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27–293 PDF 2017

DENYING TERRORISTS ENTRY TO THE UNITED 

STATES: EXAMINING VISA SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

TASK FORCE ON DENYING 

TERRORISTS ENTRY 

TO THE UNITED STATES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 3, 2017 

Serial No. 115–15 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

KATHLEEN CROOKS FLYNN, Deputy General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

TASK FORCE ON DENYING TERRORISTS ENTRY TO THE UNITED STATES 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin, Chairman 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York (ex officio) 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Mike Gallagher, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry to 

the United States: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Task Force on Denying 

Terrorists Entry to the United States ................................................................ 4 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES

Mr. Michael Dougherty, Acting Assistant Secretary, Border, Immigration, 

and Trade Policy Office of Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 14 

Mr. John Wagner, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 14 

Mr. Clark E. Settles, Assistant Director, National Security Investigations 

Division, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 14 

Mr. Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Visa Services, U.S. Department of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government 

Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Mike Gallagher for the Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 53 

Questions From Chairman Mike Gallagher for Edward Ramotowski ................ 58 

(1) 

DENYING TERRORISTS ENTRY TO THE 

UNITED STATES: EXAMINING VISA SECURITY 

Wednesday, May 3, 2017 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, TASK FORCE ON DENYING TERRORISTS

ENTRY TO THE UNITED STATES, Washington, DC. 

The task force met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in Room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Mike Gallagher [Chairman 

of the task force] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gallagher, Higgins, Rutherford, Garrett, Fitzpatrick, Katko, McCaul (ex officio), Watson Coleman, 

Jackson Lee, Barraga ́n, and Keating. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Committee on Homeland Security’s Task 

Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States will come 

to order. The task force is meeting today to examine the security 

of the visa process, and the Visa Waiver Program. I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

I want to start by welcoming back our expert witnesses to the 

Capitol, and thank him for being here doing double-duty for joining 

us yesterday for a Classified hearing. I look forward to following up 

on some of the broader themes of the briefing in order to inform 

the American people of the security of the visa process and the 

Visa Waiver Program. 

I also want to thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member 

Thompson for prioritizing this task force and its mission. Last Congress, this committee’s task force on combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel was not only successful in producing legislative 

change, but also eye-opening in what it revealed. The work done 

by Members and staff on both sides of aisle under Chairman 

Katko’s leadership raised awareness about gaps in screening and 

information sharing, both at home and with our foreign partners, 

which ultimately led to positive reforms for protecting the homeland against terrorists and foreign fighters. 

This, of course, includes the Visa Waiver Program Improvement 

and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act that enacted major VWP reforms into law in 2015. I hope that this task force, Task Force on 

Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States, will be as successful in its investigation and in its final recommendations. 

I also look forward to working with Ms. Watson Coleman from 

New Jersey, and all the Members on both sides to ensure that it 

is a success, and I thank you for the time that you spent, and I 

really am looking forward to this. 

2 

This is a critical time for our Nation’s security. The previous task 

force rightly focused on the tens of thousands of jihadist fighters 

traveling from the West to join the fight on the ground in Iraq and 

Syria. Now, however, we see that number dropping as these fighters seek to expand their actions beyond Iraq and Syria. While coalition forces continue to advance and squeeze ISIS territory, the 

threat against the West continues to rise as the fighters leave the 

so-called caliphate. 

As FBI Director Comey said this past September, ‘‘Through the 

fingers of that crush are going to come hundreds of very, very dangerous people. There will be a terrorist diaspora sometime in the 

next 2 to 5 years like we have never seen before.’’ Those chilling 

words should serve as a wake-up call. 

Just last week, it was reported that two British nationals and a 

U.S. citizen were detained by Turkish border police after spending 

over 2 years in ISIS territory. With hundreds of American fighters, 

and thousands of European fighters seeking to return to their 

home countries, armed with lawful passports, terrorist training, 

and jihadist connections, we must be able to prevent them from 

gaining entry into the United States by abusing our immigration 

system. 

ISIS has already planned, conducted, or inspired more than 180 

plots against the West, including the 2015 attacks in Paris and the 

2016 attacks in Brussels, Nice, and Berlin. The majority of these 

attackers were European citizens with valid passports, so it is easy 

to imagine any one of them gaining access to the country through 

a valid visa or through the Visa Waiver Program. 

As Secretary Kelly recently said, the United States is the prime 

terrorist target, especially since so many of these fighters are citizens of VWP countries. But that is why we are here today, to ensure our defenses are strong and to protect the homeland as it continues to be targeted. 

While there are numerous benefits to our country that stem from 

our welcoming immigration system, like tourism, trade, and business, we should never cease to examine our processes through the 

lens of a terrorist in search of potential gaps. We must always 

strive to stay one step ahead. 

That is what we learned in the wake of September 11, where all 

of the attackers entered the United States through legal means, 

mainly through lawful tourist visas. This, of course, prompted an 

overhaul of our immigration and transportation security systems, 

as well as the creation of our Department of Homeland Security. 

But our work is not yet done. We still have a lot to learn and 

a lot to adapt to. Despite the reforms undertaken in the wake of 

9/11, there are still gaps and weaknesses in our system. One of the 

attackers who killed 14 people in San Bernardino in 2015 legally 

entered the country on a K–1 fiance ́ visa, raising questions about 

the level of scrutiny given to visa applications. 

There are also remaining gaps in vetting and screening a VWP 

applicant, and in information sharing with other countries, which 

are both vital in the fight against a terrorist diaspora. 

I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses on what the 

Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State are 

doing to ensure that visa and VWP applicants are receiving suffiVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
3 

cient screening and vetting before they are allowed to enter into 

this country. I thank the witnesses again for being here and for 

their service, as well as the many men and women who serve our 

Nation, both at DHS and the State Department. 

With that, the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the 

task force, the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Watson Coleman, 

for any statement she may have. 

[The statement of Chairman Gallagher follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MIKE GALLAGHER

MAY 3, 2017 

I want to start by welcoming back our expert witnesses to the Capitol and thank 

them for being here today, as well as for the Classified briefing we had yesterday. 

I look forward to following up on some of the broader themes of the briefing in order 

to inform the American people of the security of the visa process and the Visa Waiver Program. I also want to thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson for prioritizing this task force and its mission. 

Last Congress, this Committee’s Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign 

Fighter Travel was not only successful in producing legislative change, but also eyeopening in what it revealed. The work done by Members and staff on both sides of 

the aisle, under Chairman Katko’s leadership, raised awareness about gaps in 

screening and information sharing—both at home and with our foreign partners— 

which ultimately led to positive reforms for protecting the homeland against terrorists and foreign fighters. This of course includes the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act that enacted major VWP reforms into law 

in 2015. I hope that this Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United 

States will be as successful in its investigation and final recommendations. And I 

look forward to working with Ms. Watson Coleman and all the Members on both 

sides to ensure that it is a success. 

This is a critical time for our Nation’s security. The previous task force rightly 

focused on the tens of thousands of jihadist fighters traveling from the West to join 

the fight on the ground in Iraq and Syria. Now, however, we see that number dropping as those fighters seek to expand their actions beyond Iraq and Syria. And while 

coalition forces continue to advance and squeeze ISIS territory, the threat against 

the West continues to rise as the fighters leave the so-called caliphate. As FBI Director Comey said this past September, ‘‘through the fingers of that crush are going 

to come hundreds of very, very dangerous people. There will be a terrorist diaspora 

some time in the next 2 to 5 years like we’ve never seen before.’’ 

Those chilling words should serve as a wake-up call. Just last week, it was reported that two British nationals and a U.S. citizen were detained by Turkish border police after spending over 2 years in ISIS territory. With hundreds of American 

fighters and thousands of European fighters—armed with lawful passports, terrorist 

training, and jihadist connections—seeking to return to their home countries, we 

must be able to prevent them from gaining entry into the United States by abusing 

our immigration system. ISIS has already planned, conducted, or inspired more 

than 180 plots against the West, including the 2015 attacks in Paris, and the 2016 

attacks in Brussels, Nice, and Berlin. The majority of these attackers were European citizens with valid passports, so it is easy to imagine any one of them gaining 

access to this country through a valid visa or through the Visa Waiver Program. 

And as Secretary Kelly recently said, the U.S. is ‘‘the prime terrorist target,’’ especially since so many of these fighters are citizens of VWP countries. But that is why 

we are here today—to ensure that our defenses are strong and to protect the homeland as it continues to be targeted. 

While there are numerous benefits to our country that stem from our welcoming 

immigration system—like tourism, trade, and business—we should never cease to 

examine our processes through the lens of a terrorist in search potential gaps. We 

must always strive to stay one step ahead. That is what we learned in the wake 

of September 11, where all of the attackers entered the United States through legal 

means, mainly through lawful tourist visas. This of course prompted an overhaul 

of our immigration and transportation security systems, as well as the creation of 

the Department of Homeland Security. But our work is not done. We still have a 

lot to learn and adapt to. 

Despite the reforms undertaken in the wake of 9/11, there are still gaps and 

weaknesses in our system. One of the attackers who killed 14 people in San 

4 

Bernardino in 2015 legally entered into this country on a K–1 ‘‘fiance ́’’ visa—raising 

questions on the level of scrutiny given to visa applications. There are also remaining gaps in vetting and screening of VWP applicants, and in information sharing 

with other countries, which are both vital in the fight against the terrorist diaspora. 

I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses on what the Department of 

Homeland Security and the Department of State are doing to ensure that visa and 

VWP applicants are receiving sufficient screening and vetting before they are allowed to enter into this country. I thank the witnesses for being here and for their 

service—as well as the many men and women who serve our Nation at both DHS 

and the State Department. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am delighted to be here and share this very important task with you. I 

look forward to working with you. 

I am pleased to join in holding today’s hearings on denying terrorists entry into the United States. I welcome the opportunity to 

work with you and our colleagues on the task force to examine how 

the Federal Government can continue to strengthen our Nation’s 

security, and do so in a way that upholds our American values. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has 

established the Department of Homeland Security, and directed the 

implementation of significant and wide-ranging new programs and 

policies to help prevent terrorist travel to this country. 

For example, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has 

deployed visa security units to our embassies and consulates overseas, supporting the State Department in vetting visa applicants. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection now utilizes the Electronic 

System for Travel Authorization, ESTA, to screen Visa Waiver Program travelers before they are permitted to board a plane to the 

United States. 

These agencies now also conduct recurrent vetting of all visa and 

ESTA holders to check against any new derogatory information. 

These are just a few examples of the security initiatives that have 

been implemented in the aftermath of 9/11 on an on-going basis as 

other potential vulnerabilities have been identified. 

Of course, more work remains to be done to ensure we continue 

to stay ahead of those who might seek to do us harm. That work 

must be done on a bipartisan basis in the interest of all Americans, 

and in keeping with our principles as a Nation of immigrants. 

Using rhetoric that divides us and alienates our foreign partners 

is counterproductive to the security of the United States. Banning 

certain groups of people from entering this country based on their 

faith, whether explicitly or implicitly, is unconstitutional. 

Playing on people’s fears and prejudices for political gain is just 

downright un-American. As a country, we can do better, and I hope 

that on this task force, we will do better. America is always at its 

strongest when we stand together in support of our common good 

and our shared values. 

I appreciated hearing from our Government witnesses yesterday 

in a Classified setting about the good work the Departments of 

Homeland Security and State are doing to further enhance our security. I hope to hear from these witnesses today about what more 

can be done to identify and thwart attempted terrorist travel on an 

individualized basis and how Congress can support their efforts. 

I also hope to hear from our Government Accountability Office 

witness about what their work on these visa issues tells us about 

the path that we must go forward. I look forward to a very producVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
5 

tive hearing today, and to working alongside my colleagues on the 

task force and with you, Mr. Chairman, as we go forward. Again, 

I thank you for holding today’s hearing, and I thank the witnesses 

for joining us, and I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the 

full committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for any 

statement he may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chairman Gallagher and Ranking 

Member Watson Coleman. In June 2000, three of the 9/11 hijackers 

flew from European cities to Newark International Airport, and 

were admitted into the United States. Their names were Mohamed 

Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah. Sadly, we know the rest 

of the story. 

In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Government 

went to great lengths to identify gaps in our vetting systems, and 

in how our agencies share intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security was created by the Bush administration and Congress to help protect America from terrorists by connecting the 

dots. 

Now we face a new and growing threat to the homeland. In his 

speech on April 18, Secretary Kelly described us as a Nation under 

attack facing the highest terror threat level in years. Due to our 

brave servicemen and women, ISIS and al-Qaeda have incurred 

great losses in Syria and Iraq. Yet as territory under their control 

shrinks, we are seeing an exodus of foreign fighters returning to 

their homelands, 10,000 of which are in Europe. 

Our committee is taking a serious look at foreign fighters. Last 

Congress, we pulled together a bipartisan task force to examine the 

threat posed to the United States by foreign fighters, especially 

those traveling in and out of Europe. Through this extensive 6- 

month review, the task force produced more than 50 actionable recommendations to safeguard the homeland, and this committee and 

the House passed legislation to address those recommendations. 

Those which became law include the Foreign Fighter Travel Review Act, which requires the President to review all Americans who 

traveled to Iraq and Syria to join a foreign terrorist organization, 

and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel Act, which 

requires the administration to develop a substantive strategy to 

combat the threat posed by extremists and prevent them from entering our country undetected. 

Significantly, the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 ramped up the security of the 

Visa Waiver Program by improved intelligence information sharing 

through HSPD–6 agreements and keep terrorists from entering the 

United States undetected. It also includes major provisions that 

will make it harder for terror suspects to cross borders, including 

enhanced counterterrorism screening of travelers and measures to 

crack down on passport fraud. 

This new task force will pick up where the last one left off. Addressing the readiness of the homeland in light of the foreign fighter exodus, I was pleased to name Congressman Mike Gallagher of 

Wisconsin as the chair of this initiative. As a former combat veteran and Middle East issue expert, I know he will tackle these urgent issues with seriousness and dedication. Together with the 

6 

other seven members of this bipartisan task force, I know that this 

will be equally productive and essential for America’s security. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the important 

work performed by the Department and the State Department to 

prevent terrorists from gaining access to our homeland. With that, 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

MAY 3, 2017 

In June 2000, three of the 9/11 hijackers flew from European cities to Newark 

International Airport and were admitted into the United States. Their names were 

Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah. Sadly, we know the rest of the 

story. 

In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the United States Government went to 

great lengths to identify gaps in our vetting systems and in how our agencies share 

intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security was created by the Bush administration and Congress to help protect America from terrorists by ‘‘connecting the 

dots.’’ 

Now we face a new and growing threat to the homeland. In his speech on April 

18, Secretary Kelly described us as a ‘‘Nation under attack’’ facing the highest terror 

threat level in years. Due to our brave service men and women, ISIS and al-Qaeda 

have incurred great losses in Syria and Iraq. Yet as the territory under their control 

shrinks, we are seeing an exodus of foreign fighters returning to their homelands, 

10,000 of which are in Europe. 

Our committee has taken a serious look at foreign fighters. Last Congress, we 

pulled together a bipartisan task force to examine the threat posed to the United 

States by foreign fighters—especially those traveling in and out of Europe. 

Through this extensive, 6-month review, the task force produced more than 50 actionable recommendations to safeguard the homeland, and this committee and the 

House passed legislation to address those recommendations. Those which became 

law include the Foreign Fighter Travel Review Act, which requires the President 

to review all Americans who have traveled to Iraq and Syria to join a foreign terrorist organization, and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel Act, 

which requires the administration to develop a substantive strategy to combat the 

threat posed by extremists and prevent them from entering our country undetected. 

Significantly, the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 ramped up the security of the Visa Waiver Program by improved intelligence information sharing through HSPD–6 agreements and keeps terrorists from entering the United States undetected. It also includes major provisions 

that will make it harder for terror suspects to cross borders, including enhanced 

counterterrorism screening of travelers and measures to crack down on passport 

fraud. 

This new task force will pick up where the last one left off: Addressing the readiness of the homeland in light of the foreign fighter exodus. I was excited to name 

Congressman Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin as the Chair of this initiative. As a 

former combat veteran and Middle East issue expert, I know he will tackle these 

urgent issues with seriousness and dedication. Together with the other 7 members 

of this bipartisan task force, I know this will be equally productive and essential 

for America’s security. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on the important work performed by DHS and the State Department to prevent terrorists from gaining access 

to our homeland. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Other Members are 

reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:] 

7 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

MAY 3, 2017 

Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson, thank you for your leadership in convening the Task Force on Denying Terrorist Entry into the United 

States. 

On this the inaugural hearing of the task force, I recognize and thank Chairman 

Mike Gallagher and Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman for leading this task 

force as we consider the important question of ‘‘Denying Terrorists Entry to the 

United States: Examining Visa Security.’’ 

I welcome today’s witnesses: John Wagner, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department 

of Homeland Security; Clark E. Settles, Assistant Director, National Security Investigation Division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of 

Homeland Security; and Michael Dougherty, Acting Assistant Secretary for Border, 

Immigration, and Trade, Office of Policy, Department of Homeland Security. 

In February 2017, Chairman McCaul with the consultation with Ranking Member 

Benny Thompson announced the formation of this task force. 

The purpose of this task force is to examine all pathways by which extremists 

might infiltrate the homeland and will seek to identify gaps in U.S. Government information-sharing and vetting procedures. 

As for those of us who are senior Members of this committee, we understand how 

important it is to protect the security of our homeland from those who would do it 

harm. 

The route that the terrorist used on September 11, 2001 was commercial aircraft 

that they turned into improvised explosives that killed over 3,000 people, and 

caused life-changing injuries to hundreds of others. 

If they could have killed more innocent people they would have, and we know they 

would have sought to do so. 

The Committee on Homeland Security is committed to ensure that no terrorists 

will have the opportunity to do such great harm to neither the United States nor 

its people ever again. 

As a former chair of the Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Ranking Member of this subcommittee my commitment to air travel security and protecting the homeland from terrorist attacks remains unwavering. 

The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State share the 

critical responsibility of identifying and preventing foreign fighters who may seek 

to enter the United States. 

Since September 11, 2001, it has been a priority of this Nation to prevent terrorists or those who would do Americans harm from boarding flights whether they are 

domestic or international. 

For this reason, in the last Congress I introduced H.R. 48, the ‘‘No Fly for Foreign 

Fighters Act,’’ which requires the director of the Terrorist Screening Center to review the Terrorist Screening Database and the terrorist watch list to determine if 

an individual boarding a U.S.-bound or domestic flight poses a terrorist threat or 

is suspected of being a member of a foreign terrorist organization. 

H.R. 48 ensures that the Terrorist Screening Database is kept up-to-date and that 

the watch list is as effective as possible in preventing travel by those who would 

do harm to our Nation or its people. 

The No Fly for Foreign Fighters Act also directs that the DHS report findings to 

the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 

The visa waiver program nations are long-time allies, which include: 

• Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Spain, 

Sweden, United Kingdom. 

The visa waiver program nation participants also provide vital intelligence on terrorist threats and those who may work against the safety and security of our people. 

However, I want to point out several important facts that Task Force should consider regarding visa waiver program nations as we consider this issue: 

• Several nations who are listed as part of the visa waiver program also have serious social and cultural tensions among minority populations that have erupted 

into violence; 

• Travelers from Europe and elsewhere around the globe are no longer traveling 

along predictable routes to reach the battle fields of Syria and Iraq; and 

8 

• The exact number and identities of those who have traveled to the region controlled by ISIS/ISIL to engage in the conflict is still unknown. 

An example of the tension that exists just underneath the surface in the nation 

of France came to light in 2005. 

Two youth, one Malian and other Tunisian, were electrocuted as they fled police. 

Following the tragedy the nation of France experienced 3 weeks of riots that engulfed 274 towns throughout the nation. 

The rioters were mostly unemployed minority youth from destitute suburban 

housing projects. At the end of the 3 weeks of riots: 

• 9,000 cars were torched; 

• Dozens of buildings were destroyed; 

• 2,900 rioters were arrested; and 

• 129 police and firefighters were injured. 

In January 2006, another riot occurred this time lead by French youth opposed 

to a new law that they believed would decrease job security, cause lower wages, and 

weaken worker rights. 

The riots were extensive and violent as a result the French government revoked 

that law. 

There was no similar redress of the issues that caused the 3 weeks of riots by 

immigrant youth in October 2005. 

The problems that are the underlying cause of the riots in 2005 are systemic and 

still present. 

The issues before the Task Force transcend geography. 

Where there is poverty and systemic disparity in living conditions and insurmountable forces to resist upward mobility by poor immigrant communities of color 

therein lays the fundamental indisputable threat to the United States’ security. 

