J-S62006-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

WILLIAM R. PERKINS, 

 Appellant No. 806 EDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered February 7, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-46-CR-0007355-2010 

& CP-46-CR-0003367-2011 

BEFORE: ALLEN, OLSON, and OTT, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2014 

William R. Perkins (“Appellant”) appeals from the order denying his 

petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

sections 9541-46. We affirm. 

 The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history 

as follows: 

 On November 1, 2012, Appellant entered an open guilty 

plea before this Court to two (2) counts of Criminal 

Conspiracy to Commit Burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1), 

both felonies of the first degree, and one (1) count of 

Accidents involving Damage to Attended Vehicle, 75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3743(a), a misdemeanor of the third degree. 

The Commonwealth, in return, agreed to nolle pros over 

two hundred additional charges. As part of the guilty plea, 

Appellant admitted that he entered into an agreement with 

another man, John Wilson, to engage in burglaries that 

involved entering the homes of elderly residents without 

permission in order to take property that did not belong to 

[them]. Appellant admitted that he was the driver for 
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thirty-five burglaries committed with Wilson in 

Montgomery County. 

 A sentencing hearing was held before this Court on 

March 5, 2013. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate 

sentence of not less than ten (10) years and not more 

than twenty (20) years. During pre-trial, guilty plea, and 

sentencing proceedings, Appellant was represented by 

[trial counsel]. 

 Appellant filed a direct appeal, which was discontinued 

on May 3, 2013. [New counsel] represented Appellant 

during post-trial appellate proceedings. 

 On August 6, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se [PCRA 

petition], and this Court appointed [PCRA counsel] to

represent him. PCRA counsel filed an amended petition 

asserting Appellant’s guilty plea: (1) was neither knowing 

nor intelligent as a result of his alleged physical and 

mental impairments and the side effects of medications;

and (2) resulted from the alleged ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. 

 On February 7, 2014, this Court held an evidentiary

hearing on Appellant’s PCRA Petition in which Appellant 

and former trial counsel testified. After hearing, and upon 

review of the record, this Court determined that Appellant 

failed to plead and prove that he was entitled to relief. 

The Court issued an Order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA 

Petition that same day. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/3/14, at 1-2. This timely appeal followed. Both 

Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 Appellant raises the following issues: 

A. Did the [PCRA court] err in dismissing [Appellant’s PCRA 

petition], where [Appellant] did not render a knowing, 

intelligent and voluntary plea due to the effect of his 

prescribed medications? 

B. Did the [PCRA court] err in dismissing [Appellant’s PCRA 

petition], where [Appellant’s] trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by advising [him] that he would 
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receive a forty (40) to eighty (80) month sentence of 

imprisonment in exchange for entering open guilty pleas 

and [Appellant] was thereafter sentenced to ten (10) to 

twenty (20) years of imprisonment? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

In reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA relief, 

an appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether the record supports the 

determination of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009). We pay great 

deference to the findings of the PCRA court, “but its legal determinations are 

subject to our plenary review.” Id. Stated differently, “[t]he PCRA court’s 

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in 

the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 

(Pa. Super. 2013). 

In order to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must 

plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or 

sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors or defects in 

42 Pa.C.S.A. section 9543(a)(2), and that the issues he raises have not been 

previously litigated. Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. 

2012). An issue has been "previously litigated" if “the highest appellate 

court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has 

ruled on the merits of the issue, or if the issue has been raised and decided 

in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence.” Koehler, 

36 A.3d at 131-132; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2). If a claim has not been 
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previously litigated, the petitioner must prove that the issue was not waived. 

An issue will be deemed waived under the PCRA “if the petitioner could have 

raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on 

appeal, or in a prior state post[-]conviction proceeding.” Id. at 132; 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). 

Finally, one of the errors enumerated in section 9543(a)(2) of the 

PCRA is a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. To obtain relief under the 

PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel's ineffectiveness 

so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of 

guilt or innocence could have taken place. Id. “Generally, counsel’s 

performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will 

only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” Id. 

