[Cite as State v. Roulette, 2011-Ohio-6993.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SCIOTO COUNTY 

State of Ohio, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 : Case No. 10CA3364 

v. : 

 : DECISION AND 

Ezekiel Roulette, : JUDGMENT ENTRY

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : Filed: December 22, 2011 

________________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES:

Bryan Scott Hicks, Lebanon, Ohio, for Appellant. 

Mark E. Kuhn, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph L. Hale, Scioto County 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellee. 

________________________________________________________________ 

Kline, J.: 

{¶1} Ezekiel Roulette appeals the judgment of the Scioto County Court of 

Common Pleas, which convicted him of two felonies and two misdemeanors. Roulette 

contends that the trial court erred when it changed its ruling on the admissibility of 

certain exhibits while the jury was deliberating. We disagree for two reasons. First, the 

trial court was not divested of jurisdiction to revisit its admissibility ruling after the jury 

retired to deliberate. And second, Roulette invited any error he now complains of. 

Roulette next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. 

Roulette, however, frames his argument as a claim that his convictions were against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Consequently, we review Roulette’s claims to 

determine (1) whether Roulette’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 2 

evidence and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support Roulette’s 

convictions. Because there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could 

conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Roulette was guilty of the crimes for which 

he was convicted, we find that Roulette’s convictions were not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Thus, there was also sufficient evidence to support Roulette’s 

convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

I. 

{¶2} On the night of June 8, 2009, Roulette, Karrington Martin, Sara Husted, 

and Mary Helmick (hereinafter “Mary”)1

 returned to Portsmouth following a trip to 

Columbus to acquire crack cocaine. Upon returning to Portsmouth, the group stayed at 

the home of an acquaintance of Mary’s. 

{¶3} On the morning of June 9, 2009, Roulette accused Mary of stealing his 

crack. Mary denied this accusation. However, when Roulette could not find the crack, 

he hit Mary multiple times. At one point, Roulette hit Mary in the stomach, which 

caused her to urinate on herself. Mary begged Roulette to stop hitting her. Roulette 

then told Mary that she would have to pay him $600. Shortly thereafter, Roulette, 

Martin, Husted, and Mary drove off in Husted’s gold Nissan Pathfinder. 

{¶4} Mary then called her father, Ed Helmick (hereinafter “Ed”). Initially, Mary 

asked Ed to pick her up at “Krogers.” At that point, Ed drove to the Kroger in 

Portsmouth. Mary then informed Ed that she was at the Wheelersburg Kroger. Ed then 

drove to the Wheelersburg Kroger, where he received a phone call from Roulette. Ed 

testified that “[Roulette] wanted [Ed] to give him 600 bucks or he was going to hurt 

 

1

 We refer to Mary Helmick as “Mary” because she has the same surname as another 

witness in this case, Ed Helmick (i.e., Mary’s father). 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 3 

[Mary].” Tr. at 34. Roulette told Ed that he “didn’t care whether he had to put [Mary] on 

the street, knock her in the head, or beat her ass every day.” Id. 

{¶5} Roulette then told Ed to give the money to a woman wearing a pink shirt. 

Shortly thereafter, Martin, who was wearing a pink shirt, walked by Ed’s car in the 

Kroger parking lot. Ed, however, did not give Martin any money. Roulette then called 

Ed back and threatened to take Mary to Cleveland, where he would force her into 

prostitution. Ed stalled by explaining that he was going to contact his ex-wife (i.e., 

Mary’s mother) and ask her to help come up with the money. Instead, Ed went to the 

New Boston Police Department. 