We cannot solve these problems for other nations alone these nations must be 

committed to working with groups within their population to remove barriers that 

cause tensions. 

The United States continues to struggle with its own scars from its battles to 

bring justice, equality, and opportunity to persons of color, women, and poor persons 

who were hindered by segregation as well as social and economic barriers. 

Our work as Members of this committee and this task force should focus on making sure the Terrorist Screening Center Database and the watch list used by DHS 

receives the full benefit of our relationships with the intelligence agencies of the 

visa waiver program countries. 

I am a firm supporter of the visa waiver program and believe that it provides economic, cultural, and social exchanges that enrich the Nation in many ways. 

I thank the Members of the task force who will work toward a better understanding of the threats posed by terrorist and how this committee and Nation may 

better prepare to repel them. 

I am looking forward to hearing what our witnesses have to say and I am sure 

they have important testimony. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. We are honored to be joined by a very distinguished panel of witnesses: Mr. Michael Dougherty, acting assistant secretary for border, immigration, and trade at the Office of 

Policy at the Department of Homeland Security; Mr. John Wagner, 

deputy executive assistant commissioner at U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Clark 

Settles, assistant director for the National Security Investigation 

Division at Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Edward Ramotowski, deputy assistant secretary for visa services at the Department of State; and 

Ms. Rebecca Gambler, director of homeland security and justice 

issues at the Government Accountability Office. I thank you for 

being here today. The witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dougherty for 5 minutes for an 

opening statement. 

9 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DOUGHERTY, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BORDER, IMMIGRATION, AND TRADE POLICY 

OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson 

Coleman—— 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Just turn on your mic there. I did that five 

times in my first week here. 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Thanks. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Don’t worry about it. 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson 

Coleman, and distinguished committee Members, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today with my DHS State Department and GAO colleagues. 

The Visa Waiver Program, or the VWP, was created by Congress 

in 1986 to allow citizens of qualifying countries to enter the United 

States for business or pleasure without having to secure a visa, but 

only after necessary security clearances were performed. 

In addition to promoting and easing travel to the United States, 

the VWP relieved the Department of State from having to interview low-risk applicants from program countries at our consulates 

overseas. The VWP has evolved since that time with Congress having legislatively modified it five different times. 

Today, the program can properly be viewed not just as a means 

of easing travel to the United States, but as a means to improve 

our security posture, modernizing screening and vetting processes, 

increasing information sharing within our Government and with 

foreign partners. 

As the committee is aware, DHS Secretary Kelly has emphasized 

that blocking terrorists ensures criminals from entering the United 

States is a top priority of our Department, and we are committed 

to working closely with Congress and our interagency and foreign 

partners to protect our homeland. 

Currently, 38 countries are approved to participate in the VWP, 

which allows their nationals to travel to the United States for up 

to 90 days. Travelers are required to complete an on-line application in advance of travel. That is known as the Electronic System 

for Travel Authorization, or ESTA. 

Looking at the ESTA application, CBP conducts automatic vetting to assess whether the individual is eligible to travel under the 

VWP, or could pose a risk to the United States or to the public at 

large. 

To participate in the VWP, countries must share information on 

terrorists and serious criminals, timely report lost and stolen passports, have robust border and travel document security practices, 

and engage in effective traveler and migrant screening. 

Looking at the criteria for lost and stolen passports, for example, 

VWP countries have to report that loss or theft no later than 24 

hours after they become aware of it, and VWP countries have contributed over 50 million such records to INTERPOL, which accounts for 70 percent of the INTERPOL holdings. 

Rigorous National-level assessments of program countries are 

conducted by the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that 

they meet the security standards required for continued participaVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
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tion in the program. The bottom line is that to join or to continue 

in the VWP, a country cannot represent a threat to the United 

States and must be working as a partner to prevent terrorist travel. 

The committee has contributed to the strengthening of the Visa 

Waiver Program through its leadership in developing the VWP Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015. I would 

like to take a moment to highlight several important changes that 

have resulted from DHS’s implementation of the act. 

We have increased the sharing of terrorist and criminal identity 

information. Several countries have increased the frequency of 

their reporting of lost and stolen passports to INTERPOL. Several 

countries have agreed to adopt new technologies for vetting asylum, refugee, and other immigration applications. 

All VWP countries now are issuing and using for travel to the 

United States fraud-resistant electronic passports that meet or exceed international standards, and DHS has implemented enhanced 

restrictions on travel under the VWP for individuals who have 

traveled to certain countries of concern since March 2011 or are 

dual nationals of particular countries. 

DHS manages the on-going statutorily-required monitoring and 

regular assessment process to ensure the VWP countries are consistently meeting program requirements. These assessments are 

performed in consultation with DHS’s component agencies, the 

State Department, and other interagency partners, as well as the 

intelligence community and the governments of VWP countries 

themselves. 

Be assured that the Department engages in regular monitoring 

of all VWP countries to identify emerging threats and 

vulnerabilities and to take appropriate action. As Secretary Kelly 

recently indicated, we have to ensure the VWP is prepared to 

counter the threat of foreign fighters returning from the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. Under his leadership, DHS will continue 

to look at ways to work with this committee to strengthen the security of the program. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I will look forward to answering any of your questions. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Wagner, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN WAGNER, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WAGNER. Thank you. Chairman Gallagher and Ranking 

Member Watson Coleman and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today about U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s role in securing international 

travel. 

Our agency works around the clock to adjudicate U.S.-bound 

travel, and we have developed mechanisms to address National security risks and other questions as far in advanced of arrival on 

U.S. soil as possible. To provide a sense of scale, last year, CBP inspected over 390 million arriving international travelers, of which 

11 

about 119 million flew into our airports. That is about 327,000 

international air passengers each day, and that is just inbound. 

Visitors make up about 50 percent of these arrival numbers, and 

they are generally split into two categories: Visa and visa waiver. 

Visitors from countries that need a visa go to the U.S. embassy 

overseas, and work with Department of State to get a visa. My colleague from the State Department will describe that process in 

more detail in a few minutes. 

For the Visa Waiver Program travelers, CBP has developed an 

on-line application process known as the Electronic System for 

Travel Authority, or ESTA, for short. These travelers must have an 

approved ESTA in order to board the plane overseas, and we have 

built a verification system with the airlines to support this. 

Now, CBP adjudicates ESTA applications against a series of law 

enforcement and intelligence databases. For the first half of this 

fiscal year, we have approved about 6.9 million ESTA applications, 

and denied over 35,600. Of these denials, about 1,050 were due to 

National security concerns. 

Following the enactment of the VWP Improvement Act of 2015, 

CBP took several steps to apply the new restrictions for individuals 

who would travel to the 7 countries and individuals who are dual 

nationals. So far, this fiscal year, we have denied ESTAs to about 

13,000 people due to travel restrictions and nearly 3,000 for the 

dual nationality. 

Now, once a visa or ESTA is issued, CBP’s National targeting 

center conducts continuous vetting against a host of law enforcement and intelligence databases to ensure travelers remain eligible. If any issues arise, CBP may revoke the ESTA, or work directly with Department of State to have the visa revoked. 

For the first half of this fiscal year, over 1,800 visas have been 

revoked as a result of this, and over 450 of these were due to National security concerns. Now, once the travel is actually booked, 

CBP conducts predeparture vetting on all international travelers 

coming to the United States. 

By law, airlines provide CBP with advanced passenger manifest 

information and access to their reservation systems. CBP reviews 

this data along with previous crossing information, intelligence reports, and law enforcement databases to identify any potential risk 

factors. 

When risk factors are identified, we built several mechanisms to 

address those questions while the traveler is still overseas: 

Preclearance operations, immigration advisory program, and our 

regional carrier liaison groups. Let’s start with preclearance. 

We have 15 air preclearance locations in six countries. This is 

where uniformed CBP officers have legal authorities to complete 

the same immigration, customs, and agriculture inspections of 

travelers at a domestic airport. This is our highest level of capability overseas. If found ineligible to travel to the United States at 

a preclearance location, CBP has the authority to deny entry on 

foreign soil. 

In fiscal year 2016, CBP officers processed 18.3 million travelers 

for entry into the United States at our preclearance locations, totaling over 15 percent of our U.S.-bound travelers. Of this total, CBP 

12 

prevented 6,400 inadmissible travelers from boarding U.S.-bound 

flights. 

Now, second, we have the Immigration Advisory Program and 

the Joint Security Program. This is where we have plainclothes 

CBP officers at major gateway airports in Western Europe, Mexico, 

Central America, Asia, and the Middle East. Using advanced information from our National targeting center, IAP officers work in 

partnership with the host governments and the airlines to address 

any National security risk and immigration issues. If any concerns 

remain after our interview of the passenger, CBP can issue a noboard recommendation to the air carrier, and refer the traveler 

back to the U.S. embassy for a more thorough review of their status. 

Last year we recommended over 4,500 no-boards to the airlines. 

Now, for foreign locations not covered by preclearance or the IAP 

officers, we have regional carrier liaison groups that work directly 

with the airlines to issue no-board recommendations in cases where 

there is any National security concerns or any immigration questions. 

Now, once passengers arrive in the United States, all people are 

inspected by CBP officers. The experience and the intuition of each 

individual officer is invaluable, and this provides the final piece to 

the prearrival vetting and all the background checks. CBP officers 

review travel documents, review the results of prearrival vetting, 

collect biometrics, if required, and then interview all travelers to 

determine the purpose and their intent of travel. 

If there is any questions about their admissibility, their customs 

declaration, agricultural concerns, or any National security issues, 

the person is referred into secondary inspection for more thorough 

examination. 

So we continually strive to improve our vetting and our intervention initiatives to identify and close any security vulnerabilities, 

and remain closely engaged and coordinated with our Government 

counterparts, foreign governments, and our private-sector stakeholders. 

So thank you again for the opportunity, and I look forward to answering any of your questions. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Wagner. 

Mr. Settles, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CLARK E. SETTLES, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. SETTLES. Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson 

Coleman, and distinguished committee Members, thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss the efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement to enhance U.S. visa security and to prevent the travel of terrorists and other criminal actors. 

Visa security is an essential component of our responsibility to 

protect the homeland, shared by both the Department of State and 

the Department of Homeland Security, which includes the Offices 

of Homeland Security Investigations, HSI, and U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, CBP. 

13 

At HSI, we strive to uphold our Homeland Security responsibility 

by confronting dangerous challenges on a global stage, with particular focus on those emanating from beyond America’s physical 

borders. I am honored to highlight our security programs that protect the United States against an ever-evolving diverse and global 

threat. 

HSI special agents investigate transnational crime by conducting 

a wide range of criminal investigations in coordination with our 

foreign and domestic partnering agencies, targeting the illegal 

movement of people, merchandise, monetary instruments into, 

within, and out of the United States. 

The agency has extremely broad authorities and jurisdiction over 

the investigation of crimes with a nexus to U.S. borders and ports 

of entry. HSI’s three operational priorities are border security, public safety, and National security. In an effort to augment and expand visa security operations, HSI is honored to manage the Visa 

Security Program in partnership with CBP, the Department of 

State, the intelligence community, and other DHS agencies and 

holdings. 

The VSP’s primary purpose is to identify terrorists, criminals, 

and other individuals who pose a threat, or are otherwise ineligible 

for a visa at the earliest possible point in the visa application process, thereby pushing the U.S. borders out as far as we possibly can. 

Visa Security Program operations are currently conducted at 30 

visa-issuing posts in 25 countries. The Visa Security Program is 

currently scheduled to expand to two visa-issuing posts in fiscal 

year 2017 and plans to expand as resources allow every year thereafter. We understand that one of our most important priorities is 

to detect and prevent threats before they reach our Nation’s borders. 

To achieve this objective, HSI’s international operations, in parallel with the Visa Security Program, also deploy highly-trained 

personnel to 66 offices in 49 countries. The HSI special agents deployed to the 30 visa-issuing posts world-wide utilize available and 

investigative resources, in-person interviews, and collaboration between U.S. agencies and foreign government counterparts in order 

to investigate and disrupt the travel of suspect individuals during 

the visa application process. 

Experience has shown the Department that there is no technological tool available that can substitute for having highly-trained 

and experienced investigators deployed overseas to conduct informed interviews, enhance the information we have of terrorists 

and other criminal networks, and share that information with our 

foreign partners. 

HSI’s Visa Security Program is supported by the preadjudicated 

threat recognition and intelligence operation team, PATRIOT. PATRIOT is an interagency endeavor with CBP’s National targeting 

system. Through PATRIOT system, VSP conducts automated 

screening of visa applicants’ information against DH holdings, as 

well as holdings of other U.S. agencies prior to the visa applicant’s 

interview and visa adjudication. Derogatory information discovered 

during automated screening is manually vetted by domestic PATRIOT personnel in the National capital region utilizing law enforcement, open-source, and Classified systems. 

14 

PATRIOT analysts then provide deployed VSP personnel with 

the most enhanced information available well in advance of the 

visa applicant’s in-person interview. Following this enhanced analysis of all known derogatory information, collaboration with foreign 

government partners, and participation in the in-person visa applicant interview, HSI-deployed special agents provide a unified DHS 

recommendation on visa eligibility to the Department of State. 

In fiscal year 2016, VSP personnel facilitated the screening and 

vetting of more than 2.2 million visa applicants, recommended the 

refusal of 85,000 visas, and submitted 1,669 watch list nominations 

for counterterrorism reasons. We also facilitated the legitimate 

trade of 442 visa applicants. 

Honorable Members, if I may, I would like to recognize this 

month we celebrate police week, a time to honor all law enforcement officers who lost their lives in the line of duty, to include a 

fellow HSI brother, Special Agent Jeremy Scott McGuire, who lost 

his life in the line of duty last year, and whose name we will be 

honoring and adding to the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial. I just want to say: Rest in peace, Scott. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and for 

your continued support out of our law enforcement mission. I would 

be pleased to answer any questions. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Dougherty, Mr. Wagner, 

and Mr. Settles follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DOUGHERTY, JOHN WAGNER, AND

CLARK E. SETTLES

MAY 3, 2017 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished committee Members. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to prevent terrorists 

and other criminal actors from entering the United States, either by acquiring U.S. 

visas or traveling through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). This work involves close 

interagency collaboration and partnership with foreign governments. Ultimately, 

traveler screening and vetting is an integral component of our responsibility to protect the homeland, and DHS employs a multi-layered strategy to do so. 

Furthermore, as called for in Section 5 of the President’s Executive Order (EO) 

13780, Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States, 

DHS is diligently working with the Departments of State (DOS) and Justice and the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to implement a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures. These standards seek ‘‘to 

identify individuals who seek to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis, who 

support terrorism, violent extremism, acts of violence toward any group or class of 

people within the United States, or who present a risk of causing harm subsequent 

to their entry.’’ 

DHS Secretary John F. Kelly has made clear that blocking terrorists and criminals from accessing the United States is one of his highest priorities, and the administration is undertaking serious and sustained efforts to ensure that we keep 

bad actors from reaching our shores and endangering our people. As part of this effort, we are modernizing screening, expanding information sharing within our Government and with foreign partners, and exploring innovative approaches for detecting threat actors. By focusing on better obstructing terrorists and criminals, we can 

more effectively facilitate legitimate trade and travel. 

PUSHING OUT THE ZONE OF SECURITY

Secretary Kelly noted in his remarks at George Washington University on April 

18, 2017, that ‘‘[t]he more we push our borders out, the safer our homeland will be.’’ 

The Secretary went on to highlight in those remarks the importance of knowing who 

15 

is coming into the country and what their intent for coming is prior to their arrival 

‘‘at our doorstep.’’ There are a multitude of activities, efforts, and programs that 

DHS and its component agencies undertake to do just that. 

In fiscal year 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspected over 390 

million travelers at 328 ports of entry (POE), of which over 119 million flew into 

air POEs. CBP’s pre-departure strategy is one of the ways by which DHS assists 

our interagency, foreign government, and private-sector partners to deny international travel to potential terrorists and criminals. A major component of this 

strategy is the recommendation of denial of visas, as well as denial and/or revocation of visa waiver approvals to individuals who may present a risk to National security or public safety. It is a risk-based, intelligence-driven strategy that extends 

our border security efforts outward to detect, assess, and mitigate, at the earliest 

possible point in the travel continuum, any risk posed by travelers before they reach 

the United States. As threats evolve, CBP works in close partnership with our foreign counterparts—including those in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East— 

to develop greater situational awareness of emerging threats, leverage partner capabilities to affect threat networks, and coordinate enforcement actions. These concerns are not limited to the United States and there is a growing international commitment to combating these shared threats to our security. 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) also actively works to push our 

defenses outward. To achieve this goal, ICE forward deploys personnel to 66 offices 

in 49 countries. ICE’s international staff works in conjunction with overseas law enforcement counterparts to detect, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal 

groups and individuals who seek to harm our country and people. Furthermore, ICE 

special agents investigate transnational crime by conducting a wide range of criminal investigations in coordination with our foreign and domestic partner agencies, 

targeting the illegal movement of people, merchandise, and monetary instruments 

into, within, and out of the United States. 

Visa and Travel Authorization Security 

As President Trump has stated, ‘‘Homeland Security is in the business of saving 

lives, and that mandate will guide our actions.’’ Since taking office this administration has worked tirelessly to enhance border security, promote public safety, and 

minimize the threat of terrorist attacks by foreign nationals in the United States. 

Part of this process is ensuring the security of international travel by preventing 

dangerous persons from obtaining visas, travel authorizations, and boarding passes. 

Before boarding a flight or vessel destined for the United States, most foreign nationals must obtain a non-immigrant visa from the DOS—issued at a U.S. Embassy 

or Consulate. The visa process involves multiple security checks, including screening 

of applicants against a wide array of criminal and terrorist databases to verify the 

individual’s identity and to detect derogatory information that might lead to an inadmissibility determination, as well as an in-person interview with the applicant. 

CBP also conducts vetting of all valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas. Although the visa application and adjudication processes rest with the DOS, CBP’s 

National Targeting Center (NTC) conducts continuous vetting of U.S. immigrant 

and nonimmigrant visas that have been recently issued or revoked. Recurrent vetting ensures that changes in a traveler’s admissibility and eligibility for travel are 

identified in near-real time, allowing CBP to immediately determine if it is necessary to take action prior to subject’s arrival to the United States, such as a ‘‘noboard’’ recommendation to a carrier, and/or a recommendation to the DOS to revoke 

the visa. 

In an effort to augment and expand visa security operations, ICE manages the 

Visa Security Program (VSP) for DHS. VSP’s primary purpose is to identify terrorists, criminals, and other individuals who pose a threat or are otherwise ineligible 

for visas prior to visa adjudication or application for admission to the United States. 

VSP operations are currently conducted at 30 visa-issuing posts in 25 countries. 

Through the VSP, ICE deploys special agents to visa-issuing posts world-wide to 

utilize available investigative resources, in-person interviews, and collaboration between U.S. agencies and our foreign counterparts, in order to investigate and disrupt the travel of suspect individuals during the visa application process. Experience has shown the Department that there is no technological substitute for having 

experienced ICE special agents deployed overseas to apply law enforcement capabilities to the visa process through investigative measures, informed interviews with 

suspect applicants, and leveraging local contacts for information. 

Special agents assigned to international VSP posts are supported through domestic-based screening and vetting of visa applicants, the Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT). PATRIOT is an interagency 

endeavor between ICE and CBP’s NTC. Through PATRIOT, VSP conducts autoVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
16 

1 Recurrent vetting is on-going throughout the period of validity of the ESTA. ESTA applicants who are denied may apply for a nonimmigrant visa. 2 At this time, EVUS is only a requirement for individuals traveling on passports issued by 

the People’s Republic of China who have been issued unrestricted, maximum validity B–1 (visitor for business) or B–2 (visitor for pleasure) visas, generally valid for 10 years, Chinese nationals. The requirement is new, and the U.S. Government expects that it may be applied to additional countries or nonimmigrant categories may be designated in the future. 3 Pub. L. No. 114–4. 

mated screening of visa application information against DHS holdings, as well as 

holdings of other U.S. agencies, prior to the visa applicant’s interview and visa adjudication. Derogatory information discovered during automated screening is manually vetted and analyzed by domestic PATRIOT personnel using law enforcement, 

open source, and Classified information. PATRIOT analysts then provide deployed 

VSP personnel with relevant information prior to interviews and other investigative 

activities. Following an analysis of all known derogatory information, deployed ICE 

special agents provide a unified DHS recommendation on visa eligibility to DOS consular officers. 

