MILITARY 

READINESS

Actions Are Needed to 

Enhance Readiness 

of Global Response 

Force to Support 

Contingency 

Operations

Report to Congressional Committees

October 2017

GAO-18-81

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-81, a report to 

congressional committees

October 2017

MILITARY READINESS

Actions Are Needed to Enhance Readiness of Global 

Response Force to Support Contingency Operations

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Global Response Force (GRF) has two 

distinct uses: one is to enhance DOD’s ability to rapidly deploy forces in 

response to a range of worldwide contingencies with a tailorable joint force; and 

the other is to provide a set, or “menu,” of units that combatant commands can 

request to augment their capabilities in light of unexpected challenges when 

requirements exceed their capabilities. Since 2010, according to officials, DOD

has used the GRF 35 times in support of worldwide contingencies, with 32 of 

those times involving deployment of individual GRF units to augment combatant 

commander needs, and 3 times involving their use as part of a joint task force. 

This predominant use of individual GRF units to augment combatant 

commanders’ needs has diminished the set of units available for mission 

scenarios related to the GRF’s use as a tailorable joint force. For example, when 

DOD deployed a ballistic missile defense unit as a part of the GRF to augment a 

combatant command’s missile defense capabilities, the particular capability it 

supplied to the GRF was not available for participation in a tailorable joint force 

to respond quickly to a potential worldwide contingency, if such an event 

occurred. DOD does not know what risks it assumes to readiness for GRF 

mission scenarios due to its general reliance upon the GRF as an augmentation 

capability available to individual geographic combatant commands, because 

DOD has not assessed those risks. Without conducting a risk assessment and 

taking steps to address any identified risk to accomplishing the GRF’s intended 

uses, DOD’s attempt to satisfy one of the uses (that is, individual GRF-assigned 

units assisting combatant commands) may hamper the other use (that is, 

deployment of a joint task force for a contingency).

GRF units train individually to meet GRF missions, but DOD does not conduct 

any GRF-specific joint training exercises, and the individual GRF units have 

limited opportunities to train as part of an integrated joint force, according to 

DOD officials. While the GRF Execute Order calls for integrating elements of the 

GRF into existing joint training, the military services lack the authority to direct 

other services to supply forces for joint training exercises, even when those 

forces are currently on a GRF rotation. Moreover, since the disestablishment in 

2011 of U.S. Joint Forces Command—which, among other things, was the lead 

agent for joint force training—and because units designated for the GRF mission 

may be assigned to different combatant commands or may be service-retained, 

no single commander has the authority to require joint force training of GRF 

units. As a result, no joint training exercises are specifically designed to exercise 

GRF units as a joint task force. Army officials told GAO that joint exercises are 

important because they give individual units from different services the 

opportunity to identify challenges and develop solutions, thereby enhancing the 

GRF’s joint task force capability. Without an entity having the responsibility and 

authority to plan, direct, and conduct joint training exercises focused on GRFassigned units deploying as a joint task force as appropriate, DOD risks 

undermining the effectiveness of the rapid deployment of a GRF joint task force 

in response to unforeseen worldwide contingencies. View GAO-18-81. For more information, 

contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 or 

russellc@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD must be able to rapidly deploy 

forces to respond to a range of 

worldwide contingencies, and in 2007 it 

established the GRF to enhance that 

capability. The GRF is a set, or 

“menu,” of forces from the military 

services, each of which possesses

unique capabilities, and which the 

Secretary of Defense can deploy 

rapidly anywhere in the world. 

House Report 114-537, accompanying 

a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,

included a provision for GAO to 

evaluate challenges DOD may be 

facing regarding the GRF. GAO 

reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD 

has used the GRF, and assessed any

risks associated with its use of the 

GRF; and (2) GRF-assigned units are 

trained to meet GRF missions 

individually and as a joint force. GAO 

reviewed GRF deployment information

from 2010 to 2017 and the GRF 

Execute Order, observed a training 

exercise, and interviewed 

knowledgeable officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD (1) 

assess the risks assumed in its 

reliance upon the GRF as both an 

augmentation capability and a 

tailorable joint force; (2) design 

appropriate responses following the 

risk assessment; and (3) designate an 

authority to establish and enforce 

integrated joint training as appropriate 

for GRF-assigned units. DOD 

concurred with GAO’s three 

recommendations.
Page i GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

Letter 1

Background 3

DOD Has Generally Used the GRF to Augment Combatant 

Command Capabilities and Has Not Assessed the Risk on Its 

Ability to Respond as a Joint Force 5

GRF Units Have Trained Individually to Meet GRF Missions, but 

They Have Not Trained as Part of an Integrated Joint Force 9

Conclusion 13

Recommendations for Executive Action 14

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 14

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 17

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 19

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 21

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense

EXORD Execute Order

GRF Global Response Force

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Page 1 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