This requires the petitioner to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is 

of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or 

her action or inaction; and (3) petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's act or 

omission. Id. at 533. A finding of "prejudice" requires the petitioner to 

show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different." Id. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a 

meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Loner, 836 A.2d 125, 132 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (en banc), appeal denied, 852 A.2d 311 (Pa. 2004). 
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In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred in 

determining that, despite the effect of his medications, he entered a 

voluntary plea. Because Appellant could have raised this claim in his direct 

appeal, it is waived under the PCRA. Koehler, supra; see also 

Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 

As stated by the PCRA court: 

Appellant’s claim that he was under the influence of 

medications at the open guilty plea hearing is waived 

because he could have litigated the issue on direct appeal 

but did not do so. Notably, Appellant does not frame the 

issue as one of trial counsel ineffectiveness, but simply 

raises it as a direct challenge to the knowing, voluntary, 

and intelligent nature of his plea. As such the issue is not 

cognizable under the PCRA. 

 PCRA Court Opinion, 6/3/14, at 4-5 (citation omitted). 

 Even if Appellant has properly framed his claim, the PCRA court 

concluded that the record refutes his challenge to the validity of his guilty 

plea. We agree. 

 When asserting a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel in the context of a 

guilty plea, a defendant must show that plea counsel’s ineffectiveness 

induced him to enter the plea. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 875 A.2d 328, 

331 (Pa. Super. 2005). As this Court stated: 

Because a plea of guilty effectively waives all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, after sentencing, 

allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel in this context 

provide a basis for withdrawal of the plea only where there 

is a causal nexus between counsel’s ineffectiveness, if any, 

and an unknowing or involuntary plea. The guilty plea 
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hearing becomes the significant procedure under scrutiny. 

The focus of the inquiry is whether the accused was misled 

or misinformed and acted under that misguided influence

when entering the guilty plea. 

Commonwealth v. Flood, 627 A.2d 1193, 1199 (Pa. Super. 1993) 

(citations omitted). 

Further, this Court summarized: 

Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea 

was aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of 

proving otherwise. 

 * * * 

 The long standing rule of Pennsylvania law is that a

defendant may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting 

that he lied while under oath, even if he avers that counsel 

induced the lies. A person who elects to plead guilty is 

bound by the statements he makes in open court while 

under oath and may not later assert grounds for 

withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he

made at his plea colloquy. 

 * * * 

[A] defendant who elects to plead guilty has a duty to

answer questions truthfully. We [cannot] permit a 

defendant to postpone the final disposition of his case by 

lying to the court and later alleging that his lies were 

induced by the prompting of counsel. 

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523-24 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted). 

 The PCRA court explained its reasons for concluding that Appellant’s 

guilty plea was valid as follows: 

 Here, Appellant does not allege a deficiency with regard 

[the information the trial court gave him before the entry 
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of his guilty plea]. Appellant also does not allege that he 

is innocent of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. 

Instead, he asserts that his plea was not knowing, 

voluntary, or intelligent because he was allegedly under 

the disabling influence of prescription medications. 

However, Appellant repeatedly stated under oath that the 

medications he was taking at the time he offered his plea 

did not affect his ability to understand what he was doing. 

Thus, Appellant’s claim that his guilty plea was “unlawfully 

induced” is belied by the record.

 At his open guilty plea hearing, Appellant repeatedly 

affirmed that he understood what he was doing and that 

any medication [he had taken] had not impaired his ability 

to understand what he was doing[.] 

 ***

 Appellant stated numerous times under oath that, while 

he purportedly was taking medications at the time he 

offered his open guilty plea, they did not affect his ability 

to understand what he was doing. He also stated that he 

was not taking [a drug for AIDS, which could affect his

judgment,] at the time he entered his guilty plea. He is 

bound by his sworn testimony, and it is improper for him 

to contradict his testimony now and assert that he was 

unaware of what he was doing when he pleaded guilty.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/3/14, at 6-7 (citations omitted). 

 Our review of the open guilty plea hearing supports the PCRA court’s 

conclusion that Appellant repeatedly assured the court that he understood 

the proceedings despite any prescription medication he had taken. Thus, as 

found by the PCRA court, Appellant is bound by his statements. Pollard,

supra. Appellant’s first issue fails.

 Appellant has properly phrased his remaining issue as one in which 

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in advising him that he would receive a forty to 

eighty month sentence induced him to enter an invalid plea. Citing the 
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United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 

(2012), Appellant first claims that he is entitled to relief because trial 

counsel allegedly advised him to reject the Commonwealth’s offer of a seven 

to fourteen year sentence, and enter an open plea, resulting in an actual 

sentence longer than the original offer. In the alternative, Appellant claims 

he entered his open guilty plea because trial counsel had informed him there 

was a “deal” made that Appellant would receive only a forty to eighty month 

sentence. 