In fiscal year 2016, VSP deployed special agents and PATRIOT personnel facilitated the screening and vetting of more than 2.2 million visa applicants, recommended the refusal of more than 8,500 visas, and submitted 1,669 Terrorist 

Screening Center Database nominations. The VSP will expand to two additional 

posts in fiscal year and is tentatively scheduled to add an additional two posts in 

fiscal year 2018. 

If travelers are eligible to travel under the VWP, they must apply for and be approved for a travel authorization via the Electronic System for Travel Authorization 

(ESTA). Through ESTA, CBP conducts enhanced vetting of potential VWP travelers 

to assess whether they are eligible to travel under the VWP or could pose a risk 

to the United States or the public at large. All ESTA applications are screened 

against security and law enforcement databases, and CBP automatically refuses authorization to individuals who are found to be ineligible to travel to the United 

States under the VWP. Similarly, current and valid ESTAs may be revoked if concerns arise through recurrent vetting.1

In November 2016, CBP launched the Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS). 

Similar to ESTA, EVUS is an on-line system used by visa holders to periodically 

update their biographic information to facilitate their travel to the United States.2

To maintain a valid visa for purposes of seeking admission to the United States, 

travelers with designated nonimmigrant visas from identified countries are required 

to maintain a valid EVUS enrollment before traveling to the United States. Enrollments generally last for 2 years or when the traveler’s visa or passport expires, 

whichever comes first. Data collected through EVUS helps us determine whether 

such travel poses a law enforcement or security risk by checking against select law 

enforcement databases and queries law enforcement databases that include terrorist 

screening, lost/stolen passports, INTERPOL wants/warrants, and immigration violations. 

Finally, thanks to the support of Congress, the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act of 2015 3 provided the necessary funds for CBP to initiate 

counter-network operations within the NTC. The newly established Counter Network Division’s (CND) mission supports CBP, other DHS components, and interagency law enforcement and intelligence community partners to develop an interoperable counter-network process that provides a comprehensive understanding of 

emerging threats, including those emanating from terrorism, special interest aliens, 

transnational organized crime and illicit trade networks. Informed through identification of the tactics, techniques, and procedures of adversarial networks—including their efforts to exploit legitimate travel pathways and processes such as the visa 

process and the VWP—the CND quickly develops analytic solutions and makes 

those available across DHS components to mitigate further risk. 

Visa Waiver Program 

An important way in which DHS is pushing out the zone of security is to work 

with our international partners, including those countries who are members of the 

VWP. DHS’s focus and priority for the VWP is to make it a comprehensive security 

partnership with America’s closest allies. The VWP must be a security program first 

and foremost—merging together best practices in National security, law enforcement security, and immigration security; and providing the United States with an 

effective tool for fostering and deepening our National security relationships with 

key partner countries. As Secretary Kelly recently indicated, we have to continue 

to look at ways to strengthen the security of the VWP given the threat of foreign 

17 

4 VWP-eligible countries: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 

Japan, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, The Netherlands, 

New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 

Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom. 5 Per the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, all references to ‘‘country’’ or ‘‘countries’’ in this document also apply with respect to Taiwan. 6 Exceptions include citizens of countries under other visa exempt authority, such as Canada. 

Citizens of countries under visa exempt authority traveling to entering the United States via 

air are subjected to CBP’s vetting and inspection processes prior to their departure for the 

United States. In the land environment, they are subject to CBP processing upon arrival at a 

U.S. port of entry. 7 DHS report OIG–13–07 ‘‘The Visa Waiver Program,’’ November 2012. GAO report GAO–16– 

498 ‘‘Visa Waiver Program,’’ May 2016. 

fighters returning from the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. DHS is committed to fully 

ensuring that the VWP is serving the security interests of the United States. 

Currently, 38 countries 4 5 participate in the VWP, which allows their nationals 

to travel to the United States for business or tourism for stays of up to 90 days 

(with certain exceptions) after applying and being approved through the ESTA.6 In 

return, these countries must prove that measurable and consistently high requirements are met, including: That information-sharing practices enable the rapid relay 

of information concerning known and suspected terrorists and serious criminals; 

that lost and stolen passport information is consistently and timely reported; that 

robust border and travel document security practices are in place; and that effective 

traveler and migrant screening practices are standard operations. VWP countries 

also undergo regular, in-depth security assessments conducted by DHS in consultation with DOS to ensure compliance with these requirements. 

The assessments of a VWP country’s security standards and operations are among 

the broadest and most consequential reviews conducted under any U.S. Government 

program. Rigorous National-level assessments are used to ensure that countries 

meet the security standards required for continued participation in the program. 

DHS, in coordination with the DOS and the intelligence community, conducts statutorily-required reviews of each VWP country at least once every 2 years. The VWP 

assessment evaluates the country’s counterterrorism and law enforcement capabilities, immigration enforcement policies and procedures, passport production and 

issuance processes, and border security traveler screening capabilities. As needed, 

the review may also include a site visit where an integrated U.S. Government team 

conducts thorough inspections of airports, seaports, land borders, and passport production and issuance facilities in the VWP country and holds discussions with the 

host government, counterterrorism, intelligence, law enforcement, border security, 

and immigration officials. DHS submits a Report to Congress upon the completion 

of the assessment. Notably, both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 

the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) have reviewed and written favorably 

of the methodology DHS uses in conducting these assessments.7

Separately, DHS also conducts an annual assessment of all 38 VWP countries 

against the risk criteria defined in the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 (VWP Improvement Act), passed under this 

committee’s leadership, and engages in on-going monitoring of member countries to 

rapidly identify emerging threats and vulnerabilities. 

The bottom line is that in order to join or continue in the VWP, a country cannot 

represent a threat to the United States and must be working as a partner to prevent terrorist travel. In all instances, the Secretary of Homeland Security retains 

the statutory authority to suspend or terminate a country’s participation in the 

VWP if there is a credible threat originating from that country that poses an imminent danger to the United States or its citizens. 

Under the VWP Improvement Act, VWP countries are now required to issue highsecurity electronic passports (e-passports); implement information-sharing arrangements to exchange criminal and terrorist identity information; establish mechanisms to validate e-passports at each key POE; report all lost and stolen passports 

to INTERPOL or directly to the United States no later than 24 hours after the country becomes aware of the loss or theft; conclude a U.S. Federal Air Marshals agreement; collect and analyze Advance Passenger Information (API)/Passenger Name 

Record (PNR) information to identify high-risk travelers; screen international travelers against the INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database 

and notices; report foreign fighters to multilateral security organizations, such as 

INTERPOL or EUROPOL; and cooperate with the United States in the screening 

of refugees and asylum seekers. 

18 

8 Including Brunei, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal. 9 In fiscal year 2016, since implementing the new travel and dual nationality restrictions to 

the Visa Waiver Program, CBP denied, canceled, or revoked 39,303 ESTA applications. These 

individuals would not be eligible to travel under the VWP. 10 Biometrics are collected for most foreign nationals arriving at U.S. airports. 11 As of April 19, 2017. 

Since passage of the Act, DHS has confirmed the following changes among VWP 

countries: 

• An increase in the sharing of terrorist and criminal identity information; 

• Several countries 8 have increased the frequency of their reporting of lost and 

stolen passports—VWP countries account for over 70 percent of the almost 73 

million lost and stolen travel documents reported to INTERPOL; 

• Several countries have agreed to adopt new technologies to work with DHS to 

jointly vet asylum, refugee, and other immigration applications against each 

other’s data, establishing a formidable force multiplier for detecting criminals, 

terrorists, and unqualified applicants; and 

• All VWP countries are now issuing and using for travel to the United States 

fraud-resistant e-passports that meet or exceed the International Civil Aviation 

Organization standards. 

In addition, following the enactment of the VWP Improvement Act, DHS has 

taken several steps to apply enhanced restrictions on visa-free travel under the 

VWP for individuals who have traveled to Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, 

or Yemen or individuals who are dual nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria. Beginning January 13, 2016, CBP initiated a protocol to identify ESTA holders who 

had travelled to Iraq, Syria, Iran, or Sudan since March 1, 2011 who may be ineligible for future travel if they do not meet the criteria for a waiver allowed for under 

the Act. On February 18, 2016, DHS announced that individuals who had travelled 

to Libya, Somalia, and Yemen also may be ineligible for future travel if they do not 

meet the criteria for a waiver.9 Additionally, on January 21, 2016, CBP began denying new ESTA applications and revoking existing ESTAs for individuals who indicated dual nationality with Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria. 

In November 2014, in response to increasing concerns regarding foreign terrorist 

fighters, DHS strengthened the security of the VWP through the addition of new 

data elements to the ESTA application. These enhancements included a series of additional questions a VWP traveler must answer on the ESTA application, to include 

other names/aliases, citizenships, contact information, and city of birth. 

ARRIVAL PROCESSING

CBP’s use of advance information, its pre-departure targeting operations, and its 

overseas footprint all comprise critical parts of CBP’s multi-layered security strategy 

to address concerns long before they reach the physical border of the United States. 

U.S. law requires all private and commercial air and sea carriers operating routes 

to, from, or through the United States to provide API and PNR data to CBP. These 

data, which include travelers’ biographic and travel reservation information, are 

screened against U.S. and international law enforcement and counterterrorism databases to identify high-risk individuals before they fly to the United States. Even if 

issued a visa or other travel authorization, however, it is important to note that 

upon arrival in the United States, all persons are subject to inspection by CBP officers. CBP officers review entry documents, query CBP and other law enforcement 

databases, collect biometrics (including from VWP travelers),10 and interview all 

travelers to determine the purpose and intent of their travel, and whether any further inspection is necessary based on, among other things, National security, admissibility, customs, or agriculture concerns. 

Of note, CBP’s Tactical Terrorism Response Teams (TTRT) are deployed at U.S. 

POEs and consist of CBP officers who are specially trained in counterterrorism response. TTRT officers utilize information derived from targeting and inspection to 

mitigate possible threats. TTRT officers are immersed in the current and developing 

threat picture through the continuous review of information, and are responsible for 

the examination of travelers identified within the Terrorist Screening Database, and 

other travelers suspected of having a nexus to terrorism who arrive to a POE. For 

fiscal year to date,11 as a result of the dedicated efforts of the men and women serving on CBP’s TTRT, and the information discovered during secondary inspection, 

nearly 600 people who had been granted visas or other travel documents, or had 

an approved ESTA, have been refused admission to the United States. CBP officers 

and agents remain our last line of defense against those who would seek to enter 

the country to do us harm. 

19 

In addition, CBP officers remove from circulation counterfeit, fraudulent, and altered travel documents, as well as lost or stolen travel documents presented for use 

by an individual other than the rightful holder, such as those presented by impostors. CBP currently uses 1:1 facial comparison technology at select primary lanes 

at John F. Kennedy International Airport and Washington Dulles International Airport on U.S. and non-U.S. travelers arriving in the United States. This technology 

enables CBP officers to use facial recognition technology as a tool to assist in determining whether an individual presenting a valid e-passport is the same individual 

whose photograph is contained in that passport. In those cases where the CBP officer is unsure of the traveler’s true identity, the traveler is referred for additional 

checks to confirm identity or to document fraudulent use of a passport. Since this 

technology was deployed in early 2016, over 400,000 travelers have had their identities confirmed with the use of 1:1 facial comparison technology. 

Finally, CBP’s Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit (FDAU) serves as the central 

repository and point of analysis for all fraudulent travel documents interdicted or 

recovered by CBP personnel. FDAU analysis of fraudulent documents provides intelligence, alerts, and training back to the field, as well as serves as a mechanism to 

remove fraudulent documents from circulation to prevent their further use—a lesson 

learned from the 9/11 Commission Report. This cyclical process adds a layer of security to the homeland by removing an additional opportunity for misuse. 

IDENTIFYING AND APPREHENDING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY

WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

An important mission of DHS is to actively identify and initiate enforcement action on persons who have overstayed their terms of admission in the United States 

and who pose a threat to national security, border security, or public safety. ICE 

undertakes this very important activity for DHS. Within ICE, there are dedicated 

units, special agents, analysts, and systems in place to address nonimmigrant 

overstays. Through investigative efforts, ICE analyzes and determines which overstay leads may be suitable for further National security investigation. Once leads 

are received, ICE conducts both batch and manual vetting against Government 

databases, public indices, and social media (when appropriate). This vetting helps 

determine if an individual who overstayed has departed the United States, adjusted 

to a lawful status, has a pending immigration benefit application, or would be appropriate for an enforcement action. 

As part of this tiered review, ICE prioritizes nonimmigrant overstay cases 

through risk-based analysis. ICE Homeland Security Investigation’s (HSI) Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) oversees the National program 

dedicated to the investigation of nonimmigrant visa violators who may pose a National security risk and/or public safety concern. Each year, CTCEU analyzes 

records of hundreds of thousands of potential status violators after preliminary 

analysis of data from various Government systems, including the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and CBP’s Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), along with other information. After this analysis, CTCEU 

establishes compliance or departure dates from the United States and/or determines 

potential violations that warrant field investigations. 

CTCEU proactively develops cases for investigation in furtherance of the overstay 

mission, monitors the latest threat reports, and addresses emergent issues. This 

practice, which is designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting specific risk 

factors based on intelligence reporting, travel patterns, and in-depth criminal research and analysis, has contributed to DHS’s counterterrorism mission by initiating and supporting high-priority National security initiatives based on specific intelligence. 

In fiscal year 2015, CTCEU reviewed 971,305 leads regarding potential overstays. 

Numerous leads were closed through an automated screening and vetting process. 

The most common reason for closure was subsequent departure from the United 

States. A total of 9,968 leads were sent to HSI field offices for investigation. As a 

result in fiscal year alone, HSI made 1,910 arrests, secured 86 indictments, and obtained 80 convictions. 

CTCEU refers leads that do not meet ICE HSI criteria for further investigation 

to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations’ National Criminal Analysis and Targeting Center. 

CONCLUSION

The men and women of DHS and its component agencies do a tremendous job 

every day to protect our country. As terrorists and criminals change their methods 

and tactics and technologies continue to evolve, DHS will work with its interagency 

20 

and foreign partners—as well as private-sector partners—to adapt and respond 

swiftly and effectively to prevent their entry into the United States. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. We look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Settles. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Am I saying it right? Ramotowski or 

Ramotowski. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. That is absolutely right, Ramotowski. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ramotowski. I apologize if I butchered that before. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. RAMOTOWSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF VISA SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Thank you, Chairman Gallagher, Ranking 

Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the committee. I am pleased to assure you that the Department of State 

takes our commitment to protect America’s borders and citizens 

very seriously. Toward this end, we constantly analyze and update 

our screening and clearance procedures. 

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. visa system is a layered interagency effort focused first and foremost on National security. Beginning with 

a petition to DHS, or a visa application submitted to a consular 

section abroad, during the interview, prior to travel, upon arrival 

in the United States, and while the traveler is in the United 

States, the Department of State works together with our National 

law enforcement and intelligence partners to protect our borders. 

The vast majority of visa applicants and all immigrant visa applicants are interviewed in person by a consular officer. Each consular officer completes an extensive training program which has a 

strong emphasis on border security, fraud prevention, interagency 

coordination, and interviewing techniques. 

In addition to that, 122 assistant regional security officer investigators at 107 diplomatic posts world-wide work with consular officers to bring additional law enforcement and antiterrorism expertise to the visa process. 

All visa applicants are vetted against databases, which contain 

millions of records of individuals found ineligible for visas in the 

past or regarding whom potentially derogatory information exists 

on terrorist, criminal, or other grounds. We collect 10 fingerprint 

scans from nearly all these applicants, and screen them against the 

DHS and FBI databases of known and suspected terrorists, wanted 

persons, immigration law violators, and criminals. 

All visa applicants are screened against photos of known or suspected terrorists and prior visa applicants. When an interview 

raises any concerns that the applicant may be a threat to National 

security, or the interagency screening process shows potentially derogatory information, the consular officer suspends the visa processing and submits a request for a Washington-based interagency 

security advisory opinion review, which is conducted by Federal 

law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as the Department of State. 

As my colleague noted, the Department of Homeland Security’s 

PATRIOT system and the Visa Security Program provide addiVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
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tional protections at certain of our overseas posts. DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement special agents assigned to 29 embassies and consulates in high-threat locations provide on-site vetting of visa applications, as well as other law enforcement support 

and training to consular officers. 

But security reviews do not stop when the visa is issued. The Department and partner agencies continuously match new threat information with our records of existing visas, and we use our authority to revoke those visas when warranted. We refuse more than 

2 million visa applications each year. Since 2001, the Department 

has revoked more than 160,000 visas based on information that 

surfaced after the issuance of the visa. This includes nearly 11,000 

visas potentially revoked after information emerged, post-issuance, 

suggesting possible links to terrorism. Notice of these revocations 

is shared across the interagency in near-real time. 

Executive Order 13780 on Protecting the Nation from Terrorist 

Attacks by Foreign Nationals signed by the President of March 6, 

2017, and the Presidential Memorandum on Heightened Screening 

articulate the administration’s commitment to rigorously and continuously upgrade and refine our screening and vetting processes 

to keep this country safe. 

These actions range from interagency efforts to harmonize 

screening and vetting standards across multiple immigration programs to focusing on ways to improve our ability to deport criminal 

aliens. 

Additionally, the Department recently instructed posts worldwide to develop criteria for identifying sets of visa applicant populations that warrant increased scrutiny. We have likewise heightened vetting for any visa applicant who was ever present in any 

ISIS-controlled territory. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the committee, the 

Department of State’s highest priority is the safety of our fellow 

citizens at home and overseas. Every visa decision is a National security decision. We appreciate the support of the Congress as we 

constantly work to strengthen our system. I would encourage you 

to visit our consular sections when you are abroad to see how we 

do this on a daily basis. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramotowski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. RAMOTOWSKI

MAY 3, 2017 

Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished 

Members of the committee, and thank you for this opportunity to testify at today’s 

hearing. The Department of State is fully dedicated to the protection of our borders. 

We have no higher priority than the safety of our fellow citizens at home and overseas. We and our partner agencies throughout the Federal Government have built 

a layered visa and border security screening system, and continue to refine and 

strengthen the five pillars of visa security: Technological advances, biometric innovations, personal interviews, data sharing, and training. We are the first line of defense in border security, as the Department of State is often the first U.S. Government agency to have contact with foreign nationals wishing to travel to the United 

States, and we fully share your commitment to preventing individuals from exploiting the visa process as a means of entering our country with the intent to do harm. 

This layered approach enables the Department of State to track and review the 

visa eligibility and status of foreign visitors from their visa applications to their 

entry into the United States. Lessons learned through the years have led to significant improvements in procedures and capabilities. At the same time, recent terror 

22 

incidents both overseas and at home have demonstrated the changing nature of 

threats and our obligation to constantly analyze, test, and update our clearance procedures. We will never stop doing so. 

A LAYERED APPROACH TO VISA SECURITY

In coordination with interagency partners, the Department has developed, implemented, and refined an intensive visa application and screening process. We require 

personal interviews in most cases, including all immigrant and fianc ́e cases, employ 

analytic interviewing techniques, and incorporate multiple biographic and biometric 

checks in the visa process. Underpinning the process is a sophisticated global information technology network that shares data among the Department and Federal 

law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Security is our primary mission. Every 

visa decision is a National security and public safety decision. The rigorous security 

screening regimen I describe below applies to all visa categories. 

Visa applicants submit on-line applications—the on-line DS–160 nonimmigrant 

visa application form, or the on-line DS–260 immigrant visa application form. Online forms enable consular and fraud prevention officers, and our intelligence and 

law enforcement partners, to analyze data in advance of the visa interview, including the detection of potential non-biographic links to derogatory information. The 

on-line forms offer foreign language support, but applicants must respond in 

English, to facilitate information sharing among the Department and other Government agencies. 

Consular officers use a multitude of tools to screen visa applications. No visa can 

be issued unless all relevant concerns are fully resolved. The vast majority of visa 

applicants—including all applicants for which there are any concerns—are interviewed by a consular officer. During the interview, consular officers pursue case-relevant issues pertaining to the applicant’s identity, qualifications for the particular 

visa category in question, and any information pertaining to possible ineligibilities 

including those related to criminal history, prior visa applications or travel to the 

United States, and/or links to terrorism and other security threats. 

Consular officers also employ a variety of statutory tools to adjudicate visa applications. Under the law that applies to most nonimmigrant visa classifications, if the 

consular officer believes a nonimmigrant visa applicant may fail to abide by the requirements of the visa category in question, the application will be refused under 

section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). A consular officer may 

also initially refuse a case under INA section 221(g) to confirm information presented in the application, request additional information from the applicant, request 

a security or legal review from Washington, or pursue local leads or other information to determine whether the applicant is subject to a security or non-security-related ineligibility. In fiscal year 2016, consular officers denied 2,980,271 visas (includes both final and administrative refusals), conducted 138,324 fraud case reviews, and sent 36,258 requests for reconsideration to USCIS for petitions previously approved. 

