a

time, appeared to be making headway. But

60mm mortar shells, dropped within 50 yards

of the front lines, together with small-arms

fires and artillery, broke the enemy. But many

Japanese, who seeped through the 2d Battalion's lines, set about a vigorous program of

harassment. There was no sleep for anyone

atop Mt. Petosukara for the remainder of the

night. Early in the morning the battalion aid

station was attacked by a small group, but

corpsmen and doctors, plus Marines in the

area, rallied to the threat and repulsed the

enemy. Daylight revealed that between 60

and 70 Japanese had been killed in the abortive punches at the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines.25

Elsewhere along the 4th Division front

there were numerous instances of minor infiltration attempts, with all units reporting activity. For the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines,

stationed to protect the regiment's exposed left

flank, the action was particularly vicious. Just

before dawn the enemy rushed forward, armed

with grenades and "idiot sticks," encouraging

themselves with loud shouts and screams.

Though this thrust failed to penetrate the

Marines' lines, some of the enemy fell within

24 Major General Merritt A. Edson was once asked

which was the toughest operation in the Pacific. His

classic answer is apropos: "The one in which you got

hit!"

25 Barringer. Joslin.

221
five yards of the foremost foxholes. The action

report of the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, estimated the number of exemy killed in this

attack at "more than 200. 26

The Banzai Attack

Since the early stages of the Saipan planning

General Holland Smith had been convinced

that, if and when an all-out banzai attack were

launched at Saipan, it would come along the

western coastal plain. It was this belief

(shared by all officers on the Corps staff) that

prompted Holland Smith to caution Major

General Watson to keep the left of his 2d

Marine Division strong as it advanced up the

coast. Inasmuch as Watson and his staff had

arrived at a similar conclusion, the division, in

its long surge from the Charan Kanoa beaches

to Tanapag seaplane base, had been ever alert

to Japanese attack along the coastal plain.

On 2 July, with the Japanese becoming more

and more compressed in the island's northern

end, the Corps commander issued an order

warning all units to take special precautions

against a mass attack and to tie in—by physical

contact—all front lines at night.

On 6 July, Holland Smith, accompanied by

Major General Watson, visited the 27th Division command post and while there warned

General Griner that "a banzai attack probably

would come down Tan apag Plain late that

night or early the next morning." Further,

Holland Smith cautioned Griner to "make sure

that his battalions were physically tied in." To

this, according to General Smith, General

Griner gave assurance that "his division was

prepared for just such a Japanese move."27

Holland Smith's warning was timely.

In regard to this conference, General Griner

later wrote:

He [Holland Smith] makes no mention of the change

in orders which was the purpose of his visit. The first

evidence any of us had of the impending counterattack

was the report of a Jap prisoner, captured in the early

26 3d Bn, 24th Mar Report, 11.

27 Quotations from Coral and Brass, 194. Another

reference to this same conference may be found in On

To Westward, Robert Sherrod, 131.

222

evening of July 6 by the 105th Infantry, who was sent

to the Corps G-2 for further interrogation.28

The attack which hit the 1st and 2d Battalions, 105th Infantry, on the early morning

of 1 July was the culmination of a long series

of reverses for Saipan's defenders. General

Saito had virtually given up hope on 25 June

when he wrote: "There is no hope for victory

in places where we do not have control of the

air. . ." And since then nothing had occurred

to warrant optimism. By 6 July, according to

the NTLF G-2 Report, the Japanese had two

courses of action remaining: "to fight a withdrawing action ending in complete annihilation on the northern tip of the island, or to

attempt to muster their disorganized and

crumbling forces into one all out ‘banzai'

charge." Saito chose the latter.

Huddled in Saito's cave command post at

about 0600, 6 July, his subordinates heard the

general's order:

I am addressing the officers and men of the Imperial

Army on Saipan.

For more than twenty days since the American Devils

attacked, the officers, men, and civilian employees of

the Imperial Army and Navy on this island have fought

well and bravely. Everywhere they have demonstrated

the honor and glory of the Imperial Forces. I expected

that every man would do his duty.

Heaven has not given us an opportunity. We have

not been able to utilize fully the terrain. We have

fought in unison up to the present time but now we

have no materials with which to fight and our artillery

for attack has been completely destroyed. Our comrades have fallen one after another. Despite the bitterness of defeat, we pledge "Seven lives to repay our

country."

The barbarous attack of the enemy is being continued. Even though the enemy has occupied only a

corner of Saipan, we are dying without avail under the

violent shelling and bombing. Whether we attack or

whether we stay where we are, there is only death.

However, in death there is life. We must utilize this

opportunity to exhalt true Japanese manhood. I will

advance with those who remain to deliver still another

blow to the American Devils, and leave my bones on

Saipan as a bulwark of the Pacific.

As it says in the "SENJINKUN" [Battle Ethics],

"I will never suffer the disgrace of being taken alive,"

28 Ltr from MajGen G. W. Griner, Jr., to MajGen

0. Ward, 17Dec49. The "Jap prisoner" to whom

Griner refers was a leading seaman from the 55th

Keibitai who stated that his unit had been ordered to

make an all-out attack at 2000. 1VTLF G-2 Report, 57.
Mined

Area

RJ 2

Tanapag

The Ditch

Makunsha

Assembly

Area

RD 7093

tt fJ.

Palm Grove

Radar Hill

CD #

767

721

FRONT LINES IN TANAPAG

PLAIN AREA ON NIGHT OF

6-7 JULY

MAP 22

2000 Yds.

1
Maniagasso

Island

31k 6

13 July 1944

Mutcho

Point

RD 7093

Flores

Point

Tonapag

Harbor

Regimental Boundaries

For Mop-Up (Sand 9 July)

Tanapag

Village

Mokunsho

e.%.‘6

Morpi Point

Mt Mort,'

8 July

1-1Uly

Ig24

25

0-8

Petosukara

Harakiri

Gulch

Karaberra

7July Pass

(2123

. 767

',---'`Hill Paradise

721 Volley

Radar Hill

Garopan

Hill 700

Hashigoru •

Donnay •

Inai Fohan

0-9

— LEGEND —

Indicates Progress Before

7 July

PROGRESS LINES FOR

7,8 AND 9 JULY 1944

0 2000 4000 Yds

MAP 23
and "I will offer up the courage of my soul and calmly

rejoice in living by the eternal principle."

Here I pray with you for the eternal life of the

Emperor and the welfare of the country and I advance

to seek out the enemy.

Follow me.

If the subordinates, had, indeed, followed

the example of General Saito, there would have

been no attack. The tired general, feeling that

he was too aged and infirm to be of use in the

counterattack, held a farewell feast of saki

and canned crab meat and then committed

hara,kiki.29

Several days prior to Saito's final order the

assembly of remaining Japanese forces had

begun. Some Japanese were out of reach behind U. S. lines, others were hidden in the

deep shadows of caves, but all available were

mustered. Marpi Point, Paradise Valley and

Harakiri Gulch were sites for mobilization and

reorganization. Many provisional units were

formed in an effort to achieve some degree

of tactical unity among the assorted groups

and individuals.

Weapons and equipment were wanting and

some Japanese were armed only with grenades

or crudely-fashioned spears. One Japanese

staff officer (Major Kiyoshi Yoshida) who participated in the .battle estimated the total participants at 1,500, many with no weapons. In

the light of subsequent events, however, his

estimate appears too low. Assuming that he

was misinformed on this point, it is not at all

surprising; even at the assembly points, U. S.

artillery and mortar fire hampered Japanese

efforts to organize their troops and an accurate

count was impossible.

As the conglomerate force moved toward

Makunsha, which would serve as a point of

departure, it was subjected to persistent, heavy

concentrations of artillery fire. This resulted

in a limping approach with leaders calling

upon every conceivable device to maintain the

unity of their commands. Greater silence by

the sprawling force would have helped; early

in the evening patrols from the 27th Division

Reconnaissance Troop had detected unusual

activity. This had resulted in the large num29 NTLF 0-2 Report, 57-58. For a detailed Japanese

account of the days leading up to this climactic episode,

and the 'suicide itself, see Appendix IX, page 284.

ber of unobserved fire concentrations thrown

into the Makunsha vicinity.

Despite what hag been said about the unsatisfactory state of weapons and equipment,

the willingness of the individual Japanese to

die honorably and to take seven American lives

to repay his country somewhat compensated

for the shortage. Here was a determination

which was seldom—if ever—matched by the

fighting men of any other country.

Preceding the main force as it approached

U. S. lines were a number of strong patrols.

In their reconnaissance-in-force missions the

patrols poked and prodded the lines, seeking

vulnerable points and goading the soldiers to

open up and reveal positions. These explorations, no doubt, divulged the 300 yard gap

between the 1st and 3d Battalions, 105th

Infantry. The blow fell at 0415. First and

hardest struck were the isolated positions held

by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 105th Infantry.

The attack on these units hit from front, flank

and, after moving through the gap, the rear.

Almost as soon as the attack was launched,

communications to the rear were cut. It was

then simply a matter of two isolated battalions

of soldiers fighting for their lives. This they

did and did well. Some of the soldiers stacked

so many dead Japanese forward of their positions that _it was necessary to move to get fields

of fire.

Major McCarthy, commanding the 2d Battalion, described the onslaught:

It reminded me of one of those old cattle stampede

scenes of the movies. The camera is in a hole in the

ground and you see the herd coming and then they leap

up and over you and are gone. Only the Japs just kept

coming and coming. I didn't think they'd ever stop.30

The sheer weight of this attack, its ponderous momentum, carried it through the soldiers'

lines. In addition, hundreds of Japanese

moved past the isolated defense area, using the

gap on the right.

The fanatical surge then carried to the 3d

Battalion, 105th Infantry, located on the high

ground overlooking Harakiri Gulch. Here the

soldiers were on better defensive terrain; the

Japanese had to climb up to them. The lines

held, and the Japanese suffered staggering

3° The 27th's Battle For Saipan, 15.

223
LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM J. O'BRIEN, USA, 1st Battalion,

105th Infantry, posthumously awarded the Medal of

Honor for refusing evacuation after he was seriously

wounded during the Tanapag Plain banzai attack and

instead manning a jeep-mounted .50-caliber machine

gun until his death.

losses. This portion of the battle did not cease

with the coming of daylight on 7 July but

continued until midafternoon.

Next to feel the impetus of the determined

thrust was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, in

firing positions about 500 yards southwest of

Tanapag Village.31 The Japanese mass that

struck this unit was apparently that portion of

the banzai force which had moved through the

31- The 3d and 4th Battalions, 10th Marines, now

attached to the 4th Marine Division, had occupied this

area during 6 July to provide supporting fires for the

23d Marines in their sweep to the northern tip of the

island. These two artillery units had been formed into

a groupment under the commanding officer of the 4th

Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth A. Jorgensen).

After arrival in position areas the later officer had contacted the commanding officer of the 105th Infantry,

informed him of the artillery positions and, at the same

time, secured information as to the 105th Infantry's

front lines. Telephone and radio commupications were

established between the Marine artillery and the

105th's command post, and a Marine liaison officer

remained with the Army commander. Interview with

Maj W. P. Oliver, Jr., 16Jan50.

224

gap between the 1st and 3d Battalions, 105th

Infantry. Hardest hit were Batteries H and

Headquarters and Service, in position on the

left of the railroad track (see Map 22). Batteries I and G, set up on the right of the track

also got into the fight, although they were not

as closely engaged as the other two. The only

battery that actually fired its howitzers during

the melee was H, the others being forced to

remain silent by the presence of other artillerymen to their front.

First Lieutenant Arnold C. Hofstetter, an

officer of Battery H, tells the story of the

vicious action:

Small arms and machine gun fire was heard to the

front and right front at considerable distance at about

0300, July 7, 1944. No information as to source could

be obtained. Later, the fire appeared to come closer

and, since it appeared that the position might be attacked, the gunners were told to cut time fuzes to 4/10

second in preparation for close in fire.

About 0515, just as it was getting light, a group of

men seen advancing on the battery position from the

right front at about 600 yards. It was thought that

Army troops were somewhere to the front, so fire on

this group was held until they were definitely identified

as Japs at about 400 yards. We knew that our men

manning the listening post were somewhere to the front,

so the firing battery was ordered to open fire with time

and ricochet fire on the group to the right. Firing was

also heard from the machine guns on the left.

After the howitzers started firing, it sounded to me

like numbers 3 and 4 were not firing enough, so I went

to these pieces to get them firing more. I got them

squared away and stayed with number 4 until Japs

broke through wooded ravine to the left, and I heard

that word had been passed to withdraw. The firing

battery fired time fuze and percussion fuze so as to get

a close ricochet. Some smoke shell was fired. Cannoneers were shot from their posts by machine guns and

small arms, . . . which interrupted the howitzer fire

and finally made it impossible to service the piece.

The remainder of the firing battery fell back about

150 yards from the howitzers, across a road, and set up

a perimeter defense in a Japanese machinery dump.

This was about 0700. We held out there with carbines,

one BAR, one pistol, and eight captured Jap rifles, Japs

got behind us and around us in considerable strength.

They set up a strong point in a point of woods to our

rear. . . . About 1500, an Army tank came in from the

right and got the strong point and Army troops relieved

us.

I estimate that 400-500 Japs attacked the position.

They used machine guns, rifles, grenades, and tanks.82

32 The presence of Japanese tanks in this attack is

of interest mainly because of the curiosity of these
Some mortar fire fell in the area, but it may have been

from the . . . rear.

During the early phases of the battle, before

Battery H was forced to abandon its firing

positions, one of its howitzers was turned completely around to engage a Japanese medium

tank which had ploughed through to the rear.

At a range of less than 50 yards the artillerymen sent 105mm shells crashing into, and destroying, their armored target. Eventually,

however, the pressure from Japanese infantrymen was too great; Battery H's outnumbered

survivors pulled back. In the frantic confusion

and haste of the retreat, they failed to remove

the breech blocks or firing locks from the

howitzers. The Japanese, oddly enough, neither

used nor destroyed the weapons while they had

control of the area.

Battery I had been attacked at 0455, with

Japanese advancing astride the railroad track.

The first thrust Was repulsed and the Japanese

fell back to reorganize. A series of actions,

followed this same pattern, continued until

0650, when all of the battery's small-arms ammunition was expended. At this time the battery commander (Captain John M. Allen)

ordered the firing locks removed from the

howitzers and the unit to fall back to the positions of Battery G. Here the two batteries

continued the fight until relieved by elements ,

of the 106th Infantry later in the day.

Located directly behind Battery H, headquarters and service personnel of the battalion

were forced to retire after heavy, close-in

fighting. Among the 136 casualties in the battalion was the commanding officer, Major William L. Crouch, who was killed. Japanese

killed in the encounter numbered 322.33

Even as the Japanese surged directly against

remaining operative after over three weeks of steady

reverses. The vehicles were three in number; one an

amphibious tank, one a medium and one a light.

33. The foregoing account of the activities of the 3d

Battalion, 10th Marines, is derived from the following

sources: Memorandum to the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops from Brigadier General Graves B.

Erskine, 19Jul44 ; Report of enemy counterattack

into position of 3-10 on 7 July 1944, ltr from CO, 10th

Marines to CG, 2d Mar Div with Enclosures (A), (B),

(C) (D), and (E).

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS HAROLD C. AGERHOLM, 4th Battalion,

10th Marines, awarded the Medal of Honor for making repeated trips through a fire-swept area in a jeepambulance to load and evacuate singlehandedly approximately 45 wounded men of the 8d Battalion, 10th

Marines, before he was mortally wounded by an enemy

rifleman.

the 3d Battalion, brother artillerymen of the

4th Battalion, 10th Marines, in position to the

southeast, received pressure from the fringe of

the main enemy tide. In defense of its firing

,positions, the battalion killed about 85 Japanese. Despite the turmoil of the banzai attack,

the 4th Battalion responded on the morning of

7 July to an urgent request ,for support •originated by the 23d Marines, fighting down the

cliffs above Makunsha.34

By 0530 the lunging stab had pierced another

400 to 600 yards to the command post of the

105th Infantry. Rallying to the defense of the

installation, headquarters personnel met the

Japanese in what was to be the end of the

savage surge. The soldiers fought from deserted Japanese positions and exchanged blow

for blow, bullet for bullet, with their attackers.

Their defense perimeter was never penetrated;

and, after several hours of close-in fighting,

34 Interview with Maj W. P. Oliver, 16Jan50.

225
the battle was over. The enemy survivors

withdrew."

While most of the credit for the repulse goes

to the personnel fighting the Japanese at close

hand, the fires of the 27th Division artillery

also contributed prominently to the outcome.

From 0515 to 0615, 7 July, the three 105mm

howitzer battalions fired a total of 2,666 rounds

an average of more than 44 rounds per

irninute for a period of an hour.

Meanwhile, as the main prong of the attack

spent its fury in the manner just described,

two secondary efforts struck up Paradise Valley and Harakiri Gulch. Emerging head-on

into the prepared positions of the 2d Battalion,

165th Infantry, the Paradise Valley Japanese

were massacred as they spurted from the narrow funnel of the ravine. The other effort was

just as funereal Striving to break out of

Harakiri Gulch and seize the high ground to

the south, the enemy were slaughtered by the

1st Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion,

105th, in position along the rim of the gulch.

At dawn, the 3d Battalion, 106th, was inserted

in the center of this position.

The same cross-compartment move which

had been attempted by the U. S. soldiers during the day was now being tried—from the

opposite direction—by the Japanese. The shoe

was on the other foot, and the Japanese met

murderous fire as they exposed themselves.

Neither of these secondary efforts achieved

anything positive for the Japanese, and in the

process virtually exterminated the entire force.

Not content that their efforts had been repulsed, the Japanese continued to expend themselves in futile charges throughout most of 7

July.

After the Japanese banzai attack had passed

over them, men of the 1st and 2d Battalions,

105th, were cut off from friendly tropps. Of

those present when the attack started, only 25

per cent now remained, the rest being killed,

wounded or missing. In addition, they had no

35 Majer Regan Fuller, NTLF Liaison Officer with

the 27th Division, reported that "there was nothing

going on but a little sniping by 1100 in vicinity of the

C. P." Ltr from Maj R. Fuller to CMC, 12jan50.

226

communications with other units and there

was little ammunition left. Carrying or dragging the wounded, the decimated force started

trudging to the south to reach friendly lines.

Japanese units, repulsed by units farther

south, trickled in small, disorganized bands

toward Makunsha, their starting point, and

more often than not met the battered remains

of the 1st and 2d Battalions on the way. This

resulted in a series of uncoordinated skirmishes

and finally forced the soldiers to form a perimeter defense at the village of Tanapag, both

flanks tied into the water. In this position they

fought off a succession of thrusts which continued for about 15 hours.

As if fate had not been cruel enough, about

noon of 7 July, Army artillery observers spotted the soldiers' perimeter at Tanapag and,

presuming it to be an enemy outpost, directed

fire down upon it. A great number of the survivors, driven into the water by the deluge,

were picked up by U. S. destroyers at the

reef's edge. The remainder was evacuated by

means of amphibian tractors and DUKW's.

Casualties (killed, wounded and mising) in

the two battalions were heavy: 1st Battalion349; 2d Battalion-319.36

Thus ended one of the most devastating

single battles of the war. The mop-up would

take another two days, but the fight was gone

from the Japanese survivors. Just how many

Japanese were committed to this struggle is

unknown. Major Yoshida's estimate of 1,500

was doubled by a Korean civilian, Mamoru

Iwaya, who also participated in the attack.

Both agreed that there was a shortage of

weapons (Iwaya said about one-third of the

personnel carried rifles and the rest had

spears). Estimates of the number of machine

guns: Yoshida said one heavy and "a few"

light machine guns, Iwaya said "approximately

10" light machine guns. The latter also thought

that the attack was personally led by General

Saito, who, he thought, was killed in the fight.

In a large jumbled force such as this, no one

36 Among the dead was the 1st Battalion commander,

Lieutenant Colonel William J. O'Brien, who posthumously was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions

during the banzai attack.
BAHIA, AFTERMATH. Japanese dead litter Tanapag Plain in the zone defended by the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry.

could be sure just how many participants there

were.a7

The following riarrative account by Major

General Griner, the 27th Division Commander,

gives a concise summary of the over-all picture:

At 0530, 7 July, the Commanding Officer, 105th Infantry, telephoned that tremendous masses of the

enemy were attacking his 1st and 2d Battalions, that

terrific mortar fire was falling on them, and that the

telephone lines had gone out. He estimated the enemy

attackers to number fifteen hundred (1500). I alerted

the 106th Infantry (less one (1) battalion) 88 for move37 27th Div Interrogation of Mamoru Iwaya (Korean) 2d class worker (civilian), 7Ju144. NTLF

Interrogation of Major Kiyoshi Yoshida, intelligence

officer of 43d Division Headquarters, 11Jul44. The

27th's Battle For Saipan, 15-16. 165th Inf Report, 8-9.

105th In! Report, 10.

88 The one battalion referred to is the 3d battalion

ment and telephoned General Erskine, Chief of ,Staff,

NT&LF, giving him the estimate of the enemy strength.

Further investigation of the situation at the front led

me to believe that the enemy strength was underestimated, and at 1100, 7 July, I again telephoned General

Erskine, stating that this was the main enemy counterattack and consisted of no less than three thousand

(3000) enemy soldiers. I stated that I was employing

the Division Reserve and requested that a battalion of.

the 20 Marine Division be turned over to me as soon as

prii et icable at a specified location. He attached to the

Division the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Our tank losses

from enemy action were somewhat large. Twice we

requested that an additional platoon of tanks, which

represented only a small fraction of those available to

NT&LF, be made available to the Division. These requests were denied, obviously because that headquarters did not accept my version of the importance

which was attached to the 165th Infantry, in position

on the rho of Harakiri Gulch.

227
SERGEANT THOMAS A. BAKER, USA, Company A, 105th Infantry, posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor

for refusing, even though wounded, to leave the lines.

