Opinion filed Jun e 18 , 2 009



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

___________ 

### No. 1 1- 08 -0 02 26 -CV

____ ____ __ IN TH E INT ERE ST OF A. L.K ., A CHILD

On App eal from the 118th Distric t Court
How ard County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 45,457

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Th is i s an a c c e le rate d a

pp e a l f ro m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts . We a ff ir m. Ba c k gr ou nd Fa c ts Ap pe lla nt, Me lanie Marg are t D e L oa c h, is A .L .K .’ s mo th er. L e e Roy Cla y Ki tc he ll i s A. L

. K. ’s fa t h er . A.L .K. was bor n on Aug ust 31, 2002. A.L .K. lived with appellant f or about the first eig hteen months of his life. On Mar ch 25, 2004, the Te x as De partment of F amily and Protec tive Service s removed A .L .K., his ha lf sister M.A.C., a nd his ha lf brother J.A.K. from a ppellant’s ca

re. On the next day , the Depa rtment filed an “ Orig inal Petition for P ro t ection of a Child, for Conservatorship, a

nd for Te rmination in Sui t Affe cting the Pare nt-Child R elationship” in San Saba County , Texas. I n the fi nal orde r in that ca use, the trial c ourt appointed Kitche ll as A.L .K.’s perma nent manag ing conser

vator and appointed appellant as A.L .K.’s possessory conser vator. The2

or de r p ro vid e d tha t app e lla nt’ s poss e ssi on

of and a c c e ss t o A .L .K . w e re to o c c ur a t ti me s mutua lly

a g re e d to by

the pa rt ie s and , in

the a bs e nc e of su c h a n a g re e me nt, a t the so le dis c re tio n o f K itc he ll. Af te r t he De pa rt men t r e c e ive d a lle g a tio ns that K itc he ll h a d s e xua lly a bu se d A .L .K ., it

remove d A.L .K. from Kitchell’s care

. On J une 26, 2007, the Depa rtment filed its “Orig inal Petition fo r P ro te c tio n o f a

Chi ld, fo r C on se rv a tor sh ip, and fo r T e rm inatio n in S uit Af fe c tin g the Pare ntChi ld R e la tio ns hip ” in this c a us e . A t th a t ti me , a

pp e lla nt w a s in the Tr a vis County

Jail . In it s petition, the Depar

tment alleg ed that, if reunific ation of A.L .K. with a ppellant could not be achie ved, the trial cour

t should terminate the parent-c hild relationship betwee n appellant a nd A.L .K. The Depa rtment reque sted the trial cour t to terminate the pa

rent-c hild relationship betwee n Kitchell and A.L .K. Kitchell sig ned an a ffidavit in which he voluntarily relinquished his pare ntal rig hts to A.L .K. L a te r, the De pa

rtme nt f ile d a no tic e of

its int e nt t o p ur su e te rm inatio n o f a pp e lla nt’ s p are nta l r ig hts

. Following the filing of this cause , the trial cour t appointed the De partmen t as A.L .K.’s te mpo ra ry mana g ingc on se rv a tor

and a pp ro ve d p la c e me nt o f A. L .K . with Cha rl ott e Spe nc e . M .A .C. and J.A. K. al s o lived with Charlotte Spence a nd her husba

nd, Aubre y

Spence. T he Spence s are J.A. K. ’s bio log ic a l g ra

nd pa re nts

. Af te r a be nc h tr ia l, the tr ia l c ourt e nte re d an or de r te rm inatin g a pp e lla nt’ s p are nta l r ig hts to A.L .K. Under

T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN . § 161.001(Ve rnon 2008), the tr ial court found b y clea r and

c on vin c inge vid e nc e that a pp e lla nt: [1] eng ag ed in conduc t o r knowing ly place d the child with persons who eng ag ed in conduc t which enda ng ers the phy sical or e motional well-being of the c h il d [a s s tate d in Se c ti o n1 6 1

. 0 0 1 ( 1 ) ( E ) ]; [2] ha d h e r pa

re nt- c hil d re la tio ns hip te rm inate d wi th re sp e c t to ano the r c hil d based on a

finding that [ h er ] co n d uct was in violation of § 161.001(1) (D) or (E), Te xas F a mil y

Cod e , o r s ub sta

nti a lly e qu iva le nt pr ov isi on s of the law o f a no the r s ta te [a s s tate d in Se c ti o n1 6 1

. 0 0 1 ( 1 ) ( M ) ]; [3] f a ile d to c omp ly

wi th t he pr ov isi on s o f a

c ourt or de r t hat sp e c if ica lly established the a ctions nece ssary for [her] to obtain the return of the c hild who has be e n in the pe rm ane nt o r t e mpo ra ry mana g ing c on se rv a tor sh ip of the [De pa

rtme nt] for not less than nine months as a re sult of the child’s re moval from the pa rent unde r Ch a p te r 2 6 2 f o r th e a b u s e o r n e g le c t o f th e c h il d [a s s tate d in Se c ti o n1 6 1