October 27, 2017

Congressional Committees

According to the 2012 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint 

Force 2020, after more than a decade of war, our nation and armed 

forces are transitioning to a future in which the world is trending toward 

greater stability overall, but is also potentially more dangerous than ever 

before due to destructive technologies available to a disparate range of 

adversaries.1 Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) needs the 

ability to rapidly deploy forces to respond to a range of worldwide 

contingencies.2 In 2007, DOD established the Global Response Force 

(GRF) with the objective of providing the Secretary of Defense with an 

array, or “menu,” of rapidly deployable forces, and thereby enhancing 

DOD’s ability to respond quickly to worldwide contingencies or augment 

the geographic combatant commands’ capability to respond to 

unforeseen challenges.3

House Report 114-537, accompanying a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for us to 

evaluate challenges that DOD may be facing regarding the GRF.4 This 

report reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has used the GRF and 

assessed any risks associated with its use, and (2) GRF-assigned units 

are trained to meet GRF missions, both individually and as a joint force.

For objective one, we reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

GRF Execute Order (EXORD) to identify the GRF’s documented global 

missions, forces, and timelines.5 We reviewed the Joint Staff’s GRF 

 1

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (Sept. 10, 

2012).

2

According to DOD, a contingency is a situation requiring military operations in response 

to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate 

authority to protect U.S. interests. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1-02, DOD Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms (June 2017).

3 DOD’s ability to respond quickly to worldwide contingencies primarily involves a joint 

force, while augmenting the geographic combatant commands’ capability to respond to 

unforeseen challenges mainly utilizes individual units.

4

See H.R. Rep. No. 114-537, at 120 (2016).

5

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Global Response Force Execute Order, Mod 6 

(Dec. 10, 2015).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

deployment information from 2010 to 2017 to understand the frequency of 

GRF deployments and identify specific instances in which the GRF’s 

ability to accomplish its missions was affected. To identify the extent to 

which DOD has assessed any risks to mission readiness based on its 

reliance on the GRF to serve its two identified uses, we also interviewed 

senior officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness; Joint Staff; and Army, Marine Corps, Navy, 

and Air Force headquarters; as well as conducted site visits to force 

providers at Army Forces Command, Marine Forces Command, Navy 

Fleet Forces Command, Air Force Air Combat Command, and U.S. 

Transportation Command. We also interviewed U.S. Africa Command, 

U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command officials, as well as 

visited U.S. Central Command and U.S. Southern Command.6 We 

compared DOD’s effort to assess risks against criteria in the Standards 

for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which states that entities 

should identify and analyze risk and define objectives.7

For objective two, we reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

GRF EXORD and DOD’s Guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting 

System to understand how GRF readiness is developed, reported, and 

evaluated.8 We reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government to identify criteria for how agencies should develop an 

organizational structure and assign responsibilities. We observed a 

Deployment Readiness Exercise at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that 

demonstrated some potential benefits of training exercises for GRF units. 

We also interviewed senior officials from the Joint Staff, military service 

force providers, and geographic combatant commands to better 

understand training practices for the GRF and its assigned units. See 

appendix I for more details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2016 to October 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

 6

We selected these unified commands because they are the common users of the GRF. 

Their views are not generalizable.

7

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).

8

Department of Defense Instruction 7730.66, Guidance for the Defense Readiness 

Reporting System (DRRS) (July 8, 2011).
Page 3 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The GRF EXORD generally establishes the GRF as a set, or “menu,” of 

forces from the military services—each of which possesses unique 

capabilities—that the Secretary of Defense can deploy rapidly anywhere 

in the world. According to Joint Staff officials, deployment is for a duration 

that can range from a few weeks to several months. The GRF EXORD 

was first issued in 2007 and, according to DOD officials, has been revised 

several times to modify the number or types of assigned units. The 

current version, which was issued in 2015, continues to identify two uses 

for the GRF, described as follows:

• One is to enhance DOD’s ability to respond quickly to a range of 

worldwide contingencies. In this scenario, the GRF would generally be 

used as a tailorable joint force. For example, in the event of a 

humanitarian crisis such as an earthquake, GRF units possessing the 

capabilities needed to meet the crisis can be combined into a joint 

force and rapidly deployed to the affected area. In this scenario, the 

GRF units selected would act together as a joint force under the GRFsupplied Joint Task Force headquarters or a preexisting one.9

• The other identified use of the GRF is to augment the capabilities of 

geographic combatant commands in light of unexpected challenges. 

