14-2592 

Lian v. Lynch 

BIA 

Hom, IJ 

A201 173 014 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

27th 4 day of April, two thousand sixteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 RICHARD C. WESLEY,

8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

9 DENNY CHIN,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 XIAO LING LIAN, AKA IVY WINGYIN 

14 WONG, 

15 Petitioner, 

16 

17 v. 14-2592 

18 NAC 

19 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

21 Respondent. 

22 _____________________________________ 

23 

24 FOR PETITIONER: Joshua Bardavid, New York, New 

25 York. 

26 

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

28 Assistant Attorney General; Linda S. 

29 Wernery, Assistant Director; Janice 
2 

1 K. Redfern, Senior Litigation 

2 Counsel, Office of Immigration 

3 Litigation, United States 

4 Department of Justice, Washington, 

5 D.C. 

6 

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

10 DENIED. 

11 Petitioner Xiao Ling Lian, a native and citizen of the 

12 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 26, 2014, 

13 decision of the BIA affirming a May 8, 2013, decision of an 

14 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Lian’s application for asylum, 

15 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

16 Torture (“CAT”). In re Xiao Ling Lian, No. A201 173 014 (B.I.A. 

17 June 26, 2014), aff’g No. A201 173 014 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 

18 May 8, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

19 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

20 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

21 the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” 

22 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 

23 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

24 established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Su Chun Hu v. 

25 Holder, 579 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2009). 
3 

1 Past Persecution: Adverse Credibility Determination 

2 The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

3 circumstances,” base a credibility finding on, inter alia, an 

4 asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, 

5 and inconsistencies in his statements and other record evidence 

6 “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the 

7 applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia 

8 Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). 

9 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that 

10 Lian was not credible. 

11 The IJ reasonably relied on an inconsistency between Lian’s 

12 hearing testimony and her airport interview in finding her not 

13 credible. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 179-80 

14 (2d Cir. 2004). As an initial matter, the BIA did not 

15 impermissibly assess the reliability of Lian’s airport 

16 interview in the first instance, but simply agreed with the IJ’s 

17 findings and explained its reasons. See 8 C.F.R. 

18 § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (“The Board will not engage in de novo review 

19 of findings of fact determined by an immigration judge. Facts 

20 determined by the immigration judge, . . . shall be reviewed 

21 only to determine whether [they] . . . are clearly erroneous.”). 

22 Moreover, the agency did not err in finding reliable the record 
4 

1 of Lian’s interview, which was transcribed verbatim in question 

2 and answer format, signed by Lian on each page, and conducted 

3 with an interpreter. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 

4 721-22 (2d Cir. 2009). 

5 At her interview, Lian stated that she had never been 

6 arrested in China. However, in her asylum application and at 

7 her hearing, she inconsistently stated that she had been 

8 arrested and beaten in China on account of her religious 

9 practice. The agency was not compelled to accept Lian’s 

10 explanation that she was nervous. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 

11 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Yun–Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 

12 432 F.3d 391, 397 n.6 (2d Cir. 2005). 

13 Having questioned Lian’s credibility, the agency 

14 reasonably relied further on her failure to rehabilitate her 

15 testimony or independently satisfy her burden of proof with 

16 reliable evidence corroborating her claim of past persecution. 

17 See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). 

18 Given the inconsistency and lack of corroboration findings, 

19 substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that 

20 Lian was not credible as to her claim of past persecution. See 

21 Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66. 

22 
5 

1 Well-Founded Fear of Persecution: Burden 

2 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish 

3 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of 

4 future persecution, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2), which must be 

5 both subjectively credible and objectively reasonable, 

6 Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 178. To establish a well-founded 

7 fear, an applicant must show either that he would be singled 

8 out for persecution or that the country of removal has a pattern 

9 or practice of persecuting those similarly situated to him. 

10 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). The agency was not compelled 

11 to find that Lian established a well-founded fear of persecution 

12 in China on account of her practice of Christianity. 

13 As the IJ found, the country conditions evidence in the 

14 record provides that between fifty and seventy million 

15 Christians practice in unregistered churches in China, and that 

16 in some areas their activities, including proselytism, are 

17 tolerated without interference. Further, the proffered 

18 evidence did not suggest greater persecution in Lian’s 

19 hometown. Therefore, the agency did not err in determining 

20 that Lian failed to demonstrate either that officials are likely 

21 to discover her religious practice, see Hongsheng Leng v. 

22 Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2008), or that there 
6 

1 exists “systemic or pervasive” persecution of similarly 

2 situated Christians sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or 

3 practice of persecution in China, In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 

4 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005); see also Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 

5 110, 112 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2009). 

6 Accordingly, because the agency reasonably found that Lian 

7 failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on 

8 account of her practice of Christianity, it did not err in 

9 denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because 

10 all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See 

11 Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

13 DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition 

14 is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

15 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 

16 FOR THE COURT: 

17 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk