Opinion filed Au gust 13, 20 09



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

____________ 

### No. 1 1- 08 -0 01 40 -CR

____ ____ __ JEFF ERYEU GEN E KEITH , A ppellant

V.
STA TE OF TEX AS , A ppellee

On App eal from the 385th Distric t Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR 31910

O P I N I O N The jury convicted Jeffe ry

Eug ene K eith of murder

and ar son, and it assessed his punishment

a t c on fi ne me nt f

or lif e fo r e a c h o ff

e ns e . We a ff

ir m. I

. Ba c k gr ou nd Fa c ts Keith was indicte d for murde ring his mother, Caroly n Keith, and then attempting to cove r up the murder

by setting f ire to her house. Ke ith does not c halleng e the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to support these convic tions and, theref ore, the fac ts of

the cr imes will not be summariz ed. Instead, Keith complains of two pr ocedur al ruling s.2

Ke ith ’s c ouns e l f

ile d a mot ion to h a ve him

e xami ne d b y

a n e xpe rt wi tne ss t o d e te rm ine his competenc y

to stand trial. The trial court appointed a medical doctor to evaluate Keith. Following a compe tency

hear ing, the trial court f

ound that Keith was incompetent to stand trial and c ommitt ed him to a me nta l he a lthfa c ili ty

. Ke ith sta y e d in the fa c ili ty

fo r a pp ro xima te ly

on e a nd on e -h a lf y e a rs
. Personnel in the fa cility informed the trial court that Keith was now competent to stand trial, and the t r i a l c o u rte n t e r e d

a n o r d e r r e s t o r i n g h i s c o mp e t e n c y. Prior to tr ial, Keith objected to be ing publicly shackle d during trial, and the tr i al co urt

c on du c te d a

n e vid e nti a ry

he a ri ng . T he tr ia l c ourt

ov e rr ule d K e ith ’s ob

je c tio n, and he was vis ibl y restra ined during trial with handcuf fs, a be lly chain, and leg shackle s. At trial, Keith objec ted to the State’s exercise of

pere mptory challeng es on four Africa n-Amer ican ve niremembe rs. The tria l court denied Ke ith’s motion, and the trial proce eded. T he jury found Ke ith guilty

of murder

and ar son, found that two enha

nceme nt para g raphs wer e true, and assessed his punishment at conf inement for life for eac h offe nse. I I

. Issues K e i t h c h a l l e n g e s h i s c o n v i c t i o n w i t h t w o i s s u e s , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t h e w a s d e p r i v e d o f afa ir trial bec ause o f t h e u s e of visible restra ints and that the State improperly struck two Af

ricanAm e ri c a n v e nir e me mbe rs
. I I I

. Vi sib le Re strain ts Ke ith a rgue s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by de nying his ob je c tio n to the us e of

vis ibl e re str a int s beca use the pre sumption of innocence was unduly compromised. The dec i s i o n to use phy sical

re str a int s mu st b e ma de by the tr ia l court on a c a se -b y -c a se ba sis , a nd the us e of

su c h r e str a int s w ill

ne c e ssi ta te re ve rs a l on ly

wh e re the de c isi on

c on sti tut e s an a

bu se of dis c re tio n an d re su lts in h a rm
. Co ok s v . S tat e , 8 4 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 9 7 , 7 2 2 ( T e x. C r i m
. A p p
. 1 9 9 2 )

. T h e t e s t f o r a b u s e o f d isc re tio n is whether the trial cour

t’s decision wa s outside the z one of rea sonable disag ree ment. Lan de rs v . S tat e , 25 6 S.W.3 d 295 , 303 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ); Ap oli na r v . S tat e , 1 55 S.W. 3d

18 4, 18 6 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2005). Phy sically

restra ining or

shackling a def

endant in fr ont of the jury i n fring es upon the constitutional presumption of innocence

. De c k v . M iss ou ri , 544 U. S. 622 , 630 -3 1 (20 05 ). To a vo id

c omp ro mis ingthi s r ig ht, a tr ia l c ourt

may on ly sh a c kle a

de fe nd a nt i n e xce pti on a l c ir c ums tanc e s,3

and it must clearly

and af firmatively

detail those circ umstances

. Lon g v . S tat e , 823 S.W .2d 259, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 9 91). Examples of exceptional circ umstances wa rra nting sha ckling include situations in which the acc used has a history of esca pe, expressed an intent to es ca p e, t h re atened ph y sic a l vi ole nc e , a ssa

ult e d p e rs on s in

the c ourt ro om, a nd re pe a te dly int e rr up te d co ur

t pr oc e e din g s. Ga mm ag e v . S

tat e , 6 30 S.W. 2d

30 9, 31 3- 14 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n An ton io 19 82 , p e t. r e f’ d) . T ri a l c ourt s must procee d with gr eat c aution whene ver the exceptional circ umstances a re ba sed on conduct

occur ring outside the courtr oom. Id. at 315. The trial court made sever al finding s in suppor t of its ruling