{¶6} The New Boston police contacted the Scioto County Sheriff’s Department 

shortly after Ed explained his situation. While Ed was working with law enforcement 

officials, he continued to have phone conversations with Roulette. Eventually, Roulette 

and Ed arranged for Ed to give Roulette the money in the parking lot of the New Boston 

Wal-Mart. Law enforcement officers positioned themselves in the Wal-Mart parking lot 

while Ed remained at the New Boston Police Department. At some point, Ed learned 

that Roulette was in a gold Nissan Pathfinder. Soon after learning about the Pathfinder, 

law enforcement officers surrounded the vehicle and arrested Roulette, Martin, and 

Husted. Mary’s injuries did not appear life threatening, and law enforcement decided 

not to call an ambulance. Mary, however, did require some medical attention, so a law 

enforcement official transported Mary to a hospital. 

{¶7} A grand jury indicted Roulette on multiple counts related to the incident, 

and Roulette’s case was tried to a jury. The jury found Roulette as follows: not guilty of 

Kidnapping; guilty of Extortion, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2905.11(A)(2); 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 4 

not guilty of Felonious Assault, but guilty of the lesser-included offense of Assault, a 

first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2903.13; not guilty of Aggravated 

Robbery, but guilty of the lesser-included offense of Robbery, a second-degree felony, 

in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2); and guilty of Attempted Theft, a first-degree 

misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(5) / 2923.02. 

{¶8} Roulette appeals and asserts the following assignments of error: I. “THE 

TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY OVERTURNING ITS 

INADMISSIBILITY RULING AND ALLOWING EVIDENCE INTO THE JURY ROOM 

AFTER THE JURY HAD ALREADY RETIRED TO DELIBERATE.” And, II. “THE 

CONVICTIONS WERE BASED ON AN INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.” 

II. 

{¶9} Initially, we will address some errors in the trial court’s judgment entry. 

The entry states, among other things, that Roulette was guilty of Assault, “a 

misdemeanor of the first degree, in violation of [R.C.] 2903.12(A).” R.C. 2903.12 does 

not govern misdemeanor Assault. The correct statute is R.C. 2903.13. The jury form 

lists the correct statute, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of 

assault under R.C. 2903.13. Additionally, the entry also states that Roulette was guilty 

of “Robbery, a felony of the second degree, in violation of [R.C.] 2902.11(A)(2).” The 

correct statute for Robbery is R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). Similar to the Assault conviction, the 

jury form for the Robbery count lists the correct statute, i.e., R.C. 2911.02(A)(2), and the 

trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of Robbery under that statute. 

Nevertheless, we remand this case to the trial court to correct these errors in the 

judgment entry. 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 5 

III. 

{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Roulette claims that the trial court erred 

when it admitted certain exhibits into evidence that the court had previously ruled were 

inadmissible. Roulette focuses his argument on the fact that the trial court changed its 

ruling after the jury retired to deliberate. 

{¶11} “‘[T]he admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound 

discretion of the trial court.’” State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, at 

¶79, quoting State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

“The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it 

implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. 

Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157. 

{¶12} The trial court ruled certain photographs were inadmissible as a discovery 

sanction. In its case in chief, the State introduced photographs of Mary, which depicted 

Mary’s injuries. (As Roulette pointed out at trial, the photographs also depicted marks 

on Mary’s arms consistent with intravenous drug use.) During discovery, the State had 

notified Roulette that photographs of Husted’s Pathfinder were available for Roulette to 

review. The State, however, did not specifically indicate that the photographs of Mary 

were available. The trial court determined that, because the State specifically 

mentioned the automobile photographs but not the photographs of Mary, Roulette was 

not sufficiently notified of the existence of the photographs of Mary. Therefore, as a 

discovery sanction, the trial court ruled that the photographs of Mary were inadmissible. 

{¶13} While the jury was deliberating, it sent the trial court a request. The jury 

requested that the trial court allow the jury to review the photographs of Mary. After 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 6 

consulting with both Roulette and the State, the trial court ruled the photographs were 

admissible and allowed the jury to review them. 