The PCRA court found that Appellant’s reliance upon Lafler, supra, is 

misplaced. We agree. As explained by the PCRA court:

 [I]n Lafler, the defendant rejected a plea offer on the 

advice of counsel, proceeded to trial, [was convicted], and 

received a more severe sentence. Notably, Lafler went 

before the U.S. Supreme Court with a stipulation that 

counsel’s performance was deficient when he advised the 

defendant that he could not be convicted at trial. Here, no 

such stipulation was before the Court. In addition, 

Appellant did not [forgo] a plea and proceed to trial. He 

entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent open plea in 

the hopes that the Court would impose a lighter sentence 

than the purported plea deal. He repeatedly affirmed 

during the guilty plea hearing that he understood the 

possible sentences he faced, that the Court had discretion 

to sentence him within the sentencing guidelines, or above 

them, and that he was “throwing [him]self on the mercy of 

the Court.” [N.T. 11/1/12, at 19]. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/3/14, at 8-9.

Once again, our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s 

conclusion. It is undisputed that Appellant did not reject the seven to 

fourteen years initially offered by the Commonwealth due to the advice of 
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counsel, but rather because Appellant told counsel that he could not serve 

that long of a sentence. See N.T., 2/7/14, at 4. At the PCRA hearing, trial 

counsel testified that the strategy accepted by Appellant was to enter an 

open plea with the “hope and expectation” that Appellant receive “a 

sentence in the standard range” of the sentencing guidelines by “trying to 

mitigate the sentence with medical testimony” relating to Appellant’s 

“physical condition.” See id., at 33. As noted by the PCRA court, the fact 

that Appellant received a somewhat longer sentence than previously offered 

does not equate to the stipulated ineffectiveness that caused the defendant 

in Lafler to reject the proffered plea and proceed to trial. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing 

U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in Lafler that “the ineffective advice 

led not to an [offer’s] acceptance but to its rejection. Having to stand trial, 

not choosing to waive it, is the prejudice alleged.”) 

 Appellant also argues that his guilty plea is invalid because trial 

counsel promised him that a “deal” existed by which Appellant would only be 

sentenced to a forty to eighty month prison term. Once again, our review of 

the written guilty plea and oral guilty plea transcript refutes Appellant’s 

claim. 

At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel unequivocally denied Appellant’s 

assertion. N.T., 2/7/14, at 28. Moreover, Appellant agreed in the written 

guilty plea colloquy that no promises were made to him, an answer which 
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Appellant twice affirmed during the oral plea colloquy. See N.T., 11/1/12, at 

8, 17. At the PCRA hearing, Appellant explained that it was his 

understanding that, even though a “deal” had been made with the 

Commonwealth, he was not to relay this fact to the trial court. According to 

Appellant: 

 When you make a guilty plea, you know, whether it be 

in Philadelphia, and it was a negotiated plea, your 

response is, no, it is not negotiated and that is - - there 

was no deals when I was coming up in the system, there 

was no offer. There was none of this. 

 So I thought if by telling [the trial court] what [it] 

wanted to hear that I was going - - being in compliance 

with what the rules were that I understood. That I’m not 

supposed to tell you, yeah, I have an agreed deal for 40 to 

80 months[.] 

 ***

 I believed there was a plea agreement. I believed the 

[trial court] told [trial counsel] he was going to give me to 

[sic] 40 to 80 months. That is what I believed. 

N.T., 2/7/14, at 20-21.1

 When asked by the Commonwealth why at sentencing he did not 

inform the trial court about the “negotiated” sentence, Appellant testified:

And the reason I didn’t do that is because of the way I

was brought up in the system. We didn’t do them things. 

If you had a deal, it was under the table, because they 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Appellant was sixty-four years of age at the time of sentencing, and had 

spent thirty-three of those years in prison. See N.T., 3/5/13, at 18. 

 
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didn’t present them to the Courts years ago. That is how 

they did things. 

N.T., 2/7/14, at 23. In essence, Appellant asserts that he lied during the 

plea colloquy. As noted above, such an averment does not entitle him to 

post-conviction relief. Pollard, supra. 

In sum, Appellant’s claims are waived and otherwise without merit. 

We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant postconviction relief. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/6/2014