alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### James M. Adsit *et al. v.*William Smith.

*Trust—whether it exists.*The mere fact that a person who obtained the discharge from a soldier, and procured a land warrant to he issued thereon, purchased the warrant before it was issued, contrary to the act of congress on that subject, will not constitute such purchaser a trustee of the soldier as respects the land entered under such warrant.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Chicago; the Hon. John A. Jameson, Judge, presiding.

This case was before this court at the September term, 1868, and is reported in 49 Ill. 403, where a statement of the case will be found, as presented on the first trial. On the remand" of the cause a new hearing was had, and additional testimony introduced, whereupon the court below found a trust existed, in favor of Smith, and decreed accordingly. Adsit appealed;

Messrs. King, Scott & Payson, for the appellant, Adsit, and Mr. Thomas Clowry, for the purchasers, Wright and Rourk.

Mr. W. T. Burgess, for the appellee.

*413Mr. Chief Justice Breese

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This case was before us at a former term, and is reported in 49 Ill. 403. It was then decided on the testimony of Holmes alone, the party from whom Adsit obtained the discharge, and on which a land warrant was issued as a bounty for military services in the war with Mexico. On his testimony, it was held, Adsit was the trustee of Holmes, and bound to account for the land in that capacity.

On a rehearing of the cause in the superior court, Adsit was a witness, and his testimony puts a different phase upon the transaction, and so balances the testimony of Holmes as to render it impossible to base a decree upon it.

There being no evidence of a trust, or of fraud on the part of Adsit, his testimony balancing that of Holmes on that point, nothing is left of the case, but the fact of obtaining by Adsit Holmes’ discharge, and procuring thereon a warrant to be issued for the land in controversy. The most that can be said of this, is, that the transaction was in violation of an act of congress, but that would not give a court of chancery jurisdiction to hold Adsit as a trustee, and make him accountable as such. All the matter alleged, of trust and of fraud, has no support in the testimony. Nothing appearing to corroborate Holmes’ statements, and they being denied by Adsit, the one is as much entitled to belief as the other.

There is nothing, then, in the record sufficient to give a court of chancery jurisdiction of the subject matter, there being no fraud and no trust established; consequently, the decree finding a trust existed, must be reversed, and the bill must be dismissed.

If Holmes has any right to the money Adsit received for the land, he can prosecute that right in a court of law, and ' recover according to the justice of his case.

The decree is reversed for want of jurisdiction.

*Decree reversed.*
# COURT OF APPEALS

SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO

MANDATE

THE STATE OF TEXAS

To the 46th District Court of Wilbarger County, Greeting:

BEFORE our Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas, on November 6, 2014,

the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. William E. Brown and Helen W. Brown as Trustees of

the William E. Brown and Helen W. Brown Revocable Living Trust

Case Number: 07-13-00428-CV Trial Court Number: 26,012

was determined and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated November 6, 2014, it is hereby ordered,

adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded in part and

affirmed in part.

It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that appellant pay one-half of the costs of

this appeal, and appellees pay one-half of the costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

It is further ordered that this decision be certified below for observance.

o O o

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of said Court of Appeals for

the Seventh District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed

and executed.

WITNESS, the Honorable Justices of our said Court, with the seal thereof annexed, at

the City of Amarillo on January 23, 2015

.



# Vivian Long

VIVIAN LONG, CLERK
#### J & R Brick Masonary, Inc., Respondent, v Retaco Holding Company, LLC, Defendant, and Dworkin Construction Corp. (USA) et al., Appellants.

[825 NYS2d 235]

*740In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendants Dworkin Construction Corp. (USA) and Dworkin Construction appeal (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (M. Garson, J.), dated March 28, 2003, which denied the motion of the defendant Dworkin Construction Corp. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, (2) from an order of the same court (Feldman, J.) dated June 14, 2005, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (b) to set aside a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against them, and (3), as limited by their brief, from so much of an amended judgment of the same court (Feldman, J.) dated August 9, 2005, as, after a nonjury trial, and upon the order denying their motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (b) to set aside the verdict, is in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sum of $48,390.

Ordered that the appeals from the orders are dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the amended judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.

The appeals from the intermediate orders must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the amended judgment in the action *(see Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeals from the orders are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the amended judgment *(see*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

Contrary to the appellants’ contentions, the Supreme Court properly found that the plaintiff substantially performed its contract for masonry work and was entitled to damages to the extent awarded *(see Norberto & Sons, Inc. v County of Nassau, Dept. of Pub. Works,*16 AD3d 642 [2005]). For example, the only evidence that the plaintiff used ordinary beach-type sand rather than coarse masonry sand in the grout was the hearsay testimony of the appellants’ president, based on engineering reports that were not produced during disclosure or at trial. Moreover, the appellants never established what effect, if any, the use of ordinary beach-type sand rather than coarse sand would have on the project. The appellants’ president admitted that the plaintiff provided grout that met the minimum “2,000 *741p.s.i.” or compressive strength requirement specified in the contract.

