SAND 2004-0102 

Unlimited Release 

December 2003 

Confidence Building Measures at Sea: 

Opportunities for India and Pakistan 

Rear Admiral Hasan Ansari (r) 

Rear Admiral Ravi Vohra (r)

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/33 

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated

by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin 

Company, for the United States Department of 

Energy’ National Nuclear Security Administration

under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
The Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories assists political and

technical experts from around the world to acquire the technology-based tools they need to 

assess, design, analyze, and implement nonproliferation, arms control, and other cooperative 

security measures. As part of its mission, the CMC sponsors research on cooperative security and 

the role of technology. Reports of that work are provided through the Occasional Papers series.

Research is conducted by Sandia staff, international technical experts, and visiting scholars. (The

CMC’s Visiting Scholars Program is administered by the Institute for Public Policy at the 

University of New Mexico.) For additional information on the CMC’s programs, visit the CMC

home page on the World Wide Web at <http://www.cmc.sandia.gov> or write to: 

Cooperative Monitoring Center

Sandia National Laboratories 

Mail Stop 1373

Albuquerque, NM 87185-1373

For specific information on this report contact:

David Betsill at the above address. 

This report was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, NM 87185.

ii
 Confidence Building Measures at Sea: 

Opportunities for India and Pakistan 

Abstract

The sea presents unique possibilities for implementing confidence building measures

(CBMs) between India and Pakistan that are currently not available along the contentious

land borders surrounding Jammu and Kashmir. This is due to the nature of maritime

issues, the common military culture of naval forces, and a less contentious history of

maritime interaction between the two nations. Maritime issues of mutual concern provide

a strong foundation for more far-reaching future CBMs on land, while addressing

pressing security, economic, and humanitarian needs at sea in the near-term. Although 

Indian and Pakistani maritime forces currently have stronger opportunities to cooperate 

with one another than their counterparts on land, reliable mechanisms to alleviate tension

or promote operational coordination remain non-existent. Therefore, possible maritime

CBMs, as well as pragmatic mechanisms to initiate and sustain cooperation, require 

serious examination.

This report reflects the unique joint research undertaking of two retired Senior Naval 

Officers from both India and Pakistan, sponsored by the Cooperative Monitoring Center 

of the International Security Center at Sandia National Laboratories. Research focuses 

on technology as a valuable tool to facilitate confidence building between states having a 

low level of initial trust. Technical CBMs not only increase transparency, but also 

provide standardized, scientific means of interacting on politically difficult problems.

Admirals Vohra and Ansari introduce technology as a mechanism to facilitate consistent 

forms of cooperation and initiate discussion in the maritime realm. They present 

technical CBMs capable of being acted upon as well as high-level political 

recommendations regarding the following issues: 

x Delimitation of the maritime boundary between India and Pakistan and its 

relationship to the Sir Creek dispute 

x Restoration of full shipping links and the security of ports and cargos 

x Fishing within disputed areas and resolution of issues relating to arrest and 

repatriation of fishermen from both sides

x Naval and maritime agency interaction and possibilities for cooperation.

iii
Acknowledgements

Kent Biringer: For his constructive criticism and ability to get to the core of the issues, to 

separate the kernel from the chaff. 

Jenny Koelm: The tireless, patient, indefatigable co-worker who helped shape contents 

and research material.

David Betsill: For his discreet but sane advice. 

Bob Matthews: Who worked well beyond his mandate as “tech editor,” patiently editing 

changes by the hour, reworking the material, and offering solid advice. 

Stephanie Sustaita: The logistics provider and just-in-time savior. The improbable was 

done straightaway while the impossible took just a little longer. 

Nora Tankersley: The benign minister of finance, counselor, and morale booster who 

kept the Visiting Research Scholars on an even keel. 

All the other staff for their support, kindnesses, and courtesies.... 

iv
Abbreviations and Acronyms

APRI Asia-Pacific Research Institute

CBM Confidence-Building Measure

CMC Cooperative Monitoring Center

COLREG Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions

 At Sea

CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measure

CSI Container Security Initiative

DOE Department of Energy 

DOD Department of Defense 

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

GPS Global Positioning System 

ICG Indian Coast Guard 

ICRC International Convention of Red Cross

IDSA Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis 

ILO 147 International Labor Organization Convention No 147, Merchant 

Shipping (Minimum Standards)

IMO International Maritime Organization 

IOMAC Indian Ocean Maritime Affairs Council 

INCSEA Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas

KPT Karachi Port Trust 

LoC Line of Control 

m Meter(s)

MARPOL International Convention for Prevention of Maritime Pollution 

from Ships

MARSAF Maritime Safety Colloquium

MEI Military Expenditure Intensity

MOD Ministry of Defense 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPI Military Personnel Intensity 

MSA Maritime Security Agency (Pakistan)

N/A Not available

NECC National Environmental Coordination Committee

nm nautical mile

OSC Operation Safe Commerce

PEPC Pakistan Environmental Protection Council

PNSC Pakistan National Shipping Corporation 

PQA Port Qasim Authority

RAMSAR International Convention on Protection of Wetlands

ROE Rules of Engagement

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 

SACEP South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme

SAR Search and Rescue

SASAP South Asian Seas Action Plan 

v
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication 

SOLAS International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea 

STCW International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, 

and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 

TALOS Technical Articles of the Law of the Sea 

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

US United States

WTO World Trade Organization 

vi
Contents

Executive Summary.......................................................................................................... 1

Introduction....................................................................................................................... 4

Confidence Building Measures....................................................................................... 7

Key Issues........................................................................................................................ 8

Territorial Issues............................................................................................................. 10

Maritime Boundary....................................................................................................... 10

Sir Creek ....................................................................................................................... 17

Maritime Trade............................................................................................................... 22

Shipping and Trade....................................................................................................... 22

Security of Ports and Cargo ......................................................................................... 25

Fishing and the Fishermen’s Plight............................................................................... 28

Naval Interactions and Coastal Force Interactions ..................................................... 34

INCSEA and Law of Naval Warfare ............................................................................. 34

Indian Coast Guard–Pakistani Maritime Security Agency Cooperation ..................... 37

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 40

Proposed Actions............................................................................................................. 41

Near-Term Projects ...................................................................................................... 41

Complete Proposals List............................................................................................... 41

Appendixes....................................................................................................................... 45

Appendix 1 Agreement Between India and Pakistan on the Advance Notice of

Military Exercises ........................................................................................................... 46

Appendix 2 Lahore Declaration and Lahore Memorandum of Understanding....... 49

Appendix 3 Technical Aspects of the Law of the Sea (TALOS)................................. 53

Appendix 4 Protocol On Resumption Of Shipping Services Between India and 

Pakistan............................................................................................................................ 55

About the Authors: ......................................................................................................... 58

vii
Figures

Figure 1. Sea Lines of Communications........................................................................... 10

Figure 2. India's and Pakistan's Perceptions of Maritime Boundary Lines

from Sir Creek........................................................................................................... 13

Figure 3.Example of Possible India-Pakistan Maritime Boundary as Determined by the 

Seaward Approach Method....................................................................................... 15

Figure 4. Sir Creek and Vicinity (Map B-44)................................................................... 17

Figure 5. Sir Creek, Showing Points 1 and K................................................................... 20

Figure 6. South Asia Search and Rescue Responsibilities................................................ 38

Tables

Table 1. Indian Maritime Boundary Agreements ............................................................. 11

Table 2. Pakistani Maritime Boundary Agreements......................................................... 12

Table 3. India and Pakistan Fish Production .................................................................... 28

Table 4. State of Gujarat-Fishing Data ............................................................................. 29

Table 5. Number of Boats and Fishermen Released by India and Pakistan ..................... 30

viii
Executive Summary

Despite suspicion and mistrust, India and Pakistan have engaged in confidence building 

measures (CBMs) in the past. However, an assessment of previous initiatives reveals a 

disturbing feature: the near absence of naval or maritime CBMs. Although maritime

issues have been frequently a part of nation-to-nation dialogue, discussions to resolve 

outstanding disputes have not yet succeeded. 

Even with this checkered history, the maritime sphere holds the greatest opportunity and 

potential for realistic cooperation between India and Pakistan. Many maritime issues of

concern do not respect boundaries. For example, oil pollution, environmental disasters, 

human safety at sea, maritime crime, and terrorism often require a coordinated approach

in order to be successful. Second, maritime forces and coastal agencies maintain similar

functions at sea and often speak one another’s operational language in a way that cannot 

be mirrored on land. Third, Indian and Pakistani naval forces do not harbor animosity to 

the degree that land forces do. Finally, technology is already in use in the maritime world 

and can be easily converted to a cooperative application. 

India and Pakistan are currently facing a historical crossroads of opportunity. The time is 

right to pursue CBMs that may prove pragmatic and can lead to further stability and 

security. The medium to achieve a breakthrough is the sea, where it is feasible to 

negotiate CBMs that deal with less contentious issues and involve agencies that have a 

higher probability of near-term success. This paper, therefore, focuses on feasible 

projects and advocates a maritime building-block approach to address larger and more

complex issues as confidence increases. 

Political, process-oriented recommendations and technical project proposals have been 

developed to address four main topic areas, based upon the cooperative research of senior 

naval scholars from both India and Pakistan, as well as their in-depth interactions with 

high-level Navy and Coastal Authorities in the region. Recommendations are made

based upon topical areas that may hold mutual benefits for both sides. Technical projects 

are proposed to increase transparency, communication, and the standardization of 

approaches between both sides. The main topical areas for maritime cooperation are 

therefore supported by various technical project proposals, ranging from short-term to 

long-term in approach and feasibility.1

The recommendations and technical project proposals with most potential for being acted 

upon in the near-term are as follows: 

1 At the time this paper is going to press, December 2003, there are a number of articles appearing in the

South Asia regional and international press reporting favorable gestures and proposals for cooperation in

the maritime arena between India and Pakistan. These intimations include avoiding arrest of fishermen in

specified areas, initiating a passenger ferry service between the countries, and cultivating communication

and interaction between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistani Maritime Security Agency.

1
Disputed India-Pakistan maritime boundary 

1. The authors recommend that both sides include the maritime boundary in 

government-to-government talks, separate the Sir Creek dispute from the larger 

maritime boundary discussion, and actively involve technical and legal experts 

from both sides to address delineation methods.

2. Technical projects to support these initiatives include:

a. Developing boundary mapping technologies, including Geographic 

Information Systems (GIS) and remote sensing imagery for the maritime

boundary and Sir Creek in order to facilitate critical discussion between 

technical and policy stakeholders in both India and Pakistan. 

b. Encouraging a meeting between environmental groups from both sides to 

investigate or exchange existing information regarding the fragile ecosystem 

surrounding the mouth of the Sir Creek area, which could build a foundation 

for joint environmental monitoring and management once the boundary is 

settled.

Shipping and trade links/port and cargo security 

1. The authors recommend that both sides convene the India-Pakistan Joint 

Commission to revise outdated Shipping Protocols, which are inhibiting maritime

trade and economic growth. 

2. Technical projects to support the opening of maritime trade links include:

building upon current US-led port security initiatives in order to increase customs

and security information exchange between future Indian and Pakistani ports of 

open trade. 

Fishermen arrest avoidance and repatriation

1. The authors recommend that governments adopt an “arrest avoidance policy” for 

fishing crews that inadvertently stray across the disputed maritime boundary. 

2. Technical project proposals to further alleviate this problem include:

a. Development of a fishermen’s arrest and repatriation database to be jointly 

monitored and used between authorities and coastal agencies on both sides.

b. Creation of a “zone of disengagement” which would allow registered fishing 

in the current area under dispute, through a system of zone demarcation and 

technical monitoring by authorities of each side.

Naval and maritime agency interaction

1. The authors recommend that India and Pakistan:

a. Update respective Naval Rules of Engagement in accordance with the San

Remo manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea 

(1984) and support Navy-to-Navy agreements such as the “Prevention of 

Incidents at Sea Agreement” (INCSEA) in order to reduce the potential for

accidents during operations.

b. Activate more formal contacts between India’s Coast Guard and Pakistan’s 

Maritime Security Agency to facilitate operational coordination of 

humanitarian, environmental, and security responsibilities.

2
2. Technical project proposals include conducting a joint table-top search and rescue 

(SAR) simulation exercise between officials of India’s Coast Guard and 

Pakistan’s Maritime Security Agency, to lead to a potential coordinated sea 

exercise.

3
Introduction

The partition of India in August 1947 was a traumatic event. Post-world-war Britain, 

lacking the will and resources to continue its South Asian involvement, decided to pull

out of its former possession a year earlier than scheduled, leaving the sub-continent at the 

mercy of forces of lawlessness and anarchy and with a number of unfinished issues.

The legacy of unfinished business includes the dispute regarding accession of Kashmir

and unsettled border issues with all of India’s and Pakistan’s neighbors. These issues 

contribute to major inter-state conflicts that continue to sour bilateral relations. A halfcentury of confrontation and conflicts have sparked reckless militarism, with states

incurring disproportionately high military expenditures.2

 The arms race has now 

escalated to the nuclearization of both India and Pakistan, with an increasing focus on 

delivery systems.

Three major wars, numerous armed skirmishes, and recurring exchange of fire across the 

Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir have set the scene for one of the most volatile regions 

in the world. The fourth and eighth largest armies in the world have remained eyeball-toeyeball in confrontation for the most part of fifty years. Kashmir continues to remain at 

the center of all contentious issues, which defy resolution. Its centrality has precluded 

progress on other relatively minor issues that constitute “irritants.”

