An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-164

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 19 August 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

C.E.C.B., S.M.B., E.M.G.B. New Hanover County

Nos. 10 JT 159-161

Appeal by respondents from order entered 21 November 2013

by Judge J.H. Corpening, II in New Hanover County District 

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 July 2014.

Regina Floyd-Davis for petitioner-appellee New Hanover 

County Department of Social Services.

Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for 

guardian ad litem.

Hunt Law Group, P.C., by James A. Hunt, for respondentappellant mother.

Mark L. Hayes for respondent-appellant father.

HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.

Respondent-mother and respondent-father (“respondents”) 

appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to their 
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children, Cathy, Sally, and Emily.

1 After careful review, we 

affirm.

Background

On 24 May 2010, the New Hanover Department of Social 

Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging that Cathy,

age 7, Sally, age 2, and infant Emily (collectively “the 

children”) were neglected and dependent. DSS also alleged that 

fourteen-year-old “Amy,” respondent-mother’s biological daughter 

and respondent-father’s adopted daughter, was neglected and 

dependent.2 By order filed 16 August 2010, the trial court 

adjudicated the children neglected based upon the parties’

stipulation that respondents engaged in domestic violence. 

In a November 2011 permanency planning review order, the 

trial court found that respondents had complied with their 

Family Services Agreement and returned the children to the legal 

custody of respondents. The trial court ordered respondents, 

who had separated, to continue to comply with prior court orders 

and to maintain appropriate housing and employment. Afterwards, 

the children mostly lived with respondent-father. 

 

1 Pseudonyms are used throughout this opinion to protect the 

identity of the children and for ease of reading.

2 Amy is not a subject of this appeal because she reached the 

age of majority prior to the filing of the petition to terminate 

parental rights.
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DSS filed a new petition on 12 March 2012 alleging that the 

children and Amy were neglected and dependent. By order filed 

11 June 2012, the trial court adjudicated the children neglected 

and dependent based, in part, upon respondents’ stipulation that 

respondent-mother allowed the children to be exposed to Mr. C., 

“with whom she is engaged in a domestic violence ridden 

relationship” and that respondent-father’s home was not an 

“appropriate living arrangement due to [its] deplorable state.”

The trial court ceased reunification efforts with respondentmother on 21 September 2012 based, in part, upon her continued

relationship with Mr. C. in direct violation of a prior court 

order. The trial court ceased reunification efforts with 

respondent-father on 17 June 2013 after finding he “only 

recently obtained housing” that “appear[ed] to be appropriate 

for the children[.]” 

DSS filed a petition to terminate respondents’ parental 

rights on 19 July 2013. DSS alleged that the parental rights of 

respondents were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (neglect) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1111(a)(2) (failure to make reasonable progress). The 

termination of parental rights hearing began on 18 September 

2013, after which the trial court found that both grounds 
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existed to terminate respondents’ parental rights. The court 

also determined that termination of respondents’ parental rights 

was in the best interest of the children and entered an order 

terminating respondents’ rights. Respondents separately appeal. 

Standard of Review

“The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, 

cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in 

turn, support the conclusions of law. We then consider, based 

on the grounds found for termination, whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in finding termination to be in the best 

interest of the child.” In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221-

22, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted).

Arguments

I. Grounds for Termination

Respondents first contend the trial court erred in 

concluding that grounds existed to terminate their parental 

rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). We disagree.

A trial court may terminate parental rights based on a 

finding that the parent has neglected the juvenile. N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2013). A neglected juvenile is one who 
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“does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline” from 

a parent or caretaker, or “who lives in an environment injurious 

to the juvenile’s welfare[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) 

(2013). Generally, “[a] finding of neglect sufficient to 

terminate parental rights must be based on evidence showing 

neglect at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re 

Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997). However, 

“a prior adjudication of neglect may be admitted and considered 

by the trial court in ruling upon a later petition to terminate 

parental rights on the ground of neglect.” In re Ballard, 311 

N.C. 708, 713-14, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1984). Where a prior 

adjudication of neglect is considered by the trial court, “[t]he 

trial court must also consider any evidence of changed 

conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the 

probability of a repetition of neglect.” Id. at 715, 319 S.E.2d 

at 232. Thus, where

there is no evidence of neglect at the time 

of the termination proceeding . . . parental 

rights may nonetheless be terminated if 

there is a showing of a past adjudication of 

neglect and the trial court finds by clear 

and convincing evidence a probability of 

repetition of neglect if the juvenile were 

returned to her parents.

In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000). 