When his unit was forced to withdraw during the

savage banzai attack, Baker, unable to move by himself, requested that he be propped against a tree

from which he could carry on the fight alone. Later,

when the sergeant's body was found, his weapon was

empty, and eight Japanese lay dead before him.

of the action then in progress. At this time, the 4th

Marine Division was experiencing no opposition in the

advance to the northeast. I issued orders about noon

to the Commanding Officer, 106th Infantry, to counterattack the enemy to relieve the 1st and 2d Battalions,

105th Infantry, and to recapture a Marine Artillery

Battery which, unknown to this Division,89 had taken

positions in the Division Zone of Action six hundred

(600) yards in rear of the forward line of the preceding

night. It later appeared that this artillery was in support of the Marine regiment, 2d Marine Division, which

was on the left of the 4th Marine Division.40 The 106th

Infantry advanced five hundred (500) yards in front of

their line of Departure but failed by three hundred

(300) yards to relieve the battered elements of the two

battalions of the 105th Infantry. This incident was

39 Though the 27th Division C. P. was not informed

of the presence of Marine artillery, the 105th Infantry

C. P. was. See footnote 31 on page 224.

40 This was the 2d Marines, attached to the 4th Division at 0920, 6 July.

228

witnessed by Major Fuller,41 Liaison Officer from NT&

LF, who reported to his headquarters that the advance

could easily have been continued and subsequently gave

me the same report. Colonel Stebbins, the Regimental

Commander, upon being interrogated later, stated that

the decision to advance no farther was his own and

made despite the protest of one of his battalion commanders, that although the enemy fire being received

was not heavy, he realized that masses of JAps were

being passed over who could fire in his rear. He stated

that the mopping up of the area already gained consumed the remaining period of daylight. When the line

stabilized, I inserted the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,

between the right of the 106th Infantry and the left of

the battalion of the 105th Infantry which was still

intact 42 with instructions that the 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines would advance only to conform to the movement of the right of the 106th Infantry. I also made

arrangements for the evacuation by DUEWs of the

beleaguered elements of the two battalions, 105th Infantry. I then called the Chief of Staff, NT&LF, as

was my custom as the daylight hours drew to a close,

to report the existing situation. I advised that the line

was firmly established, without break or gap of any

kind, and stated that another battalion of the 2d

Marine Division would provide sufficient reserve if

made subject to my call. The Chief of Staff then advised that the 2d Marine Division had been moved forward to a line about fifteen hundred (1500) yards in

rear of the then existing front and that General Smith

was contemplating passing them through the 27th Division at daylight the next morning. General Erskine

then asked if the 27th Division could complete the job

and wipe out the enemy. I replied that we could. He

stated that he would call back. Within thirty minutes

he telephoned that the 2d Marine Division would pass

through the 27th Division at daylight and that the Division (less 165th Infantry) would pass to NT&LF reserve. The 165th Infantry would be attached to the

2d Marine Division.43

As indicated, the 1st and 2c1 Battalions, 106th

Infantry, were ordered at about noon of 7 July

to counterattack and relieve the battered battalions of the 105th. Though this move regained the positions of the 3d Battalion, 10th

Marines, and pushed farther to the north, the

advance was halted 200 to 300 yards short of the

Tanapag Village perimeter. Since physical relief had not been accomplished, it remained for

the two battalions to be evacuated by amphibian

41 Major Regan Fuller, USMC.

42 The battalion here referred to is the 3d Battalion

which was still• on the high ground overlooking the

mouth of Harakiri Gulch.

43 Source of this quote is Major General George W.

Griner's Certificate of 12 July 1944, para. I.
tractors. The LVT's of the 773d Amphibian

Tractor Battalion supplied the transportation

and at 2200, 7 July, the last survivor left the

perimeter.

With the 106th Infantry's advance through

the battlefield, the true scope of, the enemy attack was revealed: Japanese bodies littered the

plain area. An accurate count would have to

await complete mop-up, however.

When the 106th Infantry stopped, an interval

existed between it and other 27th Division units

along Harakiri Gulch. To fill this, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, was committed. As night.

fell the 27th Division's front was solid, extending from the beach, across the plain, through

Harakiri Gulch's mouth, along the top of the

cliffs as far as Paradise Valley, then inland to a

connection with the 4th Marine Division.

Against the coastal portion of this line the

Japanese executed a vigorous thrust during the

night of 7-8 July. Though the strength, organization and planning of this second attack were

weak by comparison with the previous effort,

the vigor and determination, with which it was

executed did not vary. Shortly after midnight

a report came from the observation post atop

Hill 767; Japanese force moving south. Enemy

"feeler" patrols probing for weak spots were

engaged as early as 0300, but the information

that they took back to their commanders must

nothave been encouraging. No holes existed.

The attack, launched about 0430, struck the

1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, along the beach.

Grazing defensive fires swept across the flat

beach like a scythe, cutting all in its path. The

Japanese never seriously threatened penetration

of the lines and those that attempted to swim

around the flank were spotted and killed.

Shortly after 0700 the Japanese attack petered

out and died. The 106th Infantry estimated

that it had slaughtered about 1,000 of the enemy,

while at the same time its own losses were practically negligible.

As actions of the tanks on 7 July have not

been mentioned thus far, it will be well to summarize their activities. Available to the 105th

Infantry were two platoons of light tanks and

one Oatoon of mediums. Early in the morning

of 7 July before the regimental commander was

fully aware of the tragic circumstances of his

1st and 2d Battalions, he ordered one platoon

of lights to proceed to the front lines. After

moving along the beach road as far as Road

Junction 5 (in the vicinity of Battery H's firingpositions) , two of the tanks were lost due to

enemy actions and a third slipped off the road

and "bellied up." The personnel of the latter

were rescued by the platoon of mediums which

also had ventured up the road as far as the road

junction. The presence of enemy soldiers along

the route made it apparent that a tank thrust,

unprotected by infantry, would be a costly operation, and the tanks withdrew to the command

post of the 105th Infantry. There they assisted

the headquarters personnel in the defense of the

installation.

The next tank excursion was not made until

shortly after noon. This followed the shelling,

by friendly artillery, of the beleaguered band

of soldiers in the vicinity of Tanapag. It will.

be recalled that the intensity of this fire had

driven many soldiers out onto the reef. Once

there, they were subjected to small-arms fire

from Japanese located along the beach. In an

attempt to eliminate this source of trouble and

relieve the situation, three light tanks sortied.

Bends in the shore line masked their fire, however, and the three vehicles ventured upon the

reef in search of direct firing positions. This

proved a bad maneuver. All three fell into a

hole and had their motors drowned out..

Meanwhile, two medium tanks advanced ,

along the beach road and reached the isolated

perimeter. There Major McCarthy, the 2d Battalion Commander (and one of two officer-survivbrs) , went on board one machine and used its

radio to describe his dire situation to the regimental commander. On the tanks' return trip,

Major McCarthy followed on foot with a small

detachment. After the latter's arrival at the

105th Infantry command post, the entire situation was reviewed, providing the first complete

summary of what had taken place. This resulted in Griner's. orders to the 106th Infantry

to push out and relieve the men at the battered

perimeter."

Meanwhile, the 2d Marine Division had been

alerted and moved to a position which would

44 Lore, 495-501.

229
• 2D DIVISION MOP-UP following banzai attack. Marines had to be alert for wifiiii(led .Japanese who could still fire

one more shot or hurl one more grenade.

afford depth to the west coast defenses. A line

from Tanapag Seaplane Ramp extending about

3,000 yards inland was established by dark of

7 July. The NTLF Operation Order for 8 July

instructed the 2d Marine Division, less detachments," to "advance in the present 27th Infantry Division zone of action, pass through elements of [that] division on its front line,

attack, mop up and destroy enemy elements.

. . . Upon passing through the 27th Infantry

Division assume operational control 165th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, . . .

assume tactical control within the assigned zone

of action at 0630 [8 July]." Upon passage of

its lines the 27th Division would revert to

NTLF reserve."

oDetachments included: 2d Marines and Company

A, 2d Tank Battalion, which were attached to the 4th

Marine Division and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines,

which was attached to the Saipan Garrison Force.

46 NTLF Operation Order 25-44.

230

THE 2D DIVISION'S MOP-UP OF 8 AND 9 JULY

No effective resistance was offered the 2d. Marine Division after it had passed through the

27th Division on the morning of 8 July, although large numbers of poorly armed and

totally disorganized enemy were encountered.

Some Japanese used the familiar device of hiding in caves and firing from the deep shadows,

but the bulk seemed eager to die and made headlong rushes at the Marines. This foolish expenditure simplified the mop-up.

The 6th Marines, advancing on the division

left, uncovered one strong pocket of resistance

in a wooded swampy area just east of Tanapag

Village. Here an estimated force of 100 holedup Japanese set about a lively defense of their

positions. Flame-throwers, tanks, and 75mm

half-tracks blasted at the strong point, but the

fight continued. Since this sector promised to be

extremely time-consuming and since it was de-
sired that .the mop-up continue, one company

(F) stayed behind to contain and destroy the

enemy force while the remainder of the regiment swept on. By dark the 6th Marines had

reached the water's edge and stopped for the

night.

Meanwhile, many Japanese had waded out

upon the reef to escape the onslaught. This was

but a temporary reprieve, however, inasmuch

as amphibian tractors, embarking combat patrols,, were sent to encourage the enemy- to surrender and, if they refused, to ,eliminate them.

The 6th Marines' action report characterized

the day's activities as an "attack . . . against a

disorganized, swarming mass of Japs . . waiting for the final death blow. . . ." Adding the

hundreds found strewn through its zone to the

number that it disposed of, the 6th Marines

made a "conservative estimate" for 8 July of

1,500 dead Japanese in its area.47

A correspondent, who surveyed much of the

battle area on 7 and 8 July, was moved to write:

"The whole area seemed to be a mass of stinking

bodies, spilled guts and brains."48

On more rugged terrain inland the 8th Marines encountered much the same type of resistance. Here, with more caves to investigate,

the sweep was somewhat slower. One wooded

pocket encountered, a deep ravine, caused a

minor delay. The tactic that previously had

worked so well was again employed: one company stayed behind to contain and mop-up

while the rest continued the push. The 8th Marines' zone, being inland of the main path of

the banzai attack, contained fewer enemy

bodies; but, even so, there was conclusive evidence that a terrific battle had taken place.49

As noted before, the 165th Infantry had been

attached to the 2d Marine Division for the mopup of 8 July. Actually, however, this regiment

had begun mopping up on 7 July almost as soon

as the Japanese attack dissipated. Fighting

through deeply-gouged Harakiri Gulch was

much easier on 7 July than on previous days.

The banzai attack relieved the soldiers of the

47 6th Mar Report, 15-16.

48 On to Westward, Robert Sherrod, 140.

49 8th Mar Report, 9. 2d Mar Div Report, Section

VI, 25.

SERGEANT GRANT F. TIMMERMAN, 2d Tank Battalion, posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his action

during the 8 ,July mop-up. Timmerman blocked with

his body a Japanese grenade which would have fallen

through his tank's open turret hatch upon the other

crewmen inside.

worst of their tasks. By dark the 1st Battalion

had moved through Harakiri Gulch and had

reached the plateau overlooking the coastal

plain. The regiment was thus placed in a favorable position for the descent.

On the 8th, however, the soldiers delayed

their sweep, awaiting arrival of the Marines on

their left flank. By about 1130 the Marines

were abreast and the push was resumed. Moving down the cliff proved difficult. Wooded

:fissures and eroded cuts provided excellent

hide-outs for die-hard stragglers from the

banzai attack and eradication of these was a

.Herculean task. Independent smaller actions—

a job for squads and platoons rather than a

coordinated battalion attack—were necessitated

by the great number of indentations in the cliff

face.

While the 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry,

stalked the stragglers in the cliff, the 2d Battalion by-passed Paradise Valley, leaving the

231
FOLLOWING BANZAI ATTACK, 2d Division passed through the

deployed as skirmishers with the welcome support of a

enemy stragglers.

mop-up to the 3d Battalion. This resulted in

a rapid surge to Makunsha Village for the

former. The valley was still a cesspool into

which many stragglers had drained, and the

task would take time. Darkness cut short the

3d Battalion's work on 8 July, and the unit

withdrew to positions at the valley's upper

entrance for the night.

On 9 July, while the 2d Battalion waited in

Makunsha, the 1st Battalion finished its cliff

task and moved to the coast. The blasting this

cliff received had altered its appearance; much

of the underbrush was gone and many of the

caves and crevasses had been filled.' Paradise

Valley was also cleared of Japanese during the

day. The 3d Battalion systematically combed

232

27th Division and mopped up the area. Here Marines,

medium tank, move along .Tanapag Plain in search of

the valley's jagged slopes and by about noon

emerged on the coastal plain.5°

Activity in the sectors of the 6th and 8th

Marines followed the pattern established on 8.

.July. The 8th Marines met little difficulty and

devoted a share of its fire power (including

attached tanks) to support the 165th Infantry.

Action against the enemy that had swum

out to the reef continued. Efforts to induce

these to surrender were to little avail: only 14

prisoners were taken by the LVT's patrolling

there, while about 100 resisted and either

were killed or took their own lives. One Japanese officer was observed to behead four of a

• 50 165th Inf Report, 8-9. 2d Mar Div Report, Section VI, 26. Love, 475, 498, 514-518.
group of his soldiers before he himself was

killed by the Marines.

One episode, described by First Lieutenant

Kenneth J. Hensley of Company G, 6th Marines, indicates the difficulties experienced in

convincing the Japanese on the reef that they

should surrender. Hensley was in command

of four amphibian tractors and 24 riflemen on

9 July when the incident occurred.

. .. We closed to about 1.00 yards from the 50-60 enemy

On the reef and motioned them to come to the boat.51-

They motioned us away. One officer armed with a rifle

;ind standing on a rock, apparently controlling the

50-60 enemy soldiers, aimed his rifle at the boat several

times. We covered this officer with machine guns and

closed with the LVT(4)'s to about 50 yards. We again

motioned for them to come out to the boats. The Jap

officer then fired at the leading boats, and a machine

gun, apparently about .50 caliber, opened fire on the

boats putting two holes completely through one

LVT (4). Many of the enemy threw hand grenades

from the reef and fired rifles at the leading boats. Immediately all boats opened fire with all small arms and

annihilated these 50-60 enemy on this section of the

reef.52

In addition to its reef-sweeping details, the

6th Marines also cleared the pocket east of

Tanitpag Village during the day. One hundred

Japanese bodies were counted there.

Following the precedent of their fallen comrades, Japanese emerged during the night from

their hiding places and attempted to pierce

the strong U. S. defense. On the night of 8-9

July the 165th Infantry killed about 75. in

front of its positions. Similarly, the next night

150 more fell from such abortive incursions.

The 6th Marines reported killing "50 or more"

on each night as the enemy attempted to sneak

through the lines. Just where they were going,

or what they were trying to accomplish, is not

clear. These efforts amounted only to a gesture,

or a final gasp, from a dying Japanese force.53

And. so, the Tanapag-Makunsha plain area

was again in U. S. hands. As indicated

throughout the narrative of this phase of the

Saipan fight, the Japanese had suffered an almost unbelievable massacre. And yet not un51"Boat" is here used to refer to amphibian tractors.

52 Statethent of 1 stLt K. J. Hensley, Appendix K

to NTLF G-2 Report.

53 Qd Mar Div Report, Section VI, 26. 6th Mar Report,

13. 16,5 Inf Report, 9.

880590° --50--16

believable, for densely sprawled through the

area for all to see was the hideous evidence. By

the 27th Division's count, 4,311 enemy dead lay .

in the battle area.

To determine accurately just which Japanese were killed by the various participating

units in this battle is impossible. There are

certain clues, however. In the sectors of the

two battalions of the 105th Infantry which

bore the brunt of the initial attack, 2,295 Japanese bodies were counted. Another 2,016 lay

to their rear. How many of these fell prior to

the climactic banzai attack as a result of artillery, naval and air bombardment which had

been almost continuous since 13 June? And

how many, on the other hand, were killed during the savage attack and the mop-up that followed?

The questions started very soon after the

battle. On 12 July the G-1 of the 27th Division submitted a letter to NTLF on the subject of burial of Japanese dead. General Griner

added an endorsement to the letter which said

in part :

In view of press releases and official dispatches indicating the numerical strength of the enemy counterattack on 7 July as between 300 and 500, basic report

is forwarded indicating that by actual count, 4,31.1

enemy soldiers were buried in the area between the

farthest advance of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 105th

Infantry, and the farthest advance of the enemy. In

the same area, 406 bodies of American soldiers were

found.

A further breakdown of enemy dead indicates that

2,295 were killed in the combat area of the 1st and 2d

Battalions, 105th Infantry, and 2,016 in the combat

area of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 106th Infantry, the

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 105th

Infantry. These dead represented the number of enemy

that pushed beyond the defensive line of the 1st and

2d Battalions, 105th Infantry.

Basic report is forwarded in the hope that by proper

distribution of the facts, accuracy of historical records

and press releases will be preserved.54

General Schmidt, who had recently relieved

Holland Smith as Commanding General,

NTLF,55 answered General Griner's letter on

15 July. Schmidt did not question the number of

54 CG, 27th Inf Div, 1st Endorsement to ACofS, G-1

. 27th Div, fir of 12.1'1144.

55 Schmidt turned over the 4th Marine Division to

Major General Clifton B. Cates (later nineteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps) on 12 July 1944.

233
dead Japanese found and buried but seriously

doubted that these had all fallen as a result of

the banzai attack. Also, Schmidt's letter called

attention to the interrogation of Major Yoshida, who had estimated that only 1,500 Japanese had participated in the attack.

The areas over which the enemy made its counterattack [continued General Schmidt's letter] against

the 105th Infantry on 7 July have, from time to time,

been subjected to naval gunfire, bombing, strafing attacks and artillery fires from 13 June to 7 July, and it

is evident that these fires produced some casualties.

It is probable that some of the dead remained on the

ground as a result of the initial occupation by the 105th

Infantry, and subsequent advance of the 106th Infantry

and elements of the 2d Marine Division in the same

zone of action.

Staff officers and observers, who visited the scene of

attack soon after the ground was recaptured by the

2d Marine Division, have reported very large numbers

of enemy dead within the zone and have also stated

that many of the dead, due to the advanced .state of

decomposition, had apparently been in the area for

some time. Some photographs turned in to this headquarters bear out these reports.

More than 300 freshly killed Japanese were counted

on 8 July, in front of and in the positions of the 3d

Battalion, 10th Marines (Artillery) which were overrun. It is probable that these Japanese constituted

a large part of the enemy force which penetrated the

positions of the 105th Infantry.

General Griner was not long in answering.

His letter of 16 July said in part:

It Was not suggested that each enemy soldier was

killed by infantry elements of this division, or by its

infantry and artillery, although the 27th Division Artillery was the only artillery in direct support of the

action. Our Naval gunfire, aerial bombing, and Corps

Artillery did good work everywhere on the island and

at all times. Any estimate of the casualties inflicted

by them on the enemy is acceptable, provided it is applied uniformly in all Division Zones of Action.

On the morning of 8 July, over 24 hours

after the NTLF liaison officer with the 27th

Division, Major Regan Fuller, had estimated

the enemy counterattack force at 1,500, NTLF

had sent a dispatch to Admiral Turner which

stated that the 1st and 2d Battalions, 105th Infantry, had been "overrun by a considerable

force estimated to be at least 300 to 400 Japanese, supported by two tanks." 56 It was to this

inaccurate dispatch that Griner next referred

and demanded correction, saying in part:

56 NTLF G-3 Journal, 1800, 6 July to 1800, 8 July.

234

The great mass of the enemy dead found in the area

between the extreme advance of the 105th Infantry

and that of the 106th Infantry (2295) obviously were

killed by the 105th Infantry since the enemy counterattack had subsided completely prior to the advance of

the 2d Marine Division at noon, 8 July.

In view of the fact that 2,016 enemy dead lay in the

area in mat of the positions of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 106th Infantry, the statement . . . that it is

probable that the 300 Japanese dead found in front

of the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines (Artillery) "constituted a large part of the enemy force which penetrated the positions of the 105th Infantry" is not a

reasonable conclusion. No mention is made of the fact

that this position was relieved by the 2d Battalion,

106th Infantry, which reasonably could have been expected to have inflicted casualties in doing so.

As the only General Officer who was present on this

front at any time prior to noon, 8 July; as the Commander of all troops operating in that zone, except a

Battalion of Marine Field Artillery which had entered

the area without the knowledge of this headquarters

and had emplaced certain field guns 520 yards in rear

of the most advanced line, not however for the purpose

of supporting the troops in this area; and as one who

followed in detail each event as it occurred, I submit

that my personel observations should receive greater

credence than is indicated by the record. I viewed

perhaps a thousand enemy dead and did not see more

than two or three in an advanced state of decomposition. Paragraph 127 of the Army Medical Field Manual,

"Field Sanitation" (FM 8-40), states that at a temperature of 85° F maggots will be formed in about eight

hours. The staff officers and observers did not arrive

on the scene until at least thirty-one (0500, 7 July, to

1200, 8 July) hours had elapsed after the launching of

the enemy counterattack.57

Realizing that a controversy was developing

at Saipan, Admiral Nimitz, Commander in

Chief, Pacific, sent a dispatch to Admiral

Spruance, Commander Fifth .Fleet, on 9 July

ordering an investigation of the banzai attack.

For this task, Spruance appointed two members of his staff, Colonel James E. Jones,

USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel George S.

Eckhardt, USA. These officers developed the

facts of their report by conversations with

General Holland M. Smith, General Griner,

members of the NTLF and 27th Division

staffs, and "such representatives of the troop

units involved as were available for explanation of the action on the ground." 58

57 Ltr from MajGen Griner to CG, NTLF, 16Jul44.

58 This investigation has often been erroneously referred to as the "Spruance Board."
On 19 July Spruance submitted a report to

Admiral Nimitz containing his conclusions

relative to the counterattack. Spruance's report failed to establish the exact number of

enemy that had participated in the attack, saying: "Estimates of the enemy strength in the

assault run from 1500 to 3000." Though this

figure is not specific, it serves to correct the

first report from NTLF of "300 to 400." The

last paragraph of the report contains comments on the conduct of troops and commanders involved in the fight:

(a) The gap between the 1st and 3d Battalions 105th

Infantry could have been readily closed by swinging

the left of the 3d Battalion forward. In any case, this

gap should have been covered by local reserves and/or

planned machine gun fires. These is no evidence of such

measures being taken.

(b) The 3d Battalion 105th Infantry although not

as heavily engaged as the other two, [made] no effort

to go to the relief of the 1st and 2d Battalions. The

reserve company of the 3d Battalion was not committed except to protect the battalion command post

which was under attack.

