occasional paper

6

May 2008

International 

Partnerships to 

Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction

by Paul I. Bernstein

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (previously the Center for Counterproliferation 

Research) has been at the forefront of research on the consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for American security. 

Originally focusing on threats to the Armed Forces, the WMD 

Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to the 

challenges of homeland defense and security. In February 2004, 

President George W. Bush commended the Center for providing 

“vital insight into the dangers of a new era.”

The broad mandate of the Center includes research, education, and 

outreach. Its research focuses on understanding the security implications of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the challenge of 

fashioning effective responses to them. Education and outreach 

programs seek to enhance awareness in the next generation of 

military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates to 

defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, and 

operations. As a part of its outreach efforts, the WMD Center hosts 

annual symposia on key issues, bringing together experts and 

participants from the government and private sectors.


International Partnerships 

to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction

International Partnerships to 

Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction

by Paul I. Bernstein

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

May 2008

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Occasional Paper 6
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department 

or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution 

unlimited.

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of 

reprints or reviews.

First printing, May 2008

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512–1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. For GPO publications on-line access their Web site at: http://

www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/sale.html.

For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, consult the National 

Defense University Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu.
Contents

Acknowledgments ......................... ix

The Partnership Imperative.................. 1

New Dynamics of Cooperation............... 3

Reducing Nuclear Dangers .................. 14

Strengthening Biodefense and Biosecurity ...... 21

Security Cooperation ....................... 26

The Way Ahead ........................... 31

Notes..................................... 36

About the Author............................. 41

vii

Acknowledgments

This occasional paper of the National Defense University’s Center for the 

Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center) examines the role, 

manifestations, and challenges of international cooperation to combat the 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat and poses important questions for 

future leaders to address in moving international cooperation forward in this 

area.

The foundation for the paper is the presentations given and discussions 

conducted during the WMD Center’s seventh annual symposium, Building International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, held at the 

National Defense University on May 16–17, 2007. In several areas, the author has 

expanded upon those discussions and examined broader issues and considerations impacting international cooperation against the WMD threat.

While all symposium sessions were off the record and all comments 

delivered on a nonattribution basis, the WMD Center wishes to thank the many 

speakers and panelists for their contributions to that event and, hence, to this 

paper. In particular, the WMD Center thanks the Honorable Stuart Levey, Under 

Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and the Honorable John Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, for delivering the symposium’s keynote addresses.

The WMD Center also expresses its special appreciation to the symposium’s international speakers, who in many cases traveled great distances to participate and in all cases made invaluable contributions to the symposium’s success. They include Ambassador Peter Burian of Slovakia, Ambassador Alan 

Charlton of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ivan Dvorak of the Czech Republic, 

Ambassador Friedrich Gröning of Germany, Mr. Gu Guoliang of China, Ambassador Raminder Singh Jassal of India, Ambassador Dennis Richardson of 

Australia, Mr. Guillaume Schlumberger of France, and Mr. Kazuyoshi Umemoto 

of Japan. 

Additionally, the symposium owes its success to the following key participants: Ambassador David Abshire, Ambassador William Bellamy, Mr. Joseph 

Benkert, Ms. Lisa Bronson, Dr. Ashton Carter, Dr. Lewis Dunn, Dr. Roger George, 

the Honorable Christopher (Ryan) Henry, Ambassador Robert Joseph, Rear 

Admiral John Miller, USN, Dr. Tara O’Toole, Mr. Vayl Oxford, Dr. James (Ben) 

Petro, Dr. James Tegnelia, and the Honorable William Tobey.

The author would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Aaron 

Arnold, Dr. Lewis Dunn, Mr. Joseph Hogler, Ms. Jessica Iannotti, and Dr. Jeffrey Larsen.

ix

International Partnerships 

to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction

1

The Partnership Imperative 

Building international partnerships is a central element of U.S. strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. policy 

recognizes that the proliferation problem is far too large, complex, 

and important for any one nation to tackle alone. Meaningful and sustained progress in combating WMD requires active collaboration among 

all states that have a stake in managing the problem and the will and 

capacity to contribute. Current policies build on a foundation of global 

cooperation that dates back decades, even as they reflect significant 

changes in emphasis to adapt to contemporary proliferation challenges.

These challenges result in large part from the ongoing and in 

some respects intensifying impact of globalization. As many have 

observed, the phenomenon is twofold—technological and political—and 

both dimensions are making the WMD proliferation problem more complex and difficult to manage. Technologies with broad legitimate uses that 

could be applied to unconventional weapons continue to spread globally 

at a rapid rate, and the growing demand (and competition) for energy, in 

particular, has the potential to fuel nuclear proliferation pressures in strategically important and sometimes unstable parts of the world. Politically, 

globalization has contributed to the erosion of traditional state power and 

boundaries and served to empower both smaller states that are seeking to 

challenge the status quo and nonstate actors—ranging from individuals 

to transnational networks—with independent and often extremist agendas. The results are clear enough: significant proliferation challenges from 

states whose WMD programs confer on them disproportionate strategic 

importance; growing interest on the part of terrorists to acquire WMD; 

and weak states and poorly governed spaces where illicit radical and criminal networks flourish. As these phenomena converge, new proliferation 

pathways are likely to emerge.1

As proliferation dynamics continue to be shaped by globalization, 

the limits of traditional nonproliferation diplomacy and strategies have 

become more apparent. The international nonproliferation regime of 

treaties and institutions is an important political and legal foundation in 

the fight against WMD, especially in establishing norms of behavior and 

providing the basis for action to punish noncompliance by states. But this 

regime, despite its longstanding legitimacy, alone cannot deal effectively 
2 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

with the toughest proliferation challenges we face. It has structural weaknesses not easily overcome and an uneven track record in confronting and 

reversing noncompliance, and it is not well suited to attack directly the 

problem posed by nonstate actors such as terrorists and clandestine 

WMD procurement networks.

A principal thrust of American policy, therefore, has been to 

complement traditional nonproliferation and disarmament diplomacy 

with new policy instruments that are focused more on practical cooperation with security partners to enhance prevention efforts, better enforce 

compliance, and build defense and response capabilities. In recent years, 

Washington has spearheaded a number of initiatives focused on different 

aspects of the proliferation challenge whose purpose is to create a framework for action among like-minded nations. By design, these initiatives 

are not engaged in creating large, standing organizations or bureaucracies, but seek instead to adopt actionable principles that enable concrete 

steps to reduce the WMD threat and increase the capacity of states to act. 

Some of these initiatives are global in nature—that is, they invite the 

broadest possible participation. Prominent examples include the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Others, such the Group of 8 (G–8) Global Partnership and the 

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, are designed to leverage the capabilities and resources of more advanced and prosperous states. 

This approach rests vitally on the responsible exercise of national 

sovereignty in combating WMD. This is no less important than sustaining 

the authorities vested in the institutions that govern the international 

treaty regime. Security partners are asked to recognize and act on the 

obligation all states share to address WMD challenges through cooperative activities that are consistent with existing international and domestic 

law and ensuring that their national territory is not a source of proliferation threats. To cite one example, United Nations (UN) Security Council 

Resolution 1540 obligates states to adopt national laws to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring WMD and related materials and equipment.2

By effectively marshalling coalitions of the willing to act against 

proliferation threats, international initiatives have begun to alter the 

dynamics of global cooperation in combating WMD. Progress is being 

made through a flexible network of partnership activities that gives many 

nations an active stake in the fight against WMD and opportunities to 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 3

contribute to shared security goals. In particular, these initiatives respond 

to the unique challenges posed by relatively new proliferation problems 

such as sophisticated WMD black markets and WMD terrorism—problems that are not limited to individual states of concern but rather are 

transnational in nature and that therefore require active collaboration to 

address. These initiatives foster common understanding of the threat, 

intelligence- and information-sharing, enhanced capacity and interoperability, and habits of cooperation that over time can be leveraged to 

address a number of security challenges. Collaborative efforts have progressed despite widespread hostility to many aspects of current U.S. foreign policy. Thus, even countries that opposed the war in Iraq have been 

strong supporters of other U.S. initiatives to counter WMD proliferation. 

To a significant degree, then, U.S. leadership is expected and accepted and 

will remain indispensable to sustain existing activities, catalyze new 

efforts, encourage broad participation, and help leverage the collective 

will, resources, and power of partner states to achieve progress.

The discussion that follows is not intended to be comprehensive 

in addressing every international program or cooperative initiative that 

has been established in recent years. Rather, it highlights a number of 

important activities that exemplify the effort to establish new mechanisms 

for partnership, as well as some challenge areas where additional focused 

work is required.

New Dynamics of Cooperation 

Proliferation Security Initiative 

A proactive approach to interdiction has become a prominent 

component of combating WMD strategy, in recognition of trends in the 

trade and trafficking of WMD- and missile-related materials and technologies that demand a systematic and broad-based response. That response 

has taken shape principally through the Proliferation Security Initiative 

(PSI), a growing coalition of nations committed to impeding the transfer 

and transport of WMD-related goods in ways that are consistent with 

existing international and domestic law but outside the framework of any 

treaty or multilateral export control regime. Launched in May 2003, 

just weeks after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, PSI exemplifies how political 
4 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

support for combating WMD goals can be converted into operational 

capacity to achieve concrete security benefits without creating a formal 

organization or bureaucracy. The PSI began with 11 charter nations, but 

today over 80 countries have endorsed its Statement of Interdiction Principles. More than 25 exercises have been conducted, and a number of 

successful interdictions 

have taken place, including oper ations that 

blocked export to Iran of 

controlled equipment 

relating to its missile and 

nuclear activities.

Just as important, participation in PSI 

has emerged as an important standard of good nonproliferation behavior, 

and in this sense the initiative represents a form of norm-building—one 

that results from the political commitment of a significant segment of the 

international community to define certain activities as unacceptable and 

to act collectively to thwart and delegitimize those activities. The willingness and capacity of states to enforce national and international laws in 

order to interdict illicit shipments are now seen as a test of their commitment to an activist global effort to combat WMD. As the de facto norm 

represented by PSI takes hold, this could serve to exert pressure on important countries that have yet to become full participants in PSI, such as 

China and India.