. 0 0 1 ( 1 ) ( O ) ].3

The trial c ourt also found by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that ter mination of appellant’s pa renta l rig hts was in A.L .K.’s best intere st. See Section 161.001(2). The trial c ourt’s orde r also terminated Kitchell’s parental rights t o A.L .K. Kitchell has not

a pp e a l e d t h e t e r

m i n a t i o n o f h i s p ar e n t a l r i g h t s an d i s , t h e r e f o r e , n o t a p art y t o t h i s a

p p e a l. I n it s order , the trial cour

t appointed the De partment a s A.L .K.’s per manent mana g ing c onservator. Issues on Appe al Appellant pre sents nine issues for r eview. I n her f irst issue, she contends that the tr ial court

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de nyinghe r r e qu e st f

or a 18 0- da y e xten sio n o f t

he dis mis sal date of

thi s
cause under Section 263.401 of the F amily Code. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN . § 263.401 (Ve rnon 2008). In her second throug h ninth issues, she challeng es the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the

e vid e nc e to sup po rt the tr ia l court ’s Se c tio n 161 .0 01 (1 )( E) , (M) , an d ( O) and be st- int e re st f

ind ing s. Sufficiency of the E

videnc e Standards of Revie w Te xas c ourt s h ave lon g re c og nize d th a t the natur a l rig ht exis tin g be tw e e n a par e nt an d a c hil d is of “constitutional dimensions.” W iley v. Spratlan , 5 43 S.W. 2d 34 9, 35 2 ( Te x. 19 76 ). Th e re is a strongpresumption that the best intere st of a child is serve d by keepingthe child with the natura l pare nt. In re G.M

. , 596 S.W .2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). Thus, involunta ry termination statutes are strictly scrutinized in favor of

the par ent. Ho lic k

v . S mi th , 685 S.W .2d 18, 20-21 (Te x . 1985). Due proce ss r equire s that the g rounds for te rmination be established by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. In re J

.F .C. , 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d

2 5 6 , 2 6 3 (T ex
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S.745, 76 9 ( 19 82 )) ; In re J

.P.H. , 196 S.W .3d 289, 292 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) . This require s
a mea sure or

deg ree of proof

that wi l l p ro d u ce i n the mind of the trier of fa ct a f

irm belief or conviction as to the truth of the alleg ations sought to be e stablished. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN
. § 101 .0 07 (V e rn on

20 08 ); In re J

.P.H. , 19 6 S.W. 3d a t 29 2. Ev e n tho ug h it is a fi ne on e , th e re is a distinction between leg al and f ac t ual suffic iency

when the bur den is by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. In re J

.F .C. , 96 S.W .3d at 266. When the burden of

proof is by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e and a revie wing court

e xami ne s the e vid e nc e fo r le g a l suf fi c ie nc y , we loo k at a ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the finding to determine w hether a re asonable trier of

fac t co u l d h ave formed a firm belief

or conviction that the finding was true

. Id. We m us t a ssume that th e fa c tf

ind e r r e so lve d d isp ute d f

a c ts4

in f a vo r o f i ts f

ind ing , if a re a so na ble fa c tf ind e r c ou ld d o s o. F ur

the r, we sh ou ld d isr e g a rd a ll evidenc e that a rea sonable fac tfinder c ould have disbelieve d or found to have been inc redible. Id. But, we are not to disreg ard all evidenc e that does not support the finding . For instance, to disre g ard undisputed fac ts that do not support the f inding could lead to a flawe d analy sis of the exist ence , or not, of clea

r and c onvincing evidenc e. Id. F ur ther, whe n we vie w e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t fa vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t, i t c ann ot b e vie we d in “ iso la te d b its and pie c e s d ivo rc e d f ro m it s surrounding s; it must be viewed in its proper c ontext with other evide nce.” AutoZone, Inc. v . Rey es , 2 7 2 S