However, the bilateral landscape is not entirely barren and devoid of cooperative features. 

Some notable examples include: 

x Indus Water Treaty, 19603

x Salal Hydroelectric Plant, 1978 

x Prohibiting attacks against nuclear installations and facilities, 1988 

x Advance notice of military exercises, maneuvers, and troop movements, 19914

2

 Faruqui, Ahmed. Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia. Aldershot,

UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2002. Faruqui notes that “the military stalemate between India and Pakistan

over the first half century of their existence has been a negative-sum game. Today Pakistan’s MPI (military

personnel intensity—military personnel per head of population) is 3.3 times that of India and MEI (military

expenditure intensity per dollar of GDP) is 1.8 times that of India. Thirty years ago the MPI was 1.4 and

MEI was 1.0. Clearly, this is unsustainable, particularly by Pakistan. South Asia is moving away from

global disarmament trends; globally military spending declined 37% whereas in South Asia it went up by

12%. Between 1987 and 1994, military spending in the industrial world declined by 41% and in the

developing world by 13%. Out of the top 10 armies in the world India is ranked 4th and Pakistan is ranked

8th.” 3

 It is noteworthy that the Indus Water Treaty was facilitated by the World Bank, which financed the

infrastructure costs.

4

 The Agreement Between India and Pakistan on the Advance Notice of Military Exercises (6 April 1991)

includes (see Appendix 1 for the full text of the agreement):

a. Agreement that naval ships and submarines belonging to the other country are not to close less than

3 nm from each other so as to avoid any accident while operating in international waters.

b. Agreement that aircraft of either country will refrain from buzzing surface units and platforms of the 

other country in international waters.

c. Exchange of radio frequencies by the two navies to enable vessels and aircraft to communicate when

they are in each other’s vicinity.

4
x Prevention of airspace violations and preventing over flights and landings by

military aircraft, 1991 

x Joint declaration on complete prohibition of chemical weapons, 1992 

x Lahore Declaration of 1999.5

The main thrust of this paper is maritime affairs, which have suffered from benign 

neglect. The continental mindset has historically dominated and structured the thinking, 

strategy, and goals in South Asia. The Pakistani armed forces have dominated the 

domestic political scene, supported by a nexus of politicians and bureaucrats. They have 

concentrated their energies on terra firma, including Kashmir, Siachen Glacier, the LoC,

Durand Line, etc. The Indian strategy has been reactive, and in spite of its vast oceanic 

frontage, remains land-oriented. This situation persists despite the fact that over 95% of 

the trade of both countries is carried by sea. It is lamentable that South Asia has little 

share of the six trillion dollars worth of trade in the Indian Ocean region6

. The apathy and 

indifference of the establishment towards maritime affairs remain an enduring enigma,

and the military scene remains remarkable for the absence of Naval CBMs. 

People on both sides of the border are suffering from “crisis fatigue.”7

 A diaspora of 

Muhajirs (immigrants) in Sindh and Kashmiri Muslims have settled in Punjab on the 

Pakistani side. Similarly, there is a community of Sikhs and Hindu Punjabis on the Indian 

side. These communities on both sides of the border are politically significant and yearn

for normalization of relations, free movement of goods, and ease of travel. While other 

regional trading blocs are thriving, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 

(SAARC) countries continue to languish in poverty, inherent mistrust, and hostility. 

Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean is bereft of any collective maritime security and trade

arrangements.

An almost perpetual preoccupation with interstate conflicts has left little time and 

resources to seek regional solutions. Whatever talks have taken place have been a 

dialogue of the deaf. 

The medium to achieve a breakthrough is the sea, where it is feasible to negotiate CBMs, 

which deal with less contentious and softer issues. This paper, therefore, initially focuses 

on soft, doable projects, advocating a building-blocks approach to address larger and 

more complex issues as confidence continues to build. 

Transparency is a fundamental requirement of confidence building. Some essential 

aspects of transparency—monitoring, surveillance, and verification—are enabled by 

technology. Today’s technologies facilitate making connections and building mutual

5

 See Appendix 2 for the text of the declaration.

6

 Ishrat Hussain, Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. Address to Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and 

Industry, June 2002.

7

 Kashmiri Muslims and the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs in Pakistan and the Punjabi-speaking Sikhs and

Hindus dispersed all over India yearn to rekindle their spiritual linkages and rediscover their roots in their

ancestral lands and cultures. The debilitating arms race has to be checked and funds diverted towards

alleviating poverty, improving health and hygiene, education, potable water, and housing for all.

5
confidence. This paper identifies projects and proposals that may be implemented

through the applications of currently available technologies. 

Today, when the atmosphere is conducive to dialogue, it is necessary to adopt an 

incremental bottom-up approach involving low-level, technical experts and professionals, 

thereby avoiding the potential pitfalls of high-profile failures. The log-jam in the 

maritime field can only be broken by focusing on substantive issues through a strategy of 

employing low-key, pragmatic steps, leading progressively to larger solutions.

This paper addresses in a general way issues in the maritime sphere and, more 

specifically, the festering disputes concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundary, 

Sir Creek, and the fishermen’s issues, which have a strong humanitarian aspect.8

The present research focuses on four points: 

x The delimitation of the maritime boundary and relationship with Sir Creek 

x Restoration of full shipping links and the security of ports and cargos 

x Fishermen arrests and repatriation 

x Naval and maritime agency interactions and possibilities for cooperation. 

The reason to select the sea as the starting point for initiating a dialogue for confidence 

building is indicated by Dr. Siddiqa-Agha, who states that “the Indian and Pakistani

navies do not carry as much psychological baggage as other branches of the services 

do.”9

 Commander Rajesh Pendharker of the Indian Navy, too, has opined that “the 

character of the Naval forces themselves makes it possible to cooperate in a manner

detached from political wranglings between the two states.”10 Both of these statements

are true to a large extent, considering the efforts made by the two navies to forge 

cooperation in the past, despite hostility on other fronts. 

These authors have focused on the sea as a good starting point for carrying the seeds for 

future agreement, since it is less contentious than other areas. Despite the personal 

involvement of some Heads of Service on both sides, there has been regrettably little 

Navy-to-Navy contact or dialogue. Fortunately, the process got a shot in the arm at 

Lahore in February 1999 when the Prime Ministers of both the countries agreed to:

x Conclude an agreement for prevention of incidents at sea 

x Periodically review the implementation of CBMs, and, where necessary, set up 

consultative mechanisms

x Review the existing communication links with a view to upgrading them. 

8

 At the time this paper is going to press, December 2003, there are a number of articles appearing in the

South Asia regional and international press reporting favorable gestures and proposals for cooperation in

the maritime arena between India and Pakistan. These intimations include avoiding arrest of fishermen in

specified areas, initiating a passenger ferry service between the countries, and cultivating communication

and interaction between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistani Maritime Security Agency. 9

 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Maritime Cooperation between India and Pakistan: Building Confidence at Sea,

SAND 98-0505/18. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, November 2000. p. 11. 10 Rajesh Pendharkar, The Lahore Declaration and Beyond: Maritime Confidence-Building Measures in

South Asia, Occasional Paper 51. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Centre. February 2003. p. iii. 

6
The Lahore declaration has thus provided the two countries with an excellent instrument 

not only to structure mechanisms for establishing/upgrading communications but also to 

commence negotiations/consultations for formulating a set of CBMs, along similar lines 

as INCSEA, which would minimize the risk of initiating a war by accident.

From the military point of view, the efforts of both sides over a decade and a half finally 

culminated in the 1991 agreement titled “Advance Notice of Military Exercises and 

Manoeuvers.” As far as the two navies are concerned, both sides have by and large 

adhered to various clauses of the agreement. However, aircraft of both sides continued to 

buzz each other’s ships and aircraft at sea. Vijai Sakhuja has written about four such 

incidents.11 Cdr. Pendharker has also described three incidents, one each in the years 

1995, 1996, and 1999.12 These close encounters could have resulted in ugly incidents at 

sea but, fortunately, did not. Further, it is no less important to note that a number of 

Chiefs of Naval Staff of both countries had, during their tenures as Chiefs, expressed 

their keen desire to their respective governments to commence a Navy-to-Navy dialogue 

through visits of ships and officials at senior levels. All of these efforts were aimed at 

fostering friendly relations and creating a more congenial operational atmosphere at sea. 

However, these efforts were blocked by hardline elements on both sides and by certain 

political events.

Confidence Building Measures

History shows that to be truly effective, the concept of CBMs requires substance rather

than platitudes. The approach must be rational and pragmatic, focusing on proposals that 

are less contentious, mutually beneficial, and easily put into action. Acceptance and 

implementation by both sides of small, initial steps can be followed by a deliberate and 

incremental approach to the larger, more complex, substantive issues. This buildingblock approach envisages a process where each previous measure forms the basis for 

further measures that consolidate and strengthen the building of confidence. 

This paper addresses issues in the military, economic, and humanitarian fields. The paper 

is also cognizant of the fact that any approach to CBMs, while recognizing the common 

interests of the regional states, must also be mindful of the interests of the outside users 

of the area. 

The maritime field offers great opportunities for enacting CBMs. Navies and naval 

officers have a transnational reach and outlook and their history is not encumbered with 

animosity. An incremental approach to problem solving, starting with subjects that are 

less contentious and have minimal security implications, is recommended.

CBMs as an institutional process may take years to produce positive results; hence,

patience and political will are necessary ingredients to progress. It is noteworthy that in

South Asia as many as 40 channels are currently working on CBMs. While CBMs are 

often seen as essentially military, it is important that “soft” issues are not ignored; the 

11 Vijai Sakuja, “Cold War In The Arabian Sea,” Strategic Analysis, XXV, 4 (June 2001). pp. 376-377. 12 Rajesh Pendharkar, op. cit., p. 5. 

7
role of people and societies is just as important as governments. Unfortunately, the public 

attitude in this area is that CBMs and Track II initiatives are the exclusive domain of a 

few concerned citizens.

Therefore, there is a crying need to dispel the perception of elitism and to bring CBMs 

and increased dialogue to the popular level. Use of the vernacular press to inform the

general public about the role of CBMs is necessary to mold public opinion and mobilize

support.

A pressing need of the hour is to extend the scope of CBMs and enlarge them to other 

areas in the non-military fields, such as economics, trade and shipping, water resources,

environment, power, energy, education, and science and technology. 

It is necessary to emphasize that the single most important component of a CBM is 

transparency. Both parties need to be consistently reassured through a series of constraint 

measures, communications, and verifiability. These are the primary tools which 

institutions, aided by technology, can make the states’ behavior more predictable.

Mistrust is a formidable problem as well as a formidable weapon. For any measure to 

succeed, both sides have to be convinced that the other side will abide by the mutually

established rules. It is therefore advisable to adopt an incremental approach and to 

identify and start with small steps, which are of common interest and help build 

confidence over a period of time. The measures identified must also be capable of being 

put into action and should not offend any sensitivities (political, military, or otherwise). 

Key Issues 

There are three substantive issues in the maritime arena that have the potential to flare up 

and raise the political temperature. These are (1) the maritime boundary, (2) Sir Creek, 

and (3) fishermen’s arrests. These issues also hold the promise of economic benefits for 

both sides if resolved in a cooperative atmosphere. However, for about the past 50 years, 

the two sides have been preoccupied with Kashmir, which has remained their main focus. 

The maritime issues, though under discussion at various times, have remained in the 

background and accorded little attention. 

The maritime boundary issue arose out of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea (UNCLOS) III (1982), which gave vast swathes of the ocean to coastal states’ 

jurisdiction, thereby sowing the seeds of inevitable conflicts of interest. As compared to 

the highly volatile issue of Kashmir, the delimitation of the maritime boundary and the 

dispute involving the Sir Creek have not yet attained a flash point status, although both 

issues have the potential to do so at a future date. Sir Creek issues are complex in nature. 

Although less complicated, delimitation of the maritime boundary has also not made any 

headway, because it has been linked to Sir Creek.

Next, the 1975 Protocol on Shipping and Trade constitutes self-imposed shackles that 

need to be broken if trade potential is to be realized and for both countries to prosper. The 

countries’ economic health is as dependent on ports as it is on keeping sea lines of 

8
communications open. For Pakistan, with only one port, this represents its jugular; denial 

or closure of the port would be a crippling blow to the economy. In addition, the security 

of ports has assumed great importance and significance in the wake of the terrorist attacks

of September 11, 2001. Therefore, issues related to port security need to be addressed in 

detail.

There is also the perennial humanitarian problem of captured fishermen, who regrettably 

continue to be pawns in a game of profits and politics. 

In addition to these issues, the paper looks at the possibility of interaction and 

cooperation between Naval and maritime agency officials. 

The study concludes with a set of recommendations and project proposals. The 

recommendations cover both short-term and long-term measures as recommended actions 

for government agencies, both unilateral and bilateral. The proposed technical projects 

are considered able to be put into action with possible assistance from various technical

and regional sources.

9
Territorial Issues 

Maritime Boundary

Published figures show that over 95 percent of overseas trade of both India and Pakistan 

is carried in ships.13 Given this dependence on sea-borne trade, a maritime conflict

between India and Pakistan would have a significant negative impact on the two 

countries’ economies. India and Pakistan are both heavily dependent on unrestricted 

inflow of oil from the Persian Gulf states. In the event of a conflict, each countries’ navy 

would likely focus on disrupting the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and trade of 

the other country, while defending their own interests. 