As a matter of standard procedure, all visa applicant data is reviewed through 

the Department’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), an on-line database containing approximately 36 million records of persons, including those found 

ineligible for visas and persons who are the subjects of potentially derogatory information, drawn from records and sources throughout the U.S. Government. CLASS 

is populated, in part, through an export of the Terrorist Screening Database 

(TSDB), the Federal terrorism watch list. CLASS employs sophisticated namesearching algorithms to identify accurate matches between visa applicants and any 

derogatory information contained in CLASS. We also run all visa applicants’ names 

against the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD, our internal automated visa application record system) to detect and respond to any derogatory information regarding visa applicants and visa holders, and to check for prior visa applications, refusals, or issuances. The CCD contains more than 181 million immigrant and nonimmigrant visa records dating back to 1998. This robust searching capability, which 

takes into account variations in spelling and naming conventions, is central to our 

procedures. 

We collect 10-print fingerprint scans from nearly all visa applicants, except certain foreign government officials, diplomats, international organization employees, 

and visa applicants over the age of 79 or under the age of 14. Those fingerprints 

are screened against two key databases: First, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) IDENT database, which is a database of available fingerprints of 

known and suspected terrorists, wanted persons, and those who have committed immigration violations; and second, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Next 

23 

Generation Identification (NGI) system, which contains more than 75.5 million 

criminal history records. 

All visa photos are screened against a gallery of photos of known or suspected terrorists obtained from the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and against visa 

applicant photos contained in the Department’s CCD. 

In 2013, in coordination with multiple interagency partners, the Department 

launched the ‘‘Kingfisher Expansion’’ (KFE) counterterrorism visa vetting system. 

While the precise details of KFE vetting cannot be detailed in this document, KFE 

supports a sophisticated comparison of multiple fields of information drawn from 

visa applications against intelligence community and law enforcement agency databases in order to identify terrorism concerns. If a ‘‘red-light’’ hit is communicated 

to the relevant consular post, the consular officer suspends the application and submits it for a Washington-based interagency Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) review 

by Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In addition to this KFE ‘‘redlight’’ scenario, consular officers are required to submit SAO requests in any case 

with applicable CLASS name-check results, and for a variety of interagency-approved policies developed to vet travelers that raise security concerns, including certain categories of travelers with a particular nationality or place of birth. In any 

case in which reasonable grounds exist to question visa eligibility on security-related 

grounds or when otherwise required by interagency policy, regardless of name-check 

results, a consular officer suspends visa adjudication and requests an SAO. Consular officers receive extensive training on the SAO process, which under the aforementioned circumstances, requires them to deny the visa per INA section 221(g) and 

submit the case for interagency review via an SAO for any possible security-related 

ineligibilities. An applicant subject to this review may be found eligible for a visa 

only if the SAO process resolves all concerns. 

DHS’s Pre-adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT) and Visa Security Program (VSP) provide additional law enforcement review of visa applications at designated overseas posts. PATRIOT is a pre-adjudication visa screening and vetting initiative that employs resources from DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and 

the Department of State. It was established to identify National security, public 

safety, and other eligibility concerns prior to visa issuance. A team of agents, officers, and analysts from ICE and CBP perform manual vetting of possible derogatory 

matches. 

PATRIOT works in concert with the Visa Security Units (VSU) located in 29 highthreat posts, and we are working with ICE to deploy VSUs to more visa-issuing 

posts as rapidly as available resources will support. ICE special agents assigned to 

VSUs provide on-site vetting of visa applications and other law enforcement support 

to consular officers. When warranted, DHS officers assigned to VSUs conduct targeted, in-depth reviews of individual visa applications and applicants prior to 

issuance, and can recommend refusal or revocation of applications to consular officers. The Department of State works closely with DHS to ensure that no known or 

suspected terrorist inadvertently receives a visa or is admitted into our country. 

TRAINING

Consular officers are trained to take all prescribed steps to protect the United 

States and its citizens when making visa adjudication decisions. Each consular officer completes an intensive, 6-week Basic Consular Course. This course features a 

strong emphasis on border security and fraud prevention, with more than 40 classroom hours devoted to security, counterterrorism, fraud detection, and visa accountability programs which are supplemented by computerized self-study tutorials to review this information. Adjudicators receive extensive classroom instruction on immigration law, Department policy and guidance, and consular systems, including how 

to review background data checks and biometric clearances. 

Students learn about the interagency vetting process through briefings from the 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Consular Affairs’ (CA) Office 

of Screening, Analysis, and Coordination; CA’s Counterfeit Deterrence Laboratory; 

Diplomatic Security; and the DHS/ICE Forensic Document Laboratory. 

In addition, officers receive in-depth interviewing and name-check technique 

training, spending more than 30 classroom hours critiquing real consular interviews, debriefing role plays, and participating in other in-class activities. Basic 

interviewing training includes instruction in techniques for questioning an applicant 

to elicit information relevant to assessing visa eligibility. Officers practice analyzing 

verbal and non-verbal cues to judge an applicant’s credibility and the veracity of the 

applicant’s story. They examine and assess documentation, including electronic apVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
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plication forms, internal background check information, passports, and required 

supporting documents during the interview. 

Officers receive continuing education in all of these disciplines throughout their 

careers. All consular officers have top-secret clearances, and most speak the language of the country to which they are assigned and receive training in the culture 

of the host country. 

VISAS VIPER PROGRAM

U.S. missions overseas report information about foreign nationals with possible 

terrorist connections through the Viper reporting program. Following the December 

25, 2009 attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253, we strengthened the 

procedures and content requirements for Viper reporting. Chiefs of Mission are responsible for ensuring that all appropriate agencies and offices at post contribute 

relevant information for Viper nominations. Viper cables must include complete information about all previous and current U.S. visas. On December 31, 2009, we updated instructions regarding procedures and criteria used to revoke visas. We added 

specific reference to cases that raise security and other concerns to the guidance regarding consular officers’ use of the authority to deny visa applications under INA 

section 214(b), if the applicant does not establish visa eligibility to the satisfaction 

of the consular officer. Instruction in appropriate use of this authority has been a 

fundamental part of officer training for several years. 

CONTINUOUS VETTING AND VISA REVOCATION

Federal agencies have been matching new threat information against existing visa 

records since 2002. We have long recognized this function as critical to managing 

our records and processes. This system of continual vetting evolved as post-9/11 reforms were instituted, and is now performed in cooperation with the TSC, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), FBI, DHS/ICE, and DHS/CBP’s National 

Targeting Center (NTC). All records added to the TSDB and Terrorist Identities 

Datamart Environment (TIDE) are checked against the CCD to determine if there 

are matching visa records. In addition to recurrently vetting against biographic data 

taken during the visa process, biometric data taken during the visa process is likewise available to interagency partners in their counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts. Vetting partners send these matches electronically to the Department 

of State, where analysts review the hits and flag cases for possible visa revocation. 

We have information-sharing agreements under which we widely disseminate our 

data to other agencies that may need to learn whether a subject of interest has, or 

has ever applied for, a U.S. visa. 

The Department of State has broad authority to revoke visas, and we use that 

authority widely to protect our borders. Cases for revocation consideration are forwarded to the Department of State’s Visa Office by embassies and consulates overseas, NTC, NCTC, and other entities. As soon as information is established to support a revocation (i.e., information that surfaced after visa issuance that could lead 

to an ineligibility determination, or otherwise indicates the visa holder poses a potential threat), a code showing the visa revocation, and lookout codes indicating specific potential visa ineligibilities, are added to CLASS, as well as to biometric identity systems, and then shared in near-real time (within approximately 15 minutes) 

with the DHS lookout systems used for border screening. As part of its enhanced 

pre-departure screening, CBP uses these records, among other lookout codes, to recommend that airlines not board certain passengers on flights bound for the United 

States. Every day, we receive requests to review and, if warranted, revoke visas for 

aliens for whom new derogatory information has been discovered since the visa was 

issued. The Department of State’s Operations Center is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 

days a week, to address urgent requests, such as when a potentially dangerous person is about to board an aircraft. In those circumstances, the Department of State 

can and does use its authority to revoke the visa immediately. We continue to work 

with our interagency partners to refine the visa revocation and associated notification processes. 

Revocations are typically based on new information that has come to light after 

visa issuance. Since individuals’ circumstances change over time, and people who 

once posed no threat to the United States can become threats, continuous vetting 

and revocation are important tools. We use our authority to revoke a visa immediately in circumstances in which we believe there is an immediate threat, regardless of the individual’s location, after which we will notify the issuing post and interagency partners as appropriate. We are mindful, however, not to act unilaterally, 

but to coordinate expeditiously with our National security partners in order to avoid 

possible disruption of important investigations. In addition to the millions of visa 

25 

applications we refuse each year, since 2001, the Department has revoked approximately 160,000 visas, based on information that surfaced following visa issuance, 

for a variety of reasons. This includes nearly 11,000 visas prudentially revoked after 

information emerged post-issuance suggesting possible for suspected links to terrorism. 

GOING FORWARD

We face dangerous and adaptable foes. We are dedicated to maintaining our vigilance and strengthening the measures we take to protect the American public. We 

will continue to apply state-of-the-art technology to vet visa applicants. While increasing our knowledge of threats, and our ability to identify and interdict those 

threats, the interagency acts in accordance with the rules and regulations agreed 

upon in key governance documents. These documents ensure a coordinated approach 

to our security and facilitate mechanisms for redress and privacy protection. 

Executive Order 13780 on Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into 

the United States (E.O.) signed by the President on March 6, 2017, and the Presidential Memorandum on Heightened Screening, articulate the administration’s commitment to rigorously enforce our immigration laws and continuously upgrade and 

refine our screening and vetting processes to keep the people of the United States 

safe. These actions range from interagency efforts to harmonize screening and vetting standards across multiple immigration programs to focusing on ways to improve our abilities to deport criminal aliens. Additionally, the Department recently 

instructed posts globally to develop criteria for identifying sets of visa applicant populations warranting increased scrutiny. We have likewise heightened vetting for any 

visa applicant that was ever present in ISIS-controlled territory, for example. In addition, we are working with the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to 

implement these steps in compliance with all relevant court orders. 

We are taking several measures to confront developing threats and respond to recent terrorist incidents both overseas and in the United States. 

We constantly analyze our current processes, including security vetting, to identify areas where we could improve. We are working closely with DHS and the interagency to explore and analyze the use of social media screening of visa applicants. 

At the same time, we continue to explore methods and tools that could assist in this 

type of screening and potentially provide new methods to assess the credibility of 

certain information from applicants. We believe these endeavors will provide us insights to continue to ensure the visa process is as secure, effective, and efficient as 

possible. 

Information sharing with trusted foreign partners is an area that has seen significant development in recent years. For example, beginning in 2011 the Departments 

of State and Homeland Security implemented arrangements for systematic information sharing with Canada. The established processes provide for nearly real-time access to visa and immigration data through matching of fingerprints, as well as 

through biographic name checks for information that an applicant previously violated immigration laws, was denied a visa, or is a known or suspected terrorist. Canadian officers currently access the U.S. records of Syrian nationals seeking refugee 

resettlement in Canada, among other populations of visa and immigration applicants. 

As part of our long-term strategic planning to improve efficiency and accuracy in 

visa adjudications, we are investigating the applicability of advanced technology in 

data analysis, risk screening, and credibility assessment. Keeping abreast of hightech solutions will help us reduce threats from overseas while keeping the United 

States open for business. 

I assure you that the Department of State continues to refine its intensive visa 

application and screening process, including personal interviews, employing analytic 

interview techniques, incorporating multiple biographic and biometric checks, and 

interagency coordination, all supported by a sophisticated global information technology network. We look forward to working with the committee on issues addressing our National security in a cooperative and productive manner. 

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM

The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) was established as a pilot program in 1986 to 

more efficiently use U.S. Government resources. Since then, it has been steadily 

strengthened. The program enables nationals of 38 participating countries to travel 

to the United States for tourism or business stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa but subject to vetting through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) that is equivalent to the checks done when issuing a visa. Approximately 20 million people enter the United States each year under this program, enVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
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abling the Department of State to focus more resources on visa applicants from 

countries that do not meet VWP’s high security standards. The VWP enables the 

Department of State to focus more resources on visa applicants who merit additional 

scrutiny. It also allows us to benefit from information sharing with VWP countries. 

All travelers coming to the United States under the VWP undergo the same 

checks for ties to terrorism and are subject to the same multiple layers of security 

reviews as visa applicants, including fingerprint screening. While VWP travelers do 

not undergo a consular interview, they are required to provide certain biographic 

information for screening prior to travel through the Electronic System for Travel 

Authorization. Only citizens of VWP countries with an ESTA approved by DHS can 

travel to the United States under this program. Refugees, asylum seekers, and noncitizen residents of VWP countries cannot travel under VWP. The Department of 

State annually publishes the visitor visa refusal rates for every country. This information garners significant interest from countries aspiring to join VWP, as the refusal rate is the most visible of the VWP requirements. 

Members of the Visa Waiver Program are our closest and most essential partners 

on counterterrorism. They are currently Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 

Brunei, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 

Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 

Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San 

Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 

Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. 

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT AND TERRORIST TRAVEL PREVENTION ACT OF

2015

Under the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention 

Act of 2015, nationals of VWP countries who are also nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, 

or Syria, or have traveled to or been present in Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, 

Yemen, or Somalia on or after March 1, 2011 are no longer eligible for VWP travel 

and require a visa to travel to the United States. 

Those nationals who travelled to these countries for official or military service on 

behalf of a VWP country are statutorily exempt from the new requirement. Also, 

under the new Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security may waive these travel-related VWP restrictions if he determines that such a waiver is in the law enforcement or National security interests of the United States. As a general matter, certain types of travelers whose travel is in the U.S. National security interest might 

include employees of humanitarian organizations, journalists, and individuals who 

travel to Iraq or Iran for legitimate business purposes. Such waivers are granted 

only on a case-by-case basis. In fiscal year 2016, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

approved 211 such waivers. 

Visa applications have increased by approximately 8 percent in Visa Waiver Program countries since these legislative changes took effect in early 2016. Our data 

indicate that through December 2016, we facilitated visa services for 60,000 travelers affected by them. For example, for those who need a U.S. visa for urgent business, medical, or humanitarian travel to the United States, U.S. embassies and consulates provide visa interview appointments on an expedited basis. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Ramotowski. We look forward 

to doing just that. 

Ms. Gambler, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE 

Ms. GAMBLER. Good afternoon, Chairman Gallagher, Ranking 

Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the task force. I appreciate the opportunity to testify at today’s hearing to discuss GAO’s 

work reviewing DHS’s efforts to screen and inspect travelers seeking to come to the United States. Each year, millions of visitors legally enter the United States. Some of them enter with a nonimmigrant visa, while others enter the country under the Visa 

Waiver Program. Under this program, nationals from 38 countries 

can apply for admission to the United States as temporary visitors 

for business or pleasure for up to 90 days without obtaining a visa. 

27 

GAO has a body of work addressing DHS and other agencies’ efforts to screen travelers and manage and oversee the visa process 

and the Visa Waiver Program. My remarks today reflect our findings and recommendations related to these programs and efforts. 

First, with regard to CBP’s screening efforts, CBP screens travelers coming to the United States and seeks to identify potentially 

high-risk travelers at the earliest point in the travel life cycle. CBP 

also operates three predeparture programs to help identify and 

interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. 

These three programs are preclearance, the immigration advisory 

and joint security programs, and the regional carrier liaison 

groups. 

Preclearance locations operate at foreign airports and serve as 

U.S. ports of entry. CBP officers at these locations inspect travelers 

and make admissibility determinations prior to an individual 

boarding a plane to the United States. Under the immigration advisory and joint security programs, CBP officers posted at foreign 

airports partner with air carriers and host country government officials to help prevent terrorists and other high-risk individuals from 

boarding U.S.-bound flights. Regional carrier liaison groups are located and operate at domestic airports, and among other things, assist air carriers with questions regarding U.S. admissibility requirements and travel documents. 

CBP data indicated that in fiscal year 2015, these programs identified and interdicted approximately 22,000 high-risk air travelers. 

However, we found that while CBP has data and statistics on these 

programs, the agency has not evaluated the effectiveness of these 

programs as a whole, including having performance measures and 

baselines to assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. We recommended that CBP develop and implement such 

measures and baselines to better measure the effectiveness of these 

predeparture programs, and DHS concurred. 

Second, with regard to the Visa Security Program, we reported 

on efforts to expand the program and address challenges in its operations. Under this program, ICE deploys personnel to certain 

U.S. embassies and consulates to assist the Department of State’s 

consular officers with security reviews of visa applications, among 

other things. 

In our 2011 report on this program, we identified various management and oversight challenges, such as limited guidance regarding interactions between ICE officials and consular officers, lack of 

comprehensive data for performance measures to accurately evaluate the program, and variation from post to post in the training of 

consular officers by ICE agents. We also found that ICE did not 

track information on the time ICE agents spent on non-Visa Security Program activities. We have on-going work reviewing the Visa 

Security Program and visa security efforts more broadly, and we 

plan to report on the results of our work later this year. 

Third, with regard to the Visa Waiver Program, last year we reported on DHS’s oversight of the program. In particular, we reported that all 38 countries had entered into three agreements required under the program to: No. 1, report lost and stolen passports; No. 2, share identity information about known or suspected 

28 

1 Throughout this statement we generally use the term ‘‘foreign national’’ to refer to an 

‘‘alien,’’ which is defined under U.S. immigration law as any person who is not a U.S. citizen 

or national. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). In addition, temporary visitors are foreign nationals 

present in the United States on a temporary basis pursuant to a specific nonimmigrant category 

(see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(1)–(2)), including those who are allowed 

to seek admission without a visa, such as Mexican nationals and citizens of Canada and the 

British Overseas Territory of Bermuda (and certain residents of other adjacent islands, such as 

the Bahamas) under certain circumstances, as well as Visa Waiver Program (VWP) participants. 

See 8 C.F.R. § § 212.1, 214.6(d); 22 C.F.R. § § 41.0 to 41.3. Foreign nationals seeking permanent 

status in the United States must generally obtain an immigrant visa, which provides a path 

to lawful permanent residency. For the purposes of this statement, we use the term ‘‘visa’’ in 

reference to a nonimmigrant visa. 2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1187. The VWP was established in 1986 as a pilot program, under which 

the nationals of up to eight designated countries which extended reciprocal privileges to U.S. 

citizens and nationals and fulfilled certain other program criteria, would not need a visa for admission to the United States as temporary visitors during the pilot program period. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, tit. III, pt. B, § 313, 100 Stat. 3359, 

3435–39. VWP became a permanent program in October 2000. See Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106–396, tit. I, § 101, 114 Stat. 1637 (2000). 3 Foreign fighters are individuals who leave home, travel abroad to terrorist safe havens, and 

join or assist violent extremist groups. 

terrorists; and No. 3, share criminal history information. However, 

not all countries had shared such information. 

In August 2015, DHS established a new requirement for Visa 

Waiver Program countries to implement the latter two agreements. 

However, DHS did not establish time frames for instituting these 

requirements. 

We recommended that DHS specify time frames for working with 

participating countries to address additional program requirements, including the requirement to fully implement these agreements, and DHS concurred with our recommendation. 

In closing, our work on DHS’s efforts to screen travelers and 

manage the Visa Security Program and the Visa Waiver Program 

has identified findings and recommendations to help strengthen 

management and oversight of these programs and efforts. DHS has 

actions planned or under way to address a number of our recommendations, and we will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts. 

This concludes my oral statement, and I am pleased to answer 

any questions Members have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER

MAY 3, 2017 

Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the 

task force: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s body of work on U.S. Government 

programs and activities related to screening foreign nationals seeking to travel to 

the United States on a temporary basis—either with a nonimmigrant visa, or in 

some cases, without a visa.1 Each year, millions of such temporary visitors legally 

enter the United States. From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015, the Department of State (State) issued more than 52 million visas for business travel, pleasure, 

or for foreign and cultural exchange student programs, among other things. In addition, from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015, more than 116 million visitors 

were admitted to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which 

allows nationals from 38 countries to apply for admission to the country as temporary visitors for business or pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a U.S. 

embassy or consulate abroad.2

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to identify and interdict travelers who are potential security threats to the United States, such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human traffickers, drug smugglers, and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the earliest possible point in the travel life cycle to make the 

Nation’s physical borders the last, not the first, line of defense.3 DHS adjudicates 

petitions for certain visa categories, and also has certain responsibilities for 

29 

4 The 38 VWP countries include Taiwan. Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act provides that ‘‘[w]henever the laws of 

the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, States, governments, or similar 

entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.’’ Pub. L. 

No. 96–8, § 4(b), 93 Stat. 14, 15 (1979) (classified at 22 U.S.C. § 3303). 

strengthening the security of the visa process, including establishing visa policy and 

managing the VWP. In particular, DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

is tasked with, among other duties, securing U.S. borders and processing all travelers on U.S.-bound flights; inspecting all people entering or applying for admission 

to the United States; and screening VWP applicants to determine their eligibility 

to travel to the United States under the program. In addition, DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) oversees the Visa Security Program (VSP) 

under which it deploys officials to certain U.S. embassies and consulates to 

strengthen the visa process by working with State officials in reviewing visa applications. State is responsible for visa adjudication and issuance for foreign nationals 

seeking admission to the United States and is responsible for managing the consular officer corps and its functions at over 220 visa-issuing posts overseas. 

Foreign nationals who wish to come to the United States on a temporary basis 

and are not citizens or nationals of countries that participate in the VWP must generally obtain a visa authorizing their travel. U.S. law provides for the temporary 

admission of various categories of nonimmigrants, such as tourists, foreign students, 

diplomats, and temporary workers, who are admitted for an authorized period of 

stay, consistent with any time limitation and other terms of admission. The process 

for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains several steps, including document reviews; collection of biometrics (fingerprints and full-face photographs); cross-referencing an applicant’s name and biometrics against multiple databases maintained by the U.S. Government; and in-person interviews. Personal interviews with consular officers are required by law for most foreign nationals seeking 

visas. For an overview of the visa process, see figure 1. 

Prior to this step, some nonimmigrant visas require petitioners to file a petition 

on behalf of the beneficiary, or on their own behalf, as appropriate, with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS is responsible for approving or denying the 

petition, notifying the petitioner, and sending the approved petition to the Department of State. 

The VWP was established in 1986 to facilitate the legitimate travel of visitors for 

business or pleasure to the United States. Qualifying nationals from the 38 countries participating in the VWP—for example, France, Germany, and Hungary—may 

travel without a visa to the United States for business or pleasure stays of up to 

90 days.4 In 2007, Congress passed the Implementing Recommendations of the 


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30 

5 Pub. L. No. 110–53, tit. VII, subtit. B, § 711, 121 Stat. 266, 338–45. 6 Among other things, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD–6—Integration and 

Use of Screening Information, issued on September 16, 2003, directed the Secretary of State to 

develop a proposal for enhancing cooperation with certain foreign governments, beginning with 

those countries for which the United States has waived visa requirements, to establish appropriate access to terrorism screening information of the participating governments. 7 Pub. L. No. 114–113, Div. O, tit. II, 129 Stat. 2242, 2988–95. The law now prohibits individuals who are nationals of VWP countries who have been present in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, 

Libya, Somalia, or Yemen on or after March 1, 2011, from traveling or being admitted to the 

United States through the VWP, with certain exceptions. According to CBP, these new eligibility 

requirements do not bar travel to the United States; instead, a national of a VWP country who 

does not meet the requirements must obtain a visa for travel to the United States. The law also 

now requires that countries fully implement passenger information exchange agreements in 

order to participate in the VWP. Additional requirements have been added regarding machinereadable, electronic passports for individuals; country certifications of a mechanism to validate 

passports; termination of designation for countries that fail to share information or fail to screen 

individuals admitted to, or departing, the country for unlawful activity; designation of high-risk 

program countries that may be suspended from the program; and other enhancements to the 

electronic system for travel authorization. 8 GAO, Border Security: CPB Aims to Prevent High-Risk Travelers from Boarding U.S.-Bound 

Flights, but Needs to Evaluate Program Performance, GAO–17–216 (Washington, DC: Jan. 24, 

2017); Visa Waiver Program: DHS Should Take Steps to Ensure Timeliness of Information Needed to Protect U.S. National Security, GAO–16–498 (Washington, DC: May 5, 2016); and, Border 

Security: DHS’s Visa Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk World-wide, GAO–11–315 (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2011). 9 GAO–17–216. Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the United States. Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated location 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which mandated several changes to modernize the 

program through enhanced bilateral cooperation on critical counterterrorism and information-sharing initiatives, support and expansion of tourism and business opportunities to enhance long-term competitiveness, and strengthening of bilateral relationships.5 In particular, the U.S. Government began requiring each VWP country 

to enter into a • Lost and Stolen Passport (LASP) agreement to report information about the 

theft or loss of passports, • Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD–6) arrangement to share 

watch list information about known or suspected terrorists,6 and • Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agreement to establish frameworks for enhanced law enforcement cooperation, including sharing of criminal 

history information. 

The Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 

2015, which became law in December of that year, amended certain requirements 

to provide enhanced security measures for the program, among other purposes.7

My testimony discusses: (1) CBP programs aimed at preventing high-risk travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights, (2) ICE’s management of the VSP, and (3) 

DHS’s oversight of the VWP. This testimony is based on our prior reports, in particular, those published in March 2011, May 2016, and January 2017.8 For these 

reports, we examined program documentation, such as standard operating procedures and agencies’ policies and guidance, as well as agency data on program performance. We also interviewed DHS and State officials, among others, in headquarters and at U.S. embassies and consulates. Additional details on the scope and 

methodology are available in our published reports. In addition, this statement contains updates to selected information from these reports. For the updates, we collected information from DHS on actions it has taken to address findings and recommendations made in prior reports on which this statement is based. All of our 

work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

CBP’S AIR PREDEPARTURE PROGRAMS INTERDICT HIGH-RISK AIR TRAVELERS, BUT CBP

HAS NOT FULLY ASSESSED THE PROGRAMS’ PERFORMANCE

CBP Identifies and Interdicts High-Risk Travelers Before They Board U.S.-Bound 

Flights 

As we reported in January 2017, CBP electronically vets all travelers before they 

board U.S.-bound flights and continues to do so until they land at a U.S. port of 

entry.9 Through these vetting efforts, CBP seeks to identify high-risk travelers from 

31 

(seaport, airport, or land border location) where DHS officers inspect persons entering or applying for admission into, or departing the United States pursuant to U.S. immigration law. 10 According to CBP officials, information from both the Advance Passenger Information System, which includes biographical information such as full name, date of birth, gender, flight 

number, date of arrival and departure, citizenship, and passport/alien registration card number, 

among others, and the Passenger Name Record, which refers to reservation information contained in an air carrier’s electronic reservation system and/or departure control system that sets 

forth the identity and travel plans of each traveler or group of travelers included under the 

same reservation record, are utilized in the targeting and vetting of individuals attempting to 

travel to the United States. See 49 U.S.C. § 44909; 19 C.F.R. § § 122.49a, 122.49d. 11 Information in the TSDB comes from two sources: The National Counterterrorism Center, 

which provides information on known or suspected international terrorists, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which provides information about known or suspected domestic terrorists. 

For more information about the process by which the U.S. Government manages this watch list, 

see GAO, Terrorist Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency Actions Since the December 

29, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts, GAO–12–476 (Washington, DC: 

May 31, 2012). 12 In general, when a traveler is identified through rules-based targeting, the traveler is considered to have hit a rule. 

the millions of individuals who travel to the United States each year. As we reported in January 2017, CBP’s vetting and targeting efforts are primarily conducted 

by its National Targeting Center (NTC) and entail: (1) Traveler data matching and 

analysis, (2) rules-based targeting, and (3) recurrent vetting. Specifically: 

• CBP’s primary method of identifying high-risk individuals is through the comparison of travelers’ information (such as name, date of birth, and gender)10

against records extracted from U.S. Government databases, including the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the U.S. Government’s consolidated terrorist watch list.11 Traveler data matching focuses on identifying known highrisk individuals—that is, individuals who may be inadmissible to the United 

States under U.S. immigration law or who may otherwise pose a threat to 

homeland or National security. CBP’s primary tool for vetting and targeting 

travelers is the Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is a computer-based 

enforcement and support system that compares traveler information against intelligence and law enforcement data to identify high-risk travelers. Traveler 

data matching occurs throughout the travel process and, upon a positive or possible match, CBP officers can select these individuals for further vetting, interviewing, and inspection. 

• CBP’s rules-based targeting efforts seek to identify unknown high-risk travelers—that is, travelers for whom U.S. Government entities do not have available derogatory information directly linking them to terrorist activities or any 

other actions that would make them potentially inadmissible to the United 

States but who may present a threat and thus warrant additional scrutiny. CBP 

identifies unknown high-risk individuals by comparing their information 

against a set of targeting rules based on intelligence, law enforcement, and 

other information. NTC officials stated that these rules have identified potential 

high-risk travelers, including potential foreign fighters. Rules-based targeting 

evaluates travelers during the travel process and, in some cases, in advance of 

the travel process. If a traveler is a rule ‘‘hit,’’ this individual can be selected 

for further vetting, interviewing, and inspection.12

• CBP supports its traveler data matching and rules-based targeting efforts 

through the use of recurrent vetting. NTC’s vetting, targeting, and traveler data 

matching activities in ATS run 24 hours a day and 7 days a week and automatically scan updated traveler information, when available. This process is to ensure that new information that affects a traveler’s admissibility is identified in 

near-real time. Recurrent vetting occurs throughout the travel process and continues until a traveler arrives at a domestic port of entry. For example, after 

checking into a foreign airport, a traveler may have his or her visa revoked for 

a security or immigration-related violation. Due to recurrent vetting, CBP 

would be alerted to this through ATS and could take action, as appropriate. 

CBP’s Air Predeparture Programs Interdict High-Risk Travelers on U.S.-Bound 

Flights, but CBP Has Not Evaluated Overall Effectiveness of Air Predeparture 

Programs 

As we reported in January 2017, throughout the travel process, CBP’s 

predeparture programs use the results of NTC’s efforts to identify and interdict 

high-risk individuals destined for the United States while they are still overseas; 

however, we found that CBP had not evaluated the effectiveness of its predeparture 

32 

13 GAO–17–216. 14 See 19 C.F.R. § 101.5. CBP’s Preclearance location in Victoria, Canada, only processes maritime travelers and, as a result, we did not include it in our January 2017 report. See GAO– 

17–216. 15 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(7); 19 U.S.C. § 1629. See also 8 C.F.R. § § 235.1, 235.5; 19 C.F.R. 

§ § 148.22, 162.6, 162.8; and Preclearance Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–125, tit. 

VIII, subtit. B, § 813, 130 Stat. 122, 217–18 (2016) (classified at 19 U.S.C. § 4432) (authorizing 

the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish and maintain CBP preclearance operations in 

a foreign country). 16 Individuals denied admission to the United States at a Preclearance location are not permitted to proceed beyond the point of inspection and, thus, are unable to board a flight to the 

United States. 17 According to CBP officials, in accordance with CBP’s current Preclearance agreements and 

processes, CBP officers retain the authority to inspect these travelers and their accompanying 

goods or baggage after arriving in the United States should further inspection be warranted. 

programs as a whole, including implementing a system of performance measures 

and baselines to assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals.13

CBP operates three air predeparture programs that are responsible for all U.S.- 

bound air travelers—Preclearance; The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and 

Joint Security Program (JSP); and the regional carrier liaison groups (RCLG). As 

we reported in January 2017, CBP data indicated that these programs identified 

and ultimately interdicted approximately 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 

2015, the most recent data available at the time of our review. Information on individuals who the NTC identifies through traveler data matching or rules-based targeting, including recurrent vetting, is compiled automatically through ATS into a 

daily high-priority list, or traveler referral list. CBP officers at the NTC review the 

traveler referral list for accuracy and to remove, if possible, any automatically-generated matches determined to not be potential high-risk individuals. After this review, CBP officers at the NTC use ATS to send the traveler referral list to officers 

at each Preclearance, IAP, JSP, and RCLG location, as shown in figure 2. 

Preclearance.—Preclearance locations operate at foreign airports and serve as U.S. 

ports of entry. Preclearance operations began in 1952 in Toronto to facilitate trade 

and travel between the United States and Canada. As of January 2017, CBP operated 15 air Preclearance locations in six countries.14 Through the Preclearance program, uniformed CBP officers at a foreign airport exercise U.S. legal authorities to 

inspect travelers and luggage and make admissibility determinations prior to an individual boarding a plane to the United States.15 According to CBP officials, an inspection at a Preclearance location is the same inspection an individual would undergo at a domestic port of entry, and officers conducting Preclearance inspections 

exercise the same authority as officers at domestic ports of entry to approve or deny 

admission into the United States.16 As a result, travelers arriving at domestic air 

ports of entry from Preclearance locations do not have to be re-inspected upon 

entry.17 According to CBP data, in fiscal year 2015, CBP officers at Preclearance 


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33 

18 Primary inspection refers to the procedure that CBP uses to conduct an initial inspection 

of individuals seeking to enter the United States to determine if additional review or scrutiny 

is needed to ensure compliance with U.S. law. Persons who need additional scrutiny and persons 

selected as part of a random selection process are subjected to a more detailed review called 

a secondary inspection. This involves, for example, a closer inspection of travel documents and 

possessions, additional questioning by CBP officers, and cross references through multiple law 

enforcement databases to verify the traveler’s identity, background, purpose for entering the 

country, and other appropriate information. 19 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225a(b). 20 A confirmed encounter refers to when a representative of the U.S. Government (in this case 

a CBP officer) comes into contact, either through physical interviewing or inspection or through 

electronic vetting, with an individual whose identity is confirmed as a match to a record in the 

TSDB. The No-Fly List, which is a subset of the TSDB, identifies individuals prohibited from 

boarding flights to, from, within, or overflying the United States. 21 RCLGs are not responsible for travelers departing from Preclearance locations. 22 GAO–17–216. 

locations determined that 10,648 air travelers were inadmissible out of the approximately 16 million air travelers seeking admission to the United States through a 

Preclearance location. In addition to requiring that all travelers undergo a primary 

inspection, CBP officers in these locations also referred almost 290,000 individuals 

for secondary inspection.18

Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP).—IAP 

and JSP operate at 9 and 2 foreign airports, respectively, as of January 2017. According to CBP officials, under this program, unarmed, plainclothes CBP officers 

posted at foreign airports partner with air carriers and host country government officials to help prevent terrorists and other high-risk individuals from boarding U.S.- 

bound flights by vetting and interviewing them before travel.19 According to CBP 

program documentation, CBP established IAP in 2004 to prevent terrorists, highrisk travelers, and improperly documented travelers from boarding airlines destined 

to the United States. Building on the IAP concept, CBP established JSP in 2009 to 

partner with host country law enforcement officials to identify high-risk travelers. 

CBP officers at IAP and JSP locations have the ability to question travelers and review their travel documents. They are to act in an advisory manner to the air carriers and host governments and do not have authority to deny boarding to individuals on U.S.-bound flights or fully inspect travelers or their belongings. IAP and 

JSP officers are authorized by CBP to make recommendations to airlines as to 

whether to board or deny boarding (known as a no-board recommendation) to selected travelers based on their likely admissibility status upon arrival to the United 

States. The final decision to board travelers, however, lies with the carriers. According to CBP data, CBP officers at IAP and JSP locations made 3,925 no-board recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 29 million air travelers 

bound for the United States from such locations. During this same time period, CBP 

data indicated 1,154 confirmed encounters with individuals on the TSDB, including 

106 on the No-Fly List.20

Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG).—RCLGs are located and operate at 

three domestic airports—Miami International Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, and Honolulu International Airport. CBP established RCLGs in 

2006 to assist air carriers with questions regarding U.S. admissibility requirements 

and travel document authenticity. According to CBP officials, RCLGs are responsible for coordinating with air carriers on all actionable referrals from NTC on U.S.- 

bound travelers departing from an airport without an IAP, JSP, or Preclearance 

presence. Each RCLG is assigned responsibility for travelers departing out of a specific geographic location.21 Similar to IAP and JSP, CBP officers in RCLGs also 

make no-board recommendations, as appropriate, to air carriers. CBP officers at 

RCLGs do not have authority to make admissibility determinations about U.S.- 

bound air travelers, and the final decision to board or not board a traveler lies with 

the carrier. CBP officers working at the three RCLGs made 7,664 no-board recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 59 million travelers bound 

for the United States from locations within the RCLGs’ spheres of responsibility. 

During this time period, CBP data indicated that RCLGs also reported 1,634 confirmed encounters with individuals in the TSDB, including 119 on the No-Fly List. 

In January 2017, we reported that CBP had not evaluated the effectiveness of its 

predeparture programs as a whole, including implementing a system of performance 

measures and baselines to assess whether the programs were achieving their stated 

goals.22 We reported that CBP had taken some initial steps to measure the performance of these programs. Specifically, CBP officials told us that they had collected 

a large quantity of data and statistics regarding the actions of their predeparture 

programs and had done so since program inception for all programs. However, due 

34 

23 GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GAO–12–208G (Washington, DC: January 

2012). The best practices outlined in GAO–12–208G are based on GAO studies, policy documents, and program evaluation literature. To ensure the guide’s competence and usefulness, 

drafts were reviewed by selected GAO, Federal and State agency evaluators, and evaluation authors and practitioners from professional consulting firms. 24 See, generally, Pub. L. No. 103–62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993) (GPRA) and Pub. L. No. 111–352, 

124 Stat. 3866 (2011) (updating GPRA). In particular, see 31 U.S.C. § 1115 (relating to agency 

performance plans and performance measurement). 25 Pub. L. No. 107–296, tit. IV, subtit. C, § 428(e), (i), 116 Stat. 2135, 2191 (classified at 6 

U.S.C. § 236(e), (i)). 

to changes in operational focus, technology updates, and the use of separate data 

systems at program locations, CBP had not collected consistent data across all of 

its predeparture programs. As a result, CBP did not have baseline data on which 

to measure program performance. However, CBP officials stated at the time that 

they had updated and uniform data collection systems that were consistent across 

all predeparture programs, which would enable CBP to identify performance baselines from fiscal year 2015 onward. According to senior CBP officials, some of the 

results of these programs were not easily measured. Officials also noted that relying 

on data alone may not always present the most accurate picture of the true impact 

of predeparture programs because changes to the travel process or other factors may 

impact the programs in ways that are not fully captured by the data. However, on 

the basis of our analysis of CBP’s documentation, including official hearing statements, and interviews with program officials, we found that CBP used these data 

as indicators of the programs’ success. 

According to GAO’s Program Evaluation Guide, which articulates best practices 

for program evaluation, a program evaluation is a systematic study using research 

methods to collect and analyze data to assess how well a program is working and 

why.23 Moreover, consistent with requirements outlined in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), as updated by the GPRA Modernization 

Act of 2010, performance measurement is the on-going monitoring and reporting of 

program accomplishments, particularly toward pre-established goals, and agencies 

are to establish performance measures to assess progress toward goals.24 Agencies 

can use performance measurement to make various types of management decisions 

to improve programs and results, such as developing strategies and allocating resources, and identify problems and take corrective action. Therefore, we recommended that CBP develop and implement a system of performance measures and 

baselines for each program to help ensure that these programs are achieving their 

intended goals. By using data from fiscal year 2015, for example, to develop initial 

baselines, CBP could better measure program performance toward meeting stated 

goals. In response, CBP established a working group to develop and implement a 

system of performance measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of 

CBP’s predeparture programs. As of December 2016, the working group was gathering baseline data from fiscal year 2015 to compare with fiscal year 2016 data. In 

February 2017, CBP officials stated that the working group had identified potential 

performance measures but needs to further refine them. CBP officials stated that 

they expect to complete this work by the end of June 2017. 

ICE AIMS TO STRENGTHEN SCREENING OF VISA APPLICANTS THROUGH ITS VISA

SECURITY PROGRAM

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized DHS to assign officers to each diplomatic and consular post at which visas are issued, and also authorized DHS to 

immediately assign personnel to Saudi Arabia to review all visa applications prior 

to final adjudication.25 In response, DHS implemented the Visa Security Program 

(VSP) in 2003, and as of March 2016, ICE had established 26 visa security units 

in 20 countries. VSP aims to prevent terrorists and otherwise inadmissible travelers 

from attempting to enter the United States by screening visa applicants before the 

travel process begins. When reviewing applications for visas under VSP, ICE 

screens applicant information to identify applicants that potentially match records 

of individuals who are known or suspected threats to the United States or have immigration violations or derogatory information related to their criminal histories. In 

accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS officers assigned overseas 

are authorized to perform the following functions: 

• provide expert advice and training to consular officers regarding specific security threats relating to the adjudication of individual visa applications or classes 

of applications, 

35 

26 See 6 U.S.C. § 236(e)(2). 27 GAO–11–315. 28 GAO–16–498. In this statement, such required agreements are referred to as both agreements and arrangements. 