.(c) Although the position of the 27th Division was

penetrated to a depth of 1000 to 1500 yards, this penetration was always firmly contained.

(d) There is no question that our troops fought

courageously in this action. The 1st and 2d Battalions

and Headquarters Company, 105th Infantry and the 3d

Battalion, 10th Marines deserve particular mention.

(e) All evidence points to the fact that the front

line units of the 27th Division were alert to the imminence of a Japanese attack at dawn on 7 July 1944.59

Whatever conclusion the reader may draw

from the facts presented, the statement in subparagraph (d) of Admiral Spruance's report

should emerge in bold relief above the clouds

and fog of controversy: "There is no question

that our troops fought courageously in this action."

D—PLUS 22, 23 and 24 (7, 8 AND 9 JULY)

To the Shore at Marpi Point

It will be recalled that on 0 July the 4th Marine Division had been ordered to take over

the entire front at a point just beyond Makunsha. From there it would drive to Saipan's

northeastern tip. Assumption of its broad zone

59"Report on Japanese Counterattack at Saipan on

Morning of 7 July 1944" from Commander, Fifth Fleet

to Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific

Ocean Areas, 19Jul44.

demanded commitment of all three infantry

regiments of the division, and on 7 July NTLF •

attached an additional regiment, the 2d Marines, to assist in delivering the last punches.

Artillery support had been bolstered also; the

3d and 4th Battalions, 10th Marines, attached

to the 4th Division, moved to advanced positions from which they could deliver fires f orward of the 23d Marines. As already indicated,

however, these two battalions suffered heavy

personnel losses in the hanzai attack and were

in no condition to provide effective support.

The 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious. Corps, executed general support missions from its newly occupied positions about

500 yards inland from Garapan's south edge.

The Japanese banzai attack had an important bearing on the final drive of the 4th Division. Many of the enemy who would have contested the last few miles of Saipan had already

expended themselves in the Tanapag onslaught. The several thousand who accelerated

their appointment with death could have provided a considerable challenge in the rocky approaches to Mt. Marpi. This result was not

apparent to the men of the 4th Division, since

they were not in the attack's path but was true

nonetheless. But this is not to say that the last

days at Saipan would go unopposed.

On .6 July the center and right regiments

(24th and 25th respectively) had made rapid

progress, reaching the dominating ground just

short of 0-8. The 23d Marines, however, met

rugged terrain in its expedition to the west

coast. A precipitous cliff, carved with enemy

positions, would have to be descended before

the unit could begin its final, half-mile drive

to the west coast. The newly-attached 2d Regiment was assigned a zone between the 23d and

24th. On its four-regiment front the division

attacked at 0930.

.The two right regiments moved at a fast clip

on 7 July, encountering only minor trouble in

the form of sporadic small-arms fire from

small bands or patrols of the enemy. In addition, the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, reported

fire from a large-caliber gun positioned in a

cave. This weapon was pushed out for one or

two rounds then hastily retracted before the

235
TAKING COVER behind a medium tank, these Marines try to locate the source of the automatic fire cracking about

them. Man in foreground carries an SCR 300 radio with short antenna. Oak planking on side of tank is to

prevent Japanese magnetic mines from sticking there.

Marines could bring down counter-fires. Eventually, however, the enemy gunner selected the

wrong moment to peek his gun from the hiding

place, doing so just as a shell landed in the

entrance. The cave gun and its elusive gunner

were destroyed.

One difficulty during the day was presented

by the great number of civilians pouring

through the lines. Until these had approached

close enough for recognition, it was impossible

to distinguish them from enemy soldiers, and

it was necessary to proceed with a great deal of

caution.

By early afternoon of 7 July the two right

regiments had pushed so far ahead of units on

236

the left that General Schmidt ordered them to

hold up and wait.6°

The going had been tougher on the left. Here

the problem was to find suitable routes from the

cliff top to the flat below. In a maneuver designed to exploit the 24th Marines' success,

Colonel Stuart's 2d Regiment moved to its

right through the the 24th Marines' Zone' and

reoriented its direction of attack straight toward the west coast. By dark of 7 July,

Stuart's Marines were disposed along the high

ground overlooking the coastal plain (see Map

23).

60 4th Div Report, Section VI, 34-35. 24 Mar Report,

24. 25th Mar Report, 9.
THROUGH A BATTERED CANEFIELD on the west coast 'men of the 2d Marines, accompanied by a medium tank from

Company A, 2d Tank Battalion, push toward the northern end of the island. Hundreds of the enemy were

killed during this phase of the operation.

For the 23d Marines the activities of 7 July

were a continuation of those begun the previous day. This regiment had to cross the coastal

plain and reach the beach just northeast of

Makunsha, and no amount of detouring would

allow it to execute this until the cliff line flanking Karaberra Pass was cleared of enemy

forces. Some imaginative Marine named the

high ground overlooking the pass "Prudential

Hill," 61 and the title stuck. To attempt to

traverse the plain without first clearing the

cliffs which dominated it would have been. an

invitation for the Japanese to deliver fire into

the regiment's rear.

This was the problem then: the ,Marines

faced the west coast and the Japanese did also.

The Marines needed the base of the cliff for a

line of departure but this was dominated by

61 Though this name was derived from the Prudential

Life Insurance Company's trademark, Webster's definition, "Prudential—That which relates to or demands

the exercise of discretion," is also apt.

the Japanese in the cliff. In addition, the base

was mined and covered with plunging fire.

The struggle continued throughout 7 July and

most of the caves and positions were destroyed.

The coming of darkness, however, indicated the

desirability of returning to the high ground for

the night with plans to get a fresh start on

8 July. From positions overlooking the coastal

flats, the 23d Marines observed large straggler

groups moving toward Marpi Point and

brought long-range machine-gun and 75mm

half-track fires to bear on them. According to

the 231 Marines' action report, "over 500 were

killed." 62

'Fighting in and around Karaberra Pass was

close-in, personal and, frequently, individual

Marine against individual Japanese. Because

of this, men of the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines,

were especially alert for anyone with oriental.

facial characteristics as they cleaned the area.

62 23d Mar Report, 47-48.

237
ANTICIPATING A BLAST, Marines hug cover near island's northern end. At times like these, one may only hope

and pray.

So it was that one dark-complexioned person,

dressed in a Marine uniform but showing a

poor command of the English language, narrowly escaped death before he was finally permitted to surrender. After being marched to

the 3c1 Battalion command post, he explained

to Major Treitel, commanding the unit, that he

was a Marine, of Puerto Rican ancestry, who

had the misfortune of resembling the Japanese. It was the third time he had been taken

prisoner by fellow Marines at Saipan. Major

Treitel described him as "one frightened hombre," and well he might have been.63

As the division stopped for the night of 7-8

July the lines took on a peculiar appearance.

The left had not progressed, while the right

had moved from 700 to 1500 yards. Connecting

the two extremes was the 2d Marines, facing

the west coast. The night passed quietly.

For the attack on 8 July, General Schmidt

decided to hold the right of his line stationary,

63 Treitel.

238

while the left moved to the sea. This, in effect,

was a reorientation of the direction of attack,

since units would be moving to the northwest

rather than the northeast. If successful, however, this maneuver would greatly reduce the

division frontage, which on the morning of 8

July was 6,300 yards. The scheme affected

units as follows: the 25th Marines and the right

battalion of the 24th (2d) would hold their

positions facing to the northeast, while the remainder of the division swept to the northwest

(see Map 23).

The plan was a good one, having as its most

unique feature the support provided by rocket

craft—LCI(G)'s—lying off Makunsha and firing into the cliffs directly below the 23d Marines. Though delayed somewhat by the terrain, occasional road blocks and mines, and

desultory fire from caves, the advance to the

coast was rapid. After placing the finishing,

blasting alterations on Prudential Hill's western landscape, the 23d Marines dashed across
the coastal flat and reached the beach at 1410.64

The 2d and 24th Marines, meanwhile, kept

generally abreast and secured their assigned

zones by 1530. A great number of Japanese

were killed during this move and in the subsequent mop-up along the coast. Many of those

encountered were no doubt survivors of the

banzai attack which had struck the 27th Division. In three operations (Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan), men of the 2d Marines could

not recall a single day in which they had killed

as many Japanese. It is probable that the 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, with its score of about

800 enemy killed on 8 July, accounted for more

64 Dillon.

Japanese on that day than it had throughout

the rest of the operation.65 One company commander observed _that "hunting was exceptionally good." 66

An unusual employment of 37mm guns during the day is worthy of note. In order that the

1st Battalion, 24th Marines, might use all available men in the push across the coastal plain,

Major Roger G. B. Broome (Weapons Company, 24th Marines) volunteered to assume,

with two 37mm guns and a few riflemen, a

position from which to protect the right flank

as the unit swept to the coast. After the in65 Interview with Capt C. SchulN, 16Jan50.

66 Brooks.

BELOW MT. MARPI'S AUSTERE HEIGHT (833 feet), 4th Division's tanks and infantry . push across flat toward the final objective on 9 July. Many positions on Marpl's sheer northern face were by-passed by the speedy moves, and

Marines had to return later for the mop-up.

239
UNCOMPLETED MARPI AIRSTRIP was overrun by 4th Division's 9 July dash to Saipan's northern coast.. Marines appear

alert after 25 days of combat.

fantry had departed, Broome's isolated position was rushed by a numerically superior

group of Japanese. During the skirmish, the

37mm crews fired their pieces at ranges of 10

to 20 yards, taking up the brief slack between

rounds ,by throwing grenades and firing small

arms. For a time the issue was in doubt, but

the Marines held. This exceptional employment of a weapons unit was necessary and effective in this situation."

67 Ltr from Col 0. Lessing to CMC, 11Jan50. Major

Broome died from wounds received during this skirmish.

240

IL

The 2d and 24th Marines, after reaching

their objectives, spent the remainder of the day

mopping up the jagged coast line.

Earlier in the afternoon, when it was apparent that the attack to the northwest would

be successful, General Schmidt approved the

25th Regiment's request to advance its lines to

the dominating terrain 600 yards to its front.

Patrols had located no enemy in that area, and

Colonel Batchelder deemed it advisable to

capitalize on the situation. The advance had

the additional advantage of providing observation over the Marpi Point area.
SAIPAN WON, the landing force command and unit representatives attend official flag raising at Charan Kanoa.

During the day the division's left had moved

1,500 yards in seizing the western coastal area

and had advanced the northern portion of its

line approximately 600 yards closer to the island's tip. At one point in the proceedings

(shortly after noon), General Schmidt had entertained hopes of reaching Mt. Marpi during

the day and issued an operation order to that

effect. Time consumed mopping up beach areas,

however, caused the general to defer the plan

until the next day.

Night activity was confined to the coastal

areas, where groups of civilians and some

military personnel came from the caves to surrender." Surrender was not on the minds of

the screaming Japanese that attacked the 1st

68 4th Mar Div Report, Section VT, 35-36. 23d Mar

Report, 48. 24th Mar Report, 24. 25th Mar Report, 9.

Battalion, 2d Marines, however. This battalion, set up on the lip of the coastal cliff,

received a series of miniature banzai attacks

that lasted most of the night. The point of

attack was a logical one: at the right center of

the battalion's front, where a 30-40 yard break

existed. This break tilted sharply to the water's

edge, affording the Japanese a corridor for the

climb to the top of the cliff. Whatever the

cause of this unusual formation, it had been

apparent to the men of the 1st Battalion that

this area had dangerous potentialities. In view

of this, machine guns had been emplaced on

either shoulder with sectors of fire interlocking

over the mouth of the chute.

Into these prearranged fires the Japanese

hurled themselves in attack after attack and,

despite the repulse of all attempts, succeeded241
ELECTING TO LIVE, these Saipan civilians east their lot with the Americans. This puzzled, tired group eyes apprehensively one of the United States invaders to whom they surrendered.

by the sheer momentum of their thrust—in

knocking out both machine guns. These were

replaced, however, and the slaughter continued. Later, one of the replacements was

also destroyed. Vast quantities of incendiary

grenades were used during the night to light

the funnel and xpose the enemy, but mortars

or artillery could not be used because of the

proximity of the Marines to their attackers.

Machine guns, rifles and grenades were enough,

however; the enemy soldiers were stopped before they could really get started. As had

been the case in other such attempts, the Japanese seemed to feel an obligation to get killed

in an attack, as if some higher honor would

thus be accorded them. The coming of daylight revealed enemy dead thickly stacked in

242

the narrow confines of the corridor. No accurate count of the bodies was completed, but the

battalion commander estimated about 100.69

Objective 0-9 (extreme northeastern tip of

Saipan) had seemed very distant on 15 June

1944 when the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions hit

the Charan Kanoa beaches. It seemed to get no

closer as the days grew to weeks, and the number of casualties climbed from one digit to five,

69 A count, initiated by Gunnery Sergeant Claude E.

Moore, was abruptly terminated when the latter received four holes in his buttocks from a single bullet.

While stooping to count the bodies, the sergeant presented a profile view of his posterior to a Japanese survivor in a nearby cave, who inflicted the unusual

wound. The bullet hit no bones and the sergeant was

not too uncomfortable to see the humor of the situation. Kyle.
and the young matured to grim old age. As

long as a single wooded hummock separated

the front lines from the farthest tip of land,

objective 0-9 had been an ambition—little

more.

Ambition became reality on 9 July when the

4th Division spurted to the shores of Marpi

Point. The final thrust was made with three

regiments abreast, from right to left, 25th,

1 24th, and 2d. Men of the 23d Marines, meanwhile, spent the day mopping up along the

northwest coast, assisted by the LVT (A)'s of

the 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion which

fired on cave positions from seaward.

The attack of 9 July produced nothing

startling in the way of tactical situations or

enemy reactions. Firm pressure was applied all

along the front and a fast pace maintained.

Indeed, many units, anxious to be the first to

reach Marpi Point, moved faster than reasonable caution would dictate. Many enemy

groups were by-passed with the result that

much time and effort were spent extricating

holed-up Japanese' after 9 July.

Along the west coast in the 2d Marines' zone,

isolated enemy units somewhat retarded the

push, but generally the Japanese realized the

, futility of coming out to do battle and instead

chose to remain in the myriad caves along the

coast. Extermination of all of these was not

to be accomplished on 9 July—or 9 August, or

9 September, for that matter.

By 1615 all three regiments had reported

that they were in possession of 0-9.7° And as

the Marines looked to the north, all that they

could see was water. There was no objective

0-10.

Good news travels fast. In the same minute

that the 4th Marine Division reported seizure

of 0-9, Admiral Turner, the Expeditionary

Force Commander, declared the island secured.

The time was 1615, 9 July 1944.

This was merely a formal declaration, however. It meant that all organized resistance

had ceased and that the entire island—technically at least—was in our hands. Or, as one

• Marine put it: "It means that if you get shot

how, you were hit in your own rear areas."

For the men of the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines,

70 4th Mar Div Report, section VI, 36-37.

word that the island was "secured" came as

something of a surprise. In the words of the

battalion's action report:

At 1615 a message was heard from an unknown station by tank liaison officer over tank TCS radio, that

the island was secured. Part of F Company was pinned

down on the beach for four hours by intense enemy

machine gun and rifle fire from the western cliff face

which resulted in one dead and ten wounded. This

company was not able to pull completely back on to the

high ground until darkness set in. It took five hours

to evacuate the wounded up the treacherous cliff:a

For the Japanese, hundreds of whom still

lurked in the many caves and recesses, "secured" had no meaning. Mopping up of these

die hards continued for months thereafter.

More than a year later, even after the final

surrender of Japan, there were still, Japanese

soldiers at large on Saipan.

Naval Activity

During the closing days of the operation, the

Navy bent a good share of its efforts toward

the improvement of facilities at Saipan. Tanapag Harbor would figure prominently in the

post-battle value of Saipan, and the task of

clearing mines, wrecked barges and ships was

already underway. By -6 July the Minesweeper

and Hydrographic Survey Group reported that

a 150-foot channel had been swept from Tanapag Harbor to the northwest docks. This set

the signal for initiation of work on the piers

and seaplane ramps in the Tanapag–Garapan

area.

There was no diminution in the pressure exerted against other islands in the Marianas.

Tinian, .Guam, and Rota were peppered daily

with bombs in preparation for contemplated

landings. On 7 July Admiral Spruance announced the target dates for two of them:

Guam-21 July, Tinian-24 July.

Japanese air activity in the _final days of

the campaign was weak and ineffective. During the night of 6-7 July, while Saito's loyal

subordinates prepared for the final banzai, 12

to 15 planes made two raids against Saipan

and ships near the island. Although the Condition Red lasted from just after dark until

after midnight, the raiders failed to achieve

any hits. In the process, U. S. night fighters

712d Bn, 24th Mar Report, 13. Bothwell.

243
from the fast carrier groups downed two of the

intruders and the destroyer Hudson accounted

for a third. Again, some Japanese planes

attempted to land at Marpi Point Airfield and

at North Field on Tinian but, apparently,

were frustrated by ships' gunfire.

The final air attack executed against Saipan

during the capture and occupation phase of

the operation came at 1945 on 7 July and lasted

until after midnight. In all, the Japanese

launched nine separate raids during the evening

but, aside from the dust, noise and excitement

kicked up by the 25 bombs dropped on Aslite

Airfield, achieved nothing. Night fighters rising from Saipan and from the fast carriers

divided the honors, each shooting down one

enemy plane.

Much more devastating attacks were launched

against the airfields at Saipan in the months

to follow, but the feeble display of 7 July

marked the last one prior to "securing" the

island on 9 July.72

As noted at various points throughout this

narrative, the Japinese ground troops were not

happy with the poor,showing of their aircraft.

Another indication of this appears in the diary

of an unidentified noncommissioned officer stationed on Tinian: "6 July—Did Vice Admiral

Kakuda (Commander in Chief 1st Air Fleet)

when he heard that the enemy had entered our

area go to sleep with joy?" 73

72 TP 51 Report, Encl. A, 13-14, and Annex 1 to

End l A.

CINCPAC-CINCP0A Item #11.405.

•

ELECTING TO DIE, hundreds of Saipan civilians refused surrender offers, flung children and selves upon the jagged

coastal rocks.

244
TANAPAG HARBOR'S MANIAGASSA ISLAND, a nuisance and threat to American shipping, was seized on 13 July by the

3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Ships in this pre-D-Day picture are Japanese. Muteho Point is in right background.

The Crowning Horror

Following the declaration that the island was

secured, efforts to induce cave-occupants to

surrender were intensified. Interpreters, using

public address systems, pleaded with people in

caves to come out. The device was not only

attempted from land but from sea as well. LCI

gunboats moved close inshore and broadcast

promises of good treatment, for which they

were answered with fire from Japanese soldiers

in the caves. Even some of Saipan's leading

citizens, who had surrendered and received

good treatment, talked to those in the caves,

urging them to yield. But, for the effort expended, the results were not encouraging. The

primary reason for this failure was that the

people had been saturated with Japanese

propaganda to the effect that the Americans

intended to torture and kill them. This had 

been repeated so often that the people came to

believe it.74

74 Another reason often mentioned is that Japanese

At this time the very zenith of horror occurred. Hundred of civilians, believing that

the end had come, embarked on a, ghastly exhibition of self-destruction. Casting their children ahead of them, or embracing them in

death, parents flung themselves from the cliffs

onto the jagged rocks below. Some waded into

the surf to drown or employed other gruesOme

means of destroying themselves. How many

civilians died in this orgy of mass hysteria is

not known. A commander of a patrol craft

(YP) said that progress of his- boat around

Marpi Point at this time was slow and tedious

because of the hundreds of corpses floating in

the water.

soldiers would not permit the civilians to surrender

and killed those who weakened. This was not borne

out, however, by an atrocity investigation which was

conducted by five officers from the NTLF G-2 Section.

Approximately 150 Japanese and Chamorro civilians

were interrogated on this point, and none testified that

they were threatened or used as shields by Japanese

soldiers. There is a strong possibility, however, that

those who would have testified differently are dead.

245
Maniagassa Island

One small objective in the Battle for Saipan

remained. This was tiny (250 yards wide, 300

yards long) Maniagassa Island in Tanapag

Harbor. Lying like a possessive apostrophe

some 2,500 yards northwest of the seaplane

base, the isle was known to be occupied. It was

conceivable that Japanese located there could

harass activities within the harbor as well as

provide Japanese on other islands with information relative to U. S. ship and plane movements. Even a small radio set could relay

messages to other islands in the Marianas for

further transmission to Japan.

The spegial assignment of capturing Maniagassa went to the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,

commanded once again by Lieutenant Colonel

John W. Easley.75 Preparations for this miniature operation were as complete as those for a

full-scale campaign. Air observers from the

2d Marine Division conducted the reconnaissance, took the necessary aerial photos, and di75 This officer had commanded the 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, during the D-Day landings, but had been

wounded and evacuated by D-plus 1. He returned to

duty in time for the closing stages of the operation.

246

rected supporting artillery fires. Naval gunfire

support was furnished by one LCI (G) firing

its 40mm guns. The 5th Amphibian Tractor

Battalion provided 25 LVT's to transport the

battalion, while five LVT (A)'s from the 2c1

Armored Amphibian Battalion rendered closein support.

With detailed preparations completed, the

landing was executed at 1100, 13 July 1944. In

the 15 minutes preceding this, the 10th Marines rained 900 105mm howitzer and 720

75mm shells upon the island. Nearly the entire objective was within the bursting radius

of each shell, and the target was well saturated.

Marines of Companies I and K hit the beach

unopposed and hastily set about completion of

their mission. Within an hour Maniagassa was

overrun. Of the 29 Japanese defenders, 15

were captured and the remainder killed. The

Marine casualty report was singular: one man

wounded in action. One rifle platoon and a

60mm mortar section were left to garrison the

new possession, and the remainder of the attacking force returned to Saipan.76

76 6th Mar Report, 17.
CHAPTER VII

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Conclusions

SUMMARY

Thus, in less than a month, Saipan had been

ripped from the enemy's determined clutches.

Tangible proof was again provided that persistence and determination are important adjuncts to, but never substitutes for, tools and

technique. As emphasized in many instances,

the Japanese were not wanting in individual

heroism. But in their willing hands were insufficient or inadequate tools. They did well

with what they had. It simply was not enough.