Figure 1. Sea Lines of Communications

Trade routes through the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea14

Hatched arrow: Trade routes to India and Pakistan

Shaded arrow: Trade routes for SE and NE Asian countries

13 Rahul-Roy Chaudhury, India’s Maritime Security. New Delhi: ISDA and Knowledge World, June 2000.

p. xiv.

14 The importance of these SLOCs to the rest of the world is indicated by the following figures: 

Energy Dependence on Gulf Oil: Japan 76%, China 40%, Australia 65%

Trade through Indian Ocean in US $: Oil trade through Hormuz $200 billion, oil trade through Straits of

Malacca $70 billion, Japan’s trade over $250 billion, China’s trade $100 billion.

10
Additionally, war at sea has no geographical limits. A conflict in the Arabian Sea would 

have a global dimension. Nearly 70% of the Gulf’s oil is trans-shipped through the waters 

of the Arabian Sea.15 Many Northeast Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and South 

Korea are heavily dependent on Gulf oil. An India/Pakistan war at sea could increase 

shipping insurance rates. If shipping companies undertook a longer route, sea freight 

costs would rise as well.

This scenario has become even more complicated since India and Pakistan attained

nuclear status in 1998. In any future conflict, therefore, intervention, or at least presence, 

of large powers in the area to contain and diffuse the situation cannot be ruled out. It is 

therefore in the interest of both countries that most issues be addressed without delay, 

thereby reducing the number of thorny issues that have dogged the political relationship 

between the two countries for over fifty years. Delimitation of the maritime boundary is

such an issue.

India started delimitation of boundaries at sea with its maritime neighbours in the 1970s16

and has signed nine bilateral and three trilateral agreements to date, as shown in Table 1. 

Table 1. Indian Maritime Boundary Agreements 

Partner Country Date Type of Agreement

Indonesia 8 August 1974 

14 January 1977 

Bilateral

Maldives 28 December 1976 Bilateral

Myanmar 23 December 1986 Bilateral

Sri Lanka 26/28 June 1974 

23 March 1976 

22 November 1976 

Bilateral

Thailand 22 June 1978 

27 October 1993 

Bilateral

Sri Lanka and Maldives 24 July 1976 Trilateral

Indonesia and Thailand 22 June 1978 Trilateral

Myanmar and Thailand 27 October 1993 Trilateral

15 Peter Walker, “The Evolving Regional Security Environment: What the Maritime Strategist Should

Know.” Presented to the Regional Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean conference, Halifax, Nova

Scotia, July 2001.

16 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Trends in the Delimitation of India’s Maritime Boundaries. New Delhi, IDSA,

2002. http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan9-5.html. p. 2.

11
Similarly, Pakistan has signed agreements with Iran and Oman and settled its maritime

boundaries with those two countries, as shown in Table 2. 

Table 2. Pakistani Maritime Boundary Agreements 

Partner Country Date Type of Agreement

Oman 1996 Bilateral

Iran 1996/1997 Bilateral

Despite this record of formulating agreements with their neighbors, India and Pakistan 

have held six rounds of discussions between 1989 and 1998 without a breakthrough.17

The first meeting was held on 2 June1989 and the sixth and last one on 9 November

1998. After defining the scope of discussions and agreeing to the basic agenda, little was 

achieved during the first two rounds. There was a thaw in bilateral relations in 1991, 

which enabled both sides to achieve some progress on the issue during the two meetings

held that year. During the fifth round, held in November 1992, the talks floundered due to 

technical differences and linking of contentious issues. In the last round of discussions 

held in November 1998 at New Delhi, India’s proposal of a seaward approach to 

establishing the maritime boundary was discussed but no agreement could be reached.

The Pakistani viewpoint was that in order to delimit the maritime boundary, it would be 

necessary to first decide upon a mutually agreeable land terminus. This would then 

become a reference point used to draw the boundary line on charts up to a distance of 200 

nm from the shore. The distance of 200 nm was chosen because it is the distance of the 

exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The Indian view was that the Pakistani proposal, defacto, suggested that no progress would be possible until the Sir Creek dispute was 

resolved. India considered that the two issues could be de-linked and tackled 

simultaneously as separate issues. In January 1994, India presented a “non-paper”

suggesting a seaward approach method in conformity with International Law.

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, a security analyst, has stated that there is a difference in the 

perception of officials of India and Pakistan regarding the demarcation of the maritime

boundary line, as shown in Figure 2.18

17 Ibid, p. 5. 18 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, op. cit., p. 31. 

12
Figure 2. India's and Pakistan's Perceptions of Maritime Boundary Lines

Projecting from Sir Creek

X – India’s perception

Y – Pakistan’s perception

Most writers have suggested the following three possibilities as methods to delimit the 

maritime boundary: 

(a) Land Terminus. This process involves resolution of the Sir Creek dispute to begin 

with, and is therefore unlikely to be resolved in the immediate future.

(b) Base Line. This approach, too, is unlikely to offer a solution in the near-term because

India has not yet finalized and submitted its base line charts to the UN SecretaryGeneral, and the baseline proposals must subsequently be accepted by the concerned 

agencies.

(c) Seaward Approach. Under the circumstances mentioned in subparagraphs (a) and (b) 

above, the seaward approach as outlined in the United Nations Convention on 

International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) offers a possibility that needs to be 

considered and discussed to arrive at an interim solution. 

The United Nations Convention on International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III (1982)

became effective on 16 November 1994. This law conferred greatly extended maritime

zones to coastal and island states, thereby extending the jurisdiction of maritime nations 

over vast areas of adjoining seas. For delimitation of maritime boundaries, the new law 

has adopted the “median” or the “equidistance” principle in the case of both adjacent and 

opposite coastal states. Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS III also describe the process of

delimitation of the EEZ and the Continental Shelf. In the case of India and Pakistan, 

being adjacent coastal states, article 6.2.5.3 of the Technical Aspects of Law of the Sea 

(TALOS), a technical support document to UNCLOS, also proves relevant. Specific 

information regarding TALOS approaches can be found in Appendix 3. 

13
Some writers have noted that, depending upon the starting point on land, one country will 

gain or lose an area of approximately 2500 square nm in the EEZ. However, this 

estimation is not supported by actual chart work, which, as described in the 

recommendations below, reduces the area of gain or loss by a factor of 100. 

Recommendations:

In view of the foregoing, it is proposed that the two governments consider the following 

recommendations to delineate the maritime boundary:

1. De-link Sir Creek from the maritime boundary issue.

2. Agree to adopt the seaward approach in conformity with TALOS Article 6.2.5.3 up to 

a mutually agreed point from the coastline. The remaining area from this point to the 

coast could be delineated at a later date pursuant to agreements reached regarding Sir 

Creek. The procedure for delineating the maritime boundary is described below: 

x Determine a point 200 nautical miles at sea (the EEZ limit), equidistant from the 

coasts of India and Pakistan, using well established and undisputed shore/baseline 

points from their respective mainlands. (As per the procedure described in Article 

6.2.5.3).

x Adopting the same procedure, determine and mark points on the chart at 150, 100, 

50, and 35 nm from the two coasts, or up to any agreed distance (perhaps 16 nm).

x Mark a point on the mouth of the creek, equidistant from the two positions 

claimed by India (1) and Pakistan (K) as an interim solution without any prejudice 

to future claims.

x The line joining these points would then indicate the marked boundary on the 

chart.

An example illustrating this proposed method is shown in Figure 3. 

The above procedure seems simple in theory, but in practice it may not be so easy to 

apply in this instance. It would require all the patience, professional skill, and 

understanding of expert hydrographers from both sides to arrive at a boundary line that 

could be recommended for consideration by the appropriate authorities. 

Finally, it is important to understand that as long as the shore points selected are mutually

acceptable to the two sides, the boundary line delineated using the angular bisection 

process, will undergo only minimal change when the final base lines are established. The

only part of the maritime boundary line that will be affected will be the 25-35 nm closest 

to shore, which will shift depending upon the terminus point determined after the issue of 

Sir Creek issue is resolved. To help this process, a maritime mapping software package

could also be used.

14


Sir Creek

The Sir Creek dispute is documented to have originated in 1875 between the two princely

states of Sind (now in Pakistan) and Kutch (now in India).19 The government of Bombay,

under the British, took up the issue in 1907-1908, and, after consultations with both sides,

brokered an agreement and promulgated its decision in a letter dated 20 September 1913 

(Number 5543) and in the form of map Number B-44, which was published in 1914.

Map B-44 was subsequently implemented in 1924 in the form of map Number B-74, both 

of which are now referred to as the “1914 Resolution Maps”. Some experts believe that 

maps B-44 and B-74 differ in their contents. Map B-44 is shown in Figure 4, below. 

Figure 4. Sir Creek and Vicinity (Map B-44) 

After independence, the dispute resurfaced in July 1948 when Pakistan raised the issue of 

the delimitation of the Sind/Kutch border. The dispute remained low-key for some time, 

but in mid-1965 the Rann of Kutch area to the east of the Creek erupted in bloody 

clashes, and the subsequent events led to war.

After the war, the two sides referred the dispute to an Arbitration Panel, which published 

its decision on 19 February 1968, defining a new boundary between Kutch and Sind. 

Although Sir Creek was not in the purview of this panel, the panel’s award referenced the 

September 1913 document and thus created a link between the boundary defined by the 

Panel and the boundary promulgated by the British in 1913. 

At the Panel’s directive, the two sides were to erect pillars along the newly defined 

boundary, but this task was not undertaken with any enthusiasm by either side. Therefore, 

the demarcation of the boundary remains incomplete to this date. 

19 H.R. Gupta, The Kutch Affair. Delhi: UC Kapur, 1969. p. 77.

17
Six bilateral discussions have been held on this issue between 1989 and 1998, but the two 

sides have failed to come to an agreement. Possible presence of hydrocarbons in 

proximity of Sir Creek is stated to be one reason, according to some media reports. 

However, there have been no reports of discovery of oil or gas in the area so far. There is 

also a perception in certain quarters in India that Pakistan is delaying the process for 

political reasons, and may press for an arbitration at a later date. Indian officials, on the 

other hand, do not wish to get involved with another arbitration panel and would like to 

settle the issue bilaterally.

The fact remains that the two sides have fought a war in this area, sought arbitration in 

the past, and yet have not been able to resolve the ongoing dispute. This is indicative of 

the complexity and sensitivity of the problem and perhaps other issues involved. 

Over the past five decades, several natural geomorphic changes have occurred in the 

deltaic region of the Indus River. Sir Creek, being a part of this delta system, is now 

reported to be somewhat different in reality from the map that was printed in 1914.20 The 

following changes in particular are relevant to the issue: 

x The orientation of the creek has changed, creating a gap of approximately two 

kilometers from the point as marked in the 1914 map to the current outflow of the 

creek.

x The mouth of the creek has widened. 

x An island has appeared near the mouth of the creek due to siltation, so that the 

boundary as marked on the 1914 map ends landwards of the tide line. 

The respective stands of India and Pakistan on how the boundary is to be delineated are 

as follows:

Pakistan

x Land boundary to be defined along the green line shown on Map B-44 (Figure 4). 

The boundary runs along the east bank of the creek. 

x Delimitation of the maritime boundary to be addressed after the land terminus is 

decided and the Sir Creek dispute settled. 

India

x The boundary of Sir Creek should be defined by the mid-channel principle, in 

conformity with International Law. 

x De-link Sir Creek and address maritime boundary delimitation separately. 

A.G. Noorani quotes a notation by the tribunal that delineated the Sind-Kutch border, “In 

view of the aforesaid agreement, the question concerning Sir Creek parts of the boundary 

20 Rear Admiral KR Menon (Ret), “Maritime Confidence Building in South Asia,” in Maritime Confidence

Building in Regions of Tension, Report No 21. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1996.

p. 78.

18
is left out of consideration.”21 He also quotes an observation by the Commissioner of 

Sind on the boundary award, “that the Sir Creek changes its course from time to time and 

the western boundary of the area, which it is proposed to surrender to Rao of Kutch, 

should therefore be descried as ‘the center of the channel’ of the Sir Creek.”22 The 

provision described above is indicative of the claim and objections raised by the princely

state of Kutch regarding the boundary delimitation. However, the same was not agreed to 

by the British.

At the last bilateral meeting held in November 1998 in New Delhi to settle the issue 

based on the median line principle, no progress could be achieved, probably because of 

the lack of up-to-date hydrographic charts of the Creek. Therefore, before the next 

meeting is scheduled it would be advisable to complete a fresh hydrographic survey to 

ascertain the latest orientation and depths in the creek and its approaches. This survey 

would:

x Delineate the high water line 

x Locate protruding edges along the Creek 

x Take soundings and marking of coastline in the approaches area. 

x Gather information regarding the navigability in the creek. 

In case a hydrographic survey has been recently completed and charts prepared by one

side (India reportedly notified Pakistan of a recent survey), then time could be saved by 

carrying out joint check surveys at selected points. Once authenticated charts of the 

Creek, acceptable to both sides, are available, it is hoped that the two sides will be able to 

make some progress at their next meeting.

As it stands, the two sides have the following options available: 

x Indian claim of the boundary line along the Western bank, terminating at point 1 

(Figure 5) 

x Pakistani claim of the boundary line along the Eastern bank, terminating at point 

K (Figure 5) 

x Indian proposal of defining the boundary as one equidistance line in accordance

with UNCLOS/TALOS Article 6.2.5.2 (See Appendix 3) 

x Arbitration

x Maintain status quo; i.e. mutually agree to remain in dispute. 

21 AG Noorani, in Micheal Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds. Crises Prevention, Confidence Building and

Reconciliation in South East Asia. Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995. p. 100. 22 Ibid, p. 101.

19
Figure 5. Sir Creek, Showing Points 1 and K 

Recommendations:

The authors are of the opinion that, considering the hostility and impasse of the past 55 

years, the most pragmatic solution to the dispute would be to divide the Creek along the 

median/equidistant line in accordance with International Law. However, considering the 

political climate in the two countries at the present stage, it is perhaps best to maintain the 

status quo and hope that both India and Pakistan will resolve this dispute in an 

atmosphere of compromise and not hold delimitation of the maritime boundary hostage to 

the Sir Creek issue.

In the interim however, CBMs involving Sir Creek could advance relations and 

management of the area overall. UNCLOS has a provision for creation of Maritime

Sensitive Zones under mutual agreement. Such zones and areas, under interim

arrangement, could either be jointly exploited or made a subject of joint study for 

environmental monitoring and ecological preservation, without prejudice to larger 

maritime claims of either side.23 A joint study of this complex inter-tidal ecosystem, in 

accordance with UNCLOS, Part 12, Section 2, Article 200 may prove to be very useful.

The study could be focused either on the Sir Creek area, or it could be a larger project 

involving entire or part of the coastline from Karachi to Mumbai. A sub-regional 

23 Gaurav Rajen, Cooperative Environmental Monitoring in the Coastal Regions of India and Pakistan,

CMC Occasional Paper 11, SAND98-0505-11. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 1999. 

20
mechanism for cooperation under UNCLOS also exists as the South Asian Seas Action 

Plan (SASAP).24 The governments of India and Pakistan have agreed to this regional plan 

along with the governments of other cooperating South Asian countries.

One of the key elements of the SASAP is to encourage collaboration among regional 

scientists and technicians and their institutions for the study of various processes 

occurring in the coastal areas and open ocean, as well as assessing sources and levels of 

pollutants and their effects on marine life and human health. The SASAP thus provides 

India and Pakistan with a framework for sharing environmental release and effluent data 

in the Sir Creek and coastal regions. A joint project may help gain a better understanding 

of ecological and physical aspects of the Sir Creek area, as well as help lower the 

tensions in the area of dispute. 

24 Prasantha Dias Abeyegunawardene, South Asian Seas: a critical moment. UN Environment Programme,

http://www.unep.ch/seas/sascap.html.

21
Maritime Trade

Shipping and Trade 

Oceans are still the “great highways” on which much of the world’s business depends.

The global economy now depends on the continuous, uninterrupted flow of shipping 

among producers of raw materials, energy component manufacturers, assembly plants, 

and consumers.

Trade within South Asia, and maritime trade in particular, can be the great engine that 

drives the peace process forward. Economic cooperation and development can only come

about when the political situation is stable and secure. 

There is now a convergence of interests for India and Pakistan to work towards 

restoration of unrestricted direct trade and shipping links. Generally, a consensus exists 

that there is greater trade potential between the two countries than currently takes place.25

Consumers in both countries are not well served by current trade barriers.26 In fact, the 

UN humanitarian development report (2002) estimates that trade with India would make

foodstuffs cheaper by 20-30% in Pakistan.27

Sea-borne trade represents a vital lifeline for both India and Pakistan, where over 95% of 

goods are transported by sea.28 For Pakistan, with only one major port, sea trade is the

jugular vein of the economy. Any disruption of the SLOCs or port closures can quickly 

bring Pakistan to its knees. Whereas India’s overall trade is $44 billion, the bilateral, 

official trade with Pakistan has never exceeded $500 million. Meanwhile, unofficial trade 

is estimated at $2 billion and illegal trade at $1 billion.29 This situation is the adverse 

consequence of shipping constraints and tariff barriers.

Pursuant to the Simla Agreement in 1972, both countries signed the 1974 Protocol on 

Resumption of Trade. This was followed in January 1975 by the Protocol on Resumption

of Shipping Services (Appendix 4). However, the clauses of the 1975 Protocol were so 

restrictive concerning ship registrations, volumes of cargo, equality principles, etc., that it 

actually resulted in a sharp decline in trade. It is a measure of the official apathy towards 

maritime affairs that this Protocol, which was to be reviewed yearly, did not come up for 

review until 1984.30

25 At a meeting on 28-29 June 2003, the President of the India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and

Industry noted that “trade can be jacked up to US$3-4 billion from US$500 Million from present. Major

items are: pharmaceuticals, autos, IT, tea, chemicals, tires, iron ore, textile machinery.” Daily Times, 27

June 2003.

26 Amit Mitra, Secretary General, FICCI. 

27 United Nations Human Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002. 28 Geoffrey Till, “Regional naval trends in the Indian Ocean,” International Maritime Seminar on the Indian 

Ocean, Islamabad, 1994. 

29 Described as “abysmally low; trade potential is for $5 billion.” Y. Sinha, Indian Foreign Minister,

address to India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Delhi, June 2003. 30 “Both sides accept the expansion of trade to their ‘mutual benefit’ to expand the 1975 Protocol to cover

the carriage of 3rd country liner cargo originating from the ports of either country and destined to ports in

third countries and vice versa.” The next meeting in 1976 discussed transit trade to landlocked countries,

22
The Shipping Protocol stipulates, “Neither country can lift third country liner cargo 

originating from the ports of either country and destined for ports in third countries and 

vice versa.” That is, Indian ships are not allowed to carry cargo from Pakistan to any 

country other than India, nor can Pakistani ships carry cargo from Indian ports to any 

third country. The fact is that this Protocol has worked to the detriment of shipping 

concerns on both sides of the border by restricting them to lifting only bilateral cargo, 

which is insignificant.31

Shipping companies operate in consortiums, and containers are transported and transshipped from hubs. Ships and cargos that are not part of this system are losers. Pakistani 

shipping, being small and largely in the government sector,32 would greatly benefit if 

allowed to join various consortiums to lift cargo to the Indian ports. Indian ship owners, 

having larger fleets,33 are also eager to call at Karachi/Port Qasim Authority (PQA), 

especially with transit cargo for Afghanistan. Currently this lucrative business goes by 

default to third-flag vessels. Pakistan’s freight bill, including these third party vessels, is 

$1.3 billion a year and India’s is at least four times as high.34

Pakistani shipping works on the basis of a single port operation; this imposes great 

limitations on the efficient operation of the fleet and hinders rationalization of its 

services. For example, in a one-port system ships often leave less than fully loaded and it 

is difficult for shippers to participate in consortia to maximize utilization of their 

capacity. If the restrictions on both sides on carrying third-flag cargos are lifted, a much

larger Indian market and a greater number of Indian ports would be open to Pakistani 

trade and shipping. Both the public and private ship owners in Pakistan are clamoring for 

a revision of the protocol to allow them access to this lucrative business.35 Regrettably, 

there has been no progress on this issue, possibly because Pakistan has not yet agreed to 

grant Most Favored Nation status to India. 

The trade figures are misleading, as they do not reflect the clandestine transactions of 

over $3.0 billion a year, conducted largely through unofficial monetary channels of 

“hundi” and “havala.” These are informal banking systems where transactions are 

covered by a chit system or simply by word of mouth. Payments are made and accepted

carriage of passengers, shore leave of seamen, and delay in freight remittances. The Foreign Ministers

meeting in June 1983 was inconclusive. The India-Pakistan Joint Commission in July 1985 virtually sealed

the issue with “insufficient volume of trade” and “imbalanced tonnage.” The negotiations have foundered

on the issue of transit trade to Afghanistan. 31 Bilateral trade is $500 million. Most trading is indirect, transshipped via Dubai or Singapore in third flag

vessels or from Central Asia; trade volume is estimated at $2.0 billion. Smuggling is pegged at $1 billion.

Riaz Khokhar, Pakistani Foreign Secretary, quoted in Daily Times, 27 June 2003. 3217 ships, 240,605 GRT. Regional Seminar on Liberalisation of Maritime Transport Services Under

WTO/GATT, 11-13 February 2002, Bangkok.

33 Four hundred ships, 6 million GRT. Despite being 5th largest fleet in world only 36% of India’s foreign

trade in carried in Indian ships (50% of its oil, 26% of bulk carrier cargo, and 21% of liner cargo). Amit

Agarwal, Chairman, Foreign Committee of the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

34 Regional Seminar on Liberalisation of Maritime Transport Services, op. cit. 35 National Shipowners’ Association-Pakistan. Mr. Masood Baghpati’s letter to the Government on 9 June

1996 and PNSC Chairman’s letter to the Government 1993.

23
in either country, either by direct communication or via agents in Singapore, Dubai, or 

other Gulf ports. Bilateral trade in 1948-49 was between 35-50% of the two countries’ 

total, but it has now dwindled to 1% or less, because of restrictive tariff barriers.36

Pakistan has a list of 600 items that may be imported from India, but the high import

duties make them non-competitive, thereby encouraging smuggling and indirect trade 

through third countries.37 These trade practices have served Pakistani consumers badly,

while reaping huge profits for a nexus of shady businessmen, corrupt politicians, 

officials, smugglers, and criminals. The UN Human Development Report of 2002 

estimates that open trading would reduce the cost of foodstuffs in Pakistan by 20-30%.38

There is now a convergence of commercial interests on both sides of the border. The 

moribund India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been revived and highprofile, large-scale exchanges of delegations have taken place. Some direct trading and 

joint venture activity is evident. Trade and commerce is the engine that will drive the 

peace process forward. In order to prosper, this region has to trade internally and 

externally as a trading block.

Bilateral trade has some obvious advantages: no language barrier, lower freight charges, 

quick just-in-time deliveries, and familiar trade practices. Less obvious advantages 

include access to the lucrative transit trade through Pakistan to Afghanistan, Central Asia, 

and Iran for India and Nepal and through India to Bangladesh for Pakistan. Pakistan 

would also benefit from the huge Indian middle-class market estimated at 200 million

people.

Despite glowing references made by government officials regarding road, rail, and air 

links, it is a fact that the infrastructure does not exist in these areas to handle the current

restricted volume of trade, not to mention possible future increases in trade. Trade is 

almost entirely carried by sea and shall continue to be so for the foreseeable future. To

allow unrestricted flow of trade it is necessary to revise the Shipping Protocol of 1975. 

The mechanism exists whereby the India-Pakistan Joint Commission can be convened to 

remove Clauses 5 and 9 of the Protocol, thereby removing the impediments to free 

movement of goods and cargo in ships owned, operated, and chartered by either country. 

Booming bilateral trade would nourish both economies, lower lead times, ensure cheaper 

goods and commodities, and create a reservoir of vested interests and goodwill that will 

go a long way towards reduced tension and hostilities. 

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the India-Pakistan Joint Commission be convened to discuss Most 

Favored Nation status for India, review the Shipping Protocol, and introduce appropriate 

amendments to Clauses 5 and 9, thereby breaking the shackles on bilateral trade. It would 

be best if these clauses were removed altogether. This would result in manifold increases 

in direct trade, reduced shipping time, and reduced freight charges. It would discourage 

smuggling and bring profits to the national carriers. This CBM is not highly sensitive 

36 Sify News (India), 9 June 2003. 37 Amit Mitra, Secretary General, FICCI. 

38 United Nations Human Development Programme, op. cit.

24
politically and is unlikely to cause any repercussions since it is beneficial to both 

countries. It is not inconceivable that ship owners may enter into joint ventures to 

maximize profits in the future.

The two sides have also discussed the issue of restoration of passenger services between 

Karachi and Mumbai, but these talks have been inconclusive. It is recommended that 

restoration of passenger services also be considered as a CBM. 

Security of Ports and Cargo

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks within the United States, the 

security of ports, their resilience to violence and disaster, and the ability of a port 

complex to recover are important and urgent concerns. The emerging threat of smuggling

radioactive materials and the endemic issues of smuggling drugs and contraband items, 

are driving the port authorities to improve security measures. However, the security 

problem is compounded by the nature of the maritime shipping business and the physical 

location of most ports. Most ports are wide open and easily accessible both from land and 

water. They are surrounded by large population centers, congested with multiple agencies

operating around the clock. The ports are saddled with intensely competitive cargo 

handling regimes, obsolete transaction practices, institutional corruption, and poor 

communications. All of these factors combine to raise serious security concerns. The 

popular perception does not associate ports with terrorism, but the fact is that flags of

convenience and registrations represent the soft underbelly of the maritime world.39

Some of these concerns put the free flow of trade, and thus freedom of navigation, firmly

on the contemporary international agenda. The ports and transportation measures need to 

be developed and harmonized both regionally and globally. Unilateral efforts to tighten 

security within one country without commensurate efforts in neighboring countries would 

remain ineffective. Today, global economy and trade have to be protected. It is not trade, 

per se, that needs protection, but the overall system in which it takes place that has to be 

protected. However, it is critical that maritime nations strike a balance between security

and the free movement of trade. 

Security can no longer be a neglected element of the transportation system. Transparency 

of both goods and personnel is essential. Communications and database technologies can 

promote transparency, especially through private-public information sharing, allowing 

the authorities to monitor the system’s activities. To achieve this, expertise needs to be 

developed by commitment of resources, upgrading facilities, and overhaul of 

procedures.40

39 William Langwiesche, “Anarchy at Sea,” Atlantic Monthly, October 2003. 40 It is estimated that in developing countries transportation and logistics cost add 15% to the goods cost

compared with 5% for developed countries. World Bank paper quoted in The Economist, 6 April 2002.