. W

. 3 d

5 8 8 , 5 9 2 (T ex
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g City of Keller v. W ilson , 1 6 8 S. W. 3 d 80 2 , 8 2 7 ( T e x. 20 05 )) . A ft e r a

re vie w und e r t

he se sta nd ard s, if we de te rm ine that no re a so na ble fa c tf ind e r c ou ld form a f irm belief or

conviction in the t ruth of the matter to be prove n, then we must hold that the evidenc e is leg ally

insufficient. In re J

.F .C. , 96 S.W .3d at 266. Wh en a court of appe als undertakes a f actua l sufficienc y

revie w, it must give due

co n s i d er at i o nt o ev i d en ce t h at t h e f ac t fi n d er co u l d re as o n ab l y

h av e f o u n d t o b e c l ea r a n d

co n v i n ci n g. Id. at 263. We must also determine if the evidence is such t hat a f actf inder c ould rea sonably

form a firm be lief or conviction about t he truth of t he allega tions about which proof is soug ht. Id. at 266. We must also ask: I s the disputed evidenc e such that a re asonable fac tfinder c ould not have re solved t h a t d i s p u t e d e v i d e n c e i n f a v o r o f i t s r

u l i n g ? Id. T h e evidence is fa ctually insufficient if, on the

rec ord as a

whole, the disputed e vidence that a reasonable fac tfinder could not have cre dited in favor of the findingis so significa nt that a fa ctfinder

could not rea sonably

have f orm ed a fi rm belief or conviction in the thing soug ht to be proved. Id. To terminate pa

renta l rig hts, the proponent must prove by clea r and convincing evidenc e that a par ent committed o n e o r m o re of the ac ts or omissions set forth in Section 161.001(1) and that termination of par ental rig hts is in t he child’s be st interest. In re J .L. , 1 6 3 S. W. 3 d

7 9 , 8 4 ( T e x. 20 05 ); In re B.L.D. , 1 13 S.W. 3d 34 0, 35 3- 54 (T e x. 20 03 ); Richardson v. Gre en , 677 S.W .2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1984). On appeal, appellant asser ts that the evidenc e wa s leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support

e a c h o f th e th r e e g r o u n d s –

Se c ti o n1 6 1

. 0 0 1 ( 1 ) ( E ) , ( M ) , an d ( O ) – th a t t h e tr ia l c ourt found to support the termination.5 The Evidenc e at Trial The De partm ent presented four witnesses at trial: (1) appellant; (2) Amy Her nandez, a

case worke r for

the Department; (3) Char lotte Spence; and ( 4) I saac Miramontes, the c ourt-appointed specia l advocate and guardia n ad litem assig ned to A .L .K. After the Depa rtment reste d, appellant’ s
c ouns e l r e c a lle d a

pp e lla nt t o th e sta

nd

. We have re vie we d a ll the e vid e nc e in t he re c or d, and

we wi ll summarize the evidenc e below. A.L .K. was f

ive y ear s old at the time of trial. Appellant testified that A.L .K. lived with her until he was about eig hteen months old. She said that the Depa rtment remove d him from her c are
a s p art of a neg le c tf ul s up e rv isi on

c a se . T he De pa

rtme nt p la c e d A .L .K . in

Ki tc he ll’ s c a re in BigSpring. Appellant testified t hat, whil e A.L .K. was in Kitche ll’s car e, she ta lked with A.L .K. on the phone “ quite regularly ” and visited him twice in B ig Spring . The De partment re moved A.L .K. from Kitche ll’s c are on J une 25, 2007, and f iled this cause in B ig Springthe next day . At that time, appellant wa s in the Travis County J ail. After

the Department removed A.L .K. from Kitchell’s car e, A.L .K. spent some time in foster c are and then wa s place d in the car e of Char lotte and Aubre y Spe nc e . T wo of

a pp e lla nt’ s o the r c hil dr e n, M. A. C. a nd J.A. K. , a lso liv e d w iththe Spe nc e s. Appellan t w a s r e le a s e d

f r o m t h e T r a v is Co u n ty

Ja il o nJu ly

8 , 2 0 0 7

. U p o nh e r

r elea se,
a pp e lla nt l ive d in

L lano . Sh e a lso sa id t

hat sh e ma int a ine d emp loy me nt af te r he r re le a se fr om j a il. On Aug ust 15, 2007, appellant sig ned a f amily service plan. The plan required appellant to perfor m a number of t asks and service s, including completing a psy cholog ical eva luation, completing a drug and alc ohol assessment, attending and succe ssfully completing individual counseling , attending and

su c c e ssf ull y c omp le tin g pa

re nti ngc la sse s, su

bmi tti ngto r and om d

ru g sc re e nin g s, ma i nt a i n i n g sta ble housing a nd employ

ment, providing the Depa

rtment with curre nt locating information about her self,

and de mon str a tin g he r w ill ing ne ss t o p ro te c t A .L .K . f ro m f utu re a bu se or negle ct. Th e fa

mil y service plan indicated that a courtesy worke r would be assigned to appellant, and the f amily service pla n r e qu ir e d a

pp e lla nt t o c on ta c t he r c ourt e sy wo rk e r t o s e t up so me of the se rv ic e s. Erica Partlow-Melton wa s t h e initial case worke r for the Depa

rtment in this case. The evidenc e showed that Melton did not assign a c ourtesy worke r to appe llant. Appellant testified that sh e c ou ld n ot c omp le te the fa mil y se rv ic e pla

n b e c a us e the De pa

rtme nt did no t a ssi g n he r a c ourt e sy worke r in the L lano ar ea
. He rn an dez testified that this case ha d been a ssigne d to her on6