• review any such visa applications either on the initiative of the employee of the 

department or at the request of a consular officer, or other persons charged with 

adjudicating such applications, and 

• conduct investigations with respect to consular matters under the jurisdiction 

of the Secretary of Homeland Security.26

In March 2011, we reported, among other things, on DHS’s efforts to expand VSP 

and challenges to VSP operations overseas.27 For example, we found that training 

of consular officers by VSP agents varied from post to post, with some consular officers at some posts receiving no training. Therefore, we recommended that DHS 

issue guidance requiring ICE to provide training for consular officers. DHS concurred and issued guidance to enhance the training of consular officers by VSP offices abroad. 

We also found that ICE did not gather comprehensive data on all the performance 

measures needed to evaluate the VSP mission objectives and that the data that ICE 

collected on VSP activities were limited by inconsistencies. Therefore, we recommended that ICE collect reliable data to allow it to accurately evaluate VSP performance. DHS did not concur with this recommendation and stated that VSP captured all the required performance metrics. However, as we reported, we determined 

that ICE was collecting some data on the required performance measures, but that 

the data were not sufficient to accurately demonstrate the progress made toward the 

program’s stated objectives. We continue to believe that without collecting comprehensive data on performance measures, DHS cannot accurately demonstrate 

progress of VSP in enhancing National security. In addition, we found that VSP 

agents performed various investigative and administrative functions beyond their 

visa security responsibilities, which limited their time spent on visa security activities, and ICE did not track this information in its tracking system, making it unable 

to identify the time spent on investigative and administrative functions. Therefore, 

we recommended that ICE develop a mechanism to track the amount of time its 

agents spent on visa security activities and other investigations to determine appropriate staffing levels and resource needs for VSP operations. DHS did not concur 

with our recommendation and stated that ICE tracked case investigation hours 

through its case management system, and that adding the metric to the VSP tracking system would be redundant. However, we found at the time, according to ICE 

documentation, that ICE could not accurately determine the amount of time that 

VSP agents spent on investigative and visa security activities because ICE did not 

distinguish between the hours logged by VSP agents and hours logged by other ICE 

officials at posts abroad and that ICE did not maintain accurate data on the time 

VSP agents spent on visa security activities at posts. 

ICE did not take action to implement these recommendations and we continue to 

believe that it needs to take steps to address issues we identified. We have on-going 

work assessing DHS, State, and other U.S. agency efforts to strengthen the security 

of the visa process, including oversight of VSP, in which we plan to follow up on 

the findings and recommendations from our March 2011 report related to ICE’s efforts to enhance VSP performance measurement, among other things. We plan to 

report later this year on the results of this work. 

ALL VWP COUNTRIES HAVE ENTERED INTO INFORMATION-SHARING AGREEMENTS OR

EQUIVALENTS, BUT NOT ALL ARE SHARING INFORMATION AS REQUIRED

In May 2016, among other things, we reported that all 38 countries participating 

in the VWP had entered into the three types of required information-sharing agreements, or their equivalents, to: (1) Report lost and stolen passports, (2) share identity information about known or suspected terrorists, and (3) share criminal history 

information.28 However, we reported that not all countries had shared information 

through two of the agreements. Specifically, we reported that all VWP countries reported passport information through the first agreement, but about one-third of 

VWP countries were not sharing terrorist identity information through the second 

agreement and about one-third of the countries had not yet shared criminal history 

information through the third agreement. Although U.S. agencies receive law enforcement and National security information from VWP countries through other 

means, such as multilateral entities, the U.S. Government identified the information-sharing agreements as critical for protecting the United States from nationals 

of VWP countries who might present a threat. For example, as we reported, inforVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
36 

29 See Pub. L. No. 114–113, div. O, tit. II, § 204(c)–(d), 129 Stat. at 2991–92 (requiring countries to fully implement information-sharing agreements in order to participate in the VWP); 

8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)(2)(F). 

mation provided through HSPD–6 arrangements has enhanced U.S. traveler-screening capabilities and improved U.S. agencies’ ability to prevent known and suspected 

terrorists from traveling to the United States. Prior to the December 2015 enactment of the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act 

of 2015, U.S. law required VWP countries to enter into, but did not specifically require that countries implement, the information-sharing agreements. DHS announced in August 2015 that it had developed a new requirement that countries implement the agreements by sharing information.29 However, as we reported, DHS 

had not specified time frames for working with VWP countries to institute this and 

other new VWP security requirements. In May 2016, we recommended that DHS 

specify time frames for working with VWP countries to institute the additional VWP 

security requirements, including the requirement that the countries fully implement 

agreements to share information about known or suspected terrorists through the 

countries’ HSPD–6 arrangements and PCSC agreements with the United States. 

DHS concurred with the recommendation and, as of April 2017, reported that officials are continuing to work with VWP countries on time frames for implementing 

program requirements. 

Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the 

task force, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to 

any questions that you may have. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you so much, Ms. Gambler. I guess sort 

of going off that, one of the last points you made, Mr. Dougherty, 

would you agree with GAO’s assessment that one-third of VWP 

countries are not currently in compliance with their obligations? 

What happens when DHS discovers a country to be in noncompliance or lacking in full implementation of their obligations? 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. DHS, in the last GAO report, had agreed with 

recommendations that GAO had made on the remarks made here. 

Our point at this point in time is that the countries that are in the 

Visa Waiver Program are in compliance. There are many ways that 

DHS can engage those program countries to get further compliance. 

We engage them in many ways. Our assessments are ordinarily—take place by going to those countries and looking for them 

to make enhancements that we know that they can make. So the 

Department is very interested in making sure that all countries are 

current, and that is our position right now is that the countries 

within the Visa Waiver Program are compliant with both HSPD– 

6 and the other agreements that we expect from them. 

[Additional information follows:] 

That assessment is not current. The May 2016 GAO report provided a snapshot 

of how many countries were meeting the requirements for formal information sharing of terrorist and serious criminal identities immediately following the enactment 

of the enhanced requirements under the VWP Improvement and Terrorist Travel 

Prevention Act of 2015. Congress passed the Act in December 2015, and GAO’s data 

collection for this audit ended in January 2016. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendation to engage with VWP countries, where needed, to ensure that they 

meet, what were at the time, newly enacted requirements. 

DHS, in coordination with the Departments of State and Justice, has implemented GAO’s recommendation to great success. Today, all VWP countries have arrangements for sharing terrorist identities under Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive–6 (HSPD–6). All VWP countries also have signed Preventing and Combatting Serious Crime (PCSC) or equivalent agreements, with six countries still needing to ratify. In addition, these formal tools for information sharing supplement existing informal channels that exist between the United States and each VWP country and which DHS verifies to be occurring as part of its VWP country assessments. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. How often are those reviews conducted? 

37 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Ordinarily, they are every 2 years, but if we 

find that somebody is not quite up to speed, we can accelerate that 

and engage in more dialog with them. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Is that—if you find someone who is not up to 

speed or noncompliant, is there a formal process for addressing 

that or is it more an informal, hey, this is a problem—— 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Well—— 

Mr. GALLAGHER [continuing]. Do something about it. 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. I think, technically—yes, right. We are engaged 

at various levels in different governments, from the top down over 

to law enforcement, so we can—we can have an informal communication with them, we can also de ́marche them, if we wish. So I 

think the process would come through DHS headquarters eventually, if things were getting very serious, in that we would have to 

tell them we are getting to a point where we need to engage in 

some type of activity, such as shortening the period of time in 

which your nationals can come to the United States in order to get 

compliance from those countries. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. Ms. Gambler, just so I understand. 

Is it GAO’s position that DHS is currently not meeting the 2-year 

time line for a compliance review, and if so, what are the obstacles 

to adhering to that time line? 

Ms. GAMBLER. In the report that we issued last year, as well as 

in previous reports on the Visa Waiver Program, we did find that 

DHS was not consistently submitting to Congress those GAO reports within a timely fashion, and so we have made recommendations to the Department to take steps to ensure that those reports 

are submitted in a timely way. 

Based on our work, following up on those recommendations, DHS 

is taking steps to address that recommendation, but it remains 

open at this point. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. Mr. Ramotowski, your written testimony states that the vast majority of visa applicants are interviewed by a consular officer. Who wouldn’t be? Who would not be 

included in that vast majority? How does that process work? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Under the INA, there are some statutory exemptions, which include diplomats and officials, children under the 

age of 14, and individuals over the age of 79, and individuals renewing a visa that has expired less than 12 months previously. But 

even with those exceptions, if there is any kind of an indication in 

our screening and vetting process that that applicant might present 

a threat, we can and do conduct interviews. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Just when it comes to the screening and vetting 

process, give me a sense of the overall—your assessment of the 

overall workload of your consular officers who, you know, we are 

asking them to do a very important job, and also, what sort of 

training do they get in the questioning process? Is it just a checklist, or what does that look like? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Well, in terms of workload, we handle about 

14 million visa cases of all types each year, refusing over 2 million, 

and issuing about 111⁄2 million. The volume varies, of course, by 

country, by region, and we limit our officers to 120 interviews per 

day. 

38 

The training that they get begins when they first join the Department of State. They take the basic consular officer training 

course at our training center out in Arlington, and they are trained 

in the immigration law, interviewing techniques, and law enforcement officers from various partner agencies speak to these groups 

and have helped us develop our training materials. 

They are trained in the culture and language of the country and 

region to which they are going. Once they have arrived at their embassy or consulate duty station, they continue to get in-service 

training. Most of our posts have a fraud prevention unit that is focused exclusively on detecting, deterring, and defeating fraud of all 

types, criminal activity, and the personnel in that unit work with 

the line officers who are conducting the interviews to ensure that 

the line officers are aware of any recent scams, any fraud trends, 

things of that sort. As officers progress through their careers, they 

will get enhanced mid-level training, management training, leadership training, and so forth. So it is a comprehensive process. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Ramotowski. One hundred 

twenty seems like a lot. As a former military interrogator, that is— 

we are asking them to do a lot. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Ms. Watson 

Coleman, for 5 minutes for questions. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would 

like to ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Massachusetts—oh, what happened to the gentleman from Massachusetts?— 

be allowed to sit and question the witnesses as well. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Second, I would like to yield my time at 

this moment to Hon. Barraga ́n, who has a time issue. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ms. Barraga ́n, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Thank you. I represent the Los Angeles Port, 

which is how we like to call it, America’s port, one of the largest 

ports, and I had a chance to visit with CBP down at the port and 

to see what they do. The work that they do is so excellent on making sure to secure our ports. 

According to staffing numbers in March, CBP was almost 1,400 

officers short of its staffing target, and likely, thousands of officers 

below what your staffing model would indicate is optimal for security and facilitation at our ports of entry. While the men and 

women of CBP’s office are doing their best under the circumstances, at some point, security and facilitation suffer. 

Attrition is a problem and hiring is slow. Meanwhile, the President has proposed hiring 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents, but 

zero new CBP officers for our Nation’s ports of entry. What needs 

to be done to address CBP’s staffing needs for ports of entry? 

Mr. WAGNER. So you are correct, we are still about 1,400 officers 

short. We still have not fulfilled the original 2,000 that Congress 

provided to us about 3 years ago now. Thankfully, our attrition is 

fairly low. We are at about 3.4 percent per year in the CBP officer 

ranks, about 750 to 800 officers per year. 

But you are correct, the hiring has been slow. We are barely 

keeping pace with the attrition right now, so I know we continue 

to go through the entire hiring process from the written exam to 

the polygraph to some of the other requirements, and look at where 

39 

people are failing out of the process and how do we do a better job 

at recruiting, and how do we get right people into this occupation 

and will take the jobs where we need them. 

So we are having a pretty extensive review of that with our Office of Human Resources, and looking at ways to shorten the process and get better applicants in, and then look at, you know, like 

we can do with the military and veterans that are coming out of 

service, and how do we—how do we make it a lot easier for them 

to take these occupations? 

As far as additional officers, you know, we annually submit a 

workload staffing model report, which articulates our needs. It is 

all based on the workload, the data, how long it takes to perform 

each function that we have at the ports of entry. You are correct, 

the numbers are still a couple of thousand in that, and we submit 

that report annually to the Hill. 

So in the mean time, you know, we look at balancing those vacancies with the use of overtime and the use of technology to help 

us do that so we are not vulnerable and we do close those security 

gaps. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. Ramotowski, Reuters has reported that Secretary Tillerson 

had sent a series of internal cables, four in total, to consulate and 

embassies abroad, instructing them of new measures to increase 

vetting of visa applicants. In these cables, Secretary Tillerson has 

directed U.S. consulates and embassies to specifically identify population risks that warrant, ‘‘increased security,’’ and to implement 

tougher screening procedures for this particular group of people. 

Applicants who fall into one of the tougher screen—applicants 

who fall into one of the identifiable population groups will be subjected to a higher level of security screening. Have you worked to 

develop a uniform system for identifying populations who pose a security threat? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. We are actually engaged in that process now 

with our partner agencies, some of which are represented here and 

others that are not, to do exactly that. You know, the Department 

of State works with and tries to take a whole-of-Government approach to analyzing and detecting potential threats against our 

country, so we are in the process of doing that. 

The Secretary did direct embassies and consulates to begin that 

process to focus on areas that—and groups that might present a 

higher degree of risk and to ensure that those groups get effective 

screening. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Are we doing something to make sure it is a uniform process, that there is a uniform standard? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Yes. There is definitely a uniform standard 

foundational base to our vetting process, which I outlined in my 

initial comments. Every visa applicant—well, most visa applicants 

give electronic fingerprints. Every visa applicant is checked 

through our facial recognition system, through a series of sophisticated biographic name checks, and so forth. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. If I could just quickly interrupt, because I have 

a few seconds. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Yes. 

40 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. My understanding is that the instruction was for 

them to identify groups—— 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Correct. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N [continuing]. That could be a higher risk. So my 

question is more of like how do you identify those populations having a uniform standard? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Well, the degree of risk is going to vary with 

each particular region and country, and that is why we are asking 

our folks in the field to meet with their other agency counterparts 

to identify potential groups that present a higher risk. 

Certain regions, certain areas certainly do present a higher risk 

than others, and, for example, to respond back to the Chairman’s 

question regarding 120 interviews, that is a maximum. We will 

take all the time we need to drill down and get to the bottom of 

an individual case in order to assure ourselves that that applicant 

does not present a threat. So that is what we are trying to do, to 

identify and focus our resources on areas that present a greater 

risk. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. All right. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask my questions, I do want to commend you and Ms. Watson Coleman and the 

others on this task force. Having led one of these last term, what 

you are looking into is critically important to the security of our 

country, and recognizing the diffusion, if you will, of ISIS from 

strictly in the Syria and Iraq area to now metastasizing, if you will, 

to other areas of world, it is clear that they want to infiltrate the 

West, it is clear they want to get into the United States, and these 

things that you are looking into are very important and helps keep 

our country secure, so I thank you for that. 

I thank the whole panel for what you do to try and keep our 

country safe and secure, and I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. Wagner, I was troubled not by anything you said, but the 

statistics you talked about, and being that you are still down about 

1,400 from the authorization you had. I know you touched on it 

briefly, but if you could expound a little bit more on what you are 

finding as the reasons for the delays and what we can do to help 

you expedite that process? 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes. So it is—the numbers are about 1,000 from 

the original 2,000, and then due to some of our reimbursable agreements that we have entered into, that number is then bumped up 

a little bit, so it is total about 1,400 officers right now between 

what level we are funded from, from appropriations, and then from 

the reimbursable agreements that we have. 

So we try to balance that, you know, try to balance that in places 

where we can absorb that understaffing using overtime and other 

means to be able to do that. What this also means is, you know, 

sometimes we have to say no to additional requests for service. 

We are getting a lot of requests for service, a lot of airports, land 

border locations coming in asking us to be able to process more 

flights and more people. So we try to find creative ways really to 

be able to do that. 

41 

Now, the process itself, we have made some progress in shortening the length of time it takes to hire people. We have done some 

work, what we call consolidated hiring hubs, where we move some 

of those administrative procedures together, working closely with 

the military to be able to do this. But, still, when we look at the 

different steps in the process, and you know, for people that apply 

for the job, you know, about half of them don’t even bother to show 

up for the written exam. 

You know, and only about 38 percent of the people pass the written exam, and then the other steps in the process, the interview, 

the medical screening, the physical fitness screening, you look at 

the polygraph, knocks out a lot of people, and we have worked 

some exemptions to that, I understand. 

Mr. KATKO. Just basically, the process you have set up just substantially weeds out a ton of the people? 

Mr. WAGNER. It does. 

Mr. KATKO. Is that the biggest problem? 

Mr. WAGNER. We have got to get more sophisticated in the recruiting and the advertising of these occupations. They are great 

jobs, and we want to be able to put the right people in them, of 

course, without also reducing our criteria for doing so, which will 

hurt us down the road to do that for the job. 

Mr. KATKO. OK. 

Mr. WAGNER. So it is very strict. The backgrounds have to be 

very strict, but they are very good Federal jobs, so we have to just 

find the right people that are willing to take them in the locations 

where we have those vacancies. Most of those vacancies are on the 

Southwest Border area. 

Mr. KATKO. Gotcha. Thank you. 

Mr. Settles, I want to switch gears for a minute. We spoke previously about the use of biometrics and the importance of biometrics, biometrics going forward in the enforcement of our laws, 

and keeping our country safe and on an immigration standpoint as 

well. So could you talk about some of the advances that have taken 

place with respect to biometrics, and any problems you see in gaining biometric data from various agencies in pursuit of the Visa 

Waiver Program? 

Mr. SETTLES. So I could talk about that generally. If it is OK, 

I would like to make a correction to the record. In my statement, 

I added a zero to a number. I actually meant to say 8,599 recommended refusals from our VSP post, not 85,000, so I just wanted 

to correct that for the record. 

What I can say is ICE HSI doesn’t play as large a role. We are 

more of a consumer of that information. We do have a program 

that is under way that we are working with DOD that I would 

have to probably share in a more Classified setting. 

Mr. KATKO. I understand. 

Mr. SETTLES. Which we would love to, but I would probably yield 

to my other esteemed colleagues here at the State Department and 

CBP to talk a little bit more about the biometric side of it. 

Mr. KATKO. OK. Someone like to take that? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. I can. 

Mr. KATKO. Mr. Ramotowski. 

42 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Yes, thank you. The Department of State 

shares all of the information we collect through the visa process 

with our interagency partners, and that includes, of course, the 

electronically collected fingerprints, which go into the DHS IDENT 

database, and it is accessible to all of our DHS partners, as well 

as FBI. We send the fingerprints for screening through the FBI’s 

criminal fingerprint database and to other agencies as well. 

Other biometrics include the photograph, which we get from all 

applicants, and that is screening against our facial recognition system, which includes, among other things, up beyond 60,000 terrorist photographs that have been collected by the intelligence community. If there is a facial recognition match, that would, of course, 

signal a consular officer to halt action on that case. 

So we continue to share all of our data and to develop capabilities even further. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you. I am running out of time. I want to 

thank the Chairman for letting me ask questions. I have to run to 

another meeting, but I encourage all of you in this space to look 

at the advances being made in the biometric field and make sure 

you apply them on the front lines, and to the extent you need help 

from us, you have got to let us know, because we will be there for 

you. So thank all of you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Jackson Lee for 

5 minutes for questions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chair very much. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. I am going to pursue a lining of questioning. First of all, let me say the task force is asking a very important question, and I hope that we can work on these matters in 

a bipartisan manner and expand to look at a number of other 

issues that impact the security of Americans. 

I do want to indicate that we have, on this committee, great respect for all of the personnel that are in the service of our country 

for its domestic security and National security. I think sometimes 

policies cause our very dedicated staff persons to really have to perform in a way that is inconsistent with our values of democracy 

and justice and fairness for all. 

Let me, first of all, say to Mr. Settles, my sympathy as well to 

your team for the loss of your fallen agent and to his family. 

I want to indicate to Mr. Wagner, we have worked together for 

a number of years, and I thank you for your service. You remember 

the Muslim ban and the Russian, which it came before the court 

orders, and everyone was scrambling, and many Members of Congress were trying to help their constituents, and the awkwardness 

of what has been normally good relationships was evident. So I 

hope that, going forward—I hope we don’t have that order in place, 

but going forward, that those dispatched in local offices can recognize that we are on their team seeking information. 

I had a 16-year-old Jordanian-statused young man traveling on 

his own being held and his family could not see him, I couldn’t see 

him, and he was shipped off to Chicago, and he lived in Houston, 

Texas. 