The informal procedures and practices by which PSI has been 

executed, and its clear adherence to international legal standards, have 

been instrumental in achieving the widespread support it enjoys. Broadening participation even further is one of a number of challenges facing 

the PSI community. Greater international support is key to expanding the 

initiative’s operational reach, improving operational capacity, and increasing responsiveness to interdiction opportunities. Broader participation in 

the Asia-Pacific region is one priority. The importance of this region cannot be overstated; one of the most dynamic hubs of the global economy, 

it is home to some of the world’s busiest ports, airports, shipping lanes, 

The PSI Principles were developed to reinforce 

political will, cooperation, and legal frameworks . . . 

and deny proliferators the ability to operate. Thus, 

the principles recognize that each sovereign state 

has national authorities, the ability to use them 

broadly, including in conjunction with international 

legal authorities and in cooperation with like-minded 

nations, to bring effective pressure against the proliferation trade.

—former U.S. Under Secretary of State 

Robert G. Joseph
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 5

and transshipment centers—including some that figured prominently in 

the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market.

While an increasing number of Asian states are participating in 

PSI activities, such as the October 2007 Pacific Shield 07 exercise off the 

coast of Japan, several key regional powers remain reluctant to embrace 

PSI. These include India, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and South Korea. 

The reasons vary. The Indian government faces domestic political pressure to resist participating in a U.S.-led initiative that some view as undermining India’s foreign policy independence. The government of Malaysia 

has expressed concern about both the legality of PSI and the prospect of 

increased international involvement in the Straits of Malacca—a concern 

shared by Indonesia.3 Additionally, some reports note that these and other 

Asian governments may be suspicious of U.S. intentions with respect to 

PSI given that Washington has not ratified the UN Convention on the 

Law of the Sea.4 China and South Korea are more concerned about how 

North Korea might react to their participation in PSI, especially at a time 

when the ultimate outcome of the Six-Party Talks remains uncertain. As 

this process continues to unfold, both Beijing and Seoul remain wary of 

actions that could increase regional tensions, especially since some participants have characterized recent PSI exercises such as Pacific Shield 07 as 

being directed, as a practical matter, at the regime in Pyongyang.5 It 

remains to be seen whether the new conservative government in South 

Korea will be more willing than its predecessor to become part of PSI.6

There have been calls, including from President George W. Bush, 

to expand the scope of PSI to include interdiction of financial payments 

between proliferators and their suppliers, and proliferation networks 

more broadly.7 Others have argued that the informal nature of PSI limits 

its effectiveness and sustainability and that it should yield to some type of 

standing organization, formal membership, and more institutionalized 

means of communication.8 A more severe critique suggests that the 

impact of PSI has been exaggerated and that resources and political 

capital are better directed toward more aggressive efforts to secure WMD 

materials at their source.9

Admittedly, it can be difficult to assess the effectiveness of PSI 

given its vague measures of success and the secretive nature of many 

interdiction operations. Beyond what government officials choose to discuss publicly about actual interdictions, however, it seems clear that PSI is 
6 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

helping to advance a global network of combating WMD partner relationships, establish a new norm of nonproliferation behavior, create new 

modes of security cooperation, and enable more effective interagency collaboration in a number of countries.

G–8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons 

and Materials of Mass Destruction 

The Global Partnership offers a different model of international 

cooperation, one that leverages the unique capabilities and resources of 

more prosperous nations to implement targeted WMD risk reduction 

programs. Established at the G–8 summit in 2002 in Kananaskis, Canada, 

the Global Partnership committed the G–8 nations to raise up to $20 

billion by 2012 to support a series of projects addressing nonproliferation, 

disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety and security issues, 

principally in Russia but also in other countries. By 2004, an additional 13 

European and Asian nations as well as the European Union had joined the 

Partnership and pledged financial contributions toward the $20 billion 

goal, which now appears to be within sight (see table 1).10 Even taking 

into account the $10 billion pledged by the United States, the securing of 

these commitments in full will represent a significant infusion of global 

resources toward combating WMD and a greater degree of burdensharing.

Table 1. Global Partnership Members

G–8 Partners Additional Partners

Canada Australia Norway

France Belgium Poland

Germany Czech Republic South Korea

Italy Denmark Sweden

Japan Finland Switzerland

Russia Ireland

United Kingdom Netherlands

United States New Zealand
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 7

As it enters its sixth year, the Global Partnership is generally 

viewed as a mixed success. Focused on securing or eliminating WMD 

materials at their source, Global Partnership programs have contributed 

directly to reducing WMD threats in a number of ways.

Chemical weapons destruction. This was the highest priority established in 2002, given the size and poor security of Russia’s stockpile and 

Moscow’s requirement to destroy it by 2012 under the terms of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention. Significant Global Partnership 

resources—more than $2 billion from 17 countries and the European 

Union—have supported the development of several facilities that have 

allowed Russia to destroy about one-quarter of its 40,000-ton chemical 

stockpile. Billions more will be required to complete the job, but the effort 

is now far better organized and equipped.11

Nuclear submarine dismantlement. This, too, has been a priority 

area, for both security and environmental reasons, and Partnership funds 

have helped Russia to accelerate the pace of dismantlement, develop 

infrastructure for spent fuel storage and radioactive waste management, 

and undertake environmental cleanup projects. More than a dozen Partner nations have contributed to these activities, which include the dismantlement of 21 submarines.12 In addition to the remaining submarines 

awaiting dismantlement, the issue of 46 decommissioned nuclear-powered vessels has yet to be addressed by the Global Partnership but is being 

discussed with Russian authorities.13

Physical protection of nuclear materials. Work in this area builds 

on cooperative threat reduction activities begun by the United States and 

Russia in the 1990s to improve security at Russian nuclear materials storage facilities. As of December 2007, upgrades had been completed at more 

than 85 percent of “sites of concern,” including all 39 Russian navy 

nuclear sites and all 24 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites, with work at 

more sites scheduled for completion in 2008.14 In addition, 178 buildings 

containing hundreds of metric tons of weapons-useable Russian nuclear 

material have been secured.15

Fissile material disposition. This encompasses a number of activities, including the U.S.-Russia Megatons to Megawatts Program, under 

which the United States is purchasing and down-blending 500 metric tons 

of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russian warheads;16 a $1 billion 

effort to shut down Russia’s remaining plutonium production reactors 
8 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

and replace them with fossil fuel plants; a multilateral effort to dispose of 

34 tons of Russian plutonium; and a number of “global clean-out” activities, agreed to at the 2004 G–8 Summit, focused on eliminating the use of 

HEU in research reactors worldwide and securing and removing fresh 

and spent HEU fuel.17

Employment of former weapons scientists. While the prevention of 

“brain drain” was established as a major Global Partnership goal in 2002, 

in practice these activities remain centered in the International Science 

and Technology Centers (ISTCs) in Moscow and Kiev established under 

earlier U.S.-Russian initiatives. According to the G–8’s most recent report 

on the Global Partnership, since 2002 more than 1,400 research projects 

have been funded through ISTC, involving more than 17,000 former 

weapons scientists.18 Several Partner donors help fund these projects. 

Some outside assessments, however, point to this element of the program 

as chronically underresourced.19

These accomplishments notwithstanding, much work remains to 

be done to realize the full potential of the Global Partnership. While the 

original goal of $20 billion is close to being achieved, by most accounts it 

is clear that considerably more than that will be required to complete specific projects and more broadly to achieve threat reduction progress commensurate with Partnership goals. More fully translating funding 

commitments into actual programs remains a challenge as well. A recent 

review of Global Partnership activities concluded that about $8 billion 

had been expended through early 2007.20 Outstanding issues related to 

liability, taxation, and access that often have made it difficult to begin or 

complete projects need to be resolved. Funding priorities and day-to-day 

activities should reflect the need to reduce the most pressing threats, in 

particular nuclear and biological terrorism, more than has been the case 

to date.21 Finally, G–8 leaders must give serious consideration to expanding the Global Partnership to include both new donors and new recipients, so that assistance in reducing WMD threats can be made available 

wherever it may be needed.

Targeted Financial Measures 

Disrupting the financial flows that fuel proliferation is a powerful 

new tool that the international community is using with growing sophistication. Regular coordination between security agencies and finance 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 9

ministries is now an imperative. Like terrorists, proliferators require 

access to the global financial system and routinely abuse this system to 

bankroll their activities. Institutions and individuals enabling this abuse 

are subject to pressure and sanctions that, if properly targeted, can 

impede the ability of proliferators to operate. It is important to distinguish such measures—which are directed at individuals, key regime 

members, front companies, and financial institutions—from more traditional sanctions regimes, as noted by Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of the 

Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence:

Some of these targeted measures require financial institutions 

to freeze funds and close the accounts of designated actors—

effectively denying these actors access to the traditional financial system. At times, the action includes bans on travel or arms 

transfers, which further confine and isolate the target. To maximize the effect, we try to apply these measures in concert with 

others. . . . These kinds of measures have several advantages 

over broad-based sanctions programs. First, by singling out 

those responsible for engaging in the illicit activity—rather 

than targeting an entire country—they are more apt to be 

accepted by a wider number of international actors and governments. Second, targeted financial measures warn innocent people not to deal with the designated target. And third, these measures serve as a deterrent. Those who are tempted to deal with 

targeted high risk actors are put on notice: if they continue this 

relationship, they may be next.22

Recent actions suggest that targeted policies against financial 

institutions and others who facilitate proliferation can be effective in 

exposing and complicating the WMD activities of states of concern and 

even influencing their policies. The government of North Korea, for 

example, clearly was surprised by the disruptive effects of actions taken 

against a Macao-based bank that Pyongyang used to support illicit activities. The designation, in September 2005, of Banco Delta Asia (BDA) as a 

“primary money laundering concern” led the bank to freeze $25 million 

in North Korean assets. More consequentially, it also led a number of 

financial institutions to curtail or terminate business with both BDA and 

the regime in Pyongyang.23 This targeted financial measure ultimately 

created leverage in the Six-Party Talks, as U.S. negotiators were able to use 
10 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

the promise to lift the designation against BDA and work to release the 

funds as a bargaining chip in reaching the denuclearization agreement 

announced in February 2007.24

Both unilateral and multilateral actions and authorities underpin 

the increasing use of targeted financial measures. In the United States, 

Executive Order 13382, issued in June 2005, is designed to freeze proliferators’ assets that come under U.S. jurisdiction and deny proliferators 

access to the U.S. financial system. To date, 35 entities and 3 individuals 

have been designated for their links to WMD-related activities in Syria, 

North Korea, and Iran. The United States most recently expanded this list 

in October 2007, designating a number of Iranian individuals and entities, including two state-owned banks (Melli and Mellat), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Ministry of Defense and Armed 

Forces Logistics.25 Two additional entities, Bank Saderat and the Quds 

Force—the foreign operations arm of the IRGC—were designated under 

a different Executive order focused on support to terrorism. Even on their 

own, U.S. actions can have a global impact, given the central role of the 

dollar and U.S. institutions in the international financial system. At the 

same time, the continued effectiveness of U.S. financial measures will 

require their careful, selective application to avoid generating a backlash 

in the broader international community aimed at reducing reliance on 

U.S. financial instruments.