. The court found that Ke ith had previously

assaulted two de puty

sheriff s, h ad k i ck ed the windows out of a ja il van, had bee n convicted of

reta liation for thr eate ning two pe ace office rs, had be en convic ted of unlaw fully car rying

a we a po n o n li c e ns e d p re mis e s, ha d b e e n c on vic te d o f a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult , a nd ha d b e e n in vo lve d in fi g hts wi th ot her

inm a te s o ve r c a rd

g a me s w hil e inc a rc e ra

te d a wa iti ngtr ia l. T he tr ia l c ourt a lso found that the other inmate s were afr aid to turn their bac k to Keith, that jail personnel ha d pree mpted further violence w hile awa iting trial by maintaining K eith in a hig h risk to supe r max classification

a nd by br ibi nghim

to t a ke his me dic a tio n wi th e xtra fo od , that Ke ithwa s si x-f oo t- six to six- fo otseven a nd weig hed approximately 300 pounds, that it took m ultiple officer s to subdue Keith when he bec ame violent, and that pressure point s wer e inef fec tive on him. The trial cour t expressed

conce rn over

the possibilit y

of a violent outburst in light of K eith’s unstable menta l history and the upsetting photog raphic evidenc e of his murde red mother

. Keith does not cha lleng e the f actua l sufficienc y of any

of these f indings but asse rts that they

are insufficient to justify

the use of phy s i ca l restra ints. Keith arg ues that phy sical re straints are appropr iate only

as a la st resort and note s that much of the conduct upon which the tria l court re lied

occur red y ear s befor e trial. Keith observe s, for e x ample, that the a ssaults on the two deputy sheriff s
a nd kic kin g the wi nd owou t of a ja il v a n o c c ur

re d in the mid -9 0s , th at th e agg ra vate d a ssa

ult conviction occ urre d in 1999, and that the unlawf ully car rying a wea pon conviction occurre d in 2002. Keith also ar g ues that a highe r standard is applicable w hen the que stioned conduct oc curs outside the c ourt ro om a nd po int s o ut t

hat th e re was no evid e nc e of vio le nt b e havio r i n th e c ourt ro om. Finally , Keith sug g ests less drastic se curity measure s, such as a

stun belt, should have bee n considere d.4

The trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion. While some of Keith’s c onduct occ urre d y ear s be fo re tr ia l, i t w a s p a rt

of a patte rn of be havio r t

hat c on tin ue d thro ug h h is de te nti on a wa iti ngtr ia l. Th e tr ia l c ourt

a lso ha d co ns ide ra

ble e vid e nc e of Ke ith ’s me nta l or emo tio na l issu e s, kn e w t hat th is

c ou ld b e a n e mot ion a l tr ia l, a nd kn e w the e xtra or din a ry me a su re s the sh e ri ff

’s of fi c e wa s u sin g to keep K eith medicate d and to pr event him f rom injuring others. There was no e vidence that Midland County ha d a stun b e lt o r o the r f

or m of re str a int su ff ic ie nt t o c on tr ol K e ith . T he tr ia l c ourt did consider a l eg b ra ce , b u t t h e county did not have one that fit Keith. Finally , we note that the trial court took steps t o limit the pre judicial eff

ect of Keith’s phy sical re straints. Keith was not re quired to stand, and he w as g iven the choic e to be se ated be fore the jury panel e ntere d the room to preve nt calling attention to the restra ints. I ssue One is ove rruled. I V. Batson Chall enge Keith objecte d to the State’s use of f our per emptory

strikes on Afr ican- Americ an venire members pur suant to Batson v. Kentuck y , 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and T EX
. C ODE C R IM
. P R OC
. ANN . art. 35.261 (V ernon 2006) . The State provided rea sons for its strikes, including the fa ct that two listed their relig ious affiliation as Pentec o s t al . Keith objecte d, contending that “re ligious

a ff ili a tio n is [not ] a g oo d r a c e ne utr a l r e a so n. ” Th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d K e ith ’s Batson c ha lle ng e s. Ke ithc on te nd s on a

pp e a l that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d a s to the tw o Pe nte c os ta l ve nir e me mbe rs be c a us e the State fa iled to offer

a ra cially neutra l rea son. When review ing a Batson c h a l l e n g e , t h e r e c o r d i s e xam i n e d i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o ra ble to the t rial court’s ruling