{¶14} This case falls squarely within the “invited-error doctrine.” “Under the 

invited-error doctrine, ‘[a] party will not be permitted to take advantage of an error which 

he himself invited or induced.’” State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 493, 1999-Ohio-283, 

quoting, Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 20, at 

paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶15} While it deliberated, the jury requested to view “the photos of Mary 

Helmick’s face and arm.” Tr. 358. The trial court then asked whether Roulette wanted 

the court to grant the jury’s request. And Roulette’s trial counsel stated, “I consulted 

with Mr. Roulette. We’re good. We’re okay to let the pictures go up.” Id. at 359. The 

trial court clarified Roulette’s position as follows: 

{¶16} “[Court]: Now you understand that’s contrary to my previous ruling. 

{¶17} “[Def. Counsel]: Yes, sir. 

{¶18} “[Court]: All right. And you and Mr. Roulette have discussed it and 

although I’ve not allowed them to be admitted into evidence, I’ll change that, if you 

desire. I’ll change that, allow them to be admitted and then they go up, but I have to 

have your approval. 

{¶19} “[Def. Counsel]: Mr. Roulette and I discussed the pros and the cons of it. 

The possible benefits as well as the possible harm and we’re in agreement to let them 

go up. You can change that ruling. 

{¶20} “* * * 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 7 

{¶21} “[Court]: Okay, All right, I’ll let them go upstairs and my previous ruling is 

changed now with the consent of both parties.” Id. at 359-360. 

{¶22} At trial, Roulette obviously recognized that there were benefits to allowing 

the jury to view the photographs of Mary. The State noted, on the record, that the 

photographs were advantageous to Roulette in certain respects. Specifically, the State 

indicated that “[Roulette’s trial counsel] did comment on the photos to his advantage, 

that some of the marks [on Mary’s arm] were [drug] injection marks.” Id. at 360. 

Roulette attempted at trial to cast doubt on Mary’s credibility based on her drug use. 

Thus, by approving the trial court’s reversal of its earlier ruling on the admissibility of the 

photographs, Roulette invited the error he now complains of on appeal. 

{¶23} Roulette, however, argues that the trial court lacked authority to revisit its 

earlier ruling, and, therefore, Roulette could not have waived the error. Roulette relies 

on R.C. 2945.35, which governs the items that may be brought to the jury room during 

deliberations. R.C. 2945.35 provides as follows: “Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury, 

at the discretion of the court, may take with it all papers except depositions, and all 

articles, photographs, and maps which have been offered in evidence. No article or 

paper identified but not admitted in evidence shall be taken by the jury upon its 

retirement.” 

{¶24} Roulette focuses on the sentence “No article or paper identified but not 

admitted in evidence shall be taken by the jury upon its retirement” to argue that “[t]he 

statute gives the trial court no authority to reverse its rulings once the jury has retired.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Roulette claims that the trial court “had no jurisdiction or 

authority” to even consider the jury’s request regarding the pictures. Id. at 12. 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 8 

{¶25} Roulette’s arguments are misplaced. “The obvious purpose of [R.C. 

2945.35] is the exclusion from the jury room of that evidence which has been ruled 

inadmissible.” State v. Graven (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 112, 113. The phrases “[u]pon 

retiring for deliberation” and “upon [the jury’s] retirement” do not limit the trial court’s 

ability to revisit an evidentiary issue after the jury begins its deliberations. Nothing in the 

statute divests a trial court of jurisdiction to revisit an evidentiary ruling. Cf. State v. 

Callahan (March 22, 2000), Mahoning App. No. 97 C A 224, quoting Henry v. U.S. (C.A. 

6, 1953), 204 F.2d 817, 820-21 (“There is no iron-bound, copper-fastened, double 

riveted rule against the admission of evidence after both parties have rested upon their 

proof and even after the jury has entered upon its deliberations. Considerable latitude 

in discretion is vested in the trial judge in this respect.”). 

{¶26} The trial court did not violate the statute because the jury did not view any 

inadmissible evidence. The trial court determined that the photographs of Mary were 

inadmissible as a discovery sanction. When the jury ultimately reviewed the 

photographs, the trial court had changed its ruling and deemed them admissible (with 

Roulette’s approval). 