So anyhow, what I wanted to ask was the question of reports 

that we received on the implementing of the rules, and when that 

ban was in place. That conflict in implementation guidance resultVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
43 

ing in different ports implementing the order differently, such as 

taking a statused Jordanian. Currently, what guidance does CBP 

issue to CBPOs operating at the ports of entry regarding implementation of the travel ban? What is the status of the travel ban 

with respect to your officers throughout the country? 

Mr. WAGNER. Well, I believe they are subject to litigation, and, 

you know, we are following what the court orders. So we put that 

information out to the front-line personnel to comply with all of the 

court’s instructions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Meaning that there is no travel ban—there is 

no Muslim ban. You are not operating under a Muslim ban right 

now. 

Mr. WAGNER. No, we are not. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. OK. Let me further ask—and I know we are 

in an open setting. I had a bill dealing with foreign fighters. What 

can you tell me about your procedures for individuals who come 

through a Visa Waiver Program—excuse me, country, and may 

have fought and gone to the caliphate to fight and are now coming 

through a Visa Waiver Program, or may come through a Visa 

Waiver Program, what procedures are your officers using with respect to that population? 

Mr. WAGNER. So a couple of different ways we would look at 

that. First is the granting of the ESTA approval to even travel. 

They have got to fill out an on-line application with us, including 

their place of birth, all of their passport information. We run that 

through a series of law enforcement databases, and we also bounce 

that against—certain data fields against the intelligence community. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Does that include preventing them from getting travel documents as well? 

Mr. WAGNER. Correct. So that would prevent them from traveling 

under the Visa Waiver Program if there were any concerns identified there. Once they get that approval, then they actually book 

their travel, we do look at the airline reservation data, we look at 

what their trip consists of, we look at all the different parts and 

the data pieces within that reservation, as well as the airline manifest information, which is basically your passport details. 

We run that through a series of what we call rule sets, and we 

take all of that reservation data, and we take intelligence reports, 

and we translate that into rules. We say: Give me all of these passports from this country with males between these ages traveling 

from this country or this route, and we start with a list and then 

further cull it down on the basis of that, and narrow that down to 

people we need to talk to or question about things. 

Or we link it against known pieces of information. So again, in 

conjunction with the law enforcement and intelligence community, 

known pieces of information that we can connect the person to 

more than likely would deny their travel under that program or 

cause them to go through additional scrutiny or inspections either 

overseas or when they arrive. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have got a quick question. Thank you so 

much to Ms. Gambler. I just want to know, you are sitting on the 

panel with the implementators of rules of security. What is your— 

what is the GAO’s perception of the layered approach in the Visa 

44 

Waiver Program, and do you think it is structured enough or is 

there more that we need to do? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Based on our work looking at not just the Visa 

Waiver Program, but some of the other programs that we have 

talked about today, I think we have seen progress in implementation in terms of DHS’s oversight of the program. One of the key 

areas that we have talked about as it relates to some of the 

predeparture programs that I mentioned in my oral statement is 

the need for DHS and CBP to develop metrics and baselines to 

really help them assess the effectiveness of some of these programs. 

So that is a key recommendation that we have made to DHS related to some of their screening and predeparture efforts that we 

think it is important for them to implement going forward. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. To the Chairman and the Ranking Member, 

let me thank you for your indulgence, and to all of the witnesses, 

thank you for your service to the Nation. I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, the Chair now recognizes the sheriff, now Congressman Rutherford, 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like the 

start off, first of all, by thanking all of you for your great service. 

As I have had an opportunity to travel around the country and observe some of your agents and employees in action, it has been refreshing, and so I thank you for that. You have a lot of dedicated 

members out there. 

I want to touch base with something that Mr. Settles said about 

the—you corrected the number, the 8,500 in admissions. Now, GAO 

reports that we identified 22,000 high-risk travelers in 2015, and 

so these 85, were they in that 22,000, I presume? 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes. These are the numbers for the 30 visa-issuing 

posts we have in 25 countries that we strategically placed. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. So that only includes the VSU folks, 

right? 

Mr. SETTLES. That is the VSU, the Visa Security Program. The 

units overseas, we call them the units. The program is the Visa Security Program, and so that is for those 30 posts. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. So about—does that mean about half of 

these or a little more than half are being determined to be highrisk, but they are being allowed to come in? Is that a correct assessment or no? 

Mr. SETTLES. No, because the number starts at about 2.2 million 

for those 30 posts, and we whittle it down and we have derogatory 

information on about 74,000. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. 

Mr. SETTLES. Then utilizing automated vetting, as I talked about 

yesterday in the Classified setting, what I can say is the information is as good as what is in there. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Right. 

Mr. SETTLES. I think, like I mentioned, Director Comey said, You 

can vet until the cows come home, but if the information isn’t in 

the system. So we amplify that information with analysts, both 

here and the United States that when we have derogatory hits, 

then we send it to our agents over there that are solely there to 

do that cop-to-cop foreign liaison partnership, and also, to, you 

45 

know, increase the information so we have more in the system for 

the future. So that 8,500 is part of that process. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. 

Mr. SETTLES. Then from there, we go down to where we watch 

listed 1,669. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. I know that Mr. Wagner, the CBP is, in 

fact, following up on the GAO’s recommendation about the baselines, can you talk a little bit about where you are at on those 

measures? I am curious of the 8,500, particularly, or any of them. 

Do we know of any that have actually been subject to the Visa Security Program and then allowed in and committed a terrorist act 

here, or not allowed in and committed a terrorist act in France or 

Germany or somewhere else? 

Mr. SETTLES. So I don’t have specific information like that. As a 

matter of fact, I don’t know of an incident, but what I can tell you 

is, of the ones that we watchlisted, you know, obviously they didn’t 

come into the country. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Right. 

Mr. SETTLES. Whether or not, it is kind-of complicated with reporting as far as whether our foreign partners would have shared 

that with us, but we do share what we can, obviously, back out of 

this whole process. That is the biggest part of us—— 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Back to our foreign partners? 

Mr. SETTLES [continuing]. Being there, back to our foreign partners. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. 

Mr. SETTLES. I did provide, in the Classified setting, a pretty 

good example, I think, of what happens every time we kind of go 

through that process yesterday. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Thank you for that as well. 

The Visa Security Program has been, I think, incredibly successful in providing increased information and recommendations to the 

consular offices regarding visa applications. Can you talk a little 

bit, Mr. Settles, about how the ICE attache ́s at embassies and consulates where they don’t have VSU, how do you assist with the 

screening and the vetting of visa applications at those locations? 

Mr. SETTLES. They are—so in the 66 countries—I am sorry, at 

the 66 posts where we have—and 49 countries, you know, our 

agents are there to do a lot more than just the Visa Security Program. They are there to help with transnational criminal networks, 

you know, the kind-of broader perspective of what Homeland Security investigation does. 

It is more of on a request from State Department and the consular affairs officer. If they see something during their routine 

process and the high site vetting—— 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. They reach out. 

Mr. SETTLES [continuing]. They come over to us and ask for our 

help, and you know, that is kind-of the difference. We provide 

training and any recent trends or intel we have, but it’s more on 

a case-by-case instead of it being like a full-time responsibility of 

the agent. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. Listen, again, I think all of my time has 

run out, but I really appreciate all of your service to our country. 

God bless. 

46 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Ms. Watson 

Coleman. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank each and every one of you for what you represent and who 

you represent here today, and it just seems to me that, collectively, 

we are doing a heck of a job and interacting with one another. 

Mr. Settles, a real quick question. Just like Mr. Wagner was 

asked, did he need more help on the CBP, do you need more—do 

you have greater requests than you are able to address with the 

things that you are doing in the foreign countries? 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes, ma’am. With more—certainly we can do more. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. We just need to know that. 

Mr. SETTLES. We have an aggressive—we are doing as much as 

we can aggressively with the resources we have. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. At some point, we would like to have 

some information specifically about what additional things, resources, whatever, staff you need to do what you are doing. I think 

what you are doing is very important, as I believe every one of you 

are doing very important things. 

Last month, Secretary Kelly stated that we needed to start looking very hard at the security of the Visa Waiver Program, and do 

you know what he meant by that, Mr. Dougherty? Has the DHS 

begun a review of the VWP, and what security enhancements are 

being considered? 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Thank you. Secretary Kelly, when he was making remarks about taking a hard look at the VWP, was basically 

iterating, I think, the concern that we all have, that foreign fighters may be coming out of the Levant, making their way into Europe, and those people are Europeans. They have European citizenship. 

So Secretary Kelly’s intention, and the intention of, I think, everyone represented by DHS here, is to look at additional things 

that the Department can do to make visa-free travel to the United 

States more secure than it is now. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Can you discuss what kind of additional 

things you are doing, what kind of enhancements, security enhancements are under consideration—— 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. I think—— 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. In this setting? 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. I would like to have that conversation with you 

off-line if we could, and I think it is a dialog. I know that the committee is very conversant on opportunities that the Department can 

take. We have some of our own, but I think we are at a point, 

ma’am, where we are looking at several things, and we would prefer to discuss that in a quieter setting. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. One last question to Mr. 

Wagner. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and in the wake of the 

attempted attack on Northeast—Northwest Flight 253 in 2009, the 

Nation’s visa and passenger vetting processes have been completely 

revamped and strengthened, obviously, with the individualized 

threat assessment for each traveler to the United States that includes screening against all kind of Government holdings, biometrics, capture, and interview. 

47 

Tell me how can this individualized threat assessment be 

strengthened, and what do you need from us to support your efforts? 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes. The underwear bomber, the Christmas day 

bomber, I mean, that was the whole genesis really behind our 

predeparture program, and we looked at a very close call in that 

situation. We looked at the opportunities we missed. You know, we 

had officers overseas at the airport that that guy had come 

through. We weren’t necessarily having them focused on that type 

of particular threat, so we adjusted that. 

We put this—the whole predeparture process and the no-board 

recommendation process into place with a very strong focus on, besides the immigration issues, the National security focus, and really, to err on the side of caution. If there is any concerns about an 

individual, we ask the airline not to fly them and refer them back 

to the U.S. embassy where, across Government, we have more time 

to assess this person and look at them. That was really the genesis 

of that program. 

As far as just—I think we look for support in, you know, what 

we request in our appropriations request as far as the capabilities 

at our National targeting center and the systems we build to continue to conduct the analysis and the vetting of this information 

across Government against as many sources as we possibly can to 

make sure we are not missing any gaps, and that we don’t have 

to wait for another incident to sit down and figure out what gaps 

we missed or what information wasn’t available at the right time 

to prevent that person from moving into this, say, the next step of 

the process. 

So we have been focused on it since then, and we have really 

built a really strong capability with a National security focus ever 

since that. That was a close call. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. So you don’t need anything from us? 

Mr. WAGNER. Well, I think we put it in the appropriations request, and there is money, I believe, for our National targeting center to support, and Congress has been very generous and very supportive of us building out an entirely new facility in Northern Virginia. We had two National targeting centers. We consolidated 

them into one location. I please invite any of you to come out and 

see the work that goes on there and the partnerships across Government that we have established. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Fitzpatrick for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to echo my colleagues. I thank you all for your service. 

I come here via the FBI, so I consider you all family, needless to 

say. You have got a very tough job keeping us all safe, but we 

thank you for doing it. 

I just want to explore for 1 second the hypothetical of terminating the Visa Waiver Program. Obviously, the world in 2017 is 

much different than it was back in 1986 when that law was implemented. Obviously, all of those countries are very different as well. 

There are obviously a lot of bad people who live in many of those, 

if not all, of those 38 countries. As Chairman McCaul stated in his 

48 

opening statement, several of the 9/11 hijackers came in via Europe 

with no vetting whatsoever. 

Hypothetically, if that program were to terminate, would DHS 

even have the bandwidth and the capacity to deal with that new 

world if we were ever at that point where we needed to go there? 

Mr. WAGNER. I would really defer to the Department of State. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. If they terminated the program, then, presumably, all of those travelers would have to apply for a visa from the 

Department of State, so it is really our bandwidth. Certainly, in 

Europe, the capacity to handle 18 million visa applications a year 

when globally, right now, we are doing 14 million just isn’t there. 

It would take quite a bit of time and resources to ramp up to be 

able to handle that caseload, if the entire program was suddenly 

eliminated. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. What would you see that looking like, numerically? Could the embassies handle it or are we at the point now 

where it wouldn’t even be possible? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. It wouldn’t be possible with that volume, with 

the current physical plant and staffing that we have, no, it 

wouldn’t be possible, not in any reasonable length of time. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. So we have grown dependent upon the Visa 

Waiver Program then, essentially? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Well, resources that were used to handle visa 

applications when the program started in the mid-1980’s, have 

since been reallocated, both real estate and officer positions, to 

other countries where the visa demand was greater. We didn’t just 

keep officers in Europe with nothing to do. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. OK. 

Mr. WAGNER. The volume is about 19.5 million travelers last 

year under the Visa Waiver Program. So the volume is substantial, 

but I think if you look at comparison of the visa versus Visa Waiver Programs, both programs collect similar biographical data from 

the individual. The vetting queries that are run in the analysis is 

fairly similar on the two programs. 

The big distinction is the point in time when that traveler meets 

with the U.S. Government official. For a traveler with a visa, they 

meet with a consular officer to give their fingerprints, have their 

photo taken, and be interviewed at the U.S. embassy while still 

overseas. 

The Visa Waiver Program, we allow that traveler, after that 

prescreening, that their first interaction with a U.S. Government 

official would then be a CBP officer at the port of entry where they 

would get interviewed, collect the same fingerprints, run the same 

queries, and also have their photo taken. So it is really whether 

you allow that person to get on the plane to travel here to collect 

the same kind of information and go through a similar type of 

interview. 

The background checks and the biographical data that serves at 

the platform for the two are fairly similar in that. So it is also looking at it from, you know, asylum claims and some of the admissibility issues is do you allow the risk of the person getting on the 

plane to the same level of information once they get here or do you 

do it overseas? That is probably the biggest distinction between the 

two. 

49 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. I would also add that the information sharing 

that is so important to populating our watch lists about threats 

from these countries might be endangered also if the program were 

to be suddenly terminated, because a number of our partner countries use their membership in the Visa Waiver Program to justify 

any enhanced information sharing with the United States that benefits both sides. So that is a factor to consider as well. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Is it fair to say, though, that the Visa Waiver 

Program presupposes that we have confidence and faith in the security protocol of these other countries? If so, is that warranted 

today? 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Sir, if I could answer that, I think it is probably 

as strong as it has ever been. The assessments that are performed 

by the Department of Homeland Security are very granular. So we 

look at, for example, how do you train your people? Do you have 

a legal system that we would recognize as putting criminals away 

or terrorists away? Do you have security processes that we recognize as essential to making sure that you don’t have a lawless population or a group of terrorists in your midst who then could become part of the Visa Waiver Program? 

I haven’t physically sat down and counted everything that we 

consider in an assessment, but there is a significant number of security features that are involved in those assessments and they are 

very, very detailed. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Chair recognizes Mr. Higgins for 5 minutes. 

Votes went off, but we should be good with 5 minutes and some 

words at the end. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will move fast. 

Deputy Commissioner Wagner, thank you for your service to the 

Thin Blue Line. Sir, I recognize and respect the mourning band 

upon your badge. How long have you been behind a badge, sir? 

Mr. WAGNER. Over 25 years, sir. 

Mr. HIGGINS. In the 25 years, have you managed to be able to 

recognize a damn good cop when you see one and when you interview one? 

Mr. WAGNER. Absolutely. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. 

The applicants that try to come to work for your agency, are not 

many of them experienced and recognized and decorated officers 

and deputies from other agencies? 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes, some of them are. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, sir. What is the failure rate for the psych eval 

and the polygraph test for those deputies and police officers? 

Mr. WAGNER. I don’t know that we have the data by their previous occupation. I wouldn’t know. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Your best guesstimate on that? 

Mr. WAGNER. No visibility into that, sir. It is a different part of 

an organization. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I am getting at the 1,400 agents that you need and 

that there seems to be a built-in resistance in the system. By my 

own experience, I am recognized as a police officer for 14 years, 

sometimes officers choose to advance their career and go to another 

50 

department. They can’t pass the psych eval and they can’t pass the 

polygraph. It is a rather bizarre circumstance. Tell this committee, 

are you running into that? 

Mr. WAGNER. Well, there is no psychological exam for the CPB 

officer occupation. For the polygraph, yes, there is a very, very high 

failure rate for that. 

Mr. HIGGINS. What would you say the failure rate is? 

Mr. WAGNER. It is upwards of 60 to 70 percent. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. 

I would just like the committee to recognize that this is a common circumstance across the country when experienced and highly 

decorated and capable police officers apply for jobs at Federal agencies, they can’t get hired. When the ranking officers that are interviewing them sometimes know that they are turning away a damn 

good cop for that job. 

Deputy Secretary Ramotowski, we have—it seems to me there is 

a tendency in our Nation and perhaps the world to give a certain 

pedigree to a visa. That visa comes with a certain expectation that 

that individual has been properly vetted and cleared and whatnot. 

I would like to address that for a moment. 

The beginning process of applying for a visa, the person applying 

for that visa has to present what is referred to as proper certificates to proper Government authorities, like birth certificates and 

marriage licenses. Is that correct? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Depending on the type of visa, yes, that is correct. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Those documents are frequently coming from—you 

know, we are familiar with certain levels of security measures on 

our own identifications here in America: Watermarks, barcodes, 

magnetic scans, et cetera. But a birth certificate and a marriage license coming from a rural area in some of these nations that the 

citizens are seeking access to our country, given the very advanced 

state of the ability to forge documents, it would seem to me that 

that would be a very weak link in the chain, and that is where the 

chain begins, that these documents are presented from some rural 

community. I mean, I have arrested men with many excellent IDs, 

driver’s licenses, American driver’s licenses that would pass muster 

that any cop would look at and say, that is a real driver’s license, 

and the whole thing is fake. The ID is fake. The whole thing is 

fake. The only thing real on it is his picture. If that can happen 

with an American driver’s license, what are they doing with marriage licenses and birth certificates at these—in this vetting procedure? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. You are quite right, sir. That is why we never 

depend exclusively on the documents for granting an immigration 

benefit, because in many countries, they could be and are fraudulent. We have fraud prevention offices at all of our large- and medium-sized embassies. Even at the smaller ones, an officer is always designated as a fraud prevention officer. They are focused on 

reviewing and investigating any suspicious documents. 

Our officers have a network of contacts throughout the country 

with civil registrars, government passport offices, courthouses, and 

so forth to verify documents when necessary. Also, the value of the 

consular interview is ascertaining whether the applicant matches 

51 

the documents that he or she is presenting; does the story make 

sense? If a marriage is claimed but the two parties do not know 

anything about each other, then there is maybe a problem there. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you for your answer, sir. 

In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I have further questions 

that I’ll submit in writing. I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

We now have to go vote, as one does in Congress from time to 

time. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their time and for their testimony, both yesterday and today. This was a great way to start the 

work of the task force with serious, thoughtful conversation. 

I want to thank the Members of the task force on both sides of 

the aisle for being here, for being thoughtful. I am very excited 

about where this headed. We have an incredible, incredible range 

of experiences, local law enforcement, Federal law enforcement, 

military, diverse backgrounds. My hope is that we are able to harness that, harness the outside expertise that you bring, and come 

up with some recommendations that are serious, that are smart 

and, ultimately, will make the homeland more secure. And for waking up every day in pursuit of that noble objective, and I can’t 

think of an objective more noble than that. I want to thank each 

and every one of you. 

So with that, pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing 

record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the task 

force stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the task force was adjourned.] 

(53) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MIKE GALLAGHER FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY

Question 1a. What is the status of biometric exit implementation, pursuant to 8 

U.S.C. 1365b? 

Answer. Since the 2018 deadline was set by Secretary Johnson and the issuance 

of the Executive Order, ‘‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 

United States,’’ CBP has accelerated the implementation of a biometric entry/exit 

system. CBP is deploying key components of a biometric air exit solution through 

face recognition capture at airport gates in eight airports during the summer of 

2017, plus a series of additional programs through airline partnerships, and will 

have the capability to accept biometric departure data at the top 20 airports by the 

third quarter of fiscal year 2018. CBP is also moving forward with a practical and 

achievable implementation strategy in the land environment by focusing on biometric exit capabilities for third-country nationals. CBP will continue to test new innovative solutions for biometric capture for at-speed vehicles until a feasible solution 

is found. 

Question 1b. How does DHS expect this capability to enhance its ability to identify 

terrorists in the terrorist detection? 