Respondents argue that the trial court’s conclusion that neglect 
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is likely to be repeated is not supported by its findings of 

fact. 

The trial court made the following relevant findings in 

support of its conclusion of law that grounds existed to 

terminate respondents’ parental rights based on neglect:

5. That family living environment, while 

residing in [] Nevada, was marred with 

substance abuse by [respondent-father] and 

domestic violence between [respondents].

[Amy] testified that the family had 

involvement with the Washoe County 

Department of Social Services in [] Nevada.

[Amy] described their living environment as 

marred with domestic violence, drug use, 

chaotic and fraught with financial problems. 

In, [sic] 1999, [respondent-father] was 

incarcerated for three years for possession 

of illegal substances. [Respondent-father] 

acknowledges the involvement of the Washoe 

County Department of Social Services on only 

one occasion.

6. That the domestic violence continued 

when the parties moved to [] North Carolina.

On May 22, 2010, [DSS] assumed legal custody 

of [Amy, Cathy, Sally, and Emily] due to an 

incident of domestic violence between 

[respondents]. Both parents were arrested, 

and there was no alternative placement 

arrangement for the children. 

. . . .

9. That from May 22, 2010 through October 

27, 2011 [DSS] maintained legal custody of 

[Amy, Cathy, Sally and Emily]. The parents 

stipulated to the neglect allegations 

contained in the Juvenile Petition filed on 

May 22, 2010. [Cathy and Sally] were placed 
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with [respondent-father]. [Emily], as an 

infant, was placed with [respondent-mother], 

who was breastfeeding at the time. [Amy] 

remained in foster care until she requested 

to be placed with her siblings in her 

father’s home, which was done on September 

20, 2010. Following an incident with her 

father, [Amy] was again placed in a group 

home on May 18, 2011. In February of 2011, 

[respondent-mother] had to undergo emergency 

surgery, and [Emily] was moved to 

[respondent-father’s] home with her 

siblings. During the period of time from 

May 2010 to October 27, 2011, [DSS] made 

reasonable efforts with each parent. [Amy] 

described life after the parents’ separation 

as showing “no improvement.” The same 

problems existed with each parent, just 

involved other people. 

10. That [respondents] successfully 

completed the Domestic Violence Program, and 

initiated couples counseling between May and 

October of 2011. . . . That legal custody of 

[Cathy, Sally, and Emily] was restored to 

[respondents] in October 2011. [Respondentfather] exercised primary custody, with 

[respondent-mother] exercising secondary 

custody. Subsequently, [respondent-mother] 

reported to a Social Worker at [DSS]

regarding [respondent-father’s] care of the 

children. She complained that [respondentfather’s] house was unclean, and the 

children were being neglected and abused. 

She complained that [Cathy] was not going to 

school, and [Amy] had to babysit the younger 

children. She complained that [respondentfather] was verbally and physically abusive 

to the children over small things. 

[Respondent-mother] personally observed the 

house to be unclean, and in disarray. 

[Respondent-mother] personally observed the 

children with poor hygiene. [Amy] testified 

that her younger siblings were not being 
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bathed, and did not have adequate food. 

11. That in January of 2012, [DSS] received 

reports alleging neglect of [Cathy, Sally, 

and Emily] due to [respondent-father’s] 

dirty home and care of the children. This 

Court finds the testimony regarding the 

children’s living environment while in the 

physical custody of [respondent-father] to 

be credible. The children were not being 

properly cared for by [respondent-father]. 

[Respondent-father’s] home had deteriorated 

to deplorable conditions. [Cathy] had 

numerous tardies and absences from school. 

[Cathy, Sally, and Emily] did not appear 

properly groomed. [Cathy, Sally, and Emily] 

were subsequently placed in the physical 

custody of [respondent-mother] pursuant to a 

Safety Assessment, while [DSS] conducted an 

investigation of the recent allegations. 

[Amy] remained in the legal custody of 

[DSS]. [Respondent-mother] testified that 

when [Cathy, Sally, and Emily] returned to 

her physical custody in January of 2012, 

they would wake up screaming, and hoarded 

food in drawers, toys and purses. She had 

never previously observed such actions from 

her children. 

12. That [respondent-mother] filed for [a] 

Domestic Violence Protective Order against 

[respondent-father] in January of 2012, 

which was subsequently dismissed. In March 

of 2012, [respondent-mother] again filed for 

a Domestic Violence Protective Order against 

[respondent-father] alleging fear of further 

violence, threats of harm from him, and a 

threat to kill her. She was granted the 

Domestic Violence Protective Order on March 

23, 2012, which remained in effect until 

March 24, 2013. 