The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Adams, J.E, Ritter, Lunn and Covello, JJ., concur.
#### § 601.20 Streamlining Environmental Impact Statements.

The NCPC as Lead Agency shall use all available techniques to minimize the length of an EIS. Such techniques include, without limitation, drafting an EIS in clear, concise language; preparing an analytic vs. encyclopedic EIS; reducing emphasis on background information; using the scoping process to emphasize significant issues and de-emphasize non-significant issues; incorporating relevant information by reference; using a programmatic EIS and tiering to eliminate duplication in subsequent EISs; and following the format guidelines of § 601.22.
# Attachment 1
#### § 1000.245 May a Tribe/Consortium continue work with construction funds remaining in an AFA at the end of the funding year?

Yes, any funds remaining in an AFA at the end of the funding year may be spent for construction under the terms of the AFA.
Report of Independent Registered
Public Accounting Firm



To the Board of Directors, PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.:



We have examined management’s assertion, included in the accompanying
Report on Assessment of Compliance with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria, that Midland Loan Services, a division of PNC Bank, National
Association ("Midland" or the "Company") complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of
the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation AB for the commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions (the "Platform"),
as of December 31, 2012 and for the year then ended, excluding criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii), 1122(d)(3)(i)(B), 1122(d)(3)(i)(C), 1122(d)(3)(i)(D),
1122(d)(3)(ii), 1122(d)(3)(iii), 1122(d)(3)(iv), and 1122(d)(4)(xv), which the Company has determined are not applicable to the
servicing activities performed by it with respect to the Platform. Management is responsible for the Company's compliance with
the servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion based on our examination.



Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence
about the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered
necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of selected asset-backed transactions and securities that comprise
the Platform, testing of selected servicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether the Company processed those
selected transactions and performed those selected activities in compliance with the applicable servicing criteria. Our procedures
were limited to the selected transactions and servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this report.
Our procedures were not designed to detect noncompliance arising from errors that may have occurred prior to or subsequent to our
tests that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report.
We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination
on the Company’s compliance with the servicing criteria.



In our opinion, management’s assertion that Midland Loan Services
complied with the aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2012 for the Platform
is fairly stated, in all material respects.





/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP





March 1, 2013















PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 1100 Walnut, Suite 1300, Kansas City,
MO 64106

T: (816) 472 7921, F: (816) 218 1890, www.pwc.com/us
#### Eugenia E. Sweeney v. William Sweeney.

Motion granted, with ten dollars costs.
#### In the Matter of Raquel W., Respondent, v Lawrence R., Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 751]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Michael F. Griffith, J.), entered November 7, 2005 in a proceeding pursuant to the Uniform Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The order, among other things, granted petitioner custody of her two children.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs. Present—Hurlbutt, A.PJ., Martoche, Centra and Pine, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edwin Cook, Appellant.

Judgment of conviction affirmed. All concurred.
### §14515. Discharge or retirement for age

Each reserve officer of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who is in an active status or on an inactive-status list and who reaches the maximum age specified in section 14509, 14510, 14511, or 14512 of this title for the officer's grade or position shall (unless the officer is sooner separated or the officer's separation is deferred or the officer is continued in an active status under another provision of law) not later than the last day of the month in which the officer reaches that maximum age—

(1) be transferred to the Retired Reserve if the officer is qualified for such transfer and does not request (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned) not to be transferred to the Retired Reserve; or

(2) be discharged from the officer's reserve appointment if the officer is not qualified for transfer to the Retired Reserve or has requested (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned) not to be so transferred.

(Added Pub. L. 103–337, div. A, title XVI, §1611, Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2954; amended Pub. L. 104–106, div. A, title XV, §1501(b)(31), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 498; Pub. L. 107–107, div. A, title V, §517(d), Dec. 28, 2001, 115 Stat. 1095.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2001—Par. (1). Pub. L. 107–107, §517(d)(1), substituted "if the officer is qualified for such transfer and does not request (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned) not to be transferred to the Retired Reserve" for ", if the officer is qualified and applies for such transfer".

Par. (2). Pub. L. 107–107, §517(d)(2), added par. (2) and struck out former par. (2) which read as follows: "if the officer is not qualified or does not apply for transfer to the Retired Reserve, be discharged from the officer's reserve appointment."

1996—Pub. L. 104–106 substituted "inactive-status" for "inactive status" in introductory provisions.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2001 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 107–107 effective on the first day of the first month that begins more than 180 days after Dec. 28, 2001, see section 517(g) of Pub. L. 107–107, set out as a note under section 10154 of this title.

#### Effective Date of 1996 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–106 effective as if included in the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act, title XVI of Pub. L. 103–337, as enacted on Oct. 5, 1994, see section 1501(f)(3) of Pub. L. 104–106, set out as a note under section 113 of this title.