November

1, 2007. Her

nandez said that Melton had not set up a courte sy worke r for appellant a

nd that the fa ilure to provide a courte sy worke r t o appellant wa s her “ mistake as we ll.” Howeve r, Her nandez testified that she attempted to locate a p p ell ant in November

2007 for the pur

pose of pro viding he r with a c ourtesy worke r. He rnande z said that she attempted to contac t appellant by calling the phone numbers and by sending letters to the addr esses that the D epar tment had listed for

a pp e lla nt i n it s c omp ute rs . H e rn and e z al so te sti fi e d th a t sh e re c e ive d n o r e sp on se fr om a pp e lla nt. Her nandez ac knowledg ed that appe llant could not c omplete some of the service s in the plan without having a cour

tesy worke r. Appellant testified that she attended A A/NA sessions in L lano. She said that she attende d churc h and that she obtained counseling from a prie st. Howeve r, appe llant was ar rested in San Saba County in D e c e mbe r 2 00 7 f

or po ss ess io n of a

da ng e ro us dr

ug . App e lla

nt s ig ne d a

state me nt i n
connec tion with the arr est. I n the statement, a ppellant said that she ha d trave led to Waco with a man named “ Mike”; that Mike had pur chase d 7 0 0 p ills from another man in Waco; that, a fter the purcha se, she a

nd Mike had drive n to San Saba; that a poli ce office r had stopped them; and that the office r had f

ound the pi lls in the car. Appellant also testified t hat s he was place d on misdemeanor probation in Gillespie County for burg lary of a coin-ope rate d machine. At the time, appellant wa s alre ady on probation for

a state ja il felony

offe nse of possession of a controlled subst ance . Appellant

sa id t hat th e mis de me ano r b ur g lary of fe ns e c a us e d h e r f

e lony pr ob a tio n to be revo ked and that, there fore , she we nt back to jail. She said t hat s he was in the Travis County J ail from De cembe r 21, 200 7 , u n t i l J an uary

22, 2008, when she was sent to the Plane State Jail. On Fe bruar y 15, 2007, He rn and e z le arn e d f

ro m Ch a rl ott e Spe nc e tha

t a pp e lla nt w a s in the Pla ne State Jail . H e rn and e z sa id that she sent a le tter to appe llant at the jail asking appellant to conta ct her

. Appellant testified that she enrolled in the Chang es cla ss, a women’ s health cla ss, and a pare nting c lass at the Plane State J ail. She said that she completed the women’ s health cla ss but was unable to complete the Chang es cla s s an d t h e par enting class bec ause she was tra nsfer red to the Woodman St ate Jail. Appellant re mained inca

rce rate d at the time of trial. She said that she had not se en A.L .K. since he was re moved from Kitc h el l ’s car e. Appe llant thought that she w ould be re lease d from pr iso n o n July

1, 20 08 . H ow e ve r, sh e a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he r m isd e me ano r p ro batio n in Gi lle sp ie7

County mi ght ser ve as a “ ho ld” on he r r e le a se and

that sh e fa c e d a

po ssi ble fe lony

c ha rg e in S an S ab a C o u n t y i n co n n ec t i o n wi t h h er De ce mb er

2 0 0 7 arre s tfo r p o s s es s i o no f a d an ger o u s dru g. When a sked further about her criminal history , appellant said that she had “some theft by chec ks and the cr iminal trespassing and a D WI .” Appellant testified that she was mar ried to Da rre ll Hatfield. Appe llant said that Hatfield ha d

a sig nif ic ant c ri min a l his tor

y
. Hatf ie ld wa s in ja il a t the tim e of tr ia l. A pp e lla nt s a id t hat H a tf ie ld would be re lease d from jail on J une 12, 2008, and that she planned to re unite wi t h h i m upon her rele ase f rom prison. She said that A.L .K. did not know Hatfie ld. Appellant an d Hatfie ld had a c hild, J .R.H., toge ther. J.R .H. was bor n on J anuar

y 1, 2007. A p p e l l an t ’ s a n d H a t f

i e l d ’ s p ar e n t a l r i g h t s t o J

. R

. H

. h a d b e e nt e r m i n a t e d

. D u r i n g h e r

t e s t i m o n y, appellant a dmitted that she used coc aine a nd smoked marihuana the ni g ht befor e J .R.H. was born. Appellant said that J .R.H. was removed from her c are beca use “[t] here was c ocaine and mar ihuana found in my

sy stem and her

sy stem.” Appe llant acknowle dg ed that her pare ntal rig hts to J .R.H. had been te rminated, a

nd the t ri al court admitted into evidence a copy of the Apr il 19, 2007 order terminating the parent-child relationship betwee n appellant and J .R.H. I n that order , the trial cour t found by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that appellant had violated S ection 161.001(1) (D) a nd (E) of the F amily

