Filed 3/19/14 In re D.A. CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re D.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. H040052 (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. DP002759)

SANTA CRUZ COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. M.A., Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant M.A. is the father of D.A., the girl who is the subject of this dependency proceeding. Appellant appeals from the juve nile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders, making the following arguments: ther e was insufficient evid ence to support the dependency petitio n’s allegation regarding his substance abuse, the juvenile court erred in requiring him to submit to substance abuse a ssessment and testing as part of his case plan, and the juvenile court erred in ordering D.A. removed from his physical custody. As set forth below, we will affirm.2 F ACTUAL A ND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND On May 23, 2013, the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (hereafter “the Department”) filed a de pendency petition pursua nt to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). There were f our allegations in the petition, all of which alleged that 9-year-old D.A. was in danger of physical and emotiona l harm. Paragraph b1 alleged that appellant repeatedly beat D. A.’s mother, L.G. (hereafter “mother”), in D.A.’s presence, and that appellant threatened D.A. on an occasion when D.A. tried to stop the violence. Paragraph b-2 alleged that mother had a history of neglecting D.A. “due to . . . chronic substance abuse.” Paragr aph b-3 alleged that ap pellant had a “pattern of poor impulse control, violent conduct an d substance abuse.” Paragraph b-4 alleged that mother “minimize[d] the a buse in the home and has failed to take measures to protect [D.A.] from the repeated ex posure to domestic violence.” The Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report recommended that the juvenile court assert jurisdiction, place D.A. in out-of-home care, and or der family reunification services. On July 12, 2013, the juve nile court held a conteste d jurisdiction and disposition hearing. At the hearing, the juvenile cour t admitted the jurisdicti on/disposition report and

an addendum to that report into evidence. The jurisdiction/disposition report stated th at mother tested po sitive for marijuana when she gave birth to D.A. in October 20 03. The report noted that mother abused prescription drugs betw een 2003 and 2013. The jurisdiction/disposition report stated th at appellant engaged in a confrontation at D.A.’s school in November 2012. Appe llant was angry that D.A. had been removed from an afterschool program, and he yelled at a teacher in the presence of students. He also yelled at the school principal and thr eatened her. He shouted obscenities in the school’s hallway and parking lot. His conduc t resulted in a lockdown of the school, and the school superintendent or dered him to stay away from the school for 14 days.3 Appellant later telephoned the principal and left a message stating that “she would pay

for this.” The jurisdiction/disposition report described another incident at D.A.’s school that occurred on May 21, 2013. Du ring this incident, appellant approached a student and

confronted her about her actions toward D.A. Appellant’s conduct made the student feel afraid. The school superintendent determined that appellant’s conduct “disrupted the orderly operation of” the scho ol and was likely to cause “n egative emotional trauma on the part of the student.” Pursuant to Pe nal Code section 626.4, the superintendent ordered appellant to stay away from the sc hool and to refrain from communicating with school personnel and students. The jurisdiction/disposition report stated th at D.A. spoke with the school principal and police officers after the incident on May 21, 2013. D.A. described a long history of domestic violence between appellant and mo ther. She explained that the violence occurred “all the time” and had been happening “since [she] was little. ” She noted that appellant gets very angry, and that appellant hits mother beca use of her addiction to pills. D.A. told the principal and police o fficers that appellant beat mother on May 18, 2013. During the incident, D.A. wa s at the family home with appellant and mother. D.A. heard mother scream, and D.A. ran into the kitchen to check on mother. Mother was crying, and D.A. saw that mothe r’s face was swollen. It appeared that appellant had struck mother in the face. Th e day after the beating, mother told D.A., “[O]ne day he is going to kill me.” Polic e officers spoke with mother on May 21, 2013, and they observed bruising on mother’s cheek and shin. D.A. also told the principal and police o fficers about an incident that occurred in December 2012. During that incident, ap pellant and mother argued at home, and appellant tried to put a rope around mothe r’s neck. Mother tr ied to get away, but appellant placed the rope over mother’s fo rehead. It appeared that appellant was4 attempting to hang mother. D.A. hit appellant in order to stop him. Appellant told D.A., “If you hit me again, that is the last thing you will ever do.” D.A. told the principal and the police officers that appellant’s threat made her feel afraid. She al so told the principal and the police officers that she f eared appellant might hurt her. The jurisdiction/disposition report descri bed appellant’s hist ory of drug-related

and alcohol-related convictions and arrest s. He was convicted of possession of a