In this scenario, GRF units would generally be deployed as individual 

units or in groups. For example, a combatant command may on 

occasion require additional intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance capability, and accordingly a GRF unit possessing 

that requisite capability can be taken from the GRF and temporarily 

allocated to the combatant command for a certain period of time.

Although the GRF EXORD identifies these two intended uses, the 

document does not prioritize one use over the other.

To meet the range of capabilities delineated in the GRF EXORD, the 

services nominate and assign units to the GRF on a rotating basis for a 

 9

A Joint Task Force is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the 

contingency or crisis require capabilities of services from at least two Military Departments 

operating under a single joint force commander. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-33, 

Joint Task Force Headquarters at I-1 (July 30, 2012).

Background
Page 4 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

certain period of time. Each nominated and assigned unit possesses a 

specific capability outlined in the GRF EXORD.10 These specific 

capabilities correspond to the operational requirements of eight global 

mission scenarios listed in the GRF EXORD. For example, the GRF 

includes a Marine Expeditionary Unit and an Airborne Brigade Combat 

Team because of the unique capabilities of those units. According to 

DOD officials, once a force is assigned to the GRF, it is on alert status for 

a period of typically 6 to 9 months, with a potential to be deployed. 

Accordingly, services rotate units onto and off of the GRF in order to 

maintain a high state of readiness, which, in turn, allows them to meet the 

rapid response timeframes required by the GRF EXORD.

To gain access to units assigned to the GRF, according to Joint Staff 

officials, combatant commanders submit an emergent request for forces 

to the Joint Staff. Generally as part of the global force management 

process, when a combatant command identifies an emergent requirement 

for a force that cannot be met using units already assigned or allocated to 

the combatant command, the combatant command then submits a 

request for forces. If the Joint Staff, joint force providers, and military 

services determine that a GRF-assigned unit is the most appropriate 

solution for the combatant command’s requirement, the Joint Staff will 

recommend it as the sourcing solution to the Secretary of Defense. Once 

approved, the GRF-assigned unit will be allocated to the combatant 

commander.11

 10According to officials from the Joint Staff, the services set their respective deployment 

schedules to rotate units on and off the GRF. The specific range of capabilities outlined in 

the GRF EXORD and the units that provide them are classified.

11The Secretaries of the Military Departments assign forces under their jurisdiction to 

unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those 

commands. Forces not assigned to a combatant commander are retained under the 

Secretary of the Military Department and are commonly referred to as “service retained” or 

“unassigned.” An allocation is the transfer of an assigned force from one combatant 

commander to another by the Secretary of Defense. 
Page 5 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

According to an official from the Joint Staff office responsible for 

managing the GRF across DOD, since 2010 DOD has used the GRF 35 

times in support of worldwide contingencies—with 32 of those uses 

involving individual GRF units being deployed in support of or to augment 

combatant commander needs. However, according to Joint Staff officials 

overseeing the management of the GRF, DOD has not assessed the 

extent to which it assumes risk associated with the potential unavailability 

of GRF units for a short-notice deployment as a joint force in response to 

a contingency, given the predominant use of the GRF as a resource for 

combatant commands to obtain individual units. According to an official 

from the Joint Staff, deployment of select GRF units as part of a joint task 

force has occurred three times: once to Haiti in support of an earthquake 

humanitarian response, and twice to Afghanistan in July 2010 and June 

2011 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. According to these 

officials, GRF capabilities in support of Haiti included command and 

control, security, and transportation and distribution of humanitarian 

supplies. GRF units in support of Operation Enduring Freedom provided 

force protection to coalition forces as well as train, advise, and assist 

capabilities.

The predominant use—32 of 35 deployments—of individual GRF units to 

augment a combatant commander’s needs has, in turn, diminished the 

set of units available for mission scenarios related to the GRF’s use as a 

tailorable joint force, and accordingly the capabilities available for 

inclusion under a GRF joint task force. For example, Joint Staff officials 

stated that DOD deployed a ballistic missile defense unit designated for

the GRF to a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility 

to augment that combatant command’s missile defense capabilities. 

