NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION; 

THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY; 

NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY; 

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION; 

MONTANA AUDUBON, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

 v. 

DEB HAALAND, in her official capacity as 

Secretary of the Interior; DONATO JUDICE, 

in his official capacity as Montana Bureau of 

Land Management State Director; BUREAU 

OF LAND MANAGEMENT; U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 

Defendants, 

STATE OF WYOMING; WESTERN 

ENERGY ALLIANCE; STATE OF 

MONTANA, 

Intervenor-Defendants, 

 v. 

ANSCHUTZ EXPLORATION 

CORPORATION, Proposed DefendantIntervenor, 

No. 20-35793 

D.C. No. 4:18-cv-00069-BMM 

MEMORANDUM*

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JAN 5 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Movant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 9, 2021

Seattle, Washington

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Movant-Appellant Anschutz Exploration Corporation (“AEC”) appeals the 

District Court’s order denying its motion to intervene in this case. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

In the underlying litigation giving rise to this appeal, Plaintiffs challenge a 

policy adopted by the Bureau of Land Management in 2017 to accelerate the 

issuance of federal oil and gas leases. We assume familiarity with the background 

of this policy, which we discussed in a recent opinion. See W. Watersheds Project 

v. Haaland, No. 20-35780, __ F.4th __ (9th Cir. __, 2022). As in Western 

Watersheds, the Plaintiffs here challenge certain lease sales that took place under 

this policy, including a June 2018 sale in Wyoming at which AEC acquired oil and 

gas leases spanning roughly 24,000 acres. In May 2020, the District Court 

partially granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and vacated these lease 

sales. Less than two months after the District Court’s order, AEC moved to 

intervene solely to appeal the vacatur of the sales impacting its leases. 
3 

We review a denial of intervention de novo, and we review the timeliness 

element for abuse of discretion. Smith v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 843, 

853 (9th Cir. 2016).

Under Rule 24(a), a nonparty is entitled to intervention as of right when it 

“(i) timely moves to intervene; (ii) has a significantly protectable interest related to 

the subject of the action; (iii) may have that interest impaired by the disposition of 

the action; and (iv) will not be adequately represented by existing parties.” 

Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 960 F.3d 603, 620 

(9th Cir. 2020). Although AEC has satisfied the second and third elements, the 

District Court concluded that AEC’s motion was untimely and that its interests 

were adequately represented by Western Energy Alliance (“WEA”), a trade 

association that intervened to represent the interests of member companies in the 

oil and gas industry, including AEC.

To determine whether a motion for intervention as of right is timely, we 

consider the totality of circumstances facing the would-be intervenor, with a focus 

on three primary factors: “(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant 

seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and 

length of the delay.” Smith, 830 F.3d at 854. Here, AEC moved to intervene 

within the 60-day window to appeal the District Court’s summary judgment 

decision, which weighs in favor of a conclusion that its motion was timely, see W. 
4 

Watersheds, slip op. at 15. The only prejudice identified by the District Court was 

the prospect that Plaintiffs would be forced to confront “additional . . . briefing” 

and “possible additional arguments” on appeal. As we have explained in a nearly 

identical context, however, that is “a poor reason to deny intervention, particularly 

given the possibility that [AEC’s] additional arguments could prove persuasive.” 

W. Watersheds, slip op. at 21. Although AEC argued that it did not intervene 

earlier merely because “it had no reasonable basis to believe that the court would 

vacate its leases,” cf. W. Watersheds, slip op. at 23–24, weighing all three 

timeliness factors, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in 

concluding that AEC’s motion was untimely.

To evaluate the adequacy-of-representation element, we consider three 

factors: “(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly 

make all of a proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is 

capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed 

intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties 

would neglect.” Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 

893, 898 (9th Cir. 2011). Although the arguments AEC seeks to raise would 

become moot if intervention were granted, cf. W. Watersheds slip op. at 26, the 

requirements in Rule 24(a) are to be “broadly interpreted in favor of intervention,” 

and “our review is guided primarily by practical considerations, not technical 
5 

distinctions,” Citizens for Balanced Use, 647 F.3d at 897 (citation omitted). Here, 

Plaintiffs have challenged lease sales encompassing hundreds of thousands of acres 

across Montana and Wyoming. Like the would-be intervenor in Western 

Watersheds, see slip op. at 9, AEC has invested considerable resources to acquire 

and develop the leasehold interest now jeopardized by this litigation, and thus “has 

a substantial due process interest in the outcome of this litigation by virtue of its 

contract” with the federal government, id. at 28. Thus, the practical considerations 

in this case persuade us that AEC should be allowed to intervene for purposes of 

appealing the District Court’s summary judgment order.

Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s order denying AEC’s motion to 

intervene. We need not reach the court’s other grounds for denying intervention.

Costs to be taxed against Plaintiffs-Appellees.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.