controlled substance and being under the influence of a c ontrolled substance in 1987. In 1988 and 1998, he was again convicted of being under th e influence of a controlled substance. He was arrested for being unde r the influence of a controlled substance in 1997 and 1999. In 2011, he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, a breath test at the hospital following the arrest showed that he had a blood-alcohol content of .08 percent, and the arrest re sulted in a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of reckless driving. The addendum to the jurisdiction/disp osition report stated that appellant had engaged in “pharmacological attempts at pain ma nagement.” It also stated that appellant engaged in “continued use of marijuana after its use was no longer medically supported.” Mother testified at the hearing. Sh e explained that she and appellant were married, that they were still a couple, and that they were “working to get [their] family back together.” Mother attended Narcotic s Anonymous meetings, and she was willing to participate in outpatient treatment for her s ubstance abuse. She moved out of the family home before the hearing, and she explained that she would not return to the family home

until she became stable in her s obriety. She admitted that appellant hit her in the face, but she denied that appellant had tried to place a noose around her neck. She testified that it was her fault that the family was en gaged in dependency proc eedings, and that she wanted the juvenile court to place D.A. with appellant in the family home.5 Appellant also testified at the hearing. He testified that he and mother had a “tumultuous” relationship and “always” fought about mother’s substance abuse. He admitted that he had pushed mother, but he deni ed that he had ever hit mother. Appellant explained, “I have like zero domestic violence on my record.” He also explained, “I really don’t get angry that easy.” Appellant testified that he took pres cription pain killers due to a medical condition. He testified that mother had prev iously accessed his medications, and that he currently locked up his medications so that mother could not access them. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juven ile court found that all of the allegations in the dependency petiti on were true. It accordingly su stained the dependency petition and asserted jurisdiction over D.A. It or dered D.A. to be removed from the physical custody of her parents, gr anted appellant and mother reunification services, and

scheduled a six-month review h earing. As part of the di spositional order, the juvenile court adopted the Department’s recommende d case plan, which included terms requiring appellant to complete a drug and alcohol assessment and to participate in drug and alcohol testing upon r easonable suspicion. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. This appeal followed.

D ISCUSSION I. The Dependency Petition’s Allegation Re garding Appellant’s Substance Abuse Allegation b-3 of the dependency petition a lleged that appellant had a “pattern of poor impulse control, violen t conduct and substance abuse” that impacted his ability to care for D.A. Appellant contends that we mu st reverse the juvenile court’s true finding on the substance abuse component of allegati on b-3, arguing that there was no evidence that his drug or alcohol cons umption affected his ability to care for D.A. Appellant has failed to make an argument that warrants our consideration.6 “When a dependency petition alleges multip le grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s ju risdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over th e minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not cons ider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction ar e supported by the evidence.” ( In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) An “appellate c ourt may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findi ngs once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence.” ( In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4t h 1484, 1492.) An appellate court will not consider an issue rais ed by a father if the appellate court “cannot render any relief to Father that would have a practical, tangi ble impact on his position in the dependency proceeding.” ( Ibid. ) Here, appellant concedes that allegations b-1, b-2, and b-4 of the dependency petition were supported by subs tantial evidence, and that th e juvenile court properly asserted jurisdiction over D.A. based on thos e allegations. Thus, even if we were to

conclude that insufficient ev idence supported allegation b-3, we would still affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order. ( In re Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.) Moreover, our reversal of the true finding regarding appellant’s substance abuse would have no impact on any other aspect of th e dependency proceeding. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, reversal of the true finding would not requir e us to strike the substance abuse terms from his case plan. (See In re Christopher H . (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006 [dispo sitional order requiring father to submit to drug and alcohol testing was proper, even though dependency petition’s allegation regarding substance abuse was not proven].) Although appellant asserts that the true finding regarding his substance abuse has the “potential to infect future proc eedings,” he fails to identify any future consequences of the finding. (See In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th7 at pp.1494-1495 [where father argued ju risdictional finding “might have some consequence in a future dependency or family law proceeding,” but failed to suggest any way in which the findi ng could actually affect a future proceeding, appellate court refused to review sufficiency of evidence supporting finding].) Accordingly, because we cannot render any effective relief, we will not consider appellant’s argument regarding the substance abuse component of allegation b-3. (See id. at pp. 1487-1488 [“Because Father’s contentions, even if accepted, wo uld not justify a reversal of the court’s jurisdictional ruling or the grant of any othe r effective relief, we decline to address them . . . .”].) II. Substance Abuse Terms in Appellant’s Case Plan A term of appellant’s case plan require s him to complete “a drug and alcohol assessment.” Another term of appellant’s ca se plan requires him to “participate in drug and alcohol testing” upon “reasonable suspici on.” Appellant asserts that the juvenile court erred in ordering him to comply with the foregoing terms because there was no showing that his drug and alc ohol consumption “impacted his ability to care for D.A.” He accordingly requests that we strike the te rms from his case plan. We find no error and

will not strike the terms. “At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court must order child welfare services for the minor and the minor’s parents to f acilitate reunification of the family.” ( In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006, citing Welf. and Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (a) [“whenever a child is removed from a parent’s . . . custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide ch ild welfare services” to the child and the parents].) The juvenile court “has broad di scretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fash ion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion.” ( In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006