In any case, achieving wider and more lasting effects requires an 

organized and sustained international response. Increasingly, as finance 

ministries around the 

world have become sensitized to the problem, 

multilateral actions are 

enhancing U.S. efforts. 

Four UN Security Council resolutions adopted 

since 2006 provide the 

basis for designating and 

freezing the assets of entities and individuals linked to the WMD programs of North Korea and Iran.26 The European Union has enacted two 

rounds of its own sanctions, expanding the list of entities and individuals 

As banks do their risk-reward analysis, they must 

now take into account the very serious risk of doing 

business in Iran, and what the risks would be if they 

were found to be part of a terrorist or proliferation 

transaction.

—U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury 

Robert Kimmitt
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 11

cited by the United Nations and adopting more far-reaching measures to 

limit arms sales and travel by Iranian officials.27

Additionally, the concerted U.S. effort to increase international 

financial and economic pressure on the Iranian leadership—by sharing 

information about Tehran’s abuse of the global financial system with governments, publics, and private sector leaders—has had an impact.28

Increasingly, the machinery of that system has taken steps to broaden 

international participation in financial sanctions. For example, in October 2007, the Financial Action Task Force, a group of 34 states created by 

the Group of 7 (G–7) to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism and proliferation, advised financial institutions of its member 

states to consider the risks in doing business with Iran and adopted 

guidelines for member states to follow in implementing the financial 

measures in UNSC Resolution 1737.29 These actions to advance implementation of Security Council resolutions were reinforced just one week 

later by G–7 finance ministers.30

While implementation of UN and European Union measures has 

been uneven, by many accounts financial measures directed at Iran are 

having an impact. A growing number of banks are unwilling to conduct 

business with Tehran; according to U.S. officials, foreign-based branches 

and subsidiaries of Iranian-owned banks are increasingly isolated, and 

there has been a significant drop in foreign investment—particularly in 

the energy sector, where Iran needs overseas partners to develop its oil 

reserves. U.S. measures announced in October 2007 appear to be complicating new oil projects by targeting major oilfield engineering firms controlled by government entities such as the IRGC. Oil firms in Russia, 

China, and Europe now find it difficult to move forward with development projects. The government of France has asked its largest companies 

not to bid for projects in Iran.31

That said, it is uncertain how effective targeted financial measures 

directed at Iran ultimately will be. The November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities suggested that 

international pressure and scrutiny may influence Iranian decisionmaking.32 If true, then the expansion of targeted financial sanctions may 

prove an effective instrument in shaping Tehran’s calculus. At the same 

time, the effect of financial measures may be mitigated by high oil 
12 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

revenues and steps taken to limit the impact of sanctions on the regime 

and the economy.33 Even taking these uncertainties into account, the 

emergence in recent years of targeted financial measures directed at proliferators—and the clear demonstration that they can raise significantly 

the cost of engaging in illicit activities—sends a strong signal that the 

international community is prepared to act collectively against those who 

would abuse the global financial system in pursuit of the most destructive 

weapons.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 represents yet a different model of international cooperation in countering 

weapons of mass destruction. Rather than a political initiative designed to 

marshal a coalition of the willing, Resolution 1540 provides a universal 

framework for all states to develop and implement measures to prevent 

the proliferation of WMD. Adopted unanimously in April 2004, Resolution 1540 established for the first time binding obligations on UN member states to refrain from supporting by any means nonstate actors seeking to produce or acquire WMD, to criminalize the proliferation of WMD 

to nonstate actors, and to adopt and enforce effective domestic controls 

on WMD, their means of delivery, related materials, and means of financing proliferation activities. To raise awareness of Resolution 1540 and 

oversee its implementation, the UNSC 1540 Committee was established. 

Resolution 1673, adopted in April 2006, called for intensified efforts to 

implement Resolution 1540 and extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee through April 2008.

More than 140 states have submitted initial reports on the steps 

they have taken or plan to take to implement Resolution 1540. Efforts are 

being made through regional outreach activities to encourage and assist 

the roughly 50 states—largely in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific—

that have yet to submit an initial report. While some states have the means 

to meet these obligations on their own or with only modest help, many 

countries have limited capacity to do so and require significant assistance 

from the international community. In its April 2006 report, the 1540 

Committee identified several important gaps in the ability of states to 

implement fully Resolution 1540: accounting, physical protection, law 

enforcement, border controls, export and transshipment controls, and 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 13

financial controls.34 Four years after its adoption, it is abundantly clear 

that implementation of Resolution 1540 will be a long-term process 

requiring sustained political commitment and the broadest possible 

degree of international cooperation. However, despite some reservations 

(particularly in the G–77 group of developing states), Resolution 1540 

appears to be increasingly accepted as a legitimate legal and political standard and an important mandate for national action and international 

cooperation.

The 1540 Committee increasingly serves as a clearinghouse for 

facilitating needed assistance in capacity building, matching requests for 

and offers of assistance, and actively promoting the role of donor nations, 

international and regional organizations, multilateral export control 

regimes, nongovernmental organizations, and academia. Aggressively 

mobilizing and targeting available expertise and resources are perhaps the 

major challenges facing the committee as it seeks to develop a coherent 

and innovative strategy for assistance based on tailored outreach and 

assistance efforts and the development of national action plans and roadmaps.35

Going forward, the committee—and the Security Council, as it 

considers extending the committee’s mandate beyond April 2008—will 

need to address a number of important issues:

n Compliance and evaluation. How will the committee assess the progress 

states are making in implementing Resolution 1540? What constitutes 

compliance with the resolution’s standard of “appropriate and effective” 

measures? Should a set of “best practices” supporting capacity building 

be adopted?

n Priorities. Should implementation efforts be informed by a greater 

sense of priority? Should assistance be concentrated on states where 

implementation would have a greater relative impact in reducing 

proliferation risks? Acknowledging the requirement for adherence to 

all obligations, should there be an effort to establish implementation 

priorities for individual states, especially those with capacity limitations? 

Should the committee assume a more proactive role in shaping national 

priorities—for example, through the national action plans?

n Committee mandate and structure. Should the committee’s mandate be 

made permanent? Does the committee require additional authorities, 

resources, or expertise to act effectively in promoting implementation 

and coordinating assistance from suitable public or private entities? Is 

such coordination sufficient, or should the committee be partnered 
14 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

more formally with organizations already organized to provide 

technical assistance to states, such as the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 

Weapons? How can existing cooperative initiatives, such as the G–8 

Global Partnership, be leveraged to strengthen implementation?

Reducing Nuclear Dangers 

International cooperative activities reflect a strong emphasis on 

reducing the danger posed by nuclear threats. The strong nuclear focus 

underscores the acute concerns nations have with respect to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, particularly by rogue or radical states, and the 

possibility of nuclear terrorism. Cooperative efforts span several key 

dimensions of the problem: nuclear terrorism, nuclear energy and the 

fuel cycle, and nuclear detection and forensics.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 

The Global Initiative seeks to strengthen mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism and to provide the practical means to implement measures codified in recently 

adopted international legal frameworks—in particular, the International 

Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the 

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear 

Facilities (as amended in 2005), and UNSC Resolutions 1373 and 1540.36

Spearheaded by the United States and Russia, the Global Initiative recognizes that nuclear terrorism threatens not just a handful of states, but also 

all responsible nations, and thus requires coordinated action to enhance 

national and international capacity. Announced by Presidents Bush and 

Vladimir Putin in July 2006, the Global Initiative emphasizes improving 

capabilities in the following areas:

n accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear and radioactive 

materials

n security of civilian nuclear facilities

n detection, search, confiscation, and safe control

n denying safe haven and financial resources to nuclear terrorists

n national legal and regulatory frameworks

n response, mitigation, and investigation

n information-sharing.37
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 15

As of February 2008, 66 nations had joined the Global Initiative.38

Members endorsed a Statement of Principles in November 2006, considered an initial work plan 

in February 2007, and in 

June 2007 identified 

more than 25 specific 

activities to be cond u c t e d t h r o u g h 

2008—to include expert 

meetings, tabletop and 

field exercises, and various forms of mutual assistance—designed to critically assess and enhance capabilities across all of the Global Initiative 

objectives. A number of capacity-building activities have been completed. 

Underscoring the critical importance of law enforcement to the success of 

the Global Initiative, in June 2007 the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 

hosted a conference on international nuclear terrorism law enforcement. 

This event gathered more than 500 professionals from 28 countries with 

the goal of fostering a common understanding of both nuclear terror 

threats and best practices for law enforcement, intelligence, border control, and nuclear security. Additionally, under the auspices of the Global 

Initiative, the United States is engaged in bilateral discussions with a 

number of governments on intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, and 

training. The Department of State is establishing specialized partner 

capacity-building teams located at U.S. Embassies to provide tailored, taskspecific technical and operational assistance to Global Initiative partners.

As the Global Initiative adds partners and implements its work 

program, it will be important to harmonize its work with parallel efforts 

under way by the international community to reduce nuclear threats and 

improve nuclear security, including the G–8 Global Partnership and the 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), a U.S.-led effort to remove 

weapons-usable material from potentially vulnerable sites and convert 

research reactors around the world to use low-enriched uranium not suitable for manufacturing nuclear weapons.39 Additionally, the private sector 

has an important role to play in meeting the goals of the Global Initiative, 

not least with respect to the security of civilian nuclear power facilities, 

suppression of illicit trafficking through ports, airports, and other key 

transport nodes, and the development of advanced technologies. 