13. That [DSS] subsequently learned that 

[respondent-mother] had allowed [Cathy, 
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Sally and Emily] to be cared for by [Mr. C.] 

for a three day period, when she did not 

have housing due to a miscommunication 

relative to moving into a new residence.

[Emily] sustained bruises on her buttocks 

during said period. [DSS] filed a Petition 

alleging [Cathy, Sally and Emily] to be 

neglected Juveniles on March 12, 2012, and 

assumed legal custody of said children on 

the same date.

14. That in March of 2012, [respondentmother] filed for a No-Contact Order against 

[Mr. C.], which was granted by the Court.

15. That at a hearing held on May 17, 2012, 

the parties stipulated to the allegations of 

neglect and dependency, to wit: [Neglect] 

Despite warning from the petitioner . . . to 

avoid contact of the children with [Mr. C.] 

in a current Safety Assessment, and a 

prohibition in prior Court Orders, the 

mother has been cohabiting with [Mr. C.] for 

at least the last three days and allowed him 

to inappropriately discipline [Emily], 

leaving bruising on her buttocks area. She 

has engaged in domestic violence in the 

presence of the children with 

[Mr. C.] and has a history of domestic 

violence in her relationship with the father 

of the children. . . . [Dependency] The 

mother allowed the children to be exposed to 

[Mr. C.], with whom she is engaged in a 

domestic violence ridden relationship. The 

father’s home was not an appropriate living 

arrangement due to its deplorable state.

There are no relatives in this state to 

provide care for the children.

16. That [DSS] made reasonable efforts with 

[respondent-mother] from March of 2012 until 

August 29, 2012. [Respondent-mother] was 

directed to comply with the terms of her 

Family Services Agreement. She was directed 
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to participate in individual and family 

therapy, maintain a support system, maintain 

housing and be financially responsible for 

her rent and utilities. [Mr. C.] was 

prohibited from contact with the children. 

17. That [Amy] was placed in a trial home 

placement with her mother in June of 2012. 

Subsequent to said placement, [respondentmother] maintained a relationship with [Mr. 

C.]. [Amy] observed [Mr. C.] in her mother’s 

home with her mother’s consent on more than 

one occasion. That in July of 2012, [Amy]

and her mother engaged in a physical 

altercation, wherein [Mr. C.] was present. 

[Amy] sustained a black eye [] and 

[respondent-mother] was bitten on the 

finger, and presented with bruises about her 

body. [Respondent-mother] was charged with 

misdemeanor child abuse; however, the 

charges were dismissed. [Amy] was not 

informed of the Court Date, and did not have 

transportation to testify in District Court 

regarding the incident; hence, the charges 

were dismissed by the state. [Respondentmother] denies that [Mr. C.] was ever at her 

residence. Efforts toward reunification 

with [respondent-mother] were ceased [] at 

the hearing on August 29, 2012 with a 

finding that such efforts would be futile 

and inconsistent with the Juveniles’

permanent home within a reasonable period of 

time. . . . 

. . . .

19. That [respondent-mother] has 

consistently maintained that she is not in a 

relationship with [Mr. C.]. She has 

testified before this Court, that she has 

had no contact with [Mr. C.] since February 

of 2012. She has testified that [Mr. C.] 

has stalked her. 
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20. That on July 9, 2013, [respondentmother] filed for a Complaint for No-Contact 

Order for Stalking or Nonconsensual Sexual 

Conduct against [Mr. C.]; however, said 

request was dismissed as [respondent-mother] 

did not attend the hearing, citing her work 

obligations. On July 20, 2013, 

[respondent-mother] filed for a Complaint 

for No-Contact Order for Stalking or 

Nonconsensual Sexual Conduct against [Mr. 

C.]; the Order was entered on the same date 

and effective for one year thereafter.

21. That [Mr. C.] denies that he has 

maintained a relationship with [respondentmother], denies that [respondent-mother] 

consented to any visits to her home, and 

denies having sexual relations with 

[respondent-mother], as testified to by his 

daughter, [M.C.]. On the same day of the 

Court hearing wherein efforts towards 

reunification were ceased with [respondentmother], on August 29, 2012, she was 

observed with [Mr. C.]. [Respondent-mother] 

indicates that she observed him walking down 

the street, and pulled her car over to talk 

to him. When questioned during testimony 

about this incident, [Mr. C.] pled the Fifth 

Amendment Right against Incrimination 

indicating his knowledge of the existence of 

a No-Contact Order between the parties. 