According to Joint Staff officials, the deployment of individual GRFassigned units is intended to be a temporary solution for a specified 

period of time. According to these officials, the ballistic missile defense 

unit’s deployment was extended beyond its original timeframe and it was 

not replaced on the GRF menu of forces with another such unit because 

there are not enough of these particular types of units to meet the 

requirements across the combatant commands. Therefore, during the 

ballistic missile defense unit’s deployment, the particular capability that 

unit supplied to the GRF was not available as part of a tailorable joint 

force to respond quickly to a potential worldwide contingency—the other 

broad intended use of the GRF. Given that DOD has not defined an 

acceptable level of risk—relative to the length of time during which units 

remain committed to augmenting combatant commanders’ needs—DOD 

lacked reasonable assurance that extending the ballistic missile defense 

DOD Has Generally 

Used the GRF to 

Augment Combatant 

Command 

Capabilities and Has 

Not Assessed the 

Risk on Its Ability to 

Respond as a Joint 

Force
Page 6 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

unit’s deployment would not surpass an acceptable level of risk to mission 

for either of the GRF’s uses.

Two other units with capabilities particularly suited for use as part of a 

joint force have also been deployed individually to augment combatant 

command capabilities. One is U.S. Transportation Command’s Joint 

Enabling Capabilities Command, which provides joint communications, 

planning, and public affairs support to a joint force or joint task force 

headquarters. A second is U.S. Transportation Command’s Joint Task 

Force – Port Opening, which provides capabilities able to deploy within 12 

to 36 hours to support the opening of a port, including the capability to 

rapidly establish and initially operate an aerial or sea port of debarkation, 

conduct cargo handling and movement operations to a forward 

distribution node, and facilitate port throughput in support of contingency 

operations. Like ballistic missile defense units, these two units are limited 

in number. According to officials from U.S. Transportation Command, 

because the units have been used primarily to augment geographic 

combatant command capabilities, they are at times unavailable for use as 

part of a tailorable joint force that can be used to respond quickly to 

unforeseen worldwide contingencies. Because DOD has not defined the 

risk it assumes in its use of GRF units, it cannot determine the likelihood 

that units used to augment combatant commanders’ needs might be 

required to constitute a joint force composed of GRF units, nor has DOD 

defined the significance of the risk it incurs by not having a given 

capability available to the GRF. Further, although DOD has used the GRF 

primarily to augment combatant commanders’ needs, risks for both uses 

should be identified and analyzed appropriately since neither use is 

prioritized over the other. While DOD did not encounter issues accessing 

GRF units that it required during any of the three instances in which the 

GRF was deployed as part of a joint force, Joint Staff officials have 

nonetheless raised an issue concerning the degree of risk that DOD 

continues to assume by using GRF capabilities to augment combatant 

commander needs that may be needed by the GRF to constitute a joint 

force.

DOD officials stated that using GRF units to augment geographic 

combatant command requirements leaves them unavailable for use as 

part of a joint force ready to respond to an unforeseen worldwide 

contingency. They stated that this is largely due to the fact that some 

GRF units are limited in quantity but in high demand worldwide. For 

example, according to DOD officials, while intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance systems are in such high demand that they are 

consistently used to augment combatant commanders’ requirements, 
Page 7 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

they are also typically used as an essential part of a joint force. As such, 

there is a likelihood that a GRF joint force might require, but not have 

access to these capabilities, thus potentially increasing the risk of not 

accomplishing a given mission. DOD officials stated that in the event of a 

crisis requiring the employment of GRF units as part of a joint task force, 

GRF units currently employed elsewhere could be reassigned. It is 

uncertain, however, whether such reassignment would enable a GRF 

joint task force to meet its timeframes for deployment given that GRF 

units are expected to be ready for deployment on very short notice. 