With Saipan "secured" the months of mopping

up began. To the men required to stalk and

ferret out the remaining Japanese hidden

about the island, "secured" had only psychological significance. The enemy whom they

sought was as real on 10 July as on the day

before. Possibilities of meeting death from the

dark shadows of a cave were still present. The

ground was just as hard at night. The flies

were every bit as thick. The canned rations

were monotondus and tasteless.

What, then, of the psychological implications? Only this: officers and enlisted men now

felt that caution was a more laudable quality

than bravery; patience more important than

aggressiveness. The unspoken maxim applied:

"Look before you leap." In the fevered excitement of battle, news of friendly casualties was

accepted with stoic calm; minds, as well as

bodies, became conditioned to combat. But

every man hit after 9 July—and there were

many—became a matter of personal sorrow to

all that heard of it. At last there was time

to be sad.

Naval Gunfire

In considering the tools that attained the

U. S. success, naval gunfire looms forth conspicuously. During the pre-D-Day bombardment certain factors (listed on page 36, Chapter I) limited the effectiveness of preparatory

fires. But these notwithstanding, naval gunfire achieved appreciable results at Saipan.

Foremost in achievement was the almost complete rupture of enemy communications. Although this did not represent the fruits of a

single weapon or arm, certainly ships' gunfire

deserves a great amount of credit. .Admittedly,

total ammunition expenditure does not necessarily mirror the effectiveness of a weapon, but

it does reflect the vigor of the effort. Total

rounds expended on troop support missions

(not counting pre-D-Day bombardment) by

battleships, cruisers and destroyers in the Saipan operation were 138,391, a weight of over

8,500 tons. In addition to this, 5,882 starshells

were fired.'

The tremendous impression upon the Japanese created by U. S. naval gunfire is indicated

1 Expeditionary Troops, Marianas Report, Naval

Gunfire Support, Appendix A to Part 2, Enclosure G.

Of the battleships, Tennessee fired the most rounds

with 5,579; of the cruisers, Birmingham led the field

with 12,673, followed by Cleveland with 10,149; destroyer TVadleigh could claim the honors in its class,

firing 4,598 rounds, over 1,000 more than its closest

competitor (Pringle).

247
ARCH OF TRIUMPH. Ala rines return from mopping-up

patrol after Saipan was declared secure. •

in the following extracts from prisoner of war

interrogations and captured documents:

. . . I was horrified by the number of deaths on our

side due to the naval gunfire which continued every

day.

We did not stay long in this fourth headquarters.

Caught in the concentration of naval gunfire the

wounded and dead continued to increase.

. . . most feared . . . was the naval shelling which

managed to reach the obscure mountain caves where

. . . CPs were located.

The greatest single factor in the American success

. . . [was] naval gunfire

The feeling of everyone is 'if they would only stop

the naval shelling. . .

The enemy naval gunfire, using mainly a shell with

attached instantaneous fuze (land shell) has great destructive power. They also use a shrapnel shell. The

call fire on land is extremely quick and exact and until

night attack units are some tens of metres from the

enemy they continue to receive naval gunfire.

. . . The practical experiences of the defense forces in

Saipan in the battle which lasted over half a month

lay only in power of the enemy naval bombardment. . . .

This is by no means a complete list of the

testimonials, but this sampling clearly indicates Japanese opinion of this weapon. As the

NTLF Naval Gunfire Report summarizes:

Naval gunfire is a powerful, weapon in amphibious

248

operations. It has many important uses even after a

successful landing has been made ashore. In order to

properly utilize the weapon and to take full advantage

of its capabilities, its control ashore must be placed

in the hands of highly trained and experienced personnel. Future planning and training should take this

into account.2

Air Support

Working hand in glove with ships' gunfire

during the preparatory stages and, subsequently, in support of troops ashore was the

aircraft's strafing and bombing. Since 11 June,

when Mitscher's Task Force 58 trespassed the

Marianas' waters and skies, the planes had

been engaged in almost constant action. The

Marianas, and more specifically Saipan, placed

the air war on its most equal basis up to that

time in the Central Pacific. The lightning

knockout which had been the rule in the Gilberts and Marshalls did not obtain at Saipan.

The unconscious foe kept reviving himself and

contesting the issue.

Why this was true is no mystery: geographically and strategically the Marianas demanded decisive defense. This was basic, simple and logical. The implications of U. S.

seizure of these islands were more than the

Japanese higher command cared to ponder.

With a prodigality born of desperation and

fright, the Japanese squandered their aircraft.

It was like a gambler attempting to recoup

his losses with larger wagers. While momentarily causing some rearrangement and adjustment of U. S. dispositions and plans, this

extravagance finally resulted in a resounding

defeat for the enemy and, as noted previously,

after the Battle of the Philippine Sea the Japanese fast carrier fleet virtually retired from

the war. Land-based aircraft, however, flying

from Japan via the Bonins or Volcanos, then

to fields in the Marianas or Palaus, delivered

a series of raids on U. S. ships and installations at Saipan.

Admiral Mitscher's fast carriers played the

key role in repulsing the enemy fleet, but it remained for the escort carriers 8 to stave off

2NTLF Naval Gunfire Report, 19-21.

3The escort carriers (CVE's), used experimentally

in the Gilberts campaign, had performed so excellently
UNITED STATES NAVAL GUNFIRE scored a direct hit on this 6-inch naval gun casemate on Agingan Point. After being overrun, the position served United States personnel as an observation post.

those raiders that penetrated to Saipan itself.

Helping in this task were U. S. Army P-47's

stationed at Aslito Airfield.

Any recital of the exploits of planes at Saipan which fails to mention the valuable OY

observation aircraft would be an incomplete

one indeed. These vulnerable little planes performed nobly in their myriad assignments. Not

only did they focus the wrath of U. S. artillery

on Japanese troops and installations, but they

acquired a wealth of intelligence information

and proved so valuable that they were a "must" in the

Marianas. In all, 12 participated.

8895900-50-17

by their constant snooping over the enemy's

holdings.

Close support of ground troops presented no

innovations or departures from accepted technique. Initially, strike groups for infantry

support were furnished by planes from the

•carriers of Task Force 58, while antisubmarine

and combat air patrols, photographic, smoke,

observer, spotter, and air delivery missions

went to planes on the CVE's. After the forenoon of 17 June, however, most of the close

support was furnished by Navy planes flying

from CV.E's and later by Army planes from

Aslito Airfield. During the first days of the

249
campaign there were, at times, as many as

twelve "urgent" requests for close support missions. Since it was physically impossible for

aircraft to operate in a restricted area on more

than one mission at a time, a filter system was

devised whereby the officer handling the support air request net passed the mission to the

air liaison officer at the regimental or division

command post for screening and decision as to

which mission, then pending, deserved priority.

This system of lower-level screening worked

satisfactorily and was the best solution considering that only one Support Aircraft Control Party controlled aircraft supporting three

divisions. For this party to perform all screening itself would have imposed more of a workload than it could have handled efficiently.

After artillery had been established ashore,

fewer requests were made for air, and the latter's missions were confined to targets which,

owing to the configuration of the terrain, could

be struck best from above.

The most oft-heard complaint regarding

close air support at Saipan Was that too much

time was required getting strikes executed.

Through the lengthy process of requesting the

mission, effecting coordination, designating the

target, and finally having the mission flown,

infantry units had to wait. A large majority

of the requested missions were cancelled by

reason of the infantry advancing past targets

before the planes appeared.

In his report after the operation, General

Holland Smith expressed the opinion that it

was unwise to depend upon the fast carriers for

close support, since these would' frequently be

needed to battle the enemy flet (as they had in

the Battle of the Philippine Sea). Further,

these carriers would often be unavailable for

vital rehearsals preceding the various operations. This, Holland Smith felt, was unfortunate. For these reasons, he recommended:

... that sufficient air groups he designated and trained

as direct support groups and be assigned to CVE type

carriers.

. . . that Marine Aviation provide air groups for this

specialized duty. The troop experience of senior Marine

pilots combined with the indoctrination of new pilots

in infantry tactics should insure greater cooperation

and coordination between air and ground units.4

4COMINCH P-007, CG JtExpTrps, 2-7.

250

Favorable action on Holland Smith's recommendation is indicated by the following paragraph from Admiral Nimitz' report:

Four CVE's have been designated for close (troop)

support and will embark Marine aircraft squadrons.

It is not anticipated that Marine squadrons will furnish all close air support but they will be used • with

Marine divisions when the situation permits. In addition a certain number of Marine aviators are being

assigned to the various amphibious force flagships to

assist in the control of support aircraft.5

Artillery

Certainly the four major artillery units (one

from each division plus XXIV Corps Artillery) performed a vital function at Saipan.6

The total number of rounds fired, 291,495,7

tells only part of the story; time and time again

the 75's, 105's and 155's brought timely, effective fire on the precise source of enemy resistance. Throughout this narrative the excellence

of this support has been taken for granted, just

as it was at the time. All artillery units were

exceptionally well-trained and well-led and,

once assigned missions, hit their targets. This

excellence of performance must not be forgotten

or mistaken in any subsequent criticism of

artillery coordination.

Only a minute proportion of the accidents

resulting from misdirected artillery fire can be

traced to errors by gunners. In any case, these

can neither be determined nor analyzed. The

bulk of the trouble arose from the fact that

5'1-bid., 2-8.

6 General Harper capsulized the XXIV- Corps Artillery's role by saying that "... it reaped a harvest and

accomplished more in furtherance of the common cause

than possibly has ever been done by a similar group of

battalions in the history of the Army: Saipan was a

Corps Artilleryman's dream." Ltr from BrigGen A. M.

Harper to CG, USAFICPA, 13:111144.

7 This figure is derived from an addition of the totals

of each unit as listed in individual action reports. All,

save the 27th Division artillery, gave a specific figure

for Saipan; the exception gave a grand total for Saipan

and Tinian but did not separate the two. A reasonably

accurate estinnite was provided, however, by the fact

that approx el y two-thirds of its missions were

fired at Saipan; arid, thus, approximately two-thirds

of its ammunition were expended there also. This

total does not include the rounds fired by the cannon

companies of the three infantry regiments of the 27th

Division, nor those fired by the regimental weapons

companies of the Marine regiments.
there was no strong, central control of the four

separate artillery units. This meant that no

single source could be consulted to find out who

was firing where. Before an air support mission could be flown, for example, it was necessary to check with each individual artillery

unit. Though time-consuming, this process had

to be followed rigidly to preclude the possibility of friendly aircraft flying into the path

of onrushing artillery shells. The most serious

consequence of this situation was that troop

commanders, having requested the air strike,

had to delay their moves Until it was executed.8

Much more critical than the long waits, however, were the instances of barrages landing

within U. S. lines. Since it was inconceivable

that a forward observer would deliberately call

in fire upon his own head, the conclusion 'drawn

was that most of these misdirected concentrations were called by observers on a flank. It

was long-established doctrine that artillery

should not fire outside its own division zone

without specific permission from the adjacent

division concerned; and, since all artillerymen

were well indoctrinated on this point, it must

be assumed that this was general practice. Just

how many, if any, accidents occurred because

of a violation of this policy can not be estimated.

What, then, of the instances where permission to fire was requested and granted? Normally, this would appear virtually to guarantee

the mission's safety. In most cases it did. In

some others, however, there is the possibility

that the front line unit had not accurately reported its position or that the report was incorrectly plotted on situation maps. Another

startling possibility is that the unit requesting

permission to fire outside of its zone had erred

in its map reading, failing to orient properly

an area on the ground to one on the map. Thus,

permission to fire on a specific map location

8 Two plans were in effect at Saipan to protect

planes from the high ordinates of howitzers. One plan

restricted the trajectory of shells in a given area to a

specific maximum height. The other stopped all artillery fire within a prescribed area. The latter plan

was the subject of vehement complaints from infantry

commanders, who at times were denied artillery support for periods ranging from 30 to 90 minutes.

may have been granted, whereas the rounds

themselves would fall into a ground area occupied by friendly troops. The map of Saipan,

as indicated before, left much to be desired,

and on many occasions individuals believed

themselves on certain terrain features located

in one area when in actuality they were in

another.

Obviously, the addition of a strong artillery

coordination agency would not automatically

have solved all these difficulties. Even welloiled machinery requires human hands to set it

in motion. But few persons will deny that more

centralized control of the artillery was needed

at Saipan.

The "joint operations section," an embryo coordination and control agency foE all three supporting arms (air, naval gunfire, artillery),

functioned from the NTLF command post.

But, hampered by a shortage of personnel and

communications, it was unprepared to control

properly all the U. S. artillery. Most of its

information had to be secured by roundabout,

indirect means which slowed its processes and

limited its effectiveness. Representatives of all

three supporting arms were present in the section, however, and the work they did, with limited resources, was excellent. The limitations

of the group is indicated in the following excerpt from the Corps Artillery report:

Each time an air strike was requested by. an Air

Liaison Officer . to Commander Support Air Afloat, it

was necessary for the Commander Support Air to call

Commander Support Air Ashore by radio who in turn

inquired of the Corps Artillery representative [Assistant S-3] whether or not the Corps Artillery was

firing in a given area. He then had to call the Corps

Artillery EEC (where it was frequently necessary to

call the Groups or Battalions) and pass the information back to Commander Support Air Afloat along the

same chain of communications. A similar situation

existed with naval gunfire, but the time element was

not as vital nor was there the necessity for closely

timed coordination since naval gunfire and artillery

fires do not necessarily interfere with each other.°

Landing Vehicles

Selection of the LVT as the principal landing vehicle was demanded by the fringing reef

off Saipan's western beaches. These vehicles

9XXIV Corps Arty S-3 Report, 12-13.

251
FLAME-THROWER TANK shoots stream of fire into an enemy cave. Marine at rear of vehicle is talking on sound

powered telephone to tankmen.

proved eminently satisfactory. During the long

D-Day churn from the line of departure to the

beach, many officers .and men cursed the slowness of the LVT's, but when the tracks ground

into the reef, hung for an agonizing moment,

then clawed .for the beach, the curses became

murmurs of appreciation.

Bobbing like ping pong balls in the choppy

seas, armored amphibians (or amphibian tanks

as the Army called them) preceded the troopcarrying LVT's. It is doubtful that while

afloat armored LVT's were able to locate and

hit point targets, but the fact that continuous

fire was maintained upon the beaches was

enough to confirm their value. During the shipto-shore movement there is a short, but critical,

252

interval in which the troops are too close to the

shore to permit naval gunfire or air bombardment of the landing beaches. During this

period at Saipan the armored LVT's assumed

the starring role. Once upon the beach, these

vehicles suffered heavily.

The name "armored amphibian" presents a

false picture of the invulnerability of this

vehicle. While in the water the vulnerable

points are protected, but once it emerges upon

the dry land of the beach, or hangs for a moment at the reef's edge, it presents a huge area

-which can easily be penetrated by almost any

caliber of enemy shells. In reality, only the

turret is armored, the remainder is an inviting

Achilles heel.
The value of the armored LVT's did not end

with the ship-to-shore movement. They performed vital missions of beach security during

the nights and executed fire missions against

enemy coast line cliff positions during the days.

Significant in the Saipan operation was the

introduction of the LVT (4), which included a

ramp for loading and discharge of cargo.-

Jeeps, artillery pieces, and other heavy gear

were unloaded without the use of booms or

cranes—and with far less hazard to troops.1°

The 4th Marine Division's plan to move to

the high ground (0-1) aboard LVT's did not

prove feasible. Only a few of the vehicles made

the trip successfully. The failure of this bold

tactic may be attributed to two causes: first,

the vehicles provided large, slow-moving targets for enemy weapons, and, second, the terrain at many points forbade movement inland.

Every one of 719 LVT's and LVT (A.)'s in

scheduled assault waves debarked from LST's

on D-Day, and over 98 percent of these reached

the beaches as planned. Considering the heavy

volume of enemy fire which peppered the

Ltr from MO W. C. Stoll, Jr., to CMC,11Jan50.

beaches, this percentage is surprisingly high.

Grouping combat and non-combat losses into

single categories, casualties in amphibian vehicles for the entire operation were as follows:

armored LVT's-65; cargo LVT's-139.11

Tanks

While no startling innovations in tactics . Or

technique in the employment of tanks were unveiled at Saipan, the Operations of _these

weapons were a vital, and often decisive, factor

in each day's operations. Aside from proving

their superiority over the enemy's tanks whenever a duel could be provoked, U. S. tumor

blasted pillboxes and caves impeding the infantry advance, assisted in the evacuation of

casualties, carried vital supplies to hardpressed front line troops, and, on at least one

occasion, provided a mobile observation post

for the direction of naval gunfire. Throughout

the operation they were valuable to the perpetuation of a high state ,of morale among the

soldiers and Marines who felt that virtually

11 NTLF LVT Officer's Report, 26Jul44. Ltr from

LtCol V. J. Croizat to CMC, 20Dec49.

MEDIUM TANKS move through favorable terrain on Saipan. The firepower of these weapons was a vital factor in the

speedy United States success.

253
(

nothing could stop them as long .as tanks were

present.

Saipan marked a further growth in the technique of tank-infantry cooperation. After the

inevitable growing pains of earlier campaigns

and training areas, the tank-infantry concept

reached full maturity at Saipan. Here,

through terrain more variable than that encountered in previous Pacific operations, the

tank-infantry team passed the rigid test of

combat.

At least one item of equipment which made

its first battle appearance at Saipan is worthy

of special note: tanks employing flame-throwers

as their main weapons. Though imperfect in

many respects, these served a useful purpose,

particularly in close assault on troublesome

locales. But against more distant targets the

weapon's effectiveness was limited by the short

range of its fire stream, together with the unavailability of napalm, demanding that ordinary fuel oil be burned. Many of the principles

of tactical employment, as well as suggestions

for improvements in design and maintenance,

developed at Saipan.12

The operation also marked the first extensive

use—by the Marine Corps—of the tank-dozer.

This vehicle, nothing more than a medium tank

with a bulldozer blade installed on its bow,

performed vital missions of digging and filling,

while at the same time providing armored

protection to its personnel.

Devices for the added protection of tanks,

such as fencing the sponsons with oak planking as a preventive measure against magnetic

; mines, were further developed at Saipan. Many

vehicles had reinforced concrete between the

planking and the armor plate as well as additional tank blocks '',Welded to the glacis plate

and turret. Saipan was an important period of

vtielaboration and development in the technique

' 12 This was the progenitor of a much improved flame-

'thrower vehicle used by the 1st Marine Division a few

months later at Peleliu. Chief improvement of the

Peleliu flame-thrower was a great increase in the

range of the fire stream, but the vehicle upon which

it was mounted—an LVT17-was too vulnerable for full

effectiveness. •The obvious outgrowth of this was the

Installation of the long-range flame-thrower on a

medium Sherman tank. This weapon was used in the

Iwo Jima operation.

'

; 254

of added protection, a technique that reached

its zenith in the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations.

Perhaps the most unusual single items of

equipment relating to tanks at Saipan were

rubber, self-sealing water tanks, fastened to

the bustles of some of the 4th Tank Battalion's

vehicles, enabling infantrymen to fill canteens

in the midst of a fire fight.13

Engineers

The functions of the engineers, in almost

any campaign, may be brushed over with the

brief notation that they did a good job. And

yet this inadvertently implies that the life of

an engineer is really not so bad after all. Such

cursory handling represents the fact that much

of what the engineers do is routine, unglamorous, and tiresome. Certainly there is little

narrative value in the improvement of a road,

establishment of water purifier, or removal of

a tank barrier; these are tedious and humdrum

activities which are taken for granted. Even

the touchy job of disarming bombs, mines and

booby traps normally becomes an individual or

small group project and captures only passing

interest when performed in the midst of an

island conquest. One may only shudder to

contemplate the effect on the tactical scheme if

all these prosaic engineer duties were not performed, however. Engineer support is inextricably tied to the activities of the infantry,

and it is only fitting and proper that this relationship be recognized in its true light.

The vital shore party function was executed

by the engineers, also. .Initially assigned to

this backbreaking labor were the Pioneer (2d)

Battalions of the 18th and 20th -Marines (2d

and 4th Divisions respectively)and two naval

construction (Seabee) battalions (18th and

121st). When the two Seabee units left the

beach on 18 June for work on Aslito Airfield,

the Army's 152d Engineer Battalion (part of

the Saipan Garrison Force) took over shore

party functions on the Blue Beaches. At night

shore party personnel assumed responsibility

for beach security.

Later in the operation, when ships were un18 R. K. Schmidt.
COMMUNICATION TEAM OF 1ST JASCO operates its .SCR 284. Good United States communications at Saipan were

the. key to controlling the complex amphibious assault forces. Poor Japanese communications, made worse by

United States fire superiority, were fatal to General Saito's maneuver schemes.

loaded, shore parties were released for infantry

missions. The 2d Marine Division formed its

returning shore party personnel into a Provisional Battalion which was used for a number of security and mopping-up assignments.

The 4th Division did not reorganize its pioneer

battalion .after reversion but attached companies to infantry regiments for "defensive

missions only."

So far, only incidental mention has been

made of the combat, or assault, engineers. The

1st Battalions of the 18th and 20th Marines

and the 102d Engineer Battalion (U. S. Army)

furnished personnel especially trained in the

assault and demolition of blockhouses, pillboxes and caves. These battalions were broken

up into companies and attached to the infantry

regiments on the basis of one combat engineer

company each. Then followed the breakdown

from company to platoon with one assault engineer platoon being assigned to each infantry

battalion.14 These attachments remained constant throughout the operation, and in nearly

every instance in which demolitions were required, these engineers performed their dangerous specialty."

With these amplifying remarks, then, it is

safe to say that the engineers did a good job,

without fear that the statement will be undervalued.

14 On 1 May 1945 a change in Marine Corps Tables

of Organization placed an assault platoon in each infantry battalion. This platoon, similar to the assault

engineer platoons that operated at Saipan, was organized, equipped and trained to execute missions of assault

on fortified positions.

15 20th Mar Report, 1-13. 102d Engr Report, 1-3.

255
Signal Communications

In any careful analysis of the Japanese situation at Saipan, the failure of communications

crops forth steadily. Enemy commanders

nearly always found their hands tied by the

absence or means to pass on instructions to

their subordinates. It would be difficult to determine just how many of the enemy's ill-coordinated attacks could be traced directly to

poor communications.