25
Because of the very large volume of cargo being shipped and long supply chains, the 

related communication systems have become nearly as important as ships and ports 

themselves.41

Port security now has a new dimension and urgency. With the creation of the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, funds and resources are available to improve security 

of designated ports in the United States and abroad. Operation Safe Commerce (OSC)42

will analyze weaknesses in security along the entire supply chain. Specialist teams from 

Sandia National Laboratories and commercial partners are already engaged in supply 

chain security evaluation and Security Effective Assessments of designated ports in the 

United States and abroad. Specialist teams will identify procedures and technologies to 

improve security and help plan a layered and balanced security posture while maintaining

the viability of maritime commerce. 

In parallel, the US Customs Service has implemented the Container Security Initiative

(CSI), which focuses on seaports with large volumes of containerized cargos going to the 

United States. The US DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration is cooperatively 

supporting this initiative through its Megaport Initiative, which addresses the nuclear 

material smuggling threat. Technical and security support for this initiative comes from

US national laboratories, including Sandia National Laboratories, which perform

feasibility and vulnerability assessments of ports to design and determine the 

effectiveness of nuclear material detection systems for ports of interest. 

Recommendations:

In the context of India and Pakistan, adequate security measures would help generate a 

level of confidence prior to restoration of unrestricted shipping and trading. Effective 

security measures warrant a layered defense approach and transparency of goods and 

personnel movement. Crew identification, container tagging and tracking, 

communication, and data base technologies can promote transparency through 

information sharing between port authorities of Karachi, Port Qasim, Mumbai, Kochi, 

and Chennai. The port authorities and partners participating in bilateral agreements would

be in a position to monitor ships, container movements, and flow of goods and to develop 

robust risk-management practices. 

As confidence builds, data and information on security matters can begin to be shared. If 

Pakistani and Indian ports (Karachi-Mumbai, etc.) each enter into bilateral agreements

with the United States, it would be expedient and logical to complete the triangle by

entering into bilateral agreements locally. The following recommendations are made for 

improving port and cargo security. 

41 Figures for 2000: 5.88 billion tons total—2.15 billion tons oil, 1.98 billion tons dry cargo, and 1.75

billion tons other cargo. 200 million containers transported. Only 2% were inspected. Editorial in The

Economist, 6 April 2002. 42 OSC addresses the security of maritime commerce at the three largest US ports: Los Angeles/Long

Beach, Seattle/Tacoma, and New York/New Jersey, which transact annual business of $200 billion (43% 

containers).

26
It is recommended that respective governments and port authorities: 

x Reform practices, streamline procedures, and upgrade facilities 

x Share data regarding crews and cargos 

x Share security information

x Negotiate local bilateral agreements modeled after the US Container Security 

Initiative.

These issues are very real and should be addressed comprehensively in the form of a 

separate study.43

43 At the initiative of IMO and DG Shipping, India, the Indian Ocean Rim States have set up the Port State

Control Organization with Headquarters at Goa to monitor the entry of sub-standard ships into the waters

of these states. Financial constraints may, however, stop India from investing heavily in environmental

hardware.

27
Fishing and the Fishermen’s Plight 

The fishing industry both in India and Pakistan has come a long way from the time of the

Independence. The fisheries sector has become a powerful income and employment

generator, and it is an important instrument of livelihood for a large section of the 

economically underdeveloped population in both countries. More than seven million

people in India and Pakistan depend on fisheries and aquaculture for their livelihood. 

India has emerged as the third largest producer of fish in the world.44

Progress in fish production and export earnings from fishing over the years can be seen in 

Table 3. 

Table 3. India and Pakistan Fish Production

1961-1962 1999-2000

 Fish Production-India (tons) 1,160,000 5,657,000

 Fish production-Pakistan (tons) 66,600 333,047

1961-1962 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002

 Fish Exports-India (million rupees) 39.2 6308.8 N/A N/A 

 Fish Exports-Pakistan (million $US) N/A 188.9 136.0 125.6

The growth factor and export earnings not withstanding, the fishing industries in both 

India and Pakistan are beset with the following problems:

x Proliferation of boats and trawlers resulting in over-fishing along coasts of 

Gujarat and Sind 

x Dwindling yield in the coastal areas in the last two to three years 

x Environmental and ecological damage; for example, mangroves along the coast 

are being depleted 

x Undemarcated maritime boundary making laws and regulations difficult to 

enforce.

The number of fishing craft that are known to operate along the coasts of Gujarat and 

Sind is very large, approximately 26,000 from Gujarat45 and 4,000-4,500 from Sind .46

To understand the overall issue certain basic facts concerning the Indian state of Gujarat

are instructive, as noted in Table 4. 

44 Government of India, 10th Planning Commission Working Group Report, June 2001. Most data

pertaining to India is from the Working Group Report.

45 Ibid. 46 Moinuddin Ahmed, “Pakistani Fishing Industry in Doldrums,” Dawn, 29 January, 2001.

28
Table 4. State of Gujarat-Fishing Data47

Length of the coastline of Gujarat state 1,600 km

Number of fishermen in Gujarat 140,208

 Number of fish landing centers 286

Number of fishing villages 851

Number of fishing vessels in Gujarat 9,222 (traditional, non-motorized)

5,391 (traditional, motorized)

11,372 (mechanized)

Total number of vessels 25,985

Although data about the exact number of fishermen and fishing boats from Gujarat that 

are operating off the Sir Creek area are not readily available, the magnitude of the 

problem can be visualized when we consider that an additional 4000 to 4,500 Pakistani 

fishing craft48 are reported to be operating along the Pakistani coast between Karachi and 

Sir Creek. 

Fishermen have been fishing using traditional methods in the waters off the coast for 

centuries and know about the seasonal migratory trend of fish, which does not regard any 

national boundary. They follow the fish to bring in the required quantity of catch to 

satisfy local market demands. The Pakistani boats go over to the Indian side to catch 

pomfret, grouper, prawns, shrimp, etc. Indian fishermen encroach the Pakistani waters in 

search of squid, ribbon fish, red snapper, tiger prawn, etc. In the process of doing so, 

some fishermen stray deep into the territory of the other country. In most cases, this

happens due to lack of adequate instrumentation on-board the trawlers, especially in the 

smaller traditional boats that do not even carry radio sets. The majority of these 

fishermen are poor and are hired by the wealthy contractors ashore, who provide only the 

very basic amenities to the crew and tend to take minimal responsibility in case the

fishermen cross the international boundary and get arrested. 

Whatever the circumstances, fishermen caught fishing in the other country’s territory are 

arrested with their boats, escorted to the nearest harbor, and handed over to the local 

police. The police register the case and introduce the crew into the court system for

further legal action. Regrettably, the legal process, both in India and Pakistan, is painfully

slow, and it often takes years before the arrested crews are released from the jails. One 

major concern about this process is that it may divert scarce resources from other, more

important security issues, such as interdicting drug trafficking or smuggling.

It is distressing to note that the fishermen are used as political pawns, and not one 

fisherman on either side has secured a release through the legal process. Release of 

fishermen and their boats is announced from time to time by the respective President/ 

Prime Minster of one or the other country, as goodwill gestures.

47 Ibid. 48 Moinuddin Ahmed, op. cit. An FAO report suggests a potential of 24,000 mt/year with proper

conservation policies enacted; needing only 460 modern trawlers. Current population of 2565 trawlers,

1500 motorized sailboats, and 100 canoes are concentrated only on the Sind coast.

29
The number of fishermen and boats released by the two countries since 1994 is shown in 

Table 5. 

Table 5. Number of Boats and Fishermen Released by India and Pakistan

Month/Year Fishermen Released Boats released

May 1994 109 8 

Jul/Oct 1997 196 17 

Dec 1998 149 13 

May/Sep 1999 13 2 

Apr/Sep 2000 204 14 

 Dec 2001 202 13 

Pakistani media reported the release of 269 fishermen and 31 boats on 5 September

2003.49 Indian media reported release of 93 Pakistani fishermen by India and 74 

fishermen by Pakistan on 4 November 2003.50

The issue of fishermen getting arrested by the law enforcement agency of another country

is not unique to India and Pakistan. Numerous incidents of a similar nature take place in 

almost all coastal parts of the world. What is distressing is that whereas most other 

nations have managed to resolve this issue by laying down certain rules through bilateral 

agreements, India and Pakistan have failed to resolve this essentially humanitarian issue

over the last five decades.51 Perhaps the main reason for the arrests is that there are too 

many fishing craft operating in the near shore area and competing with each other for 

their livelihood.

The state of Gujarat has not yet promulgated any regulations to earmark separate fishing 

areas for the traditional craft and the mechanized fishing boats, like some other coastal

states in India have done. Poaching by fishing fleets of extra-regional countries like 

Russia, Taiwan, South Korea, and others has also been observed and reported. Effective 

fisheries enforcement therefore presents the possibility of preventing future disputes not 

only between India and Pakistan but also with extra-regional states.

49 “Pakistan to release 269 Indian fishermen as part of peace packages,” Agence France Presse, 3 

September 2003.

50 Times of India, 19 November 2003. p. 9. 51 Fishing disputes and agreements gained prominence following state declarations of EEZs, according to

UNCLOS. Many nations soon experienced overlapping claims in maritime jurisdiction. The 1990s heralded

in a decade of increased concern for the management of resources and the potential escalation of fishing

conflicts in NE Asia. Subsequently, three bilateral agreements were signed (China-Japan 1997, KoreaChina 1998, and Japan-Korea 1998). These agreements are significant for the following reasons: 

x The maritime boundaries in North East Asia are still not clearly defined.

x Boundary issues were separated from fishery issues. Thus, all agreements are transitional, pending

boundary delineation.

x Detailed nautical zones were created, in which registered fishermen from either side could work

openly, with flag states maintaining jurisdiction over their own vessels.

x Provisional EEZs were established with exchange quota agreements to allow seasonal or regulated

fishing in traditional areas by fishermen of the corresponding state.

x Bilateral Joint Fishing Commissions were established to conserve and manage living maritime

resources and effectively monitor the nature and progress of the agreement.

30
Proliferation of boats and trawlers in the area is beginning to adversely effect the 

preservation of fish stock. In the case of India, the report of the Working Group of the 

Tenth Planning Commission states that, “a sizeable percentage of the fishing vessels 

operate in the near shore waters. During the 1990’s, the marine fish production has 

reached a plateau. Most stocks are showing signs of over exploitation.” Any further 

growth of fishing craft in the near shore area is therefore likely to prove counterproductive in the long-run. 

It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to address issues of fish stock assessment,

regulating fishing practices, restricting number of boats and trawlers, encouraging 

environmental conservation, and other related issues. These aspects are in the ambit of 

respective governments and local administration and need to be addressed separately.

This paper focuses on the issue of fishing in the disputed area and the consequential 

arrest of fishermen. The problem, besides being a major irritant in bilateral relations, has 

a strong humanitarian element that cries out for alleviating the misery of the 

impoverished fishermen community.

Recommendations for Arrest Avoidance and Repatriation:

The practice of fishermen crossing the international maritime boundary is unlikely to stop

even after the boundary issue between India and Pakistan is resolved. Only operational 

cooperation and coordination and establishment of communications between the Indian 

Coast Guard and Pakistani Maritime Security Agency ships at sea may help mitigate the 

suffering of the fishermen and their families. The following recommendations should be 

considered:

x Strict instructions may be issued by both governments not to arrest fishermen

unless they are found indulging in illegal activities like narcotics trafficking, 

smuggling, etc. It is understood that the Prime Ministers of both the countries had 

indeed come to this understanding at Lahore in February 1999. However, 

subsequent political events did not allow the two governments sufficient time to 

implement the understanding. This is perhaps an ideal solution, but the fishing 

area and the operational framework need to be defined and notified. 

x Boats found in each other’s territory be warned and turned/escorted back into 

their respective country’s area. This would require continuous presence of patrol 

craft, for which both sides may not have enough resources. 

x Both countries grant fishing licenses to a specified number of boats of the other 

country on a monthly/seasonal/yearly basis, limiting the total permissible quantity 

of catch on an annual basis.

Technical Project Proposals:

1. Create a 40 x 40 nm Zone of Disengagement (ZoD) straddling the disputed 

maritime boundary in which fishing boats from both India and Pakistan would be 

permitted to operate without fear of arrest (see Figure 3). This would allow the 

fishermen on both sides to continue their traditional fishing methods, and allow 

them to share the transboundary migratory fish resource. The boats would, 

31
however, not be permitted to cross the outer limit of the Zone of the other country, 

and the total catch would have to be regulated on an annual basis. Ships and aircraft 

from the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and Pakistani Maritime Security Agency (MSA) 

would patrol within their respective Zones and warn/escort the other country’s 

fishing vessels tending to cross the outer limit of the zone line. The outer limit of 

the zone could be marked with buoys. 

2. Structure a Joint Commission to lay down the number and types of boats from each 

country that may be permitted to fish in the zone, the type of fish, and the annual 

catch quantity. 

3. The Joint Commission could also be authorized to adjudicate cases of violations. 

4. As an interim measure, the fishermen arrested with their craft may be handled as 

follows: on arrival at the port, crew to be released and repatriated after registering 

the case. Catch to be auctioned. Boat to be returned after the legal trials and

formalities are completed. Both sides to discuss and finalize the amount to be levied 

on account of maintenance of the boat, on a monthly basis, until the legal 

proceedings are completed.