{¶27} The trial court was not divested of jurisdiction to revisit an evidentiary 

ruling while the jury was deliberating. Additionally, Roulette invited any error that he 

now complains of on appeal. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

determined that the photographs of Mary were admissible and allowed the jury to review 

them. Accordingly, we overrule Roulette’s first assignment of error. 

IV. 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 9 

{¶28} In his second assignment of error, Roulette argues that his convictions 

were based on insufficient evidence. Roulette’s argument, however, focuses primarily 

on the credibility issues of the State’s witnesses. Thus, although Roulette asserts that 

his convictions were based on insufficient evidence, he frames his argument as a claim 

that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. A sufficiency-ofthe-evidence challenge and a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge are “two 

distinct legal concepts.” State v. Puckett, 191 Ohio App.3d 747, 2010-Ohio-6597, at 

¶29 (citation omitted). Therefore, we will review Roulette’s second assignment of error 

under both the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard and the manifest-weight-of-theevidence standard. See id. 

{¶29} When reviewing a case to determine if the record contains sufficient 

evidence to support a criminal conviction, we must “‘examine the evidence admitted at 

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind 

of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, 

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” State v. Smith, Pickaway App. No. 06CA7, 2007-Ohio-502, at ¶33, 

quoting State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

See, also, Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319. 

{¶30} The sufficiency-of-the-evidence test “raises a question of law and does not 

allow us to weigh the evidence.” Smith at ¶34, citing State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio 

App.3d 172, 175. Instead, the sufficiency-of-the-evidence test “‘gives full play to the 

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 10 

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Smith

at ¶34, quoting Jackson at 319. This court will “reserve the issues of the weight given to 

the evidence and the credibility of witnesses for the trier of fact.” Smith at ¶34, citing 

State v. Thomas (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 79-80; State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio 

St.2d 230, at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶31} “Even when sufficient evidence supports a verdict, we may conclude that 

the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, because the test under the 

manifest weight standard is much broader than that for sufficiency of the evidence.” 

Smith at ¶41. When determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, we “will not reverse a conviction where there is substantial 

evidence upon which the [trier of fact] could reasonably conclude that all the elements 

of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Eskridge (1988), 

38 Ohio St.3d 56, at paragraph two of the syllabus. See, also, Smith at ¶41. We “must 

review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the 

credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of 

justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted.” Smith at ¶41, 

citing State v. Garrow (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 368, 370-371; Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 

175. But “[o]n the trial of a case, * * * the weight to be given the evidence and the 

credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” DeHass at paragraph 

one of the syllabus. 

{¶32} “When an appellate court concludes that the weight of the evidence 

supports a defendant’s conviction, this conclusion necessarily includes a finding that 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 11 

sufficient evidence supports the conviction.” Puckett at ¶34, citing State v. Pollitt, Scioto 

App. No. 08CA3263, 2010-Ohio-2556, at ¶14. “‘Thus, a determination that [a] 

conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue 

of sufficiency.’” State v. Lombardi, Summit App. No. 22435, 2005-Ohio-4942, at ¶9, 

quoting State v. Roberts (Sept. 17, 1997), Lorain App. No. 96CA006462. 

A. Assault 

{¶33} Roulette was convicted of Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), which 

provides, in part: “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to 

another[.]” 

{¶34} Roulette challenges his assault conviction based on the credibility of the 

State’s witnesses. Roulette notes that Mary is a drug abuser who admitted to having 

prostituted herself in the past to support her habit. Additionally, at the time of trial, Mary 

was incarcerated on a theft-from-the-elderly charge. Roulette also noted that there 

were inconsistencies in Mary’s testimony regarding certain aspects of the events in 

question. For example, Mary’s testimony regarding what the group did after returning 

from Columbus on the night before the incident differed from the testimony of other 

witnesses. 