U. S. commanders, on the other hand, had

a completely different experience and were

nearly always able to reach subordinates,(usually by several means) to convey instructions,

orders and information. This was a priceless

advantage. One regimental commander pointed

out, in this connection:

. . . our communications worked so well that there is

a general disposition to take them for granted. The

work of signal troops is not spectacular and goes unnoticed when everything is in working order, but abuse

is heaped upon them for each little failure. Sections

were usually under-manned and their work was never

finished.16

One item of signal equipment left much to

be desired: the infantry platoon leader's radio

(SCR 536). Unpredictable, fragile, shortranged, easily affected by moisture, the tiny

sets did not answer the requirements. The need

for improvement of these radios was apparent

to all who had to depend upon them for communications.17

Logistics

Logistics is "that branch of military art that

comprises everything relating to the movement

and supply of troops."18 To most fighting men

the term took on a significance as fundamental

as beans and bullets. Few realized, for example, that embarked in the assault shipping

for Saipan was a ratio of over a ton of equipment and supplies to each man of the landing

force.19 Only by pausing for a moment over

that starting truth may we realize the tremendous scope of logistical support. And, of

course, the supply of troops did not end with

16 Wallace.

17 ur from Capt W. H. Pickett to CMC, 9Jan50.

18 Modern Military Dictionary, 1936, Max B. Garber.

16 COMINCH P-007, 5-4. -

256

the landing, nor even with securing of the

island. It may accurately be stated that the

logistical task is never done.

Tonnage carried by individual ships at

Saipan was greater than in previous operations.

In earlier days of the war, when air supremacy

over target areas was questionable, transports

were lightly loaded with the aim of quick unloading and rapid routing to a rear area. With

the air issue no longer in doubt, it followed

that the tonnage could be increased.

In general, throughout the operation, supply

functioned without critical hitches. In the

matter of mortar and artillery ammunition,

however, there were shortages from time to

time. This situation caused General Holland

Smith to comment that "seven units of fire for

artillery and mortar ammunition were generally inadequate.” In view of this, he recommended that, in the future, ten units of fire

be carried for these weapons.2°

Medical

Few persons, indeed, are aware of the great

number of personnel engaged in medical activities during a combat operation. The surgeon

of the 27th Division shed some interesting statistical light on this situation:

The medical service of the Division and attached

troops included the 102d Medical Battalion, the 98th

Portable Surgical Hospital, the 28th Field Hospital,

and the organic Medical Detachments with each regiment, separate battalion, etc. This made a total of

approximately 100 Medical Officers and 1200 Medical

Department enlisted men, or one Medical Department

man for every 14 combatants. [Author's italics.]21

A check of the rosters of the two Marine

divisions reveals a ratio of about one doctor or

corpsman to.every 17 Marines.

It is almost' superfluous to state that these

medical personnel were busy. 'While a great

number of minor wounds were handled directly

in the battalion and regimental aid stations

and never were admitted to division hospitals,

the following table of admissions indicates the

extent of the latters' activities:

22/bi4., 5-18. An examination of the Peleliu and

Iwo Jima action reports reveals that this recommendation was not adopted for those campaigns.

.21 27th Division Surgeon's Report, 1.
SAIPAN HOSPITAL was rough but ready. Speedy evacuation and expert medical attention was a key factor in maintaining high morale.

TOTAL ADMISSIONS (all causes)

2nd Marine Division Hospital 5,156 22

4th Marine Division Hospital 5,20323

27th Infantry Division Hospital 4,274 24

In addition to the medical units attached to

the divisions were several Corps installations:

Medical Battalion, V Amphibious Corps; 31st

Field Hospital (Army) ; 2d and 3d Provi-

. _

22 Report of activities of Medical Department, 2d

Marine Division during FORAGER Operation, 8.

23 Medical Report, 4th Marine Division, 7.

24 27th Division Surgeon's Report, Table I. This report actually showed an aggregate of 5,166, 892 of

whom were killed in action. In the interest of consistency with Marine reports (which did not include

!CIA's under Admissions) these 892 have been subtracted from the total.

sional Portable Surgical Hospitals (Army).

And, though not actually on the island, the

doctors, nurses and corpsmen of the hospital

ships (Solace, Bountiful, Relief and Samaritan) further swell the totals of medical personnel.

Also, though not specifically carried on

muster roles as medical personnel, the Marine

and soldier stretcher bearers were a vital cog

in the evacuation machinery. The lion's share

of credit for this dangerous, fatiguing task

goes to the men of the division bands, who, in

combat situations, put aside their cornets and

trombones to man the stretchers. Few tasks in

combat are more thankless and heart-rending

than this. Obviously, these specially-assigned

stretcher bearers could not perform the entire

257
EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES was difficult and fatiguing.

Here a poncho is used as a stretcher, a substitution

often necessary because of a shortage of stretchers.

chore, and it was often necessary to assign

regular combat troops to the job.

Still another category of personnel engaged

in medical support can be made of the pilots

who successfully air-evacuated 860 casualties

from Saipan to hospitals in the Marshalls.

The only new medical problem presented at

Saipan was the extra work load imposed by

the thousands of civilians, many of whom required care. Without exception, medical installations performed all tasks excellently and

earned the esteem and gratitude of all hands.

Japanese Tactical Lessons

In no battle up to that time were the Japanese as conscientious about reporting and analyzing U. S. combat methods as they were at

Saipan. The volume of messages dealing purely

with tactical lessons clearly indicates that the

importance of this information had been forcefully impressed on all Japanese commanders.

Some of the conclusions and deductions based

upon these reports are of interest, particularly

since many of them coincide with U. S. opinions on the same subjects.

258

A staff officer of the Japanese Combined

Fleet, Captain Taisa Shimamura,, wrote one of

the more astute studies on the subject of tactical lessons. Prepared in August 1944, the

document was captured at Leyte, Philippine

Islands in October-November • 1944. The captain's observations as to the place of the U. S.

landings on Saipan is of interest:

Since the 31 Army's arrival on Saipan in March of

this year all estimates were consistently in agreement

that the enemy would attempt landings at the harbor

on the west coast of Saipan, particularly at Oreai (the

actual landing place), and that he *ould attempt to

seize the "Aslito" airfield. In May the defending forces

even simulated such an action and executed joint ArmyNavy maneuvers. However, there were many other

suitable landing beaches elsewhere on the island.

Therefore it was not possible to concentrate sufficient

combat strength at °real.

Shimamura's remarks regarding the Japanese organization of the ground point up

s,hortcomings which U. S. reports also emphasized:

Although the enemy landing area was anticipated

, yet because of the following factors, fortifications had

not progressed much beyond the stage of a single line

of light defensive positions.

a. Coral sand impeded the strengthening of the beach

positions.

b. Cement did not arrive (due to transport sinkings).

c. Although the defense plan had been established,

the defensive positions were not organized in depth

owing to a change in command during preparations.

Light shelters were constructed here and there in the

beach position. There were practically no communication trenches leading from the beach position to the

rear. There were no obstacles on the beach.26

Relative to the conduct of the defense at

Saipan, Captain Shimamura observed:

On the night of the 16th [June], we carried out a

large scale night attack [against the 6th Marines].

One battalion broke through a portion of the • enemy's

line and penetrated to his rear, but we suffered great

losses. Contact between higher headquarters and the

attacking force was disrupted and there was even a

rumor that Lt. Gen. Saito had been killed in action.

Further on in the same document is a logical

conclusion to the tactic of launching all-out

night attacks:

. . . it may be inferred that a more flexible delaying

action might have been executed even though the enemy

25 Captured Japanese document, "Tactical Lessons—

Naval Shelling of Saipan," Captain Taisa Shimamura,

August 1944, 2.

26Ibid., 2-3.
had command of sea and air, if fortification and communication had been adequate, if we had made thorough preparations for the effective employment of our

forces, and it we had avoided the sudden weakening

of our defensive potential by limiting the number of

troops used in the night attack.27

It is significant to note that many of the

Japanese commanders recognized that the

frantic night assaults were foolish wastes ofmanpower; but, rather than recommending

that this long-established tactic be discarded,

they instead suggested that the number of

troops committed to the nocturnal efforts be

reduced. Here is illustrated a basic, fundamental flaw in Japanese military thinking

which had been evidenced in every operation

since the war's beginning: whenever there was

doubt in a commander's mind as to the success of a venture, he cut down the number of

troops committed and, thus, foredoomed it to

almost certain failure.

All of the reasoning leading up to a specific

recommendation in regard to night attacks is

present in the following passages from Shimamura's study, but a helpful conclusion is not

forthcoming:

In the execution of our night attacks, we must give

further study to the coordinated use of our strength,

the use of smoke, and the use of small, picked units.

But the chief consideration [author's italics] is the fact

that . . . a night attack by the bulk of the defending

force might defeat its purpose and help the enemy in

securing his landing.

Thus leaving the reader suspended, the captain

anticlimatically added: "The night attack is

our only recourse against the enemy, but at

present even it has only a slight chance of

success.7)28

Japanese conclusions in regard to U. S.

naval gunfire have already been quoted, but

Shimamura's analysis exposes one point which

other enemy sources did not (and which many

U. S. sources did) :

The duration of naval shelling during landing preparations depends upon the degree of neutralization and

destruction the enemy deems necessary. Apparently

„ because of heavy losses [suffered by U. S. forces]. in

the Saipan landing after only two days of preliminary

shelling, in their subsequent landing on Guam, pre27 Ibid., 4-5.

28 Ibid., 8-9.

liminary shelling continued for ten days with the obvious intention of destroying gun emplacements and

positions.29

The lessons learned in regard to the application of air power were a summary of more than

the Saipan operation:

Needless to say, air power is the best means of disrupting an enemy landing. However, there is not a1.

single instance in the past where the enemy was destroyed upon landing or his plans frustrated by air:!,

power. In view of this, the urgent need of the moment

upon which the fate of our nation depends, is to supple;..

ment the combat power of the forces responsible fcii;

island defense by the consolidated use of all available

weapons and Material.

In another part of the same document Captain!

Shimamura commented that the Japanese.

forces had been "exposed to such air superiority since Guadalcanal, and . . . have been :'

completely immobilized by day in battle after:

battle."3°

Perhaps the most important tactical lesson

which the Japanese drew from Saipan was the

importance of organizing their defenses in.

depth. At Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa,

the enemy did not depend upon a shallow,

linear defense but, instead, prepared positions

in considerable depth. Bitter experience finally

taught its lesson, but the Japanese were reluctant pupils.

One of the foremost criticisms of Japanese

tactics by U. S. sources was the failure to mass

artillery fire. Later in the war the enemy corrected this shortcoming, but it is interesting to

note that the weakness is not mentioned in any

of the Japanese messages or studies prepared

after Saipan.

Japanese Strategical Summary

The decisive defeat at Saipan shook Tokyo

to its deepest roots. Almost unanimously, in29 Ibid., 6. Unfortunately, Shimamura credited us

with a deduction that we did not make. The lengthy

preparation for Guam was more accidental than

planned, inasmuch as the reason was the delay imposed

by the necessity of returning ships from the Marianas

to Pearl Harbor to lift the 77th Infantry Division. The

commitment of the 27th Division at Saipan had left a

vacancy in the Guam plans which had to be tilled.

Spruance.

30Ibid., 7-8.

259
THE VICTOR at Saipan was the-front line infantryman,

who, despite the tremendous tonnage of supporting

fires, still had to root out and defeat the enemy. Here

a 16-inch naval shell provides a seat for a ragged

Marine as he returns several days' accumulation of

topsoil to Saipan. This man's rifle is clean.

formed Japanese concluded that the war was

lost. Three months before the Saipan operation began, the Japanese General Staff recommended making peace with the United States

because of severe shipping losses, but it was not

until the jolting loss of Saipan that the opinion

became general. After the shocking news had

reached Tokyo, Premier Hideki Tojo announced that: ",Japan has come to face an unprecedentedly great national crisis." Almost

immediately, Tojo, the one man most responsible for his country's entry into the war, was

relieved as active head of the Japanese army,

which post he held by virtue of his position as

Chief of Staff. This was only the beginning

of Tojo's downfall; on 18 July 1944 Tojo, with

his entire cabinet, resigned, and General Kuniaki Koiso succeeded him as premier. The

new government was charged with giving

260

"fundamental reconsideration" to the problem

of continuing the war."

After stating that he considered Guadalcanal the turning point from Japan's offensive

to defensive, Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano,

Supreme Naval Advisor to the Emperor, spoke

in forceful terms of that time when Japan's

hopes for effective defense ended. "When we

lost Saipan, Hell is on us."32 Vice Admiral

Shigeru Fukudome, who had served in a number of prominent naval positions, spoke along

the same lines: "With the loss of the Marianas

I felt that the last chance had slipped from us

definitely." Lending further testimony to the

same opinion was Vice Admiral Shigeyosh

Miwa, who said: "Our war was lost with the

loss of Saipan. I feel it was a decisive battle.

The loss of Saipan meant [that the U. S.]

could cut off our shipping and attack our

homeland."34

As noted in the narrative of the Battle of the

Philippine Sea, Japanese naval air strength

had been virtually eliminated from the war in

that decisive engagement. Captain Mitsuo

Fuchida, air staff officer to the Commander in

Chief, Combined Fleet, underlined this fact:

. this operation [Marianas] was to be a decisive one

because we felt if the Marianas were lost there could

no longer be a dependable line even in the Philippines.

So we planned an all out attack and used up practically

all of our air strength.35

31 Campaigns, 220.

32 USSBS Interrogation Nay No. 80, Fleet Admiral

Nagano, Osami, Chief of Naval General Staff Apr41—

Feb44 ; Supreme Naval Advisor to the Emperor, 20

Nov45.

33 USSBS Interrogation Nay No. 115, VAdm Fukudome, Shigeru, IJN, 9-12Dec45. Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet from 1940 to Apr41 ; Chief First Section,

Naval General Staff, Tokyo, Apr41—May43 ; Chief of

Staff, Combined Fleet from May43—Mar44 ; Commander, Second Air Fleet, Ju144-15Jan45 ; Commander,

10th Area Fleet, 15Jan45—Dec45.

84IISSBS Interrogation Nay No. 72, VAdm Miwa,

Shigeyosh, IJN ; successively director Naval Submarine

Department and CinC Sixth (Submarine) Fleet.

35 USSBS Interrogation Nay No. 99, Capt Fuchida

Mitsuo, IJN, 25Nov45. Senior staff officer of First Air

Fleet in which capacity he served in the Marianas

Sept43—Apr44 ; air staff officer to CinC Combined Fleet

from Apr44 to end of war.
THE COST of Saipan was over 3,001) killed. Here a rifle and helmet mark the location of a dead Marine so that

. he may be picked up for proper burial.

The Assessment

It is plain, from these expressions, that the

Japanese were fully cognizant of what Saipan's

loss meant. Their assessment was accurate:

it was the the beginning of the end.

To relatives of fighting men in the far-oft

United States, news of casualties (see Appendix III) was staggering. Imperceptible to

many were the facts that the enemy's fleet had

lost the potential of operating beyond the coy-.

ering range of shore-based aircraft and that a

base providing adequate airfields for longrange raids against the Japanese homeland had

been seized. These were vital truths, which

Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal expressed as follows: "The final occupation of

Saipan will enable us to project surface and air

operations that will include the mainland of

Japan, .the Philippines, and a greater part of

the Dutch East Indies."36

But even for those who took the trouble to

examine a map and found that Saipan was,

indeed, within land-based aircraft striking distance of the Empire, the true import was not

apparent. To most, Saipan was a dirty little

plot of ground, many thousands of miles from

the United States, where over 3,000 Americans

died. In the frantic flood of war news and the

continuation of the assault against Japan, it is

doubtful that many United States citizens ever

made the real assessment.

Looking back on the battle, realizing its significance in the course of the war in the Pacific.

36 Quoted from History of World War II, Miller, 683

261
I?

analyzing its effect on the Japanese military

and citizenry, we may now recognize Saipan in

its proper perspective. In this connection, General Holland Smith wrote:

I have always considered Saipan the decisive battle

of the Pacific offensive. Creasy, establishing the criterion for his Battles defined decisive as an event

which varied the world drama in all its subsequent

scenes. Saipan was decisive because it varied the Pacific drama in all its subsequent scenes.

Iwo Jima and Okinawa were costlier battles and

carried us closer to Japan, but their capture was made

possible only by our earlier success at Saipan, which

breached Japan's inner defense line, destroyed the main

bastions and opened the way to the home islands.37

Precisely, how had Saipan "varied the Pacific drama in all its subsequent scenes?" Before

Saipan, the United States and Japan both

had powerful carrier-based air; after Saipan,

only that of the United States was effective.

Before Saipan, U. S. land-based bombers were

beyond range of the Japanese homeland (except for the tenuously held air bases in China) ;

after Saipan, land-based U. S. bombers could

rain destruction upon the Japanese cities. Before Saipan, U. S. submarines were based

approximately 2,400 miles from Japanese home

waters; after Saipan, the distance was reduced

by about one-half, increasing submarine efficienor vastly. Before Saipan, the Japanese

government that had, precipitated the war

against the United States was still in power;

after Saipan, the government changed and the

new one was directed to reconsider the feasibility of continuing the war. In these respects

the Pacific drama had been varied.

Saipan was a bold venture in which U. S.

soldiers, sailors and Marines challenged and

defeated Japanese might. It was a matter of

projecting U. S. arms and resources 1,000

nautical miles from the nearest base into the

very heart of an island group possessing a

powerful potential. Previous island hops had

not exceeded 000 miles and never had sur37Coral and Brass, 181.

262

rounding enemy air bases been as close or as

po-Werful. In this situation the enemy was

brought to his knees.

But on his knees he fought. And the Japanese fought well in this, or any other, position.

Whenever men of various • parts of the world

are compared in fighting tenacity, the men of

Japan must rate among the best. Their fighting psychology has often been called fanaticism, but the connotation of that term perhaps

does the Japanese an injustice. Perhaps "inspired patriotism" is a fairer appraisal. At

any rate, the Japanese were possessed of fighting characteristics of which any nation could

be proud.

From the acrid beginning until the bitter

end, the Saipan operation represented a triumph of the well-led over the poorly-led, the

more-skilled over the less-skilled, the stronger

over the weaker. 'Reduced to its basic formula,

this spelled success for one, doom for the other.

And yet, to fail to mention the myriad examples of personal heroism by U. S. forces

would be a serious omission indeed. In addition to the six men (four Marines, two soldiers) who posthumously received the Medal

of Honor, there were thousands of examples of

heroic acts, most of which were never officially

recognized. U. S. forces, though less anxious

than their adversaries to expend themselves

in battle, showed no hesitancy in executing

assigned missions—even when prospects for

immediate success were not particularly bright.

With all the superiority granted by weapons

and supply, there is still no substitute for

fighting when the enemy chooses to fight to the

bitter end.

From the top commanders who initiated the

strategic planning, to the front line riflemen

who wrested the soil from the subborn defenders, the traditional "well done" applies.

Now, as never before, the United States was

truly at the Empire's threshold. A strong,

hard fist was hammering on Japan's front

door.
APPENDIX I

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Bibliography

The preparation of the Saipan monograph

entailed consultation of several thousand documents. Many of these merely confirmed information found in other sources, some contributed only a single fact or an isolated impression, still others were so general that they

could hardly be considered as valuable. In this

bibliography, therefore, only the most important and useful will be mentioned. Unless

noted differently, the below listed documents

are filed in the Marine Corps Historical Division.

Documents

JICP0A Information Bulletins 7-44 and 29-

44. The former, entitled "Marianas," gives

detailed facts concerning .the islands' appearance, history, geography, climate and

people. The latter, entitled "Weather Survey for Carolines and Marianas," (rives

weather statistics for the islands.

VAC 0-2 Study of the Theater of Operations,

Southern Marianas. Contains descriptions

of Saipan, Tinian, Aguijan, and Rota, together with information on terrain, climate

and meteorology. This document was very

important in the preparations of detailed

landing force attack plans.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Operation Plan 3-44,

23Apr44. Assigns southern Marianas as a

specific objective. Filed at Naval Records

and Library.

TF 51 Operation Plan A10-44, 6May44. Assigns detailed missions to troops and ships

of the Joint Expeditionary Force.

TF 56 Operation Plan 3-44, 26Apr41. NTLF

Operation Plan 3-44. 2d Mar Div Operation

Order 18, 1May44. 4th Mar Div Operation

Plan 4 44, 6May44. These documents give

troop plans for the seizure of Saipan. The

.27th Infantry Division prepared 21 separate

plans for possible employment at any of the

Marianas objectives; three preferred plans--

Hq 27th Inf Div Opn Plan I, II, and M—

are filed at the U. S. Army Historical Division.

COMINCH P-007, 30Dec44,-"Invasion of the

Marianas, June to August 1944." Prepared

at the Headquarters of the Commander in

Chief, United States Fleet, this document

is a valuable synthesis of action reports received from major subordinate units participating in the Saipan, Tinian and Guam

operations.

ComFIFTHFleet Reports (Initial and Final)

on the Operation to Capture the Marianas

Islands, 13Jul44 and 30Aug44, respectively.

The former report contains a comprehensive

summary of the Battle of the Philippine

Sea; the latter draws general conclusions

(chiefly strategic) regarding the entire Marianas campaign.

TF 51 Report on Amphibious Operations for

the capture of the Marianas Islands, 25Aug

263
44. Contains detailed, day-by-day account

of activities of all principal elements of the

Joint Expeditionary Force, 15 enclosures.

TF 56 Report on FORAGER, 20ct44. Basic

report of Commanding General Expeditionary Troops, seven enclosures in separate

volumes, covering planning, operations, intelligence, logistics, personnel and special

staff officers' reports.

NTLF Special Action Report of Marianas,

Phase I, Saipan, 12Aug44. Recounts in

detail the day-by-day progress of the landing

force, from early planning stages to operation's conclusion, 12 enclosures in separate

volumes. Most valuable source for over-all

summary of ground action at Saipan. Enclosure I contains reports of XXIV Corps

Artillery, NTLF Air Officer and NTLF

Naval Gunfire .Officer.

2d Mar Div Special Action Report, Phase I,

Marianas, undated. Narrative account of

division activities from initiation of planning to the end of the operation. Contains a

number of excellent photographs showing

the terrain over which the division operated.

Action reports of regiments and battalions

of 2d Marine Division filed in separate

folders.

4th MarDiv Operations Report Saipan, 15

Jun-9Jul44. Narrative account of division

activities from initiation of planning to the

end of operation. Contains, in addition to

reports of staff sectons, reports of major

subordinate units, 12 annexes.