Moreover, the potential effect of and risks associated with such an 

occurrence—specifically, the unavailability of required forces to assemble 

GRF units as part of a joint force—has not been assessed. The 

identification and analysis of risks provides the basis for developing 

appropriate risk responses, such as, in this case, further defining and 

prioritizing the GRF’s intended uses and missions. Because DOD has not 

identified or analyzed risks associated with the uses of the GRF, it may 

lack reasonable assurance that this response will be sufficient to mitigate 

the risks. Further, without identifying risk, DOD is not well positioned to 

develop other risk-mitigating strategies, and to know when to activate 

them.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government establish that 

management should assess risks related to achieving defined 

objectives.12 Specifically, the standards state that management should 

analyze the identified risks to estimate their significance and define 

tolerances for levels of risk assumed, thereby providing a basis for 

responding to the risks. The standards also call for management to 

design responses such that risks are contained within the defined risk 

tolerance for the identified objective. DOD has not assessed the risks to 

readiness for mission scenarios that it might assume for both uses of the 

GRF because of its general reliance upon the GRF as an augmentation 

capability available to individual geographic combatant commands for 

response to unforeseen challenges or opportunities.

Furthermore, we found that there are varying perspectives within DOD 

concerning the intended uses of the GRF, although the GRF EXORD 

generally identifies two overarching uses, as previously discussed. 

Specifically, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness and the Joint Staff stated the view that the 

 12GAO-14-704G.
Page 8 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

GRF is a menu of forces, each unit possessing unique capabilities that 

can be used either individually to address geographic combatant 

command-identified capability gaps or collectively as a joint force to react 

to unforeseen worldwide contingencies. However, officials from U.S. 

Africa Command and U.S. Central Command view the GRF primarily as a 

pool from which they can draw forces, and it is these geographic 

combatant commands that have most often requested those capabilities 

provided by individual GRF units. Officials from the Army expressed 

another perspective, based in large part on the requirement for the Army 

to provide a joint task force headquarters for the GRF. Army officials said 

that, in their view, the GRF serves primarily as a pool of forces from which 

a joint task force can be created to meet unforeseen worldwide 

contingencies.

Although the GRF EXORD generally identifies the two uses, it does not 

prioritize the use of GRF assets to meet either. Additionally, DOD has not 

defined the risk to meeting the objectives of either of the two uses, and, 

thus does not have the necessary knowledge to determine when to 

deploy units for one use or the other. As previously stated, DOD has used 

the GRF to augment combatant commanders’ forces more frequently—32 

out of 35 deployments—rather than retaining the units assigned to the 

GRF to support a rapidly deploying joint force.

Conducting a risk assessment that identifies any risks associated with the 

use of the GRF could help DOD to design responses, such as further 

defining and prioritizing the GRF’s intended uses and missions in an effort 

to mitigate any identified risks. Without conducting a risk assessment and 

taking steps to address any identified risk to accomplishing either of the 

GRF’s uses, DOD’s attempt to satisfy one of the two intended uses of the 

GRF may inadvertently hamper the other intended use.
Page 9 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

GRF units train individually to meet GRF missions, but there are no GRFspecific joint training exercises, and the individual GRF units have limited 

opportunities to train as part of an integrated joint force, according to 

DOD officials. Specifically, according to service officials, GRF readiness, 

and that of assigned units, is based on the assigned force’s participation 

in their respective service training exercises and are generally focused on 

the respective units’ core missions or functions.13 In addition to servicelevel training, GRF units can also participate in joint training exercises 

sponsored by one of the geographic combatant commands. These 

commands can give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and 

forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, 

including over all aspects of joint training.14 However, if GRF units are 

service retained or assigned to different combatant commands, they 

would not all fall under the authority of a single commander that could 

direct joint training. According to military service officials, there are no 

GRF-specific joint training exercises. However, according to some 

combatant command officials, some joint training exercises have included 

units currently assigned to the GRF. Few, if any of these exercises, 

however, provide opportunities to conduct training for the GRF’s joint task 

force headquarters in conjunction with GRF-assigned units. For example, 

according to U.S. Southern Command officials, the Joint Staff’s 2017 

Joint Task Force Forming Exercises will be held in U.S. Southern 

Command’s area of responsibility, and will include the unit currently 

assigned as the GRF’s Joint Task Force headquarters. However, the 

exercise will not include any other GRF-assigned units. Therefore, the 

training will not provide an opportunity for the GRF to demonstrate 

readiness, gain efficiencies, or identify deficiencies associated with 

deploying elements of the GRF as a tailorable joint task force.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01H, Joint Training 

Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, notes that U.S. forces 

may be employed across the range of military operations, and that DOD 

must support national security requirements with joint military capabilities 

designed to adapt and succeed in any operational environment. It further 

 13DOD uses the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Enterprise as its joint program of 

record for readiness reporting. See, e.g., Department of Defense Instruction 7730.66, 

Guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), encl. 2 para. 5.b (July 8, 

2011).