. ) “We cannot8 reverse the [juvenile] court’s determination in this regard absent a clear abuse of discretion.” ( Ibid. ) “Our courts have recognized that severe measures are necessary to prevent drug usage from undermining the prospect of th e successful reunification of families.” ( In re

Neil D. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4t h 219, 225.) Where the record demonstrates that a father has a substance abuse problem, a dispositional order requiring drug a nd alcohol testing is proper. ( In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1007-1 008.) Such an order is appropriate even if a depend ency petition allegation regard ing substance abuse has not been proven and the substance abuse has “not yet affected [t he father’s] ability to care for” the child. ( Id. at p. 1006, 1008.) Here, the record demonstrates that appe llant had a substance abuse problem. He was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and a breath test showed that he had been driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent. He used marijuana, even though the drug was not medica lly required. He had several convictions and arrests for being under the influence of a controlled substance, and he had a conviction for possession of a controlled substance. At th e time of the jurisd iction and disposition hearing, he was taking prescrip tion pain medications. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, it is of no consequence that there was no evid ence showing the effect of his drug and alcohol consumption on his ability to care for D.A. ( In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008.) Accordingly, beca use the record shows that appellant had a substance abuse problem, the juvenile court di d not abuse its discreti on in ordering him to complete a drug and alcohol assessment and to participate in drug and alcohol testing. (See generally id. at pp. 1006-1008 [no abuse of discre tion in ordering father to submit to drug and alcohol testing where father had ar rests and convictions for driving under the

influence and a blood test showed th at father had used methamphetamine]

. )9 III. Order Removing D.A. From Appellant’s Physical Custody Appellant asserts that the juvenile cour t erred in ordering D.A. removed from his physical custody because there was “no substan tial evidence . . . that D.A. needed to be removed from [his] custody to be protected.” He accordingly requests that we reverse the order removing D.A. from his physical custody. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the removal order, and that reversal of the removal order is not required. As part of the dispositional order in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court

must direct where th e child will live. ( In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169.) To order a child physically removed from her parent ’s custody, the juvenile court “must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the child w ould be at substantial risk of harm if

returned home and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removal.” ( In re R.V., Jr. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 849.) “The parent need not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate.” ( Ibid. ) “The focus . . . is on aver ting harm to the child.” ( In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 136.) We review the juvenile court’s dispos itional order for substantial evidence. ( In re R.V., Jr., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 849.) “ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our review requires that all reasonable inferences be given to support the findings and orders of the juvenile court and th e record must be view ed in the light most favorable to those orders.’ ” ( In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733.) Here, the evidence showed that appellant had an anger mana gement problem and was prone to violent and threatening conduct . When he became angry about D.A.’s removal from an afterschool program, he shout ed at a teacher and the principal, yelled obscenities on the school campus, and threaten ed the principal. He frequently beat mother, prompted by mother’s use of prescrip tion pills. When D.A. attempted to prevent appellant from hanging mother, appellant th reatened to physically harm D.A.10 Appellant’s threat to D.A. made D.A. feel scared, and D.A. feared that appellant might hurt her. Despite the evidence showing appe llant’s tendency to engage in domestic violence and angry outbursts, ap pellant denied engaging in do mestic violence and denied that he angered easily. Appellant’s threat to D.A., combined with his history of violence and inability to recognize his anger problem, demonstrated that D.A. was at substantial risk of physical harm in appellant’s presen ce. We therefore conc lude that there was

sufficient evidence that D.A. would be at substa ntial risk of harm if placed in appellant’s custody and sufficient evidence that D.A. could not be protecte d without removal from appellant’s custody. We acco rdingly must affirm the dispositional or der removing D.A. from appellant’s physical custody. (See In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 136- 137 [substantial evidence supported dispositio nal order removing child from father’s physical custody where the father engaged in a pattern of domestic violence and “had not successfully addressed his anger issues”].)11 D ISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

__________ _______________ _____________ RUSHING, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

___________________ _________________ PREMO, J.

___________________ _________________ MÁRQUEZ, J.