We have many collective plans. Many countries 

participating in the initiative have proposed taking 

various measures to fine-tune practical work in the 

area in order to deprive terrorists of every chance to 

use nuclear energy in criminal interests.

—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak
16 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) seeks to address 

a specific proliferation challenge: the proliferation risks associated with 

the expansion of civilian nuclear power. The GNEP seeks to marshal 

advanced nuclear technology capabilities to 

facilitate this expansion 

in a way that limits and 

reduces proliferation 

dangers. Among its key 

features are the development of proliferation-resistant technologies to 

recycle spent fuel, so as to 

avoid creating large new stocks of weapons-usable materials, and the creation of a fuel services consortium that would provide, at reasonable 

prices, an assured supply of fresh reactor fuel to and recovery of used fuel 

from nations that forego the development or acquisition of enrichment 

and reprocessing technologies. In this way, it is hoped that emerging 

nuclear power needs can be met while limiting the spread of the most 

sensitive fuel cycle technologies that contribute to the manufacture of 

nuclear weapons.

Since it was unveiled by the Department of Energy (DOE) in February 2006, GNEP has generated significant debate on a number of fronts, 

including the degree to which the technologies it is promoting are in fact 

proliferation-resistant, waste management challenges, the merits of moving quickly toward commercial-scale facilities, and the nonproliferation 

risks associated with recycling plutonium. The debate surrounding some 

of these issues is highly technical and falls outside the scope of this 

paper.40 But it is fair to say that more work is required to examine and 

validate the technology concepts behind GNEP as part of a longer-term 

research and development effort. Accordingly, prudence suggests that 

nonproliferation efforts, such as planning for future safeguards requirements, proceed on the assumption that the goals of GNEP may change 

over time or may not in the end fully be achieved.41 Indeed, DOE’s 

We are determined to play an active role in making 

the advantages of the peaceful use of nuclear 

energy available to a wide range of interested 

States, in particular developing countries, provided 

the common goal of prevention of proliferation of 

nuclear weapons is achieved.

—Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin,

Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 17

Strategic Plan for GNEP cautions against unrealistic expectations for its 

nonproliferation benefits:

there is no technology ‘silver bullet’ that can be built into an 

enrichment plant or reprocessing plant that can prevent a country 

from diverting these commercial fuel cycle facilities to non-peaceful use. From the standpoint of resistance to rogue-state proliferation there are limits to the non-proliferation benefits offered 

by any of the advanced chemical separation technologies, 

which generally can be modified to produce plutonium if a 

nation is willing to withdraw from its Non-Proliferation Treaty 

or violate its NPT or safeguards obligations.42

In any case, any nonproliferation benefits that might be realized 

through the technology innovations envisioned by GNEP are many 

years—probably decades—away. Progress toward establishing a nuclear 

fuel services consortium can be achieved far more quickly, but here the 

challenges are more political in nature. To be sure, there is by now widespread appreciation that the center of gravity of the nuclear proliferation 

problem is the “loophole” in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 

that allows nuclear aspirants to develop the means to manufacture 

nuclear weapons under the cover of civilian power programs. In light of 

the North Korea experience and the ongoing struggle with Iran, and as 

more states proceed with plans to pursue a nuclear energy infrastructure, 

there is a growing sense of urgency about the need to limit the spread of 

enrichment and reprocessing technologies while accommodating growing 

interest in nuclear power.43 Both the security and economic rationales for 

doing so are strong. States choosing to pursue nuclear power principally 

for energy purposes—as opposed to hedging their security bets—must be 

given an economically attractive option to do so—that is, one that does 

not require developing a closed fuel cycle and making a huge investment 

in fuel production, storage, and disposal capabilities. The fuel services 

consortium envisioned in GNEP, as well as other national fuel center initiatives, emphasizes economic incentives and reduced risk for states and 

would be voluntary in nature rather than codified as part of the international nonproliferation regime.44

Still, many nations are sure to resist any effort perceived as limiting their access to peaceful nuclear technology as discriminatory and 
18 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

contrary to their rights under Article IV of the NPT. While the GNEP 

Statement of Principles is clear that participating states will not forfeit any 

rights, the initiative is nonetheless viewed by many in the context of President Bush’s 2004 call to the Nuclear Suppliers Group to permanently deny 

enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already 

possess them, even if these states are members in good standing of the 

NPT.45 Thus, the fear persists that GNEP will lead to a permanent twotier system comprised of those who provide enrichment services and 

those who must purchase them. In this context, the possibility exists that 

GNEP will actually stimulate interest on the part of some states to acquire 

independent enrichment capabilities. Taking these considerations into 

account, IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei’s proposal to 

create a multilateral framework for the nuclear fuel cycle leading, through 

a phased process, to the conversion of enrichment and reprocessing facilities from national to multilateral operations may be a more politically 

palatable approach for some, even if it is more cumbersome to bring to 

fruition.46

Technical and political concerns have not, however, prevented 

GNEP from making progress as an international forum for consideration 

of nuclear energy and nonproliferation challenges. As of February 2008, 

21 countries had become members of GNEP.47 In addition to the Statement of Principles, an Action Plan has been adopted that outlines initial 

priorities, milestones, and mechanisms for cooperation, and establishes 

two working groups on infrastructure development and reliable nuclear 

fuel services.48 At the same time, a number of important nuclear energy 

states—including Argentina, Brazil, India, and South Africa—remain outside GNEP.

Nuclear Detection 

The United States is engaged in a concerted effort to improve 

capabilities for detecting nuclear and radiological materials at overseas 

ports of departure and domestic ports of entry. Many nations are participating in the effort, led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), to create a global architecture for nuclear detection and reporting. A global architecture will build 

on national systems; as these mature, they will form the basis for regional 

networks, which can then be integrated into a global architecture that 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 19

operates within existing national and international legal authorities. To 

facilitate the development of national capabilities, DNDO, under the auspices of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, has proposed 

collaboration on a model guidelines document for the development of 

national detection architectures.

Today, overseas detection assets fall under the rubric of a number 

of U.S. programs. The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, managed 

by DOE, helps foreign partners prevent illicit nuclear and radiological 

trafficking by installing detection equipment at key sites such as airports, 

seaports, and border crossings. The SLD Core Program has provided 

equipment and training to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. To date, 117 

sites have been equipped in Russia, and the United States has agreed to 

equip all of Russia’s border crossings by the end of 2011, for a total of 350 

locations. Outside of Russia, the program has identified more than 100 

additional sites to receive detection equipment. The SLD program also 

encompasses the Megaports Initiative, which provides radiation detection 

equipment to enhance cargo screening at key international seaports. As of 

January 2008, Megaports capabilities were operational in ports in 12 

countries and were in various stages of implementation at 17 other ports. 

Current planning calls for installing nuclear screening capabilities at 75 

ports by 2014.49

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) are related DHS-managed programs. The Container Security 

Initiative targets high-risk containers at ports of departure for enhanced 

screening and is installing Megaports nuclear detection assets at 58 ports 

around the world. Through CSI efforts at these ports, approximately 90 

percent of all trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific cargo imported into the 

United States is now subject to prescreening. The Secure Freight Initiative 

is a pilot program mandated by the Security and Accountability for Every 

Port Act of 2006. All U.S.-bound containers are being scanned at three 

ports in Honduras, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom to determine if 

100-percent scanning can be achieved by combining nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment.50

Initiatives such as these have advanced international cooperation 

in nuclear detection of the U.S. supply chain, and this may have deterrent 

effects that are difficult to discern and evaluate. Yet there are also inherent 
20 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

limitations to these strategies that argue for realistic expectations. These 

include the porous nature of international borders, reliance on foreign 

border forces that may be ineffective or unreliable, the existence of alternative smuggling routes, and the difficulty in detecting highly enriched 

uranium.51 In recent congressional testimony on the Secure Freight Initiative, a senior DHS official noted the political, logistical, technological, 

and funding challenges in expanding the scope of container screening 

activities globally.52

Nuclear Technical Forensics 

As with detection, technical forensics has become a major thrust 

in the effort to deter and prepare for the possibility of a nuclear terror 

attack. Here, too, success will depend on international cooperation, in 

particular collaborative efforts to develop databases of nuclear sources 

against which information from an intact or detonated nuclear or radiological device can be assessed to support an attribution process. Limitations in U.S. forensics capabilities are widely acknowledged, especially the 

declining number—and increasing age—of scientists with required 

expertise in radiochemistry. In a nuclear emergency, personnel with the 

necessary skills may be needed to support other urgent technical missions 

in addition to forensics. In this sense, international cooperation can serve 

as a force multiplier by making available a broader cadre of experts to 

assist in forensic investigation. The broader the range of cooperation in 

this area, the better the 

prospects for determining the source of an 

attack and marshalling 

the international comm u n i t y to h o l d to 

account those responsible 

and take action to prevent and deter further 

attacks.

Working out formal modes of cooperation also makes sense given the simple fact that in 

the event of a nuclear detonation, debris will be transported globally and 

will be analyzed by laboratories in many nations. With respect to specific 

The U.S. Government should extend its ongoing initiatives to counter WMD terrorism to include provisions for prompt technical and operational cooperation in the event of a nuclear detonation anywhere 

in the world. . . . The wider the participation in this 

effort, the more confident the processes of nuclear 

forensics will be.