Code. Ap pe lla nt te sti fi e d th a t, u

po n h e r r e le a se fr om p ri so n, sh e wa nte d to have su

pe rv ise d v isi ts

or we e ke nd vis its wi th A .L .K . U lti ma te ly , s he de sir e d f or A. L .K ., M. A. C., and

J.A. K. to l ive wi th her f ull tim e. S he said that she wanted the children to rema in toge ther. Appe llant testified that the Spences did a

n “excellent job” takingcar e of the children. Her nandez testified that the Depa rtment’s original goal in this case was for Charlotte Spence to b e a pp oin te d a s A .L .K .’ s p e rm ane nt m ana g ingc on se rv a tor . Sh e sa id t hat th e g oa l c ha

ng e d to termination of appe llant’s pare ntal rig hts and adoption of A.L .K. af ter the D epar

tment learne d of

a pp e lla nt’ s D e c e mbe r 2 00 7 a

rr e st. Her n an d e z te s ti f

ie d th a t A

. L

. K

. w a s p la c e d w it h Ch ar lo tt e Sp e n c e o n A u g u s t 1, 2007. He rn and e z sa id t

hat A. L .K

. wa s c ur

re nt on his me dic a l e xami natio ns , that he pa rt ic ipate d in

we e kly play thera py , that his pla ce m en t wi th the Spences w as suffic ient to provide for his needs at the prese nt time, and that the Depa rtment’s g oal for A .L .K. was a doption by the Spence s. Herna ndez8

believed that it was in A.L .K.’s best intere st to terminate appe llant’s pare ntal rig hts. Herna ndez testified that adoption by the S pence s would allow A.L .K. t o maintain contac t with his siblings. S he

sa id t hat A .L .K . h a d “ g ro wn

up wi th” the Spe nc e s a

nd his sib lin g s a

nd that he ha d “ bo nd e d w e ll” with t h em
. Her

nandez testified that appe llant’s continuing c riminal activity conce rned the Depa rtment. Her

nandez s ai d t h at s h e had no r eason to be lieve that appe llant could provide counseling or medica l car e for A.L .K. Charlotte Spence testified that she wa s marrie d to Aubrey Spence. She sa id that A.L .K. had lived with them since Jul y 31, 2007. She said that A.L .K. also l ived with them from Mar ch 2004 until late October 2004. M.A.C. and J.A.K. also lived with the Spences. Char lotte Spence testified that she and he r husband pr ovided for al l o f A.L .K.’s nee ds, that they intended to provide a perma nent place ment for him, t hat they wanted to a dopt him, and that they could provide long -term

car e for him. She said that A.L .K. was doing very well and that, on a re g ular ba sis, he said, “I like it here .” Cha r lo tt e Sp e n c e te s ti f ie d th a t s h e an d

h e r h u s b an d d id n o t w an t A

. L

. K

. , M

. A

. C. , a nd J .A.K. to be se parated from e ach othe r. Mir a mon te s te sti fi e d th a t it wo uld be in A. L .K .’ s b e st i nte re st f or the tr ia l c ourt

to t e rm inate

a pp e lla nt’ s and Ki tc he ll’ s p are nta l r ig hts . M ir a mon te s sai d th at the fi rs t f a c tor he too k in to

co n s id e r a ti o nw a s A

. L

. K

. ’ s a g e an d h is n e e d f o r a s a f e an d s ta b le e n v ir o n me n t. H e s a id th a t t he Spe nc e s h a d p ro vid e d A .L .K . w ithsu c h a n e nv ir on me nt. He a lso sa id t hat th e Spe nc e s app e a re d to be me e tin g a ll o f A .L .K .’ s n e e ds . M ir a mon te s a lso te sti fi e d th a t A.L.K. was thr ivi ngin h is place ment with the Spences. H e said that it was in A. L

. K. ’s b est interest to re ach some form of perma nency , which could be rec eived through termination of appe llant’s and Kitche ll’s pare ntal rig hts followed by

adoption. Miramontes said that it did not app ea r t h at ap pellant could provide per manenc y

for A.L .K. and that he was ve ry conce rned a

bout her inca

rce ration and a dditional outstanding c harg es. Miramontes a lso said that a ppellant did not have the ability to provide a sa fe home environme nt for A.L

. K. o r t o provide for his needs. Miramontes did not know whe ther appellant would be capa

ble of taking care of A.L .K. in six months. He testified that A.L .K. dese rved to have pe rmane ncy

as quickly

as possible. Trial Court’s Finding Under Section 161.001( 1) ( M) I n her f ourth and fifth issues, appellant cha lleng es the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the evidenc e to support the tria l c o u r t’ s Se c ti o n