5. Inform the local fishing community unions/associations to provide necessary help 

for speeding up the legal formalities. Fishery unions of both countries to be

encouraged to establish contact with each other through e-mail/fax/telephone lines 

for mutual help and assistance.

6. Introduction of the following low-end technological steps would also help in 

maintaining a tighter control in the area:

a. Warning Aids Ashore:

Both countries may consider erecting tall structures on undisputed land on the 

coast, on either side of the boundary. These structures could be equipped with: 

- Transponder facility to keep track of each country’s own boats. The 

equipment could be designed to give an audio warning and mark boats 

likely to cross the boundary.

- Transfer this information electronically to ICG/MSA ships on patrol for

further necessary action. 

- Upgrade the facilities in the shore structures in due course of time by 

installing a Vessel Monitoring System. 

- Have powerful lights with red and green sectors, both for ease of navigation 

at night and also for an indication to the fishermen that they are likely to 

stray into the other country’s territory (as soon as they start seeing the red 

light).

b. Warning Aids Onboard:

Since it may not be possible to do much with the traditional fishing boats at this 

stage, a beginning could be made by mandating all mechanized/motorized

fishing craft of 18-20 m length or more to carry a transponder and an instrument

with a GPS link that would give them: 

32
- Latitude/longitude position.

- An audio warning when the boat crosses the international boundary and the 

outer limit of the common fishing zone of the other country. These warnings 

would have to be in the local language. 

- In due course, such vessels could be fitted to participate in the Vessel 

Monitoring System.

Note: In order to encourage the fishermen to install the above equipment onboard, the cost of the equipment would almost certainly have to be subsidized. 

c. Data Bank:

A data bank should be created at central locations ashore, which may be 

networked with all the small and large fishing harbors of the area. These data 

banks are to maintain a record of all the fishing boats and their crews. Captains

of the boats must submit a list of their crew to the network center before 

proceeding to sea. This network may be built up over a period of time and 

would prove most useful in crew tagging, boat tracking, and identifying the 

boats and crews in case of arrests. In due course, both countries may consider

linking the two networks so that the questions of identity and citizenship of the 

arrested crew are established without any doubt and loss of time. Involvement

of the fishermen unions in populating and building up the database would 

expedite the process and also provide the unions’ access to the data. 

33
Naval Interactions and Coastal Force Interactions

INCSEA and Law of Naval Warfare 

On 6 April 1991, India and Pakistan concluded an agreement on advance notice of 

military exercises, maneuvers, and troop movements (see Appendix 1). Clearly, this

agreement, though important from the military point of view, does not address issues of

safety and security of smaller units, non-combatants, and neutral ships and aircraft. The 

need for a more comprehensive agreement to prevent incidents at sea was recognized by 

both India and Pakistan and incorporated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 

to the Lahore Declaration of February 1999.52

The CMC and Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University in their 

publications53 and seminars54 have promoted and endorsed this clause as a significant 

CBM. The participants at the 2002 Symposium on Confidence Building in South Asian 

Waters in Malaysia, recognizing the urgent need for an INCSEA-type agreement,

recommended the Malaysia-Indonesia model as a more suitable precedent. This 

agreement was preferred because it, “made creative and explicit provision for its 

application to the operation of their ships in disputed waters without prejudice to their 

respective claims.”55 INCSEA is not an end itself, but a beginning. Whereas it may not 

prevent all incidents, it will be a catalyst for a change in relationship.

Despite rigorous efforts, the INCSEA proposals have not advanced due to lack of 

substantive progress on the political front. It is also a fact that maritime issues in this

region have tended to take a back seat in both government and non-government forums.

Without digressing from this core proposal, this paper seeks to recommend that both 

navies consider a revision and update to their respective Rules of Engagements (ROEs) in 

conformity with the San Remo Manual on “International Law Applicable to Armed

Conflicts at Sea.” The Law of Naval Warfare dates back to 1907. Whereas laws of 

warfare in other spheres (e.g. laws of the air, Law of Armed Conflict on Land, etc.) have 

52 Paragraph 5 of MOU, “The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in

order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.” 53 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, op. cit. 54 Seminars concerning advance notice CBMs included the following activities conducted by the Centre for 

Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University (www.dal.ca/~centre).

a) Symposium on Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters at Lumut, Malaysia 29-31 June

2001

b) Workshop on Regional Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean, Halifax, Canada, July 2001

c) Maritime Study working group seminar in Islamabad, Pakistan, 22 May 2001

d) Symposium on Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 29 

April-3 May 2002

e) Symposium on Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters, Colombo, Sri Lanka, August

2003. 55 Detailed report on the Symposium on Confidence Building in South Asian Waters in Malaysia, CMC, 

May 2002.

34
been revised and updated,56 these issues in the maritime arena have all remained

unaddressed until recently.

The law relating to land warfare has been affirmed in recent treaties, such as the 

Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 1949. However, this has not 

been the case regarding the Law of Naval Warfare.57, 58

It is often not realized that the Law of Naval Warfare does not merely provide a code of 

conduct of operations in war, but also has a confidence building potential in peacetime.

With the prohibition of the use of force except in self-defense under the UN Charter, 

there has been a marked reluctance on the part of countries to acknowledge the existence 

of hostilities. Modern wars have many gray areas, due to which the rules and regulations

of naval activities need to be revised. The nature and dimension of naval warfare have 

changed dramatically, as evident from the recent conduct of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

While all aspects of armed conflict, land, air or sea, should be in conformity with the 

basic principles of international humanitarian law, certain specificities of naval 

operations need to be taken into account, particularly where neutral interests are involved

at sea. This raises the issues of contemporary international law as applicable to armed

conflict at sea. Examples of such conflicts include the Falklands conflict, which raised

significant questions of the use of exclusion zones; the Iran-Iraq war, which saw 

extensive attacks on neutral shipping as well as use of exclusion zones by belligerents; 

the downing of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes; the sinking by the Liberation 

Tigers of Tamil Elam of a vessel chartered by the International Committee of the Red 

Cross (ICRC); and a blockade of Iraq by Coalition forces without declaration of war. 

The Institute of Humanitarian Law, supported by the ICRC, after two decades of labor by 

experts produced the “San Remo Manual of International Law Applicable to Armed

Conflicts at Sea” on 12 June 1994.59 This restatement is very timely considering that: 

x 50% of the world’s gas and oil reserves are off-shore

x Over 100 states face the sea (and are in a position to exploit it) 

x UNCLOS III has given states jurisdiction over vast swathes of sea 

x The nature of armed conflict has changed. There is no longer a “declaration of 

war” that precedes armed conflict. 

The title referring to armed conflict at sea is a little misleading, because today maritime

strategy and application of sea-power is as much concerned with power projection onto 

land. Otherwise, naval commanders would be faced with conflicting rules at sea and on

56 This proposal was mooted and adopted at the International Seminar on the Indian Ocean, Islamabad,

April 1994.

57 Louise Doswald-Beck Head, International Review of the Red Cross No. 309, pp. 583-594. 58 Almost all treaties date from 1907 and did not deal with all subjects. Subsequently, a non-binding code

was adopted in 1913 at Oxford. The Oxford Manual on the Law of Naval War governing the relations

between belligerents was adopted by the Institute of International Law. 

59 The manual takes into account the UN Charter, Laws of the Sea, air law, Law of Armed Conflict on

Land, and environmental law.

35
land. US strikes on targets in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq emphasize this important

dimension of sea power. 

The San Remo Manual addresses important issues including: 

x Use of different sea areas (EEZ, territorial sea, and exclusion zones) which impact

rights of passage of neutral shipping 

x Establishing that indiscriminate naval operations are unlawful

x Principles of “proportionality” and “due regard” are called up 

x Prohibition of attack on the environment without military necessity as a violation 

of the concept of “collateral damage” (This prohibition precludes hostile action in 

rare and fragile ecosystems, etc.) 

x Prohibition of disproportionate effects on environment compared to the military

advantage to be gained 

x Aspects of air law as they apply to civil aircraft 

x Protection of legitimate rights of neutral states

x Distinction between civilians, protected persons, and combatants at all times

x States’ rights to choose methods and means of warfare are not unlimited.

In the absence of this manual, many naval forces have adopted their own rules of 

engagement. Among the more notable examples are: 

x US Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NW9A) and its 

annotated supplements (1989)

x German manual of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict.60

The US handbook is a comprehensive document. Part I deals with US Naval Operations 

in peacetime, and Part II applies to conduct of US forces in armed conflict. The United

States applies this law whether war has been declared or not. 

There is an urgent need to revise rules and regulations governing naval activities in times

of peace and war. Many provisions of the San Remo Manual are finding their way into

modern naval manuals. Like most significant navies, India and Pakistan need to review 

their respective rules of engagement vis-à-vis the San Remo Manual. 

If revised and implemented, customary law regulating armed conflict would become

common law worldwide, and more particularly in South Asia. This would:

x Codify rules of engagement to be in conformity with International Law 

x Provide commonality of doctrine, which would produce predictable

actions/reactions in areas of congruity 

x Be recognized internationally as a set of rules which may be used in courts if 

needed

x Create a common grid and range of mutual interests. 

60 Federal Ministry of Defense, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts Manual, ZDv15/2 (1992).

36
Adoption and promulgation of a common Law of Naval Warfare by each state would 

pave the way for the conclusion of INCSEA as a natural corollary and result of this 

measure.61 This recommendation may be the subject of a separate study or project. 

Indian Coast Guard–Pakistani Maritime Security Agency Cooperation

Both the ICG and MSA are paramilitary forces and operate under the defense ministries

of their respective countries. These forces are not structured as fighting arms like the 

Navies. The advantage of seeking closer cooperation between these two services is that 

the progress of dialogue and the actual implementation on the ground would be very 

closely monitored by the respective Navies and Defense Ministries. Further, the Charter 

of Duties assigned to the two services is also similar in nature and they are broadly 

responsible for the following type of activities in their respective areas: 

x Protection of fishermen

x Search and rescue at sea 

x Assistance in disaster management at sea 

x Anti-piracy

x Anti-smuggling

x Interdiction of narcotics trade and gun running 

x Protection of the marine environment

x Pollution control, especially from oil spills. 

The listed activities can be effectively executed by ensuring a certain amount of synergy 

between the ICG and the MSA. This would mean functional cooperation and 

coordination of operations at sea between the two services. To bring about the required 

level of understanding, the following steps are recommended: 

a. A tabletop exercise involving search and rescue (SAR), oil spill pollution control, or 

any other incident, to be conducted in a neutral country, like Canada. The Canadian 

Coast Guard has been active in the Asia-Pacific region in fields such as SAR, marine

environment protection, oil spills, and maritime training. Canada has also been active 

in bringing maritime professionals together to share views on maritime safety and 

security in Track II settings. A concrete example is the Middle East and Northern 

African Maritime Safety Colloquium (MARSAF), which provides a foundation for 

sustainable maritime cooperation. The Canadian Coast Guard has built up an 

acceptable, helpful, non-military image and thus is an ideal vehicle for bringing the

MSA and ICG officials together for a joint exercise. This exercise would need to be 

sponsored and worked through the Defense Ministries so that bureaucratic delays are 

61 Some important aspects called up in San Remo Section IV: Areas of Naval Warfare include 

territorial sea, inland water, land territories, EEZ, continental shelf, and archipelagic waters of belligerent

states. No hostile action in (a) rare and fragile ecosystems or (b) habitats of depleted, threatened and

endangered species. Protection of legitimate rights of neutral states. States’ rights to choose methods and

means of warfare are not unlimited. Distinguish between civilians/protected persons and combatants at all

times. It should be noted that the manual exempts eight categories of vessels from capture during war,

including small coastal fishing vessels and small boats engaged in local trade. Therefore, exemption during

peacetime should not be difficult.

37
avoided. It would also be prudent to structure the exercise specifically for the Arabian 

Sea area and involve one or two other countries, e.g., Oman or the Maldives, as 

appropriate.

Each side could depute at least one senior-level officer and one-middle level officer 

for the exercise. Participation could be as many as four officers from each side. The 

aim of the exercise should be to promote understanding between the officers and 

work out common procedures for operations at sea.

A map indicating the SAR responsibilities assigned by international agreement to the 

countries in the South Asia region is shown in Figure 6 below:

Figure 6. South Asia Search and Rescue Responsibilities

b. After overcoming the initial operational difficulties, the next logical step would be to 

hold an exercise at sea. This may be a sensitive issue because all participating sides

would have to commit assets as a part of the exercise. It would therefore be prudent 

to limit the overall scope so that no side gets over committed.

c. Once the above CBM is achieved, it may be possible to persuade India to invite 

Pakistan to participate in the “Dosti” SAR exercise held annually between India and 

the Maldives. This would be a brave and historic step forward, and, given the right 

political atmosphere at the time, it is hoped that the authorities in India would extend, 

and Pakistan would accept, the proposal. In due course of time, it may become a 

38
regular feature and gather support of the other countries of the region and may

develop in shape and concept like Joint Exercises Trincomalee of the 1950s and 

1960s.

d. In the next phase, the ICG and the MSA ships at sea could coordinate their patrols 

and searches at sea and exchange operational information regarding smuggling,

narcotics, gun running, etc., on designated radio frequencies. This phase would also 

include an agreement on monitoring the fishing activities in the proposed Zone of 

Disengagement. For this purpose, the officials of both ICG and MSA could jointly 

board patrol craft to ensure that rules regarding type and quantity of catch, etc. are 

being followed.

e. The two parties could establish communications between the ICG and MSA 

headquarters at Mumbai and Karachi and share data regarding pollution control,62

protection of marine environment, and disaster management. This would go a long 

way towards getting an overall picture of the activities in the area of concern. The 

ICG, having larger resources of technical equipment and expertise, could extend help 

to MSA at the time of their need and vice-versa. This would help both sides share 

data and deploy maritime assets in a more economical way, with greater positive

results.

f. In due course, the two countries could consider setting up Maritime Rapid Response 

Centers, linked to each other, with adequate and mandatory powers to board and 

inspect various types of craft for anti-smuggling and anti-gun-running operations, etc. 

