## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 20

- 2965

_____________________________

I AN M. B ERG ,
Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA ,
Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County

. Dustin Stephenson , Judge

.
September 29, 2021

P ER C URIAM

.

In this appeal filed pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967) , we affirm the revocation of Appellant’s probation and the resulting sentence for the underlying offense of grand theft. However, we remand with directions that the trial court strike a technical violation from the revocation order and correct the
revocat ion order to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement

.

T he trial court found that A ppellant violated condition three of his probation by changing his residence without the consent of his probation officer. Appellant’s probation officer testified that she went to A ppellant’s listed residence and was told by A ppellant’s father that A ppellant was not at the house, that he did not know A ppellant’s whereabouts, that he had a trespass2 injunction against A ppellant, and that A ppellant was not allowed to come back . Such hearsay alone is not sufficient to establish that A ppellant changed his residence in the absence of any nonhearsay evidence to corroborate it. See Rutland v. State , 166 So. 3d 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (observing that “a probation officer’s hearsay
te stimony, by itself, that another person told him or her the probationer no longer lived at a residence is insufficient to support a change of residence violation; the cases are clear and legion”); Webb v. State , 154 So. 3d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (h olding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant changed his residence without permission where defendant’s probation officer made a single visit to defendant’s address to find defendant and was told by defendant’s aunt and his mother that defendant no longer lived there); Cito v. State , 721 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant changed his residence without permission where the only evidence was hearsay testimony from def endant’s probation officer that defendant’s mother stated that she did not know w here he was).

Although A ppellant’s probation officer further testified that she subsequently spoke to A ppellant on the phone about his desire to move to Panama City, she di d not testify that A ppellant admitted changing his residence. Appellant’s probation officer also testified that she instructed A ppellant to come into the office the next day so that they could find somewhere for A ppellant to stay because she realized that appellant was essentially homeless. To the extent the trial court found that A ppellant failed to report as instructed, this could not be used as a basis to revoke A ppellant’s probation because it was not charged in the probation violation affidavit. Grimsl ey v. State , 830 So. 2d 118, 120 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Furthermore, A ppellant could not be found to have willfully violated his probation due to forced homelessness. See Davis v. State , 276 So. 3d 119 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Charles v. State , 209 So. 3d 32, 35 ( Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Bravo v. State , 268 So. 3d 193, 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).

Because the trial court erred in finding that A ppellant violated his probation by changing his residence without his probation officer’s consent , we remand with directions that the trial court strike the violation of condition three from the3 revocation order. However, we affirm the revocation of Appellant’s probation based on the trial court’s determination that Appellant also violated his probation by committing the new offenses of armed trespass and resisting an officer without violence. See Fuentes v. State

, 219 So. 3d 956, 958 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); Collins v. State , 446 So. 2d 268, 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

Finally

, the tri al court entered an amended revocation order indicating that A ppellant violated condition five of his probation by committing the criminal offense of armed burglary of a dwelling. This conflicts with the trial court’s oral pronouncement finding that A ppell ant committed the lesser criminal offense of armed trespass. Owens v. State , 141 So. 3d 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). The trial court’s written order must conform to its oral pronouncement. See Thompson v. State , 965 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“When a conflict exists between an oral revocation pronouncement and the written order revoking probation, the oral pronouncement will control.”). Therefore, we remand with directions that the trial court correct the revocation order to conform to its oral pron ouncement.

A FFIRMED and R EMANDED with directions

.

R OBERTS and J AY , JJ., concur ; R OWE , C.J., concurs in result only

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Ian M. Berg , pro se

.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee

, for Appellee.