27th Inf Div Report of Operations on Saipan,

240ct44. Narrative account of division's

activities from initiation of planning to the

end of operation. Contains, in addition to

reports of staff sections, reports of major

subordinate units and activities, 14 volumes.

CINCPAC—CINCPOA translations of captured Japanese documents including field

orders, message files, "lessons learned" summaries, recommendations, organization

charts, and diaries. Of this great mass of

material, Item #9983-85, "Dispatches sent

and received by 31st Army Headquarters on

Saipan from 13 to 29 June 1944 . . ." is by

far the most valuable.

264

Proceedings of a board of officers appointed to

inquire into the circumstances surrounding

the relief of Major General Ralph C. Smith,

0-1723, USA, from command of the 27th

Infantry Division while engaged in the FORAGER operation. The proceedings, exhibits,

testimony of witnesses, and conclusions contained in this board's report, though sometimes prejudiced and opinionated, provide a

wealth of narrative detail relating to the

Saipan operation.

Primary Sources

The War Reports of General George C. Marshall, General Henry H. Arnold and Admiral Ernest J. King. New York and Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The

Campaigns of the Pacific War. Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1946.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Interrogations of Japanese Offlcials. 2 Volumes,

Washington: Government Printing Office,

1946.

Secondary Sources

Arnold, Henry H. Global Mission. New York:

Harper and Brothers, 1949.

Buchanan, A. R., editor. The Navy's Air War,

A Mission Completed. New York: Harper

and Brothers for Aviation History Unit OP519B, DCNO (Air) , 1946.

Daniel, Hawthorne. Islands of the Pacific.

New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943.

Haugland, Vern. The AAF Against Japan.

New York and London: Harper and

Brothers, 1948.

Historical Division, War Department, Washington, D. C. Small Unit Actions. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946.

Hough, Frank 0. The Island War: The United

States Marine Corps in the Pacific. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott

Company, 1947.

Howard, Clive, et al. One Damned Island After Another. Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press, 1946.

Johnston, Richard W. Follow Me! New York:

Random House, 1948. '
Josephy, _Alvin M., et al. Uncommon Valor:

Marine Division in Action. Washington:

Infantry Journal Press, 1946.

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports.

New York': Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949.

Knox, Dudley W. A History of the United

States Navy. New York: G. P. Putnam's

Sons, 1948.

Krieger, Herbert W. Smithsonian War Background Studies Number Sixteen, People of

the Western Pacific, Micronesia and Melanesia. Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press,

1943.

Love, Edmund G. The 27th Infantry Division

in World War II. Washington: Infantry

Journal Press, 1949.

Miller, Francis Trevelyan. History of World

,War II. Philadelphia and Toronto: The

John C. Winston Company, 1945.

Pratt, Fletcher. The Marines' War. New York:

William Sloane Associates, 1948. •

Proehl, Carl W. The Fourth Marine Division

in World War II. Washington: Infantry

Journal Press, 1946.

Robson, R. W. The Pacific Islands Handbook,

1944. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1945.

Sherrod, Robert. On to Westward, War in

the Central Pacific. New York: Duell, Sloan

and Pearce, 1945.

Smith, Holland if. Coral and Brass. New

York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949.

Stockman, James R., et al. Campaign for the

Marianas. Philadelphia: Marine Corps Publicity Bureau for Historical Division, U. S.

Marine Corps, 1946.

Yarn ai ha ra, Tadao. Pacific Islands Under

88959V-50-18

Japanese Mandate. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1940.

Periodicals

Donovan, James A., Jr. "Saipan Tank Battle."

Marine Corps Gazette, October 1944.

Heinl, Robert D., Jr. "Naval Gunfire Support

in Landing." Marine Corps Gazette, September 1945.

Hockmuth, Bruno A. "Observations on Saipan." Marine Corps Gazette, January 1945.

Love, Edmund G. The 27th's Battle for

Saipan." Infantry Journal, September 1946.

Sherrod, Robert. "Battalion on Saipan." Marine Corps Gazette, October 1944.

Stockman, James R. "The Taking of Mt.

Tapotchau." Marine Corps Gazette, July

1946.

Letters and Interviews

In addition to sources already cited, over

300 officers and men in key positions during

the Saipan operation were consulted by letter

or interview. Many of the letters were in comment on a preliminary draft of this monograph. In addition to correcting errors of

omission or commission, these letters were helpful in confirming statements which had been

gleaned from impersonal, frequently confusing, action reports. To list each of these letters and interviews separately would impose

too much bulk upon this manuscript. Suffice

it is to say that these are available in the working files of the Marine Corps Historical Division for the reference of any bona fide student

of this phase of military history. Many of

these letters and interviews have been cited at

appropriate points throughout the monograph.

265
APPENDIX il

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Chronology

1944

30 January— U. S. Marines and Army

23 February troops seize Marshalls Islands.

17-18 February Task Force 58 strikes Truk,

revealing weakness of that

base. Decision to by-pass

comes soon after. •

22-23 February Task Force 58 strikes Southern Marianas.

29 February U. S. Army troops land at

Los Negros in the Admiralties.

12 March Joint Chiefs of Staff direct

that Southern Marianas \ be

seized, target date 15 June.

20 March 4th Marines (Reinforced)

seizes Emirau.

Admiral Nimitz issues FORAGER Joint Staff Study setting forth the purpose of the

Marianas Operation.

22 March U. S. Army troops land at

Hollandia.

23 March Admiral Nimitz issues operation order for Marianas; Admirals Spruance and, Turner

follow suit.

30 March— Task Force 58 strikes Western

1 April Carolines.

26 April Expeditionary Troops operation order states mission

. . to capture, occupy and

defend Saipan, Tinian and

Guam. . ."

266

1 May

17-19 May

21 May

25 May

29-30 May

6-11 June

11-13 June

14 June

15 June

16 June

Northern Troops and Landing

Force issues operation order;

2d and 4th Marine Divisions

to land on Saipa,n's western

beaches in the Outran Kanoa

vicinity.

Landing Force maneuvers and

rehearses at Maui and Kahoolame, Hawaiian Islands.

Six LST'S, embarking assault

elements of the two Marine

divisions, burn at Pearl Harbor.

LSrs, carrying assault elements of the two Marine divisions, LVT's and artillery, depart Pearl Harbor.

Portions of the two divisions

not embarked in LST's, depart Pearl Harbor.

Joint Expeditionary Force at

Eniwetok for final staging.

Task Force 58 executes preparatory bombardment Of

Saipan.

Fire support ships of the

Northern and Southern Attack Forces arrive at Saipan

and commence bombardment.

2d and 4th Marine Divisions

land at Saipan.

27th Infantry Division begins

landing at Saipan.
16-17 June

17 June

18 June

19-20 June

22 June

24 June

25 June

28 June

4 July

Japanese launch strong, unsuccessful tank-infantry night

attack against 6th Marines.

First observation planes

(OY's) land at Charan Kanoa

airstrip.

165th Infantry captures Aslito Airfield.

Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Japanese Navy suffers decisive defeat.

Aslito airfield becomes operational for fighter aircraft.

Major General Ralph C.

Smith relieved as commander,

27th Infantry Division; Major

General Sanderford Jarman

assumes command.

Mt. Tapotchau, Saipan's key

terrain feature, captured by

8th Marines. Kingman Peninsula seized by 4th Marine Division.

Major George W. Griner, Jr.

assumes command of the 27th

Infantry Division,- relieving

Major General Sanderford

Jarman.

Advance reaches Tanaparg

Seaplane Base; 2d Marine Division pinched out of lines.

6-7 July Japanese launch savage allout bamai attack along TanapagAain ; 105th Infantry

apki 3d Battalion, 10th Maiines hardest hit.

8 July *l Marine Division passes

through 27th Infantry Division for mop-up of Tanapag

9 July 4th Marine Division reaches

Marpi Point; Admiral Turner

announces Saipan secured;

mop-up begins; 2d and 4th

Marine Divisions get ready

for Tinian operation.

12 July Major General Harry Schmidt

assumes command of Northern Troops and Landing

Force when Lieutenant General Holland Smith decides to

go to Guam; Major General

Clifton B. Cates assumes

command of 4th Marine Division.

13 July 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,

captures Maniagassa

9 August Aslito Airfield becomes operational for Liberator bombers

(B-24).

15 October Aslito airfield becomes operational for B-29's.

24 November Saipan-based B-29's raid

Tokyo.

267
APPENDIX III

SIAPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Casualties'

UNIT

Killed or Died of Wounds • Wounded TOTAL

Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted

-

NTLF Troops' 1 22 6 148 7 170

XXIV Corps Arty (USA)3 1 5 5 10 6 15

2d Marine Division;

-Division Troops' 

2d Marines; t

3 17 18 161 21 . 178

H&S and Weapons 1 13 4 86 5 99

1st Bn 1 61 14 239 15 300

2d Bn 1 45 6 207 7 252

3d Bn 4 76 12 243 16 319

6th Marines;

H&S and Weapons 2 22 4 92 6 114

1st Bn , 6 90 16 323 22 413

'2d Bn 6 120 13 335 19 455

3d Bn 5 105 17 408

-11

22 513

8th Marines;

H&S and Weapons

1st Bn 

1

5

J J i

1,5

90

6

16

-s-1?

73

355

7

21

88

445

2d Bn 6 91 9 364 15 455

3d Bn 3 89 . 17 304 20 393

1st Bn, 29th Marines 6 91 17 333 23 424

10th Marines' 10 88 25 237 35 . 325

18th Marines 4 73 14 355 18 428

2d Armd Amph Bn 5 36 7 100 12 136

2d Amph Trac Bn 0 10 5 46 5 56

5th Amph Trac Bn 1 6 3 33 4 39

2d Tank Bn 0 5 0 13 0 18

4th Marine Division;

Division Troops' 4 16 12 101 16 117

28d Marines;

H&S and Weapons 5 16 4 52 9 . 68

1st Bn 4 84 12 304 16 388

2d Bn 

3d Bn 

5

4

97

95

18

13 '

278

275

23

17

375

370

24th Marines;

H&S and Weapons 0 16 9 71 9 87

1st Bn 7 71 20 319 27 390

2d Bn 2 78 19 295 21 373

3d Bn 7 109 11 355 18 464

Marine casualty figures furnished by Machine Records Section, HQMC, on 23Nov49 for period 15 June-9 July 1944.

2 Included in this category for purposes of this breakdown: V AC Hq, Med Bn, Sig Bn, Air Del Sec, Amph Recon Bn,

18th and 121st NC Bns, 7th Fld Dpt, AWS #5, and other Corps Hq Troops. •

'Figures from XXIV Corps Arty 5-1 Report.

4 Included in this category for purposes of this breakdown: Div Hq, MP Co, Sig Bn, Recon Co, Prov Rkt Det, VMO,

JASCO, Ser Bn, MT Bn, and Med Bn.

Also Incluires 2d 155m Howitzer Bn, V Amphibious Corps. •

6 Included in this category for purposes of this breakdown: Div Hq., MP Co, Sig Bn, Recon Co, Prov Rkt Det, VMO,

JASCO Ser Bn, and Med Bn.

268
2

1

2

1

4

UNIT

Killed or Died of Wounds Wounded TOTAL

Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted

5th Marines;

H&S and Weapons . 1 2 5 18 6 20

1st Bn 5 67 9 267 14 334

2d Bn 2 88 10 288 12 376

3d Bn 6 78 21 297 27 375

4th Marines7 4 44 24 227 28 271

0th Marines 4 26 14 140 18 166

0th Amph Trac Bn 0 2 1 20 1 22

th Tank Bn 1 17 5 36 6 53

UNIT

Killed in Action Wounded in Action Missing in Action TOTAL

Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted

27th Infantry Diyision,8

Special Troops_ 1 2 3 7 0 0 4 9

105th Inf Reg;

1st Bn 9 199 15 276 1 46 25 521

2d Bn 11 166 16 291 0 29 27 486

3d Bn 0 45 8 158 0 2 8 205

Sp Units 2 42 6 60 0 4 8 106

Det 295 JASCO 4 7 2 4 0 5 6 16

106th Inf Reg;

1st Bn 3 46 14 224 0 0 17 270

2d Bn 5 51 11 206 0 0 16 257

3d Bn 5 50 14 206 0 0 19 256

Sp Units 1 9 3 43 0 0 4 52

Det 295 JASCO 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 4

165th Inf Reg;

1st Bn 9 • 69 7 237 0 0 16 306

2d Bn 2 50 19 233 0 1 21 284

3d Bn 1 39 4 149 0 0 5 188

Sp Units 0 2 3 40 0 0 3 42

Det 295 JASCO_ _ _ _ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

27th Div Arty 5 18 11 44 2 2 18 64

102d Med Bn 0 4 0 22 0 0 0 26

1165th Engr Group 0 0 1 14 0 0 1 14

Co C, 88th Chemical Bn 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 3

102d Engr Bn 0 18 2 50 0 13 2 81

773d Amph Trac Bn 1 4 2 12 0 2 3 18

762d Tank Bn 3 15 3 54 0 6 6 75

38th Fld Hosp9 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0

708th Amph Tank Bill° 0 19 0 155 0 10 0 184

715th Anvil Trac Bno 0 8 0 41 0 4 0 53

534th Amph Trac Bnlo 0 8 0 25 0 0 0 33

GRAND TOTAL" 195 2,949 588 10,364 3 125 , 786 13,438

7 Also includes 4th 105mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious Corps.

8 Since no revised 27th Infantry Division casualty figures for the period 15 June-9

Division G-1 Report for 21 July has been used.

9 From 27th Inf Div G-1 Periodic Report, 11Jul44.

From "Army Amphibious Tractor and Tank Battalions in the Battle for Saipan,

Gugeler, USA, 20Jan45. No breakdown into officers and enlisted was shown.

" The following U. S. Army organizations suffered no casualties during the operation:

1st Plat, 604th Graves Reg (QM) Co, and 98th Portable Surgical Hospital.

July are available, 27th Infantry

15 June-9 July 1944", lstLt R. A.

94th and 95th Bomb Disp Squads,

269
APPENDIX IV

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Command and Staff

List of Major Units'

Expeditionary Troops

Commanding

General LtGen Holland M. Smith.

Chief of Staff BrigGen Graves B. Erskine.

0-1 LtCol Albert F. Metze.

0-2 Col St. Julien R. Marshall.

G-3 Col John C. McQueen.

G-4 Col Raymond E. Knapp.

G-5 Col Joseph T. Smith.

Northern Troops And Landing Force

Commanding

General LtGen Holland M. Smith. .

Chief of Staff BrigGen Graves B. Erskine.

0-1 LtCol Albert F. Metze.

G-2 LtCol Thomas R. Yancey (USA).

0-3 Col Robert E. Hogaboom,

0-4 LtCol Joseph C. Anderson (USA).

2d Marine Di-vision

Commanding

General MajGen Thomas E. Watson.

Assistant Division

Commander BrigGen Merritt A. Edson.

Chief of Staff Col David M. Shoup.

D-1 LtCol James T. Wilbur.

D-2 LtCol Thomas J. Colley.

D-3 LtCol Wallace M. Greene, Jr.

D-4 Col Robert J. Straub.

2d Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Walter J. Stuart.

Executive Officer LtCol John H. Griebel.

11-1 Capt Leonard G. Hicks.

11-2 Capt John L. Schwabe.

11-3 Maj Samuel D. Mandeville, Jr.

R-4 Maj Harold "K" Throneson.

1 Changes in commanders only are shown. Officers

listed in other staff positions are those who originally

landed with the unit at Saipan. Casualties other than

commanders are not shown.

270

1st Battalion, Qd Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Wood B. Kyle.

Executive Officer Maj Wendell W. Andrews.

Bn-3 Maj Charles P. Lewis, Jr.

2d Battalion, 2d Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Richard C. Nutting.

Executive Officer Maj Michael P. Ryan.

Bn-3 1 stLt William B. Somerville.

3d Battalion, Qd Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Arnold F. Johnston

(WIA 21 June).

Maj Harold "K" Throneson

(21 June to 4 July).

LtCol Arnold F. Johnston

(from 5 July).

Executive Officer Maj Benjamin T. Owens.

Bn-3 Capt Richard Phillippi.

6th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col James P. Riseley.

Executive Officer LtCol Kenneth F. McLeod.

R-1 Capt Philip J. Costello.

11-2 Cant Donald V. Nahrgang.

11-3 Maj Loren E. Haffner.

R-4 Maj Cyril C. Sheehan.

1st Battalion, 6th Marines

Battalion

Commander William K. Jones.

Executive Officer __Maj James A. Donovan, Jr.

Bn-3 Capt Charles H. Triplett.

2d Battalion, 6th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Raymond L. Murray

(WIA 15 June).

Maj LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.

(from 15 June).

Executive Officer Maj Howard J. Rice.

Bn-3 Capt Joseph E. Rowland.
3d Battalion, 6th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol John W. Easley

(WIA 15 June).

Maj John E. Rentsch

(15 June to 2 July).

LtCol John W. Easley

(from 3 July).

Executive Officer Maj John E. Rentsch.

Bn-3 Capt Edward L. Singletary.

8th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Clarence R. Wallace.

Executive Officer _LtCol Jack P. Juhan.

R-1 Capt Lloyd E. Iverson.

R-2 lstLt James H. Kavanagh, Jr.

R-3 Maj William H. Souder, Jr.

R-4 Maj Alfred E. Holland.

1st Battalion, 8th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.

Executive Officer Maj Robert J. Oddy.

. Bn-3 Maj Daniel V. McWethy, Jr.

2d Battalion, 8th Marines

Battalion

(:nr ander LtCol Henry P. Crowe

(WIA 15 June).

Maj William C. Chamberlin

(from 15 June).

Executive Officer Maj William C. Chamberlin.

Bn-3 Capt Arthur J. Rauchle.

3d Battalion, 8th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol John C. Miller

(WIA 15 June).

Maj Stanley E. Larsen

(from 15 June).

Executive Officer Maj Stanley E. Larsen.

Bn-3 Capt Osborne K. LeBlanc.

1st Battalion, 29th Marines

(Attached to 2d MarDiv)

Battalion

Commander LtCol Guy E. Tannyhill

(WIA 17 June).

LtCol Rathvon M. Tompkins

(from 17 June, WIA 2 July).

LtCol. Jack P. Juhan

(from 2 July, reverted to

8th Marines' executive officer

4 July).

Maj William W. McKinley

(from 4 July).

Executive Officer Maj William S. Vasconcellos.

Bn-3 Maj William W. McKinley.

10th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Raphael Griffin.

Executive Officer LtCol Ralph E. Forsyth.

R-1 lstLt Russell C. White.

R-2 Capt Robert W. Sullivan.

R-3 LtCol Howard V. Hiett.

R-4 Capt Edward R. Gilbert.

1st Battalion, 10th Marines

Battalion

Commander Col Presley M. Rixey

(transferred to Regimental

Executive Officer on 24 June).

Maj Wendell H. Best

(from 25 June).

Executive Officer Maj. Wendell H. Best.

Bn-3 Capt Michael J. Bo.

2d Battalion, 10th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol George R. E. Shell

(WIA 16 June).

Maj Kenneth C. Houston

(from 16 June).

Executive Officer Maj Kenneth C. Houston.

Bn-3 Capt Richard B. Cavanaugh.

3d Battalion, 10th Marines

Battalion

Commander Maj William L. Crouch

(KIA 7 July).

Maj James 0. Appleyard

(from 8 July ).

Executive Officer Maj Wade H. Hitt.

Bn-3 Capt Alan H. Tully.

4th Battalion, 10th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Kenneth A. Jorgensen.

Executive Officer LtCol Harry N. Shea.

Bn-3 Maj James 0. Appleyard.

2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amph Corps

Battalion

Commander LtCol Marvin H. Floom.

Executive Officer Maj Gene N. Schraeder.

Bn-3 Maj Earl J. Rowse.

18th Marines 2

Commanding

Officer LtCol Russell Lloyd

(to 6th Marines on 25 June).

LtCol Ewart S. Lane

(from 26 June).

2 Command and staff list of 18th Marines is from the

unit's muster roles. A check of other available records

and letters from officers gives the following additional

information: , Lieutenant Colonel Russell Lloyd was

also CO 2d Marine Division Shore Party until 25 June

1944 when he was attached to the 6th Marines. Major

G. L. H. Cooper commanded the division shore party

from 26 to 30 June 1944 when the beaches were turned

over to the Army. Lieutenant Colonel Chester J. Salazar. retained- administrative command of the 2d Battalion, 18th Marines, throughout the period, although

his unit, with personnel from other regiments and attached units, functioned as the 2d Division Shore Party.

Lieutenant Colonel Ewart S. Lane had administrative

command of the 18th Marines until 25 June 1944 and

tactical command from 26 June.

271
Executive Officer ___LtCol Ewart S. Lane.

R-1 Capt Winfield S. Haltom, Jr. Commanding

R-2 and R-3 Capt Murdoch J. McLeod. Officer Col Louis R. Jones.

R-4 Capt Walter J. Hulsey. Executive Officer ___LtCol John It. Lanigan.

1st Battalion, 18th Marines R-1 Capt Charlie J. Talbert.

Battalion R-2 Capt Richard W. Mirick.

Commander LtCol August L. Vogt. R-3 Maj Edward W. Wells.

Executive Officer ___Capt Joseph G. Politica. R-4 Capt Henry S. Campbell.

1st Battalion, 234 Marines

234 Marines

24 Battalion, 18th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Chester J. Salazar.

Executive Officer

and Bn-3 Capt Jerome R. Walters.

Battalion

Commander LtCol Ralph Haas.

Executive Officer _Maj James S. Scales.

Bn-3 Cant :James It. Miller.

24 Battalion, 234 Marines

24 Tank Battalion Battalion

Battalion Commander LtCol Edward J. Dillon.

Commander Maj Charles W. McCoy. Executive Officer ___Maj Albert H. Follmar.

Executive Officer Bn-3 Maj Robert H. Davidson.

and Bn-3 Capt John C. Richards, Jr. 3d Battalion, 234 Marines

24 Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Battalion

Commander Maj Henry G. Lawrence, Jr.

(transferred to NTLF staff as

LVT control officer on 2 July).

Maj Fenlon A. Durand

(from 2 July).

Executive Officer Maj Fenlon A. Durand.

Bn-3 Capt William H. Housman, Jr.