—Joint Working Group of the American Physical 

Society and the American Association for 

the Advancement of Science
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 21

areas for cooperation, the highest payoff most likely lies in comprehensive 

international databases and sample banks to enable debris to be assessed 

against actual, as opposed to calculated, signatures. As one recent assessment has suggested, the ideal database would be supplemented by sample 

banks and managed to allow for complete and prompt access in response 

to a nuclear event, and to protect national and commercial secrets.53

Some progress is being made along this front by the Nuclear 

Smuggling International Technical Working Group, established in 1996 to 

foster cooperation in countering nuclear trafficking. In addition to the 

development of forensic databases, the group’s efforts focus on establishing protocols for evidence collection and laboratory investigation, evaluating methodologies for forensic analysis, and conducting lab-to-lab exercises.54 Recent reviews of collaborative opportunities in nuclear forensics 

identified a number of possibilities:

n joint research to develop improved capabilities to collect debris, take 

field measurements, perform rapid automated analysis, and maintain 

chain of custody

n improved methods of analysis, in particular techniques that measure 

new properties of debris material influenced by manufacturing process 

or location, promise greater sensitivity, require reduced sample sizes, 

and allow for signature discovery on the nano-scale

n advanced statistical techniques to reduce uncertainties and determine 

confidence levels in scientific conclusions

n taggants to provide a unique signature to nuclear fuel during fabrication 

that can be recovered during forensics analysis.55

Strengthening Biodefense and Biosecurity 

Advances in the life sciences and in the very nature of international society and the global economy mean that biological weapons 

(BW) pose a strategic threat to all nations. Attacks using disease agents 

have the potential to be highly lethal on a broad geographic scale, and 

there are no material limits to multiple attacks. Biotechnology is a highly 

capitalized global enterprise, and life science infrastructures are spreading 

at a steady pace. As a result, the sources of knowledge that could lead to 

unanticipated and dangerous advances in the threat are increasingly 

dispersed around the world, embedded in legitimate science and manufacturing processes. And while there may be uncertainties about the 
22 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

intentions and capabilities of terrorists with respect to biological weapons, we know that al Qaeda has a demonstrated interest in these weapons 

and a continuing intent to conduct high-impact, large-scale attacks.

These factors, which point to the confluence of science, technology, economics, and politics, make abundantly clear that national solutions and responses are insufficient to manage this problem effectively. 

Preventing, deterring, and preparing for biological attacks are inherently 

global challenges. And while there is an impressive amount of work being 

done—in bilateral and multilateral governmental forums, under the auspices of the Biological Weapons Convention and other treaty organizations, in a broad array of international organizations, and in the scientific 

community—the international community overall is only in the initial 

stages of constructing a coherent strategy and supporting capabilities for 

biosecurity. Consider three major challenges facing effective global collaboration.

One major challenge is threat perception and leadership awareness. 

International partners do not yet share a common understanding—or 

“common operating picture”—regarding the scope and urgency of the 

BW challenge. For some, biodefense and biosecurity are principally public 

health issues, rather than a national security challenge requiring broadbased preparedness efforts. Further, even highly experienced leaders are 

unfamiliar with biological warfare, infectious disease, the nature of epidemics, and the range of response options. This complicates development 

of a sense of shared risk and responsibility across governments.

A second challenge is the sheer complexity of the problem. Effective strategies will lie at the intersection of multiple sectors—security, 

health (public, plant, and animal), medicine, economics, law enforcement, 

and the scientific process itself—and thus engage a range of expert and 

stakeholder communities. This presents significant challenges both within 

and between governments working to strengthen preparedness and 

response. High-profile simulations suggest that a major bioweapons incident would impose difficult demands on governments and place tremendous strains on political relationships and security commitments, even 

among close allies.56

Complexity challenges current modes of organization and interaction. Thus, a third challenge is the weak institutional framework that 

currently exists. Governments are engaged widely on this problem, but 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 23

there is no transnational body whose principal mission is to serve as a 

coordinating authority. Similarly, more than 30 international organizations are involved in some aspect of biosecurity; they are addressing 

important elements of the problem, but their efforts are not integrated in 

any meaningful way. Exercises demonstrate that many nations plan to rely 

on support from international organizations in responding to bioterror 

events (see table 2). While many of these organizations offer outstanding 

expertise, their capacity for action on the ground in responding to complex events is limited.57

Overcoming these challenges will not be easy. An action plan to 

systematically strengthen the global community’s ability to cope with BW 

threats should consider the following elements.58

First, governments must increase their own capacities to prevent, 

detect, and respond to bioweapons attacks across the multiple sectors 

noted above, while working to establish collaborative relationships to 

maximize the utilization of finite resources. De facto “biosecurity alliances” would focus on building collective capacity for threat assessment, 

surveillance, and situational awareness; joint training and exercises; joint 

development and production of medical countermeasures and diagnostic 

tools; and sharing of experts, medicines, and other response capabilities 

in the event of an attack. Countries with more established programs or 

advanced capabilities should be prepared to provide assistance.

Second, governments and international 

organizations need to 

wor k more close ly 

together to establish 

modes of practical cooperation and identify 

areas where national 

policies may conflict 

with the advice that 

organizations provide. In some circumstances, international organizations may be uniquely qualified to assist in managing a particularly challenging task, such as developing and maintaining an equitable and effective system for allocating available vaccines and treatments. But they will 

Because of the inherently international nature of 

bioterrorism and agroterrorism preparedness and 

response, it is vital that countries coordinate across 

both national and organizational borders to create 

international relationships as well as intersectoral 

relationships.

—Dr. Marc L. Ostfield, Senior Advisor for 

Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health Security, 

U.S. Department of State
24 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

be able to do so only if they have the political and practical support of 

governments.

Third, international organizations need to coordinate more effectively with each other to develop integrated approaches that leverage the 

diverse range of expertise and capability they represent, harmonize potentially conflicting priorities and organizational cultures, and make efficient 

use of available resources (financial, technical, and logistical). This is particularly true for organizations dealing with security and law enforcement 

on one hand, and humanitarian and public health issues on the other. 

Some experts have suggested establishing an international matrix for biosecurity that would link existing entities more robustly and enhance their 

regulatory powers to create a stronger and more cohesive, if still somewhat disaggregated, institutional capability for international oversight of 

the life sciences.59

Table 2. Major International Bioterrorism Exercises

Event Scenario Participants

Global Mercury 

(2003)

Smallpox Senior health ministry officials from 

eight countries, plus European 

Union (EU) and World Health Organization (WHO)

Silent Twilight 

(2004)

Smallpox Eurasian states, plus Switzerland, 

Turkey, the United States, EU, North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for Security and Co-operation 

in Europe, and WHO

Atlantic Storm 

(2005)

Smallpox Former senior officials from nine 

countries, plus EU and WHO

TOPOFF 3 (2005) Plague

Mustard Gas

First responder organizations in 

Canada, United Kingdom, and 

United States

Black ICE (2006) Smallpox Five organizations from the United 

Nations system and seven independent organizations

Black Death (2007) Plague Senior law enforcement officials 

from nine countries and five international organizations
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 25

Fourth, consideration should be given to establishing a coordinating authority to facilitate cooperative efforts by governments and 

international organizations, assess gaps and redundancies in response 

planning and capabilities, and recommend strategies to enhance global 

biosecurity. These functions extend beyond the capabilities and mandates 

of existing technical organizations. Exercises point to the need for such an 

authority to enhance unity of effort and elicit stronger commitments 

from governments, though where it should reside, how it should be organized, and what powers it should have are not self-evident. Some experts 

have suggested looking to the United Nations, building on the counterterrorism strategy adopted by the General Assembly in 2006 and the Secretary-General’s Biotechnology Initiative.60 However, some governments 

oppose the creation of a new international institution, preferring to focus 

on strengthening coordination among states and nongovernmental 

organizations.

Fifth, beyond building capacity and strengthening institutions, it 

is just as critical to foster a global culture of biosecurity, in order to shape 

the “cultural battlespace” where the fight against biological weapons is 

being waged. A culture of biosecurity should sensitize all sectors to the 

requirements of effective BW preparedness and response, encourage an 

appropriate balance between public health and national security concerns, and reinforce for individual scientists and practitioners the norms 

against abusing information, materials, or techniques from the life sciences to support weapons programs.61

The U.S. Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) provides 

one foundation for advancing this ambitious agenda. Since the early 

1990s, the BTRP and its predecessor programs have made significant contributions to preventing BW proliferation in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, with emphasis on eliminating BW 

infrastructure, improving biosafety and biosecurity, and supporting cooperative biological research. The accomplishments that can be attributed at 

least in part to BTRP are discussed in a recent assessment performed at 

congressional direction by the National Academy of Sciences.62 The principal recommendations of this study, however, emphasize the importance 

of building on BTRP to create and execute a biological threat reduction 

strategy defined by sustained collaborative partnerships, robust international networks, and comprehensive technical engagement. Only in this 
26 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

way, it is argued, can the international community have a reasonable 

prospect of meeting the challenge posed by the continued spread of dualuse biotechnology capabilities.

To enable this transition, the following key steps are recommended by the National Academy:63

n transform BTRP from a “Washington-directed program of assistance 

to a genuinely collaborative program of partnerships . . . built on 

strong relationships between important scientific, public health and 

agricultural institutions and specialists.” Should the program expand 

beyond the states of the former Soviet Union, “collaboration rather 

than assistance should be a guiding principle wherever possible.”

n give greater emphasis to a “comprehensive, multi-faceted approach 

to international engagement for achieving biosecurity, public health, 

and agricultural objectives,” to include countermeasures development, 

facility security, surveillance, biosafety, laboratory and production best 

practices, and research.

n give BTRP a “central role in supporting development of international 

networks of institutions and specialists with common interests in 

biological research, public health, agriculture, and biosecurity.” 

International networks are “an essential mechanism in building trust 

among governments engaged in activities with dual-use dimensions 

and providing insights as to intentions of colleagues at the facility 

level.” Such networks also would support the early identification of 

disease outbreaks and development of public health capabilities.

n given concerns about poor security conditions at biotechnology and 

life sciences facilities in regions such as the Middle East, South Asia, 

Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, ensure that BTRP is 

prepared to apply its capabilities in response to urgent requirements 

that could emerge outside of the former Soviet Union.

Security Cooperation 

Strategic Framework 

From the outset, U.S. strategy for combating WMD has recognized the importance of engaging with allies and other security partners 

to increase the capacity of friendly states to assist in preventing, deterring, 

defending against, and responding to WMD threats. The international 

initiatives promoted by the Bush administration are intended to foster 

stronger partnerships and cannot succeed without concrete and sustained 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 27

cooperation. In the Defense Department, security cooperation and building partner capacity have become increasingly salient elements in defense 

strategy in general and in the parallel campaigns against global terrorism 

and weapons of mass 

destruction in particular. In these efforts, 

capable partners can 

reduce the burden on 

U.S. forces and contribute to regional and 

global defense in depth. 

The 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review highlights the importance of security cooperation and 

improving partner capabilities, and recent defense guidance directs that 

security cooperation activities be more tightly integrated into the operational plans developed by the geographic combatant commands to 

achieve national security goals.