This Court finds that [Mr. C.’s] testimony 

is not credible. 

22. That [respondent-mother] attended a 

basketball game with [Mr. C.] in December of 

2012. She had testified that she was 

working on the date in question; however, 

[Ms. B.], his ex-significant other, and his 

daughter,[M.C.], saw [respondent-mother] at 

the game. In fact, her attendance at the 

game caused much consternation to the child.

Additionally, [respondent-mother] has 

provided [Mr. C.] transportation to serve 
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his weekends in jail. [M.C.] has heard 

[respondent-mother] and [Mr. C.] engaging in 

sexual intercourse at his home on the 

weekends. This Court finds the testimony of 

[Ms. B.] and [M.C.] to be very credible.

23. During this hearing on termination of 

parental rights, she has reiterated that she 

has not maintained a relationship with [Mr. 

C.]. She is not credible in her assertions 

to this Court regarding her relationship 

with [Mr. C.].

24. That [respondent-mother] has engaged 

[in and] been involved in abusive 

relationships with [name omitted], [Amy’s] 

biological father, [respondent father], 

[Cathy, Sally, and Emily’s] biological 

father and [Mr. C.], her significant other. 

25. That at the hearing held on August 29, 

2012, [respondent-father] was ordered to 

comply with his Family Services Agreement. 

He was directed to complete a parenting 

class, follow all recommendation[s] and 

demonstrate that he can effectively 

discipline and maintain a clean home. He 

was directed to actively participate in 

individual therapy. He was directed to 

obtain and maintain stable housing, and in a 

timely manner, be responsible for payment of 

his rent and utilities. 

26. That [respondent-father] began therapy 

in August of 2012, and maintained therapy 

until the plan of reunification for him was 

changed. [Cathy, Sally, and Emily] have 

been in foster care since May of 2012. 

[Respondent-father] did not obtain housing 

until February of 2013. He resided with 

various friends until he subsequently 

obtained a room at the TravelLodge Motel, 

initially in exchange for work at the motel. 

Subsequently, he became an employee of the 
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hotel and rented a room. This housing, nor 

his previous housing arrangements, was not 

appropriate for placement of the three 

girls. Five months prior to the filing of 

the Petition to terminate his parental 

rights, [respondent-father] rented a two 

bedroom mobile home, which appears to be 

clean. He has maintained said housing. He 

has completed a parenting class. He has 

maintained employment since December of 

2012, working 60 to 80 hours per week, and 

is current in his child support. He 

recently purchased a vehicle from his friend 

[name omitted]. Prior to this, [DSS] had 

assisted [respondent-father] by providing 

bus passes transportation vouchers of bus 

passes on two occasions. [Respondentfather] has maintained visitation with his 

children, and said visitations have gone 

well, and been appropriate. 

27. That [Amy] noted the difficulties that 

[respondent-father] had in providing 

appropriate care for herself and her 

siblings, when residing in Nevada and North 

Carolina. [Respondent-mother] noted the 

difficulties that [respondent-father] had in 

providing appropriate care for [Cathy, 

Sally, and Emily] when providing care for 

[Cathy, Sally, and Emily]. The children 

were placed in his primary care after the 

hearing held on October 27, 2011, and five 

(5) months later, they were removed due to 

[a] filthy living environment in which he 

had allowed his residence to deteriorate. 

There were numerous tardies and absences of 

[Cathy] from school, which were attributed 

to [respondents]. [Respondent-father] was 

not able to maintain his residence 

subsequent to the children’s removal.

. . . .

29. That [respondent-father] attributes the 
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removal of the children from his home to 

[respondent-mother]. He testified that 

[respondent-mother] wanted primary custody 

of the children, and when he refused her 

request, she threatened that he was “going 

down.” [Respondent-father] testified that 

he worries that [respondent-mother] would 

make further allegations against him if the 

children were ever returned to him. 

Respondents do not challenge the above findings of fact, 

and they are therefore binding on appeal. See In re Humphrey, 

156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003) (“Findings of 

fact to which a respondent did not object are conclusive on 

appeal.”).