5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Battalion

Commander Capt George L. Shead.

Executive Officer Capt William C. Stoll.

Bn-3 not shown.

24 Motor Transport Battalion

Battalion

Commandeg Maj Milton J. Green.

Executive Officer Maj Robert H. Sanders.

Bn-3 Capt Harry C. Olson.

24 Service Battalion

Battalion

Commander Capt Robert IT. Perkins.

Executive Officer Lt Francis E. McElroy.

Bn-3 not shown.

24 Medical Battalion

Battalion

Commander LtComdr Claude R. Bruner.

Executive Officer

and Bn-3 not shown.

4th Marine Division

Division

Commander MajGen Harry Schmidt. Battalion

Asst. Division Commander LtCol Alex. A. Vandegrift, Jr.

Commander BrigGen Samuel C. Cumming. (WIA 27 June, evacuated

Chief of Staff Col William W. Rogers. 29 June).

D-1 Col Walter I. Jordan. LtCol Otto Lessing

D-2 LtCol Gooderham L. McCormick. (29 June to 3 July).

D-3 Col Walter W. Wensinger. LtCol Alex A Vandegrift. Jr.

D-4 Col William F. Brown. (from 3 July).

Battalion

Commander LtCol John J. Cosgrove

(WIA 19 June).

Maj Paul S. Treitel

(from 19 June).

Executive Officer Maj Paul S. Treitel.

Bn-3 Maj Robert J. J. Picardi.

24th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Franklin A. Hart.

Executive Officer LtCol Austin R. Brunelli.

R-1 Capt Kenneth N. Hilton.

R-2 Capt Arthur B. Hanson.

R-3 LtCol Charles D. Roberts.

R-4 Maj Clyde T. Smith.

1st Battalion, 24th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Maynard C. Schultz

(DOW 16 June).

Maj Robert N. Fricke

(16 to 18 June).

LtCol Austin R. Brunelli

(18 June to 4 July).

LtCol Otto Lessing

(from 4 July).

Executive Officer _._Maj Robert N. Fricke.

Bn-3 lstLt Gene G. Mundy.

24 Battalion, 24th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Richard Rothwell.

Executive Officer Capt Claude M. Cappelmann.

Bn-3 Capt Charles C. Berkeley.

8d Battalion, 24th Marines

272
Executive Officer

and Bn-73 Capt Webb D. Sawyer.

25th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Merton J. Batchelder.

Executive Officer LtCol Clarence J. O'Donnell.

R-71 Capt Francis A. Norton.

R-2 Capt Charles D. Gray.

R-3 LtCol William F. Thyson, Jr.

R-4 Maj Arthur E. Buck, Jr.

1st Battalion, 25th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Hollis U. Mustain.

Executive Officer _Maj Henry D. Strunk.

Bn-3 Capt Fenton J. Mee.

2d Battalion, 25th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Lewis C. Hudson, Jr.

Executive Officer Maj William P. Kaempfer.

Bn-3 Cant Victor J. Barringer.

3d Battalion, 25th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Justice M. Chambers

MIA 22 June).

Maj James Taul

(22 to 23 June).

LtCol Justice M. Chambers

(from 23 June).

Executive Officer Maj James Taul.

Bn-3 Cant James G. Headley:

14th Marines

Commanding

Officer Col Louis G. DeHaven.

Executive Officer '' LtCol Randall M. Victory.

1stLt Cecil D. Snyder. •

R-2 Capt Harrison L. Rogers.

R-3 Maj Frederick J. Karch.

R-4 Maj Richard J. Winsborough.

1st Battalion, 14th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol Harry J. Zimmer.

Executive Officer _Maj Clifford B. Drake.

Bn-3 Maj Thomas McE. Fry.

2d Battalion, 14th Marines

Battalion

Commander LtCol George B. Wilson, Jr.

Executive Officer Maj William McReynolds.

Bn-3 Capt Jack H. Riddle.

3d Battalion, 14th Marines

Commanding

. Officer LtCol Robert E. MacFarlane.

Executive Officer Maj Harvey A. Feehan.

Bn-3 Capt Penton H. Elliott.

4th Battalion, 14th Marines

Commanding

Officer LtCol Carl A. Youngdale.

Executive Officer Maj John B. Edgar, Jr.

Bn-3 Maj Roland J. Spritzen.

889590°--50--19

4th 105mm Howitzer Battalion, V Amphibious Corps

Commanding

Officer LtCol Douglas E. Reeve.

Executive Officer Maj Marvin R. Burdett.

Bn-3 Capt Joe H. Daniel.

20th Marines

Commanding

Officer LtCol Nelson K. Brown.

Executive Officer Capt William M. Anderson.

R—i Capt Martin M. Calcaterra.

R-2 Capt Carl A. Sachs.

R-3 Maj Melvin D. Henderson.

R-4 Capt Samuel 0. Thompson.

1st Battalion, 20th Marines

Battalions

Commander Maj Richard 0. Ruby.

Executive Officer Maj George F. Williamson.

Bn-3 Capt Martin H. Glover.

2d Battalion, 20th Marines .

Battalion

Commander Maj John H. Partridge.

Executive Officer Capt Howard M. Dowling.

Bn-3 Capt George A. Smith.

4th Tank Battalion

Battalion

Commander Maj Richard K. Schmidt.

Executive Officer Maj Francis L. Orgain.

Bn-3 Capt Leo B. Chase.

10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Battalion

Commander Maj Victor J. Croizat.

Executive Officer Maj Harry T. Marshall, Jr.

Bn-3 not shown on rolls.

4th Motor Transport Battalion

Battalion

Commander LtCol Ralph L. Schiesswohl.

Executive Officer _Maj Vaughan H. Huse.

Bn-3 lstLt Walter W. Alford.

4th Service Battalion

Battalion

Commander Col Richard H. Schubert.

Executive Officer not shown.

Bn-3 2dLt James T. Willis.

4th Medical Battalion

Battalion

Commander LtC6indr George W. Mast.

Executive Officer LtComdr George M. Davis, Jr.

Bn-3 not shown.

27th Infantry Division 3

Division

Commander MajGen Ralph C. Smith

(relieved 24 June).

MajGen Sanderford Jarman

(from 24 Jun',‘., reverted to

3 Complete staff and command list for 27th Division

units not available.

273
Saipan Garrison Force Commander on 28 June).

MajGen George W. Griner

(from 28 June).

Assistant Division

Commander BrigGen Ogden J. Ross.

Chief of Staff Col A. C. Stebbins.

G-1 LtCol M. Oakley Bidwell.

0-2 LtCol W. M. Van Antwerp.

0-3 LtCol F. H. Sheldon.

LtCol Charles B. Ferris.

105th Infantry

Commanding

Officer Col Leonard A. Bishop.

8-2 Maj Malcolm M. Jameson.

S-3 Maj Philip E. Smith. •

1st Battalion, 105th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol William'J. O'Brien

(KIA 7 July ) .4

24 Battalion, 105th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol Leslie Jensen

(transferred to Regimental

Executive Officer) .5

Maj Edward McCarthy.

Executive Officer Maj Edward McCarthy.

3d Battalion, 105th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol Edward T. Bradt.

106th Infantry

Commanding

Officer Col Russell G. Ayres

(relieved 26 June).

Col A. C. Stebbins

(from 26 June).

Executive Officer LtCol Joseph J. Farley.

1st Battalion, 106th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol Winslow Cornett.

Executive Officer Maj John Nichols.

Qd Battalion, 106th Infantry

Battalion

Commander Maj Almerin C. O'Hara.

3d Battalion, 106th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol Harold I. Mizony

(KIA 28 June).

Maj Francis Fisher

(from 28 June).

Executive Officer Maj Francis Fisher.

4 Name of O'Brien's replacement not shown in documents consulted.

5 Date of this change not shown in documents consulted. Assumed to have been about 1 July.

274

165th Infantry

Commanding

Officer Col Gerard W. Kelley

(WIA 28 June).

LtCol Joseph T. Hart

(from 28 June).

Executive Officer : LtCol Joseph T. Hart.

S-1 Capt Edward S. McCabe.

S-2 Maj William F. McCahill.

S-3 Capt Charles E. Coates, Jr.

S-4 Capt Herman M. Lutz.

1st Battalion, 165th Infantry

Battalion

Comm ander Maj James H. Mahoney.

Executive Officer Capt Edward J. Strong.

S-3 Capt Henry A. Berger.

24 Battalion, 165th Infantry

Battalion

Commander LtCol John F. McDonough

(WIA 25 June).

Maj Gregory Brousseau

(from 25,June, WIA 27 June).

Capt James A. Dooley

(temporary 27 June).

Maj Dennis D. Claire

(from 27 June).

Executive Officer Maj Gregory Brousseau.

S-3 Capt James A. Dooley.

Sd Battalion, 165th Infantry

Commanding

Officer Maj Dennis D. Claire

(transferred to 2d Bn 27 June).

Maj Martin H. Foery

(from 27 June).

Executive Officer Maj Martin H. Foery.

S-3 Capt Martin E. Nolan.

27th Division Artillery

Commanding

General 

Executive Officer

104th

Commanding

Officer 

BrigGen Redmond F. Kernan, Jr.

___Col Harold G. Browne.

Field Artillery Battalion

LtCol George P. VanNostrand

105th Field Artillery Battalion

Commanding

Officer LtCol Nicholas D. LaMorte.

106th Field Artillery Battalion

Commanding

Officer LtCol John J. Fitzgerald.

249th Field Artillery Battalion

Commanding

Officer LtCol Dwight McCallum.

XX/V Corps Artillery

Commanding

General BrigGen Arthur M. Harper.

Adjutant Capt Wayne B. Young.

8-9 Maj Milford W. Wood.

S-3 LtCol F. W. Wheless.

S-4 Maj E. P. Waggoner, Jr.
APPENDIX V

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Kyle's Mission

Kyle's Mission

From its inception, the mission assigned to

the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, in NTLF Operation Plan 3 44 was the subject of much thought

and discussion. That mission, in part, follows: " . . . land on the night of D minus

one-D day, on selected beaches of Magicienne

Bay, move rapidly inland, seize Mt. Tapotchau

before daylight, and defend same until relieved."1

To carry the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, to

Saipan for its daring assignment, six destroyer transports (APD's) were assigned.

To fit this shipping, the battalion commander,

Lieutenant Colonel Wood B. Kyle, reorganized

his unit (normally three rifle companies and a

headquarters company) into five companies

and assigned 'numbers in place of normal lettered designations. Each company, about 125

. -

officers and men strong, was then assigned to

an APD. Three' of the companies were basically rifle units, while the other two each contained an echelon of battalion headquarters,

rifle and weapons units. Remaining personnel,

transportation, and equipment of the battalion

were attached to the 2d.Marines' headquarters

and transported to Saipan with the 2d Marine

Division convoy. The sixth APD (five . were

used to carry the five companies) would transiNTLF Operation Plan 3-44.

port Company A, Corps Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, which had been attached

for the mission. (See Appendix VII for Task

Organization.)

To preserve mobility, Kyle's unit would

carry no weapons heavier than 60mm mortars; the heavy machine guns and 81mm mortars, plus five days of all types of supplies,

were embarked aboard two escort carriers

(CVE's). A portion of the Corps Air Delivery

Platoon was embarked in the designated carriers to package and handle supplies and equipment for further parachute-drop to the battalion from torpedo planes.

The battalion's ship-to-shore movement would

be accomplished in rubber boats, towed by

landing craft to within about 50 yards of the

beach, from which point they were to be paddled ashore. The amphibious reconnaissance

company would precede the main landing by

about one hour, find and mark the beach and

hold a shallow beachhead until the remainder

of the battalion had landed. From that point,

the long, hard trek to Tapotchau's summit

would begin.2

The desirability of having friendly troops

so located on the morning of D-Day is obvious; possession of that height would to some

extent limit the enemy's observation of our

2KVie•

215
RUGGED TERRAIN and a prepared enemy would have confronted the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, in its move from the

shore of Magicienne Bay to Mt. Tapotchau's heights. Fortunately, the mission was cancelled.

beachhead and would afford us a precious advantage. But would this advantage be overbalanced by prohibitive losses? Or, more specifically, was there sufficient indication that the

mission would be successful despite the cost?

Gambles frequently pay off; the Guadalcanal campaign had proved that. Guadalcanal

had been a tribute not only to. the "ready"

Fleet Marine Force but to the willingness of

our higher command to accept risk. The exact

point where gamble becomes foolhardy venture is sometimes difficult to determine. Looking with historical rather than planning eyes,

it is easy to decide that Kyle's mission exceeded

the bounds of acceptable risk; but, at the time,

lacking the complete and detailed aerial photograph coverage which had been requested, it

was a difficult decision.

276

Aside from the risk to personnel, there were

several disconcerting imponderables. Would

possession of the mountain's summit be sufficient to curtail the enemy's observation to any

marked degree? The battalion could hope to

occupy only a part of the vE(st hill mass, and

the remainder would still be available to the

Japanese. Enemy observers might even be

accorded a greater degree of safety by the Marines' presence, since U. S. naval gunfire, air

and artillery bombardment of that area would

be somewhat limited.

A 2d Division staff estimate, prepared during the planning stage, deduced that Kyle's

mission was impracticable and would be disastrous. Since the 1st Battalion, 2d Ma rifles, was

operating as an immediate subordinate unit

of the Northern Troops and Landing Force,
it remained for the 2d Division to present:its

views to the Corps staff. Lieutenant Colonel

Wallace M. Green, Jr., division operations

officer (D-3), journeyed to Corps Headquarters and was referred to the G-5 (Planning)

Section. There Colonel Greene presented the

estimate to Colonel Joseph T. Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Anderson, USA,

with the recommendation that the mission be

cancelled. The estimate was accepted, but

no action on the cancellation of the mission

was taken.3

As part of the same 2d Division effort to

convince Corps' planners that Kyle's mission

was unfeasible, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas

J. Colley, 2d Division intelligence officer, flew

to Pearl Harbor and presented his section's

conclusions to the Corps intelligence officer.

These conclusions, based upon a comprehensive

interpretation of available aerial photographs,

established the fact that the enemy had strong

defensive positions facing Magici enne Bay .4

The mission was finally changed on order

of Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, who

had spent many sleepless nights pondering the

problem. Prior to departure from Pearl Harbor for the target area, the general arrived in

the office of his. chief of staff, Brigadier General Graves B. Erskine, and said something to

the effect: "I've decided that battalion won't

execute that mission." He went on to indicate

that the unit would remain under NTLF control as a ready reserve to be committed wherever a desirable situation presented itself. The

battalion would still be transported in six .

APD's, and supply would still be accomplished

by air-drop. It was too late to change these

details, and indeed, circumstances might later

3 TAGen T. E. Watson's endorsement to LtCol W.

B. Kyle's ltr, 20Nov48. The date of Col Greene's

recommendation is not indicated in documents consulted, but it is assumed to have been in early May 1944.

4 Lir from Col T. J. Colley to CMC, 14Jan50. The.

photographs concerned in this study, Colley writes,

were "very poor in quality. The photos were taken at

various .angles, neither vertical nor oblique, of changing elevation (and scale) and somewhat fuzzy in detail." He felt it was likely that the plane which had

taken the pictures was attempting "to evade attack by

Japanese airplanes."

develop which would make the arrangement

desirable.5

The wheels were thus set in motion to cancel

the mission. It is interesting to note that,

.though plans had been cancelled to land Kyle's

unit before the main landings, the unit was to

"be prepared after How-hour [author's italics]

to land on order on selected beaches of Magicienne Bay, or on other beaches to be designated later."' In addition to written changes

.to operation orders (joint Expeditionary Force

published the change on 20 May), there were a

number of conferences between principal commanders and all units were informed of the

alteration.

Even now we may breathe a sigh of relief.

Magicienne Bay's coastline bristled with defenses, and the long nightmarish route from

the bay to Mt. Tapotchau would have been a

formidable. challenge even had there been no

enemy along the way and had it been undertaken in broad daylight.

Few Schemes of maneuver or plans of action

throughout the entire Pacific war were the subject for as much argument and discussion as

the one assigned to the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines. That all of the opinion, even on the

Corps staff, was not favorable, to the Scheme is

indicated by the following observations of Colonel John C. McQueen, G-3, V Amphibious

Corps:

The (4-3 Section, V Amphibious Corps, did not subscribe to the plan of landing Kyle's battalion at Magicienne Bay. The section firmly believed that Kyle's

battalion would completely fail in its mission and also

believed that those of the battalion who might successfully be landed would be wiped out before getting

very far toward their objective. . . To us the idea of

this battalion successfully reaching the summit of Mt.

Tapotchau before daylight, even from the viewpoint

of terrain alone, seemed incredible: When Kyle first

reported to me for secret instructions pertaining to the

type of training his battalion would undergo for the

planned hazardous landing, it was easy to discern that

he knew he was in for an extremely tough assignment,

and he appeared to fully realize the seriousness of the

undertaking. Of course we did not disclose our own

feelings in the matter. Our section's reaction to the

5 Interview with Col R. E. Hogaboom, LtCo1 J.

Stewart and LtCol E. W. Durant, Jr., 3Dec48.

6 NMI' Operation Plan 3-44, Change No. 1.

277
plan was made known and discussed with G-5 and the

Chief of Staff. However, those in authority decided to

incorporate the scheme in the operation plans and carry

It out in the event later intelligence data indicated not

too strong opposition in the Magicienne Bay area. We

were greatly relieved when we learned ... that the mission had been cancelled by General Smith.7

Another observation, furnished by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Yancey, USA, G-2,

Northern Troops and Landing Force, further

clarifies the reasons for the cancellation:

I am sure that what actually prompted General Holland Smith to . . . change the mission of the battalion

was the lack of detailed information concerning enemy

dispositions and defense positions in the Magicienne

Bay area. There was very little information that could

be obtained on this area due to lack of cloud free photographic coverage of large enough scale to determine

accurately hostile defensive installations.

General Smith and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier

General Graves B. Erskine, were both concerned about

this situation and during the planning phase of the

operation frequently visited the G-2 Section to emphasize the importance of obtaining information of the

Magicienne Bay area. When this information was not

forthcoming, it appears logical that the mission as initially assigned reached the stage when it was more than

a calculated risk and was subsequently cancelled.8

With all that has been said of the Magicienne Bay plan, it is of particular interest to

note that personnel of the 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, were, in no sense pessimistic about

their assigned task. In this respect, the commander of Company A (Captain Louis V.

Brooks) has written:

There was probably no doubt in anyone's mind that

the mission was unusually hazardous, but this very

fact seems to have lent a zest to it which contributed

substantially to the high morale. And morale definitely

was high. Throughout the training phase there was a

sense of exhiliration derived from the knowledge that

the battalion had been selected for something special,

and it was felt by the officers and men of the battalion

that they had been so chosen because they were well

led and had a good fighting record. Such appelations

as "Kyle's Raiders" and "Suicide Battalion", given us

by men of other units, merely served to increase our

pride.

Our training took on a special character, and as it

progressed, our confidence in our ability increased.

Along with this was a widespread confidence in Colonel

Kyle's leadership. This was particularly strong among

those of us who had been with him at Guadalcanal

and Tarawa.

. . . The fact that we had been chosen for a special

mission—alone--and that there might be many outcomes seemed merely to heighten our enthusiasm.°

7 Ltr from Col J. C. McQueen to DirPubInfo, 15Jun49.

8 Yancey. 9 Memo from Capt L. V. Brooks to author, 25Jul49.

278
APPENDIX VI-BASIC ORGANIZATION, HIGHER ECHELON TASK FORCES

SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

TF 16

SERVICE FORCES

TG 50.17

FUELING GROUPS

MAJOR COMMANDERS

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

TF 17

SUBMARINES

PACIFIC FLEET

CINGPOA

(ADMIRAL C.W. NIMITZ)

SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

SOUTH PACIFIC

FORCE

LAND BASED

AIR FORCES

COMMANDER

5th FLEET

(ADMIRAL R.A.SPRUANCE)

TF 50

FIFTH FLEET

TASK FORCES

CINCSWPA

LAND BASED

AIR FORCES

SWPA

T F 58

FAST CARRIER TASK

FORCE

TF 51

JOINT EXPEDITIONARY

FORCE

(VICE ADMIRAL R.K. TURNER)

SUBMARINES

SW PA

TF 57

FORWARD AREA

CENTRAL PACIFIC

IF 56

EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS

( LIEUTENANT GENERAL

H.M.SMITH )

TF 52

NORTHERN ATTACK

FORCE

(VICE ADMIRAL

R.K.TURNER)

IF 53

SOUTHERN ATTACK

FORCE

TG 51.1

JOINT EXPEDITIONARY

FORCE

RESERVE

TG 51.8

GENERAL RESERVE

TG 51.2 to 51.7

DEFENSE AND

GARRISONS GROUPS

TG 51.9

LCT FLOTILLA

THIRTEEN

TG 52.1

NORTHERN

SUPPORT

AIRCRAFT

TG 52.2

WESTERN

LANDING

GROUP

TG 52.7

SERVICE AND

SALVAGE

GROUP

TG 52.8

EASTERN

LANDING

GROUP

TG 52.9

DEMONSTRATION

GROUP

TG 52.17

FIRE SUPPORT

GROUP ONE

IG 52.10

FIRE SUPPORT

GROUP TWO

TG 52.14

CARRIER SUPPORT

GROUP ONE

TG 52.11

CARRIER SUPPORT

GROUP TWO

TG 52.12

TRANSPORT

SCREEN

TG 52.13

MINESWEEPING

AND

HYDROGRAPHIC

SURVEY GROUP
•

APPENDIX VII

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Task Organization

Northern Troops and Landing Force—Lieutenant General H. M. Smith.

Corps Troops

Headquarters and Service Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less detachments).

Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less

detachments).

Motor Transport Company, V Amphibious

Corps (less detachments).

Headquarters, Provisional Engineer Group, V

Amphibious Corps.

Headquarters, Provisional LVT Group, V Amphibious Corps.

7th Field Depot (less detachments) (Reinforced).

Medical Battalion, V Amphibious Corps.

31st Field Hospital (Army).

2d Provisional Portable Surgical Hospital

(Army).

3d Provisional Portable Surgical Hospital

(Army).

Air Warning Squadron #5 (less detachments).

Detachment, 680th Air Warning Company

(Army).

Detachment, 726th Air Warning Company

(Army).