1 6 1

. 0 01(1)( M) finding . Section 161.001(1)( M) provides9

that a cour

t ma y order termination of the pa rent-c hild relationship if the pare nt has “ha d his or her pare nt-child relationship terminate d with r espec t to another child based on a finding that the par ent’s conduct wa s in violation of Parag ra p h (D ) or ( E).” Sec tion 161.001(1)(D) provides a g round for te rm inatio n w he n th e pa

re nt h a s “ kn ow ing ly

pla c e d o r k

no wi ngly allowe d th e c hil d to re ma in i n conditions or surrounding s which enda ng er the phy s i ca l or emotional well-be ing of the child.” Section 161.001(1)( E) provide s a g round for termination when the pare nt ha s “eng ag ed in conduc t or knowing ly

place d the child with pe rsons who eng ag ed in conduc t which enda ng ers the phy sical or emotional we ll-being of the c hild.” Section 263.405 of t he Family Code g overns a ppeals of f

inal order s involving childre n under the Depa rtment’s ca

re. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN
. § 263.405 (Ve rnon 2008). The statute requir es that a stateme nt of points on whic h a party intends to a ppeal be filed with the trial court not later than the fi ft e e nth da y a ft e r t he tr ia l c ourt

sig ns the fi na l or de r. Se c tio n 2 63 .4 05 (b ). Th e state me nt o f p oin ts may be combined with a motion for new trial. Section 263.405(b-1)

. The statute provides that “ [t ]he appellate court may not consider any issue that was not spec ifically prese nted to the trial cour t in a timely filed st atement of the poi nts on which the party intends to appea l or i n a stateme nt combined with a motion for new tr ial.” Section 263.405(i). Appellant timely

filed a motion for ne w trial and a st atement of points on which she intende d to appea l. She challeng ed the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence to support the trial court’ s finding s under Sec tion 161.001(1)(E) and (O ) in the motion for new t ri al an d in the statement of po int s. Ho we ve r, sh e did no t c ha lle ng e the tr ia l cou rt ’s fi nd ingun de r S e c tio n 1 61 .0 01 (1 )( M) in

e ith e r d oc ume nt. Th e statut e is c le ar t hat a pa rt y wh o doe s not ra ise an is su e in a state me nt o f p oin ts do e s n ot pr e se rv e that iss ue fo r a pp e a l. Th e re fo re , we c ann ot c on sid e r a pp e lla nt’ s f ourt h a nd fi ft h issues. We n ote that th e e vid e nc e se t f or th a bo ve sh ow e d th a t a

pp e lla nt h a d h e r p are nt- c hil d relationship t er m i n at ed with respect to J .R.H. based on a finding that she had e ng ag ed in conduc t that violated Section 161.001(D) and (E) . There fore , assuming that appellant prese rved the issue for revie w, the evide nce is leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt t o s u p p o rt the trial cour t’s finding under Section 161.001(1)( M). The trial c ourt’s finding under Sec tion 161.001(1)( M) i s sufficie nt to support a ter mination order

. See I

n re A.V. , 113 S.W .3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (“O nly one predic ate finding under se ction10

16 1. 00 1( 1) is n e c e ssa

ry to s up po rt

a jud g me nt o f t e rm inatio n. ” ). As su c h, we need n ot a dd re ss appellant’ s second , third, six th, and seve nth issues challeng ing the trial court’ s findings unde r Section 161.001(1)( E) and ( O). Trial Court’s Best Interest Finding Appe lla nt a rgue s in he r e ig hth

and nin th i ssu e s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly and fa c tua lly insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her pare ntal rig hts was in A.L .K.’s best interes t

. I n decidingwhether the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support a trial court’ s finding that te rm inatio n is in the c hil d’ s be st int e re st, we are g uid e d b y the no ne xclu siv e lis t of

fa c tor s se t f

or th in Holley v . Adams , 544 S.W .2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976)

. Those fac tors include (1) the desire s of the child, (2) the emotional and phy sical nee ds of the child now and in the f uture, (3) the emotional

and ph y sic a l da

ng e r t o th e c hil d n ow and in the futur e , ( 4) the pa re nta l a bil iti e s o f t

he ind ivi du a ls seekingcustody , (5) the pr og rams ava ilable to assist these individuals, ( 6) the plans f or the c hild by these individuals, (7) the sta bility of the home, ( 8) the a cts or omissions of the paren t that may indicate the e x isting par ent-c hild relationship is not a proper one , and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the pa

rent. 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. The list is not an ex haustive one. Id. The foc us is on the child’s best interest, not that of the par ent. Du pr e e v . Tex . De