Similarly, tankers passing through the area could also be inspected for anti-pollution 

operations, as is being done by Italy, France, Turkey, etc. 

The authors believe that in due course of time, the success story of the ICG/MSA 

cooperation will trickle upwards and may help to soften the attitudes in the armed forces 

of both the countries.

62 Peter Cozens, “Overview of Maritime Security in Indian Ocean,” Asia Pacific Research Institute. 

Approximately 0.5% of a super tanker’s cargo of crude oil settles down during the delivery voyage and has

to be washed out. 0.5% of 100,000 tons is 500 tons. With 100 such tankers crossing the Indian Ocean

every day, nearly 50,000 tons/day are perhaps being jettisoned between the Persian Gulf and North East 

Asia.

39
Conclusion

A stage has now been reached in South Asia when the current situation can no longer be 

allowed to drift. The ongoing 50-year confrontation between India and Pakistan has taken 

a heavy toll on the economies and social development of both nations. The people are 

suffering from crisis fatigue and yearn for a tension-free environment.

The timing is right, the leadership is willing to talk, and popular support for peace exists

on both sides. This unique historical opportunity must not be allowed to pass. Bold, 

visionary leaders need to grasp this moment.

Intractable issues may be set aside, as this paper suggests, and the two sides may address 

issues that are soft and less politically volatile; the need is to proceed with cautious haste

and optimism by building blocks for future cooperation and linkages. 

The thrust of this paper is on maritime issues. The continental approach may be set aside 

and the more promising areas of conflict resolution at sea may be addressed. Initially, the 

contacts need to be confined to technical and professional levels; a bottom-up approach 

contains greater promise of success. 

The private sector is emerging as a powerful player in the South Asian arena, and the 

dynamics of commerce and trade will help knock down the artificial barriers. Trade in 

general, and maritime trade in particular, may be the engine that will drive the peace

process forward. 

The authors of this paper have great faith in the ancient wisdom and sagacity of the 

peoples of this great Asian Sub-continent to stem the tide of sapping hostility and come 

together as a harmonious community, as behooves the inheritors of a glorious past, 

tradition, and culture. 

In conclusion, the authors recommend that the following proposed actions be seriously 

considered and immediate steps taken to put these CBMs in place. Thereafter, we 

recommend enacting as many proposals as possible to solve the maritime issues and drive

the peace process forward. 

40
Proposed Actions 

Analysis of the issues presented in this study leads to the following lists of proposed 

actionable CBMs. These lists propose specific ways to address the key issues identified in 

this study. The first list is a focused subset of projects that could be implemented in the 

near term. The second, complete list describes CBM actions arranged by the subject 

areas they are intended to address. Some of these actions may take longer to implement

than those in the first list. They may also have significant political components that 

would need to be addressed first. 

Near-Term Projects 

1. Demonstrate technologies for locating fishing vessels with respect to a Zone of 

Disengagement and maritime boundary. 

a. Inexpensive location indicator for vessels 

b. Vessel location monitoring system to include 

- Location tracking

- Identity database (for both vessels and personnel). 

2. Request Canadian and US simulation experts to sponsor and conduct a tabletop 

exercise involving SAR and invite ICG and MSA personnel to attend.

3. Develop boundary mapping technologies, including Geographic Information

Systems (GIS) and remote sensing imagery, for the maritime boundary and Sir 

Creek in order to facilitate critical discussion between technical and policy 

stakeholders in both India and Pakistan. 

4. Both governments to take steps to upgrade port security by negotiating bi-lateral 

agreements with the US for designated ports (such as Karachi/PQ, Mumbai,

Kochi, Chennai). 

5. Conduct an ecological survey of the Sir Creek ecosystem. Involve nongovernmental organizations already engaged (for example, the International 

Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in Pakistan and India). 

Convene an appropriate transboundary workshop in either country under the 

auspices of the CMC. 

Complete Proposals List 

Maritime Boundary

1. Policy decision by both governments to de-link Sir Creek from the maritime

boundary issue. 

2. Convene meetings of the Working Group (established by the Lahore MOU) at the 

Additional Secretary level to negotiate the maritime boundary along the following

guidelines:

a. Use seaward approach method in accordance with TALOS 

b. Divide Sir Creek at the median outflow point, as an interim measure, without 

prejudice to any future claim by either side. 

3. Develop boundary mapping technologies, including Geographic Information

Systems (GIS) and remote sensing imagery, for the maritime boundary and Sir 

41
Creek in order to facilitate critical discussion between technical and policy 

stakeholders in both India and Pakistan. 

Sir Creek 

1. Maintain status quo. 

2. Complete the survey of the Sir Creek estuary. Since India has recently conducted

surveys in the area, it takes the lead in this effort. Indian survey information to be 

exchanged with Pakistani Navy hydrographers for authentication. The joint 

survey effort should include: 

a. Delineation of high water line 

b. Fixing of protruding edges along the creek 

c. Sounding and marking of coastline in the approaches area. 

3. Conduct check surveys if and where required. 

4. Survey the Sir Creek ecosystem. Involve non-governmental organizations already 

engaged (IUCN). Convene a workshop in either country under the auspices of the 

CMC. Encourage a meeting between environmental groups from both sides to 

investigate or exchange existing information regarding the fragile ecosystem 

surrounding the mouth of the Sir Creek area, which could build a foundation for 

joint environmental monitoring and management once the boundary is 

established.

5. Establish boundary mapping technologies and remote sensing imagery for Sir 

Creek in order to facilitate critical discussion between technical and policy 

stakeholders.

Shipping and Trade 

1. Both governments agree to convene immediately the India-Pakistan Joint 

Commission to review 1975 Shipping Protocol and to delete Clauses 5 and 9. This 

would open up unrestricted shipping and cargo haulage between the two 

countries.

2. Resume passenger services between Karachi and Mumbai.

Security of Ports and Cargos 

1. Both governments take steps to upgrade port security by negotiating bi-lateral 

agreements with the US for designated ports (such as Karachi/PQ, Mumbai, and 

Cochin). As trade links strengthen between these ports, the dynamics of 

commercial activity will enable sharing of data regarding crews and cargo loading 

initially. Eventually, security information will be shared, as well. There is 

potential for bi-lateral agreements between the ports along the lines of the US 

Container Security Initiative and Operation Safe Commerce.

Fishermen

1. Both governments agree in principle to create a Zone of Disengagement on either 

side of the proposed/disputed maritime boundary.

2. Convene a meeting of hydrographers from both countries to delineate the ZoD. 

3. Demonstrate technologies for locating fishing vessels with respect to ZoD and 

maritime boundary. 

42
1. Inexpensive location indicator for vessels 

2. Vessel location monitoring system to include 

- Location tracking 

- Identity database for both vessels and personnel. 

4. Structure a Joint Commission to administer the ZoD.

5. Promulgate orders for licensing, catch limits, surveillance, and fishing restrictions 

in the ZoD. 

6. Minimize hardships to fishermen by following an arrest avoidance policy. 

7. In case of arrests, release the crew after registering of case by police. Boat to be 

released after the legal process is completed.

Interaction Between Naval and Other Maritime Authorities

Navy-to-Navy

1. Each navy to revise and update its respective Rules of Engagement in accordance 

with the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at

Sea.

2. The Defense Ministries’ and Naval Headquarters’ staff should convene meetings

of professional naval officers to negotiate INCSEA agreements on the basis of the 

updated rules of engagement.

Indian Coast Guard/Pakistani Maritime Security Agency Cooperation 

1. Defense Ministries accept the principle of cooperation between the ICG and MSA 

and approve joint SAR exercises. 

2. Request Canadian/US simulation experts to sponsor and conduct tabletop SAR 

exercises and invite both countries’ organizations to participate. 

3. Both countries’ Defense Ministries order follow-up exercises at sea. 

4. The Directors General of ICG and MSA depute representatives to draw up 

operational plans to conduct regular, live SAR exercises and share data and assets. 

5. The Directors General may seek their governments’ approval to set up Maritime

Risk Response Centers to deal with oil spills, pollution events, and other 

emergencies.

6. The ICG Director General seeks government clearance to invite Pakistan to 

participate in the Dosti SAR exercise held annually between India and the 

Maldives.

43
[This page intentionally left blank] 

44
Appendixes

The following appendixes include, in their entirety, important agreements and documents

referred to in the body of the paper. The following documents are presented: 

Appendix 1. Agreement Between India and Pakistan on the Advance Notice of Military 

Exercises (6 April 1991) 

Appendix 2. Lahore Declaration and Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (21 

February 1999) 

Appendix 3. Technical Aspects of the Law of the Sea (TALOS) 

Appendix 4. Protocol On Resumption Of Shipping Services Between India and 

Pakistan (15, January 1975) 

45
Appendix 1 

Agreement Between India and Pakistan on the Advance Notice 

of Military Exercises 

(6 April 1991) 

Whereas Pakistan and India recognize the need to jointly formulate an agreement at the 

government level on giving advance notice on exercises, manoeuvres and troop 

movements in order to prevent any crisis situation arising due to misreading of the other 

side's intentions. Therefore, the governments of Pakistan and India jointly decide that: 

1. Their Land, Naval and Air Forces will avoid holding major military manoeuvres and

exercises in close proximity to each other. However, if such exercises are held within

distances as prescribed in this Agreement, the strategic direction of the main force being 

exercised will not be towards the other side, nor will any logistics build up be carried out

close to it. The following will constitute a major military manoeuvre/exercise for the 

purposes of this Agreement:

a. Land Forces 

1. India-Pakistan International Border 

Concentrations of Corps level (comprising two or more divisions) and 

above.

2. Line of Control and the area between the Manawar Tawi and Ravi 

Rivers.

Division level and above. 

b. Naval Forces: Any exercise involving six or more ships of destroyer/frigate 

size and above, exercising in company and crossing into the other's Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ). 

c. Air Force: Regional Command level and above. 

2. Both sides may not conduct exercises of Land Forces at Divisional level and above 

within five kilometers (Kms) of the areas specified at Paragraph (1).a. (1) and (2).

3. Both sides will provide notice regarding exercises of Land Forces as follow:

a. All exercises/concentrations at Divisional level in areas specified at Paragraph

(1).a (2).

b. All exercises/concentrations at Corps level within a distance of seventy five 

Kms in areas specified at Paragraph (1).a. (1) and (2). 

c. All exercises above Corps level irrespective of the distance. 

4. Both sides will give fifteen days prior notice when formations with defensive roles are 

moved to their operational locations for periodic maintenance of defences.

5. The schedule of major exercises with troops will be transmitted in writing to the other

side through diplomatic channels in advance as follows:

46
a. Air exercises at Regional Command level and above. -- Fifteen days 

b. Divisional level exercise, and major Naval exercises involving six or more

ships of destroyer/frigate size and above, exercising in company and crossing into 

the other's EEZ. 

c. Corps level exercises -- Sixty days 

d. Army level exercises -- Ninety days 

Provided that the above provisions relate to the commencement of moves of formations

and units from their permanent locations for the proposed exercises.

6. Information on the following aspects of major exercises will be intimated:

a. Type and level of exercises. 

b. General area of the exercise on land, air and sea. In respect of air and sea 

exercises, these will be defined in latitude and longitude. 

c. Planned duration of the activity. 

d. Number and type of formations participating. 

e. Any shifting of forces from other Commands/Corps/Strategic formations

envisaged.

f. The move of strategic formations, particularly armored division, mechanized

divisions, air assault divisions/reserve infantry formations and artillery 

divisions/air defence artillery divisions. 

Provided that in respect of major Air and Naval exercises, only the information at 

Paragraphs (a) to (c) need be intimated.

7. In case some change in exercise area/grouping of participating formations from the 

previously notified composition is necessitated, the country carrying out the exercise will 

intimate the details of changes so as to reach the other country at least thirty days in 

advance in respect of Corps level exercises and above, and fifteen days in advance in 

respect of divisional level exercises and Naval exercises. In respect of Air exercises, if 

minor changes to the previously notified details are necessitated, an advance notice of 

seven days will be provided.

8. Any induction/concentration of additional troops of a division size force and above,

within one hundred and fifty kms of areas specified at Paragraph 1.a.(1) and (2), for 

internal security duties and/or in aid of civil power will be notified to the other side at 

least two days before the start of their movements, whenever possible. In case of 

immediate movements, information may be passed on Hot Line to the Army 

Headquarters of the other country. The force so employed will not move forward their 

logistic bases/installations and armor/artillery.

9. Each country will be entitled to obtain timely clarification from the country 

undertaking military manoeuvres/exercises concerning the assembly of formations, the

extent, direction of the exercise and the duration.

10. The Naval ships and submarines belonging to the other country are not to close less 

than three Nautical Miles (NMs) from each other so as to avoid any accident while 

operating in international waters.