14Combatant commanders may also coordinate and approve forces for training in support 

of other combatant commanders’ requirements.

GRF Units Have 

Trained Individually to 

Meet GRF Missions, 

but They Have Not 

Trained as Part of an 

Integrated Joint Force
Page 10 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

states that the department and its mission partners must prepare to 

operate in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 

environment. Finally, it notes that the joint training challenge is to be 

responsive to all emerging and extant mission requirements of the 

combatant commanders.15

The need for interoperability is especially important for units assigned to 

the GRF not only because the GRF EXORD requires that they be ready 

for eight global mission scenarios, but because the overall GRF concept 

suggests they need to be capable of integration into a tailorable joint 

force. Underscoring this need for interoperability and jointness, the GRF 

EXORD outlines that combatant commanders should integrate elements 

of the GRF into Joint Exercise Program events to help sustain the 

readiness and capabilities of those units to execute various mission 

capability requirements.16 It also notes that combatant commanders 

should conduct a training event with the GRF’s Joint Task Force-capable 

headquarters at least once every 30 months in order to maintain the 

headquarters’ readiness to support each geographic combatant 

command. While these requirements are important to ensure the GRF 

units receive the proper training and are integrated into combatant 

command joint exercises, there are no specific GRF joint training 

exercises that provide opportunities for individual units assigned to the 

GRF to train as a tailorable joint task force.

Joint Staff and service officials told us that the GRF’s assigned forces do 

not require additional or special training because they will perform the 

core missions for which they train regardless of whether they are 

deployed individually or as part of the GRF joint task force. These officials 

stated, therefore, that existing training is sufficient to develop and 

determine readiness of the GRF. However, the importance of exercising 

the GRF Joint Task Force headquarters and associated GRF-assigned 

units was demonstrated to us when we observed an Army-sponsored 

joint training event involving GRF-assigned forces during a January 2017 

Deployment Readiness Exercise at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during 

 15Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01H, Joint Training Policy for the 

Armed Forces of the United States, encl. A, para. 2 (Apr. 25, 2014).

16The Joint Exercise Program is a principal means for combatant commanders to maintain 

trained and ready forces, exercise contingency and theater security cooperation plans, 

and conduct joint and multinational training exercises. See GAO, Joint Exercise Program: 

DOD Needs to Take Steps to Improve the Quality of Funding Data, GAO-17-7 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2017).
Page 11 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

which several interoperability challenges arose. For example, the Army 

and Air Force faced a challenge in calculating the weight of Army heavy 

equipment being loaded onto Air Force aircraft preparatory to a simulated 

airdrop mission. Based on the Army’s calculations, the equipment load 

was well under the specified weight limit for the aircraft, but the Air 

Force’s onboard computers showed the load as being over the limit. 

While the cause of the difference in the two figures was not identified to 

us at the time, Army officials suspected that it could be attributed to a 

double-counting of the weight of the parachute. In another example, 

inclement weather at Fort Bragg during the exercise caused ice build-up 

on participating aircraft. This showed that the Air Force’s de-icing 

capability was limited to a few aircraft at a time, which caused delays in 

loading and preparing the aircraft for take-off. According to Army officials, 

had the mission required more personnel, equipment, and aircraft, this 

issue would have created a risk to meeting the GRF’s mission timelines.

Despite the challenges encountered during the exercise, Army officials 

told us that exercises, such as the Deployment Readiness Exercise 

conducted at Fort Bragg, are important because they give units from 

different services the opportunity to identify challenges and develop 

solutions. As a result, these exercises can enhance the GRF’s joint task 

force capability. Additionally, a senior official from the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Force Training 

Directorate told us that the ability to act jointly was very important in 

military operations and noted the need for joint training.