{¶35} Roulette also argues that the testimony of both Martin and Husted is 

tainted by their desire to avoid lengthy prison sentences. Martin was initially charged 

with multiple crimes for her involvement in this case, but she pled guilty only to extortion 

in exchange for her testimony against Roulette. Prior to her plea deal, Martin faced 

forty-three years in prison. Similarly, Husted was charged with multiple crimes for her 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 12 

role in this incident, and she faced forty-three years in prison. Like Martin, Husted pled 

guilty only to extortion under a plea deal. 

{¶36} According to Roulette, the credibility issues of Mary, Martin, and Husted 

undermine the legitimacy of Roulette’s assault conviction. We note that Roulette also 

argues that “[w]ithout the photographs [of Mary], all you are left with is a mishmash of 

testimony from witnesses who on their own are simply not credible enough to put the 

greater amount of evidence on the State’s side.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Roulette 

asserts that, other than the testimony of witnesses with credibility problems, the 

photographs are the only tangible evidence that Roulette caused Mary physical harm. 

First, as discussed in Roulette’s first assignment of error, the trial court did not err when 

it admitted the photographs of Mary. Second, even without the photographs, there was 

substantial evidence to convict Roulette of assault, notwithstanding the credibility issues 

of the State’s witnesses. 

{¶37} Roulette ignores the consistency of the testimony regarding the elements 

of Roulette’s assault charge. Mary testified that, on the morning of June 9, 2009, she 

awoke to Roulette screaming and accusing her of stealing his crack. Roulette 

continued to look for his crack, but he could not find it. Mary then testified as follows: 

“First [Roulette] hit me and I fell down on the bed and then he continued to hit me and 

then I peed on myself because he hit me so hard in the stomach. And then he stopped 

for a minute because I was begging him to stop[.] * * * [Roulette] stopped for a minute 

and kept asking me to find * * * it or he was going to keep doing it, keep beating on me. 

And I just kept saying I don’t know where it’s at, I don’t know where it’s at. So he tore 

up the bedroom looking and then he started to hit on me again. He punched me a few 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 13 

times in the face and I fell on top of [a] dog and the dog bit me and it just like – it made a 

little place on my face, and then where [Roulette] punched me, it made it worse. And I 

peed on my self again.” Tr. at 150-151. 

{¶38} Mary testified that Roulette then left the house for a few minutes and that 

he told Martin to watch Mary. Mary testified that when Roulette returned, he hit her 

again. Mary also testified that after she fell to the ground, Roulette kicked her in the 

head and stomach. Finally, Mary testified that she asked Roulette how much money 

she needed to get “to make him quit[,]” and she offered to call her parents to get money. 

Id. at 152. 

{¶39} Martin’s testimony and Husted’s testimony corroborate Mary’s version of 

events. Martin testified that she slept in the Pathfinder the night before, and at some 

point in the morning, she entered the house. Martin testified that she saw Roulette and 

Mary arguing. Martin then testified that she saw Roulette “hit [Mary’s] ear and the dog 

bit her on her eye.” Id. at 229. Martin testified that she noticed that Mary’s crotch was 

wet, which was consistent with someone urinating on herself. 

{¶40} Martin also testified that when the argument began, Husted was 

showering. Martin testified that after Husted came out of the shower, Martin and Husted 

then went outside to the Pathfinder. While Martin and Husted were in the Pathfinder, 

Martin testified that she could hear Mary screaming and yelling for Roulette to stop. 

{¶41} Husted testified that, on the morning of June 9, she was showering and 

that when she came out of the shower, Roulette and Mary were arguing about money 

and drugs. Husted went out to the Pathfinder to smoke a cigarette, and she testified 

that she “contemplat[ed] whether to leave or what to do.” Id. at 258. Husted testified 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 14 

that she considered leaving because she heard Mary screaming, “Stop it.” Id. Husted 

also testified that “[Mary] was just screaming like she was being * * * hurt.” Id. When 

Mary eventually came out of the house, Husted testified that she noticed that Mary had 

blood on her shirt. 