The 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction establishes “security cooperation and partner activities” as 

one of eight military mission areas, emphasizing the importance of security partners both to the military’s role in nonproliferation activities and 

to coalition operations to counter WMD or in WMD environments.64 To 

better focus work in this mission area, the Defense Department is crafting 

a supporting strategy to build partner capacity and integrate the broad 

range of activities already under way or needed to take security cooperation to the next level. This international strategy envisions the creation of 

regional networks comprised of states committed to working with the 

United States to improve national and collective capabilities in the areas 

of proliferation prevention, interdiction, missile defense, passive defense, 

consequence management, research and development, and training and 

education. These regional networks would build on existing bilateral and 

local relationships developed under the aegis of the geographic combatant commands and potentially could be connected through broader 

structures such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 

which currently has 66 member nations.

An example of how this strategy might be pursued is the International Counterproliferation Program’s recent WMD exercise in the Black 

The U.S. Armed Forces should undertake cooperative activities with regional military partners that 

promote improved partnership capacity to combat 

WMD. These activities should foster common threat 

awareness, coalition building, and interoperability.

—National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction
28 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Sea region. This U.S.-sponsored exercise involved more than 390 individuals, including U.S. Government officials and subject matter experts, as 

well as WMD personnel from Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, and Romania. 

The scenario of the 5-day exercise involved the trafficking of weapons of 

mass destruction across borders by a sophisticated network of criminals 

and terrorists, and allowed participating governments to exercise both 

national and international operational procedures. A simulated command 

post exercise and a coordinated field exercise near Bucharest, Romania, 

allowed the four partner countries’ national organizations to assess their 

readiness for a WMD event. Additionally, the exercise provided practice 

in a simulated environment in which governments could conduct integrated deterrence, detection, response, and investigation of WMD and 

related materials.65

A more focused international strategy to combat WMD and 

strengthen partner capacity will build on tailored approaches that have 

been taking shape for a number of years based on the unique requirements and challenges of individual regions and combatant command 

areas of responsibility.

Europe 

U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has established a number of multinational forums (called clearinghouses) that serve as vehicles 

for theater engagement and coordination in its area of responsibility. The 

objective is to maximize collaboration with limited resources by organizing at the subregional level. Three clearinghouses have been established. 

The Southeast Europe clearinghouse encompasses Albania, Croatia, and 

Macedonia (the Adriatic Charter nations), as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro. The South Caucasus clearinghouse 

serves as a forum to coordinate security cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The Africa clearinghouse joins 13 African nations 

with USEUCOM, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 

European Union, and the United Nations.66

In NATO, members committed in 2002 to improve operational 

capabilities to fight new threats such as terrorism and WMD. The Prague 

Capability Commitments included a pledge to enhance national and collective capabilities to defend against chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Not all the initiatives identified at that time 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 29

have come to fruition, but NATO has nonetheless taken important strides 

in developing a WMD defense concept and improved operational capabilities against threats posed by both state and nonstate actors.67 NATO’s 

Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion is intended to be a high-readiness 

unit able to deploy quickly to support NATO missions of any kind in any 

location. Thirteen nations are represented in the battalion, which achieved 

full operational capability in June 2004 and is capable of reconnaissance, 

detection, sampling, and decontamination operations. The Joint CBRN 

Defence Centre of Excellence opened in November 2007 in Vyskov, Czech 

Republic, to serve as a multinational resource for expertise, education and 

training, and the development of concepts, doctrine, lessons learned, and 

standards. Eight nations participate in the Centre, which is working 

toward accreditation for its education and training activities. On a different track not tied to the 2002 Prague commitments, the Alliance continues to investigate technical and operational concepts for a layered theater 

ballistic missile defense capability.

East Asia 

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) engagement strategy 

emphasizes developing cooperative mechanisms directed toward partner 

capacity building in areas such as interdiction, WMD elimination, implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540, consequence management, and 

WMD terrorism. Bilateral working groups are one focus. With Japan, 

USPACOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have established a 

CBRN Defense Working Group whose objective is to improve the readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces to conduct and sustain operations in the event of a WMD attack, to include execution of 

consequence management operations. Recent activities have addressed 

issues such as decontamination, WMD medical preparedness, and opportunities for cooperative research and development. A Counterproliferation Working Group established with South Korea is focused on developing WMD elimination capabilities.68 USPACOM is also working with the 

Philippines to deny terrorist networks the ability to obtain WMD capabilities as part of its regional war on terror engagement strategy.

The command also participates in the Multilateral Planning and 

Augmentation Team (MPAT), a cadre of military planners from 33 

nations with interests in the Asia-Pacific region. MPAT facilitates the 
30 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

rapid establishment and/or augmentation of multinational coalition task 

force headquarters, concentrating on smaller scale contingencies and 

operations other than war, including terrorism. With its focus on 

operational issues, it also emphasizes developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) to guide multinational responses to crises; these procedures recognize that defense ministries and armed forces cannot provide 

effective crisis planning and response alone. For this reason, the efforts 

and capabilities of a number of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and UN agencies are integral to MPAT’s work. 

MPAT has developed SOPs for contingencies involving CBRN and toxic 

industrial materials. One addresses coalition task force operations in a 

CBRN environment, the other how to organize for and direct consequence management operations. Recent exercises have focused on consequence management and pandemic influenza.69

Southwest Asia 

The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) approach to building partner capacity emphasizes the use of largely bilateral activities to 

encourage host nations to develop integrated civil-military response 

capabilities. While some multilateral structures exist, advancing a broadbased multilateral strategy is difficult given the politics of the region and 

the degree of mistrust that exists among some governments. The Command leverages a diverse set of activities at the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels:

n Commander, USCENTCOM visits to host nation senior military and 

civilian officials, including chiefs of defense staff

n Cooperative Defense Program workshops and exercises in passive 

defense, consequence management, medical countermeasures, missile 

defense, and shared early warning

n International Military Education and Training activities

n Foreign Military Sales

n Bilateral Air Defense Initiative to develop common approaches to the 

regional ballistic missile threat

n International Counterproliferation Program activities

n Proliferation Security Initiative

n Regional Disaster Management Center of Excellence in the Horn of 

Africa

n Disaster Preparedness Program in Central and South Asia
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 31

n host nation partnerships with state National Guard units in the United 

States.

Mind the Gap 

The unified commands are well engaged in regions of strategic 

importance developing the mechanisms that can support partner capacity 

building and meaningful cooperation. Perhaps the most important challenge to sustaining effective theater engagement is the growing perception 

among many partners of a capabilities gap with the United States—a 

belief that, regardless of their force modernization efforts, they will continue to fall further behind an increasingly sophisticated U.S. military. 

This is true for both the conventional warfighting capabilities typically 

associated with the capabilities gap, as well as more specialized areas of 

the combating WMD mission. It also may be an issue for nonmilitary (for 

example, homeland security) capabilities for addressing the WMD threat. 

The implications of this (real or perceived) gap are potentially serious if 

partners otherwise willing to assume regional security burdens come to 

believe they are unable to do so because they cannot operate effectively 

with U.S. forces. Going forward, security cooperation policies should 

focus on reducing this gap, especially with our closest and most important partners.

The Way Ahead 

Initial progress in advancing new types of international cooperation for combating WMD is promising, but there remain major challenges to developing a network of partnership activities that can be sustained over the long term. The efforts of the last several years have 

provided a strong beginning, but more work must be done to ensure 

these initiatives take root and continue to offer meaningful collaboration 

with practical security benefits. A number of questions merit attention.

Are there too many initiatives asking too much of countries that 

may have limited capacity? The multiplicity of initiatives reflects the complexity of the threat and the aggressive search for innovative means to 

attack it. Engaging the international community broadly across the many 

functional dimensions of the problem (political, military, financial, legal) 

requires putting in place a range of mechanisms for collaboration. From 
32 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

the U.S. perspective, there is merit in such an approach: it provides flexibility in marshalling small or large groups of partners into coalitions to 

work specific problems and thus enables tailored strategies. At the same 

time, the sheer number of combating WMD initiatives can place strains 

on the ability of states to contribute. This is revealed by the gap, in some 

cases, between commitments and actions. A good example, discussed 

above, is implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540, where the gaps are 

significant and will only be closed through the sustained political commitment of those who need help to create capacity and those capable of 

providing such assistance. Where we have a strong stake in the success of 

an initiative, addressing capacity problems should be a policy priority.

Will these initiatives have staying power? It is reasonable to ask 

whether the existing commitments nations have made can be sustained 

over the longer term. At one level, this is a political challenge for the 

United States. Some partner nations question whether the United States 

will remain committed to this general approach to the WMD problem, 

and to specific initiatives, particularly given the change in administrations 

that will occur in 2009. In the policy reviews that will take place, which 

programs will remain priorities? This concern underscores the recognized 

leadership role of the United States in forging international collaborative 

efforts. If the United States does not continue to push on key initiatives 

and exert proactive leadership, the political commitments other states 

have made could weaken. Washington must remain mindful of the fact 

that for many governments, joining and participating in U.S.-led initiatives entail a considerable political and resource investment, especially at 

a time when there is significant anti-American sentiment. For its part, it is 

reasonable for the United States to ask: Who else will step forward to 

assume a leadership role in this arena? The United States has facilitated 

leadership opportunities for states within the framework of existing cooperative efforts, but who will offer the next compelling idea for a partnership initiative?

At another level, the question of staying power is an organizational and management challenge. Can activities that by design have no 

permanent, standing support organization be self-perpetuating? What is 

the minimum degree of institutional structure required to ensure sustainability, especially in the face of changes at the political level? Is the U.S. 

Government organized to manage effectively the growing number of 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 33

partnership activities? The “policy entrepreneurship” that gave rise to the 

wide range of initiatives now under way is essential to devising innovative 

approaches to tough policy challenges. At some point, however, there also 

may be a need for more formal or centralized coordination and harmonization of these activities to ensure unity of effort.

How can other important stakeholders be integrated? Despite broad 

involvement by nations and international bodies in many new initiatives, 

there is room to expand participation in the combating WMD global 

network of partnerships that can enhance both its effectiveness and its 

legitimacy.

First, better integration of rising powers, in particular (but not 

only) China and India, could yield important combating WMD benefits. 