p’ t of Pr ote c tiv e & Re

gu lator y Se rv s. , 907 S.W .2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no wr it). The e vidence demonstrated that A.L .K. had been in the Spences’ home since July 31, 2007. The Spences had provided a safe and stable e nvironment to A.L .K., and A.L .K. was thrivingin that environment. The Spences ha d met A.L .K.’s nee ds. A p p el lant testified that the Spence s did an

e xce lle nt j ob takin g c are of the c hil dr e n. Mir a mon te s te sti fi e d that it w a s in A. L .K .’ s b e st i nte re st to rea ch some for

m of perma

nency and that he deser

ved to ha ve perma nency as quickly

as possible. T h e S p e n c e s w an t e d

t o a d o p tA

. L

. K

. an d , t h e r e f o r e , t o p r o v i d e h i m w i t h t h a tp e r m an e n c y. Appellant had not e x hibite d ad eq u ate pa renting abilities in the past. A.L .K. was r emoved from h e r c ar e w h e n h e w a s e ig h te e n mo n th s o ld

. A p p e ll an t h a s a le n g thy c r im in a l h is to r y a nd a history of drug use. She smoked marihuana and used c ocaine the nig ht before J .R.H. was born, a nd he r p are nta l r ig hts to J.R .H . we re te rm inate d. Ap pe lla nt w a s in ja il w he n th e De pa

rtme nt f ile d th is

cause . She was re lease d from jail about two wee ks later. Appe llant ag ree d in the family service plan that she would maintain stable housi ng and employ ment. Howeve r, she failed to do so. Instead, she continued to enga g e in criminal activiti es, and her f elony probation wa s revoke d. Appellant we nt11

to jail on Dece mber 21, 2007, a nd she re mained inca

rce rate d at t h e ti me of trial. The evidenc e demonstrated that a

ppellant could not pr ovide A.L .K. a safe and stable home environment or me et hi s ph y si cal and

e mot ion a l ne e ds . F ur

the r, the re wa s n o e vid e nc e that a pp e lla nt w ou ld b e a

ble to sustain a safe and st able environment or to meet A.L .K.’s nee ds in the future. B ased on a ppellant’s pa st c on du c t, t

he tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly c on c lud e d that app ella

nt w ou ld n ot b e a

ble to provide A.L .K. a sa fe a

nd stable environme nt or to meet his needs in the f uture. The e vidence is both lega lly and fa ctually sufficie nt to support the trial court’s f inding that te rm i n a t i o n o f t h e p ar e n t

- c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a p p e l l an t an d A

. L

. K

. w a s i n A

. L

. K

. ’ s be st int e re st. We o ve rr

ule a pp e lla nt’ s e ig hth

and nin th i ssu e s. Appellant’s Reque

st for an Extension On J une 26, 2007, the tria l court ente red a temporar y order naming the Depa

rtment as the temporar y sole manag in g conser

vator of A .L .K. Section 263.401(a ) and ( b) of the F amily Code pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: (a) Unles s the cour

t has commenc ed the tria l on the merits or g rante d an extension under Subsection (b), on the first Monday afte r t he first a nniversar y of the date the c ourt rende red a

temporar y order appointing the depa

rtment as tempora

ry mana g ingc on se rv a tor , th e c ourt sh a ll d is mi ss the su it a ff e c tin g the pa

re nt- c hil d re la tio ns hip fi le d b y the d e pa rtme nt t hat r e qu e sts te rm inatio n o f t he pa re nt- c hil d relationship or requests that the de partment be named c onservator of the c hild. (b) Unle ss the court ha s commence d the trial on the mer its, the court may not re ta in t he su it o n th e c ourt ’s do c ke t a ft e r t he tim e de sc ri be d b y

Sub se c tio n ( a ) u

nle ss the cour t finds that ext raor dinary

circ umstances ne cessitate the child rema ining in the temporar y manag ing c onservatorship of the depa rtment and that continuing the a pp oin tme nt o f t

he de pa rtme nt a s te mpo ra

ry managin g conse rv a tor

is i n th e be st int e re st o f t

he c hil d. I f t

he c ourt make s thos e fi nd ing s, the c ourt may re ta in the su it on the cour

t’s docket f

or a period not to exceed 180 day s after the time descr ibed by Subsection (a)

.
The trial c ourt deter

mined that the dismissal date for this ca use wa s J une 30, 2008. I n h e r b r ie f

, a p p e ll an t s tate s th a t h e r c o u n s e l o r a ll y r e qu e s te d an e xte n s ion unde r Section 263.401(b) a

bout two weeks be fore the final trial. How ever , appellant a lso states that “[t] he hear ing dur ing w hich this init ial motion was made was not included in the Reporter ’s Recor d.” A docket e ntry

made by the trial cour

t on May 21, 2008, indicates that a ppellan t ’s co u n s el made a motion to ex tend the dismissal date and that the trial court de nied the motion.12