{¶42} We reiterate that the “weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of 

the witnesses are primarily for the [jury.]” DeHass, at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

Based on the testimony of the State’s witnesses, there is substantial evidence upon 

which the jury could reasonably have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

Roulette “knowingly cause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause physical harm to” Mary. R.C. 

2903.13(A). Thus, Roulette’s assault conviction is not against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. See Eskridge at paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, there is also 

sufficient evidence to support Roulette’s assault conviction. See Lombardi at ¶9. 

B. Extortion 

{¶43} Next, we consider Roulette’s challenge to his conviction for extortion in 

violation of R.C. 2905.11(A)(2). That statute provides: “No person, with purpose to 

obtain any valuable thing or valuable benefit or to induce another to do an unlawful act, 

shall do any of the following: * * * Threaten to commit any offense of violence[.]” 

{¶44} Roulette argues that the State failed to show that Roulette threatened to 

commit an offense of violence. Essentially, Roulette argues that the only evidence of a 

threat of violence is Ed’s testimony that Roulette threatened, over the phone, that he 

would kill Mary if Ed did not give Roulette $600. Roulette argues that Mary, Martin, and 

Husted testified that Roulette only threatened that he would force Mary into prostitution 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 15 

if Ed failed to pay. Roulette asserts that although forcing someone into prostitution “is 

despicable, [] it is not a crime of violence.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. 

{¶45} Even assuming that forcing someone into prostitution is not a crime of 

violence, there was substantial evidence that Roulette threatened an offense of 

violence. Mary contacted Ed and told him that she needed him to pick her up at 

“Krogers.” After Ed mistakenly drove to the Portsmouth Kroger, Mary informed him that 

he needed to go to the Kroger in Wheelersburg. While Ed waited in the parking lot of 

the Wheelersburg Kroger, Roulette called him. Ed testified that Roulette “wanted me to 

give him 600 bucks or he was going to hurt my daughter.” Tr. at 34. When asked how 

Roulette said he was going to hurt Mary, Ed stated that Roulette “didn’t care whether he 

had to put her on the street, knock her in the head, or beat her ass every day.” Id. Ed 

testified that those were Roulette’s “exact words.” Id. Ed also testified that Roulette 

“said he would kill [Mary].” Id. at 40. 

{¶46} Additionally, Roulette’s argument overlooks Martin’s testimony. Roulette 

argues that Mary, Martin, and Husted testified that Roulette threatened only to force 

Mary into prostitution. Martin, however, also testified that she overheard Roulette tell 

Ed that Roulette would “throw [Mary] in the water.” Id. at 235. Specifically, Martin 

testified that Roulette told Ed that Roulette “was going to take that bitch swimming if you 

don’t get my money.” Id. The jury could reasonably infer that Roulette’s statement that 

he would take Mary “swimming if you don’t get my money” constituted a threat of 

violence. 

{¶47} Thus, there is substantial evidence upon which the jury could reasonably 

have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Roulette, “with purpose to obtain 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 16 

[$600,] * * * [t]hreaten[ed] to commit an[] offense of violence[.]” R.C. 2905.11(A)(2). 

Therefore, Roulette’s extortion conviction is not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. See Eskridge at paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, there is also 

sufficient evidence to support Roulette’s extortion conviction. See Lombardi at ¶9. 

C. Attempted Theft 

{¶48} Roulette was convicted of attempted theft in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(5). R.C. 2913.02(A)(5) provides that “[n]o person, with purpose to deprive 

the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the 

property or services in any of the following ways: * * * By intimidation.” This statute 

does not address “attempted” theft specifically. However, R.C. 2923.02(A) governs 

“attempt,” and it provides as follows: “No person, purposely or knowingly, and when 

purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall 

engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.” 

{¶49} The Revised Code does not include a statutory definition of “intimidate.” 