Two studies conducted on behalf of DOD further underscore the 

importance of joint exercises for developing GRF force readiness. The 

first study, released by the Institute for Defense Analysis in 2015, 

reported that the current joint exercise program did not ensure a proficient 

and ready GRF.17 Specifically, the study identified three key issues 

associated with GRF training. First, realistic interoperability training of 

individual units assigned to the GRF was not sufficient to ensure overall 

GRF readiness. Second, while the then-current version of the GRF 

EXORD assigned joint training responsibilities to the services, according 

to the study, the service responsible for the Joint Task Force-capable 

headquarters element lacked the authority to direct the required level of 

joint training for GRF elements provided by other services. Third, the 

 17Institute for Defense Analyses, Enhancing Rapid Response: Global Response Force 

Readiness (October 2015).
Page 12 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

GRF, in its entirety, had not been exercised or deployed as a joint force 

since its inception and thus had not demonstrated the ability to rapidly 

deploy as an operationally coherent joint task force. The report 

recommended that DOD designate a single commander with authority to 

establish and enforce joint integrated training at the tactical level, make 

changes to improve training for the GRF’s Joint Task Force headquarters, 

and implement a joint demonstration campaign for the GRF. According to 

Joint Staff officials, they are not aware of any actions taken in response to 

these recommendations. The second study, released by RAND in 2016, 

also emphasized that realistic exercises were key to ensuring and 

validating the GRF’s readiness.18 The report added that current exercises 

rarely included full and realistic force packages and recommended that 

joint airborne exercises be designed explicitly to identify and assess the 

implications of possible challenges and validate planning assumptions 

about a GRF joint task force.

According to Army officials, a major factor inhibiting joint training 

exercises focused at GRF-assigned units as a joint task force is the fact 

that it can be difficult to get other services to agree to participate in 

service-sponsored events because—as the Institute for Defense Analysis 

study pointed out—services lack the authority to direct other services to 

supply forces for joint training exercises, even when those forces are 

currently on a GRF rotation. Moreover, since the disestablishment of U.S. 

Joint Forces Command in 2011, which was responsible, among other 

things, for being the lead agent for joint force training, there is no single 

commander with the authority to require joint force training. As noted 

above, although geographic combatant commanders may direct joint 

training of forces under their command, units designated for the GRF 

mission may come from forces assigned to different geographic 

combatant commands or service-retained forces, according to officials.

According to a senior Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness’ Force Training Directorate official, the 

challenge to conducting joint GRF training is that there is no entity having 

authority and responsibility for such training. He noted that because the 

GRF is department-wide and is not assigned to a single service or 

geographic combatant command, there is no single advocate for the GRF 

mission and training with the authority to direct the services and 

 18RAND Corporation, Enabling the Global Response Force: Access Strategies for the 

82nd Airborne Division (2016).
Page 13 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

geographic combatant commands with GRF-dedicated units to prepare 

for the joint requirements inherent in the GRF mission. As a result, there 

are no joint training exercises specifically designed to exercise GRF units 

as a joint force. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, management should develop an organizational structure 

with an understanding of the overall responsibilities, and assign these 

responsibilities to enable the organization to operate in an efficient and 

effective manner, comply with applicable laws and regulations, and 

reliably report quality information. To achieve this, management should 

assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles throughout the 

entity.

Without an entity having the responsibility and authority to plan, direct, 

and conduct joint training exercises focused on GRF-assigned units 

deploying as a joint task force as appropriate, DOD risks undermining the 

effectiveness of the rapid deployment of a GRF joint task force in 

response to unforeseen worldwide contingencies.

DOD has developed the GRF as a rapid response force available to react 

to unforeseen contingencies or crises. While the GRF has responded to 

worldwide contingencies, GRF units have been primarily used to augment 

existing geographic combatant command capabilities. DOD has not 

assessed the risks it assumes by its reliance upon the GRF for 

augmenting combatant commanders’ forces as opposed to having the 

GRF-assigned units available for allocation to a joint task force in

response to a contingency. Without performing a risk assessment and, as 

appropriate, designing responses to mitigate any identified unacceptable 

risks to accomplishing either of the two GRF uses, DOD cannot ensure 

that the GRF is able to meet its mission. Additionally, without a 

designated authority to establish and enforce integrated joint training for 

GRF-assigned units as appropriate, DOD has not developed GRFspecific joint training exercises or fully integrated the GRF into existing 

joint exercises. Without making improvements in these areas, DOD risks 

the ability of the GRF to respond to unforeseen, worldwide contingencies 

as an integrated joint force in a timely fashion with all the resources it 

needs.

Conclusions
Page 14 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

We are making the following three recommendations to DOD:

• The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, should assess the risks to accomplishing both of 

the GRF’s uses: that is, its use as an augmentation capability 

available as needed to individual geographic combatant commands; 

and its use as a tailorable joint force available for rapid response to a 

specific threat. (Recommendation 1)

• The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, should, as appropriate following the assessment 

of risk, design responses, such as further defining and prioritizing the 

GRF’s intended uses and missions, to mitigate any identified risks. 