#### Effective Date

Section effective Oct. 1, 1996, see section 1691(b)(1) of Pub. L. 103–337, set out as a note under section 10001 of this title.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RICH XIONGPAO, a.k.a. Thai Xiong, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10108 

D.C. No. 1:15-cr-00285-LJO

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 12, 2018**

Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. 

Rich Xiongpao appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 

60-month mandatory minimum sentence imposed following his jury-trial 

conviction for manufacturing 100 or more marijuana plants, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 15 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-10108 

clear error, United States v. Ferryman, 444 F.3d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006), we 

affirm.

Xiongpao contends that the district court clearly erred in determining that he 

possessed a firearm in connection with the offense such that he was ineligible for 

safety valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and subject to a two-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). It is undisputed that Xiongpao lived 

at a particular campsite for the sole purpose of tending to the marijuana grow site 

at issue and possessed a loaded shotgun, which was provided by the drug 

organization, at that campsite. Despite Xiongpao’s assertion that he only intended 

to use the shotgun to protect against animals and not other intruders, the district 

court reasonably concluded that Xiongpao did not meet his burden of showing that 

the shotgun was unconnected to the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 

526 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of safety valve relief where 

district court explained that, even if weapons found in defendant’s home were 

intended to protect his family, defendant’s concern for his family’s safety 

“stemmed from the dangers created by his involvement in a drug conspiracy”).

AFFIRMED.
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# The Cold War legacy of the F-102A

By Air Force Staff Sgt. Robert BarnettJBER Public Affairs

                JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON, Alaska  –              http://www.pacaf.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123377528

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```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 132 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 132

Expressing the support of the House of Representatives for the members 
     of the United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military 
         operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 24, 1999

Mr. Gejdenson submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
   the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the 
Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined 
  by the Speaker in each case for consideration of such provisions as 
        fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Expressing the support of the House of Representatives for the members 
     of the United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military 
         operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Whereas the President has authorized United States participation in NATO 
        military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
Whereas up to 22,000 members of the Armed Forces are presently involved in 
        operations in and around the Balkans region with the active 
        participation of NATO and other coalition forces; and
Whereas the House of Representatives and the American people have the greatest 
        pride in the members of the Armed Forces and strongly support them: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the House of Representatives supports the members of 
the United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military operations 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and recognizes their 
professionalism, dedication, patriotism, and courage.
                                 <all>
```
|                               |
|-------------------------------|
|                               |  |
| Media Contact                 | August 13, 2012 |
| Casey Lassiter, 205-970-6176  |   |
| Investor Relations Contact    |   |
| Mary Ann Arico, 205-969-6175  |   |
| maryann.arico@healthsouth.com |   |

----
#### William Loscher, Appellant, *v.*Willy Hager (Sued as “William” Hager), Respondent, Impleaded with “Adolph” Stempel, the First Names “William” and “Adolph” Being Fictitious, etc.

First Department,

March 6, 1908.

Pleading — bill of particulars — order precluding testimony.

Where a complaint sets out separate causes of action charging two defendants with assault and false imprisonment but alleges no special damage, the .plaintiff will not be required to furnish a bill of particulars giving the names of various persons by whom he was formerly employed, nor will he be" required to give particulars as to the names of the police officers who arrested him when the defendant admits that he called the police to make the arrest.

An order for a bill of particulars should not direct that the plaintiff shall be precluded from giving evidence in case he fails to give the particulars required. A motion to preclude the giving of such evidence should be made only after the plaintiff has failed to comply with the order, or has complied with it insufficiently.

Appeal by the plaintiff, William Losclier, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 10th day of December, 1907, granting the respondent’s motion for a bill of particulars of plaintiff’s two separate causes of action.

The complaint sets out separately that defendants falsely accused plaintiff of stealing a stove, and assaulted him.and caused his arrest."

*Charles' Fisehér,*for the appellant.

*Henry F■ Lippold,*for the respondent.

*569Per Curiam :

The plaintiff alleges nb special damage. It is, therefore, unnecessary to require him to furnish the names of the. various business concerns with whom he was formerly employed. The defendant admits having called the police officer to arrest plaintiff, and should be at least as well able to ascertain their names as plaintiff is. The order must, therefore, be modified by striking out the third subdivision of the particulars required to be given under the first cause of action, and the first .subdivision of the particulars required to be given under the second cause of action. The direction for the pre- • elusion of evidence in case of plaintiff’s failure to give, the required particulars must also be stricken from the order. A motion to that effect may be made hereafter in case the plaintiff fails to comply with this order or complies with it insufficiently.

The order appealed from will be modified in accordance with this memorandum and as modified affirmed, without costs.

Present — Patterson, P. -L, Ingraham, McLaughlin, Clarke and Scott, JJ.

Order modified as directed in. opinion and as modified affirmed, without costs. Settle order on notice. .
## Subpart H—Contract Management

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2018—Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title VIII, §801(a), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 1830, added subpart heading.