. Se e Ke e ton v . S tat e , 749 S.W .2d 861, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The trial court’s ruling will only be reverse d when it is clea rly err oneous. Se e Es te v es v . S tat e , 849 S.W .2d 822, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). A ruli ng is clea rly err oneous when, afte r sea rchingthe re cord, w e
are left with the “de finite and firm conviction that a mistake has bee n committed.” Hi ll v . S tat e , 827 S.W .2d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). I n Purkett v. E lem , 5 14 U. S. 7 65 (1 99 5) , th e Sup re me Court de lin e a te d the thr e e -s te p p ro c e ss for pr operly

deter mining a Batson c ha lle ng e . F ir st, the op po nen t of a pe re mpt or y c ha lle ng e mus t make out a pr ima fac ie ca se of r acia l discrimination, essentially a burde n of p ro d u ct i o n . I n the second step, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to respond with a r ace ne utr a l e xplanat ion. T hir d, if a ra c e -n e utr a l e xplanatio n h a s b e e n p ro ff e re d, the tr ia l c ourt

mus tKeith cites decisions such as Hi ghle r v. Stat e , 834 N .E.2d 182, 196 (In d

. Ct . A pp. 2005) , aff’d

in pa rt , 854 N .E.2d 283 (I nd. 1 2006); Sta te v. Fuller , 862 A .2d 1130 (N. J. 2004); United S tates v. Brown , 352 F .3d 654, 668 (2d Ci r. 2003); Stat e v. Purce ll , 18 P.3d 113 (A

riz . C t. A pp. 200 1 , re v ie w

de nie d); United

Sta tes v . Sta

fford , 136 F .3d 1109 ( 7th C ir. 1998); and United Sta tes v

. Some rs te in , 959 F . Supp. 592 ( E.D . N .Y . 1997) , i n s upport of thi s cont ent ion. 5 decide whether

the opponent of the strike has proved purposef ul rac ial discrimination. The burde n of pe rs ua sio n is on

the op po ne nt o f t

he str ike to c on vin c e the tr ia l c ourt that th e str ike wa s r a c ia lly motivated. Id. at 767-68. Keith’s ch alleng e foc uses on the sec ond step of this analy sis. Keith does not contend that the State’s re asons were p re t ex tual, and the r ecor d indicates that the State struc k all Pentecostal venire members, including one non-A frica n-Amer ican. Nor

is Keith try

ingto expand Batson ’s scope in the traditional sense by arguing that relig ious affili at i o n should rece ive the same protec tion as

rac ial identity . His argument is not predic ated upon his ow n relig ious a ffiliation, and he makes no complaint of the strike e x erc ised on the non-Afr ican- Americ an Pentecostal ve niremembe r. I nstead, Keith’s position is that religious af filiation is not a racia lly

neutra l rea son an d , there fore , that the State did not satisfy its burden of production wit h reg ard to the t wo Afr ican- Americ an Pentec ostal

ve nir e me mbe rs
. Th e Te xas C ourt

of Cr imi nal App eal s has he ld t hat th e us e of

re lig iou s a ff

ili a tio n is a permissible basis to str i k e a v eniremember. Cas ar e z v . S tat e , 913 S.W .2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Ke ith acknowledg es this, but maintains that an eme rg ing c onsensus exist s for the pr oposition that e xer c isi ngpe re mpt or y c ha lle ng e s b a se d s ole ly

up on re lig iou s a ff

ili a tio n is un c on sti tut ion a l. 1 Ra the r, Ke ithsu g g e sts , th e State mus t r e ly up on a ve nir e me mbe r’ s r e lig iou s be lie fs , and he c ontends that Casarez

supports this conclusion beca use t he prosecutor in that case argued that he struck the Pentecostal ve niremembe rs due to his experience with them having t roubl e passing judgme nt on oth e rs
. W e d o n o t h a v e t h e p r e r o g a t i v e t o o v e rtu r n o r m o d i f y Casarez . Moreove r, we do not believe that this case squa

rely prese nts the issue Keith adva nces be cause the State did not rely entirely upon the ve nir e me mbe rs ’ r e lig iou s a ff ili a tio n. On e of

the tw o was fa

mil iar w itha

po te nti a l de fe ns e witness, and the State indicated that it was conc erne d about her tempera ment. This individual li sted herse lf as the pe rson she a dmired most and the “de vil, d ev il, devil” as the pe rson she a dmired the least. The second was Keith’s former coac h. There is no claim that these are n o t ra ci al l y n eutra l6

re a so ns . B e c a

us e the y wo uld jus tif y the us e of

a pe re mpt or

y strik e , e ve n if

the ve nir e me mbe rs ’ relig ious affiliation is not a rac ially neutra l rea son, no harm is shown. Keith alter

natively argues that the use of

relig ious prefe renc e viol at es t h e equal rig hts and relig ious fre edom provisi ons of t he Tex as C onstitut ion. T EX
. C O N ST
. art. I , §§ 3a, 4. This issue was not raised be low and, ther efor e, is not proper ly befor e us. But even if it we re, be cause the State had

rac i al l y n eutral reasons in addition to the venire members’ relig ious affiliation, no harm is shown. I ssue Two is over

ruled. V. Holding The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

RI CK STRANGE

JUSTI CE
Aug ust 13, 2009 Publis h. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , a n d

S t r a n g e , J.