(Recommendation 2)

• The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, should designate an authority to establish and 

enforce integrated joint training for GRF-assigned units, as 

appropriate. (Recommendation 3)

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its 

written comments, DOD concurred with our three recommendations and 

noted planned actions to address them. DOD’s comments are reprinted in 

their entirety in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary for Personnel 

and Readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries 

of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 15 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-5431, or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and of Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix III.

Cary Russell

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 16 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 17 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

The objectives of our review were to examine the extent to which (1) 

Department of Defense (DOD) has used the Global Response Force 

(GRF) and assessed any risks associated with its use; and (2) GRFassigned units are trained to meet GRF missions, both individually and as 

a joint force.

For our objective of determining the extent to which DOD has used the 

GRF and assessed any risks associated with its use, we reviewed the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GRF Execute Order (EXORD) to 

identify the GRF’s overall uses and the global mission scenarios it is 

intended to meet, as well as the operational requirements and forces 

assigned to meet the requirements.1 We also interviewed the responsible 

DOD officials to understand how DOD selects, designates, and validates 

forces on the GRF, and the processes for making changes to the GRF 

EXORD, as well as how DOD decides when to use GRF forces for either 

of the two intended uses of the GRF. Also, we reviewed Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government to identify relevant internal 

controls—specifically, that management should assess risks related to 

achieving defined objectives, analyze the identified risks to estimate their 

significance, define tolerances for levels of risk assumed, and design 

responses such that risks are within the defined risk tolerance—and 

compare them with DOD’s risk assessment efforts for the GRF.2 Also, we 

reviewed the Joint Staff’s GRF deployment information from 2010 to 2017 

to understand the frequency of GRF deployments and identify specific 

instances in which the GRF’s ability to accomplish its missions was 

affected—specifically, instances in which GRF capabilities were 

unavailable for use during a GRF operation.

For our objective of determining the extent to which GRF-assigned units 

are trained to meet GRF missions, both individually and as a joint force, 

we reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GRF EXORD and 

DOD’s Guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting System to 

understand how GRF readiness is developed, reported, and evaluated.3

We also reviewed DOD’s Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of 

 1

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Global Response Force Execute Order, Mod 6 

(Dec. 10, 2015).

2

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).

3

Department of Defense Instruction 7730.66, Guidance for the Defense Readiness 

Reporting System (DRRS) (July 8, 2011).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 18 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

the United States to identify existing requirements related to joint training, 

and documents related to GRF training to determine the extent to which 

the frequency and types of GRF training meet overall joint training 

requirements as well as training requirements established in the GRF 

EXORD.4 We observed a Deployment Readiness Exercise at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, to learn about the types of GRF training, as well as 

challenges and potential benefits of training exercises for GRF units. We 

also interviewed senior officials from the Joint Staff, military service force 

providers, and geographic combatant commands to better understand 

training practices for the GRF and its assigned units, as well as varying 

perspectives regarding the challenges and potential benefits of GRF 

training exercises for accomplishing GRF missions.

We interviewed senior officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Joint Staff; and Army, Marine 

Corps, Navy, and Air Force headquarters, and conducted site visits to 

force providers at Army Forces Command, Marine Forces Command, 

Navy Fleet Forces Command, Air Force Air Combat Command, and U.S. 

Transportation Command. We also interviewed officials from U.S. Africa 

Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command, and

visited U.S. Central Command and U.S. Southern Command.5 Our 

interviews focused on understanding the degree to which DOD 

organizations assess and maintain a consistent understanding of the risks 

entailed in using GRF forces and gaining an understanding of the 

challenges encountered in identifying, designating, and employing forces 

on the GRF, as well as the extent to which the GRF’s ability to 

accomplish its intended missions has been affected.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2016 to October 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 4

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01H, Joint Training Policy for the 

Armed Forces of the United States (Apr. 25, 2014).

5

We selected these unified commands because they are the common users of the GRF. 

Their views are not generalizable.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 19 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 20 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 21 GAO-18-81 Military Readiness

Cary B. Russell, (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key 

contributions to this report include Guy LoFaro, Assistant Director; Adam 

Anguiano; Alberto Leff; Michael Shaughnessy; Michael Silver; Yong 

Song; and Cheryl Weissman.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100904)
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