In the absence of a statutory definition, we give the term its “common, everyday 

meaning.” See State v. Dorso (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 60, 62. The dictionary defines 

“intimidate” as “to make timid or fearful : inspire or affect with fear : FRIGHTEN[.]” 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) (caps sic). This definition is 

consistent with the trial court’s definition in its jury instructions. See Tr. at 349 (stating 

that “[i]ntimidation means to frighten, scare or bully”). 

{¶50} Roulette’s conduct constituted intimidation. Roulette told Ed that if Ed did 

not pay Roulette $600, then Roulette would force Ed’s daughter into prostitution and 

that Roulette would “knock her in the head” and “beat her ass every day.” Id. at 34. Ed 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 17 

also testified that Roulette threatened to kill Mary. Additionally, Martin overheard 

Roulette tell Ed that Roulette would throw Mary in the water. The evidence 

demonstrates that Roulette intended to make Ed fearful. Ed sought help from the police 

when he realized that Mary might be in danger. Several law enforcement officials 

testified that Ed appeared distraught as a result of his conversations with Roulette. 

Consequently, there was substantial evidence that Roulette knowingly attempted to 

deprive Ed of $600 through intimidation. Thus, Roulette’s attempted theft conviction is 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Eskridge at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. Accordingly, there is also sufficient evidence to support Roulette’s attempted 

theft conviction. See Lombardi at ¶9 

D. Robbery 

{¶51} Finally, by virtue of his other convictions, Roulette’s robbery conviction, in 

violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2), is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. R.C. 

2911.02(A)(2) provides that “[n]o person, in attempting or committing a theft offense * * 

*, shall * * * [i]nflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on another[.]” 

{¶52} As detailed above, Roulette was guilty of attempted theft in violation of 

R.C. 2913.02. A violation of R.C. 2913.02 constitutes a “theft offense” under the 

robbery statute. See R.C. 2911.02(C)(2) & R.C. 2913.01(K)(1). And in attempting to 

commit a theft offense against Ed, Roulette threatened to inflict physical harm on Mary. 

{¶53} The defendant need not threaten the victim of the underlying theft offense 

with physical harm to be guilty of robbery under R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). In State v. Lynch

(May 13, 1993), Montgomery App. No. 13312, the court analyzed a robbery conviction 

under a provision of R.C. 2911.02(A), which provided, in part, as follows: “No person, in 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 18 

attempting or committing a theft offense, * * * shall use or threaten the immediate use of 

force against another.” (Emphasis sic). The court held that “[i]t is clear under the law in 

Ohio, * * * that ‘the person against whom force is used or threatened need not be the 

victim of the theft itself.’” Id., quoting (Committee Comment to H 511). “The statute 

itself (R.C. 2911.02) [prohibits] the use of force ‘against another,’ who could be anyone.” 

Id. 

{¶54} As stated above, R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) prohibits “[i]nflict[ing], attempt[ing] to 

inflict, or threaten[ing] to inflict physical harm on another.” And the person against 

whom physical harm is threatened need not be the victim of the theft itself. See Lynch. 

Consequently, because there was substantial evidence that Roulette threatened to 

inflict physical harm against Mary while he committed a theft offense against Ed, 

Roulette’s robbery conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See 

Eskridge at paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, there is also sufficient evidence 

to support Roulette’s robbery conviction. See Lombardi at ¶9. 

E. Conclusion 

{¶55} We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support each of 

Roulette’s convictions. Therefore, none of Roulette’s convictions is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Consequently, there is sufficient evidence to support to support 

each of Roulette’s convictions. Accordingly, we overrule Roulette’s second assignment 

of error. 

V. 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 19 

{¶56} Having overruled both of Roulette’s assignments of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. However, we remand this case to the trial court to correct 

the errors in its judgment entry as detailed above. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CAUSE REMANDED. 
Scioto App. No. 10CA3364 20 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED AND THE CAUSE BE 

REMANDED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Scioto County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. 

 Harsha, P.J. and McFarland, J.: Concur. 

For the Court 

 

 

 BY:_____________________________ 

 Roger L. Kline, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing 

with the clerk.