NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION; THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY; NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY; NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION; MONTANA AUDUBON,

Plaintiffs

- Appellees,

v. DEB HAALAN D , in h er official capacity as Secretary of the Interior; DONATO JUDICE, in h is official capacity as Montana Bureau of Land Management State Director; BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Defendants, STATE OF WYOMING; WESTERN ENERGY ALLIANCE; STATE OF MONTANA,
Intervenor

- Defendants,

v. ANSCHUTZ EXPLORATION CORPORATION, Proposed Defendant

Intervenor, No. 20

- 35793
D.C. No. 4:18

- cv - 00069

- BMM

MEMORANDUM *

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

JAN 5 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 Movant

- Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 9, 2021 Seattle, Washington Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Movant

- Appellant Anschutz Exploration Corporation (“AEC”) appeals the District Court’s order denying its motion to intervene in this case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse. In the underlying litigation giving rise to this appeal, Plaintiffs challenge a policy adopted by the Bureau of Land Management in 2017 to accelerate the
issuance of federal oil and gas leases. We assume familiarity with the background of this policy, which we discussed in a recent opinion. See W. Watersheds Project
v. Haaland , No. 20

- 35780, __ F.4th __ (9th Cir. __, 2022). As in Western Watersheds , the Plaintiffs here challenge certain lease sales that took place under
this policy , including a June 2018 sale in Wyoming at which AEC acquired oil and gas leases spanning roughly 24,000 acres. In May 2020, the District Court partially granted Plaintiffs’ motion for su mmary judgment and vacated these lease
sales. Less than two months after the District Court’s order, AEC moved to intervene solely to appeal the vacatur of the sales impacting its leases

.3

We review a denial of intervention de novo, and we review the timeliness
element for abuse of discretion. Smith v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. , 830 F.3d 843, 853 (9th Cir. 2016). Under Rule 24(a), a nonparty is entitled to intervention as of right when it “(i) timely moves to intervene; (ii) has a significantly protectable interest related to the subject of the action; (iii) may have that interest impaired by the disposition of the action; and (iv) will not be adequately represented by existing parties.”
O akland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland , 960 F.3d 603, 620 (9th Cir. 2020). Although AEC has satisfied the second and third elements, the District Court concluded that AEC’s motion was untimely and that its interests were adequately repre sented by Western Energy Alliance (“WEA”), a trade association that intervened to represent the interests of member companies in the oil and gas industry, including AEC. To determine whether a motion for intervention as of right is timely, we
consider the totality of circumstances facing the would

- be intervenor, with a focus on three primary factors: “(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of the delay. ” Smith , 830 F.3d at 854. Here, AEC moved to intervene
within the 60

- day window to appeal the District Court’s summary judgment
decision , which weighs in favor of a conclusion that its motion was timely , see W.4

Watersheds , slip op. at 15. The only preju dice identified by the District Court was

t he prospect that Plaintiffs would be forced to confront “additional . . . briefing” and “possible additional arguments” on appeal

. As we have explained in a nearly identical context, however , that is “a poor reas on to deny intervention , particularly given the possibility that [AEC’s] additional arguments could prove persuasive.”
W. Watersheds , slip op. at 21. Although AEC argued that it did not intervene earlier merely because “it had no reasonable basis to beli eve that the court would vacate its leases,” cf. W. Watersheds , slip op. at 23

– 24, weighing all three timeliness factors, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in concluding that AEC’s motion was untimely.
To evaluate the adequacy

- of

- r epresentation element, we consider three factors: “(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect.” Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n , 647 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2011). Although the arguments AEC seeks to raise wo uld become moot if intervention were granted, cf. W. Watersheds slip op. at 26, the requirements in Rule 24(a) are to be “broadly interpreted in favor of intervention,” and “our review is guided primarily by practical considerations, not technical5

distinctions,” Citizens for Balanced Use , 647 F.3d at 897 (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs have challenged lease sales encompassing hundreds of thousands of acres across Montana and Wyoming. L ike the would

- be intervenor in Western Watersheds , see sli p op. at 9, AEC has invested considerable resources to acquire and develop the leasehold interest now jeopardized by this litigation , and thus “has a substantial due process interest in the outcome of this litigation by virtue of its contract” with the fed eral government, id. at 28. Thus, the practical considerations
in this case persuade us that AEC should be allowed to intervene for purposes of appealing the District Court’s summary judgment order

. Accordingly, w e reverse the District Court’s order den ying AEC’s motion to
intervene. W e need not reach the court’s other grounds for denying intervention. Costs to be taxed against Plaintiffs

- Appellees. REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings

.