These states are not isolated from the partnership network, but neither 

are they fully integrated. These are countries whose power and influence 

are growing, and who are emerging as regional political and economic 

leaders. They also have growing infrastructures in critical sectors such as 

nuclear energy and biotechnology where proliferation risks could emerge, 

and are increasingly influential players in other commercial sectors relevant to combating WMD (such as international finance and banking). 

Bringing them more fully into the mainstream of global combating WMD 

efforts could build on existing areas of cooperation, such as the Six-Party 

Talks in the case of China, and a number of bilateral U.S.-India activities. 

Similarly, Washington should consider how best to include less powerful 

but still potentially important nations in regions such as Southeast Asia, 

Africa, and South America. These regions may appear less strategically 

important today from a proliferation standpoint but conceivably could 

emerge in the future as areas of concern.70

Second, the private sector has a large stake in managing the proliferation problem. WMD events of even less-than-catastrophic proportion 

could have a dramatic impact on global commerce and put at risk key 

sectors and many individual businesses. Participating in proliferation-related transactions and networks, even unwittingly, can cost businesses and 

banks dearly, both financially and reputationally. Moreover, the business 

community may possess unique sources of information about WMD-related activities that can assist national and international combating WMD 

efforts. In some areas, the private sector is already an important partner; 

the major effort of recent years to secure the global maritime supply chain 
34 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

relies critically on close and extensive cooperation with private port operators. As another example, the United States has enlisted the support of 

the private banking sector to facilitate targeted financial measures against 

selected organizations and individuals in Iran. More needs to be done to 

mobilize the business community as a full partner in combating WMD. 

Areas for consideration include the following:

n Encourage private sector entities to endorse key international initiatives 

such as the Global Initiative to Combat WMD and the Proliferation 

Security Initiative, and encourage member states to work with the 

commercial sector to enhance implementation.

n Develop partnerships with critical industries, such as nuclear energy and 

biotechnology, that have the potential to shape the future proliferation 

landscape in profound ways, with the goal of enhancing awareness of 

proliferation risks and encouraging voluntary adoption of appropriate 

safeguards and regulatory mechanisms.

n Encourage key industries and commercial sectors to adopt and promote 

best practices and codes of conduct geared to the management of 

proliferation risks. Over time, best practices and codes of conduct can 

help to create a “culture of nonproliferation” and a norm of behavior. 

Measures adopted by the U.S. chemical industry provide one useful 

model and point of departure.71

n Strengthen information-sharing between government and the private 

sector through regulatory mechanisms and improved technology.

n Work with the international insurance and risk assessment industries to 

support the development of an effective private market for mitigating 

and insuring against the risks of WMD attacks.72

Third, in regard to the global community of interest, experience 

has demonstrated, sometimes painfully, that no one country or national 

intelligence apparatus has sufficient information to understand fully all 

aspects of the WMD challenge. Indeed, intelligence agencies operating 

largely on the basis of classified information will see at best only some 

pieces of the puzzle. There is a growing appreciation of the need to exploit 

more aggressively and systematically the broader reservoir of knowledge 

that exists among experts and specialists around the world, both in and 

outside government. Tapping this tacit knowledge requires creating a networked community of interest focused explicitly on WMD threat and 

response. A promising example of this approach is the Global Futures 

Forum, an initiative of the Central Intelligence Agency to create a collab-
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 35

orative forum, both virtual and face-to-face, for multidisciplinary strategic level dialogue and research. In addition to proliferation, communities 

of interest are being established around such related problems as radicalization, terrorism and counterterrorism, illicit networks, pandemics, and 

social networks.

Quo vadis 2009 policy? Any new U.S. administration will want to 

put its own mark on the nonproliferation and combating WMD agenda 

and can be expected to make changes and adjustments. With respect to 

partnership activities, objective assessments of strategy and policy should 

yield useful lessons about both the forms of cooperation and the challenges to achieving real impact on the ground. They also should conclude 

that international cooperation is only increasing in importance and that 

the concerted effort to put in place a matrix of partnership activities has 

in fact yielded security benefits. Building on success should, therefore, be 

a guiding principle for the new team taking the reins of national policy. 

Even for those initiatives that have had a productive track record, a strong 

effort will be required in the period ahead to sustain the political commitment and practical engagement of security partners both large and small. 

Indeed, the many partners who have joined various elements of the fight 

against WMD will be watching carefully for significant changes in the 

direction and emphasis of U.S. policy. The next administration should 

give early attention to these issues, with an eye toward establishing a 

framework for action that will strengthen the international consensus 

that has enabled the considerable degree of practical cooperation achieved 

in recent years.
36 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

Notes 1 For a discussion of how globalization is shaping proliferation dynamics, see Kenneth D. 

Luongo and Isabelle Williams, “The Nexus of Globalization and Next-Generation Nonproliferation,” 

Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 3 (November 2007), 459–473. See also The Fund for Peace, “Threat 

Convergence: Possible New Pathways to WMD Proliferation?” Conference Report, Winter 2006, available at <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/tc/threat-convergence.php>. 2 For a discussion of sovereignty as an element of U.S. nonproliferation policy, see Jofi Joseph, 

“The Exercise of National Sovereignty: The Bush Administration’s Approach to Combating Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 2 (July 2005), 373–387. 3 See Stephanie Lieggi, “Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise Hosted by Japan Shows 

Growing Interest in Asia But No Sea Change in Key Outsider States,” WMD Insights, issue 

21(December 2007-January 2008), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/WMDInsights_Dec07-

Jan08Issue.pdf>. 4 Ibid. The article goes on to note that “[T]his concern is intensified by arguments of U.S. 

pundits opposed to UNCLOS warning that ratification would endanger PSI activities. According to 

officials from the Bush Administration, which now favors U.S. ratification of the convention, Malaysia 

and Indonesia have both given indications that they would be more willing to participate fully in PSI 

if the United States joined the sea convention.” 5 Ibid. This report also speculates that concern about Japan’s increasing military profile has 

contributed to China’s reluctant stance toward PSI. 6 See “S. Korea May Join US-Led Security Program,” Associated Press, February 27, 2008, 

available at <http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jPOFaJLWLCLPblfR9YJdqedPrlyAD8V2K6N80>; 

and “South Korea Could Join PSI, Report Says,” Global Security Newswire, January 14, 2008, available 

at <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/print.asp?story_id=C7F34122-82FF-48EE-8819-A4C30BB77CBA.html>. 7 President George W. Bush, remarks on weapons of mass destruction proliferation, Lisbon, 

Spain, March 5, 2004. 8 See Alex Reed, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Too Much, Too Soon,” The Henry L. 

Stimson Center, August 13, 2007, available at <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=533>. 9 Ibid. 

 10 See Paul F. Walker, “Looking Back: Kananaskis at Five—Assessing the Global Partnership,” 

Arms Control Today (September 2007) for a recent unofficial accounting of Global Partnership commitments. See also the Global Partnership Resource Page maintained by the James Martin Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies at <http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/funding.htm>. Nearly $18 billion 

in commitments have been made. 11 Walker. According to this account, Russian authorities believe that completing the chemical 

weapons destruction process will require a total of $7 billion to $8 billion. 12 “Report on the Global Partnership,” G–8 Global Summit Heiligendamm, available at

<www.g-8.de/nn_220074/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/anlagen/gp-report-final.html>. 13 Ibid. 14 National Nuclear Security Administration Fact Sheet, “NNSA: Working to Prevent Nuclear 

Terrorism,” December 2007, available at <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2007/NA-07-

FS-01.pdf>.

 15 Ibid. These include Russian navy reactor fuel sites, Rosatom military and civilian sites, and 

non-Rosatom civilian sites. 16 Ibid. According to NNSA, 300 metric tons had been down-blended by the end of 2007 and 

are now being used to produce 10 percent of U.S. electricity. 17 For a more detailed discussion of these activities, see Robert Einhorn and Michéle 

Flournoy, “Assessing the G8 Global Partnership: From Kananaskis to St. Petersburg,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Strengthening the Global Partnership Project, July 2006, 9, available at 

<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060701_g8_global_partnership.pdf>. 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 37

 18 “Report on the G–8 Global Partnership,” 2. 19 Einhorn and Flournoy, 16. 20 Walker. 21 Einhorn and Flournoy, 14. As noted by the authors, “Russia has declined to discuss biological security within the context of the Global Partnership, a point of contention with donor countries” 

(10). 22 Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, remarks before the 

5th Annual Conference on Trade, Treasury, and Cash Management in the Middle East, March 7, 2007, 

available at <http://abudhabi.usembassy.gov/remarks_of_stuart_levey_.html>. 23 As reported by Patrick Murphy, Leonard S. Spector, and Leah R. Kuchinsky, “Special 

Report: Financial Controls Emerge As Powerful Nonproliferation Tool; North Korea and Iran Targeted,” WMD Insights, issue 15 (May 2007), available at <www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/WMDInsights_May07Issue.pdf>. 24 Ibid. 25 The White House, Executive Order 13382, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters”; and U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, “Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” October 25, 2007, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94193.htm>. List of designations as of December 26, 2007. See also Peter Crail, “UN Iran Sanctions Decision Awaits,” Arms 

Control Today, November 2007. 26 The Security Council resolutions pertaining to North Korea are 1695 and 1718. Those pertaining to Iran are 1737 and 1747. 27 Michael Jacobson, “Raising the Costs for Tehran,” The Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy, PolicyWatch no. 1324, January 3, 2008, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2700>. 28 The U.S. outreach to the international financial community has included meetings with 

more than 40 banks worldwide. See Robert Kimmitt, “The Role of Finance in Combating National 

Security Threats,” prepared remarks at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 10, 2007, 

available at <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=337>. 29 “Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Activity-Based Financial Prohibitions of 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737,” Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, October 12, 2007. See also “Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Financial Provisions of 

United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction,” June 29, 2007. 30 Statement of G–7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington, DC, October 19, 2007. 31 On these points, see Stuart Levey, “Iran’s Economic Suicide,” The Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2007; Steven Mufson and Robin Wright, “Iran Adapts to Economic Pressure,” The Washington 

Post, October 29, 2007, A1; and John Irish and Mohammed Abbas, “Gulf Bowing to U.S. Pressure 