47
11. Combat aircraft including fighter, bomber reconnaissance, jet military trainer and 

armed helicopter aircraft will not fly within ten kms of each other's airspace, including

the Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ), except when such aircraft are operating 

form Jammu, Pathankot, Amritsar and Suratgarh air bases on the Indian side, as well as 

Pasrur, Lahore, Vehari and Rahimyar Khan air bases on the Pakistan side, in which case 

they will maintain a distance of five kms from each other's airspace. Unarmed transport

and logistics aircraft including unarmed helicopters and Air Observation Post (AOP) 

aircraft will be permitted to operate up to 1000 meters from each other's airspace 

including the ADIZ.

12. Aircraft of either country will refrain from buzzing surface units and platforms of the 

other country in international waters.

13. This Agreement supersedes all previous understandings in so far as the above points 

are concerned.

14. This Agreement is subject to ratification. It shall come into force with effect from the 

date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.

15. Done at New Delhi on this sixth day of April, 1991.

Shaharyar M. Khan

Foreign Secretary

For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Muchkund Dubey 

Foreign Secretary 

For the Government of the Republic of India 

48
Appendix 2 

Lahore Declaration and Lahore Memorandum of Understanding

(21 February 1999) 

Lahore Declaration 

The following is the text of the Lahore Declaration signed by the Prime Minister, Mr. A. 

B. Vajpayee, and the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, in Lahore on Sunday:

The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and 

prosperity for their peoples;

Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly 

cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling 

them to devote their energies for a better future;

Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries 

adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;

Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the

universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in 

letter and spirit;

Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for 

improving the security environment;

Recalling their agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an environment of peace and

security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all 

outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose; 

Have agreed that their respective Governments:

shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and 

Kashmir.

shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.

shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive 

outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.

49
shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of 

nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating 

measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at 

prevention of conflict.

reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their 

efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with 

a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their 

quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural 

development.

reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their 

determination to combat this menace.

shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Signed at Lahore on the 21st day of February 1999.

Atal Behari Vajpayee - Prime Minister of the Republic of India

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif - Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

50
Lahore Memorandum of Understanding

The following is the text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Foreign 

Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath, and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad,

in Lahore on Sunday:

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan:-

Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles

and purposes of the U.N. Charter;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in 

letter and spirit;

Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an 

environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and

that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for 

this purpose;

Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt 

measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two 

countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following:-

1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear 

doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and 

conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.

2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of 

ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.

3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the 

risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. 

The two sides further undertake to notify each, other immediately in the event of any 

accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout 

with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the 

two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such 

actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall 

identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on 

conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national 

sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.

51
5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to 

ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.

6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence

Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative

mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.

7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. 

between the respective Directors-General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading 

and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.

8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and nonproliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.

Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by 

experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid

1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements.

Done at Lahore on 21st February 1999 in the presence of Prime Minister of India, Mr. 

Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

(K. Raghunath)

Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India

(Shamshad Ahmad)

Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 

52
Appendix 3 

Technical Aspects of the Law of the Sea (TALOS) 

A. Technical Aspects of the Law of the Sea (TALOS) for delineating rivers of adjacent

states and maritime boundary: 

6.2.5 The Equidistance Line 

6.2.5.1

An equidistance line has already been defined (see 6.2.1). Figure 27 illustrates 

graphically the construction of an equidistance line between opposite States (a) 

and one between adjacent States (b). 

6.2.5.2

Figure 27 (a) shows the coasts (the low-water line) of two opposite States, both of 

which employ normal baselines (i.e. not a system of straight base lines). The 

construction of the median line may be seen on the left hand side of the figure. 

Taking points a and b, a perpendicular bisector op is drawn with m being the 

precise bisecting point of the line ab. Proceed towards p until a point c of State A 

now becomes equidistant from a mid point q to a, b and c. Now taking b and c a 

perpendicular bisector o’p’ is drawn. This intersects the first baseline bisector op 

at q. Then proceed towards p’ until a point d in State B becomes equidistant from

a midpoint r to b, c and d. By continuing to proceed to the right in this way, the 

segments of the median line would be constructed until the total median line is 

derived. The points along the median line equidistant from three points are known 

as tri-points.

Figure 27(a) 

53
6.2.5.3

Figure 27 (b) shows the coasts (low water line) of two adjacent States, again, both 

of which employ normal baselines. There is no essential difference between the 

method of determining the equidistance line in this case and that already 

described for opposite coasts. Difficulties in determining the link with the land 

boundary may, however, be avoided by beginning the exercise from seaward 

rather than from the land boundary terminal. The construction of this equidistance 

(lateral) line may be achieved as follows: Starting a suitable distance offshore 

look for two points, in this case a and b, situated in States A and B respectively, 

that are an equal distance from starting point t. Produce the angular bisector op. 

Proceed shorewards until point until at point u it is found that an additional point 

c is equidistant with a and b. Now prescribe the angular bisector between b and c 

and again continue shorewards until point v is reached where a new point d is 

equidistant to c and b. Continue the process and it will be found that the 

equidistance line terminates at the land boundary between States A and B.

Figure 27(b) 

54
Appendix 4 

Protocol On Resumption Of Shipping Services Between India 

and Pakistan

(15 January 1975) 

This agreement also flows out of the provisions of the Shimla agreement. It relates to 

resumption of shipping services between the two countries and enjoins upon each 

contracting party to make available all facilities to the shipping crews.

RECALLING the provisions of the Shimla Agreement of 1972 to progressively restore 

and normalise relations between the two countries, and

RECALLING further the Protocol on Resumption of Trade between India and Pakistan 

signed at New Delhi on the 30th November 1974, and

RECALLING to restore direct shipping services between the two countries,

The Delegations of India and Pakistan, which met in New Delhi from the 11th to 15th

January 1975, have agreed as follows:

(1) Necessary steps will be taken by both the countries to restore direct shipping

services by the 15th February 1975, on the principles of sovereign equality, and 

mutual benefit.

(2) Such services will cover the carriage of cargo between the two countries.

(3) Such carriage will only be by the vessels of the mercantile marine sailing under the 

flag of either country in accordance with its laws and regulations. 

(4) All cargo between the ports of the two countries shall be carried on the principle of 

equality in matters relating to cargo lifting and freight earnings on an annual basis. 

(5) Vessels of either country will load in the ports of one country only such cargo as is 

destined for other country. 

(6) For coordination of all questions connected with the operation of direct shipping 

services between both the countries, the Government of India hereby nominate the 

Director General of Shipping, Bombay on their part and the Government of 

Pakistan likewise nominate the Director General of Ports and Shipping, Karachi on 

their part.

(7) The authorities referred to in Article (6) will nominate the shipping companies of 

their respective countries to determine by mutual discussions the details of 

operation of the services. For this purpose the representatives of the Shipping 

companies shall meet, as early as possible, on a mutually convenient date.

55
(8) The vessels of either country, their crew, and cargoes shall be admitted to the 

territorial waters and the parts of the other country and shall be accorded the mostfavoured-nation treatment relating to their entry, stay, loading/unloading of cargo, 

leaving of the ports, and all necessary facilities for safe maritime navigation. 

(9) The provisions of Article (8) shall be subject to Article (5) and such restrictions as 

are or may be imposed, from time to time, by the laws of either country. 

(10) Either country shall adopt, within the limits of their laws and port regulations, all 

appropriate measures to facilitate and expedite maritime traffic, to prevent delays to

vessels and to expedite the carrying out of customs and other formalities applicable

at the ports.

(11) All ships documents including those relating to nationality, registration, tonnage 

and survey issued or recognised by one country shall be recognised by the other 

country.

(12) Either country shall recognise the seamen's identity documents issued by the 

appropriate authorities of the other country. 

(13) Holder of Seamen's identity documents specified in Article (12) shall, during the 

stay of the vessel in the ports of the other country, be permitted to land on 

temporary shore leave without visa, on his obtaining a Landing Permit valid for a 

period not exceeding 24 hours, provided he deposits his Continuous Discharge 

Certificate with the Immigration authorities and provided further that the crew list 

has been submitted to the concerned authorities in accordance with the laws and 

regulations in force in that port. The said person shall be subject to customs control. 

His entry and stay in port shall be governed by the provisions of the India-Pakistan 

Visa Agreement of 14th September 1974 and the laws and regulations in force in 

that port. 

(14) When a member of the crew disembarks in the port of the other country due to 

illness, he shall be permitted to enter a hospital. He shall also be permitted to rejoin

ship or be repatriated. If a member of the crew is left behind for reasons such as, 

“missing the ship” or his transfer from the ship, he shall be permitted to rejoin ship

or be repatriated. 

(15) The captain of the vessel staying in the port of the other country or a person 

authorised by him shall be permitted and assisted to contact or visit the Consular 

official representing the interest of the other country. 

(16) If a vessel of either country be involved in maritime peril or encounters any other 

danger off the coast or in the ports of the other country, the vessel, the cargo, the 

crew and the passengers shall receive the same assistance which is accorded to a 

national vessel, its cargo, crew and passengers. This will be subject to the

respective laws and international obligations of the two countries. 

56
(17) The cargo, ship stores, machinery spares etc., of the damaged vessel which have to 

be offloaded, shall not be subject to customs duties and taxes provided the same are 

taken out of the country within a reasonable period. 

(18) All payments and expenses relating to shipping services between the two countries 

shall be effected in freely convertible currency in accordance with the foreign

exchange regulations in force from time to time in each country. 

(19) The representatives of the two authorities referred to in Article (5) above shall 

meet, as necessary, to discuss and resolve all outstanding problems. If they are 

unable to settle any question concerning the interpretation or application of this 

Protocol, such questions shall be referred to the respective Governments for 

settlement.

(20) To facilitate urgent consultants in matters relating to implementation of this 

protocol and any arrangements made there under, visas shall be granted 

immediately, on request, to four nationals of either country nominated by the 

respective authorities referred to in Article (6), for travel to the other country. 

Names and full particulars of the nationals so nominated shall be exchanged as 

soon as possible and Consular authorities representing the interests of both the 

countries informed accordingly. 

(21) Both the Governments shall take necessary steps to rescind with effect from the 1st

February 1975, the existing restrictions on the entry of merchant vessels of their 

countries to each other's ports. 

(22) The working of the Protocol shall be reviewed by the two Governments after the 

lapse of one year and thereafter as may be mutually agreed upon.

This Protocol will come into force on the date of signing.

Sd/- Sd/- 

M. Ramakrishanayya K. T. Kidwai

Secretary to the Government of India Secretary to the 

Ministry of Shipping and Transport Government of Pakistan 

and Leader of the Indian Delegation. Ministry of Communications

 and Leader of the Pakistan Delegation. 

New Delhi, 15th January 1975. 

57
About the Authors: 

Rear Admiral Hasan Ansari (Pakistan)

Rear Admiral Hasan Ansari served an impressive career in the

Pakistani Navy from 1955-1995. His naval experience encompasses

Command, Staff, Administrative, and Industrial assignments. He 

attained top positions open to engineering duties officers throughout

his career, serving as Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Material) and 

(Logistics) at Naval Headquarters, overseeing a ships transfer 

program in Washington DC, and becoming a Principal of the 

Pakistan Navy Engineering College, where he established a graduate 

program in electronics and telecommunications engineering. His last 

navy command was Commander Logistics. Admiral Ansari's academic history includes

postgraduate War Studies at the Royal College of Defence Studies (London UK) and 

post-graduate specialization in marine engineering from R.N.E.C. (Plymouth UK). He is 

a graduate of the Royal Naval Engineering College (Plymouth UK), Forman Christian 

College (Lahore), and Britannia Royal Naval College (Dartmouth).

For his distinguished services, he is the recipient of the high Hilal-E-Imtiaz (Military) and 

Sitara-E-Basalat awards.

Throughout the past five years, Admiral Ansari has served as a Member of the Public 

Service Commission, Government of Sindh, where he helped bring about institutional 

changes such as syllabi revision, exams formatting, and psychological testing of civil 

servants. In 1991, he assisted in founding the Pakistan Institute of Maritime Affairs, 

which is headed by Admiral Chaudri, the first Commander-in-Chief of Navy.

Admiral Ansari is married with two grown children. He is an avid reader and passionate 

golfer.

Rear Admiral Ravi Vohra (India) 

Rear Admiral Ravi Vohra retired with a distinguished career in the 

Indian Navy spanning 1962-1994. Key naval appointments included 

Assistant Controller of Warship Production and Acquisition (Delhi), 

Flag Officer Offshore Defence Advisory Group (Bombay), Naval 

Attaché (Bonn West Germany), Naval Assistant to the Chief of Naval 

Staff (Delhi), Command of INS Taragiri, Second-in-Command of the 

missile destroyer INS Rajput, and Second-in-Command of the INS 

Nilgiri. Admiral Vohra is a graduate of the National Defence

Academy in Pune, post graduate from Staff College in Greenwich 

(UK), and has had training in missile control and exploitation from Russia.

Beginning in 2001, Admiral Vohra has focused on Indian Ocean related issues for the

Strategic Studies & Security Group, a non-government organization. Prior to this, he was 

the Chairman and Managing Director of Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, 

located in Calcutta. Admiral Vohra has also been a Chairman of the Indian Shipbuilders 

Association and was awarded the Vashisht Seva Medal by the President of India in 1984.

Admiral Vohra is married with two grown children.

58
Distribution

450 MS 1373 CMC Library, 5341 

1 MS 9018 Central Tech Files, 8945-1 

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 9616 

1 MS 0619 Review and Approval Desk, 9612 

59