Detachment, 763d Air Warning Company

(Army).

Detachment, Company C, 101st Signal Battalion (Army).

Mobile Communication Unit Central Pacific

(Army).

Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less Company A).

•

a. 1st Battalion, 2d Marines ( Reinforced)—

Lieutenant Colonel Kyle.

1st Battalion, 2d Marines (Reinforced).

Company A, Amphibious Reconnaissance

Battalion, V Amphibious Corps.

b. 2d Marine Division (Reinforced)—Major

General Watson.

2d Marine Division (less 1st Battalion, 2d -

Marines).

1st Battalion, 29th Marines.

2d Armored Amphibian Battalion.

2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

715th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Army).

2d Joint Assault Signal Company.

18th Naval Construction Battalion.

1st Amphibian Truck Company.

Detachment, 7th Field Depot.

3d Platoon, 604th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company (Army).

Detachment, Air Warning Squadron #5.

2d Provisional Rocket Detachment.

2d 155mm Artillery Battalion (Howitzer),

Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps.

c. 4th Marine Division (Reinforced)—Major

General Schmidt.

4th Marine Division.

708th Amphibian Tank Battalion (Army).

10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less

Company A) Attached: Company C, 11th

Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

773d Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Army).

534th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Army).

1st Joint Assault Signal Company.

279
121st Naval Construction Battalion.

2d Amphibian Truck Company.

Detachment, 7th Field Depot.

311th Port Company (Army).

539th Port Company (Army).

Detachment, Air Warning Squadron #5.

4th 105mm Artillery Battalion (Howitzer),

Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps.

1st Provisional Rocket Detachment.

d. Corps Artillery—Brigadier General Harper,

USA.

XXIV Corps Artillery

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery,

XXIV Corps Artillery.

1st Provisional Gun Group (155mm Gun)

(Army).

1st Provisional Gun Battalion.

32d Coast Artillery Gun Battalion.

225th Field Artillery Howitzer Group

(155mm Howitzer) (Army).

145th Field Artillery Battalion.

225th Field Artillery Battalion.

447th Amphibian Truck Company (Army).

e. Antiaircraft Artillery—Colonel Barager,

USA (from Garrison Forces).

864th Automatic Weapons, Antiaircraft Battalion (less detachments) (Army).

Battery A, 751st Antiaircraft Battalion

(Army).

Battery B, 751st Antiaircraft Battalion

(Army).

f. Saipan Garrison Forces—Major General

Jarman, USA.

Army Defense Troops.

Army Service Troops.

Other units as assigned. •

g. Tinian Garrison Forces—Major General

Underhill.

17th Marine Antiaircraft Battalion.

280

18th Marine Antiaircraft Battalion.

Other units as assigned.

h. Vth Infantry Division (Reinforced) )1—Major General Ralph Smith.

Hq, 27th Infantry Division.

Hq, Special Troops.

Hq Company.

MP Platoon.

27th Division Band.

27th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop.

727th Ordnance LM Company.

27th QM Company.

27th Signal Company.

105th Infantry Regiment.

106th Infantry Regiment.

165th Infantry Regiment.

Hq, 27th Division Artillery.

104th Field Artillery Battalion.

105th Field Artillery Battalion.

106th Field Artillery Battalion.

249th Field Artillery Battalion.

102d Engineer Battalion.

102d Medical Battalion.

98th Portable Surgical Hospital.

38th Field Hospital.

295th JASCO.

762d Tank Battalion.

766th Tank Battalion.

1165th Engineer Group Hq.

34th Engineer Battalion.

152d Engineer Battalion.

1341st Engineer Battalion.

94th Bomb Disposal Squad.

95th Bomb Disposal Squad.

88th Chemical Battalion.

604th QM Graves Registration Company.

Detachment, 534th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

The 27th Infantry Division, initially in Expeditionary Troops reserve, was released to Northern

Troops and Landing Force control on 16 June 1944.
SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

APPENDIX VIII Japanese Order of Battle Saipan

STRENGTH AT SAIPAN

ON 15 JUNE

Army Units

31st Army Headquarters — LtGen Hideyoshi

Obata. Administrative command for Army

troops in the Marianas-Bonins-MarshallsCarolines. General Obata was at Palau when

United States forces landed and therefore did

not participate in Saipan's defense. 

Northern Marianas Army Group and 43d Division Headquarters (combined) — LtGen

Yoshitsugu Saito. Saito's command included

all Army units on Saipan, Tinian and Pagan.

*118th Infantry Regiment—Colonel Ito. Three

infantry battalions with one artillery battery

attached to each, regimental engineering, communication, supply and medical companies.

Original strength 3,463, regiment lost 858

men from submarine attack while in transit

to Saipan. This unit did not arrive until the

first week in June 1944. 

*135th Infantry Regiment (minus 1st Battallion ) Colonel Suzuki. Two infantry battalions

with one artillery battery attached to each,

regimental engineering company, supply and

medical units. 1st Battalion of this regiment

was on Tinian. 

*136th Infantry Regiment—Colonel Ogawa.

Three infantry battalions with one artillery

battery attached to each, regimental engineering, communication, supply and medical

companies. 

*43d Division Ordnance Company—Captain

Murase. 

*43d Division Transport Company—Captain

Yamamoto. 94

*43d Division Field Hospital — LtCol Fukayama. 246 of the personnel were detached

and sent to Pagan on 21 May 1944. 500

*43d Division Intendance Battalion — LtCol

Okawa. Only 120 of this group were Army

personnel; the others were laborers and technicians. 2,500

1,100 47th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters

—Colonel Oka. The 315th Independent Infantry Battalion, which had been part of the

Brigade, departed for Pagan before U. S.

268 landings on Saipan. 2:27

**316th Independent Infantry Battalion—Captain Eto. Three infantry companies, a machine gun company and a gun company. 618

**317th Independent Infantry Battalion—Captain Sasaki. Three infantry companies, a machine gun company and a gun company. 

**3d Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment

(less 2d Battalion) — LtCol Nakashima.

Two battalions, each organized into three

four gun batteries. 845

**3d Battalion, 10th Field Artillery Regiment

—Captain Yamane. One battery of eight field

guns, two batteries of seven howitzers each. 323

**3d Company, 25th Engineers Regiment-1st

Lieutenant Yoneya. 188

9th Tank Regiment—Colonel Goto. Five tank

companies and one maintenance company.

3,650 Each tank company equipped with 10 medium

tanks, one or more light tanks and one

tankette. 550

2,605

2,200

99

*43d Division Communication Company—Captain Washizu. 223

* Units marked * were part of the 43d Division.

1st Battalion, 18th Regiment—Captain Kubo. __ 600

* Units marked * were part of the 43d Division.

** Units marked ** were part of the 47th Brigade.

281
25th Anti-Aircraft Regiment (less 2d Battalion

Headquarters and the 3d, 4th, 5th and 9th

Batteries)—Lieutenant Colonel Niiho. This

unit included searchlight and antiaircraft

batteries. 

43d Independent Anti-Aircraft Battery — 1st

Lieutenant Kimishima. 

44th Field Machine Cannon Battery—lst Lieutenant Nagatani. 

7th Independent Engineers Regiment (less 2d

Company — Colonel Koganezawa. Two companies and an ordnance and material platoon.

One company of this regiment was on Guam.

Also known as an Army Fortification Regiment. 

16th Shipping Engineers Regiment (less 2d

Company and one detachment )— Major

Tsunegana. The second of its three companies

was located on Guam and a detachment at

Pagan. 

264th Independent Vehicle Company—Captain

Iwarna. 

278th Independent Vehicle Company—Captain

Arima. 

Miscellaneous Straggler Units

9th Expeditionary Force. This straggler unit

was originally 1,500 strong. 

11th Independent Engineer Regiment. 

150th Infantry Regiment. 

14th Independent Mortar Battalion. 

17th Independent Mortar Battalion. 

3d and 4th Independent Tank Companies.

Suffered heavy casualties from submarine

attack. Survivors combined into one unit.__ 118

600

150

150

55th Naval Guard Force (Maizuru Keibitai)--

Captain Takashima. 2,000

1st Yokosuka Special Landing Force — Lt

Comdr Karashima. Three rifle companies battalion gun, demolition, communication, supply,

transport and engineer sections, medical and

intendance units. 800

5th Communication Unit—LtComdr Miyazaki. 369

5th Construction Unit—Rear Admiral Tsu-

, jimura. 456

41st Naval Guard Force ( Sasebo Keibitai )—A

reinforcement, destined for Truk, not a complete unit. 400

600 Office of Supplies, Accounts—Paymaster Commander Mihara.. 

Military Stores — Commander Mizumoto ;

Transport—Commander Mizumoto ; Harbor

Master—Ensign Takashima. 100

450 14th Air Group*** 

902d Air Group*** 

120 Air Flight U 156. 300

Southeast Area Air Base—Vice Admiral

120 Sato. 500

Aerology Bureau, Saipan—Captain Yamaga. 88

115th Airdrome Construction Unit. 269

236 Airdrome Construction Unit. 392

14th Hangar Maintenance Section. 29

14th Anti-Aircraft Maintenance Section. 110

Tora Construction Battalion (air mainte45

908

200

300

580

580

Navy Units

Central Pacific Fleet Headquarters and 5th

Special Base Force Headquarters ( cornbined)—Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. Administrative command for Navy in MarianasMarshalls-Carolines. 

282

nance). 600

Total Army Forces 22,702

Total Navy Forces 6,699

29,662

*** The majority of these two air groups was gone

at the time of United States landings and only small

elements remained. Intelligence agencies were unable

502 to establish their strength on Saipan.
APPENDIX IX

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

The Last Days of General Saito

The following is a translation from a captured Japanese officer's personal account of the

last days of Lieutenant General Saito, the Commanding General of all Army forces on Saipan.

The personal story of this officer who participated in the counterattack against our forces

the morning of 7 July 1944, reveals a vivid picture of events leading up to the attack that

occurred on the above date.

I don't remember the exact date too well, because of

the intense bombardment and the naval shelling, but

about the time that the Field Headquarters moved

stealthily in the middle of the night from among the

mountains in CHACHA to the fourth position (4 kilometers into the mountains due EAST of the NORTFIEASTERN limit of GARAPAN Town), the 135th Infantry, by now robbed of the summit of TAPOTCHAU,

was chased far into the TALAF0F0 area by the enemy

forces along the eastern sea coast.

At the new Field Headquarters a conference was

quickly held to decide how to extricate themselves

quickly from this predicament.

Some officers proposed that "we should die gloriously

in battle with a final charge now, in this place."

However, General SAITO ordered "Because there

are many military units which were left scattered on

the field of battle, gather these all together and construct positions from here toward the NORTH in the

narrowest portion of SAIPAN Island. You must chew

the AMERICAN forces to pieces."

At this point the staff determined those positions on

maps. They fell in a line running .from NORTH of

TANAPAG through HILL 205.2 to TALAF0170.

However, in order to carry out the construction of

that defensive line, they had to gather picks and

shovels. They were all in BANADERU.

I did not think that the plan, as General SAITO

conceived it, would work under these conditions.

However, before the positions were completed, the

enemy was upon our front lines and we couldn't spare

even one man as a runner during that day. This was

2 July. Because our lines of communication were

broken all control had to be carried out at night. Moreover, under these conditions of retreat, it is impossible

to control the situation except at night.

Here is an example of that.

The 135th Infantry drew back to rear positions a day

before they were supposed to. When the Division Headquarters learned of this it was already too late to stop

it. Because of this, the strategic plan of the Division

was ruined. That is to say, the Naval forces .and the

portion of the Army forces which had been fighting

bravely and stubbornly around GARAPAN Town were

cut off from a patch of withdrawal. The 136th Infantry

and other Army units which were on the EAST slope

of TAPOTCHAU were isolated. And what aggravated

the condition most and was most ,bothersome, was that

we could not transport back to the new positions the

provisions to halt the enemy advances.

We did not stay long in this fourth headquarters.

Caught in the concentration of Naval gunfire the

wounded and dead continued to increase.

We stayed at the fifth headquarters only 2 days. On

about 3 July (I'm not sure of exact date) we moved

to the sixth and final headquarters.

This area is generally called THE VALLEY OF

HELL [Paradise Valley] and we felt that this was an

unpleasant hint and suggestion concerning our future.

The intelligence which managed to reach me at this

last place was all depressing.

On 4 July, an enemy unit I165th Infantry] appeared

on the other side of the valley and fired at us with

heavy automatic weapons. At that time I felt we were

entirely surrounded and had lost all hope.

General SAITO was feeling very poorly because, for

several days he had neither eaten nor slept well and

was overstrained. He was wearing a long beard and

was a pitiful sight.

283
That morning that very valley received intense bombardment (I don't know whether it was naval gunfire

or pursuing fire from artillery, but it was the second

most intense bombardment I had been in). It was so

fierce that I thought maybe the cave where the headquarters was would be buried. At this time the Staff

and Lt. Gen. SAITO received shrapnel wounds.

I felt that the final hour was drawing near.

Lt. Gen. SAITO called his Chief of Staff and held

a secret conference of his unit commanders. The contents of that conference were never revealed to us but

nevertheless it was undoubtedly aimed at taking a final

action in realizing the end in true Japanese Army

fashion. This final decisive action had to be simply one

of two courses. First, to remain as we were and starve

to death or secondly, to make a last attack and fight

to the finish. Of course, the Division Commanding

General and Chief of Staff chose the latter. However,

in order to carry out the latter there were many difficulties to be encountered. First of all, to what extent

could the soldiers be assembled? Even if they could be

assembled, only a few could be supplied with weapons.

Furthermore, it would take two days and two nights

to assemble them and issue the orders. Whereupon,

the evening of 6 July or 7 July was decided upon. Flaying lost the freedom of maneuverability there was only

one road left open, a last all out desperate attack.

There was no hope for success. The final order and instructions were written up and undoubtedly resulted

in the order to carry out the forementioned ceremonial

action. The opinion of Vice Admiral NAGUMO was

probably received but even though he was in the

vicinity there was no communication between the two

headquarters. Under these conditions the final plan

was drawn up. However, since the fighting on SAIPAN

Island was under the command of SAITO, combining

both Army and Navy forces, this was quite proper.

Officer messengers took a period of four days and

nights [sic] to disseminate orders to the unit commanders in various places.

After issuing the orders, it seemed that the work of

headquarters was finished. Everybody put his personal

belongings in order. By the kindness of the headquarters cook a farewell feast for General SAITO

was prepared for the evening of the 5th. However

this consisted of only sake and canned crab meat.

284

Why did they have this farewell feast? Since General SAITO, because of his age and the exhausted

' Condition of his body, would not participate in the

attack of the 7th and had decided to commit suicide

in the cave, it was feted. 10 A.M. 6 July!! This time

was set by the General himself as the final hour. I

had to be up at the front that morning in a liaison

capacity so I was unable to witness the final hour.

I think that it happened in the following manner.

Cleaning off a spot on the rock himself, SAITO sat

down. Facing the misty EAST saying "TENNO

HEIKA! BANZAI!" (Hurrah for the Emperor!), he

drew his own blood first with his own sword and then

his adjutant shot him in the head with a pistol.

When I returned to the headquarters from my duties,

(10 P.M. 6 July) they had already cremated the General's body. He had probably said "It makes little

difference (in this battle) whether I die today or tomorrow, so I will die first! I will meet my staff in

YASUKUNI Shrine!" 3 A.M. 7 July.

This was the time ordered for the commencement of

the attack.

Because the units were confused and mixed as described previously, from the middle of the night of

7 July, we set out for MATANSHA 1 to gather the

troops. However, as usual, we were shelled enroute.

At 0330, the troops who were able to gather at

MATANSHA, the non-combatant troops of the headquarters, all together totaled barely 600. Many had no

weapons. The total participants I would estimate at

about 1500, mixed Army and Navy!

The Battle commences!

We had only one machine gun but it kept firing

bravely, making night into day! About the time the

gun was silenced the whole attack came to an untimely

end, fading like the dew on the dawn of the 7th.

7 July This is a significant day in the war. This

was the day marking the end of the fighting on

SAIPAN; the day when the brave officers and men of

the Japanese Army followed General SAITO to his end.

I will attack the enemy alone again soon and join

my brave comrades!"

1 Matansha was a small village about 1,000 yards

northeast of Makunsha.
0 SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

APPENDIX X

Navy Unit Commendation

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

THIRD BATTALION, TENTH MARINES, SECOND MARINE DIVISION

FLEET MARINE FORCE

for service as follows:

"For outstanding heroism while serving with the 2d Marine Division in action against

enemy Japanese forces on the island of Saipan in the Marianas, July 7, 1944. When Japanese

forces initiated a final concerted attack down the west coast of the island before dawn of July 7,

the 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines, was occupying a newly won position astride the railway

along the west coast road, with two batteries disposed on the left of the railroad and the remaining two on the right and echeloned to the rear. The mounting enemy attack penetrated

the extreme left flank of our front lines and moved between the coast road and the railway.

Security elements to the front of the forward batteries recognized and gave battle to the oncoming force of approximately 600 Japanese supported by tanks. Battalion howitzers opened

up at point-blank range, firing shells with cut fuzes; gunners employed ricochet fire when

the fanatic banzai troops over-ran the forward section; and the cannoneers, command post and

supply personnel in the rear positions united as one to engage the infiltrating Japanese soldiery.

Under the forceful direction of skilled officers, this artillery battalion functioned effectively as

an infantry unit despite the lack of specific training, the four batteries waging a furious and

prolonged battle from quickly organized strongpoints and holding the line indomitably until

relieved several hours later. Strengthened by fresh troops, the defending garrison continued

its counter-and-thrust tactics and, recapturing the heavy guns which had fallen into hostile

hands, knocked out three of the enemy tanks and annihilated approximately three hundred Japanese troops. By their valor, determination and sustained fighting spirit, the intrepid officers

and men of the 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines, had succeeded in breaking the enemy's last desperate effort to oppose the seizure of Saipan, thereby hastening the conquest of this strategically

important base. Their gallant defense of a vulnerable position in the face of overwhelming

disparity adds new luster to the traditions of the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to the 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, on July 7, 1944

are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL,

Secretary of the Navy.

285
APPENDIX XI

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Distinguished Unit Citation

The 105th Infantry Regiment (less 3d Battalion and Company G) and the Spears Detachment, 762d Provisional Tank Battalion, attached, are cited for exceptionally outstanding

performance of duty in combat against the

enemy at Saipan, Marianas Islands, on 7 July

1944. The regiment attacked north toward the

village of Makunsha on the west coast of Saipan, against increasing enemy resistance. At

dawn on 7 July, this unit was subjected to one

of the greatest Japanese mass attacks attempted

in the Pacific Theater. The 1st and 2d Battalions fought furiously, as the enemy, attacking in great numbers and with fanatical fury,

penetrated the combined perimeter defense and

inflicted overwhelming casualties on the units.

Forced to yield, the survivors of that fierce assault formed successive defensive positions and

continued to engage the attacking forces. These

units, faced with a dwindling supply of ammunition, water, and medical supplies, fought off

incessant enemy attacks throughout the day.

Meanwhile the Japanese drive had carried on to

the regimental command post where it was completely stopped and contained by the determined

stand of Regimental Headquarters and Special

286

Units. Every available man engaged in the

action. Through the courage, tenacity, and endurance displayed by all ranks, this unit and its

attachment, suffered severe casualties, repulsed

the powerful assault launched by a numerically

superior enemy and contributed materially to

the defeat and destruction of the Japanese

forces at Saipan. The conduct of the 105th Infantry Regiment (less 3d Battalion and Company G) and the Spears Detachment, 762d Provisional Tank Battalion, attached, throughout

the battle reflects great credit on itself and is

in keeping with the highest traditions of the

armed forces of the United States. (The foregoing citation supersedes the citation made

previously to a subordinate unit for action included in the above-cited period, and does not

constitute an additional citation authorizing the

wearing of an Oak-Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Unit Emblem to personnel of Headquarters Company, 105th Infantry Regiment,

cited in paragraph 4, section VII, General

Orders 45, War Department, 1946, which is

rescinded.) [General Orders No. 49, Department of the Army, 14 July 1948.]

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PROPERTY OP C.2

HISTORICAL BRANCH, G-3

HEADQUARTERS MAR+NE CORPS

PLEASE RETURN TO ROOM 3121
THE SECRETARY 00* THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting

the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED

consisting of: Division Headquarters; Division Special Troops; Division

Service Troops; 23rd, 24th, 25th Marines; 20th Marines (Engineer's); 1st

JA,SCO; 534th and 773rd Amphibian Tractor Battalions (Army); 10th Amphibian

Tractor Battalion; Company "C" 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 708th

Amphibian Tank Battalion (Army); VMO-4; 2nd Amphibian Truck Company;

14th Marines (Artillery); 311th and 539th Port Companies (Army); Detachment

7th Field Depot; 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, V Amphibious Corps;

Detachment, Air Warning Squadron #5; 4th 105mm (Howitzer) Corps

Artillery, V Amphibious Corps; 14th Marines (Artillery), (less 3rd and 4th

Battalions); Headquarters, Provisional LVT Group, V Amphibious Corps;

2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion; 2nd and 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalions;

715th Amphibian Tractdr Battalion (Army); 1341st Engineer Battalion (Army);

1st Amphibian Truck Company; 2nd Tank Battalion; 1st and 2nd Battalions,

10th Marines (Artillery) and the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment,

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For outstanding performance in combat during the seizure

of the Japanese-held islands of Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas from

June 15 to August 1, 1944. Valiantly storming the mighty fortifications

of Saipan on June 15, the Fourth Division, Reinforced, blasted the

stubborn defenses of the eneiny in an undeviating advance over the

perilously rugged terrain. Unflinching despite heavy casualties, this

gallant group pursued the Japanese relentlessly across the entire

length of the island, pressing on against bitter opposition for twenty-.

five days to crush all resistance in their zone of action. With but a

brief rest period in which to reorganize and re-equip, the Division

hurled its full fighting power against the dangerously narrow beaches

of Tinian on July 24 and rapidly expanded the beachheads for the

continued landing of troops, supplies and artillery. Unchecked by

either natural obstacles dr hostile fire, these, indomitable men

spearheaded a merciless attack which swept Japanese forces before

It and ravaged all opposition within eight days to add Tinian to our

record of conquests in these strategically vital islands."

For the President,

Secretary of the Navy