Answer. In response to a 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress directed the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to implement a biometric entry/exit 

screening system which would help identify terrorists, by for example, preventing 

terrorists from ‘‘tossing an old passport and slightly altering the name in the new 

one.’’ A biometric exit solution, in addition existing checks of any biographic watch 

list information, will assist CBP in identifying imposters and tie the information to 

any biometric watch list hits, strengthening current capabilities. Full biometric exit 

capability will improve DHS’s ability to more accurately and completely identify 

overstays, as more complete arrival and departure information will then be available for all travelers. 

Question 1c. Will the current funding stream be sufficient for implementation at 

the Nation’s busiest international airports by 2018? 

Answer. The current funding stream will be sufficient to execute CBP’s plan to 

begin accepting biometric exit data at the Nation’s busiest airports by the third 

quarter of 2018. CBP’s primary focus in fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 is developing the essential program elements and back-end infrastructure for biometric 

air exit. The funds will be utilized for information technology, program management, operational support, outbound enforcement (CBP officers), and technology innovation for other modes of operation such as land and sea. CBP is currently developing an official Life-cycle Cost Estimate for the Biometric Entry/Exit program. CBP 

will continue working with the airlines and airport authorities as we further our 

biometric exit requirements. 

Question 2. Please explain how DHS continually vets visa holders or individuals 

who enter via the Visa Waiver Program for ties to terrorism or other derogatory information once they have entered the United States. 

Answer. For visa holders and applicants, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) visa screening operations are currently supported by two units—the 

Visa Security Coordination Center and the Counterterrorism Criminal Exploitation 

Unit. ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agents deployed to international posts through the ICE Visa Security Program (VSP) are supported by 

screening and vetting efforts of the Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT). 

PATRIOT is an inter-agency coordination effort to conduct advanced visa application vetting and enhance visa security. Participating agencies include Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), ICE, and 

Department of State (DOS). PATRIOT identifies National security, public safety, 

54 

and other visa eligibility concerns at the earliest point of an individual’s visa application life cycle. Upon issuance of a visa and subsequent admission to the United 

States, ICE’s Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit then tracks the visa 

for the remaining validity and life cycle in the overstay enforcement system. 

DHS, in collaboration with DOS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, continues to engage visa waiver countries to enhance the exchange of known or suspected terrorists and watch list data. Further, ICE has expanded the VSP to a number of Visa Waiver Program countries to support the whole-of-Government effort to 

secure travel to the United States. 

CBP conducts continuous vetting of nonimmigrant and immigrant visas to ensure 

that changes in a traveler’s eligibility are identified in near-real time. This allows 

CBP to immediately determine whether to provide a ‘‘no-board’’ recommendation to 

a carrier in imminent travel situations, to recommend that DOS revoke the visa, 

to deny an Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) application, or whether additional notification should be made for individuals determined to be present 

in the United States. 

Through ESTA, CBP conducts enhanced vetting of Visa Waiver Program (VWP) 

applicants in advance of travel to the United States in order to assess whether they 

are eligible to travel under the VWP, including whether the traveler constitutes a 

National security risk or public safety threat. Additionally, CBP requires air carriers to verify that VWP travelers have valid authorization prior to boarding an aircraft bound for the United States. CBP vets ESTA applicants against the 

INTERPOL Lost and Stolen Passport Database, the Terrorist Watchlist, and other 

Law Enforcement Databases. 

ESTA applications are subject to continuous re-vetting, which means that even 

though an applicant has an approved authorization for travel, that authorization is 

continuously reviewed throughout its validity period for new derogatory information 

and is subject to further review and subsequent denial if warranted. 

Question 3. A major lesson from 9/11 was the importance of interagency intelligence sharing. While we had derogatory information on some of the attackers, it 

did not make it into the hands of those who could have prevented their entry into 

the United States. 

How has the Department improved their ability to move derogatory information 

around the USG in a way that effectively identifies and interdicts known or suspected terrorists? 

How confident is the Department that the changes are tough enough to prevent 

any known or suspected terrorist from gaining entry? 

What gaps still exist, if any? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has matured its ability to 

move both derogatory and identity information around the United States Government (USG) to improve identification and interdiction of known or suspected terrorists (KST) through watchlisting and screening. Data held in the FBI’s Terrorist 

Screening Center’s Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB, ‘‘The Terrorist Watchlist’’) 

is made available for searching by appropriately cleared—FOUO level—partners, in 

real-time either through direct access to TSDB or through Department-maintained 

screening databases such as TECS (DHS). The Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

(I&A), through the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), shares terrorism-related information with other intelligence agencies to help identify KSTs 

and take action to prevent their entry to the United States or lead to their arrest. 

DHS supports the USG’s terrorist watchlisting as part of its day-to-day mission and 

adheres to established processes and procedures for Federal agencies to make their 

information available in the TIDE. 

International actors that qualify as KSTs, are submitted to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which determines whether the information is credible. If 

so, the information is entered into the TIDE database, to which DHS and other Federal agencies have access. TIDE KST unclassified names and identifiers are provided to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) where another review of the nomination and the relevant intelligence is conducted to verify the information before updating the TSDB. The TSDB is distributed to DHS screening systems for use, by 

various components, in their screening activities. Purely domestic actors who qualify 

for nomination as KST’s are nominated directly to TSDB. 

In addition to the TSDB, the TSC has provided its Biometric Watchlist to the 

DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which is managed by the 

Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM); all DHS enforcement encounters 

are run against in the IDENT Biometric Watchlist. The Department of Defense Biometrically Enhanced Watch List (BEWL) has also been loaded into IDENT, and all 

biometric encounters are matched against the BEWL. The U.S. Army National 

Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) is notified of any matches and coordinates with 

55 

DHS as to appropriate actions that need to be taken. All entrants into the United 

States (including Visa Waiver Program travelers on their first trip into the United 

States) have their fingerprints captured and matched against the Biometric 

Watchlist. The TSC is notified of any matches and will coordinate any actions to 

be taken when a watch-listed person is encountered. 

The Department is confident the current processes have improved the USG’s ability to identify and block KSTs from gaining entry to the homeland. • U.S. Custom and Border Protection (CBP) employs matching algorithms to compare biographic identities from TECS records against identities in the TSDB. 

When a potential match is identified, NTC adjudicates the match and pulls information from CBP holdings that can augment or enhance the data contained 

in the TSDB record. • The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) also contributes information 

derived from encounters with KSTs directly into TIDE via the DHS Watchlist 

Framework. After the information is entered into TIDE, a subset ‘‘addendum B’’ 

of qualified information is down-streamed to TSDB to bolster vetting and 

screening purposes. In 2016, TSA made 1,100 watchlist nominations based on 

information acquired during routine operations, and in the first quarter of 2017 

added 222 nominations. • U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)/Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate maintains a cadre of staff who are certified as 

watchlist analysts through DHS I&A’s Watchlist training effort program. These 

analysts update TIDE records of KST’s with biographic information from USCIS 

data systems. • U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Homeland Security Investigations 

(HSI) is the largest partner with FBI and currently provides the Deputy Director to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). With HSI Agents in every 

JTTF office Nation-wide, ICE is able to quickly assist with all National security 

investigations to prevent KST entry. 

Question 4. Foreign fighters are currently in and leaving conflict theaters where 

the Department does not have a presence on the ground. 

Generally speaking, how does the Department work with other agencies that may 

have an in-theater presence (i.e. DOD and the IC) to incorporate information collected in theater into the screening and vetting process? 

Answer. DHS works extensively with our interagency partners to identify and disrupt terrorist travel. DHS personnel embedded at several Department of Defense locations in the United States and overseas review information collected from conflict 

zones—including in the Syria and Iraq theater—and work with interagency partners to incorporate appropriate information into databases and systems to bolster 

watchlisting and traveler screening. All pertinent information collected on known or 

suspected terrorists in an operating theater is required, via Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 6, to be sent to the National Counterterrorism Center for inclusion in the Terrorist Identity Datamart Environment (TIDE). The unclassified 

names and identifiers in TIDE are pushed (in near-real time) to the Terrorist 

Screening Center where they are loaded in the Terrorist Screening Database 

(TSDB). Once in TSDB, all of the information is made available or provided at the 

FOUO level to Federal partners, as well as State and Local Law Enforcement use 

in their screening and day-to-day operations. 

Question 5a. Partnerships with our European allies will be crucial in identifying 

potential foreign fighters returning to their home countries as part of a ‘‘terrorist 

diaspora.’’ These Western foreign fighters are certainly a threat as they may more 

easily circumvent security measures—largely due to visa-free travel to the United 

States and ease of travel throughout Europe. Without knowing who these individuals are, it will be impossible for the United States to adequately screen and vet 

them to ensure they are not permitted to travel to the homeland. 

How does the Department work with our European allies to identify returning foreign fighters? 

Question 5b. Is there additional information that could be shared that would bolster your screening and vetting efforts? 

Question 5c. If so, why are they not sharing it (lack of capabilities, unwillingness, 

etc.)? 

Question 5d. How does the Department leverage international organizations, such 

as INTERPOL, to enhance your screening and vetting capabilities? 

Answer. The Department maintains close cooperation with European allies to 

combat terrorism, including the threat posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters 

(FTF). Our countries share information on FTFs through formal arrangements (such 

as Homeland Security Presidential Directive–6 (HSPD–6)) and through informal intelligence and law enforcement channels, as well as through international organizaVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:26 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0503\17TF0503.TXT HEATH
56 

tions, such as INTERPOL. This sharing enhances U.S. holdings, which enables the 

United States to identify foreign terrorist fighters more effectively and take appropriate action to safeguard the United States. 

The U.S. Government conducts extensive vetting of foreign travelers. All individuals seeking to travel directly to the United States from Europe are known to the 

Department prior to their departure because of either the submission of an Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for travel under the Visa Waiver 

Program (VWP) or a visa application, as well as the receipt of pre-departure passenger data required from all airlines and ships bound for the United States. The 

Department extensively vets this data to determine whether the prospective traveler 

should receive additional physical screening, be denied boarding or, ultimately, denied admission to the United States. 

Most European allies participate in the VWP. Since 1986, the VWP has evolved 

from a travel facilitation program into a comprehensive security partnership between the United States and the individual VWP countries. VWP countries must 

meet stringent security requirements to ensure their designation does not pose a 

risk to U.S. National security, law enforcement, or immigration enforcement interests. These requirements include implementing a series of arrangements to share 

terrorism information, cooperate on criminal threats, and improve identity management relating to and reporting lost and stolen passport information. In 2015 and 

2016, the Department implemented additional security enhancements to the VWP, 

requiring participants to collect and analyze passenger data (Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Records), screening travelers at borders against National and international databases, cooperation with the United States on refugee/ 

migrant vetting, allowing U.S. Federal Air Marshals on U.S.-bound flights, and implementing additional identity document security provisions. DHS conducts evaluations of each VWP country at least once every 2 years and engages in on-going monitoring between formal evaluations to assess participants’ counterterrorism, law enforcement, immigration enforcement, border management, and identity document 

security capabilities. European partner countries and the European Union have 

taken significant steps to improve counterterrorism and border security capabilities 

in Europe over the past year, to include: Enhancing border controls to require systematic database checks of all persons crossing Europe’s external Schengen borders 

(effective April 2017); passing the E.U. Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive in 

April 2016 (to be implemented by May 2018); creating a new European Border and 

Coast Guard Agency (effective October 2016); and improving vetting programs 

through greater database interoperability. European partners have also established 

the European Counterterrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol in January 2016, which 

functions as a central hub for E.U. member states to share terrorism-related information. 

The Department continuously looks for new ways to build on existing partnerships with European allies to respond to current and emerging threats. For example, the Department has offered its expertise and technical assistance to assist European partners in developing air passenger data collection and analysis capabilities, and has conducted numerous workshops sharing best practices and collaborating on travel trends and passenger targeting. The Department is also working 

with a number of European partners to leverage both existing and new informationsharing agreements to cooperate directly on vetting priority travelers against our respective immigration, law enforcement, and National security data at a system-tosystem level. In addition, the Department is working with nine European countries 

to establish Preclearance facilities at last-point-of-departure airports. Countries participating in a Preclearance arrangement adopt a close and continuous partnership 

with the Department that allows the United States to leverage its full authorities 

and capabilities prior to departure. Pursuing these initiatives requires the Department and the prospective partner to address a number of challenging legal, policy, 

operational, and resource issues. 

Multilateral partnerships, such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL, facilitate U.S.-European cooperation. INTERPOL provides an efficient and accessible way for U.S. 

and European partners to share information on lost and stolen passports, as well 

as foreign terrorist fighters and criminals, thereby enhancing countries’ own screening. Moreover, it is a requirement for VWP countries to report to INTERPOL lost 

and stolen passport information and foreign terrorist fighter data. The United 

States leverages these data sets in its screening and vetting programs. Following 

the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, DHS worked closely 

with EUROPOL to share terrorist-related information and provide investigatory 

support. The Department has assigned officers to EUROPOL, and to its ECTC, to 

facilitate the exchange of information with European counterparts and to enhance 

cooperation on investigations of terrorist and criminal networks. 

57 

Question 6a. How does U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) Fraud 

Detection and National Security Directorate screen immigration benefit applications 

for National security concerns? 

Answer. USCIS conducts background and security checks against law enforcement, intelligence, and other databases and other sources of information. When information indicates a potential National security or fraud or public safety concern, 

adjudicators refer the case to the Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate for further vetting. 

FDNS Immigration Officers evaluate National security, public safety, and fraud 

referrals and determine what additional vetting may be necessary to obtain a complete understanding of the concern. FDNS officers possess a range of tools for researching concerns, including access to additional databases and the ability to conduct a site visit, and work with counterparts in adjudications to determine the impact of a concern on eligibility for the immigration benefit request. As part of the 

vetting process, FDNS officers also seek and share information with law enforcement agencies and other U.S. Government partners as appropriate. 

Question 6b. How can USCIS improve its document fraud detection and overseas 

verification procedures? 

Answer. USCIS continually strives to update and improve its fraudulent document training for immigration officers and adjudicators. They receive fraudulent 

document training during basic training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Center. In subsequent courses, immigration officers and adjudicators receive fraudulent document training from USCIS staff assigned to ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations Forensic Laboratory. Additional training is offered via in-person instruction, on-line instruction, and self-study materials. USCIS also continues to expand collaboration with the Department of State to meet overseas verification 

needs. 

Question 7a. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the Secretary of Homeland 

Security authority to assign DHS employees to diplomatic and consular posts to provide expert advice and training to consular officers regarding specific security 

threats relating to the adjudication of individual visa applications or classes of applications. Today, ICE agents conduct this mission under the Visa Security Program 

(VSP), which has been successful at providing increased information and recommendations to Consular officers regarding visa applicants and potential travelers 

to the United States. 

With the growing threat of foreign fighters traveling to the United States, how 

does having ICE agents stationed abroad in Visa Security Units (VSUs) add to the 

security of the homeland? 

Answer. In addition to these written responses, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) would welcome the opportunity to provide a briefing regarding 

further information on the programs outlined below in a closed forum with additional law enforcement and/or intelligence sensitive details. 

ICE, through the Visa Security Program (VSP), deploys special agents to visaissuing posts world-wide to utilize available investigative resources and apply ICE’s 

broad law enforcement authorities to the visa process. Deployed special agents responsibilities include, but are not limited to: 

• investigating suspect visa applicants; 

• conducting comprehensive visa applicant interviews; 

• conducting further interviews as part of broader criminal investigations; 

• collaborating with Department of State consular officers; and 

• directly coordinating with other law enforcement, intelligence, and host government entities. 

These capabilities make VSP unique among screening efforts in that it does not 

simply recommend the denial of travel; instead, ICE special agents investigate and 

exploit suspect travelers in an effort to identify unknown threats and potential violations of criminal law. Further, deployed special agents gather and receive threat 

information from host governments on potential terror threat networks and foreign 

fighter information. These efforts enable ICE Visa Security Units (VSUs) to build 

an understanding of transnational terrorist and criminal networks, and broadly 

share and document that information with other U.S. Government entities and indices to proactively combat terrorist and criminal travel networks. 

Question 7b. How do ICE attache ́s at Embassies and Consulates where there is 

not a VSU assist with the screening and vetting visa applicants? 

Answer. ICE believes in a whole-of-Government effort to promote increased visa 

security. ICE attache ́s engage and support the various consular offices within their 

operational responsibility to support the interagency screening enterprise. 

They share threat information, and, in coordination with Diplomatic Security, provide investigative support related to identified violations within ICE’s authorities. 

58 

Further, all ICE special agents are trained in immigration law, to include visa ineligibilities, and support case-by-case requests made by consular officers to facilitate 

Department of Homeland Security vetting efforts on applicants identified by consular officers as warranting increased scrutiny. At specified VSP posts, ICE screens 

100 percent of all non-immigrant visa applications prior to visa adjudication and 

dedicates a special agent(s) to support visa security efforts. 

Question 7c. Given the limited resources available, how does ICE decide which 

overseas posts warrant the stationing of a VSU? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2016, ICE expanded VSP operations to an additional 5 visaissuing posts in 5 countries. As a result, the ICE VSP now screens 30 visa-issuing 

posts in 25 countries. In fiscal year 2017, ICE will expand operations to two additional posts. ICE is committed to the aggressive expansion of VSP operations, maximizing available resources domestically and internationally to enhance the screening, vetting, and investigative efforts. 

To guide expansion efforts, ICE utilizes a site selection process to determine highrisk and strategically important posts for expansion. The site selection process encompasses a three-part process: (1) A risk-based post evaluation; (2) an assessment 

of each post’s expansion capabilities; and (3) an analysis of intelligence current 

threat reporting. The first part of the process uses a myriad of Government and 

publically-available data sources to evaluate the risk to mission posed by each visaissuing post. The second and third parts of the process consider a number of factors 

to further determine the accessibility of a post, as well as the operational value of 

deployment. Some of these factors include regional need, post support, and operational capabilities in country to ensure deployment to posts that would be most effective and valuable to the VSP mission. ICE will continue to evaluate the criteria 

used to update and improve site selection process. ICE would welcome the opportunity to further brief the site selection process in a closed forum with additional 

law enforcement or intelligence sensitive details. 

Question 7d. Are there any specific regions where VSU presence is not significant 

enough given the threat? 

Answer. ICE is committed to the aggressive expansion of VSP operations, as resources allow, addressing identified threats. As part of the site selection process, 

ICE assesses regional need when considering deployment to ensure geographic 

placement of VSP operations benefits the global Department of Homeland Security 

mission and whole-of-Government effort to prevent terrorist travel. Going forward, 

ICE will continue to conduct an annual site selection process to identify geographic 

areas requiring placement of VSP operations in accordance with available resources. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MIKE GALLAGHER FOR EDWARD RAMOTOWSKI

Question 1. Foreign fighters are currently in and leaving conflict theaters where 

the Department does not have a presence on the ground. 

Generally speaking, how does the Department work with other agencies that may 

have an in-theater presence (i.e. DOD and the IC) to incorporate information collected in theater into the screening and vetting process? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2a. A major lesson from 9/11 was the importance of interagency intelligence sharing. While we had derogatory information on some of the attackers, it 

did not make it into the hands of those who could have prevented their entry into 

the United States. 

How has the Department improved their ability to move derogatory information 

around the USG in a way that effectively identifies and interdicts known or suspected terrorists? 

Question 2b. How confident is the Department that the changes are tough enough 

to prevent any known or suspected terrorist from gaining entry? What gaps still 

exist, if any? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3a. Mr. Ramotowski, you testified that since 2001 there have been nearly 11,000 visas potentially revoked after information emerged, post-issuance, suggesting possible links to terrorism. 

How many of these 11,000 individuals were subsequently removed from the 

United States after their visas were revoked? 

Question 3b. How quickly did the removal occur? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4a. Partnerships with our European allies will be absolutely crucial in 

identifying potential foreign fighters returning to their home countries as part of a 

‘‘terrorist diaspora.’’ These Western foreign fighters are certainly a threat as they 

may more easily circumvent security measures—largely due to visa-free travel to 

59 

the United States and ease of travel throughout Europe. Without knowing who 

these individuals are, it will be impossible for the United States to adequately 

screen and vet them to ensure they are not permitted to travel to the homeland. 

How does the Department work with our European allies to identify returning foreign fighters? 

Question 4b. Is there additional information that could be shared that would bolster your screening and vetting efforts? 

Question 4c. If so, why are they not sharing it (lack of capabilities, unwillingness, 

etc.)? 

Question 4d. How does the Department leverage international organizations, such 

as INTERPOL, to enhance your screening and vetting capabilities? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Æ