Over Iran Bank Links,” Reuters, January 14, 2008. 32 National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007, 

key judgments available at <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>. 33 Measuring the impact of sanctions, including financial sanctions, is recognized as a difficult task. The December 2007 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) questioned the impact of financial measures directed at Iran, and argued for a more systematic effort to 

evaluate their effectiveness. See “Iran Sanctions: Impact in Furthering U.S. Objectives Is Unclear and 

Should Be Reviewed,” GAO-08-58, December 2007, available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

d0858.pdf>. Some commentators challenged the GAO’s methodology and findings. See, for instance, 

Matthew Levitt, “GAO Misleads on Iran Sanctions,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 

January 17, 2008, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1122>. 34 Report of the Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/2006/257, 

United Nations. 
38 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

 35 United Nations Security Council, 5806th meeting, December 17, 2007, briefings by Chairmen of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, 5–7 (S/PV.5806). 36 The White House, “Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Russian Federation 

President V.V. Putin,” July 15, 2006. 37 See U.S. Department of State, “Statement of Principles for the Global Initiative to Combat 

Nuclear Terrorism,” November 20, 2006, available at <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/

76358.htm>, and “U.S.-Russia Joint Fact Sheet on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” July 15, 2006, available at <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/69062.htm>. 38 U.S. Department of State, “Current Partner Nations to the Global Initiative to Combat 

Nuclear Terrorism,” February 14, 2008, available at <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/82787.htm>. The 

European Union and International Atomic Energy Agency enjoy observer status. 39 According to the U.S. Department of Energy, since its inception in 2004 through the end of 

2007, GTRI has removed approximately 39 nuclear bombs’ worth of HEU and secured more than 565 

radiological sites around the world containing enough material for approximately 8,500 dirty bombs. 

See National Nuclear Security Administration Fact Sheet, “GTRI: More Than Three Years of Reducing 

Nuclear Threats,” December 2007, available at <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2007/

NA-07-FS-03.pdf>. 40 On the technical issues, see Review of DOE’s Nuclear Energy Research and Development Program, National Research Council of the National Academy of Science, October 2007, chapter 4; Matthew Bunn, “Assessing the Benefits, Costs, and Risks of Near-Term Reprocessing and Alternatives,” 

statement before the Committee on Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water 

Development, September 14, 2006; Richard K. Lester, “New Nukes,” Issues in Science and Technology

(Summer 2006), 39–46; Edwin S. Lyman, “The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Will It Advance 

Nonproliferation or Undermine It?” Union of Concerned Scientists, June 19, 2006; and Union of 

Concerned Scientists, “U.S. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Initiative,” April 10, 2006. 41 See “Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom,” Report of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Safeguards 

System, September 2007, 8. 42 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Strategic Plan (GNEP-167312, Rev. 0), Department of 

Energy, January 2007, 3–10. Emphasis in original. 43 Legislation under consideration in the U.S. Senate, “Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act 

of 2007” (S 1138), includes the following “Declaration of New Policy”:

It shall be the policy of the United States to discourage the development of 

enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in additional countries, encourage the 

creation of bilateral and multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and 

ensure that all supply mechanisms operate in strict accordance with the IAEA 

safeguards system and do not result in any additional unmet verification burdens for the system. 44 See Christopher A. Ford, “The Promise and Responsibilities of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 

Energy,” remarks to the 19th Annual United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, U.S. 

Department of State, August 27, 2007. 45 President George W. Bush, remarks on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, February 11, 2004, The White House. 46 “A New Framework for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Statement at the Special Event on the 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Dr. Mohamed 

ElBaradei, September 19, 2006. In December 2007, Congress authorized and appropriated $50 million toward the establishment of an international fuel bank to be managed by the IAEA. 47 The 21 GNEP partners are Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, China, France, Ghana, Hungary, 

Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovenia, South Korea, 

Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. Additionally, GNEP observers are the IAEA, Euratom, and the Generation IV International Forum. 
International Partnerships to Combat WMD 39

 48 U.S. Department of Energy, “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Inaugural Steering Group 

Meeting Makes Marked Progress,” December 19, 2007.

 49 National Nuclear Security Administration Fact Sheet, “NNSA’s Second Line of Defense 

Program,” January 2008, available at <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2007/NA-07-FS-05.

pdf>. See also Micah Zenko and Matthew Bunn, “Second Line of Defense Program,” Nuclear Threat 

Initiative, November 20, 2007. 

 50 “NNSA’s Second Line of Defense Program.” See also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

“CSI in Brief,” October 3, 2007, and “Ports in CSI,” December 28, 2007. Some observers question the 

wisdom of requiring 100 percent scanning, believing it will divert resources from containers considered to pose a high risk. Senator Susan Collins (R–ME), a co-author of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act, recently stated at a hearing on the Secure Freight Initiative, “I continue to 

believe that requiring the scanning of all cargo bound for the U.S. at every foreign port is misguided. 

It is contrary to the risk-based, layered system of security established by the SAFE Port Act.” See Jon 

Fox, “Scanning of Containers Abroad Daunting, U.S. Says,” Global Security Newswire, October 17, 

2007. 

 51 Zenko and Bunn. 

 52 Fox. 

 53 Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, Program Needs, Joint Working Group of the American Physical Society and the Association for the Advancement of Science, February 2008, 28. 

 54 Michael J. Kristo, “U.S. and Russian Collaboration in the Area of Nuclear Forensics,” paper 

prepared for “The Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015,” international workshop 

sponsored by the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences, November 12–13, 

2007. 

 55 Nuclear Forensics; and Kristo. 

 56 See results of the Atlantic Storm tabletop conducted in 2005, available at <www.atlanticstorm.org>. 

 57 U.S. Department of State, “Black ICE Bioterrorism International Coordination Exercise 

After Action Report,” 2007, 12, available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/79521.

pdf>.

 58 Ibid. Some of the points that follow reflect the key themes and recommendations that 

emerged from the Black ICE exercise. 

 59 Prominent among these experts is Barry Kellman of DePaul University. See his book Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

 60 A/RES/60/288, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, “The United Nations Global 

Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” September 8, 2006. On the Biotechnology Initiative, see “SecretaryGeneral, Receiving Schmidheiny Freedom Prize, Proposes Initiative to Expand Benefits of Biotechnology, Mitigate Risks,” SG/SM/10747, November 20, 2006. 

 61 In 2007, the United States initiated an International Roundtable under the auspices of the 

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to foster dialogue among scientists, policymakers, 

and other experts on the security implications of dual-use research in the life sciences. 

 62 National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, The Biological Threat 

Reduction Program of the Department of Defense—From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships

(Washington, DC: The National Academy Press, 2007), 2, 27–42. 

 63 Ibid., 4–7, 21, 67–83. 

 64 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 13, 2006), 26–27.

 65 See “Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA] Sponsors Black Sea Regional WMD Exercise,” DTRA News Release, September 28, 2007. 

 66 Presumably the Africa clearinghouse will transition to the recently established U.S. Africa 

Command. 
40 CSWMD OCCASIONAL PAPER 6

 67 Initiatives identified for the 2002 Prague Summit were Deployable Analytical Laboratory, 

NBC Event Response Team, Virtual Centre of Excellence for NBC Defence, Biological and Chemical 

Defence Stockpile, and Disease Surveillance System. 68 WMD elimination refers to activities to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, 

and/or destroy a state or nonstate actor’s WMD programs and related capabilities. 69 The MPAT Web site can be accessed at <http://www1.apan-info.net/Default.

aspx?alias+www1.apan-info.net/mpat>. 70 Department of State International Security Advisory Board, “Report on Building International Coalitions to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” February 5, 2007, 10, available at <http://

www.state.gov/documents/organization/66363.pdf>. 71 The American Chemistry Council and the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers 

Association have developed codes of conduct to guide the behavior of their members with respect to 

security management. See Thomas Lehrman, “Building Transformational Partnerships to Combat 

WMD Terrorism,” remarks at the U.S. Military Academy, November 7, 2006, available at <http://www.

state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/77155.htm>. 72 Ibid. See also International Security Advisory Board, 15–16.
41

About the Author

Paul I. Bernstein is a Vice President with Science Applications 

International Corporation (SAIC) in McLean, Virginia. He specializes in 

analysis and project management in the areas of weapons proliferation, 

strategic forces policy, and regional security, and works with the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Staff, 

and National Defense University on a range of technical and training 

activities. Mr. Bernstein is a member of the Combating WMD Panel of 

the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, has supported development 

of key Department of Defense combating WMD strategy and concept 

documents, and is a regular guest lecturer on WMD issues at the Army 

and Marine Corps War Colleges. He developed the programs of instruction for the Proliferation, Terrorism, and Response Course at the Defense 

Nuclear Weapons School and the WMD elective taught at the Army War 

College. In the strategic forces area, Mr. Bernstein is engaged in a number 

of efforts to examine the future nuclear landscape and future directions 

for U.S. nuclear policy.

Mr. Bernstein is most recently the author of “Shaping the Nuclear 

Landscape,” Joint Force Quarterly 46 (3d Quarter, 2007); The Future 

Nuclear Landscape, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Occasional Paper 5 (National Defense University Press, April 2007); and 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Primer (SAIC, October 2006). 



John F. Reichart

Director

STAFF

W. SETH CARUS

Deputy Director, Distinguished Research Fellow

JOHN P. CAVES, JR.

Senior Research Fellow

REBECCA K.C. HERSMAN

Senior Research Fellow

RICHARD A. LOVE

Senior Research Fellow

FORREST E. WALLER, JR.

Senior Research Fellow

M. CREIGHTON HOTTINGER

Research Project Specialist

ROBERT J. PETERS

Research Associate

MARC POLLAK

Research Associate

M. SHANE SMITH

Research Associate

HEATHER VILLENA

Research Associate

Occ as i o n a l Pap er Serie s

The Future Nuclear Landscape

Paul I. Bernstein, John P. Caves, Jr., and John F. Reichart

Occasional Paper no. 5, April 2007

Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”

W. Seth Carus

Occasional Paper no. 4, January 2006

Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?

Lewis A. Dunn

Occasional Paper no. 3, July 2005

Iraq and After: Taking the Right Lessons for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

Michael Eisenstadt

Occasional Paper no. 2, May 2005

For additional information, including publication requests, please contact the Center directly at 

WMDWebmaster@ndu.edu or (202) 685–4234 or visit the Center Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/wmdcenter/index.cfm
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

Washington, D.C.