Respondent-father argues that because he satisfied his case 

plan, he addressed conditions which led to the removal of his 

children, and, therefore, there is no likelihood of future 

neglect. The trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that

respondent-father exposed the children to domestic violence and 

substance abuse; that three months after the children were 

returned to respondents’ legal custody, respondent-father was 

unable to provide for the children’s physical and economic 

needs; that respondent-father had to rely upon friends for 

temporary housing for himself; and respondent-father did not 

obtain housing appropriate for his three daughters until 

February 2013. Further, although the children were removed from 
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respondent-father’s home due to its deplorable conditions, 

respondent-father blames respondent-mother for the children’s 

removal. These findings support the trial court’s determination 

that respondent-father has neglected his children and that there 

is a reasonable probability that the children will be neglected 

if respondent-father is responsible for the children’s care in 

the future. The trial court did not err by concluding that 

respondent-father’s parental rights were subject to termination 

for neglect.

Respondent-mother argues that since there was no evidence 

that she “was in any relationship at all at the time of the 

termination hearing, or even since the filing of the 

petition[,”] there was no risk of repetition of domestic 

violence and thus neglect of her children. 

We hold that the trial court’s findings of fact support its 

conclusion of law that respondent-mother neglected her children 

and that such neglect will likely be repeated should her 

children be returned to her care. A trial court’s determination 

that neglect is likely in the future “must of necessity be 

predictive in nature[.”] In re McLean, 135 N.C. App. 387, 396, 

521 S.E.2d 121, 127 (1999). Respondent-mother’s past actions 

and poor decisions are important indicators of the likelihood of 
-16-

repetition of neglect. Respondent-mother’s repeated failure to 

stop the cycle of violent incidents involving the fathers of her 

children and Mr. C., which continued after the petition was 

filed, was sufficient to show neglect would likely recur if the 

children were returned to respondent-mother’s care.

We, therefore, hold that the trial court did not err in 

determining that the ground of neglect existed with respect to 

respondent-mother and respondent-father. Our determination that 

there is at least one ground to support a conclusion that 

parental rights should be terminated makes it unnecessary to 

address the remaining grounds. In re Clark, 159 N.C. App. 75, 

84, 582 S.E.2d 657, 663 (2003). 

II. Best Interest

Respondent-mother also contends the trial court abused its 

discretion in concluding that the termination of her parental 

rights was in the best interest of her children.

In determining whether terminating the parent’s rights is 

in the juvenile’s best interest, the court shall consider the 

following criteria and make written findings regarding the 

following that are relevant:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the 

juvenile.
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(3) Whether the termination of parental 

rights will aid in the accomplishment of the 

permanent plan for the juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the 

parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between 

the juvenile and the proposed adoptive 

parent, guardian, custodian, or other 

permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2013). The court’s decision is 

discretionary and reviewable only for abuse of discretion. In 

re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). 

“A ruling committed to a trial court’s discretion is to be 

accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing 

that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result 

of a reasoned decision.” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 

S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).

Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact 

to support its conclusion that it is in the best interest of the 

children that respondent-mother’s rights be terminated:

35. That [Cathy] is ten years old, [Sally] 

is five years old, and [Emily] is three 

years old. The Juveniles have been in the 

legal custody of [DSS] most recently since 

12 March 2012. They were previously placed 

in the legal custody of [DSS] from May 22, 

2010 through October 27, 2011, having been 
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adjudicated neglected and dependent 

Juveniles. They are young children and there 

is a strong likelihood of adoption. 

Termination of parental rights will aid in 

the accomplishment of the permanent plan for 

the Juveniles.

36. That [Sally] and [Emily] are placed 

together in a pre-adoptive home . They are 

very bonded to their foster parents. 

[Sally] needs and has a structured 

environment. They refer to the foster 

parents as “mommy” and “daddy.”

37. That [Cathy] is not in a pre-adoptive 

home; however, [DSS] has identified a preadoptive home for her. [Cathy] was 

previously placed in said home, and has a 

bond with the previous foster parent. 

[Cathy] appears to be a happy child, and 

makes friends easily. She has asked her 18 

year old daycare teacher to adopt her. She 

has asked the Guardian ad Litem to adopt 

her. She has asked the nephew and wife of 

her current foster parents to adopt her. 

[Cathy] has articulated that she would 

prefer to live with her mother, as “Dad 

cannot care for them.”

38. There is a strong bond between the 

children and their parents. It is clear 

that the children love their parents, and 

that the parents love the children.

39. That it is in the best interests of 

[Cathy, Sally, and Emily] that the parental 

rights of [respondent-mother] and 

[respondent-father] be terminated. 

Respondent-mother does not challenge the above findings of fact. 

She argues that because she made progress on her plan, the trial 
-19-

court should not have terminated her rights. As these findings 

reflect a reasoned decision, we find no abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order 

terminating the parental rights of respondent-mother and 

respondent-father.

AFFIRMED.

Judges DILLON and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).