The trial c ourt held the be nch trial i n t h i s cause on J une 4, 2008. Af ter the tria l court reque sted announce ments for the rec ord, the following exchang e took pla ce betw ee n appellant’ s
c ouns e l and

the tr ia l c ourt : [APPE L L AN T’ S CO UN SEL ]: [B ]ef or e Iann ou

nc e re a dy Iwo uld lik e to rene w my mo t i o n that Imade two we eks ag o and my reque st for an e x tension. I don’t know if y our Honor w ould like for me to re state m y rea sons from before. Iam sure the Court

re me mbe rs , b ut b a sic a lly re qu e sti ng[ap pe lla

nt] be g ive n a

c ha nc e to complete se rvice s, g et an e x tension. S h e is set to be re lease d from her curr ent inc arc e ratio n on July 1s t, and the re fo re I wo uld lik e to re ne w my ob je c tio n – no t my objection – my

motion for an extension which Imade two we eks ag o. THE COURT: The motion is in all respec ts denied. [AP PEL L ANT’S COUNSEL ]: I n with that point t h en , I announce rea dy

. After the evidence was conclude d, appellant’ s counsel ag ain re newe d his request for an extension: [AP PEL L ANT’S C OU NS E L ] : Your Honor, pr ior to, Ig uess, re sting a nd closing , Iwould like to rene w my orig inal mo t ion and re quest an e x tension once ag ain. I believe that there’ s been signific ant evidenc e to show that [appellant] has put fo rt h th e e ff or t, t hat she ma de the a tte mpt , a nd Iwo uld re ne w m y

mot ion to r e qu e st that th e re be an e xten sio n an d th a t sh e be g ive n e ve ry op po rt un ity in o rd e r t o f

ini sh and show that she can complete all service s and that she basica lly should not have her rig hts terminated. THE COURT: The motion is in all respec ts denied.
We r eview a trial court’s ruling on a motion for extension under an abuse o f d i s cretion

s t an d ard. S

e e I n r e D

. W. , 2 4 9 S. W. 3 d 6 2 5 , 6 4 7 ( T e x. A p p
. — F o rt Wo rth 2 0 0 8 , p e t. d e n ied). To obtain an extension under Section 263.401(b) , appellant ha d the burde n of demo n s t ra t i n g that “extraordinar

y circ umstances ne cessitate[d] the child rem ai n ing in the te mporary manag ing

cons e r v a to r s h ip o f th e d e p artm e n t an d th a t c o n ti n u in g th e a p p o in tm e n t o f th e d e p artm e n t as temporar y manag ing c onservator [was] i n t h e b es t interest of the c hild.” The trial c ourt’s docke t sheet shows that, on May

21, 2008, appellant’ s counsel made a mot ion to ext end the dismissal date. Howeve r, as a cknowledg ed by appellant in he r brief, the rec ord does not c ontain a re porter’ s rec ord of t he h e ar in g o nth e mo ti o n
. T h e r e f o r e , th e r e c o r d

d o e s n o t s h o w th a t a

p p e ll an t t e n d e r e d

a ny evidenc e in support of her reque st for an e x tension. I n the abse nce of a re porter’ s rec ord of the hear ing, w e ar e unable to determine w hether appellant met her burden for obtaining a n extension.13

Under this circumstance , we c annot co n cl ude that the tria l court abuse d its discretion in deny ing appellant’ s motion for ext ension. On the trial date, appe llant’s counsel renewe d the m otion for ex tension when the tria l court reque sted announc ements for the re cord. A t that time, appellant offe red no evidenc e in support of the mot ion . I ns te a d, he r c ouns e l st a te d th e g ro un ds that he be lie ve d ju sti fi e d a n e xten sio n. B e c a

us e
a pp e lla nt t e nd e re d n o e vid e nc e in su pp or t of he r mot ion fo r a

n e xten sio n, sh e c ann ot d e mon str a te that the trial cour

t abused its discretion in deny ing it. I n r e D

. W. , 249 S.W .3d at 648. Appellant’ s counsel a g ain re newe d the motion for extension at the conclusion of the evidenc e. View ing a ll the evidenc e pre sented at t ri al , we cannot sa y that the trial cour

t abused its discretion in deny ing appellant’ s motion. The evidence , which is summari zed above, did not demonstrate that “extraordinar

y circ umstances” justified a n extension or that continuing t h e D epar tment’s

a pp oin tme nt a s A. L .K .’ s te mpo ra ry mana g ing c on se rv a tor wa s in his be st int e re st. W e ov erru le appellant’ s first issue. This Court’s Ruling We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.

T E R RY M c C A LL

JUSTI CE

J une 18, 2009 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.